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Roland Sturm
Dagmar Eberle (eds.)

Conservative Parties and Right-Wing Politics in North America

Reaping the Benefits of an Ideological Victory?

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Right-Wing Politics in North America

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Preface

Even a quick glance at the party systems of North American and European democracies since the 1970s reveals the complexity and variation across time and space that characterizes the ideological roots, programmatic orientations and organizational arrangements of political conservatism. On both sides of the Atlantic, the 1980s saw important changes inspired by neo-conservatism. Although many neo-conservative governments in the industrialized world were voted out of office in the 1990s, they succeeded in anchoring their specific understanding of the state and public policy in the political mainstream. Core elements of the neo-conservative agenda – such as the goal of fiscal consolidation – were widely adopted, even by social democratic parties in Europe. At the turn of the millennium, one could observe the return to power of conservative parties in some countries, for example in the United States. Yet the parties of the Right also faced considerable tensions over the last few decades, which often triggered the decline or break-up of established conservative parties as well as the rise of new parties. In North America and Europe alike, the phenomenon of right-wing populism resurfaced in the political arena. Particularly in the North American democracies, the formation of new right-wing parties went along with ideological, programmatic and organizational changes. These forced established conservative parties in North America to implement concomitant changes and at the same time served as model for conservative parties in Europe.

In May 2002, some thirty scholars from Germany, Canada and the United States met for a three-day conference at the University of Augsburg to discuss the current state of conservatism in North America. This book presents the "output" of the conference, which was jointly organized by the Institute for Canadian Studies, University of Augsburg, and the Department of Political Science, University of Erlangen-Nuremburg. The thirteen papers assembled here deal with crucial developments in four broad areas: ideological and value change in the North American mass publics, conservative ideology and party programmes, internal structures and societal networks of conservative parties, and the public policies of conservative governments. As editors, we are convinced that the contributions in this volume will not only broaden the knowledge on American and Canadian politics, but will also advance a more differentiated "Image of America" (R. L. Bruckberger) and further

stimulate the discourse on the interrelationship between societal change, political ideology and changes in party organization in North America.

Neither the organization of the conference nor the publication of the proceedings would have been possible without the support and cooperation of many individuals and institutions. First and foremost, we would like to thank the participants of the conference who revised their papers within a very short deadline. Unfortunately, not all the conference papers could be included in this volume, since the editing process was subject to tight restrictions of time and space. Second, we were fortunate to have the help of two excellent research assistants: Dorothea Ritzel, who assisted us in managing the conference, and Andrea Rapp, who prepared the manuscript for publication. Third, we thank the Association for Canadian Studies in German-Speaking Countries, the Bavarian American Academy, the Bavarian government, the Canadian Embassy, Berlin, and, last but not least, the University of Augsburg for their generous financial support.

Augsburg/Erlangen, December 2002   Rainer-Olaf Schultze
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                                                     Dagmar Eberle

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Part I

Mission Accomplished? A Comparative Exploration of Conservatism in the United States and Canada

Dagmar Eberle/Rainer-Olaf Schultze/Roland Sturm

Matters of Perception – European Perspectives on North America

When analyzing institutions and events in the "New World," observers from the "Old World" have rarely been motivated just by curiosity. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, both liberals and conservatives tried to paint a picture of the United States that was supportive of their own position in the domestic debates (von Beyme 1986: 25ff.). Alexis de Tocqueville explicitly stated in the foreword of his seminal work on "Democracy in America" that his interest in the United States arose from his desire to seek "the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices, and its passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or to hope from its progress" (de Tocqueville 1956: 36). Thus, the political instrumentalization of America, so pervasive in the current public discourse in Europe, is not a new phenomenon. Ever since the birth of the American nation, Europeans have tended to project their highest hopes or worst fears onto the "New World."

Also, in the last few years, political and social forces in Germany and Europe who advocate a stronger orientation towards North American policies and practices have gained ground. In many policy areas, ongoing debates are characterized by a high degree of polarization and low complexity. Often, North American trends are portrayed either as shining examples to be fully embraced or as miserable failures to be wholeheartedly condemned. This kind of stereotyped acceptance or rejection, driven by ideology, rarely does justice to the North American situation. Nor does it contribute much to the solution of the political problems at stake. Apart from the question to what extent North American experiences and models are transferable to Europe, the ambiguities and paradoxes of society and politics in the United States are frequently neglected in public discourse. Furthermore, North America is regularly equated with the United States. These dual shortcomings lead to an overly simplistic image of North American realities.

Two examples shall suffice to demonstrate the first of these shortcomings. One area where the North American model currently dominates the German discussion is the controversy on the reform of Germany's system of higher education. For more than a decade, a broad coalition of business repre-

sentatives, intellectuals, conservative and increasingly also social democratic politicians has been pushing reform measures aiming at an extensive overhaul of German universities to make them more alike to, and thus more competitive with, their US counterparts. As Jürgen Gebhardt notes, "[...] the exemplary nature of the American university appears to be-self evident in the limited perceptions of the German public: in the light of this perception, Harvard, Stanford, or Yale are everywhere" (Gebhardt 2001: 7). What gets lost in the debate is the highly differentiated and hierarchical nature of the American system of higher education, which precludes a simple extrapolation from the quality of its top institutions to the quality of the whole system. Proponents and opponents of the current reform thrust usually bolster their arguments more with clichés than with an intimate knowledge of the landscape of higher education in the United States.

For a second, classic example of one-sided perceptions, one could point to the European discourse on modernity. Beginning with Tocqueville's analysis, Europeans have been studying North American developments to learn about the future of their own societies. The United States, the "first new nation" – to borrow the title of Seymour Martin Lipset's famous book –, is perceived as the incarnation of progress and modernity. Yet, in the European perspective, modernization and secularization are inextricably intertwined, which has made it difficult for European observers to come to terms with the continued significance of religion in the United States (see Kamphausen 2002). In this non-secularized modern society, religious motives and convictions permeate left- and right-wing politics so that the US political culture exhibits a strong moralistic flavour (see Jürgen Gebhardt's chapter in this volume). Moreover, in the course of US history, religious awakenings repeatedly preceded and contributed to periods of political reform and reorientation (Huntington 1981: 165). The growth of fundamentalist and evangelical sects from the late 1960s onwards was a major factor in the rise of the "New Right" in the late 1970s and 1980s. Not only did these groups provide a mass base for the conservative movement that swept Ronald Reagan into power in 1980. In ideological terms, their concerns about so-called social issues, such as opposition to abortion, gay rights, and sexual liberation, constitute a defining feature of the new conservatism (Berlet 1998; Himmelstein 1990). Strikingly, these conservative churches flourished in the affluent suburban neighbourhoods of the new technocratic Sunbelt region. As Lisa McGirr has pointed out,

"these men and women [...] rejected some elements usually associated with modernity – namely, secularism, relativism, and egalitarianism, believing that a [...] modern life could, and should, exclude them – while embracing thoroughly modern lifestyles." (McGirr 2001: 94)

The moral issues championed so vigorously by the Christian Right in the United States do not play a significant role in the political controversies of

most industrialized countries. "No one burns down abortion clinics in Europe, Australia, or Japan," to quote Seymour M. Lipset's incisive remark (Lipset 1996: 28). The same is true for the second, often overlooked nation on the North American continent. In their vast majority, Canadians find the social conservatism manifest in a segment of their own "New Right" rather appalling. It is perceived as an incursion of foreign, namely US values. However, just as the internal complexity of US politics and society, the considerable differences between the two North American countries hardly ever enter into the debate on this side of the Atlantic.[1] It goes without saying that such an undifferentiated perspective falls short of the standards of academic discourse.

Only a careful, unbiased analysis that is sensitive to the ambiguities and subtle distinctions underlying North American politics can be truly instructive for the European discourse. This idea has been the starting point for our conference on "Conservatism in Canada and the United States" where the papers assembled in this book were originally presented. Two main questions have inspired us. One is the interaction between societal and ideological change. Is the new conservatism of the 1980s and 1990s in North America to be interpreted as a consequence of the "end of the social democratic century" (Ralf Dahrendorf)? This question entails a two-dimensional approach since the ideological shift has to be examined as reaction both to socio-economic and socio-cultural transformations and to the decline of the policy model of the Keynesian welfare state. Secondly, it is necessary to explore the parallels and variations in the experiences of the two North American polities.

Such an analysis reveals that despite similar problems – budget deficits, stagflation, the crisis of the welfare state, etc. – the problem-solving strategies of the Right displayed marked differences. This points to the path dependency of these developments which, contrary to the conventional wisdom, should not be underrated. Its enormous significance is underscored by the North American as well as by a transatlantic comparison. Different national pathways also meant different opportunity structures for conservative parties. Undoubtedly, the new conservatism succeeded in anchoring its specific understanding of the state and public policy in the political mainstream, thereby transforming public philosophy. Yet, as the contributions in this volume show, at the level of party systems, electoral politics and mass publics, the evidence of a "conservative revolution" is much less clear. This is especially true for the Canadian case, where the organizational disarray on the Right

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1   While the argument can be made that any discussion of North America should include Mexico, we deliberately decided not to do so. Since our focus is on political ideologies and political culture, integrating Mexico would mean to broaden the scope of our analysis to the Latin American context. This would obscure rather than deepen any insight we can gain from comparing the two Anglo-American democracies on the North American continent.

severely impaired the chances of conservative forces to reap the electoral benefits of their ideological victory.

Conservative Ideology in Canada and the United States – Defining Features and Trajectories of Change

Since many European observers fail to notice that the North American continent is home to two very distinct political entities, they are generally oblivious of the fact that these two nations share a common point of departure: the American Revolution. "The United States is the country of the revolution, Canada of the counterrevolution" (Lipset 1990: 1). A large number of colonists who rejected the American Revolution emigrated to the northern part of the continent which remained under British authority, but till then had been primarily inhabited by francophone settlers. Hence, English Canada largely came into being with the inflow of the so-called "Loyalists" (Bell 1992). This critical juncture in the history of both countries had decisive consequences for their ideological make-up.

In the aftermath of the revolution, the new nation occupying the southern half of the North American continent developed a sense of identity which, due to the strength of its integrative function and its ideological nature, has variously been described as "civil religion" (Bellah 1975), "American Creed" (Huntington 1981) and "American Ideology" (Lipset 1996). Its core is Lockean liberalism, the worldview of the revolutionaries. As the Canadian political scientist David Bell has summed up this process of nation-building, "to be American meant to hold liberal ideals" (Bell 1992: 64). "Americanism" is characterized by an emphasis on individual liberty and the "natural right of property," a strong distrust of the state and an egalitarianism defined mainly in terms of equality of opportunity (Minkenberg 1990; Lipset 1990; Lipset/Marks 2000; Lösche 1989).

North of the border, as Gad Horowitz and Seymour M. Lipset have documented, the influence of liberal ideas was diluted by a Tory strain: the ideological baggage of the Loyalists contained an "organic conservatism" which was reinforced by the continuing identification with Britain and the monarchy (Bell 1992; Horowitz 1985; Lipset 1990). A greater deference and more respect for authority, a positive attitude towards the state as well as a stronger sense of group solidarity and collectivism flowed from the Tory presence within the Canadian society. The distinctive values embedded in the political cultures of Canada and the United States are nicely illustrated by the principles enunciated in their basic documents: Whereas the American Declaration of Independence speaks of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,"

the British North America Act of 1867, Canada's original constitution, refers to "peace, order, and good government."

Because of these divergent backgrounds, the term "conservatism" came to acquire a different meaning in both countries. Rather than to European notions of conservatism, the American version relates to classical liberalism. George Grant, a prominent Canadian conservative intellectual, has contended that:

"Americans who call themselves 'conservatives' have the right to that title only in a particular sense. [...] Their concentration on freedom of governmental interference has more to do with nineteenth century liberalism than with traditional conservatism, which asserts the right of the community to restrain freedom in the name of the common good." (Grant 1965: 64f.)

It should be noted, however, that conservative anti-statism in the US predominantly refers to laissez-faire capitalism, not necessarily to a libertarian stance on questions of morality. Considering the moral fervour characteristic of US politics – but largely absent in Canada –, it should not be surprising that a moral traditionalism has been ingrained in American conservatism (Himmelstein 1990; Leggewie 1997). In this view, the maintenance of a moral order in the Judeo-Christian tradition may lie with intermediate institutions like families or neighbours, but also with the state.

Conversely, the aggressive individualism and – economic – anti-statism of American conservatism do not constitute defining features of the conservative tradition north of the 49th parallel. Conservatism in the European sense, as described by Grant, has left its indelible mark on the Canadian variant which can be understood as a – sometimes uneasy – marriage of pro-market liberalism and Toryism (Campbell/Christian 1996; Horowitz 1985). In the north, the pro-interventionist bias of the Tory legacy has been reinforced by the ever present desire to dissociate oneself from the neighbour to the South and by contextual factors, i.e. Canada's geography and demographics plus the specific configuration of its regional and ethnic cleavages. Canadian conservatives, and their primary political vehicle, the Progressive Conservative Party, have generally approved of an activist government and considerable state intervention in the marketplace. And their belief systems and policies have traditionally been infused with the values of *noblesse oblige* – the paternalistic responsibility of the élites for the less well-off (Lipset 1996).

Further distinctions are necessary to clarify the usage of "conservative" and "liberal" in everyday politics. In the United States, it is only since the New Deal era beginning in the early 1930s that these terms have come to be widely used as labels attached to specific political concepts and forces (Beer 1978; Minkenberg 1990). This era saw a considerable extension of state activity triggered by the Great Depression: the reign of the "Keynesian welfare state consensus" (King 1987) set in. During the presidency of the Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt, the US government assumed a greater responsibility

for the economic security and welfare of its citizens and expanded its regula-
tory activities. Roosevelt dubbed his New Deal programs as liberal and la-
belled his adversaries as conservatives – a characterization that proved to be
very successful and durable (Himmelstein 1990: 26). The opponents of the
so-called "welfare liberalism" who had maintained their belief in anti-statism
and laissez-faire increasingly congregated in the Republican Party. But many
of them came to terms with an expanded role for government in economic life
(Himmelstein 1990; Lipset 1996).

Similarly, north of the border, a national welfare state began to emerge in
the 1930s and 1940s under the auspices of the Liberal Party, Canada's second
major party. However, the welfare policies of the two North American nations
clearly reflected their different political cultures. For the social policy regime
set up in Canada was much more extensive and had a greater redistributive
impact (Banting 1997). The Tory-statist tradition supported the use of politi-
cal power for such purposes and, in combination with Canada's ideological
diversity, fostered the formation of a moderately successful socialist/social
democratic party which put the governing Liberals under pressure from the
left (Horowitz 1985; Lipset 1996). Needless to say, the aforementioned con-
textual factors of Canadian politics also have to be taken into account when
explaining the variations in the welfare state regimes, as well as the country's
parliamentary system which, due to the fusion of executive and legislative
powers, allows more effective and cohesive government decision-making at
the national level. The most telling sign, though, of the continuing signifi-
cance of the historic-ideological differences is the phenomenon of "Red Tory-
ism" which began to exert considerable influence in the Conservative Party in
the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II (Patten 2001). This
outlook puts a strong emphasis on the duty of the state to help the less fortu-
nate. It goes beyond acquiescence to the welfare state consensus to active
advocacy of the creation and extension of social welfare programs and infra-
structures (Horowitz 1985; Patten 2001). As Horowitz has pointed out, the
mere thought of such "leftist" tendencies within the US Republican Party
seems ridiculous (Horowitz 1985: 50).

Nonetheless, on the programmatic-ideological level, the welfare state
consensus put the conservatives in Canada and the United States in a reactive
position, since the policy trends were set by the "liberals." In the two coun-
tries, the respective party of the "liberals" was ideologically in a hegemonic
position during the post-war period. Both the Liberal Party and the Democ-
ratic Party moved further to the left during the 1960s and 1970s. And they did
so not only in the sense of a "social democratic tinge" (Lipset 1996: 37)
through the expansion of welfare programs, but also in terms of a rights-based
liberalism aimed at enhancing personal freedoms and furthering equity
through affirmative action programs. Linked to this was an increasing open-
ness to the issues pushed by new social movements, such as women's rights

and environmentalism (McGirr 2001; Campbell/Christian 1996; Himmelstein 1990). Thus, "to become an effective political contender, conservatives had to reconstruct their ideology" (Himmelstein 1990: 25). Especially in the United States, but to a lesser extent also in Canada, a considerable range of organizations, magazines and think tanks dedicated to conservative causes sprang up (see Martin Thunert's chapter). Conservatives reformulated their themes and arguments so as to adapt them to the changes in the political and social environment. But for its breakthrough on the level of politics and public philosophy, the emerging new conservatism depended on socio-economic and socio-cultural transformations to create the necessary political and ideological opening by triggering the breakdown of the Keynesian welfare state consensus (see Dagmar Eberle's chapter for the Canadian case).

In both countries, the growing disenchantment with Keynesian welfare state policies was, of course, linked to a faltering economy, rising deficits and increasing individual and collective insecurities in a post-industrial and globalized marketplace. At the same time, particularly in the US, parts of the old middle class and the working class felt deeply alienated by more pluralistic lifestyles and changing gender roles, while the new social and ethnic movements pressed for the recognition and accommodation of such individual choices and identities (Himmelstein 1990; Harrison 1995; McGirr 2001). Aided by regional discontent and resentment of the federal governments in the American South and West and in the Canadian West, the economic concerns and, in the US, the socio-cultural themes became the vehicle for electoral success of the conservatives in the 1980s: in 1980, the avowed conservative Ronald Reagan won the presidential race in the United States; in 1984, Brian Mulroney led the Conservative Party to an impressive victory in the Canadian federal election.

What differentiates this new conservatism from the "Old Right" in the US and the Tories in Canada? Its most distinguishing feature certainly was that it offered an economic theory which could compete with Keynesianism (Schiller 2002). With the adoption of monetarism and supply-side economics, the conservatives not only put forth an alternative concept, these doctrines also legitimized the aim of welfare retrenchment and the renewed emphasis on classical free-market liberalism. Hence, with respect to its economic priorities, the conservatism of the 1980s and 1990s may be labelled as neo-liberal (see Jane Jenson's chapter). Its second ideological "innovation," the emphasis on social issues, at first came to the fore solely in the US Right. Only with the foundation of the Reform Party in the late 1980s did it find a home in Canadian party politics (see chapters by David Laycock and Lisa Young/William Cross). In the United States, a strong movement of grassroots activists inspired by religion and mobilized by their opposition to social permissiveness was instrumental in the rise of the new conservatism (Himmelstein 1990; McGirr 2001).

Neither in the United States nor in Canada, this new conservatism developed as a homogeneous force. In Canada, the divisions within the Right acquired a partisan dimension, whereas the different strands of US conservatism mainly rallied behind the Republican Party. In the 1970s and 1980s, the American New Right assembled a not always harmonious coalition of moderate and hard-core right-wingers, of economic and social conservatives. The new factions vying for influence with traditional mainstream Republicans made strange bedfellows: the intellectual neo-conservatives and the already mentioned New Christian Right. On the ideological level, the latter's focus on social issues and the state as moral authority with the task of upholding inherited values has never been fully reconciled with the free-market radicalism of the former.

Yet, common interests and goals provided the base for a certain synthesis of views labelled as "fusionism" (Himmelstein 1990). The two perspectives shared a preference for the free market, a distrust of centralized "Big Government" as well as the opposition to the welfare state. As Lisa McGirr argued, "many social conservatives believed that economic freedom was essential to building a Christian world" (McGirr 2001: 165). So moral arguments provided a non-economic justification of laissez-faire capitalism. And the welfare system was not only to be rejected because of its costs and economic impact, but also because of its alleged socio-cultural repercussions. According to New Right argumentation, the welfare state has created a culture of dependency: instead of helping the poor out of their misery, it is inducing anti-social behaviour (King 1987; Withorn 1998).

While both the Christian Right and the neo-conservatives agreed that America was suffering from a cultural crisis, in terms of their background they could hardly have been more different. Whereas the label "neo-conservative" is by now often applied to hard-line right-wing politics, originally, it denoted a curious blend of New Deal liberalism and strict anti-communism (Lipset 1996). The term was coined in the mid-1960s for a group of liberal, often Jewish intellectuals such as Irving Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Aaron Wildavsky who dissociated themselves from the New Left and the rising counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s (Dorrien 1998). These intellectuals did not object to the idea of the welfare state per se, but to the welfare expansion of the 1960s, the Great Society housing and welfare policies. They argued for the return to a minimal welfare state which should concentrate on the "truly needy" and rely more on private initiatives on an intermediate level of society (Minkenberg 1990). With regard to society's socio-cultural dimension, the neo-conservatives believed in strengthening public order and respect for traditional institutions and authorities as stabilizing elements of a capitalist society. But, – at least until the 1980s –, they did not exhibit the aggressive moralism of the social conservatives and generally abstained from the fight against abortion, sex education, pornography or gay rights (Dorrien 1998).

Although its protagonists have elicited a lot of criticism by other factions of conservatism, in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, neo-conservatism "has now blended almost without remainder into the conservative establishment" (Dorrien 1998: 65).

North of the border, the battle lines were not completely dissimilar, although the battles were played out in a different landscape. Mulroney's election as leader of the Conservatives and then as Prime Minister definitively marked the ascendancy of pro-market liberalism over Toryism. Yet, the latter element did not vanish into thin air. While articulating a neo-liberal economic program directed towards creating a leaner, more efficient government and cutting back state intervention into the market sphere, the Mulroney Conservatives lacked a coherent ideological vision (see Jane Jenson's chapter). Certainly, the right turn of the Progressive Conservatives was furthered by the political and intellectual advances of the US Right, but the traditional conservative parties continued to travel down different paths in the two countries. For the Canadian case, this is not only exemplified by the conspicuous absence of social conservatism in the policy agenda of the Conservative Party, but also by the fact that in the 1980s and early 1990s, i.e. during Mulroney's tenure, the cuts in taxes and social benefits were clearly less severe than south of the border (see Banting 1997). As Martin Thunert concludes in his chapter, "much of Canadian conservatism today is individualism with considerable limits"(246). In federal politics, the fragment of conservatism which was set on broadening the limits drawn by traditions and circumstances moved on to a more consistently right-wing alternative: the Reform Party, now the Canadian Alliance. However, as the election campaign in 2000 has shown, the party's moral traditionalism which brings it much closer to the American New Right than traditional conservatism is drawing strongly negative reactions from voters in central and eastern Canada so that the Alliance remains locked in its western stronghold (Marzolini 2001). Thus, its leadership is caught almost in a double bind: how to reach out to new voters while holding together the delicate coalition of economic conservatives, social conservatives and western populists.

Its populist appeal is another feature that sets the Reform/Alliance apart from the Conservative Party. The latter has generally espoused traditional notions of representative democracy, whereas the Reform/Alliance successfully monopolized the populist strand within Canadian politics. The fact that the Reform/Alliance is vigorously promoting initiatives, referenda and recall proceedings points to its Western origin as well as to a specific New Right concept of democracy. Measures of direct democracy have been advocated for generations by left-wing and right-wing movements born in the Canadian West so as to cure the perceived powerlessness of the region in federal politics. In the case of the Reform/Alliance, its penchant for direct democracy is also tied to a welfare state critique (Laycock 2002). In this perspective, the

political process is distorted to favour special interests – groups representing women, gays, low income people, etc. – over the silent majority of taxpayers, with the result of ever more state intrusion into economy and society. Devices of direct democracy are seen as a means to sideline the special interests and their allies in the old parties and the bureaucracy and to allow for an unmediated expression of citizens' preferences (see David Laycock's chapter). This plebiscitarian approach to politics has become even more attractive in light of the possibilities offered by the new communications technologies.

Similarly, in the United States, especially in California, one can observe the growing use of citizens' initiatives by conservative groups to further their causes, be it a proposal to introduce an anti-obscenity measure (1966) or the famous – and successful – "Proposition 13" of 1978 which placed a limit on local property taxation (McGirr 2001; Minkenberg 1990; Danziger 1980). Historically, populist forces have always been much stronger in the US than in Canada, as exemplified by the array of options for direct citizen participation built into the institutions of representative democracy.

Conservative Parties and Right-Wing Politics: Party Systems and Electoral Support

In the last two decades in the United States, the Republican Party has always been in a position to win presidential and congressional elections. With Ronald Reagan (1980-1988), George Bush (1988-1992) and George W. Bush (2000-), representatives of a conservative party became American presidents. What in a European context can be called a political party, did only play a minor role, however, in these successful electoral contests. Parties in the United States have no formal membership. Partisanship is an expression of sympathy which culminates in financial and/or voter support and is measured by the self-identification of respondents in opinion polls. Parties in the United States are the environment in which political entrepreneurs act, where they find a label and where some, but by far not the most important, organizational support for their campaign comes from. The national party committees and congressional campaign committees focus on candidate-assisting activities including coordinating contributions from interest groups, matching candidates with professional campaign consultants, and sharing resources such as public opinion surveys (see Howard L. Reiter's chapter).

Conservatism in the United States is, in its shape, ideological content and program, very much dependent (a) on the political convictions of a presidential candidate and (b) on tactical needs dictated by the dynamics of election campaigns; (c) it is much more present at the grassroots than at the élite level,

or among political activists, such as Republican national convention delegates who come together for inaugurating a presidential candidate.

In Canada the meaning of conservatism is easier to locate in party struc-tures as Europeans know them from their own experience. Conservatism in Canada, however, suffers from the regional imbalance of the country's party system. In the past, only the Liberal Party consistently managed to attract a substantial level of nation-wide support. It therefore considered itself to be the only truly national party in Canadian politics. The Progressive Conserva-tive parliamentary majority between 1984 and 1993 is no proof to the con-trary, as it remained an episode. When Brian Mulroney, the candidate of the Progressive Conservatives, won the general election in 1984 he had suc-ceeded in forging an alliance between the voters in Western Canada who protested against the intrusion of Ottawa into their economic affairs and the nationalist vote in Quebec, and had also won a majority of votes in the Cana-dian heartland.

In 1993 the conservative electoral coalition fell apart (see Schultze 1997). The general election reduced the parliamentary representation of the Conservatives from their parliamentary majority (169 seats) to two. Instead of 43.0 % of the vote the Progressive Conservatives only gained 16.0 %. New parties attracted former supporters of the Conservatives. The Bloc Québécois who had fielded only candidates in Québec won 13.5 % of the vote, and the Reform Party, a brainchild of Western conservatives won 18.7% (Erickson 1995). As the elections of 1997 and 2000 have confirmed, the regionalization of the vote (a phenomenon important for all parties) is of a systematic and permanent nature. For the 1997 general election Gidengil et al. have shown that:

"It is not simply that the residents of different regions have different beliefs or differ in their political judgements, important as these differences are. The impact of region is both more subtle and more profound. It lies in differences in the political agenda from one region of the country to another. This is particularly clear in the results for issue positions and economic perceptions. For Reform voting, in particular, issue priorities were quite different between the West and Ontario. The appeal of Reform's fiscally conservative message was largely confined to western voters; Ontario voters were preoccupied with the government's role in job creation. [...] This pattern of differential effects is strongest on the Quebec question. Reform did so much better in the West not because Westerners wanted to do a lot less for Quebec, but because Quebec was a much more pressing concern." (Giden-gil et al. 1999: 271)

In the United States the Republican Party under Ronald Reagan had moved to the right in its policies. This reflected, first, the intellectual efforts to reformu-late the conservative ideology, and, secondly, the mobilization of conserva-tive forces on the élite as well as on the grassroots level – big business and New Right activists – and their growing influence within the party (see How-ard L. Reiter's chapter). And it corresponded with the move of the centre ground of national politics from the Northern dust belt to the Southern sun

belt. New and more conservative electoral orientations gained ground, and the identification of these ideas especially with the profile of the Republican Party progressed. The solid Democratic South is now history.

Still, both big American parties have to cope with the problem that their ideological support base is too small for winning a presidential election. The Roosevelt coalition of voters for the Democrats, made up mostly of the union-ized workforce, the minorities and East coast intellectuals, is no longer strong enough to produce electoral majorities. As Ludlam and others argue with regard to the 2000 presidential election: "Fifty-nine percent of union family votes went to Gore in 2000, slightly above the average since 1976, but unions need to raise their membership dramatically to translate this voting behaviour into influence in the party" (Ludlam/Bodah/Coates 2002: 232). Bill Clinton's and Al Gore's move to conservative political positions, especially with regard to economic questions, was above all an effort to win over the middle classes. Clinton invented the New Democrats, a label which was meant to convince voters in the political centre that his party had successfully integrated impor-tant new, formerly conservative policies.

Reaganomics was a departure from an obsolete economic consensus which no longer had majority support. But what followed was much less economic radicalism and certainly not a full scale implementation of the de-mands of the Religious Right, such as a ban on abortion or the teaching of creationism in schools. George W. Bush has also learnt the lesson that hard core conservatism as advocated by Republican Congressman Newt Gingrich with its root-and-branch opposition to government and the welfare state has no majority support in the United States. It is therefore not surprising that the "ideological" re-definition of Conservatism as lined out in the 1994 "Contract with America," initiated by Gingrich, only served for a short time as dividing line between true and half-hearted conservatives. As Pippa Norris remarked: "The Republicans realized that they needed a fresh approach that represented more than the single-note anti-abortionist fundamentalist Christian Right, and the anti-Clinton rhetoric of the House Republicans" (Norris 2001: 11).

George W. Bush has softened the Republican Party's stance on social is-sues by advocating what he called "compassionate conservatism." He man-aged to present a fresh image of conservatism while simultaneously one could observe an increasing conservatism of the Republican Party (see Howard L. Reiter's chapter). Candidate Bush's soft conservatism was an efficient strategy to deal with the problem that in US politics, governing élites and the political parties they represent have become increasingly ideologically unidimensional whereas voters seem to be ideologically multi-dimensional (see chapter by Richard A. Brody/Jennifer L. Lawless). With his support for a role of faith-based institutions in social policies President Bush is co-opting voluntary institutions to serve governmental ends. It has been argued that this is more, not less control of society, that it is even a kind of revival of big government.

The argument is that compared to the conservative anti-state ideology of the New Right of the 1980s President George Bush has changed course, because he believes that government is not per se bad, if only used for the right purpose.

To illustrate this argument further, George W. Bush's approach to education has been cited as an example of "social engineering:"

"Messrs Reagan and Gingrich wanted to scrap the Department of Education. Mr Bush plans to increase its funding by 10 % a year and give it broader responsibilities for monitoring the performance of the country's schools. He also plans to give the department responsibility for managing an expanded Head Start programme." (The Economist, April 24, 2001, 48).

With the financial consequences of a military response to the 9/11 attack on the United States it is even doubtful whether the strongly held conservative belief in balanced budgets will remain a priority of the Bush presidency.

As in the United States, the profile of conservatism in Canada over the last two decades has been difficult to reduce to core beliefs shared by the voters, the parties and the political élites. This is not only so, because with regard to priorities in economic and social policies the Liberal Party, similar to the Democrats, changed and accepted conservative ideas, so that it became difficult for the Conservatives to argue that there was a need for electing them to change course in key sectors of domestic policy. This phenomenon of policy convergence is even true for the policy positions of Canada's New Democratic Party, a traditional banner holder of social democratic policies. At the party's 1999 congress the NDP accepted a re-positioning which brought it in line with the pro-business stance of the British Labour Party, for example.

Religious and moral issues which are so prominent for drawing a dividing line in the US party system are, among conservatives in Canada, of special importance only to a section of the Reform/Alliance. What is more important for understanding the current state of Canadian conservatism and for explaining its relative weakness, is the regionalization of Canada's political culture. The ongoing constitutional debate in Canada (Schultze/Sturm 2000) divided conservatives in different Canadian regions more than their common ground in economic or social policies could unite them. In addition, the Reform Party developed, with regard to the latter, a more pronounced neo-liberal profile and in general a more right-wing profile than the Progressive Conservatives. As the possibility of a new alliance between conservatives in Québec and conservatives in the rest of Canada is excluded, all strategic thinking which aims at the creation of a new national conservative alternative had to go into the direction of a reunification of the Reform Party and the Progressive Conservatives.

The efforts made so far, which led to the founding of the Canadian Alliance in 2000, have been, however, a dismal failure. Not only was the unification of conservatism incomplete. What is even more worrying for those who

want a conservative party which is attractive for voters, the Canadian Alliance has a problem with ideological purists and its outright populism (see David Laycock's chapter). Its first leader, Stockwell Day, spoke out against abortion, gay rights and gun control, and favoured capital punishment. In economic matters he advocated a flat tax and balanced budgets. For Canadian voters this sounded like an electoral message of the United States Republican Party. In 2002 Day was succeeded by Stephen Harper. Harper tries to broaden the party's support beyond the Christian Right and other social conservatives by concentrating on economic issues, and especially by a strong emphasis on provincial rights.

Research has shown that Canadian conservatives are in an extremely difficult position (see chapter by William Cross/Lisa Young). Although there are similarities in the views of Alliance members and members of the Progressive Conservatives on policy questions relating to economics and federalism, they diverge considerably in their attitudes regarding moral issues. Here, the Progressive Conservatives are even closer to the Liberal Party than to their fellow conservatives in the Alliance. Cross and Young also found differences between members of the Alliance and members of the Progressive Conservatives regarding intra-party democracy. Alliance members are far more suspicious of placing power in the hands of party élites and more supportive of effective decision-making powers for the party's members. As former Progressive Conservatives who are now Alliance members are more ideological in their political opinions than new recruits to the conservative cause they cannot even contribute to bridging the gap between the two conservative parties in Canada.

Taking Stock: From the "Social Democratic Century" to a Lasting Conservative Hegemony?

Both in the United States and in Canada political positions which give priority to social expenditures over balanced budgets have become obsolete. The economic and social agenda of the early 1980s which has its origins in the programmatic renewal of the new conservative governments has come to dominate political decision-making (see chapters by James D. Savage and Roland Sturm). Balanced budgets, a reduced role of the state in the economy via privatization and deregulation, cutbacks in social and regional development funds, and the spread of block grants to sub- national governments for the national policies that they have to implement are common features of governments irrespective of party. In this respect the impact of conservatism has certainly been wide-ranging. So, one could argue that the party systems in

Canada and the United States have, with regard to economic and social policies, moved to a new (conservative) consensus. Whether this is a victory for conservatism or the result of financial pressures accompanied by paradigmatic change in economic theory remains open to debate.

Conservatism in both Canada and the United States has also led to a new vision of federalism which has given party politics at the state and the provincial level more opportunities to develop regional political profiles. Party politics in Canada and the United States has traditionally been more diverse on the sub-national level than in European countries. This diversity has increased. Federal governments are happy to see responsibility for political outcomes migrate to provinces and states. Whereas in Europe this would raise questions about legitimate government and the ability of the centre to keep control, in Canada and the United States the empowerment of sub-national governments is seen as a welcome signal for burden-sharing which answers questions about the legitimacy of government in the capital.

Thus far, there is wide-spread agreement, among the contributors to this book as well as among other observers, that the general consensus on the appropriate role of government and the goals and instruments of public policy has been fundamentally reshaped under the influence of conservative approaches and ideas (see chapters by Dagmar Eberle, Jane Jenson and David Laycock). If we look at other dimensions of politics, the picture becomes blurred and inconsistent – in terms of the subject as well as the country in question.

The different national pathways are most clearly visible when one analyzes party system development. To begin with party ideology, the two American parties became more uniformly ideological with the increasing conservatism of the Republican Party. In Canada, this process did not occur with the same intensity. Indeed, one could say, it is almost exclusively restricted to the formation of the Reform Party. For the Liberals and the Conservatives, brokerage politics has always been more important than ideological coherence. There are at least two reasons for this: First, the multiple cleavages and divisions of Canadian society make politics a balancing act whose success relies on the creation of broad, often unstable and heterogeneous coalitions. Second, Canadian voters are described as more volatile than their neighbours to the South. As Kenneth Woodside has pointed out, Canadians' party identification "tends to be weaker and more readily subject to change" (Woodside 1996: 59; see also Blais et al. 2002).

Instability of party loyalty increases the likelihood of third party success. In Canada, institutional structures also played an important role in the breakdown of the Right. The electoral system with its "first past the post" mode furthers the development of regional party strongholds and imbalances in regional representation, and it exaggerates the electoral success of the strongest party (Grande 2002; Schultze 1997; Woodside 1996). A dysfunctional

second chamber, the Senate, exacerbates the problem of unequal regional representation. These conditions create potential opportunities for a party like Reform – a party with a regionally concentrated support base which can draw on feelings of regional, i.e. western, alienation.

Furthermore, the organizational disarray of the Canadian Right points to structural differences between Canadian and American parties (Klumpjan 1998). While Canadian parties are not vertically integrated, i.e. federal and provincial organizations of the same party exist separately, the respective party leadership exercises considerably more control over party organization than in the US. This centralized structure makes it much more difficult for outside groups or disgruntled insiders to gain influence and take over sections of the organization which is exactly what New Right activists did in the Republican Party (Woodside 1996: 61). Thus, under certain conditions, the formation of a new party becomes the more promising option. Referring to the tripod model developed by North American party scholars, the traditional Canadian parties – Liberals and Conservatives alike – are, in their outlook and policies, very much shaped by the "party-in-office." The Republican Party, embedded in a dense network of conservative organizations and social movements, is much more a "party-in-the-electorate."

Moving on to electoral fortunes, the Republican Party was able to translate ideological victory into a substantial increase in party identification (see Howard L. Reiter's chapter). While the Democrats had been the majority party in the decades following the New Deal, during the Reagan years a shift occurred to what an observer called "a highly competitive balance between the two parties" (Norpoth 2002: 72). From today's perspective, what has taken place in the 1980s might be termed a "limited" or "selective" realignment, mainly among white southerners and evangelical Christians (Himmelstein 1990; Norpoth 2002). Yet, looking at the development of party identification and the electoral results on the national and the state level during the last two decades, it does not seem to be warranted to speak of a clear majority status of the Republican Party.

North of the border, the right-wing vote is not only split up among two conservative parties. These parties are also less effective in mobilizing their natural constituency, i.e. those voters who share their values, than the centre-left parties (see chapter by Neil Nevitte/Antoine Bilodeau). In 2000, the Progressive Conservatives and the Alliance captured little more than half of the right-wing identifiers. Strikingly, the Liberal Party attracted more support from those on the Right than the Reform/Alliance. Three consecutive Liberal victories in federal elections therefore come as no surprise.

The impressive gains of the Republicans in the 2002 midterm elections should not blind us to the fact that the ideological shift in the American mass public is neither as pronounced nor as uniform as these results might indicate. As Brody and Lawless show, in its ideological self-designation, the American

electorate has only slightly moved to the right since the early 1970s. Turning to policy dimensions, they report that the voters have become more conservative on questions of economic and social policy over the past two decades. But overall, the changes are moderate, and on the general question of government spending, there is "no clear tendency to prefer to cut or increase services and spending" (62). A considerable gap between New Right ideology and mass opinion opens up with respect to the so-called social issues. Here, the data show a clear preference of the electorate for a liberal positions on abortion and equality of women in business and government. Corresponding with these findings, Nevitte and Bilodeau demonstrate that, on the moral dimension, both Americans and Canadians have become significantly less conservative between 1980 and 2000. Canadians have been leading in this process of change, and still continue to do so.

New Right ideologues have to come to terms with these realities if they want to operate successfully in the electoral arena. Once a party is in power, a certain pragmatism becomes imperative. Those conservatives who are more ideological on moral or economic issues may – for some time – capture a party (Stockwell Day in Canada, Newt Gingrich in the United States), but they do not make conservatism attractive for political majorities at general elections.

While, ideologically, we are faced with a new conservative hegemony especially in the fields of economic and social policies, its scope and impact is mediated by a host of factors, as the authors of this volume show. Strong partisan alignments along a well-defined cleavage structure are a phenomenon of the past – if they ever existed. This is hardly surprising, in view of the fragmented societal conditions, the post-industrial/post-Fordist economic regimes and the post-modern lifestyles which characterize contemporary Western societies.

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The Changing Ideological Landscape in North America:
Evidence from the World Values Surveys (1981-2000)

Neil Nevitte/Antoine Bilodeau

There is a longstanding tradition of identifying the differences and similarities of the political cultures of Canada and the United States, and comparisons of their respective ideological landscapes have been a prominent part of that larger discourse. These comparisons have been approached from a variety of vantage points. Some rely on historical evidence arguing that contemporary similarities and differences are the product of "founding circumstances" and the present day variations are a product of these "historical residues" (Lower 1953; Hartz 1964; Horowitz 1966). Others argue that variations in the ideologies of Canada and the United States can be inferred from differences in the social structural and institutional characteristics of the two countries (Brady 1947; Lipset 1968, 1990). And yet others draw inferences about the comparative ideological climates of the two countries by fixing on the electoral successes and policy programmes of political parties associated with "the lefts" and "the rights" (Lipson 1959; LeDuc 1985; Hibbs 1987). Another alternative approach might be to sift through the elements of popular culture on both sides of the border and to interpret shifts, reversals, and new trajectories in terms of their "ideological content." Each approach has different strengths and limitations, and each has yielded different kinds of insights.

This paper examines ideological landscapes from the grass roots, from the viewpoint of publics. We rely on public opinion evidence that comes from the World Values Surveys (WVS). Public opinion data of this sort have their own limitations. They are silent on the matter of the contemporary importance of historical residues. Nor do they say anything directly about the impact of institutions or elite discourse. But these data are well tuned to investigate comparative ideology from the vantage point of citizens, and to explore comparative ideologies of publics on both sides of the border with these kinds of data means that we are working in the tradition of Converse (1964) and others (McClosky/Zaller 1984; Verba/Schlozman/Brady 1995) who view ideological orientations as having to do with the way in which, and the extent to which, publics organize their beliefs about the political worlds they occupy.

The analysis primarily focuses on left-right worldviews of the Canadian and American publics from 1981 to 2000. The starting point of the analysis is the validation of the relevance of "left-right" as a salient optic for these two publics. We then pose, and try to answer, a series of questions: First, how are Canadians and Americans distributed in "left-right" ideological space? Sec-

ond, what content do they give to these ideological spaces? And third, what
are the linkages between these left-right worlds of citizens and the partisan
landscape? In each case, we are not only interested in cross-national compari-
sons, but we are also interested in what kinds of cross-time changes might
have taken place.

Of Data and Context

Three qualities make the World Values Surveys data a particularly powerful
research tool for the investigation of the ideological orientations of publics.
First, the WVS data are directly comparable. The WVS data come from the
same survey questions that have been asked of both Canadian and American
publics. Particularly significant for our purposes, the surveys contain identical
batteries of questions, such as left-right self-location, that are often used to
indicate ideological orientations. The surveys also contain indicators of a
variety of substantive orientations, such as those economic, political and
social outlooks that are usually associated with left-right orientations.

Secondly, the methodology and data collection strategies of the WVS
studies are deliberately designed to maximize cross-national comparability.
On both sides of the border, the data come from face-to-face interviews. The
sampling strategies are the same, which is to say that both the American and
Canadian WVS rely on the same sample frames, the same sampling tech-
niques, and the same coding protocols. By most conventional standards, this
means that the data are likely to be as reliable and comparable as any other
evidence of this sort.

Third, the WVS data have been collected at different, but coordinated,
time points. The first Canadian and American WVS data were collected in
1981. The second round of the WVS were conducted in 1990, and a third
round collected data in 2000/1. Because most of the same core items have
been repeatedly asked in both countries since 1981, this means that we have
directly comparable cross-time evidence. With such a research design, we are
well placed to examine whether any significant cross-time changes have taken
place in the ideological space of publics in both countries.

This is the first analysis of the Canadian and American cross-time data
for the twenty-year period from 1981-2000/1. Two-country cross-time com-
parisons present at least two conceptual and methodological challenges that
need to be addressed at the outset. First, two-case comparisons almost inevi-
tably draw attention to differences rather than similarities. That said, attempts
to provide a broad interpretation of the findings have to acknowledge that
more global systematic analyses of these kinds of data nearly always indicate
that the values of Canadian and American publics are relatively similar (In-

glehart 1997; Nevitte 1996). Second, much of the interpretation that is attached to cross-time comparisons is inevitably shaped by the time benchmark from which the analyses proceed.

In our case, the benchmark is 1981 and it is useful to recall what the political worlds of Canadians and Americans looked like at that time. Political beliefs are not disembodied; they exist in a context. In some respects the political context of the late 1970s and early 1980s is particularly relevant. The period might be interpreted as the pinnacle of the partisan successes of the right in Canada, the United States as well as in other advanced industrial states. In 1984 Canada's then lone party of the right, the Progressive Conservatives, enjoyed a huge election victory, as had the Republicans under Ronald Reagan four years earlier in the United States. Whether these electoral victories were ideologically motivated or reflected public reactions to the poor economic records of preceding governments is difficult to prove conclusively. But both the Republican and Progressive Conservative parties, like the Thatcher Conservatives in the United Kingdom, came to power voicing strikingly similar kinds of policy priorities. In the wake of tax revolts, the Republicans aimed to "get the government off the backs of the people" while Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives announced that the country was "open for business." These electoral advances of "the New right" declared Keynesianism bankrupt, and took aim at rolling back the welfare state (King 1987; Krieger 1986). But the new right was not just about the enthusiasm for free enterprise. It was also concerned with a more or less explicit set of conservative social and moral values, values that linked the expansion of the welfare state, the permissiveness of the 1960s, and the rise of feminism, to a sort of moral flabbiness that eroded individualism, sapped national pride, and undermined the traditional family (King 1987). The project of the new right at the beginning of the 1980s was to reverse both the economic and moral decay that years of welfare statism had wrought. The conventional wisdom was that there were significant ideological discontinuities between the old and the new rights. In this sense, the conservatism of Ronald Reagan was not the conservatism of the pre-Reagan Republicans, and the conservatism of Brian Mulroney was not the conservatism of John Diefenbaker. This paper is concerned with how the political ideological tides might have shifted from a starting point where the elite discourse appeared to express a triumphant departure from traditional North American notions of left and right.

Initial Findings

The place to begin the analysis is with an outline of basic results. The WVS asked all respondents: "*In political matters, people talk of "the left" and of*

"the right." How would you place yourself on this scale, generally speaking?
(Card shown: where 1= left, and 10= right). The evidence indicates that nei-
ther Canadian nor American respondents had any difficulty placing them-
selves on the 10 point left-right scale. In 2000, about 86% of Canadians and
95% of Americans answered the WVS left-right self-placement question, an
increase since 1981.[1] If anything, these publics appeared more comfortable
than their predecessors with the ideological language of left and right.

The aggregate WVS evidence shows some cross-time movement in the
ideological centres of gravity and also that most Americans and Canadians
think of themselves as being 'in the middle.' Figure 1 shows that, from 1981 to
2000, some 56% of Canadians and about 49% of Americans locate them-
selves in the centre of the left-right scale (score 5 or 6). The second largest
ideological group of respondents in both countries consists of those who
place themselves on the right. From 1981 to 2000, about 27% of Canadians
and 33% of Americans viewed themselves as being on the right. Over the
same period, some 17% of respondents in both countries thought of them-
selves as being on the left.

What about the cross-time shifts? In the United States, there is evidence
of a modest shift in the ideological centre of gravity from the right towards
the centre. The proportion of people who thought of themselves as being on
the right declined from 37 to 32%, and those who thought of themselves as
being on the centre increased from 44 to 51%. Meanwhile, the proportion of
people on the left remained relatively stable at around 17%. Over the same
period, Canadians were ideologically somewhat more mobile; they shifted
away from the right and the centre and moved towards the left. The propor-
tion of Canadians locating themselves on the right declined from 30 to 25%
between 1981 and 2000 while the proportion 'in the middle' declined from 57
to 54%. At the same time, there is evidence of a corresponding surge in the
number of people who see themselves as being 'on the left' (from 13 to 21%).
Between 1981 and 2000, the overall shift in both countries has thus been
leftward and the movement has been more strongly pronounced in Canada
than in the United States.

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1   The response rate is higher than what is usually observed; this rate might be attributable to
     the face-to-face interview strategy.

Figure 1: Left-Right Self-Placement: Canada, United States, 1981-2000

Source: 1981/1990/2000 World Values Surveys– Canada, United States
Question Wording: 'In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and of 'the right'. How would you place yourself on this scale, generally speaking? (A card was shown to respondents on which was printed a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means 'left' and 10 means 'right') . Responses have been recoded the following way: 1-4: left; 5-6:Centre; 7-10: Right.

The North American Right and Left: Exploring the Content

If the American and Canadian ideological landscapes are a product of different historical traditions, then there is no reason to suppose that the 'content' of the left and right will be the same. Nor, given previous research (Laponce 1970), is there any reason to suppose that the left-right ideological dimension will necessarily conform to a simple linear continuum. Historically, the substantive meanings of "left" and "right" have changed and so it is important to remain open to the possibility that Canadians and Americans may 'fit' the different 'elements' of ideology in these left/right spaces in different ways. Americans and Canadians may similarly think of themselves as being, say, on the "left" but each public might have quite different ideas about just what that self-location signifies. Further, if these ideological landscapes are subject to change, then it is entirely possible that the attitudinal architecture of the "rights" might be different at different times even within the same country. Technically, that would mean that the predictors of being "on the left" or "on the right" within either country could also be different at distinct moments. One matter that has to be addressed, then, is the question of whether the factors that predict the ideological self locations of respondents exhibit cross-time stability or not.

An enormously wide variation of values and orientations could poten-
tially structure people's beliefs systems. But what values do people have in
mind exactly when they think of themselves as being on the right or on the
left? What are the underlying values to the left-right belief-system? Are they
the same for people on the right and people on the left, and in both countries?

Our approach is exploratory and broadgauged. The core WVS dataset
contains indicators of a variety of orientations that have been routinely used
to tap different aspects of ideological beliefs (Kaase/Newton 1995;
Betz/Immerfall 1998). The strategy is to determine whether, and how, re-
spondents' self-placements on the left/right scale are significantly related to
these orientations for which we have direct and comparable measures. By
conducting six separate and controlled tests (two countries at three time
points) of what drives right- and left-wing identifications we should be able to
shed light on the "content" of the lefts and rights in the two countries at dif-
ferent times. More particularly, it should be possible to determine whether,
and where, there are cross-national differences between the "lefts" and
"rights," and whether there are detectable changes in the dimensions structur-
ing these lefts and rights across time.

In addition to the standard set of socio-economic factors (age, gender,
education, income and employment status) the model tested includes six ideo-
logical orientations: opinions about control and ownership of business, views
about meritocracy, moral conservatism, racial tolerance, social tolerance and
civil permissiveness. It also includes a variable measuring "religiosity," the
importance of religion in people's life.[2]

The data indicate[3] that there are two dimensions that consistently shape
left-right orientations among both the Canadian and American publics. One
concerns an economic left-right dimension (private ownership of business)
and the other concerns a moral left-right dimension. These findings corrobo-
rate other research results reported in Canada, the United States, and Western
Europe (Van Deth/Scarbrough 1995; De Moor 1995; Halman/Nevitte 1996;
Blais et al 2002; Lusztig/Wilson 2002). The point to emphasize is that these
dimensions are not different labels for the same thing; the dimensions are
distinct and orthogonal.[4]

A second finding that emerges from Appendix B is that left-wing and
right-wing identifications are symmetrical: the underlying dimensions are the
same (economic and moral) but with reversed polarities for people located at
the opposite ends of the left-right scale. For example, people who think own-
ership and control of business should be more private are more likely to think
of themselves as being on the right while those who think that it should be

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2   See appendix A for details on construction of variables.
3   See appendix B. Statistically significant results in boldface type.
4   A factor analysis shows that the items belong to quite different dimensions (Factor correla-
     tion = .075).

more public are more likely to be on the left. Similarly, people who are morally conservative are more likely to place themselves on the right while those who are morally liberal are more likely to be on the left. The symmetry is particularly clear and sharp for the moral dimension.

Figure 2: Impact of Economic Dimension on Right-Wing Identification: Canada, United States, 1981-2000

Source: 1981/1990/2000 World Values Surveys– Canada, United States
Question Wording: 'There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion: 1) The owners should run their business or appoint managers, 2) The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers, 3) The government should be the owner and appoint managers, or 4) The employees should own the business and should elect the managers?
Differences in probabilities are based on simulations that calculate the probability of having a right-wing identification for people who exhibit the highest level of economic conservatism minus the probability of having a right-wing identification for people who exhibit the lowest level of economic conservatism.

Third, there is also evidence of a cross-time dynamic in the ideological structure. As figure 2 shows, the salience of the economic dimension has been declining for the right, but the same is true for the left identification as well[5]. In Canada and the United States, the economic dimension lost its leverage after 1981 to become almost irrelevant. Intriguingly, the findings concerning

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5   The data presented in figure 2 are obtained from simulations based on results presented in table 1 that calculate the probability of having a right-wing identification for people who exhibit the highest level of economic conservatism minus the probability of having a right-wing identification for people who exhibit the lowest level of economic conservatism. The same logic applies for figure 3 (moral conservatism) and 4 (religiosity).

Figure 3: Impact of Moral Dimension on Right-Wing Identification: Canada, United States, 1981-2000

Source: 1981/1990/2000 World Values Surveys– Canada, United States
Question wording: 'Please tell me for the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between'. The scale is made-up of answers for the following items: 1) homosexuality, 2) abortion, 3) divorce, 4) prostitution, 5) euthanasia, and 6) suicide.
Differences in probabilities are based on simulations that calculate the probability of having a right-wing identification for people who exhibit the highest level of moral conservatism minus the probability of having a right-wing identification for people who exhibit the lowest level of moral conservatism.

the dynamic of the moral dimension work in precisely the opposite way. As figure 3 shows, from 1981 to 2000, the moral dimension became a significant and a progressively stronger predictor of respondents' right-wing, as well as left-wing, identifications in Canada. In the United States this dimension was already a strong predictor by 1981 and it remained so in 2000.

Three additional findings from these data are also noteworthy. The first one clearly distinguishes Americans from Canadians. As shown in figure 4, religiosity is a significant, and increasingly salient, predictor of right-wing identification in the United States: People for whom religion is very important (that is those who attend church frequently and think God is very important in their life) are significantly more likely to be right-wing identifiers. Religion plays differently in Canada and the United States. The second finding concerns racial and social intolerance. The left, in both countries, does not have the monopoly on tolerance. In effect, tolerance is not a structuring factor for the lefts or rights in either the Canadian or American publics. Finally, the lefts in Canada and the United States do not appear to be uniquely committed to

Figure 4: Impact of Religious Dimension on Right-Wing Identification: Canada, United States, 1981-2000

Source: 1981/1990/2000 World Values Surveys– Canada, United States
Question wording : A) Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? 1) More than once a week, 2) Once a week, 3) Once a month, 4) Only on special holy days, 5) Once a year, 6) Less often/Never. B) How important is God in your life? Please use this scale where 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.
Differences in probabilities are based on simulations that calculate the probability of having a right-wing identification for people who exhibit the highest level of religiosity minus the probability of having a right-wing identification for people who exhibit the lowest level of religiosity .

the principle of equality. The left and the right are equally likely to believe that the merit should be related to effort.

Given these basic initial findings, the next step in the analysis is to explore in greater detail the comparative cross-national and cross-time evidence of ideological dynamics on these economic and moral dimensions. At issue is the question: Why has the economic dimension become less salient while the moral dimension has become more salient? The place to begin with is a basic comparison of where Canadians and Americans stood on these two dimensions.

As Figure 5 shows, both Canadian and American publics exhibit cross-time stability when it comes to basic economic outlooks. Americans are only slightly more conservative than their Canadian counterparts on the economic dimension but the differences are inconsequential. Overall, Canadians and Americans are strikingly similar in this respect and those positions have been relatively stable across the 20-year period for which we have data. On the

moral dimension, however, Americans are slightly more conservative than are Canadians. But the most important finding here is that the positions of American and Canadian publics have changed quite significantly across the last two decades: publics in both countries have become significantly less conservative with the passage of time. But even after these shifts, Americans remain slightly more conservative than Canadians. Intriguingly, American orientations on the moral dimension seem to have followed Canadian ones: in 1990 the United States reached the 1981 Canadian level (72/73), and in 2000 the United States reached the 1990 Canadian level (63). In short, over the last 20 years, North American populations have been marked by a sharp decline in moral conservatism; a decline led by Canadians and followed by Americans.

These aggregate placements indicate shifts in the overall positions of publics on these dimensions but they reveal nothing about the underlying dynamics of the lefts and rights in both countries. Figure 6 unpacks the evidence. A great deal of data are presented in Figure 6 and they are worth considering in some detail.

First, the data clearly indicate the coherent clustering of both the lefts and rights.[6] Regardless of country location, respondents who think of themselves as being on the right clearly occupy the upper right quadrant of the figure while people who think of themselves as being on the left occupy the lower left area. The lefts and the rights in the two countries are similar but not identical, but the ideological left-right differences are more important than the cross-national ones. That is, an American who is 'on the right' has more in common, ideologically, with their Canadian counterpart 'on the right' than they do with their co-national 'on the left.'

Second, notice that the 'rights' in both countries are more tightly clustered than are the lefts. Moreover, the location of these 'rights' has changed little across the last two decades. By contrast, the lefts have been more mobile. Somewhat surprisingly, the once large gap in economic orientations that used to separate the left from the right has progressively diminished. The explanation for this convergence is that both the Canadian and American lefts have, in effect, moved towards "the right;" they have become less enamoured with state intervention in the economy. On the moral dimension, however, the pattern is precisely the opposite. Here, the left has moved away from the right over the last two decades with the result that the 'moral' gap between the rights and the lefts in both countries has become wider on this dimension.

The ideological centres deserve consideration not least of all because nearly half of both American and Canadian publics place themselves at 'the centre.' But 'centres' can also change, and they have. On the economic dimension, Canadian and American centres have been stable and statistically

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6   These clusterings confirm the symmetric nature of the left-right landscapes for both publics. The data are reported in the regression analysis.

Figure 5: Economic and Moral Dimensions of Left-Right Ideologies: 1981-2000 (Canada and Unites States)

Source: 1981/1990/2000 World Values Surveys– Canada, United States.
Economic Dimension: 'There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion: 1) The owners should run their business or appoint managers, 2) The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers, 3) The government should be the owner and appoint managers, or 4) The employees should own the business and should elect the managers?
Moral Dimension: 'Please tell me for the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between'. The scale is made-up of answers for the following items: 1) homosexuality, 2) abortion, 3) divorce, 4) prostitution, 5) euthanasia, and 6) suicide.

Figure 6: Economic and Moral Dimensions of Left-Right Ideologies by Left-Right Self-Placement: 1981-2000 (Canada, United States)

Source: 1981/1990/2000 World Values Surveys – Canada, United States.

indistinguishable over the last 20 years. But on the moral dimension the Canadian centre remains more permissive than its American counterpart, even though both the American and Canadian centres have become more permissive with the passage of time. The trend seems to indicate that a sea-change has taken place: all of the lefts, rights and centres have become less morally conservative. Despite this ideological mobility, there remain significant cross-national variations.

Notice, however, that the position of the left relative to that of the ideological centre has shifted in both countries. In 1981 and 1990, both the Canadian and the American 'centres' were virtually indistinguishable from their 'rights.' By 2000 that had changed: the American centre moved closer to the left on the economic dimension; and it occupied the middle ground between right and left on the moral dimension. In the Canadian setting, the centre in 2000 was closer to the left on the economic dimension but still closer to the right on the moral dimension. In effect, the shift of the left identifiers towards the ideological centre of gravity on the economic dimension implies that the left has moved away from the economic belief that once sharply distinguished the left from the right.

Connecting the Left-Right Ideological Divide to Electoral Politics

There is one last question to consider: How efficiently do the political parties capture their natural ideological constituencies? Our analysis to this point has paid no attention to how the ideological orientations of publics become represented within the political institutions of each country. And surely this is an important question. To what extent do people who view themselves as being "on the right" vote primarily for right-wing parties? And to what extent do those on the left vote for left-wing parties? Another way to put the question is: how efficient are the parties of the left and of the right at capturing their respective ideological constituencies? If 100% of those "on the left" support left-wing parties, then we would say that the left-wing parties are completely efficient at capturing the support of their natural ideological base. The same logic applies to the right.

As figure 7 shows, Canada's left and right-wing parties have been increasingly efficient in capturing their ideological base between 1981 and 2000. At the same time, the left-wing parties have been systematically more efficient than their right-wing counterparts. In 1981, the NDP and the Liberals together captured about 56% of the left-wing identifiers. By comparison, the PC captured only about one third of the right-wing identifiers. By 2000, the

Figure 7: How Efficiently Do Parties Capture Left and Right Identifiers:
Canada, 1981-2000

Distribution of Left Identifiers   Distribution of Right Identifiers

Source: 1981/1990/2000 World Values Surveys– Canada

NDP and the Liberals captured about 80% of the left support while the PC
and the Alliance together captured a little more than half of the support of
those on the right.

