RETHINKING INSECURITY, WAR AND VIOLENCE

Beyond savage globalization?



RETHINKING *Globalizations*

Edited by
Damian Grenfell and Paul James

Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence

Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence: Beyond savage globalization? is a collection of essays by scholars intent on rethinking the mainstream security paradigms.

Overall, this collection is intended to provide a broad and systematic analysis of the long-term sources of political, military and cultural insecurity from the local to the global. The book provides a stronger basis for understanding the causes of conflict and violence in the world today, one that adds a different dimension to the dominant focus on finding proximate causes and making quick responses

Too often the arenas of violence have been represented as if they have been triggered by reassertions of traditional and tribal forms of identity, primordial and irrational assertions of politics. Such ideas about the sources of insecurity have become entrenched in a wide variety of media sources, and have framed both government policies and academic arguments. Rather than treating the sources of insecurity as a retreat from modernity, this book complicates the patterns of global insecurity to a degree that takes the debates simply beyond assumptions that we are witnessing a savage return to a bloody and tribalized world.

It will be of particular interest to students and scholars of international relations, security studies, gender studies and globalization studies.

Damian Grenfell is a researcher in the Globalism Research Centre at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia.

Paul James is Academic Director of the Globalism Research Centre at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia and Director of the United Nations Global Compact, Cities Program (UNGCCP).

Rethinking Globalizations

Edited by Barry K. Gills
University of Newcastle, UK

This series is designed to break new ground in the literature on globalization and its academic and popular understanding. Rather than perpetuating or simply reacting to the economic understanding of globalization, this series seeks to capture the term and broaden its meaning to encompass a wide range of issues and disciplines and convey a sense of alternative possibilities for the future.

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Contributors

Kirsty Best is a researcher in the School of Media Communication and Culture at Murdoch University.

Richard Caplan is a Professor of International Relations and Fellow of Linacre College, University of Oxford, and author of *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (2005).

Wei Choong is a researcher at RMIT University in the Centre for Risk and Community Safety.

Phillip Darby is Director of the Institute of Postcolonial Studies, Melbourne, and author of *The Fiction of Imperialism*.

Robyn Eckersley is Professor in Politics at the University of Melbourne, and author of *The Green State* (2005).

Jonathan Friedman is Directeur d'Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes en Sciences Sociales, Paris and Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Lund. He is author of *Global Anthropology* (with Kajsa Ekholm Friedman).

Damian Grenfell is a Research Fellow at the Globalism Research Centre at RMIT University.

Martin Griffiths is an Associate Professor in Political and International Studies at Flinders University, and editor of *The Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics* (2005).

James Goodman is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Technology, Sydney, and author of *Nationalism and Transnationalism*.

John Handmer is a Professor at RMIT University and Director of the Centre for Risk and Community Safety.

Michael Humphrey is Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Sydney, and author of *The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation* (2002).

Paul James is a Professor of Globalization and is Academic Director of the Globalism Research Centre at RMIT University, and author of *Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism* (2006).

Belinda Lewis teaches Health sociology, politics and policy at Monash University.

Jeff Lewis is Associate Professor in Applied Communications at RMIT University, and author of *Language Wars* (2005).

Ronaldo Munck is Theme Leader in Internationalisation, Interculturalism and Social Development at the Dublin City University, and author of *Globalisation and Contestation* (2007).

Garry Rodan is Director of the Asia Research Centre and a Professor in the School of Politics and International Studies at Murdoch University, and author of *The Political Economy of Southeast Asia*.

John Tulloch is Professor of Media and Sociology, Brunel University, London, and author of *Television, AIDS and Risk.*

Oren Yiftachel is Professor of Geography and author of *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel Palestine* (2006).

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It is odd that only two names appear on the front cover of this book. It belies the deep sociality of the production process and the collective engagement involved in putting together an interconnected anthology. This book has been written over a time when the editors and authors were working in different places across the globe including in places of recent or continuing violence, learning and discussing ideas with people from all quarters. We thank all those many people who have offered their opinions, shown remarkable generosity, and who have challenged our assumptions so rigorously. We thank Anna Trembath for expertly compiling the index and Christopher Hook for efficiently handling the last stage of editing. We thank the Australian Research Council for providing financial support for important periods of field research. To our colleagues in the Globalism Research Centre at RMIT who have provided so much support, and to our friends and families, we extend our most sincere appreciation. Finally, we dedicate this book to those who are struggling to find alternative pathways to peace in places that continue to experience deep insecurity.

Part I

Globalizing insecurity

1 Debating insecurity in a globalizing world

An introduction

Damian Grenfell and Paul James

> The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization … In one word, it creates a world after its own image.
>
> K. Marx and F. Engels (1848)

Reading *Time Magazine* recently, and glancing through its opening pages of worldly quirks before turning to the ostensibly more serious articles, a banner headline called "Numbers" stands out presenting an apparently *ad hoc* list of interesting facts. Under the heading "Congo" is the number 27,000. This we are told in the briefest of terms is the number of sexual assaults reported in one province in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006. The only other context given is that the "UN says sexual violence in the war-ravaged country is the worst in the world" (*Time Magazine* 2007: 12). The next listed fact, still under the heading of "Congo," reads "60%," which we are told is the percentage of "combatants in the Congo who are believed to be infected with HIV/AIDS." The column then goes on to discuss the record number of Wikipedia entries made by Japanese government workers, and the number of contestants in a wife-carrying competition in the USA. And that is it. There is no other information on the Congo in the magazine, no other explanation, and one wonders if there is meant to be a connection between the number of sexual assaults and the percentage of HIV-infected combatants. This is the contemporary world of throwaway facts and implied presumptions about the globalizing states of violence

Violence is of course a complex social phenomenon, and for all the different ways in which it can be understood, asking basic questions is an important first step. Why do some theatres of violence attract such a high degree of sustained media attention while others can be reduced to numbers for our disturbing amusement? What if 27,000 US soldiers had been injured in one city in Iraq, or 27,000 school children sexually assaulted in one province of France? No-one would dare to place such news in a "numbers" column. In the case of the Congo, it is a combined effect of patriarchy and the persisting effects of colonialism that allow for such violence to be treated

in a remarkably trivialized way. The Congo—darkest Africa, a place of blackness and hopelessness, of wild abuse and rampant disease, and of gender-based violence—is typically treated either without anything of the same seriousness as the most minor threats to "national security" in the West or, like the Sudan, Somalia, and Sri Lanka, thrown in the too-hard basket.

While the Congo represents a particularly powerful postcolonial imaginary of a place experiencing conflict, just as with the insurgency in Iraq, the Republican Army activities in Ireland, or the militia attacks in Timor-Leste, we are continuously presented with what appears to unexaminable violence in a "world on fire," to borrow Amy Chua's (2003) phrase. This world is presented as one of barbarity, clans, blood-ties, tribes, revenge, ritual, and savagery. Such violence, it is argued, stems from a global resurgence in tribal and traditional forms of identity, a view which has become entrenched in a wide variety of media sources and has framed both government policies and academic arguments. For example, the otherwise sophisticated documenter of conflict, William Shawcross, writes of "the chaos and the suffering caused by failed states, by tribalism, and by warlordism in the post-Cold War period" (Shawcross 2000: 12). Michael Ignatieff (2003: 21) writes of the "barbarian zones" into which extending imperial order becomes, for him, a necessary imperative. In this worldview, the hopes of an ordered Westphalian system is giving way in many zones of the world to the chaos and mayhem of identity politics based on ethno-political groupings, either emanating from within nation-states or cutting across them.

Beyond Conceptions of a Manichean World

Two influential authors who have framed the two sides of the mainstream explanation for contemporary localized transnational violence have been Samuel Huntington in his *Clash of Civilizations* (1998) and Benjamin Barber in *Jihad vs McWorld* (1996). As a conservative and left-liberal analysis respectively, both authors are rightly responding in criticism of Francis Fukuyama's (1993) thesis that the end of the Cold War would result in an "end of history." However, they end up by completely oversimplifying the conditions of contemporary conflict. Huntington argues that history was far from over and that conflict would occur along civilizational lines between sets of dominant and competing religious civilizations. He asserts that civilizations clash for various reasons, including where "the process of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities," and where religion "provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations" (Huntington 1993:26). He sees a kind of traditionalism or a given "soul of culture" flowing through each of the civilizational forms.

Barber's *Jihad vs McWorld* tries to account for the same kind of disordering violence as Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, and moves beyond the notion of an essential continuity of cultures to draw a very different

matrix of determinants. Barber delineates tribalism (Jihad) from modernism (McWorld) and sets them up as contradictory forces that share a common propensity for challenging what Barber calls "democracy."

> The first scenario rooted in race holds out the grim prospect of a re-tribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened balkanization of nation-states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe, a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and mutuality: against technology, against pop culture, and against integrated markets; against modernity itself as well as the future in which modernity issues. The second paints that future in shimmering pastels, a busy portrait of onrushing economic, technological, and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerise peoples everywhere with fast music, fast computers, and fast food—MTV, Macintosh, and McDonalds—pressing nations into one homogenous global theme park, one McWorld tied together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce. Caught between Babel and Disneyland, the planet is falling precipitously apart and coming reluctantly together at the very same moment.
>
> (Barber 2001: 4)

For Barber, Jihad is found across many postcolonial settings—from the Congo to Indonesia and back to Afghanistan. "McWorld" can be understood as the end result of Marx's bourgeoisie as "it creates a world after its own image."

Both writers have drawn heated critiques, not least Huntington for his oversimplification of Islam and his failure to show how contemporary expressions of religion, including in Western civilization, have been shaped by modernizing trends including militarization, corruption, and bureaucratic state formation, as well as by modernizing ideologies ranging from Marxism and liberalism to nationalism (Salter 2002, Senghaas 2002, Ali 2003). Barber falls for a similar reductionism in that he separates out Jihad and McWorld as two distinct fields. At the same time, in realizing that Jihad and McWorld draw on interconnected processes—"Imagine bin Laden without modern media: He would be an unknown desert rat"—he tries to complicate the dichotomy by saying that Jihad and McWorld are not a clash, but a "dialectical expression of tensions" (Barber 2001: xvi). The expression is impressive, but it does not theoretically explain how two divided ways-of-being can be both Manichean opposites and dialectically engaged. For Barber, the dialectic just happens. Each side may see themselves as necessary and justified through the existence of the other, and Jihad may momentarily appropriate aspects of McWorld, such as terrorists using the internet. Barber however misses the sense in which both subjectivities are caricatures of the various

responses to modernizing and postmodernizing processes, and how as cultural–political expressions these responses actually work to reconstitute one another, not least in terms of how violence is enacted. This perhaps explains how Barber turns to the banality of modern democracy to mediate his Manichean alternatives. It is not that democracy is a not worthwhile political system, especially if it were enacted in a thorough-going consistency concerning rule of the demos. However, as Michael Mann has brilliantly documented there is a darker side to existing democracy. Democratic liberal regimes are also deeply part of the problem:

> Evil does not arrive from outside of our civilization, from a separate realm we are tempted to call "primitive." Evil is generated by civilization itself … perpetrators of ethnic cleansing do not descend among us as a separate species of evil doers. They are created by conflicts central to modernity that involve unexpected escalations and frustrations during which individuals are forced into a series of moral choices.
>
> (Mann 2005: ix)

Violence in the Context of Modernizing and Postmodernizing Globalization

As Amartya Sen has written, "The reductionism of high theory can make a major contribution, often inadvertently, to the violence of low politics" (2006: xvi; see also Comaroff and Comaroff 2003). Against one-dimensional worldviews that posits clashes of civilizations or cultures, *Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence: Beyond Savage Globalization?* is committed to rethinking the current dominant security paradigms and the mainstream patterned representations of violence. At the same time, against the tendency to reduce analysis to graphic descriptions of the various theatres of violence—and then to attribute the general causes of the horror to the proximate purveyors of that violence, the Serbs, the Taliban, Al-Qa'ida, religious fundamentalists, radical nationalists, tribal warlords—*Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence* is based on the view that critical theory remains crucial in lifting us out of a media headline understanding of conflict and violence. The framing argument of this book is that the major causes of violence in the world today cannot be caste as part of a process of retribalization or Islamicization of the world. The expanding theatres of localized transnational violence and the turn to new kinds of fundamentalisms—including in the West—need to be understood in terms of the remaking and reconstitution of social relations across all modes of practice in a period of intense globalization. Scenes of "savagery from below" are not some testimony to a return to the past—that much is largely impossible in a world where even a subjective sense of tribalism is shaped by modernizing processes from state and nation formation through to hypermediatized globalization. Hence, it is

not that tribal and traditional, modern and postmodern formations should be understood as laid out as two opposing cultures, civilizations, or worlds. Rather those various ontological formations are better seen as intersecting and overlaying each other in uneven configurations across changing local-global settings. It is despite, or more accurately because of, the dominance of the modern–postmodern, that these intersections throw up new tensions and contradictions. "Returns" to "traditional" identity politics, religious sectarianism, and reclamations of (neo)traditional truths, are in this sense the outcome of attempts to deal with a world that is fractured along cultural, economic, political, *and* ontological lines. Here the concept "ontological" is taken to refer to ways of "being in the world."

The terms that we are using to make sense of these questions—tribalism, traditionalism, modernism, and postmodernism—are difficult concepts, not the least because they carry an unfortunate and sometimes overwhelming baggage of ethnocentric and reductionist assumptions. In some hands they still evoke the classical dichotomies between the savage and the civilized, the backward and progressive, and the simple and complex. They also remind us of the older notion of a Great Divide between traditional (undeveloped) societies and modern (developed) ones, a division that was said to characterize the Global South versus the Global North, and was dominant in the development studies literature up until the 1980s. In the Global North we supposedly find industrial modern society with a few remnant tribal and traditional pockets, and in the Global South, by contrast, swathes of primordial peasantry surround pimples of overpopulated metropolitan chaos. The editors of the present volume and the writers included in the anthology all attempt in their different ways to account for the complex intermeshing of contemporary social formations. The world as they describe it is neither a homogenizing whole nor a thin set of plural differences, at least as understood in the liberal sense of "pluralism."

