LAW & ORDER
Ben Bova
The fifteenth
anniversary of the Space Age slipped by last fall with hardly a
whisper. October 4, 1957 was the day Sputnik I was launched.
The whole world was
stunned that autumn day. And in a way they never expected, the Russians
themselves were surprised.
By orbiting their
satellite over various national territories without first getting
permission from the nations involved, the Russians inadvertently
established the concept of "freedom of space." Thus, while you cannot
fly through a nation's airspace legally without the nation's prior
approval, you can fly a satellite over it without even telling the
nation you're doing so.
Within a few years
of the first Sputnik, American satellites were leisurely cruising over
the Soviet Union, photographing missile sites and everything else
visible to the best optics systems that the U.S. Air Force could buy.
There was no risk of a Francis Gary Powers fiasco; the Russians
couldn't shoot down our satellites and even if they did, there was no
one aboard to capture or kill, and the damaged "bird" would burn up
completely if
it ever re-entered the atmosphere.
The Soviet
government complained bitterly about the American spies in the sky. But
the precedent had already been set:. Satellites can overfly any
nation on Earth, and the overflown nation has no legal way to stop it.
International law, like most legal systems, depends heavily on
precedents. Once the Russians established the freedom of space, they
couldn't turn it off again. It was there for everyone.
Pretty soon Soviet
satellites were busily photographing our territory and a sort of parity
was achieved. Both sides now feel that they can watch the other guy
closely enough to make him stick to the arms limitations agreements
that have been signed recently.
Of course, the
Russians have shown what appears to be a capability for destroying
satellites in orbit. Several of their own Cosmos satellites have been
suddenly shattered into nothing but debris after passing within hailing
distance of another Cosmos-type satellite. The U.S.S.R. has not used
such tactics on any satellites but their own, but the suspicion of our aerospace people is that
the Soviets could destroy our "eyes in orbit" when they want to.
Presumably they
won't choose to do so. Not until the moment before they launch an
all-out nuclear strike. They're just holding onto the capability to stick their
fingers in our orbital eyes for those critical few moments—or
hours—before The Button gets pushed. International law won't have much
to say about it, because after The Button is pushed, the lawyers
and anyone else left alive take a quick trip back to the Middle
Ages — if we're lucky.
Wait a minute.
There's a treaty prohibiting weapons in space, isn't there? And it has
the force of international law, doesn't it? The answer is a partial
yes. That is, both sides will respect the treaty as long as it's to
their advantage to do so. If we thought that our national interests
were being threatened, and the only way to stop that threat was by
putting weapons in orbit, the treaty on space weaponry would join all
the other famous "scraps of paper" that get tossed into the wastebasket
just about the time the shooting starts.
What's more, the
space weaponry treaty refers only to "weapons of mass destruction,"
which means nuclear weapons. All the signatories to the treaty have
agreed not to stash nuclear weapons in orbit. The famous satellite
bomber of many science fiction stories is strictly outlawed.
Well, almost. Again,
the Russians have shown an enviable finesse in sticking to the letter
of the law and getting their own way at the same time. They seem to
view the world much in the same way that those aliens of Gordon R.
Dickson's, the Dilbians, do. The Dilbians never tell a lie yet somehow
never seem to tell the exact truth, either. (And-is it coincidental
that the Dilbians are giant bearlike creatures?)
The treaty barring
nuclear weapons in space is quite specific. It says that weapons of
mass destruction may not be placed in orbit. ICBM's spend most of their
mission life in space, but on a trajectory that intersects the Earth's
surface at some target area; they don't go into orbit. Now, if you make
that trajectory long enough, you can make an ICBM that soars around the
Earth almost all the way. It flies on a fractional orbit—it never
completes one whole revolution around the Earth.
