


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THE  
TRINITIES OF THE ANCIENTS;

OR, THE

MYTHOLOGY OF THE FIRST AGES,

AND

THE WRITINGS OF SOME OF THE PYTHAGOREAN AND  
OTHER SCHOOLS, EXAMINED,

WITH REFERENCE TO THE

KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRINITY ASCRIBED TO PLATO,  
AND OTHER ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS.

BY

ROBERT MUSHET.

---

“As man is formed by nature with an incredible appetite for truth; so his strongest pleasure in the enjoyment, arises from the actual communication of it to others.”

WARBURTON'S *Divine Legation*.

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LONDON :  
JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND.

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TO  
WILLIAM MUSHET, ESQ.,  
OF GRAY'S INN.

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THERE is no one to whom I can more appropriately dedicate the following pages than to yourself; not only on account of a community of tastes, sentiments, and opinions, but as a token of ancient friendship; and because the subject to which they are devoted has been one of mutual interest, which we have frequently discussed together, in those hours of rational relaxation for which I am so greatly indebted to you.

You were then inclined, as I was, to regard the opinion—attributing to Plato a knowledge of the Trinity—with considerable distrust and suspicion; and when afterwards you turned your attention to other objects, I proceeded, in the indulgence of my inclination, to prosecute an inquiry into the evidence on which that opinion is supposed to rest.

This volume contains the result of the inquiry, so far as I thought necessary to pursue it. You will perceive there

of that devotion which we pay to self-evident truth : others, again, having an object to gain, or an hypothesis to support, have attempted to prove their opinion with such arguments as the subject can supply ; and, in fulfilling this task, we must admire their learning, if we are not convinced by their reasoning.

As I was conscious, from the beginning, of some misgivings in my own mind,—first, as to the truth of the assertion, and, secondly, as to the cogency of the conclusions arrived at by these writers,—I made it a source of amusement to collect what evidence I could, conveniently, to oppose their arguments, and to satisfy myself of their truth or falsehood.

When the inquiry was brought to a conclusion, so as to confirm my preconceived idea, I judged (with what justice or truth I know not,) that the fruits of it might be useful and instructive to others, whose pursuits would bring them constantly in contact with the opinion which is attempted to be refuted. Such as they are, I willingly bequeath them to the reader.

But as this Essay was not originally designed to

meet the public eye; and as the inquiry was pursued at long intervals in a desultory manner, just as inclination prompted me, or as the manifold avocations of life allowed me quietude and leisure, I had some apprehensions that the arguments were not developed so clearly, nor the evidence collated and arranged so carefully, as if it had been undertaken with the object of publication immediately in view. However, I have striven to compensate, in some degree, for the defects and irregularities of my first mode of proceeding, by reducing the “indigesta moles” of the primary materials to their present form; having tried to breathe into them some of the spirit of order and harmony. And it is hoped the sage maxim of the Latin poet has not been violated with respect to brevity and propriety:—

. . . . . Id arbor,
   
Adprimè in vitâ esse utile, nequid nimis.

If I am too sanguine in thinking, that I have conclusively disproved the opinion of Plato and the ancients having a knowledge of the Trinity, I am certain that the weakness of the argument rests with the author, and not with the subject. There

is enough given to excite doubt and inquiry at all events: and he who is disposed to extend his researches further, will, I have no doubt, be more and more convinced of the truth, that the opinion referred to is without foundation, and the superstructure raised upon it is, consequently, without stability.

It might appear almost superfluous to make any observations here on the prevalence of this opinion. I will, however, limit myself to the early Fathers and to the ancient philosophers.

With respect to Plato himself having some knowledge of the Trinity, it seems to have met with universal concurrence in the early times of our religion, by the Christians as well as by the pagans.

There is no feature of that interesting period more curious, if not extraordinary, than this general acquiescence in that which I am now convinced has no foundation in truth. The pagan Platonists had probably some reason for their conduct: the rivalry of the new religion brought into being things new and strange; but I can find no more tangible explanation for the conduct of the Chris-



tian writers than the conjecture, that they were deluded or deceived by the specious Eclectic system of philosophy, whose singular interpretations of the expiring mythology, and of the writings of the ancient philosophers, obliterated all the landmarks of certainty and of truth. The pagans fancied they saw a resemblance between the Christian Trinity and the doctrines of Plato and others: the Fathers met them more than half-way, and in the end willingly confessed, that this essential truth of our religion was known before Christ revealed it a second time to mankind\*.

It has been supposed, that the Christian Fathers complied with, and acquiesced in, the notions of the pagan Platonists, by way of an *argumentum ad hominem*, (being, as it were, all things to all men, for the sake of proselytism,) that they might the

\* "As the Platonic pagans, after Christianity, did approve of the Christian doctrine, concerning the Logos, as that which was exactly agreeable with their own; so did the generality of the Christian Fathers, before and after the Nicene Council, represent the genuine and Platonic Trinity as really the same thing with the Christian; or as approaching so near to it, that they differed chiefly in circumstances, or in the manner of expression."—Intell. System, vol. iii. p. 185.

easier reconcile the heathen to the doctrine of the Trinity, by showing that it was not so great a mystery, or, at least, not so insurmountable an obstacle, as to have baffled the acute understanding of Plato. But I apprehend this is more fanciful than true.

As to the pagan Platonists themselves, they do not appear to have had any fixed or permanent ideas on the subject. The doctrine professed by some of the most eminent of them, was unquestionably repugnant to the essential nature or characteristic of a Trinity.

We may be certain of this, that if there had been no Christian doctrine, all the wild speculations of the early period of the Church would never have had a being: destroy the cause, and there will be no effect.

There are many and great reasons why Plato, "the Swan of Socrates," was held in such esteem and admiration by both Christians and pagans at that time. His System of Morals, taught to him by his great master, and infused into his writings,—the beauty and fascination of his style, and the elevated character of his philosophy, all con-

curred in exalting him to that pitch of glory and distinction.

He enforces upon us the beauty of virtue, and the excellence of truth; he inculcates self-denial; deprecates all pleasures merely sensual; and excites our preference for intellectual rather than for corporeal delights.

R. M.

LONDON,  
*April 12, 1837.*

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PART THE FIRST.

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ON THE

IDOLATRY OF THE FIRST AGES.





## INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

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THERE is an opinion entertained by some learned writers, both ancient and modern, which I purpose to examine in the ensuing Essay. The opinion alluded to is, that Plato had the knowledge of a Trinity of three persons in the Divine Nature, which, these writers assert, may be proved out of his own genuine writings. This hypothesis has been maintained with great learning and ingenuity; especially by the celebrated author of “The Intellectual System of the Universe,” who would persuade us, that the Grecian philosopher was as orthodox a Trinitarian as himself.

According to Dr. Cudworth, this doctrine was not peculiar to the theology of Plato; it was generally entertained and believed by many of the ancient theistical philosophers; having had its origin in more remote antiquity. In reference to its derivation, he does not hesitate to call it, a “Hebrew, Chaldaic, Orphic, as well as a Pythagorean dogma, or cabala.”

In this conclusion he only follows the later<sup>1</sup> Pla-

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this work, I shall make use of this term always to denote the Platonists who flourished during the first ages of Christianity. The others before them I call *disciples* or *followers* of Plato.

tonists, to whom he was probably indebted for this opinion. Plotinus acquaints us that the Trinity was known and recognised long before Plato's time, which had come down from the Pythagoreans, who borrowed or received it from the Egyptians. And Proclus assigns its origin to Chaldea. From all which it is manifest, that these men regarded the Chaldaic, Orphic, and Pythagorean, or Platonic triads, as one and the same doctrine, relating to the same object of belief, and springing from the same fountain.

It is my aim to point out this fallacy, and to show from the writings of the later Platonists themselves, that the Trinity which they profess to have deduced from the theology of Plato, has nothing in common with the ancient triads of the Chaldeans and Egyptians; nor could it possibly have been derived from them.

This mysterious doctrine of three persons in the Divine Nature, was strenuously maintained by these philosophers of the first ages of Christianity, however much they corrupted it by their own fanciful illustrations. And so certain were they, that it was known and believed by Plato and the ancients, that they did not scruple to charge the Christians with having purloined it from their works. I purpose, therefore, to trace this error, so as to make it appear evident, that they were, in a great measure, indebted to the Christian religion for any exact knowledge which they had of this subject; that their mode of descrip-

tion was imitated from it; and that the mistake of supposing their doctrine to be of very ancient origin, principally arose from confounding the triads, or compound divinities of antiquity, with the Pythagorean or Timæan principles of all things.

The later Platonists were not the only learned men addicted to this delusion, of believing Plato to have had an acquaintance with this great and fundamental truth of our religion; some of those called the "fathers of the church" fell into the same error, as we may see from many passages of their acknowledged writings<sup>2</sup>. The only difference between the pagan and the Christian in this respect was, that the former pretended to discover the birth of the Trinity in the superstitious land of Egypt, while the latter assigned its source to the Hebrews.

Theodoret thus expresses himself on this point.  
<sup>3</sup> "Plotinus and Numenius, explaining Plato's sense, declare him to have asserted three eternal principles, Good, Mind, and the Soul of the World; which were by Plato purloined from the philosophy and theology of the Jews." Eusebius<sup>4</sup> of Casarea, and other learned fathers coincide in this conclusion.

Whether the Hebrew philosophers had so precise and remarkable a knowledge of this subject, as these men would persuade us, was really entertained by Plato and Pythagoras, might be liable to some dispute; but there seems no tangible evidence what-

<sup>2</sup> Vide note A.

<sup>3</sup> De Principio, vol. ii. p. 496.

<sup>4</sup> Pr. Ev. lib. ii. cap. 20

ever to suppose, that the latter borrowed any of their opinions from the former; nor is it probable they ever were in Judea<sup>5</sup>, where alone they could have had access to their writings<sup>6</sup>, or have had an opportunity of conversing with their priests. Even if this had happened, (of which there is not the least proof.) it is not likely that they would have borrowed from a people so very obscure as the Jews were at that period, (so far, at least, as the Greeks are concerned,) for they enjoyed scarcely any reputation for learning or philosophy.

Another argument, still more convincing, against this assumption, is, the gross ignorance of the Greeks in their writings relating to the Jews, whether they treat of their polity or of their religion; which scarcely could have happened, had their learned travellers enjoyed that knowledge which has been supposed. Even Plutarch, who flourished many ages after Plato, when we might expect a greater diffusion of information respecting the manners and peculiarities of different nations, was so ignorant of the Jewish religion, that he makes the Hebrews to be worshippers of Bacchus! And Bryant, in his "Ancient Mythology," presents us with a singular

<sup>5</sup> Dacier's Life of Pythagoras. The author is of opinion that Pythagoras never was in Judea.

<sup>6</sup> According to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, their sacred writings "were not accessible to Greek curiosity till more than one hundred years after the death of Plato."—Gibbon, cap. xxi, *note*.

instance of this kind, arising out of the Grecian custom of ascribing to foreign words the meaning which they had in their own language, where they discovered a resemblance in sound, however remote. "The Greeks in Egypt, hearing that the chief temple of the Jews was called *Onion*, and, as I have often observed, catching at every similitude of sound, they imagined that this name was derived from the Greek word *Ovos*, which, in their language, is well known to signify a particular animal. They, therefore, concluded that they had found out the secret object of the Jewish worship, and that all their devotion was paid to an *ass*. This notion was soon propagated; and it was asserted, that in the vestibule of every Jewish temple there was an ass's head!"

From this, and other evidence which might be adduced, if it seemed necessary for our purpose, it appears idle to imagine that any of the doctrines of the Grecian philosophy were borrowed from the Jews.

It was probably the zeal of the Christian fathers which urged them to adopt this error. The same biassed spirit is manifest in the writings of Josephus, who would attribute everything good to his own countrymen.

There is, I apprehend, more truth in the commonly-received notion, that Egypt was the parent of the Grecian mythology, whence it was brought by a colony of emigrants who settled there.

According to Bryant, the Egyptians again were indebted for their religion to another fountain of greater antiquity, which he imagines to be the Ammonian worship; or the idolatry of the descendants of Ham. That, in truth, the Pagan mythology, however changed and diversified by the different tribes by whom it was received, or modified by time and circumstances, was originally derived from one common source, in remote antiquity. The resemblance of the several idolatries of different nations has been remarked by many learned men, even among the ancients. Macrobius did not scruple to assert that all the Grecian gods, however metamorphosed by that ingenious and elegant people, were all so many different powers or appellations of the sun. Other unprejudiced mythologists conceived Jupiter, Apollo, and all the superior divinities, to be the several names of one god; that the female divinities, as Rhea, Ceres, &c., however diversified by the Greeks, were only various titles of the chief god, Jupiter, or by whatever name he may be styled.

It is my intention, with the aid of the learned and sagacious Bryant, to offer some preliminary remarks on the mythological systems of the first ages after the Deluge; and especially on the compound deities prevalent in all ancient nations. My object is to show who or what these compound divinities really were, and by what reason this idolatry became so widely spread, and so deeply rooted in the human mind.



Another object, which more immediately bears on the subject of this Essay, is, to trace the origin of the triads found in most ancient mythologies; to show who they represented; and how, in the end, these supposed principles, or causes of all things, became incorporated with the Platonism of the Christian era.

As we proceed it will be observed, that the chief gods of every country (described in a three-fold nature), by whatever varieties they are distinguished, whether in the peculiarity of their worship, or in the names and characters ascribed to them, may be traced to one original source, in the worship of deified men. The histories given of these compound gods, prove them to have been mere mortals; for the scenes of their conquests and triumphs are laid not in heaven, but on earth. They are born, live, propagate their species, like other men, and then die.

That such a custom, as ancestor-worship, was practised, we have the living testimony of the Greeks and Romans, who probably carried this to a more idolatrous extent than either the Chaldeans or Egyptians. And if such religious rites were instituted by these accomplished nations to some of their principal heroes, who were known to have lived and died as mortals, we cannot be surprised that people of a more distant era, perhaps less refined than they were, should be addicted to the same superstition.

We shall find, that these ancient gods are said to have been the first kings of every country. From

them (or from the one supposed to be the chief deity.) are dated the first historical events; even time itself is said to commence with them. From the concurrence of their histories among the ancients, we may perceive who they represented. They manifestly referred to one family; for the histories related of the compound gods of Egypt, are applicable, and analogous to those of Babylonia, India, and Persia, having been founded on the same occurrences, and derived from the same source.

Besides this, another branch of idolatry shall be noticed, which seems to have been diffused over the greater portion of the globe then inhabited; this is, the adoration of the sun and the heavenly host; so that we may regard the ancient mythology as a mixture of this, and the worship of the human creature.

I purpose, then, to examine that notion before alluded to (this being the scope of our inquiry, and for the illustration of which these preliminary observations are intended), of Plato, as well as other ancient philosophers, having a knowledge of a Trinity in the Godhead.

To demonstrate the fallacy of this hypothesis, it will be necessary to give some account of Plato's theology, and the opinions held by his disciples, which have come down to us, either in their own writings, or recorded in the works of others. From a strict analysis of this kind, it shall appear, that the ancients possessed no knowledge of the doctrine attributed to them; that they had not even a suspicion

of it; and that no such construction can properly be placed on the language of Plato. If we find any allusions to the triads, or compound deities of the Egyptians, and other mythologies, in his writings, we may safely conclude that they referred to the deified objects already mentioned.

It is hard to be conceived, how men of learning and judgment could adopt an opinion of this kind, without the most incontestable evidence. For surely the Trinity is a doctrine the least obvious to the understanding of one to whom revelation was a "dead letter." Even to us, to whom it has been revealed, how full is it of wonder and mystery! No man can presume to assert that his faculties can comprehend or fathom this divine mystery: human reason is inadequate to the task; and when thus employed, our only recompense is the utter hopelessness of all our efforts to explain that which is wisely hidden from our feeble and limited minds. And yet a Pagan philosopher, who had no revelation for his guidance, to whom even the existence and nature of God was a dark enigma, is supposed, by the light of his own reason, to have adopted and freely believed a doctrine which is so infinitely beyond the limits of human reason! Without revelation, he embraced that which revelation has left still a wonder and a mystery! and which, if it were explained to us, would perhaps be more incomprehensible than ever. But how can the mind receive and freely acknowledge that which is not

revealed, and which, without revelation, could never be so much as thought of, or conceived? However excellent and successful were the efforts of Plato and Socrates, in estimating the nature and attributes of God, they were the legitimate offspring of reason well applied and directed; but to have soared beyond this, and to have penetrated the veiled and unrevealed mystery of the nature of His existence, which reason can never grasp or conceive, appears a violent contradiction.

Yet Dr. Cudworth, and those who agree with him, must necessarily admit all this. They admit even more than this; for Plato is represented not as a Pagan, who, receiving this doctrine from another source, corrupted it, by calling it three principles distinct, or three kings; but he actually is said to hold the co-essentiality and consubstantiality of the three archical hypostases: that he was no Arian, but an orthodox Trinitarian!

Another objection suggested by the *primá facie* view of the case, is the converse of that propounded in *The Intellectual System of the Universe*, where the learned author imagined such a correspondence as this, between Platonism and the Christian religion, to be a great benefit to the latter. “We<sup>7</sup> conceive, that this parallelism, betwixt the ancient and the Christian Trinity, might be of some use to satisfy those amongst us, who boggle so much at the Trinity, and look upon it as the choak-pear of Christianity;

<sup>7</sup> Vol. i. p. 61, Preface.

when they shall find, that the freest wits among the Pagans, and the best philosophers, who had nothing of superstition to determine them that way, were so far from being shy of such an hypothesis, as that they were even fond thereof."

This author having proceeded so far, might have given us a view of the other side of the picture, and candidly stated to what extent such an admission as this might also have been injurious to Christianity, by robbing it of its characteristic originality; and in giving to scepticism an instrument of considerable force, by which to contest its divine origin. We shall observe presently, that such an argument as this, was really employed by a celebrated writer of modern times, who shows how much our religion is beholden to the dreams of Plato, and the soberer speculations of Aristotle. But the truth seems to be, that Dr. Cudworth had a preconceived hypothesis to support,—and how much will a man sacrifice to this object! The force of the simple and naked truth, is often paralyzed for the sake of a theory or hypothesis. And, as if sensible of the difficulties by which it was surrounded, and not unconscious to the *prejudice* which a Christian may reasonably entertain, of the originality of the Trinity in his own religion, he uses the above apologetic strain of expression, to prepare the reader for the many surprises and encounters he is likely to meet with in his argument. The Christian must first lay aside any partiality he may indulge in favour of the origin of his Trinity;

and then be prepared to receive the startling result of Dr. Cudworth's reasoning, That this doctrine was a well-known "dogma," or "cabala," long before the later revelation made to mankind: that the three persons were not conceived by Plato, as three kings, having a separate and independent existence, but exactly in the same light in which we believe the nature of this mystery.

It is my purpose, therefore, to examine the arguments of this learned author, and to point out the degree, and the nature, of the evidence on which his hypothesis is founded. I am sensible of the boldness of the undertaking, in encountering a writer of such gigantic learning and profound acquirements as Dr. Cudworth. But as learning is only an instrument by which truth is to be sought for, and not truth itself, so far only is it worthy of esteem, or of emulation. Wherever it is otherwise employed, it can neither be admired nor respected. Far am I, however, from insinuating that Dr. Cudworth was not reasonably convinced of the truth of his argument, though his evidence does not seem to warrant his conclusions. The character and piety of that distinguished Christian exalts him far above any such charge as this. So long as profound erudition is admired by mankind, so long shall he receive the reward of all his exertions in the gratitude of posterity. Before I conclude, it may be necessary to say a few words more, relative to this great author, and to those to whom I have been otherwise indebted for the evidence which I adduce.

A considerable share of *The Intellectual System of the Universe*, is devoted to the discussion of the Trinity of Plato. The author, with the hand of profusion, and a mind overflowing with learning, in that branch of his work lays before us all the knowledge which he supposed to bear on the doctrine, that could be gathered from the eminent, as well as obsolete and obscure, writers of antiquity. There is scarcely a passage or an allusion that escaped his penetration. He absolutely overwhelms us with quotations in illustration, or in defence, of his hypothesis. But there is one single fault or omission, which well nigh subverts his ingenious structure, and which is of great service to our cause. He chiefly resorts to the *later Platonists* for evidence in support of his argument. Plato and his writings are rarely ever mentioned or referred to, in respect of that Trinity of divine hypostases. He does not show that such a doctrine as this, was ever so much as alluded to by any of the genuine disciples of Plato, which could not have happened, had they been so intimately acquainted with it as he imagines. It is only by inference, and that of great uncertainty, that he deduces a trinity from Plato's works—supported only by a few obscure expressions, which are of doubtful signification, and might possibly refer to something of a very different nature.

Those Platonists, to whom he is so greatly beholden for his testimonies, as Plotinus, Proclus, and others, were not so much followers of Plato, as professors of

the Eclectic system, whose very essence consisted in the choice of its doctrines from every possible source, as they were determined on, or thought fit, by the founders of this philosophy. It was not Platonic, nor Timæan, nor yet Pythagorean, nor Aristotelian, but a mixture of all these, with an abundant effusion of obsolete fables, night-mare dreams, and a considerable sprinkling of magic and superstition. Their theology, as it is falsely named, is a ridiculous version of the mythologic systems of different countries mingled together. They adopted the Grecian theogony, and made it “the basis of their procedure,” divesting it of that fabulous or poetical charm, which alone can make it endurable to a refined and cultivated mind. Every fable of the gods, immortalized by the Grecian poets in their exquisite writings, was adopted by these “divine men,” and robbed of all its attraction, by a new or allegorical interpretation. The licentious stories related by Homer and Hesiod of their divinities, for which they were reprobated by Plato, and consigned to the tortures of Hades by Pythagoras, were freely and willingly received into the category of their truths. But the amours of Jupiter or of Venus, were no longer considered such as the license of poetic fiction and fancy described them: in the hands of these interpreters, they became “divine energies,” and “deific unions,” such as are worthy of immortal beings.

Of these spurious followers of Plato, or later Platonists, I shall have, therefore, a great deal to say hereafter.



To Mr. Taylor, and his notes and explanations, I am greatly indebted for my knowledge of their philosophy and theology. He is a disciple of the school of Proclus, and a bigoted follower of the later Platonists; and, as such, his interpretation of their system may be relied on. He would persuade us, that he strictly adhered to Plato's genuine writings and doctrines; this, however, is on his part a great error or delusion.

I cannot mention the name of Jacob Bryant, without reverence and admiration. His love of truth; his profound and extensive learning; and his admirable judgment, constitute him a great authority in everything relative to antiquity. To his writings I am under great obligation, for some opinions and illustrations in the following Essay.

I am happy to say, that I coincide in most of his conclusions, wrought out by unparalleled industry, and surprising erudition. His great work on *The Ancient Mythology*, must continue to be the wonder of posterity: it is honorable, as much to the country in which it was produced, as to the great and inestimable author himself.

It will be readily perceived, how much I am indebted to Bryant; especially in the preliminary observations on ancient idolatry. I am inclined to agree with him in his strictures on some of the Grecian writers, on whom we cannot safely rely, when they treat of the events of remote antiquity. Their accounts of ancient history are not to be

trusted. They were guilty of great misinterpretations, chiefly arising from an undue opinion of their own country; a contempt for those whom they styled barbarians; a false idea of the antiquity of Greece; and from a strange custom of proceeding; as if the languages of other countries, more ancient, were really derived from their own. They likewise invented innumerable ingenious fables to support any preconceived notion, which perhaps had no better foundation than the accidental similitude, in sound, of a foreign word, to one in the Grecian language. I cannot do better than refer the reader to Bryant's "Dissertation upon the Helladian and other Grecian Writers," for a proof of what I have advanced above.

The whole "Ancient Mythology" is full of instructive examples of this fact.

"Cory's Collection of Ancient Fragments," has been of great service to me in one branch of this Essay. When this useful work fell into my hands, I rejoiced to see how much support I derived, by way of proof and illustration, from these very ancient and very curious records of antiquity.

The division I have adopted in the following work, seemed to be the most simple and natural.

I. I make some remarks on the compound deities of ancient nations; on the triple forms sometimes assumed by them; on the worship of the celestial host, and its prevalence; on the deification of mortal creatures; and point out who these deified persons

really were; and then, by inference, attempt to trace to this practice, the origin of the Chaldaic, Orphic, and, subsequently, the Platonic triads, or trinities.

2. I then examine the philosophy and theology of Plato, as they have descended to us, in his copious writings; and of other celebrated characters of antiquity; showing their opinions respecting the Great First Cause; in which it shall be made manifest that they had no suspicion of such a doctrine as a Trinity in the Godhead. I must likewise notice, and that at considerable length, Plato's system of Ideas, from which originated the Second Person, or *λογος*, of the later Platonists.

3. I proceed, after this, to give some account of the histories and characters of these Platonists; in which is developed the extent of their corruption of the genuine philosophy of Plato; and some critical account of the later Platonism itself; in which the errors and misrepresentation of these writers shall be pointed out; and to what extent they were indebted to the Christian religion for their trinity of archical hypostases.

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## PART THE FIRST.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### THE PREVALENCE OF COMPOUND DEITIES IN ANCIENT NATIONS.

FROM various causes, the religious systems, or mythologies of the ancients, as they can now be estimated by us, appear to be full of confusion and contradiction. It would seem, however, that so far as the public or popular religion is concerned, the belief in compound deities was general, if not universal. These were looked upon as principles and causes, in the universe; supposed to be devoid of that inferiority and subordination, applicable to a lower class of deified natures.

Beyond and above these causes, again, the learned and the wise seemed to have a glimpse, however dark and confused, of another Being without multiplicity or complexity of existence, who was distinguished as the Highest God, and Eternal Cause of all things. But even among these, this Being, and the inferior causes, were frequently confounded and mixed, as if it were only in moments of abstraction, that they could conceive the existence of the Supreme God

It has been thought by some, that these popular gods of antiquity were only so many personifications of the elements of nature; and that even the Zeus of Greece, and the Jupiter of the Romans, had no higher origin. But I cannot agree in this opinion; for though it is manifest, that secondary causes were worshipped; there is no evidence to determine us in assigning to them such a *material* origin<sup>1</sup>. This notion seems to have been deduced from the Grecian mythology (for it cannot properly, or with any reason, be applicable to that of other nations), which may be interpreted in many different ways; for it was no more than a structure raised by the fertile ingenuity of the Greeks on a more ancient foundation. They were as much perplexed with their own religion as we are at this day; which is apparent from the gloomy and desponding speculations of some of their most learned men. They were, as we have said, indebted to a foreign source for it; but through time and the singular fancies of that wonderful people, it became so changed and transformed, that the likeness of the parent was lost, or destroyed, in this, its offspring.

A great part of that confusion and contradiction, incidental to the Grecian mythology, may be explained by supposing the Greeks to have mistaken the mere titles of the divinity worshipped in other countries, for so many distinct and independent

<sup>1</sup> Vide Note B.

existences. Bryant alludes to the custom in this passage: "This<sup>2</sup> blindness in regard to their own theology, and to that of the countries whence they borrowed, led them to misapply the terms which they had received, and to make a god out of every title." He agrees with Macrobius, and other ancients, who thought these gods were so many appellations of one deity—the sun. It<sup>3</sup> may be observed, that some of the freest and best mythologists among the ancients were of opinion, that Jupiter, Pluto, Apollo, and Proserpine and Ceres, were names only of one god<sup>4</sup>.

The Stoics regarded the mundane animal, endued with an intellectual soul, as the chief cause; and as they supposed this spirit to pervade all nature, the worship offered to other gods, was adoration paid, in fact, only to parts of this great deity.

The nearest approach to the opinion above is to be found in the expressions employed in more ancient systems of mythology, where we have material objects stated to be the causes of all things. Chaos, ether, water, and air, and others of a like nature, are such as we have alluded to; but though they are called causes and principles, they do not seem ever to have been worshipped as gods; and, therefore, they must be imagined to represent mere material agency under the guidance of an intelligent Being. In truth, there may be discovered above

<sup>2</sup> An. My. vol. i. p. 383.

<sup>3</sup> Id. p. 387.

<sup>4</sup> Vide Note C.

these material causes, another efficient and primary cause, namely, God, who is distinguished from these subordinate agents. Thus<sup>5</sup>, when it is said that from water was produced the earth, or the world, we have clearly only a material agency; we must, therefore, raise our thoughts above this, and acknowledge one Intellectual Being, who brought the earth forth from the water, and who became the plastic power; the orderer and disposer of all things. We shall see, hereafter, that it is probable some of these terms, mentioned above, might really be applicable to historical events, regarding the dispensations of Almighty Providence to earth and its inhabitants.

These mythologists, who manifestly looked to One above material things, are therefore to be honorably distinguished from the atheistical speculators of some of the Grecian schools, who, having reason and intellect themselves, did deny them to have any influence or place in the creation and government of the world. They recognised no power, no cause, no agency beyond inert matter, and grim necessity. Such are the systems of Democritus and Epicurus, who, in the words of Lucretius, their great expounder, made all things out of atoms, or seeds; in whose order and disposition no reason or counsel were allowed.

<sup>5</sup> Thales called water the first principle of all (material) things; but it was Mind or God that formed all things out of the water. "Aquam dixit Thales esse initium rerum Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret." Cic. De Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. 10.



“ Nam certe neque consilio, primordia rerum  
 Ordine se quæque, atque sagaci mente locarunt ;  
 Nec quos quæque darent motus pepigere profecto<sup>6</sup>.”

For the purpose of reconciling those contradictions and discrepancies, found in the systems of mythology ; which clearly arose from no accidental circumstance, as they are universal throughout every known religion of antiquity (except the Jewish of course), and interwoven with the very fabric ; arising, as it were, from the nature of things, I would divide the history of the first ages into epochs, after this manner :—

1. We may suppose with reason, that for some time after the flood, the progenitors of mankind lived in a state of great innocence and simplicity. That they worshipped the God who saved this remnant of the human race, as a perfectly spiritual and benevolent Being ; being led and guided by the pure and simple precepts of Noah, in their mode of adoration.

2. Then symbols being introduced to typify the Deity ; the sun might reasonably be regarded as his great representative ; and other symbolical objects might be used in His worship.

3. There is an inherent propensity in man to confound the symbol and the thing signified by it. To imagine that mankind should always clearly distinguish the one from the other in religion, is to

<sup>6</sup> Lucret. lib. i. ver. 1020,

presuppose a permanency, to some extent, in their original purity; stability in religious rites; and immutability in the human mind.

Mankind, however, have inclined to retrograde, rather than advance, in purity of religion. The Hebrews of old, with all their knowledge of God, could scarcely keep themselves above idolatry.

So the posterity of Noah, in course of time, relapsed into the worship of the symbol of the true God. The sun, the sensible representative of his glory, had those rites transferred to it, and prayers offered up, which are the prerogatives only of the intellectual and invisible Being. The heresy introduced by the family or descendants of Ham, was undoubtedly of this nature. Nimrod and his followers adored the sun and celestial host; which in a simpler age were regarded only as types, or material symbols, of the Supreme Deity.

4. But even this Sabaism, or sun worship, seemed of too pure and unsubstantial a nature to be permanently practised, without some alloy. Hence, in the course of time, the very founders of this idolatry were themselves confounded with their gods, and worshipped accordingly; so that the object recognised once as the symbol of the Deity, was transferred to these creatures of frailty and mortality. Probably at first, some of the immediate descendants of Ham, who rebelled against the precepts of Noah, and set up gods for themselves, arrogated to them the titles used by the Persians and other sun-worshippers:

such as children of the sun, offspring of the gods; until at last they were really looked up to as the real progeny of heaven, and adored as such. In conformity with this, Bryant acquaints us, that Bel was an ancient name of the sun, when worshipped as the chief deity; but when the followers of Nimrod awarded to him this appellation, he was by his descendants confounded with the sun, and worshipped also. We shall see, likewise, that Osiris, Jupiter, Orus, Dionusus, and other names, denoted the sun, while at the same time they were applied to deified men.

This is clearly proved from the symbolical superstition of the Egyptians, in which we discover the symbols of Osiris and the sun to be substantially the same. There is, in truth, Osiris, the luminary of day; and Osiris, the deified ancestor, of whom the sun became a significant type. So the symbols of Isis were also applicable to the moon. But there can be no doubt that the histories of Ammon and Osiris relate to beings of this earth; and cannot be reconciled to the sun, or any heavenly gods.

From this constant collision of terms arises most of the perplexity and confusion to which we have alluded; and if we bear in our minds the distinction I have pointed out, we shall have little difficulty in reconciling all the discrepancies of the ancient mythology.