However, this argument is not enough. As many of the chapters in this collection suggest, there is also a "savagery from above" where globalizing processes both radically reconstitute the zones of conflict (in some cases leading to extended periods of violence) and remake the avenues for legitimizing military intervention, particularly through the electronic media. Violence, both embodied and structural, is carried through the new possibilities for the extension of power across time and space, not only reshaping the kinds of violence that occur within localized struggles but making new patterns of violence possible. This is explained at times through the idea of empire, where empires are understood simply as states which extend relations of power across territorial spaces over which they have no prior or given legal sovereignty, and where, in one or more of the domains of economics, politics, and culture, they gain some measure of extensive hegemony over those spaces for the purpose of extracting or accruing value. Relating this to the theme of globalization, we can say that to the extent that these extensions of hegemony have, or are projected to have, the potential to

command "world spaces" then empires tend to be globalizing formations of violence.

The implied relation here between globalization and violence also needs some defining. In mapping the links between the globalization and conflict, it is important to enter the discourse through a discussion of globalization in relation to issues as broad as human security, social change and cultural–political disruption. Our claim is that there is a generalized relation between globalization and conflict—including transnational conflict of the violent kind—based on the argument that cultural–political disruption is often associated with increasing tensions and conflict. We are not arguing that globalization *directly* causes transnational violence. Neither does this suggestion of a generalized relation imply that the descent from conflict into violence is a necessary outcome or a characteristic of globalization *per se*. Rather, we are interested in examining the way that the various processes of globalization contribute to unsettling existing life-worlds, accentuating past and present cleavages of identity politics, intensifying the communicative bases for making economic and social comparisons, increasing the objective divisions of wealth or disrupting both older authority structures and putting pressure on modern state operations, particularly in postcolonial states.

From the present standpoint, the intensification of globalization brings with it new lines of *potential* cleavage, and thus almost certain conflict (and *possible* violence). The process is one of intensifying change and impact, but it is not all one way. The practices and decisions of highly localized groups can have significant global reverberations because localized events influence and are influenced by global events. For example, when the Taliban in Afghanistan extended "traditional" Islamic hospitality to Osama bin Laden, a two-way escalation of the conflict ensued—first as a refusal to meet the USA's ultimatum to hand over bin Laden by modernist Afghani clerics trying to show their neo-traditional credentials; and secondly in the form of an invasion of Afghanistan by the US–British war-machine later rationalized by postmodern rhetoric about "freedom" being God's gift to humanity. This quickly came to put pressure on the security of the global system as a whole even though the response could have been defined and practiced in more contained terms, either regionally or globally. In this regard, it is pertinent to examine the local-global context of a range of polities and communities under threat across what has been called the "Arc of Insecurity," from Africa and the Middle East through Central Asia to Southeast Asia. In relation to the narrowly defined category of war, it is significant that over 90 percent of all wars since World War II have been fought in the Global South. These polities and communities range from the poorly named "failed states" to communities that are either experiencing continuing human insecurity in fast-developing countries such as India and China, or seeking to ameliorate emerging conditions before they take hold.

In this sense we find ourselves in the company of writers such as Tarak Barkawi, who has argued that war has had a globalizing effect by

interconnecting places and reshaping them and through "a wider transformation in the nature and utility of military force." This in turn determines "what is and is not possible in many different places" (Barkawi 2006: xiv). Similarly, we have argued elsewhere for a similar relation between even the most localized wars and globalization, arguing that globalizing systems of communication, production, and exchange mean that violence that in one sense takes place within a particular locality is at the same time reshaped and recalibrated across regions and inter-regions (Grenfell 2007, Nairn and James 2005). To understand this "savagery from above," it is important to extend the debates on security into new domains, including for instance to connect with arguments about ecological disruption and climate change, and to draw from disciplines such as postcolonial studies, nationalism studies, and anthropology. It means, on the one hand, that we do not see conditions of modernism, or postmodernism for that matter, as any more or less intrinsically violent than tribalism or traditionalism. Yet, on the other hand, it means firstly that the capacity for organizing and projecting the means and forces of violence have expanded exponentially over the course of the twentieth century and into the present; secondly, that the patterns of that violence have changed dramatically, and that the consequences of that violence, both palpable and abstract systemic, bear back on people on the ground in ways that are unprecedented.

The categories "from above" and "from below" also need explaining. They are meant to be treated only as points of orientation from where analysis begins rather than ends. In this way, the chapters in this book are to be read together as the different orientations of writers' work to fill out the many nuances of this relation. In some respects this book is influenced by thinkers as diverse as Arjun Appadurai, Gayatri Spivak, Ashis Nandy and Michael Mann, who are able to move across the most immediate moments of sadness and violence to show how they are linked through to globalizing flows in ways that any one subject may not realize. Take the following passage:

> In Mira Nair's brilliant film *India Cabaret*, we see the multiple loops of this fractured deterritorialization as young women, barely competent in Bombay's metropolitan glitz, come to see their fortune as cabaret dancers and prostitutes in Bombay, entertaining men in clubs with dance format derived wholly from the prurient dance sequences of Hindi films. These scenes in turn cater to ideas about Western and foreign women and their looseness, while they provide tawdry career alibis for these women. One of these women comes from Kerala, where cabaret clubs and the pornographic film industry have blossomed, partly in response to the purses and tastes of Keralites returned from the Middle East, where their diasporic lives away from women distort their very sense of what the relations between men and women might be. These tragedies of displacement could certainly be replayed in a more detailed analysis of the relations

> between the Japanese and German sex tours to Thailand and the tragedies of the sex trade in Bangkok, and in other similar tours to loops that tie together fantasies about the Other, the convenience and educations of travel, the economics of global trade, and the brutal mobility fantasies that dominate gender politics in may parts of Asia and the world at large.
>
> (Appadurai 1996: 38–39)

One of the remarkable things about Appadurai's writing here is that he moves seamlessly from the characters in a film to the realities outside the film, of pornographic film industries, diaspora communities and the framing of gender relations through global flows of information, trade, and people. Ironically, he is able to bring such violence to light without necessarily having to see it first-hand because of the same flows that equally make the violence he is discussing possible. For us, whether through abstract means or experienced in person, we are looking for ways to create the same sensibility of immediacy that are made sense of at least in part by broader shifts across global domains.

Beyond Naming the New Wars

Seen from above, the dominant structures of the world are changing—swirling patterns of violence are a critical part of this process—and theorists and commentators are engaged in attempts to understand and explain new patterns of political violence, war, and insecurity. Chris Hables Gray records an extraordinary list of labels used since the 1970s to try to make sense of changes in the way that war is waged: permanent war, technological war, high-technology war or technological war, technowar or perfect war, imaginary war, computer war, war without end, Militarism USA, light war, cyberwar, high-modern war, hypermodern war, hyper-real war, information war, netwar, neocortical warfare, Third Wave War, Sixth Generation War, Fourth Epoch war and pure war (Gray 1997: 21–22). He prefers the label "postmodern war" to differentiate from modern war which he says historians typically see as a form of war commencing around 1500 until the middle of the late twentieth century. Key to his sense that there should be a change in label is the heightened importance of information.

> As a weapon, as a myth, as a metaphor, as a force multiplier, as an edge, as a trope, as a factor, and as an asset, information (and its handmaidens—computers to process it, multimedia to spread it, systems to represent it) has become the central sign of postmodernity. In war information (often called intelligence) has always been important. Now it is the single most significant military factor, but still hardly the only one.
>
> (Gray 1997: 22)

Hardly indeed. There is no doubt that there has been a qualitative change in the way in which some wars are fought some of the time, but it is wrong to treat war in such a generalizing or one-dimensional way. First, the changing nature of war cannot be reduced to one mode of practice—communication. Secondly, no matter how abstract the dominant technologies and techniques of war might have become at one level across all modes of practice—communication, organization, production, exchange, and enquiry—it is only in particular ways and often only as enacted by one antagonist in battle that such a concept as "postmodern war" might be considered as appropriate. Thirdly, such a concept can usually only be used to describe one level of military engagement, even if it is a dominant level.

The Shock and Awe tactics that framed the initial invasion of Iraq may be said to have been postmodern *at one level*. Shock and Awe was, in its projection, its organization and its reliance on techno-science, abstracted from the modern limits of embodied and territorial engagement. The roll out of Shock and Awe was, for example, mediated through networked computer screens and the action was broadcast live-to-air through satellite communications no longer bound by issues of spatial extension. The precision-guided missiles of the Shock were directed through a global positioning system and lifted out of the context of local weather, topography and distance—and therefore quite different from the electro-optical or even laser-guided munitions of two decades earlier. At another level, the invasion still depended on all the continuing modern dimensions of the war-machine, including a rationalized bureaucracy with codified and systematized knowledge management systems. And now, even when the USA and the Coalition of the Willing are engaged in a body-to-body land-war in Iraq, the framing of their projection of violence is still very different in form from that of the insurgents who strap bombs to themselves and dedicate their soon-to-be obliterated bodies to a traditional deity. This layering of different forms—tribal, traditional, modern, and postmodern—abounds with tragic and ironical intersections, and it is not just confined to Iraq and Afghanistan. The East Timorese rebels at the turn of the century finally achieved victory in their fight for national independence at the very moment we were being told of the impending and inevitable death of the modern nation (Jha 2006)—and they achieved this, not through a modern bureaucratic war-machine, but by making "trust-lines" that connected abstracted territory through embodied relations of face-to-face integration.

Attempts to understand changes in warfare have been pursued perhaps most famously by Mary Kaldor in her work on the "New Wars" (Kaldor 2001; also Münker 2005). Like Gray and Münker, Kaldor sees information and technology as making contemporary warfare distinct, and also sees such warfare as differentiated by being organizationally decentralized rather than being based on "vertically organized hierarchical units" and integrated into a "globalized" war economy (Kaldor 2001: 8–9). For each of these markers of difference, central to her analysis is the link between new wars and what she refers to as "identity politics." She sees the rise of identity politics as

significantly emanating from "established political classes" and the threats that are posed to them by globalization. Maintaining legitimacy rests largely on the manipulation of political culture and the ability to mobilize people based on prejudices through an identity politics. This politics, she says, "tends to be fragmentative, backward-looking and exclusive," based on nostalgia, and "the construction of the heroic past, the memory of injustice, real or imagined, and of famous battle, won or lost" (Kaldor 2001: 78). Although nowhere as near as explicit as Barber, Kaldor works with a matrix that draws a thick line between those who are leading the process of disintegration on one side and those drawing the world together on the other.

> Often, among the first civilians to be targeted are those who espouse a different politics, who try to maintain inclusive social relations and some sense of public morality. Thus though the new wars appear to be between different linguistic, religious or tribal groups, they can also be presented as wars in which those who represent particularistic identity politics cooperate in suppressing the values of civility and multiculturalism. In other words, they can be understood as wars between exclusivism and cosmopolitanism.
>
> (Kaldor 2001: 9)

Drawing such a division sets up the terms for a new set of problems. Kaldor's stance appears to disregard the fact that identity politics is for some marginalized groupings a positive way to negotiate changing power relations. One of the features of the movements which coalesce in opposition to neoliberal globalization, for example, has been the way that testimony is used not only to legitimate resistance but also to establish identity-based boundaries in order to regulate and at times repel the more savage consequences of global capital. As such, identity politics can be seen as providing security rather than taking it away. Kaldor's writing on new wars is also part of a trend to argue that the nation-state is being rendered irrelevant by globalization. To the contrary, as many chapters in this book suggest, the state—including the nation-state, often working in tandem with globalizing processes—continues to be central in the enactment of both violence and reconstruction. Although bringing discussions of the power of globalization into contention, Kaldor still emphasizes the violence coming from sub-national groupings; that is, from "below." By comparison, the contributions to this volume contend that violence needs to be understood as both emanating from above as well as from below.

Human Security, Critical Security Studies, and the Decentering of the State

Although the literature on new wars has been influential in understanding contemporary violence and security, the growing appeal of the concept of

"human security" has also become increasingly influential, reflecting many of the changes that have come in a post-Cold War period of intense globalization. "Human security" as a concept was made famous by the United Nations Development Program report and its extension of traditional security debates into a set of seven key areas: the economic, health, food, the environmental, the political, community, and personal. Such a list posed a challenge to the traditional conceptions of state security, which, particularly through the discipline of international relations, had been the dominant way of understanding why and how violence had occurred in the world. The movement in analysis away from an emphasis on the state to groups and individuals not only reflects the kinds of violence enacted through the New Wars, but also reflects the fact that in the face of globalization many now see the state as less and less relevant in discussions over the perpetuation of violence. While human security has largely developed through policy via some states and international institutions, critical security studies has also emerged to challenge traditional security studies primarily through academic quarters. Again decentering the state, critical security studies is in part differentiated by the attempt to reconceptualize security to make it an emancipatory process rather than preventative in form. As Anthony Burke has written, the arguments of key theorists such as Ken Booth have

> strong affinities with J. Ann Tickner's vision of a security based upon "the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations" and for a reformulation of international relations in terms of the "multiple insecurities" represented by ecological destruction, poverty and (gendered) structural violence, rather than the abstract threats to the integrity of states, their interests and "core values." Together, they have state inspirational normative goals that rightly guide many attempts to reformulate security in more positive ways.
>
> (Burke 2007: 6–7)

In their attempts to extend arguments around security and violence beyond the orthodoxies of mainstream security studies, then discourses of human security and critical security are seen to inform the arguments in this book. This is said with the proviso that in our analysis the state remains a key consideration, as does the top-down violence, including that perpetrated in Iraq and Afghanistan by a coalition of states. This book has been written during the War on Terror, and although it reaches past the particularities of the events following the September 11 attacks in the USA, many chapters are either directly or indirectly influenced by the disastrous failure of the US-led occupation of Iraq and the violence recently exacerbated by badly managed intervention forces in other zones of conflict in the world. As an edited collection, there is simply not the means to cover all corners of the globe nor has it been possible to extend the thematic discussion of violence in all possible ways. What we present, however, is a broad-ranging four-part collection

of interconnected essays that link in different ways back to the core claim of this book—namely that violence in the world today should not be seen *as emanating* from a retribalization or simply from "savagery from below" (though, of course, acts of savagery from below are part of the expression of cleavage, fragmentation, and reintegration), but rather significantly through a reconstitution of social relations that are significantly shaped by processes of globalization. In the following discussion we provide an outline of the four parts of this book and how in turn each of these relates back to this central argument.