The U.S.S.R.'s
Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS) does just that. A FOBS
missile can be launched southward, for example, and swing around
Antarctica to head for the U.S. by way of Mexico. With all our radars
and ABM systems pointed north to halt a conventional ICBM attack, the
FOBS warhead can re-enter and strike without much opposition. Or much
warning. There'd be no way to know if the FOBS bird was a peaceful
satellite or an actual weapon, until it began to re-enter over an
American target. Then we'd have about thirty seconds to call the
lawyers.
Our own Air Force
has taken a dim view of the FOBS idea. SAC experts claim that the
accuracies of the FOBS system can't possibly be as good as those of
conventional ICBM's. Thus, while ordinary ICBM's can be used for
"pickle-barrel" pinpoint attacks on enemy missile silos and airfields,
the FOBS warheads could only be used against much bigger easier-to-hit
targets. Like cities. The fact that the experts who make these
reassuring noises tend to work at airfields and missile sites, rather
than in large cities, has nothing to do with their judgment.
Getting back to the
Soviet anti-satellite satellite (SASS?) it doesn't use nuclear weapons
anyway, so it's still quite legal. To destroy an orbiting satellite, a
well-placed bean-bag will do the trick. After all, the satellite is
winging along at orbital velocity—better than twenty-five thousand
kilometers per hour. Hang some buckshot in front of it or even better,
throw the buckshot at it from the opposite direction at the same
speed—and you've got a shredded satellite. No violation of any laws,
international or geophysical.
Which goes to prove
that when men really have a reason to do battle in space, they'll have
the weaponry, even if they don't use nukes. The rapidly-growing art of
high-powered lasers will no doubt be added to the arsenals of both the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Lasers will be ideal space weapons, sooner or later. They are pinpoint weapons,
not mass-destruction type. And in space, most of the limitations placed
on lasers by atmospheric distortions of the beam and absorption of the
beam's power will be completely removed. Space is the domain
for laser weapons.
The real reason why
international law prevails in orbit is that both of the competing
nations have found it more to their advantage to obey the law, such as
it is, than to violate it. When the time comes that they think it's to
their advantage to flaunt the law, they will. Because there is no way
for international law to be enforced in orbit (or on Earth, for that
matter) except by the direct conflict of one nation against another.
And that's not law enforcement. That's war.
The "freedom of
space" sounds much like an older and more honored tradition, "freedom
of the seas."
For more than a
century, the nations of the world have operated under the tacit
agreement that the oceans are open to travel and exploitation by
anyone. The right to engage in commerce and to reap the resources of
the sea (mostly fish, up until recently) has been open to all nations.
Of course, all
nations have insisted on keeping their national sovereignty rights over
the waters immediately
adjacent to their shores. Territorial waters are controlled by the
individual nations, and different nations define the limits of
territoriality in different ways. To some nations it's three miles off
their coasts, to others it's two hundred kilometers. The current trend
is to extend the claim to territoriality toward the limits of the
continental shelves, and this trend is causing international conflicts
and headaches for the World Court, which is the only international
arbiter that has a chance of settling such disputes.
Let's back up a bit.
Early in the Nineteenth Century, the United States fought with both
France and Britain over the right to freedom of the seas. Engaged in a
bitter, centuries-long struggle against each other, both France and
Britain stopped, searched and seized any ships that they thought might
give aid or trade to the enemy. American ships were stopped. American
sailors were forced to join the crews of foreign ships.
We exchanged shots
with the French, but eventually settled the affair with
diplomats—international lawyers. But with the British we engaged in the
fiasco called the War of 1812: the first war that America didn't win.
When the shooting
stopped, Britain was absolute master of the high seas. An English-led
coalition had finally subdued Napoleon, and a Pax Britannica settled
over Europe
and North America. The British wisely decided to make a stalemate peace
with the stubborn "Colonials," who capped the whole miserable affair by
decimating a British army attacking New Orleans two days after the
peace treaty had been signed in Belgium.
When you're Number
One, you may not try harder, but things tend to go your way anyhow. The
British quickly realized that their island nation depended on seaborne
commerce. So they grandly fostered the concept of freedom of the seas.