5. That which was exemplified in the worshippers of the sun, in confounding the symbol with that

which it materially represented, is made still more conspicuous in the animal-worship of the Egyptians. It might be, indeed, disputed, whether the priests, and other educated natives of that country, really regarded the animals in any other light than mere sacred symbols of their gods; but certainly the *profanum vulgus* were not likely to draw so nice a line of distinction; nor was it the interest of the priesthood to enlighten them on this point.

There seems to have been something of gratitude elicited in this creature-worship; for those animals were most revered, which, in some degree, conferred obligations on man, by promoting his comfort, and increasing his security. However, there are examples to the contrary; for in Upper Egypt, it is said, the<sup>7</sup> crocodile was worshipped, which could not have been on this account; and what is rather singular, the very creature which was believed to injure or destroy this formidable deity, was held in the greatest sanctity<sup>8</sup>. The crocodile was a symbol of the evil genius, or Typhon; the ichneumon, that of Osiris, the good and benevolent deity.

The Greeks and Romans were equally guilty of unpardonable superstition. They had, however, the art to adorn it with so much beauty and fascination, that it excites in us little of the disgust and abhorrence we feel for the wretched and debased religion of Egypt. The gods of woods, fountains, and of

<sup>7</sup> Dio. Sic., cap. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Herodot., lib. ii. cap. 67.

groves, are also more poetical and attractive images, than deities presented to us in the form of crocodiles, goats, bulls, and monsters made up of the man and the brute. This strong contrast stamps the taste and genius of the respective people.

In the worship of heroes and deified men, the <sup>9</sup>Greeks and Romans only followed a very ancient practice, to be perceived in the religious rites of the Chaldæans, Egyptians, Indians, and other nations, with whose mythologies we have any acquaintance. Some of these nations, as the Chaldæans and Indians, retained the sun-worship purer than others, as the Egyptians and Greeks; the former of whom rapidly sunk down lower in superstition every generation. And if we were to credit the accounts of some<sup>10</sup> modern travellers, they are as conspicuous now as ever, for their credulity.

There cannot be a doubt that some of the ancient philosophers rose above the popular creed, and recognised and acknowledged one infinite and eternal First Cause. All the other gods they believed to be beings created in time, who served as agents or ministerial powers, or secondary causes of the Chief Being. These subordinate deities were the stars and demons, or deified men. However, the mythologic systems seem to have made no such

<sup>9</sup> Vide Note D.

<sup>10</sup> Savary's Letters. "The frantic ceremonies the pagan religion authorized, are now renewed around the sepulchres of Santons, before the churches of the Copts, and in the fairs I mentioned."

distinction as this. If the priesthood were themselves sensible of this great truth, it was part of their artful policy to keep it from the minds of the great body of the people, who looked not beyond their popular Jupiters and Junos. Plutarch, one of the wisest and most learned priests of antiquity, attained some knowledge of such an Eternal Cause; but how dark and doubtful was this abstract idea, when it failed to influence his practice as a priest, or to free his thoughts from that childish superstition, so apparent in all his writings!

There was a practice very prevalent, which necessarily debarred the ignorant and uneducated from having any idea of this Great First Cause. It was maintained by the philosopher, as well as by the priest, that the vulgar had nothing to do with sacred things; and that, consequently, they must silently acquiesce in the religion as established, and in every fraud and delusion of the priesthood. Then again, among the Greeks especially, the office of priest, and the profession of philosopher, were perfectly distinct from each other. It was laid down as a sort of maxim, that the one should not encroach upon the province of the other; that the philosopher should scrupulously eschew everything relating to the public religion.

This was an artificial distinction of great injury to the propagation of truth; for religion had no chance of benefiting by the speculations of the philosophers, who had matured their opinions of the

Deity by long study and contemplation. Hence, the false religion of the country was connived at by the very men who alone could have purified and refined it. We must acknowledge, however, the lamentable fact, that few of them had any anxious desire to promote truth. Their great aim was to maintain an hypothesis, or found a school; their greatest ambition to establish new doctrines in opposition to old ones; and they were, for the most part, indifferent to anything but their success.

Then, again, had the philosophers proffered their services to the priesthood, to redeem the people from their savage ignorance respecting religion; they would have received no encouragement from that quarter. To have enlightened the people, was to undermine the very foundations of their power; its whole stability depended on the fraud and delusion kept up by them. The antiquity of their practice, and the legends upon which it rested, carried more force and authority than all the speculations of reason, however noble, excellent, and refined. And how powerful was such an *argument* as this, to a nation who affected so great a veneration for antiquity as the Grecians! The death of Socrates bears undying testimony to the fraud and hypocrisy of their debased and licentious priesthood; and teaches us how dangerous it was for one of the profession of philosopher, to seem to encroach upon the province of the priests. This happened in an age which shed glory over the land of Greece; when wisdom

and learning reached the highest perfection ; when the taste was distinguished for its exquisite refinement ; and yet, during this era, the priesthood clung to their fables and legends ; riveted the people more and more in their chains ; and exercised their power for the persecution of truth, and the propagation of error.

Plato and Socrates, no doubt, acknowledged one eternal, unmade Cause, a spiritual and intellectual Being ; but this did not hinder them from reverencing a multiplicity of inferior, but generated divinities. They regarded these as causes, or agents, under the guidance and government of the First Great Cause. This was the pure deduction of human reason. The mythology, or popular religion, on the contrary, rested on ancient prescription ; no gods were lawful but those whose existence was founded on tradition<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> There are exceptions to this rule. New gods were, from time to time, introduced into both Greece and Rome, as circumstances seemed to require. The general system, however, was prevented from falling to pieces by an unbounded reverence for tradition and antiquity, which was of itself sufficient, when the system was neither affected by public opinion, nor injured by the refined speculations of philosophy.

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## CHAPTER II.

THESE COMPOUND DEITIES, IN A THREE-FOLD  
NATURE, OR TRIAD.

THERE is a feature of ancient mythology of great consequence to us, in our inquiry; that the deity of most nations is described in a three-fold state, or nature; most frequently as a father, a wife, and a son. This compound god, or three divinities, is prevalent in every system of antiquity; and there is such a remarkable correspondence in their histories and characters, that they must refer to the same persons.

The chief of these three, namely, the father, was sometimes looked upon as the cause of all things; and described to us as an active and intelligent being, possessed of great virtues, as justice, goodness, and wisdom. But there is a strange anomaly in his divine nature, or divine origin, for all the actions attributed to him, happen here below; and not in heaven.

Homer, in his great poem on the mythological legends of Greece, very properly represents his gods as dwelling in heaven; and from thence they descended on earth, when they concerned themselves in mundane affairs. These other deities alluded to, are not described after this manner. They are said to live and die, and be buried like mere mortals.

They perform pilgrimages over the whole earth, and return as great conquerors.

The father, or chief god, is called the first planter of the vine; the first husbandman; and the first who erected altars to the gods. He taught mankind knowledge and science; and he is reputed to have been a person of great benevolence, justice, and goodness; all which, along with his sufferings and death, can only relate to a human being, and not to a god. Who this personage was, will be afterwards explained.

It is said of<sup>1</sup> the Babylonians, that they acknowledged a threefold god, whom they denominated Apasoon, and Tauthe, (allegorically represented to be his wife,) who gave being to a son called Moymis. Damascius, who gives us the relation, says, this people, like the rest of the barbarians, passed over in silence the one principle of the universe, namely, the Eternal Cause; so that Apasoon was only an inferior, or subordinate deity. Tauthe is styled the mother of the gods; being the same in truth with Rhea, Isis, Ceres, and the rest of the superior goddesses. From these three descended a progeny, and from this family another, until we reach Belus, who is distinguished as the fabricator of the world.

It might be inferred from this, that the Babylonian triad really existed prior to the demiurgus; but this confusion of language arises from the mis-

<sup>1</sup> An. Frag. p.318.

application of terms, and the misappropriation of different titles of one to many divinities.

This Apasoon was no doubt a deified person. The sun was his emblem as such : and he was also worshipped as the sun. He is represented as the ancestor of Bel, or Belus ; but this is also a title of the sun ; and as such he was the same with Apasoon. When we come to treat of this subject in detail, it may be proved, that as the sun they were the same ; but as deified men, the one was truly descended from the other ; and after some generations.

Belus, as the deified mortal, is here called the creator of the world ; but this is a great mistake ; for he himself was an inhabitant of the earth. It must be, therefore, Bel, as the sun, who is so styled. All this confusion arises from an universal custom of giving the same names to objects of a distinct nature.

I am inclined to think, that the demiurgus of Proclus, who is situated somewhere about the same place, in his procession of gods, as Belus occupies in the Babylonian system, was borrowed from this source ; and that the intermediate triads, or unities, between the first god and the creator, are the same with those progenies of the Babylonian family. I have some suspicion of this from Damascius himself, who, in this description, conceives the son Moymis to be no other than the *intelligible world*, without inquiring into the sense signified by the ancient mythologists. We have already observed, that Proclus

called the triad a Chaldean doctrine; and he pretends to have been indebted greatly to that nation, for much of his spurious philosophy.

The Phœnicians are said to have recognised the elementary natures, ether and air, as the two first principles, from which was begotten (or sprung out of,) Ulomus, the first god, who again gave being to the other inferior divinities. These two words, ether and air, had probably some secret signification, and alluded rather to events than to things. And being mere material agents of a higher power, they could only be recognised as secondary, and not as primary causes. The Phœnicians seem also to have passed over in silence the one principle of the universe, God himself.

All the refinement of Damascius, or him from whom he derived this knowledge, is superfluous. He calls Ulomus, the summit of the intelligible order of gods, who produced from himself Chusorus, the first expanding principle, and then the egg: which, following the Platonic version, he styles the intelligible mind; while Chusorus signifies the intelligible power. All this arises from ignorance of the histories and families of the persons deified by the Phœnicians.

In the above description, however, truth is not entirely lost sight of; for Chusorus was really a descendant of Ulomus.

According to the etymology adopted by Bryant, this word Chusorus is compounded of Chus, or Cush,

and Orus, a title of the sun. Hence it signifies Cush, the son of the sun; and as such he was worshipped.

“Chus, by the Egyptians and Canaanites, was styled Or-Chus, and Chus-Or; the latter of which was expressed by the Greeks, *Χρυσωρ*, Chrusor; and we learn in Eusebius, from Philo, that Chrusor was one of the principal deities of the Phœnicians, a great benefactor to mankind; and by some supposed to have been the same as *Ηεφαιστος*. Both the Tyrians and Sidonians were undoubtedly a mixed race, and preserved the memory of Ham and Chus, equally with that of Canaan<sup>2</sup>.”

This learned author presents us with a singular quotation from Sanchoniathon, respecting this person, Chrusor, which manifestly proves him to have been a deified mortal. Speaking of the great benefits conferred by him on mankind, he concludes by saying, *Διο και ὡς θεον αυτον μετα θανατον εσεβασθησαν* for which reason, after his death, they worshipped him as a god<sup>3</sup>.

Chus was the son of Ham, who was represented to be the sun, or Helius; so that he was only one of the children of the sun<sup>4</sup>. “If then Chrusor be, as I have supposed, Chus; the person so denominated must have been, according to the more ancient mythology, the son of Helius and Dios. We find, accordingly, that it was so.” We can, then, pene-

<sup>2</sup> An. My. vol. ii. p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> Id. p. 51.

<sup>4</sup> Id. p. 61.

trate the obscurity of the Phœnician genealogy of the gods, and see to what family it referred.

If these two words of Damascius, *Αιθηρ* and *Αηρ*, Ether and Air, be not a corruption<sup>5</sup> of two ancient proper names, mistaken for Grecian words, we might imagine the former to allude to heaven or the firmament, and the latter to be synonymous with the *violent wind*, of other ancient mythologies.

It is remarkable that Typhon, among the Egyptians, was really a personification of a tempest, as well as of an evil genius.

Plutarch, in his Treatise on the Mythology of Egypt, says<sup>6</sup>, Typhon signified something violent and unruly; but the confused account which he gives of this deity, proves how greatly perplexed he was with that portion of his history, which manifestly relates to the deluge, and of which he probably had no suspicion. Truth, however, may be elicited from this incongruous collection of fables.

In another part of his entertaining treatise, Plutarch informs us, that by Osiris, the Egyptians mean (sometimes) Nilus; and by Isis, the earth; and that Typhon is the sea, into which Osiris fell and lost

<sup>5</sup> An. My. vol. i. p. 21. Radical *Ait*. Bryant says, that *Ait* was a title of Ham, or the sun; and was compounded thus: *Athyr*, or *Ath-ur*; and places were so called from the worship of the sun. "Ethiopia was named both *Aitheria* and *Aeria*, from *Aur* and *Athyr*." Again, "*Aur* sometimes expressed *Or*, *Ur*, and *Our*, signified both light and fire. Hence came the *Orus* of the Egyptians." p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> Isis et Osiris.

himself, being tossed to and fro in the tempestuous deep. This is so far consonant with true history; but it is not to be supposed that this term Nilus alluded to the river of that name; for the description evidently refers to a person, which may be proved out of many other parts of the work. We may observe, therefore, that Osiris, in this character, alluded to the great progenitor of mankind, Noah; and that Typhon was a sort of incarnation of the deluge. Hence, Bryant acquaints us, that “Typhon<sup>7</sup> signified a deluge. The overflowing of the Nile was called by the Egyptians, Typhon.” But that it signified a violent wind or tempest, also, is clear. *Τυφ-ων*<sup>8</sup>, *ανεμος μεγας*. *By Typhon is meant a violent wind.*

The Egyptian triad, or compound deity, bears a strong resemblance to the Chaldean or Babylonian. Osiris is the husband of Isis, who gives birth to an only-begotten son Orus. Isis is a goddess, who has many titles given to her, and is represented in a great variety of characters. She is sometimes the moon, sometimes the earth; at other times nature, and a personification of her generative principle. Osiris is represented in the double character of a deified person, and the chief deity, the sun. Bryant conceives Orus and Osiris as dæmons, or deified

<sup>7</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 162.

<sup>8</sup> Bryant says, “Typhon was a derivative from Tuph, which seems to be the same with the Suph of the Hebrews. By this they denoted a whirlwind.”—vol. iii. p. 164.

mortals, to be the same person under different names. There seems some truth in this conclusion. Let us suppose Osiris to be Noah, and we shall understand this passage from the learned writer<sup>9</sup>. “The renewal of life was, by the Egyptians, esteemed a second state of childhood. They accordingly, in their hieroglyphics, described Osiris as a boy, whom they placed upon the lotus, or water-lily, and called Orus.” This plant was a sacred emblem, which grew above the waters of the Nile, rising with the flood; and it was considered a very appropriate type of the ark overtopping the waters of the deluge.

Orus, then, was Osiris in his second state; regarded also as a second birth. According to Plutarch, he returned from Hades, after having been enclosed in an ark in a state of death; his return being a sort of second existence. Hence, by the mythologists, he is denominated the first-born of mankind; and under the title of Protogonus, he is thus described in the Orphic hymns:

<sup>10</sup> O mighty first-begotten, hear my prayer,  
Two-fold, egg-born, and wand’ring through the air.

He is called egg-born, because an egg was conceived to be a very proper emblem or representative of the ark. Such is Bryant’s opinion, maintained with singular ingenuity. An egg contains the embryo of the bird; and the ark contained the germ of the future race of mankind. Hence we have an expla-

<sup>9</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 169.

<sup>10</sup> Hymn 6 (Taylor).



nation of this object being regarded as a principle, in some ancient religious systems. It was looked upon as the womb of nature, from which the very gods sprung forth into existence: the mother of all things. It is supposed that Isis in her maternal character, and as the wife of Osiris, is a personification of the ark; from which Orus came forth in his second childhood. If there is any truth in this hypothesis, we can, by means of it, explain the fable of Typhon and the mundane egg.

“ The<sup>11</sup> Orphic egg mentioned by Proclus, was undoubtedly of the same purport. It seems to have been a favourite symbol, and very ancient; and we find it adopted among many nations. It was said, by the Persians, of Oromasdes, that he formed mankind, and enclosed them in an egg.”

Protogonus, called sometimes Phanes, is described as bursting this egg, and leaping forth into light, in the Orphic theology. From him, it is said, sprang the race of gods and mortals<sup>12</sup>. This personage is the same with Dionusus, who was called *πατερ ποντου, πατερ αιης*.

Typhon, the incarnation of evil, (originally considered as the genius of the deluge,) was a person represented in various ways. He is called, by the Egyptians, the brother of Osiris, with whom he struggled for supremacy. But this is a name given sometimes to the Most High himself, or the God of

<sup>11</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 165.

<sup>12</sup> Ib. p. 166.

the Deluge, who is called, therefore, the Typhonian<sup>13</sup> Deity. When mankind relapsed into the idolatry of sun-worship, Typhon was then called Helius, and was adored as the chief god. This singular estimation of the evil genius seems to have perplexed Plutarch<sup>14</sup>, who was ignorant of the reason of this application of the term. He only regarded him in his popular, or subordinate character, as a material agent in the hands of God. Bryant affords us this explanation of the apparent inconsistency<sup>15</sup>. “The Grecians have comprehended several characters under one term, which the Egyptians undoubtedly distinguished. The term was used for a title as well as a name; and several of those personages who had a relation to the deluge were styled typhonian or diluvian.”

Plutarch gives us a very curious history of Osiris and the ark. He<sup>16</sup> relates that Typhon (namely, the Typhonian deity,) formed an ark or coffer of beautiful and exquisite workmanship, in which he shut up Osiris. “Every man admired this fine piece of workmanship, and Typhon, in a merry mood, promised to bestow it upon him whose body would fit it.” Having secretly taken the measure and proportions of the person of Osiris before the coffer was exhibited, he invited the god to enter it, and

<sup>13</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 166.

<sup>14</sup> Isis et Osiris. He acknowledges that the Egyptians sometimes regarded Typhon as the chief god, Helius, or the sun.

<sup>15</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 167.

<sup>16</sup> Isis et Osiris.

then he and his accomplices let down the lid upon him, which they fastened with nails and melted lead; after which they conveyed it away, and threw it into the sea. He says, it was afterwards cast ashore on the coast of Byblus by the waves or tide. Elsewhere he illustrates the shape of the chest or coffer by the significant metaphor of the moon's crescent, which, when decreasing, assumes a horned shape, resembling a ship or boat.

Under this fable, we can clearly perceive the ancient history to which it refers. Osiris was Noah; and Typhon the God of the Deluge. That part relating to the proportions of the body of Osiris, may possibly allude to the instructions given in the formation and construction of the ark.

Plutarch, agreeably to the mythology of some other people, says, that the Egyptians sometimes represented *water* as a principal or original cause. Whether this was on account of its relation to the deluge is problematical. Orpheus, in the hymns ascribed to him, personifies the sea, calling it Oceanus; and to it he imputes the origin of gods and men, as he did also to Protogonus.

Ocean I call, whose nature ever flows,  
From whom at first both gods and men arose.

It may have been observed, that in the compound deity of Egypt, there was really a personification of an evil principle; a peculiarity common to other nations; and which may probably have originated in a corruption, or misconception of the character of

the diluvian deity. The history of Typhon alluded to this; which may have crept in, when mankind lost the knowledge of the true God, and fell into idolatry.

The Orphic theology is said to have been the fountain of the Grecian. It is of the same nature with those systems I have mentioned; and seems to have been derived from the same source, however much it was changed and diversified in the hands of the Greeks. The Orphic triad, or compound nature, consists of Uranus, Phanes, and Cronus. It is also called Metis, Phanes, or Eros, and Ericapæus, which some interpret Counsel, Love, and Lifegiver.

If we look to the Grecians for any satisfactory explanation of this subject, we shall be greatly disappointed. Their theologians confounded the systems as they came to their hands, and, from ignorance, or vanity, misinterpreted everything connected with them, so that the resemblance of the father is defaced in the child. They adopted the terms of a foreign language, and translated them, as if they were of Grecian origin, without considering the signification they bore in the language from which they were borrowed. And so much did their religion perplex them, on account of this ignorance, that scarcely two theologians are found to agree, in the nature and character of their gods.

The numerous appellations given to the sun, in other countries, were received by them as so many distinct divinities, and they formed for them some

history or story to support the delusion; assigning to them their several departments in their monstrous theogony.

Plutarch acknowledges the Greeks were beholden to the Egyptians for the names of their gods: these they tortured, for the sake of pleasing the ear, and then applied to them the signification those words bore in their language, which seemed to have the greatest resemblance in sound.

We must look, then, to another quarter for the nature of the Orphic triad, which the later Platonists assert is the origin of their trinity. Proclus is right in ascribing its derivation to Chaldea; for the persons of this and the other triads were all from the same fountain, however transformed and obscured through time.

I have already observed who Phanes or Protogonus alluded to, as a person: it was also a title of the sun. Bryant ingeniously conjectures, that the name of Eros given to him had no relation individually, but referred to the Iris, or rainbow, which God had placed in the sky, as the symbol of his covenant with Noah and his family. The Greeks modifying the word which expressed this symbol, called it Eros or Love, and constituted it a distinct god. Hence the saying that Love was the most ancient of all the gods; and the distinction which was made between this being and their goddess Venus. The one was love without passion,—a pure and intellectual existence; the other needs no description.

Cronus was a name given to Noah, as I shall show more fully hereafter; though it was, like Osiris, applied also to the Supreme Deity. This application of the same title to beings or persons, constitutes the main difficulty of solving the ancient mythology. Upon this basis has Bryant proceeded in his great work, and whether he has succeeded, I leave to the judgment of those who understand and value his inestimable labours. The names of Noah were sometimes awarded to his sons and descendants, and therefore, in such cases, they do not so much distinguish the persons, as the families or tribes to which they belonged.

There is a passage in the Panchean Fragments, which I will give, that may throw some light on that other person of the Orphic triad.—Uranus; leaving a more particular discussion for another chapter. “The first king of that people was Ouranus, *a man* renowned for justice and benevolence, and well conversant with the stars. He was the first who honoured the heavenly gods with sacrifices, upon which account he was called Ouranus. He had two sons by his wife Hestia, who were called Pan and Cronus; and daughters, Rhea and Demetra. And Cronus reigned after Ouranus, and married Rhea, and had by her Zeus, and Hera, and Poseidon, &c.” Then come other families from them. The whole confusion here arises from mistaking titles for persons. For Ouranus, and Cronus, and Zeus, are one and the same person. And so are the

female divinities: the same with the Isis of Egypt. The attributes of justice and benevolence are constantly given to Noah. And there can be no doubt that the persons above, whether one or many, were deified mortals.

It may be observed that the Greeks, in adopting the gods of other and more ancient countries, so far misconceived the nature of some, that they made a sort of caricature of them<sup>17</sup>. It may be supposed they translated the foreign terms or titles into their own language, and from this invented some ridiculous history, corresponding to the misinterpreted appellation. Of Pan, the same with the sun in other countries, they made a filthy satyr. Pluto they made god of hell.

Bryant conceives the supposed author of the Orphic Mythology, to have been himself a deity, and that his character shows him to be the same with Orus of the Egyptians<sup>18</sup>. The history related of him, he is of opinion, refers not to an individual, but to a people called Orpheans,—worshippers of the sun. Orpheus was said to have been twice in a state of death<sup>19</sup>; “which is represented as a two-fold descent to the shades below.” It happens, also, that there was something mysterious in his death<sup>20</sup>;

<sup>17</sup> Vide Note E.

<sup>18</sup> “Under the character of Orpheus we are to understand a people, named Orpheans; who, as Vossius rightly intimates, were the same as the Cadmeans.”—vol. ii. p. 417.

<sup>19</sup> *Ib.* p. 411.

<sup>20</sup> *Ib.* p. 423.

“ for it seems to have been celebrated with the same frantic acts of grief, as people practised in their lamentations for Thamuz and Osiris, and at the rites of Baal.” He was the same person as Osiris and Dionusus; represented also as Apollo, or the sun.

There is another triad, or compound deity, on which I will offer a few observations, before concluding this chapter. If we were to credit the opinion of a modern author of great pretensions (Lord Monboddo), we would discover among the Brahmins of India, a triad infinitely excelling all the others I have mentioned. By them it was regarded, as a trinity of three divine hypostases in one God. This deity is expressed in their language, by the names of Rama, Visnou or Vishnu, and Chrisna; which, according to him, answer to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost of the Christians. Here are his own words<sup>21</sup>:—“ The Hindoos derived their whole theology and science from Egypt; and even at this day the doctrine of three persons of the Deity, in one substance, is an essential part of the creed of the Brahmins, and they call those by the same names as we do,—the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.” Now let us examine his authority for this extraordinary assertion. “ This fact is told in a French book written by one La Croze, entitled, ‘ Histoire du Christianisme des Indes,’ vol. ii. lib. iv. p. 48. And he relates it on the credit of one Manuel Godhino, a Portuguese, who was in India in the

<sup>21</sup> Orig. and Prog. of Language, vol. iv. p. 339 (note).



year 1663. And I had the fact attested by an acquaintance of mine, who had been many years in India." Such is the credulity of scepticism! We may justly say of Monboddò, what Pliny said of the Greeks; for *he* was in his taste a Grecian. "Mirum est quo procedat Græca credulitas! nullam tam impudens mendacium est, ut teste careat."

This writer would make us believe the opinion of Plotinus and the later Platonists, that the Trinity was an acknowledged doctrine, not only before the Christian religion, but before the times of Pythagoras and Plato. This is all assumption, however, for he makes no attempt to prove it. As he assures us the Indians were indebted to the Egyptians for their theology, he might also have pointed out a trinity in their religion, characterized in the same manner as the trinity of the Brahmins.

But if these triads are transcripts of the Christian doctrine, how does he dispose of the evil principle or demon<sup>22</sup>, acknowledged by the Indians as well as by the Egyptians? He cannot surely have been acquainted with the nature of these compound deities. The Indian mythology was a branch of the ancient idolatry so often alluded to, called by Bryant the Amonian worship, or the adoration of the sun.

<sup>22</sup> Plutarch, in his *Isis and Osiris*, says, that Pythagoras and Plato considered the gods of Egypt to be demons, that is, deified mortals. Typhon was a principal god; and, therefore, an evil demon.

There is a great resemblance between the Babylonian and the Indian mythology; from which we can trace the derivation of the one from the other. Lord Monboddo is not quite correct in assigning the origin of the latter to Egypt; though the religion of that country was another great branch of the general idolatry, afterwards changed by the genius and the singular superstition of the people. The Chaldeans, the Persians, Indians, and some other eastern nations, seem to have retained the original idolatry purer than the Egyptians.

Rama, according to Bryant, was a name of the chief deity,—the sun; the same with Amon and Apollo. “Ramis and Ramas denoted something high and great; and was a common title of the deity. He was called Rami, Rama, Ramas, amongst most nations in the East<sup>23</sup>.” He was called also Rama-Athan,—the great fountain of light,—the sun.

Vishnu was represented in the form of a fish; and referred to Noah and the deluge. The same emblematic representation was prevalent among the Babylonians; and we shall see, hereafter, to whose history it alluded, as given to us in some fragments from Berossus.

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<sup>23</sup> An. My. iii. 140.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE TRIAD; THE THREE KINGS OR ROYAL PERSONAGES, DEDUCED FROM ANCIENT HISTORY.

SUCH an event as the deluge must at all times constitute an era in the history of our world. To those immediately connected with so great and awful an occurrence, it must have left an impression not to be effaced for ages. Parents, no doubt, in lively language described it to their children, and these to their children, so that it would go down from one generation to another, little impaired in its prominent features. We can well imagine also, that those persons connected with the deluge, Noah and his family, were, by their descendants, regarded with peculiar veneration. The character given to the chief personage by Moses, shows how much he merited the esteem and admiration of posterity.

It is probable, likewise, that the commemoration of the event was kept up with great strictness and exactitude; and that religious rites were introduced for this exclusive purpose; for it cannot be supposed that Noah passed over his deliverance in unexpressed gratitude; and failed to establish some peculiar rite, to return thanks to God for the salvation of this remnant of the human race. We shall, therefore,

find that such is implied in the various accounts given of him; for it is constantly said, he was the first who erected altars to God.

The sacred historian is not the only one who gives an account of this great calamity. We have frequent allusions to it in the preserved writings of some very ancient authors, more or less precise.

In the extant fragments of Berossus<sup>1</sup>, a priest of Belus, or the sun, of the age of Alexander the Great, we have an account of the deluge, which wonderfully resembles that of the Sacred Writings, and corroborates its perfect truth. It may be perceived, however, that the Mosaic account enjoys great advantages over the profane, in precision of language, and accurate description. In truth, the account of Berossus was, no doubt, compiled from the memorials of Chaldea, whether handed down in oral tradition, or, what is more probable, in records preserved by the priests of the sun.

It has been observed, that the Vishnu of the Brahmins was represented in the form of a fish: so the Babylonian deity assumed the shape of half a fish and half a man; thus alluding to, or typifying, the history presented to us by Berossus. He informs us, that a monster named Oannes, appeared from the sea bordering on Babylonia, in ancient times, whose whole body was that of a fish; but his head was the head of a man. Though an animal of

<sup>1</sup> Frag. of Chaldean History.

this nature, he is said to have possessed an articulate voice, and to have spoken in the language of men. But, with singular inconsistency, Berossus acquaints us also, that this animal was devoid of reason; yet he is said, at the same time, to have taught letters and science to mankind; to have instructed them in the building of cities and temples; and, in fact, to have taught them every useful art which tends to civilize and promote the happiness of the human race.

Though all this could not be properly attributed to the individual patriarch Noah, yet it might very well be said of his immediate descendants. It is the character given them, wherever memorials can be discovered of this ancient family; and it appears to distinguish, more especially, the posterity of Ham, who are constantly celebrated by reason of their wisdom and knowledge.

But it is not necessary to think that the obscure history of Oannes alluded to one person in particular. It would more correctly refer to the whole remnant of the human race, who were miraculously saved at the deluge. For there is nothing more natural than to symbolize this great event, under the form of half-fish and half-man; the one alluding to the ark, the other to those enclosed in it.

The Grecians composed the fable of the Centaurs, from the ridiculous mistake of believing the man and the horse or bull which he rode to make one entire animal; the Babylonians, under the emblem-

tical form of a monster, represented the insensible ark, and the reasoning and intelligent beings who were for a time enclosed within it.

Bryant somewhere ingeniously says, that the Egyptian crocodile was sacred, on account of its being regarded as a very appropriate symbol of the ark.

Berosus, in another part of this fragment, gives a more exact account of Noah and the deluge, under the name of Xisuthrus, whom he supposed to be the tenth king of Chaldea. It is said, that the deluge happened in his time; and that the deity Cronus<sup>2</sup> appeared to him, and warned him of the coming event, which was to destroy the human race. This which follows is perfectly consonant with the Mosaic history. "He enjoined him to build a vessel, and take with him into it his friends and relatives; and convey on board everything to sustain life, together with all the different animals, both birds and quadrupeds, and trust himself fearlessly to the deep<sup>3</sup>."

The memorial of the deluge is to be found, more or less, incorporated with the theologies and histories of Chaldea, Egypt, and Greece; and other nations of antiquity.

<sup>2</sup> Cronus here signifies the Supreme Being. We shall find, however, that the same title was given to Noah, when demon-worship was introduced.

<sup>3</sup> Cory's An. Frag. p. 27, to which I refer the reader for the rest of this exact history; also to Bryant's Ancient Mythology.

Time<sup>4</sup> itself is said to commence from this event. All science and knowledge are said to have been discovered, and first taught by the progenitors of mankind, concerned or connected with that occurrence. Bryant imagines, that the mysteries of the ancient mythology related to the deluge, and to the preservation of mankind; and that the grief and lamentations, the rapturous joy, the frantic gestures, and other demonstrations of woe and rejoicing, were instituted in commemoration of the lost world, and subsequently of the salvation of Noah and his family. Something of the same nature was obscurely signified in the Egyptian worship, in the wailings for the loss of Osiris, and the shouts of joy which were raised, when he was supposed to be found again<sup>5</sup>.

Moses relates, that Noah was a good and a just person; and that it was for his sake, that the world and its inhabitants were not utterly destroyed. We may, therefore, suppose, that from the great sanctity of his character, he was regarded by his family and descendants with peculiar veneration. Accordingly, we find him distinguished by every great and honorable title, esteemed by the ancients, and considered to be the exponent of goodness and of greatness; as the first husbandman, the first who erected altars to

<sup>4</sup> Cronus is translated Time by the Greeks; but is this not an error, arising from the cause so often mentioned, of applying to ancient titles, the meaning which the word bore in the Greek, that had some resemblance in sound? Cronus, or Time, was a person of the Orphic triad.

<sup>5</sup> Vide Note F.