Part I: Globalizing Insecurity

Part I of this collection lays down the foundation for much of the theoretical and conceptual work in the remainder of the book, particularly by examining how, in different ways, war and insecurity have been recast through processes of globalization. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 by Paul James and Jonathan Friedman sets up a double point that holds for the chapters thereafter. They argue, first, that globalization and war are not synonymous, and secondly, and just as importantly, that processes of globalization are increasingly framing the conditions under which wars are fought. War can be a globalizing force, and, as the authors argue, the new emphases on pre-emptive and humanitarian forms of intervention are significantly, and too-often counter-productively, linked to tragic attempts at effecting globalizing and imperial order from above. Although the chapter clearly agrees that wars have shifted significantly from interstate to *localized transnational wars* (akin to Kaldor's New Wars), through a discussion of interventions and "globalizing war" the chapter continues to locate the state as an integral part of the complexities of violence and warfare—albeit framed by relations that have been remade through globalization. This is an idea that is carried throughout the book: that we are witnessing dramatic changes to the state and the use of violence, but even the demise of interstate wars does not make the state itself an irrelevancy. Chapter 3 by Ronaldo Munck focuses on how the new patterns of war have led to a redefining of security discourses. He investigates a deepening of how security is conceived, and then turns to an analysis of permanent war, a kind of globalized "state of emergency" in response to terrorism. Chapter 4 by James Goodman takes a different route in the process of reconceptualizing insecurity. Asking the question, "Whose Insecurity?" Goodman answers by arguing that "globalizing capitalism is best understood as a system of displacing insecurity, from rich to poor, across the globe." This production and transferal of insecurity, Goodman argues, is underpinned at times by the use of direct military force, a point he examines in relation to the War on Terror. Each of these chapters emphasizes the emergence of an intensifying savage globalization from above, and a remaking of security and insecurity in the world today that reframes how violence is experienced on the ground.

Part II: Reconceptualizing Insecurity

Part II continues the analysis of violence and insecurity in ways that challenge existing orthodoxies, but does so with an emphasis on directly opening up the discourse on security. These essays are in part influenced by debates on human security and critical security studies, and come from a distinctly different methodological base from writers such as Barber, Huntington, and even Kaldor. Referring to what he terms "postmodern wars," Michael Humphrey's chapter begins with a discussion of the response to the phenomenon of New Wars and "the project of liberal peace," the aim of which is to transform violent societies into stable ones through a combination of development and security delivered via intervention. The process of intervention and the resolution of insecurity, Humphrey argues, is increasingly carried through a "therapeutic security paradigm" which justifies external intervention on the grounds that trauma in war-affected populations is in turn potentially conflict producing. In Chapter 6, Kirsty Best moves the analysis of insecurity into the realm of media and representation. Working from a critical cultural studies approach, she argues that public sympathy has not been maintained despite the control strategies of the USA in the War on Terror and has not resulted in a stable relationship between sympathy, consent, and insecurity. Robyn Eckersley's chapter continues the core claim of the book by arguing that forms of insecurity are shaped by factors far beyond the "savagery from below." She asks whether environmental degradation, in particular climate change, can plausibly be drawn into security debates. Why is it that the effects of the US invasion of Iraq have been drawn into the environmental security debate, suggesting how energy policies may be subject to a process of securitization, yet climate change has not despite its devastating consequences? As an essay that in some ways links the first part of this volume to the second, Phillip Darby's chapter argues that the knowledge already exists—drawn particularly through studies in post-colonialism—to challenge common conceptions of insecurity. Although agreeing that the security establishment needs to be challenged directly, Darby draws the reader to those factors that are embedded in culture that more generally makes certain forms of security and insecurity permissible.

Part III: Rethinking Localized Transnational Conflicts

The third section of the book considers the relationship between specific instance of violence and the global exercise of control, largely in terms of a projection of Western power and values via war. In the first chapter of the section, Martin Griffiths argues that the USA in the wake of September 11 has failed to adequately address the link between what it sees as "failed states"—with a particular emphasis on Iraq and Afghanistan—and its own security. Griffiths argues that a major part of this failing is due to the USA's simultaneous support for nation-building and a neoliberal foreign economic

policy designed explicitly to weaken the periphery. Garry Rodan challenges the idea that the War on Terror has been necessary to protect human security and democracy. The implications for Southeast Asia—a region commonly referred to as the "second front" in the War on Terror—are varied. Rodan questions what the new geopolitics mean for authoritarian and post-authoritarian regimes in Singapore and Malaysia. Like many of the essays in this volume, the state remains a central feature in the discussion of violence and insecurity. However, this is done to show the complexities of such an involvement, whether it involves domestic repression or globalizing interventions. In Chapter 11, John Tulloch uses the renewal of violence in Kosovo in 2004 as a way of comparing various academic theories with administrative reports from international bodies. In particular, Tulloch builds on the critique of Huntington and Barber, begun in the present introduction, and measures the relevance of their arguments respectively in light of events on the ground. In moving through a range of debates on Kosovo, Tulloch also raises key questions around the nature of contemporary interventions and their ability to provide security in the face of globalizing cultures and economies. The last chapter in Part III moves the debate to Israel/Palestine, where Oren Yiftachel provides a broad overview of the various pathways that could lead to a resolution to what is seen as one of the world's most intractable regional conflicts. While providing a segue into the final part of this book, Yiftachel's chapter concentrates on the local–regional rather than the local–global. Taken together, each of the chapters in Part III answers back to key claims of the book not just by disabling the idea that savagery is something that comes from outside of the state and international institutional domain, but also by showing how very often local conflicts, insecurity, and repression are also shaped through global processes.

Part IV: Renewal in the Aftermath of Violence

At a time of intense and increasing violence, both immediate and structural, our aim is to understand both the sources of insecurity and to rethink the pathways to the enhancement of a genuine human security. As such, in thinking anew on violence and security it is integral that we also critically consider the pathways that are frequently used in order to overcome conflict and bring a longer-term end to violence: governance, recovery, reconciliation, and resilience. In Chapter 13, Richard Caplan examines the ways in which the international community has been able to make a significant contribution to "peace-building" in the wake of mass violence. The intervention into and then reconstruction and administration of war-torn territories pose many challenges to international bodies, not least in places such as Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In part these challenges relate to the limits of local capacity in the process of state-rebuilding, but it also is affected by the inability of intervening bodies to understand the particularities of the different places into

which they have blundered. In Chapter 14, Damian Grenfell draws both the recent violence and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Timor-Leste into debates on security and nationalism. He argues that whereas Truth Commissions can have both an immediate program-driven effect as well as a broader integrative effect socially that may help to curtail violence, the crisis in Timor-Leste across 2006 demonstrates that such bodies can only play a part in resolving particular forms of violence. Concentrating on the theme of recovery, Jeff Lewis' and Belinda Lewis' chapter on the Balinese community following the 2002 bombings argues that social tensions may be unsuccessfully contained by attempts to restore the island's reputation as being safe, peaceful, and harmonious. Within this "Bali harmony" discourse, the authors argue that discontent is treated as an aberration and the social agonisms inevitably generated by Bali's modernization and engagement with a globalizing economy are subordinated to forms of commodified social harmony. Moving to the Pacific Ocean as a context, in Chapter 16, John Handmer and Wei Choong gives particular focus to the violence in the Solomon Islands. With so much attention focused on Honiara following the Australian-led intervention force in mid-2003, Handmer argues that the effects of the civil tensions on the subsistence economies on which most Solomon Islanders depend remain largely overlooked. However, the handling of these effects provides important clues as to how forms of community resilience need to be factored into policy analysis as a way of preventing further insecurity.

Conclusion

To restate the main purpose of this book, and to draw these varying parts and chapters together, *Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence: Beyond Savage Globalization?* is intent on rethinking the mainstream security paradigms. Overall, this edited collection is intended to provide a broad and systematic analysis of the long-term sources of political, military, and cultural insecurity from the local to the global. The book is intended to provide a stronger basis for understanding the causes of conflict and violence in the world today, one that adds a different dimension to the dominant focus on finding proximate causes and making quick responses. In other words, its intention is an analytical rethinking of the causes and structures of contemporary political violence. Too often the arenas of violence have been represented as if they have been triggered by reassertions of traditional and tribal forms of identity, or primordial and irrational assertions of politics. Such ideas about the sources of insecurity have become entrenched in a wide variety of media sources, and have framed both government policies and academic arguments. The argument of *Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence*—that most existing accounts of the sources of insecurity do little to help in understanding the global-local layers of violence in the world today—will challenge these common receptions and analyses of representation.

Rather than treating the sources of insecurity as a retreat from modernity, the contributors to the book complicate our understanding of the patterns of global insecurity and take the debates simply beyond assumptions that we are witnessing a savage return to a bloody and tribalized world. Marx and Engels, quoted at the outset of this introduction, may have been right about the attempt in the West to create a world in their own image, but they were wrong about the consequences. Rather than steady progress built upon the blood of chaos and overcoming, the last few decades has continued the tragic violence of conflict and war, albeit with new intensities and in changing ways.

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2 Globalization and the changing face of war

Paul James and Jonathan Friedman[1]

The relationship between globalization and violence is complicated. However, what we can say first is that war is a globalizing force and, secondly, that processes of globalization have over the past few decades intensified and extended the impact of localized wars. Iraq and Afghanistan provide obvious examples. Notwithstanding the decline in the number of state-based armed conflicts over the course of the late-twentieth century, globalization has contributed to the disruption of relations, conflict over resources, and a reinvigoration of identity politics, including neo-fundamentalism, sectarianism, and nationalism. This does not mean that globalization *in itself* causes war, or that war is globalizing across all levels of social life, but it does mean that in understanding the changing nature of war, conflict, and violence in the present that processes of globalization need to be at the center of any analysis.

To clarify these points we need to first go back to how globalization is defined. Globalization is the process of extending a matrix of social relations—practices and subjectivities of production, exchange, communication, organization, and enquiry—across *world-space*, where the notion of world-space is itself defined in the historically variable terms that it has been practiced and understood (James 2006). In terms of this definition, and most others, the statement that globalization does not *in itself* cause war should almost go without saying. Globalization is simply a form of spatially extended interconnection that may fundamentally affect the nature of war, but processes and relations of spatial extension do not in themselves entail either war or peace. Given the tendency for hyperbole to enter discussions of globalization we need to be very clear about this. For example, on the back cover of a recent book called *Globalization and War* one of the reviewers says, "If you thought that globalization led away from war or that liberals have traditionally been anti-war, you'll learn a lot from Tarak Barkawi. Globalization, he tells us *is* war." Actually, Barkawi tells us nothing of the sort. He is careful not to treat globalization and war as the same thing, or even to conflate them rhetorically. He writes very precisely,

> A consistent theme of this volume is that it is not sufficient to claim that globalization causes war and other violent conflict but rather that war

> itself is a form of interconnection. War is not only an example of globalization, it is one of the principle mechanisms of globalization, a globalizing force.
>
> (Barkawi 2006: 92)

Although claims such as globalization brings peace, or that liberalism is an essentially anti-war philosophy, are also wrong, the reviewer has missed the point. War *is* a form of social interconnection, however horrific. Globalization *is* a form of social interconnection. This does not make them the same thing. The purpose of this chapter is to go further in putting the changing nature of war and military conflict in global context and to clarify the relationship between contemporary war and globalization. Modern warfare is an expression of the configurations of contestations over political space in world systems. If warfare in the broadest sense is configured by relations of power and conflict then the way that the power and conflict are distributed in space and time should help us locate where and when war is potentially more likely, and what form it is more prone to take. This is to treat globalization as a socially framing process, not a one-to-one determinative.

In other words, a holistic approach to war embeds our understanding of its patterns within the larger socio-political matrix in which it occurs. This also implies that the historical transformation of the matrix, including the changing nature of globalization, ought to tell us a great deal about the changing nature of warfare. The contemporary period of intensifying globalization is associated more with *localized transnational wars*—what are sometimes called "intra-state wars"—than wars between sovereign states. (See Part III of the present volume.) The significance of this recent shift only hits home when it is situated against the fact that the centuries-old history of warfare is dominated by wars between states.

What is happening to war in the present and what does this mean for the relationship between war and globalization? In this chapter, three main developments are discussed—the development of localized transnational wars despite the decline of interstate wars, the explosive development of a global war on terror, and the slower emergence of a couplet of legitimizing discourses of global intervention called "humanitarian intervention" and "pre-emptive intervention." These discourses have arisen in the context of the changing nature of war. Proponents of humanitarian intervention say that we have an ethical duty to intervene militarily to stop human rights abuses such as "ethnic cleansing" or internal oppression; proponents of "pre-emptive intervention" say that we are entitled to intervene because of a clear and present danger that threatens national or global security. Both discourses cut across prior modern conventions about the legal priority of the state boundaries and nation-state sovereignty. Both discourses became conflated as the ideological backdrop to the War on Terror, projected globally by a media-political complex very specific to our time.

The Changing Nature of Contemporary War

Notwithstanding fundamental continuities in the nature of war and violence, we can delineate a number of related changes that have permeated recent transformations as well as consciousness of those transformations. One pattern that stands out is that war is no longer primarily an interstate phenomenon. The relative number of interstate conflicts has declined in recent decades, whereas the phenomenon of major armed conflict seems increasingly to be characterized by intra-state or localized transnational violence. These conflicts, at least in a statistical sense, are lasting longer than previous wars with no clear winners. This is partly a reflex of the decline in state authority over large regions of the Global South, and the refiguring of political competition at all levels, but it is also related to global interventions, competition over globally traded resources, and climate changes such as drought (whether or not associated with global warming) that have led to intensified pressures in such places as sub-Saharan Africa.