To the victorious English, this meant that they had a right to sail
wherever they pleased and trade with whomever they desired.
International law is always written by the winners, like all law. This
time the winner created a situation that benefited just about
everybody—but especially themselves. That's called wisdom.
For more than a
century, freedom of the seas was assured by the ascendancy of the
British fleet. By Teddy Roosevelt's time, the U.S. Navy was strong
enough to help bolster the British. Then came World War II. At the end
of that war, the entire world's seas were literally mare nostrum. There
was no naval power on Earth, nor any combination of fleets, that could
dare to challenge the U.S. Navy. Freedom of the seas was ours, and we
generously continued the earlier tradition and shared this freedom with
the world,
under the knowledge that this freedom wouldn't work unless everyone had
a share of it. (All freedoms tend to be that way.)
But over the past
few years, this grand concept has started to fold up like a
prizefighter who's taken too many punches on the- chin.
What has happened is
like something out of a science fiction story. The world's nations have
discovered that there's wealth in "them thar oceans": food, oil,
natural gas, minerals. Pushed by the pressures of exploding
populations, many nations have hugely expanded, nationalized, and
modernized their fishing fleets. The Grand Banks off Newfoundland are
now the scene of a not-always-quiet competition among the fishermen of
a dozen nations, some of them from as far away as Russia and Japan. The
Americans and Canadians, who've long considered the Banks as virtually
their private domain, are now being muscled around by the newcomers in
their shiny, efficient factory ships. The World Court is listening to
case after case of alleged interference, damages, actual fights.
Meanwhile, nations
such as Peru are extending their claims to territorial rights for
hundreds of kilometers from their shores. This is to "capture" the rich
fishing grounds off their coasts and drive away the gringo fishermen.
Then there's the discovery of rich oil and natural gas deposits in
ocean areas that were open to all nations—until the discoveries. Right
now, the North Sea is being carved up into spheres of influence by the
British, Dutch, West Germans, et al, much in the way Africa
and the Orient were dissected by the European empire builders of
earlier centuries.
There is no British
fleet capable of guaranteeing freedom of the seas anymore. And
Britain's not much interested in the idea at present. The American Navy
is being challenged by the new and fast-growing power of the Soviet
fleet. And the days of battleship diplomacy are long gone, in a world
where a confrontation anywhere can result in nuclear hell half an hour
later.
So the fond old
order of freedom of the seas is going the way all laws go when no one
enforces them. Just as the concept of freedom of space will disappear
as soon as space-faring nations decide it's in their best interests to
ignore the law.
The basic point is
simple.
Law and order are
lovely concepts, but they work only when all the parties
involved get something out of the arrangement. Of course, a vastly
superior force can impress its will for a while on a smaller,
fragmented, or unprepared opponent. But that's not law and order.
That's military occupation of a conquered territory. Sooner or later
the occupation must end; often it ends in bloodshed.
To make law and
order work, to make law and order mean something more than mere words —
whether it's in orbit or on the high seas or in your favorite downtown
ghetto—then all the parties to the situation must derive some benefits
from the system. The law must be enforced, fairly and without favor.
But all parties involved must have a stake in maintaining the order.
Without law and
order, human beings are much like those missiles waiting in their silos
for The Button to be pushed. And law and order cannot be one-way,
conqueror to slave. Not for long. To make a legal system work, all the
parties involved must work at it. When a nation decides to claim extra
offshore territory, or to deny the freedom of space to another nation,
the international system of law and order breaks down. War is on the
way. Those nations have decided that they stand to gain more by
asserting their individual rights, than by observing the rights of
other nations.
And when people
ignore the law to incite riots, to bug telephones, to beat up kids and
then charge them with resisting arrest, to pelt firemen with stones,
they're creating anarchy and tearing down the protections of a legal
and orderly society.
Many people utter
the words "Law and Order" as if they were sacred. Damned few people
live up to them. THE EDITOR
Analog Science
Fiction / Science Fact