God; as he who brought men from ignorance to wisdom, and from a savage and brutal, to a civilized and humane existence.

He is called also, in reference to his situation after the deluge, the first-born of mankind; the first king of every nation (though improperly applied); and his family were looked upon also as kings, and mighty conquerors.

This reverence for Noah and his family, in course of time, degenerated into idolatry, when religious rites came to be instituted to their honor. The Most High, who brought them through the deep, was forgotten, or disregarded; and these, the creatures of His will, were, in time, considered to be the true saviours<sup>6</sup> of the world.

“In<sup>7</sup> progress of time, when there was a falling-off from the truth, we might expect that a person of so high a character as Noah, so particularly distinguished by the Deity, could not fail of being revered by his posterity; and when idolatry prevailed, that he would be one of the first among the sons of men, to whom divine honors would be paid. We might conclude that these memorials (of the deluge) would be interwoven in the mythology of the Gentile world; and that there would be continually allusions to these ancient occurrences, in the rites and mysteries, as they were practised by the nations of the earth.”

<sup>6</sup> They are also denominated mediators.

<sup>7</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 6.



Noah being the head of his family, to him was allotted the settlement of his children, and the partition of the earth among his three sons, Ham, Shem, and Japheth. He, no doubt, instructed them in the regulation and management of their affairs, as well as in the duties which they owed to God, and the proper worship due to Him. For this reason he is, therefore, called the first lawgiver; and sometimes, the first who taught geometry to mankind, as well as the original founder of altars and religious rites.

But it seems that a branch of this ancient family had within them the seeds of rebellion and of idolatry, developed afterwards in their discontentment at the partition of the earth, as adjusted by Noah. They appear to have despised their own territory, and coveted the possessions of the tribe of Shem. And their dissatisfaction at their own settlement, and defiance of the precepts of their great progenitor, in the ordination of earthly as well as of heavenly things, led them also to deny the true God, and to establish a religion of their own creating. That fierce ambition and lawless desire which inspired hatred and revenge to men, likewise undermined their loyalty and obedience to the King of heaven and of earth.

Nimrod, the son of Chus, of the family of Ham, seems to have been the first who publicly revolted against God and man. The seeds sown, perhaps, years before, were developed and brought to maturity in the mind of this person, who may be said to have

possessed the will and the abilities to carry his plans into execution. For he was a man of aspiring ambition; and from the numbers of his followers, he evinces the qualifications to command: his presumption was equal to his subsequent bold and daring actions.

Nimrod, by some, was regarded as the first king of the earth, which is probably consonant to truth. He seems to have aimed at universal sovereignty. By Berossus<sup>8</sup> he is called Alorus<sup>9</sup>, the first king of Babylon, “and gave out a report, that God had appointed him to be the shepherd of the people.” He was styled, also, Belus or Bel, a title of the sun. He was the first Titan or giant, a general name given to his followers.

In the rebellion of Nimrod, it is my purpose more particularly to observe the idolatry introduced by him.

The sacred historian informs us, that the ostensible object of erecting the tower of Babel, upon the plains of Babylonia, was, “lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the earth.” That the intention of the rebels was to form a beacon or centre-

<sup>8</sup> An. Frag. p. 32.

<sup>9</sup> Alorus was originally a Babylonish god and hero. As a god it represents the sun, the god of light and fire; when it betokens a man, it seems to refer both to Chus and Nimrod; but more particularly to the latter, who was the first monarch on earth, and the first deified hero. An. My. vol. vi. p. 119.

Bryant says, also, that the meaning of Alorus is the god of fire, or the sun.

point, around which they might congregate and concentrate their force; and then give defiance to the whole world. It ought to be remarked, that the country here did not belong to them; but to the family of Shem, which rendered this caution the more necessary; so that any sudden irruption by those, spoiled of their possessions, might, by this concentration of force, be successfully repelled.

But I cannot help believing, that besides this ostensible object in erecting the tower, there was another concealed purpose, not alluded to by Moses, for wise reasons; that it was intended for a temple, an idolatrous temple, reared to the honor of the sun and the celestial host,—the religion instituted by Nimrod.

Berosus gives the historical event with great accuracy. “They say<sup>10</sup>, that the first inhabitants of the earth, glorying in their own strength and size, and despising the gods, undertook to raise a tower, whose top should reach the sky, in the place in which Babylon now stands; but when it approached the heavens, the winds assisted the gods, and overthrew the work upon its contrivers; and its ruins are said to be still at Babylon; and the gods introduced a diversity of tongues among men, who at that time had all spoken the same language; and a war arose between Cronus and Titan.”

In another fragment, taken from Hestæus, it is

<sup>10</sup> An. Frag. p. 34.

mentioned who the god was, to whom this tower or temple was erected. "The priests who escaped took with them the implements of the worship of the Enyalian Jove; and came to Senaar, in Babylonia." This Jove was the same with Bel, or Belus, of the Chaldeans, as Berossus testifies<sup>11</sup>: "This Belus, by whom they signify Jupiter." And Jupiter was undoubtedly a title of the sun<sup>12</sup>, how much-soever he was diversified and multiplied by the Greeks and Romans. We may collect this from the description given of the sun in the Orphic hymns:

Immortal Jove, flute-playing, bearing light,  
Source of existence, pure, and fiery bright, &c.<sup>13</sup>

Nimrod founded the city of Babel, or Babylon, and, assuming the title of the sun, he is sometimes called Bel or Belus; and after his death, he was deified and worshipped as a hero, or demi-god; for his ancestors were properly considered to be gods.

"The<sup>14</sup> city of Babel, where was the scene of those great occurrences which we have been mentioning, was begun by Nimrod, and enlarged by his posterity. It seems to have been a great seminary of idolatry;

<sup>11</sup> An. Frag. p. 25.

<sup>12</sup> Varro enumerates three hundred Jupiters, arising from mistaking titles for so many distinct divinities.

<sup>13</sup> Hymn to the Sun.

<sup>14</sup> "And as the city was devoted to the worship of the sun, it was also called the city of Bel-on, sive civitas Dei solis, which was afterwards changed to Babylon." Bryant on the Dispersion of Nations.

and the tower, a stupendous building, was erected in honor of *the sun*, and named the tower of Bel.”

Many mythological fables were constructed on the event of the overthrow of the tower; and the destruction of those who arraigned Heaven and “despised the gods.”

There is a remarkable description in the Sibylline oracles, given in the Ancient Fragments<sup>15</sup>, to which I have been so greatly indebted<sup>16</sup>. Subsequently “the oracle mentions Cronus, Titan and Japetus, as the three sons of the patriarch, governing the world in the tenth generation.”

*Και τότε δη δεκατη γενεη μεροπων ανθρωπων,  
'Εξ ουπερ κατακλυσμος επι προτερουσ γενετ' ανδρασ,  
Και βασιλευσε Κρονος, και Τιταν, 'Ιαπετος τε.*

It may be observed, that these three persons are here styled kings. Cronus represents Shem; Titan, Ham; the other is obvious. Though Shem is here called Cronus, it is, more properly, a name given to his father Noah; and although there is no reason given for this misappropriation, we may well imagine that he was so called from his being the favourite son, and the most obedient descendant of the patriarch. It will be seen afterwards, that these distinctive names are often given to denote the tribes or families, and not the individuals.

Bryant<sup>17</sup> conceives the fable of Vulcan (the god of fire,) who was cast down from heaven, and thrown

<sup>15</sup> p. 51.

<sup>16</sup> Vide Note G.

<sup>17</sup> An. My. vol. iv. p. 60.

into the sea, to be founded on this ancient story. There does seem something analogous in this verse from Homer :

He seized him by the foot, and headlong threw  
From the high tower of Belus<sup>18</sup>.

This is said of Vulcan being thrown down from heaven by Jupiter.

The first defection, then, from the worship of the Most High, seems to have been the adoration of the sun, and the celestial host. The great luminary of day, the source of light and of heat, the most natural and appropriate emblem of the Divinity, was regarded by his worshippers as the chief of all the gods, and the cause of all things. By whatever variety of characters, or diversity of titles, this deity was distinguished in different countries, he may be traced to this idolatry. The three hundred Jupiters mentioned by Varro are only names of one great divinity. Macrobius bears witness to this interesting fact<sup>19</sup>.

The sun was at first adored with symbols of the purest and simplest nature. No sacrifices seem originally to have been offered to this deity. The objects which were supposed by his votaries to partake in any manner of his sensible attributes, were esteemed sacred, and looked upon as emblems of his glory or brilliancy. The element of fire, commonly used in his adoration, was such an emblem; par-

<sup>18</sup> Iliad, v. 591.

<sup>19</sup> Vide Note II.

ticipating, as it were, of his nature, and bearing a striking resemblance to those attributes.

The idolaters who instituted this worship, do not seem to have abided long by it in its simplest and purest form; the most natural and most refined of every species of idol or creature-worship. In course of time, the titles of this deity were awarded to some of their principal ancestors, by mankind, more especially to Noah and his three sons; and they and their children came to be called, accordingly, sons of god, princes of light, and other titles of a like purport.

In this custom we may trace the natural progress of idolatry. In the first instance, the sun was an emblem of the Most High, regarded as the expressed and sensible image of his glory and beneficence; but as men fell into ignorance and error, the symbol came to be confounded with God whose representative it was. Then, again, the adoration of the symbol in its originally pure and simple nature, was obscured and degraded by the admixture and participation of deified men in its worship. By the custom of bestowing the various titles of the sun, upon some men venerated as benefactors of the human race, mankind, in time, were conducted to a yet lower species of idolatry; for they came to look upon the "children of the sun" as the real progeny of that god, and worshipped them accordingly. The heads of the family were gods; the others had religious rites instituted to them, as demi-gods and

heroes. From this mixture of the symbol and that which it represented; of the sun-worship with the worship of deified mortals; of the type with the antitype; arises all the complexity and confusion perceptible in the ancient mythology. The chief deity is sometimes described in his celestial character as the glorious orb of day, in all his benignant attributes; and again, we find him reduced to a mere mortal nature such as ourselves, who rules over a tribe, propagates his species, and then dies and is buried like other men<sup>20</sup>. Hence<sup>21</sup> probably arose the heavenly Jupiter and the terrestrial Jupiter; the mundane and the super-mundane gods of later mythologists; the former the sun and celestial host; the other the deified ancestors of the human race.

The idolatry alluded to seems to have spread as widely as the adoration of the sun. In truth, the one was the associate of the other, arising out of similar circumstances, and being propagated by the same people. Where we discover the one religion, we find, more or less, memorials of the deluge, and the consequences to which it led; in the undue veneration of mankind for those connected with that great event.

Of the three sons of Noah, Ham was held in the

<sup>20</sup> Vide Note I.

<sup>21</sup> Great stress is laid upon this distinction by the later Platonists. In truth, it is the very essence of their polytheism; affording great room for refinement and manifold subtleties. In their hands it was found a most convenient instrument by which to overcome obstacles, and reconcile *apparent* contradictions.



greatest estimation by the first idolaters, and their posterity. He was looked up to as the sun, as the chief deity, and as the creator of the world. His worship prevailed among many nations of antiquity. The Jupiter Ammon of the Egyptians was this personage, who was regarded by them as the same with the sun.

This extract from a Chaldean fragment bears remarkable testimony to the introduction and practice of ancestral worship. “But<sup>18</sup> after this, their successors, overstepping the intentions of their ancestors, that they should honor them as their progenitors, and the inventors of good things, with monuments alone; honored them as *heavenly gods*, and sacrificed to them as such.”

<sup>18</sup> An. Frag. p. 56.

## CHAPTER IV.

THE SUBJECT CONTINUED ; WITH SOME OBSERVATIONS  
ON THE ORIGIN OF THE WORD *Nous*, AFTERWARDS  
CALLED ALSO *Λογος*.

THE Amonian idolatry, in passing into different countries, and being introduced among various tribes of people, must have undergone some change in its progress, either through the influence of time, or according to the character and disposition of those by whom it was adopted. Notwithstanding, it is never so much altered or obscured, as to have obliterated wholly the traces of its origin. Having primarily come from Babylonia, it extended its empire far and wide, being conveyed by the defeated rebels who fled from the overthrow of the tower of Babel. It was either eagerly adopted by the different tribes to whom it was introduced ; or forced upon them by their successful conquerors ; and if we were to take Egypt<sup>1</sup> as an example, it might be said that the new was a great improvement on the former religion.

<sup>1</sup> The Egyptians were indebted for the Amonian idolatry to their shepherd-kings, who held that country in subjection for some hundred years. It would appear, that before this epoch, they were guilty of some debased superstition ; for it is said, that these sun-worshippers were so disgusted with their religion, that they overthrew their temples and forbade their religious rites.

The people who carried this worship into so many countries were highly celebrated for their knowledge, wisdom, and science. They seem to have improved every country which they conquered, or in which they made a settlement; and hence we have constantly memorials of this kind in the history of almost every nation. The ancients supposed that they were indebted to certain individuals for the first introduction of letters; but Bryant, and I think properly, says, they mistook a tribe, or a migration of people, for an individual. Thus the Greeks awarded this honor to one Cadmus, whom they individualized from a people called Cadmeans; a title probably characteristic of their worship; for it was a custom among these idolaters to arrogate to themselves the peculiar name of their worship, or of their chief deity. They called themselves, sometimes, also, after one of their venerated ancestors, which Bryant believes this Cadmus to have been, if, indeed, there ever was such a person.

Orpheus had probably his origin in this custom; for there is no history of this person on which we can place any reliance. The Orphic theology is undoubtedly a branch of the Amonian worship, which was subsequently introduced among the Greeks<sup>2</sup>,

<sup>2</sup> The Grecians admit that they were indebted to a foreign source for their letters. A colony of the sun-worshippers settled in that country at a very early period. The inhabitants before this era were, like the Egyptians, at a very low ebb of civilization.

and refined upon by them. We must, therefore, regard the Orphic triad as of precisely the same origin, and relating to the same persons, as the triplex deities of Chaldea and Egypt. Some philosophers have begot many subtleties on these triads of the ancients, deducing from them, among other mysteries, the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead. But as we withdraw the veil of sophistry, and disclose truth in her native simplicity, we shall perceive, that the objects of their speculation originated in the worship of the patriarch and his three sons; the one being denominated the founder of the triad, the father of the three kings, or royal personages, or by whatever name they may be styled.

We have already seen that Noah is to be distinguished in history by various titles, among others of Cronus. In the fragments of Berossus, he is figured under the emblematical form of half a man and half a fish; which may either be conceived of him in particular, or of all contained in the ark in general. I have observed, also, that it is not unfrequent to call a family or tribe by the name of its founder; so that when we find it said that a war sprang up, after the deluge, between two persons, we must suppose this of their families or descendants. Hence in a Chaldean fragment, preserved by Alexander Polyhistor, it is said, "After the deluge lived Titan and Prometheus, when Titan undertook a war against Cronus." Berossus says the same thing happened after the destruction of the tower of

Babel; which refers to a war between the family of Shem, and that of Ham, or Cush, who are invariably called Titans and giants. The tribe of Shem were, no doubt, fighting for the possessions allotted to them, but which had been surreptitiously obtained by the other family. We have seen, likewise, that the Sibylline oracles particularize the three families under the names of Cronus, Titan, and Iäpetus. These persons were called the first kings of the country into which the idolatry was introduced; and accordingly they are placed in the catalogue of their kings; thus engrafting the general history of the human race after the deluge on their own particular annals. But these three persons are not only styled monarchs of the whole earth, but gods also; so that we find the reign of the gods to precede that of the demi-gods, heroes, and mortals. In<sup>3</sup> the old Egyptian chronicle, the first dynasty is put down in this order:—

“Reign of the gods.

“To Hephæstus is assigned no time, as he is apparent both by day and night. Helius his son reigned three myriads of years. (These two are titles of the sun.)

“Then Cronus and the other twelve divinities reigned 3984 years.”

These last gods refer to the deluvian families; but it ought to be remarked that the above *twelve* ought

<sup>3</sup> An. Frag. p. 89.

to be *eight*<sup>4</sup>, for such was the number in the ancient mythology. The number eight was esteemed sacred by the ancient Egyptians; called by them the sacred or holy *ogdoas*, which consisted of eight persons in a boat, who were regarded as the most ancient gods of the country. "This number was held sacred, and esteemed mysterious by other nations<sup>5</sup>." It alluded to the ark, and the eight persons enclosed in it. I need only allude to the well-known representation of Osiris and the sacred ark, or boat.

In the enumeration above, the title Cronus refers to the patriarch, though he never assumed sovereignty in his own person. Such a latitude is allowable, though not strictly consonant with truth. It was a practice of the ancients to describe him as a monarch with all the emblems of royalty; probably on account of his being the head and fountain of the whole human race. As I have often repeated, he was more particularly distinguished as a husbandman and planter of the vine.

In a passage quoted from Eusebius, on the Egyptian dynasties, the sun is in the same manner as the above placed first; then follow<sup>6</sup> Agathodæmon,

<sup>4</sup> "There is a very ancient god among the Egyptians who is called Heracles; and they assert that from his reign to that of Amasis, 17,000 years have elapsed; they reckoned him among the gods when the number was augmented from eight to twelve." —*Herodot.* lib. ii. cap. 23.

<sup>5</sup> *An. Myth.* vol. iv. p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> Bryant supposes this benign deity to be Noah, who was crowned with the lotus, and called Noë Agathodæmon. He

Cronus, Osiris, Typhon, and Orus, who are styled the first kings of Egypt. It is manifest these so-called kings are all titles of one person, except, indeed, Typhon, whose history we have already explained. Bryant acquaints us that "when the adoration of the sun was introduced by the posterity of Ham, the title of Helius was, among others, conferred on Noah." The other names by which he was called related more especially to his history and character, as Prometheus, Deucalion, Atlas, Osiris, and Zuth<sup>7</sup>.

I conceive, then, there cannot remain a doubt, that those who were called the first kings of every nation, were the same persons as the gods who were worshipped: that the deities of Egypt and even of Greece were really deified mortals, to whom the idolaters awarded the various titles of the sun. In a fragment from Epiphanius, we have it stated in corroboration of this, that it was not until some time after idolatry was introduced (namely, the Sabian worship) that Cronus and Rhea, Zeus and Apollo, and the rest, were esteemed as gods.

The Cabiritic<sup>8</sup> worship seems to have particu-

adds this curious note, "the name of Noe, the Greeks transposed and expressed *Νεο Αγαθοδαιμων*."—vol. iv. p. 202.

<sup>7</sup> Vide Note K.

<sup>8</sup> "Who these Cabirim might be, has been a matter of unsuccessful inquiry to many learned men. The most that is known with certainty is, that they were originally *three*, and were called by way of eminence, the great or mighty ones, for that is the import of the Hebrew name."—*Bishop Horsley*.

larized the three sons of Noah, who were called the *three*, and the great and mighty ones. Bryant says<sup>9</sup>, “The original Cabiritic divinity was Zeuth; the same as Dionusus, though by some writers idly distinguished.” He acquaints us, also, that it was the opinion of Pausanias that he was the same with Prometheus, *the father of mankind*. The sons of this chief god were called the sons of Sadye, the just man, and “they<sup>10</sup> are represented as demons, and in number three; and they are sometimes mentioned as the sons of the great artist Hephaistus, the chief deity of Egypt<sup>11</sup>.”

The Prometheus mentioned by Pausanias is a title of Noah, and the same as Deucalion, as Philo affirms. “Deucalion was Noah. The former name was prevalent among the Greeks; but the Chaldeans called him Noë, in whose time happened the Deluge.”

After these prefatory remarks, I will now proceed to throw some light on the origin of the Orphic triad; and attempt to deduce it from the Cabiritic mystery, or doctrine of three persons, over whom there was supposed to rule a chief or superior.

Proclus<sup>12</sup> assures us that the Orphic triad of Uranus, Phanes, and Cronus, is substantially the same with the three kings of Plato. And according to him, also, the other Platonists held a like opinion. Amelius, refining on the others, imagined a three-

<sup>9</sup> An. Myth. vol. iii. p. 342.

<sup>10</sup> Id.

<sup>11</sup> Vide Note L.

<sup>12</sup> Procl. in Tim. ii. 93.



fold demiurgus; and the three intellects to be the three kings, which, he says, are the same as those mentioned by Orpheus and Plato. These persons of the triad, however much obscured by fable and sophistry, relate to Noah and his family; and are really the demons of the ancients, called, as Bryant says, the Baalim in Scripture. Even Hesiod, in his *Opera et Dies*, makes some allusion to these persons, and when they lived. “The demons lived in the time of Cronus;” and that they were deified men we have the same testimony:

Αυταρ επει κεν τουτο γενοσ κατα γαια καλυψεν,  
 ‘Οι μεν Δαιμονες εισι—  
 Εσθλοι, επιχθονιον, φυλακες θνητων ανθρωπων.

“When they died, they became demons, a sort of benevolent beings, who resided within the verge of the earth, and were called guardians of mankind.”

Now Cronus, as we have seen, is Noah; and there can be no doubt that the meaning of this Orphic hymn alludes to Noah also, who is called Phanes<sup>13</sup> and Protogonus<sup>14</sup>. “I invoke Protogonus, *the first of men*, who was of a twofold state or nature; who wandered at large under the wide heavens enclosed in an ovicular machine, (whence he was called *Ωογενης*—*ovi genitus*,) who was also depicted with golden wings.”

<sup>13</sup> Bryant thinks Phanes is Eros,—or Iris, the rainbow; which may be true; but certainly it is also a title of Noah, from the description given of him.

<sup>14</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 203.

Bryant, out of Proclus himself, affords singular confirmation of all that has been advanced. The latter nearly approximated to the true history, which he had, no doubt, from some ancient source; but, from ignorance of its purport, he turns it to ridicule.

“As Cronus was no other than Zeus<sup>15</sup>, we may find the account of the *triad* further explained in the history of the latter; and by the same author (Proclus): *Zeus ó προ* (or perhaps, *ó πατηρ*) *των τριων Κρονιδων, ούτος εστιν ó των όλων δημιουργος*, “Time and all things among the ancients were deduced from Noah (or Cronus); hence they came at last, through their blind reverence, to think him the *real creator*, *Δημιουργος*; and that he contrived everything in his chaotic cavern:—*ταυτα πατηρ ποιησε κατα σπεος ήεροειδες*.” This is curious; but how much more singular does it appear, when we find Proclus, the Coryphæus of Platonism, and the great expounder of the trinity, aiding us so far as to declare, that this very *Cronus was the founder of the Triad*<sup>16</sup>! *βασιλευς Κρονος ύποστατης εστι—της αμειλικτου Τριαδος*, “King Cronus is the founder of the fierce Triad<sup>17</sup>.” Now Cronus being Noah, the three Cronii mentioned by Proclus as *τριων Κρονιδων*, are the three sons of the patriarch; so that the Platonic triad is founded on the ancient demoniacal worship of these three per-

<sup>15</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 107.

<sup>16</sup> Proc. Tim. lib. v. cap. x. p. 265; also An. My. vol. iii. p. 108.

<sup>17</sup> Vide Note M.

sons. The ancients are ridiculed by Proclus for entertaining the notion that Cronus was the real Demiurgus; but the Greeks were manifestly guilty of the same error, for their Zeus or Jupiter had no higher origin, though the Platonists called him the true creator of the world.

Moses informs us that the earth was divided among the three sons of Noah. Homer alludes to this settlement in his great poem :

Three brother deities from Saturn came,  
And ancient Rhea, earth's immortal dame,  
Assigned by lot, our triple rule we know<sup>18</sup>.

These were Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. We may conclude, then, that the ancient, as well as the Platonic triad, which is said to be the same with the Orphic, Chaldean, and Egyptian, was derived originally from this demoniacal worship, though men lost its true history, and attributed it to another source; awarding to it also a different nature and character.

“As<sup>19</sup> all mankind proceeded from the three families of which the patriarch was the head, we find this circumstance continually alluded to by the ancient mythologists. And the *three persons* who first constituted these families were looked upon both as deities and kings.”

The ancient mythology agrees in acknowledging two primary principles of all things; the one male and the other female<sup>20</sup>. “From the two, or more

<sup>18</sup> Iliad, b. xv.

<sup>19</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 108.

<sup>20</sup> Cory's Intro. Dissertation, p. 34.

frequently from the male, proceeded three sons or Hypostases, which, when examined severally, are each one and the same with the principle from which they sprung; but when viewed conjointly, they constitute a triad, emanating from a fourth yet older divinity, who by a mysterious act of self-triplication, becomes three, while he yet remains but one, each member of the triad being ultimately resolvable into the monad." Whether the *most ancient* mythologists reasoned or subtilized after this manner would be difficult to prove; nevertheless the whole mystery is resolvable into its elements in the worship of deified men.

Though the writer above does not seem to agree with us in the conclusions arrived at, yet he admits much to strengthen our position; for, after asserting that the polytheism of the ancients "is resolvable into the original god or goddess," he notices the *human* or *terrestrial*, and the *physical* or *celestial* aspect in which the primary principles appear to us. These we have marked or distinguished by calling the one the idolatry of sun-worship, and the other the idolatry of worshipping mere deified mortals.

This writer continues after this manner: "In his terrestrial character, the chief hero-god, under whatever name, is claimed by every nation as its progenitor and founder. And not only is he celebrated as the king of that country in particular, but of the whole world." He acknowledges also, that this

deity, in his human character, was looked upon as the father of mankind; and in his celestial character, he was held to be the sun: all which coincides with what we have advanced. This is the first or male principle, alluded to above, represented in this mixed or twofold character.

The same writer says<sup>21</sup>, “ But the character of the great goddess is of a more complex description. As the companion of man, she is *the ark*, which was regarded not only as his consort, but his daughter, as the work of his own hands; and his mother, from whose womb he again emerged, *as an infant, to a second light*; and his preserver during the catastrophe of the deluge. As the companion of the sun, she is either the earth or moon: not that the distinctions between the human and the celestial characters are accurately maintained; for they are so strangely blended together, that the adventures applicable to one are frequently, and sometimes purposely, misapplied to the other.”

It may be true, as he says, that demonolatry was introduced subsequently to the worship of nature and the elements; but I do not see how this interferes with our conclusions, that the triad was originally derived from the former. I have, indeed, admitted as much.

Before I bring this branch of our inquiry to a conclusion, I will lay before the reader a very

<sup>21</sup> Cory's Intro. Dissertation, p. 36 and 37.

curious hypothesis of Bryant's, which, if founded on truth, would explain the origin of the word *Nous*, so frequently used in the disquisitions of the later Platonists. It would prove, along with all that we have already laid down, that the whole Platonic theology, as developed by the philosophers of the Christian era, was based on a misconception of the true characters and histories of the persons mentioned in it; and that the second person of their trinity, in particular, originated from a misunderstanding of the word by which they expressed him; thus following the custom of the Greeks, in perverting the genuine signification of foreign names. That the word or name of Noah was altogether lost among the ancient Pagans, is disproved by the fact of its occurring in some very ancient writings. Among the people of the East, more especially in Chaldea, he was called Noas, Naus, sometimes contracted to Nous.

Bryant, in this singular passage, throws great light on the subject: "Anaxagoras<sup>22</sup> of Clazomenæ had been in Egypt, and there obtained some knowledge of this personage. He spoke of him by the name of Noas, and Nous; and both he and his disciples were sensible that it was a foreign appellation; yet he has well nigh ruined a very curious history, by taking the terms in a wrong acceptation, and then making inferences in consequence of this abuse. 'The<sup>23</sup> disciples of Anaxagoras say, that Nous is by

<sup>22</sup> An. My.

<sup>23</sup> Euseb. His. Synagoge, p. 374.

interpretation the deity Dis, or Dios; and they called<sup>24</sup> Athena, Art or Science; they likewise esteem Nous the same as Prometheus.’” Upon which Bryant proceeds to say, “He then informs us why they looked upon Nous to be Prometheus, because he was *the renewer of mankind, and was said to have fashioned them again, after they had in a manner been extinct.* All this is to be inferred from the words above. But the author, while he is giving us this curious account, starts aside, and, forgetting that he is confessedly treating of a foreign term, recurs to his own language, and from thence frames a solution of the story. He tells us that Nous, which he had been speaking of as a proper name was, after all, a Grecian; *vous*, the mind; that the mind was Prometheia, and Prometheus was said to renew mankind by new-forming their minds, and leading them by cultivation from ignorance to knowledge.”

That conjecture of Anaxagoras, that Nous was the deity Dis or Dios, leads us to the solution of another appellation of the patriarch, compounded of these two words, called by the Grecians Dionusus; and which they translated Divine Mind or Intellect; but which really signified *Divine Noah.* Macrobius

<sup>24</sup> Plato in his Cratylus, says, that according to some ancients, Ἀθῆνα was nothing but Νοῦς, or διανοία, mind or understanding, personified and deified. He thought, also, that those who gave that name signified by it Divine Wisdom, calling it Ἀθῆνα, as Θεοῦ νοήσιον, the Understanding of God, as if the word had been at first Θεονοη, afterwards changed to Ἀθῆνα.—Cud. Intell. System, vol. ii. p. 103.

clearly fell into this mistake when he said, “Physici Διονυσον, Διος νοον—dixerunt.” *They say that the sun is the mind of God.* For Dionusus was the same with the sun in his celestial character.

Bryant says, that Διος was the ancient term for the word Deus, God; which renders the above still more satisfactory. This curious error (if the hypothesis be founded on truth) was encouraged greatly by the later Platonists, who, not comprehending the true signification of the term Nous, regarded it in a mysterious light. “Proclus<sup>25</sup> is continually ringing the changes upon the terms νοος, νοερος, and νοητος; and explains, what is really a proper name, as if it signified *sense* and *intellect*. In consequence of this, he tries to subtilize, and refine all the base jargon about Saturn and Zeus; and would persuade us, that the most idle and obscene legends related to the Divine Mind.”

From these terms the Platonists formed their triads of intelligible and intellectual gods, or rather demons. “They<sup>26</sup> are αμειλικτος τριας, called likewise η νοητη και νοερα τριας—των νοητων—και νοερων θεων, fierce triad, intellectual and intelligible triad, the intellectual and intelligible gods.”

<sup>25</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 104.

<sup>26</sup> Id. p. 111.



PART THE SECOND.

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ON THE  
THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY  
OF PLATO,

&c.



## PART THE SECOND.

## CHAPTER I.

THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS EXPRESS THE UNITY OF GOD; BUT THEY ARE SILENT ON THE SUBJECT OF A TRINITY IN THIS UNITY.

IN these preliminary observations it was my object to trace the origin of the triads to the deification of mortal natures, (though I may seem to have been seduced by the extent, interest, and diversity of the subject, to treat of it more at large than was necessary for that purpose,) and to show to what source the Platonists were indebted for their trinity of causes or principles, so far as it related to the Orphical, and other ancient systems of mythology.

On the same grounds, we may conclude, that if Plato really entertained such a doctrine as this (borrowing it, as Proclus says, from Orpheus), which he expressed by "Three Kings," it had no higher origin than in the worship of demons. However, he does not, in his writings, judge it to be of such importance, as even to allude to it in his known and expressed ideas of the primary causes of all things. For there cannot be a greater absurdity than the practice of

some of his professed followers (the later Platonists), who egregiously confounded the ancient triads, with the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines, of the first causes or principles of all things, which are styled God, Idea, Matter, and the Soul of the World. That these philosophers were guilty of this extraordinary error, is certain: we shall be convinced of it as we proceed to treat of their philosophy or theology.

We have seen that Proclus himself, and Amelinus also, both great advocates for a trinity, assert the Orphic triad, and the three kings of Plato, to relate to the same persons, and to be derived from the same fountain. Yet these men strenuously preach to us, that the trinity of Plato is composed of the Good, Intellect, and the Soul; or, as others have it, of being, life and intellect; or God, the intelligible intellect, and the intellectual or supermundane soul of the universe.

As we are about to institute some inquiries into the real opinions of Plato, as laid down and expressed in his own genuine writings, I will first offer a few remarks on the notion or conception of God entertained by some other philosophers of his, and of the Pythagorean school, for the purpose of seeing whether any allusion is made, in their descriptions of the Divine Being, to that doctrine of archical hypostases, said to be a Pythagorean, Parmenidean, as well as a Platonic “dogma or cabala.”

It will not be denied, that in the manifold expressions on this subject, discovered in their recorded

opinions, they had abundant opportunities to make some allusion, however faint and obscure, to the doctrine so freely ascribed to them. But they seem to have studiously shunned these opportunities, for there is not one passage, not one expression, which can by any ingenuity bear such a construction.