Significantly perhaps, the parties located at the ends of the left-right
continuum (the NDP and the Reform/Alliance) have been more successful at
repulsing their 'ideological opponents' than attracting their own 'natural
ideological supporters.' The Reform/Alliance attracted less than 10% of left-
wing identifiers in Canada but attracted only about 35% of right-wing
identifiers in 2000. The core of the right-wing identifiers preferred the
Liberals and the Conservatives to the Reform/Alliance. Indeed, the most
striking finding from the WVS data is that more right-wing identifiers
supported the Liberal Party than the Reform/Alliance. And with the exception
of 1990, the NDP failed to attract the core of its 'natural ideological
supporters' but it repulsed quite efficiently the right-wing identifiers. The
NDP's failure to attract the left identifiers was most strikingly evident in
2000. In 2000, left-wing identifiers preferred the Liberals over the NDP by a
ratio of 3 to 1.

Finally, there is the case of the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party.
Their situation became more complex following the dramatic collapse that the
party experienced in the 1993 federal election. But here, the data suggest that
the PC party has remained the catch-all-party that it once was. Background

analysis shows that from 1981 to 2000, the base of PC support has consistently been made-up of relatively stable proportions of centre, right and left-wing identifiers. These are the characteristics of a 'catch all' party. What has changed though is its failure to attract a large support among the population. The defeat of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1993 cannot be attributed to the fact that the party was abandoned en masse by its supporters on the right or those on the left. Citizens abandoned the PC in equal measure across the ideological spectrum[7].

Figure 8: How Efficiently Do Parties Capture Left and Right Identifiers: United States, 1981-2000

Source: 1981/1990/2000 World Values Surveys– United States

The data from the United States are summarized in figure 8. Here, the evidence is that the Democrats have become increasingly efficient in attracting the support of left-wing identifiers. About 56% of left-wing identifiers supported the Democrats in 1981 while about 80% did so in 2000. For their part, the Republicans attract only about 10 to 20% of the left-wing identifiers. Among the right-wing identifiers, the distribution of partisan support is more divided; overall, about 50% of right-wing identifiers support

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7   The PC supporters were made-up of about 12% of left identifiers and 35% of right identifiers in 1981. Those proportions were 12 and 42% in 1990, and 14 and 35% in 2000.

the Republicans while 40% support the Democrats[8]. In that sense, the Republicans are far less efficient than the Democrats at attracting their 'natural ideological constituencies'.[9]

Concluding Discussion

What are the main conclusions that can be drawn from the analyses of these data? First, the evidence is that there have been significant aggregate shifts in the left-right self-placement of Canadians and Americans over the past two decades; there has been a modest 'leftward' shift within both publics. The extent of this shift is similar, although the starting points have been somewhat different with the result that there remains evidence of distinctive national ideological traits.

Second, when it comes to an investigation of what are the factors that structure the left-right cleavage in North America, the left-right cleavages in Canada and the United States have both common and distinct features. First, the left-right orientations in both countries are structured by a common economic component. The power of economic views to predict left and right-wing identifications, however, has weakened since 1981. That trend is common to both publics. Canadian and American left-right cleavages are also structured around a common moral dimension. But in this respect the shifts over the last 20 years have been far more striking. In 1981, moral outlooks were significant predictors of left and right-wing identifications in the United States only. But over the last 20 years, this moral dimension has evolved to become a significant predictor of left and right-wing identifications among Canadians as well. Indeed, by 2000, the moral dimension became more powerful than the economic dimension in structuring left-right orientations among publics in the two countries.

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8   The remaining 10% of right-wing identifiers said they were independent.
9   These findings are for the most part supported by a multivariate analysis in which we assess whether parties capture the left-right ideological divide while controlling for the socio-economic situations of respondents as well as for other ideological dispositions. In Canada, there is evidence that the NDP does repulse the right-wing identifiers and attracts left-wing identifiers, but that pattern is clear only for the data in 1990. At the other end of the spectrum, the Reform/Alliance attracts right-wing identifiers. As for Liberals and the Conservatives, left and right wing identifications do not appear as consistent significant predictors. In the United States, the Democrats attract the left-wing identifiers and repulse the right-wing partisans, while the Republicans, in a symmetric way, attract the right-wing identifiers and repulse the left-wing partisans (Results are not shown here but are available upon request). The following results should be interpreted cautiously though because many factors other than the socio-economic status and ideological orientations influence support for parties.

These shifts over the last two decades do not mean that the Canadian and American ideological landscapes have become 'the same.' One feature that increasingly distinguishes the left-right cleavage in Canada from that of the United States concerns religiosity. According to the WVS data, religious outlooks were a significant predictor of right-wing identification in the United States both in 1990 and 2000. By contrast, religiosity has no significant impact on the structure of either the Canadian left or the right for the same time-period.

When it comes to the aggregate locations of both publics on the economic dimension, the evidence suggests relative stability. But when these aggregate data are unpacked and examined through the prism of left-right orientations, there is evidence of significant dynamics. The left-right gap in economic orientations narrowed between 1981 and 2000. Over that period, both 'lefts' became more supportive of free enterprise orientations and less enthralled with the idea of state intervention in the economy. In this respect the WVS data provide clear evidence of a fundamental shift among those who see themselves as being 'on the left.'

North American moral views exhibit striking changes over the last two decades and when these data are unpacked, it becomes clear that both the 'lefts' and the 'rights' in both countries have become more 'liberal' in their moral outlooks. In effect, at the same time that the gap in these economic views of the lefts and rights has been narrowing, the gap between the rights and the lefts has been widening on the moral dimension.

What about the cross-national variations on these dimensions? Here, the evidence is of convergence in the spatial positioning on the economic dimension between the two countries: the left and right in Canada have become increasingly similar to their counterparts in the United States. On the moral dimension however, cross-national differences have not diminished. Although the 'lefts' and the 'rights' in both countries have become more 'permissive' with the passage of time, they have done so along distinct national trajectories. In 1981, Canadians were less 'conservative' than their American counterparts. And in the year 2000, they remained that way.

Finally, the evidence is that the political parties in both countries have been increasingly efficient at the task of capturing their natural constituencies. But the most striking finding here is that the left-wing parties, in both countries, have captured consistently more effectively their natural ideological constituencies in the last 20 years than have their right-wing counterparts.

Appendix A: Construction of Variables and Question Wording

Left and Right Identifications
In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and of 'the right.' How would you place yourself on this scale, generally speaking? (Respondents were shown a card on which was printed a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means 'left' and 10 means 'right'). Responses are coded as follows: left=1-4; Centre=5-6; Right=7-10

Predictors of Left-Right Self-Placement and Party Support
Note: The following dimensions are developed from a factor analysis (Results not shown but available upon request).

1. Economic Dimension: Ownership of Business
There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion: 1) the owners should run their business or appoint the managers, 2) the owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers, 3) the government should be the owner and appoint the managers, or 4) the employees should own the business and should elect the managers?
The variable is scaled as 1= the business and enterprises should be private; 0 = it should be public.

2. Moral Dimension
Please tell me for the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. The scale is made-up of answers for the following items: 1) homosexuality, 2) abortion, 3) divorce, 4) prostitution, 5) euthanasia, and 6) suicide.
The variable is scaled as 1= highly conservative; 0=highly liberal.

3. Notion of Meritocracy
Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The better-paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?
The variable is a dummy where 1 means respondents place high emphasis on meritocracy and 0 otherwise.

4. Religiosity
1) Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? 1) More than once a week, 2) Once a week, 3) Once a month, 4) Only on special holy days, 5) Once a year, 6) Less often/Never.
2) How important is God in your life? Please use this scale where 10 means very

important and 1 means not at all important.
The variable is scaled as 1=religion takes on a great importance; 0=religion doesn't take any importance.

5. Civil Permissiveness
Please tell me for the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. The scale is made-up of answers for the following items: 1) Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled, 2) Avoiding a fare on public transport, 3) Cheating on taxes if you have a chance, 4) Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.
The variable is scaled as 1=highly permissive; 0=highly law abiding.

6. Racial intolerance
The variable measures the number of 'groups' people said they didn't want to have as neighbours: 1) People of a different race, 2) Immigrants/foreign workers.

7. Social intolerance
The variable measures the number of 'groups' people said they didn't want to have as neighbours: 1) People with a criminal record, 2) Heavy drinkers, 3) Emotionally unstable people.

Appendix B: Predictors of Left and Right Identifications

	Left-wing Identification						Right-wing Identification					
	Canada			United States			Canada			United States		
	1981	1990	2000	1981	1990	2000	1981	1990	2000	1981	1990	2000
Female	1.5	1.2	1.0	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.6[b]	0.6	0.7[b]	1.0	0.7[b]	0.8
Age 31/50	0.7	1.1	0.7	0.9	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.2	0.8	0.8
51 over	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.6[b]	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.9[b]	1.8[a]	1.1	1.1
Education	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.5[a]	1.3[b]
Employed	1.0	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.8
Income	0.5	0.4[b]	1.8	1.1	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.2[a]	1.3	0.8	1.2	1.6
Private Ownership of Business	0.3[b]	0.5	0.8	0.3[a]	0.6	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.9[b]	2.3[a]	1.4	1.4
Notion of Meritocracy	1.1	0.8	0.4[a]	0.7	1.4	1.2	1.6	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.1	0.6[b]
Moral Conservatism	2.3	0.1[a]	0.3[a]	0.1[a]	0.1[a]	0.1[a]	1.2	1.2	4.5[a]	4.7[a]	4.5[a]	5.1[a]
Racial Intolerance	0.6	0.5	1.1	1.1	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.7	1.3	1.0	1.5
Social Intolerance	0.6	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.4	1.2
Civil Permissiveness	4.9	0.5	5.0[a]	1.1	1.0	2.1	0.6	0.6	1.7	1.1	1.9	1.4
Religiosity	0.4	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.2[a]	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.6	4.3[a]	3.0[b]
Cox and Snell R²	.035	.067	.049	.072	.091	.040	.049	.035	.047	.060	.063	.069
N	558	781	882	1318	942	814	558	781	882	1318	942	814

Binary Logit Odds-ratios are reported
a: significant at .01 level; b: significant at .05 level
An odds-ratio between 0 and 1 indicates a negative predictor.
An odds-ratio larger than 1 indicates a positive predictor.

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Political Ideology in the United States: Conservatism and Liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s

Richard A. Brody/Jennifer L. Lawless

To describe the American public's political ideology, previous research has used two methods of classification: self-designation and classification based on policy preferences. These two methods produce different results; typically, more Americans self-classify as "conservative" than would be expected based on their issue opinions (Conover/Feldman 1981). But this blurred picture of American political ideology may have changed. Alterations in the American political environment in the 1980s are said to have clarified the meaning of ideological positions for the American voter. The partisan reconfiguration of the "Solid South," the emergence of candidates who campaign in order to satisfy their electoral base among party activists, and the widening of the ideological gulf between the parties in Congress have clarified the meaning of ideological labels (Hetherington 2001). The sharpening of elite ideological divisions means that more Americans may think of their politics in ideological terms. Ideological self-designation has become more meaningful; it is more closely linked to individuals' social and economic place in the American polity, and more reflective of their issue preferences.

   Using data from the American National Election Study's Cumulative Data File, this paper conducts a "census" of American political ideology. We examine the political ideology pictures formed from self-designation, on the one hand, and policy preferences, on the other. Then, in an attempt to determine whether policy preferences represent an underlying ideological structure, we turn to an examination of the interrelations among individuals' issue preferences. We conclude the paper with an analysis of the sources of ideological self-designation and try to understand whether, and to what extent, these sources relate to macro-political changes in the 1980s and 1990s.

Literature Review: Policy Preferences and Political Ideology

Political ideology and the structure underlying it (or the lack thereof) have long interested political scientists. Converse (1964: 135), in *The Nature of Belief Systems of Mass Publics*, provided the political science community with a classic presentation of the minimalist perspective. An investigation into

belief systems (defined as a "configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence") of both political elites and "ordinary citizens" led Converse to advance the central thesis that most citizens lack consistent, deep political attitudes. More specifically, he found that individuals tend to have not only a minimal mastery of political abstractions, such as political ideology, but also minimal consistency in issue attitudes. Converse (1964: 154) explains, for instance, that the average individual "lacks the contextual grasp to understand [when and/or that] a specific case and a general principle belong in the same belief system." Coupled with his finding that most individuals tend to exhibit minimal stability in political attitudes over time, Converse posited that there is little that is *systematic* in mass belief *systems*.

This conclusion seems plausible if individuals are information misers. Popkin (1994) argues that individuals gather political information as a by-product of their ordinary activities. Socio-economic conditions, for example, are circumstances that relate citizens to the political world (see Fiorina 1983). Economic retrospective voting is not the only heuristic individuals invoke; other avenues serve as connections to government as well. It seems plausible, for instance, that welfare recipients' experiences with social service workers affect views of government and political decisions (Soss 1999). Similarly, citizens whose main contact with "government" is a neighborhood police presence might draw inferences about politics based on these life experiences (Lawless/Fox 2001). Popkin concludes (1994: 18):

"The collective nature of the vote means there is a low incentive for an individual to collect information solely in order to cast one vote among many millions. But voters may have very detailed knowledge about matters that directly affect their lives"

Zaller disagrees (1992: 59), contending that citizens have "real" beliefs about policies and politics. Because most people do not have a high level of political cognitive engagement, they internalize many contradictory messages about *any one issue*, which produces an overall sort of ambivalence toward the issue. This "competing consideration" calculus means that people tend to be situated on a delicate ideological equipoise. The consideration an individual brings to an answer to a survey question depends on which is the most salient at the time he/she is questioned, coupled with any predisposition the individual has regarding the issue. Sniderman (1993: 226) offers an alternative explanation: previous studies may have misinterpreted as "non-attitudes" political preferences that appear "ill-organized," but that, in actuality, are simply the result of the fact that many citizens arrange their preferences on the basis of deeper-lying values, some of which may appear to conflict.

Regardless of whether we subscribe to Zaller or Sniderman's logic, few would disagree with Popkin's conclusion that people employ information shortcuts to form political preferences. It is difficult to believe, however, that

citizens who tend to be inattentive to politics and poorly informed about political affairs, cleverly develop efficient shortcuts to reason about political choices. Interpersonal influences, media, party identification, demographic attributes, personal morality, and incumbency certainly serve as shortcuts on which average voters can rely to make decisions about candidates or issues in the face of little information. But there is a difference between *using* a shortcut that works and *devising* an effective heuristic. After all, if we all devised our own effective shortcuts regarding how to conceptualize and evaluate political events, we would all be theorists – a very unlikely prospect considering that an overwhelming majority of Americans are politically unsophisticated.

Jackman and Sniderman (1999) propose that "it is not possible to give an account of how people solve problems without considering the role of political institutions in organizing the choice space." In other words, citizens can readily invoke heuristics only because political institutions and the elites therein organize citizens' alternatives in a structure that is conducive to the use of information shortcuts. Essentially, Jackman and Sniderman combine the merits of an "internalist account" of political decision-making, in which citizens make choices based on general dispositions and cognition that lead them to respond to certain political stimuli, with an "externalist account," whereby social structures drive preferences. By integrating the two into a concept of "choice space," Jackman and Sniderman paint a picture of political decision-making that better jibes with empirical realities. It is of the utmost importance to realize, however, that elites can frame issues and men and women can use heuristics to make choices about the issues because men and women do hold attitudes about certain policies and preferences.

Turning to the first part of this theory, political institutions – parties in particular – tend to impose a specific set of properties, such as bipolarity or ideological framing, on the political choices citizens are asked to make. These properties simplify the manner in which elites contest politics, both inside political institutions and with the voters. By maximizing the differences between two policies, preferences, or personalities, it is often possible to reap the benefits of rational decision-making in the face of limited information. Voters need to know only what liberals and conservatives generally support, not what liberalism or conservatism are, per se. Candidates identify themselves, their opponents, and their programs with these labels, so it is easy for voters to determine whether they support a policy without knowing much about it. If political choices are not simplified and organized this way, heuristics will be less effective, perhaps inapplicable. As Jackman and Sniderman (1999: 19) put it, "Like any key, [the shortcuts] work only because the locks they fit have an extremely specialized design" – a design that operates within political institutions, shapes elite discourse, and translates into choices presented to voters.

Based on ANES data from 1976 to 1994, Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) suggest that party heterogeneity and ideological positions have, in fact, made it easier for citizens to choose a party identification based on policy preferences (see also Hetherington 2001). They argue that 1994's Republican takeover of Congress was a secular realignment that reflects the two parties' increased ideological polarization and public perceptions of the parties during this time. Since 1980, and particularly since 1992, voters have become more aware of differences between the parties' issue positions (Abramowitz/Saunders 1998: 638); and the correlation between party identification and political ideology has also increased (Abramowitz/Saunders 1998: 644). We might speculate, therefore, that an increase in party heterogeneity and association with "liberal" and "conservative" labels also facilitates individuals' "correct" ideological placement.

Self-Classification and American Political Ideology

We begin our analysis with the question of who places oneself on a political ideology scale. In order to measure self-placement on the "liberalism-conservatism" scale, we recoded the NES variable so that those who responded "don't know" or "haven't thought much about it" were grouped with individuals who did not place themselves.[1] Those who selected any ideological label were coded as placing themselves on the scale. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the absence of self-designated ideology over the past fourteen elections.

Over these three decades, on average, more than two-thirds (72%) of the American electorate identified with one of the NES's seven ideological labels to describe their political beliefs. The fraction of the electorate eschewing self-designation varied across elections, but in a fairly narrow band (between 20 and 35 percent). Figure 1 also indicates that the lowest level of ideological non-identification is found in the three most recent elections; the highest levels appear in the elections of the 1980s. *Prima facie*, this appears to confound the expectation that the public's ideology is framed by the clarity of the ideology of the elite. The Reagan years were marked by high levels of ideologically tinged rhetoric and by the putting forward of programs influenced by

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1   The exact wording of the items used in these analyses is found in Appendix A. The uses to
     which we put data from the NES Cumulative Data File are the responsibility of the authors
     of the paper and not the National Science Foundation, the National Election Study, or the
     Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Figure1: Ideological Self-Designation, 1972-1998

a conservative agenda. In contrast, the Clinton years were supposedly a period in which ideology was muddled by a Democratic president who tried to push "conservative" policies, such as balancing the federal budget and reforming the welfare system. The data, however, show that the lowest rates of ideological self-designation are found during the Reagan and Bush presidencies; the highest rates occur during the Clinton presidency.

Table 1 presents a more structured account of the choice between placing oneself and not placing oneself on the ideology scale. These data result from regressing placement/non-placement on standard demographic variables, religiosity (frequency of church attendance), partisanship, and the electoral eras at hand.

Educational attainment gives us the greatest capacity to discriminate between those who choose one of the seven ideological labels to describe their beliefs and those who do not. Women, Blacks, Democrats, and regular church attenders are less likely to find an ideological label that describes their political beliefs. Table 1 also shows us that, controlling for other factors, ideological self-designation in the Reagan years is unusually low. The negative coefficient for the Clinton years suggests that the high level of self-designation during that period is not a paradoxical consequence of the ideological muddle of Clinton's policy agenda; rather, it probably stems from the coincidental operation, in those years, of the relationship between education and ideological self-placement. Education beyond high school became the modal category the year Clinton was elected; and increased in each of the next three elections. Finally, it is important to address the suggestions that "fashion" has changed and the recent increase in the tendency to self-designate an ideological position is simply a substitution of "moderate" by voters who formerly would not

Table 1: Sources of Ideological Self-Placement[a]

Variables	B	SE_B	Significance
Education[b]	1.032	.030	.000
Church Attendance[c]	-.061	.022	.006
Blue Collar Occupation[d]	-.058	.075	.593
Partisanship[e]	.019	.008	.023
Gender[f]	-.047	.036	.000
Race[g]	-.446	.051	.000
Income[h]	.255	.017	.000
ReaganYears[i]	-.479	.075	.000
Clinton Years[j]	-.483	.141	.001
Election Year	.025	.007	.000
Constant	-2.923	.523	.000

a) Coefficients are derived from logistic regression. The dependent variable is coded "1" if the respondent places himself or herself on the seven-point Liberalism-Conservatism scale. Those who do not place themselves are coded "0." The equation has a Nagelkerke pseudo-R^2 = .196; the Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit test has a $\prod^2$ = 67.705, df=8, p = .000.
b) Years of schooling trichotomized "less than high-school," "high-school," and "more than high-school."
c) Three-step index of church attendance ranging from regularly to never.
d) Dichotomization of the NES's six-step occupation code [CF0115]; codes 4 and 5 are scored 1.
e) Seven-point party identification scale from "Strong Democrat" to "Strong Republican."
f) Female = 1.
g) White = 1
h) Five-step family income index from low to high; NES variable CF0114.
i) Elections of 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1988 coded "1." Other elections are coded "0."
j) Elections of 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 coded "1." Other elections coded "0."

Figure 2: Self-Identified Ideology, 1972-1998

have responded to the question.[2] The joint distribution of the two response categories indicates that this does not appear to be a problem. The two distributions are unrelated (r_{xy} = -.077; p_r = .793).

Now that we have spent some time exploring *who* chooses to self-identify on the liberal-conservative scale, we can turn to an examination of *where* the seven Americans in ten who use the scale to describe their political ideology locate themselves on the continuum. Figure 2 displays the mean self-placement in each of the 1972 to 1998 NES samples.

These data make two facts clear: First, the American electorate is, invariably, ideologically in the middle of the road. Second, the electorate has moved just noticeably, but statistically reliably, to the right over the past quarter century.[3]

Figure 3: Self-Identified Ideology – Education Groups, 1972-1998

2   Private communication with Professor Paul M. Sniderman, November 2001.
3   Given nearly 20,000 cases, the trend, however small, is statistically significant. The coefficient resulting from regressing the seven-point liberalism-conservatism scale on election year yields an expected increase of about one-seventh of a scale point in 1998 compared with 1972.

And if we use respondents' educational attainment as a proxy for political sophistication, we see that the middle of the road ideology is fairly stable at all levels of education (sophistication) across the 14 elections (Figure 3).[4]

If political sophistication makes a difference in political ideology, then, its influence must be in the intellectual processes by which one arrives at a self-designation, since the distributions of ideological preferences among the three groups are remarkably similar.

Policy Preferences and American Political Ideology

Policy preferences serve as an alternative way to gauge Americans' political ideology. Of course, issue positions are useful for understanding ideology only if they cohere through an underlying structure. Prior to looking for issue structures, we will examine individual issues to inform our impressions of the average American's preferences. We consider two questions: Is the average American liberal, conservative, or middle of the road on issues that are part of the American political agenda? Are there discernable trends in preferences in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s?

The NES repeated nine issues with sufficient frequency to give us information on issue liberalism-conservatism in the 1980s and 1990s[5]: From the agenda of the New Deal, we include "guaranteed jobs and a standard of living," "services versus spending," and "social security spending;" from the Great Society program of the 1960s, we include "aid to blacks" and "food stamps spending;" from the "feminist agenda," we include "women's roles" and "abortion;" and from the defense and education agendas of the Reagan years, we include "defense spending" and "public school spending." Figures 4, 5, and 6 report trends in average Americans' positions on these nine issues over the course of the last two decades.

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4   The middle education ("high school") and higher education ("more than high school") groups show a small, but statistically significant tendency to become more conservative over the time period covered by these elections. There is no statistically reliable trend for the "less than high school" group. For the "high school" group, the coefficient resulting from regressing the seven-point liberalism-conservatism scale on election year yields an expected increase of about one-fifth of a scale point in 1998, compared with 1972. For the "more than high school" group, the coefficient resulting from regressing the seven-point liberalism-conservatism scale on election year yields an expected increase of about one-seventh of a scale point in 1998, compared with 1972.

5   The text of these items is found in Appendix A and in the CODEBOOK VARIABLE DOCUMENTATION: 1948-1998 CUMULATIVE DATA FILE available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Figure 4: Policy Positions, 1980-1998

Turning first to Figure 4, we see that the opinion on guaranteeing every American "a job and a good standard of living" has been generally stable and moderately conservative over the two decades. Opinion on aid to blacks – that is, whether the "government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks" – follows a similar path. A slight but steady conservative trend (one half of a scale point) in these two measures appears in 1984 and persists through 1996. It arrested abruptly in 1998, though. Of the four measures in Figure 6, only defense spending moves across to the "liberal" side of the scale. The average citizen expressed a preference for a large increase in spending on defense at the time of the 1980 election. We should note, however, that this preference for increasing the defense budget followed the year-long hostage crisis that began with the seizing of the American embassy in Teheran in November 1979. By 1982, spending preferences in this area moved to the middle of the road. In fact, by the time of Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, defense spending preferences actually moved slightly to the "decrease" side of the scale, and remained there until the 1996 election. Finally, preferences for federal spending on food stamps held steady throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Coincident with the Republican's "Contract with America" in 1994 and 1996, we see a slight shift in the average American's preference toward a desire to cut food stamp spending in those years.

Figure 5 reveals that the tendency to leave food stamp expenditures alone or to cut them is not a reflection of a desire to cut spending in all policy areas. Between 1984 and 1996, there is no change in the preference for increasing

federal spending on public schools or social security. On the general question of whether "government should provide many fewer services in order to reduce spending" or "provide many more services, even if it means an increase in spending," the public shows only a small amount of attitude lability.[6] There is some movement around the middle-of-the-road position, but certainly no clear tendency to prefer to cut or increase services and spending overall.

On the general question of women's rights, Figure 6 shows us a consensus that women "should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government." The 1980s and 1990s are distinguishable from each other on this issue only insofar as the liberal position is more strongly emphasized in the more recent decade. Public opinion on abortion shows the average American unwavering in her/his support for the second most liberal position on the issue as well.[7] The intense politics of abortion, and its presence in national elections, the courts, and Congress have left average Americans unmoved, if not unimpressed.

Figure 5: Spending Positions, 1980-1998

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
6   Note the reversal of the seven-point scale here: Position "7" is the "liberal" preference for
     more services and spending and "1" is the "conservative" preference for service and spending cuts.
7   The item asks respondents to choose from four options. The average citizen endorses the
     following proposition: "The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest,
     or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established."

Figure 6: Women's Issues, 1980-1998

Our examination of individual issue preferences reveals a fairly high degree of stability over the two decades under review. Apparently, conjoint movement of the individual expressions of policy preferences suggests that substantively distinct issues may have in common an underlying structure, which can be considered a proto-ideology. In order to determine whether this seeming underlying structure is real or apparent, we turn now to factor analytic treatment, the appropriate formal data reduction technique to employ in our search for structure.

The Structure of Issue Opinion

Table 2 presents the "rotated component matrix" derived from factor analysis. The nine policy issues cluster on three dimensions that can be thought of as "policy liberalism-conservatism," "spending liberalism-conservatism," and "feminism."

The "policy liberalism-conservatism" dimension is comprised of the respondent's opinion on four policy questions: whether or not the government in Washington should "see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living;" whether or not the government in Washington "should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks;" whether defense spending should be "greatly decreased;" and whether spending on food stamps should be "increased."

Table 2: Rotated Component Matrix – Nine Policy Issues[a]

	Component		
Measure[b]	1	2	3
Guaranteed Jobs	**.693**	.323	-.036
Aid to Blacks	**.769**	.090	.034
Women's Equal Role	.084	.089	**.769**
Abortion Options	.006	-.005	**-.794**
Services/Spending	-.355	**-.645**	-.043
Defense Spending	**.585**	-.253	.318
Public School Spending	.085	**.646**	.265
Food Stamp Spending	**.562**	.327	-.026
Social Security Spending	.040	**.737**	-.126

a)   Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation with Kaiser
     Normalization. Boldface coefficients indicate the component with which they are
     principally associated. Contact the authors for full details of the analysis.
b)   See Appendix A for exact wording of the items and response options.

Three items comprise the "spending liberalism-conservatism" dimension: whether the government should provide "fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending;" whether federal spending on public schools should be increased; and whether federal spending on social security should be increased.

Finally, we employ two items to determine respondents' views on feminist issues: whether or not women "should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government;" and whether, by law, "abortion should never be permitted."

The observed structure has face validity: Items cluster in a sensible manner, the factors reflect political reality, and the signs are correct. Overall, the analysis indicates that the American public exhibits structured policy preferences that exhibit a multivariate version of the "constraint" Converse (1964: 135) argues is an important attribute of ideology (but cf. Luskin 2002).

Obviously, aggregate "constraint" is not individual "constraint." Our findings are not intended to contradict Converse's contention that relatively few Americans (about a quarter of the electorate in the data he examined) have a functioning ideology that helps them navigate the complex world of policy options and select those that are compatible with their previously formed policy preferences. We are examining the American electorate in the aggregate. Our findings, to this point in the paper, are also silent on the dynamics of constraint. We have not yet determined whether Americans individually, or in the aggregate, are more capable than in the past of deploying ideology in order to manage the ambiguities presented by policy options. Put another way: Are Americans more likely now, than in the past, to use ideology as a

cognitive heuristic (Sniderman/Brody/Tetlock 1991)? Having found that policy preferences have an underlying structure, we now turn to the question of whether issue structure relates to ideological self-identification.

The Structure of Ideological Self-Designation

One basic question motivates this section of our data analysis: What are the sources of individuals' responses to self-placement on the seven-point liberalism-conservatism scale? The analysis takes the form of multi-stage "causal" models with the three policy factor scores serving as the dependent variables for the first stage. At this stage, the independent variables are demographics, partisanship, and election year. In the second stage, the dependent variable is the ninety-seven point measure that compares individuals' thermometer ratings of liberals and conservatives. The independent variables for the second stage analysis are the same background and context variables used in the first stage, augmented by the three policy factor scores. And at the final stage, the dependent variable is the individual's ideological self-placement score. In addition to the independent variables used at stage two, we also include individuals' comparative affect between liberals and conservatives.

We begin with an analysis of all sample respondents who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative continuum, the results of which are presented in Table 3. The first stage includes three separate analyses – one for each of the policy factor scores.

Turning first to the "feminist agenda,"[8] the negative coefficient on "election year" indicates that, on the whole, the electorate is tending toward the liberal position on both abortion and equality for women in social, economic, and political institutions. Table 3 indicates that support for the "feminist agenda" is also related to all of the background variables. The leading factors are church attendance (regular church attendance is related to a conservative score on abortion and women's equal rights) and income (respondents with higher family income are more likely than those with lower incomes to score liberal on the feminist factor scale). As expected, party identification is powerfully related to these issues as well; Republicans tend to be conservative and Democrats liberal on the feminist agenda. There is only one surprise from the background factors: Black Americans are more conservative on feminist issues than are white Americans, which may be an instance of African American social conservatism (see Tate 1994).

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8   The factor scale is actually scored as "opposition" to the feminist agenda, i.e., in the conservative direction.

When we employ "policy conservatism" as the dependent variable, we see a significant trend in the data; Americans became more conservative on these issues as the 1980s turned into the 1990s. Four background variables also significantly relate to individuals' factor scores. In contrast to feminist issues, policy conservatism finds African Americans more liberal than white Americans. Women are more likely to be liberal than men. And those with higher family incomes are more conservative than are those with lower incomes. Once again, as expected, party identification is powerfully related to policy preferences, with Republicans more conservative than Democrats.

The pattern observed for the third policy dimension – "spending conservatism" – is very similar to the one observed for "policy conservatism." The American electorate has increasingly come to favor cutting government spending, even on popular programs like social security. Women and Blacks are more liberal. Those with higher incomes are more conservative. And, as always, party identification distinguishes liberals from conservatives. Unlike the policy conservatism dimension, though, regular church attendance relates to taking a conservative position on government spending?

At the second stage of the causal analysis, we examine as a dependent variable respondents' comparative affect toward liberals and conservatives. The three policy factor scores are related to comparative affect. Conservatives on feminism, policy conservatism, and spending conservatism are more likely to react positively to "conservatives" than to "liberals;" liberals on the three policy dimensions tend to favor "liberals" over "conservatives." Background factors also relate to comparative affect. Notably, the coefficient for "election year" indicates a trend in evaluating conservatives more positively than liberals. In addition to its indirect effect via policy preferences, church attendance also directly relates to affect, with regular church attenders more favorable to "conservatives" than to "liberals." Republicans rate conservatives more favorably than liberals, and Democrats are just the opposite. Somewhat unexpectedly, African Americans are likely to react more favorably to "conservatives" than to "liberals."[10]

At the third stage, in which the model is expanded to include comparative affect as an explanatory variable, we see that evaluations of liberals and conservatives are very powerfully related to respondents' ideological labels. In addition, regular church attenders, Blacks, males, and Republicans are likely to call themselves "conservatives;" females, secularists, and Democrats are

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9   It is not simply the opposition of those who attend church regularly to spending on public schools that drives this relationship. Regular church attendance is associated with an expressed desire for reducing the budget devoted to social security and to government spending in general.

10   Occupation, gender, and income are not directly related to the comparative thermometer ratings; their effect comes through their association with the policy dimensions.

Table 3: Three-Stage Causal Model of Ideological Self-Designation:
All Respondents[a]

Independent Variable	Stage One Feminist Issues	Regressions Policy Conservatism	Spending Conservatism	Stage Two Liberal-Con-servative Affect	Stage Three Ideology Self-Placement
Election Year[b]	-.024*	.029*	.008*	.172*	.004
Church Attendance[c]	-.401*	-.020	-.056*	-1.814*	-.077*
Blue Collar[d]	.250*	.029	.070	.330	.010
Gender[e]	-.106*	-.086*	-.246*	-.139	-.061*
Race[f]	.113*	-.519*	-.433*	2.740*	.167*
Income[g]	-.213*	.075*	.131*	.148	-.013
Party Identification[h]	.074*	.142*	.098*	2.709*	.093*
Feminist Issues[i]				3.420*	.208*
Policy Conservatism[j]				4.001*	.196*
Spending Conservatism[k]				2.685*	.097*
Lib-Con Affect[l]					.037*
Constant	3.199*	-2.785*	-.820*	26.447*	1.651*
Adjusted R^2	.189	.179	.138	.404	.495

a) The dependent variables are indicated at the column headings. Coefficients are un-standardized OLS coefficients. Starred coefficients have t-tests with an associated probability $p_t \neq .05$. Coefficients marked with a dagger [□] have t-tests with an associated probability $p_t \neq .10$.
b) Covering the national elections between 1972 and 1996.
c) Three-step index of church attendance ranging from regularly to never.
d) Dichotomization of the NES's six-step occupation code [CF0115]; codes 4 and 5 are scored 1.
e) Female = 1.
f) White = 1.
g) Five-step family income index from low to high; NES variable CF0114.
h) Seven-point party identification scale from "Strong Democrat" to "Strong Republican."
i) Scores on a two-item factor assessing preferences for abortion policy and equality of women's role. Scaled from "liberal" to "conservative."
j) Scores on a four-item factor assessing preferences for policy on government guaranteed jobs, aid to blacks, defense spending and spending on food stamps. Scaled from "liberal" to "conservative."
k) Scores on a three-item factor composed of general preferences between government provision of services versus controlling spending, and spending on public schools and on social security – scored from "liberal" to "conservative."
l) Thermometer rating of "liberals" – Thermometer rating of "conservatives" rescaled to range from 00 (most liberal") to 49 ("neutral") to 97 ("most conservative"). NES variable CF0801.

likely to label themselves "liberals." Conservatives in any of the three policy domains also have an increased likelihood of acknowledging their conservatism.

Whatever the case may have been before the 1980s, over the past two decades, it seems that we reach a similar conclusion about an individual's ideology irrespective of whether we use policy preferences or ideological self-placement as our means of classification. Moreover, Table 3 indicates that when we take into account background factors, comparative affect, and policy preferences, the distribution of ideological self-labeling for the electorate as a whole is stable in the 1980s and 1990s.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our three stage model presents a plausible account of what lies behind ideological self-designation. Granted, prior to drawing any conclusions regarding the data, it is important to acknowledge the role political information might play in ideological structure.[11] Converse (1964) recognized that his findings and conclusions about American political belief systems are conditional on political sophistication. Zaller (1992: 6), like Converse, recognizes that "Every opinion is a marriage of information and predispositions" and, accordingly, also conditions his model on political sophistication. He explains: "People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess contextual information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions" (1992: 58). And Jackman and Sniderman (1999) argue that the effective use of heuristics is contingent on the amount of political knowledge an individual possesses. Hence, education and political sophistication play facilitative roles in the explanation of political behavior. We would expect the interconnection of political attitudes and behaviors to be different for Americans with different degrees of understanding about the American political system. On average, those with more education should have more understanding of American politics than those with a lower amount of formal schooling.

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11   Luskin (1987, 1990, 2002) would raise questions about our decision to partition the sample on the basis of education. He recommends a constructed measure of political sophistication. Nie and his colleagues (Nie/Junn/Stehlik-Barry 1996) raise questions about the construct validity of "educational attainment" as a measure of political sophistication; they argue that a given level of education changes its significance for political behavior depending on the average level of educational attainment of the electorate. To the extent that educational attainment is a "noisy" measure, our estimates will be conservative.

And when we partition the sample into sub-samples based on levels of educational attainment (results not shown), the causal model results confirm this hypothesis. The better educated (more politically sophisticated) the respondent, the more completely the model accounts for his/her ideological self-labeling. Indeed, the coefficient of determination at the model's third stage doubles with each step of the measure of education: the adjusted R^2 equals .162 for the "less than high school" sub-set, increases to .324 for the "high school" sub-set, and measures .613 for the "more than high school" group.[12]

We find that, directly and/or indirectly, self-interest, policy preferences, and affect all influence the selection of an ideological label, regardless of level of education. American voters may not all be philosopher kings, but neither are their political attitudes and policy preferences without structure or constraint. Two of the most consistently important individual attributes – church attendance and party identification – are, strictly speaking, not expressions of "self-interest," "policy preferences," or "affect." The nature of the influence of church attendance on ideology is illusive. It could be "content free" and a spurious transfer of religious conservatism to the realm of politics. Or it could be full of content that protests socio-political changes and expresses the desire to introduce worship into public life and align government against "sinners." An investigation of whether denominational and doctrinal differences between churches relate to ideological differences among the faithful is certainly worth considering, but is beyond the scope of this paper.

Partisanship is another matter. For at least a quarter of a century, an outpouring of rhetoric has used ideological labeling as a campaign device. It has been asymmetric and largely negative – Republican candidates accuse Democratic candidates of being "liberal;" Democratic candidates have been less likely to charge Republicans with being "conservative." Democrats' charges tend to be framed as "issues." They accuse Republicans of "offering unfair tax breaks for the rich," "opposing a woman's right to choose," or "leaving the environment unprotected." Some scholars blame this asymmetry for some Americans' confusion about the link of party and ideology (e.g., Schiffer 2000).

Apart from rhetoric, this same quarter of a century has actually brought with it a clarification of the interconnection between party and ideology (Hetherington 2001). In Congress, the correspondence of party and ideology has become more pronounced. Southern conservative Democrats have ceased to be an important element in the House and Senate. The emergence of a truly

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12 We do not here have space to present the detailed analyses of the differences among educational attainment groups. As the coefficients of determination suggest, citizens with the least amount of formal schooling have the least pronounced ideological structure; those with the highest level of education have the most constrained ideology.

two party South has been a consequence of the sorting of new voters into one party or the other in accord with their general policy preferences or "ideology."

Sniderman (1993: 237) reminds us that "[p]eople's behavior is a function of the circumstances in which they find themselves as well as the dispositions and aptitudes they bring to these circumstances." Our research puts "ideology" among these dispositions. If we want to understand public opinion instabilities and inconsistencies, we must work from a model that does not presume "innocence of ideology." But we also find that, currently, American ideology has its roots in multi-dimensional policy preferences. People are willing to place themselves on the liberal-conservative continuum, even if that placement is not directly related to policy positions and preferences (Jacoby 1991).

Our findings suggest the sources of some of the tensions between elites and masses, as well as some of the problems elites experience in governing and campaigning. Voters seem to be ideologically multi-dimensional. But governing elites and the political parties they represent have become increasingly ideologically unidimensional. The reality we uncovered suggests that elites must "reach across the aisle" when devising policies that will win the support of popular majorities.

Appendix: NES Items Used

Items used in the data analyses:

VAR CF0803 LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE 7PT SCALE
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Extremely liberal
2. Liberal
3. Slightly liberal
4. Moderate, middle of the road
5. Slightly conservative
6. Conservative
7. Extremely conservative
9. DK; haven't thought much about it;
0. NA; INAP

VAR CF0301 7-PT SCALE PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call your-

self a strong (REP/DEM) or a not very strong (REP/DEM)? (IF INDEPENDENT, OTHER [1966 and later: OR NO PREFERENCE]:) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

PARTY ID – 7 CATEGORIES
1. Strong Democrat
2. Weak Democrat
3. Independent – Democrat
4. Independent – Independent
5. Independent – Republican
6. Weak Republican
7. Strong Republican
0. DK; NA; other; refused to answer

VAR CF0130 CHURCH ATTENDANCE (1)
1970-1988: (IF ANY RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE) Would you say you/do you go to (church/synagogue) every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?
1990 and later: Lots of things come up that keep people from attending religious services even if they want to. Thinking about your life these days, do you ever attend religious services, apart from occasional weddings, baptisms or funerals? (IF YES:) Do you go to religious services every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?
1. Every week
2. Almost every week
3. Once or twice a month
4. A few times a year
5. Never (1990 and later: 'No' in filter)
7. No religious preference (1970-1988)
8. DK how often/ DK if attend
9. NA how often/ NA if attend
0. INAP religion (1970-1988; 1972 and 1986: atheists and agnostics are INAP, although not in other years); short-form 'new' cross section (1992); question not used
Our measure is a trichotomized version of this measure:
1. Codes 1 and 2 from CF0130 "regularly"
2. Codes 3 and 4 from CF0130 "sometimes"
3. Codes 5 and 7 from CF0130 "never"

VAR CF0110 R EDUCATION
What is highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?
1. Grade school or less (0-8 grades)
2. High school (12 grades or fewer, incl. non-college training if applicable)
3. Some College (13 grades or more but no degree; 1948 ONLY: college, no identification of degree status)
4. College or advanced degree (no cases 1948)
We combine codes "3" and "4" to comprise our "more than high-school" group.

VAR CF0115 RESPONDENT OCCUPATION (1)
1972-1982: (IF R IS WORKING NOW OR IS TEMPORARILY LAID OFF:) What is your main occupation [What sort of work do you do? Tell me a little more about what you do.] (IF R IS UNEMPLOYED:) What kind of work did you do on your last regular job [What was your occupation?] (IF R IS RETIRED OR DISABLED:) What kind of work did you do when you worked [What was your main occupation?]
1984 and later: (IF R IS WORKING NOW OR IS TEMPORARILY LAID OFF:) What is your main occupation [What sort of work do you do?] What are your most important activities or duties? (IF R IS RETIRED/UNEMPLOYED/DISABLED:) What kind of work did you do on your last regular job [What was your occupation?] What were your most important activities or duties?
> OCCUPATION OF R
> 1. Professional and managerial
> 2. Clerical and sales workers
> 3. Skilled, semi-skilled and service workers
> 4. Laborers, except farm
> 5. Farmers, farm managers, farm laborers and foremen; forestry and fishermen
> 6. Homemakers (1972-1992: 7 IN VCF0116, 4 in VCF0118; 1952-1970: 4 in VCF0118)
> 0. NA; member of armed forces; INAP, no pre (1952,1960); question not used (1954)
> For our "blue collar" codes "3" and "4" are combined and scored "1"; the rest of the codes were combined and scored "0."

VAR CF0114 INCOME
1972-1990, 1992 long-form,1994-later: Please look at this card/page and tell me the letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in <previous year> before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. (IF UNCERTAIN:) What would be your best guess?
1992 short form: Can you give us an estimate of your total family income in 1991 before taxes? This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest and all other income for every member of your family living in your house in 1991. First could you tell me if that was above or below $24,999? (IF UNCERTAIN: what would be your best guess?) (IF ABOVE/BELOW $24,999:) I will read you some income categories, could you please stop me when I reach the category that corresponds to your family situation?
> FAMILY INCOME
> 1. 0 to 16 percentile
> 2. 17 to 33 percentile
> 3. 34 to 67 percentile
> 4. 68 to 95 percentile
> 5. 96 to 100 percentile

VAR CF0104 RESPONDENT GENDER
> 0. Male   1. Female

VAR CF0105 RESPONDENT RACE (1)
    R'S RACE (1)
    1. White
    2. Black
    Black "2" is recoded as "0."

VAR CF0809 7PT GOVT GUARANTEED JOBS SCALE
Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. (1972- 1978,1996-later: Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1). Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his/their own. (1972-1978,1996: Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6.)
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
    1. Government see to job and good standard of living
    ...
    7. Government let each person get ahead on his own
    9. DK; haven't thought much about it
    0. NA; INAP, no post IW (1972 form II,1980); form A (1986); question not used

VAR CF0830 7PT AID TO BLACKS SCALE
1970-1984, 1986 FORM B, 1988 FORM B: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks (1970: Negroes) and other minority groups (1980: even if it means giving them preferential treatment). Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves (1970: but they should be expected to help themselves).
1986 FORM A, 1988 FORM A, 1990 and later: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every (prior to 1996 only: possible) effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. (1996-later: Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1). Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. (1996-later: Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5 or 6).
ALL YEARS: Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about it? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
    1. Government should help minority groups/blacks
    ...
    7. Minority groups/ blacks should help themselves
    9. DK; haven't thought much about it
    0. NA; INAP, no post IW (1972,1980); question not used

VAR CF0834 7PT WOMENS EQUAL ROLE SCALE
Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that a women's place is in the home. Where would you place

yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
  1. Women and men should have an equal role
  ...
  7. Women's place is in the home
  9. DK; haven't thought much about it
  0. NA; question not used

VAR CF0839 7PT GOVT SERVICES/SPENDING SCALE
Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
  1. Government should provide many fewer services: reduce spending a lot
  ...
  7. Government should provide many more services: increase spending a lot
  9. DK; haven't thought much about it
  0. NA; INAP, question not used

VAR CF0843 7PT DEFENSE SPENDING SCALE
Some people believe we should spend much less money for defense. (1996: Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. (1996: Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.) Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
  1. Greatly decrease defense spending
  ...
  7. Greatly increase defense spending.
  9. DK; haven't thought much about it
  0. NA; INAP, question not used

VAR CF0890 PUBLIC SCHOOLS SPENDING – FEDERAL BUDGET
If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which (1986 and later: of the following) programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending decreased:
Should federal spending on <item> be increased, decreased or kept about the same?
  PUBLIC SCHOOLS
  1. INCREASED
  2. SAME
  3. DECREASED OR CUT OUT ENTIRELY
  9. DK; NA; INAP, no Post IW (1984); abbrev. telephone IW

VAR CF9046 FOOD STAMPS SPENDING – FEDERAL BUDGET
If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which (1986 and later: of the following) programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending decreased:
Should federal spending on <item> be increased, decreased or kept about the same?

FOOD STAMPS
1. INCREASED
2. SAME
3. DECREASED
7. CUT OUT ENTIRELY (VOLUNTEERED)
8. DK
9. NA; INAP, no post IW (1984); abbrev. telephone IW (1984); question not used

VAR CF9049 SOCIAL SECURITY SPENDING – FEDERAL BUDGET
If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which (1986 and later: of the following) programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending decreased:
Should federal spending on <item> be increased, decreased or kept about the same?
SOCIAL SECURITY
1. INCREASED
2. SAME
3. DECREASED
7. CUT OUT ENTIRELY (VOLUNTEERED)
8. DK
9. NA; INAP, no post IW (1984); abbrev. telephone IW (1984); question not used

VAR CF0838 WHEN SHOULD ABORTION BE ALLOWED BY LAW
There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? You can just tell me the number of the opinion you choose.
1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.
2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.
4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.
9. DK; other

VAR CF0801 LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE THERMOMETER INDEX
LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE INDEX
This index is constructed from the thermometer score for liberals (VCF0211) and the thermometer score for conservatives (VCF0212). The calculation used is the following: First, the value of VCF0211 is subtracted from 97, and that difference is added to the value of VCF0212. This sum is then divided by 2, and .5 is added to the result. Finally, the solution is truncated to obtain an integer value. If either VCF0211 or VCF0212 is 98, then VCF0801 is coded 98; 99 is coded in VCF0801 if it is the only missing data value coded in VCF0211,VCF0212.

00. Most liberal

.

49. Neutral

.

97. Most conservative
98. DK in VCF0211 or VCF0212; don't recognize OR can't rate (1980 and later) in VCF0211 or VCF0212, or both
99. NA; INAP, no post IW (1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996); form III,IV (1972); question not used

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Part II

The Canadian Citizenship Regime
in a Conservative Era

Jane Jenson

In the post-1945 decades the Canadian citizenship regime was constructed by
a Liberal government, one that was in power for all but eight years of the four
decades between 1944 and 1984, and which dominated the economic and
social policy agenda. Its major rival were the Progressive Conservatives, a
party that could win elections only when led by a populist leader or one with
Red Tory credentials. In addition, in the key decades of the 1940s and the
1960s, when much innovation in social and economic policy occurred, the
Liberals considered the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and
its successor, the self-styled social democrats of the New Democratic Party
(NDP), to be a significant electoral threat. Finally, beginning in the 1940s in
Saskatchewan and several other provinces from the 1960s on, a number of
provincial party systems from Quebec westward included strong social de-
mocratic parties that were real contenders, and frequently in power. Indeed,
by the 1960s, the progressive Quebec Liberal Party, with its plans for mod-
ernizing that province, was contributing major innovations to the regime, as
Saskatchewan's CCF had done previously and its NDP was still doing in that
decade.

 Given these characteristics of the party system, it was predictable that the
post-war citizenship regime, like that in many other advanced industrial coun-
tries, would tilt towards the centre-left. Conditions of party competition in
Canada, as well as in federal-provincial relations and international policy
communities, gave a social-liberal tint to thinking about social citizenship and
about the responsibility mix of the quartet market-family-community-state.

 These partisan conditions, as well as the institutions of federalism, dra-
matically altered beginning in the 1980s. That decade ushered in neo-
liberalism (sometimes termed neo-conservatism). In party politics, the Pro-
gressive Conservatives took office in 1984 led by Brian Mulroney, a man
who had none of the populist nor Red Tory positions of previous PC Prime
Ministers. In a number of key provinces, starting with Alberta in 1993 with
Ralph Klein as Premier, Progressive Conservative governments both explic-
itly embraced the neo-liberal policy agenda and also worked hard to inject
their ideology into intergovernmental decisions. In federal elections, the
NDP's electoral popularity plummeted, while the populist and radically con-
servative Reform Party (and then Canadian Alliance) made significant gains
in the Western provinces. Federalism was decentralizing, while transnational

policy communities with a strong allegiance to neo-liberal "cures" gained adherents inside the Canadian state.

Not surprisingly, these changes in partisan conditions as well as policy thinking are reflected in the ways the citizenship regime has been altered. Neo-liberalism has entered the political mainstream, entrenched there by right-wing parties. The citizenship regime now tilts as much to the right as it tilted leftward in earlier decades. The re-aligned principles of this regime have, in large part, been sustained, even despite the moderation in strict neo-liberalism that has been promoted by "third way" thinking, to which the current Liberal Prime Minister of Canada has subscribed.[1] The emerging citizenship regime is not a strictly neo-conservative or neo-liberal one, but neither has there been a return to the social liberalism that characterized the first three post-war decades.

This paper analyzes this shift in the citizenship regime, and argues that it is being sustained and is resilient because of four important factors. One is the shift in the balance of power of ideological traditions within the Right. There has been a weakening if not discrediting of Red Toryism as a strong position on the right. Because this tradition was a central pillar of Canadian Conservativism, since the days of Sir John A. Macdonald, its discrediting has significantly undermined that party's capacity to compete with the Liberals for the centre. Instead, economic and social conservatism were significantly strengthened by the rise of the populist and neo-liberal Reform Party. The Canadian Alliance still holds most of that ground. A second factor is the shift in the balance of power in federal-provincial relations. A significant delegitimizing of federal pretensions to policy leadership has allowed conservative governments in strong provinces such as Alberta and Ontario (and the effective withdrawal of Quebec from engagement in intergovernmental relations since 1995) to have a major influence over policy thinking and policy design. A third factor is the diffusion of neo-liberal ideas via transnational policy communities, and their adoption by bureaucrats as well as politicians. They have had perhaps even greater influence within certain government departments, especially the Department of Finance. The hegemony over social policy of that Department, infused with neo-liberalism, is the fourth factor accounting for alterations in the citizenship regime. The combination of diffusion of policy ideas, of new partisan conditions, and of reconfigurations of the balance of forces within the federal government and federal institutions have all made significant contributions to the embedding of a neo-liberal citizenship regime in Canada.

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1   See the Prime Minister's speech to Heads of Government in Berlin in May 2000. Jean Chrétien, "The Canadian Way in the 21st Century," available at http://www.pm.gc.ca.

Citizenship Regime: The Concept

In the last decades, we have seen a resurgence of attention to citizenship. A number of states have established new ministries and put aside time to celebrate citizenship. At the same time, we have seen a proliferation of claims explicitly framed in these terms. In North America, the boundaries of citizenship have become central to debates about Aboriginal rights in several countries, while the sovereignty movement in Quebec as well as the Quebec Liberal Party have reworked their political discourse using a citizenship framework. The Government of Canada's 2002 Speech from the Throne, entitled *The Canada we want*, identifies one of the country's strengths as "the bonds of shared citizenship and the partnership between government and Canadians."

Growing preoccupation with the condition of social cohesion and democratic politics has led many in government and policy circles to express concern about citizenship.[2] In diverse and fragmented societies, marked by profound restructuring of the economic and social order, there are challenges to the capacity of state institutions to ensure inclusion and participation for all who are formally members of the political community. Even more generally, with the rethinking of the political and of the state that has been provoked by the rise of neo-liberalism, the boundaries of citizenship are being refashioned if not transformed. The *citizenship regime* is being reconfigured.[3]

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2 In April 2002 the Department of Canadian Heritage redefined its Strategic Framework, defining its Mission as moving "Towards a more cohesive and creative Canada", and defining one strategic objective to be "Active Citizenship and Civic Participation", including promoting "shared citizenship." See http://www.pch.gc.ca.

3 The concept of citizenship regime was developed in Jenson and Phillips (1996a, 1996b). For anyone interested in its theoretical construction, here are the details. The concept of citizenship regime is located at the intersection of two bodies of literature, that of the Regulation Approach and neo-institutionalism. The work of historical sociologists, since T.H. Marshall's writings at the end of World War Two, teaches that citizenship is a social construction. As such, it varies across both time and space.

The first theoretical leg of the concept of citizenship regime comes from the Regulation Approach's notion of stability and change in the patterning of social relations. Regulationists accept that in some historical moments there is a certain stability in basic social, economic and political relations which allows us to say that regimes exist. Then, with the arrival of crisis – defined essentially as an intensification of contradictions always present in the regime – profound change and redirection may result. Organizing and legitimating principles can break with one model and give rise to a quite different conceptualization.

Given the fact that the notion of change is at the heart of the concept, it also requires a theoretical approach that can understand change. Embedded in the concept is an analytic proclivity for uncovering and attributing importance to ideas as well as practices. As such it fits best with analytic positions that pay attention to the role of ideas in both policy analysis and political analysis more generally. This focus on ideas – whether described as social knowledge, social learning, discourses or paradigms – makes a neo-institutional approach the most comfortable home for the concept of citizenship regime.

At its most general, citizenship establishes a system of inclusion and exclusion. It defines boundaries, recognizing the citizenship status of the included and denying that status to the excluded. Much analysis of citizenship proceeds from a quite narrow definition, one that equates citizenship with civic and political rights. This can be termed political citizenship. Important as it is, it leaves aside aspects of citizenship which have proven to be particularly significant over more than a century, and must be included when thinking of a citizenship regime. They are the social rights of citizenship and the identity dimension.

It is useful to have a concept that allows us to capture differences across time and place. By the concept of citizenship regime we mean the institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy decisions and expenditures of states, problem definitions by states and citizens, and claims-making by citizens. A citizenship regime encodes within it a paradigmatic representation of identities, of the "national" as well as the "model citizen," the "second-class citizen," and the non-citizen. It also encodes representations of the proper and legitimate social relations among and within these categories, as well as the borders of "public" and "private." It makes, in other words, a major contribution to the definition of politics which organizes the boundaries of political debate and problem recognition in each jurisdiction.

There are four elements of a citizenship regime, and each contributes to setting its boundaries and giving content to the institutions that sustain it:

- The first dimension of citizenship involves the expression of basic values about the *responsibility mix*, defining the boundaries of state responsibilities and differentiating them from those of markets, of families and of communities.
- Through formal recognition of particular *rights* and *responsibilities* (civic, political, social, and cultural; individual and collective) a citizenship regime establishes the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of apolitical community. In doing so, it identifies those entitled to full citizenship status and those who only, in effect, hold second-class status.
- A citizenship regime also prescribes the democratic rules of the game for a polity. Among these democratic rules, we include the institutional mechanisms giving *access* to the state, the modes of participation in civic

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Standing on the two theoretical legs of neo-institutionalism (which attributes importance to framing and ideas) and of regulation theory (which makes change as well as stability imaginable), we are led to see citizenship as:
- a social construction, as T.H. Marshall did;
- as being the institutionalized expression of representations of identities and ideas as well as interests. This is the neo-institutionalist contribution;
- as variable across space albeit perhaps sharing certain common elements at certain historical moments. This is the regulationist contribution.

life and public debates and the legitimacy of specific types of claims-making. Claims-making may turn to demands for better access and inclusion.

- A citizenship regime also contributes to the definition of the nation, in both the narrow passport-holding sense of nationality and the more complicated notion of national identity and its geography. It thereby establishes the boundaries of *belonging* and the national identities associated with it, including those of national minorities.

Once we realize that citizenship involves a lot more than the boundary between nationals and non-nationals, that distinctions among citizens may exist, and that state institutions engage in the politics of recognition, then we must begin to ask when the state will alter its representation of its citizens and when citizens' claims-making will change. Party politics as well as ideologies have a lot to do with this. A citizenship regime is created, institutionalized and changed through political action. Such action involves the state recognizing citizens to be sure, but it also involves actors in civil society making claims for recognition and for rights. When those actors, such as political parties, change or alter their ideologies and when the balance of forces among political actors shifts, we can predict a challenge and perhaps a change in the citizenship regime. Neo-liberalism represented such a challenge in the 1980s and 1990s. What has changed?

The Post-1945 Pan-Canadian Citizenship Regime: Individualized but Social

With the benefit of hindsight, we can now identify a citizenship regime constructed in the years after 1945, albeit from seeds planted in the inter-war years. At war's end, Canadian policy communities were unusually aware of the impact that their decisions would have for the future. They were consciously and conscientiously building a citizenship regime to reflect the lessons learned both in the inter-war period and the war years. They spoke frequently of the need to represent Canadians to themselves as part of a single, autonomous country stretching from sea to sea, and open to exercising its international responsibilities in emerging international organizations such as the United Nations and through the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (GATT).

A pan-Canadian citizenship regime was constructed over the next three decades.[4] The responsibility mix in this regime recognized a clear place for

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4   It was, of course, a regime that had to live with conflict, because of Canada's diversity.

the private sector. In their ideas as well as their actions, decision-makers in both the private and public sectors were designing a set of rules for the division of responsibilities among states and markets. The private sector had the responsibility to create well-being by going about its business profitably, while governments would provide a social safety net to protect those left behind by the rising tide of post-war economic boom and well-being, using government authority to shape markets and influence market forces.

Central to the vision of citizenship were social programmes that expressed a commitment to the collective good, being a representation of what Canadians owed to each other and therefore of the rights and responsibilities they shared. Part of this was the willingness to share the costs of unevenly distributed life risks, both those associated with moments of the life-cycle (childhood, youth, and old age, for example) and those associated with the "bad luck" of illness, disability, poverty, and job loss.[5] Therefore, from the 1940s to the end of the 1960s, Canadian governments created the social infrastructure of the citizenship regime. These were the now-familiar programmes of unemployment insurance, pensions, family allowances, post-secondary education, and universal health care, as well social assistance for those living on the margins or not able to participate in the labour market.