A second pattern to the new wars is that they tend to occur in zones where there was previously a colonial order of authority as part of an earlier period of imperial globalization. These postcolonial zones are characterized by states where openly ethnic and/or class entities project a strategy that emphasizes the control of sources of wealth. The postcolonial state has often become an instrument of enrichment. This is a historical consequence of a worldwide process of colonization and decolonialization where internal and external lines of power have continued to exploit the economic decline and political fragmentation of formerly integrated regions.

A third pattern is that there has been a tendency towards the globalization of military techniques, training, and weapons technologies. As Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman describe it, while regionally specific cultural factors have historically been strong determinants of tactical systems—compare, for example, Macedonian phalanxes, Roman legions and Mongol horse divisions—the present period is characterized by increasing global interchange, "Technological uniformity, modified by the relative abilities of nations to absorb technology, results in extreme tactical uniformity" (Harkavy and Neuman, 2001: 164). There are serious counter-examples to this point, the most prominent being the use of "suicide bombers" or "martyrs" in Lebanon, Syria, and Sri Lanka, although even these counter-techniques spread across the world to contemporary Iraq, Israel–Palestine, Chechnya, and more than a dozen other countries including most recently the United Kingdom (July 2005). A further qualification needs to be made around the nature of the global flows. The dominant examples of military globalization tend to involve a flow of influence centered on the United States. For example in the area of military training, in the 25 years before 1980 nearly 400,000 Third World officers came to the United States for military training, but there was little reciprocal flow.[2] In the sphere of organization, since the end of World War II almost all navies with the exception of Russia, China,

and those states labeled as "rogue states" have come to use US Navy protocols, standards, and concepts of operation (Tangredi 2002). In the spheres of production and exchange, arms industries across the world have tended to become drawn into post-Fordist globalized practices with increasing sub-licensing relations and proliferating unlicensed production of arms. While the American military–industrial complex remains relatively closed and tied to the US state, there are global markets, such as in small arms, associated with other countries other than the United States—in this case the key state is the Russian Federation, with 17 countries licensing to 52 producer countries. During 2002–04, over 60 states made what could be argued were irresponsible small arms deliveries to 36 countries (Berman *et al.* 2007).

A fourth pattern is that regional and localized wars, often in the past having limited impact beyond their immediate region—that is, except when great powers became involved—now have come increasingly to have profound globalizing consequences. It is a misnomer to speak of the "globalization of war" if this is taken to mean that war is now always fought on a global arena *rather than* having international and regional consequences or localized effects. However, "globalization" does not need to be seen as a totalizing phenomenon. Leaving out the War on Terror (a *global* and totalizing war that we will discuss in a moment), what we are seeing is a global pattern of specific regional armed conflicts with effects often spreading out to the rest of the world. In other words, the proliferation of local conflicts within states is a global, or rather Global South, phenomenon, and it has globalizing effects even if each war cannot be said to be global. It is not merely a coincidence that conflict and violence is patterned in the way that it is across large parts of the world. Apparently localized events, such as an ambush in Mogadishu or a massacre in Račak, are treated as indicative of a larger pattern that either entails global military learning or requires a major practical response that affects military and political relations across the globe. In the case of Račak, a transatlantic military pact (NATO) was enlisted in a war that had as its outcome the remaking of the Balkans. Refugees from the intensified ethnic cleansing that was ushered in under the cover of the bombing, resettled in places as diverse as Albania and Austria and as far away as Australia. The global communications industry redoubled this effect of globalizing connection as peoples around the world watched the unfolding of the war in a series of "international news" items.

Localized Transnational Conflict

The political fragmentation of significant zones, especially Southeastern Europe and Central Asia and Africa, has over the past couple of decades led to a significant shift towards localized transnational warfare which often seems to take on an identity-based or ethno-regional form. It is important to recognize that the end of the peak period of decolonization and the conclusion of the Cold War has led to a significant decline in the number of

state-against-state and even state-involved "civil wars" (Mack 2005, 2006). This said, we remain skeptical of the headline implications drawn by the Human Security Report for 2005 that the world is becoming less violent—for example, that "the number of armed conflicts around the world has declined by more than 40% since the 1990s" (Mack 2005: 1). This analysis, for example, leaves out non-state-related armed conflict and one-sided violence or attacks upon civilians by either governments or armed non-state groups. The follow-up Human Security Report for 2006 takes up some of these issues, but the evidence is mixed. The number of state-based conflicts is relatively constant over the period of 2002–05, and even this is qualified by the data that the 31 conflicts in 2005 represent increases in all parts of the world except for sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, evidence collected for the period 2002–05 suggests that while there was a decline in the number of non-state armed conflicts from 34 in 2002 to 25 in 2005, the number of violent campaigns targeting civilians has increased by 40 percent since 1992. Moreover, as the authors of the report recognize, none of the datasets currently being developed across the world, track the number of deaths from "collateral" causes such as war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition (Mack 2006).

Whatever be the case in the debate over whether or not the world is a more dangerous place, all too often the violence of both state-involved "civil wars" and non-state-related armed conflict is attributed to a return to savage primordialism and the resurfacing of age-old tribal and traditional conflicts. There are a thousand questions to ask that cut across such a facile claim. Asking, for example, how this regional centralization of political groupings is related to the apparent decentralization of globalizing military violence, gives surprising answers. One answer lies in the fact of sub-contracting as the way in which fragments are knitted together into larger networks. In turn, some of these networks are related to either large multi-national companies with regional interests such as the French Elf Oil Company and British Petroleum, or state governments all of whom are able to hire privatized security agencies—some reputable, others made up of gangs of disenfranchised mercenaries—in exchange for salaries, drugs, and arms. This connects to the expanding role of global military firms such as 3-D Global Solutions, Northbridge Services Group with offices in the United Kingdom, United States, Iraq, and Ukraine, and members of the International Peace Operations Association such as Medical Support Solutions and J-Global. These corporations and associations can be seen as a further expression of the linkage between global interconnection and localized zones of disintegration.

In Eastern Europe and Central Asia political fragmentation and so-called "primordial violence" is very much related to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. In Africa it is related to the withdrawal of European and international financing of states, economic decline, drought pressures, and the paradoxical introduction of "democratization" which has led to feudalization

and single-party authoritarianism. Struggles for control of resources by political elites and other gangs have emerged in a situation where state economies have more or less dissolved, the intervention of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has been haphazard, and military corporations such as Executive Outcomes and others at the service of state elites prevail.

Similar tendencies exist in Central Asia, and it has been said that where there are important primary resources in such zones we are bound to find intensive competitive warfare. This might be described as a specific sort of "civil warfare," although this term is again misleading to the extent that it tends to presume that once-settled nations now find themselves cleaving along primordial ethnic lines. A more precise description would have to include the fragmentation of states into competing, colonially reconstituted ethnicized units in alliance with networks of decentralized suppliers of arms, protection, and payoffs to local elites.

"Shock and Awe" Intervention: Humanitarian and Otherwise

Interventionary warfare or "humanitarian intervention," as the euphemism goes, is a clear example of the new generality of the process across political lines. We should not, of course, exaggerate the extent to which explicit statements about humanitarian motives are a new phenomenon. After all, major military actions, such as Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia and Hitler's occupation of the Sudetenland were accounted for in humanitarian terms (that is, as the freeing of Somali slaves and ending the ethnic tensions in Czechoslovakia). In fact, war is most often explained as a moral necessity and not only political action. This was, of course, the core of the globalizing empires of the late-nineteenth century as they explained the higher purpose of colonialism. What is different today is first the massively increased capacity of the military machines; secondly, the uneven institutionalization of a human rights regime at a global level; and thirdly the intensifying relation between the local and the global.

Humanitarian intervention is associated with a dominant and global ideological projection around the notions of "democracy" and "freedom." There has also developed a strong tendency for terms like "democracy" to change their character. No longer does the term refer to an arena of choice or rule by the people, but to a character trait, an embodied property of specific actors. It is associated with a new respectability, and those who do not adapt are said simply to be undemocratic, whether or not they have gained their positions via democratic processes or not. The embodiment of democracy implies a moralization of politics, a dichotomization between the evil and dangerous and the good and just. This supplies a rationale for war in which bombing for peace becomes a principal strategy.

The war in the Balkans over Kosovo is an example of this kind of process. There, Slobodan Milošević and the Serbian military were understood by central Western actors as the clear and present perpetrators of ethnic cleansing

and genocide. Humanitarian bombing was therefore seen as the only recourse. There seems little doubt that Milošević used the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo for his own power ends, and that he benefited politically from the chaos caused by the patterns of ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide that occurred on the ground. However, the lines of command are not so straightforward. Neither is it so clear whether Western intervention, coming in the form that it did, made a positive difference or contributed to the mess. In the case of Bosnia, Operation Deliberate Force came too late, and, in the case of Kosovo, Operation Allied Force came in the counter-productively brutal form of 38,000 sorties by over 1,000 bombers, including the first non-stop missions by stealth bombers from Whiteman Air Force Base on the other side of the world. NATO's three-month bombing of the former Yugoslavia killed between 500 and 1,800 civilians and inflicted an estimated $4 billion damage on public infrastructure such as bridges, factories, and electrical plants (Cohn 2003: 121). Pointedly, it was during the period of the bombing that the ethnic cleansing program in Kosovo was given full flight and most of the massacres in that province occurred. Ironically, in the end, Milošević was forced into negotiations by the threat of NATO ground troops, and he was finally removed from office by a democratic vote on the part of the Serbian people.

The unsettled issue of human rights, in relation to global projection of high-tech military power is at the core of this development towards massive militarized "humanitarian intervention." It is in the name of such rights that intervention is undertaken, thus undermining the sovereignty of some states and causing considerable "collateral" deaths, mostly to civilians. Most military interventions and pre-emptive strikes have proved to be chaotic, as have many of the decisions not to intervene. Afghanistan and Iraq are further examples of the counterproductive outcomes of what might be called shock-and-awe intervention, with Rwanda as a tragic case of the opposite extreme with the international community withdrawing completely. East Timor is the one positive exception where the form of intervention was largely appropriate, although even there the lead-up and aftermath were incredibly messy. In most of these cases, except examples such as Somalia (1992–93) which was abandoned, international or European forces have been required to stay long after the initial intervention, and the post-war reconstruction work by NGOs has created seriously skewed economies in the regional capitals and their hinterlands. Leaving aside the practical consequences of such action, the self-relegation of the capacity to define what is right and wrong in the name of universal standards is an expression of the centralization (and uneven globalization) of authority. This is not the place to enter into a normative debate, but we need to be clear that we are not suggesting that intervention *per se* is a bad thing. Rather we are calling into question the present dominant form of intervention: it is our take on the thread of discussion in the present volume on intervention.

The relation between the development of uneven human rights discourse and the attempt to implement "democracy" throughout the world is clearly

related to the emergence of the dominant US-based alliance that began in the post-Cold War 1990s in a period when the United States emerged as the sole global power. One interpretation of the implementation of a universalizing regime of human rights and democracy is related to a global centralization of representations concerning the political state of the world. These representations are located in major international organs in various ways. In the United Nations the issue of human rights is stressed in reaction to increasing transnational violence in the world. Here "genocide" is a rapidly proliferating term. This sometimes dovetails with the politics of the dominant Western alliance—at least where convenient—as in Yugoslavia, less in Afghanistan and Iraq which is primarily focused on the imposition of "democratic" regimes. Some writers argue that this latter politics is primarily an attempt to open the world to liberalism and to capitalist expansion, but much remains to be done here in terms of research, since the ideological component is clearly not a mere appendage to material interests.

Overlapping discourses do not necessarily coincide with overlapping interests, even if there is an interesting as well as important articulation between them. This is what is announced in Francis Fukuyama's (1992) thesis about the end of history. He suggested the triumph of liberalism, and it is certainly the case that, for one or another reason, low-level procedural democracy has increased in numbers of state adherents. What this has meant in reality is something quite different. In Africa, as we noted above, democracy broke with a modern practice of "power sharing," however corrupt, by which hegemonic heads of state would invite their opponents to join in the government, offering access to state-controlled wealth, often in strategies of maintaining clienteles and in enriching themselves. The new order implied outright majority rule, which in turn led to an increase in conflict and the neo-tribalization of political relations often with international involvement of arms merchants, military firms, companies, and governments. It often resulted in civil war with catastrophic effects. Ironically, Fukuyama's (2004) latest book is on "failed states" and the need for state-building. We have yet to see the outcome of the imposition of the Western "rule of law" on ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It occurs, of course, in a period of disaggregation of the modern state in these zones and the colonization of state activities by subcontractors and NGOs. The accompanying conflicts relate to processes of local stratification, the need to protect international staff and the development of mafias who control the streets sometimes in collusion with *partly* public forces of order as well as with international networks of crime and terrorism.

Is there a political paradox in all of this? On first examination, the fall of the Berlin Wall spelled the rise of the United States to supreme global power. However, if we look at the actual conflicts, the success rate of the United States in interventionist wars is very low indeed. Since the loss of the Vietnam War, the United States has had little real success. There have been innumerable small wars and interventions, but just to take the last 15 years,

in Iraq (1991, 2003 to present), Somalia (1992–93), Haiti (1994), the Balkans (1995, 1999), Sudan (1998), Afghanistan (2001 to present), the result has either been ineffective or a deepening of difficulties rather than the restoration of order. The machinery is colossal, but the results are less than adequate, and the costs are practically unbearable. One might conceive of US strategy as an attempt to reunite a world in fragmentation in which the centrifugal forces far outweigh the centripetal forces. If this is a globalizing empire it is an "empire of chaos" (Joxe and Lotringer 2002), and not because this is the aim.