Notwithstanding this great obstacle, Dr. Cudworth, in his learned work on *The Intellectual System of the Universe*, would persuade us that Plato was a very orthodox Trinitarian. He is not satisfied with the proof, that Plato held the abstract idea; but he declares to us, that he believed as we believe; understood, as the fathers understood, that, in a word, he was no Arian, but a true Athanasian.

“Plato<sup>1</sup> plainly and expressly agrees or symbolizes, not with the doctrine of Arius, but with that of the Nicene Council, and Athanasius; that the second hypostasis of the Trinity, whether called Mind, or Word, or Son, is not *ἕτερουσιος*, but *γενουστῆς*, or *ὁμοουσιος*, co-essential or consubstantial with the first, and therefore not a creature.” And again, he assures us that, “Plato<sup>2</sup> makes the third hypostasis of his trinity likewise to be *ὁμοουσιος*, co-essential with the second, as he elsewhere makes the second co-essential with the first.” This, indeed, is extraordinary language! The proof must be convincing, to reconcile the mind to such a startling conclusion.

Dr. Cudworth, in some of the first chapters of his

<sup>1</sup> *Intell. System*, vol. iii. p. 98.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

book, displays his extensive learning, in proving to us, that all the ancient philosophers, with a few exceptions, really maintained and confessed the existence of One Supreme, Uncreated, and Eternal Cause, by whatever appellation he was distinguished or expressed; and that the other deities, acknowledged and worshipped by them, were avowed to have been created, or generated, by this chief Deity; being therefore mere creatures, and subordinate agents. These wise men, who emerged from the chaos of the vulgar religion, and beheld God in the unity and supremacy of his nature, would not admit (for the reason that they could not understand) more than One perfect and Eternal Cause.

Accordingly, Onatus<sup>3</sup> the Pythagorean declares, “That there is not only one God; but He is the highest and greatest God, the Governor of the world. But beside him there are many other deities who differ in power; He ruling over them, and excelling them in power, greatness and virtue.” These inferior gods were the animated stars, and other heavenly bodies.

That Pythagoras himself held such a pure conception of the Divine Nature, we have the testimony of many witnesses and authorities. St. Cyril thus expresses his opinion: “We<sup>4</sup> see clearly that Pythagoras maintained, there was one God of the whole universe; the principal or cause of all things; the

<sup>3</sup> Apud Stobæus. Ecl. Phys. lib. i. p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Con. Julian, lib. i. p. 30.

illuminator, animator, and the quickener of the whole; the origin of all motion; from whom all things were derived, and brought out of nonentity into being."

Anaxagoras, an ancient and very wise philosopher, treads on the very ground, where we might expect some notice of a Trinity. But he makes no such distinction of hypostases; nor distinguishes *vous* from the first or third person: on the contrary, he simply calls God an Infinite Mind, who rules and governs the whole world; thus opposing the atheistical notion, then prevalent, that matter, or a congeries of atoms, was the cause of all things; and that mind had no place in the creation or government of the world.

This sage made still a greater reformation in the common notions of divinity; for he would not admit the sun to be anything else but an insensible body of fire; and he denied that any of all the celestial host, the moon, or the stars, were gods, as some erroneously believed: in consequence of which he was fined by the Athenians.

Socrates, in his Apology, given in the version of Plato, seems to ridicule this notion of Anaxagoras, that the celestial bodies were devoid of divinity; and unworthily charges him with holding atheistical tenets; as if his other nobler declaration did not entirely relieve him from such a calumny. However, Plato, in Phædo, qualifies and dilutes this harsh aspersion of Socrates; and says, that he did

not so much condemn Anaxagoras on the score of his denying the stars to be deities, but rather that he did not acknowledge any secondary causes of a mental nature, leaving matter to its own guidance, and to work out its own operations; bringing mind in *only* where material causes could not explain the phenomena. From which it appears, that this philosopher attained greater purity and simplicity in his theological notions than either Socrates or Plato; for he does not seem to have admitted any but material causes, save his Supreme God, or Infinite Mind. Socrates commends Anaxagoras nevertheless, because he declared *mind* (and not *matter*) to be the ruler and governor of all things; in which Plato, no doubt, freely coincided.

Aristotle also praises him, because he makes *mind* to be the first principle; the cause also of motion; and of well and fit. *Ἀναξαγορας το αἴτιον του καλως και ὀρθως νουν λεγει*, which Plato expresses by, the cause of all good things.

Dr. Cudworth<sup>5</sup> finding Anaxagoras call good a principle, as well as mind, fancies that he mentioned two hypostases of a trinity, when it is manifest that the philosopher signified no more by this, than that mind ruled all things; but the good was the motive which moved it to act, for the wisest and best of purposes: hence Aristotle says, that mind is the cause of motion, and of well and fit likewise.

<sup>5</sup> Vol. i. p. 249.



Stobæus cites a passage from Archytas, a Pythagorean, and cotemporary of Plato, which holds, that beside *matter* and *form*, there is a greater and pre-eminent cause, who is God<sup>6</sup>: “There is another more necessary cause, which, moving, brings the *form* to the *matter*. This is the chief and most powerful cause, which is properly called God: so that there are *three principles* of all things, *God* (or mind), *matter* and *form*: God, the Artificer and Mover; matter, that which is moved; and form, the art introduced into the matter.”

That the Supreme Being was called Mind, or a Mental Cause (in opposition to the material one maintained by the Atheistical school), without any expressed or implied perception of His existence as the second hypostasis of a Trinity, we have even the acknowledgment of Dr. Cudworth, who informs us that Timæus of Locris, among others (from whom Plato greatly borrowed,) of the Pythagorean school, called God *νοῦς*, mind, as well as *τ'αγαθόν*, the good. He also styled him the Creator of all good things; but without any sensible distinction of persons: he seems to have regarded these only, as appropriate and characteristic names to specify the intellectual and moral *attributes* of the Divine Nature.

“Moreover,” continues Dr. Cudworth<sup>7</sup>, “he

<sup>6</sup> Ecl. Phys. p. 32.—This passage ought to be particularly observed, and noted; as it is the true Pythagorean doctrine, and the origin of that of Plato

<sup>7</sup> Intell. System, vol. ii. p. 276.

plainly declares (as Plato did also) that this generated god of his, *the world*, was produced in time, so as to have a beginning. *Πριν ουρανον γενεσθαι, λογηστην ιδεα τε και υλα, και ο Θεος δαμιουργος του βελτιονος*—*before the heaven was made, existed the idea, matter, and God, the artificer of the best.*” From which it is manifest that this philosopher neither confounded the *idea* with God, nor recognised it as an hypostasis of a trinity, as the Platonists did afterwards.

But there is still another passage which we can produce from this Timæus of Locris, that throws some light on the nature of the *Idea*; and clearly distinguishes it from the Supreme Cause. Only two causes are recognised by him, which he styles “Intellect and Necessity<sup>8</sup>.” The first, he says, is of the *nature of good*, and is called God; the cause of all things that are most excellent; or, as Plato has it, “the Artificer of the best, and the Cause of all good.”

This which follows is important, as evincing the genuine doctrine of Plato. “Those which are consequent, and concauses rather than causes, may be referred to necessity, and they consist of *Idea*, or *Form* and *Matter*, to which may be added the *Sensible* (world), which is as it were the offspring of these two.”

Now here Timæus separates most exactly the intellectual and the ideal cause,—the one being of

<sup>8</sup> An. Frag. p. 301.

the nature of good, of a moral as well as an intellectual nature; whilst the other is the contrary of these, and ascribed to necessity. It ought to be observed also, that this intellect and that goodness are mere attributes of God, and not persons: and that the Idea, on which the whole hypothesis of a second person in the Platonic trinity is founded, cannot possibly, from these words of Timæus, be tortured into any such meaning. For, as it is ascribed to necessity, it can no more be looked upon as God, or an hypostasis of God, than matter itself, along with which it is properly classed.

Then, again, as it is denominated a concause rather than a cause, it must necessarily be subordinate to the chief cause, and a mere agent of his will; unless we believe Timæus to have held the monstrous fallacy of some of the ancients, that God himself is a mere creature of necessity; and that he is as much subject to it, and as much restrained by it, as we are by the air we breathe; or by the unseen power which limits our ambition or our desires to this sublunary sphere.

Plato closely followed Timæus and the Pythagoreans in his estimate of the Divine Being; and those other causes to which I have alluded.

According to many great authorities, Plato held only One eternal and unmade Divinity; the Maker and Governor of the whole world.

“It is manifest<sup>9</sup>, (says Eusebius,) that Plato

<sup>9</sup> Pr. Ev. lib. xi. cap. 13, p. 530.

really acknowledged only one God, however, in compliance with the language of the Greeks, he often spake of gods, plurally.”

This is not quite in accordance with Plato’s belief, for he certainly maintained a plurality of gods, whom he distinguished, however, from the chief god, as being generated in time, and, therefore, mere subordinate creatures. Dr. Cudworth<sup>10</sup> acknowledges that this god of Plato’s was expressed by a variety of appellations, not, however, as distinguishing the mysterious mode of his existence, but for the natural and obvious purpose of characterizing his various attributes. For what is there extraordinary in any one asserting that God is an Intellectual Being; having all goodness and perfection in Him; goodness being that attribute of His nature, which moves him (if we dare use the expression) to create all things after the best manner, and for the happiness of his creatures? We might say, without the implication of alluding to persons in the Godhead—that this Being is good itself; the essence or abstraction of all goodness; the very *summum bonum*; that he is also an Infinite Mind, having all wisdom and knowledge, as he possesses all possible goodness in His nature. Now, this is no more than what Plato signified by the names he employed to express his Eternal Cause. Besides the good<sup>11</sup>, he likewise styles him *ὁ Θεός*, by way of eminency;

<sup>10</sup> Intell. System, vol. ii. p. 295.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

sometimes *ὁ δημιουργος*, the maker or creator, and father of all things; sometimes, also, *Νους παντων βασιλευς*, Intellect, the king of all things: the sovereign Mind which orders and passes through all things; the first God; the greatest God; and the greatest of the gods.

It is certain that Plato signified no more by his Good and Intellect than Aristotle and Anaxagoras did, who were more explicit than the former, explaining them as I have done above; that Good is that which moves Intellect to will and execute everything in accordance with it; for Intellect in God does not seem necessarily to imply the goodness of His nature.

Dr. Cudworth assures us that the Trinity was also a Pythagorean as well as a dogma of Plato's, the proof of which he imagines to be comprised in a passage from the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum*; but, I apprehend, the contrary may be deduced from it<sup>12</sup>. "His first principle is God and (or) Good, which is of the nature of unity, and a perfect Mind; but his other principle of duality is a demon or evil principle." Again, Plutarch says<sup>13</sup>, "Pythagoras's

<sup>12</sup> Lib. i. cap. 7, p. 231.

<sup>13</sup> Lib. i. cap. 3, p. 276.—Plutarch is not to be implicitly trusted in these matters. He somewhere ascribes the same belief of an evil demon to Plato.

Pythagoras called God "the One," in which he was generally followed by those of his school. Matter he called "two," according to some. Dacier, in his Life of this philosopher, says he called God also a Quaternion.

principles were a monad and an infinite duality; the former of them an active principle, Mind or God; the latter, passive and matter." Without condescending further to prove a point of such consequence, Dr. Cudworth is satisfied with this *demonstration* from Plutarch, and proceeds, accordingly, to raise a structure on this feeble foundation. He passes over the argument in this manner:—"Pythagoras<sup>14</sup> is generally reported to have held a trinity of Divine hypostases."

The three principles ascribed to Pythagoras by others, are, no doubt, those we have before mentioned, God, Idea, and Matter; which, upon the authority of Aristotle<sup>15</sup>, were called also the Beginning, the Middle, and the End; for all the philosophers of his school seem to concur in this general doctrine. And we may conclude that the names, as Monad, Good, Mind, and others, expressed no more than the language used by Timæus and Plato; having no reference to the persons of the Godhead. We have Parmenides, likewise, charged with a knowledge of the same mysterious truth; but upon no better foundation than prejudiced assumption, and a passage from Plotinus, written under a misapprehension of the subject which he treated. "Parmenides in Plato, speaking more exactly, distinguishes three divine unities subordinate; the first, of that which is perfectly and most properly *one*; the second, of that

<sup>14</sup> Intell. System, vol. ii. p. 231.

<sup>15</sup> De Cælo.

which was called by him *one-many*; the third, of that which is expressed *one and many*: so that Parmenides did also agree in this acknowledgment of a trinity of Divine or archical hypostases." The reason assigned for this interpretation is, that this ancient philosopher called the Supreme Being<sup>16</sup>, "τὸ ἕν and μονὰς, a unity and monad; because he conceived that the first and most perfect being, and the beginning of all things, must needs be the most simple."

Let us, for a moment, assume this mode of interpreting Plato's dialogue to be correct (of which we shall see some reason for doubt by and by), it is manifest that Plotinus is guilty of great discrepancy in speaking of these divine unities. For if they allude to a trinity, the *one-many* must refer to the second person, or the Infinite Mind: yet "Plotinus seems to think that Parmenides, by his *one*, did really mean a perfect Mind, for he cannot conceive any true entity below that which understands;" and the same may be said of that isolated and solitary Monad situated above Intellect.

As he is expressly treating of divine persons, he clearly confounds the first with the second; and inadvertently opens the secret of the Parmenidean doctrine, that the Infinite or Perfect Mind, and τὸ ἕν, are one and the same person. Dr. Cudworth, implicitly relying on this mode of solution, informs

<sup>16</sup> Intell. System, vol. ii. p. 255.

us that the second hypostasis is the perfect Intellect, called, by Parmenides, *ἐν παντα*, one-many, or one and all things, in which he opposes that admission of Plotinus, that Parmenides regarded the first hypostasis to be also a perfect Mind.

“The second of them, which is a perfect Intellect, was, it seems, by him called, in way of distinction, *ἐν πολλα* or *παντα*, one-many or one-all-things; by which all things are meant the intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfect mind.” From which we may draw this inference, that the *perfect mind* was really the same person as the *one*, but it was called *ἐν παντα*, because, even according to Plotinus, “he was likened to a sphere, because it comprehends all within itself.” According to this, then, God was called by Parmenides the one, and the one-many or the one-all-things, because everything is comprehended by his infinite essence. Dr. Cudworth says, on the same subject, that “it was the first of those hypostases that was properly called, by Parmenides, *ἐν το παν*, one, the universe of all: that is, one most simple Being, the fountain and original of all.” By which he contradicts the previous hypothesis, that the first was *one*; and the conclusions of the later Platonists, who looked upon these other expressions of Parmenides to imply not a simplicity but a multiplicity.

However, as I intend hereafter to write more at large on this subject, it would be better to desist from saying more now, except to make the observation that



these philosophers do not seem to have been aware that Parmenides called the material universe also the *one*, which is expressly mentioned in Plato's dialogue of that name; and it was this, and not God, which he likened to a sphere, as containing all things within itself. By him God was called *one*, as Pythagoras did before him. The universe was *one* also, and *all things*.

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## CHAPTER II.

THE OPINIONS OF SOME MODERNS ON THE TRINITY  
OF PLATO EXAMINED.

I THOUGHT it necessary to collect these few scattered rays of light from the theology of the wisest of the ancients, for the purpose of showing how little evidence there exists, in their recorded opinions of the Supreme Being, to warrant the conclusion that they entertained the doctrine of a trinity in the Godhead.

It appears that they regarded God, Jupiter, (highest God,) and the Divine Mind, and other appellations, by which He was expressed, as words of the same purport, signifying His peculiar attributes; His unity, and superiority over generated natures. The Infinite Mind of Anaxagoras; the Good of Timæus and Plato; the Immoveable One of Aristotle and Parmenides; and the Monad of Pythagoras, are all so many titles of *One Person*, suited to the taste of those who applied them; or created out of a laudable desire to convey their notions of a *Mental* in opposition to the *Material* Cause of the Atheists.

There are three principles concurred in by most of these philosophers, probably first taught by Pythagoras—which are called God, Idea, and Matter. And as this ancient doctrine formed a chief ingre-

dient in the Platonic hypothesis, I purpose, in due time, to examine it more particularly.

Before entering upon the theology of Plato, I with devote this chapter to a few remarks on the opinions of one or two modern writers, on the Platonic trinity; and more especially on the evidence of the doctrine in Plato's own writings.

The author of *The Intellectual System of the Universe* thus expresses his ideas on this subject.

“Plato<sup>1</sup>, in his tenth book of laws, in professedly opposing Atheists, undertakes to prove the existence of a deity; but, notwithstanding, he does not there ascend higher than to the Psyche, or universal mundane soul, as a self-moving principle, and the immediate or proper cause of all that motion which is in the world.” Again, “But in other places of his writings, he frequently asserts above the self-moving Psyche an immoveable and standing Nous, or intellect, which was properly the demiurgus, or architectonic framer of the world. And, lastly, above this multiform intellect, he plainly asserts yet a higher hypostasis; one most simple and absolutely perfect Being, which he calls τὸ εἶν, in opposition to that multiplicity which speaks something of an imperfection in it, and τ'ἀγαθόν, goodness itself, as being above mind and understanding. \* \* \* \* \* And, accordingly, in his epistle to Dionysius does he mention a trinity of three Divine hypostases altogether.”

<sup>1</sup> Vol. ii. p. 300.

In another place he rejoices exceedingly at the (imaginary) similitude, which he discovers between the Christian and the Platonic trinity, in that they agree in ascribing the creation of the world to the second, and not to the first person in the Godhead.

In another portion of his work he is still more explicit, in this opinion of there being a trinity alluded to in Plato's writings. In his commentary on a passage of the *Timæus*, where the world is denominated *των αιδιων Θεων γεγενοσ αγαλμα*—*a created image of the eternal gods*—he thus expresses himself. "By which eternal gods he there meant doubtless that *το πρωτον* and *το δευτερον*, and *το τριτον*—that first, second, and third, which, in his second epistle to Dionysius, he makes to be the principles of all things: that is his trinity of divine hypostases, by whose concurrent efficiency, and according to whose image and likeness, the whole world was created<sup>2</sup>."

Lord Monboddo, in his *Origin and Progress of Language*, arrives at a similar conclusion as Dr. Cudworth; though he differs in this; that he denies Plato to make the most remote allusion to the trinity in his *Dialogues*<sup>3</sup>. "I am *persuaded* Plato got out of Egypt his peculiar doctrine of ideas, as well as the doctrine of the trinity, which he has not published in any of his dialogues, but kept as a secret to be communicated to the initiated only, in the mysteries of his philosophy: or, *perhaps*, he found

<sup>2</sup> Vol. iii. p. 85.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. v. p. 338.

this mystical philosophy in the books of the Pythagoreans of Italy, some of which Laertius tells us he purchased at a great price.”

Though he dissents on this point from Dr. Cudworth, he coincides with him in the opinion that Plato's second epistle to Dionysius is an exponent of the doctrine. He allows, indeed, (what Plato himself says,) that the mystery is expressed, not briefly only, but enigmatically; so that if the letter, by chance, fell into strange hands, no one could possibly divine its occult signification. But if this is granted, (that the subject is an enigma,) according to the procedure of this philosopher, and Dr. Cudworth, they do not esteem it in that light, but adopt the most literal and obvious interpretation; that the three natures mentioned by Plato, were the causes of all things.

As Plato, however, explicitly enumerates these natures, the mystery does not seem so much to relate to the number *three*, as to their peculiar characters, and the mode of their existence. For if the epistle had miscarried and fallen into other hands, what is the most probable solution which the purport would suggest to the reader? Certainly the most obvious and literal one; that Plato alluded to certain principles, through which, and around which, all things existed. But can this be denominated an enigma, the solution of which may be clearly gathered from the literal expression? Do these philosophers above act consistently with the premises agreed upon, when they adopt this literal mode of interpretation?

We may conclude, therefore, from the language used by Plato, that the enigma is not in the three natures mentioned by him; but in something else; which probably related to the peculiar mode of their existence.

There is another remarkable feature of this letter, apparently not noticed by Dr. Cudworth; though he pretends that Plato alluded to a trinity in some of his dialogues. It is said<sup>4</sup>, "I have never at any time written anything about these particulars; nor is there any book professedly written by Plato, nor will there be." Which passage renders the enigma still more difficult of solution; and removes it further from the literal one given by the later Platonists.

I have observed that Lord Monboddo holds the same opinion with Dr. Cudworth on this subject; but if we examine the evidence produced by him, we shall see how little reason he had for arriving at this conclusion: and how impossible it is for us to coincide with him in his belief. In truth, with all his pretensions to learning, he manifests great ignorance of the genuine philosophy of Plato. This notion appears to have been hastily adopted by him, without much knowledge of the fundamental principles of that philosophy.

As an example of his credulity, he acquaints us, that he was satisfied of this doctrine of the trinity being restricted to Plato's theology, the Platonic phi-

<sup>4</sup> Epistle of Plato to Dionysius.

losophers, and the Alexandrine school, until Dr. Heberden, a friend of his, pointed out a passage in Seneca's *Consolatio ad Helviam*, from which it appears to have been also known to, and recognised by the Stoics. This is the passage alluded to:—"Id actum est, mihi crede ab illo, quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima, æquali intentione diffusus, sive fatum et immutabilis causarum inter se cohærentium series."

From this single and isolated passage we have all the evidence which he affords us. The casual enumeration of God, incorporeal reason, and the soul of the world, (which he probably signified by the divine spirit,) is sufficient to convince him, that Seneca acknowledged a trinity of persons! But if he had read that epistle of the Stoic's carefully and attentively, he might have seen, that the language could by no possibility bear such a construction. Besides, the occasion on which he is said to propound this mysterious doctrine, seems the most unfit that could be conceived: a proof itself that Seneca had no supicion of the meaning given to his words.

The truth is, that the Stoical philosopher was so uncertain and ignorant of the nature of the Supreme Being, that he takes this opportunity of expressing his doubts and perplexities. In his public writings, and among those of his school, he could confidently speak and argue on the great and interesting subject

of the being, the attributes, and the government of God; but when, in moments of solitude and study, his own reflections were turned towards these things, or when, from a full heart, he was required to offer consolation to the afflicted, he was sensible how vain and futile were all the speculations of the schools, on the nature and existence of the unknown and uncreated Cause of all things.

What consolation can all the logic of the schools afford to present affliction; what light can it throw over the dark futurity, when death has withdrawn us from this earthly and mundane existence? What is it to the broken heart, whether God, in the language of men, be called almighty, or incorporeal reason, or the soul which pervades all things?

Hence, Seneca, overcome by the dark uncertainty of his speculations, despondingly confesses that he knows not whether God be as some call him, simply an Almighty Power; or as others, Incorporeal Reason, or Infinite Mind; or, as the Stoics argue<sup>5</sup>, the Soul of the universe; or whether, indeed, he is only fate, or the immutable chain of material causes. "Sive fatum et immutabilis causarum," is not the

<sup>5</sup> The Stoical theology made God to be the universal Soul, which enters into, and pervades all things. In this, it differed from that of the Pythagorean and Platonic schools, and other sects, which called God, an Infinite Mind, a Reasoning Divinity, and other names. Seneca may have alluded to this, in the passage above, and might have thus expressed himself, "Whether God be, as some say, Almighty God, King of Heaven and of Earth; or an Infinite Mind; or an Universal Soul," &c.



language one would employ in writing of, or alluding to, a trinity in the Godhead.

This is, however, not the only *discovery* for which we are indebted to Lord Monboddo, and others of his opinions. For in another portion of his work he informs, us that Aristotle held the nature of man to be twofold, the intellectual and the animal, in which he opposed his master Plato, who asserted the nature of man to be one substance composed of different parts; then, as if inspired with the same genius which discovered a trinity in Plato's writings, and conjured up a like opinion among the Stoics, he starts aside from the argument of which he is treating, and says, with amusing gravity<sup>6</sup>, "And here I cannot help observing that this system of morals, (Aristotle's two natures of man,) enables us to conceive the great mystery of the Christian faith, the doctrine of the *Incarnation*; for if we believe, as I think we must do, that the intellectual nature may be united, and actually is, to the animal, what should hinder us to believe, that a third nature may be united to the other two? namely, the divine; and that it was actually so in the person of Christ." Again, "And we will be the more easily disposed to believe this, if we agree with Aristotle, that the human intellect has something divine in it, as he has told us in more than one place; and it is only with respect to this part of our nature, that we are said, in Scripture, to be made after the

<sup>6</sup> Orig. and Prog. of Lang. vol. v. p. 364.

image of God. And here we may observe that not only the *Trinity* is to be found in the books of ancient philosophy, as I before observed, but that also the doctrine of the *Incarnation* is clearly to be deduced from the principles of that philosophy. This shows us how much the study of it must contribute to explain the language of Scripture, and the doctrines of the Christian theology."

How pleasing and satisfactory to the Christian to find in these antique systems, so marvellous an approximation to the revealed truth! What a confirmation of his faith, to have it thus expounded by these great spirits of old, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoic! How delightful to have the testimony of these venerated and pious sages to the mysteries of our holy religion, and to the great doctrines revealed by Heaven to mankind of after-ages! We have reached the threshold of truth; nay, we have entered within its sacred portals, when it is known and acknowledged that Plato was an orthodox trinitarian; Seneca not much worse; while the sagacious and penetrating genius of Aristotle could expatiate on, and propound the mystery of the Incarnation!

If it were not for the mystical language which these philosophers employ, we might haply succeed in working out the whole Christian theology from their writings, and unfold it as perfect and pure, as when it issued from the divinity of our blessed Saviour. Then we might, most reasonably, place these men side by side with the prophets of the

Hebrews, and consult them as we would the Sacred Writings.

How can we, after this, be surprised at Lord Monboddo's confession, that it was from Aristotle he derived all his knowledge of the difference betwixt things divine and sublunary? or that he should admire Aristotle and revere the philosophy of the schools<sup>7</sup>, "which explains to us the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, that the Son was begotten from all eternity,—a doctrine not to be conceived, and, consequently, not to be believed, by a man who has not raised his thoughts, by the assistance of ancient philosophy, from generation and production of beings temporary here on earth, to the causes divine and eternal?"

If the notion of this writer, that the Christian religion is only a sort of transcript of more ancient theological systems, required any confirmation at our hands, I might here add an important discovery, made by myself, which is another instance to those already mentioned. In my inquiries, I have stumbled on one passage, among others, from divers sources, which proves this *fact* to demonstration. I am astonished that Lord Monboddo overlooked a testimony so very valuable.

It ought to be premised, that it is necessary to make great allowance for the obscure and mystical language used by ancient writers on religion; not

<sup>7</sup> Vol. v. p. 373.

that they were ignorant of the truths on which they wrote; on the contrary, they had a profound knowledge of them, though it was a branch of their policy to conceal them, in a cloud of darkness, from the *profanum vulgus!*

Alciphron, in his thirty-ninth epistle, makes one Euthydicus thus write to Epiphanus:—"What have you not lost? The Haloa, the Apaturia, the Dionysia, and the present most sacred Thesmophorian festival. The first day was the *Ascension*: this day is appropriated for the celebration of the *fast*; that which follows is distinguished by the sacrifice of Calligarcia." This refers to ancient religious festivals, in which we have one to commemorate the *Ascension*; and in another a *fast* is particularly mentioned.

I conceive, also, that Lord Monboddo, in his opinion respecting the *Incarnation*, gave himself unnecessary trouble, in bringing to light the profound speculations of Aristotle on this mystery, since he might, with greater advantage, have consulted Homer and Ovid, who, in their gods and goddesses, and their offspring, bear immortal testimony to the union of divinity with the mortal nature!

Returning from this digression, I will now offer a few observations on the opinions of Taylor, who, notwithstanding he widely differs from the two writers already mentioned, is a true disciple of the later Platonists, and a faithful expounder of their doctrines. He asserts, dogmatically, that the Chris-

tians originally purloined their Trinity from Plato, but he repudiates the idea, that *now* there remains any resemblance between the father and his offspring. This may be proved from many parts of his writings, but chiefly from his general introduction to the Dialogues of Plato. He says, "From all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately obvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato, in any respect analogous to the Christian Trinity."

In his introduction to the Parmenides, he gives us a long quotation from Damascius, the Platonist, which gives some account of the Orphic theology, and the ancient triads of principles, whose nature and origin I have before examined and explained. He is of opinion, also, that the Platonic trinity was of Orphical origin, thus agreeing so far with Dr. Cudworth, Proclus, and others. But he differs with the former as to the nature of this Platonic trinity. "From all that has been said respecting the intelligible triad, it is easy to see what a dire perversion the modern trinity is, of *the highest procession from the first of causes*. For, in the first place, instead of venerating the first god, like the pious ancient philosophers, as a cause ineffable, unknown, and super-essential, it barbarously confounds him with his first progeny, and, by this means, destroys the prerogative of his nature." From which we may gather this, (the genuine doctrine of the later Platonists,) that the

triad does not comprehend, numerically or categorically, the first cause; but he is placed above it, and the triad is looked upon as his offspring or progeny. Hence Taylor thus speaks of the opinions of Dr. Cudworth, who expunges this first god, and recognises only the triad of being, life, and intellect, springing from him. "A superficial reader, who knows no more of Platonism than what he has gleaned from Cudworth's Intellectual system, will be induced to think, that the genuine Platonic trinity consists of the first cause, or the *good*, *intellect*, and *soul*, and that these three were considered by Plato as, in a certain respect, one. To such men as these, it is necessary to observe that a triad of principles, distinct from each other, is a very different thing from a triad which may be considered as a whole, and of which each one of the three is a part. But the *good* or the *one* is, according to Plato, super-essential, as is evident from the first hypothesis of this dialogue, (Parmenides,) and from the first book of his Republic. It is impossible, therefore, that the *good* can be consubistent with *intellect*, which is even posterior to *being*; and much less with *soul*, which is subordinate to *intellect*. And hence the good, intellect, and soul, do not form a consubistent triad."

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## CHAPTER III.

## ON THE THEOLOGY OF THE TIMÆUS OF PLATO.

SOME have observed, that as to morals Plato followed Socrates, while his theology was derived chiefly from the Pythagorean school. He was undoubtedly a close imitator of Timæus of Locris, in the dialogue so entitled: it would seem, indeed, that it was expressly called by that name, from the conformity of its doctrines, and the resemblance of its systematic features, to the book of Timæus on the Soul of the World.

Iamblichus says somewhere, that the whole theology of Plato may be gathered from the two dialogues, Timæus and Parmenides; but I apprehend that it is to the former that we are to look, for any clear, systematic, and intelligible exposition of it.

As the doctrines of this dialogue, their nature and their origin, are of great consequence to our argument, I will give an extract from the remaining fragments of the book of Timæus alluded to, which explains clearly and succinctly the nature of the *idea*, out of which the Platonists created their Intellect, or Logos. It is the germ of the theology of Plato.

“The<sup>1</sup> causes of all things are two, namely, intellect and necessity. Of these, the first is of the nature of *good*, and is called God, the principle of such things as are most excellent. Those (necessarily<sup>2</sup> existing according to the powers of bodies), which are consequent, and concauses rather than causes, may be referred to necessity, and they consist of *idea* or form, and *matter*, to which may be added the sensible world, which is, as it were, the offspring of these two.

“The first of these is an essence ungenerated, immoveable, and stable; of the nature of *same*; and the *intelligible exemplar* of things generated, which are in a state of perpetual change, and this is called *idea*, and is to be comprehended (only) by mind. Matter is, again, the receptacle of form or *idea*, the mother and female principle of the generation of the third essence; for by receiving the likenesses upon itself, and being stamped with form, it perfects all things partaking of the nature of generation.”

Again, “Before the world was made existed the *idea*, *matter*, and God, the demiurgus of the better nature. He fabricated this world out of all the *matter*, and constituted the boundary of essential nature, comprising all things within itself, one, only-begotten, perfect, with a soul, and intellect.”

<sup>1</sup> An. Frag. p. 301.

<sup>2</sup> The *ideas* of Plato are so explained by Laërtius: “He supposes *ideas* to be certain principles and causes, that such and such things are by nature what they are.” *Vita Platonis*.



Stobæus informs us also, that Archytas, another Pythagorean, held similar opinions on these principles. "It is necessary to hold that there are *three principles*; that which is the subject of things (matter), form, and that which is of itself motive and invisible in power, namely, God." And Aristotle probably alludes to the same thing when he says, "All things are three, for, as the Pythagoreans say, all things are bounded by three; for the end (matter), the middle (form), and the beginning (God), include the enumeration of everything, and they fulfil the number of the triad."

Another ancient Pythagorean writer says expressly, that it is God who brings the *form* or idea to the matter; which could never be said of the second hypostasis of the trinity.