Federalism as well as the party system were institutional expressions of this new citizenship regime. Social citizenship rights were distributed by the two levels of government, but Ottawa took on a strong leadership role for itself. It defined itself as the active representative of all Canadians. Led by the Liberal Party, in power from 1935, through the war and until 1957, the federal government sought to construct tighter social bonds among individual Canadians, and extend feelings of belonging from the "island communities" (Strong-Boag 1977: 87) of the pre-1940 years to a pan-Canadian identity (Bourque/Duchastel 1996). Country-wide institutions addressed citizens as individual Canadians, thereby mapping the whole of Canada as a single political space with which its citizens might identify. Regional identities were quite explicitly meant to be supplanted.[6]

Critics and alternative visions were constantly present. Beginning in the 1960s, for example, disputes arose over how to describe Canada's linguistic diversity. These conflicts aligned those who would represent Canadians as "anglophone" or "francophone" against those who sought to have communities and societies recognized. Was Quebec the homeland of a people and therefore a distinct society or simply a province with a francophone majority and anglophone minority? In a similar way, the 1970s oil crisis pitted those who claimed western energy supplies as the patrimony of "all" Canadians against those representing them as "their" energy resources, and the foundation for local development.

5   As Gøsta Esping-Andersen reminds us, "The welfare state is one among three sources of managing social risks, the other two being family and market" (1999: 33). We add a fourth, the community, through private redistribution. This addition creates the welfare diamond proposed by Adalbert Evers, Marja Pilj, and Clare Ungerson (1994).

6   As Paul Martin, Senior said when he presented the new Citizenship Act to the House of Commons in 1946: "It is not good enough to be a good "bluenose" or a good Ontarian or a

Practices within the party system reinforced this pan-Canadian perspective, as campaigns became moments for leaders to speak to all voters directly, employing the new radio and television technologies and thereby bypassing the regional chiefs who had dominated politics in the inter-war years (Smith 1989). At the same time, other important institutions of representation began to span the country. The creation of the Canadian Labour Congress in 1956 is one example among several. It chose to locate its headquarters in Ottawa, despite the fact that provincial governments regulate labour relations.

The country-spanning institutions were to provide access to citizens to sites of collective decision-making. Throughout these decades, then elections, important as they are, were also understood to be only one possible route to representation. There was also symbolic and programmatic acknowledgement of particular *categories* of citizens, thereby granting legitimacy to the intermediary associations of civil society representing those particular interests. Initially, intermediary associations had been recognized as vital aspects of the citizenship regime because, by organizing more marginal groups, they reinforced a fledgling national identity and built loyalty to it. By the 1970s they were accepted as important in helping citizens construct diverse identities, advocate for social rights and enhance the fairness of the democratic process by giving a voice to disadvantaged segments of the population (Pal 1993; Dobrowolsky 1998).

The result was a mixed pattern. Canada never went as far as those European countries that were building generous welfare states to cushion citizens from many of the effects of market society (Goodin et al. 1999: chapter 1). Canadians chose to define the social rights of citizenship as *safety nets* in most cases, rather than seeking to promote greater equality of condition or actively structure labour markets. Universal programmes were limited to primary and secondary education, health care, family allowances and pensions.

Two values underpinned this post-war citizenship regime: those of liberalism and of social equity.[7] These led to several key premises. First was the notion, dominant in the liberal internationalism of the time, that space was "national." In the years after World War II, anti-colonialism and the internationalism of the United Nations generated a vision of the globe as carved into national spaces. Canada was not alone, then, in seeking to firm up its borders by clearly distinguishing "us" from "them," both in the British Empire and on the other side of the 49th parallel. Within that national space, there were sub-national spaces. Most important were the provinces, defined by constitutional criteria. While there was a notion of "regions" – such as the Maritimes or the

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good Albertan. Sectional differences and sectional interests must be overcome if we are to do our best for Canada. The only way this can be done is through encouragement of the feeling of legitimate Canadianism [...]" (Kaplan 1993: 73).

7   These ideas are developed further in Jenson (2001).

Prairies, the East and the West – they tended to be represented as combinations of provinces.

A second premise, also imported from liberalism, is that the "public" and "private" were clearly distinct. This meant not only that the public and private sectors would be autonomous, albeit interdependent; it also meant that the workplace and the home were two distinct locales. Workers were to arrive at the factory or office door "unencumbered" by their family ties. Any employer responsibility was expressed through the wage package and employment contract to the individual worker – his or her family situation was not relevant.

In addition to markets and state, the family and the voluntary sector were key actors, although less visible. Families were assigned responsibility for distributing well-being for current and future generations.[8] Parents were assumed to have complete responsibility for ensuring that their pre-school children would thrive and be prepared to enter school. Schools had responsibility for overseeing the education of older children, but the rest of their development remained in the hands of their parents. Only if parents "failed" would the state step in and take children into protection. The elderly were also assumed to be the responsibility of their kin, cared for by them unless they were unable to do so. At that point, the elderly could make a claim on public funds, either for home care or to be transferred into an institution.

While the voluntary sector was actively involved in the social policy of this paradigm, little attention was actually devoted to its role or contribution. The exception was in Quebec, where the relatively tardy development of public spending led, in the 1960s, to a lively debate about public and private roles. Elsewhere, however, the fact that the Children's Aid Society was delivering virtually all child protection services in some provinces, that the Victorian Order of Nurses provided publicly financed home care, or that the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) required that non-profit associations deliver much of publicly subsidized child care did not attract a great deal of attention, until recently.

In many ways, then, this post-war citizenship regime was one that could relatively easily adapt to a turn to the right, and to a reinforcement of liberalism. This is what has happened over the past two decades, when the so-called "return of the market" occurred.[9] The result has been the entrenchment of a new citizenship regime, marked in many ways by its years of the neo-liberal cure.

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8   This description and an argument about its history and future are developed further in Beauvais and Jenson (2001).

9   This similarity is not surprising, given that since 1945 Canada has been a "liberal welfare state," according to the usual classification system and, therefore, one in which the rules of markets have also taken precedence.

The Canadian Citizenship Regime after the Neo-Liberal "Cure"

Despite the basic liberalism of the two regimes, there are differences worth identifying. A key difference between the social liberalism of the post-war regime and that apparent after the passage of neo-liberalism, is found in the extent to which market relations are given a leading role in shaping many social relations. In the last two decades, social programmes have been cut back and clawed back, targeted more and more to those who *truly* need them (Myles/Pierson 1997). The market determines availability for most of the rest, whether markets for labour or goods and services. The notion of equity is thereby narrowed, citizenship rights significantly limited, notions of responsibility redefined, forms of legitimate access rethought.

While limited space prohibits a complete analysis of all changes, a variety of policy domains will be evoked, in order to support the argument that this is a *regime shift* and not only a policy adjustment. It is also important to note that such shifts are not happening only in Canada; many of the same patterns can be observed in Europe, for example, both in individual countries and in the actions of the European Union (Jenson/Saint-Martin 2002).

Looking first at the *responsibility mix* it is possible to discern a shift away in some areas from the emphasis on social citizenship that characterized the post-war period, and therefore the role of the state in mediating market and family outcomes. In the current regime, market relations predominate, and the responsibility of all citizens is to prepare for market participation (Baker 2002: 85). A very concrete consequence of this shift is the increase in income gaps. Whereas through the 1980s market inequalities in income were significantly narrowed by the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers, this effect was significantly moderated by the late 1990s. For example: "In 1989, families in the top quintile had 4.9 times the share of after-tax income of those in the bottom quintile, but by 1998 that ratio had increased to 5.5 times" (Battle 2001: 190).

A second indicator comes from the shift to "employability" strategies. Labour market policy is clearly designed to foster participation (Bashevkin 2002: 54f.; Baker 2002). "Single windows" attempt to integrate employment and social assistance, such that the longstanding division between those *in the labour force*, and therefore covered by Unemployment Insurance, and those *outside the labour force*, and therefore covered by social assistance (welfare programmes) blurs. For example, the National Child Benefit brought a major redesign of social assistance for families. The two goals were to reduce child

poverty and to "promote attachment to the workforce by ensuring that families will always be better off as a result of working."[10]

But alongside this new acceptance of market-directed outcomes for adults there is a reconfiguration of the division of responsibility between state and family that appears in several policy areas. Increasingly, governments are claiming that they *share* responsibility for children's well-being with parents.[11] Whereas in the post-war citizenship regime, family responsibility for decisions about children and for intergenerational outcomes was virtually unchallenged, in the current period several Canadian governments, including the federal one, adopt a stance indicating their willingness to share some of the burden, and more actively to shape the lives and life-chances of children (Beauvais/Jenson 2001).[12] This is often justified in terms of "investing in children" (Jenson/Saint-Martin 2002).

And finally, there has been a significant realignment of the responsibility mix such that the voluntary sector or the community is assigned greater responsibilities, both for representing need and for delivering services. The language of partnerships goes well beyond talk; the voluntary sector has taken on significant heavier responsibilities in a range of fields (Phillips 2001). As Rice and Prince describe the new responsibility mix (2000: 234f.): "By the 1990s many programmes had been altered and benefits reduced, shifting responsibility from the federal government to the provincial and territorial governments, and through these governments onto the community and voluntary and informal sectors."

Much of the realignment just described has significant consequences for the *rights and responsibilities* of the new citizenship regime. The move away from social liberalism has been accompanied by a popular design change – substitution of targeted benefits for universal ones. The health care system is almost the only one that has resisted (thus far) this direction of change. Instead, all sorts of benefits – from pensions to child tax benefits – are now provided according to income testing (Myles/Pierson 1997; Rice/Prince 2000: 234). At the same time, celebration of "choice" has generated enthusiasm for "public services *à la carte.*" Ontario for example allows tax exemptions for

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10   The National Child Benefit is described, among other places, on the Social Union Web site: http:www.socialunion.gc.ca

11   The result is that child benefits have been one of the major areas of increased spending recently. Throughout the 1980s until 1999, spending levels were remained "more or less flat," as the benefits themselves were increasingly targeted. Since 1999 spending has been increased (Battle 2001: 187).

12   Another liberal welfare regime has made the same shift. The arrival of New Labour in power in the United Kingdom, Lister (2002: 10) points out, meant that the recent changes to child care policy in the UK "represents the first time that government has accepted that childcare is a public as well as a private responsibility." The OECD describes this notion as increasingly hegemonic: "There has been a shift [...] toward a view of children's early care and education as a shared responsibility between the family and the state, and not just for the family alone to bear" (2001: 40).

parents paying fees to private schools, while the increased reliance on private health care services is viewed by many Canadians as an inevitable direction of reform of the public system.

Making availability of services and benefits more dependent on income is not the only way that fragmentation and variety has been increased within the citizenship regime. Over the 1980s federal-provincial relations moved towards reduced federal control over the way that provinces spent funds transferred to them for health, social services and education. The Established Program Financing left little room for oversight by Ottawa. Beginning in 1995, however, intergovernmental relations became a positive hymn to the advantages of diverse choices about social programmes and other spending.

Provinces' freedom to choose and to design their own basket of services is consecrated in accords such as the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA – signed in 1999), the National Child Benefit (instituted in 1998), the health agreement of September 2000 and so on. With the increased leeway for choice granted by these intergovernmental relations, the provinces have begun to implement welfare regimes that range from progressive social democratic to hard-line neo-conservatism, and everything in between. Moreover, there is very little willingness to grant the federal government any status as "lead government." The anger and distrust generated by the unilateral actions of the 1995 Budget continues to infect intergovernmental discussions (Hobson/St-Hilaire 2000).

Access to rights and responsibilities of citizenship and therefore concern about political citizenship, in other words, is even more heavily weighted towards the provincial level than previously. Gone from the SUFA and other like documents was the idea, so fundamental to the post-war years, that common Canadian citizenship involved access to similar services and service levels across the country. The federal government has been compelled to tie its hands. The SUFA requires approval of the provinces before new programmes in their field of competence are introduced (Rice/Prince 2000: 120f.). The government of Canada has, in other words, quite limited capacity for ensuring a pan-Canadian vision of social citizenship; it has retreated to an emphasis on shared values and principles.

Also gone is the notion that there should be a direct line of accountability between service delivery and financing of the benefit. Increasingly governments, both provincial and federal, are turning over the delivery of services to other agencies, often in the voluntary sector. Food banks, the YMCA, community associations, women's shelters, popular clinics and day cares run by churches are only some examples of agencies that have a huge role in delivering services, whether to adults or children, to the unemployed or those on social assistance. Functioning according to their mandates and responsible to their own boards of directors, yet in receipt of considerable sums from government, the path of accountability is not clear at all. Nor is it immediately

clear when and how citizens have recourse to appeal decisions made by chari-
table or faith-based organizations. Therefore, the dimension of access in this
new citizenship regime is much more complex than previously and less trans-
parent for many.

Accounting for the Shift to the Right in the Citizenship Regime – More than Partisan Politics

The *first factor* to take into account in understanding the shift to the right in
the citizenship regime is the role of bureaucratic politics, especially the con-
tinued and indeed growing dominance of the Department of Finance over the
past 25 years. No matter the party in power, there was consistency in the
positions promoted by senior bureaucrats and, as a result, the positions
adopted by successive ministers of Finance. Because of the ideological confu-
sion that characterizes brokerage parties such as both the Progressive Conser-
vatives and Liberals, a strong push from Finance could often carry the day.
The combination of ideology with the strategic shift to using fiscal policy and
policy instruments of tax-delivered benefits and credits strengthened the hand
of this department over the 1980s and 1990s.

The Mulroney Conservatives in 1984 were the usual brokerage grab-bag
of traditional Tories, economic conservatives, and Red Tories with a progres-
sive bent. Thus, the Economic Summit of March 1985, seeking "consensus,"
did not achieve its goal (Bercuson/Granatstein/Young 1986: 39):

"The meeting of business and union leaders and interest groups fulfilled one of Mulroney's
campaign promises. But, said one of the organizers, the preparatory work had not been
done and there was no script. [...] it revealed that the government did not have a real grip
on the levers of power. A senior bureaucrat remarked that behind all the activity there was
no very strong ideological orientáion or vision."

However, the discussion paper issued in 1984 by Finance Minister Michael
Wilson, entitled *A New Direction for Canada: An Agenda for Economic
Renewal* had already put the issue of eliminating universal social programmes
on the table. The Cabinet was deeply divided over the issue, with Red Tories
such as Jake Epp defending the principle of universality. Conflict broke out in
Cabinet, and in public. In Parliament on the 9th of November 1984, Brian
Mulroney sided with the left of this party and declared that "he and the gov-
ernment remain 'committed to the view that universality is a fundamental key
to our social development'" (Bercuson/Granatstein/Young 1986: 103, chapter
6). Wilson's proposals for pension reform were subjected to scorn by opinion
leaders and eventually repudiated by the leader.

Given this political barrier to wholesale reform and a principled move toward neo-liberalism, the strategy of the Progressive Conservative Finance Minister became "social policy by stealth."[13] Rather than instituting new programmes or terminating existing ones, this strategy involved paring at the margins. Rules for access, eligibility and benefit levels were tightened up and "adjusted," frequently in the grey zone of tax policy, and therefore out of the political limelight.[14]

By the early 1990s there were two results of importance for social citizenship. Universality as a principle was gone from family benefits and pensions, and access was significantly limited. Second, the Department of Finance was hegemonic, despite the seeming political setbacks of Ministers such as Wilson. As Ken Battle and Sherri Torjman (1996) put it: "Finance does not *share* power over social policy with Health and Welfare and its reincarnation as Human Resources Development Canada: Finance *is* the power in social policy." This had consequences for which groups and interests could gain access to policy-makers and have their views considered in policy design and decisions. Social groups and social policy advocates had little leverage in Finance, for example.

By 1995 the Department of Finance was the lead department not only in reforming social policy but also in changing intergovernmental affairs. This is the *second factor* that needs to be considered when understanding the rightward tilt of the citizenship regime. Another crucial initiative of the Department of Finance, this time with Paul Martin at the helm, was the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), announced in the 1995 Budget.[15] It profoundly re-structured federalism and the shape of Canadian politics. Creating the CHST was not only a unilateral action to cut back transfer payments to the provinces.[16] In the name of deficit reduction, the Department of Finance was prepared to hand over the remaining levers of influence the central government had over provincial spending decisions and therefore policy design.[17] As Greenspon and Wilson-Smith describe the invention of the CHST, it was a

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13 This is the now famous label proposed by Ken Battle, writing under the pseudonym of Gratten Gray in *Policy Options*, #11. See also Battle (1993).

14 For details on the Progressive Conservatives' fiscal policy and efforts to control the deficit see Demers (1992).

15 That the ideological coherence of the Department of Finance appealed to Paul Martin is seen in this observation of the man by Greenspon and Wilson-Smith (1996: 196): "In contrast to Chrétien, Martin was a table d'hôte kind of politician. He didn't feel comfortable with the à la carte approach to governing [...]."

16 "Closeted in Dodge's [DM Finance] twentieth-floor boardroom, the Finance officials designed a new system. In a late-night session with Martin they recommended lumping health, education and social assistance transfers into a single block fund, with its overall size determined by the federal government" (Greenspon/WilsonSmith 1996: 232).

17 The CHST reform had two goals: to control and to reduce spending. "In exchange Ottawa would loosen the conditions it placed on provincial use of the money" (Greenspon/Wilson-Smith 1996: 232).

radical change driven by the thinking of people in Finance. When the Department of Health lobbied to have its own transfer (which would have removed the H from the CHST) so as to ensure money went to health spending, its policy-thinkers lost: "to the rationalists in Finance, [...] money was money. The provinces simply deposited their cheques from Ottawa in a single account and then spent them as they wished" (Greenspon/Wilson-Smith 1996: 233).

Therefore, while impoverishing the provinces, the CHST also – ironically – empowered them. They could liberate themselves from federal oversight, based on the claim that the federal government had no legitimate say over their choices. According to the provinces, the federal government had lost that legitimacy when it renounced providing significant financing for programmes. Rhetoric and the use of federal spending power to provide benefits to individual Canadians (via for example the Canada Child Tax Benefit), were its remaining policy levers. It had little influence over provincial choices about health (the major item in all provincial budgets), social assistance and education or even services for children under the National Child Benefit agreement.

This profound change in the balance of intergovernmental powers has meant that provinces have much more clout in shaping policy. The institutions of inter-governmentalism, such as the Premiers' Annual Meeting and the ongoing, rotating secretariat that services it have gained a good deal of influence in the era of the Social Union Framework Agreement. Such bodies, in turn, can be profoundly shaped by the strongest provinces. Since 1995, the two most influential have been governed by neo-conservatives. Ralph Klein's Alberta and Mike Harris' Ontario have been leaders in shaping the response of all provinces to the federal government. In the second half of the 1990s they proposed a form of confederal inter-governmentalism that would essentially eliminate any influence from the centre (Boismenu/Jenson 1998), and that option remains a threat to brandish even in the era of the SUFA.

Whether or not this type of confederalism ever comes to pass is not the point for this paper. Rather, it is necessary simply to note, that as the provinces gained influence, their neo-liberal vision of citizenship gained policy purchase. The vision of increased market power, responsibility before rights, increased familial responsibility (Vosko 2002: 172) and so on was promoted by the governments of Alberta and Ontario.[18] They were joined in 2001 by the

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18   Quebec's contribution to this policy discourse has been limited since 1995 by the fact that the provincial government led by the Parti Québécois is not a party to several key actions, because it considers them to be exclusively within provincial areas of responsibility. On a left-right spectrum the party also sends a mixed message. It sometimes claims a social democratic identity, but under the leadership of Lucien Bouchard (an ex-Cabinet Minister in the Mulroney government) and even with Bernard Landry at the helm, it very frequently lines up on the same side in policy debates as does Ontario... led throughout these years by Mike Harris.

Liberals in British Columbia, the third large province to fall into the hands of convinced and ideologically pure neo-liberals. As the citizenship regime has been re-designed, via key new initiatives such as the SUFA, the National Child Benefit, and considerations for privatizing health care, these provinces' preferences about *what* to do (rights and responsibilities), about *who* should do it (the role of markets, communities, families and the state), and about *governance* (whether public or private service delivery, for example) have gained significant purchase.

A *third factor* that needs to be included in this account of why the Canadian citizenship regime has tilted to the right is the international policy climate. Through the 1980s and a good part of the 1990s, neo-liberalism dominated the policy thinking of international organizations as well as national governments. Ideas about the need for budget controls, a less active state, increased rates of labour force participation and so on were prompted by institutions such as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). While it would be inappropriate to claim that Canadian policy-makers simply succumbed to the OECD's version of neo-liberalism (Boychuk 2001), it is worth noting that in the 1980s Canadian policy was frequently criticized by that international think tank, a shaming mechanism effective in some policy circles.

There are, moreover, structural reasons that open Canada to influence by external policy communities more than some other large public services and governments. First, as a small country with its bureaucratic capacity dispersed over 11 governments, Canada has always been a "policy taker." The *Beveridge Report* was imported to Canada via the wartime *Marsh Report*, a document that provided much of the ideational coherence in the post-1945 citizenship regime, alongside other home-grown studies such as the Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission. Then, in the 1980s and 1990s the influence of the New Public Management, together with privatization of public services, contracting-out and downsizing, meant that the federal bureaucracy lost a good deal of its capacity to generate innovative policy thinking (Bakvis 2000). In addition, the country self-identifies as a "good international citizen," and therefore has been an enthusiastic participant in international organizations, from the United Nations to the OECD, many of which have been leaders in developing policy analysis around activation, child poverty, the new economy and so on.

In such a situation, it is to be expected that international connections and processes of transnational policy learning will take on particular significance. As Keith Banting has said (1997: 268), in the current period of re-structuring in Canada:

"There has been no comprehensive blueprint of a new social contract, no equivalent of the Marsh report to provide an integrated vision of the ways in which the economic and social imperatives of the contemporary era should be reconciled. Indeed, to the extent that such

visions have been articulated, they have tended to come from international organizations such as the OECD rather than national advisory bodies."

To paraphrase Banting, it seems that the "world," is becoming an increasingly influential source of policy ideas for redesigning the citizenship regime in Canada.

Of course the *fourth factor* that needs to be taken into account in understanding the rightward tilt of Canada's new citizenship regime is the configuration of party politics that began with the creation of the Reform Party in 1986. The rise of this right-wing populist party institutionalized a political movement committed to significant alterations in the citizenship regime. As David Laycock (2002: 4) points out with respect to the dimensions of rights and of access, there are:

"[…] two general reasons why we should take the Reform and Alliance parties seriously. One is that they are the newly relevant parties of the right, determined to wean Canadians from their dependence on the post-war welfare state. The other is that they are the principle vehicles of a movement that has the potential to reconfigure democratic politics in Canada through its redefinition of concepts such as freedom, equality, justice, pluralism, tolerance and citizenship."

His detailed analysis (Laycock 2002: chapter 4) provides an overview of the changes proposed. In these policy proposals, we find reasons why brokerage parties such as the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals were at risk of having their support siphoned off by a party of principle on their right.

The challenge was particularly great for the PCs, because of their self-identification as conservatives, and the difficulty they have had throughout their history in dealing with one of the major policy issues upon which Reform focused, that is the place of Quebec in Canada. The years of "constitutional politics," launched in 1988 with the Meech Lake Accord and through the Charlottetown referendum in 1992, gave Preston Manning adequate opportunity to type such intergovernmental agreements as a "Mulroney deal" (Dabbs 1997: 169). This issue was easily coupled with a strong appeal to anti-central Canada sentiment long rampant in the West, and then focused dramatically by the decision to give the CF-18 maintenance contract to Montreal's Bombardier corporation rather than to Bristol Aerospace in Winnipeg (Simpson 2001: 99; Dabbs 1997: 119). And finally, Reform's economic and social policy attracted many committed neo-conservatives who had been voting for the PCs. The 1988 election taught an important lesson to Reform (Dabbs 1997: 137):

"Its natural constituency had two ideological boundaries: the Constitution – Western federalism and Senate reform – had been the draw, but the people who'd come in were a new breed of conservative. Reform was, apparently, the natural home of neoconservatives, Canadians interested solely in balancing budgets and paying off public debt by cutting the role and size of government. Almost at once, the neoconservative influence – a form of single-issue politics that he wanted to avoid – made the party less inclusive than Manning

had originally envisioned it. Because social conservatives and neoconservatives had a symbiotic relationship, the party drew in strong interest groups with an agenda of social-issues reform."

While this may not always have been all to the liking of Reform's leader, Preston Manning,[19] it did represent a significant challenge to the other party on the right, the PCs. The Mulroney Conservatives therefore adapted policy stances which were less than coherently neo-liberal, promising new spending and finding it hard to reduce the deficit. They had to ensure they could maintain their centralist supporters, those who remained after the neo-conservatives moved to Reform. Therefore, for example, in 1988 the government announced a quite generous day care policy, involving new expenditures and tax deductions.[20] In addition, while "Finance had been trying to turn CAP into a block grant, a fund with pre-set limits like EPF, since the 1970s"[21] (Greenspon/Wilson-Smith 1996: 231), the Mulroney government refused to take this dramatic step toward redesigning the CAP (Canada Assistance Plan – the major federal contribution to provincial spending in a wide range of social policy programmes). It decided on a more moderate (but politically very controversial) strategy of "capping CAP."[22]

In other words, it was left to the other brokerage party, the Liberals, to accomplish what the Conservatives had been unable to do and to make the changes that many neo-liberals, both within the public service and in politics, had been promoting for years. Within a year of winning the 1993 election the Minister of Finance had issued *A New Framework for Economic Policy*, hailed as a successor to the election campaign *Red Book*.[23] It provided a vision of a less interventionary state, certainly of a a state more reluctant to spend than previously, and of markets as useful locales for making key

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19   Manning tried to avoid the label of being right-wing, claiming his agenda was "ideologically neutral" (Dabbs 1997: 138). For example, in the 1990 anti-Meech Lake campaign: "Some of the orthodox right-wing conservatives noticed that Manning was going out of his way to talk about politically neutral populism and reform. 'We are neither left nor right,' Manning frequently said" (Dabbs 1997: 155).

20   The promises were not implemented, because of lack of agreement among advocates in this policy field.

21   In addition, as part of the social policy by stealth practices, CAP was being weakened throughout the 1980s and changes introduced to the principles under which it functioned, so as to make it more market-friendly (Moscovitch 1988).

22   The effects of this decision were sometimes quite perverse, and therefore had a significant influence on the second factor discussed in this paper, intergovernmental relations. As Greenspon and Wilson-Smith (1996: 231) correctly summarize the situation: "In Ontario's case, the so-called cap on CAP ultimately led to the anomaly whereby Ottawa contributed only twenty-eight cents on the dollar for a welfare mom living in Ottawa versus fifty cents for the one across the river in Hull. The arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the cap had poisoned federal-provincial relations."

23   This was often referred to as the *Purple Book*, which was the colour of its cover. Several observed that the colour purple is made by combining red and blue (blue being the traditional Conservative campaign colour) (Greenspon/Wilson-Smith 1996: 195f.).

choices. The strongest fiscal conservatives in the Chrétien government, John Manley and Paul Martin, were the key actors in the 1994 Program Review that brought a major redesign of the way the federal government would function and spend (Greenspon/Wilson-Smith 1996: 209, chapter 14). Public sector jobs were cut, policy capacity diminished and contracting for advice as well as services used as preferred policy tool (Bakvis 2000). This was followed, as we documented above, by the even more radical changes in intergovernmental relations and governance practices, prompted by the choice of the CHST as the instrument for transferring funds to the provinces.

The consolidation of the new citizenship regime, begun by the neo-liberal Mulroney Conservatives and continued by the neo-liberals in the Liberal party elected in 1993, was then underway.

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Looking Back: The Emergence of Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Canadian West and their Performance in Government[1]

Dagmar Eberle

Challenges out of the West – (De-)Constructing Continuities

Throughout the 20th century, structural changes to the Canadian party system generally originated in the West. The western provinces have served as a stage for the emergence of third parties like the CCF and Social Credit in the 1930s (Schultze 1997: 286). In the late 1980s and 1990s, the re-enactment of that play brought a new contender to federal politics, which fundamentally altered the nature of Canadian conservatism. The Reform Party, now the Canadian Alliance, superseded the venerable Progressive Conservative Party as main force of the political right and propelled an ideological shift in the direction of neo-conservatism.

Not only in its disruptive effect on the party system, but also in terms of style and content, Reform is often seen as carrying on western political tradition. Commentators draw a direct line to the spirit and the ideas of earlier populist movements that arose in the West (Dobbin 1991: 12ff.; Sharpe/Braid 1992: 7). Particularly the Alberta Social Credit League, the party led by Ernest Manning between 1943 and 1968, is regularly portrayed as having provided the mould and much of the ideological inspiration for the movement founded by his son Preston. Therefore, a look at the ideological orientations of Social Credit in the major policy areas of economic and social policy, and at its record in office, can make a valuable contribution to our analysis of the mutations and meanderings of conservatism in Canada.

Social Credit has often been characterized as an outlier to the political mainstream in Canada (cf. Finkel 1989; Harrison 1995; Macpherson 1953). Assessing the party's performance against the backdrop of national policy currents, this paper argues that it is not justified to dismiss Social Credit as a band of western reactionaries or "intellectually challenged" farmers. Its formation ties in with a critical juncture in Canadian politics: the rise of the Keynesian welfare state. Although after 1940 it often publicly articulated a strong ideological opposition to the development of the welfare state, initially Social Credit advanced the principle of greater state responsibility for individual welfare well before the traditional parties. From the end of the Second

World War until the mid-1960s, Social Credit governed as a pragmatic conservative party which introduced various reasonably generous social policies. During these years, Social Credit governments in Alberta and British Columbia exhibited a strong degree of conformity in their policy-making that was supported by their own commitment to social security, but effectively reinforced by the national welfare state regime and its public philosophy. The Reform Party, however, is a product of the next major transformation of thinking about political governance, in which Social Credit only had a small part to play. Therefore, to see a direct continuity between the two parties means to overstate the parallels in their outlook and to underestimate the difference in the ideological and political contexts to which they are wedded.

Populist Parties and Ideologies

The common denominator of the movements brought forth by the West is their populist character. Yet, populism is a frequently applied, but extremely vague analytical concept. Urban mass movements in Third World countries and the political organizations of North American farmers both have been called populist. Also, the term has been used to describe the style of democratic leaders as Ronald Reagan and John Diefenbaker as well as that of dictators like Juan Peron in Argentina. The widespread habit to detect populism in "any folksy appeal to the 'average guy'" (Laycock 1990: 15) practically reduced the concept to a mere technique of mass mobilization and legitimization. Among the welter of definitions, a reasonable approach has been proposed by Peter Sinclair. In his view, populism "stresses the worth of the common people and advocates their political supremacy," exhibits a "desire for direct democracy" and directs its protest "against some group which lies outside the local society" (Sinclair 1979: 74f.). Hence, populism expresses an anti-elitist, conflictual approach to politics. As an analytic concept, it does not denote a substantive political ideology. Rather, it can be seen as an argumentative pattern that constructs an antagonistic relationship between "the people" – conceptualized as harmonious entity – and potent social actors, and consequently demands a redistribution of political and socio-economic power. In the formation of a populist movement, this discourse on power structures becomes amalgamated with a dominant ideology, be it liberalism, conservatism or socialism.

   As a variant of political thought characterized by a strong antiestablishment flavour, populism naturally resonates with the general sentiment of a region that has seen its economic and political interests neglected by the federal government for decades. Not surprisingly, academic writings tended to interpret Social Credit and its left-wing contemporary, the Co-

operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), primarily as vehicles of regional discontent expressing the interests of western farmers vs. eastern big business (e.g. Arsenau 1994; Lipset 1968; Macpherson 1953). Especially the older literature treated the Social Credit ideology with barely concealed disdain. The unbiased reader is inclined to agree with Edward Bell's statement that "ridiculing Social Credit is a socially acceptable academic pastime" (Bell 1993: 147). Macpherson's "Democracy in Alberta," the most prominent example of that intellectual game, basically suggested that Social Credit constituted an aberration of a predominantly *petit-bourgeois* electorate led astray by its false consciousness (Macpherson 1953). The regressive and irrational image of a party far off from the Canadian norm that was painted by these early studies proved to be highly influential and durable, although more recently scholars like David Laycock (1990) and Edward Bell (1993) provided modifications of that picture for the early years of the movement.

When trying to place Social Credit within the evolution of Canadian conservatism and the broader political landscape, the focus on class structures applied by much of the work on populist movements is not very helpful. This kind of analysis is prone to reductionist conclusions since it conceives political behaviour and belief systems primarily as dependent variables to be explained by analyzing macro-level socio-economic structures (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 10f.). If we accept that human agency also constitutes an independent variable in policy analysis, we have to take the interpretative frameworks of social and political actors at their own merit and give credit to the "power of public ideas" (Reich 1988) that influence the way in which these actors define their interests. As Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, two leading proponents of the neo-institutionalist school, point out, this means to trace how factors such as conceptions of interests, shared views on state and society, policy ideas, preferences and societal contexts interact with institutional structures to generate policy outcomes (Thelen/Steinmo 1992).

Particular positions on political issues can only be fully appreciated with respect to the prevailing public philosophy, i.e. the general consensus on the appropriate role of government and the goals and instruments of public policy. In the words of Samuel H. Beer, a public philosophy is "an outlook on public affairs which is accepted within a nation by a wide coalition and which serves to give definition to problems and direction to government policies dealing with them" (Beer 1978: 5). It provides the base for a specific "pattern of political intervention" (Harris/Milkis 1989: 24), a regime that shapes the relationship between the state, markets and communities. Such a public policy regime is marked by an interconnected set of ideas – both in the sense of this broad outlook and of programmatic concepts bound to it –, institutional frameworks and policies of state intervention. These configurations – be it a minimal state regime or a welfare state regime – should constitute the backdrop of an analysis of the "Social Credit Phenomenon" (Finkel 1989).

To assess Social Credit's outsider image, a three-step approach suggests itself. First, the ideological orientations and policy outputs of Social Credit are discussed by considering whether they are exceptional in comparison to the prevailing pattern of state intervention in Canada. This overview provides the basis for an examination of the opportunities and constraints shaping Social Credit's performance as a government party. Lastly, it is asked how conservative Social Credit actually was. The review of policy and ideology focuses on two fields that are central to modern governments: social and economic policies. Since Social Credit only came to power in two western provinces, the paper presents a comparative account of the respective agendas pursued by the Social Credit governments in Alberta, where the party governed from 1935 to 1971, and in British Columbia, where it held office from 1952 to 1972 and from 1975 to 1991.

The Early Years – Social Credit's "Schizophrenic Period"

Looking for a Way out of Disaster

The Social Credit League was an offspring of the Great Depression of the 1930s that hit the West, especially the prairies, hardest of all parts of Canada (Brodie 1990: 142; Conway 1994: 98ff.). Even before, Alberta's economy had been unstable and burdened by volatile resource prices and high private and public debt loads (Finkel 1989: 15ff.). Social Credit ideas had already been disseminated in Alberta by prominent farmer activists for more than a decade when William Aberhart, a Calgary high school principal and talented lay preacher, started to build a mass movement upon that basis in the early 1930's (Irving 1959: 145ff.). The Social Credit doctrine which had originally been developed by British engineer Major C.H. Douglas seemed to offer a ready diagnosis as well as a remedy for the pressing economic and social problems of the time. In essence, it comprised a socio-economic theory that tried to explain the functioning and the flaws of the modern capitalist system. Its centrepiece was a program of monetary reform.

Douglas' basic premise was that contemporary industrial societies did not suffer from a lack of production, but from a chronic deficiency of purchasing power, because the total price of all goods necessarily surpassed the aggregate income of consumers (Bell 1993; Hesketh 1997; Irving 1959; Macpherson 1953). Accordingly, demand and supply had to be brought into balance by boosting purchasing power. Social credit meant introducing a currency substitute that was to be circulated parallel to the normal monetary system. Consumers would receive additional income in form of social credit divi-

dends, while producers would receive subsidies to lower their prices. These efforts to stimulate demand would be complemented by price controls. Douglas argued that, to implement the social credit program, the government had to strip the banks of their monopoly over credit creation, which they used to arbitrarily limit the amount of credit so as to increase their power over private and public debtors.

If one leaves aside the logical deficiencies and the authoritarian undertones of the theory for a moment, its appeal to a society that was plagued by debts yet not inhibited by traditional political ties becomes evident. Aberhart drew up a specific social credit scheme for Alberta (Bell 1993; Elliot/Miller 1987; Macpherson 1953). Central to his plan was a monthly basic dividend of $ 25 payable to every citizen in the form of credit. Under a social credit regime, experts would fix the price of goods as well as minimum and maximum wages. The newly founded party's main message in the election campaign of 1935 was that the monthly dividend plus fair prices and wages would provide social and economic security to everyone (Laycock 1990)

Obviously, Social Credit's program was highly interventionist by the standards of prevailing economic orthodoxy. By putting a strong emphasis on the equitable benefits accruing from the social credit scheme, the Alberta movement gave the pro-capitalist philosophy a leftist flavour. Aberhart's conception of Douglas' idea of the "just price" clearly demonstrates this concern for social justice. He held that producers were inflating prices so as to earn excessive profits. The government would tax away these excessive profits by imposing a levy on each product, and the income generated thereby would help to pay for the dividends (Bell 1993: 63f.; Elliot/Miller 1987: 154f.; Hesketh 1997: 59). Other planks in the Social Credit platform such as the commitment to the "ultimate introduction of State Medicine" also point to the left-leaning tendencies of the early Social Credit movement (Elliot/Miller 1987: 195; Finkel 1989: 31ff.). While Douglas had identified Finance as the main enemy, Aberhart extended the attacks to rich industrialists and monopolists. In the 1935 campaign he repeatedly denounced the (eastern) Canadian establishment as the "Fifty Big Shots of Canada" (Hesketh 1997: 47).

The First Social Credit Government

For a variety of reasons, the social credit dividends never materialized, after the Social Credit League came to power in 1935. Test runs with currency substitutes – so-called prosperity certificates were introduced in 1936 – met with a lack of public enthusiasm and intense opposition from business and banks (Bell 1993; Hesketh 1997). Upon having assumed office, Aberhart and his cabinet showed few signs of proceeding aggressively with establishing the promised scheme. They were unclear as to how a social credit system could

be put to work in Alberta, especially since the constitutional validity of any such measures was highly doubtful (Hesketh 1997; Mallory 1954). The regulation of money and credit lay solely with the federal government. Furthermore, Social Credit had taken over a government that was close to insolvency. The new premier stated that the financial situation of the province had to be stabilized before social credit could be introduced (Barr 1974: 91; Bell 1993: 111). Yet, in 1937, an insurgency led by more militant and less patient members of the Social Credit caucus forced the cabinet to take action. Three radical acts designed to bring the banks and their credit policies under complete provincial control were passed, although Aberhart and his advisers seemed to be aware that these laws would probably not withstand the test of constitutionality (Elliot/Miller 1987; Hesketh 1997; Mallory 1954). By embarking on such a confrontational course, the government could shift the blame for failing to deliver on its promises to outside forces. Ottawa did not hesitate to disallow all three acts. In 1938, the Supreme Court declared all the legislation aimed at implementing social credit *ultra vires* of the province (Mallory 1954). Thereafter, Aberhart and his ministers refrained from further efforts to make the centrepiece of their ideology a reality in the province

Much of the government's debt legislation suffered the same fate (Barr 1974; Mallory 1954). Yet, Social Credit's efforts to alleviate the heavy debt load of Albertans showed that the promises to better the lot of the "common people" were more than empty campaign rhetoric (Laycock 1990: 263). Legislative measures provided for debt moratoria and for limits on interest rates and on the repayment of old debts (Elliot/Miller 1987: 247; Hesketh 1997: 128). Public debts were approached in a similarly radical fashion: the government defaulted on provincial bonds and unilaterally cut interest rates on its debt (Conway 1994: 119f.; Dyck 1991: 304).

Likewise, in other areas of social and economic policy not directly related to monetary reform, the government displayed a considerable reform orientation during its first term. Examples are Canada's first male minimum wages introduced in 1936, an Hours of Work Act establishing maximum working times which was passed in the same year, the most advanced trade union act of the country that gave labour collective bargaining rights (1938) and a bill regulating qualifications of tradesmen, also from 1936 (Barr 1974: 92; Bell 1993: 112; Conway 1994: 123; Elliot/Miller 1987: 235; Finkel 1989: 43). In order to prevent "destructive competition" and inhumane working conditions, the minister of trade and industry, Ernest Manning, set out to establish "new-deal"-like codes for particular industries that regulated pricing, hours of work, advertising and other matters (Barr 1974: 92; Finkel 1989: 44). Also noteworthy were Social Credit's achievements in other important policy fields: the education system was modernized, and subsidized hospital treatment introduced for maternity and for needy polio, TB, and cancer patients (Elliot/Miller 1987: 235; Finkel 1989: 43, 92).

Thus, while not living up to the high "degree of de-commodification" (Esping-Andersen 1990) inherent in the dividend scheme which would have led to a significant de-coupling of individual livelihood from market outcomes, Social Credit's economic and social policies did promote the interests of farmers, workers and small businessmen. However, the approach to the still pressing problem of unemployment showed another, hardly generous but more free-market-oriented side of the government. Whereas the federal government closed its relief camps for the single unemployed in 1936, the Social Credit government carried on the provincial camps. Furthermore, it imposed tight rules for eligibility to relief. When the economy started to recover, relief for the unemployed employable was discontinued entirely (Finkel 1989: 52ff.).

In view of the dire financial circumstances of the province, Social Credit steered a decidedly conservative course in fiscal policy with balanced budgets, cost-cutting and tax rises. This was reflected in the stance that the introduction of new government programs hinged upon their affordability out of current revenues (Hesketh 1997: 174). Coupled with a general preference for private ownership, the government's goal of provincial development which required a certain cooperation with business also helped to tone down the economic radicalism over time, especially after repeated defeats at the hands of the Supreme Court and the federal government (Finkel 1989: 45ff.; Hesketh 1997: 196).

In the run-up to the next election which was held in 1940, Aberhart did not commit himself to setting up a social credit scheme. The party's campaign emphasized its record of "good, honest government,"the provision of social services, and the alleged connections of the opposition parties to either big business interests or corrupt trade unions (Barr 1974; Bell 1993; Caldarola 1979; Hesketh 1997). What remained from the enthusiasm about credit and monetary reform, was a network of provincial quasi-banks, the so-called "Treasury Branches," which handled deposits and loans (Barr 1974: 114; Finkel 1989: 46).

The Break from the Minimal State Regime

Throughout most of the literature, the early Social Credit has been characterized as a *petit-bourgeois* movement, and the explanatory value of this label has long been taken for granted. Generally, two propositions flow from this. The first states a nexus between social status and ideology: being small capitalists themselves, the members of the *petite bourgeoisie* are wedded to the capitalist system, especially to the institution of property rights, and therefore not capable of truly radical political action (Macpherson 1953; Naylor 1972; Sinclair 1979). The second proposition is not always spelled out clearly.

More as an undercurrent, it is suggested that the ideas emanating from *petit-bourgeois* movements are not to be taken seriously because the *petite bourgeoisie* lacks a proper understanding of socio-economic macro-structures. In Macpherson's words, "the history of *petit-bourgeois* political thought and action has been a history of oscillation and confusion" (1953: 226f.). This notion is reinforced by cultural differences springing from the regional cleavage between Western and Central Canada.

In the light of more recent analysis, the *petit-bourgeois* label has to be repudiated with respect to Social Credit's class base (Bell 1993). Similarly, the social credit philosophy – in either its Douglas or its Alberta version – cannot be simply dismissed as "conservatism inherent in *petit-bourgeois* agrarian radicalism" (Macpherson 1953: 220).

With respect to economic and social policy, the early Social Credit movement expressed a dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs that could be found all over Canada. For the years of the Great Depression and the war witnessed a slow process of intellectual disengagement from a public philosophy characterized by orthodox economics and a narrow view on state responsibility for individual well-being. This would eventually lead to a new post-war consensus: the Keynesian welfare state. Despite its flaws, the thrust of social credit doctrine was similar to Keynes' theory in stressing the necessity to stimulate aggregate demand. In that respect, the theory constituted an "intellectual advance relative to contemporary economic orthodoxy" (Richards/Pratt 1979: 33). Keynes himself acknowledged that. He wrote:

"Since [World War I] there has been a spate of heretical theories of under-consumption, of which those of Major Douglas are the most famous. [...] Major Douglas is entitled to claim, as against some of his orthodox adversaries, that he at least has not been wholly oblivious of the outstanding problem of our economic system." (quoted in Richards/Pratt 1979: 33)

Furthermore, it is worth remembering that, at the time, controls of wages, prices and production were not unusual as instruments of economic policy. Such measures were assigned a central role in the US efforts to bring about economic stability with the New Deal (Eisner et al. 2000: 38).

In contrast to the social policy regime prevalent up to the 1930s which offered only very limited programs of "poor relief," the early Social Credit's pledge "to secure for each and every citizen of this province [...] permanent social and economic security" (quoted in Macpherson 1953: 206) accentuated the norms of equity and social justice (Laycock 1990). In that sense, the social credit ideology displayed a comparatively progressive quality, which pointed forward to the general acceptance of a greater state responsibility for the basic welfare of citizens. The labour, debt and social legislation that Social Credit passed during its first mandate had not much to do with Douglas' teachings, but, in David Laycock's words, these acts "were generous by the standards of contemporary Canadian governments. Indeed, the market inter-

ventions Aberhart's government attempted during its first term made it look very welfare-statist compared to the federal state" (Laycock 1990: 243). In contrast to the orthodox wisdom of the time, Aberhart and Manning followed a remarkably interventionist course that did not greatly endear them to the business world.

Yet, even in the early years, Social Credit's progressive inclination had its limits, circumscribed by perceived financial necessities, ideological preferences and institutional constraints. That is why, in his study on the "Social Credit Phenomenon," Alvin Finkel characterized the party's first term in office as a "Schizophrenic Period:" "The first Social Credit administration, from 1935 to 1940, had two personalities. One was reform-minded and anti-corporate; the other was economy-minded and appeasing towards the corporate sector" (Finkel 1989: 41).

Manning, Bennett and the Welfare State Regime

The Manning Years in Alberta – from Rags to Riches

When Aberhart died in 1943, Ernest Manning succeeded him, taking over a government that had become increasingly pragmatic. His 1944 election campaign clearly signalled a conservative turn of the Social Credit party: the anti-big business rhetoric of the early years was replaced by attacks on socialism and the CCF. The ideological void that had grown out of the failure to implement a social credit scheme was filled with a pronounced endorsement of the capitalist free enterprise system. This shift was framed as "fight against the evils inherent in the other side of the coin of free enterprise – a state monopoly would be just as bad as a private monopoly" (Caldarola 1979: 43).

The days of Social Credit as a missionary for monetary reform were coming to an end. As the war brought prosperity back to Alberta, the need to boost purchasing power abated (Hesketh 1997: 223; Mallory 1954: 154; Pal 1992: 16). Likewise, the government shed whatever progressive zeal it had during its early years. Manning's handling of the new-found wealth of the province clearly demonstrated that. For in 1947, a huge oil field was discovered in the province. Alberta's oil was high-cost, and the province lacked capital as well as technical expertise to exploit the resource. Due to these constraints and to his aversion to public ownership, Manning sought to encourage the large, multinational oil companies to take over development. The province's contribution would consist of providing political stability and a good business climate (Barr 1974: 139f.; Richards/Pratt 1979: 83f.). Social Credit's approach to resource extraction was protective of private interests,

yet marked by extensive regulation of the whole process by the Oil and Gas Conservation Board (Pratt 1977: 144).

Although criticized as "rentier mentality" (Richards/Pratt 1979: 156), the strategy of promotional regulation provided the government with a seemingly never-ending stream of revenues most of which was used for a generally high level of social services in education, health and public welfare and above-average investments into infrastructure development (Dyck 1991; Smith 2001). Among the more notable initiatives of the "people programs" was the construction of a chain of "Senior Citizens' Lodges" across the province in the 1950s (Barr 1974: 134). In 1966, a Bill of Rights prohibiting various forms of discrimination was passed, as well as reforms of the welfare system which, among other things, promoted day care centres for children of working mothers and counselling services (Canadian Annual Review 1967; Dyck 1991).

However, Alberta's health and welfare programs generally reflected the notion that direct state assistance should concentrate on those in need instead of universal coverage. Since the late 1940s, the province fully sponsored health care costs for specific groups of patients like old-age pensioners and recipients of mothers' allowance as well as in the case of maternity, cancer and TB. In the early 1960s, it set up a medicare plan with subsidies for those who could not pay private insurance premiums, but it vehemently opposed the introduction of universal medicare by the federal government (Dyck 1991; Finkel 1989). Nonetheless, as Alvin Finkel noted, its overflowing coffers allowed the province to satisfy the expectations of various groups without resorting to openly redistributive programs (Finkel 1989: 159). The premier subscribed to a trickling-down theory, arguing that economic growth was much more effective in combating poverty than any redistributive program which would not increase the aggregate income (Finkel 1989). In his view, incentives for individual advancement should not be interfered with unduly. Corresponding with this conservative outlook were low rates of individual and corporate taxes and the continuation of a pay-as-you-go policy (Long/Quo 1978; Smith 2001).

Social Credit in BC – Hopeful Candidate in Search of a Party

In 1952, a second Social Credit government was elected in British Columbia. A Social Credit movement had been active on the West Coast since the mid-1930s, but it never made much headway in elections until W.A.C. Bennett, a former Conservative MLA, assumed control of the party (Blake 1985; Mitchell 1983). "[...] Bennett's party [...] had nothing to do with Social Credit doctrine [...] The party had most to do with making Bennett premier," an observer aptly summed up this takeover (Conway 1994: 173). Echoing Manning's slogans in Alberta, Bennett placed his campaign under the motto "free

enterprise versus socialism" (Blake 1985: 20). The 1952 Social Credit program was a melange of pro-business policies and reformist proposals like expanding health and social services, increasing old-age pensions and encouraging co-operatives (Mitchell 1983).

BC's first Social Credit premier stated as the government's goal: "to secure for every citizen an unfettered opportunity to obtain, through his own initiative and enterprise, a share of the material abundance of our vast resources" (quoted in Mitchell 1983: 207). Similar to Alberta, the new government saw rapid resource development mostly through large, multinational corporations as the road to prosperity (Black 1986; Howlett/Brownsey 1996; Mitchell 1983). Therefore, one aspect of economic policy was the creation of attractive conditions through tax concessions, low royalties, mild regulations and so on. The other focus lay on infrastructure development. Bennett launched massive construction programs. Roads, bridges, and railways were built to provide access to BC's resources, especially in the northern and central interior regions of the province (Dyck 1991; Mitchell 1983).

However, compared to Alberta, the BC government adopted a more activist stance in pursuit of economic growth. In fact, Bennett can be considered as the first modern "province-builder" (Blake 1985; Dyck 1991; Mitchell 1983). Particularly with his projects to open up the northern and central Interior, he set pace and direction for economic development and he did not hesitate to employ public ownership as instrument of economic policy when the private sector failed to live up to his plans. For example, his government took over a private ferry operation in 1961 and used this as the basis for creating an extensive BC Ferries crown corporation. Also in 1961, Bennett's government 'nationalized' BC Electric to become the powerful crown corporation BC Hydro.

In BC, Social Credit chose to channel the generally high revenues produced by a prospering economy into economic more than social development. Only in the 1960s did education, health and welfare surpass infrastructure as spending priorities (Mitchell 1983: 355). But the provincial welfare state was largely erected under Social Credit's reign, at the same time that such construction was occurring in all other Canadian provinces. For example, among the social policy measures adopted between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s were the establishment of a social housing corporation and a human rights commission and the introduction of a medicare plan that accommodated low-income groups – all of which were typical of contemporary Canadian provincial government policy. As for the philosophy underlying social policy, once more, parallels to Alberta could be discerned. The BC government saw the state responsible for providing social security, especially for the less fortunate, while professing an ideological bias towards the merit of personal initiative (Prince 1996).

The Golden Era of the Welfare State

In the post-war period up to the 1970s, the two Social Credit regimes became "'socially aware' conservative government[s]," adding a social conscience to private enterprise economics (Conway 1994: 159; Sharpe/Braid 1992: 24). Their style of government was decorated with ardent, sometimes hysterical attacks against socialism and "state collectivism." This rhetorical fervour prompted scholars like Alvin Finkel or Trevor Harrison to classify Social Credit as ultraconservative and therefore outside the national consensus of the post-war era (cf. Harrison 1995: 33; Finkel 1989: 4, 157). Especially Alberta earned itself a "reputation as an island paradise of free enterprise in a Canadian sea of interventionism" (Tupper/Gibbins 1992: xxv). But it seems highly questionable that the actual performance of both governments warrants such labels.

In the post-war years, most of the federal welfare state was constructed under the auspices of the Liberal Party. The Conservative Party did not reverse any of these measures during its short time in office in the late 1950s and early 1960s although its members tended to voice opposition to "Liberal Statism" and – like Social Credit – to argue for social security programs targeted to the needy (Haddow 1993; Perlin 1985; Taylor 1978). As Gosta Esping-Anderson has shown, different types of welfare state regimes have sprung from the diffusion of "a greater sense of public responsibility for individual economic security and welfare," to use Prime Minister Mackenzie King's formulation (quoted in Taylor 1978: 50). If we apply Esping-Anderson's categories, Social Credit's approach might be characterized as more liberal than the general Canadian philosophy. The latter exhibits a considerable degree of universalism that manifests itself in the area of health care (Schiller 1994: 45f.). But in social security, Canada fits the liberal regime-type which is marked by means-tested assistance and only modest universal or social insurance benefits (Esping-Anderson 1990: 26). Thus, Social Credit's disinclination for universal programs indicates a difference in degree, not in kind, between its approach and the governance philosophies of other provincial or federal governments.

Both Social Credit governments accepted state responsibility for the array of public services in health, education and social assistance usually associated with the coming of the welfare state, even though they did so grudgingly sometimes, and with major cost-sharing by the federal governments in these program areas. The expansion of social services after 1945 was very much driven by the dynamics of the federal-provincial relationship. "'Left' versus 'Right' has not been a salient characteristic of federal-provincial conflict, largely because at this level there has been substantial consensus among the governments" (Simeon 1972: 169). Generally speaking, Alberta and BC willingly participated in the cost-shared programs set up in the 1950s.

As mentioned before, a major conflict arose between Alberta and the federal government when the national medicare plan was introduced in the 1960s. But while it was the last holdout, Alberta was not the only province to argue against a universal, government-financed program (Taylor 1978: 186; 366ff.). It should also be noted that it was only after its introduction that universal health care came to assume an important place in the Canadian mindset. In a poll conducted in 1965, 52 per cent of the respondents stated their preference for a voluntary instead of a compulsory program (Taylor 1978: 367). In contrast to the disagreement on health care, Alberta did not oppose the other major universal program of the decade, the Canada Pension Plan (Finkel 1989: 154). And a study on the development of the 1966 Canada Assistance Plan reports harmonious and cooperative interactions between federal officials and Alberta administrators and office holders who strongly supported the evolving scheme (Splane 1985: 177ff.).

If Social Credit was indeed ultraconservative during this period, that did not show in any commitment to minimal government, as the spending habits of both governments demonstrate. According to comparative statistics for all Canadian provinces, Alberta's real per capita expenditure on health care ($/Person) between 1957 and 1972 was continuously well above the national average, BC's expenditure was generally on average (Simeon/Miller 1980: 253ff.). As for expenditures on social welfare, both provinces showed levels of spending above or at least around the national average. The rankings of expenditure on education see Alberta on the top of the field throughout most of the period, with BC close behind until a sharp drop in the late 1960s. Overall, the two governments were big spenders, as their comparatively high rankings in the area of social expenditures indicate. In 1967, Alberta spent $446 per person on public services, while the national average was $333 (Long/Quo 1978: 7). Yet, as outlined earlier, the Manning government chose to concentrate its spending on specific parts of the population, like students, old people and particular groups of sick people (cf. Finkel 1989). Thus, it was very generous towards selected groups, while rejecting a broadly redistributive approach to spending.

Alberta and BC were also criticized for their rentier approach to resource development which, according to an observer, could be described as follows: "give away the resources; build the infrastructure to allow their exploitation; and watch the province grow" (Conway 1994: 184). While the older Bennett had already anticipated certain strategies of province-building, his philosophy of economic development also reflected the view that resource exploitation and development should be left to the private sector (Brodie 1990; Chandler 1983). Yet, one should not overlook that this view was generally shared by the Canadian provinces until the 1970s, the heyday of province-building.

In terms of fiscal policy, both governments stuck to the orthodox, pre-Keynesian principle of balanced budgets, albeit with different implications.

Alberta was rich, but still haunted by the "debt ridden days of the past," as the provincial treasurer put it (Canadian Annual Review 1966: 185). It could afford to forego extensive deficit financing. BC resorted to creative book-keeping practices: public debts were shifted to semi-independent government agencies (Dyck 1991: 571; Robin 1978: 54). Altogether, the course of both Social Credit governments could be described as conservative pragmatism. Within the Canadian post-war consensus, they placed themselves to the right, but their post-war economic and social policies did not stray significantly from the mainstream pattern of state intervention.

Family Affairs – the Rise of Neo-Conservatism and Its Philosophy of Limited Government

Manning & Manning – Fast Forward to the Future

In the late 1960s, it became obvious that Social Credit had trouble keeping up with the ongoing changes in values and lifestyles. A resolution from the 1964 Alberta Social Credit Convention contended that "there is strong evidence of Socialism creeping into government today" (quoted in Finkel 1989: 161). Hence, Ernest Manning set out to renew the party's ideological basis so as to stem the leftist tide. He was helped by his son Preston in the effort to adapt conservative thinking to social issues of the time like poverty, and discrimination against women, native people and other marginalized groups (Dobbin 1991). The first step was a "White Paper on Human Resources Development," co-authored by Preston, which was tabled in the Alberta legislature shortly before the 1967 provincial election (Barr 1974). It argued in a highly technocratic language for using the principles of free enterprise and the efficacy of the private sector in order to solve social problems.

While this document was more geared to the Alberta context, a book written by the father-son-duo that was published in the same year aimed at the national arena. Titled "Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians," it maintained that the major federal parties – the Liberals and the Conservatives – had become ideologically indistinguishable. To provide the voters with real political alternatives, the Mannings called for an ideological realignment that would place a reorganized Progressive Conservative Party firmly on the right of the political spectrum. This party would unite all conservative forces of the country on the basis of "social conservatism:" It would promote "a new political ideology which will harness the energies of a free enterprise-private economic sector to the task of attaining many of the social goals which humanitarian socialists have long advocated" (quoted in

Sharpe/Braid 1992: 66f.). Stressing the "free and creative individual," this new perspective would relegate the government to a supportive role, while "private citizens and associations of citizens" would be responsible for economic and human resource development.

What social conservatism meant in terms of public policy was spelled out with remarkable clarity in a later paper, put out after Manning senior had retired as premier in 1968. The 1970 "Requests for Proposals and Social Contracts," largely written by Preston Manning, outlined a new model of interaction between state and economy aiming at the privatization of a broad range of social and economic government programs, for example in the fields of health care, education and regional development (Dobbin 1991: 46f.; Sharpe/Braid 1992: 69ff.). Thus, the state would concentrate on managerial functions, i.e. it would define goals, set standards, assign tasks and resources and evaluate outcomes. The operational part would be contracted out to private sector businesses or non-profit organizations. As a test, the paper proposed that governments could pay companies to supply health care clinics for employees and their families. The Mannings thought their model was widely applicable. Privatization was only deemed unacceptable for three state functions: the justice system, foreign affairs and the military (Sharpe/Braid 1992: 70f.).

While it is not justified by the record of the Manning government to qualify it in toto as "ideologically far to the right of the Canadian consensus in the sixties," as Finkel did (Finkel 1989: 157), the thrust of these three documents certainly merits such a classification. These ideas indicate that a fragment of Canadian conservatism was aspiring to achieve a decisive break with the current pattern of political intervention on the level of ideology and public policy. In contrast to the past decades, this new course is not about variations of program design or degrees of redistribution within the general framework of the post-war welfare state regime. It is about a considerable shrinkage of the public sphere by redrawing the boundaries between the state and the market, and about an extensive retreat of the state from functions and services it had incrementally assumed over 50 years. Thus, this line of thought points forward to the neo-conservative philosophy of the 1980s and 1990s.

In the late 1960s, the writings of the two Mannings did not leave any real impact on either provincial or federal politics. The effort to rejuvenate the Alberta Social Credit failed. After Manning's successor as premier lost the 1971 election, the party rapidly disintegrated. On the federal level, the Conservative Party showed little interest in the ideas emanating from the West. In 1967, the Conservatives chose Robert Stanfield as new leader. Stanfield was a 'red tory' and therefore far from the route the Mannings wanted to take (Dobbin 1991; Patten 2001). Thus, the first political forays in that direction would be left to another offspring of the erstwhile Social Credit leaders, although

this second-generation Social Credit premier did not get his inspirations from the Mannings, but from an influential right-wing think tank, the Fraser Institute.