There is also a paradox in relation to the basis of intervention. Within the heart of the American military establishment itself, we find that the intensifying *modernizing* push to make the killing machine more efficient has fallen into step with the revival in *postmodern* form of a once *traditional* ethic that juridical modernism had previously attempted to delegitimize. This ethic is contained in the concept of *jus ad bellum*, or the right to make war. The point here is that we have to be able to address the contradictory intersection of ontological formations in order to challenge the new "ethics." Describing the development in a methodologically consistent way helps to make sense of Hardt and Negri's concern that

> There is something troubling in this renewed focus on the concept of *bellum justum* … two traditional characteristics have reappeared in our postmodern world: on the one hand, war is reduced to the status of police action, and on the other, the new power that can legitimately exercise ethical functions through war is sacralized.
>
> (Hardt and Negri 2000: 12)

It is an important insight politically, however, one that neither works historically nor analytically. First, rather than war-as-policing being a traditional characteristic, this development is a hyperintensification of a *modern* conception of the routinization of security. Secondly, rather than the sacralizing of "humanitarian intervention" being a further traditional characteristic, this involves a *neo-traditional* revival of calls to God made possible because the postmodern destabilizing of the sacred makes even such instrumental enterprises as a Second Gulf War or the War on Terror open to being given a higher purpose. There is a lot more that could be said here, but it is evoked just to give some sense of the complexity of the current situation. Before finishing we need to provide some background to the Long War on Terror, a theme which runs through the heart of the present volume.

The Global War on Terror

One of the truly global effects of the contemporary reconfiguration of world politics is the rise of neo-fundamentalist Islamic terrorism. Its proponents express a deeply felt aversion to the Christian and Jewish occidental order

and call for a redressing of the dominance of the West, not merely in order to achieve balance, but to instate an inversion of that relation. In the texts produced by al-Qa'ida and related groups, there is discourse of world *Sharia* as a new global order to replace the decadent occidental world. It is interesting in this respect that the discourse is aimed at global transformation and not national or even regional liberation. Here our brief is to map globalizing war "from above." In relation to the War on Terror this means looking at two main phenomena: *networked terrorism* itself, and *interventionist counter-terror* such as instituted by the United States and its coalition since 2001.

Networked terrorism refers to the kind of terrorism, such as evidenced by the al-Qa'ida or Laksa Jihad, organized as shifting alliances around loosely connected persons and groups coming together for a "higher purpose." Here we are distinguishing networked terrorism analytically, first, from *embodied terrorism* of the kind that involves groups of persons or individuals responding in an immediate and embodied way to perceived or actual oppression, such as in local communities in Chechnya or Palestine. (On the latter see Chapter 12 by Oren Yiftachel in the present volume). Secondly, we are distinguishing it from *institutionalized terrorism* of the kind used by states, with examples including the British firebombing of civilians in Germany and the less civilian-directed United States' "Shock and Awe" techniques in Iraq.

Networked terrorism is interconnected without being institutionalized. In the terms of writers such as John Hinkson and Simon Cooper, networked terrorism is lifted out of place and embodied connections, even if it draws back on such connections and uses them. The members of individual cells

> do not derive their social bonding from a generational history that structures the knowledge of others predominantly through long-term face-to-face histories … The notion of a network is a way of characterizing a different kind of social bond: and interconnection that is, relatively speaking, fleeting and in one dimension.
>
> (Hinkson 2002: 36; see also Cooper 2003).

It is this social distancing process, in part, that allows networked terrorism to use techniques aimed at perpetrating devastating violence against ordinary citizens. Most evidence points to a highly dispersed network of groups and sources of recruitment linked by common general aims as spelled out in terms like world *Sharia* and the decadence of the West, a network of resonance enabling mobilization for specific acts of terror. There is a global coherence in the version of Islamism—Whahabism—that provides a baseline of identification coupled to a highly dispersed and mobile network of potential actors.

Bringing the themes of this discussion together, we can say that terrorism is an exemplary expression of the current state of the world in two senses.

First, as a declining hegemony contributes to producing a global pattern of localized decentralization, fragmentation, and violence, a global opposition including networked terrorism draws and reproduces what Buruma and Margalit (2004) have called Occidentalism, an inversion of the Orientalism that, in fact, characterizes all imperial orders. In a significant sense then it is also a purveyor of localized transnational violence. The real meaning of the expression "the empire strikes back" might lie in this implosion of imperial force that characterizes the decline of hegemony. The tentacles of empire return to feed upon its own head. Secondly, networked terrorism draws on the same social form that characterizes mainstream society and particularly market-based relations—that is, network relations using others as a means to other ends; relations abstracted from embodied histories; relations which are mobile, deterritorialized, and use the techniques of global financing and acquisition. In the case of networked terrorism, the connections are even more highly fragile and "flexible" but they provide a mapping of the realities of this relatively new situation.

Turning to the other phenomenon—*interventionist counter-terror*—the War on Terror is a war that both calls on all the people of the globe, and is predicated on a rhetoric legitimizing attacking the source of evil in globalized locations (The Whitehouse 2005). In George Bush's terms, "We must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world" (West Point speech, 1 June 2002). Overlaying that rhetoric is a newer claim about the legitimacy of pre-emptive strikes to protect our way of life against totalizing evil. Donald Rumsfeld speaking at the NATO headquarters in Brussels (6 June 2002) opened up this convergence of the notions of "freedom to act" and the necessity of taking the initiative to control a source of risk. "Absolute proof cannot be a precondition for action," he said. He was supported by the British Defence Secretary talking about the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the threat of chemical and biological attack and by the May 2003 vote by the US Congress to lift a ten-year ban on developing tactical-use nuclear weapons, including developing the "robust nuclear earth penetrator."

These policy shifts overturned older (modern) precepts. Over the last century, *pre-emption* and *retaliation* became illegal as rationales for action under the conventions of modern international law. It became illegitimate to strike first as a response predicated on something that "might just happen," or to respond to a single act of aggression by retaliating in kind to send a message. That is, the traditional notion of an "eye for an eye" was rejected. However, in these contradictory times retaliation has made a comeback in reconstituted form—this time as a shadowy presence clothed in a postmodern pastiche of *ad hoc* rationalizations. In the aftermath of September 11, it was claimed that the attack was so massive that it could be taken as, in effect, a declaration of continuous war thus warranting continuous defense (Steele 2002). This was despite the fact that no one declared such war, no one took responsibility for the act of terror, and only circumstantial evidence was

available to decide upon whom the retaliation should be effected. Within a few weeks a network of terrorists had a name, al-Qa'ida, and it was to be found in every primeval corner of the globe. This became a very new kind of war—a global war to be sure—but one that is unique in world history. It has no status in international law, no demarcated theatre of conflict, and no projected end. More conventional ground wars such as the invasion of Iraq became part of this war, but the overall framing of the War on Terror takes us into new kind of world war that consumes older senses of both "the homeland" and "the international."

Conclusion

Chaotic ground war or, more technically, "militarized occupation," continues to prevail in Iraq and Afghanistan, with globally impacting conflict endemic in places such as Israel–Palestine, the Sudan, the Congo. In Bosnia and Kosovo they are still rebuilding their devastated social infrastructure with limited support, and in North Korea and the Taiwan Strait new tensions are developing. In sub-Saharan Africa conflict seems to be endemic, even if there are some signs that the numbers of conflicts are declining in absolute terms. In short, the application of massive interventionary force has not brought about a positive peace anywhere, and long simmering conflicts such as Kashmir are intensifying as two more states develop weapons of totalizing defense. Unfortunately, it also seems likely that new zones of military engagement will continue to emerge in the coming years. In the meantime the world faces a global war called the War on Terror that has come to frame most existing conflicts whether they are local, regional, or global. In Simon Cooper's words, "a combination of political, economic and technological factors are leading towards a state where civilian populations are permanently militarized, where the gap between war and peace collapses, and where peace as mode of being distinct in its own right seems impossible to constitute" (Cooper 2003: 8).

From out of the discussion we can garner some simple conclusions: first, not all wars are globalizing, but modern wars tend to be. Secondly, the new transnational wars of the contemporary period tend to occur in zones where there was previously a colonial order of authority as part of an earlier period of imperial globalization. Thirdly, whereas regional and localized wars in the past usually had limited impact beyond their immediate region—that is, except when great powers became involved—now they have come increasingly to have profound globalizing consequences. Fourthly, the process of globalization in relation to war is contradictory—one of a relative balance of forces, between centralizing and fragmenting tendencies caught in a web of global relations. And finally, with the War on Terror we face a new kind of *global war* based on globalized networked relations and a new kind of engagement that, *at one level*, transcends territorial and temporal containment.

Notes

1 This chapter was written in conjunction with work done for an anthology that we have just finished editing together called *Globalization and Violence*. Vol. 3. *Globalizing War and Intervention*, Sage Publications, London, 2006.
2 Stephanie Neuman cited in Barkawi (2006: 48). See also the very critical article by Sohan Sharma and Surinda Kumar (2003).

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3 Globalization and the limits of current security paradigms

Ronaldo Munck

Whatever our perspective on the world, we cannot help wondering whether globalization and the end of the Cold War has not brought us greater insecurity, rather than the increased security promised. The processes of internationalization unleashed by the contemporary intensification of globalization have undermined the once-dominant national security model. However, writers working within the globalization paradigm have not in the main been concerned to map out the new global (in)security dilemmas. Generalized theories of "global risk" (Beck 1999) and wishful aspirations for a "global civil society" (Kaldor 2003) are not sufficient. This chapter thus seeks to develop a fruitful encounter between the globalization paradigm and the new (and old) forms of security and insecurity now becoming manifest across the world.

We start by examining the diverse ways in which globalization has redefined the nature of security. Security threats are now increasingly global—from global warming to global hunger to global terrorism—and thus the national or statist security paradigm is inadequate. We expand on this theme in the next section dealing with the simultaneous "widening" of security (to take on non-military threats) and its "deepening" (to go further than the nation-state into society). This leads us to a sustained review of the new "human security" paradigm seen by its supporters as the replacement for the national security paradigm and by its detractors as vague and unable to be operationalized. Turning to more recent dramatic events in world affairs we consider the notion that we are entering a new era of "permanent war" or "permanent security." What was once a regime of exception now seems to be the new norm. Finally, we turn to the broader picture of globalization with its winners and losers and ask whether a "global civil society" can be constructed to take us beyond the current state of seemingly limitless insecurity as the dominant human condition.

Global Security

Globalization creates greater economic, social, and cultural interactions across the globe and is thus a source of great dynamism. However, security

analysts argue that, "Many different aspects of globalisation now combine to increase the dangers of a variety of transnational threats from weapons proliferation, cyber attacks, ethnic violence, global crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation and the spread of infectious disease" (Davis 2003: 1–2). From this rather wide range of perceived threats, it is clear that two in particular are at the top of the list in terms of perceived threat levels. The first is the environment and the cluster of issues under the label of "global warming" that clearly pose transnational risks. The second is the issue of "global terrorism" with the likes of al-Qa'ida being "able effectively to exploit new communications technologies, global financial networks, and the ease of movements of people" (Davis 2003: 1).

Globalization's post-Cold War security implications have led to a number of attempts at redefining security. A narrow military conception of national security now seemed redundant and inadequate. Jessica Mathews was already arguing in 1989 that "Global developments now suggest the need for [a] broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues" (Mathews 1989: 162). National sovereignty had already been undermined by the increased freedom of financial flows in the 1980s and by the information technology revolution. Environmental strains now clearly transcended national borders. From a global development perspective there was a simultaneous move to broaden the definition of security, to include economic vulnerability and dependency in the south (Thomas 1987). External military threats were seen as less important in the Global South than economic vulnerability and state weakness.

Taking a broad overview of the globalization and security field, we see a general recognition that there are "new" security challenges that cannot be dealt with on the basis of national security or by purely military means. Even the proponents of traditional military conceptions of security now accept a tendency towards the internationalization of security. Notions of "collective security" now come to the fore, whether dealing with "global warming" or "global terrorism." The old binary opposition between the external (international) and the internal (national) can no longer be credibly sustained. Crime, drugs, people trafficking, and terrorism are as much inside as outside national borders. State security is no longer effective even in its own terms, never mind from the perspective of the many millions across the world for whom their "own" state is the main source of insecurity.

Whether globalization has increased or diminished global security is not entirely decidable. Jan Aaart Scholte (2005: Chapter 9) goes through all the main issues at stake systematically and finds arguments for and against on all counts. Although global connectivity may provide disincentives for war in the north, global reach has facilitated military intervention in the south. Although global consciousness has promoted ecological awareness, many global activities are heavily polluting. Globalization's impact on security is clearly contradictory across the board. Likewise, although globalization has brought to the fore global threats and the need for transnational responses,

the national security paradigm is far from defunct in practice. As Held *et al.* put it "The doctrine of national security remains one of the essential defining principles of modern statehood … For if a state does not have the capacity to secure its territory and protect its people, then its very *raison d'être* can be called into question" (Held *et al.* 1999:145). It is not for nothing that after the strikes against symbols of US power in 2001, the US state created a Department of Homeland Security.

Critical security theorists now argue for the need "to develop a new [security] paradigm around the policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict" (Rogers 2000: 119). This is a very broad agenda indeed, insofar as true "global security" would entail a reversal of current socio-economic polarization, unsustainable growth patterns, and unbridled global military aggression. Although this transformative view of security in the era of globalization is unlikely to be mainstreamed, there is still a considerable widening of traditional notions of security. The US National Security Strategy statement of 1994 thus declared unambiguously that "Not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications" (cited Hough 2004: 14). The broadening of security from this state perspective relates to the understanding that "soft power" can often complement "hard power."

Deeper Security

The widening security agenda can be seen as simply increasing the "securitization" of issues such as migration, health, and food by the state. However, what are the implications of a "deeper" conception of security? The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) declared paradigmatically in 1993, that, "The concept of security must change—from an exclusive stress on national society to a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial to food, employment and environmental security" (cited in Hough 2004: 13). This move by the UN was congruent with its concern to promote "globalization with a human face" as against the then prevalent somewhat fundamentalist adherence to free and unrestricted market mechanisms by the dominant powers, and the multilateral economic organizations such as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

It was not only the "soft power" of the UN that sought to deepen the traditional concept of security. Some nation-states such as Canada, but also Ireland and the Scandinavian countries, began to advance rhetorically the notion of "human security" from the mid-1990s onwards (see next section). Canada's foreign minister from 1996 to 2000, Lloyd Axworthy, consistently argued for human security in the UN and other fora, and forcefully advocated the creation of the International Criminal Court. Critics could easily

argue that this was a simple drive by a middle-ranking power to gain exposure. Furthermore, it was couched in the language of "soft power"; that is, rather than necessarily acting in the global interest it involved the pursuit of state interests by other means. Nevertheless, it has been noted that the Canadians "have been in the forefront of campaigns to ban the use of land mines, and reform the UN Security Council so that it is less constrained by power politics" (Hough 2004: 14).