If we proceed now to examine Plato's dialogue, we shall perceive a marked concurrence with these more ancient opinions; so that there cannot remain a doubt, but that they were both of the same origin, and related to the same theology. Plato esteemed all things transitory and uncertain, and therefore unfit for philosophical speculation, except the ideas or essences of things. Hence he calls the latter, very properly, *real-being*, as distinguishing their permanent nature from other objects which have only a generated or temporary existence. "It is necessary to define that which is always real-being, but which is without generation; and what that is which is generated."

He then says, the one is apprehended by intelligence, in conjunction with reason: the other, on the contrary, is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with the rational sense. We have seen that Timæus made a similar observation, when he said that the idea was comprehended by mind.

It is manifest, that every generated nature must have had a cause of its existence. This cause Plato denominates Father and Artificer, who formed the sensible world according to the image or likeness of another exemplar, or paradigmatical world. The reason for which is thus given by Plato: "If the world is beautiful, and the Artificer thereof good, it is evident that he must have looked towards an eternal exemplar in its fabrication." Had he, on the contrary, adopted the pattern of a generated nature, the world would have been neither perfect nor beautiful. Therefore the Idea was the exemplar of the sensible world, and, accordingly, God is said afterwards, in pursuing his plan, to have "placed intellect in soul, and soul in body, and fabricated the universe." For Timæus says, in his book on the Soul of the World, "That an animal so constituted, is superior to one devoid of soul and intellect." And Plato argues that, "in this manner, and for this reason, we must call the world an animal endowed with intellect, and generated through the providence of Divinity."

Again, "For the Divinity being willing to assimilate this universe, in the most exquisite degree, to

that which is the most beautiful, and every-way perfect of intelligible objects (namely, the exemplar), he composed it one visible animal containing within itself all such animals as are allied to it."

He then proceeds to argue, that as this animal world is a whole, and every-way perfect being, God could not have fabricated any other world save this alone. And, according to the words of Timæus of Locris, "As it was God's pleasure to render his production most perfect, he constituted it a god, generated indeed, but indestructible by any other cause than by Him who made it."

Then, says Plato, "When the generating father understood, that this generated resemblance of the eternal gods moved and lived, he was delighted with his own work, and, in consequence, considered how he might make it still more similar to its exemplar. Hence, as that (the exemplar, or idea) is an eternal animal, he endeavoured to render this universe such, to the utmost of his ability,"—namely, as permanent as possible.

The sun, moon, and stars, created or fabricated by the same demiurgus, were regarded also as so many gods, or divine animals. So the earth likewise:—"He also fabricated the earth, the common nourisher of our existence, which, being conglobed about the pole, extended through the universe,—is the guardian and artificer of night and day, and is the first and most *ancient of the gods* which are generated within the heavens."

After Jupiter had created the universe, and generated the souls of the celestial planets (which were so many deities), Plato imagined him to have addressed these inferior gods after this manner:—“Gods of gods, of whom I am the demiurgus and father, whatever is generated by me is indissolvable, such being my will in its fabrication. Indeed, everything which is bound is dissolvable; but to be willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized, and well composed, is the property of an evil nature. Hence so far as you are generated you are not immortal, nor in every respect indissolvable; yet you shall never be dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death,” &c.

Then he proceeds to give them some general instructions; and concludes with these remarkable words, put into his mouth by Plato:—“That mortal nature may subsist, and that the universe may be truly all (conformable to the great idea), convert yourselves, according to your nature, to the fabrication of animals, imitating the power which I employed in your generation.”

He gave these junior gods control and dominion over mortal souls<sup>3</sup>, as well as allotted to them the fabrication of mortal bodies.

<sup>3</sup> Plato held some curious notions relative to human souls. The most singular was their pre-existent state; for he imagined them to have been created, and to have had a subsistence, previously to the bodies which they afterwards inhabited, or to which they were conjoined. This fancy arose from an excessive

Then, continues Plato, "At the same time he who orderly disposed all these things, remained in his own accustomed abiding habit. But, in consequence thereof, so soon as his children understood the orders of their father, they immediately became obedient to them."

We may conclude, then, that this dialogue of Plato's is a true and genuine exposition of the Timæan, or Pythagorean system of theology.

1. We have God the Creator, or demiurgus, a supreme and eternal Being; who, as a Spirit, existed in the solitude of his own unity, until such time as it pleased him to manifest his power in fabricating the material world, and the inferior divinities.

2. We have existing with Him from all eternity, either in the Divine Mind, or external to it, the *Idea*, or Exemplar, in whose likeness and image the material world was created.

3. We have *Matter*, out of which this world or universe of Plato's was fabricated, which was also eternal. Hence we revert to the doctrine of

estimate of the soul, which he considered so superior to its material encasement, that it would be equivalent to a degradation to suppose that the latter was created prior to the former. These souls, before they entered the body, were believed to dwell in the stars, the dwelling-places of the inferior divinities, where probably they were supposed to be made, according to the instructions of the Supreme Being. And after the dissolution of the body at death, the soul returned again to the habitation of its kindred star, to enjoy a blessed life, if it had spent a good life here below.

Timæus, that before the world was, existed the Idea, Matter, and God, the demiurgus of the better nature, or the cause of all good things.

The ancient philosophers universally agreed in the pre-existence, if not in the eternity of matter. They could not conceive a creation out of nothing.

Aristotle, in his *Physics*, says, *Περι ταυτης ὁμογνωμονουσι της δοξης οί περι φυσεως, ὅτι το γιγνομενον εκ μη οντων γιγνεσθαι αδυνατον.* “The physiologists generally agree in this (laying it down for a grand foundation), that it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing<sup>4</sup>.”

Plato was of the same opinion, as well as the Pythagoreans generally. He alludes to the doctrine, in this passage, from the *Timæus*, “As the Divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that nothing should be evil; and receiving everything visible, which was not in a state of rest, but, on the contrary, which continued moving in confusion and disorder, he reduced it from the chaotic state, into order and harmony, considering that so to do was by far the best.”

All that the demiurgus had to do, therefore, was to reduce matter to order and regularity; and, as

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch says also, “It is, therefore, better to follow Plato (than Heraclitus), and declare loudly, that the world was made by God. For as the world is the best of all works, so is God the best of all causes. Nevertheless, the substance or matter out of which the world was made, was not itself made; but always ready at hand, and subject to the artificer, to be ordered and disposed by him.”

it is expressed, to bring the *forms* (of the ultimate existence of things,) to the matter, and stamp them thereon; assimilating the world, and all which it contains, to the perfection, the beauty, and the unity of the divine and eternal paradigm, or idea.

It would seem that some regarded matter itself as a divinity, a very ancient and venerable god, (which is scarcely more absurd than Plato's fancy of the divinity of the earth); but such an idea was scouted by the school of Plato, though they could not conquer, but cheerfully acquiesced in, the Epicurean dogma, so well described by the poet Lucretius:

Nullam rem à nihilo gigni divinitus unquam<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Lib. i. ver. 151.

## CHAPTER IV.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PARMENIDES OF  
PLATO.

*The one*, or το ἓν, was a favourite expression of the Pythagorean school, to express the singleness and simplicity of the Supreme Being. It, no doubt, bore some relation to the science of numbers, which formed a chief and mystical part of its philosophy. These *numbers* were analogous to the *ideas*, or essences, of the school of Plato, and the Pythagoreans of his time; and considered, in some respect, to be principles or causes in the universe. It would appear, however, that Pythagoras, who introduced the above expression among the Grecian philosophers, was himself indebted to another source for it, for it seems to have been a title given to the chief God by ancient nations, as the Chaldeans and Egyptians.

Bryant acquaints us with the fact that “Among<sup>1</sup> all the eastern nations *Ad* was a peculiar title, and was originally conferred upon the sun; and if we may credit Macrobius, it signified *one*, and was so interpreted by the Assyrians. ‘Deo, quem summum maximum-que venerantur, Adad nomen dederunt.

<sup>1</sup> Vol. i. p. 28.



Ejus nominis interpretatio significat unus. Hunc ergo ut potissimum adorant Deum.—Simulacrum Adad insigne cernitur radiis inclinatis.' ”

And according to the Hermetic Fragments<sup>2</sup>, the Egyptians maintained that all things proceeded from *one*. “Hence, from the highest to the last, the doctrine of the Egyptians, concerning the principles, inculcates the origin of all things from the *one*.”

Aristotle, who in some things differed from Plato and Pythagoras, follows them in this mode of characterizing the Supreme Being<sup>3</sup>. “The unity of the First Cause, the eternal spring of motion, is himself immoveable. This principle, on which heaven and earth depends, is *one in number*, as well as in essence.”

Plotinus informs us that the Pythagoreans denominated the first god Apollo, *the one*, according to a more secret signification, implying a negation of *many*. And Sextus Empiricus bears the same testimony relative to the unity, or chief monad. *Και δη των μεν καθ'αυτα νοουμενων γενος υπεστησαντο Πυθαγορικων παιδες, ως επαναβεβηκος το εν.* “*The Pythagoreans placed the one as transcending the genus of all things, such are essentially understood.*” That the First Cause surpasses and is situated above all the intelligible ideas of Plato, which are the essences, or essential nature of all things.

<sup>2</sup> An. Frag. p. 285. From Iamblichus.

<sup>3</sup> Meta. lib. 4, cap. 8.

Again, Syrianus, of the later Platonic school, observes after his Platonizing manner, that “the Pythagoreans called God *the one*, as the cause of union to the universe, and on account of his superiority to every being, all life, and all-perfect intellect.”

From all this it is manifest, that the  $\tau\omicron \acute{\epsilon}\nu$  was no creation, or discovery, or peculiar mode of expression, of Plato’s; but a truly Pythagorean title, introduced into Greece by him, which he probably brought out of Egypt. It distinguished the essential unity and simplicity of God from the second principle, the *idea*, as also from the third, *matter*, which have multiplicity in them: hence the idea was called the many; for being the essence of all material things, it is diffused through all nature.

Pythagoras called God *the one*, on account of his perfect unity. He also called him *four*, or the quaternion; but it does not seem that he ever styled him *three*, though he acknowledged those three principles of all things, God, idea, and matter. Probably he was considered to assimilate to the number *four* in relation to the first, second, and third; as being the measure and boundary of everything, which cannot be said so well, or so fitly, of a perfect unity, which we might conceive to subsist isolated from those other recognised principles or causes above. God, therefore, as a perfect spirit, and the cause of all motion, himself immoveable, a Being existing from eternity in the solitude of his own

nature, might be fitly considered to be represented by the number one, as that of which every conceivable number is composed, and the very origin and beginning of all multiplicity. But when his creative power came to be once exerted, and those subordinate principles called into operation, idea and matter, then he might properly be represented by *four*, as comprehending all things and essences within himself.

In course of time, however, the Pythagoreans and Plato came to refine upon the ancient doctrine, and used the term  $\tau\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$  in other and different relations. Parmenides employed it to express the singleness and harmony of the universe, which he called one and all things; as one being, and yet containing all within it. It was used also relatively to the *ideal causes*, which were styled one, many, and an infinite multitude, as implying a certain unity as well as their diffusion through all nature; for we shall see hereafter, that each distinct idea was regarded as a unity on account of its indivisibility; and therefore the archetypal universe, the exemplar of the material, may be properly called one idea and all essences; hence Plato, in Parmenides, says that this *ideal one*,  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha\ \nu\epsilon\nu\epsilon\mu\eta\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ , "*is distributed into all things that are many*," which he could not have consistently said of the other perfect  $\tau\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ , monad, and perfect unity, God.

From not perceiving, or if perceiving, not acknowledging this essential distinction, the later Platonists

have given us an erroneous interpretation of the dialogue of Parmenides. They conceived that because Pythagoras may have strictly confined the appellation above to God, all others of his school did so likewise; and, by this assumption, they have fallen into manifold, if not ridiculous, errors. Believing that, in this dialogue, Plato unfolded “the celebrated generation of the gods, and every kind of existence, from the ineffable and unknown cause of the universe,” they looked upon every idea according to its unity as a distinct god; and thus gave an opening for an extensive, interminable, and absurd polytheism. From this singular fancy arose the system of *noes* and *henades* of the later Platonists, which even Dr. Cudworth acknowledges to have been crotchets of Proclus and his followers.

Proclus gave to every idea, as a unit, or monad, an existence *per se*; and constituted it a divine person, or god. Others, however, as Porphyry, repudiated this spurious Platonism, and denied they had any such existence out of, or independent of, the divine mind.

That Parmenides regarded every idea in some respects as *one*, or a perfect unit, we have the authority of this very Proclus, who, nevertheless, fell into the absurd error of fancying that Plato made of every idea a distinct divinity. “Parmenides, after the manner of his own Pythagoreans, calls *every separate substance*, (namely, every idea,) on account of its simplicity, by the common appellation of *one*.” I

shall now attempt to show how the Platonists fell into the strange error alluded to above.

The Parmenides of Plato is a dialogue the least intelligible of all his writings. The subject of which he treats so obscurely and mystically is the system of ideas, a main branch of his as well as of the Pythagorean philosophy. These ideas were called by them sometimes also the forms and essences of all things; and they were looked upon as the intelligible causes of sensible or visible phenomena. They were supposed to have an existence by themselves, and as Socrates argues, "they are the established paradigms, as it were, by their nature, and other things, (*i. e.*, sensible objects,) are assimilated to these, and are their resemblances. The participation of forms, therefore, by other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to these forms or intelligible ideas." Thus, all such sensible objects as are great, as are beautiful or good, become so by reason of participating of these qualities from the intelligible ideas. The former are hence mere resemblances of the latter, which were called real-being, and eternal substances. This is the grand foundation of this peculiar branch of the ancient philosophy.

The reason for this doctrine is, that Plato, and others of his school, would not admit sensible and generated natures to be proper objects of science, or of philosophical speculation, on account of their incessant mutability. They are only the resem-

blances of other things which are certain and immutable. These shadowy and ideal objects or essences are eternal with God; and it was in their likeness that all material things were formed. Hence says Plato in his Parmenides, "There is a certain genus of everything, and an essence itself subsisting by itself." And Parmenides asks Socrates in the dialogue, "Does it appear to you that there is a certain species or form of *justice*, itself subsisting by itself; also of *beauty*, and the *good*, and everything of this kind?"

Now Parmenides, as Proclus bears witness, called each distinct idea *one*; though this term was likewise applied by him, and other Pythagoreans, to express the unity of God and of the universe. Hence when it is said, that the essences participate of the one, or unity, it does not follow that this should allude to the Supreme Being, though the later Platonists maintain this, and deduce from this one their triad of three persons, being, life, and intellect. But let it be granted that the ideas do participate in *all* cases mentioned in the dialogue (which I do not admit,) of God, it is not a consequence of this, that they should thereby become so many distinct persons.

It is allowed by the best interpreters of Plato's philosophy, that the essences were supposed to participate of the Supreme Being, for otherwise they would be all so many distinct, eternal natures, as the Platonists maintain. But I cannot see how these

essences can by this participation of unity become gods, or persons of a divine trinity. Aristotle says<sup>4</sup>, “The ideas are the causes (according to Parmenides and Plato) of all other things; and the essence of all other things below (sensible natures) is imparted to them from the ideas, as these themselves derived their essence from the first unity. These ideas are in the divine understanding, being looked upon by these philosophers as the paradigms of all created things.”

But let us examine the dialogue more closely and minutely, and we shall see how far the construction put upon it by these Platonists can be borne out by a strict analysis. Parmenides and Zeno seem to have held the same doctrine respecting the intelligible ideas, though they differed in their modes of expression. Hence Socrates says, “Zeno has written the same as yourself, Parmenides, though by changing certain particulars, he endeavours to deceive us into an opinion that his assertions are different from yours. For you, in your poems, say, that the *universe is one*, and he, that the *many* has no subsistence, and each speaks in such a manner as to disagree totally according to appearance from one another, though you both nearly assert the same thing; on this account it is that your discourses seem to be above our comprehension.”

Zeno replies to this, and explains the apparent

<sup>4</sup> Meta. lib. 1. cap. vi. p. 273. Vide Cud. Intell. System, vol. ii. p. 261.

paradox. “These writings of mine were composed for the purpose of affording a certain assistance to the doctrine of Parmenides against those who endeavour to defame it, by attempting to show that if the *one* is *many*, ridiculous consequences must attend such an opinion, and that things contrary to the assertion must ensue. This writing, therefore, contradicts those who say that the *many* is, and opposes this and many other opinions; as it is desirable to evince that the hypothesis which defends the subsistence of the *many*, is attended with more ridiculous consequences than that which vindicates the subsistence of the *one*, if both are sufficiently examined.”

It ought to be here observed that these philosophers did not absolutely deny the subsistence of the many. They were only opposed to the mode of existence assigned by their opponents. While the latter gave a real subsistence, the former only allowed it by participation, as I shall explain. The ridiculous consequence mentioned above, and implied in the contrary argument, was overcome by this mode of explanation. For they argue that the many has no existence, each independently; but that the *one* itself becomes *many*, and the *many*, *one*, by participation.

Socrates, who was not yet thoroughly initiated into the mysteries of this system, illustrates the doctrine by these words. “If any one should show that similars become dissimilar, or the contrary, I



should think it would be a prodigy ; but if he evinces that such things as participate both these, suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, O Zeno, that there would be anything absurd in the case ; nor, again, if any one should evince *that all things are one* through their participation of the one, and, at the same time, *many* through their participation of multitude. But I should very much wonder, if any one should show that that which is *one*, is *many*, and that the *many* is *one*." Again, he thus proceeds, "If any one, therefore, should endeavour to show, that stones, wood, and all such particulars, are both one and many, we should say he exhibits to our view such things as are many and one ; but he does not assert the one to be many, nor the many one ; nor speak of anything wonderful, but asserts that which is confessed by all men."

From this it is manifest there was a great difficulty in this doctrine of the one being many. The difficulty seems to be this. Those who maintained the subsistence of the many, must have also admitted, as a consequence of the hypothesis, that ideas or forms were either divisible, or were many in multitude. For example, if the idea called beauty is supposed to have its resemblance in material or sensible things, the beauty of each thing must either be only a portion of the great, universal, or exemplar idea, or there must be an infinitude of such ideas, corresponding in number to all material objects which possess beauty. This will appear still

clearer in the idea of magnitude. If magnitude were divided among the participants, each part of such magnitude would, by comparison, become partitude, which is absurd. If, again, the idea be regarded as a perfect unity, not participated according to the notions of Parmenides, there must be necessarily a number of such ideas of magnitude, equivalent to those material objects which are great; an absurdity no less than the former, as it is said "a part of magnitude cannot be equal to magnitude itself."

Now the Pythagoreans overcame this obstacle by maintaining that every idea is one, or a perfect unity; and that of any certain idea, as beauty or magnitude, there can only be one of which all other things participate. These ideas were regarded as the archetypes of all beauty and all greatness. So that ten thousand objects that are great, really participate all of one single idea, and not of a multitude of such.

But there is another difficulty to the perfect demonstration of this doctrine, which presents itself to our minds. How can many things possessing magnitude participate of one simple, universal idea? Must the idea be not divisible? Or if not, there must be many such ideas. Parmenides throws some light on this part of the argument. "Does not everything which participates, either participate the *whole form*, or only a *part* thereof? Can there be any other mode of participation besides these?

There cannot. Does it appear to you, then, that the *whole form is one* in each individual of many things?" which would be exactly the same as to agree to the other hypothesis, that all sensible objects participating of one universal idea, really participated of a multiplicity of such ideas. "As it is, therefore, one and the same in things many and separate from each other, the whole will be at the same time one, and so itself will be separate from itself." A conclusion opposed to the Parmenidean doctrine, that every idea or form is a perfect unity.

The philosopher also demonstrates that no form can be divisible, (by reason of its unity,) nor can any object participate only a part of it, for then there could not be one whole in each individual thing, but only a portion thereof. "Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert, that that one form is in reality divided, and that nevertheless it is still one? For see, whether upon dividing magnitude itself (namely the idea), it would not be absurd that each of the many things which are great should be great by a part of magnitude less than magnitude itself."

He then proceeds to state the difficulty in his argument alluded to above, and to explain how it may be obviated; for without this, the doctrine would lose all its proof and consistency. "After what manner can individuals participate of forms, if they are neither able to participate according to parts, not yet according to wholes?" They cannot participate according to parts, for no part, however

large, can represent the *one idea in all things*; nor according to wholes, for there cannot be more than one universal idea participated by each individual thing, otherwise there would be an infinite number of the same idea; so that instead of there being an universal idea of beauty, of justice, of greatness, &c., there would be many such, which is impossible and absurd.

But how, then, do they participate? It is alluded to in this passage. “If you consider every form as one on this account, because since a certain multitude of particulars appears to you to be great, there may perhaps appear to him, who surveys them all, to be one idea, from whence you think them to be one great thing. But what if you consider the great itself (namely, the universal idea), and other things which are great (sensible objects, for example,) in the same manner with the eye of the soul, will not again a certain something which is great appear to you (something which is neither the form nor participant), through which all these things necessarily seem to be great? Hence another form of magnitude will become apparent besides magnitude itself (the one idea) and its participants, that is, another magnitude through which all these become great; so that each of your forms will no longer be one thing, but an infinite multitude.” This is the *essence*.

The doctrine of another form of magnitude, besides the one idea, makes Socrates thus express him-

self relatively to the middle thing, or second magnitude; for he does not dispute the subsistence of the first. "Perhaps each of these forms is nothing more than a *conception*, which ought not to subsist anywhere but in the mind; and if this be the case, each will be one, and the consequences just now mentioned will not ensue." That Socrates is here speaking of the secondary forms may be collected from his genuine exposition of the Timæan hypothesis. "These forms are established paradigms, as it were, by their nature; other things are assimilated to these, and are their resemblances; and the participation of forms by other things is nothing more than an assimilation to these forms." Therefore, as individuals cannot participate of forms, either through parts or through wholes, these philosophers conceived to solve the difficulty by supposing, that each universal idea participated of a certain essence, which, though not divisible, had a power of multiplication corresponding to the sensible objects partaking of its particular nature. Hence when anything participates of greatness, it does not participate of the one universal idea, except through this essence; for otherwise, as we have seen, there would be many universal ideas of one quality or attribute. This is mentioned in a subsequent part of the dialogue, when the dialecticians enter upon their argument. "If the one is, can it be possible that it should be, and yet not participate of essence? It cannot. Will not essence, therefore, be the

essence of the one, but not the same with the one? for if it were the same, it would not be the essence of the one, nor would the one participate of essence." The one participating of essence becomes *one being*, which so far differs from the abstract one, that it possesses multiplicity, (the universal attribute given to *being* by Plato,) and is diffused through all nature, each idea still retaining its original peculiarity of participating of one, or unity and essence. "Can each of these parts (each essence) of one being desert each other, so that the one shall not be a part of being, nor being a part of the one? It cannot be. Therefore each of the parts will contain both one and being." Again, "Will not this one being (composed of essence and unity) become an infinite multitude?" It will become so far infinite, that there must be an essence for every sensible object.

Parmenides proceeds to argue, whether these essences or secondary forms also subsist by themselves, as the primary ones were believed to do. "I think that both you and any other who establishes *the essence of each form as subsisting by itself*, must allow, in the first place, that no one of these subsist in us." This seems to have been a matter of great uncertainty. "Do you see, O Socrates, how great a doubt arises if any one defines forms as having an essential subsistence by themselves?"

I have judged it necessary to treat, so far, of this dialogue, as I have done, to prove how idle, if not absurd, are the deductions of the later Platonists, who

would persuade us, that this exposition of the nature of the ideas was really a profound theological argument, in which Plato occultly or mystically treated of the existence of the Supreme Being, and of the trinity of divine hypostases. These philosophers seriously believed every idea to be a god; and, consequently, Proclus denominates this a Dialogue on the Gods. They imagined that the *one* so often used by Parmenides here related to the chief cause; and they deduced, also, from the dialogue (how, I cannot conceive), a triad of principles, which they call being, life, and intellect; *the one* being the head and fountain thereof.

It must be acknowledged, indeed, that Plato employs very extraordinary language in mentioning the ideas, which led astray these professed disciples of his; but I imagine that by *gods*, in reference to the ideas, he signified no more than their intelligible nature, in contradistinction to sensible natures; and perhaps, also, he assigned a sort of divinity to them in consequence of this superiority, and called them divine, as causes or concauses of natural phenomena; but I cannot collect (which would be too ridiculous to believe), that he ever dreamt of endowing each idea, as these philosophers did, with a distinct personality, which is essential to their being ever considered as gods.

Plato does not distinctly assign the locality of these ideas, nor describe the mode of their exist-

ence. He only says that they subsist by themselves. But the Platonists, theorizing according to their own premises, fancied them to exist in an all-perfect intellect, inferior to the First Cause, which by Dr. Cudworth is held to be, as in the Christian Trinity, the second person, or *Logos* of the Godhead.





## CHAPTER V.

OF PLATO'S SYSTEM OF IDEAS RELATIVE TO A  
TRINITY.

I HAVE before observed, that the System of Ideas was more ancient than Plato. It was a Pythagorean, a Timæan, and Parmenidean doctrine, probably first brought out of Egypt<sup>1</sup>. The substance of it, relative to the causes of all things, is compressed in this laconic sentence from “the Soul of the World:” *Πριν ὧν ὠρανον γενεσθαι, λογῶ ἡστην ἰδεα τε και ὕλα, και ὁ Θεος δαμιουργος τῶ βελτιονος—* *Before the heaven was made, there existed in reality Idea, Matter, and God, the demiurgus of the better nature*<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch says, that the Egyptians regarded the sun as a visible image of an invisible and intellectual nature.

<sup>2</sup> Plato called his chief God and eternal Cause, the Good. Aristotle called God, that *Nous*, or Mind, which is properly the cause of well and right; and he commended (as we have seen) Anaxagoras (as Socrates did likewise), who opposed the atheistical or material philosophers in saying, *Νουν ειναι και του κοσμου και της ταξέως πασης αυτιον.*

Plato also, in his *Phædo*, declares that an Intelligent Being created the world; and everything was by Him made as good, well, and beautiful as possible; in which he coincides here, and in other parts of his writings, with Aristotle and Anaxagoras.

The Platonists, however, will have this Creator to be the second person of a trinity; and not such as he is described by these ancient philosophers.

With respect to the ideas of Plato, and their mode of existence, there has been great diversity of opinion. Some have thought that Plato signified no more by them, than that they were ideas contained in the Divine Mind; others, again, have contended, that he believed them to exist external to it.

Existing externally to the Divine Mind, they might be regarded as "necessary truths;" for they are said to subsist *de natura*; and as Laërtius says, they are the causes of things being such as they are. We might say of them what Aristotle says of mathematical things, "It<sup>3</sup> is absurd to say they are in a place; for place appertains only to singulars (and not to universals, as ideas are), which are separable from each other by place: but mathematical things are *nowhere*."

Aristotle did not repudiate these ideas altogether, though he ridiculed Plato for calling them principal causes. He believed them to subsist in God, and to be the ideas of His Mind. From this it would seem, he interpreted the Platonic ideas, as if they had an independent existence by themselves; for otherwise, he would have agreed with Plato and the Pythagoreans. He wisely discarded the notion, that they were endowed with any casualty; or, that they had any influence at all in nature, being the mere shadowy dreams of Plato's imagination.

<sup>3</sup> Meta. lib. xii. cap. 5.

Though the *locum tenens* of the ideas is very indistinctly mentioned by Plato; yet we may deduce this from his writings, especially from some passages in the *Timæus*, that above the created and visible universe, there was also a kind of supermundane, eternal, and uncreated world, the archetype of the former, which contains in itself all the intelligible forms or ideas. “The material world is the most beautiful of generated natures; and its artificer the best of causes. But being thus generated, it is fabricated according to *that* which is comprehensible by reason and intelligence, and which subsists in an abiding sameness of being.”

He calls this ideal world an animal, as he also calls every distinct idea. “He established it as the most similar of all things to that *animal*, of which other animals (ideas) both considered separately, and, according to their genera, are nothing more than parts. For this contains within itself all *intelligible animals*, just as this world contains us, and other animals which are the objects of sight.” It is likewise called an all-perfect animal, and an eternal animal.

Whatever Plato may have really thought of this ideal world of his; whether it existed *per se*, or only in God, there cannot remain a doubt that a supermundane world is a legitimate inference from his language. But whether he regarded it as a god is another matter, and liable to disputation; for though he may have called it so, he never describes it as

such; and it is not probable that he would have called it an *animal*, had he entertained any such idea. If that word implies or expresses a personality, then we must come to the same conclusion as the later Platonists, who regarded every idea according to its unity, as a god; for Plato distinctly calls each idea by the common name of "animal."

If Plato believed this archetypal world to be an eternal god, he must have held an opinion repudiated by the wisest of the ancients; and maintained that there were more than one Eternal, Chief, and Independent Cause in the universe; for it is certain, that neither he nor the Pythagoreans (as I have already shown) looked upon the "Idea" as a person of a trinity in the Godhead; but as something distinct from the Deity, and ascribed by Timæus to necessity. It was, in truth, a sort of immaterial cause, under the control and guidance of God himself, for such is it represented by some Pythagoreans, who speak more distinctly of it than Plato. Some of the ancients, and even the Platonists themselves, occasionally represent the ideas, as subsisting in God. Proclus says, "The<sup>4</sup> Cause, therefore, knows the universe, and all things out of which it is composed; he being the cause also of these things. But if this be true, it is evident that *by looking into itself*, and *by knowing itself*, it knows what comes after itself."

Philo Judæus, who seems to have been greatly

<sup>4</sup> Proclus on Parmen. lib. iii.

perplexed with the paradox of an eternal and supermundane world existing with God, discovers this remedy. “God, intending to make a visible world, *first formed* an intelligible one; that so having an incorporeal and most godlike pattern before him, he might make the corporeal world agreeably to it<sup>5</sup>.”

There is an error or fallacy to be observed, of considerable consequence; that by many these ideas have been always represented as *intellectual* ideas, or conceptions. They are more properly expressed by species, or specific essences; for the Pythagoreans signified no more by their real-forms, of which the forms of material things, as they are perceived by us, are mere fleeting and changeable images. A modern author of great celebrity, draws this very necessary distinction betwixt forms and intellectual conceptions; and advances some important remarks on the ancient signification of the word “idea.”

<sup>5</sup> St. Cyril gives this remarkable passage on the subject: “Julian, by his intelligible and invisible gods, seems to mean those ideas which Plato sometimes fancies to be real substances, having an independent existence. At other times, he represents them to be only ideas or conceptions in the Divine Mind.” Con. Jul. vol. ii. cap. 4.

And Harris, in his *Hermes*, informs us, that “Nicomachus, in his *Arithmetic*, calls the Supreme Being an Artist: *εν τη του τεχνιτου θεου διανοια*, in *Dei artificis mente*. Where Philoponus in his MS. *Com.* observes as follows, *τεχνητην φησι τον Θεον ως παντων τας πρωτας αιτιας και τους λογους αυτων εχοντα*. He calls God an Artist, as possessing *within himself* the first causes of all things, and their reasons or proportions.” P. 437, *note*.

“Plato<sup>6</sup> calls them, indeed, ideas, a word which in him, in Aristotle, and all the other writers of early antiquity, signifies a species; and is perfectly synonymous with the other word *ειδος*, more frequently made use of by Aristotle.”

Again, “Is<sup>7</sup> there any one passage in any Greek author, near the time of Aristotle and Plato, in which the word idea is used in its present meaning, to signify a thought or conception? Are not the words which in all languages express reality or existence (which Plato's idea did, being called permanent and real-being) directly opposed to those which express thought or conception only?”

Notwithstanding this definition of an idea, there are some particularized by Plato, both in the *Timæus* and *Parmenides*, which can nowhere subsist, except in a mind. We may imagine him to have dreamt of forms existing *per se*; but it is impossible to conceive ideas of beauty, of justice, of goodness, and such like things, to have any such independent existence external to the mind. The specific essences are of a nature very different from mental conceptions, as these are which I have enumerated.

As we have already seen, the later Platonists conceived that Plato considered every distinct universal idea to be a deity; but in maintaining this gross absurdity, they fix a very low estimate of the mind

<sup>6</sup> Smith's *Hist. of An. Logic and Metaphysics*.

<sup>7</sup> *Idem*.

of that great philosopher, for if we follow out his arguments to their legitimate conclusions, (based upon this assumption of the divinity and personality of every such idea,) we shall soon become sensible to the labyrinth of absurdities and contradictions, into which this process would necessarily lead us.

Justice, beauty, and goodness, as universal ideas, would be gods; and, as there is a form of a triangle, and other such things, subsisting by themselves, which are the archetypes of those forms amongst us, they must also be gods.