Bennett, Take Two – Very Much His "Own Man"

By 1972, voters in BC had also grown tired of their Social Credit government and elected the "socialist hordes" against which Social Credit had always warned them. But the NDP government was short-lived. The next election in 1975 brought Social Credit back to power, led by W.A.C. Bennett's son, Bill. For most of its first two mandates, Bill Bennett's government did not offer any spectacular surprises or radical departures. Then, in the early 1980s, the BC economy suffered a severe downturn. Faced with a budget deficit for the first time, the government announced considerable spending cuts in its 1982 budget (Dyck 1991: 585; Malcolmson 1984: 79f.). But this was just the prelude to a dramatic change in philosophy and practice.

In Bennett's last term from 1983 to 1986, British Columbia was turned into a testing ground for neo-conservatism. Advised by the Fraser Institute, the government held that the recipes of the Keynesian welfare state were no longer applicable in times of stagflation. As an influential finance official outlined to the cabinet, demand management is an exercise in futility in an open economy depending on world resource markets: "The only thing we can do is to affect our market share, and the main way we can do that is through our costs, which means productivity, government costs, taxes, wages – that whole supply-side nexus" (quoted in Mitchell 1987: 50).

With the 1983 budget, the government embarked on a policy of "restraint" comprising classic neo-conservative goals: creating a leaner, more efficient government, welfare retrenchment, and minimizing state intervention in the economy to enhance competitiveness (Dyck 1991; Malcolmson 1984; Redish 1986; Redish et al. 1986). Downsizing government entailed strict fiscal discipline, an across-the-board cut in ministerial expenditure, slashing the public service, and the privatization of organizations and services. In the social sector, funding for education was curtailed, welfare payments cut and eligibility requirements tightened. Many social programs suffered severe reductions or complete abolition. These cutbacks were justified with two main rationales. First, "the new economic reality," to cite Premier Bennett, meant that the government could no longer afford the high level of social services (Marchak 1984: 37). Second, Social Credit argued that church and community groups could just as well provide such services (Redish 1986: 156ff.).

In short, Bennett's activities show how a vision of limited government that seemed doomed to irrelevancy in the late 1960s could now support a

successful political strategy which kept Social Credit in office until 1991. The Social Credit adoption of neo-conservative policies and perspectives on governance was, of course, connected to the political and intellectual rise of the New Right in the United States since the middle 1970s. In BC as elsewhere in North America, this approach was linked to and found support in the growing disenchantment with Keynesian welfare state policies generated by a faltering economy, rising deficits and increasing personal and collective insecurities in a post-industrial and globalized market place. The Bennett government was a precursor of the general ascendancy of neo-conservative thinking in the later 1980s. It charted an orthodox neo-conservative course not marked by any obvious Social Credit peculiarities. For the policy prescriptions outlined by the Fraser Institute were soon to become standard for other conservative provincial governments led by Ralph Klein in Alberta and Mike Harris in Ontario.

The West and the Rest – Not So Different After All?

The rise and reign of Social Credit in Alberta and BC can be separated into three phases: the schizophrenic period of the early years, the phase of acquiescence to the welfare state consensus in the post-war era, and finally the "new reality" of the 1980s. While generally embedded in a conservative world view, the policy positions of Social Credit proved to be quite flexible during these three phases. Policy-making in the two western provinces followed the broad development path of Canadian public philosophy. The history of Social Credit illustrates one variation in the formation, consolidation and fragmentation of a broadly inclusive model of state intervention that is denoted by the term "Keynesian welfare state." In the 1930s, Social Credit's innovative, sometimes radical policy measures in some respects made it a forerunner of the forthcoming transformation of public philosophy, which was driven by the repudiation of the minimal state regime. During the heyday of the two Social Credit governments in the 1950s and 1960s, their policies were firmly governed by the welfare state regime. When Bill Bennett changed direction in the 1980s, he put his government on the forefront of another sea change leading to an updated variant of limited government.

Thus, the journey through more than 50 years of Social Credit poses the question: what accounts for the high degree of "conformity" in social and economic policies despite the often rather eccentric rhetoric? Two factors play an important role here. First, within the Canadian federal system, federal agencies can find ways and means to ensure the dominance of the pattern of political intervention in operation at the national level. Second, as thirty years of polling from the late 1940s onwards demonstrate, Canadians throughout

the country became more and more likely to exhibit similar views about the economic and social policies they expect from their governments (Simeon/ Blake 1980: 99f.). Thus, especially in times of a stable political consensus, the national regime – its public philosophy and institutional structures – encouraged, if not forced provincial governments to act along generally acceptable lines in important policy fields.

Coercion was certainly the major factor with respect to monetary reform. Although Keynesian ideas had slowly begun to creep into federal policies since the late 1930s (Wolfe 1984), the federal government – and the courts – did not hesitate to use their power to prevent any deviation from orthodox financial governance in Alberta (Bell 1993). The provisions of the constitution that put banking and currency under federal jurisdiction and gave the federal government the right to disallow provincial laws furnished the tools to rein in an aberrant provincial government.

Naturally, other factors – political, ideological and economic – played a role as well. The still strong influence of orthodox financial thinking may have furthered political resistance and lack of enthusiasm within the province. And the vague, sometimes contradictory social credit ideology did not readily lend itself to implementation. Thus, the problem how "certain economic profundities of British fog" – as an observer had called Douglas' theory (quoted in Mitchell 1985: 111) – could be translated into a policy program for Alberta, soon led to a falling-out between Aberhart and Major Douglas (Barr 1974; Hesketh 1997; Macpherson 1953). These difficulties were compounded by the disastrous financial situation of the province.

After the war, the evolving structures of the welfare state worked through enticement and cooperation, not coercion. The social policy regime involved a continuous expansion of shared-cost programs between the federal and provincial governments and the concomitant setting of standards which induced a considerable convergence among all provinces (Simeon/Miller 1980). This corresponded with citizens' expectations of a similar kind and quality of public services in all parts of the country. The "growing parallelism of preferences, demands and expectations among regional populations" (Simeon/Miller 1980: 276) not only reflected the power of the welfare state consensus, but also the general decline of regional differentiation in economic and social composition. A government that had not responded to these developments would have threatened its political survival. Furthermore, both BC and Alberta could do so in a relatively painless way, because they were very prosperous during the golden era of the welfare state. Apart from considerations about political strategy, both Social Credit governments in principle accepted responsibility for social security and human welfare even though they did not fully buy into the welfare state discourse. Until Manning's 1967 White paper and 1970 "Requests for Proposals and Social Contracts," the

western Canadian Social Credit outlook and the Canadian post-war consensus represented variations on a theme, not fundamentally different alternatives.

In their study of provinces and parties in Canadian political life, Richard Simeon and Robert Miller note their surprise at the relatively high positions held by Alberta and BC in rankings on social spending. They comment:

"One is prompted to speculate that the rankings of all three westernmost provinces near the top of both health and welfare reflects an historical tradition of greater populism in politics [...] which [...] [is] at work whichever party is in power." (Simeon/Miller 1980: 259)

In the 1930s, Social Credit's program and activities made it almost a model case for populism since the movement saw itself promoting the interests of ordinary people vis-à-vis the political and economic élites and wanted to change existing power structures. But the anti-establishment thrust of populism did not figure prominently in the policies of governments that sought to accommodate the interests of large corporations and the expectations of an electorate whose desire for experiments had ebbed away. The same forces that drove Social Credit to the right in the 1940s also dampened its populist character. What remained was a "paternalistic concern for the 'condition of the people'" – a common feature of Canadian conservatism (Horowitz 1985: 49). Thus, Social Credit's supposedly populist character became less a matter of content than of style, as is often the case. And the conflictual approach associated with populist politics was reduced to the popular sport of Ottawa-bashing and the anti-socialist crusade.

Conclusion: How Conservative Was Social Credit?

As noted earlier, a lot of the work on Social Credit zeroed in on its allegedly *petit-bourgeois* make-up. Whereas, in the early version of the argument, this was supposed to prove the movement's conservatism, the debate got a new spin in the 1970s with scholars pointing out similarities between the early Social Credit and its contemporary, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The traditional notion of the first being a right-wing populist movement and the latter embodying left-wing populism was called into question by, among others, R.T. Naylor:

"As to the contradiction between Social Credit and CCF emerging from identical conditions, it ceases to exist once these movements are viewed in terms of objective class standards than subjective standards of the leaders. The two movements are indistinguishable. For the farm constituency, the policy proposals of both groups were identical." (Naylor 1972: 253)

Again, this misrepresents the nature of Social Credit. An examination of the policy propositions of both parties in the 1930s reveals major differences. In

its 1933 Regina Manifesto, the CCF vowed to replace capitalism through "the full programme of socialized planning" so as to end the exploitation of the working class (Young 1978: 59f.). Large-scale public ownership and the redistribution of economic and social resources were central to this Canadian variant of socialism. Both Douglas and Aberhart rejected nationalization as a cure for the woes of the economic system. The British engineer considered socialism as another cover-up for the powerful financial interests. It would lead to excessive centralization and give the state – and thereby the sinister forces commanding it – even more control over the individual (Hesketh 1997: 26). Likewise, purely redistributive measures were seen as a dead-end because they did not create any additional wealth (Finkel 1989: 82). While Social Credit promised a guaranteed minimum standard of living to every citizen, it accepted social stratification: "Government credit [...] gives to the individual [...] the essentials of physical life, such as food, clothing and shelter, and then offers him additional rewards for his individual enterprise," as Aberhart wrote in a letter in 1933 (quoted in Hesketh 1997: 62). In contrast to the socialist approach, these benefits were not to be financed primarily by a fundamental re-allocation of existing resources. Instead, "Social Credit planners would tap the unexploited reserve of credit and purchasing power previously suppressed by a flawed system of accountancy, a conspiracy of financiers and their willing political puppets" (Laycock 1990: 240).

Doubtless, the social credit as well as the socialist programs involved a strong degree of state interventionism into the economy that would lead to radical changes in the workings of a capitalist economy. Yet Aberhart and his followers described their ultimate goal as enhancing individual freedom, and claimed that their proposals would not interfere with private property. The inconsistencies between these intentions and the plan to control credit, prices, wages, and production seemed to be lost upon the Social Credit leaders. Aberhart called the social credit scheme "wondrously simple" and maintained that it could "be introduced in our present system without a very great upheaval of Social, Commercial or Political interests" (quoted in Bell 1993: 69). This quote from 1933 indicates that Aberhart believed his program would not affect anyone adversely except for the banks. Social Credit was not about abolishing the free enterprise system, but about correcting its flaws by subsidizing the individual consumer. As Bob Hesketh notes, Aberhart "would give the little guy a break, charting a course that would save individual enterprise by eliminating the unfair rigging of the marketplace by the big, moneyed interests" (Hesketh 1997: 70).

The ever-present threat represented by the financiers also lay behind Aberhart's orthodox fiscal policy. If, as Aberhart believed, debts were the means by which Finance controlled governments, it was imperative that the budget be balanced (Hesketh 1997: 103f.). This became even more important after federal agencies had crushed any attempts at monetary reform in the late

1930s. The principles of the social credit doctrine militated against forms of compulsory social programs that increased government debts and extracted purchasing power from the economy by requiring citizens to pay premiums or taxes to participate. With the possibility of social credit getting more and more unlikely, the latitude for social policy became rather restricted. Thus, the conservative turn of the 1940s lay in the logic of the ideology. The limitations imposed by the federal system were the major element in bringing this to the fore, aided by the aforementioned political and economic circumstances. And the increasing strength of the political contender to the left – the CCF – should also be assessed explanatory force in this case.

Although it counted a considerable number of leftist activists among its rank-and-file in the beginning, the ideology upheld by its leaders definitively set Social Credit apart from the progressive movements of the time. In its schizophrenic period, Social Credit comprised seemingly contradictory elements: a conservatism manifest in the emphasis on private ownership, individual initiative, the protestant work ethic and old-fashioned moral views, combined with an undeniably state-interventionist social policy reform thrust. If we follow Horowitz' interpretation of conservatism in Canada, this should be considered less an aberration than an instance of the recurring "occasional manifestation[s] of 'radicalism' or 'leftism'" within Canadian conservatism (Horowitz 1985: 49).

Therefore, the move to the right should be considered as a shift, not a break, because there are ideological and political consistencies between the Aberhart and the Manning years that derive from the original social credit doctrine. This is evident in the fields of economic and social policy. The pay-as-you-go principle and the opposition to nationalization could be cited as examples. Likewise, Manning's comments on the plans for post-war reconstruction echoed Aberhart's earlier criticisms of redistributive programs. In 1946, Manning stated in a speech:

"[...] let us not delude ourselves into thinking that the mere redistribution of the national income increases the aggregate by one five cent piece. That, I submit, is the great weakness and inadequacy of the multiplicity of post-war social insurance schemes being propagated today." (quoted in Finkel 1989: 103f.)

The failure to increase purchasing power constituted one of the two prongs of the welfare-state critique that assumed a more important place in party discourse after the defeat in the federal arena. The other expressed an anti-bureaucratic attitude springing from the individualistic orientation of Social Credit. Again, Aberhart's and Manning's argumentation ran along the same lines. A typical statement by Aberhart from a 1943 radio broadcast declared:

"[compulsory state insurance schemes] all involve compulsion and regimentation [...] the individual citizen is forced to conform to a mass of regulations and conditions which are arbitrarily imposed upon him by some State bureaucracy." (quoted in Laycock 1990: 237)

More than 20 years later, Manning used almost the same words to condemn the medicare plan at a federal-provincial conference. The minutes of that meeting recorded Manning stating "that in his view the principles of universal compulsory application are unsound in a free society. [...] People would be forced to do things in a certain way by the state, and for this reason Alberta could not agree with the compulsory principle" (quoted in Finkel 1989: 150).

Once more, it should be noted that, first, these attacks did not question the general need to increase government activity so as to provide social security and second, as our overview has shown, Manning's actions were not always consistent with his rhetoric. For example, the Canadian Pension Plan, which was supported by the Alberta premier, is also based on "the principles of universal compulsory application." That being said, the extent to which this reasoning anticipates the late 20th century critique of the welfare state is striking. Since the 1970s, both critics from the right and the left have pointed out the oppressive, overly bureaucratic features of this form of state intervention that make it counter-productive to the original intentions (cf. Habermas 1996). It is notable that the welfare-state critique, the highly individualistic outlook, the preference for private enterprise, the business-like approach to governing and the moral traditionalism are all themes that not only ran through the Aberhart and Manning years, but also connect Social Credit to the Reform Party.

Yet, that does not make Reform a re-incarnation of Social Credit. Each of the two movements originated in a distinctive context that decisively influenced its ideology and policy choices (cf. also Sigurdson 1994). Hence, there is a difference in kind, not only in degree, between their governance philosophies which are linked to different public policy regimes. What the two Mannings wrote in the late 1960s, can certainly be seen as "the bridge between the prairie movements of the first half of the century and the tides of reform in the century's last two decades," to quote from a biography of Preston Manning (Dabbs 1997: 74). But these writings did not reflect the Alberta reality of the time – neither on the policy nor on the ideological level. Social Credit's rise and transformation was associated with the same social, economic and political dynamics and forces that produced and modified the Keynesian welfare state. The *trentes glorieuses* of the welfare state also were the golden years of Social Credit – an era of big government characterized by an ever widening range of state responsibilities and constantly rising public expenditures. The party did not survive the demise of the post-war consensus. When it became indistinguishable from other conservative provincial governments, as in BC under Bill Bennett, it also became replaceable within the party system.

Returning to the three stages of Social Credit as a governing party in the West, Reform can be seen as a variation on the third, neo-conservative stage, as the party is mixing free-market economics and fiscal conservatism with a strong dose of social conservatism. The latter did not feature prominently in

Bill Bennett's "new reality" agenda. The rise of Reform is not only tied to the socio-economic changes manifest in an increasingly global and post-industrial economy, it is also a reaction to the appearance of post-materialist values and new social movements. While Preston Manning and the leaders of the Alliance are enthusiastic about the emerging global economic order, the New Right does not approve of the socio-cultural changes that constitute the other side of the transformation process taking place in Western societies (Laycock 2002; Sigurdson 1994). Many of the supporters of Reform/Alliance are alienated from the pluralistic lifestyles and social practices of an increasingly multicultural society which seem to lead to a greater need for state intervention into family life and the private sphere than was common in the "good old days" before the 1960s. Like Social Credit in its first phase, Reform/Alliance is somewhat schizophrenic with respect to the parallel dynamics of modern society.

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Populism, Conservatism and the New Right in English Canada: Blending Appeals, Constructing Constituencies and Reformulating Democracy

David Laycock

Introduction

Over the past fifteen years, Canadians have seen particularly complicated contests for right of centre voters. Since 1993, these contests in English Canada have taken their dynamics and dramas primarily from a new party of the 'new right,' which has gone by two names but has aimed at essentially the same overall set of objectives.

In this paper I discuss the ideological foundations of efforts made by the Reform party of Canada, and its successor, the Canadian Alliance party, to build a viable conservative party capable of simultaneously achieving several objectives on the federal political scene. First, Reform and the Alliance party have pressured federal and provincial governments to cut taxes, social programs, and state regulation of business, while encouraging citizens to decrease their expectations of public life and public institutions. Second, they have claimed an effective copyright to populist appeals against political elites that were once the specialty of left-wing parties in Canada. Third, since 1986 this party has aimed to displace the Conservative party as the only viable national party of the political right in Canada. All of this is to be achieved, finally, by developing an inherently fragile coalition among social conservatives, economic conservatives, western Canadian regionalists, and direct democracy/anti-party populists.

This is an ambitious political shopping list for any party. Success on each front is in some ways a condition of success on the others. To secure the whole package would be remarkable by the standards of post-war Canadian party politics. As it is, partial and perhaps temporary realization of several of these objectives has produced ideological, policy and party-system impacts well beyond those of Canada's social democratic 'third party,' the CCF/NDP, over the past 65 years.

But merely achieving one or two of these major objectives would fall far short of the raison d'être of this new political organization, which was to reconstruct not just the national party competition, but also the Canadian welfare state and established patterns of public democratic decision-making. As one of their most unabashed media cheerleaders has recently put it, the "whole point" of the early Reform party was "to change the country, to fix the way we Canadians govern ourselves" (Byfield 2002: 9). Doing so will require

that they combine appeals and constituencies within and beyond the tradi-
tional sources of conservative party support in ways that no new European
party has managed.

My primary purpose in this paper is to shed some light on the ideological
foundations of these four mutually dependent aspects of the Reform/Alliance
agenda. After setting the stage on which Reform and the Alliance have oper-
ated since the mid-1980s, I discuss the ideological underpinnings of these
four Reform/Alliance objectives, addressing the challenge of building the
intra-party coalition in various ways as I go. The overall portrait should sug-
gest how these ideological foundations fit together in a new right populist
democratic framework.

Reform and the New Party System in Canada

In retrospect we can say that Preston Manning picked an excellent time to
inject a new party of the right into the federal Canadian party competition, but
the initial signs were not encouraging. After Manning created and secured
highly centralized control over the Reform party in 1987 (Flanagan 1995), its
first foray into electoral politics was de-railed by the transformation of the
1988 federal election into a de facto referendum on "free trade" with the
USA. Forces on the Canadian right outside a core of highly alienated western
regionalists had no interest in supporting a new party that ran no candidates
beyond western Canada and endorsed the incumbent Progressive Conserva-
tive government's aggressive campaign in support of the FTA![1]

Shortly after the Conservative's election victory their electoral coalition
began to unravel. Perhaps the most revealing factor in this was a pair of fed-
eral government initiatives to complete the work of constitutional reform
initiated a decade earlier by Pierre Trudeau's Liberal government. First with
the ill-fated "Meech Lake Accord" arranged among the Prime Minister and
Canada's premiers, and then with the 1992 national referendum on the more
complicated "Charlottetown Accord," Canada's political and media elites
failed to secure effective consent to a constitutional reform package.

While the Meech Lake proposal focused on formal recognition of Qué-
bec's 'distinct society' status in the federation, the Charlottetown proposal
attempted to offer this to Québec along with various institutional concessions
to Canadian women, native peoples, proponents of an expanded and federally
supported welfare state, and proponents of an elected Senate. These conces-

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1   In the 1988 federal campaign, Reform nominated 72 candidates in the four western prov-
     inces, received 2 per cent of the national popular vote, and captured no seats. Even in the
     ridings it contested, Reform managed only 8.5 percent of the vote.

sions were perceived as insufficient by Québecois nationalists, many feminists, most native leaders, and to western advocates of a "Triple E" Senate. Opponents of the welfare state saw the Accord as a trojan horse for welfare state expansion and, perhaps as serious, federal power. In other words, the Charlottetown Accord provided a diverse set of targets at which everyone from western regionalists to disgruntled conservatives to feminists to Québec nationalists could take aim (Johnston et al. 1996). And they did, scuttling the Accord by a narrow popular vote margin in all but the Atlantic provinces.

The Reform party was the only significant party in English Canada to officially and vociferously oppose the Charlottetown Accord. In doing so, it attracted the attention of the national media and a set of constituencies that had been increasingly alienated by Brian Mulroney's Conservative government. Reform cashed in on the fact that it had stood up to Canada's political elites, by articulating opposition to an accord that would have constitutionalized much that English Canadian conservatives and many alienated citizens outside of Ontario and Québec have opposed since the 1960s. This opposition secured Reform strong populist credentials, and did much to remove them from the social democratic NDP, a party that had laid claim to a good deal of the western populist tradition during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

For many who were soon to become Reform party voters, the Charlottetown Accord symbolized English Canadian appeasement of the Québec government's continuing demands for a disproportionate amount of the federal government's attention and resources since the 1960s. The Accord also symbolized the creeping advance of the regulatory welfare state into ever more aspects of Canadian life. It symbolized federal government and political elite willingness to accommodate native peoples' demands for powers of self-government and the resources that would make this viable. And taken in conjunction with 1981 constitutional reforms, which most notably established the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as the litmus test of all provincial and federal legislation, the Accord seemed to symbolize a further surrender of control over public policy to the judiciary and unaccountable federal politicians.

Since 1992 Reform and the Alliance have extended their portrait of the Charlottetown Accord as a product of unaccountable elite political processes to virtually all aspects of federal public policy. In doing so they have tapped into the rich vein of populist resentment and insecurity that has sustained many new parties of the right in Europe (Betz/Immerfall 1998). Unlike these European parties, however, Reform and its successor, the Canadian Alliance, have been able to augment this support with considerable corporate and establishment media backing – and without railing against 'globalization' or presenting non-white immigration as the biggest threat to the people's well-being. I will return to these aspects of Reform/Alliance success later.

The 1993 and 1997 federal elections were of course won by the Liberal party. But the real story in these elections wasn't Liberal victory – far from

uncommon in Canada's 20th century – but the Reform party's role in forcing a re-alignment within the political right in English Canada, and the consequent re-alignment of the federal party system.

The 1993 federal election was the party's watershed event. It gained fifty-two parliamentary seats and the second-largest proportion of the national popular vote. But only one of these seats was from Ontario, and the Bloc Québecois had secured the role of Official Opposition in Parliament. Reform's 1993 popular vote was only marginally higher than the Conservatives', even though the latter had been reduced to two MPs. So the 'fight for the right' was clearly not going to go just one electoral round.

In 1997 the Reform party did much to set the agenda and tone for the federal election campaign in English Canada, especially on fiscal matters. In doing so, it proved that its status as the pre-eminent Canadian party of western protest and new-right conservatism was no one-term aberration. It collected 175% of the NDP's popular vote in the latter party's three western provincial strongholds, and three times as many seats as the NDP nationally. In 1997 Reform increased its popular vote in all western provinces, and ended up with 19.4% of the national popular vote (27% outside of Québec), 60 seats and official opposition standing in the House of Commons.

Despite a respectable Ontario popular vote just below 20% in 1993 and 1997, Reform seemed stuck in the mold of a western 'rump' party. Party leader Manning read the 1997 results as confirmation of his view that his party had to re-cast itself as a less regionally focused, more moderate-sounding party. He and his advisors reasoned that doing so would require a sustained campaign to attract enough support away from the federal Progressive Conservatives to render it virtually uncompetitive. Manning decided to get serious about "uniting the right," and in early 1998 launched a series of processes internal and external to the party that involved a cautious yet clearly leader-managed process involving two party-wide ballots. This culminated in the spring of 2000 in the creation of the Canadian Conservative and Reform Alliance.

Preston Manning had finally been granted his wish to re-invent his own party, but had not expected that party members would believe that this re-invention would require a new leader. Some party insiders believe that Manning's leadership race defeat was indirect punishment for his unwanted efforts to broaden the party out, and deprive it of ideological consistency, in the mistaken hope that this was the way to power (Byfield 2002).

In any case, Manning lost to a fellow evangelical Christian, Stockwell Day, whose previous work experience had ranged from auctioneer to Bible college administrator to Finance Minister in Alberta's Progressive Conservative government. Day's recruitment of many Christian conservatives into the Alliance party during his leadership campaign provided him with the necessary margin of victory over Manning.

Day's appeal was briefly extended well beyond a core of social conservatives. Beginning with his May leadership victory, and through the summer and early fall, numerous previous Conservative backers from the Ontario business community funded the most expensive party campaign in federal election history. After Day's clumsy, error-filled campaign, the Alliance obtained a slight increase in national popular vote and seat totals but only two seats in Ontario. The same businesspeople and senior operatives in the Ontario Progressive Conservative party who had enthusiastically bankrolled and promoted the Alliance campaign quickly called for Day's removal as party leader. They threatened to let the Alliance party languish in debt until it replaced the hapless and embarrassing Alliance leader. Day responded with a series of astonishingly bad political judgements and heavy-handed control of the party to produce a steep downward spiral for himself and his party.[2]

The Alliance party spent the next year in public opinion free-fall. By August 2001, Day's leadership was supported by only 21% of voters in Alberta, where Alliance candidates in the 2000 election had received 66% of the popular vote (Walton 2001). Under increasing pressure from even his loyalists (Grace 2001), and after several long-time Reform MPs left his caucus to sit as independents in Parliament,[3] Day agreed to put his leadership to a membership vote. While Day's campaign team recruited more new members than the three other candidates combined during a two month campaign, Stephen Harper trounced Day on the first ballot in March 2002.

Harper won because he had secured the support of the vast majority of long-time Reform members who had stuck with their party as it had been reborn as the Alliance, then almost buried by Stockwell Day. Harper had once been Preston Manning's protégé and chief policy advisor, then served as an MP from Calgary from 1993 to 1997. He left his safe Calgary seat in the House of Commons because he thought Manning was compromising the appropriate core Reform message of economic conservatism and welfare state re-design in his efforts to attract a broader support base. From 1998 to early 2002, Harper pursued this purer ideological agenda as president of the National Citizen's Coalition, a prominent right-wing organization that lobbies governments to cut taxes and business regulations, and to remove restrictions on business spending in elections.[4] While also a practicing evangelical Chris-

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2   For an overview of this fall from grace, see Laycock 2001: chapter 9; for details, see Harrison 2002.

3   Initially 11 MPs left the Alliance caucus to form the "Democratic Representative Caucus." 8 of these eventually formed a loose alliance with the 12 member federal Conservative caucus. Shortly after Harper's victory, all 8 remaining 'rebels' had returned to the Alliance caucus, and the "Progressive Conservative Democratic Representative Coalition" was history.

4   In Harper's biography on the Canadian Alliance website (http://www. Canadianalliance.ca), the Alliance reproduces the National Citizens' Coalition's self-description as "Canada's foremost organization for the defence of our basic political and economic freedoms." On the NCC, see http://www.morefreedom.org.

tian,[5] Harper has been clearly more interested in a neo-Hayekian agenda of economic conservatism than one of social conservatism.

Whether party members and, more importantly, potential supporters will be happy with a leader who values right-wing ideological consistency more than appeals to 'median voters' or serious efforts to produce a merger with the Progressive Conservatives remains to be seen (*Globe and Mail* 2002; Greenspon 2002). Since his leadership victory, Harper has performed reasonably well in parliament, and boosted the party's standing in the polls. The alternative – retaining Day as leader – was almost certainly a ticket to mass membership defection and political oblivion.

Enough background has been provided to allow us to examine the Reform/Alliance party's central objectives. We will begin by considering their campaign to pressure Canadian governments to dramatically cut taxes, shrink social programs and the post-war welfare state generally, and substantially reduce Canadians' expectations of their public institutions and public life.

Shrinking the State and Public Life

Like most European parties of the new right, and certainly like the post-1970s American Republican party, the Reform/Alliance party has set its sights on a leaner and meaner state, a less politicized civil society, and a citizenry who see themselves primarily as besieged taxpayers and individualized consumers. The Reform party under Preston Manning echoed what has for years been the Canadian daily press's mantra about the importance of tax cuts, deficit reduction and de-regulation of business.[6] But Reform insisted more forcefully than most mainstream media that deficit reduction, tax cuts, and de-regulation of business could and should be combined with major social program spending reductions. In fact, Manning and other Reformers argued that with this trio of policies, deficit reduction would be a sure bet, just as American Republicans had been contending since the 1980s.

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5   Harper attends the Bow Valley Missionary Alliance Church in Calgary.
6   Daily newspapers in Canada cover a much narrower range of ideological positions than Europeans would find normal. And mass media concentration in Canada is enough to make Silvio Berlusconi envious. In Vancouver, to take a representative example, the same company owns the biggest private television network and the two local daily newspapers, along with a third daily newspaper published in Toronto. This company also owns the major daily paper in every large city west of Ontario, and half of the major dailies in the rest of English Canada. The fourth daily paper available in Vancouver, the *Globe and Mail*, takes an editorial line almost as conservative on fiscal matters as the three others, but has no time for social conservatism popular among Reform and Alliance activists.

Shrinking the state was desirable for economic conservatives within Reform and the Alliance because it would mean more space within which the market could operate, thereby increasing what for them is the realm of real freedom. For social conservatives in the Reform/Alliance fold, this economic conservative case against the state was generally compelling. However, for social conservatives a more basic reason for shrinking the state concerns the essentially immoral turn they believe it has taken over the past generation. Social conservatives believe that anti-family, pro-abortion, secular humanist voices and forces in public life are massively aided and abetted by state subsidies and mutually beneficial connections with government bureaucrats. In this account, the power and benefits accruing to the 'new class' of welfare state officials and their 'special interest' advocate associates are contrary to the natural workings of civil society, perhaps even to the natural moral order of patriarchal nuclear families.

Finally, for the populist anti-statist element in the Reform/Alliance support base, shrinking the state is necessary because while it may oppress by overtaxing, or constrain the private business of family life, the modern Canadian federal government governs unaccountably. Corrupt politicians interact with independently powerful bureaucrats and judges to thwart the people's will. Their anti-popular measures can only be stopped if the federal state apparatus is given a major and systemic shock. Elections by themselves cannot accomplish this task. Politics and the state have become so disreputable that the only cure is the shock therapy of major program cuts, public sector layoffs and government withdrawal from economic and social life.

So while the central diagnoses of the contemporary Canadian state vary among the major Reform/Alliance constituencies, they converge on a single remedy: the modern welfare and regulatory state must be seriously curtailed. And these constituencies believe, for distinctive yet complementary reasons, that a necessary corollary of this is a transformation of public life via a depoliticization of civil society. The problem is that the politics of interest representation since the early 1960s has, in Reform/Alliance eyes, spun out of control. Too many issues have become the focus of not just substantial public debate, but also numerous group representations to legislators and policymakers, resulting in too much state support for these groups, and too many constraints on individuals and businesses.

This Reform/Alliance indictment of overactive and overly successful 'special interests' has been aimed especially at women's, gays', low income and ethnic minority groups seeking 'reverse discrimination' in the workplace, other group-specific material benefits, and a more prominent role in the broader Canadian society and polity.[7] But the indictment is also addressed to environmentalists, French Canadians employed in the federal civil service,

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7   For attitudinal evidence among Reform members and activists on these matters, see
     Archer/Ellis (1994), and Clarke et. al. (2000).

defenders of crown corporations, and pretty well any organizations that favour placing state provisions or regulations between citizens and the operation of the market economy.

So what looks like an ineffectual foot in the policy process door to those on the left looks like an overly pluralistic and thus dangerously interventionist network of policy communities to the Canadian right. Reform and Alliance spokespeople have indirectly adopted Hayek's analysis of the pathology of a welfare state which places no constitutional limits on the scope of legislation that can tamper with the 'spontaneous order" of the market (Laycock 2001: chapters 2, 4). They have repeatedly and successfully conveyed their dissatisfaction with the over-politicization of civil society, and the multiple layers of government subsidy to "special interests" that has fuelled this.

For Reform/Alliance social conservatives, over-politicization of civil society is coincident with its over-secularization, and the scourge of state intrusion into the domains of family life that are properly directed by God's law. For the populist anti-statists within the Reform/Alliance fold, post-war and especially post-1960 extensions of the political arena into more dimensions of civil society – schools, workplaces, gun control, pollution control, etc. – are also to be condemned. From this perspective, these developments have multiplied the opportunities available to corrupt politicians to disturb natural rhythms and personal freedoms in private life and relationships.

Pluralist politics, in other words, have run amok as state intervention – whether legislatively or judicially imposed – has been deprived of any natural limits, and has colonized associational life in civil society. To make matters worse, this is fuelled by high taxes sanctioned by a special-interest/political class entente at the centre of the modern Canadian welfare state.[8] And pluralist politics overpopulated by special interests propped up by indulgent governments and courts have supported a political culture of entitlement-seekers rather than one driven by model citizens of the new right, who are self-reliant consumers and grudging taxpayers.

In addition to their case against the politicized welfare state, core Reform and Alliance party supporters also perceive a systemic regional bias in the Canadian federal system. In the 2000 federal election, the Alliance party attracted virtually all Western Canadian voters who felt a strong sense of regional alienation (Blais et al. 2002: 109). To add insult to the injuries of the welfare state, modern Canadian federal governments have systematically discriminated against the interests of western Canadians, the electoral backbone of the Reform/Alliance party since its inception, while favouring residents of Québec and Ontario. Thus the Reform case for anti-majoritarian

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8   This critique is central to Preston Manning's book-length manifesto, *The New Canada* (1992), and provides a key part of the intellectual scaffolding upon which the Reform and now the Alliance party principles have been built. For the most current version, see http://www.canadianalliance.ca/yourprinciples/policy_declare/indes.html

correctives to the federal system, especially for the "Triple E Senate" (equal, elected and effective), has been made in the hope that these correctives could dismantle an intrusive and ultimately corrupting political economy constructed primarily by central Canadian politicians and interests.

Claiming the Populist High Ground

New right populism constructs a new populist story about the people's enemies by re-defining the 'special interests' and by contesting reform liberal and social democratic understandings of equality. Most nineteenth and twentieth century North American populists portrayed various private sector corporate groups and the political parties they funded as the special interests (Laycock 1990; Kazin 1998). New right populists define special interests as groups that support the welfare state, oppose major tax cuts, and propose allocations of social resources on the basis of non-market principles.

This new populism has taken root in the fertile ground of massive civic alienation from legislative structures and processes of representation, parties as representational vehicles, the accountability of legislators and bureaucrats, and the role of expertise in political decision making.[9] For Reform's purposes, the most politically salient aspect of this alienation was displayed in a 1993 survey showing that over two-thirds of the judgments Canadians made about political parties were negative.[10] By 1997 'anti-party' voters were three times as likely to support Reform as other parties.[11]

By merging the new right political economy and policy agenda with an attack on politics and its welfare-state-supporting machinations, new right populism entered virgin and electorally promising territory for the political right. It may be that this was the only promising path for the political right to take towards the end of the twentieth century. The old right's efforts to explicitly shore up illiberal values of hierarchy, social inequality and elite rule had long ago lost any semblance of social legitimacy.

The new right's discovery of the political salience of populism has involved a very effective campaign to redefine equality. Part of this is expressed in the revived use of direct democracy – especially citizen's initiatives – in the western United States since 1978 and "Proposition 13" in California, and in the Canadian Reform party's advocacy of such initiatives, along with referenda and recall proceedings. I will explore this application of the concept

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9   On various public opinion surveys that have confirmed these trends, see Nevitte et. al. 1999; Clarke/Kornberg/Wearing 2000; Young 1999.
10   See Clarke, *A Polity on the Edge*, 124f.
11   Gidengil et. al. 2001.

of equality shortly. Here we can note the broader conceptual thrust that al-
lowed the right to liberate itself from older and damning associations with
privilege and social hierarchy.

During the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, the old right was
severely handicapped in competition with reform liberalism and social de-
mocracy by having ceded them the powerful idea of equality. To maintain any
chance of electoral viability, conservative parties throughout the western
world were required to accept the idea that democracy required an accommo-
dation with the emerging welfare state and the mildly redistributive Keynes-
ian tools of fiscal management. In Canada, the federal Progressive Conserva-
tive party – and most of its provincial wings, until the early 1990s – realized
that electoral competitiveness required them to acknowledge that working and
middle class people alike saw equality of opportunity as a right of 'social
citizenship' (Jenson 1997). These Conservative parties understood that this
must be practically expressed in incremental programmatic augmentation of
the welfare state.

The genius of right-wing populism is to have provided plausible ideo-
logical homes for a compelling alternative conception of equality that did not
require grudging acceptance of the welfare state. A first conceptual step was
to revive a nineteenth century liberal understanding of equality as formal
equality under the law, call this 'true' equality of opportunity, and contrast it
with the 'equality of condition' that they claimed was desired by various spe-
cial interests under the heading of equality of opportunity. These special in-
terests wanted special treatment for their groups, not equal treatment, and
they had managed to get it financed from taxes paid by 'ordinary citizens.'

In Canada as elsewhere, the case against these special interest violators of
a re-defined equality of opportunity was linked to fiscal and accountability
crises in liberal democracies. Responsibility for both the fiscal and account-
ability crises was laid squarely at the feet of these special interests, their privi-
leged access to and demands on the state policy process, consequent high
taxation, over-extension of the public sector into the marketplace, and irre-
sponsible personal behaviour encouraged by generous social welfare pro-
grams.

The final premise in the argument is that the redistributive thrust of the
welfare state has actually undermined equality of opportunity while rendering
modern governments unaccountable. Governing parties and special interests
have transferred to hard-working taxpayers the cost of programs that have
served only special interests, compliant politicians, and bureaucrats. And they
have done so without paying any political price; in fact, with every additional
brick in the welfare and regulatory state wall, it became more difficult to hold
any politicians or special interest lobbies accountable, and easier to add more
programs. Politicians and special interests have shafted ordinary people/

taxpayers by hiding behind rhetoric of 'rights for the underprivileged' and 'social justice.'

In sum, re-defining equality, and situating this definition within a critique of the political economy and institutionalized pluralism of the welfare state, has been central to Canadian political right's ability to construct a critique of democracy in Canada with considerable popular appeal.[12]

New Right Equality and Direct Democracy

How does this re-definition of equality connect with Reform's advocacy of direct democracy? Darin Barney and I have used the term "plebiscitarian" in analyzing the view that representative democracy is hopelessly compromised by special interests and corrupt party politicians, and is in need of major modification through the devices of direct democracy (Barney/Laycock 1999). Plebiscitarianism offers to substitute direct connections between the people and the policies or social results they seek for the distorted mediation of citizen preferences by compromised political organizations. These direct connections are the recall, the initiative, and the referendum. Their value is typically conveyed in terms of allowing market-like registration of citizen preferences, in political markets where political parties and special interest groups now hedge these exchanges. In this view, direct democracy will miti-gate the impact of parties, organized interests and an 'activist' judiciary in the policy process. The case for such mechanisms treats the animus against party found in much contemporary political reform discourse [13] as a key indicator of systemically corrupt democratic representation.

By presenting itself as the only alternative to unaccountable parliamen-tary majorities, Reform took up a position squarely within the plebiscitarian space created by public disenchantment with traditional representative struc-tures. Reformers pressed for integration of plebiscitary instruments into gov-ernance practices, and undertook intra-party experimentation with electronic voting and communications technology.[14] With direct democracy as an in-strument of 'democratic security'[15] Canadians would have more control over

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12 For details on how this view of equality is expressed in Reform and then Alliance party platforms, see Laycock 2001: chapter 4.
13 For evidence regarding attitudes towards parties in Canada, see Gidengil et. al. 2001.
14 Manning 1992.
15 Reform Party of Canada, 'Address from the People,' 2. This 'Address' was presented one day prior to the February 1996 federal Speech to the Throne. In light of recent right-populist party advances in Denmark, Germany, Norway, Holland and France that highlight threats to the people's security, it is interesting to note that back in 1996 the Reform party translated all of its programmatic emphases into the language of security. The Address

government. Direct democratic weapons like initiatives and recall were prom-
ised to humble unaccountable political elites, on issues whose resolution had
been stolen from 'the people' by party elites and their special interest allies.
These issues included taxation, budget deficits, MPs' pensions, immigration,
multiculturalism, capital punishment, gun control, abortion and aboriginal
self-government.

Reform and the Alliance have supported revitalization of pluralist civil
society. But this support ends at the point that it involves associational exten-
sion into policy-shaping channels within the public sphere. Direct democracy
is an important part of this program, because plebiscitary instruments bridge
the divide between individuals and the sphere of state action without involv-
ing market-threatening, tax-heightening and bureaucracy-building mediation
in policy deliberation by organized interests. In the Reform/Alliance view,
citizens are essentially political consumers who need to register privately
formed preferences in both economic and political markets unmediated by the
distortions of special interests. In this way we can avert much of our political
market failure, and make good on the major deficits we have incurred in de-
mocratic representation.

The new right's adaptation of direct democracy seeks a contraction of the
policy reach of public institutions while diminishing the deliberative partici-
pation of groups and associations in those institutions. This double contrac-
tion is deemed necessary because the public sphere is home to the redistribu-
tive and market-limiting initiatives of the welfare state. Reform wished to
expand political choice for consumers with one hand, and with the other hand
eliminate group-mediated representational activities within welfare state
structures and state regulation of the market economy. The Alliance party has
extended Reform's desire to privatize Canadian political culture and represen-
tational structures. This would lead to our having fewer and cheaper public
institutions, and fewer social obligations underpinning conversion of some
private wealth into public goods through high taxation and redistributive
social programs.

So even though many Reform and Alliance party supporters genuinely
wish to make democratic citizenship more efficacious, their party's adoption
of plebiscitarian approaches to direct democracy threatens broader democ-
ratic participation. It does so by delegitimizing many vehicles of pluralist
representation and deliberation as mere tools of 'special interests' (Laycock
2001: chapters 2, 5, 6).

Stephen Harper appears to be considerably less enthusiastic about direct
democracy than Preston Manning and many long-time Reform/Alliance activ-
ists. He undoubtedly sees the political value involved in retaining support for

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spoke of the people's desire for personal security, economic security, 'personal social secu-
rity,' public safety/security, control over government ('democratic security'), and 'national
security' via a constitution that provided equal rights to al provinces and individuals.

these devices in the Alliance policy book. But in the past his ideological single-mindedness led him to see direct democracy as a populist sideshow to the main act of dismantling the high-tax regulatory welfare state. And he is clearly worried that the Alliance will lose credibility with the business community and major media if it promotes the kind of referenda (on abortion and capital punishment, to name two) that Stockwell Day's Christian fundamentalist supporters tried to push to the front of the Alliance agenda in the 2000 election. Finally, controlling various direct democracy campaigns is an expensive and organizationally challenging matter. Taking up a lot of party time with such efforts is inconsistent with Harper's vision of a much more disciplined, professional and formally hierarchical structure and process in the Alliance party (Grace 2002a). Harper appears, then, to wish to leave much less to chance in the 'political market' in order to establish the dominion of the economic market.

Whether downplaying the direct democracy element of the Alliance package will be acceptable to those in the party for whom it is a huge attraction is hard to say. Harper may be able to keep them on board by retaining the party's formal commitment to regular use of initiatives and recall, and because he heartily endorses the other grass-roots energizing element of right-populism: attacks on the legitimacy of government per se, and on the trustworthiness/accountability of politicians. There is nothing in his economic conservatism that would lead him to have serious reservations about this traditional aspect of Reform/Alliance populist appeal.

Whatever attention Harper gives to direct democracy, there is no question that his party and Canada's new right have decisively outflanked the left in the competition for successful use of populist appeals. The NDP rode somewhat successfully on populist coat-tails in its 1988 campaign against the Canada – US Free Trade Agreement, but lost its populist credentials and much of its electoral appeal after supporting the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords.

The federal NDP is now trying to regain some populist appeal by identifying with the agenda of anti-globalization social movement organizations, but this has not recovered lost support among its previous western Canadian or trade union constituencies. Nor is there any evidence that the federal NDP will soon follow European social democrats in accepting welfare state 'modernization' or tax cuts. The party's activists believe that neither fiscal problems nor broadly based desires for reduced taxes should deter Canadian governments from pursuing greater equality along social class, gender, ethnic and generational lines (Erickson/Laycock 2002). The party has not found a way to weave its unreconstructed social democratic outlook into a populist appeal with anything like the force of that enjoyed by Reform/Alliance, and seems unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.

Unlike Reform and the Alliance, the NDP's attempts at populist appeals receive virtually no support in the popular electronic or print media. And

unlike Reform and the Alliance, the federal NDP has done little to re-fashion its appeals or programs with innovative responses to broadly perceived democratic and representational deficits. Vague suggestions for a participatory, community-based politics contained in a recent 'New Politics Initiative' aimed at giving anti-globalization and environmentalist movements more clout within a restructured federal NDP[16] do not add up to much for all but a tiny fraction of 'the people' in Canada today.

Finally, we should note that Reform and the Alliance have out-flanked left-populism without having drawn on resentment towards immigrants nearly as much as their European counterparts, and without having linked popular feelings of insecurity to concerns about 'globalization.' It is true that like European parties of the new and extreme right, Reform was far more prepared than its mainstream predecessors and rivals to raise the issue of immigration. Like those European parties, Reform advocated a substantial reduction in levels of immigration. Reform even has a history of difficulty muzzling some vocal racist activists and early MPs.

Recently, the Alliance party has tried to score points in Parliament by alleging that the Liberal government is too lax in its refugee immigration policies, and recommending deportation of thousands of refugee claimants to show that it is serious about the 'war on terrorism' (Laghi 2002: chapters 1, 5). In doing so the Alliance party seemed to some, including the Liberal government, to be jumping on the anti-immigration bandwagon that has produced alarming political results recently in Europe. And if *The Report Magazine* chief political writer's recent recommendations to re-emphasize the immigration and 'Indian rights' issues (Grace 2002b) are anything to go by, there is still considerable willingness within the party to play the 'race card.'[17]

Yet the Reform and Alliance parties have paled in comparison to the vast majority of new parties of the right in Europe on measures of xenophobia, opposition to immigration, or unwillingness to come to terms with the reality of multiculturalism. Immigration and multiculturalism are reasonably prominent public issues, but Canadians have not given nearly so high a priority to these matters as European citizens since the early 1980s.[18]

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16   See http://www.newpolitics.ca for this proposal.

17   Kevin Grace ended his *Report Magazine* commentary on Harper's leadership victory with suggestions that Harper propose an alternative set of policies 'to win over right-wing Liberals and working-class NDPers.' The first was gun control, the second 'Indian rights' (because "Canadians strongly oppose race-based entitlements"), and the third, immigration, since "Canadians do not want immigration that transforms the country's racial balance" (Grace 2002b: 13). While the *Report Magazine* has been the de facto house organ for Reform/Alliance since 1986, it should be noted that such explicit recommendations to exploit race issues are not heard from Alliance MPs.

18   See Betz (1994), chapter 3, for an overview of European xenophobia in relation to immigrants and internal visible minorities.

Reform activists and voters were considerably more likely than supporters of other parties to express opposition to current levels of immigration, and annoyance over immigrants' apparent reluctance to integrate into Canadian society and values, and a commitment to assisting Canadians born in Canada ahead of assisting recent immigrants (Laycock 2001: 144f.). Nonetheless, Reform never directly appealed to racism like virtually every new right-populist party in Europe. In fact, Reform party voters and activists were significantly more tolerant of both visible-minority immigration and multiculturalism than supporters of Norway and Denmark's long-dominant social-democratic parties (Laycock 2001: 145).

We should also note high-profile efforts made by Reform and the Alliance to recruit ethnic minority candidates in the 1997 and 2000 elections, and the absence in recent years of any politically salient concern with 'racial purity' in English Canada (as compared to France, Scandinavian countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, or Austria). These factors help to ensure that a large gap will remain between parties of the new right in Canada and Europe on the questions of immigration and racial tolerance.

From a European perspective, the Reform/Alliance appeal is also distinctive among new right parties because it makes no effort to channel backlash against 'globalization.' We see nothing analogous to the anti-European Union, welfare chauvinist appeals made by LePen in France, Progress parties in Scandinavia, and Haider's Freedom party in Austria. The Reform party was always an unalloyed supporter of North American and global free trade. The Alliance party remains a consistent promoter of global free markets, and has become the loudest parliamentary voice in favour of supporting all aspects of the American campaign against terrorism. Reform and Alliance spokespeople never articulate concerns about the loss of Canadian sovereignty or culture to non-Canadian forces. They thus offer no analogues to LePen's potent appeal in France.[19]

Were the Alliance party to become stridently anti-immigrant or anti-globalization, its chances of eclipsing the Conservatives federally would evaporate. It would take a beating in opinion polls and among many of its current media supporters, lose whatever credibility it has as an alternative to the governing Liberals, and say goodbye to the corporate financing required to fuel a competitive national party. We can thus safely conclude that the Alliance party will not come to resemble Europe's new parties of the right in these crucial regards.

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19 There is arguably a notable exception to this generalization if we take into account fears that English Canadian culture is threatened by francophones and secularizing forces within Canada. A good number of Reform activists have subscribed to the view that English Canadian politics and culture were perilously threatened under the 'French' federal leadership of Pierre Trudeau. A popular Reform assembly and campaign speaker in the late 1980s and early 1990s wrote a book making this claim. See Gairdner 1990.

The Fight for the Right

Not having to pay substantial attention to battles with the left on the populist political front after 1993 was crucial to Reform's ability to force a re-alignment of Canada's national party system. Yet any chance of forming a national government is dependent on the Alliance party also winning the fight for the right.

Almost immediately after Steven Harper became the new Alliance leader, he was faced with a symbolic encounter with one of Reform/Alliance's enduring challenges. Can the party gain enough of an upper hand in its competition with the Progressive Conservative party – for polling numbers, media credibility, party financing and votes – that it can claim to be the 'real and only alternative' to the right of the federal Liberal government? The symbolic encounter took the form of a meeting with the Progressive Conservative's federal leader, Joe Clark.

Harper was not using the meeting to engineer an equal-status 'merger' with the Conservatives, an objective incessantly urged on Reform and Alliance by the English Canadian daily press since the late 1990s. Instead, his concern was to outflank Clark in the dance that the two parties have conducted since Preston Manning turned his focus to 'uniting the right.' Harper's aim is to finally secure the Alliance a position of unquestioned dominance in the 'fight for the right,' and do so by avoiding organizational or ideological compromise with the Conservatives. So the result of this meeting with Clark was a foregone conclusion. With each accusing the other of bad faith and demanding too many unrealistic concessions, Harper and Clark both said they needed to focus on rebuilding their own parties.

The details of these positions are not important. For the foreseeable future, both parties will attempt to re-establish their credibility as critics of the governing Liberals, and hence as recipients of the money from the Ontario business community that will ultimately determine who wins the fight for the right. Here, we need to consider the ideological foundations sustaining the Alliance effort to displace the Conservatives as English Canada's only serious federal party of the right.

There is tremendous antipathy between these two parties. This is ultimately reflected in the fact that Conservative voters as a group are far more likely to rank Liberals as their second choice than they are to give Reform/Alliance this symbolic nod, while only marginally preferring the Alliance over the social democratic NDP (Nevitte et. al. 1999: chapter 8; Laycock 2001: 20). Alliance voters in 2000 were, by contrast, most prepared to consider the Conservative party as their second choice (Blais et al. 2002: 77). However, having seen the animosity displayed by Reform activists towards

Conservative leaders from Brian Mulroney to Joe Clark, we know that for many Alliance voters this second choice would be painful indeed.

The pain of this second choice has identifiable ideological roots, though not all have been established with equal strength in all Reform/Alliance voters. In no particular order, we can list these as:

1. Opposition to any party coalition which requires Québec.
   The core of Reform/Alliance voters voted Conservative federally before 1993 (Archer/Ellis 1994; Nevitte et. al. 1999). One of the main reasons many jumped ship was that Reform allowed them to express their antipathy to Québec politicians and federal parties that courted Québec support to secure national office. In western Canadian Reform voters' eyes, courting Québec prevented both Liberal and Conservative governments from seeing western Canadian needs and policy preferences as equally important. While there is some deep-seeded anti-francophone intolerance among Reform/Alliance supporters (Archer/Ellis 1994; Clarke et. al. 2000), most of this antipathy is connected to a broader anti-central Canadian tradition in western Canada that has deep populist roots (Laycock 1990).

2. Opposition to the idea of a brokerage party that compromises with and makes concessions to 'special interests.'
   Beyond a distaste for any party that brokers interests of Québec nationalists and Canadians in other regions, the Reform/Alliance party has always rejected the idea of specialized internal groups or caucuses. This was partly a matter of Preston Manning not wishing to give an organizational base to any internal party challengers on policy or leadership questions. But the prohibition was also based on rejection of the idea that a party should be in the business of brokering among different groups. The party was to belong to and be directed by the membership, and not have its agenda set by women's, youth, native, environmental or other potential caucuses (Flanagan 1995).

   The federal Progressive Conservative party under Brian Mulroney brokered a very unstable coalition between western conservative activists and supporters, Ontario business community supporters, and Québecois nationalists. From the Reform/Alliance perspective, this coalition was always unbalanced: Ontario and especially Québec interests always won out over western interests. Reform was to be different, and certainly never susceptible to strategic manipulation by non-western or elite interests.

   For a party of the right with national ambitions, there are several problems with this perspective. In the first place, Reform and the Alliance have always informally brokered between the various elements within the party – economic conservatives, social conservatives, western regionalists, and direct democracy, anti-party enthusiasts. Ensuring that

these elements within the party did not have internal institutional bases has not eliminated brokering among them, even though it has probably saved the party some debilitating and highly public conflicts.

Secondly, the party's ideology and need for corporate financing both push the party to act as a promoter of business community interests in the party's on-going campaign for tax-cuts, social program cuts, and deficit elimination. These Reform/Alliance positions are all, arguably, concessions to "special interests" within the business community.

An example of this can be found in recent Alliance party opposition to the Kyoto Accord. The party has accused the federal Minister of the Environment of refusing to consider evidence from the 'climate change specialists who do not support Kyoto' (Alliance Party 2002). The specialists referred to are primarily oil industry-friendly scientists. Most observers from outside the oil industry consider it to be a 'special interest' on the question of climate change. Unless the interests of the oil industry coincide perfectly with those of all Alliance party members, using the party to advocate oil industry positions appears to be a kind of interest brokerage. And it has the appearance of strategic manipulation, through the suggestion that the interests of the oil industry are those not just of Alliance members, but of all citizens – especially those from Alberta, Canada's oil-producing province – represented by Alliance MPs.

3. Opposition to a party that did not do more to disable the regulatory welfare state when it had a chance.

    When the Conservatives were the only party to the right of the Liberals, federal voters with strong anti-statist feelings typically voted Conservative as the least of available evils. Once the Reform party became viable, these voters could vote for a party that characterized the Mulroney Conservatives as 'Liberals in disguise,' unwilling to engage in the social program cutting, tax reductions and deficit elimination that their business-friendly rhetoric had seemed to imply. The Conservatives' imposition of a widely unpopular value-added tax [the GST] proved that they were not serious about tax reductions, and their deficits grew over their years in office. And since the Mulroney Conservatives appeared to be held hostage to this disguised Liberalism by the notably more left-wing voters and Tory MPs in Québec, and because any viable Conservative government would need to mollify these same interests, there was no chance then and is none now that they would make good on their occasional anti-statist themes if given another chance.

4. Opposition to the institutionalized social pluralism within the policy process that the federal PCs did not target sufficiently.

    Earlier we noted Reform/Alliance opposition to a policy process that is overpopulated with demanding special interests who have leveraged construction of a welfare state by parties and governments. To solve the

problem of the overdeveloped welfare state thus requires eliminating the institutionalized pluralism in the policy process. This can only be done if the state removes itself from many aspects of social good provision, thus depriving special interests and parties of mutually reinforcing incentives to design and deliver expensive programs. The state will retreat from these policy domains only if it lacks the money to be active within them. This means drastically cutting taxes, to deprive the state-party-special interests nexus of its revenue lifeblood.

If one wishes to see how this is done, the Conservative regimes of Alberta and Ontario during the 1990s and the new British Columbia Liberal regime offer object lessons. These governments have dramatically narrowed the range of groups consulted on public policy, slashed taxes, and moved quickly to cut social spending (Laycock 2001: chapter 8; Harrison/Laxer 1995; Ralph/Régimbald/St-Arnaud 1997). The Reform and Alliance parties have consistently rejected the idea of forming provincial wings; with parties like this in power provincially, there is no need to do so.

The general point here is that the Reform/Alliance desire to displace the Conservatives stems from a rejection of the idea that Canadian conservatism should actively sustain and seriously support public institutions that advance collective purposes through provision of public goods, except in cases like defence where market failure is assured if the state does not do so. Under Harper's leadership, this rejection of pre-1984 traditions of Canadian conservatism will be articulated with increasing frequency and single-mindedness.

Conclusion

After over a year of internal party turmoil over leadership and policy matters, the Canadian Alliance is still not back to its pre-2001 strength. New leader Steven Harper may have restored faith in the party among many party activists and supporters in western Canada. But the damage done by Stockwell Day to the party's prospects in Ontario will be hard to undo. Even after Harper won the Alliance leadership, the Ontario business community continued to assert its unwillingness to fund the Alliance party until Alliance effected a practical merger with the federal Progressive Conservative party (McNish/Laghi 2002; *The Globe and Mail* 2002*)*.

Harper appears to be in no hurry to agree to anything short of a minor role for the Conservative party and its leader in a united party. Such a role would be too humiliating for Conservative loyalists to accept. And though the Alliance party wishes to end internal fights between social and economic

conservatives and anti-party populists, it is unlikely that Harper will be able to silence social conservatives or direct democracy enthusiasts to this degree. Finessing their disagreements more than Stockwell Day managed is a more realistic objective.

So in the foreseeable future, the Alliance party is unlikely to absorb or bury the Conservative party, or to solve the problems inherent in building its conservative coalition. Nonetheless, we have reasons to believe that the Alliance will continue to be effective in advancing its economic policy agenda to Canadian governments, and in diminishing Canadians' experiences and expectations of state provision and pluralistically inclusive public life.

Perhaps the most important factor favouring continued Alliance success in these regards is the solid support that the Alliance economic agenda enjoys in the Canadian daily press. The *Vancouver Sun*'s endorsement of the Alliance party on the eve of the 2000 election is representative in this regard. The *Sun*'s editorial described the Alliance platform as "more practical and less political than Canadian voters are accustomed to seeing," and contended that its "proposals on taxation and the use of the private sector in public arenas are not radical – they're based on sound policy analysis and proven choices" (*Vancouver Sun* 2000).

By the mid-1990s Reform/Alliance positions in favour of major tax cuts, deficit elimination, public sector reductions, and social program rationalization were consistently advocated in virtually all of English Canada's influential daily papers. Media support for Reform began in the 1980s in the widely read, right-wing *Alberta Report* and *BC Report* magazines. By the 1993 election the overwhelming majority of weekly "community newspapers" in small-town British Columbia and Alberta had endorsed Reform. More qualified endorsements from the daily press across much of urban English Canada followed shortly thereafter. While few of the dailies endorsed Reform's social conservatism, since 1993 they have consistently supported the Reform/Alliance fiscal and economic agenda.

This degree of mass media support for the central dimension of a third party's policy agenda is unheard of in Europe or the United States. Of course calling this Reform or Alliance economic policy is somewhat misleading, since it is essentially that of corporate Canada, and has been advanced by corporate lobbyists – and their policy research institutes – since the 1980s.

The Alliance party is also lucky to have new right governments in power in English Canada's three biggest provinces. In the two wealthiest provinces, Alberta and Ontario, Conservative Party Premiers Ralph Klein (1993-2002) and Michael Harris (1995-2002) have governed with an emphasis on tax-cutting, social program slashing and union-bashing. Neither leader has seen an electoral advantage in promoting the social conservative side of the Reform/Alliance agenda. But their approaches to economic and much provincially-controlled social policy, along with their rhetorical attacks on bureau-

cratic, federal government, trade union and new social movement actors and agendas, have done much to legitimize 'Reform-style' politics in English Canada.