In the academic domain a parallel process of "deepening" of security as a paradigm was occurring. The influential work of Barry Buzan (1983) had already in the early 1980s begun the process of "widening" security, with his book *People, States and Fear* adding the categories of economic, societal, and ecological security to that of military security. However, it was the state and not the individual that remained the reference point for security, insofar as the state was seen as the primary agent for the reduction of insecurity. By the early 1990s, this view was unsustainable, particularly in Europe, and Buzan, with Ole Weaver, further developed the notion of "societal security" to give it a status separate from the traditional notion of state security (Buzan *et al.* 1998). In post-Cold War Europe, in societies changing rapidly, not least through the increase of mass migration, a focus on sovereignty was seen as less important than issues of identity—including culture, religion, and language.

The deepening of security, through the development of a concept of "societal security" was not designed, however, to replace state security but to complement it. The reconceptualization of security is thus very incomplete here. There is here a reified understanding of "identity" as an objective given and little understanding of security as a social construction. There is also an implicit Eurocentrism at play here insofar as it privileges quite uncritically a Western conception of security and securitization (compared for example to an Islamic conception). Above all, the "deepening" of the security paradigm by what has become known as the Copenhagen School seems to ignore the gendered nature of security as concept and practice. A gender perspective would entail not just adding new issues (widening), but a genuine reconceptualizing (deepening). To understand globalization, conflict, and security today we require a gendered approach that can deconstruct the patriarchal state, problematize the gendered nature of identity, and explore the links between militarism and patriarchy (see Tickner 2001).

From a critical security perspective, there are clear limits to the "widening" and "deepening" operations carried out within the mainstream paradigm since the end of the Cold War, and the contemporary intensification of globalization. It could be, and has been, argued that the events of 2001–03 (September 11, Afghanistan, Iraq) have in fact taken us back to the days when state security reigned supreme. State security was paramount over that of the individual, and state-led military power rendered soft-power irrelevant. However, Steve Smith makes a strong contrary argument that "the events of September 11 support those who wish to widen and deepen the

concept of security" (Smith 2006: 57). It was not, after all, a state that declared war on the United States but rather a transnational network reflecting a very different conception of identity, community, and, indeed, of "security" itself. What this tells us, of course, is that security itself is a conceptual battlefield with no agreed definition or parameters.

Human Security

We could argue that the simultaneous widening and deepening of security comes to a logical conclusion with the concept of "human security," now seen as a full-blown alternative to state security. The concept of "human security" is inseparable from the optimistic Western view following the end of the Cold War that globalization would lead to democratization and conflict over fundamentals would become a thing of the past. In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance published its influential report *Our Common Neighbourhood* arguing that, "The concept of global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states, to include the security of people and the security of the planet" (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 338). At the same time, the concept of "human security" was coming to the fore in the work of the UNDP which launched the "human development index" (HDI) focused on the welfare of individuals rather than the economy.

Economic development and military security now became intertwined in the dominant northern discourse. Its basic principles seemed straightforward enough, "since the idea of human security is to improve the lives of people rather than improve the security of national borders and key issues cross these borders, coordinated action by the international community seems essential" (King and Murray 2001–2: 607). Human security is a move in the realm of security that parallels the discursive shift in development theory to "sustainable development," and in international law to "human rights." It is a people-centered approach to security and seeks to create a situation where all will enjoy "freedom from fear and freedom from want." It is assumed to be the *raison d'être* of the United Nations and many national governments have adopted it as a foreign policy slogan.

There has been considerable effort put into changing and operationalizing the concept of "human security" (Alkire 2003). Nevertheless, it is quite open to the charge that, "Human security is like 'sustainable development'—everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means" (Paris 2004: 250). For the national security advisor, human security looks very much like a laundry list of desirable but utopian goals; an ideal rather than a relevant policy category. It is also open to many, often conflicting interpretations. We might, for example, agree that to bring peace to a region we need to address the root causes of conflict, but then the remedies suggested might vary hugely. From a traditional state security perspective, the human security approach can only dilute the analytical power of security, and

presents such a vast array of different threats and complex ambitious solutions that nothing gets done.

Over and beyond its vagueness, the human security approach can also be interrogated in terms of its assumed unproblematic humanism. In 2003, the Commission of Human Security issued a landmark report *Human Security Now*. It argued that when a state was neither willing nor able to ensure the human security of its citizens "the principle of [international] non-interference yields to the international responsibility to protect" (Commission of Human Security 2003: ix). It is still states or the state system that are expected to ensure human security by intervening where "fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities" (Commission of Human Security 2003: 8) do not protect human security. This approach enlists the concept of "human security" in a radical way to support the global governance agenda. As Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell put it, "*Human Security Now* argues for a bio-politics of human population based upon global forms of coordination and centralisation … collectively having the ability and legitimacy to support the efforts of weak and ineffective states" (Duffield and Waddell 2006: 15).

The resilience of global populations can be improved through regulatory networks, including aid programs, to ensure bio-political regulation. The critique of human security as a form of bio-political regulation draws on the work of Michel Foucault. Bio-politics and bio-power can be seen as the appropriate regulatory mechanism for the era of global governance. As Foucault put it, "regulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis … security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings, so as to optimize a state of life" (Foucault 2003: 246). Arguably, human security is ultimately about the security of the modern state. It is a hugely ambitious project to establish through bio-power disciplinary power over the human-as-species.

Permanent Security

The benign version of human security did not come to pass, as the optimistic global security mood of the 1990s gave way to the post-2001 moves towards an enhanced permanent security state. The modern "state of emergency" emerges when a state declares that military methods are necessary to deal with disorder that cannot be dealt with by normal political means. The panoply of counter-terrorism measures declared by the President of the United States of America after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have been wide-ranging, clearly disproportionate, and designed to last. As Michael Dillon argues:

> on September 11th 2001, the United States found itself subject to the recoil of the violence of globalization. Declaring war on the terror to

> which New York had been subjected, the Bush administration invoked a global state of emergency to wage indefinite war on an indefinite enemy. The outcome has been a radical suspension of the law to save the law.
>
> (Dillon 2002: 77)

The logic of modern power is articulated most clearly by Giorgio Agamben (2005), who argues that the "state of exception" which was once a provisional measure in the West has now become a working paradigm for government.

Globalization and security have set the parameters of events prior to and since 2001. A single asymmetric attack by a relatively small organization is clearly not the cause of this transformation in world affairs. Nor can it explain how or why an emergency extra-political regime has now become the new normality. The traditional divide between war and peace has now disappeared as the world embarks on a "long war." US President George W. Bush has declared that "Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" (cited in Gross 2006: 75). The Global War on Terror, declared in 2001, has since transmuted in the White House and Pentagon with the addition of the concept of the "Long War." This additional terminology reflects a recognition that you cannot declare war on a form of war. However, there is still no recognition that this Long War cannot be won by military means. As John Arquilla puts it, "in terms of the Long War thus far, and in what is likely to come, ideas and beliefs have, in important ways, begun to trump traditional war-fighting" (Arquilla 2007: 384).

The Long War, like the Cold War before it, seeks a clearly identifiable enemy that fits conventional geo-political and military thinking (Münkler 2005). It does not respond to the complex array of factors creating global insecurity and, in fact, adds to them. It is not even sustainable security in conventional terms, "The current US security paradigm is essentially one of "control"—a matter of responding to current and potential threats primarily by the use of military force" (Rogers 2007: 136). This exposes the severe limitations in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that was meant to transform US military strategy after the end of the Cold War. The use of weapons, high technology, and the adoption of information and communications technology, would put an end to war as we know it (Hirst 2001). The American "way of life" was now joined by an American "way of war." But the RMA was disrupted by the asymmetric attacks of 2001 and their global dissemination by global information and communications technology.

An underlying reason why the RMA and the Long War are of dubious efficacy as security drivers, even in their own terms, is because they rest on outdated modernization perspectives on development ("regime change" for example) and on a technological determinism, which ignores the social, political, and cultural determinants of conflict. More specifically, by demonizing the likes of al-Qa'ida, the dominant security discourses cannot

comprehend its nature. A quite different way in would be to approach this type of organization in terms of social movement theory and as part of global civil society. Victor Asal and colleagues make a coherent argument that organizations such as al-Qa'ida can be viewed as "transnational advocacy networks," a theoretical approach mainly applied to human rights movements (Asal *et al.* 2007). After all, al-Qa'ida has embraced a localized and networked form of organization, it is alert to the importance of symbolic political action, and like humanitarian networks it works on public opinion through an adept use of the new communications technology.

A Long War against Islam attributed to some underlying "clash of civilizations" is not based on a historical understanding of the relationship between globalization and war (on which see Barkawi 2006). It was an illusion of the 1990s and "the end of history" (Fukuyama) that globalization meant peace and that war was a thing of the past. It is not so much that globalization causes war, but an understanding that "war is itself a form of *interconnection*, and a historically pervasive and significant one at that. War in this sense is a *globalizing force*, and it has been for a long time" (Barkawi 2006: xii). We can then go on to explore how the West and Islam are interconnected and their mutual constitution. The modernity and hybridity of a movement such as al-Qa'ida precludes any simplistic model based on "Islamic fundamentalism," and shows how the Long War on Terror is only a recipe for the deepening and broadening of insecurity.

Beyond Security

To understand (in)security in the era of globalization, I would argue that we need to move beyond the security paradigm. The various theoretical approaches to security—from realism through to post-structuralism—are also constructing the political meaning of (in)security. We have examined in particular the "broadening" and "deepening" of the security problematic and the very ambiguous concept of "human security" seen by some as liberal wishful-thinking and by others as Foucauldian control mechanism. What Ken Booth advocates, from the perspective of the "new" critical security studies, is a move beyond turning all political problems into security issues ('securitising politics") to rather "turn every security issue into a question of political theory (what might be called *politicising* security)" (Booth 2005: 14). Security is too important to be left to what in Northern Ireland were called the "securocrats" or for that matter the academic specialists in security studies.

From a globalization perspective, security cannot be divorced from the global political economy. Security and insecurity issues do not arise in sterile apolitical environments or as part of some military strategists abstract scenario planning. The political economy of globalization to a large extent dictates life-chances and whether we might lead comfortable lives, or suffer from social exclusion (Munck 2006). As Roger Tooze argues: "It is the

apparently increasingly arbitrary, random, sudden and unpredictable nature of the workings of the global economy that have heightened the sense that these matters concern our security" (Tooze 2005: 143). We could go further and argue that the currently dominant neoliberal market-friendly type of globalization not only generates, but even depends on insecurity. The watchword of competitiveness—that applies between people, communities, cities, nation-states, and regions—is explicitly creating insecurity and rejecting any notion of social protection or solidarity.

Neither can we approach security in a global context without some idea of the complexity and tensions in the real world. Globalization clearly did not do away with what are mistakenly seen as pre-modern forms of conflict derived from racial, ethnic, tribal, or national forms of identity. Paul James directs our attention to the complexities and contradictions which structure people's lives and social relations in the era of globalization (James 2006). This is not an abstract contest between globalization (good) and tribalism (bad) as many proponents of globalization have argued. James develops instead a counter-position "that allows us to make decisions about political-ethical directions, on the basis of an understanding about the complexities of different forms of community and polity, rather than on the basis of ideologically-driven prejudice about the essential virtues of savage globalization" (James 2006: 9).

One seemingly attractive response to global insecurity would be to foster the development of a "global civil society" which would counter the state and other forms of violence and insecurity. It is defined as "the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks and individuals located *between* the family, the state, and the market and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, politics and economies" (Anheier *et al.* 2001: 17). At this broad level, this is a definition that would embrace many forms of globalization contesting movements throughout the world, such as al-Qa'ida. However, the proponents of global civil society clearly do not wish to see "global terrorism" or "global crime" for that matter, as part of their cosmopolitan sphere of civilized dialogue. Indeed, they have gone as far as supporting wars that they deemed "humanitarian" such as the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces in 1999.

Whether there can be such a thing as a humanitarian war goes to the heart of the relationship between globalization and security. For Mary Kaldor and others the nature of the "new wars"—where criminalism and tribalism supposedly prevail—necessitate a cosmopolitan response that will include military force (Kaldor 2003). Iris Marion Young, although sympathetic to the view that outside agencies should intervene when a state cannot save its own citizens from violence, also argues that she finds "disturbing that some international actors appear to assume that such commitments to human rights themselves legitimate some states making war on others" (Young 2007: 100). The contradictions of the notion of "humanitarian wars" and the spectre of "human rights imperialism" directs us, I would argue, to

what is the main limitation of global civil society theory, namely its failure to address and understand the nature of contemporary "postmodern" violence (Delanty 2001).

To effectively "go beyond" even critical security studies (see Fierke 2007 for an overview) we need to start with the theory–practice nexus and accept that theory is "*for* some one and *for* some purpose" (as Robert Cox famously put it). An emancipatory theory would need to explore the sources of *human insecurity* over and above the challenges to *state security*. There is today a global anxiety or what Bauman calls "liquid fear" (Bauman 2006) that permeates all areas of our life creating insecurity around many of the facets of globalization and not just the new global terror that the security literature concentrates on. There are regressive structures and processes in today's global society that clearly create ever greater insecurity. These would range from inequitable trade arrangements and unjust wars to polluting, sexist and racist daily social practices. There are also progressive structures and processes striving to knot together the local communities and global networks in pursuit of a better life for all. There is certainly a gap here, as Richard Wyn Jones argues because "international relations specialists on the whole have been remarkably ineffective on the relationship between their work—their theories—and political practice … There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel" (Wyn Jones 1999: xx).