Plato describes the creation of Time by Jupiter, the Highest Cause, in a very majestic manner, as an image of Eternity flowing from itself; and as the one is the exemplar of the other, Eternity will be a divinity likewise, on the same grounds.

I have observed, that from this dialogue these spurious followers of Plato, deduced a triad or trinity of archical hypostases, which Plotinus confirms in these words:—"Parmenides in Plato, speaking more exactly, distinguishes three divine unities subordinate; the first of that, which is perfectly and most properly *one*; the second of that, which was called by him *one-many*; the third, which is expressed *one* and *many*. So that Parmenides did also agree in this acknowledgement of a trinity of divine or archical hypostases."

For this I am indebted to Dr. Cudworth, who conceives this explanation to be a key by which we can open the treasures of that obscure book, the

Parmenides. But how can this be reconciled with the dialogue itself, and other parts of the writings of Plato, in which the peculiar doctrine of ideas is so frequently treated of, or alluded to?

Socrates, in the *Philebus*, puts an end to this vain delusion of divine hypostases, by the very terms which he employs relative to the ideas. "It is now agreed never to introduce into conversation, as an instance of *one* and *many*, the members or parts into which any single thing may be considered as divisible, because, when a respondent has once admitted and avowed—that all these (ideas) are that one thing, which is thus at the same time many—he is refuted and laughed at by his questioner, for having been driven to assert such monstrous absurdities as these (appear to be), that a single one is an *infinite multitude*, and an infinite multitude *one*." In which the *publicity* of the argument is acknowledged, or at least implied; so that it could not certainly relate to the other doctrine propounded in Plato's letter to Dionysius, which he expressly states was never publicly written of by him; and in which Dr. Cudworth and others perceive a trinity of three persons in the Godhead.

Plato, in that singular description in the *Timæus*, of the generation of the visible world, says, that the fabricator created it after the similitude of the *eternal gods*; which is, indeed, a very exceptionable mode of expression; but there can be no doubt, that these eternal gods were the same with the divine



ideas, or exemplars, which, altogether, he denominates an eternal animal, and animal-itself. "For this, indeed, contains all intelligible animals (these eternal gods) comprehended in itself."

Shortly afterwards he thus writes of the Creator and Chief Cause, confirming the noble expression of Socrates in the *Philebus*, that Intellect is King of heaven and of earth. "When, therefore, that God, who is a perpetually *reasoning divinity* (he is not called an animal, as he called the Idea), cogitated about the god (the visible world) who was destined to subsist at some certain period of time, he produced his body smooth and equable," &c.

He likewise calls the universe "a blessed god," and the earth the most ancient of the gods under the heavens. From this it is manifest, that the language of Plato, in using the word "god" in so many varieties of meaning, was liable to misapprehension, especially by those who snatched at the literal signification, without inquiring into its bearing on the general argument. Thus Plotinus informs us, that mind, or intellect, was begotten of the first god, which generated all entities together *with himself*—the pulchritude of the ideas which are all *intelligible gods*, which gods he believed to have an existence individually, while Plato could not mean any more than that they were the eternal essences of things existing by nature.

Taylor, indeed, says, that the word *god* was of various significations among the ancient philoso-

phers; and it is attributed by Plato, as well as by the ancient theologians, to beings which participate of the gods: these beings are the divine ideas.—This is conformable to the genuine speculations of Plato, who maintained that the ideas participated of God, as material and sensible things in this world participate of them. But there is a great difference between this, and the absurd notion that all these intelligible ideas are gods.

I am particular and minute on this point, because Dr. Cudworth, in referring to these eternal gods abovementioned, says<sup>b</sup>, “By which eternal gods, he there meant, doubtless, that *το πρωτον*, and *το δευτερον*, and *το τριτον*—that first, second, and third, which, in his Second Epistle to Dionysius, he makes to be the principles of all things.”

This conclusion is hasty and contradictory, for as these eternal gods are synonymous with the intelligible ideas (and this is so far acknowledged by the later Platonists), how can this writer hold the above, when in other parts of his work he is abundantly severe on Proclus, for supposing the ideas to be causes and gods; and would persuade us, that Plato conceived them to be only ideas of the Divine Mind, neither having an existence by themselves, nor being causes in the universe; which is certainly in opposition to the express language and belief of Plato.

There can be no doubt of the marked distinction

<sup>b</sup> *Intell. System*, vol. iii. p. 85.

which Plato makes between his divine animal and perpetually-reasoning divinity, the demiurgus of the world; but if, according to Dr. Cudworth, the ideas are all in God, then God, in that description given by Plato, was not contemplating the archetypal idea "subsisting by itself," but only the thoughts or conceptions of his own mind.

There is some sense and coherence in the notion, that the sensible was made in the likeness of a supermundane or intelligible world; but there is neither sense nor coherence in the assertion, that the Creator of the world made it an image of himself; for what material object can ever be an image of a Spiritual and Intellectual Being?

As we might expect, the later Platonists do not all agree, as to the hypostases in their trinity.—The general opinion, however, seems to be, that the ideal or supermundane world is the second person, which we have thus stated by Porphyry, an undoubted pagan, and perverter of Plato's writings. He informs us that from the Good, or Supreme Cause, was generated a Mind or Intellect incomprehensible to mortals, which subsisting by itself, contains the things that really are, and the essences of all beings. Then, he says, this Mind sprung out of God from all eternity as its cause; notwithstanding this he calls it "self-begotten," and "its own parent."

The Christian doctrine was of some service in this description; but the author either misunderstood it, or willingly perverted it, for his own purposes.

As the second hypostasis, therefore, was confessed to be the ideal or intellectual world deduced from Plato's theology, which contained all the ideas within it, I shall make some observations and inferences on this important point.

1. When Plato, in the *Timæus*, distinctly calls the Creator a perpetually-reasoning divinity, he must have signified by this that he was a perfect intellect; and as the archetypal world is held by the Platonists to be an Eternal Mind sprung from God, there must necessarily be two supreme intellects, and not one. And Dr. Cudworth, who will not acknowledge the ideas to have a separate existence, but will have them to be ideas of the Divine Mind, it is manifest that he annihilates the second supreme intellect altogether, and merges it in the first.

Then, again, if the ideal world be really the second hypostasis, as Porphyry maintains, the intellect or *Nous* of the Platonists cannot be the demiurgus of the *Timæus*, since he represents the "animal itself" as something subsisting distinctly from the perpetually-reasoning divinity. Hence we must conclude, that the Jupiter Artificer is the Supreme Being, and that he alone is emphatically styled by Socrates, "king<sup>9</sup> of heaven and of earth."

<sup>9</sup> Socrates, I have observed, commended Anaxagoras because he called the Great First Cause a supreme mind or intellect. Here Socrates calls him by the same name, intending, no doubt, to oppose the Democritical or atheistical doctrine, which acknowledged none but material, and therefore *irrational* causes. According to this philosophy, the world was made by chance or

If this archetypal world be regarded as a god for the reasons stated, upon the same grounds we ought also to maintain that these generated deities of Plato, the sun, moon, and stars, must also have their archetypes, which are gods, for they are the mere images of intelligible ideas. By reason of this necessary inference, that these are distinct intellectual divinities, and that the archetype of the whole universe is a composition of a numerous variety of gods, we find Dr. Cudworth thus lecturing the Platonists:

“ It<sup>10</sup> was a gross absurdity in those Platonists, to make the second, in their trinity of gods, not to be one god or hypostasis, but a multitude of such; as also was that a monstrous extravagancy of theirs, to suppose the ideas, all of them, to be so many distinct substances and animals.”

This censure may be very just; but it ought to be acknowledged, at the same time, that the “ eternal animal,” considered to be the second person of the Platonic trinity, had no better foundation; for its existence rested on precisely the same grounds, as the existence of every distinct and indi-

by necessity, which Socrates expresses, “ fortuitously and at random.” “ Whether shall we say that the power of the *irrational* principle governs all things in the whole universe fortuitously and at random? Or shall we, on the contrary, agree with our ancestors and predecessors in affirming, that a certain admirable *intellect* and *wisdom* orders all things together, and governs throughout the whole?”

<sup>10</sup> Vol. iii. p. 65.

vidual idea; being, in fact, a congeries, or rather a repository of all such ideas.

The same author says, "It cannot at all be doubted that Plato, and most of his followers, very well understood that these ideas were, all of them, nothing else but the *noëmata* or conceptions of the one perfect intellect, which was their second hypostasis<sup>11</sup>." That is, of the later Platonists, who clearly looked upon the supermundane world, or the "eternal animal itself," (whose existence is abnegated by Dr. Cudworth,) as their second hypostasis.

From this it appears that the learned writer conceived the demiurgus, or perpetually-reasoning divinity, to be the all-perfect intellect, who possessed in himself that very "eternal animal," which Plato believed, or maintained, to subsist by itself, and on which the Creator looked as the paradigm of the visible universe. For what can be clearer than his own words? "Whatever ideas *intellect* conceived by cogitation in *animal-itself*, such and so many he

<sup>11</sup> Vol. iii. p. 67. The author assumes too much in this passage. For if it were, as he affirms, there would be no difference betwixt Plato and Aristotle on this point. Their difference was relative to the existence *per se* of these ideas. Plato maintained this, while the other says clearly, that they are the ideas of the Divine Mind. Aristotle says also, "That in God, intellect or mind is really the same thing with the intelligible ideas." By which he means, that the intelligibles are nowhere but in the Divine Mind. The reason given is this, that as God is the architect of the world, he could not look without himself for the ideas, (as Plato fancied,) but rather that they were all eternally contained in himself.

conceived it necessary for the universe to contain." In which, intellect manifestly refers to the Creator, who, according to this, *did not* contain within himself the intelligible ideas, nor the intellectual or ideal world. So that Dr. Cudworth differs not only from the Platonists, who esteemed the fountain and repository of the ideas to be the second hypostasis; but even from Plato himself, who makes the Creator, an intellect, or person, distinct from the archetypal world.

2. As the intelligible world is one thing, and the Intellect of the *Timæus* another, (the genuine theology of Plato,) the former, judged to be the Intellect or Logos, by the later Platonists, then the perpetually-reasoning divinity must be the Supreme Cause, the same with the Mind of Anaxagoras and Aristotle, and the King of Heaven and of Earth of Socrates and Plato. So that it is a mere delusion of Dr. Cudworth's to suppose, the Intellect to be the second person, and, as such, to be emphatically (as in the Christian doctrine,) the Creator of all things. And, as he expunges the ideal world, by denying the subsistence of ideas, as laid down in Plato's writings, by inference, he reduces the causes to two only, namely, God and the sensible world.

3. There cannot be a doubt of this sensible universe being a created thing, except so far as the matter out of which it was supposed to be generated by God was eternal. It was represented to be the third hypostasis of the Platonic trinity. And

it was expressly stated by Plato to be a god, endued with a soul and an intellectual nature. So that we have here temporals mingled with things which are eternal; the created with the uncreated.

The doctrine is thus stated by Moderatus, as Simplicius acquaints us. "He declares, that according to the Pythagoreans, the first one or unity is above all essence (or the intelligible ideas), the second one, which is that which truly is, and intelligible, according to them, is the ideas; and the third, which is *psychical* or soul (of the created universe), partakes of the first and second."

Dr. Cudworth does not deny that the sensible world was represented to be the third hypostasis, though he attempts to persuade us that it is an adulterated doctrine<sup>12</sup>. "The third of these hypostases is called by some of them, the immediate soul of the corporeal world." And Proclus, who is of this opinion, says, that Numenius<sup>13</sup> "called the first god the father, the second the maker or fabricator, and the third the thing made." Eusebius, also, (no contemptible authority,) bears testimony to this in these words<sup>14</sup>. "All these things Plato's interpreters refer to the first god, and to the second cause, and to the third, the soul of the world."

In consequence of this egregious error, of confounding temporals with eternal, Dr. Cudworth found himself in a dilemma from which he could

<sup>12</sup> Vol. iii. p. 42.

<sup>13</sup> Com. Tim. Platon. lib. ii. p. 93.

<sup>14</sup> Pr. Ev. lib. ii. cap. 20.



not easily escape. Hence he says<sup>15</sup>, “ We conclude, that this ancient cabala of the trinity was depraved and adulterated by those Platonists and Pythagoreans, who made either the world itself, or else  $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu$   $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\iota\omicron\nu$ , an informing soul of the world, to be the third hypostasis thereof, they mingling created and uncreated beings together, in that which themselves, notwithstanding, call a trinity of causes and principles.” The difficulty is overcome in this manner: “ It is most reasonable to compound this business, by supposing with Plotinus and others, that Plato held a double psyche or soul, one  $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\iota\omicron\nu$  or mundane, which is, as it were, the concrete form of this corporeal world, &c.; another supermundane or  $\sigma\epsilon\pi\alpha\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$  separate, and which is not so much the form as the artificer of the world.” The inconsistency of this will be immediately perceived, after what I have previously recorded of this author having, by inference, denied the separate existence of the intelligible world, which is the only one that can be deduced from Plato; and which is, in truth, that supermundane world mentioned by Plotinus. It is the all-perfect Intellect of the Platonists, and not, therefore, the third hypostasis of their trinity. Hence the soul of the world is a creature, and not an eternal thing; and cannot be a person of the Godhead. Hence Dr. Cudworth’s trinity of good, intellect, and soul, is, by his own arguments, reduced to one hypostasis, as he does not acknowledge the ideal

<sup>15</sup> Intell. System. vol. iii. p. 45.

world nor the mundane soul to be the other two.

We revert once more to the original principle laid down by us (and which has been confirmed rather than weakened by what followed), that the triad of Plato was substantially the same with the Pythagorean, which was, that before the world was created, existed God, the Creator, a Supreme Intellect; idea, the archetype or exemplar of the visible world; and matter itself, which was universally maintained to be eternal. The two latter cannot, by any sophistry, be considered as hypostases of a trinity; for, as we have seen, they were ascribed to necessity; and it was only the first who was looked upon as having all volition in him, as being the chief and only supreme cause; for the ideas and matter were subject to his over-ruling power.

It will have been observed, that this Pythagorean triad could not, by any possibility, have been derived from the other ancient triads, of which I have already written at large. They relate to things perfectly distinct in their origin, and essentially different in their nature.

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## CHAPTER VI.

## ON THE RELIGION OF PLATO; AND SOME CONJECTURES ON HIS EPISTLE TO DIONYSIUS.

NOTWITHSTANDING the learned author of *The Intellectual System of the Universe* argues that Plato was substantially an orthodox trinitarian, and that the doctrine of the trinity was a Mosaic, Chaldean, as well as Pythagorean dogma, or cabala, he is guilty of this singular contradiction, which, in reality, subverts the very foundation of his hypothesis, resting as it does on ancient tradition.

“The<sup>1</sup> three principal *attributes* of the Deity are,—1st, Infinite goodness; 2nd, Infinite wisdom and knowledge; 3rd, Infinite active and perceptive power. From which divine attributes the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem to have formed their trinity of archical hypostases.”

It may be recollected that I advanced as much in a previous chapter; and attempted to show that Plato signified no more by his Supreme Mind, and the Good, than that they were mere attributes of one Spiritual, Intellectual, and Benevolent Being.

Dr. Cudworth, in other portions of his work, somewhat incautiously, I think, brings Plutarch forward as an authority for Plato’s belief in a trinity;

<sup>1</sup> Vol. i. p. 426.

and refers us to his Isis and Osiris for a confirmation. But in consulting that learned and amusing treatise, what do we discover? That besides the good, there was also an evil principle acknowledged by Plato; which surely cannot constitute an hypostasis of one God.

Plutarch says, that Plato held the world to be moved and regulated, not only by one cause, but happily by many, or at least by no fewer than two; of which the one is the Creator of all *good things*; the other of an opposite nature, producing different and contrary effects,—namely, *evil things*. Plato, he says, seems also to hold a third cause between the good and the evil, which is neither devoid of soul nor reason, nor yet immovable itself, as some think, but adjacent and inherent in the other two causes; though it always inclines to the good one. He then proceeds to point out some resemblance (fanciful, indeed,) between the notions of Plato respecting these principles, and the Egyptian deities, Osiris, Typhon, and Orus, because he found Typhon to be an incarnation of the evil principle. This is really all the light which Plutarch affords. Dr. Cudworth would persuade us it had some relation to Plato's trinity of archical hypostases!

As we have refuted the hypothesis of the mysterious doctrine of a trinity being even suspected by Plato, or any of his school, I will now proceed to make some observations on the religion or theology professed by him.

Plato was remotely a disciple of Pythagoras; but, approximately, he acquiesced in the theology propounded by his contemporary, Timæus, in his book on the Soul of the World. He believed in One Supreme, Eternal, and Spiritual Being, who was the cause of all things, and for whose sake all things subsisted. Subordinate to him he also acknowledged other causes, or principles, of a *necessary* kind,—the ideas and matter; the one being the forms subsisting *de natura*, of which the forms assumed by sensible or material objects are mere images or resemblances. These forms, or archetypes, as well as matter, were conceived to have existed from all eternity. Without the ideas God could not have generated anything, or, at least, he could not have generated anything good and perfect, since the very perfection and goodness of the visible universe depended on the eternal nature of the archetype after which it was fashioned.

God was not strictly a creator; namely, a maker of something out of nothing,—as the ancient philosophers could not comprehend a creation in its true signification: he was considered to be only a plastic power, who ordered, disposed, and regulated the matter existing, for his purposes, from all eternity; and who stamped upon material things the forms which they assume in nature.

Plato held, that God gave being to a number of generated deities, or junior gods, who were a sort of ministerial or adjunct powers in the government of

the world<sup>2</sup>. These were the animated stars, or souls of the celestial host, which were immortal, not by their own nature, but by the will and goodness of their creator. The chief god was called by divers names, to characterize his multifarious attributes. He was represented as the *Summum Bonum*, or the abstraction of universal goodness; as a supreme intellect, and as the giver of all life, and the governor of the whole world. He is the generator of the inferior gods, and the fountain and cause of all good.

Plato likewise believed the whole world to be a god, generated, and endued with a soul and intellect, by the chief cause. In some respects it was looked upon by him as a principle or cause, for which he is severely taxed by Aristotle, who justly ridiculed the idea of any generated or temporal object being considered in that light.

In the argument of a trinity in Plato's theology,

<sup>2</sup> As the religion of Plato and Socrates was probably the same, I shall here briefly protest against the idle assertion of some men, that the latter denied all gods but the Eternal Cause. Tertullian says, "Propterea damnatus est Socrates quia deos destruebat? What gods were these? The animated stars? No! They were the deities of the Grecian mythology. For as he repudiates (in his Apology) the calumny of being called an atheist, he acknowledges some gods, but not those of the city, namely, of Athens."

Socrates believed, like Plato, in one Chief Cause, and a host of generated and inferior divinities, who administered the affairs and the government of the world.

great stress is laid on a certain passage in an Epistle of his to Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse. This is the substance of it: "All things are situated about the king of all things, and all things subsist for his sake, and he is the cause of all beautiful things; but second things are situated about that which is second; and such as are third in gradation about that which is third."

In communicating this information, Plato is peculiarly cautious and mysterious. He desires Dionysius to destroy the letter after he has read it, lest it should fall into other hands. And he says, that the purport of it is expressed in such language, that even should it, by chance, miscarry, no one could possibly divine its secret meaning. Whether he apprehended the fate of Socrates, or whether he was thus cautious for other unknown reasons, is impossible to decide. St. Cyril, in this passage, alludes to the first supposition<sup>3</sup>. "Plato was not ignorant of the truth. He had the knowledge of the only begotten Son of God, and of the Holy Spirit, whom he styles Psyche; and he could have expressed himself more correctly, had he not dreaded the poison which Socrates drank, and been afraid of Anitus and Melitus." As Plato, in this Epistle, says explicitly, that the peculiar doctrine alluded to, is conformable to the Socratic philosophy, I will hazard this conjecture on its hidden signification.

<sup>3</sup> Con. Julian, lib. i. p. 34.

1. That king, around whom all things are situated, is probably the same with Him, whom Socrates styles Intellect, the king of heaven and of earth, and who, as the good, was looked upon as the cause of all good and of all beautiful things.

It may be observed that Plato does not say, "around him are all things that are first;" but everything whatsoever is situated around Him, comprehended in his essence, and subsisting for his sake; He is the Supreme Cause,—the same with the Jupiter of the *Timæus*, the artificer of the best things.

2. By the second thing (which is not called a king, but, in general terms, a nature) Plato probably meant the intelligible ideas, or animal-itself, which were regarded as causes in the universe.

Even Dr. Cudworth seems to acquiesce in this mode of solution. "Though some might think Plato to have given an intimation of the *noes* (intelligibles) in his *δεύτερον περι τα δευτέρα*,—second things about the second; yet by these may very well be understood the *ideas*; as by the third things about the third, all created beings."

3. The third nature may be considered to be the Psyche or universal soul of the world, around which subsist all created, sensible, or material things.

Plato, indeed, affirms in this Epistle, that he had never written on this subject, nor did he intend to write; but this might be supposed to refer to a system, or theory, in which these natures were ex-



plained, their participation of each other defined, and the mode of their existence, in relation to each other, pointed out. That there is some probability in this conjecture may be deduced from his other writings, in which they are treated of separately and individually, but never systematically nor consecutively.



PART THE THIRD.

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ON PLATONISM,

WITH

SOME ACCOUNT OF ITS MOST EMINENT  
PROFESSORS.



## PART THE THIRD

## CHAPTER I.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS  
OF PLATONISM.

As, I think, it has been demonstrated that no such doctrine as a trinity of divine hypostases can be deduced from the genuine philosophy of Plato; nor from the speculations of his school; or of any of the various sects of ancient philosophers, who shed a glory over that era of Greece; and that the triads of gods, originating in very remote antiquity, were in their nature and origin absolutely distinct from the Pythagorean three-fold principles of all things: it is my purpose now to give some account of the Platonic theology, and of some of its most celebrated professors.

The revolutions of empires which followed the deaths of Aristotle, Plato, and the illustrious men of that era, changed the whole character and spirit of the Grecian people, corrupting, if not destroying, the immortal republic of letters, which even now excites our reverence and admiration.

Under the successors of Alexander the Great,

there sprung up many innovators of the genuine philosophy, who assumed the general name of Pythagoreans. Contrary to the maxim, that philosophy should never be mingled with the vulgar religion, or mythology, they combined them into one monstrous and disjointed system, and tried "to embellish<sup>1</sup> truth with fiction; and whether they aimed at confirming or invalidating the creed of their ancestors,—to effect either purpose they invented fables and lying prodigies."

A number of these pseudo-Pythagoreans settled down in the city of Alexandria, in Egypt, and founded that celebrated school of philosophy which flourished for many generations after. This country would seem to have been doomed to be the scene of every extravagance, and the nurse of every error and superstition, as if the climate, or the people, or whatever other cause, which brought into life the wonderful mythology of Egypt, was inimical to the purity and simplicity of truth. The land which Herodotus eulogizes for its fertility in the products of the earth, was as prolific in the propagation of error and imposture.

Besides this school founded in Alexandria, Dr. Gillies says<sup>2</sup>, "Other self-entitled philosophers travelled over the Greek conquests of Asia, col-

<sup>1</sup> Gillies, *Aris.* vol. i. p. 181. This learned writer, in a Supplement to that work, gives an excellent sketch of the rise of the Platonic philosophy.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. i. p. 181.

lecting every rite of superstition, and every tale of wonder, which they afterwards amplified in their fabulous compositions, for the amusement and delight of the idle multitudes assembled in the great cities, built and hastily peopled by the Macedonian conquerors."

Gibbon<sup>3</sup> informs us, that the philosophy of Plato, about three hundred years before Christ, fell into the hands of a few Hebrews of liberal mind, who devoted their lives to religious and philosophical contemplation. They probably made up a composition of Judaism and Platonism, which they passed off for a system; for how could they reconcile the vague speculations of Plato on religion, with the certainty of their own sacred writings?

In this declension of learning, which followed the conquest of Greece (an event which uprooted the patriotism of the people, as well as their learning), Pythagoras was much more severely injured in his character and reputation, than Plato or Aristotle. He is represented to us as a magical impostor, and as a person addicted to every puerile fable. And, of course, he is more admired for his reputed skill in occult science, than for true wisdom and virtue, by which he has earned the just applause of posterity.

The wonderful and ridiculous stories related of him, came down to the Platonists of after-times, embellished, rather than obscured, by fresh addi-

<sup>3</sup> Dec. and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. iii. cap. 21. p. 8.

tions; which were eagerly incorporated by Porphyry and Iamblichus in their lives of him, written about the third century of the Christian era. They record, without a blush, his great skill in sorcery; and the many preposterous miracles ascribed to him. There is not a fable, however shallow and improbable, which these biographers do not receive and digest without compunction or hesitation. And so besotted were their minds, so credulous and superstitious, that they were not conscious of having defamed the character of this great man! On the contrary, they seem to have believed, that all his glory and fame originated from, and rested on, his learning in magic and sorcery!

It is said of the Samian philosopher, that to prove he was the true Hyperborean Apollo, he exhibited one of his thighs in a full assembly at the Olympic games, which, being formed of well-burnished gold, shone with a dazzling splendor, and convinced as well as amazed the spectators. At the same games he brought down an eagle from the sky, and whispered some mysterious words to it—after which it renewed its flight to the empyrean above.

Alluding<sup>4</sup> to the sanctity in which he held *beans*, (for in the Golden Verses he instructs his pupils to abstain from touching that vegetable,) they relate, that one day, as he espied an ox entering a field of beans, he ran up to it, and after he had pronounced

<sup>4</sup> Dacier's Life of Pythagoras.



a word in its ear, it turned away and took another road.

Then, there is the javelin of Abaris—of surpassing virtue, with which he could cross the widest and most rapid rivers; pass over the most inaccessible mountains, calm the raging tempest, drive away the plague, and all other mortal diseases, and mitigate or destroy every evil incident to mankind. The possession of this weapon rendered him, in a manner, omniscient; for it is said, he was at the same time seen in different towns at a great distance from each other.

Such is a specimen of the history given of him, who brought philosophy into Greece; who gave a new life to morality, and formed it into a system; who laid the foundation of the best philosophy then existing; and who was as skilful and profound in mathematical science, as he is said by Porphyry to have been in the arts of magic and sorcery.

Though it appears the new Platonism arose before the Christian era, it flourished most conspicuously, and had a more extended influence, in the third and fourth centuries. Its essential principle was in the selection of what were considered the least objectionable doctrines from all sources; but especially from Plato and Aristotle's writings. These were formed into a heterogeneous system, and called the Eclectic Philosophy.

Another great principle in this system was, to reconcile the ancient mythology to certain precon-

ceived notions, and to reduce it to harmonize with their philosophical speculations. This would appear a hopeless task. But the *opus magnum* was attempted; and, in the hands of the Platonists, every idle fable of the poets, concerning the existence and the generation of the gods, underwent a new interpretation. The story which the common polytheist believed, or which the sceptical reader ridiculed, was supposed to have a secret and profound meaning, only to be perceived by one initiated into the new system.

This *allegorical key* was successfully applied to the writings of Aristotle, Plato, and the Pythagoreans. It unlocked the treasures of Plato, after a long night of darkness and ignorance. Those doctrines of which his own immediate disciples, and even Plato himself, enjoyed but a faint glimpse, were disclosed, and elucidated by this light of after-ages! The great philosopher was believed to have been skilful in this art of allegory,—so that, according to them, without applying it to his works, there is no chance of arriving at the true and occult meaning!

There were many circumstances which tended to elevate Plato to the distinction which he attained, among the professors of the eclectic philosophy. It was not so much the beauty of his style, (for they had no taste for such a refinement,) nor his elevated conceptions of the Supreme Being, nor his notions of moral virtue and beauty, which captivated them, as a certain obscurity in his doctrines; a mysterious,

undefined mode of expressing his ideas; and a sort of *jugglery* in his logic. The vividness of his imagination, in many cases injurious to him as a philosopher, which gave "to airy nothings a local habitation and a name," was rather esteemed than condemned by these disciples. The severe style, and close reasoning of Aristotle, had not half the charms of the creations of Plato's fancy.

These "Eclectics," far from looking upon Plato as one of those superior minds, who esteemed the vulgar or poetical mythology as a mere mass of fables, begotten in idle hours, and fostered by tradition, would have him to confide and believe in every childish and lascivious story of the gods, invented by Homer and Hesiod. They so far redeem the calumny, however, as to argue, that he did not receive them *literally*; but such as they were after they had passed the ordeal of their own allegorical interpretation.

Suppose the fables to be taken and put in the alembic, and distilled in accordance with this improved mode, we shall find the vices of the gods to be transformed into so many virtues—their amours become exertions of super-essential energy. Hence Sallust, in his Treatise on the Gods and the World, acquaints us that the Rape of Proserpine occultly signified the descent of souls (an excellent interpretation); and that the amorous propensities of Jupiter were only "creative energies," and "divine fury."

Plato, in his Republic, and elsewhere, seems rather to oppose the Platonists; as he speaks literally, and not allegorically, of the impious fables related of the gods; and appears to coincide with the emphatic denunciation of Pythagoras, that the souls of Homer and Hesiod merited the tortures of the damned by reason of their impiety.

It is probable that the introduction of the Christian religion had some influence over the minds of the later Platonists; and that in the course of time, when its influence extended, it effected a change in the eclectic philosophy.

When the new religion sprung into light, and afterwards penetrated the gardens of Rome and Alexandria, it must have created a strong sensation (although it was ostensibly viewed with contempt,) on account of its pure and sublime morality, its perfect simplicity, and the reputed character of its Divine founder. They might have despised our Saviour and his disciples as men not of the "schools;" they might have scorned his pretensions to divinity, and the miracles attributed to him; but they could not long shut their eyes to the intrinsic excellence of his religion, nor their ears to the daily whispers of its advancement in the world.

Curiosity thus becoming excited, inquiries would, in consequence, be made respecting the nature of this new system, until in the end, some unbelievers were tempted to peruse it in the sacred writings. They could not but acknowledge the purity and

sublimity of its doctrines, and its superiority to their own vulgar religion. The learned unbelievers of that period would "through evil and through good report," have willingly crushed Christianity in its infancy, as a formidable rival to their own philosophy; but all their efforts having failed in fighting against Heaven itself, they sat down discomfited, and vented their rage and virulence in their writings. Yet notwithstanding this hatred of Christianity, and professed contempt for its Founder, it effected a wonderful influence over their minds, and it is manifest that, in the course of time, they even borrowed from the pages of the Holy Scriptures. Bryant confirms my opinion in this passage. "It<sup>s</sup> is to be observed, that when Christianity had introduced a more rational system, as well as a more refined worship, among mankind, the pagans were struck with the sublimity of its doctrines, and tried in their turn to refine. But their misfortune was, that they were obliged to abide by the theology which had been transmitted to them, and to make the history of the Gentile gods the basis of their procedure. This brought them into immense difficulties and equal absurdities, while they laboured to solve what was inexplicable, and to remedy what was past cure."

There is one, however, of whom honorable mention is made, who must be relieved from this charge

<sup>s</sup> An. My. vol. iii. p. 101.

relative to the pagan deities. Philo, a learned and eminent Jew of the first century, was a disciple and great admirer of Plato. But he could follow Plato in his philosophy only, for, being a Hebrew, he must have acquiesced in the religion of his country.

A controversy has been raised relative to the exact period in which he lived; some contending he was before Christ, and others that he flourished after. The opponents of Christianity attempt to maintain the former, for the purpose of showing that the doctrines promulgated by Christ were known previous to his appearance among men; but Bryant<sup>6</sup>, I think, proves satisfactorily, that he not only lived during the whole period of Christ's existence on earth, but that he must have had access to the Scriptures, or conversed with the Christians on the subject of their religion. He also imagines that from his expressive silence he must have thought very favourably of it.

I cannot doubt, from the language used by Philo Judæus, (which he could not have from other sources, for where did they exist?) concerning the Logos, that he borrowed it either from the New Testament, or from some one well acquainted with it. The peculiar words employed to define and express this person, are so singular, that it is impossible he could have invented them. He calls him the Divine Operator by whom all things were disposed. A

<sup>6</sup> Bryant's Philo, to which I refer the reader for a more exact account.

Being superior to the angelic natures and all created things. Also the image of God, and the same with God; the Logos, or eternal word of the everlasting God; the mediator between God and man, the advocate for all mortals. "The same Word is the Intercessor for man, who is always tending to corruption." This Person is also, according to him, the Fountain of all wisdom; and that man may, by drinking at this sacred spring, obtain, instead of death, the reward of everlasting life. "We maintain, also, that by the High Priest is not meant a man, but the divine Word." Philo even styles him the Shepherd of his flock. We may, after this, say with Bryant, "So much was Philo beholden to the Christians, that we may read in him the opinion of the apostles and the doctrines of Christ himself, upon this essential article of our belief."