These Premiers have consistently portrayed their opponents as "enemies of the province."[20] This has bolstered the Reform/Alliance insistence that the Ontario 'Common Sense Revolution'[21] was also the people's, and that its opponents are 'special interest' enemies of the people. With the new Liberal government in British Columbia following in the Harris and Klein regimes' footsteps, the Alliance party can argue that more than half of English Canadians now benefit from the type of governance that Alliance would implement federally. Media coverage of these three provincial regimes has been largely uncritical and frequently laudatory, thereby helping to 'normalize' this approach to governance for many citizens.

Still another key factor supporting Alliance success is the continued decline in public trust of governments and politicians (Nevitte 2002), and corresponding increase in cynicism about the purposes to which redistributive state programs and public goods might be applied. The point to be made here is simply that Canadian citizens' unexceptional political distrust and cynicism provides a very congenial environment for the kind of anti-political, anti-statist message that Reform/Alliance has specialized in for 15 years.

The weakness of federal or provincial social democratic party responses to the new right agenda will also support continued Alliance party ideological and policy influence. So will Canadians' perception that in the context of increasing global economic integration, the federal government is less relevant to most citizens' lives than it was in the hey-day of welfare state growth. I merely mention these two factors in passing here; addressing either properly would take a separate article.

As Steven Harper noted in a 1998 article with mentor and leadership campaign manager Tom Flanagan, a conservative party does not have to win federal office in Canada to have a major impact on the way we live and think about political life (Flanagan/Harper 1998). In conjunction with provincial governments implementing new right policy, and an English Canadian media that supports these governments and the Reform/Alliance economic agenda, the Reform and Alliance parties have had a major impact on policy debates, citizens' expectations of governments, and federal government policy choices. They have done so by constructing an alternative democratic paradigm, and identifying a logic of power that pervades relations among political and economic structures, 'special interests,' 'the people' and failed democracy in Can-

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20 Following Harris's resignation as Premier of Ontario, *The Globe and Mail* newspaper commented editorially that Harris has consistently "treated critics as malevolent obstacles in the path of his right-thinking crusade." See *The Globe and Mail* 2001.

21 This was the title given to the 1995 Ontario Conservative manifesto, a name that the Conservatives have since proudly attached to their two terms in office.

ada. In this paper I have argued that understanding the significance of this new right populist democratic paradigm requires us to consider the mutual dependence between ideological underpinnings of the Canadian new right's socio-economic agenda, central among which is a market model of democratic politics and social purposes.

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Conservatism and Religion in the United States

Jürgen Gebhardt

I.

In modern politics conservatism and religion have been considered natural bedfellows by many an enlightened political scientist. This point of view explains the overriding interest of European as well as American political scientists in the Christian Right and its impact upon the "new conservatism" and on the Republican Party since the 1970s. But this perspective presents a rather myopic view of the specific American stance towards the religious-political complex. In Europe the old alliance of throne and altar lived on in democratic politics and has brought forth a long-standing commitment of the church establishments and church members towards conservative parties, which is highlighted by the emergence of explicitly Christian parties, even if the influence of the churches on electoral politics is waning. We still find, particularly in countries with a tradition of state-supported religion, that surveys show "moderately strong statistical associations between individual religiosity and political ideology," as Wald has pointed out. "Political conflict frequently pits a 'secular' left wing against a 'religious' right." I would like to note that portraying the European left as 'secular' seems problematical in the face of the intramundane religiosity of European mass-movement politics.

"In the United States," Wald states, "by contrast, a much weaker relationship is found between religious attachment and self-described ideological position. The 1991 world values service showed the United States to be virtually the only one of fifteen countries where vote in national elections was essentially unrelated to the measure of belief in God. This suggests that the tie between religion and ideology is not natural but rooted in history." (Wald 1997: 21)

This means that the respective shape of the religious-political complex is determined by socio-historical cultural conditions. In the American case we are confronted with a sustained religious commitment in terms of the strengths of religious institutions, practices and beliefs. There cannot be a significant correlation between a particular outlook on politics and the belief in God if virtually all Americans say they believe in God or some idea of a supreme being. The majority of 86% is churched and claim a formal religious affiliation in terms of adherence to faith-based organizations which reflect a multi-versum of Christian and non-Christian modes of religiosity. The rising

group of the 'unchurched' (14%) marks only a tendency toward privatization of religion and modes of free-floating spirituality, as is documented by the fact that only 0.4% of the people recently surveyed describe themselves as atheists. By the most conventional yardstick of social science theory, modernization involves secularization in terms of the decline of 'religion.' Notwithstanding the obvious changes in the spiritual and cultural landscape of the US, it remains true that the most modernized society of the West is the most conservative country in religious terms. Focusing on the American scene, Martin E. Marty concludes:

"First, contrary to expectations, religion is much in evidence, which means that the secular paradigm and prophecy that had dominated Western academic thought have come to be questioned. Second, rather than being contained within formal institutions, religion has unmistakably and increasingly diffused throughout the culture, and has assumed highly particular forms in the private lives of citizens. Third, traditional religion has not fallen away, but has survived and staged an impressive comeback, establishing itself firmly and enduringly in large subcultures." (Marty 1989: 11)

In other words: With respect to the religious underpinning of cultural life, the US is a non-secularized modern society. Consequently, religious groups and faith-based organizations, depending on their position on social and political issues on the left-right ideology scale, range from "liberal" to "conservative." The theological outlooks play a part in social and political alignments but they are shifting in connection with historical circumstances, as evidenced by the recent move of Evangelical Protestants and Catholics to the Republican Party. However, observed from a historical point of view, we see a continuing history of realignments and changing loyalties of major and minor religious groups and individuals to political programs and parties, and "the recent rise in political activism among some religious groups is not a departure from national tradition but only the renewal of a long-standing pattern in American political life" (Wald 1997: 319). A correct reading of the religious moment in the present resurgence of social and political conservatism depends on an assessment of the peculiar status of religion in American politics in the larger context of the Anglo-American experience.

II.

"No other Western nation [...] matches our obsession with religion. The vast majority of us believe in some version of God, and nearly all of that majority actually do believe that God loves her or him, on a personal and individual basis." (Bloom 1992: 25)

But American religiosity according to Harold Bloom, as quoted here, is marked by characteristics of its own, and in this respect it differs in content

and form from the religious make-up of Western mainstream religion. The hallmark of religion in America is not just sectarian pluralism and the absence of powerful church establishments, but the prevalence of Christian heterodoxies centering on a radical biblicism. In Europe these had been suppressed, but in the founding process of the American republic these religious undercurrents came to the fore in the making of a republican and democratic Christianity and the emergence of such indigenous religious bodies as Mormonism, Christian Science, or Seven-Day Adventism. Looking beyond the polled pieties of Gallup surveys, Bloom claims that what is at stake is not "religion in America" but rather what he calls "American Religion."

"There are indeed millions of Christians in the United States, but most Americans who think that they are Christians truly are something else, intensely religious but devout in the American religion, a faith that is old among us, and that comes in many guises and that over-determines much of our national life." (Bloom 1992: 37)

It goes without saying that Blooms approach to American religiosity is based on the great tradition of East Coast transcendentalism from Emerson to William James. In his famous "The Varieties of Religious Experience" (1902), James generalizes on the American sense of religiosity on the basis of varied empirical evidence. It is marked as almost wholly personal and experiential and centres on the experience of a larger power existing beyond the human self, which is friendly toward human beings and their ideals. James argues against the European God, the God of Hegel and in favour of the God of the common people, the God of a popular Christianity. This God presides over a plural world that resembles more a confederated republic than an empire (James 1967: 110, 321f.). This is the God who – in the view of Bloom – "is invoked endlessly by our leaders, and by our flag-waving President in particular, with especial fervour in the context of war." But this invoked force appears to be the American destiny, the God of our national faith (Bloom 1992: 32). Here Bloom is referring to the God of American civil religion as it emerged in the founding process of the Republic. The founders' Republicanism blended the notion of natural religion with a Christian minimal dogma in a way that integrated doctrinally diverse creeds and sects present in the colonies. The outcome was a religious amalgam that provided the religious-political framework of the new nation. It served as the matrix for an evolving 'ordering faith' of the republic as distinguished from "saving faith" of sectarian creeds (Gebhardt 2000). The biblical God metamorphosed into an American God who elected his American people to prove itself as the redeemer nation in the world. This God had revealed himself in the founding experience and bestowed his blessing upon the American experiment to this day. Of course, this God puts the Americans through punishing afflictions like civil war, foreign wars, the threat of communism and fascism, and more recently jerk states and terrorism to be tested in their perseverance with the sacred cause of the founders. This civil religiosity materializes in a wide range of

public rituals like the opening of parliamentary and court sessions, the oaths of office and conferred sacerdotal functions upon the presidential office as is revealed by the rite of inauguration (Wald 1997: 60ff.).

The well-known pledge of allegiance puts the minimal dogma of a civil theology in a nutshell. "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands: one nation under God, indivisible with liberty and justice for all." At the first meeting of a new legislative period, the members of the House of Representatives solemnly take this pledge of allegiance and collectively confess to their civil religion. This civil religion ethos provides American politics with its moral dimension, one that entails a sacralization of American society, its democracy, free enterprise economy and international standing. All major conflicts in American politics spring forth from this moral basis of the American ethos. "(P)olarization occurs over moral issues rather than economic ones and the politics of interest groups is supplemented by the politics of a moral reform." That means less class conflicts and more moral convulsions inspired by waves of creedal passion as Huntington argues. "It is precisely the central role of moral passion that distinguishes American politics from the politics of most other societies, and it is characteristic that it is most difficult for foreigners to understand" (Huntington 1981: 11).

III.

The area where ordering faith and saving faith overlap has always determined the involvement of religious groups in the great political conflicts of the nation. They were committed to the moral and political integrity of the providentially preordained American order as proclaimed in the foundational myth. In particular the multi-facetted Protestantism was vexed by a recurrent anxiety about the lapse in Christian standards in a nation they deemed to be Christian in form and content.

"Pervading these efforts was a mixture of moralism and social activism that transcends terms such as 'liberal' and 'conservative'. Whether abolishing slavery or passing blue laws, advocating women's rights or attacking masonry" or preaching the social Gospel, Protestants saw themselves "as champions of [...] 'civic piety.'" (Gillespie/Lienesch 1988: 410f.)

In a sense, all national identity was grounded in Protestantism, and most American Protestants thought of America as a Christian nation. This nation was not a denominational speciality but the conviction of the general public. Thus, Wodrow Wilson, a Presbytarian, stated: "America was born a Christian nation. America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture" (quoted in

Schulte Nordholt 1991: 479). Protestants rightly considered their faith to be the normative American creed. But their role as cultural custodians of the national Christian soul came to be increasingly under strain in the course of the dynamic cultural and socio-economic changes within American society, and the threat to the American way of life from outside, that is communism.

In particular the biblicistic underspinnings of the Protestant consensus dissolved and the strictly 'evangelical' understanding of Christian doctrine lost its hold on mainstream Protestantism and on American culture in general. There was, however, less 'secularization' involved than the scholars want us to believe (Watson 1997: 12f.; Oldfield 1996: 16-179). Rather, what took place was a process of religio-cultural responses to intellectual challenges of the time, and there is no doubt that since the turn of the 19th century, a doctrinal, organizational and socio-cultural realignment has taken place. The split first involved a correct reading of the biblical tradition and produced what was to be called Evangelical Protestantism: Fundamentalism as well as Pentacostalism and Charismatism, which separated themselves from mainstream Protestantism. Second, it entailed an anti-modernist reading of civil religion. From the twenties onward, a complex of sentiments, ideas and attitudes shaped up in defence of the traditional values of rural and small-town America. These centred on opposition to the teaching of evolution and to communism (including New Deal welfare statism) as well as on the fight against moral decline (Wilcox 1988: 663ff.). This legacy of a new moral and social custodianism was revived in the Protestant anti-communism and anti-liberalism of the fifties, but as in the 1920s, it lacked the support of the mass public. Post-war intellectual conservatism and the ensuing neo-conservatism cultivated a new interest in Christianity but more of the neo-Orthodox and Catholizing or the Niebuhrian realistic stance. The traditionalist conservatives "had largely been academics in revolt against 'secularized,' mass society," the religio-cultural conservatism of Evangelical Protestantism that goes under the label 'New Right' was a revolt by the 'masses' against the secular virus and its aggressive carriers in the nation's elites" (Nash 1996: 331).

A prolific literature has dealt with and is still dealing with the rise of the Christian Right and its lasting impact on the Republican Party that resulted from the "ballot-box marriage between the Republican Party and the Christian Right" (Diamond 1998: IX). However, opinions differ as to the longevity of this alliance in particular and the future of politicized Evangelism in general (Watson 1997: 184f.; Oldfield 1996: 225ff.; Diamond 1998: 240ff.). The much told story of the return of a marginalized religious subculture of American Protestants into the centre of American Party politics began in the late seventies, only after the Carter administration, intellectual and political conservatism and Evangelism joined forces under the umbrella of the Republican Party. They formed a countermovement against the political-cultural upheaval brought about by the creedal passion of political revivalism in the 1960s and

1970s, whose reading of the civil religion was reflected in major court decisions on church-state relations and in particular on social issues like abortion or the rights of homosexuals etc. By the end of Reagan's second term, the self-styled conservative coalition encompassed "libertarianism, traditionalism, anticommunism, neo-Conservatism, and the religious right." The latter brought to "American conservatism a moral intensity and populist dimension not seen since the Goldwater campaign of 1964" (ibid.: 332). This moral intensity developed from a typical American figure of thought that is reflected by the notion of a conspiracy of secular humanists to promote atheism, liberalism and socialism leading up to the destruction of family, morality, the free enterprise system and, last but not least, the American Republic. The most interesting aspect, however, is the populist dimension that the Christian Right contributes to this conservative coalition. It presents us with the paradox of a non-secular modern society. The different strands of Evangelical Protestantism were "grass-roots movements with democratic structure and spirit" built around "self-appointed and independent-minded religious leaders" and dominated by powerful localism.

"(B)y instinct and conviction they reverted to those populist techniques that had characterized American popular religion for over a century. Their power in the modern world lies in their characters democratic persuasions." (Hatch 1989: 214)

Force was added to this combination of morality and movement politics in that a certain segment of Catholic laity, who were radical anti-abortionists, fell in with the moral crusaders. But as far as Catholics are concerned, their shift toward the Republican Party might be explained better by their improved socio-economic status than moral fervour. In that they differ from Jewish neo-conservatism. Jewish academics have been prominent in intellectual conservatism since the 1970s without, however, mustering much support from the Jewish community. But the Protestant Right, forced to cooperate with Catholics and Jews in the Republican Party, had to somewhat tune down its traditional anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism. In effect, the traditional anti-communism is slowly being replaced by anti-Islamism, and a Bible-based pro-Israel posture is preparing a common ground for Evangelicals and Jews, not withstanding considerable differences on other political and social issues over a century.

This anti-Islamic stance has some bearing on the foreign policy outlook of political Evangelicalism. Of course, its political agenda does not focus on foreign policy but on domestic issues and the socio-moral norms they entail. The efforts of coalition building are directed towards the promotion of "family values" that involves – in fact – a political program of reshaping society in terms of moral conservatism. The scope of 'values' ranges from resistance against homosexual marriages, bureaucraticized child care, compulsory sex education in schools, abortion in particular and against governmental activi-

cism and welfare statism in general, in that those undermine the moral base of American society. The policies advocated like financial support for the traditional family and for private schools, and setting up a private and faith-based welfare system, tougher measures against pornography and crime etc., amount to dismantling the power of the federal government. In this respect the political program of the 1995 'Contract with the American Family' of the Christian Coalition coincides with the Republican Party's 'Contract with America' of 1994. The latter, however, approaches the issues of Big Government from a political and economic vantage point. The House Republicans fear government as threat to taxpayers and business, the Christian Coalition sees it as a threat to the values of evangelical families (Oldfield 1996: 219). The political agenda of political conservatism is undergirded by moral values even if the particular religious and moral concerns of the Christian Right have been neglected by the GOP for reasons of electoral success. There is, however, the less visible impact of Evangelicalism on foreign policy that was mentioned above. Kenneth Wald argues that "in one policy domain, foreign policy, religious differences have proved particularly elusive." Therefore "it proves difficult to identify strong ties between religious traditions and foreign policy priorities" (Wald 1997: 183). But the biblicist world view of political Evangelicalism re-enforced certain religious and moral trends that marked conservative approaches to foreign policy since the Reagan administration. The ongoing tendency to replace anti-communism by anti-Islamism coincides with similar trends prevalent within the conservative foreign policy establishment after the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War. Evangelical and conservative Republicans subscribe to a religious reading of the course of world affairs, even if the conservative policymakers differed from the specific and rather doctrinaire version of the Evangelists 'premillenialist' Armageddon theology featuring a final all-out war between the forces of good and evil (Diamond 1998: 202ff.). On the other hand, it must be noted that millenialist and apocalyptical ideas about the American mission in the world have always been a determining factor in American foreign policy since the Americans had committed themselves to the providentially ordained spreading of the gospel of the 'City upon the Hill' all over the world. So Wilson, the foremost protagonist of apocalyptic internationalism, claimed that "America was intended to be a spirit among the nations of the world" (quoted in Bloom 1992: 263). Wilsonianism became the synonym for the moralism, liberal or conservative American foreign policies in the 20th century. It merges national interest and American Creed and proclaimed America custodian of a new world order. The rise to global world leadership in World War II and in the Cold War confirmed the notion of an 'Almost Chosen People' engaged in war against evil and destined to acting under the benevolent guidance of the American God. In this sense, American foreign policy always reflects the politico-religious make up of American society in general.

Wald is right in saying that the links between religious traditions and for-
eign policies are elusive. But this is to be explained by the fact that American
foreign policy is intrinsically bound up with American religiosity. Protago-
nists of a more secular and realist foreign policy were never able to mute this
Wilsonianism. The reemphasis of religiously inspired moralism in foreign
affairs by Republican administrations since Reagan, effectuated an influx of
Evangelical apocalypsism into the upper and middle echelons of the admini-
stration since many an officeholder came from the ranks of the Christian
Right. Reaganites like Interior Secretary James Watt, a pentecostalist, ob-
served in discussing environmental concerns "I don't know how many future
generations we can count on until the Lord returns." Secretary of Defence
Caspar Wineberger affirmed: "I have read the Book of Revelation, and, yes,
believe the world is going to end by an act of God, I hope – but every day I
think time is running out" (Gibbs 2002). This trend has gained momentum in
the present Bush administration. In particular after the terrorist attack on
September 11, the eschatological interpretation of politics is on the rise in
terms of the belief in a last battle between good and evil being about to un-
fold. The notion, however, is not confined to an Evangelically inspired con-
servatism but it is pervading the American society at large.

IV.

In sum, the political mobilization of Evangelical Protestantism has given
present day conservatism a moralistic character that is quite in tune with mor-
ally loaded politics in the US in general, but was lacking in the traditional
American conservatism of the fifties. This tentatively formed conservative
alliance has to be viewed against the backdrop of long-standing socio-cultural
changes in the pattern of American religiosity, which was briefly discussed
earlier. First, there is a movement toward privatized religion and spirituality
featuring the autonomy of moral and social judgement at the expense of insti-
tutionalized religion. Second, "pace and direction of change has varied mark-
edly among different denominations." Protestants and Jewish congregations
are losing membership, while Catholics and other religions are on the gaining
side. Third, while mainline Protestant denominations are dwindling, aging
and loosing vitality, evangelical and fundamentalistic groups of all varieties
are on the gaining momentum. "The revitalization of Evangelical religion is
perhaps the most notable feature of American religious life in the last half of
the twentieth century" (Putnam 2000: 76f.). But Evangelicalism does encour-
age less civic involvement in the wider community and focuses more on indi-
vidual piety and church-centred activities. This Evangelical tradition of slight
political involvement has been overcome, as pointed out, by a combination of

charismatic leadership and modern techniques of mass communication that proved successful in terms of mass mobilization in electoral campaigns on the local, state, and national level to date.

My reflection on religion and conservatism started out with a brief discussion of the unique character of the politico-religious complex in the US, that is the non-secular modern society. American politics is permeated by recurring creedal passions and religiously inspired moral fervour. The religious moment in the recent resurgence of conservatism, therefore, is not surprising and documents a long-standing historical tradition of religious politics. Compared with the general picture of the politico-religious scene in the US, the conservative connection is just a case in point. Considered in terms of basic political ideas, attitudes, electoral choice, and stands on specific political and social issues, identifiable religious groups support all political loyalties, as Kenneth D. Wald has shown in his seminal work on religion and politics in the US. Dealing with the major religious traditions (including 95% of the adult population), he distinguishes between mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, Black Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jews and Seculars who are the unchurched. He places the religious impact on conservatism in proportion to the overall range of involvement in public policy, and concludes:

"On both basic questions of political identity and many specific issues that have dominated political debate, the six major groups are usually arrayed across the spectrum of opinion. When the focus of attention shifts to social issues [...] the six groups assume positions that differ from their ordering on other kind of political issues" (Wald 1997: 215).

However, even a particular concern with moral questions does not imply conservative loyalty, as is proven by the Black Protestants who stay firmly in the ranks of the Democratic Party as do most of the Catholics and all Jews. A peculiar moral impulse may animate today's conservatism, but the deepseated moralism of civil religion marks all of American civic culture, irrespective of the varying political profiles of religious affiliations.

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Part III

Finding the "There" There:
Membership and Organization of the Republican Party in the United States[1]

Howard L. Reiter

The title of this study is based on the famous characterization of Oakland, California, by Gertrude Stein: "There's no there, there." Similarly, the major parties of the United States are, by comparative standards, lacking in both membership and organization (Scarrow 2000: 85). There is no formal party membership, and in the many states that conduct "open primaries," any voter can participate in a party's selection of its nominees for public office. Even where the primary is "closed" to party identifiers, the act of identification consists of a simple statement to an election official. Organizationally, the federal structure of the American political system produces highly decentralized parties in which party organizations at the "higher" levels of the system have little leverage over those at "lower" levels. Because of these characteristics, we will have to be inventive in operationally defining membership and organization. By doing so in a variety of ways, we can have greater confidence in those findings, especially if different methods produce similar findings.

This study is not merely descriptive. Our thesis is, that the present state of the Republican party can best be understood by the increasing conservatism of the party's base over time. The causes of that development would take us far afield; suffice it to say that they are rooted in part in structural changes in American society, such as the migration to the south and southwest, the rising salience of race relations, and the tax revolt of the late 1970s. In addition, conservative forces were mobilized, as demonstrated by the increasing political activism by business sectors as well as social movements such as the religious right and anti-tax activists (see e.g. Berman 1998; Brennan 1995; Carter 1995; Carter 1996; Fraser/Gerstle 1989; Himmelstein 1990; Hodgson 1996; Martin 1996; Miles 1980; Rae 1989; Reinhard 1983). The turning points in these developments were the presidential nomination of Barry Goldwater in 1964, when conservatives made themselves an indispensable part of any winning nominating coalition, and the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, which

demonstrated that victory was possible despite the articulation of strongly conservative positions.

One of the most important causes and consequences of this development has been the increased role of the south in the Republican party, which in the first century of its existence had a minimal presence in the region. That role was a cause of increasing conservatism, as the Goldwater campaign began a long process of migration of white conservative southerners from the Democratic to the Republican party, and substantial numbers of African-Americans and white liberals – in this essay, "liberal" will be used in its American sense – in the opposite direction. These realignments had the effect of making both parties more uniformly ideological. Increased conservatism also had the effect of elevating southerners to leading roles in the party, as the two most recent Republican presidents, at least two of the three top Republican leaders in the House of Representatives since 1995, and the leader of the Senate Republicans since 1996 have all been southerners.

The other side of the coin is that Republicans have lost much of their appeal in the northeast. Until the 1950s, the northeast often provided the party with its highest presidential vote percentages and highest proportions of congressional seats. Since then, however, and in large part as a consequence of the increasing conservatism of the national party, the northeast has become the Republicans' weakest region; in 2000 George W. Bush carried only one northeastern state, and Republican members of Congress were substantially outnumbered by Democrats in the region.

Increasing conservatism and the displacement of the northeast by the south will be illustrated by numerous examples to follow.

Membership

For a party that lacks formal membership, we will examine the mass base of Republicanism with several alternative measures.

Registration. One might use as an indicator of the Republican mass base the voters who register as Republicans. However, since party registration is public information, some voters may be reluctant to state their partisanship in this way; in addition, people who register with a party might not bother to change their registration even when they no longer feel an attachment to that party. The most important reason not to use such data, however, is that only 28 states and the District of Columbia, comprising about 60 percent of the population, have party registration. Nor can the states with party registration be easily compared, as the percentages who are not registered with either major party differ vastly, from a high of 68 percent in Ohio to a low of seven percent in Kentucky; surely the incentives for registering with a major party

vary from state to state. The only meaningful inference to be drawn from these data are that in 11 of these 28 states, Republicans outnumber Democrats; except for New Hampshire, all these Republican states are in the midwest or far west (Barone/Cohen/Cook 2001).

Identifiers. The method most commonly used by political scientists to define party allegiance is party identification, which entails responses to the question that has long been asked in the American National Election Studies (ANES):

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Would you call yourself a strong Democrat/Republican or a not very strong Democrat/ Republican? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic party?

Figure 1: Republican Identifiers as Percent of All Respondents, and as Percent of Major-Party Identifiers, 1952-2000.

Source: American National Election Studies

Because it has been demonstrated that self-styled independents who regard themselves as closer to one major party than the other, are in most respects behaviorally identical to "not very strong" partisans (Keith et al. 1992), and in order to maximize sample sizes, we will combine those who think of themselves as Republicans with those independents who feel closer to Republicans than to Democrats.

First we examine trends over time. The ANES has tracked party identification since 1952, and the proportion of Republican identifiers is presented in figure 1. Because of fluctuations in the proportion of independents, the figure also presents the Republican proportion of major-party identifiers. While

short-term considerations play a role in the trend, with the Eisenhower years showing an early peak and Goldwater's nomination associated with a trough, on the whole the party's fortunes improved after Reagan's election in 1980. Some scholars have called this a realignment (Meffert/Norpoth/Ruhil 2001).

The increase in Republican fortunes is associated with the geographic changes in the party's base that were cited earlier. In 1952, 11.6 percent of the Republican identifiers were white southerners; in 2000, 31.6 percent were. In 1952 northeasterners, who comprised 25.0 percent of the American people, made up 30.2 percent of Republicans; in 2000, when northeasterners were 17.5 percent of Americans, they were only 15.9 percent of Republicans.

Measuring the shift of Republicans to the right requires operationally defining ideology. The most venerable questions on ideology asked by ANES are the "thermometer ratings" that were first used in 1964. Respondents are asked to place several groups, including liberals and conservatives, on a scale from zero to 100. By subtracting each respondent's rating of liberals from that person's rating of conservatives, we can derive a reasonable measure of conservative ideological preference, which ranges from-100 to +100.

Figure 2: Conservatism of Republican Party Identifiers Compared With That of Pure Independents, 1964-2000.

Source: American National Election Studies

By this measure, the mean conservative score among Republicans rose over time; however, so did the mean conservative score among all Americans. A more meaningful measure of Republican conservatism requires some basis of comparison, preferably one not dominated by Democrats, who may have undergone their own ideological transformation. Therefore we subtracted from the Republican mean that for "pure" independents, those respondents

who leaned toward neither party. The solid line in figure 2 presents the re-
sults, and it shows a clear upward trend from a low point in 1968. Peaks oc-
curred during the Reagan campaign of 1980, and in 1996. While in the latter
year Bob Dole was not a highly ideological candidate, the effects of Newt
Gingrich's leadership of House Republicans for the previous two years proba-
bly account for the unprecedentedly high level of conservatism of the Repub-
lican base.

The broken line in figure 2 shows the proportion of Republicans who
rated conservatives at least 50 points higher than liberals, and it too rose over
the period, with peaks in 1980 and 1996. However, these expressions of ideo-
logical proclivity do not test respondents' views on issues. Issue-based meas-
ures of ideology present problems when studied longitudinally. Some issues
change their meaning over time, and what was considered innovative at one
time is no longer controversial years later; school desegregation is one exam-
ple. Moreover, some issues, like Vietnam and law and order in the 1960s,
lose their salience over time. There is one question whose persistent signifi-
cance seems undisputed. Since 1972, the ANES survey has included a ques-
tion that asks respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale:

"Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a
job and a good standard of living.[...] Others think the government should just let each
person get ahead on their own. [...] And, of course, some other people have opinions
somewhere in between [...]"

We can again subtract from the mean Republican response to this question the
mean response among pure independents, and the trend is shown in figure 3.
As with the other questions, the trend is upward, this time with peaks in 1984
and 1996.

The apparent parallelism of the trends in figures 2 and 3 is confirmed by
correlation coefficients among these three measures, all of which exceed +.6
and two of which are statistically significant with p<.05 despite the small
number of data points. These results strengthen our confidence in the validity
of our finding that the party has moved to the right.

Activists. These trends are confirmed among party elites. From 1988
through 1996, as table 1 shows, Republican national convention delegates
were increasingly likely to call themselves very conservative, and less likely
to call themselves moderates. In Congress, too, the parties became more po-
larized after 1976, although whether this was due to a rightward shift among
Republicans or a leftward shift among Democrats (perhaps both) is difficult
to say (Hetherington 2001: 622f.).

Figure 3: Conservatism of Republican Identifiers' Responses to Question of Government Job Guarantee, Compared With That of Pure Independents, 1972-2000.

Source: American National Election Studies

Table 1: Ideological Self-Identification of Republican National Convention Delegates, 1988-1996.

	1988	1992	1996
Very liberal	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Liberal	1.7	0.8	0.4
Moderate	35.5	28.4	20.7
Conservative	54.1	59.0	55.7
Very conservative	8.7	11.8	23.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(473)	(500)	(474)

Note: Respondents who did not identify with an ideology are exbuded.
Sources: Washington Post Republican Delegate Poll, 1988, July 26-August 6, 1988; The Washington Post Poll: 1992 Republican Delegate Poll, August 3-10, 1992; and ABC News/Washington Post GOP Delegates Poll, July 25-August 5, 1996.

It is a truism that party activists are usually more ideologically extreme than the mass of party identifiers, and that was the case in 2000. We have identified Republicans who said that they had worn campaign buttons; put bumper stickers on their cars or signs on their lawns; gone to campaign meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or the like; or done other work for a party or candi-

date. We will call these people "campaign activists;" they comprised 15.1 percent of all Republicans. In a separate but overlapping category, we have identified Republicans who gave money to the Republican party or to Republican candidates; we call them "campaign donors," and they constituted 9.5 percent of all Republicans. In table 2, we compare their ideological identity, as well as their views on several issues, with those of less active Republicans. The table shows that in all these ways, nearly always by statistically significant degrees, campaign activists and campaign donors are more conservative than other Republicans. This is potentially important because those partisans are likely to be more influential than others, and to apply their energy and money to relatively conservative candidates and issue positions. On the other hand, activists are often more concerned about electoral success than about ideological purity (Stone/Abramowitz 1983).

Table 2: Comparison of Ideology and Issue Positions of Republican Campaign Activists and Campaign Donors with Those of Other Republicans, 2000 (Source: American National Election Studies).

	Campaign activists	Others	Campaign donors	Others
Ideology	34.2	19.7***	40.1	19.9***
Gov't services	2.53	2.85*	2.51	2.83*
Defense spending	3.96	3.66**	4.00	3.68*
Health insurance	3.71	3.38*	3.73	3.40
Job guarantee	4.26	3.89**	4.17	3.92*
Aid to blacks	3.92	3.80	3.90	3.81

Note: Except for "Gov't services," higher scores denote greater conservatism.
* Difference significant at .05 level by T-test
** Difference significant at .01 level by T-test
*** Difference significant at .001 level by T-test

Organization

Political parties in the United States have organizational structures, although they are less hierarchical and centralized than those of parties in many other nations. In several respects, the national party organs of the Republican and Democratic parties are stronger than they have ever been, but their function is largely limited to coordinating the funding and other campaign resources of the candidates who identify with the party. Alongside these formal structures have arisen networks of party insiders, financial donors, and ideological activists that must be considered when we discuss party organization at the begin-

ning of the twenty-first century. To one author, "American political parties are turning into 'webs' or 'nets,' where ideas and information flow in a variety of directions" (Pitney 2001: 106). Other scholars, describing the presidential nominating process, assert that:

"Operating as loose but stable networks of elected officials, fund-raisers and other activists, the two major parties control the resources candidates need to compete for delegates in state primaries and caucuses." (Cohen et al. 2001: 1)

We shall first discuss the evolution of the functions of the longstanding national Republican party organs, and then describe as best we can the more amorphous networks that play vital roles in the functioning of the party.

Traditional structures. Each major party in the United States has a national committee comprised of representatives of the 50 states and other entities such as the District of Columbia, and in each house of Congress each party has a campaign committee. While the national committees were established more than a century and a half ago, until fairly recently the strongly federal structure of American politics relegated them to a minor role. In the words of one study, they epitomized "politics without power" (Cotter/Hennessy 1964).

However, this situation changed in the last half of the twentieth century, as two innovative Republican chairmen, Ray C. Bliss (1965-1968) and Bill Brock (1977-1980), increased the national committee's funding and developed a broader sphere of activities. Bliss rebuilt the party's financial base, especially with direct mail, established numerous campaign training programs, beefed up the research division to give the party a more constructive image, and scrupulously avoided identification with any one faction. To present a unified front, Bliss organized a Republican Coordinating Committee of notables from all wings of the party (Bibby/Huckshorn 1968; Klinkner 1994: 71-87). Brock launched an ambitious set of projects that included enhancing the direct mail-based financial structure; actively recruiting candidates even at the state and local level; coordinating interest groups' political action committees and their donations to Republican candidates; improving relations between the party and such groups as blacks, women and evangelicals; launching policy committees and publications to present the Republicans as the party of new ideas; and running generic television advertisements for the party (Cotter/Bibby 1980; Conway 1983; Klinkner 1994: 133-154).

Although the Democrats have made strides in emulating many of these changes, Republicans seem to have been pioneers in organizational development. Three reasons make this so: the Republicans, as the party with closer ties to the business world, have greater access than the Democrats to managerial talent; those business contacts and a wealthier mass base have also given Republicans more funding than Democrats receive, which help them implement their goals, especially when they entail the use of expensive technolo-

gies; and the culture of the Republican party seems to place a higher priority on organization and hierarchy than Democratic culture does (Freeman 1986; Klinkner 1994).

Today, the national party committees and congressional campaign committees focus on candidate-assisting activities, including coordinating contributions from interest groups, matching candidates with professional campaign consultants, and sharing resources such as public opinion surveys. Unlike the Democratic committees, the Republican committees even use their clout to take sides in Republican primaries (Herrnson 1988; Aldrich 1995; Kolodny 1998; Berke 2002). For such activities they have vastly increased their fundraising. Table 3 shows the trend over time. While the amount of money raised in presidential election years tends to be higher than in non-presidential election years, the overall trend is decidedly upward, especially regarding "soft" money on which there are no limits per contributor, although the funds are not supposed to be used for direct electoral purposes.

Table 3: Financial Receipts, All Republican National Organizations, 1992-2001.

	Federal ("hard" money)	Non-federal ("soft" money)	Total	Percent Non-federal
A) Receipts through 20 days after election, in millions of dollars				
1991-1992	266.3	49.8	316.1	15.8
1993-1994	223.7	52.5	276.2	19.0
1995-1996	407.5	141.2	548.7	25.7
1997-1998	273.6	131.0	404.6	32.4
1999-2000	447.4	244.4	691.8	35.3
B) Receipts in non-election years, in millions of dollars				
1997	77.8	40.2	118.0	34.1
1999	96.9	59.6	156.5	38.1
2001	131.0	100.1	231.1	43.3

Sources: A) Federal Election Commission 2001; B) Federal Election Commission 2002a

Where does the money come from? We can answer this question geographically as well as by sector of the interest-group world. In 2001, according to data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics, in nearly every state individuals gave vastly more money to Republican national party committees or to Republican state party committees than to their Democratic equivalents; the mean percentage was 68.6 percent to Republicans. In only four states, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island, did Democrats receive more money than Republicans. All are predominantly Democratic

states, and indeed there was a strong positive correlation between the Republican percentage of receipts and George W. Bush's vote percentage in 2000 (r=+.721, p<.000). Proportionally, Republican money comes from states where Republicans are strongest, and this means the states in the south, Rocky Mountains, and parts of the midwest (Center for Responsive Politics 2002c).

Because some states have larger populations, and wealthier populations, than others, the most Republican states are not always the states that provide Republicans with the greatest amount of money in the aggregate. Residents of California, which is not a strong Republican state, gave the party more money than those of any other state in 2001, and New Yorkers ranked third (Center for Responsive Politics 2002a). Table 4 lists the interests represented in contributions in 2001, showing the amount contributed to national Republican committees, the percentage of total Republican receipts that each interest represented, and the percentage of contributions to both major parties that went to Republicans. Republicans received the overwhelming majority of business contributions from nearly all sectors, and virtually no money from organized labor, which is a longstanding pattern. In light of Republican policies and the backgrounds of Bush and Richard Cheney, it is not surprising that the energy sector was one of Republicans' strongest supporters. The only interests besides labor to give Democrats at least 45 percent of their money were communications and electronics, where Democrats have made great efforts to woo contributors; lawyers and lobbyists, as Democrats have opposed Republican efforts to limit liability lawsuits, which are unpopular among trial lawyers; and ideological and single-issue groups. This last category may be surprising, as the biggest spender in it was the pro-Republican National Rifle Association. However, seven of the ten largest donors in this group were pro-Democratic, including four linked to prominent Democrats (including Hillary Rodham Clinton), and groups concerned with gay and lesbian rights, Social Security, and getting more liberal women into Congress.

Informal structures. In the distant past, Republican presidential candidates won presidential nominations by securing the support of state and local party leaders who controlled patronage-based machines. Even after primaries became part of the process in the early twentieth century, insurgent candidates such as Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 could win most of the primaries and still not obtain the nomination. By mid-century, the weakening of party organization enabled some insurgent candidates – Wendell L. Willkie in 1940, Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952, and Barry M. Goldwater in 1964 – to secure the nomination with shrewd tactics and grass-roots support. In 1972 came a proliferation of primaries, a result of the Democrats' McGovern-Fraser reforms which swept the Republicans along in their wake. For a time, it appeared that winning primaries could be an effective way for insurgents to overcome organization resistance; in this fashion, Ronald Reagan nearly deprived an incumbent president, Gerald Ford, of the nomination in 1976 (Reiter 1983).

Table 4: Interest-Group Contributions to Republican National Committees, in Thousands of Dollars, 2001.

Sector	Contributions	Percent of total Republican contributions	Republican percent of major-party contributions
Agribusiness	6,234	6.4	89.5
Communications/electronics	9,315	9.6	54.7
Construction	3,808	3.9	82.7
Defense	1,407	1.4	74.6
Energy/natural resources	7,225	7.4	86.4
Finance/insurance/real estate	24,010	24.7	71.5
Health	8,529	8.8	78.7
Lawyers & lobbyists	3,571	3.7	39.4
Transportation	5,200	5.3	79.2
Misc. business	16,813	17.3	80.5
Labor	308	0.3	4.1
Ideology/single-issue	1,318	1.4	25.7
Other	9,536	9.8	73.4

Source: Center for Responsive Politics 2002b

However, Reagan would be the last Republican insurgent to come close to being nominated. Beginning in 1980, every Republican nominee has won the nomination with ease, and with the support of the party establishment. While such insurgents as Patrick J. Buchanan in 1992 and 1996, Malcolm "Steve" Forbes, Jr., in 1996, and John S. McCain in 2000, won some primaries and caucuses, their campaigns were soon overwhelmed by the party leaders' favored candidates. There are two reasons for this reassertion of the power of party elites. The first is the ideological homogeneity of the party: Buchanan, Forbes and McCain were not far different from their opponents, so they could not effectively rally an ideological faction. The second reason is that the party leaders have been able to provide crucial support for their favored candidates, in some places – notably New Hampshire and South Carolina – by controlling the party organization, but more importantly, by mobilizing networks of financial contributors. Most recently and most dramatically, George W. Bush raised more than $94 million in the nominating contest of 2000, more than the treasuries of the two runners-up, Forbes and McCain, combined (Federal Election Commission 2002b).

Bush's experience was only the most dramatic example of how financial networks can be mobilized by party elites. In each presidential election cycle, such elites have agreed on a candidate, typically someone who has paid his dues: Reagan in 1980, George H. W. Bush in 1988, and Robert J. Dole in 1996 had all run for president before, and Bush and Dole had each been both

vice-presidential nominee and chairman of the Republican National Committee. By quickly agreeing on the heir-apparent, leaders can guarantee to these candidates the resources that will sustain them through losses in the early primaries and caucuses, another experience that all these candidates as well as George W. Bush suffered. Cohen et al. (2001) have accumulated much empirical evidence for the convergence of endorsements by party elites.

Understanding Republican organization, however, requires analysis of other, less party-centered structures as well. One is a network of activist organizations that are part of the conservative movement. Every February, they convene a Conservative Political Action Conference in the Washington area; in 2001 it claimed 3,478 participants. This conference has long been sponsored by the American Conservative Union (ACU) in association with *Human Events* magazine and Young America's Foundation, an offshoot of Young Americans for Freedom (YAF); in recent years other organizations such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the *Washington Times Weekly Edition* have also been sponsors (*Human Events* 2001). Some are ideologically broad-based, such as the ACU and YAF. Others are somewhat more focused, such as the socially and culturally conservative Eagle Forum and the Christian Coalition. Still others focus on particular issues, like the NRA. It is difficult to assess the clout of these mass-based organizations, as they do not publish membership figures. However, they clearly form part of a cluster of conservative groups with close ties to the Republican party.

Other conservative organizations operate on a more elite level. Some are essentially lobbying groups, such as the Free Congress Foundation, which focuses on cultural issues, and Americans for Tax Reform. These particular organizations are spearheaded by prominent Washington-based conservative activists, Paul Weyrich and Grover Norquist respectively. Others are research organizations, which are commonly called think tanks. They include the venerable and moderately conservative American Enterprise Institute, the more conservative and assertive Heritage Foundation, the internationally focused Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the libertarian Cato Institute, the urban-focused Manhattan Institute, and the socially conservative Family Research Council. Such outfits, often well funded by wealthy individuals and businesses, have influenced the debate over policy issues, especially among Republicans.

The lobby groups mentioned in the preceding paragraph are more ideological than more traditional lobbyists and political action committees (PACs) of the business world. As discussed earlier, business has funded candidates of both major parties, although especially in recent years, far more of their largesse has gone to Republicans than to Democrats. While individual corporations have their own PACs and lobbyists, there are organizations that coordinate the activities of numerous PACs and lobbyists, including the large-corporation Business Roundtable, the small-business National Federation of

Independent Businesses, the Business Industry Political Action Committee, and the U. S. Chamber of Commerce.

No attempt to depict the networks of organizations that are friendly to Republicans would be complete without the communications vehicles. Most venerable are two magazines, *Human Events* and *National Review*; a later convert to conservatism is *Commentary*, a publication of the American Jewish Committee; and newer outlets are the *American Spectator* and the Rupert Murdoch-funded *Weekly Standard*. Among the leading conservative newspapers are Murdoch's *New York Post*, the Unification Church-affiliated *Washington Times*, and the editorial page of the *Wall Street Journal*. Talk radio programs are heavily conservative, and most prominent among the hosts has been Rush Limbaugh; others include G. Gordon Liddy and Michael Reagan, son of the former president. On television, the Fox network is the favorite of conservatives. In addition is a wealth of web sites. All these outlets help communicate news and talking points to the conservative (usually Republican) faithful. They also inform sympathizers of politically correct terminology, such as calling tax cuts "tax relief."

These inventories mention only some of the most prominent of the rich and dense infrastructure of organizations that have helped to promote conservative causes in the United States for many years. Like all complex political networks, they are linked not only by the communications outlets mentioned in the preceding paragraph, but by overlapping directorates of members. Among the 18 trustees of the Heritage Foundation in February 2002, for example, were trustees of the Hoover Institution, the Free Congress Federation, the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, and other conservative entities including the Bradley and Scaife foundations and the Amway Corporation (Heritage Foundation 2002). This is not to imply anything sinister about these connections, but they demonstrate how conservatives communicate and coordinate their activities.

Such organizations and networks also serve as vehicles of recruitment when Republicans assume office. The Heritage Foundation scored an early success when it provided policy ideas and personnel for the new Reagan administration in 1981. The Federalist Society, an organization of conservative law professors and students, has provided candidates for appointment to courts and administrative departments at the highest levels of governments, as well as law clerks for judges including justices of the U. S. Supreme Court. Membership in such bodies provides automatic ideological credibility for applicants to positions controlled by Republicans.

The conclusion to which the foregoing analysis leads, is that it is impossible to understand fully the structure of the Republican party without extending our operational definition of organization to entities outside the party itself. In another era, when such bodies were few and their alliances with the party based only on temporary convenience, it would not have been necessary

to use such an expansive definition. However, to overlook these associations today would mean failing to understand some of the mechanisms by which the party has been able to improve its fortunes and sustain that improvement over an extended period of time.

It is also important to identify a division of labor between different parts of the conservative networks during election campaigns. The party leaders and financial contributors prefer candidates who can appeal to the moderate "swing" voters, and so they usually select candidates who are not too extreme in their conservatism or their way of expressing it. Activists, as shown earlier, tend to be more extreme in their ideology. The challenge for the party is to motivate activists while not tying the candidate too closely to some of the activists' more controversial opinions. At national conventions, the former challenge has taken the form of giving activists a free hand in writing the platform. "What is new," one analyst wrote in 1980, "is the extent to which the activists seem to be able to determine the convention's issue agenda" (Malbin 1981: 136).

The process by which ideologically motivated activists have gained control of platform-writing is a logical outgrowth of their motives, and of candidates' motives as well. Delegates who are issue activists volunteer for the platform-writing committee, especially in an age when nominations are decided early and there are few other decisions to be made at the convention. Candidates who are chosen in part because of their relative moderation want to keep activists happy, in order both to dampen conflict at the convention and to keep partisans motivated for the autumn campaign. This is not surprising in the cases of Gerald Ford in 1976 and George Bush in 1992, who had difficult relationships with their party's right wing and used the platform as a sop to them (Weinberg 1977f.; Abramson/Aldrich/Rohde 1995: 43f.). However, even Reagan in 1980 had difficulty keeping fervent ideologues from writing a platform more extreme than what he wanted (Moore 1981: 141-150). In the 1996 presidential election, Robert Dole failed to get the platform committee to include a statement indicating that Republicans have differing views on abortion, and afterward told journalists that he had not read the platform, and did not intend to do so or be bound by it (Sabato 1997: 95-103; Stanley 1997: 37f.).

Republican presidential nominating politics, then, operate on two levels. On the level of candidate choice, party elites and financial donors hold sway, obtaining the nomination for establishment-oriented candidates who present a moderately conservative image. On another, less visible level, issue activists get to write the platform and hope that the candidate, if successful, will be bound by it. Journalists, who focus on candidates' personalities and assume that the public is uninterested in platforms, cooperate in this arrangement by not pressing the candidate too hard about the fact that the platform and the candidate's own appeals are somewhat divergent.

No examination of Republican-oriented organizations would be complete without acknowledging that they are not all conservative. There are moderate Republican groups both within and outside government, most notably the Republican Leadership Council, which was founded in 1997 as a Republican counterpart to the prominent Democratic Leadership Council. Seventeen of the 28 current and former public officials who comprised its Founding Directors and Advisory Board in 2002 were from the northeast (Republican Leadership Council 2002). There are other, more focused groups such as the Republican Pro-Choice Coalition, which promotes abortion rights, and the gay and lesbian Log Cabin Republicans. None of these groups have been very influential within national Republican circles. Moderate Republicans in the House of Representatives, also a minority within their party, have formed the Tuesday Group (Kolodny 1999a, 1999b).

Factionalism

A final subject of central importance to understanding the composition of a political party is the cleavage structure within it. Therefore it is necessary to examine the factionalism within the Republican party in recent years. There has been much written not only about differences between conservative and moderate Republicans, but also between social conservatives and economic conservatives, and between supply-siders and those whose highest priority is balancing the budget. These battles within the conservative camp, however, have never interfered with the overall doctrinal unity of the party. They have been contests over nuance, not over serious ideological differences. Most Republicans of whatever conservative stripe support tax cuts, a missile defense, and restrictions on abortion, whatever their differences over which issues to emphasize in campaigns.

Identifiers. What have been the geographic contours of Republican divisions? Examining this question requires dividing the nation into geographic sections, and for this purpose we use the standard four-part scheme of northeast, southeast, midwest and far west. Because we will begin by using the American National Election Studies, we use the operational definitions used by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. We return to the ideological measure that we used earlier, and show in figure 4 how self-identified Republicans in those four geographic sections have rated conservatives and liberals since 1964. In most years, southerners were the most conservative of the four groups, and northeasterners the least conservative. While over time, the degree of conservatism of the party as a whole changed in ways that were discussed earlier, the relationship among the four sections has not changed very much.

National convention delegates. We can also compare how the sections voted at national nominating conventions. The modern conservative movement had its origins in the 1930s, with divisions over the New Deal domestic program, and the debate over U. S. involvement in the Second World War (Reiter 1999). Conservative candidates and their peak votes included:

1)   Robert A. Taft and Arthur H. Vandenberg on the fifth presidential ballot in 1940;
2)   Robert A. Taft on the second presidential ballot in 1948;
3)   Robert A. Taft and Douglas MacArthur on the presidential ballot (before switches) in 1952;
4)   Barry Goldwater on the presidential ballot (before switches) in 1964;
5)   Richard M. Nixon and Ronald Reagan on the presidential ballot (before switches) in 1968;
6)   The vote against the minority apportionment formula in 1972 (when there was no contest over the presidential nomination);
7)   Ronald Reagan on the presidential ballot (before switches) in 1976;
8)   Ronald Reagan's vote tally as recorded by *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (1980a:1801 and 1980b:1936) (the roll-call vote that year was virtually unanimous for Reagan).

There were no divided votes at any of the other conventions in the 1940-1976 period, and none since 1976. Roll-call data for the years before 1980 are easily obtainable (Bain/Parris 1973; *Congressional Quarterly* 1976: 10f.). Because delegates vote by state delegation, and because there is no theoretical reason not to weight states equally, figure 5 shows the mean state percentage for each of the conservative standard-bearers. For all the years under examination, the northeast stood out as the least conservative section, usually by a large margin; in most years the southeast was slightly more conservative than the western sections. The biggest shift was in the far west, which was relatively liberal in the 1940s but sharply conservative beginning in 1968; sectional support for Goldwater and Reagan, the rise of issues like federal control of land and environmentalism, and the presence of defense industries on the west coast help explain this shift.

Figure 4: Ideology of Republican Identifiers, by Section, 1964-2000.

Source: American National Election Studies

Figure 5: Support of Geographic Sections for Conservative Side at Republican National Conventions, 1940-1980.

Source: see text

The contested Republican presidential nominations since 1980 have had two characteristics in common. First is the absence of moderate or liberal candidates; John Anderson in 1980 was the most recent such contender, and he failed to win a single primary. While commentators have made much of the differences between cultural conservatives like Pat Robertson, Gary Bauer and Alan Keyes and economic conservatives like Bob Dole, Steve Forbes (in 1996) and Jack Kemp, or between supply-siders like Kemp and Forbes and more traditional budget-balancing Republicans like Dole and Pete DuPont, all

of these candidates identified themselves as conservatives, and all shared a general opposition to government spending on social programs and to legal abortion. The second characteristic of the nominating battles from 1988 through 2000 is the departure of the losers from the race in March. This practice had the effect of elevating the nominee's percentages in the later primaries, thereby rendering primary votes much less useful as indicators of candidates' relative strength. It also resulted in virtually unanimous roll-call votes, so the analyst can no longer use such votes to study Republican factionalism.

As an alternative to roll-call votes and primary results, we can examine media surveys of delegates to ascertain if candidates represented different ideological groups, and if northeastern exceptionalism has persisted. In 1988, when Vice President George Bush won the vast majority of delegates, the ideological profile of his delegates was very similar to those of the runner-up, Senator Robert Dole, and of the uncommitted delegates. Only Pat Robertson's delegates were markedly more conservative. However, among the Bush delegates, northeasterners were indeed more moderate-to-liberal than delegates from other parts of the nation, a difference that is statistically significant ($p<.000$). Table 5 presents the data.

Table 5: Candidate Support and Ideology, Republican National Convention Delegates, 1988.

Self-described ideology	Candidate			
	Bush, Northeast	Bush, non-Northeast	Dole, other, uncommitted	Robertson
Very liberal	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.0%
Liberal	9.2	1.8	1.7	0.0
Middle of road	36.9	17.3	20.6	3.3
Conservative	45.5	57.4	55.2	30.0
Very conservative	8.3	23.3	22.0	66.7
Total	99.9	100.0	99.8	100.0
N	(314)	(1332)	(286)	(60)

Note: Percentages do not always sum to 100, due to rounding.
Source: Los Angeles Times Poll, Republican Delegate Survey, July 14August 7, 1988.

In 1992, the *Washington Post* delegate survey unfortunately did not ask the delegates if they supported Bush's only rival, Pat Buchanan. The only question that was related to a nominating issue and divided the respondents, asked whether the respondent would approve or disapprove if Bush decided to dump Vice President Dan Quayle; it evoked a far more positive response from liberals and moderates than from conservatives. "Family values" was a major theme of the convention, and another question asked if the recent riots in Los Angeles had been due to "a breakdown in family values or government

neglect of the cities;" conservatives were far more likely than moderates or liberals to cite family values as the main cause. The Quayle question showed that his strongest support was among conservatives outside the northeast; northeasterners of whatever ideology, and moderates and liberals outside the northeast, had similar responses to the question. The family values question found a clear ideological division, with liberals and moderates responding similarly regardless of where they lived, but no statistically significant geographical split. Table 6 presents the results.

Table 6: Opinion on Dumping Quayle, and Family Values as Root of Los Angeles Riots, by Ideology and Section, Republican National Convention Delegates, 1992.

	Would approve of Bush's decision to replace Quale	Cite breakdown in family values as main cause of riots
Northeast: liberal and moderate	65.1% (N=43)	50.0% (N=42)
Northeast: conservative and very conservative	73.2% (N=41)	68.4% (N=38)
Other: liberal and moderate	70.6% (N=85)	50.5% (N=95)
Other: conservative and very conservative	51.2% (N=281)	78.1% (N=302)

Note: Those not answering the questions are excluded from the calculations.
Source: The Washington Post Poll: 1992 Republican Delegate Poll, August 3-10, 1992.

In 1996, the main issue before the delegates was abortion. The *ABC News/Washington Post* delegate survey asked four questions about the issue: whether they personally favored a constitutional amendment outlawing it, whether the vice-presidential nominee should be someone who opposed it, whether the platform should endorse a constitutional amendment banning it, and whether the platform should include "a statement that recognizes opposing views on abortion." As with the 1988 data, we divided the supporters of the nominee, former Senator Dole, into sectional groupings, and present the results in table 7. Dole supporters were less likely to identify themselves as conservatives than were the handful of respondents who backed his main rival, Pat Buchanan. The table shows that on each abortion question, and by strikingly similar percentages, there was a strong sectional difference among Dole supporters, but that neither Dole group was nearly as conservative as the Buchanan supporters.

Table 7: Opinion on Abortion, by Candidate Support, Republican National Convention Delegates, 1996.

	Candidate		
	Dole, Northeast	Dole, non-Northeast	Buchanan
For constit. amendment banning abortion	14.7% (N=75)	37.5% (N=309)	75.6% (N=41)
Prefer pro-life vice-presidential nominee	13.3 (N=75)	40.0 (N=330)	86.4 (N=44)
For anti-abortion constit. amendment in platform	14.1 (N=71)	46.8 (N=308)	80.5 (N=41)
Against plank recognizing diverse views on abortion	26.5 (N=68)	37.3 (N=319)	83.7 (N=43)

Source: ABC News/Washington Post GOP Delegates Poll, July 25-August 5, 1996.

As a final indication of the continuing significance of northeastern exception-alism, table 8 correlates section with ideology. Two findings stand out from the table: the persistence of the correlation of northeastern residence with more moderate self-identification, increasingly so according to the values of gamma, and the decreasing tendency of Republican delegates in both parts of the country to identify themselves as moderates. By 1996, 94 percent of dele-gates chose an ideological label for themselves, and by nearly a four-to-one ratio opted to call their views conservative or very conservative.

Table 8: Ideological Self-Identification of Republican National Convention Delegates, by Section, 1988-1996.

	1988		1992		1996	
	Northeast	Other	Northeast	Other	Northeast	Other
Very liberal	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%
Liberal	2.7	1.4	1.1	0.7	0.0	0.5
Moderate	57.7	28.7	51.7	23.5	42.4	15.9
Conservative	35.1	59.9	43.7	62.2	50.6	56.8
Very conserva-tive	4.5	9.9	3.4	13.6	5.9	26.7
Total	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.1	99.9
N	(111)	(362)	(87)	(413)	(85)	(389)
Kendall's Tau-C	.223		.186		.219	
Gamma	.501		.537		.592	

Note: Percentages do not always sum to 100, due to rounding. Respondents who did not identify with an ideology are excluded. All statistics significant at the .000 level.
Sources: Washington Post Republican Delegate Poll, 1988, July 26-August 6, 1988; The Washington Post Poll: 1992 Republican Delegate Poll, August 3-10, 1992; and ABC News/Washington Post GOP Delegates Poll, July 25-August 5, 1996.

In the absence of divided roll-call votes or available delegate surveys from 2000, we are left with exit polls of primary voters for the Republican contest that year. From the New Hampshire primary through Super Tuesday, the race was essentially between Governor George W. Bush and Senator John McCain. While McCain had compiled a largely conservative voting record in Congress, his advocacy of campaign finance reform and attacks on leaders of the religious right gave him a largely moderate electoral base. Exit polls from the 17 states that held Republican primaries through Super Tuesday found McCain receiving, on average, 25 percent more support from self-identified moderates than from self-identified conservatives. The result was a predictable geographic pattern. In none of the northeastern primaries did McCain receive less than 33 percent of the votes from self-identified Republicans; in none of the primaries outside the northeast, except for Arizona, did he receive more than 32 percent (Cable News Network 2000).

In sum, Republican factionalism continued to show the northeast to be more moderate than the rest of the country. However, the increasing ideological homogeneity of party elites sometimes muted this cleavage, as when George Bush and Bob Dole, both moderate conservatives, were the chief rivals in 1988. And in 2000, western conservative John McCain was a very unlikely heir to liberal New York governors Thomas E. Dewey and Nelson A. Rockefeller as the standard-bearer of the northeastern wing.

Members of Congress. In order to examine the behavior of Republican members of Congress, we use the scores calculated by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1997). Examining each congressional ballot from 1789 onward on which the minority position secured at least 2.5 percent of the vote, Poole and Rosenthal estimated a dynamic model of roll-call voting. They found that a two-dimensional model with a linear trend incorporating each member's behavioral change over time predicted more than 80 percent of the members' votes. Each member received a coordinate – a score – on each of the two dimensions. It is with Poole and Rosenthal's first dimension that we are concerned. In their words, it "represents conflict over the role of government in the economy," and "divides the two major political parties." (Poole/Rosenthal 1997: 35, 46)

Figures 6 and 7 show the mean scores on this dimension for Republicans in each house of Congress, separated into geographic sections, over ten-year intervals. The patterns are quite similar in both houses. Until the New Deal, the northeast was the section most opposed to government intervention; afterward, it was by far the most favorable. While the meaning and content of these issues changed radically over the course of the twentieth century, the data for recent decades is quite similar to what we saw for the mass of Republicans and for national convention delegates: in a phrase, northeastern exceptionalism.

Figure 6: Conservatism of Republican Members of the U.S. Senate, by Geographic Section, 1909-10 to 1999-2000.

Source: http://voteview.uh.edu

Figure 7: Conservatism of Republican Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, by Geographic Section, 1909-10 to 1999-2000.