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4 Global capitalism and the production of insecurity

James Goodman

On 5 February 2003 the US Secretary of State Colin Powell convened a press conference at the United Nations Security Council to present the US case for a war on Iraq. Such conferences are routinely held against the backdrop of a large tapestry of Pablo Picasso's famous anti-war testament, *Guernica.* For this occasion, and without precedent, the tapestry was covered up. *Guernica* depicts the material effects of the first deliberate carpet bombing of an entire town—an act designed to strike terror into the hearts of the Basque people and of all would-be anti-fascists. Powell could not stand in front of *Guernica* and argue for the (precision) carpet bombing of Iraq. The *New York Times* commented, "Mr. Powell can't very well seduce the world into bombing Iraq surrounded on camera by shrieking and mutilated women, men, children, bulls and horses" (Dowd 2003).

The shrouding of *Guernica* is symbolic of a deep contradiction in the US mission to secure the globe, making it safe for markets and democracy. On the one hand, there is the abstract appeal to universal security and the material abstraction of military technology; on the other is the concrete effect in terms of human suffering and the absolute insecurity of warfare. In this respect we may say that the pursuit of security necessarily produces insecurity; but insecurity for whom? Action to address insecurity is double-sided as it defines whose freedom is to be protected, and whose freedom is to be limited. Security is "both a freeing from (danger) and a constraint or limitation imposed upon it" (Dillon 1996: 122). In broader terms, this realm of security—of bounded freedom—constitutes society. Within this realm, the "sin of security," as Dillon puts it, is the failure to feel insecure. That insecurity is required to protect security is neatly exemplified in the US detention center for terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay, which declares itself "Honor-bound to Defend Freedom."

In capitalist societies insecurity is systemic. Capitalism literally produces insecurity. The opportunity to profit and the risk of loss is capitalism's lifeblood. Capitalist security hinges on private property, on "having" rather than "not having" and on the security that possessions provide. As wealth is stratified, so is security and with the concentration of property ownership comes the concentration of security. Here the question of pursuing security is

profoundly political. When security is defined by the powerful, "making safe" tends to serve the status quo. When security is defined by the subordinated, it tends to challenge the social order. Removing sources of insecurity for the subordinated means removing the means to dominate, and under capitalism this means removing the "inalienable right" to private property.

With deepening capitalist relations, systemic insecurities are intensified. The process of commodification and financialization has gained global reach, deepening the integration of livelihoods and living environments into a universal cash nexus (Rupert 2003). Societies as a result become ever-more vulnerable to volatile flows of liquid assets, rendering them radically insecure. This globalization of insecurity is deeply stratified, with sharpening divides between those suffering under it and those profiting from it. Indeed, globalizing capitalism is best understood as a system displacing insecurity from rich to poor across the globe. Such systemic insecurity is socially concentrated at the collision between living environments and marketization, and profoundly exacerbates social divides, including contributing to the feminization of poverty. It is spatially concentrated in a growing range of poorer and vulnerable states, but, as argued here, the side-effects of systemic insecurity rebound on the center. There is increasing anxiety amongst dominant states about vulnerability to refugee flows, to the "contagion" of financial instability, to cross-border environmental crises, to subversive information flows, to transnational political violence, to flows of laundered money, to illicit drugs and arms flows. Reflecting this, there are increasingly intensive efforts to secure external borders and escalating interventions against "failed" or "rogue" states on the periphery.

Against this backdrop, the US-led "War on Terror" and Powell's efforts at the UN become symptomatic of a broader geopolitics of insecurity where the center strikes out to secure itself against an increasingly insecure periphery. Overall, we may perceive three elements in this production of global insecurity. First, intensive commodification and financialization generate systemic insecurity. Secondly, systemic insecurity is displaced to the social and spatial margins. Thirdly, the resulting side-effects generate militarist interventions from the center, to impose order by command. The chapter explores each of these three elements after first charting insecurity dilemmas in the War on Terror.

A Global Insecurity Complex

Defined in interstate terms, one state's security is another's insecurity. Today, with the globalization of capital flows, this security complex is both widened and deepened. Global social bifurcation creates intra-state security crises and disrupts state power. A global structural asymmetry now sees "an increasingly integrated, comprehensively institutionalized, international conglomerate" of dominant states imposing order on a panoply of fragmented, disarticulated and under-legitimated states (Shaw 2002: 89). Since 2001, this

structural divide has seen the Coalition of the Willing waging a total war for Northern security, to guarantee "the establishment and respect for order, both internally and on the world stage" (Harvey 2003: 190). The war is waged by an enclave of dominant states against "failing" or pariah states deemed to harbor guerilla insurgents that have emerged from "a vacuum created by the state's retreat from human development and human security" (Gill 2003: 210).

This War on Terror should thus be seen as a systemic war, expressing the symptoms of global maldistribution of security and insecurity. Ironically the Northern impulse to intervene, and impose liberal capitalist order, becomes self-defeating. Pre-emptive militarism increases the political salience of worldwide asymmetries. Challengers wage war on the terrain of the imagination, where military defeat is refigured as symbolic atrocity and humiliation, "ratcheting-up fear and hatred" (Held 2003: 194). In this context anti-terror becomes self-fulfilling and the security dilemma revisits with a vengeance.

Central to this dynamic is the arrogation of legitimacy where Northern prosecutors of various "wars on terror" define their interests as universal interests. This unilateral universality is grounded in the exceptional military and therefore moral power of the United States. There is now an increasingly "asymmetrical pattern of change in the field of state sovereignty: a marked tendency towards its erosion in the bulk of states in the international system, accompanied by an accumulation of exceptional prerogatives on the part of one state" (Gowan 2003: 53 and 57). Here, the United States defines itself as the universal state. In 1999, Madeleine Albright could confidently claim, "If we have to use force it is because we are America," explaining "We are an indispensable nation" (quoted in Johnson, 2000: 217). The indispensable nation affirms its own exceptional prerogatives: in 2003, while accusing Iraq of developing weapons of mass destruction, the United States was doing precisely that with a new nuclear program of its own. When the issue was raised by a journalist at a White House press conference the response was that there was no "moral equivalence" (Office of the Press Secretary to the US President 2002).

The United States defines its mission as first and foremost a drive for freedom, meaning market freedom. In the opening paragraph of the Preamble to the 2002 US National Security Strategy, the US President asserts the universality of "a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise," values that "are right and true for every person, in every society" (White House 2002a). The 2002 Strategy underlines the sentiment, stating:

> If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person—or a nation—to make a living.
>
> (White House 2002a:18).

The ideological offensive for market freedom entails a universalizing national absolutism. Despite the high-sounding rhetoric, the Strategy serves the US first and foremost: "the purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends" (White House 2002a: 16). As the reification of freedom, the United States acts with impunity and is inviolable: rogue states that "hate the United States and everything for which it stands," are not just enemies of the United States, they are "enemies of civilization," and must be defeated before they threaten international peace and security (White House 2002a: 14 and Preamble).

The drive for "market freedom" is deeply embedded in a form of divine absolutism. On 16 September 2001 the US President portrayed al-Qa'ida as "evil-doers," and on 20 September he told Congress that "Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them" (White House 2001a,b). The January 2002 State of the Union address alluded to the 1941 Japanese attack on the United States and deployed the concept of the "Axis of Evil" to generalize the War on Terror beyond the immediate confines of al-Qa'ida and Afghanistan (White House 2002b). A year into the invasion of Afghanistan, in his 2003 State of the Union Address, the President described how the United States had risen to the "call of history," and asserted "the liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, but God's gift to humanity" (White House 2003). The rhetoric was infectious: in February 2003 the Australian Foreign Minister described the Saddam dictatorship as "an evil and wicked regime led by an evil and wicked man. We make no apology for him—he is an evil and wicked man" (Australian Commonwealth Senate 2003). In May 2004 the Australian Trade Minister signed-off on a trade agreement in Washington; in his speech he waxed lyrical, not about trade, but about battlefield blood ties and defeating evil (Vaile 2004).

In the face of "evil," the rule of law is abandoned. In the 2003 Address the US President estimated "more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries [while] many others have met a different fate," and in a remarkable aside he added that these suspects "are no longer a problem for the United States and our friends and allies" (White House 2003). Those who remained a problem were held indefinitely as "unlawful combatants" with their own extra-legal detention regime (Achcar 2002: 54). As became clear, this arbitrary counter-terror regime was to be deployed not just against Bin Laden, the ultimate "evil doer," but also to pre-empt multiple other threats. The war on "evil" became universal and, as revealed by the Pentagon's 2006 policy of the "Long War," potentially unending (Department of Defense 2006).

The sheer scale of this war project, its invocation of divine mission, its grounding in marketization, and its resonance across the globe, is suggestive of a deep-seated sense of vulnerability and insecurity at the centers of world power. In this respect, the September 11 terror attacks on the United States were less significant than their aftermath in terms of the decisions made by

the US Government and its allies. The reaction and ensuing spiral of insecurity is born out of deep-seated systemic insecurity dynamics.

Sources of Insecurity and Commodification

The social undercurrents that drive the global epidemic of insecurity are particularly powerful, almost to the point of being overwhelming. Their insistent structural logic is generating a system-wide dynamic, forcing otherwise manageable or avoidable crises to the fore. The discussion here centers on three dimensions to this process; commodificaton, displacement, and command.

To first discuss commodification, it is important to start with the idea that insecurity is only in the last instance a military matter. Global insecurity is in large part grounded in the process of globalized commodification—a process that reproduces the security of the propertied, and deepens the insecurity of the property-less. To understand prevailing security dynamics, attention must focus on the social, cultural, and ecological relations embedded in commodity production and consumption (Van der Pijl 1998; Sklair 2000). Ultimately commodification renders exchange value infinitely fluid. With no independent determination of value, the value of capital becomes tautologous. Its only reference point, as Negri points out, is the quantitative measure of value flow, or "productivity" expressed as units of profit over time (Negri 2003). The key to continued accumulation becomes the construction of seamless and universal time, literally the time of capital, enabling permanent value flow without break or discontinuity.

Under neoliberal globalism the capacity to flow across borders—ultimately to achieve global reach—is a paramount concern. Fluidity, the capacity to render assets liquid, and thus escape material contradictions, is a central source of power. Growing capital fluidity is reflected in the rise of finance corporates: in 1989 none of the world's 50 largest companies were based in the finance sector; in 2003 there were 14 such companies on the list (UNCTAD 2005: 19). In 2004 the assets of the top ten financial globalizing corporations amounted to $13 trillion, whereas the assets of the top ten non-financial globalizing corporations stood at $3.1 trillion (calculated from UNCTAD, 2006: A.1.14 and A.1.11). There has been a global financialization of assets: total international private lending stood at about a tenth of global income in 1980; in 2006 it stood at nearly half of global income (McGuire and Tarashev 2006). In 1978, finance flows were ten times the value of world trade; in 2000, they stood at about 50 times the value of world trade, with total flows amounting to $1.5 trillion per day while global gross domestic product (GDP) stood at about $40 trillion (Palan 2003).

The emergence of "nomadic" capitalism, where circulation speeds up in a casino of accumulated abstract value, imposes new imperatives for structures of protection. Various corporate rights regimes are constructed, treating corporate investors "as an equal subject of international law, on a par with

governments" (Gal-Or 2005: 122). Investor protection commitments and rights to sue signatory governments for discriminatory regulation are now routinely written into investment agreements (Cutler 2003). There were fewer than 80 such agreements in 1990; by 2004 there were more than 400. In 2006, corporate investors had initiated 255 cases against 70 countries, several leading to large pay-outs, such as in 2006 when Argentina was instructed to pay $165m (UNCTAD 2005; 2006). Financial power is also reflected in the emergence and growth of the "offshore" economy, the logical development of capital's "drive beyond its own barriers" (Marx quoted in Palan 2003: 173). Offshore entities now account for the entire foreign-exchange market, and 80 percent of international financial transactions: a fifth of the world's private wealth is now said to be held in tax-havens (Palan 2003: 7).

Stocks of monetary value are increasingly disconnected from qualitative values, of for instance coresponsibility or sociality. The role of global credit-ratings agencies exemplifies the process. Here, three agencies—Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch—now set the framework for national policymaking worldwide. Governments pay the agencies six-figure sums to provide a "sovereign" rating that determines access to international finance. In 1975, Standard & Poor's conducted three country ratings; in 2004 it produced more than a hundred (Klein 2004). With intensified marketization there is a dramatic "extension of command-through-money," and the "dehumanization of the subject" is taken to new lengths (Holloway 2002: 202). Neoliberalism thus radically disembeds social relations, bringing a "reconfiguration of civil society, and the re-privatization of aspects of risk (both market risk and credit risk) that were largely socialized" (Gill 2003: 206). With society subordinated to capital flows, exchange value dominates and we see the privatization of use value.

Financialization here spells social disarticulation: "the atomization inherent in commodification in this way is no longer compensated by socialization" (Van der Pijl 1998: 4). The cash nexus confronts lived materiality, and generates profound crises of legitimacy. "Private–personal" spheres for instance, ecologies and living environments, "nature's" reproductive and generative capacity, the structures that reproduce political legitimacy such as welfare states, rights regimes, and representative structures, become sites of contestation between commodification and decommodification. In such contexts use-value becomes the central "active, collective antagonistic element" (Negri 2003: 126). In the face of these challenges maintaining security becomes central to protecting exchange value. Coercive power is called on to protect and promote the security of value. The territorial state—and the United States as the universal state—reach out to widen the realm of control against the realm of uncertainty.

The Displacement of Insecurity

Relations of insecurity are always uneven, and increasingly so. Rather than resolving or even managing the contradictions of accumulation, neoliberal

globalism operates by displacing contradictions from the "West" into the "Rest." Displacement generates new risks and instabilities, writ large across the globe. Once, the modern state—whether post-imperial or post-colonial—offered a means of containing the effects of capitalist accumulation. Now it is progressively regeared to globalizing interests. The state becomes a transmission belt for global forces, not a bulwark against them (Cox 1987). Postcolonial states especially are emptied out as vehicles for popular aspiration. As Ahmad notes, "terrorism is now where national liberation used to be" (Ahmad 2003: 43).