It is to be observed of Philo Judæus, that in so fully and explicitly acknowledging the existence of the Divine Logos, as he appears to have done, he must necessarily have misinterpreted the Jewish prophecies relating to the advent of our Saviour; for he denies totally and absolutely that this personage could ever be manifested in human nature. This strict abnegation was, as Bryant remarks, the great stumbling-block to his conversion to Christianity, for otherwise he was on the very threshold of our faith. In his descriptions of the Logos, he is constantly spoken of in his divine or pre-existent state; and as Philo denies, because he cannot com-

prehend, that He could ever appear in the flesh, it is clear that the prophecies foretelling the Messiah, in his estimation, could not relate to this eternal Word of God. So that he whom the Hebrew nation expected as a king, instead of the lowly “man of sorrows and acquainted with griefs,” if entertained or believed by Philo at all, must have been, in his opinion, a person distinct from the divine Logos.

It may be observed, also, that this philosopher, being of the Jewish persuasion, enjoyed great advantages over the pagan Platonists, who made the ancient mythology “the basis of their procedure” in raising their new-fangled polytheism; so that it ought not to surprise us if he had some knowledge of the Logos, *before* simplifying his conceptions by contact with the Christian theology. Whatever diversity of opinion might exist on this point,—the source of his knowledge,—it is abundantly manifest from all we have said, that he could not have deduced the existence of the second Person (much less that singular and peculiar language with which he variously describes and alludes to him) from the writings of Plato. If we would but compare his precise ideas, with the ridiculous and confused notions of the other Platonists, we shall receive sufficient confirmation of this assertion. I regret, therefore, that I am obliged to disagree from Bryant, who, in his observations on some passages of Philo’s writings and opinions, concludes that the ancient philosophers recognised a trinity in the Godhead;



and he argues that Philo, receiving an obscure knowledge of the subject from these, was enabled to refine and render it more accurate by consulting the Christian religion. He says, "The Greek<sup>7</sup> philosophers were not totally ignorant of this truth. But they refined upon it, and introduced *matter* as part of the trias, and as eternal." The eternity of matter was a recognised principle among all the physiologists, as Aristotle acquaints us; but it was not regarded by *all* as a deity or a person: Plato and the best philosophers repudiated this absurd doctrine. It does not follow that because matter was believed to be eternal, they should have looked upon it as an hypostasis of a triad.

Again, Bryant says, "From<sup>8</sup> the account given by Diogenes Laërtius of Plato, one would imagine that he allowed only two first principles: 'Plato declared that the two principles of all things were God and matter, which he styles mind and the efficient cause.'" . . . "But<sup>9</sup> others give a better account of Plato's opinion, of which Plutarch affords an example: 'We find that Socrates, as well as Plato, held three principles, which are styled God, matter, and idea.'" "

This is perfectly conformable to the Pythagorean doctrine; but why imagine these principles to relate to a trinity of archical hypostases? It appears that Bryant was not consistent in his opinions on this

<sup>7</sup> Bryant's Philo, p. 72.

<sup>8</sup> Id.

<sup>9</sup> Id.

point, for I find him to say in his *Ancient Mythology*<sup>10</sup>, “I am sensible that some very learned persons have thought that they discovered an allusion to a mysterious truth of another nature, in the triad of Plato and of his followers. But if we collate what these writers have said by way of explanation, we shall, I believe, find that they had no idea of any such mystery.”

<sup>10</sup> Vol. iii. p. 109.

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## CHAPTER II.

## THE SUBJECT CONTINUED.

THERE is a remarkable feature of the Christian religion in its infancy, on which sceptics might well ponder,—that the miracles which confirmed its divine origin, were so well attested as not to be disputed by the Platonists, the bitterest enemies of the truth, though, as might be expected from men steeped in superstition and occult science, they attributed them to the powers of magic, or theurgy. Hence, instead of aiming to overthrow their testimony by reason and argument, they were satisfied with raising up men to rival Christ, or to surpass him, in performing wonders and miracles. At first, they conceived Pythagoras<sup>1</sup> would answer their purpose well, degrading him to a level with their own minds, until they wisely thought, that the wonders related of him might be liable to some uncertainty, by reason of their great antiquity and want of proof; when they left him, and caught hold of a worthy champion of the new light, in Apollonius Tyanæus, one of the greatest impostors of that era.

Marcellinus, in an epistle to Saint Austin, says, that this rivalry of Apollonius with Christ was one of the many objections which the pagans made to the Christian religion<sup>2</sup>. “The pagans pretend that

<sup>1</sup> Vide Note N.      <sup>2</sup> Inter Epistol. Augus. Ep. 136.

our Lord did no more than some other men; as they can produce Apollonius, Apuleius, and other magicians, who, they contend, performed greater miracles.”

This “false Christ,” Apollonius, called himself a Pythagorean, that he might have some authority for his pretended miracles; so that he tried to persuade his followers, that he did no more than follow the example of his great master, being, like him, gifted with supernatural powers. The very ghost of the Samian philosopher (deeming it proper to visit and instruct this worthy favourite) taught him how to worship and reverence the gods; and it is said that he was so much loved by these deities, that he frequently enjoyed their conversation. To such an extent did he carry the ridiculous delusion!

In the third century there came to light another great luminary, in the person of Ammonius Saccas. He did more than any of his predecessors to revive and propagate the eclectic philosophy; whose very existence seemed to depend on a rancorous dislike of the Christian religion.

Ammonius is reputed to have been born of Christian parents; and, probably, he was educated in that creed, the knowledge of which enabled him to incorporate some of its doctrines with his own disjointed and grotesque system. As the very essence of the eclectic philosophy consisted in gleaning the supposed truth from every possible source, he may have been justified in borrowing from

Christianity. Hence Gillies says of him<sup>3</sup>, "He is, perhaps, the first apostate who turned the pure streams of the Gospel into the foul marshes of corrupted Platonism."

Ammonius left this legacy to his pupil, Plotinus, whose dark, superstitious, and mystical mind, was well fitted to embellish and improve it. With great industry he applied himself to comprehend its abstruse speculations; and, after some years' study, he presented the system to the world in his voluminous writings, which were found to be almost unintelligible, from the obscurity of his language and the wretched barbarism of his style. These faults, indeed, were rather admired than condemned by his numerous disciples, who were delighted far more by that which was obscure and mystical, than by things plain and intelligible.

Plotinus appears to have secretly consulted the writings of the Christians, and imitated his master, in introducing into his system some peculiar doctrines of Christianity, which he changed and perverted according to his taste. "Some<sup>4</sup> peculiar doctrines of the Gospel are clothed in such swelling bombast by the new Platonists, as has shaken the faith of able and ingenuous men, and led them to doubt whether the momentous truths of our religion were not originally derived from Egyptian and Indian sources, and employed, with pious fraud, by the first propagators of Christianity."

<sup>3</sup> Gillies, *Aris.* vol. i. p. 194.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* vol. i. p. 195.

It is undoubted that the doctrines of the Christian religion, at this period, became subjects of speculation and public discussion among both Christians and pagans. These were, by the former, really employed to solve some difficult and mystical parts of Plato's writings; while some, on the other hand, applied to Plato to clear up some points of their theology. Gibbon informs us what those subjects were which agitated the schools at that period. "The<sup>5</sup> same subtle and profound questions, concerning the nature, the generation, the distinction, and the equality of three divine persons of the mysterious Triad or Trinity, were agitated in the *philosophical* and in the Christian schools of Alexandria."

From these discussions probably arose all that Platonism in which the writings of many of the Fathers are steeped. They seem to have adopted the new version of the philosophy of Plato, as a genuine exposition of his writings, and acquiesced in the newly-discovered opinion, that the Trinity was acknowledged by Plato and the ancients. Hence they never dispute this *fact*, but reason upon it as if it had been incontrovertibly proved; and rather glory in the idea, that a pagan philosopher, of such great parts as Plato, should be found to concur in one of the essential truths of the Christian faith. Some of the Platonists, on the other hand, who bore an unrelenting hatred to the very name of Christ, instead of being disarmed or conciliated by this

<sup>5</sup> Dec. and Fall, vol. iii. p. 12.

yielding of some learned Christians, turned upon them, and maintained that they borrowed their Trinity from Plato. This was the natural consequence of once admitting the doctrine to have been recognised before Plato's time.

Amelius, who seems to have consulted the New Testament, pretends to be surprised at finding the Logos mentioned in the Gospel of St. John the Evangelist<sup>6</sup>. "And this was the Logos, or Word, by whom, existing from eternity, according to Heraclitus, all things were made, and whom that barbarian (St. John) also places in the rank and dignity of a principle, affirming Him to have been with God, and to be God,—and that all things were made by Him, and that whatever was made had life and being in Him." From this we may perceive how much the Sacred Writings were read, and how much the Platonists were indebted to them for their modes of expression, and for some of their doctrines.

Let us now return to Plotinus. This man was a dark and superstitious Egyptian, who, finding by experience that a prophet has little honor in his own country, went to Rome, where he finally settled, and delivered public lectures on his new version of Plato. He founded a school of great celebrity, which comprised many of the learned pagans in that city. It flourished under him and his followers, or successors, until it was abolished, ultimately, by the

<sup>6</sup> Eus. Pr. Ev. lib. ii. cap. 9.

Emperor Justinian, in the middle of the sixth century. If a man's writings are to be considered a true index of his mind, we shall find that Plotinus was the weakest and most credulous of men; and quite unfit either to be called a philosopher, or to be regarded as capable of expounding or comprehending Plato's works. We might expect, in one of his pretensions, to have a person gifted with a penetrating sagacity, a simple and contemplative mind, a clearness of expression, and a proper sense of gravity and decorum. What is the case? He has no regard for truth, nor patience to search after it; he is addicted to all kinds of absurd fables, which would even startle the credulity of a child; he is a philosopher, quack, magician, all in one.

The system which he pawns upon us for the philosophy of the "divine Plato," is a composition of obsolete legends, whose beauty and freshness were blighted and withered by time; of the vulgar mythology of Greece, which had fallen into contempt; and an abundant sprinkling of theurgy, and all the wonders of the "black art." He is, with respect to true philosophy, what a fanatic is with respect to religion. With all the imbecility of a visionary, he conjoined the art and cunning of an impostor. His writings, as I have said, are obscure, if not utterly unintelligible. It is said of Iamblichus and Proclus, that their works were as obscure as might be; but in comparison with those of Plotinus, they were simple and comprehensive.



The occult sciences seem to have produced the same influence over the human mind, at that time, as the idle pursuits of alchemy and astrology did in the dark ages of modern Europe. They destroyed the reason, and gave licence to the imagination; an imagination not refined by the charms of poetry, nor elevated by the sweet strains of music; but an imagination which revelled in the gloom of superstition, and brooded over the horrors of magic, and the demoniacal world which it conjured into existence. These speculations in the end uproot the reason and judgment, and rapidly lead on their unhappy victim to insanity.

Plotinus, emerging from his demon associates, became abstracted from this world, and often imagined himself to have communion with the highest, or super-essential divinity. Porphyry, a disciple of his, says this of him as well as of himself: "Plotinus, often trying to exalt his mind to the highest god, *that god sometimes appeared to him*, who possesses neither form nor idea, and who is above intellect and all intelligible things; to whom I, Porphyry, affirm myself to have been united in the sixty-eighth year of my age."

Some of these visionary Platonists, as if to redeem themselves from the impurities of magic and theurgy, affected a perfection not attainable by human nature;—another species of madness brought upon them by the study of their philosophy. They were, in consequence, so imbecile as to be ashamed of the

humanity which God had given them. Their skill in magical arts gained them the love and admiration of the whole host of demoniacal powers, with whom they professed to hold a friendly and sociable intercourse; and as it was a maxim of theirs, that souls, purified by abstinence and learning, would attain a place among them, it is probable that Plotinus and Porphyry hoped for this consummation in themselves.

The latter Platonist was a man capable of great things, had his mind not been enfeebled by these abominable pursuits. Of a melancholy temper, and great enthusiasm in religion, he was urged to take away his own life, that he might have a constant, instead of an occasional, intercourse with the highest god; but, happily for himself, his extreme piety cooled by reflection, and he allowed his spirit to become disembodied by a natural death.

Porphyry was a rancorous enemy to the Christian religion. He has the reputation of having written thirty books against it, which, as Gibbon expresses it, have been "committed to the flames by the prudence of orthodox emperors."

If these writings were to be judged by some now extant, they could have produced no great impression on others out of the pale of his system. His Treatise on Abstinence from Animal Food is replete with silly conceits and defunct fables. For example, he says, "That the nature of a kindred body is attractive of soul, experience abundantly taught these theologians. Hence those who wish to receive

into themselves the souls of prophetic animals, swallow the principal parts of them, as the hearts of crows, or of moles, or of hawks, &c.”

In the same treatise, he gives us a very novel prescription for the cure of the gout, which he possibly practised on himself, if it were possible that so great an ascetic could fall into such a calamity. “Hence some who have been afflicted with gout in the hands and feet to such a degree as to be infested with it for eight entire years, have expelled it by abandoning wealth, and betaking themselves to the *contemplation of divinity!*”

Iamblichus was another important link in the chain of Platonicians. His writings partake of the same character.

How would Plotinus and Porphyry have rejoiced at the apostasy of the emperor Julian! He chose and preferred the loathsome and mutilated carcass of polytheism, to the fair impersonation of religion, and virtue, and truth. He abandoned the Spiritual Being of the Christians, and addressed his prayers to the material sun!

Julian, like all apostates, bore an implacable hatred to the religion which he had rejected. He falsely pretended that it was composed of Asiatic superstition and Jewish idolatry; blinded perhaps to the origin of the later Platonic theology, which in a great measure had its source in the East.

Gibbon informs us, that Julian was initiated into the theurgic science, and into the Eleusinian mys-

teries, which were revived by the Platonists, along with the ancient mythology of Greece. The gravity with which he passed through these imposing ceremonies, endeared him more and more to his admirers, and increased his own admiration of a religion possessing so much pomp and grandeur.

In his Oration to the Sun, and to Cybele, the mother of the gods, he avows his polytheism, and all the fanaticism of Plotinus. Did this adopted religion of his influence his mind as it had done some of his predecessors? Let us hear the historian:—"Notwithstanding the modest silence of Julian himself, we may learn from Libanius, the orator, his faithful friend, that he lived in a perpetual intercourse with the gods and goddesses: that they descended upon earth to enjoy the conversation of their favorite hero; that they gently interrupted his slumbers, by touching his hands or his hair; that they warned him of every impending danger, and conducted him, by their infallible wisdom, in every action of life; and that he had acquired such an intimate knowledge of his heavenly guests, as readily to distinguish the voice of Jupiter from that of Minerva; and the form of Apollo from the figure of Hercules."

The next great link in the chain of these "divine men," as they are called by their admirers, is the celebrated Proclus, whose voluminous and elaborate commentaries on the philosophy of Plato, are a proof of his indefatigable zeal and industry in the cause which he espoused. He was a man of considerable

mental powers; but unfortunately, like his predecessors, he fell a prey to the fascinations of a false philosophy; adopted erroneous principles; was addicted to the theurgic science, and a belief in demons; and, in a word, fell into the same mischievous and unpardonable errors as Plotinus and Porphyry.

He, too, pretended to hold converse with the gods; and to have demons constantly at his will and command. "Proclus<sup>7</sup>, one of these teachers of darkness, professed himself an adept in all mysteries; conversed familiarly with Pan and Esculapius; worshipped with their appropriate rites the gods of all nations, even of the Arabian nomades; and undertook by Chaldean oracles, and Orphic hymns, to avert or cure the numerous infirmities of mind and body."

The learned dissertation of Proclus on theurgy, is, I believe, no longer extant; but from some remaining passages, we have a lamentable example of the egregious stuff of which it was composed:—"Sometimes an herb or a stone is sufficient for a divine operation. Thus, a thistle can procure the sudden appearance of some superior power. The laurel, raccinum, the land and sea onion, the coral, the diamond, and the jasper, operate as safeguards. The heart of a mole is subservient to divination; sulphur and marine water to purification."

<sup>7</sup> Gillies, *Arist.* vol. i. p. 211.

The system of Proclus is a mixture of Oriental learning, and the philosophy of Plato, with a copious dose of the Grecian polytheism, diluted and refined by the allegorical method. He places great credence in the Chaldean oracles, and the Orphic hymns, which he thought had some indefinable relation to the speculations of Plato. Hence he falls into the error of confounding the Orphic and Chaldean triads of *persons*, with the three principles of the Pythagoreans, God, Idea, and Matter. In consequence of this, he is guilty of many strange absurdities.

I have made these observations on the later Platonic philosophers, for the purpose of showing the consistency of their minds and pursuits; that we may perceive clearly how little they are to be trusted in their versions and interpretations of Plato's writings.

As they combined foreign matter with the ancient philosophy, they are to be distrusted also on this account; though it is chiefly their unhallowed pursuit of occult science, which rendered their minds incapable of grasping any comprehensive system, or of calmly and patiently searching after the truth. To the sober deductions of reason, they preferred the unhealthy excitement of wonderful legends and childish fables. Whatever they found mysterious, they mystified; whatever was doubtful, they involved in greater obscurity; and by their double meanings, and allegorical tests, we can discover neither truth nor certainty in any of their speculations.

It is to be acknowledged, indeed, that both Plato and the Pythagoreans, in their numbers, ideas, and demoniacal world, laid themselves open to a similar charge; for they were guilty of obscurity and mysticism in treating of these subjects. But the sphere in which they acted or circumscribed themselves, in relation to these objects, was narrow, in comparison with the license taken by the later Platonists.

It is to be remarked, however, that if they erred on this score, there is no reason to think that they gave any countenance to the allegorical science, which deduced a different meaning from Plato than the literal; and created a new and strange system out of the ancient mythology. The origin of it was among the Platonists themselves; and, I think, it may be traced to the influence of the Christian religion. It was the offspring of necessity, brought into use for the purpose of self-defence.

The purity and reasonableness of the new religion, the piety and moral conduct of its believers, and the noble characters of its priesthood, came in due time to be contrasted with the expiring polytheism, the licentiousness of the pagan world, and the debased and fraudulent priests of the ancient gods. Besides, it was advancing with rapid strides among all classes; it had ascended to the very court itself, and flourished among the rich as well as poor.

The sagacious pagans perceived this, and became sensible that, without a strong and continued opposition, the old religion would succumb. And could

they silently and meekly allow the religion of Plato, and of the ancients, hallowed by antiquity, and confirmed by tradition, to be laid in the dust, before the upstart system of a few brief years! They were sensible, however, that if they revived the mythology, in its naked form, their labour would be all in vain. For how could the polluted and livid carcass of a thousand years, exist in the same atmosphere with the living and breathing form of Christianity? How were the fables of Homer, Hesiod, and Ovid, of their highest divinities, to be expunged from their theology? For what is written, is written.

They were certain that to attempt to maintain these and other fables in their literal sense, would be fatal to their cause; for at that period they would have been laughed at by the pagans themselves. The allegorical interpretation was happily suggested, and eagerly adopted, for the salvation of the dying polytheism. By means of it, all asperities were made smooth, discordances harmonized, and every contradiction, however apparently hopeless, was easily reconciled.

The obscene legends of the pagan deities, by a magic touch, were converted into wholesome and instructive stories of divine energy, and celestial virtue. "Proclus," says Bryant, "tries to subtilize and refine all the base jargon about Saturn and Zeus, and would persuade us that the most idle and obscene legends related to the Divine Mind, to the Eternal Wisdom, and supremacy of the Deity."



Pythagoras and Plato were subjected to the same test; from which emerged the new version of the later Platonists, bearing no greater resemblance to the original, than astrology to astronomy, alchemy to chemistry, or the delusions of occult science to the pure and legitimate deductions of philosophy.

Plato came to be compared with Christ, and his morals and theology with those of Christianity. By the pagans, the latter was looked upon as a sort of new version of the Oriental or Pythagorean philosophy, which had been translated into the writings of Plato. This delusion was carried to such an extent, that Dr. Gillies observes, "Plato was the only heathen philosopher, that many Christian fathers, after lopping off certain redundancies, were inclined to admit within the pale of the church." They saw Plato only in his degenerate offspring.

Augustine is said to have confessed there was a wonderful resemblance between Christ and Plato. And Celsus (I believe *not* the Christian) maintained that Christ must have read the works of Plato. This is all pure deception on their part, and the result of the fraud and design of the pagan Platonists.

The scripture doctrine of the Trinity was construed into an imitation of the doctrine of Plato. A certain likeness was supposed to be discovered between the three principles of Pythagoras and the three persons of the Divine Trinity, all which has been entirely exploded.

## CHAPTER III.

## NO TRUE TRINITY IN THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE.

THE mantle of Proclus descended on the shoulders of Taylor; who, in the nineteenth century, attempted to revive the school abolished by Justinian in the sixth! This modern champion of the Platonic philosophy is a fervent polytheist. He is a bigoted follower of Proclus and his mystical school: he adopts all his errors, and eagerly gives credence to every improbable fable.

Taylor would also try to imitate the style of his school, as if it were laudable to transfer the barbarisms of one language, and infuse them into another. This is an example of the style so highly extolled by him in Proclus. "*How can our conceptions reach the principle of these principles, who is concealed in the superluminous darkness of occultly initiating silence!*"

This enthusiast rails at the present generation, who are, according to him, mere pigmies in true knowledge; and he would persuade us, that the world was in a very unhappy plight, because forsooth it prefers the religion of Jesus Christ to his version of polytheism! The modern practice of acquiring knowledge by experience is held in little

estimation by him, in comparison with the mass of wisdom and erudition contained in the works of antiquity. He looks upon the sun being the centre of our planetary system, as a mere delusion, worthy of these degenerate times. And he says, with singular gravity, "At<sup>1</sup> such a period as the present, when there is such a dire perversion of religion (paganism), and men of every description are involved in extreme impiety, we cannot wonder if the spirit of profane innovation should cause a similar confusion in the system of the world." This is beautifully illustrated by a religion so refined and admirable as this would signify! "Every planet has a number of satellites surrounding it, analogous to the choir of the fixed stars; and every sphere is *full of gods, angels, and demons*, subsisting according to the spheres in which they reside."

Taylor is also painfully ironical upon our astronomers, who make their telescopes the standard of truth in the affairs of the celestial regions, and who presumptuously doubt of the existence of that which cannot be seen through them; for he sagely informs us, that the *divine nature* of the stars cannot be perceived through such fallacious instruments.

But after all, the charge against this learned man may be founded on the grossest ignorance; for to understand his system, he says, it is necessary to enjoy that which we have no hope of—*a deific union*,

<sup>1</sup> Intro. to the Timæus of Plato.

“with the super-essential and most arcane object of perception,” even God himself.

In relation to a trinity in Plato, we have seen that Taylor widely differs from Dr. Cudworth. He will not allow it to have any resemblance to the Christian doctrine. But the truth is, that when we come to make an examination into this trinity, we shall find it to be devoid of the essential characteristic of a trinity,—namely, Three Persons in One God; for above the Platonic triad of being, life, and intellect, the Platonists acknowledge a Monad, or a  $\tau\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ , of which the former are the progeny; so that here we have either four persons or things, or a unit placed above a triad, and distinct from it, having none of its co-essentiality.

The Platonists, and Taylor among them, in fact, bring us to the conclusion, that the Highest God, or Chief Monad, is not a hypostasis of a trinity, since they deny and refute his consubistence and co-essentiality with the other supposed persons of the Godhead.

This may be proved out of many passages of their writings. Taylor says, in his general Introduction to Plato's Works, “The Highest God, according to Plato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from being a part of a consub-sistent triad, that he is not to be connumerated with any thing; but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is even beyond being, and he so ineffably transcends all relation and habitude, that

language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge refunded into ignorance.”

And Proclus, on the *Timæus*, says also of the Monad above the triad, and of the descending triads from the Highest God, “Plato everywhere ascends from multitude to unity, from whence also the order of the many proceeds; but before Plato, and according to the natural order of things, one is before multitude, and every divine order begins from a monad. Wherefore the divine numbers proceed in a *trinity*; yet, *before this trinity* there must be a *monad*. Let there be three demiurgical hypostases, nevertheless, before these must there be one, because none of the divine orders begins from multitude. We conclude, therefore, that the demiurgical number does not begin from a *trinity*, but from a *monad*, standing alone by itself from that *trinity*.”

Iamblichus, refining on this notion, seems to ascend above the monad, and acknowledge another yet superior to it. “Prior<sup>2</sup> to truly existing beings (ideas) and total principles, there is *one god* prior to the *first god*, and king immoveable, abiding in the solitude of his own unity. For neither is the intelligible connected with it, nor anything else; but he is established as the paradigm of the god who is the father of himself, is self-begotten, who is father alone, and is truly the good.” In which we have a unity above unity; and the *Timæan* doctrine of

<sup>2</sup> De Mys. sec. viii. cap. 2. *ab initio*.

exemplars carried to an extreme; for here there is even a paradigm of God himself.

The Platonists had manifold triads descending in gradations from each other, all communicating by participation of each other, and of the first monad. This procession of their gods from the first triad is enumerated in six orders, the intelligible, the intelligible and intellectual, and supermundane, the liberated and the mundane. And according to Proclus, there are mundane Jupiters, Junos, and Minervas, as well as celestial. Jupiter, Neptune, and Vulcan, are said to be a triad of fabricative principles; Vesta, Minerva, and Mars, defensive; Ceres, Juno, and Diana, vivific; Mercury, Venus, and Apollo, elevating and harmonic, and so on. And all this they would pass off' as the genuine philosophy of Plato.

Not only did the Platonists (borrowing a doctrine which they could not comprehend,) egregiously subvert the very notion of a trinity by introducing a monad above it; but we find that even in this they do not all agree among themselves. Amelius, as Proclus acquaints us, held a trinity in which each hypostasis was a sort of trinity in itself; there were three demiurgical creators, three intellects, and three kings.

Dr. Cudworth, as it were, restrains Plato's supposed intellect, or second person, *to be* the creator of all things; but Plotinus, in whom he confides, asserts that it is not intellect, but soul, which is the

creator. Porphyry coincides with this, except that in place of the mundane soul, (which he had sagacity to perceive could not be the creator, being a generated thing itself,) he introduces a supermundane. "He<sup>3</sup> calls the supermundane soul the immediate creator of the world; and the mind or intellect to which it is converted, not the creator himself, but the paradigm." This is clearly opposed to the Timæan doctrine, already discussed in full.

St. Austin, who is addicted to Platonism, points out a difference between Plotinus and Porphyry. "God<sup>4</sup> the Father, and the Son, or Logos, were acknowledged by the Platonists as well as by the Christians; but relative to the Holy Ghost, or third person, there is a discrepancy between Plotinus and Porphyrius, inasmuch as the former placed Psyche, or soul, after the paternal intellect, thus making it the third, while the latter put it between the Father and the Son, making it hence the second hypostasis."

Taylor, following Proclus, relative to the triad, holds that it emanates from the monad, and consists of being, life, and intellect; in which we have, as already observed, a quaternity rather than a trinity. He also says, "by<sup>5</sup> the demiurgus and father, we must understand Jupiter, who subsists at the extremity of the intellectual triad, and *αυτοζωον*, animal-itself, which is the exemplar of the world, and from the contemplation of which it was fabricated by

Pro. in Tim. p. 93, 94.      <sup>4</sup> De Civit. Dei. lib. x. cap. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Intro. to the Timæus of Plato.

Jupiter, is the last of the intelligible triad, and is the same with Phanes of Orpheus." In which we have a strange jumble of the Timæan and the later Platonic philosophy; and the old error of commingling the Pythagorean principles and the *persons* or *things* alluded to in the hymns of Orpheus. Here the intellect, or second person, of Dr. Cudworth's trinity is placed at the extremity of the intellectual triad, so that he is put out of the first triad altogether.

This Phanes, whom Taylor ignorantly confounds with the exemplar world of Plato, was a person of the Orphic triad. It was a title of the sun<sup>6</sup>, the chief deity of the east, and so it is described in the hymn to Protogonus:

Hence Phanes, called the glory of the sky,  
On waving pinions, through the world you fly.

And Syrianus says, "After chaos and ether subsist the first and occult genera of the gods, among which the first apparent god is the king and father of the universe, who because he is the first *visible* deity is called Phanes."

But we have also shown that the other history related of him alluded to the deluge and the ark, or mundane egg. Hence Syrianus says likewise, though he is ignorant of the true purport of his words, "the whole of this first and occult genera of the gods, which is called by the Chaldean theologians the intelligible triad, was represented by Orpheus

<sup>6</sup> Vide Note O.



under the symbol of an egg, on the exclusion of which, by the goddess Night, the god Phanes came forth, who is called Protogonus," or the first-born of mankind, as declared by Orpheus himself.

I cannot help thinking (though I lay no stress on the conjecture,) that the later Platonists derived their monad above the triad from that piece of ancient history of which I have already fully treated in the former part of this work. It is manifest that Proclus, and some of his predecessors, borrowed greatly from what are called above, "Chaldean theologists." And, as I have frequently remarked, confounding things of a nature perfectly distinct, they looked upon the Chaldean, Orphic, and Pythagorean triad as all one, relating to the same persons, or principles of all things. Now, whatever may have been the Chaldean and Orphic doctrines, it is certain that they had no countenance from Plato or any other Grecian philosopher. of a monad above a triad, since it is clearly stated in many collated passages already quoted, that before the universe came into being, there existed only three things (sometimes styled principles, though *one* had no casualty in it), God, the Creator, the Idea, or paradigmatical world, containing within all the essences of things subsequently made, and Matter, out of which were fabricated all material things. The Platonists must have had, therefore, their doctrine from another source.

It is natural to suppose, then, that as Proclus cer-

tifies his trinity to be of Chaldaic origin, and others that it was well known to the Egyptians, and introduced into Greece by Orpheus, that the Platonists really had their triads from the mythology of these countries. And perceiving in Timæus, that Pythagoras and Plato also maintained three principles, they supposed them to be the same as the former. This conjecture is greatly confirmed by a passage previously quoted out of Proclus himself, *that Cronus was the founder of the triad*; and also by the persons mentioned as hypostases of the Orphic triad, which are Phanes, Uranus, and Cronus<sup>7</sup>. It may be supposed, then, that the intelligible triad mentioned by Syrianus above, as being a Chaldaic doctrine, refers to the three sons of the patriarch; the latter being styled the founder of the former; and that their monad above a triad was a refinement upon this ancient piece of history.

I apprehend that many of the speculations of these Platonists, relative to the triads, may be explained by adopting this mode of interpretation. And that most of the errors and inconsistencies of which they are guilty arose from an attempt, founded on ignorance, of reconciling the learning which they had from the east with the philosophy of Plato. This singular notion of the trinity being the offspring of the chief monad, or God, led necessarily to a great number of subtle distinctions, and to a vast deal of absurdities.

<sup>7</sup> Vide Note P.

From the language of the Platonists, we might conclude that this Monad, or  $\tau\omicron$  ἕν, of theirs was no better than one of the shadowy gods of Epicurus. For it is said of him, that the better to conceal his own atheism, he invented an order of deities so entirely devoted to their own ease, so indifferent about the world which they did *not* create, and so careless with respect to the interests of our race, that it was to man much the same thing as if he had candidly abnegated deity altogether.

The Platonists are subject to the same charge, or liable to the same suspicion, in their descriptions of their Supreme Being. It was, however, more the warmth of their enthusiasm, than their scepticism, which led them to these extremes. Plotinus informs us, that this being, by reason of his unity and simplicity, is above knowledge and understanding, and does not even so much as understand himself. This is probably his reason for so strange a paradox: "Intelligence itself does not understand, but only that which has intelligence." And Taylor, dragging in Pythagoras and Plato, as if they really agreed with his visionary opinions, says, "By the one itself, the Pythagoreans and Plato signified the first cause, which *they* very properly considered as perfectly super-essential, ineffable, and *unknown*." This word *unknown* is evidently in Taylor's mind pregnant with meaning, which we, having no "deific union," have no hope of getting a glimpse of.

The unity above trinity, or according to Iambli-

clus, unity above unity, and other such vagaries, induced the Platonists to describe their first god with pompous and swelling words, possessing more sound than sense, which they mistook for eloquence or sublimity. Hence God is imagined to be magnificently described by “the thrice-repeated unknown darkness of the Egyptians,” by calling him “the principle of principles, who is concealed in the superluminous darkness of occultly initiating silence;” and other such sentences, which were conceived to express ideas, as well as to be masterpieces of description.