Source: http://voteview.uh.edu

Conclusion

Several themes have emerged and re-emerged in this analysis. The first, and perhaps most important, is the increasing conservatism of the Republican party, relative to the rest of the nation, in the past couple of decades. We have seen that by several measures, Republican identifiers are a more conservative group than they were in the 1960s; that even in the short span of eight years from 1988 to 1996, Republican national convention delegates grew more and more likely to identify themselves as conservatives; that the vast majority of pro-Republican organizations and publications stand well to the right; that conservative activists have come to dominate the platform-drafting process at Republican national conventions; and that all Republican presidential candidates since 1980, and especially those who win nominations, are clearly conservative. More often than not, the presidential contest is among candidates of different shades of blue, rather than the more ideological contrasts of earlier eras.

Related to this first finding is a shift in the geographic center of gravity of the party, which has moved away from the northeast and into the south. This is reflected in the increase in the presence of southerners and the decrease in the presence of northeasterners among the party's mass base, and in its predominantly southern leadership in both the White House and Congress. Within the party, among mass identifiers, national convention delegates, and members of Congress, northeasterners provide the base of the moderate wing, a faction that has suffered a great loss of influence over the years (Rae 1989). The financial base of the party has also shifted away from the northeast and toward the south and west. Nearly thirty years after his presidential nomination, Barry Goldwater told his biographer, "We knew that the only thing we could accomplish would be moving the Republican headquarters from New York to the West Coast, and we did that. We got it away from the money" (Goldberg 1995: 208).

The foregoing findings would be less significant were it not for a third one, the increased clout of the Republican party at the polls. As we have seen, the party has enjoyed a substantial increase in the proportion of Americans who identify with it, as well as a better financed and more innovative organization. These developments have played a role in producing, over the past nine presidential elections, four solid Republican victories, one narrow Republican victory, and in 2000 an electoral vote victory even when the party had narrowly lost the popular vote. In 1980, Republicans won control of the U. S. Senate for the first time in 28 years, and in 1994, they won both houses of Congress for the first time in 64 years. The election of 2000, which produced paper-thin presidential and congressional results, demonstrated how far the Republicans had come from the days when they were clearly the minority

party. It is a tribute to their effectiveness that these gains came despite a lack of evidence that the American people are ideologically anywhere nearly as conservative as Republican strategists have hoped (Ferguson/Rogers 1986; Gold 1992).

In the amorphous world of American political parties, where it is difficult to find the there, there, the Republicans have shrewdly developed a vehicle for promotion of electoral and policy gains. In this endeavor, they have produced results as close to the "party government" model as any major American political party ever has. The significant fact is not that they do not always achieve their goals, but that they come as close as they do.

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Party Membership on the Canadian Political Right: The Canadian Alliance and Progressive Conservative Parties[1]

William Cross/Lisa Young

The upheaval on the Canadian political right in the past decade is well documented (Carty 2000; Woolstencroft 2001; Ellis 2001). Today, the two parties of the right, the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives, continue to compete against each other for the support of right-of-centre voters. One result of this electoral fracturing of the political right is the three-straight majority victories won by the Liberal Party.[2] Not surprisingly, Liberal Party opponents have spent much of the last decade seeking a reunification of the right as an important first step in an electoral coalescing of enough of the government's opponents to defeat it. Much of the attention paid to the question of uniting the right has concerned the machinations of party leaders and other elites. Which parliamentary caucus are Alliance party dissidents aligning with? Will the new Alliance leader favour electoral cooperation with the Conservatives? Will the Conservative leader seek a meaningful partnership with the Alliance? While all of these are important considerations, they ignore the role that the grassroots supporters of both parties, and particularly the activist core found in the parties' memberships, will play in any attempt at unification or electoral cooperation.

The upheaval on the political right has had important implications for the norms of party membership in Canada. The dynamic force on the right, the Canadian Alliance party, arrived on the scene with a different concept of party membership from that found in the three parties then dominating federal politics. The success of the Alliance's predecessor, the Reform Party, in the 1993 election prompted the other parties to reconsider their norms of party membership. The most significant changes occurred in the Alliance's sister party of the right, the Conservatives. The Conservatives adopted the Alli-

2   The Liberals averaged just 40 per cent of the popular vote in these contests, considerably less than the 47 per cent of the popular vote won by parties forming the previous six majority governments dating back to 1958.

ance's membership policy, allowing supporters to join the party directly through their national headquarters, changed their method of leadership selection to provide for direct election by all party members, did away with differentiated memberships for groups such as women, and changed their norms of party democracy to allow for a more meaningful role in party decision making by the grassroots membership (Carty 2000: 107-129; Young 2002: 195).

Given the changing dynamic of party membership, any success at uniting Canada's political right must involve widespread agreement among the grassroots' activists in both the Progressive Conservative and Canadian Alliance parties. It is the activist base of each party that will have to endorse, and put into practice, any meaningful plan for electoral cooperation. There is reason to believe that this will not be easily accomplished. There have been many reports of extreme bitterness between local organizations of the two parties during the past decade. Members of the Alliance party have often exhibited a visceral and strongly negative reaction towards the party that for many of them was their former political home. Many grassroots Tories blame their former colleagues who joined the Alliance for their party's recent electoral devastation. Given these sentiments, and the importance of cooperation between these two groups of activists to a meaningful resolution, it is surprising that there has been little attention paid to questions such as who are the members of each of these parties, what do they have in common with one another, and what is the potential for uniting them within a single political tent.

In this paper, we begin to fill this gap by examining the similarities and differences of the Alliance and Conservative parties' grassroots members. We begin by examining who the members of each party are. Do they come from similar socio-demographic groups or are there significant differences between the two? We then consider some of the key factors that have traditionally divided the parties at the elite level: policy views, and attitudes towards party democracy. We identify those policy areas where there is substantial policy agreement between the members of the two parties and those where there is substantial divergence. We then consider the views of party members on indicators of support for intra-party democracy. The Canadian Alliance initially laid claim to their uniqueness from the Conservatives substantially on the basis of being more ideologically conservative and in being more participatory and democratic and thus more responsive to the party's grassroots. We examine whether these attitudes persist among the parties' members.

Throughout this inquiry, we give special consideration to the characteristics and views of the one-quarter of Alliance members who formerly belonged to the Conservative party. We hypothesize that these members may play a key role in finding common ground between the two parties, or alternatively, they may be the most ardently anti-Tory.

Our analysis leads us to several conclusions. First, on socio-demographic characteristics, Conservative and Alliance members are, for the most part,

more similar to each other than to members of the other parties. The exceptions to this are on measures of education and income. Conservatives are both better educated and have higher incomes than Alliance members and in this way are more similar to Liberal party members. On questions of policy, we find relative similarity in the views of members of both parties on policy questions relating to economics and federalism. The attitudinal area where members most diverge is on questions of social tolerance. Here we find Tory members have views more similar to members of the Liberal party than to Alliance members. We also find considerable differences between the parties in terms of members' views towards questions of party democracy. Alliance members are far more suspicious of placing power in the hands of party elites and more supportive of effective decision making powers for the party's members. Finally, we find that former Conservatives who now belong to the Alliance party are not likely to serve as a bridge between these two groups. On most indicators these members are as far or farther away from members of their old party than are Alliance members as a whole.

Methodology

This essay is part of *The Canadian Study of Political Party Members* project. The data used for this analysis were collected through a mail-back survey of randomly-selected members of the five major Canadian political parties, conducted between March and May of 2000. The survey was mailed to a regionally-stratified, random sample drawn from the membership lists of each political party.[3] Responses were received from 887 Conservatives, for a response rate of 44 per cent, and from 1052 Alliance members for a response rate of 43 per cent. Given that the sample was drawn during a period when there was no election anticipated and no leadership contests underway, we expect that the members sampled are longer-term, more active members than would be captured had the survey been conducted when leadership or nomination contests were underway.[4] While the analysis in this paper is restricted

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3   The regional sampling process varied by party. For details regarding this, please contact the authors. For all the parties except the Liberals and the Bloc, a regional weighting variable was created to correct for sampling procedures. Accurate regional membership breakdown was not available for the Liberal party, and regional weighting was not relevant for the Bloc.

4   The Alliance leadership campaign was underway in the spring and summer of 2000. However, the membership list we used did not include those new members signed up in the course of the campaign. It is important to note that members who joined the Alliance party during either of its recent leadership contests are not included in our sample. Accordingly, results presented for the Canadian Alliance should be interpreted with some care.

to the Canadian Alliance and Progressive Conservative parties, where appropriate we report findings relating to the Liberal party so as to indicate the relative placement of the Alliance and Conservative members in the party system.

Who Belongs to the Progressive Conservative and Canadian Alliance Parties?

In this section we examine the socio-demographic characteristics of members of the two parties. Their ability to reach an agreement and work together politically may well be influenced by how similar they are to each other. Becoming active in a local party association is in some respects similar to deciding to join any social or charitable organization. One is more likely to join and maintain active membership if they find they have things in common with other members. This examination also considers whether a new, combined membership would expand a unified party's reach into new groups of activists or whether the two memberships largely reflect one another.

As illustrated in Table 1, we consider several characteristics: gender, age, employment status, educational background, income, language and religion. We find that on many of these characteristics, the Alliance and Conservative membership is similar; certainly more similar to each other than to those of the other major federal parties. However, there are important exceptions to this. Conservative members are financially better-off and considerably better educated than are Alliance members. On these characteristics where there is significant difference between the two parties, Alliance members who formerly belonged to the Conservative party are more similar to members of their new party than to their former colleagues. We also find that on the considerations of age, language, and gender, the two groups are similarly underrepresentative of the Canadian electorate. Accordingly, a unification of the two parties would not automatically broaden the base of their membership.

The memberships of both the Alliance and Tory parties are overwhelmingly male. Females comprise only one-third of the memberships of these parties, compared with one-half of the Liberal party membership. To some extent this may result from both parties' rejection of differentiated membership. The Alliance party has explicitly declined to organize specific branches of the party for constituent groups of members such as women. The Conservatives did create women's groups within the party in the 1970s but abandoned these in their internal reforms of 1995 (Young 2002: 195). General voting patterns also evidence a significant gender gap for the Alliance party with their vote coming disproportionately from men (Gidengil et al. 2000).

Table 1: Socio-Demographic Traits of Progressive Conservative and
Canadian Alliance Party Members

		Conservatives	Alliance	Liberals	Alliance/former Conservatives
Gender	male	67%	68%	53%	68%
Age	65 and over	53%	59%	33%	65%
	under 40	12%	6%	19%	2%
Employment status	retired	47%	56%	35%	57%
	employed full-time	38%	30%	42%	29%
Education	at least some university	63%	41%	66%	43%
Family income	more than $ 70,000	41%	26%	37%	29%
	less than $ 50,000	37%	49%	42%	46%
Mother tongue	French	6%	1%	28%	2%
Religion	Catholic	19%	14%	52%	12%
	Protestant	68%	69%	32%	73%

Members of the Conservative and Alliance parties are relatively old. In both parties the average member is in his early sixties, with roughly half of the members of each party being older than 65, and only one-in-ten being under 40 years of age. The Liberals are by far the 'youngest' party with an average age of 54, one-third of their members over 65, and one-in-five younger than forty. This 'greying' of party membership, particularly strong in the two right-of-centre parties, is evident even among that cohort of members most recently joining the parties. When we restrict the analysis to members joining after the 1993 election, we find that the average age of Alliance members is 61 and for Conservatives 56. As Alliance and Tory members are similar in this regard any uniting of the two will not significantly broaden age representation within the new party. The age of party members is reflected in their employment status. One-half of Conservative and Alliance members are retired while only one-third are employed full-time. By contrast, more than four-in-ten Liberals are employed full-time and approximately one-third are retired.

In terms of family income, Conservative members are closer to their Liberal counterparts than they are to Alliance members. Only one-in-four Alliance members reports a family income greater than $70,000 compared with four-in-ten Liberals and Conservatives. There is also a marked difference in the levels of education achieved by members of the Alliance and Conservative parties. In this regard, Conservatives are again more similar to Liberal members. For example, two-thirds of Conservative and Liberal members have some university education compared with only slightly more than four-in-ten Alliance members. These differences in income and education pose a barrier to unification. Many initial supporters of the Alliance party left the Conservative party because of a belief that the party was dominated by elites and thus unresponsive to the concerns of average Canadians (Laycock 2002; Woolstencroft 1996: 205). Given the income and education characteristics of

the two memberships, this concern might re-emerge in unification attempts.

Both the Alliance and Conservative memberships are overwhelmingly Anglophone. While more than one-in-four Liberal members has French as their mother tongue, the same is true for only one per cent of Alliance and six per cent of Conservative members. This is more than a result of Conservative and Alliance regional weakness in the province of Quebec. Ten per cent of Liberal members from outside Quebec claim French as their mother tongue compared with two per cent of Alliance and PC members. It thus appears that a uniting of the political right will do nothing to improve this extreme language imbalance.

In terms of religion, the Conservatives have a slightly higher percentage of Catholic members than the Alliance but far fewer than the Liberals. The members of these two parties overwhelmingly belong to the Protestant faiths. To some extent this is a reflection of the Alliance and Tory's comparative lack of Francophone members who are overwhelmingly Catholic. However, even among Anglophone members we find that 36 per cent of Liberals are Catholics compared with 12 per cent of Alliance and PC members. The Alliance membership includes significantly higher representation of what are traditionally thought of as evangelical faiths than does the Tory party. Slightly more than one-in-ten Alliance members belong to evangelical faiths compared to one-in-twenty five Tories and one-in-fifty Liberals.[5]

Both the Conservative and Alliance parties have strong regional bases of support – the Alliance in Western Canada and the Conservatives in Atlantic Canada. At the same time both are very weak in other regions of the country. Under an agreement with the parties, that facilitated the collection of these data, we agreed not to report the parties' membership totals by region or province. Nonetheless, there are things we can report in this regard. The lack of a significant number of French speaking members in both parties suggests that they have few members in the province of Quebec. Further evidence of this under-representation is found in the composition of the electorate in the parties' recent leadership contests. Both parties used a method of direct leadership election allowing all party members to vote in the contest unmediated by convention delegates. In the Conservative's 1998 contest, only 11 per cent of the total votes were cast by Quebecers (Stewart 2002: 61). The Alliance party did not release the total number of leadership voters from Quebec, as they did from every other province except Prince Edward Island, because the party was so organizationally weak in the province that it could not organize and staff riding-based ballot locations. As a result, Quebecers had to vote by telephone and their votes were lumped together, for reporting purposes, with

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5   We include responses of Baptist, Pentecostal, Evangelical, Apostolic, Mennonite and
     Alliance in the Evangelical category. We are certainly under-reporting the number of
     Evangelicals as many respondents listed themselves as Protestants without indicating a particular faith.

party members from remote locations and those away from home on voting day who also were permitted to vote by phone. We can conclude from these data that a unification of the two parties, would not dramatically improve their organizational capacity at the constituency level in Quebec. However, unification would strengthen another regional gap found in each party's membership. Voters from the four Western provinces were under-represented in the 1998 Tory contest, and the four Atlantic provinces were under-represented in the 2000 Alliance contest. The Tory's organizational strength in Atlantic Canada and the Alliance's in Western Canada would compliment one another.

Policy Views of Party Members

More important, perhaps, than who the members of each party are, are the views they hold on major policy questions. We find that members of the two parties are fairly similar in their overarching political ideologies but that there are significant differences in some key policy areas.

Table 2: Members' Placement of Self on a 10 Point Left-Right Ideological Scale

Right		
	7.56	Alliance/former PCs
	7.33	Canadian Alliance
	6.69	Conservatives
	5.30	Liberals
	4.70	Bloc
	3.47	New Democrats
Left		

We asked members to place themselves on a 10 point left-right ideological scale and we find that Conservative and Alliance members place themselves closer to each other than they do to members of the other major parties. As illustrated in Table 2, the average Alliance member places himself at 7.33 on this scale and the average Conservative at 6.69. The memberships of the other parties in the system all fall well to the left with the Liberals being the next closest at 5.30. We can conclude from this that in terms of general ideology, Alliance members are somewhat to the right of the Conservatives, but the two groups are not far apart and are considerably closer to each other than to the members of any of the other parties.

Table 3: Factor: Laissez-Faire Economic Approach. Mean Factor Scores by Party (Lower Scores Indicate Greater Support for Laissez-Faire Approach)

	mean	standard deviation	N
Liberal	.13	.79	905
Alliance	-.41	.92	1052
Conservative	-.45	.94	889
Alliance/former PCs	-.60	.92	291

In order to consider the policy views of party members in more detail, we examine the results of a factor analysis that includes members' views on 22 policy related questions.[6] This analysis shows that members' views revolve around four general policy areas: laissez-faire economics, provincial powers, social tolerance and populism. We find the views of Conservative and Alliance members quite similar on the economic and provincial powers measures, but dramatically different on issues of social tolerance and populism.

The economic factor is made up of ten variables that measure attitudes towards government intervention in the economy. These range from spending on social programs and job creation projects, to caps on health care and university tuition expenses (full wording of all questions is found in Appendix A). As illustrated by the factor scores in Table 3, the opinion structures of Alliance and Tory members are virtually identical to each other on this measure and differ substantially from those of the other parties.[7] The Alliance and Conservative members exhibit significantly stronger support for a laissez-faire approach than do members of the other parties. Party members most supportive of a laissez-faire approach are Alliance members who are former Tories.

On the provincial powers measure we again see that opinion structure among Conservative and Alliance members is quite similar. This factor includes members' views on whether provinces should have more power and whether Quebec has the right to succeed unilaterally. Members of these two parties are closer to each other on these issues than they are to members of the other parties. As shown in table 4, members of both parties are more supportive of greater provincial powers than are members of the Liberal party. The views of Alliance members who are former Conservatives are almost identical to those of all Alliance members.

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6   For full details of the factor analysis, see Cross and Young forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Political Science. The economic and social tolerance factors each explain 17 per cent of the variance, the provincial powers factor 8 per cent and the populism factor 7 per cent. The *eigenvalue* for each factor is greater than one.

7   Factor scores are calculated using each of the variables making up the factor. Each variable is weighed on the basis of how closely associated it is with the underlying factor. Missing cases are assigned values of zero.

Table 4: Factor: Provincial Powers. Mean Factor Scores by Party (Lower Scores Indicate Greater Support for Provincial Powers)

	mean	standard deviation	N
Liberal	.42	.85	905
Conservative	.13	.75	889
Alliance	.01	.69	1052
Alliance/former PCs	.00	.68	291

The most substantial difference in policy views is apparent in the social tolerance factor. This factor is made up of eight variables measuring members' views regarding issues such as minority rights, tolerance for new lifestyles, and attitudes towards feminism. We find that Alliance members are by far the least tolerant of all the parties on this measure. As illustrated in Table 5, the Alliance is an outlier on this factor and is the only party to fall on the less tolerant side of the overall mean. The Conservatives fall in between the Alliance and the Liberals but are twice as far from the Alliance as from the other parties. Alliance members who are former Tories are even further from the centre than is their new party as a whole.

Table 5: Factor: Social Tolerance. Mean Factor Scores by Party (Higher Scores Indicate Greater Tolerance)

	mean	standard deviation	N
Liberal	.38	.85	905
Conservative	.00	.88	889
Alliance	-.80	.76	1052
Alliance/former PCs	-.85	.77	291

The difference in members' views regarding questions of social tolerance provides the biggest ideological stumbling block to uniting the grassroots' activists of the two parties. This factor, and the economic factor, explain considerably more of the variance in members' views than do the other two factors. It is questions of social tolerance that have also marked some of the most bitter public disputes between elites of the two parties in recent years. The widely perceived differences between the two parties in this area are verified in the views of their members.

The Alliance is again an outlier on the populism measure. This factor includes members' views on the proper representational role of the MP and on shifting more decision-making power to the grassroots. This is the only factor on which the Alliance and Conservative members are not neighbours. In the other three factors, even when there is substantial difference between the

Alliance and Tory members, there are no parties that fit ideologically between these two. On the populism scale the Tories and Alliance are at opposite ends of the spectrum. As illustrated in Table 6, Alliance members are by far the most supportive of populist views and Conservatives the least supportive. Alliance members who are former Tories reflect the populist values of their new party.

Table 6: Factor: Populism. Mean Factor Scores by Party (Lower Scores Indicate Greater Support for Populism)

	mean	standard deviation	N
Liberal	.16	1.1	889
Conservative	.01	1.1	905
Alliance	-.27	.81	291
Alliance/former PCs	-.34	.8	1052

Members' Views on Party Democracy

The Alliance party has long maintained that one of the key characteristics that differentiates it from the Conservative party is the practice of having party members make major party decisions. The Alliance was the first major party to allow voters to join the party directly through its national office, thus creating an unmediated relationship between its grassroots supporters and the party's national headquarters. Major decisions such as whether to expand the party beyond the four westernmost provinces, and whether to engage in the United Alternative project that resulted in transforming the party into the Canadian Alliance were made via mail-in ballots of the membership. Similarly, the Alliance was the first federal party to adopt an every-member vote process of leadership selection. The party's formal commitment to its membership is evidenced in a policy process that is dominated by constituency activists. The only way a policy plank can become official party policy or part of the party's campaign manifesto is for it to be adopted by a convention of grassroots activists.

In the party's transformation into the Canadian Alliance, the party's elite has been criticized by some members for what they consider to be a moving away from Reform's commitment to its grassroots supporters. Nonetheless, there remains in the Alliance membership a strong commitment to intra-party democracy and, consistent with the findings on the populism measure discussed above, this presents a formidable obstacle to unity between the two parties. To examine this further we consider members' views on a number of issues relating to party democracy. As illustrated in Tables 7 through 10,

Table 7: Role of MP. Whose Views Should an MP Reflect in the House of Commons?

	local Con-stituents	local party members	party policy conventions	party leader-ship	own con-science
Conservative	54%	3%	16%	11%	16%
Alliance	78%	3%	7%	2%	10%
Alliance/former PCs	72%	3%	13%	2%	10%
Liberals	56%	4%	13%	8%	20%

Table 8: Leadership Selection: Which is the Best Way to Elect a Party Leader?

	delegate convention	direct election	combination of the two
Conservative	20%	43%	37%
Alliance	7%	67%	26%
Alliance/former PCs	7%	67%	26%
Liberals	30%	31%	40%

Alliance members consistently display a greater commitment to grassroots driven party decision making than do their Conservative counterparts. Alliance members who are former Tories, reflect their new party's commitment to party democracy.

One encouraging finding in this regard, for those favouring unification, is that Conservatives appear dissatisfied with the influence of regular members in party decision making. The differential between the influence members think they should have and actually do have is substantial and second only to that found in the governing Liberals. Given the traditional 'iron law of oligarchy,' we expected to find a substantial differential in the governing party; however, it is surprising to find such a large differential on this measure among the members of a fourth or fifth place party. The results of table 10, however, indicating strong deference to the party leader, suggest this issue is more complicated and worthy of further investigation.[8]

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8   For a full discussion of members' views relating to intra-party democracy, see Young and Cross, forthcoming (December, 2002) in *Party Politics*.

Table 9: Relative Influence of Regular Members and Party Leader: How Much Influence Do Ordinary Members/Party Leader Have/Should Have in Party? (1-7 scale, 1= very little influence, 7= very influential)

	party leader			ordinary members		
	has	should have	differential	have	should have	differential
Conservative	5.93	5.84	-.09	3.59	5.01	-1.42
Alliance	5.97	5.59	-.38	4.59	5.61	-1.02
Alliance/former PCs	5.95	5.58	-.37	4.67	5.66	-0.99
Liberal	6.32	5.69	-.63	3.17	5.05	-1.88

Table 10: Who Should Set Party Policy?

	leader, so that party can win elections	regular members
Conservative	47%	53%
Alliance	25%	75%
Alliance/former PCs	25%	75%
Liberal	35%	65%

Conclusion

Examination of the attitudinal and socio-demographic characteristics of Conservative and Alliance party members illuminates the challenges facing those who would unite the political right. In order for there to be a successful unification of these two parties, activists at the constituency level will have to work together in nominating candidates and getting them elected to Parliament. Our data indicate that in several key areas the remaining members of the Tory party differ substantially from Alliance members and more closely resemble Liberal party members.

The difference in attitudes towards party democracy may prove to be a difficult obstacle to overcome. The creation of any new party will necessarily involve agreement on a new party constitution and decision making structure. The data indicate that Alliance party members are likely to insist upon grassroots driven processes while Tories appear more inclined to be deferential to party elites.

Conservative party members, like their Liberal counterparts, are better educated, financially better off, more socially tolerant and less suspicious of elites than are Alliance members. These Conservative members also differ substantially on these measures from the quarter of Alliance party members

who used to belong to the Tory party. The logical conclusion resulting from this is that local Tories who share similar socio-demographic and attitudinal traits with Alliance party members have in large numbers already moved to the Alliance party. The remaining Conservative members do not share these similarities with Alliance members and thus may be uncomfortable in building a new political home with these fellow constituency activists.

Appendix: Questions Used in Factor Analysis.

Which ONE of the following best reflects your view?
- O Members of Parliament should reflect the views of their constituents
- O MPs should reflect the views of local party members
- O MPs should reflect the views of party policy conventions
- O MPs should reflect the direction established by the party leader
- O MPs should vote as their conscience dictates

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The government must do more to reduce the income gap between rich and poor Canadians.	O	O	O	O
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.	O	O	O	O
Overall, free trade with the United States has been good for Canada.	O	O	O	O
Health care user fees should be instituted as a cost-control measure.	O	O	O	O
Minority groups need special rights.	O	O	O	O
More should be done to protect Canadian business from foreign competition.	O	O	O	O
Quebec has the right to separate no matter what the rest of Canada says.	O	O	O	O
Employment insurance should be harder to collect than it is now.	O	O	O	O
The government should leave it entirely to the private sector to create jobs.	O	O	O	O
Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.	O	O	O	O
Universities should make up revenue short-falls by raising tuition fees.	O	O	O	O
Provincial governments should have more power than they do.	O	O	O	O

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
If people are willing to pay the price, they should be allowed to use private medical clinics.	O	O	O	O
Immigrants make an important contribution to this country.	O	O	O	O
International trade creates more jobs in Canada than it destroys.	O	O	O	O
We have gone too far in pushing bilingualism in this country.	O	O	O	O
We could probably solve most of our big national problems if decisions could be brought back to people at the grassroots.	O	O	O	O

We are interested in knowing your views about how the federal government should allocate its budgetary surplus. Please rank the following alternative in order of priority from the highest priority (1) to the lowest priority (3):

O   Increase spending on social programs

Please indicate which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion:

All provinces should be treated equally, with none receiving special powers
OR
Quebec should be recognized as a distinct society

If the courts say that a law conflicts with the Canadian Charter of Rights, who should have the final say?

The courts, because they are in the best position to protect individual rights
OR
The government, because they are the representatives of the people

The feminist movement encourages women:

To be independent and stand up for themselves
OR
To be selfish and think only of themselves

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Women and Conservative Parties in Canada and the United States[1]

Lisa Young/William Cross

The mobilization of the second-wave women's movement in North America in the 1970s was one of the phenomena that catalyzed the neo-conservative movement of the 1980s and beyond. Organized feminism contributed to a reshaping of traditional family forms, demanded an end to gender-based discrimination and, particularly in the Canadian case, called for an expansion of state services to make women's equality a reality. Organized feminism alone did not bring about the neo-conservative revolution of the 1980s, but it certainly contributed to it. In turn, neo-conservatism in both countries targeted feminism as the source of a range of policy changes it sought to reverse.

The focus of this paper is on the partisan manifestation of the conservative response to feminism in Canada and the United States from the 1980s to the present. Right-of-centre parties in the two countries differed substantially in their responses to organized feminism, suggesting that the character of conservatism (at least in organized partisan form) in the two countries is substantially different. In the United States, the Republican party defined itself as overtly anti-feminist; anti-feminist organizations, many of which were religious groups, allied themselves with the party in order to combat feminism's policy agenda. In contrast to this, the Canadian Progressive Conservative party continued to try to appeal to moderate but fiscally conservative feminists and did not ally itself with anti-feminist organizations. The change in the Canadian party system in 1993 altered this somewhat. The newly-formed Reform Party (later Canadian Alliance) has ties to anti-feminist and Christian right organizations, and is considerably more hostile to feminism than was the Conservative party. In fact, until 1993, social conservatives in Canada lacked a partisan vehicle. The change in the Canadian party system consequently brings the Canadian experience closer to the American than it was in the past.

The Republican Party and Feminism[2]

When the American women's movement first mobilized in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Republican party was not immediately hostile to feminist claims. Like the Democrats, the Republicans appeared to believe that supporting moderate feminist claims could increase the party's electoral support. At its 1972 convention, the party approved an internal rule that encouraged state parties to try to have equal representation for men and women in their delegations to future party conventions, retained a platform plank pledging support for the Equal Rights Amendment, or ERA, which was a proposed constitutional amendment that would have guaranteed equal rights for men and women, pledged support for federally funded day care, and promised vigorous action on behalf of women's equality and in opposition to discrimination in the workplace, the educational system, and the provision of credit. In large part, the party's openness to a feminist agenda during this period can be attributed to the activism of feminist women inside the party. In fact, feminist Republicans at the 1972 convention had enough seats on the party's platform committee to force a floor fight on abortion (the feminist issue clearly missing from the platform), but chose not to do so in order to avoid a confrontation (Young 2000: 94f.).

By the next presidential election year, the Republican party had begun to change significantly. The party was devastated by the Watergate scandal, and new right forces were becoming an ever more important internal constituency in the weakened party. As public controversy over ratification of the ERA became more intense, anti-ERA groups began to mobilize in the party. Freeman (1987: 227) notes that Republican feminist activists supported Gerald Ford's campaign for the presidency, so the contest between Ford and Ronald Reagan at the convention provided the backdrop for conflicts over key policy items in the platform debate, including the ERA and reproductive freedom. Republican feminists sought to retain the party's support for the ERA in the platform, and to prevent an anti-abortion plank from being included in the document. After an intense fight on the platform committee, they were successful in preserving the ERA plank, but could not keep the anti-abortion language out of the document (Freeman 1987).

It was in 1980 that the Republican party became clearly and overtly hostile to feminism. In his bid for the Republican nomination, Ronald Reagan assembled a coalition of fiscal and social conservatives that included antifeminist organizations that had mobilized to oppose ratification of the ERA. At the 1980 convention, the party dropped its platform commitment to the constitutional amendment and adopted strong pro-life rhetoric, thereby estab-

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2   This account of the Republican party's responsiveness to feminism is based on documentary research and interviews with partisans. For details, see Young (2000).

lishing the anti-feminist stance the party subsequently maintained. The party's 1980 platform document voiced support for congressional efforts to restrict the use of tax dollars for abortion, and emphasized the importance of mothers and homemakers in maintaining the country's values (Young 2000: 99).

Since 1970, American party preference and voting behaviour has been characterized by the presence of a "gender gap," or gender difference in partisan preference. Simply put, the Republican party is more popular among male voters and the Democrats among female voters. The size of this gender gap has increased since 1970; it first became substantial in the presidential elections of 1980 and 1984. The Republican party's response to its emerging "woman problem" was not to alter its core policy positions, but rather to try to appear open to women's participation. In the run-up to the 1984 presidential election, Reagan campaign officials pressured state parties to ensure that their delegations to the national convention approached gender parity (Baer 1993: 560), resulting in an unprecedented 44% female delegates at the meeting. The Reagan campaign also recruited high-profile women to organize Women for Reagan-Bush, and ensured that women were profiled at the party's convention (Kirschten 1984). The party did not, however, alter its policy stance on issues like the ERA, abortion or child care.

The 1984 presidential election arguably marked the point of the greatest polarization of the two American parties around issues of feminism, as feminist organizations were integrally involved in the Democratic campaign, as were anti-feminist forces in the Republican. In subsequent years, the polarization has moderated somewhat, but the basic pattern holds. Most significantly, the GOP remains steadfastly opposed to abortion rights, which remain a core concern of the American feminist movement. Comparisons of attitudinal surveys of party activists over time demonstrate that Republicans remain substantially less supportive than their Democratic counterparts of the ERA, abortion rights and feminism in general. Figure 1 traces attitudes of US party convention delegates toward the ERA between 1980 and 1988. It illustrates clearly the considerable divide between the two parties on the issue, with less than one-third of Republicans supporting equal rights in the constitution. Similarly, Figure 2 shows increasing support for abortion rights among Democratic activists between 1972 and 1992 and much lower support among Republicans. By 1992, only one-quarter of Republican delegates surveyed supported a pro-choice stand, in contrast with some four-fifths of Democrats.

Among delegates to the Republican national conventions, gender differences on these feminist issues were relatively small. Gender differences on the abortion issue were small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. There were statistically significant gender gaps in support for the ERA, with Republican women more supportive of the amendment than their male counterparts in 1980 and 1984. The reverse was true in 1988. A more substantial cleavage among Republican delegates was based in religion. While there was

Figure 1: Support for ERA: US Party Convention Delegates

Sources and wording: 1980 Party Elite "pro-ERA;" 1984 Party Elite "pro ERA;" 1988
ABC "support ratification"

Figure 2: Support for Pro-Choice Stance: US Convention Delegates

no statistically significant gender difference on a survey item asking about
support for a constitutional amendment to ban abortion, there was a substan-
tial and statistically significant difference between born-again Christians and
other Republicans on the item. At the 1988 convention, 61 percent of born-
again men and 85 percent of born-again women favoured the amendment,

compared with only 21 percent of men and 20 percent of women who did not identify themselves as born-again Christians. Similarly, born-again Christians were substantially less supportive of the ERA than were other delegates. In 1988, only 12 percent of born-again Christian delegates supported the amendment, as compared with 38 percent of other delegates (Young 2000: 114).

Through the 1990s, the Republican party's stance vis-à-vis feminism remained oppositional. The Christian Coalition solidified its place as a core constituency within the party, and has played a key role in ensuring the party's ongoing opposition to abortion rights. Platform documents through the 1990s and in 2000 retained the party's opposition to abortion, supported a constitutional amendment to protect unborn children, and made clear the party's opposition to affirmative action measures. The party's platform remains silent on child care and other issues of particular importance to women. A new emphasis in the GOP platform, however, is education. The party's newfound enthusiasm for a federal role in education is articulated in terms of "strengthening accountability and empowering parents" (RNC 2000), presumably in a bid to win back the support of the so-called suburban "soccer moms" who abandoned the party in the 1996 election. Despite its efforts to elect more women to improve its image, the GOP has lagged behind its competitor in this respect. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that in the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Republicans have not been able to keep up with the more rapid rate of increase shown by the Democrats.

The Republican party is home to an active and influential women's organization, the National Federation of Republican Women (NFRW). Neither this nor other women's organizations in the party are a channel through which feminist ideas come to the party. The NFRW shies away from affiliation with either feminist or anti-feminist camps. The group defines itself in terms of service to the party and promotes women in a cautious and non-controversial way. Originally a "ladies' auxiliary" that mobilized women to work on behalf of (male) Republican candidates and to strengthen the party's organization base, the NFRW was formed at the behest of the Republican National Committee (NRC). Since it gained formal independence from the RNC in the mid-1970s, the group has become a financially independent, professionalized force within the party. The group focuses on providing campaign support for Republican candidates, and since 1979 has sponsored schools for learning campaign management for its members. The one objective that the NFRW and the contemporary women's movement share is the election of women. The organization runs seminars for women Republican candidates. In essence, the NFRW occupies an ambivalent position on the political terrain that has been shaped by contemporary feminism. As a voice for women in the Republican party, the group has taken party leaders to task for their records on women's issues when the party's electoral fortunes appear to be at stake.

Otherwise, the group has carefully avoided taking a position on controversial issues such as the ERA or abortion.

Figure 3: Women in the House of Representatives

Source: Centre for American Women and Politics

Figure 4: Women in the Senate

Source: Centre for American Women and Politics

The Progressive Conservative Party and Feminism[3]

Although the mobilization of the Canadian feminist movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s placed pressure on all three of the major political parties at the time to respond, the Conservatives experienced the least pressure for change. The New Democratic and, to a lesser extent, Liberal parties were experiencing significant internal feminist mobilizations which exerted pressure on the parties to alter their internal representational practices and their policy stances. There was no analogous mobilization inside the Conservative party. To the extent that Conservative women expressed discontent, it was because of the limited role they were allowed to play in campaigning. They responded with some caution toward the emerging women's movement. In 1968, the president of the PC women's association confided to another party official that she thought the proposed Royal Commission on the Status of Women (a government inquiry that examined the status of women in Canadian social, economic and political life and made a series of recommendations intended to improve this status) was "a waste of money" (MacAulay 1968). Nonetheless, the PC women's association later joined with its counterparts in the two other parties to advocate formation of the commission which would launch second-wave feminism in Canada.

In large part because internal pressures for change were not strong inside the Conservative party, the party was slower than its counterparts to respond to the emerging women's movement in the 1970s (see Young 2000: 144f.). Despite a lack of enthusiasm for feminism among stalwart female activists, the party adopted some policy stances in keeping with feminist demands in its 1972 platform. These included promises of legislation to protect women from dismissal during pregnancy and to provide maternity leave, to make day care facilities available to all female federal employees and to encourage industry to follow suit, and to provide federal assistance for training child care workers (PC 1972). The party's stance on abortion was best described as ambiguous. It noted the increasing rate of abortion, and promised to place the issue before the House of Commons, allow time for meaningful debate, and study the medical, sociological and psychological effects of abortion, culminating in a revision of the abortion laws (PC 1972). Despite this apparent intention to enact more restrictive legislation on abortion, the PCs did promise to make birth control information available to women free of charge (a controversial stance in some circles at the time).

By 1975, the party had adopted more explicitly feminist rhetoric. Its *Program for Women in Canada* boldly asserted:

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3   This research is based on documentary and archival research as well as interviews with partisans. For details, see Young (2000).

"It is time for action, not words. Widespread discrimination against women still exists [...]
It is Progressive Conservative Policy that changes must be made which will guarantee in
law the right of Canadian women to equal rights with men [...]." (in: Chong 1975)

Rhetoric aside, the PCs remained slow to develop policies on issues of impor-
tance to women, the party's women's organization remained an auxiliary, and
there was little evidence of changing roles for women in the party.

The party became more open to feminism under the leadership of Joe
Clark, then a young and moderate Conservative. In 1976, the year Clark was
elected leader, the national president of the PC women's association reported
that her association was facing a crisis of changing understandings of gender
roles: "I have found in each Province a group not receptive nor responsive to
the existing Women's Association, but at the same time not altogether adverse
to the idea of such an association provided that it move into the contemporary
society." Out of this sense of discontent came a movement to reform the role
of the women's association and to appoint a women's organizer. This change
was not made until 1981.

During the same period, the party began to adopt more fully developed
positions on issues of importance to women. In the 1980 election campaign,
the party promised action to encourage women to enter "non-traditional"
occupations, to implement pay equity in the federal public service and among
federal contractors, to remove a blatantly discriminatory section of the *Indian
Act*, and to remove the spousal exemption from the sexual assault law and
reclassify sexual assault as a form of violent assault rather than a separate
category of criminal activity. Less in keeping with a feminist agenda, how-
ever, were the party's positions on parental leave and child care, which essen-
tially constituted avoiding taking a stand on the issue. On the controversial
question of abortion, Clark promised that his party would continue to treat the
matter as a free vote in the House of Commons and endorsed the general
direction of the law at the time (which listed abortion as an offence in the
Criminal Code, but allowed some access to abortion via the approval of hos-
pital committees).

It was not until 1981, humbled by losing office after only nine months,
that the PCs began to take organized feminism seriously. This was part of a
broader effort to update the party's image, hoping to appeal to younger urban
voters by jettisoning its image as a party dominated by elderly rural activists
(see Young 2000: 160). Like their Republican counterparts, the Conservatives
faced an electoral deficit among women. This was not because of the party's
latently anti-feminist stances, but simply because the party was seen to be
behind the times. The Conservatives' response to their woman problem was
similar to the Republicans insofar as it emphasized promoting women within
the party. Unlike the Republicans, however, the PCs also tried to attract
women through appeals based in moderate liberal feminism (see Young 2000:
161). This effort to update the party's image was rather successful, leading

ultimately to the landslide election victory of the Mulroney government of September 1984.

Relations between the Conservative government and organized feminism were acrimonious throughout the Mulroney years, in large part because of feminist opposition to Mulroney's neo-liberal agenda. Despite this, the Mulroney government remained committed to seeking support from "women voters" and, in pursuit of this objective, was active in promoting women within the party and within government, and in pursuing liberal feminist policy stances on non-economic issues.

Throughout the Mulroney years, women were well represented in internal party organizations. Through most of the Mulroney era, women comprised at least half the party's national executive. In 1983, newly elected party leader Brian Mulroney appointed the first woman to serve as national director of the party, a move that "shocked the caucus and backroom boys" (in Sharpe 1994: 113). Moreover, the mid-1980s were a period of burgeoning activism for women in the party. The women's bureau organized PC women's caucuses in major Canadian cities. Designed to help women acquire leadership, organizational, and political skills to participate in the mainstream of party politics, the caucuses emphasized networking and "access to power" for women (Young 2000: 163). As Figure 5 shows, the proportion of women in the Conservative caucus increased substantially during the Mulroney years, lagging only slightly behind the other parties. Women were relatively well represented in powerful positions in Mulroney cabinets, and the Mulroney era ended with one of them – Kim Campbell – being elected party leader in 1993.

Figure 5: Women as % of Party's MPs

In terms of policy, the Mulroney government's responsiveness to feminism was mixed. The government antagonized feminist organizations by cutting their funding and reducing their access to the policy process, and feminist leaders were alarmed by apparent sympathy within the Conservative caucus for an anti-feminist organization, R.E.A.L. Women. The Mulroney government pursued a neo-liberal economic agenda, which entailed reducing the size of government and entering into a continental free trade agreement. Neither of these policy directions were in keeping with the more statist approach advocated by organized feminism. In its first mandate, the Mulroney government fulfilled a campaign promise to introduce legislation establishing a national child care program, but then let the legislation die in the Senate when the 1988 election was called. The legislation was never reinitiated.

On questions unrelated to the role of the state in regulating the market and not requiring significant government transfers, the Mulroney government's record was considerably more positive, although not uniformly so. This mixed record can be attributed in large part to the difficulty the government experienced in managing "women's issues" because of the sharp divide within its caucus on social issues. As party leader, Mulroney was forced to mediate between socially conservative MPs advocating a "family values" agenda and more progressive MPs, including a number of women who considered themselves to be feminists. When faced with one such controversy in his caucus, Mulroney was reported to have chastised MPs advocating socially conservative stances on the grounds that he "didn't spend all this time improving the status of women in government to have this kind of difficult press" (in Vienneau 1991: A2). Divisions in the Mulroney caucus on social issues were particularly clear in the aftermath of a 1988 Supreme Court decision striking down the existing abortion law. The next year, the government introduced legislation banning abortion, except when the physical, mental or psychological health of the pregnant woman was at risk in the opinion of the doctor performing the procedure. This legislation was intended to satisfy both sides by recriminalizing abortion on the one hand, but creating a gaping loophole to allow doctors to perform abortion at their discretion on the other (Brodie 1992: 98). This legislation passed a free vote in the House of Commons, but was defeated by a curious coalition of pro-life and pro-choice Senators in a tie vote. Ironically, this outcome was partly the result of the efforts of several of the Conservative women Mulroney had appointed to the Senate. After this defeat, the government made no further efforts to regulate abortion. It must be noted that the Mulroney legislation was considerably less restrictive than anything proposed by the American Republicans, and still allowed for public funds to be used to fund abortions. In comparative perspective, then, the Conservative compromise appears moderate.

Moderation was also evident in the party's treatment of a number of other moral issues related to feminism. When the Supreme Court struck down por-

tions of the law governing sexual assault, the minister of justice consulted extensively with women's groups to introduce new "no means no" sexual assault legislation (see Bashevkin 1996: 230). In response to the murder of fourteen women at a Montreal university in 1988, the government initiated a task force to study violence against women and passed significant gun control legislation that was backed by many of the women in the PC caucus (see Young 1996).

Ideological divisions found within the PC caucus mirrored those found within the extra-parliamentary party. Surveys of delegates to the party's 1983 and 1993 leadership conventions found evidence of some support for feminist policy stances, particularly among women. At the 1993 convention, delegates were asked their opinion of the ideas of the women's movement, and over half indicated support or strong support. While only 44 percent of delegates to the 1983 convention believed that there should be no restrictions on access to abortion, 71 percent of delegates to the 1993 convention considered abortion a private matter between a woman and her doctor. Similarly, while 34 percent of 1983 delegates advocated increasing government spending on child care, 41 percent of 1993 delegates agreed that the federal government should establish a national child care program either immediately or when finances improve (Young 2000: 174f.). In short, the Conservative party membership was far less hostile to feminism than American GOP activists in the same era.

The Role of Women and Feminist Issues in the New Canadian Party System

The 1993 General Election marked the beginning of a new party system at the national level in Canada. Of the changes brought about by this election, the most significant for our purposes is the emergence of the Reform party to challenge the Progressive Conservative party's place as the predominant right of centre party. Formed in 1987 as a Western Canadian protest party, Reform was a vehicle for discontented Westerners and disaffected Conservatives. Positioning itself as a right-wing alternative to the unpopular Mulroney government, and as a populist voice for Canadians who believed they had been excluded from the constitutional negotiations of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Reform party was well situated to benefit from the downfall of the Conservatives in 1993.

From a gendered perspective, the Reform party was markedly different from the Progressive Conservative Party. While the PCs had adopted internal measures guaranteeing representation for women, Reform rejected any kind

of differentiation among members based on gender or other characteristics.[4]
In refusing to recognize the issue of the underrepresentation of women within
party politics, Reform distinguished itself not only from the Canadian Con-
servatives, but also from the American Republican party, which has main-
tained a women's organization and which pursues a strategy of fostering the
careers of conservative-minded women in order to enhance the party's credi-
bility. In contrast to this, Reform was resolute in its refusal to recognize
women as a category within the party.

Consistent with this, Reform and its successor the Canadian Alliance do
not recognize women as a politically salient group within society or the elec-
torate. Both parties' platforms have remained silent on "women's issues" *per
se,* and the category "women" cannot be found in either party's platform. This
follows from the recommendation of a party committee led by then party
leader Preston Manning's wife (Flanagan 1995). An ideologically-based re-
fusal to recognize the category "women" has carried through into the party's
electoral strategy. This was illustrated clearly in the General Election of 2000.
During the election campaign, it was evident that the Canadian Alliance was
considerably less popular with female than with male voters. This tendency
was exploited by the Liberal party, which proceeded to run a campaign em-
phasizing the Alliances' "values" on issues like abortion and gay rights,
mainly to female audiences. In the face of a substantial gender gap, which
may have been large enough to decide the outcome of tight races in some
Ontario ridings, the Alliance did nothing to try to appeal to female voters.
This may have been partially a reflection of the party's inept national cam-
paign team, but was certainly in keeping with its steadfast refusal to acknowl-
edge gender differences in political orientations or opinions.

Although Reform and the Canadian Alliance have not adopted policies
relating explicitly to women, their platforms have included policies directed
toward strengthening the traditional family. The core of these policy propos-
als are changes to the Income Tax Act designed to facilitate, and perhaps
even encourage, one parent to stay at home with children (Reform Party of
Canada 1999). Reform and its successor also apparently have ties of some
sort to anti-feminist and pro-family groups. Organizations such as the anti-
feminist REAL women and the Canada Family Action coalition, a Christian
group opposed to abortion, extension of rights to homosexuals and, and op-
posed to tax discrimination against single-income families, have at various
times had connections to the parties (see Young 2000: 180). The role anti-
abortion and religious groups play in the party became a matter of some con-
tention in the Canadian Alliance's 2002 leadership race, in which the winning
candidate, Stephen Harper, criticized his main opponent, former leader
Stockwell Day, for recruiting supporters among anti-abortion and religious

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4   This is reflective of the party's adherence to a principle of what might be referred to as
      "undifferentiated membership." For a discussion of this, see Young/Cross, forthcoming.

groups, arguing that allying the party with such groups decreased its electoral viability.

The Canadian Alliance has lagged behind other Canadian political parties in the election of women to the House of Commons. As Figure 5 above shows, Reform and the Canadian Alliance have had fewer women in their caucus than the other major political parties. With women making up just over 5% of the party's parliamentary caucus after the 1997 election, Reform achieved the lowest rate of representation of women of any major Canadian party at the federal level in fifteen years. This increased slightly in 2000. It is notable that the rise of the Reform Party/Canadian Alliance has coincided with a downward trend in the number of women who were elected both under the PC banner and in other major parties. A case can be made that this is attributable to the influence of Reform/Canadian Alliance, which has sought to delegitimize efforts to increase the number of women elected on the grounds that such measures are undemocratic and discriminatory (see Young 2002).

To understand the role of gender in differentiating the two right of centre Canadian parties, we will use data from the 2000 Study of Canadian Political Party Members. This study involved a mail-back survey of randomly-selected members of the five major Canadian political parties, conducted between March and May of 2000. The survey was mailed to a regionally-stratified random sample drawn from the membership lists of each political party.[5] A total of 10,928 surveys were mailed to partisans, with 3872 completed surveys returned, yielding an overall response rate of 36 percent.[6] Membership in Canadian political parties fluctuates significantly over the course of an election cycle (Carty/Cross/Young 2000: 158f.), so the timing of the survey is significant. Because the study was undertaken during a period when there was no election anticipated and no leadership contests underway,[7] we expect that the members sampled are longer-term, more active members than would be captured had the survey been conducted when leadership or nomination contests were underway.

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5   The regional sampling process varied by party. For details regarding this, please contact the authors. For all the parties except the Liberals and the BQ, a regional weighting variable was created to correct for sampling procedures. Accurate regional membership breakdown was not available for the Liberal Party, and regional weighting was not relevant for the BQ as its membership is restricted to Quebec.

6   A total of 241 surveys were returned as undeliverable. This number was subtracted from the number of surveys sent when calculating the response rate. The response rate by party was: PC 44%; CA 43%; BQ 34%; Liberal 32%; NDP 29%. To increase the response rate, each survey mailed was followed approximately one week later by a reminder card with contact information for the researchers.

7   The Canadian Alliance did have a leadership contest beginning in May of 2000, but the list from which the sample was drawn was closed prior to the beginning of that leadership contest. This ensured that none of the members recruited by leadership candidates were included in the survey.

According to the results of the survey, women constituted a minority of members of both the PC and CA parties, at 33 percent and 32 percent respectively. This was substantially less than the proportion of women in the Liberal party (47 percent) and NDP (46 percent).[8] The majority of the women in both parties report having joined the party on their own initiative (63 percent in the Conservative party, and 74 percent in the Alliance). Of the female members in the Conservative party, one-quarter were asked to join the party by a family member; the same is true of 16 percent of women in the Alliance. The survey asked party members about what activities they undertook on behalf of the party. These activities ranged from displaying a sign, to raising money, to running for a nomination. The only item on which there was a statistically significant gender difference was serving on a riding association executive. Women in both the Canadian Alliance and Conservative parties were six percentage points less likely to have done so than their male counterparts.

The findings summarized in Table 1 tell us about the perceptions of party members with respect to the influence women *have* and *should have* within their party, which in turn illuminate the extent of gender-based conflicts in both of the parties. The first column provides a breakdown, by party and gender, of respondents' views with respect to how much influence women wield within each party. In the survey, party members were given a list of groups within their party (including women, visible minorities, ordinary members, riding associations, business, unions, the party leader and pollsters) and were asked to rank how influential each group was on a scale from 1 (not at all influential) to 7 (very influential). As Table 1 shows, respondents in all the parties ranked women as relatively influential; mean scores on this measure were above the median point of the scale, 3.5. In all parties except the CA, however, male party members perceived women to be more influential than did the women themselves. There is virtually no variation among parties in male party members' average ranking of women's influence in their party.

In contrast to this, women in the CA stand out because they give themselves the highest influence ranking, with a mean score of 4.50. It is intriguing that women in the Alliance perceive themselves to be so influential, given the absence of representational guarantees for women or substantial numbers of

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8   Because no figures are available from the five major parties with respect to the gender breakdown of their membership, it is impossible to determine whether there was gender bias in the rate of response to the survey. It is, of course, possible that female party members were systematically more or less likely than their male counterparts to return the survey. Given this, we cannot verify the representativeness of the sample with respect to gender. Women comprised 38% of the respondents to the survey. This breakdown is roughly consistent with data available from public opinion surveys. Howe and Northrup (2002: 89) report that, when members of the Canadian public were asked whether they had ever been a member of a political party, 19% of male respondents and 13% of female respondents answered in the affirmative; in this instance, 43% of individuals who had belonged to a political party were women.

women in senior party positions or the party's caucus. It is possible that the kind of influence they perceive themselves to exercise is a more traditional, behind the scenes, influence of women over men rather than a feminist notion of influence as women's ability to affect outcomes directly. Certainly, a feminist conception of women's influence would see the relative absence of women from senior positions in the party as indicative of a lack of influence. Like women in the three other parties, PC women rate their influence lower, on average, than do the men in their party.

The second column of Table 1 shows a gender gap in all five of the parties with respect to the influence women *should have* in the party. This item was also a 7-point scale, in this case asking how influential women should be within the party. As the table demonstrates, the mean score on this item among women in each party is higher than the mean score for men. The average score for women in the Liberal party, the NDP and the Bloc on this measure is greater than 5 out of a possible 7, for the PCs 4.88 and for the Alliance 4.73, showing that women in every party believe that they should exert considerable influence over party affairs. To put this in perspective, women think women should exercise *more* influence than should pollsters, unions, business, visible minorities and youth, but *less* influence than riding associations, ordinary members, and the party leader.

It is noteworthy that the Conservative and Alliance responses are clustered together, lower than the corresponding figures for the other three parties. The gender gap on this item is smaller in the two conservative parties than in the three other major Canadian parties. It is also worth noting that the average score for women in the Canadian Alliance is 4.73, and for men in the BQ and NDP is 4.91 and 4.95 respectively. In other words, men in the two left-leaning parties believe that women should be more influential in their parties than *women* in either of the conservative parties believe they should be in theirs.

The third column of Table 1 represents mean differential scores by party and gender. To calculate the differential score, we subtracted the 'influence women should have' from the 'influence women have' for each respondent. The figures in Table 1 are averages for this variable, which essentially measures a belief that women are insufficiently influential within the party. It is noteworthy that party members of either gender believe, on average, that women should have more influence in their party. Once again, women in the Canadian Alliance appear relatively content with the extent of their influence; their mean influence differential score is only 0.35, which is half the size of the differential score for Conservative women (0.79). On this measure, women in the Conservative party are closer to women in the three other parties (mean differential 1.11) than to women in the Alliance. Moreover, Conservative men are closer to men in the other three parties on this measure than they are to men in the Alliance.

This analysis demonstrates that even though the Conservatives and Canadian Alliance are at the same end of the spectrum of parties with respect to the role of women in their party, they differ substantially from one another. On most of these measures, the Conservatives are closer to the three other parties than to the Alliance. The Alliance stands out relative to all other parties in the limited emphasis its members place on influence for women and in the very muted character of gender conflict within the party.

Table 1: Perceptions of the Influence of Women Within Respondent's Party

Party	Gender	Influence Women Have (mean)	Influence Women Should Have (mean)	Influence Differential (mean)
CA	Women	4.51	4.73	-0.35
	Men	4.30	4.42	-0.14
	Difference	*0.21**	*0.31***	*-0.21**
PC	Women	4.20	4.88	-0.79
	Men	4.32	4.61	-0.32
	Difference	*-0.12*	*0.27***	*-0.47****
Three other	Women	4.19	5.26	-1.11
parties	Men	4.35	4.80	-0.45
	Difference	*-0.16*	*0.40***	*-0.66***

*** ANOVA difference of means significant at p=.001
** ANOVA significant at p=.01
* ANOVA significant at p=.05

One of the issues that has formed a focus for women's activism within Canadian political parties since the 1970s, is increasing the relatively small number of women nominated as candidates and elected to the House of Commons. Prior to 1993, the Conservatives were actively engaged in a number of programs such as candidate training schools for women and women's organizations within the party, intended to increase the party's number of female candidates. The Alliance has taken no formal or informal measures to increase the number of women running under its banner and has the smallest proportion of women in its parliamentary caucus.

To determine party members' evaluations of their party's efforts (or lack thereof) to nominate female candidates, we asked them whether they thought that their party had done enough, about the right amount, or too much to nominate women. As Table 2 below demonstrates clearly, the majority of party members in every party and of either gender believe that their party has done about the right amount in this area. Satisfaction is greatest among Canadian Alliance members, 90 percent of whom believe that the party has done about the right amount. This is contested by only 9 percent of female and 8 percent of male party members, suggesting that the party's hands-off approach

to this issue is in no way a source of conflict within the party. Once again, the Conservatives are much closer to the three other parties than to the Alliance on this issue. In both the Conservative party and the three other parties, 26 percent of respondents thought more should be done to nominate women. The corresponding figure for the CA is 9 percent.

Table 2: How would you evaluate your party's efforts to nominate women candidates?

	CA		PC *		Other three parties ***	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Not enough	9%	8%	28%	25%	34%	19%
	(29)	(55)	(73)	(130)	(273)	(188)
About right	90%	90%	72%	72%	63%	74%
	(276)	(597)	(190)	(378)	(502)	(742)
Gone too far	1%	2%	1%	4%	2%	7%
	(2)	(16)	(2)	(21)	(18)	(72)

*** Chi-square significant at p=.001
** Chi-square significant at p=.01
* Chi-square significant at p=.05

Table 3 illustrates the same phenomenon. When asked if it would be acceptable for their leader to use a hypothetical power to appoint candidates under certain circumstances,[9] we find that close to a majority of members of all parties are willing to use the power of appointment for high profile candidates or to forestall an interest group from capturing a nomination. When it comes to appointing a woman or a visible minority candidate, however, support drops in all parties and, once again, CA members stand out. Only 22 percent of Alliance members support appointing female candidates, compared to 41 percent of PC members and 47 percent of members of other parties. With respect to appointing visible minorities, 14 percent of CA members are supportive, as are 31 percent of PCs and 43 percent of other party members. The Alliance's principled objection to special measures for under-represented groups once again distinguishes it from both the PCs and the three other Canadian parties.

When we examine attitudes of members of the two Canadian conservative parties toward feminism, we find that once again the CA members stand

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9   In Canadian political parties, the power of the members of a local riding association to select their own candidate is usually jealously guarded. Despite this, members of the Liberal Party voted in 1990 to give their party's leader the power to appoint candidates under special circumstances. This power has been used periodically in the three subsequent elections to appoint high-profile candidates and female candidates and to prevent an interest group, Liberals for Life (an anti-abortion group) from capturing nominations.

out from both the Conservative party members and other party members in their antipathy toward organized feminism. The item used to gage party members' attitudes on this issue asked them to select one of two statements: The feminist movement encourages women "to be independent and stand up for themselves" or "to be selfish and think only of themselves." As Table 4 demonstrates, the majority of Canadian Alliance members opted for the latter statement, while the majority of PC members selected the former. On this measure, the Conservatives are once again closer to members of the three other political parties than they are to members of the Alliance. These vastly different patterns of response are the clearest indication of the enduring difference between the two Canadian conservative parties with respect to feminism and the role of women. Members of the Progressive Conservative party remain relatively open to feminism while members of the Alliance are relatively hostile to it.

Table 3: Agree with Leader Appointment Under the Following Circumstances:

	CA		PC		Other Three Parties	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Hi-profile	44%	45%	55%	62%	45%	52%
	(131)	(299)	(139)	(330)	(325)	(498)
Chi-square	No		P=.05		P=.01	
Interest	65%	62%	69%	69%	54%	59%
Group	(193)	(402)	(168)	(360)	(378)	(542)
Chi-square	No		No		P=.05	
More women	24%	21%	43%	39%	56%	41%
	(68)	(134)	(106)	(201)	(404)	(375)
Chi-square	No		No		P=.001	
More visible	19%	12%	34%	29%	49%	38%
minorities	(54)	(75)	(81)	(150)	(343)	(350)
Chi-square	P=.01		No		P=.001	

When discussing the structure of opinion surrounding issues raised by the feminism movement within the American Republican party, we noted that those convention delegates who identified themselves as "born-again Christians" were less inclined to support feminist policy stances. Although we do not have an identical measure to employ among Canadian Alliance members, we can approximate this measure by categorizing the religious affiliations given by delegates. Approximately 12 percent of CA members indicated affiliation with a religion that was categorized as "evangelical."[10] The cor-

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10   This probably underestimates the actual rate slightly, as those who indicated "Christian" as
     their religion were not included.

Table 4: Percent of Members Choosing the Statement "The feminist movement encourages women to be independent and stand up for themselves."

Party	Women	Men	Total
CA	37%	39%	38%
	(116)	(255)	(371)
PC **	73%	64%	67%
	(188)	(337)	(525)
Other 3	92%	81%	86%
Parties ***	(739)	(789)	(1528)

*** Chi square significant at p=0.001
** Chi square significant at p=0.01

responding figure for Conservatives was 4 percent. Evangelical religion was not a statistically significant factor in determining attitudes toward feminism among Conservatives, but among Canadian Alliance members it did play a role. While 41% of non-evangelical CA members indicated that the feminist movement encouraged women "to be independent and stand up for themselves," the same was true of only 16% of evangelical CA members.

From this analysis of the Study of Canadian Political Party Members data, it is evident that the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservative party differ considerably in their attitudes toward organized feminism and the role of women in the party. The Progressive Conservatives remain relatively moderate in their support for feminism and their support for measures to increase the political representation of women. The Canadian Alliance has more in common with the American Republican party than with the PCs when it comes to gender. The Alliance has ties to Christian right and anti-feminist organizations, although these ties are less significant and far less formalized than those between similar groups and the American Republican party. Members of the Alliance, like their Republican counterparts, are generally hostile toward organized feminism. That said, the Alliance and the GOP differ in two significant ways. First, the Alliance is not as overtly anti-feminist in its policy stances; it avoids taking issues on controversial questions like equal rights for women or abortion. Second, the Alliance is less willing than its Republican counterpart to try to moderate its image by promoting women internally. It has remained ideologically coherent in its refusal to single out women or any other group for special measures, while the Republicans have been willing to make targeted efforts to win over women voters and to woo women as candidates for electoral offices.

Conclusion

At the outset of this paper, we noted that neo-conservatism was in part a reaction to the emergence of feminism and the social changes it brought about. To the extent that we can use the partisan manifestations of neo-conservatism as a measure of how strong the neo-conservative reaction was in North America, it is apparent that the Canadian feminist movement prompted a less vehement reaction among Conservatives than did its American counterpart. The Progressive Conservative party has never been as overtly anti-feminist as the Republican party, indicating that even under the leadership of Brian Mulroney the party was predominantly neo-liberal rather than neo-conservative.

Closer to the American GOP is the Reform Party/Canadian Alliance. Although a decade later than the GOP, Reform/CA shows many characteristics in common with the Republican backlash against feminism. Unlike the GOP, however, the CA lacks strong and formalized ties with anti-feminist organizations. This is due in part to the more permeable character of American political party organizations. As the Canadian Alliance has become the more prominent and electorally successful of the two Canadian conservative parties, Canada and the US have converged in their conservative partisan responses to feminism. That said, both the Republicans and the Alliance have suffered electorally as a consequence of their stances, creating a strong pressure for moderation in both cases.

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Conservative Think Tanks in the United States and Canada

Martin Thunert

Introduction

An analysis of the contemporary (neo)-conservative landscape in North America would be incomplete without a contribution on the role of think tanks – and a wide spectrum of conservative think tanks in particular. What do we mean by 'conservative think tanks'?

Think tanks are organizations that, as a minimum, provide resources so that experts, public intellectuals and academics can deal with, and write about, political and/or public policy issues. Worldwide, think tanks vary in size, funding, specialization, institutional mission etc. Applying a generous definition of 'think tank', the World Bank estimates that 3000 institutes operate in the world today – more than a third of which are located in North America. In the United States alone, some directories have counted 1200 think tanks, if one includes university-based institutes and governmental research organizations (see Hellebust 1996). If one excludes most of the latter two, the number decreases to 300-400. Canada is home to more than 50 think tanks, if one follows a generous definition and perhaps a little more than 30, if the narrower U.S. definition applies (see McGann/Weaver 2000; Abelson 2002). A growing proportion of these organizations display an identifiable ideology or worldview, which becomes visible in their mission statements, their publications, and in the way they are portrayed and labelled in the media. Following American students of think tanks like Andrew Rich (2001b) and others, a think tank may be labelled 'conservative' or 'right-of-centre,' if it promotes a combination of at least two of the following issues and concepts: the free market system (including low taxes, privatization and deregulation), limited government, individual liberties and values, and/or strong religious expression, traditional family values, and a strong defence.[1] Henceforth, the category 'conservative think tanks' encompasses a large variety of policy experts, institutes and foundations promoting a wide array of fiscally conser-

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[1] In contrast, a think tank may be labelled 'left-of-centre' (or 'liberal' in the American terminology), if it promotes state interventionism in the name of reducing inequalities and to ensure social justice, if it embraces strong collectivist and communal values and advocates a lower spending on defence and national security. Think tanks may be labelled 'centrist' if they display no identifiable ideology or worldview.

vative and business-oriented, socially conservative and grass-roots oriented, libertarian and free-market-oriented as well as unilateralist and security-driven approaches to public policy questions.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first section will introduce the landscape of conservative think tanks in North America and explain major trends in think tank development with an emphasis on the conservative segment. The second part deals with activities and strategies of American and Canadian conservative think tanks and will focus on institutional as well as cultural differences in their operating environment. The third part discusses the place of think tanks within the (neo)-conservative movement in North America.

The Landscape of Conservative Think Tanks in North America[2]

The first wave of think tanks that emerged in the first part of the 20th century were academic think tanks, which engaged in policy research and in applied basic research. A first group of academic think tanks were created by government, but they were working independently within public sector guidelines. This type of academic think tank is very common in continental Europe, in Asia and in parts of Africa, but less significant in the United States and marginally more significant in Canada. In the United States one finds the *United States Institute of Peace*, in Canada the *Institute for Research on Public Policy*, *Canadian Policy Research Networks*, or the *Centre for Foreign Policy Development*. Outside the United States and to a lesser degree within the United States, think tanks are sometimes affiliated with universities. However, they differ from pure academia in that the research that is conducted is channelled towards certain fairly specific themes and purposes and to identifiable audiences. The *Hoover Institution* at Stanford University is a good example of a conservative think tank belonging to this category of academic think tanks.

In Canada the *Parkland Institute*, and the *Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues* fit into this category without being labelled conservative. A third type of academic think tank, the privately funded academic think tanks, are more numerous in North America. In the United States the *Brookings Institution* and the *Council on Foreign Relations* are the oldest representatives of this type, whereas the *American Enterprise Institute* (AEI) or the *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (CSIS) are their conservative counterparts. In Canada the *C.D. Howe Institute* fits best into this group.

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2   More detailed in Abelson/Lindquist 2000.

The second wave of think tanks which emerged largely between World War II and the late 1970s are contract research institutes. They conduct technocratic research based on government contracts. In the United States one finds pro-defence institutes like the huge *Rand Corporation* or the technocratic *Urban Institute* which is pro-government in domestic policy. In Canada the *Atlantic Provinces Economic Council* and the *Economic Council of Canada* (until its demise in 1992) fit this category.

The third wave of institutes, with a few exceptions emerging after 1970, are the so-called advocacy think tanks. Think tanks of this type do not restrict their activities to seemingly objective scientific research, but see themselves primarily as advocates for specific solutions to public policy problems or for their own political worldview. Some of these institutes are organizationally bound to special interests like business federations, trade unions, religious organizations or environmental groups, but others are more independent and advocate a certain paradigm or a guiding idea.

Most of the conservative and libertarian think tanks in the United States and Canada belong to this category. Together with their counterparts on the centre-left these organizations aim to shape public opinion and government policy over a wide range of issues so as to advance the political worldviews and approaches to public policy making, which are supported by their members and donors.

The fourth wave of think tanks is perhaps the most heterogeneous: think tanks with a purely regional focus, think tanks affiliated with a political party and so-called 'legacy institutes', which are devoted to the legacy of an important individual. Unlike in Europe, party think tanks are virtually unknown in the United Sates and in Canada. Most conservative think tanks keep a strict organizational and financial distance even to those political parties, which are friendly to their cause. The importance of regional think tanks for conservatism – some of them legacy institutes – will become evident in the following section.

Recent Trends in Think Tank Development

Think tanks in the United States and Canada have experienced three major developments in recent decades: (1) their numbers have grown substantially, (2) many, especially newer, think tanks have adopted identifiable ideological missions and (3) many, again mainly newer, think tanks have become quite aggressive advocates and promoters of their research and their ideas (see Rich 2001b). It should be noted, however, that the growth of think tanks since the late 1960s has been accompanied by the proliferation of other 'new' types of political organizations such as interest groups, citizens' initiatives, nongovernmental organizations etc.

Unlike earlier, more modest growth periods of policy research institutes, the number of think tanks with a clearly identifiable ideology[3] has been on the rise in both the United States and Canada between the early 1970s and late 1990s. By the mid-1990s identifiable conservative/libertarian think tanks greatly outnumbered identifiable progressive/left-wing think tanks. This imbalance is more pronounced in the United States than in Canada, (Rich 2001b) where, in terms of funding and staff, think tanks with an identifiable conservative and/or libertarian ideology outnumber those with an identifiable progressive or left-wing ideology by 2:1 and outspend them by 3:1. One important reason for this asymmetry both between Canada and the U.S. as well as within the U.S. between conservative and left-leaning think tanks, is the proliferation of think tanks based in some of the 50 states of the union, dealing with state-policy issues. On the state-level, new policy research organizations have more often held commitments to identifiable ideologies than to producing balanced, neutral, question-driven research than on the national level (see Rich 2001a). Half of the state-based think tanks can be identified as conservative, whereas on the national level, centrist think tanks represented the largest group with more than 45%. Rich has noted that conservative American think tanks on average pursue broader missions and research agendas than most of their left-leaning counterparts, which often concentrate on small 'constituency issues' such as low-income housing. Other research has shown that despite their inclination to become so-called "full service institutes," conservative think tanks strategically target certain issue areas, in which conservative ideas and concepts might be popular beyond the confines of a hard-core conservative constituency. Examples are school vouchers in education policy and a critique of affirmative action programs (see Stefancic/Delgado 1996).

In Canada, the overall number of think tanks and the size of the country's policy research community are too small to develop a multi-tier structure of transnational, federal and state-based think tanks comparable to that in the United States. As a matter of fact, many Canadian think tanks, especially conservative ones, are based outside Ottawa in places like Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montreal and Halifax, but their location should not suggest that they are regional or provincial think tanks. Most Canadian think tanks are neither exclusively federal nor regional. Canada's think tank structure can be described as decentralized – much like that of Germany.

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3   Identifiable ideologies are usually classified in a triple scheme: either as right-leaning, which includes conservative and libertarian views, as left-leaning, which encompassed socialist/social democratic and other state interventionist views or as centrist or non-identifiable ideological orientation.

Important conservative and centre-right think tanks in Canada:

C.D. Howe Institute, Toronto
Formed in 1973 when the *Private Planning Association of Canada* merged with a foundation established to honour Canada's prominent wartime minister C.D. Howe, the institute represents a central Canadian business elite that likes to run things without getting too carried away by libertarian or New Right ideology. *C.D. Howe*'s board is drawn from Canada's biggest corporations. Its main focus is economic issues, particularly trade, but in recent years it has published more on social policy, on Quebec and the likely consequences of separation as well as on immigration and multiculturalism. Thanks to its central Toronto location, it is well known and respected for its efficient way in which it offers practical advice on near-term policy issues. One example was the highly influential book *Social Canada in the Millennium* by Thomas Courchene. *C.D. Howe* is also renowned for its frequent off-the-record meetings in which representatives of its corporate sponsors meet movers and shakers from the political world in Canada and beyond.

   C.D. Howe represents a Canadian equivalent to the *American Enterprise Institute*: a mainstream centre-right privately funded academic think tank, who advocates issues close to the mainstream business agenda (corporate Canada) based on academic research findings. *C.D. Howe*'s pragmatic approach looks for politically realistic options rather than the correct ideology. This pragmatic approach to public policy is what distinguishes *C.D. Howe* from at least two more 'purist' free market think tanks.

Fraser Institute (FI), Vancouver
The *Fraser Institute* is Canada's answer to the *Heritage Foundation* and to the *Cato Institute*, but it was modelled upon the *Institute of Economic Affairs* in London and founded in 1974 in Vancouver by Michael Walker, a former civil servant in the Finance Ministry and a personal friend of Milton Friedman. The *Fraser Institute* has as its objective the re-direction of public attention to the role that markets can play in the solution of social and economic problems. It employs a core group of about a dozen researchers and engages like-minded neo-conservative academics from Canada and abroad. Headquartered in Vancouver, the *Fraser Institute* runs branch offices in Toronto and Calgary. The board members include well-known conservative think tankers from Britain and the United States. It is closely integrated into a network of American philanthropic foundations, who are willing to fund free market research. While it was mocked during the 1970s and 1980s as a bunch of economic cranks, the *Fraser Institute* today is the largest and best funded private think tank in Canada. The institute has strategic alliances with 54 institutes in more than 40 countries through the *Economic Freedom Network*.

A journalistic study on neo-conservatism in Canada, hostile to the institute, summarizes:

"Its visibility has grown to the point where it may well be perceived by many as the pre-eminent right-wing think tank in the country, totally overshadowing the far more academi-cally credible and, by comparison, moderate work of the C.D. Howe Institute."(Jeffrey 1999: 424)

Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIMS), Halifax

AIMS was founded in 1995 by Brian Crowley with some organizational help of the *Atlas Foundation* in Fairfax, VA and the *Institute of Economic Affairs* in London, UK. Sir Anthony Fisher, a British post-World War II chicken farmer, on the advice of Friedrich von Hayek did not donate to the pre-Thatcher British Conservative Party, but rather invested in changing the cli-mate of ideas by founding a series of free market think tanks. Fisher – like Hayek – believed that people could learn about the virtues of a free society through thoughtful, well reasoned publications geared towards the educated layperson. The first, oldest and still the flagship of the Fisher network – com-prising about 100 institutes on all continents – of think tanks was the London-based *Institute of Economic Affairs* founded in 1955. In the United States Fisher helped to set up the *Cato-Institute* and a large number of like-minded state-based think tanks. In Canada Fisher and his *Atlas Foundation* were involved in the founding of the *Fraser Institute* and particularly in the crea-tion of AIMS.

Over the years, AIMS has become more than a regional think tank. One of its more recent studies, *Operating in the Dark: The Gathering Crisis in Canada's Public Health Care System*, won the explicit praise of Alberta pre-mier Ralph Klein. In both the Alberta legislature as well as in an Op-ed in *Globe and Mail*, Klein argued that AIMS' health care study represented the direction that Medicare must take in the future.

Other conservative think tanks in Canada are the *Montreal Economic In-stitute* or the *Centre for Cultural Renewal* (CCR) in Ottawa (formerly *Centre for Renewal in Public Policy*). The CCR focuses on the important and often complex connections between public policy, culture, moral discourse and religious belief. "Our goal is to provide a vision of civil society that addresses the fundamental connections between public policy, culture, moral discourse, and religious conviction"(Mission Statement).

Think Tank Strategies and their Operational Environment

Organizational and Managerial Strategies of Conservative Think Tanks

As was mentioned earlier, think tanks and their forerunners have been in existence in the United States and to a lesser extent in Canada since the early decades of the 20th century. The *Council on Foreign Relations*, the *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, the *Brookings Institution* or the *Canadian Institute for International Affairs* are examples of such longstanding institutes. But it were primarily conservative think tanks like the *Heritage Foundation*, the *Hoover Institution*, the *American Enterprise Institute* and more recently the *Cato Institute* that have raised the public profile of think tanks generally in the United States in recent decades. In Canada, the *Fraser Institute* and the *C.D. Howe Institute* have performed a similar role. Although think tanks of all persuasions and fields have benefited greatly from a much higher profile in public discourse since the 1970s and 1980s, for some observers 'think tank' –especially in the 1980s – became a synonym for right-thinking social and economic research. While this misconception never bore any relationship to reality, as some centrist and left-leaning policy research institutes are among the most established in the business, it is true that conservative think tanks have been pacemakers in developing organizational and managerial strategies of think tanks in general. In the United States the strategies and organizational structure of the *Heritage Foundation* in particular have served as a model for scores of new conservative think tanks, both large and small. For conservative institutes in Canada and indeed worldwide, *Heritage* as well as libertarian think tanks such as the *Institute of Economic Affairs* in London or the *Cato Institute* in Washington have been equally important as models. Outside the United States as well as on the state level in the U.S., the Virginia-based *Atlas Foundation* has become the major organizational resource for the creation of smaller conservative think tanks.

Many conservative think tanks have sought to emulate *Heritage*'s strategy of devoting a substantial portion of its operational budget and its human resources to marketing and advocacy. Conservative think tanks typically devote more resources to the promotion and the marketing of their research than centrist or left-wing think tanks. A promotional style is more suited to their organizational preferences than is the case for centrist think tanks. "Staff researchers are often compelled to produce reports on pending policy questions in a timely fashion and produce them with a plan to their promotion"(Rich 2001b: 56). Many older conservative think tanks such as the *American Enterprise Institute* in the United States or the *C.D. Howe Institute* in Canada have moved from an emphasis on producing books and formal

reports to focusing on shorter monographs and policy briefs or on conferences and dialogue activities. The main reason for this change in the product line is not the competition from the *Heritage Foundation*, but a feeling that policymakers and other 'proximate decision-makers' will not take time to read long products. Another reason is the Internet, which makes it easier to distribute briefs and position papers than 400-page books.

More specifically, conservative think tanks in the U.S., but increasingly also in Canada have been pacemakers in employing the following strategies:

- An emphasis on aggressive self-promotion. New research is introduced through news conferences, press releases and promotional material. Authors are readily available for interviews in the print-media as well as on television and radio. Summaries of quotable research findings are faxed and e-mailed to a large variety of decision-makers and media representatives.
- Strategic alliances with sympathetic media are an important dissemination tool: Think tank research staff are encouraged to write guest editorials and 'op-ed' pieces in wide circulating newspapers. Pre-packaged editorials are made available for broadcast and print media. Members of conservative think tanks have been the first to make contacts with formerly neglected media such as talk-radio.
- To gain the attention of the media, some think tanks like the Canadian *Fraser Institute* have introduced gimmicks such as a 'debt clock' or the celebration of 'tax freedom day' – the day in June, on which people have paid their annual share of taxes to the government and start working for their net income.
- Conservative think tanks have been aggressively challenging established factual icons of the 'enemy' such as poverty indexes. One strategy is to challenge the credibility of 'left-leaning' and mainstream research results on poverty numbers, the degree on environmental damages etc. If the factual evidence of 'mainstream' or 'left-leaning' social indexes cannot be disputed, another commonly used strategy is replacing 'left-leaning' indexes with your own indexes such as the Index of Economic Freedom (see Gwartney/Lawson/Block 1996) or competitiveness rankings. Behind these performance indexes is a changing notion of how a 'successful' society looks like. In most performance indexes, which are promoted by conservative think tanks, older European welfare states like Sweden, France, Germany or the Netherlands are beaten by Singapore and Hong Kong.
- In addition to delivering research products in a timely fashion to decision-makers and journalists, conservative think tanks have been making efforts to target the decision-making elites of tomorrow via essay writing contests, the publication of student reviews and the conducting of seminars for future leaders.

Conservative think tanks in both countries and especially in the United States seem to enjoy a range of organizational advantages over their centrist and left-wing counterparts. This raises the question, whether these organizational advantages translate into advantages in influencing policy-making, and if they do, how?

Conservative Think Tanks and the Policy-Making Environment in the U.S and Canada

The desire to influence public policy – either directly through consultation or indirectly through the shaping of the climate of opinion – is common to all the think tanks of the world. Otherwise a think tank would rather classify as a somewhat detached academic organization interested mainly in basic re-search. Where think tanks differ is in the means and the strategies by which they pursue their goals as well as in the institutional and cultural characteris-tics of their operating environment. Generally speaking, many American think tanks have both the resources and opportunity to convey their ideas effec-tively to policy-makers, Canadian think tanks must overcome several institu-tional, cultural and economic barriers before they can play a decisive role in key policy-making circles (see Abelson/Carberry 1998: 528). But these ob-stacles are not insurmountable.

Economic Constraints and Opportunities

American think tanks have been enjoying access to philanthropic funding for decades and in much larger quantity and amounts of money than think tanks in every other country including Canada. Few Canadian think tanks can afford not to rely on governmental project funding, whereas a sizeable portion of United States think tanks have large endowments or enjoy considerable pri-vate funding. This is particularly good news for conservative institutes: Con-servative think tanks in the United States have been supported by a new and ideologically committed cadre of conservative family foundations and philan-thropic foundations such as the *Coors Foundation*, the *Olin Foundation* and others. A dozen of mid-size family foundations concentrate 75% of their funding on 18 conservative think tanks. Corporate donors and conservative philanthropies work to build strong institutions by providing general operat-ing support rather than project-specific funding. This unrestricted money allows groups considerable flexibility to attract, train, and keep talented peo-ple, launch special projects, and develop their data-bases and skills. In some cases, conservative foundations have made long-term funding commitments. Some well-known conservative American public intellectuals like Dinesh D'Souza or Charles Murray have made their semi-academic careers largely

outside universities in think tanks funded by these foundations (see Brock 2002). This development is all the more remarkable, because non-ideological and state-funded think tanks have been forced to operate increasingly with cuts in their general operating support and on the basis of two or three year project funding.

In contrast, over-dependence on government funding has provided numerous hazards for some Canadian think tanks. Some like the *Economic Council of Canada* went out of business in the early 1990s. Conservative Canadian think tanks are the least government-dependent of all Canadian think tanks, but their financial uncertainty is much greater than that of their U.S. counterparts. Tax codes are not a large problem for think tanks. In either country it is relatively easy for think tanks to be recognized as a charitable organization despite a strong advocacy stance.

Incentives and Constraints of the Institutional Environment

Given the institutional differences in the political decision-making process of the United States and Canada it is hardly surprising that Canadian and American think tanks try to be influential in different ways and at different stages of the policy-making process. The logic of the American political system has been described as separated institutions (Congress and the Presidency) competing for shared powers. The Canadian system – on the federal level as well as in the provinces – works according to the principle of responsible government, for example the fusion of a single-party government with its majority in Parliament versus the opposition parties. Whereas the American decision-making process appears fragmented and decentralized – within several power centres in the administration and within Congress – the Canadian system is depicted as more closed and characterized by cabinet solidarity and party unity. In the United States most of the higher administrative positions are staffed with political appointments, whereas the upper echelons of the administration in Ottawa are staffed by career civil servants. In short, a fragmented, decentralized and revolving system of decision-making is likely to provide more access points for external influence than a more centralized political system. Or so it seems. It is also true that one needs more resources to service and advice a system with more access points than one needs to service a system with fewer and more predictable access points. This may help to explain why think tanks in parliamentary systems such as the Canadian, need fewer resources than their American counterparts to reach similar objectives. Herman Bakvis summarizes the institutional incentives for think tanks in Canada:

"[…] under certain circumstances, namely the presence of a leader with strong convictions combined with a vacuum within the party in terms of policy ideas and capacity, external

ideas and personnel providing structures can be used to good effect in devising a distinctive agenda."(Bakvis 1997: 120)

Still, one cannot dispute that a generous funding environment plus the above characteristics of the American system – in addition to other features such as fixed legislative terms and elections – offer an almost unique environment for external advisers. The movement of hundreds of people in and out of government every four or eight years is probably the most conducive feature to think tank impact in the United States. But more recent evidence from countries such as Britain or Australia, which share more features with the Canadian decision-making process, has shown that parliamentary systems do not per se pose barriers to think tank influence.

American think tanks – and especially conservative ones – focus their advisory activities on the workings of congressional decision-making -especially in committees – and to presidential elections and the subsequent transition process between the election of a new President or a new Congress in early November and the inauguration of a new president on January 20th. Think tank-written blueprints for governing and the 'mass'-transfer of think tank research staff into administrative leadership positions in the White House and/or major departments are highly visible examples of potential think tank influence in the United States (see Abelson 2002). Measured by the above criteria, the influence of identifiable conservative think tanks has never been higher than under the Republican administrations of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and George W. Bush (2001-).

Canadian think tank influence in Ottawa is certainly less visible than that of their American counterparts in Washington D.C. Some Canadian think tanks have established a close working relationship with the senior and middle level bureaucracy in Ottawa. But these collaborative efforts are rarely documented. For conservative think tanks, the Ottawa civil service is potentially difficult territory, as a senior bureaucracy largely shaped by decades of Liberal Party rule is more inclined to work with centrist or left-leaning think tanks, which are often run and staffed by former civil servants,[4] than to listen to the anti-government rhetoric of e.g. the *Fraser Institute*. Still, anecdotal evidence shows that some economists from pro-business think tanks such as the *C.D. Howe Institute* and even from the *Fraser Institute* or the *Atlantic Institute for Market Studies* increasingly find a ready audience in some ministries such as Industry and Finance, or at North American desks in other ministries such as DFAIT. In reverse, conservative think tanks are no longer off-limits as speaking venues for centrist representatives of the Liberal govern-

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4 One former senior civil servant who became the founder of the centreleft *Caledon Institute of Social Policy* in the early 1990s told this author that he considers him more influential in shaping the nuts and bolts of social policy and even some more general policy directions than during his tenure within as a senior bureaucrat. Ken Battle in a conversation with the author, Ottawa, October 1997.

ment like Finance Minister John Manley. Still, conservative think tanks –
partly because of their fringe location from Vancouver to Halifax and partly
because of their ideology – are not as much part of the bureaucratic Ottawa
policy establishment as some centrist and left-leaning institutes are.

The Role of Think Tanks within the Conservative Movements in the U.S. and Canada

Think tanks are elite organizations, they are not institutions of bottom-up
policy making. Therefore the relationship between think tanks of any kind and
potentially corresponding social movements of any kind is indeed a difficult
one. In terms of political organization the conservative movement in North
America is made up by at least three components: grass-roots conservatives,
corporate conservatives and brain-trust conservatives.[5] Each component has a
different relationship to think tanks.

Grass-roots conservatives are largely religious fundamentalists as well as
shrewd political operators experienced in direct-mail campaigning and tele-
vangelism. They are not necessarily conventional community activists. They
simplify choices, they like manichean dichotomies, doomsday scenarios etc.
More recently, their relationship to corporate conservatism has become un-
clear, as many of the less educated followers they address belong to the seg-
ments of society, who perceive to be affected negatively by free trade and by
the consequences of economic conservatism. In some cases, e.g. Pat Bu-
chanan, their grass-roots populism takes an openly anti-big business and anti-
trade stance and traces of gentle neo-fascism can occasionally be detected.

By definition grass-roots conservatism is not too interested in frameworks
of ideas or in in-depth policy analysis. Think tanks – with few exceptions –
have little relevance for the mission of grass-roots conservatives and therefore
the relationship between conservative think tanks and conservative activists is
not a close or easy one.

In contrast, the relationship between think tanks and the corporate right is
more complex and more straightforward at the same time. Initially, think
tanks started out as policy analysts and advisers as well as human resources
providers to technocratic corporate and defence conservatism. The poster
organizations for this phase are the *American Enterprise Institute* and par-
tially the *RAND Corporation*. But this was only the beginning. Today, corpo-
rations, corporate foundations as well as pro-business family foundations are
the main sponsors of one important segment of conservative policy institutes,
the libertarian pro-free market think tanks. What sets the corporate world of

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5   I borrow this distinction from Michael Lind 1996.

the United States apart from that of continental Europe and to some extent from that of Canada is that significant segments of the American business elite embarked on a love affair with free-market theories and the libertarian movement in the 1970s and 1980s. The majority of the American business elite – with the possible exception of defence and agricultural industries– was never attracted to modes of social and economic interest mediation such as corporatism or tri-partism. Unlike Canada, there was no significant sector of state-owned crown corporations in the United States. While economic liber-tarians largely remained whistleblowers on the sidelines in most continental European countries – with the possible exception of Switzerland – laissez-faire economists, philosophers and policy experts became agenda-setters, political advisers and even political operators and policy entrepreneurs in the United States during and after the Reagan era. Something similar – albeit on a much smaller scale – happened in Britain during the Thatcher era, but hardly in Canada or continental Europe.

Despite its strong corporate support, the libertarian movement politically often remains marginal on the federal level in both the U.S. and Canada, as conservative parties and politicians in government so far have only adopted such libertarian policy recommendations that are compatible with the interests of business and largely ignored more radical recommendations that might hurt big business or important business sectors like the coal and steel industry. In addition, the dogmatic anti-statism of the libertarians and their almost a-political and anti-pragmatist understanding of politics cannot be easily recon-ciled with the 'strong state' – currents of conventional conservatism. Many conservative politicians and their social base usually abhor libertarian notions of law and order (legalization of drugs), defence (mercenary armies) and social stratification (abolition of all kinds of entitlements and benefits).

While weak in their relationship with activists and some conservative op-eratives, conservative think tanks and libertarian think tanks in particular are key to the mission of brain-trust conservatives, those who need ideas for con-servative governance. While most conservatives abhor political planning and social engineering, they need intellectual ammunition and a certain degree of intellectual respectability in the war of ideas. In North America, most univer-sity departments and most academics in the social sciences, in humanities and in law do not serve this purpose for conservatism, neither do the current af-fairs media – with the exception of the business press or the Fox News Chan-nel and other news operations owned by Rupert Murdoch – nor most public intellectuals. Brain-trust conservatives created counter-institutions: semi-scholarly or current affairs magazines like the *Weekly Standard*, policy re-search organizations and institutes, grant-giving and operative foundations, promotion of experts and their own brand of public intellectuals. Conserva-tive think tanks are part of an establishment of a counter-infrastructure for conservative and libertarian ideas. A similar conservative brain-trust infra-

structure, but at a much smaller scale and restricted to some provinces – mostly in western Canada – as well as the *National Post* on the federal level, has been slowly emerging in Canada over the past decade.

In terms of brain-trust conservatism, libertarianism is a power house in the United States and at least in some parts in Western and Atlantic Canada largely due to the *Cato Institute* in Washington D.C. and a network of smaller regional as well as international think tanks like the *Fraser Institute* in Vancouver B.C. and smaller units like AIMS in Halifax, NS. The strength of libertarianism among brain-trust conservatives rests upon two pillars: a close research connection to academic economics and to some other social science disciplines ensures the adherence to scholarly standards and provides academic recognition, as well as a talent pool of young experts. International networking and a coherent worldwide mission create synergy effects for libertarian think tanks. Michael Lind describes the role of libertarian think tanks in the Republican Party of the U.S. as follows:

"The strategy of the Republican party is based on a division of labour, with the grass-roots right serving as an electoral coalition, and the libertarian right as a governing elite. To be elected, Republican conservatives need the mailing-lists and the phone-banks of the grass-roots right; once elected, they have to rely on the Washington-based libertarian policy experts to draft legislation that will please the corporations and rich individuals who subsidize their campaigns."(Lind 1996: 80)

Public Impact of Conservative Think Tanks

Have conservative/libertarian think tanks been able to secure meaningful and substantive influence in proportion to their organizational advantage outside the conservative movement?

There will be no satisfactory answer to this question, since there is no consensus, how think tank impact can and should be measured. How think tanks affect decision-making is more complex than is the case with straight-forward political counselling. First of all, think tanks participate in the political decision-making process via the media. Secondly, policy experts active in think tanks also participate in thematic and issue networks as well as in epistemic communities. The weight carried by individual think tank experts in a particular issue network depends on the situation and the issue in question and often needs to be examined qualitatively on a case-by-case basis. What follows are some quantitative as well as qualitative indicators of think tank activity and possible think tank impact in North America (see Stone 1998).

Quantitative Measurement of Think Tank Impact

Quantitative approaches usually measure the public visibility of think tanks in media citations, the sale of think tank publications and the appearance of think tank staff before legislative committees or in policy debates on TV. What the quantitative data usually yields are indications of how successful the strategy of a given think tank is in comparison to its competitors. An active and highly visible think tank may or may not have a high policy impact. Henceforth the following empirical results may give the reader an idea how conservative think tanks stand in relation to other think tanks, but it cannot provide conclusive evidence about policy impact.

Media Visibility of (Conservative) Think Tanks in the United States

Since the mid-1990s, University of Montana sociologist Michael Dolny collects media citations of the 25 leading think tanks in the United States for the left-leaning report *Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting*. Dolny distinguishes the political orientation of think tanks into the categories: 'conservative or right-leaning', 'centrist' and 'progressive or left-leaning'.

In his findings for the year 2001, 48% of citations measured went to conservative or libertarian think tanks such as the *Heritage Foundation*, the *Cato Institute* and the *American Enterprise Institute*. 36% of the references were to so-called centrist think tanks, led by the *Brookings Institution*, which alone has almost twice as many citations as any other think tank. Left-wing think tanks such as the *Economic Policy Institute* constituted 13% of all media citations. This pattern of distribution has been consistent since the first citation-study was conducted by Dolny in 1996. From a left-of-centre perspective, these numbers look like a huge imbalance in think tank visibility. From a conservative perspective, which considers 'centrist' think tanks such as *Brookings* as institutions 'on the other side of the divide,' it looks like a toss-up. Whichever interpretation one prefers, it remains almost indisputable that conservative think tanks are important conduits for bringing items on the 'corporate agenda' – such as privatizing social security, privatizing prisons, pushing forward the global economy, maintaining a large military budget and opposing universal health care – to the forefront of the mainstream political debate.

Dolny's findings are partly confirmed by a 1996 poll among congressional staff and journalists (so-called 'Washington-influentials'), conducted by the public relations firm Burson-Marsteller, who were asked about their perception of think tank influence in Washington D.C. Almost 72% of so-called 'Washington influentials' identified conservative think tanks as having greater influence in American politics than centrist and 'liberal' think tanks (see Burson-Marsteller 1993, 1997).

Table 1: Citations of Different Ideological Categories of Think Tanks in U.S. Media

Think Tank Category	1996	1997	2001	post-9/11
Conservative	53%	54%	48%	40%
Centrist	32%	30%	36%	49%
Progressive	16%	15%	16%	11%

But in at least one important policy area, economic policy, conservative think tanks lag behind their centrist counterparts and are not significantly ahead of left-leaning think tanks as far as their citations in the U.S. press are concerned:

Table 2: Think Tank Citations on Economics Issues in the U.S. Press 1999-2000[6]:

Think Tank	Orientation	Percentage
Brookings Institution	centrist	30%
Institute of International Economics	centrist	19%
American Enterprise Institute	conservative	11%
Economic Strategy Institute	left-leaning	9%
Cato Institute	libertarian	7%
Heritage Foundation	conservative	6%
Economic Policy Institute	left-leaning	6%
CBPP	left-leaning	4%
Urban Institute	left-leaning	4%

Media Visibility of (Conservative) Think Tanks in Canada

In a political system like the Canadian that is dominated by the executive branch and its parliamentary majority and a long history of Liberal Party rule after World War II, influencing public debate via the news media is particularly important for conservative think tanks. Between 1985 and 1999 four Canadian think tanks share 60% of all media citations. Two of them can be classified as centrist or without identifiable ideology (*Conference Board of Canada, Economic Council of Canada*) the others are conservative (*Fraser Institute*) and moderately conservative/pro-business (*C.D. Howe Institute*) (see Abelson 2002: 94-106). The strong showing of conservative institutes is amplified by the fact that the *Economic Council of Canada* was shut down by the Mulroney government in 1993. Among the runners-up, who share the

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6   Compiled by the author from data in Ruble 2000.

remaining 40% of media citations, conservative think tanks with the exception of the *Canada West Foundation* are in a weaker position than some left-leaning ones such as the *Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives* (CCPS) or the *Caledon Institute of Social Policy* (CISP). In references to think tanks on CBC Radio between 1988 and 1996, the *C.D. Howe Institute* and *Fraser Institute* are ahead of the competition by far. They were referred to twice as often as their progressive competitors CCPA and CISP.

The leading media role of the *Fraser Institute* and the *C.D. Howe Institute* was confirmed by an earlier study about the 'buzz factor' that was conducted informally in 1995 by the *Globe and Mail* (see Campbell 1995).

Table 3: Mentions in the *Globe and Mail* between 1993 and 1995:

Think Tank	Orientation	Percentage
Fraser Institute	conservative-libertarian	139
C.D. Howe	centre-right	39
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives	left-wing	18
IRPP	centrist	16
Mackenzie Institute	centre-right	14
Canada West Foundation	centrist	12
CPRN	centre-left	3
Pearson-Shoyama Institute	centrist	2

Qualitative Measurement of Think Tank Impact

Public visibility and influencing the climate of opinion among elites, elites in waiting and future elites have always been high priorities of conservative think tanks and the visibility and perception of influence-data suggests that conservative think tanks in both countries are good at just that: creating buzz and creating the impression of influence. It is unclear, however, whether public visibility translates into credibility. Data is available from the United States.

Relationship between Identifiable Ideology of Think Tanks and the Type of Research they Produce

Based on a case study of 28 think tanks in California, the researcher Andrew Rich of Wake Forrest University in North Carolina has found that think tanks that are centrist or of no identifiable ideology are most often cited for results of their research e.g. when a new major study or book monograph is being published (see Rich 2001a). Their research often is evaluative or technical in nature. These think tanks also produce basic/foundational research and are

engaged in political education. This work tends to be more rigorous, and its results less governed by an ideological point of view.

In contrast, think tanks that are conservative/libertarian or progressive/left-wing, Rich found, are most often cited for commentary and as authors of op-ed pieces. These think tanks are engaged in advocacy, transformative and sometimes basic/foundational research. Research tends to be transformative during the stage of agenda-setting and becomes more advocacy-oriented as an issue moves towards policy enactment. Rich concludes that the proliferation of ideological and in particular conservative/libertarian think tanks means an increase in the production of research that is more often geared to changing or reinforcing its audiences' point of view than providing them with new insights or technical help. This development implies, according to Rich (2001a) that the products of advocacy think tanks become more similar to the products of interest groups, lobbyists and NGOs. Rich contends that once think tanks become indistinguishable from or compete with interest groups, they are at a disadvantage because think tanks represent no identifiable constituency.

Conservative Think Tanks and the Role of the State in Canada

The impact problem of conservative think tanks in Canada was not that their research was used as ammunition and thereby lost some of its credibility but that the core of the conservative-libertarian message went against the grain of Canadian political culture. Conservatism beyond a collectivist one-nation conservatism (Red Toryism) had an acceptance problem in Canada – at least until the Harris election in Ontario in 1995, but perhaps until now – especially in central Canada. Canada, it was argued, was a creation of central government politics against the odds of geography, the economy and ethnic boundaries. Thus the long-time-held conclusion: the stronger the central government, the stronger Canada. Conservatives, who are out to weaken the government, were seen as weakening Canada and thereby as being unpatriotic (see Frum 1996: 2). From a neo-conservative perspective Big Government became the quasi-official religion in much of Canada. Conservatism may be seen as cold and heartless in other parts of the world, in Canada conservatives are also accused of being unpatriotic and subversive, to sell out the country. Big Government, high taxes and a high amount of regulation were seen as the price to pay for 'being Canadian'.

But this equation seems to have lost much of its appeal and relevance today. At the early days of the 21st century, a strong current of Canadian conservatism comes without apologies. Much of Canadian conservatism today is individualism with considerable limits. One-nation conservatism (red Tory) has not been replaced, but severely challenged by the forces of economic and social conservatism. Unlike the United States, the new conservatism and most

of its thinkers concentrate almost exclusively on economic and other non-moral issues, but less on religious issues. While compared to the United States Canadian conservatism seemed to lack a strong libertarian current, this is no longer the case after a decade-long period of libertarian fiscal policy of Alberta and Ontario governments.

Nobody would argue that these developments are a direct consequence of the activities of conservative think tanks in Canada. But neither can they be discounted entirely.

Observers of the policy-making scene in Canada, who are not conservatives themselves, have observed that ideas about the proper role of the state have shifted in the Canadian policy community since the 1990s. For an organization like the *C.D. Howe Institute* the limits of acceptable state intervention into the economy have become much narrower than they were in the early 1980s. The libertarian views of the *Fraser Institute* have become much more acceptable as a basis for policy debates (see Dobuzinskis 1996: 102f.). Dobuzinskis (1996: 104) has demonstrated convincingly that other policy research since the mid-1980s – most notably the *Macdonald Commission* (see Simeon 1987) – has depicted the role of the state as a problem rather than as a solution to public policy problems. While think tanks in favour of a minimal state are a smaller proportion of Canadian think tanks and policy experts than they are in the United States, most mainstream Canadian think tanks today advocate a much more modest role for a smaller and more efficient state than they did twenty years ago.

6. Conclusion

While American and Canadian think tanks have more in common in terms of management and institutional strategy than they had twenty years ago, it may very well be that continuing institutional, cultural and economic differences in their operating environments pose different risks and opportunities for future impact and success.

United States

If Lind (1996) and Rich (2001a) are correct, the very success of American conservative think tanks in the past may be their greatest risk.

According to Michael Lind, the conservative movement in the U.S. is run by a few family foundations, by a few think tank executives, a small elite of intellectual managers and fixers like the Kristol family, some business executives, some key politicians and major donors to the Republican Party such as

the National Rifle Association. In Lind's view, this tightly controlled move-
ment has led to a "Gleichschaltung" of debate on conservative policy issues.
Once a policy position has been adopted by the Republican Party, conserva-
tive opposition is silenced and funding is cut for dissenters. The extreme
narrowing of conservative debate is, then, seen as a long-term weakness of
American brain-trust conservatism, of which think tanks are an integral part.
Lind's assessment of the in-breeding, the "Gleichschaltung" and the Sta-
linesque dogmatism of the movement has been anecdotally confirmed by
conservative renegade David Brock (2002). I believe that these developments
constitute a real threat for some think tanks such as the *Heritage Foundation*
and perhaps AEI, who are very close to the current Republican administra-
tion, but less so for the *Cato Institute* and smaller institutes – especially con-
servative institutes in the states, who are further removed from the Washing-
ton scene.

In a more systematic and rigorous argument others like Rich (2001) qual-
ify the policy-influence of conservative think tanks because of their over-
reliance on advocacy. The content and timing of many of the products of
conservative think tanks are targeted to make them more useful among policy
makers looking for support for pre-existing points of view, rather for those
looking for new knowledge or understanding on topics. If a decision-maker or
anybody involved in public policy debates needs help justifying a position in
favour of e.g. school vouchers, tax cuts, free trade etc., or needs help convinc-
ing colleagues or an audience of the merits of a position on vouchers, tax cuts
or free trade, he or she might use a glossy, timely product of a conservative
think tank to help him/her make his/her case.

Many conservative advocacy think tanks in the United States concentrate
and thereby limit their influence to the policy enactment phase. They are
influential because their products usually provide ammunition for those who
have already made up their mind about their position on a policy. But more
substantive and important opportunities for think tanks to be influential may
come earlier in the policy-making process where they can affect how issues
are framed, how problems are perceived and how alternative problem solu-
tions are being discussed. Many smaller and newer conservative think tanks
are not devoting much time and resources to these efforts, and concentrate
instead on providing ammunition (see Rich 2001a).

Because the American political system is so fragmented and the number
of policy entrepreneurs in Congress so much higher than in a parliamentary
system, many American think tanks, and conservative ones in particular, are
tempted to use these various points of access for providing ammunition to
like-minded decision-makers and they neglect the development of new policy-
relevant ideas.

Canada

Conservative Canadian think tanks are in a different position regarding their opportunity structure for policy impact. Due to their marginal role in the Ottawa policy community for at least the past decade, their influence seems to decline during policy enactment. Their target seems to be the agenda-setting phase, before decision-makers have established their policy positions. If Ottawa were to be run by an ideologically conservative government, the rules of the game would be different for conservative think tanks in Canada. To improve their standing within the context of the present political configuration, one can evaluate potential success strategies for conservative think tanks in Canada:

- Align yourself with a particular party or party leader. In the British model think tanks have aligned themselves with individual leaders rather than with the party organization. A likely scenario, should Canada get more political leaders with a desire for more external advice from think tanks like Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair.
- Form closer institutional relationships with government departments sharing your policy interest. This proposition is highly attractive and has been followed by pragmatic and moderate think tanks, but it is of limited attractiveness to more 'radical' think tanks outside the Ottawa mainstream.
- Replace declining policy capacity due to downsizing of governmental actors with external capacity and long-term strategic advice. This approach to become an external centre of policy competence has been taken by the *C.D. Howe Institute* in general and by other conservative think tanks vis-à-vis provincial governments in Alberta or in the Maritimes and by some centre-left think tanks vis-à-vis the Liberal federal government.
- Recruit former politicians and celebrity academics to your think tank to get a higher public profile: an approach followed by the *Liu Centre* at UBC which hired left-leaning former External Affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy. Among conservative think tanks the *C.D. Howe* has a close association with John Crow (Governor of the Bank of Canada) and earlier with Tom Courchene, the *Fraser Institute* features Reform Party founder Preston Manning as Senior Fellow. Apart from these examples Canadian think tanks are not talent pools for an incoming conservative government as American think tanks are. However, American think tanks such as *Manhattan Institute* and AEI have become training grounds for Canadian conservatives such as David Frum (1996).

For the time being, the major channel of influence of conservative think tanks in Canada will not be their direct influence on specific policy outcomes, but their contribution to shaping policy discourse north of the 49th parallel. In the medium and long-term Canadian conservative think tanks must make sure that their policy recommendations – while thinking the unthinkable – reflect the political as well as the bureaucratic context within which these recommendations are being discussed, reinterpreted, redesigned, repositioned, and perhaps implemented. Eventually, a declining policy capacity of the federal bureaucracy, the chronically weak policy capacity of Canadian parties and more moderate policy contributions from Canadian universities, due to lack of funding and poorer teacher-student ratio, will help those conservative think tanks with workable recommendations in key policy areas such as health care, immigration policy, North American economic integration. It seems that many of the topics on the future agenda of Canadian public policy are topics like the reform of health care, North American integration, monetary union etc., where conservatives are less constrained by old Liberal dogmas than their mainstream and left-leaning competitors. In the event of a change of government in Ottawa to a party other than the Liberal Party, a new conservative government will have nobody else to turn to than to conservative Canadian think tanks.

As a tentative conclusion one can venture into the following: while current developments suggest that in terms of policy influence the best for American conservative think tanks might be behind them, although their overall conditions remain excellent, it seems that the best for Canadian think tanks and particularly conservative think tanks is yet to come.

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Part IV

The Economic Dimension: Fiscal Conservatism, Deficit Reduction, and Welfare Retrenchment in the United States[1]

James D. Savage

In the American context, it is important to understand that contemporary conservative fiscal policy represents the extension over time of certain class interests that have been championed by political parties of different names and different fiscal policies. This historical evolution of policies in defense of material interests may best be understood from an historical institutionalist, path dependency theoretical interpretation of policy development (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). Employing this perspective, it is possible to see six "critical junctures" in the history of American political economy, dating to colonial America and the founding of the republic that over time influenced the development of contemporary conservative fiscal and economic policies. Each of these periods encouraged the policies that were pursued in the following era, often under the direction of a "dramatic actor," each of which is noted for institutional adjustments and "institutional stickiness" that lasted for some time.

Six Critical Junctures in the Evolution of Conservative Fiscal Policy

1. The Introduction of Paper Money and the Constitution's Fiscal Rules

The introduction of paper money in 1690, known as "bills of credit," in place of special currency in the American colonies served as the first critical juncture in the development of conservative American fiscal policies. Used throughout the colonial period, during the Revolutionary War in the form of the "continental," and by the state governments under the Articles of Confederation, paper money was the financial instrument that permitted governments to engage in deficit spending. Paper currency, however, often proved to be inflationary, which worked to the advantage of debtors rather than creditors, particularly during the financing of the Revolution. James Madison cited the states' widespread use of paper money as a central reason for the calling of

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the Constitutional Convention (Madison 1987). In Art. I Sec. 10, the Constitution explicitly prohibited the more debtor-class friendly states' emission of paper money, reserving that power to the national government (Savage 1988; Beard 1960). In the effort to enhance the powers of the central government during this formative period, Alexander Hamilton, a "dramatic actor" in path dependency terms, outlined the government's economic responsibilities. Significantly, while the states would maintain their control over internal sources of taxation, external sources, principally in the form of tariffs, would fall under the control of the national government. Tariffs would form the lynchpin of Hamilton's plan to promote industrialization and the interests of the "moneyed aristocracy" at the expense of agriculture, and, no supply-sider Hamilton, he specifically argued that higher taxes would spur greater economic productivity. An enhanced federal authority, centralized banking and currency, high tariffs, and large-scale federal spending for "internal improvements," and a decided tolerance for deficit spending and a large federal debt, formed the cornerstone of Federalist and later Whig party fiscal policies.

2. Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democracy and "Little Government"

The second critical juncture came with the election of Thomas Jefferson, another dramatic actor, in 1800. Jefferson, and later Andrew Jackson, firmly opposed the centralizing tendencies and the fiscal policies of the Federalists and Whigs. Though Jefferson represented the interests of the wealthy planter class, Marx and Engels described this group as the remnant of feudalism, as compared to the wealthier bourgeois manufacturing and banking interests of the North (Marx/Engels 1971). In any case, both Jefferson and Jackson pointedly favored the "working people," a politically identifiable and recognized subset of the population that consisted of both agricultural and industrial workers. This period of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian "democracy" was characterized by the assertion of states' rights, decentralized banking and currency, constrained federal spending, lower tariff rates, a decided preference for balanced budgets, budget surpluses, and debt reduction, to the point that the national debt was essentially eliminated in 1836, the only time this would occur in the history of the United States. If big government refers to enhanced powers for the central government, this period of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian democracy certainly may be categorized as the archetype of "little government" in American political history.

3. Lincoln and the Rise of Big Government

The third critical juncture was Abraham Lincoln's presidential election in 1860. From Lincoln's presidency through Theodore Roosevelt's, under the

direction of the Republican Party the federal government aggressively pursued Hamilton's economic vision. "Big government," in virtually all of its manifestations, was embraced by those whom Jefferson and Jackson labeled the "moneyed aristocracy." Banking and currency were centralized, tariff rates rose dramatically, and federal spending magnified to previously inconceivable levels for internal improvements, pensions, and an extended patronage system. Federal agencies and programs proliferated, and during the Panic of 1873, President Grant explored the idea of a federal jobs program to aid the unemployed. Even as the federal government actively promoted industrialization through its tariff policies, interest groups of all varieties turned to the national government for assistance, including the Populists, who sought federal funding as part of an effort to offset the worst side effects of a manufacturing economy. The government's extraordinarily high tariffs generated enormous revenues, enabling expenditure levels to skyrocket. Before Lincoln's presidency, the largest single-year expenditure was $65 million in 1859, but in the years following the rise of the Republican Party, expenditures never fell below $240 million. Between 1865 and 1900, federal spending annually averaged $325 million.

4. The Income Tax

The fourth critical juncture produced the great transformation in the Republican Party's ideological disposition to "big government," which over time resulted in the stunning redirection in Republican fiscal policy that culminated in the ascendancy of Ronald Reagan. This critical juncture was institutional rather than electoral in nature, namely the initiation of the personal and corporate income tax by way of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The significance of the income tax cannot be overstated. For nearly a hundred and twenty years, big government had advanced the material interests of the wealthy manufacturing and banking interests in the United States by way of a high taxing, high spending fiscal policy, and a federal government that actively promoted and protected the nation's industrialization and the transfer of wealth from the agrarian sector of the economy to its manufacturing sector. Those who benefited from these policies, the conservatives of their day, cheered on the expansion of federal intervention in the economy, even in the form of national regulatory activities that rationalized the economically troublesome rules enacted by the state governments (Beard/Beard 1962; Kolko 1963; Josephson 1966). The imposition of the corporate and personal income taxes in 1910 and 1913, however, shifted the financial burden to these very same beneficiaries who before welcomed big government because the burden of its expenses fell on those paying consumer taxes in the form of tariffs. Conservatives, in other words, were free-rider beneficiaries of federal public

policies. Where Gilded Age Republican politicians once proclaimed in the 1880s the virtues of a big spending "billion-dollar" Congress, beginning in the 1920s, Republican presidents such as Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover publicly embraced a new-found economy in government.

5. The New Deal, Keynesian Economics, and Big Government

The fifth critical juncture was the combined events of the onset of the Great Depression, the election of Franklin Roosevelt, and the emergence of the New Deal. In many ways, this is an obvious and highly celebrated break in American political history. Yet, it took Roosevelt and the New Deal to galvanize an anti-big government conservative ideology. For all the talk about economy in government, the fact remains that under Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, federal spending grew significantly more than pre-World War I level spending under the Democratic president Wilson. In 1915, expenditures reached $760 million; between 1921 and 1931 annual expenditures, excluding debt payments, were over $2 billion, a growth in spending far greater than the rate of inflation. Hoover, moreover, continued to proclaim the virtues of high tariff rates, and he pledged doubling public works expenditures between 1928 and 1931. In other words, suppose, in a counter factual analysis, the Sixteenth Amendment had never become law: It is entirely possible that the big government, big spending, big taxing Republican Party would have responded to the Great Depression with a massive public works program, just as President Grant once considered in the Panic of 1873, and as Hoover actually supported on a small scale in the early years of the Depression. Returning to actual events, the New Deal's explosion in federal expenditures, the Keynesian use of deficit spending, and the rise in the national debt, one way or another would have to be financed through corporate and personal income taxes. Under Roosevelt, the Democrats remained true to the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian legacy that opposed tariffs, and by the end of Roosevelt's presidency the average tariff rate on dutiable imports returned to its pre-Civil War level. Thus, now bearing a goodly amount of the costs of the associated with the New Deal, American conservatives were firmly opposed to the expansion of big government and the emerging welfare state.

Interestingly, one of the most effective conservative responses to the welfare state was, as Hacker points out, the development and expansion of a competitive, private sector corporate pension and health care system, though one heavily skewed towards benefiting the wealthy, in direct response to the Social Security Act of 1935. When considered separately, American public sector support for such social welfare spending and tax expenditures as a percentage of GDP, such as pensions, health care, disability, unemployment, and poverty benefits, excluding education, ranks below ten other industrial-

ized democracies. When private sector support is added to this total, however, the United States ranks marginally below only three of these countries, and significantly below only one country, Germany (Hacker 2002). Yet, although corporations are the leading contributor to pension programs of all types, beginning in 1998 more of these pension funds were in the form of defined contribution rather than defined benefit programs, thus enabling corporations to shift the burden of risk on to their employees. At the same time, while workers absorb the risk, many corporations, such as Enron, discourage their employees from diversifying their retirement portfolios (Wyatt 2002).

6. The Reagan Revolution and Fiscal Conservatism

The sixth and most recent critical juncture in the evolution of modern conservative fiscal and economic policy clearly is the presidential election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Reagan's fiscal and social agenda decisively shaped the policy decisions of his era and those of every president that followed him. Reagan's significance is such, that not only did his policies clearly differ from those of the Democratic Party, they also signified a break from previous Republican presidents. Prior to Reagan, Republican presidents did indeed attempt to limit the growth of federal expenditures compared to congressional Democrats, but they recognized the nation would never again tolerate government passivity in the presence of another major recession or depression, and they were still influenced by Keynesian economics and the counter cyclical use of deficit spending. President Eisenhower announced that under circumstances similar to what Roosevelt faced, he would support deficit spending, President Nixon declared that "we are all Keynesians," and President Ford continued to employ the language of Neo-Keynesian full-employment economics in his budget documents.

   Reagan's nomination as the Republican presidential candidate represented the ascendancy of the conservative wing of the party over its moderate elements. Unlike many Eastern and Midwestern Republicans, including Nelson Rockefeller, George Romney, and even Gerald Ford, who accepted and often embraced government, Reagan's more critical view of government reflected the Western brand of conservatism associated with Barry Goldwater that hated Communism, Paul Laxalt's "Sage Brush Rebellion" that viewed the federal government's land management policies with disdain, the cultural conservatism of Richard Viguerie's "New Right" and Jerry Fawell's "Moral Majority," and the fiscal conservatism of the Jarvis-Gann "Tax Revolt" of California's Proposition 13. All these conservatives had to do was look at the bankruptcy and federal bailout of New York City in the 1970s to see the evils of big government, deficit spending, and the welfare state. The contagion of deficit spending, moreover, spread to the national government. By 1975 and

1976, the federal deficit had grown to its highest point in American history, and for conservatives like Reagan and his followers, these deficits abundantly demonstrated that only political and policy failure resulted from moderate Republican accommodations with liberal Democrats. Reagan's election in 1980 effectively meant the demise of the political center in American politics, especially as it applied to the politics of budgeting (Patashnik 2001; Pierson 2001).

Reagan's administration differed those of his Republican predecessors by undertaking a full-scale assault on Keynesian economics. This was an effort that was greatly aided by the breakdown in the Keynesian hegemony in the economics profession, and the rise of stagflation in the 1970s that undermined the logic of the Phillips curve tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. Reagan's economic advisors consisted of traditional budget balancing conservatives, monetarists, and supply-siders, each of which viewed Keynesianism with disdain. The budget balancers disliked Keynesian deficits, monetarists believed in the superiority of monetary policy, and supply-siders argued for the primacy of tax cuts over spending to stimulate the economy. Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors, for example, consisted primarily of monetarists who erased references to Keynesian full-employment deficits from the budget and other executive branch publications.

Unlike his Republican predecessors, Reagan offered conservatism a new economic theory that directly competed with Keynesianism by adopting supply-side economics as the theoretical rationale for his fiscal policy proposals. Supply-side economists argued that the way to restore the nation's economic health was to spur its productivity and entrepreneurial spirit through major reductions in corporate and personal income tax rates. Inspired by their greater ability to keep more of their income, entrepreneurs and investors would produce more goods to meet demand, thus lowering prices and combating inflation, while hiring more workers, thereby reducing unemployment. As a result, the nation could avoid the painful liberal prescription of the Phillips curve tradeoff, which, in any case, could not provide a policy solution for stagflation. Equally important as a selling point, supply-side economics predicted by way of the Laffler Curve that displayed the trade-off between tax rates and tax revenues, these economically stimulating tax cuts would actually produce an increase in federal revenues, thus relieving the nation of its budget deficits. Although it was unclear that supply-side proponents actually promised that their tax cuts would produce sufficient revenues to balance the budget, the Reagan FY 1982 budget predicted the budget would be balanced within four years. The Reagan tax cuts stand as the conservative America's most determined and successful effort to defund the state.

Defunding the State

It is important to note, that although some analysis (Pierson 2001) points to an overall stabilization of federal tax revenues as a percent of GDP following the Second World War, what is important for American conservatism and the Reagan presidency is that Ronald Reagan lived throughout this entire period of revenue expansion, from the early 1930s through both the New Deal and the Great Society, each of which is associated with big government and high taxes. Although Reagan, ironically, supported the New Deal and Roosevelt's efforts to beat off the Depression, he was reportedly astonished at the taxes subtracted from his Warner Brothers studio check. Reagan's personal experience with the high marginal rates for top income earners, which remained at 70 percent even after the famous 1962 Kennedy tax cut reduced the top marginal rates from 91 percent, by a number of accounts played a significant role in encouraging him into conservative politics (Cannon 1982).

Reagan responded to the existing tax policy regime with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA). The Act was the most important and lasting victory of the Reagan Revolution, and its profound symbolic importance to American conservatism far outweighs its very real and significant policy implications. Symbolically, for conservatives the act represented the triumph of the market and the private over the public sector, of regaining command over what Reagan described as an "out of control" big government, of the notion that the public would better determine how their resources should be used than government possibly could. The act's meaning was deeply connected to the defunding of the wasteful, intrusive national government. Unlike traditional budget balancing Republicans who were willing to raise taxes to eliminate deficits, as in the case of Richard Nixon, whose administration supported the unsuccessful 1969 Tax Reform Act that repealed tax preferences that favored wealthy individuals and corporations, Reagan dramatically proclaimed a strategy of denying the childishly inefficient and inept officials who administered the government their allowance:

"Over the past decade we've talked of curtailing government spending so that we can lower the tax burden. Sometimes we've even taken a run at doing that. But there were always those who told us taxes couldn't be cut until spending was reduced. Well, we can lecture our children about extravagance until we run out of voice and breath. Or we can cure their extravagance simply by reducing their allowance."

The Reagan 1981 tax cut crystallized the conservative position on American fiscal policy. It drew the line in the sand that separated good conservatives from questionable ones, a line that ironically Reagan himself would cross repeatedly in the coming years, but a position that only he could take and still win the hearts of loyal conservatives. Taking advantage of the rarely used reconciliation process and capitalizing on Reagan's admirable behavior fol-

lowing an assassination attempt, Reagan succeeded in pushing his tax and spending cuts through Congress (White/Wildavsky 1989; Gilmour 1990). From a policy perspective, ERTA eliminated bracket creep, thus ending the federal government's inflationary and politically invisible revenue raiser; lowered top marginal rates from 70 to 50 percent; reduced overall rates by 25 percent over three years; enhanced deductions for married couples; expanded individual retirement account credits for employer-sponsored pension programs; and significantly accelerated the pace of business depreciation and cost allowances. Pierson (1998: 129) suggests that the "deficit did not result from massive tax cuts. The Reagan tax cuts, often identified as the primary culprit in the deficit story, rolled taxes back only moderately from historically high levels." Nevertheless, as Table 1 indicates, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 profoundly influenced the federal government's revenues over the decade of the 1980s. From FY 1982 through FY 1990, as shown in the first row of data, ERTA's provisions reduced federal revenues by some $1.764 trillion. As a result, combined with the recession of the early 1980s and his increase in defense spending, Reagan's tax cut contributed significantly to the rapid expansion in the deficit, from a projected $45 billion deficit for FY 1982 to an actual $127.9 billion, with expectations of endless deficit spending to come.