Proclus, in his commentary on Plato’s Second Epistle, confirms our *aspersion* of his Chief Being, and of his not being considered an hypostasis of a trinity. “Plato neither connumerates the ineffable principle of things with the other principles posterior to him, nor does he coarrange it with the second and third powers;” on the contrary he is said, to situate it above and before the triad, as a monad having no complexity or multiplicity in it. And that he is no better than an Epicurean god, may be collected from many other passages. He is called ineffable, simple, and all-transcending nature, “who establishes all things about him, *but does not generate or produce anything, nor does he presubstist as the end of things posterior to himself.*” In which his casualty is absolutely denied (if I rightly understand the passage), for if he be not the end (or beginning, rather), of all things, which have a posterior existence, or the

first of a chain of inferior causes; but substantially disjoined from them, they operating without him, then he can be no Supreme Cause at all. So much for this refinement of the Platonists, who style him also the *Causeless cause of causes*.

To conclude. We may be certain that it is quite a delusion to attribute a knowledge of a trinity to Plato, or to any of the ancient philosophers, before the times of Christianity. Upon the Christian trinity becoming known to the Platonists, they fancied it bore some resemblance to the compound deities of antiquity, and to the Pythagorean principles of all things. In consequence they began to refine upon the old doctrines, but assuming the Grecian polytheism "as the basis of their procedure," they fell into manifold absurdities and contradictions. All this has been pointed out, and I have clearly shown, I apprehend, that both the Chaldean, Orphic, and other triads, and the principles of Plato, had a different origin, and related to distinct things, which the Platonists confounded together, and with the Christian doctrine.



## ADDITIONAL NOTES.

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### NOTE A. p. 21.

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I WILL here present the reader with one or two instances, from the writings of the Fathers, of their concurrence in the opinion, that Plato had a knowledge of the Trinity. St. Cyril, in his book, *Contra Julian.*, lib. viii., says, “That there would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonic Trinity, for an absolute agreement with the Christian; had they only accommodated the right notion of co-essentiality, or consubstantiality of their three hypostases; so that there might have been but one specific nature or essence of the Godhead, not further distinguishable by any natural diversity, but numerically only; and so no one hypostasis any way inferior to another.”—Intell. Syst. vol. iii.

In this passage it is called the *Platonic Trinity*, and not the trinity of Plato, as if it referred to the doctrine of the later Platonists; but the writer, no doubt, alluded to the speculations of the more ancient philosopher, thus acquiescing in the generally received notion, that the trinity was an acknowledged “cabala,” before the Advent of our Saviour.

I have remarked this incongruity in the conduct of the Arian party, that what they denied in the Christian, they seemingly maintained in the Platonic, theology; namely, the *eternal* existence, and consequently the uncreated nature of the Second Person of the Trinity. We discover Eusebius, and others of his party, agreeing to, and upholding the version of the doc-

trine, as ascribed to Plato, while they virtually denied the co-equal existence of the Son with the Father. This version admitted the external existence of all the three hypostases.

I find Socrates, the historian (*Ec. Hist. lib. vii. cap. 6*), makes this very singular observation on this inconsistency of the Arians. "I am surprised how Georgius and Timotheus should persist in the Arian persuasion, the one having Plato always in his hands, the other continually breathing Origen; for Plato does not admit anywhere, that his first and second cause had a beginning to their existence; and Origen constantly acknowledges the Son to be co-eternal with the Father."

Eusebius (*Pr. Ev. lib. ii. cap. 20*), makes use of this language, which, though insinuating an inferiority and subordination in the persons, is totally silent on the point alluded to:—"The oracle of the Hebrews places the Holy Ghost after the Father and the Son, in the third rank, and acknowledges a holy and blessed Trinity after this manner; so that the third power should also transcend all created nature; being the first of those intellectual substances which proceed from the Son, and the third from the First Cause: *see how Plato enigmatically declares this doctrine in his Epistle to Dionysius.*"

Clemens Alexandrinus, in mentioning this epistle, subscribes to the conclusion of Eusebius:—"I understand this to refer to the Holy Trinity; the third being the Holy Ghost; the Second, the Son, by whom all things were made, according to the will of the Father."

Dr. Cudworth (*vol. iii. p. 187*.) says, that "Origen also affirmeth the Son of God to have been plainly spoken of by Plato, in his Epistle to Hermias and Coriscus." These are the words: "Celsus, who pretends to know all things, and who cites so many other passages out of Plato, does purposely (as I suppose) dissemble and conceal that which he wrote concerning the Son of God in his Epistle to Hermias and Coriscus."

The ancient, as well as the modern Christian, may well seek



refuge in these Epistles of Plato; because he can find no support from his more authoritative writings. But let us briefly examine the point in question, and see how far such an interpretation as this can be borne out.

When we meet with an obscure or ambiguous passage in an author, we naturally have recourse to the context. Now it does not appear, from the tenour of the Epistle alluded to, that Plato intended to convey any peculiar, or mysterious, or esoteric doctrine. The occasion seems the most unfit for any such purpose. And if he had no such intention, is it probable he would have been guilty of such an egregious absurdity, as even to allude to a subject of this kind? It may be said, indeed, that those to whom he addressed himself may have previously shared with him the knowledge of this truth; but the whole tenour of the Epistle belies any such thought.

What, then, were those objects he referred to in the passage? "Swearing by that God who is the *leader* of all things present and future; and by the father and lord of this leader and cause." It seems to me highly probable that these two causes were, 1. The Eternal Cause. 2. A secondary and generated cause; for the ancient philosophers so regarded the beings subservient to their Creator. The latter may have been either the *sun*, or the *mundane soul* of the universe. According to the Timæan theology, the mundane soul was a generated god; and so was it held to be by Plato himself: it could not be, therefore, an hypostasis of the trinity.

Plutarch, in his Platonic Questions, informs us, that Plato, in his book De Republica, called the *Sun* the king and lord of all the sensible world; as he pronounced the *Good* to be the Sovereign of the intelligible world. He says, likewise, that the sun was by Plato looked upon as the very issue and essence of God, or the Good; which is certainly a refinement of Plutarch's, in which he implies rather a kind of metaphysical, than a material creation of the sun.

THE devotion of the early Fathers to the Platonic philosophy, begot a very objectionable habit of *Platonizing*, with which their theological writings are strongly tinged.

Origen, in his *Περί Αρχων*, so far subscribes to a particular tenet of the ancient philosophy, that he discovers an analogy between the human and the mundane body; the latter of which he calls one great animal, possessing or being bounded by a soul—the virtue and the reason of God; just as our body, having many members, is contained by one soul\*. Herein he recognises the doctrine of the “Soul of the World.”

Others seem to have exceeded this language, and to have conceived this mundane soul not to be the *virtute Dei ac ratione*, in a general sense; but the Holy Spirit itself, as the third hypostasis, which is the very doctrine ascribed to Plato. There is this incongruity, however,—an insurmountable obstacle—that Plato’s mundane soul of the world was a created, and not an eternal nature. And it was, probably, upon this ground—of its being a thing generated in time—that Plotinus and others founded so low an estimate of the soul of the world, as to call it a species of the human; the relationship being fancifully expressed by styling the former the *elder sister* of the latter.

The Stoics went to the other extreme, and looked upon the human soul as part of the Godhead: “Why should you not believe,” says Seneca, “that there is something divine in him who is part of the Godhead? That *whole* in which we are contained is *one*, and the one is God, we being his companions and members.”—Ep. 92.

\* Sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris aptatum est, et ab una anima continetur; ita est universum mundum, velut animal quoddam immane, opinandum puto; quod quasi ab una anima, *virtute Dei ac ratione* teneatur.

## NOTE B. p. 38.

SINCE this was written, I find myself to receive some support from Bryant, who, when alluding to these primary principles, makes this observation: "When it was said in the early histories, which Thales and other Grecians copied, that all things were derived from water, I do not believe that the ancient mythologists referred to that element as the *ύλη*, or *material principle*; but to the deluge, as an epocha, when time, and nature, and mankind were renewed.

"Plutarch mentions it as an Egyptian notion, that all things were derived from *water*; but at the same time tells us, *Οσιριν Ωκεανον*, that Osiris was Oceanus."—*Ant. My.* vol. iii. p. 99.

In consequence of this, the ocean was by some ancient mythologists personified, and called, metaphorically, the origin and father of all things. And Osiris was called Oceanus, for a similar reason that he was also called the sun: both being symbols of Osiris. By Homer the ocean is styled "the generation of the gods." And Orpheus, in his mystic hymn to this deity, says, that from him sprung both gods and mortals, which can only be explained by holding Osiris and Oceanus to be the same deified person.

## NOTE C. p. 39.

THE perplexity of the ancients, originating in the error of imputing a distinct personality to the various titles of the chief deity, the sun, is abundantly conspicuous in their own writings. Some seem to have tried to analyze their theology, and to class the deities according to their respective ranks; but the task

was so hopeless, that they abandoned it with disgust, and compromised the matter, like Macrobius, who believed all the gods to be either titles of the sun, or exponents of his power and benignant influence.

It is probable, if not certain, that these unhappy mythologists adopted the Orphic hymns as a chief guide in their researches; for they seem to have been considered a great authority, on account of the antiquity imputed to them. But what light could they derive from these records, to cheer their dark and labyrinthian path? Only this, that in these hymns, the same attributes are awarded to deities supposed, in the common Greek mythology, to be perfectly and individually distinct, which, with other circumstances, imply them to be only names of one god. So that to set out with the hope or expectation of assigning to this deity his locality,—to that his province, his rank, or his government, would terminate in disappointment and defeat.

For one example, let us choose the god who is called, “father of gods and of men;” a character not to be with reason assigned to more than one deity. In the Orphic hymns we find it given to a variety of *apparently* distinct deities. In the Hymn to Night, it is said,

Night, parent goddess, source of sweet repose,  
From whom at first both gods and men arose.

Heaven is called “father of all.” To Protogonus, the first begotten, is assigned the honor of the birth of gods and mortals; so to Saturn, to Jupiter, to Oceanus, &c.

Diodorus Siculus informs us, that some thought Osiris to be Serapis; others, Dionusus; other Pluto; whilst some believed him to be the same as Zeus, or Jupiter; and not a few took him for Pan. To suppose Jupiter, Pluto, Pan, Osiris, and Serapis, to be all the same god, is, indeed, contrary to the commonly

received notions; but such is the truth, and so much is implied in the words of Diodorus.

Porphyry, a rank pagan, seems to have disregarded so important a feature, in the Grecian theogony, as the genders of the deities; for according to Bryant, "he acknowledged that Vesta, Rhea, Ceres, Themis, Priapus, Proserpina, Bacchus, Attis, Adonis, Silenus, and the satyrs, were all one and the same. Nobody had examined the theology of the ancients more deeply than Porphyry."—*An. My.* vol. i. p. 395.

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NOTE D. p. 45.

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A GREAT authority has this passage:—"In the barbarous ages of Greece, their only gods were those natural divinities, the heavenly luminaries. But on their first commerce with Egypt, for the arts of policy, they found there a new species of idolatry, the worship of *dead men*, which civilized Egypt had invented; and which, as they improved in policy, had almost worked out their first natural deities; the same with those of all other uncivilized nations. This new species the Greeks eagerly embraced, &c."—*Div. Leg.* vol. iii. lib. iv. sect. 5.

I cannot see what reason Dr. Warbuton had for this conjecture. As the Greeks acknowledged they were indebted to Egypt for their religion, why might it not be supposed also, that they brought the worship of deified men along with their other idolatry? Is there no grounds for supposing that this superstition took root long before Greece was the *second* time colonized?

The author of the *Divine Legation* seems, in the above passage, to have followed an observation in the *Cratylus* of Plato; that it was the philosopher's opinion, that the first inhabitants of Greece considered these only to be gods, which were so

regarded by many of the barbarians—the sun, the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens.

This would be quite true, had he only admitted the other branch of idolatry—the worship of *dead men*, which was prevalent long before Greece was inhabited; and which the Greeks brought, most probably, out of Egypt.

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NOTE E. p. 63.

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BRYANT observes, with respect to the practice of the Greeks, of demeaning their deities, “Vulcan the blacksmith, who was the master of the Cyclops, and forged iron in Mount Etna, was a character familiar to the Greeks and Romans. But this deity, among the Egyptians and Babylonians had nothing similar to this description. They esteemed Vulcan as the chief of the gods; the same as the sun; and his name is a sacred title, compounded of Baal-Cahen, Belus sanctus vel princeps; equivalent to Orus or Osiris.”—Vol. i. p. 169.

Again, “Polytheism, originally vile and unwarrantable, was rendered ten times more base by coming through the hands of the Greeks. To instance in one particular: Among all the demon herd, what one is there of a form and character so odious and contemptible as Priapus? an obscure, ill-formed deity, who was ridiculed and dishonored by his very votaries. His hideous figure was made use of only as a bugbear to frighten children, and to drive the birds from fruit-trees, with whose filth he was generally besmeared. Yet this contemptible god—this scarecrow in a garden—was held in high repute at Lamp-sacus, and esteemed the same as Dionusus. He was, likewise, by the Egyptians revered as the principal god; no other than the Chaldaic Aur; the same as Orus and Apis, whose rites

were particularly solemn. . . . The author of the Orphic Hymns styles him, *πρωτογονον—γενεσιν μακαρων, θνητων τ'ανθρωπων*, the first-born of the world; from whom all the immortals and mortals were descended."—Vol. i. p. 178.

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NOTE F. p. 71.

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IN the *mysteries* of the ancients, there is no feature more curious and interesting than those expressions of grief and lamentation which formed so important a part of the religious ceremony. Every country seems more or less to have been addicted to this singular superstition; and it was, probably, practised long after the event, which it commemorated, had been forgotten; or at least, in ignorance of that to which it had a particular reference.

Plutarch, in his *Isis and Osiris*, has remarked a religious observance among the Egyptians of this nature, where he describes it as a custom of the people, at a particular season, to proceed to the sea-shore, where they rent the air with lamentations for some one lost; and then after a time, supposing the person (namely, Osiris,) to be found, they as suddenly burst forth into exclamations of great joy and delight.

M. Ouvaroff, in a note to Section Third of his *Essay on the Eleusinian Mysteries*, makes these observations on this ancient custom. "The most ancient religious ceremonies have been expressive of grief and lamentation. Adonis was the subject of mourning in Phœnicia, as Osiris was in Egypt. Adonis and Osiris are proved to have been the same personage (Selden, *De Diis Syr.*); their festivals, exactly alike, were divided into three parts; the loss or disappearance, *ἀφανισμος*,—the search, *ζητησις*,—and the finding, *εὑρεσις*: we shall, perhaps, then discover in these *myths* and usages, the traces of one of those

great *religious traditions*, which have diffused themselves everywhere."

His conjecture is consonant with truth; but he assigns the origin of the religious tradition to an anterior period of time, and to different objects, than I am inclined to believe is the truth; for in the text he cursorily hints, that the ceremony alluded to the fall of man; when it is more probable that it was instituted in commemoration of the destruction of mankind, and the salvation of Noah and his family from the deluge. That this conjecture is nearer the truth, may be collected from the abundant memorials of this event in antiquity; and from the peculiar characteristics of the ceremony itself; as well as from the histories of the person concerned.

Bryant affords us this curious extract from Stephanus, which corroborates what I have said above. "The tradition is, that there was formerly a king named Annacus (*i. e.*, Noah), the extent of whose life was above three hundred years. The people who were of his neighbourhood and acquaintance, had inquired of an oracle how long he was to live. And there was an answer given, that when Annacus died, *all mankind would be destroyed*. The Phrygians, upon this account, made great lamentations: from whence arose the proverb, *the lamentation for Annacus*, made use of for people or circumstances highly calamitous.

"When the flood of Deucalion\* came, all mankind was destroyed, according as the oracle had foretold. Afterwards, when the surface of the earth began to be again dry, Zeus ordered Prometheus and Minerva to make images of clay in the form of men; and when they were finished he called the winds, and made them breathe into each and render them vital."—*An. My.* vol. iii. p. 14.

Bryant says that Suidas also "has preserved, from some

\* Much must be allowed for the corruption of traditionary knowledge.



ancient author, a curious memorial of this wonderful personage (Noah), whom he affects to distinguish from Deucalion, and styles Nannacus. ‘Nannacus was a person of great antiquity, prior to the time of Deucalion. He is said to have been a king, who, foreseeing the approaching deluge, collected everybody together, and led them to a temple, where he offered up his prayers for them, accompanied with *many tears, &c.*’”

The same learned writer gives another curious passage from the Orphic Argonautica, which I will give, as it bears on the subject in question. “After the earth had been tendered to the Mustæ, we commemorated the *sad* necessity, by which the earth was reduced to its chaotic state. We then celebrated Cronus, (another title of the patriarch,) through whom the world, after a term of darkness, enjoyed again a pure serene sky; through whom was produced also Eros, (or the rainbow), that two-fold, conspicuous, and beautiful being.”—An. My. vol. iii. p. 175.

The prophet Ezekiel gives some very interesting facts respecting the idolatry of the ancients, in which I discover the three distinct species pointed out in what I have said on this subject; namely, the adoration of the sun, the deification of men, and the worship of *creeping things*, practised in Egypt.

Cap. viii. v. 16.—*There were about five and twenty men with their backs toward the temple of the Lord, and their faces toward the east; AND THEY WORSHIPPED THE SUN TOWARD THE EAST.*

V. 14.—*Then he brought me to the door of the gate of the Lord's house, which was toward the north; and behold, there sat women weeping for TAMMUZ.*

V. 7.—*And he brought me to the door of the court, and when I looked, behold a hole in the wall. Then said he unto me, Son of man, dig now in the wall; and when I had digged in the wall, behold a door. And he said unto me, Go in, and behold the wicked abominations that they do here. So I went in and*

*saw; and behold EVERY FORM OF CREEPING THINGS, AND ABOMINABLE BEASTS, and all the idols of the house of Israel, portrayed upon the wall round about.*

The weeping for Tammuz, mentioned by the Prophet, is, no doubt, the same superstition as the lamentations for the loss of Adonis and Osiris. "The chief deity of the Canaanites," says Bryant, "was the sun, whom they worshipped with the Baalim, under the titles of Ourehol, Adonis, Thanmuz."

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NOTE G. p. 77.

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THIS interesting Sibylline Oracle affords us a very accurate account of the destruction of the Tower of Babel. It is a good paraphrase of the Mosaic history of that event.

But when the judgments of the Almighty God  
 Were ripe for execution; when the tower  
 Rose to the skies upon Assyria's plain,  
 And all mankind one language only knew,  
 A dread commission from on high was given  
 To the fell whirlwinds, which, with dire alarms,  
 Beat on the tower, and to its lowest base  
 Shook it convulsed. And now all intercourse,  
 By some occult and overruling power,  
 Ceased among men: by utterance they strove,  
 Perplexed and anxious, to disclose their mind;  
 But their lip failed them; and in lieu of words,  
 Produced a painful babbling sound: the place  
 Was thence called Babel; by the apostate crew  
 Named from the event. Then severed far away,  
 They sped uncertain into realms unknown:  
 Thus kingdoms rose; and the glad world was filled.

An. Frag. p. 51.

Eupolemus says, on the same subject, "The city of Babylon owes its foundation to those who were saved from the catastrophe of the deluge: they were the giants (of the tribe of

Ham), and they built the tower which is noticed in history. But the tower being overthrown by the interposition of God, the Giants (or Titans) were scattered over all the earth."—*Idem*, p. 57.

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NOTE H. p. 78.

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“IN short,” says Macrobius, “that to the power of the sun is to be referred the control and supremacy of all things, is indicated by the theologians, who make it evident in the mysteries by the following short invocation: ‘Oh, all-ruling sun, spirit of the world, power of the world, light of the world.’”—*Sat. lib. i. c. 23*.

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NOTE I. p. 80.

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DIODORUS SICULUS, one of the most veracious and least prejudiced of the Greek writers, gives us some insight into the *double* idolatry, in this explicit account of the Egyptian divinities:—

“The Egyptians,” says he, (*lib. i. cap. 1.*) “held, that besides their heavenly or immortal gods, (the celestial host,) there were other inferior ones, begotten of these gods, who were originally *mortal men*. On account of their wisdom and benevolence, they obtained immortality, and were deified. These were kings who reigned in Egypt. Some of them retain their own names; but others were called *after the heavenly gods*. Sol (or Helius), Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter (surnamed Ammon), Juno, Vulcan, Vesta, &c., *reigned in Egypt*. Sol was the first king, and was so denominated after the planet of that name. Some differed from this, and represented Vulcan to have been the first king.” This is superfluous, because Sol, Saturn, Jupiter, and Vulcan, were

all one; being titles of the chief deity,—the sun. That part which relates to the earthly gods explains itself.

The same excellent writer informs us also, that the Ethiopians held the same opinions, and made the same distinction, as the Egyptians, respecting their heavenly gods, and the deified mortals. The first, were the sun, moon, &c.; the second, mortal men, who, on account of their virtues and their benefits to mankind, purchased immortal honor. These were Isis, Pan, Hercules, and Jupiter, whom they regarded as great benefactors.—Lib. iii. cap. 1.

“The mystagogue taught them that Jupiter, Mercury, Bacchus, Venus, Mars, and the whole rabble of licentious deities, were only *dead mortals*,—subject in life to the same passions and infirmities with themselves; but having been, on other accounts, benefactors to mankind, grateful posterity had deified them; and with their virtues had indiscreetly canonized their vices.”—Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 208.

This canonization of their vices was, no doubt, a corruption superinduced on the ancient religion: the contradiction in their character proves this.

The epistle will be well known to the reader which Alexander the Great is said to have written to his mother; wherein he declares, he had extorted from one Leo, a chief priest of the Egyptian mysteries, that not only the lower popular divinities, worshipped by them and adopted by the Greeks, had been originally mortal men; but that the very *Dii majorum gentium*, Jupiter, Saturn, &c., were of the same earthly origin. This is only true in their secondary character.



## NOTE K. p. 87.

I HAVE observed elsewhere, that when ancestral worship was introduced, men gave the titles of their heavenly gods to these new deities: Heliu8 or the Sun was a name given to Noah, and also to some of his descendants, especially to Ham.

As an instance of this custom, we have the following inscription, taken from the obelisk of Heliopolis, the ancient Temple of the Sun, in Egypt, preserved by Marcellinus :

## VERSE THE FIRST.

“The Sun to King Rhamestes. I have bestowed upon you to rule graciously over all the world. He whom the Sun loves is Horus the brave, the lover of truth, the son of Heron, born of God, the restorer of the world. He whom the Sun has chosen is King Rhamestes, valiant in battle; to whom all the earth is subject, by his might and bravery. Rhamestes the king, the immortal offspring of the Sun.”

DIODORUS informs us, that on one of the altars, in a temple of Memphis, there was a sacred pillar with an inscription which terminated in this manner: “I am the eldest son of Cronus, sprung from the genuine and respectable race of Saus, and I am related to the fountain of day.”

## NOTE L. p. 88.

THE Cabiritic mysteries were probably instituted for the same purpose as that which we have supposed of the other mysteries; namely, the commemoration of the deliverance of mankind at the deluge.

The Cabiri were looked upon as priests as well as deities. They were in number three,—having a king to rule over them. So says Dr. Warburton of the mysteries of Eleusis also. “A magistrate, entitled *ΒΑΣΙΛΑΕΥΣ*, or King, presided in the Eleusinian mysteries . . . . This title, given to the president of the mysteries, was doubtless *in memory of the first founder.*” —Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 265.

Who these mysterious characters were may be gathered from this. “Corybus (for the Cabiri and Corybantes were the same), the father and head of the band, was the same as Helius; and, in the Orphic hymns, is further described with the attribute of Dionusus.” “The Corybantes,” says Strabo, “were a kind of *demons*, the offspring of Helius and Athena. Under the denomination of Cabiri, and the like, were included not only a set of persons who administered to the gods, but the divinities whom they worshipped.”—An. My. vol. iii. p. 352.

From the worship of these three arose the ancient triad, called sometimes the Royal, the Fierce (as Bryant thinks from a mistake), and the Sweet Triad. They were Ham, Shem, and Japheth; Noah being regarded as the king, the ruler, and founder of the order.

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NOTE M. p. 90.

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So Bryant conceives the true signification to be. He supposes *αμειλικτος*, *fierce*, to be a Grecian word, formed from the ancient terms, Malech and Malechat, to which it had no relation. It ought to be, then, that Cronus or Noah was the founder of the *Royal Triad*, which will exactly correspond with the three royal personages of Orpheus, and the three kings of other mythologists.

Proclus says distinctly that Nous is Cronus, the same also as

*Zeus: Νους μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ Κρονὸς παντελῶς· Νους δὲ ὁ μεγιστὸς Ζεὺς.* He calls this person *truly intelligible*; the very language employed by the Platonists to express their second hypostasis. “Proclus says that Cronus had the title of *Κορονοῦς*; which, we may be assured, was originally *Κοιρανὸς Νους*. By this is signified the *great Ruler*, the head of all; in other words, the *Patriarch Noah*.”—An. My. vol. iii. p. 100 to 108.

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NOTE N. p. 195.

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I WAS not aware, before I found the fact mentioned by Bishop Warburton, that the god Esculapius was set up by the pagans as a rival of Christ. I will quote here the observations of this learned writer. “We may observe, that Esculapius was one of the ancient heroes who were employed, by the defenders of paganism, to oppose to Jesus; and the circumstances of Esculapius’s story made him the fittest of any, in fabulous antiquity, for that purpose. Ovid, who lived before these times of danger to the pagan gods, and, indeed, before the coming of that Deliverer who gave occasion to so many impious comparisons, hath yet made Ochirröe, in contemplation of his future actions, prophesy of him in such strains, as presented to his excellent translator the image of the *true physician of mankind*; and thereby enabled him to give a sublimity to his version, which is not borrowed from his original.

Ergo ubi vaticinos concepit mente furores,  
 Incaluitque Deo, quem clausam pectore habebat;  
 Aspicit infantem, totique salutifer orbi  
 Cresce puer, dixit: tibi se mortalia sæpe  
 Corpora debebunt: animas tibi reddere ademptas  
 Fas erit. Idque semel, dis indignantibus, ausus,  
 Posse dare hoc iterum flamma prohibebere avitâ:  
 Eque deo corpus fies exsanguis: deusque,  
 Qui modò corpus eras, et his tua fata novabis.—OVID.

Once as the sacred infant she surveyed,  
 The God was kindled in the raving maid,  
 And thus she utter'd her prophetic tale :  
 " Hail, great physician of the world, all hail ;  
 Hail, mighty infant, who, in years to come,  
 Shalt heal the nations and defraud the tomb ;  
 Swift be thy growth, thy triumphs unconfined ;  
 Make kingdoms thicker, to increase mankind.  
 Thy daring art shall animate the dead,  
 And draw the thunder on thy guilty head :  
 Then shalt thou die. But from the dark abode  
 Rise up victorious, and be twice a God."—ADDISON.

The Platonists of the first ages of the church forged many stories of Pythagoras and others, for the purpose of those impious comparisons referred to by Dr. Warburton.

" Iamblichus, in his life of Pythagoras, seemingly aware of the birth of Christ, presumes to say, that when the mother of the Samian philosopher was with child of him, her husband, being ignorant of her pregnancy, brought her to the Oracle at Delphi, and there the prophetess told him the first news of his wife having conceived, and also, that the child she then went with, should prove the greatest blessing to mankind, &c."

Again: " The Platonists, namely Porphyry and Iamblichus, said, in comparing Christ with Pythagoras,—because Christ walked on the sea, Pythagoras rode through the skies; because Christ had been forty days fasting in the wilderness, Pythagoras was forty days without food in the temple of the Muses, at Metapontum; because Christ descended into Hades, and rose again from the dead, and appeared upon earth, Pythagoras descended to the shades below, remained there a complete year, saw Homer, Hesiod, and other departed spirits; returned upon earth, wan and emaciated, and reported what he had seen in full assembly of his disciples; whilst his mother, by his special direction, before his descent, registered, upon tablets, all that passed, and noted the times of his temporary death and resurrection: to carry on the competition, he was made to allay winds,



tempests, and earthquakes; to cure diseases, whether of mind or body; and to foretell to certain fishermen, whom he found at work, how many fish they should inclose in their net, &c."—Cumberland.

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NOTE O. p. 216.

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JULIAN in his Oration to the Sun, quoted by Dr. Cudworth, and commented on by him, says, "This god, whether he ought to be called that which is above mind and understanding, or the *idea* of all things, or the *one* (since unity seems to be the oldest of all things), or else, as Plato called him, the *good*; I say, this uniform cause of all things, the original of all pulchritude and perfection, unity and power, produced from himself a certain *intelligible sun*, every way like himself, of which the *sensible sun* is but an image." "For thus," says Cudworth, "Dionysius Petavius rightly declares the sense of Julian in this Oration: Vanissimæ hujus et loquacissimæ disputationis mysterium est; a principe ac primario Deo, νοητον, quondam et archetypum solem editum fuisse; qui eandem prorsus σχεσιν et ταξιν in genere των νοητων habeat, quam in αισθητοις ille, quem videmus, solaris globus obtinet. Tria itaque discernenda sunt, princeps ille Deus, qui τὰγαθον a Platone dicitur, ὁ νοητος ἥλιος, ὁ φαινόμενος δισκος . . ."—Vol. ii. cap. 4. p. 34.

Upon this Cudworth takes the opportunity to put forward his own views of the theology of Plato, and says, "We may take notice how near this Pagan philosopher and emperor Julian approached to Christianity;" namely as regards the doctrine of the Trinity. But was not Julian at one time a Christian himself? so that he could not be ignorant of the Christian doctrine. This is, however, *en passant*; and has no effect on my judgment on the above passage. Let us briefly examine it.

1. The language of Julian would lead us to suppose, that it was all one whether we call his god the *idea*, the *one*, or the *good*; but if he meant this to be an exposition of Plato's opinions (which seems to be the case), we must, consistently with truth, and in justice to the divine philosopher himself, dissent from this confusion and commingling of ideas perfectly distinct. There can be no question, that Plato, as well as Timæus, clearly distinguished God from the Idea. Nor am I aware that Plato ever said that God produced an intelligible idea from himself, as Julian represents it. The ideas were supposed to be eternal.

2. The Idea, namely, the intelligible world, being something *sui generis* distinct from God, according to Plato; if they are viewed as one and the same, it is clear the idea could not then be that archetypal world, maintained by the Platonists.

3. The creation, or rather the generation, of the sensible sun after the image of the intelligible, is the genuine philosophy; but how could either Cudworth or Petavius fall into the error of believing the latter to be the *divine intellect*, since it can only be, by the premises, a *part* of the archetypal world, and not the whole? The intelligible sun cannot contain more than itself; nor can the sensible contain more than the images of the forms or ideas in the intelligible. What become, then, of all other objects in the universe? They are represented, by this reasoning, to be external to the divine intellect, deduced from Julian's intelligible sun.

If this argument of Cudworth's be admitted, it is manifest that we must come to the conclusion of the later Platonists, so strongly reprobated by him, for holding that the genuine philosophy made every intelligible idea to be a god: according to the two writers above, each idea becomes a divine intellect.

Let us be just to Julian. This error is not his, but that of Petavius and Cudworth.

## NOTE P. p. 218.

DR. CUDWORTH, with the desire of making everything subservient to his hypothesis of an ancient trinity, is surely guilty of unnecessary refinement, when he takes those titles, Saturn, Cronus, Jupiter, &c., and tries to reconcile and reduce what he conceives to be so many co-equal deities, to one universal Numen. He did not perceive them to be mere titles of the chief deity.—the sun. Probably he followed in the wake of Plato, who, in his *Cratylus*, was so far culpable of the Greek custom, that while he acknowledges, in one sentence, the words whose etymology he is attempting to discover, to be of foreign extraction, in another he forgets this truth, and, in spite of his own confession, tries to deduce the original meaning of certain foreign words, by supposing them to be compounds of Grecian ones. Who can place any confidence in such a mode of procedure? Yet the whole of this, from Cudworth, rests on the same fallacy. “Plato, who propounds this difficulty (of making one Numen out of Jupiter, Saturn, &c.) in his *Cratylus*, solves it thus: that by Jupiter, here is to be understood the soul of the world, which, according to his theology, was derived from a perfect and eternal mind, or intellect (which Cronus is interpreted to be) as Cronus also depended upon Uranus, or Cælus, the supreme heavenly God, or first original Deity. So that Plato here finds his Trinity of Divine hypostases, archical and universal, *Ταγαθον*, *Νους*, and *Ψυχη*, in Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus; or Cælus, Saturn, and Jupiter . . .”—Vol. ii. p. 461.

THE END.

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