The astonishingly rapid rise in deficit spending in Reagan's first year in office forced conservatives to chose between two cherished interests, balanced federal budgets and deep and significant tax cuts. Both goals represented real and symbolic constraints on big government, but the call for balanced budgets was a deeper felt, long-term concern that united conservatives since the 19th Century, while an emphasis on cutting taxes was a more contemporary reaction to the enactment of the income tax. Reagan pledged to accomplish both tasks during his presidential campaign, and he partially fulfilled his campaign promise with ERTA. The matter of balancing the budget remained a painfully sore subject, as Reagan frequently had declared that deficits were the source of inflation and high interest rates and that he would balance the budget where Jimmy Carter had failed. Reagan, moreover, embraced the conservative cause of adding a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution, and his initial FY 1982 budget proposal projected a minuscule $23 billion deficit in FY 1983 and a balanced budget in FY 1984. Yet, in the face of sky-rocketing deficits, these projections became meaningless within months of their release.

Table 1: Effect of 1981-1988 Legislation on Revenues (Fiscal Year, Billions of Dollars, Administration Estimates).

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total: 1982-1990
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981	-36	-91	-137	-170	-210	-242	-264	-291	-323	-1,764
Legislation after 1981 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982	*	+17	+36	+39	+47	+57	+57	+56	+57	+366
Highway Revenue Act of 1982		+2	+4	+4	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+35
Social Security Amendments of 1983			+6	+9	+10	+12	+25	+31	+23	+116
Railroad Retirement Revenue Act of 1983		*	*	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+6
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984			+1	+9	+16	+22	+25	+28	+31	+132
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985					+1	+3	+3	+3	+3	+13
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986						+3	+2	+2	+1	+8
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986						*	+1	+1	+1	+3
Tax Reform Act of 1986						+22	-9	-24	-20	-31
Continuing Resolution for 1987						+2	+3	+3	+3	+11
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987							+9	+14	+16	+39
Continuing Resolution for 1988							+2	+3	+3	+8
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988								+1	+7	+8
Family Support Act of 1988								*	*	*
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988								*	*	*
Other		-1	-2	-3	-2	-3	-3	-4	-3	-21
Subtotal for Legislation		-18	+45	+59	+78	+124	+120	+121	+128	+693
TOTAL: All Legislation	-36	-73	-92	-111	-132	-118	-143	-171	-195	-1,071

*Less than $500 million. Source: Budgets of the U.S. Government, FY 1982-1990; House Budget Committee.

To the tremendous disappointment of supply-siders, Reagan acceded to increasingly anxious advisors who advised a revision in policy (Roberts 1984). In 1982, the administration supported the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), which significantly raised taxes. In fact, as Table 1 indicates, following ERTA and during the remainder of his presidency, Reagan signed off on fifteen different bills, all but one of which increased taxes. The one bill that actually reduced taxes, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, was intended to be revenue neutral, but flaws in its provisions actually caused it to lose revenues. The 1986 Act, however, did further Reagan's goal of reducing top marginal rates, from 50 percent to just 28 percent. Nevertheless, despite all of this revenue raising legislation, the effects were by far outweighed by ERTA, which generated a net revenue loss of $1.071 billion over the decade. As shown in Table 2, which indicates the relationship between the size of these annual revenue losses with the growth in deficit spending, ERTA accounted for 28 percent, or $36 billion, of the FY 1982 $127.9 billion deficit, with the revenue loss and its effect on the deficit being particularly severe in the remaining years of the decade. Thus, a general perception of the Reagan years, one commonly encouraged by conservatives through the years, but one that is factually questionable, is that the conservatives' iconic president stood fast against tax increases. Yet, on the other hand, the consequences of Reagan's one great tax reduction proved far more significant for defunding the federal government than all his tax increases combined.

Table 2: The Net Tax Loss of Federal Legislation as a Percent of the Federal Budget Deficit (in Billions of Dollars).

	FISCAL YEARS								
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Net Tax Loss*	36	73	92	111	132	118	143	171	195
Deficit*	127.9	207.8	185.4	212.3	221.2	149.8	155.2	152.5	221.2
Tax Loss as % of Deficit	28	35	50	52	60	79	92	100	88

Sources: Budgets of the U.S. Government, FY 1982-FY 1990, House Budget Committee, and "Historical Tables," Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2003

One very significant action that Reagan repeatedly took to protect both the spirit and fact of ERTA in the face of widespread pressure to raise taxes, was reverse his long-standing position that deficit spending was inherently economically harmful, a strategy that would later be adopted by other conservatives. Reagan repeated throughout the 1970s, during the 1980 election, and in the early months of his presidency, that deficits were the primary cause of high interest rates, inflation, and the crowding out of private investment.

Beginning in December 1981, Reagan and his top economic advisors countered that these economic arguments were essentially false, and that, strictly speaking, a balanced budget for economic reasons was unnecessary. In 1984, Reagan declared to reporters, "over the last couple of years, even though our deficits vastly increased, our interest rates went down to half of what they were." At a convention of home builders and bankers, Reagan announced that "with the interest rates coming down at the same time that the deficit is going up [that] indicates there isn't that tie." In his presidential debate with Walter Mondale, Reagan asserted, "Yes, the connection that's been made again between the deficit and interest rates--there is no connection between them" (Savage 1994: 104). Supporters of supply-side economics never really regarded a balanced budget as a vital macroeconomic policy, especially when tax cuts weighed in the balance, and monetarists simply rejected the linkage between deficits and these economic consequences for theoretical reasons. Nevertheless, Reagan never abandoned the principle that deficit spending symbolized a wasteful, "out of control" federal government, which thus justified adding a balanced budget requirement to the Constitution, while avoiding tax increases that would only produce more revenue that would fund big government.

The Reagan Legacy: Fiscal Conservatism, Deficit Reduction, and Welfare Retrenchment

Deficit Reduction, Spending Restraint, and the Rise of Macro Budgetary Rules

Ronald Reagan's conservative fiscal policy called for deep cuts in domestic spending as well as tax reduction. Reagan's greatest success, as in the case of his tax cuts, came in the first year of his administration by way of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act 1981 (OBRA). Following this initial victory, overall restraint in spending was less the product of dramatic cuts in expenditures and more the result of holding spending relatively stable in nominal dollars, while inflation ate away at the constant dollar value of the domestic discretionary and some entitlement programs. OBRA cut $53.2 billion in budget authority and $35.2 billion in outlays, or 6.7 and 4.8 percent respectively, from the FY 1982 budget. These reductions affected spending in 266 of the 1,310 accounts in the federal budget. Of the total reductions in budget authority, 24 percent of the reductions applied to general governmental operations; 26 percent to grants for state and local governments; 27 percent to welfare grants administered by states and local governments; 11 percent to welfare programs admin-

istered by the federal government; and 2 percent to social insurance programs.

Thus, the burden of Reagan's largest spending reductions fell heaviest on state and local governments and then on general federal operations, both of which were the politically and programmatically easiest to cut in the budget. The major social insurance programs, Social Security and Medicare, essentially were untouched. The primary welfare programs affected were public housing Section 8 assistance, Medicaid grants to the states, food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and child nutrition programs (Keith 1981; Ellwood 1982). Over a million recipients lost their food stamp benefits, school lunch prices were increased for a million recipients, and a reported 560,000 people lost benefits that pushed them into poverty, including 325,000 children (Rosenbaum 1984). Between FY 1981 and FY 1985, essentially Reagan's first term in office, his proposed budget cuts in these and similar social and welfare programs would have cut funding by $75 billion, a combined reduction of some 17 percent from previously enacted levels. Yet, especially after the conservatives lost their voting control of the House in the 1982 elections, Congress was generally unwilling to support further reductions beyond those adopted in OBRA, leaving Reagan with about half of what he proposed over this period (Bawden/Palmer 1984). When all social "safety net" programs are included in this calculation, Reagan's combined proposed reductions for the period FY 1981-1985 total 17.2 percent, with 8.8 percent enacted, as indicated in Table 3. The table shows the expected budget baseline outlays for FY 1985, the percent amount that would have been changed given the administration's proposals, and the percent change actually enacted into law. As for general federal operations activities, which are commonly funded through appropriations rather than through entitlement or trust fund accounts, between FY 1982 and FY 1984, total congressionally enacted appropriations approved by Reagan grew by 30.3 percent but exceeded his combined requests by less than 1 percent, or $3.3 billion (Savage 1988).

Reagan's fiscal policies clearly aggravated the federal government's fiscal position. Although the federal deficit certainly grew significantly in the 1970s, the string of peacetime deficits ushered in with Reagan proved to be truly phenomenal. From a low point of $78.9 billion for FY 1981, the deficits of Reagan presidency ranged up to $221 billion and never fell below the FY 1982 mark of $127.9 billion. Meanwhile, the national debt nearly tripled, from $994.8 billion in FY 1981 to $2.6 trillion in FY 1988. With the rise of these unprecedented deficits and those that followed during the Bush presidency and into the presidential election of 1992, American politics, and the media's coverage of politics, became consumed with the issues of how to achieve deficit reduction and the elusive goal of balancing the budget. The endless machinations of the deficit politics of this period have been well-described elsewhere (White/Wildavsky 1989; Gilmour 1990), but it is worth

highlighting several important consequences of the nation's deficit spending and balanced budget obsessions.

Table 3: Social "Safety Net" Program Changes During the Reagan Revolution FY 1981-FY 1985 (in Billions of Dollars).

	Projected Outlays Without Reagan Reductions	Proposed Reagan Reductions	Changes Enacted
Retirement & Disability			
Social Security	$200.6	-10.4%	-4.6%
Veterans Compensation	10.7	-8.4	-0.9
Veterans Pensions	3.8	-2.6	-2.8
Supplemental Security Income	8.1	-2.5	+8.8
Other Income Security			
Unemployment Insurance	29.8	-19.1	-17.4
AFDC	9.8	-28.6	-14.3
Food Stamps	14.5	-51.7	-13.8
Child Nutrition	5.0	-46.0	-28.0
Woman, Infants, and Children	1.1	-63.6	+9.1
Housing Assistance (Section 8)	12.3	-19.5	-11.4
Low-Income Energy Assistance	2.4	-37.5	-8.3
Health			
Medicare	80.4	-11.2	-6.8
Medicaid	24.9	-15.7	-2.8
Other Health Services	1.8	-44.4	-33.3
Education & Social Services			
Compensatory Education	4.1	-61.0	-19.5
Head Start	1.0	*	*
Vocational Education	.8	-37.5	-12.5
Guaranteed Student Loans	4.1	-22.0	-39.0
Other Student Aid	4.5	-68.9	-15.6
Veterans' Readjustment Benefits	1.1	-9.1	-9.1
Social Services Block Grant	3.4	-41.2	-23.5
Community Services Block Grant	.7	-100.0	-37.1
Employment & Training			
General Employment & Training	5.7	-43.9	-38.6
Public Service Employment	4.8	-100.0	-100.0
Job Corps	.7	-42.9	-7.7
Work Incentive Program	.5	-100.0	-35.1
TOTAL	$436.5	-17.2%	-8.8%

*Less than 1 percent. Source: *The New York Times*, October 25, 1984, 15.

The first consequence was the imposition of macro budgetary rules, primarily in response to the budgetary stalemate of divided government. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, better known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, sought to achieve a balanced budget in five years. The law did impose a $10 billion across-the-board cut in nonexempt programs, threat-

ened sequesters if deficit targets were not met, and may have proved to be more successful if the Supreme Court had not declared its monitoring and enforcement mechanism unconstitutional. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was soon followed by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which aimed at controlling spending rather than budget balancing, by dividing spending into specific categories that would be punished separately by sequesters if they exceeded their spending caps. "Firewalls" were set between the three discretionary spending categories of defense, international, and domestic accounts, so that a category would not be raided to fund another category. The act also initiated PAYGO rules that demanded revenue or spending offsets if entitlement programs were added or enhanced, and imposed parliamentary points of order against appropriations bills that exceeded their spending allocations. The basic rules of the Budget Enforcement Act were later incorporated into the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Denounced by some observers as gimmicky and the product of elected politicians who wanted to avoid making tough decisions (Wildavsky 1988; Collender 1989), these rules were, nevertheless, designed to create centralized, front-loaded, top-down decision making by enacting various types of hard spending targets and caps, and imposing sanctions through parliamentary points of order and sequesters that would force desired outcomes, especially fiscal restraint, on the budgetary process (Savage 2001).

In addition to their technical aspects, these rules reflected the ideological triumph of conservatives in American fiscal policy. The purpose of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, for example, was not simply to balance the budget for the purposes of sound public finance and accounting, but explicitly to constrain the Democratic Party, liberalism, and big government.

"I see the deficit issue as the choke point on government," Senator Phil Gramm reflected. "If you mandate a balanced budget, you force politicians to explain up front to people what programs cost and how they are going to pay for them. There is no possibility that government could have grown as it did in the 60s and 70s had we had a Gramm-Rudman in effect, or had we had a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution." (Gramm 1988)

The combination of Republican control over the presidency during the 1980s and early 1990s and the enactment of these various macro budgetary laws, despite their flaws and the inevitable efforts of politicians of both parties to circumvent them, does appear to have contributed to restraining the expansion of one particular category of big government, domestic discretionary spending. As shown in Table 4, which identifies outlays by the budget enforcement categories (BEA) established in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, the great growth in federal spending since FY 1975 occurs in mandatory expenditures, especially social and health insurance programs. These programs largely reflect inherent demographic trends and public policy decisions made prior to the Reagan presidency, such as the enactment of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid enacted during the New Deal and Great Society.

National defense spending was on a downward path since 1987, but the events of September 11, 2001 created a national emergency that will force defense expenditures to climb for some time to come, though at projected levels measured in constant dollars that will rival but not exceed the military buildup of the Reagan years. Meanwhile, Reagan's fiscal policies reduced domestic discretionary spending by 20 percent, from $246.6 billion in FY 1980 to just $197 billion in FY 1987, the year when Gramm-Rudman-Hollings achieved its maximum success. Although it has been suggested, particularly by Democrats, that Reagan engineered these reductions in domestic spending by intentionally creating large deficits, there is no evidence to substantiate this claim. Not only were the Reagan White House and the Office of Management and Budget stunned by the escalating deficit in 1981 (Greider 1981; Stockman 1986), Reagan readily supported the tax increases incorporated in TEFRA in 1982 to stem the rising tide of red ink. Moreover, much of the pressure the deficit exerted on domestic spending came from Democrats themselves, who used the deficit issue to attack Reagan for short-term political gain.

Table 4: Outlays by BEA Categories, FY 1996, Constant Dollars.

FISCAL YEAR, FY 1975-FY 2004

Table 4 also identifies another interesting trend, the boost in domestic discretionary spending beginning in FY 1998. As the budget moved from endless deficits to projections of endless surpluses, both the Democratic White House and the Republican controlled Congress ignored the spending caps imposed in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. Between FY 1998 and FY 2001, domestic discretionary spending grew from $254.2 billion to $292 billion, the fastest rate of increase since the Reagan presidency. Although Democrats could be

expected to support such increases, the congressional Republicans too abandoned spending restraint, causing them to be chastised by such conservative commentators as Robert Novak and Rush Limbaugh. Novak, for example, chronicled the Republicans' eagerness to engage in pork barrel spending on a wide range of dubious projects (Novak 2001a, 2001b). In this regard, Novak simply echoed the complaints about Republican legislators offered by David Stock during the early days of the Reagan Revolution, where he declared the Republicans were as entrenched in the spending trough as Democrats (Greider 1981). As Kevin Hassett of the conservative American Enterprise Institute noted, "It is really obvious that when there is money around, they will spend it, even if they are Republicans" (Kessler 2002).

Reagan as the Conservative Model for Acceptable Fiscal Policy

To the point of cult of personality status, Reagan is *the* hero of American conservatives, and the myth if not the reality of his fiscal policy sets the standard for what constitutes an acceptable policy encore, certainly in the Republican Party. Thus, it is not surprising that President George H. Bush, who proclaimed in 1980 that presidential candidate Reagan's supply-side program was nothing more than "voodoo economics," throughout his term in office was regarded with suspicion and to this day remains less than fully accepted by conservatives. Faced with a budget deficit spiraling out of control, Bush in 1990 entered into a budgetary agreement with congressional Democrats that caused him to renounce his "read my lips" pledge to avoid tax increases by raising top marginal rates from 28 to 31 percent. Moreover, the budgetary terms of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act – as is shown in Table 5 – over the next three years essentially froze budget authority and reduced outlays for defense spending by 1.7 percent in nominal terms, while permitting budget authority for domestic discretionary spending to increase by nearly nine percent and outlays by almost 12 percent.

As indicated in Table 5, primarily due to BEA, in 1996 constant dollars, domestic spending jumped from $212.3 billion in FY 1989 to $221.5 billion in FY 1990, and these numbers continued to rise rapidly following the election of President Bill Clinton in 1992. For many American conservatives, these fiscal policy decisions more than warranted their disdain for the Bush administration, and when the Republicans captured the Congress in 1994, following the House Republicans' "Contract With America," their conservative leadership reversed what they considered to be Bush's capitulation in the spending terms of the BEA. The terms of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act – as is shown in Table 6 – provided for a sharp increase in budget authority for defense spending, as it essentially froze the remaining non-defense discretionary accounts in nominal terms over a five-year period.

Table 5: Discretionary Spending Limits of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act, Fiscal Years 1991-1995 (In Billions of Dollars).

	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY 1995	Percent Change
Defense						
Budget Authority	288.918	291.643	291.785	------	------	.99
Outlays	297.660	295.744	292.686	------	------	-1.67
Domestic						
Budget Authority	182.700	191.300	198.300	------	------	8.87
Outlays	198.100	210.100	221.700	------	------	11.91
International						
Budget Authority	20.100	20.500	21.400	------	------	6.47
Outlays	18.600	19.100	19.600	------	------	5.38
All Categories						
Budget Authority	------	------	------	510.800	517.700	1.35
Outlays	------	------	------	534.800	540.800	1.12

Table 6: Discretionary Spending Limits of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (in Billions of Dollars).

	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	Percent Change
Defense						
Budget Authority	269	272	275	282	290	7.81
Outlays	267	267	269	271	273	2.25
Nondefense						
Budget Authority	258	261	262	260	261	1.16
Outlays	286	293	295	294	288	.70

Not wishing to repeat his father's alienation of many Republicans and conservatives, President George W. Bush has pursued a much more Reagan Revolution-like fiscal agenda. The overarching priority of his first months in office was passing a major tax cut. Bush pressed for his tax reduction despite numerous warnings that his proposed $1.6 trillion tax cut threatened both the budget surplus and the retirement of the national debt. Astonishingly, for the first time in nearly thirty years, the federal government balanced its budget in FY 1998, and was on course to eliminate the national debt for the first time in the history of the republic, a goal that Thomas Jefferson could only dream about and that just eluded Andrew Jackson. Moderate and liberal Democrats fiercely opposed Bush's plan, fearing that a replay of Reagan's 1981 tax cut would again defund the state, ruining their chances to increase domestic discretionary spending and expand entitlement programs. Bush's tax cut, moreover, was larger than Reagan's, accounting for 1.5 percent of GDP as compared to Reagan's 1.3 percent cut. The $1.35 billion tax cut, as finally ap-

proved, lowered top marginal rates from the 39.6 percent that had been en-
acted in the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993 during the Clin-
ton administration to 33 percent, allowed charitable deductions for nonitem-
izers, reduced the marriage penalty, doubled the $500 child credit, and re-
pealed the estate tax, a provision that benefited the richest 2,000 taxpayers.
On half of the total Bush tax cuts benefit the wealthiest 1 percent of taxpay-
ers. Although Bush sold his tax plan in Keynesian garb, such that it would
stimulate aggregate demand to boost the weakening economy, supply-side
economists and opponents of big government welcomed Bush's tax cut, win-
ning him important credibility with movement conservatives (Leonhardt
2001; Baker 2002). In the fall of 2001, as the economy slipped into recession,
Bush offered up another tax cutting stimulus plan costing $60 billion in 2002,
but, again to gain the support of conservatives, he accepted a Republican
proposal that nearly doubled the cost.

Meanwhile, the Democrats' fears for a replay of the debilitating deficit
politics of the Reagan years were well-founded. In January, 2001, the Office
of Management and Budget announced that the government would run defi-
cits for the remainder of the Bush presidency, while the Bush FY 2003 budget
calls for a 14 percent increase in defense spending, an 8 percent total increase
in spending, but just a 2 percent increase for domestic discretionary pro-
grams.

Social Welfare Retrenchment

Following the passage of OBRA in 1981, the Reagan administration was not
particularly successful in making either deep cuts or dramatic program
changes in America's welfare programs. Nonetheless, Reagan's conservative
policy orientation toward these programs would have a lasting effect on the
nature of welfare policy. While cutting the budgets of these programs and
reducing the number of beneficiaries, the administration sought to make wel-
fare recipients more self-reliant by imposing work requirements on benefici-
aries, and it aimed at devolving the administration of these programs to the
states. In the case of AFDC, for example, OBRA reduced AFDC budget au-
thority by 17.6 percent for FY 1982, it reduced program eligibility through
such restrictions as limiting allowable family assets, including food stamps
and other benefits in the income calculation, raising the income standard, and
excluding children over the age of 18, and limiting the coverage of pregnant
women. Moreover, the states were authorized to impose "workfare" require-
ments to encourage recipients to find employment, and long-term plans for
AFDC included abolishing the program and leaving the decision to maintain a
similar kind of coverage to the states (Champagne/Harpham 1984; Berkowitz
1984).

The spirit of OBRA lived on to influence two major welfare initiatives, the adoption of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 (WRA) and the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The WRA, enacted under a Democratic president who in good conservative fashion declared he would "end welfare as we know it," suggests how far the United States has come since the federal government created the grand welfare programs of the Great Society. Despite the active opposition of the liberal wing of the Democratic party, Bill Clinton signed a welfare bill that substantially reduced food stamp and Supplemental Security Income benefits, while it imposed strict workfare and eligibility restrictions (Mule 2001). The new law required welfare beneficiaries to find work within two years and restricted their lifetime benefits to sixty months. Federal funding totaling about $16.5 billion was block granted to the states in the form of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) support. The states, in turn, were authorized to apply their own standards as to benefit levels; welfare to work policies, which includes the determination of what qualifies as work; the benefit reduction rate, which is the tradeoff between income earned and benefits that may be retained; sanctions, in terms of punishments for failing to comply with the work requirements, including "hard" sanctions such as the permanent denial of benefits to "soft" sanctions such as the temporary denial of a portion of benefits; the time frame over which benefits may apply; and diversion, those policies intended to keep beneficiaries off welfare rolls, such as mandating that a welfare applicant look for work before receiving benefits. Prior to the act, 80 percent of the federal funding received by the states was simply distributed to beneficiaries. That figure is now about 50 percent, with the balance spent on employment assistance programs, job training, and childcare for working parents, all with the intention of encouraging welfare beneficiaries into the workforce. These various requirements were completely in keeping with a Reagan-like, conservative view of public policy.

At the same time, standard welfare programs were being trimmed or transformed, one expanded significantly during the 1980s and 1990s, the EITC, and this too was in the spirit of conservative social policy. Established in 1975, EITC has become perhaps the most important welfare program offered by the federal government, and it has won the support of conservatives and liberals alike to the point that its growth rate exceeds both Social Security and Medicare. What makes EITC so politically popular is that it combines two programmatic elements that are fully consistent with conservative thinking: beneficiaries receive benefits in the form of a tax credit rather than a direct subsidy, and the requirement that beneficiaries must work and earn an income in order to gain the credit. This work requirement distinguishes EITC from earlier negative income tax credits that made no sure demands on beneficiaries. Conservatives look to EITC as a way to reward and attract more working poor "Reagan Democrats" to the Republican Party. Liberals are

attracted to the use of the tax code to improve income equality at a time when creating direct expenditure programs are both politically difficult to enact and are viewed as one more exercise in big government. Providing tax cuts rather than direct payments to "welfare queens" is simply better politics. Conservatives did become somewhat disenchanted with EITC in the late 1990s because the working poor failed to vote for Republican candidates, though due to support from both parties the program had become firmly embedded in the tax code (Howard 2001). Combined with increases in the minimum wage, by 2000 EITC had a dramatic effect on the poverty rate for the working poor, as in the case of a single mother with one child who worked full time at the minimum wage. As shown in Table 7, benefits continued to increase during the 1990s, as did the ratio of earnings to the poverty line, from .89 in 1989 to 1.07 in 2000.

Table 7: The Earned Income Tax Credit, Income, and the Ratio of Earnings to the Poverty Line.

	1989	1993	2000
Minimum Wage	$4.65	$5.06	$5.15
Minimum EITC Benefit Single Mother, 1 Child	$1,264	$1,709	$2,353
Earnings for Single Mother, 1 Child, Full Time at Minimum Wage	$10,568	$11,838	$12,653
Ratio of Earnings to the Poverty Line	.09	1.00	1.07

Source: Agency for Children and Families, Dept. of Health and Human Services

Corporate Welfare Expansion

Returning to the postulate that the state is an organization protecting the interests of class interests, it is worth noting that in addition to tax cuts aimed at defunding the state while benefiting the wealthy, conservatives welcomed big government if it supported corporate welfare. Here, it is useful to recall that in the American context that traditional conservatism never endorsed a laissez faire view of government. The Federalists, Whigs, Gilded Age and Age of Normalcy Republican Party eagerly sought the benefits of federal power through high tariffs and massive internal improvement spending. Ronald Reagan clarified conservatism in a post-corporate and income tax world, so that it aimed at tax reductions and social spending reductions. This position, however, certainly did not rule out state action and public polices that aided the material interests of the possessing class, including the provision of direct and indirect subsidies to large corporations, just as in the days of the Gilded Age.

Although "corporate conservatism" is the prevalent form of conservatism in the United States, particularly as practiced by the Republican Party, conservatism also encompasses a more libertarian version. So, ironically, one of the most scathing analyses of corporate welfare is periodically produced by the Cato Institute, a somewhat libertarian conservative think tank. In 2001, the Cato Institute reported that

"federal subsidies to private businesses cost tax payers over $87 billion per year. That is over 30 percent more than the Cato Institute's 1997 corporate welfare estimate of $65 billion. If corporate welfare were eliminated tomorrow, the federal government could provide taxpayers with an annual tax cut more than twice as large as the tax rebate checks mailed out in 2001." (Slivinski 2001)

A report by *Time* magazine estimated the value of corporate welfare to run as high as $125 billion a year. Another Cato study declared that the twelve worst corporate welfare programs, including the Export-Import Bank, the Market Access Program in the Department of Agriculture, and the Commerce Department's Advanced Technology Program, helped to create an "incestuous relationship between business and government," and that it created an "uneven playing field" by benefiting some businesses and not others. Examples of other types of tax and direct subsidies to wealthy corporations abound. Between 1996 and 2000, 67 percent of all federal agriculture subsidies, which totaled $71.5 billion, went to the top 10 percent of recipients. In 1996, the Federal Communications Commission granted television broadcasters $70 billion in free digital television licenses. In 1995, the Congressional Budget Office found that spending, tax, and credits for business would total $722 billion, and this was prior to the passage of the corporate friendly 1997 Balanced Budget Act and 2001 tax act (Congressional Budget Office 1995).

Conclusion

Contemporary American fiscal policy largely exists within the ideological framework of Ronald Reagan's conservative Revolution. In path-dependency terms, the last twenty years reflect remarkable "institutional stickiness" in terms of the overarching political discourse, policy choices, and the evolution of fiscal rules employed by the Republican and Democratic parties. The Bush administration has even taken up Reagan's cry that deficits are not responsible for higher interest rates. The Chairman of Bush's Council of Economic Advisors, R. Glenn Hubbard, declared that there is "little empirical evidence" connecting deficits and interest rates. Thus, in true Reagan like fashion, "A good economy leads to a good budget situation, not the other way around" (Pearlstein 2002). Thus, in other words, spending cuts, not tax increases are

the only justifiable policy for producing deficit reduction. In strict public policy terms, this last twenty years have witnessed what some analysts have described as the "fiscalization" of the budget, where all policy choices are made with a consideration of how they affect the deficit (Patashnik 2001), and that this current "regime of austerity" has helped to hollow out the state (Pierson 2001). When welfare program expansion is tolerated, this expansion comes in the form of tax benefits, which themselves are a way of defunding the state, as the government is further deprived of resources. These observations are all true, but what remains critically important is understanding that these outcomes are the result of an historical break in the development of American fiscal policy, a critical juncture as it were, which has been authored by a dramatic actor, guided by a relatively coherent conservative ideology, and institutionalized by way of fiscal policies reflecting real material interests that are quite willing to use the state to further their goals.

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The Promises Kept by Our Rivals – New Budgetary Strategies of the Conservatives in Canada

Roland Sturm

Introduction

Between 1984 and 1993, when the Progressive Conservatives were in office in Ottawa, they initiated a breakthrough in Canadian budgetary politics both with regard to the policy-making process and with regard to the strategic role of deficits for budget-making. Thereby, they prepared the ground for the budgetary successes of the Liberal governments led by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. Today the federal government is in a position to target balanced budgets *ex ante* and to use budget surpluses not only for tax cuts and new expenditures, but also to pay back public debt.

When the Conservatives came into power the public debt of the federal government was on the rise. It reached almost 75 per cent of the GDP in 1994. In 2001, it had been reduced to 52 per cent and the Liberal government aimed at a public debt level of 40% per cent of the GDP within five years (OECD 2001: 55). A balanced budget was first achieved by a Liberal government in 1997. The Conservatives had promised this ground-breaking budgetary turnaround, but it were the Liberals who, standing on the shoulders of their Conservative predecessors in this policy field, kept the Conservative promises.

The Legacy of the Old-Style Liberals

When Brian Mulroney had become Prime Minister as candidate of the Progressive Conservatives in 1984, he was confronted with a history of budgeting which had as its central objective the mobilization of resources to finance state interventionism in the economy and in society. The period from the early 1970s to 1982 has been characterized as one "in which there was a grudging and belated rediscovery of scarcity" (Doern/Phidd [2]1992: 139). The debate on the deficit began in Canada after the world wide oil crisis in 1974/75, although not with an immediate impact on Canadian government policies. The slowdown in economic growth after 1975, which was accompanied by budget deficits, started the trend which led to a growing debt problem. Strick ([3]1985:

177) has summarized the policy dilemma of Keynesianism at that time:

"The sizeable budget deficits being incurred annually were caused by a combination of developments. Rising costs produced an automatic increase in government spending on established programs; a sluggish economy, together with the indexing of the personal income tax, reduced the rate of increase in government revenues. The deficits provided an expansionary impact on the economy as a whole. However, with inflationary pressures continuing, the desire to avoid further increases in an already substantial deficit ruled out massive additional expenditure for employmentcreating programs."

In 1979, tight monetary policy by the Bank of Canada, as a reaction to a policy change in the US Federal Reserve, pushed up interest rates and therefore the cost of debt services. Higher interest rates also affected the Canadian economy as a whole. The recession which finally resulted in 1981-82 caused dramatic increases in the deficit and a rapid accumulation of federal debt (Carmichael 1984: 5).

The monetarist "counterrevolution" (Donner/Peters 1979) in economic thought, which led to a reorientation of the Bank of Canada's economic philosophy in 1975, at first criticized the limits and failures of Keynesian macroeconomic management, especially its inability to cope with stagflation (simultaneous occurence of economic stagnation and inflation). The monetarists did, however, not only claim to have a recipe for beating inflation, they also argued that part of the economic damage done was due to an excessive role of the state in the economy. They criticized big government which crowded out private investors, because government borrowing caused higher than necessary interest rates on capital markets. The fiscal policy goal derived from this argument was to restrain federal spending with the objective of reducing its share of the GNP. In addition to a general critique of state interventionism, the deficit as such started to attract greater attention. The driving force behind the massive increase of the deficit in the 1970s was not only the reduced public income, caused by the recession. In the mid-1970s Canada had also introduced policies which prevented relative budgetary gains from high inflation, such as indexed tax-brackets, personal income tax exemptions and indexed social assistance payments. In other words, neither was in these cases inflation creating a greater tax income, nor was it devaluating social expenditures.

The debate on the deficit, which reached the decision-making process of the Canadian government at the end of the 1970s, stressed the problems of expenditure policies which tended to get out of control and of the growing importance of resources needed to finance the annual debt service (Butler/Macnaughton 1984). The Liberal Trudeau government argued that expenditure policies should be made dependent on economic growth, but it did not end a strategy of budgeting, which gave priority to programmes over financial limitations. In a belated reaction to political pressures, Prime Minister Trudeau ordered a two billion Dollar expenditure cut in August 1978, which was,

however, exercised without any consequence for the general thrust of budgeting. This cut has been described as "prime ministerial 'lightning bolt,'" which hit at a time when most ministers were on vacation (Doern/Phidd ²1992: 145). Perceptions of the deficit problem remained divorced from public expenditure control. Expenditure cuts were above all meant to be anti-inflationary policies. As late as 1979 the Canadian Tax Foundation published a study which came to the conclusion (Bird 1979: 55): "For the moment [...] it seems safe to say that anyone worrying unduly about the growth of the public debt in Canada is for the most part wasting his time."

Prime Minister Joe Clark's short-lived Progressive Conservative minority government of 1979 tried to react more strongly to the lack of resources for new expenditures and announced for the coming four years 10% expenditure cuts and a reduction of total expenditures from 21% of the GDP in 1979 to 18% of the GDP in 1983.

Trudeau's return to power in 1980 postponed, however, a change of budgetary direction. Trudeau's Third National Policy was a last effort to use the country's resources to create socio-economic stability, although not necessarily social redistribution. Doern and Phidd (²1992: 147) have noted that: "In terms of resource allocation the Liberal expenditure plans gave a clear indication, if carried out, that economic development would receive the top priority, and social expenditures would be given a low priority." Trudeau's policies gave priority to programmatic change; fiscal limits were seen, but remained of secondary importance. Minister of Finance MacEachen officially committed the government to expenditure increases no greater than the growth of GNP and to a gradual reduction in the deficit, but without major tax increases. It was hoped that the success of the government policies would also solve the deficit problem. A typical example of the thrust of Trudeau's policies is the National Energy Program (NEP) which subsidized eastern consumers by keeping oil prices below prices on the world market, as had already been the case in 1973. This was a major factor, which contributed to the virtual doubling of the federal deficit in the 1979 to 1981 period (Doern/Maslove/Prince 1988: 207).

A new problem was created in the 1970s by the plethora of tax expenditures, subsidies which had the double effect of pleasing interest groups and of strategic incentives for the Keynesian demand management of the economy. Savoie (1990: 323) illustrates this point. He writes: "It will be recalled that tax expenditures were viewed as free money and 'more easily accessible' and that by 1985 it was estimated that Ottawa had over 300 tax expenditure items, compared with 200 in 1980." Doern and others (1988: 207), just as Isabella Bakker (³1990: 425) and David Wolfe (1985: 121), argue that from the mid-1970s until the 1982-83 recession federal spending was well under control, and that the deficit was caused above all by revenue shortfalls: "Key policy changes, such as the decision in 1974 to index the income tax system, explain,

along with a small handful of other tax expenditures, much of the increasing loss of billions of revenue Dollars." A further loss of revenue was provoked by the fact that the government had been forced to reduce its taxes on petroleum as international oil prices began to fall. Up to 1984 the effects of recession and in its aftermath expansionary fiscal policies led to a sizeable increase of the federal deficit (OECD 1988: 12).

The Clark government of 1979-80 had established an envelope system of budgeting, the Public Expenditure Management System (PEMS), as it was officially called, which can be regarded as the last effort to rescue budgeting from the mere logic of muddling through. In theory, it strengthened the element of programmatic decisions and of enlightened argument in the budgetary decision-making process. The basic idea of this envelope (i.e. cabinet committee) system, which was slightly modified, but left in place during the Trudeau administration of 1980-84, was to set a broad framework for policies which was controlled by the envelope Priorities and Planning chaired by the Prime Minister. The day-to-day management of expenditures in the general framework set, was left to envelopes with broader job descriptions, such as social development, or economic and regional development. In these envelopes, different ministries were supposed to cooperate both to find the best and most efficient policy and to make optimal use of the limited resources of each envelope. Without going into detail by elaborating on these problems which slowly destroyed the envelope system in the 1980s (see Sturm 1989: 37ff.), it is necessary to stress that a major conflict of interest was built into this system of budgeting: the conflict between departmental spenders and the guardians of the public purse. Whenever the latter (most of the time the Prime Minister or the Finance Minister, Gillespie 1984) accepted that the logic of spending programmes deserved an exception from spending rules and expenditure limits, the deficit increased. The envelope system was never intended to define an absolute ceiling of overall expenditures. Still, it was hoped that the kind of policy initiatives anchored in correct priorities it generated would create sufficient economic growth to accommodate all present and future spending needs.

The harsh reality was, however, that the lack of budgetary stability in the Trudeau years soon became apparent. Neither was spending under close control, nor could the necessary efficiency gains be achieved, on the contrary, as Maslove (1984: 19f.) argues:

"Previous to PEMS a department had a limited incentive to seek out inefficient and outdated programs and to eliminate or change them. In all likelihood the money saved would stay with the department and would be available to spend on other new or expanding programs. Under PEMS, there is a greater chance that the savings will be claimed by the relevant 'envelope' and be reallocated elsewhere. And clearly, the larger the savings, the more worthwhile it is for others to fight over them. In these circumstances, the incentive for departments to examine critically their ongoing programs [...], which is never strong in the best of circumstances, is even more blunted."

Trudeau first reacted to such problems with a strengthening of the guardians in the envelope system. When John Turner succeeded Pierre Elliott Trudeau as Liberal Prime Minister in 1984 he also reorganized the powerful social and regional development envelopes.

In the early 1980s the world market prices for crude oil unexpectedly started to fall. Trudeau's plan to finance his national strategy with the income created by the sale of the country's national resources was in shambles. Short-term measures had to be found to at least allow the government's priorities to hibernate. The second budget of Finance Minister Allan MacEachen of November 1981 could not avoid to assert both the need for fighting inflation through a policy of high interest rates and for reducing the deficit, for example, by closing off tax loopholes. At the same time this budget increased the pressure on tax income by tax expenditures which mostly favoured Canadians with middle and higher incomes. Doern and Phidd ([2]1992: 147) report that: "The budget produced a political disaster in an economy sinking into depression. It was widely perceived to be one that produced neither good economic nor social policy." The June 1982 budget was intended to tackle more directly the inflation problem, although it was obvious that the deficit was difficult to ignore. Again PEMS was side-lined as an instrument of priority setting. A "Six and Five" programme (Swimmer 1984) was announced. The idea behind this programme, so the Trudeau government claimed, was to set an example for private sector income increases by limiting wage increases for federal employees to six per cent in 1982 and five per cent in 1983.

The 1983 and 1984 Liberal budgets were based on the expectation of a growing Canadian economy stimulated by a Special Recovery Program, which included spending programmes for capital projects and incentives for private investment over a period of four years. The Finance Minister tried to alleviate the growing concerns over the deficit in a background paper entitled "The Federal Deficit in Perspective," which was tabled along with the budget. The paper argued that only 20-40% of the deficit were structural, i.e. would not disappear automatically when the economy recovered. But the measures introduced in the 1983 budget would, after a brief transitory period, overcome the present structural problems. Deficits of the federal government, so another argument of the Finance Minister, have also to be seen in perspective. The surpluses of provincial governments have to be taken into account for an accurate overall picture of the dimensions of the general government deficit problem (Strick [3]1985: 182ff.).

The Debt Crisis in Perspective

Still in 1984, the C.D. Howe Institute, a Canadian think tank, when presenting a study on the deficit (Bruce/Purvis 1984: V), felt the need to explain why this issue should be dealt with at all. In the foreword to the study, one finds the remarkable statement that "[f]or most Canadians, who are more concerned with persistent high unemployment, action to reduce the federal deficit may appear untimely, even ill-advised." And another C.D. Howe study of the same year (Carmichael 1984: 2ff.) stated that "[t]he hard fact about Canada's deficit is that for over 10 years Canadians have accepted more in services and transfers from the federal government than they have been willing to pay for." This lack of awareness of the importance of the deficit problem was reflected in opinion polls, in which in no year more than two per cent of those polled indicated that they believed the deficit or the national debt constituted the most important economic problem facing Canada. In addition, the new Mulroney government of 1984 was at first perceived as being unwilling to tackle tough issues such as reducing the federal deficit (Prince 1986: 3).

Perceptions changed since the mid-1980s, and especially after 1988 the deficit came to dominate the agenda of budgetary policy-making. But explanations for the deficit were not uniform. And there was no social consensus on deficit control strategies. Wolfe (1985: 133ff.) even argues, that the financial and business communities were successful in exploiting the debate on the deficit to strengthen their political influence. For business interests, deficits were caused, above all, by the combined result of uncontrolled spending on social programmes and of inefficient and interventionist bureaucracies. Labour unions and consumer groups pointed to the need for an increase in tax income, especially by taxes on corporations and upper-income earners (Doern/Maslove/Prince 1988: 206).

The Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney stressed from the start that the economy was in disequilibrium in two areas: unemployment and the deficit. The government did not see the need for a policy choice, but argued that its medium-term approach was to emphasize the importance of sound public sector finances as a precondition for sustainable growth in the longer run (OECD 1986: 20).

What exacerbated the situation was the speed with which the deficit situation deteriorated. The total debt to GDP ratio had risen from roughly 27% in 1980 to 75% in 1995. In 1995, every fourth tax Dollar had to be used to pay the annual interest on the accumulated debt and Canada's relative position among the major OECD economies had also dramatically worsened. Canada went from having the second lowest net debt-to-GDP ratio amongst the G 7 economies in 1980 to having the second highest (after Italy) in 1994 (OECD 1995: 47). Debt levels were close to OECD average in the early 1980s, in the

early 1990s they exceeded the OECD average by more than 20 percentage points (OECD 1993: 41).

In contrast to Germany and the United Kingdom, Canada financed its debt to a great extent externally. At the beginning of the 1990s almost a quarter of public debt had been financed by foreign investors (a phenomenon of special importance for the provincial level), whereas at the beginning of the 1980s the corresponding share was one-tenth (OECD 1993: 41). The ratio of net external liabilities to GDP for Canada was 45.5% of GDP in 1994. The OECD, in its 1995 report (53), warned that the magnitude of this debt, together with the burden of debt service it places on the current account, may lead to a greater volatility in the exchange rate of the Canadian Dollar. Another consequence may be financial "crowding out" of industrial investors, if interest rate increases are required in order to attract the necessary domestic and foreign savings.

New Directions in Budgetary Policy-Making

Although the deficit problem was not central to the election campaign after the election victory of the Progressive Conservatives, which brought Brian Mulroney into the office of Prime Minister, the new Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson, soon identified the reduction of the deficit as one of the major tasks of the new government. Ottawa, it was argued, ran out of "real money" long ago. The Trudeau government was in the view of the Tories spending money it did not have and was therefore contributing to growing deficits. The strategic consequence of this analysis was to opt for a policy of expenditure reductions. In the view of the Mulroney government, the broader aim of deficit control was, to regain business confidence, to lower interest rates, to increase economic growth, which meant in the end to create new jobs (Prince 1986: 14). Deficit reduction on the federal level of government was complicated by the dismantling of the previous government's National Energy Program. The Western Accord of 1985 redistributed gross energy sector revenue flows from the federal government to the provinces. But the problems of transition from the old to the new government were not the only reason why the pace of budgetary change was criticized by business groups as being too slow. The prevailing incrementalism had a lot to do with the brokerage style of the new government, who wanted to consult and to reduce confrontation in policy-making.

The basic idea of the Mulroney government with regard to deficit control, was to slow down the growth of public debt until debt growth was in line with economic growth. Annual deficits were to be reduced gradually, because there was the fear that too rapid deficit reduction might risk weakening or

even reversing economic recovery. In its "Agenda for Economic Renewal," the federal government laid down the following strategy (OECD 1988: 34):

- "to reduce the growth of the public debt to no more than that of the economy over the medium term: that is, to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio;
- to achieve continuing, sizeable year-over-year reductions in the deficit;
- to achieve substantial year-over-year reductions in the government's financial requirements; and
- to ensure that the greater part of the fiscal progress is achieved through effective expenditure restraint and good management."

In the 1986 budget, deficit spending to stimulate the economy was definitely ruled out by the government. The major instrument for fighting the deficit was to be expenditure cuts. These included cuts in the size of the public service. A task force led by deputy Prime Minister Eric Nielsen developed ideas for such cuts.

The annual federal deficit was reduced from 8.6% in 1984/85 to 4.8% in the fiscal year 1988/89. Economic growth was, however, still too weak to bring about a reduction in the debt to GDP ratio. In the years leading to the 1988 election, the Mulroney government was eager to prove that its deficit control strategy was on track. In 1988, there was still the hope that it would be a realistic aim to stabilize general government debt at forty per cent of GDP (OECD 1988: 44). The government's deficit control strategy was helped by a period of economic boom between 1986 and 1989, which consolidated the debt to GDP ratio without the need for extremely brutal expenditure cuts. With hindsight the Department of Finance (1990: 63) summarized the government strategy in the following way:

"Fiscal consolidation was a pillar of the government's 1984 Agenda for Economic Renewal, and spending restraint is the cornerstone of that fiscal strategy. While the deficit is affected by total budgetary expenditures, the government can only directly control program expenditures. These expenditures account for just under three-quarters of total federal spending; the rest, public debt charges, now makes up about 28 per cent of budgetary expenditures. Public debt charges can only be reduced indirectly, by getting the deficit and hence debt down and by creating an environment with lower inflation which is necessary for significant and sustainable declines in interest rates."

Public opinion was detracted from the deficit issue in the 1988 election campaign, which was turned more or less into a referendum on the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Here, Prime Minister Mulroney showed much more consistency than with regard to his more general neo-liberal agenda, the Agenda for Economic Renewal of November 1984, with which he had started his time in office. The February 1988 Budget projected only a small decline in the federal deficit over the next two years. This reflected the assumed impact of lower oil and grain prices, the transitional effects of Stage I of the

planned tax reform, which was originally designed to be deficit neutral, and the phasing out of customs duties under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (OECD 1988: 45).

In the first Mulroney years, not only the priorities of budgeting changed, but also its organization. Although PEMS continued to exist formally, power of decision-making was further concentrated in the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Finance. Eric Nielsen, the second man in Mulroney's cabinet, sat in all envelope meetings and reported to Priorities and Planning. When Dan Mazankowski took over Nielsen's role in 1986, he created an Operations Committee which brought together the leading figures of the different envelopes. The Committee operated parallel to PEMS structures, which were de facto robbed of their ability to make decisions.

After his re-election in 1988, Brian Mulroney's government remained under pressure to fight the budget deficit by simultaneously increasing taxes and cutting spending. Tax increases were, however, often sporadic, and it was difficult to identify the government's tax strategy. Following a more-or-less continuous year-on-year reduction in the deficit in the years 1985 to 1988, the federal government was expecting to achieve a balanced budget by the mid-1990s (OECD 1995: 38). Critics argue that in this period the Mulroney government did not do enough. Fanny S. Demers (1992: 84) summarized the general mood when she wrote: "The current government only truly started to attack the deficit problem in 1988, instead of during the relative periods of boom that the economy enjoyed from 1983 through 1987." In the late 1980s and early 1990s it proved to be increasingly difficult to control the deficit. Sharply-rising interest payments followed by weakened economic activity, i.e. a substantial shortfall in tax receipts, increased annual deficits (OECD 1992: 34). An unforeseen challenge to budgetary stability was provided in 1991 by the costs of the Gulf War. In 1991, more than half of the growth in programme spending was accounted for by increases in unemployment-insurance payments, agricultural support and defense spending related to the Gulf War (OECD 1991: 52). In January 1992, the Mulroney government even had to announce a two-month freeze on discretionary spending and on hiring in a last effort to keep the 1991/92 deficit below the planned level.

The major source of the new tax income was supposed to be a new indirect tax, the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Although it was announced as the second stage of the 1988 tax reform, which – following the example of the United States tax reform of 1986 – had facilitated the tax code, it was also attractive to the government, because it promised to be a prolific revenue raiser and was consistent with the government's overall deficit reduction strategy. A nine per cent GST was introduced in 1991. What the government did not foresee was the loss of confidence, which especially its deficit-reduction policies, caused in the Canadian electorate. The GST turned out to be the most unpopular tax in Canadian history (Brown-John 1994: 21). To demon-

strate its resolve not to use additional income from GST for additional pro-
gramme spending, the government in 1991 established by law a Debt Servic-
ing and Reduction Fund (DSRF). The DSRF was supposed to apply GST
revenues as well as net privatization proceeds and voluntary contributions to
service and reduce the debt (OECD 1991: 53). One could argue, however, as
Abele (1991: 18) did, that the fund was "a cosmetic gesture," because "once
the revenue is collected, there is no way to tell 'GST Dollars' from other tax
income or from foregone expenditures." In addition, total GST revenues
would have amounted to only about half of what the government had to pay
annually to service the debt. So the reduction part of the Fund's title was at
least misleading.

With regard to reform of the decision-making institutions at the level of
the federal government, the process of centralization of decision-making in
the PEMS was brought to its logical end. PEMS was abolished, because the
conventional wisdom in the Mulroney government was that PEMS encour-
aged spending (Graham 1989: 21). The new post-1988 cabinet structure
strengthened above all the guardians of the public purse and increased their
numbers. It eliminated all spending powers of departmental ministers. The
Operations Committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, was upgraded
and formalized. It could now even act as gatekeeper for the Priorities and
Planning Committee (P&P). Only after the Operations Committee's approval,
Priorities and Planning could exercise its role, which was to control any sig-
nificant government expenditure, even if it was to be taken from existing
programme reserves. Smaller routine programmes had to be approved by the
Treasury Board. In addition, a new Expenditure Review Committee, chaired
by the Prime Minister, was established. It had the task of conducting an ongo-
ing review of all government expenditures to ensure appropriate spending
behaviour. Katherine Graham (1989: 19ff.) aptly summarized the second-term
Mulroney government's obsession with institutionalized expenditure controls:

"There are at least four bodies concerned with guarding the public purse: the Department
of Finance, Treasury Board, the Expenditure Review Committee and P&P. The Operations
Committee may also have a role in dealing with spending matters. [...] The new federal
decision-making system certainly has guardians, possibly so many of them that they will be
tripping over each other."

In its second term, the Mulroney government also continued its policy of
controlling the cost of staff working for the federal government. It operated
with fixed federal wage budgets, which meant that every wage increase had to
be paid for by job losses. In addition, the government reduced public sector
employment substantially. The "downsizing" of the federal bureaucracy was
supposed to have a major impact on the deficit, especially when, as was the
case for the 1991/92 budget, the recession led to a greater budget deficit than
was originally forecast. Eugene Swimmer (1992: 285) has questioned, how-
ever, the rationale of this restraint programme by a simple comparison of the

effects of this policy with the impact of changes in interest rates on the deficit:

"In 1990-91, all personnel costs (including management) made up 12 per cent of the fed-
eral budget. If these costs increased by 5 per cent as a result of free collective bargaining,
the additional cost would amount to $870 million. Although this number seems large in the
abstract, it must be considered in comparison to other government policy choices. The
Bank of Canada's decision in 1990 to push up the Canadian short-term interest rate to 3.3
percentage points above the US rate (instead of maintaining the traditional 1.9 point differ-
ential) generated $2.5 billion in annual interest payments on the total national debt."

Deficit Control Policies

One principle of deficit control policies in Canada was to choose a strategy
which implied a moderate pace of deficit reduction, gradually building up
over time. For Canada, deficit control meant both higher taxes and radical
expenditure cuts. In contrast to the neo-conservatives in the United States,
who in the first term of the Reagan administration believed, that reduced taxes
would stimulate the economy in a way that created higher tax income, which
would in turn allow higher defense spending and reduce the deficit, the Cana-
dian Tories led by Brian Mulroney never held similar views. Moderate tax
increases were justified to restore fiscal stability and to restore the revenue
yield (in % of GDP) of earlier decades. Still, taxation was not meant to be the
major instrument of deficit control.

Spending cuts represented 98% of the deficit reduction achieved in
1985/86, then 67% in 1986/87 and 70% in 1990/91 (Prince 1986: 49). In the
1995 budget, the spending cuts still outweighed revenue increases by a ratio
of 7 to 1. Deficit reductions between late 1993 and late 1997 were at about
90% due to expenditure cuts (OECD 1997: 35). This is not surprising. As a
general rule, expenditure cuts were much preferred to increases in taxation for
two reasons, which have both to do with the geographic location of Canada
next to the United States. On the one hand, only tax levels which, compared
to the ones in the United States, are economically viable will attract the nec-
essary US-investments to Canada. On the other hand, Canadian citizens com-
pare their tax burden with the situation of their neighbours South of the bor-
der, and by this comparison they define what they find acceptable.

Expenditure cuts affected above all civil service salary, public investment
and social and defense expenditures. In the early 1990s, the reduction of the
size of the civil service was accompanied by government reorganization and
privatizations. More than fifty agencies and other government entities were
eliminated or consolidated. Since the mid-1980s forty Crown corporations
(public enterprises) have been privatized, which meant a reduction of public
employment of about 100,000 (OECD 1994: 59). Public service bashing

developed into a kind of traditional government practice since the 1970s (see e.g.: Zussman 1986). Following the line of argument of the Trudeau and Mulroney governments, the Chrétien government, too, attacked the waste in the federal bureaucracy. Reduced federal programmes meant reduced federal employment. In the three years from 1994/95 to 1997/98, Prime Minister Chrétien reduced the number of federal employees by about 15 per cent (i.e.: 55,000 jobs). Another area of substantive cuts has been defense. Cuts included the closure of military bases at home and abroad. With respect to the cuts in overseas aid, it has to be mentioned that the size of Canadian programmes for this purpose was in the past well above the OECD average, and measured by this yardstick, spending patterns in Canada are only getting more similar to the ones of other Western democracies.

Another recurrent feature of deficit control policies in Canada is the reduction of the role of the federal government as provider of public goods and public services and a strengthening of the role of the provinces. Canadian federalism has steadily increased the relative autonomy of the provinces in financial matters. Shared responsibility of the federal government and the provinces has been transformed into the model of an annual one-time limited federal grant with additional funds provided by the provinces depending on their own decisions. Thus, the federal government gains complete control of the financial totals transferred to the provinces and avoids the danger of unforeseen spending, due to legal obligations to support special government programmes. Since 1990, the size of per capita transfers for the Established Programs Financing (EPF) had been frozen in nominal terms, which meant, taking account of inflation, a de facto cut. The EPF was the largest transfer programme accounting for 58 per cent of transfers to the provinces in 1994/95.

The Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), which made up 22 per cent of transfers to the provinces in 1994/95, was capped by the federal government for the three highest income provinces (Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario) by imposing an annual limit of 5% on its growth. The right of the federal government to impose this ceiling was upheld by a decision of the Supreme Court in August 1991. In April 1996, transfers under the CAP, with funding of provincial social welfare programmes based on a shared-cost basis, were merged into a block grant with those transfers of the EPF system, which used to provide block grants to finance provincial post-secondary education and health (OECD 1995: 41). The new block grant is called Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST).

Probably there is a political and an economic limit to deficit control policies which concentrate on the reduction of transfer payments to the provinces. A political limit could be seen in the danger to the cohesion of the Canadian federation which may result from a further reduction of common interests and involvement of federal and provincial governments. An economic problem

may arise if federal cutbacks seriously jeopardize the provincial deficit control policies.

In contrast to the deficit control strategy of the British government, the Canadian government did at first not rely on privatization proceeds to balance the budget. To use privatizations as a serious income earner for the federal government would have been difficult, anyhow, because in Canada the state sector in industry, which could be privatized, was much smaller than its British equivalent. In addition, the privatization policy which started in the mid-1980s was implemented relatively cautiously, and often restricted by competing aims of government policies, such as social and regional development. So, the budgetary impact of privatization initiatives was limited. It was estimated that, in the mid-1980s, the total value of the Crowns (i.e. the nationalized industries) was 60 billion dollars. Until 1992 only 3.6 billion dollars were added to federal income by 24 privatizations (Stanbury 1994: 218).

Debt servicing costs are influenced by decisions of the Bank of Canada. With regard to interest rates the latter has, however, to take into account the international environment and especially developments in the United States. So, the ability of the Bank to control the growth of the deficit is limited.

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney tried unsuccessfully to control the deficit by legislation. In 1989 an Expenditure Review Committee of the Cabinet was installed. In 1990, the Mulroney government introduced the Expenditure Control Act which reduced, froze or limited spending in every policy field except for major transfers to households and equalization payments to some provinces. The ambitious aim of the Act was to reduce the deficit to GDP ratio to 1% by 1994. In 1992 a Spending Control Act followed, which limited programme spending till 1995/96 (when the Act was not renewed by the Chrétien government) to the levels projected in the 1991 budget. Any overspending in one year had to be recovered in the following two years. On the revenue side, the Act increased unemployment insurance premiums to compensate for the rising costs of unemployment (OECD 1993: 32). The problem, which legislation to control expenditures could not solve, was the unexpected weakness in the growth of revenues, which would have necessitated even greater cuts if new deficits were to be avoided. Deficit control legislation may, however, have a political rationale. Legislation may be useful to convince the markets that a government's intention to control expenditures can be trusted to get implemented, and it may force the opposition to explain to the public where it stands with regard to politically painful cuts (Doern/Phidd [2]1992: 186).

Lessons Learned by the Liberals

Jean Chrétien won the 1993 election on a Liberal platform titled "Creating Opportunity" (the so-called Red Book) which promised a balanced approach to deficit reduction. The aim was to reduce the annual deficit to three per cent of the GDP (the same criterium which can be found in the Maastricht treaty) by 1996. An increase in taxes was almost ruled out, because of the already higher tax burden of Canadians compared to US-citizens. Inacceptable to the new government was also old style Keynesian deficit spending. The Red Book did, however, mention expenditure cuts.

The 1994 budget defined areas of spending cuts and upheld the tight control on public sector wages. It was largely uninspiring. Observers soon compared it to the not very successful last Mulroney budgets. Although the economy recovered briefly in 1994, and the federal government financial deficit declined for the first time in five years, the federal debt as percentage of the GDP still grew to almost 75%. The 1995 budget was much stricter with regard to expenditure cuts, which covered not only a whole range of policy areas, but also federal-provincial transfers, and drastically reduced (the plan was 15%) public sector jobs. With the 1995 budget the annual deficit could be reduced, and the sharp rise of the overall federal debt was halted. The 1996 budget continued the multi-year spending cuts announced in 1995.

For the budget 1997/98 a surplus could be recorded, the first federal budget surplus since the budget year 1969/70 (OECD 1999: 47). Since then, the Liberals have stayed course. Relying on cautious assumptions about the economy and the development of interest rates as well as on the fall back position of a contingency reserve, they were able to keep the Canadian budget in surplus.

Prime Minister Chrétien did not change the centralized structure of cabinet decision-making on the budget introduced by his Progressive Conservative predecessor. In 1995 he initiated, however, a new Expenditure Management System as an additional mechanism to control federal spending. The latter was designed to put a ceiling on spending and was supported by a Programme Review (1994-97), which tested every single government programme. After ministries have received their share of the budget, all new spending will have to come from internal reallocations of resources either from within or among the relevant ministries. This provision has been lifted since 1998, when the budget had moved into surpluses. There is also no longer a policy reserve to pay for unforeseen or extra expenditures. Planning, too, once synonymous with programming, is reduced to a mechanism to control future spending. All ministries have to submit a two-year business plan which explains future departmental activities in the framework of given approved expenditure levels (OECD 1995: 64f.; OECD 2001: 68f.) Although

strict expenditure controls have eroded a bit in the age of prospective surpluses and because of the federal government's intent to allocate funds for key spending priorities there is no danger that balanced budgets will be less likely in the future and that the vision of the Conservatives of budgetary discipline and fiscal prudence will be abandoned by the Liberal party. So, indeed, the Conservative promise of a sound budgetary strategy was kept by their Liberal rivals.

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