With weakened systems of social regulation, both in low-income Southern and high-income Northern societies, the key social logic becomes one of forcing risks to the margins, of "third-worldizing" the costs of accumulation. Labour–capital contradictions, formerly managed by state welfarism, are displaced by globalism, with capital flows effectively sidestepping sites of industrial resistance. Yet the realization crisis remains and, in some ways, is accentuated through deeply uneven structures of consumption, with one-fifth of the world's population accounting for more than four-fifths of global consumption (Tansey *et al.* 1994). A globalization of poverty has been holding the system in place, repressing the realization crisis by imposing peripheralization on whole swathes of the globe, including post-communist "transition" societies and newly industrializing "emerging markets" (Chossudovsky 1997; Rapley 2004).

In the North, wealth increases hand-in-hand with deindustrialization. In some favored Southern societies industrialization proceeds, but with failing income generation (Arrighi 2003, note 38). The rest are sucked dry by resource extraction and insolvency and then by-passed in their entirety: peoples and territories become quite simply "surplus to requirements" (Munck, 2000: 142). Efforts to displace capital–labor contradiction create sharper spatial divides and intensify the process of ecological exhaustion. Accumulation on a world scale thus disrupts structures of reproduction, bringing to the fore the contradiction between capital and nature—what O'Connor calls the "second contradiction" (O'Connor 1998).

The global logic of social and ecological dumping, and the spatial concentration of insecurity that results, crystalize the contradictions of accumulation. In the first instance the displacement process operates at a planetary level, marking out an unprecedented consumption and development divide between North and South, a "huge and growing polarization of wealth between the immiserated bulk of humanity and extremely wealthy social groups within the core countries" (Gowan 2003: 59). Ironically, in the process it creates new security dilemmas. Ecological side-effects become inescapable as mal-development in the North brings us to the brink of planetary exhaustion: here Northerners become dependent upon the conservation—not consumption—of Southern resources (Paterson *et al.* 2003). There are parallel social side-effects, as social collapse within zones of Southern poverty rebounds in the form of "failing" states, transnational political violence and

peoples fleeing from hunger and militarism. Security dilemmas return with a vengeance, forcing a new interventionism into circulation.

In this context, militarism becomes increasingly indispensable for Northern elites, but also increasingly inadequate. The more that dominant players seek to deny global ecological insecurity, for instance retreating behind a climate shield as the Pentagon recently proposed, the more the risks and insecurities escalate (Schwartz and Randall 2003). Likewise, the more that dominant states insist on market freedoms, for instance in the World Trade Organization's "development round," the more that peoples of the South mobilize around demands for self-reliance for instance in terms of "food sovereignty" (Dunkley 2004). Even the War on Terror itself can be seen as a panic response, as revealing "anxieties at work even at the top of the greatest power in history" (Callinicos 2003: 64).

The Command of Insecurity

Displacing the contradictions of accumulation, and repressing the yearning for meaningful security requires eternal vigilance and readiness. The reclamation of material qualities must be coercively denied and "the obligation to produce exchange-value" must be maintained (Wood, 2003: 153). A permanent fear must be invoked to sustain the tautologous basis of capital.

In the current period, as signified by Powell's performance at the UN, the contradiction between the logic of command and its material effects is immeasurably deepened. Beyond the US rhetoric, the security agenda is embedded in a global social nexus that pits the secure against the insecure. Globalizing forces are in the first instance extensions of the power of capital, a grab for power "to secure, extend and obscure the exploitative and distributive mechanisms through which inequalities of wealth and power are reproduced" (Rosenberg 2000: 165).

Just as domestic neoliberalism was paired with a stronger more authoritarian state, whether in Pinochet's Chile, Thatcher's Britain, or Reagan's United States, so the emergence of a global neoliberalism has required a new form of globalist command, a "coercive apparatus … to police social order around the world" (Panitch and Gindin 2003: 29). This long-established national nexus between capital and coercion is transmuted into a global nexus, a "global military–corporate complex"(Ferguson and Turnbull 2004: 84). The system of capital flows is thereby inextricably bound into the globalized power of command sovereignty (Rosenberg 1994). The "freedoms" of capital are institutionalized within interstate agreements, disciplining states to facilitate accumulation (Robinson 2002). As finance sheds its national base, it gains international legal standing and the right to access markets. Such rights are enforced through cross-national institutions where national sovereignty is exercised to promote the rights of "corporate citizens."

The resulting "new constitutionalism" is both structural and institutional, vested with its own system of structural sanctions in the form of potential or

threatened capital flight (Gill 2003). Dominant states construct the structures of governance to force instabilities to the periphery, expressed in the "structural adjustment programs" imposed by the "Wall Street–Treasury–IMF complex" in concert with the European Union and Japan (Harvey 2003: 185). There is a sharp increase in global surveillance, with the extension of informational power vested in the dominant states. Such surveillance is omnipresent, bringing into being a panopticon effect, sifting high-risk from low-risk categories, offering new channels for the exercise of state oversight (Gill 2003). Subordinate states are forced into a mode of permanent crisis management that increasingly becomes the primary logic of state territoriality. With personal security dramatically undermined by volatility in the world economy, "day-to-day violence in the world-system" deepens, and "people everywhere are taking back from the states the role of providing for their own security" (Wallerstein, 2003: 65). As Harvey puts it, "Privileged classes seal themselves off in gilded ghettos in Bombay, Sao Paulo and Kuwait while enjoying the fruits of their investments on Wall Street" (Harvey 2003: 185). The rest survive on the margins.

The result, as both Palan (2003) and Gill (2003) note, is the commercialization of sovereign power. In many respects this is not a new phenomena; as charted by Tilly (1990), state power was forged out of the dialectic between coercion and capital. What is new, perhaps, is the depth and extent of coercive power required to ground the accumulation of value. The extended and deepened reach of finance throws whole populations into the flux of circulation. The shift from territorial ideologies of coresponsibility as a body called a nation, to ideologies of "global constitutionalism centred on the sovereign investor/consumer," force us all to become "citizens in a world of flux" (Palan, 2003: 188). A powerful confrontation opens up between non-territorial finance-space and lived territorial spatiality. The gulf between those who escape the effects of power, and those who bear its burdens—between Powell and the survivors of the 1937 bombing of Guernica perhaps—is dramatically widened.

Conclusion

In a global system that relies upon opportunity and risk, insecurity is always on the horizon. As the United States and its allies take on "the impossible task of suppressing the expressions of the fundamental problems of the world today" we are forced to live with endemic instability and violence (Ichiyo 2002). The war for security must go on forever—there is "never enough"—and thus war has to be domesticated and naturalized (Ferguson and Turnbull 2004). This systemic insecurity may however be seen as the central and even fatal flaw of commodification. The totalizing command state can never secure control (James 2004). Security can only be achieved by forcing instability to the margins, even as it erupts across the multiplying arcs of instability.

Irresistibly, insecurity and coercion force new agendas onto the table, agendas that impose human values against the abstract exchange-values of

the cash nexus. Deep divides have opened up between the state–capital nexus and the materiality of everyday life. The juridical claims of new constitutionalism, constructed with greater intensity from the early 1990s, hand-in-hand with the heightened military preparedness, were confronted by the lived reality of marginality in manifold counter-globalist upsurges framed as "global justice movements" (Rupert 2003; Goodman 2007). Lately, as noted, we have experienced the intensive exercise of command in the so-called War on Terror, itself confronted by an unprecedented global anti-war movement. Claims for a War on Terror have continued to implode, and are actively opposed both in the United States and worldwide.

We may then speculate that naked coercion is itself a measure of weakness, not strength. We can argue that the coercive logic of power exposes the imperial project, making it vulnerable to assault. Ahmad argues we are experiencing "for the first time in history, a globalized empire of capital itself, in all its nakedness" (Ahmad 2000: 1). Harvey goes so far as to predict "economic suicide" if the US doctrine of "permanent war" is maintained (Harvey 2003: 207). Wallerstein agrees, arguing that "there is little doubt the United States will continue to decline as a decisive force in world affairs over the next decade" (Wallerstein 2003: 27).

Counter-intuitively, decline only seems to embolden the advocates of permanent war. In 2003 the United States and its allies invaded Iraq, flouting the UN Charter, against the largest world protest ever assembled. The mystique of command has remained powerful, and has been electorally popular. In 2004, both the US Presidency and the Australian Government affirmed their electoral base. It was only in 2007, after four years of sustained policy failure, that political blocs began to shift. The very process of collective suicide—in Harvey's terms—and the ratcheting risks and insecurities this entails, seem to be mutually reinforcing. There is, it seems, a deep insecurity dynamic at play, expressing the commodification–militarization process.

Responding to Powell's attempt to obscure *Guernica*, Ariel Dorfman wrote a poem: "Pablo Picasso has words for Colin Powell from the other side of death" (Dorfman 2003). In the poem Dorfman evoked the material power of Picasso's image, asserting the human impacts of war. Powell's attempt to obscure the embodied horror of war, and of responsibility for it, is symptomatic of universal command, but it is also suggestive of its vulnerabilities. Humanizing the effects of command security opens up the possibility of negating them. The embodied or concrete always impinges on the abstract, and at least has the potential to force it into abeyance. It is on this ground—of overturning absolute command and abstract exchange value—that the process of unraveling insecurity dynamics may begin.

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Part II

Reconceptualizing security

5 New wars and the therapeutic security paradigm

Michael Humphrey

The "War on Terror" was declared by the USA in response to a new kind of war, "global terrorism." The development of counter-terrorism at home and pre-emptive war abroad signified a major change in how the USA, the only global superpower, was going to meet the new political and military challenges in the post-Cold War era. Yet while we are told "the world changed forever" by the events of September 11, this ignores the way earlier post-Cold War challenges of civil war, genocide, and terrorism in the 1990s had already begun to shape Western military and security policies about intervention and conflict prevention. Global terrorism and the War on Terror are only one action–reaction pair in the West's security responses to the new forms of political violence since the end of the Cold War. A new lexicon of political violence has been coined to describe new forms of intra-state or non-state violence and warfare—"ethnic cleansing," "urbicide," "genocide," "terrorism," and "new wars"—and Western responses to this violence including humanitarian intervention," "human rights war," "perpetual war," "pre-emptive war," and "war against terror." Alongside these forms of war, I will argue, we have also seen the emergence of a new "therapeutic security paradigm" in which external intervention is justified on the grounds that either trauma in war-affected populations or irrational conflict in putatively "failed states" is the basic source of terror. Meanwhile, under changing legitimating regimes, the project of "global liberal peace" remains an extension of military power.

New Wars

The "new" post-Cold War expressions of political violence can be characterized as asymmetrical violence or warfare usually undertaken between state and non-state actors. They are unconventional in the sense that they are intra-state or localized transnational wars rather than interstate wars and whole civilian populations become their primary targets with the aim of killing, injuring, and traumatizing them into submission or flight. The increased vulnerability of civilians in these wars has led to the strengthening of international law to protect them but without much success (Slim 2003).

These different kinds of violence can be broadly included under the term "new wars" which Mary Kaldor argues arise in the context of the erosion of state autonomy and its monopoly over legitimate violence from above through the emergence of transnational militaries and alliances and from below through the privatization of violence (Kaldor 2001) Mark Duffield (2001) sees the new wars as systemic, explained as part of the process of global political and social transformation, rather than by specific causes such as ethnic conflict. Further, global terrorism can also be understood as an extension of these "new wars" in the periphery (in "failed states"), privatized violence harnessing the networks of globalization and deterritorializing of what were previously geographically contained conflicts.

Despite the unconventional character of the new wars, interventions in these wars are premised on apparently conventional models of conflict resolution, development, and national reconstruction. In reality however the new wars can be seen as having a postmodern dimension in their asymmetry, resistance to closure, complexity, and non-hierarchical integration (Schehr and Milovanic 1999). The conduct of modern military warfare has also been described as postmodern with the major shift from command and control to more decentered and networked forms of communications and intelligence (Gray 1997). The hi-tech or low-tech battlefield has become as global as the "War on Terror" declares. Even though international intervention has been justified in terms of universal discourses of human rights and democracy, the new wars do not fit easily into contingency models of conflict resolution. Not only do such models tend to wrongly assume the linear progression of conflict from a beginning to an end, but as the new wars are not linear it is also unclear where the political centre of peace might be.

In the early 1990s the West's response to the new wars was to intervene to provide humanitarian relief. The international humanitarian assistance program to Sudan is a good example of relief without Western military intervention. In 1992 the UN Secretary-General launched a new Agenda for Peace which called for greater "coherence" in the use of political, military, and humanitarian aid to integrate peace and security into conflict management (Macrae and Leader 2000). This changed the earlier multilateral arrangement whereby donor governments had provided financial support to the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who then designed and delivered relief program. The policy of "coherence," and demands for greater accountability, brought donor governments much closer to decision-making about specific emergency situations thereby creating the impression of politicization of humanitarian assistance. "In the process," write Macrae and Leader "the independence of humanitarian action, its defining feature, becomes compromised without a corresponding political benefit in terms of conflict management" (Macrae and Leader 2000: 5).

The growing role of the military in humanitarian intervention and the impact of the wars in the former Yugoslavia on European national security policy made conflict prevention an integral part of intervention. Kosovo

marked the beginning of NATO's policing role through humanitarian intervention outside the authority of the UN Security Council (Shank 1999). Intervention was expanded beyond humanitarian relief by revitalizing development programs to alleviate "poverty." The proposition that the new wars are the result of global poverty has become international orthodoxy amongst the major international institutions, notably the World Bank, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and OECD-DAC (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and Development Assistance Committee). Intervention takes place through donor governments, international NGOs and in cases of extreme political crisis, militaries. Mark Duffield refers to the development–security paradigm as "global liberal governance," the emergence of a networked form of intervention and dependence in the name of "poverty alleviation" and security (Duffield 2001). The strategic aims of development is no longer the Cold War project of supporting pro-Western elites in the South but social transformation through conflict resolution achieved by changing individual attitudes and behaviors towards violence (Duffield 2001: 39).

Global liberal governance views the grievances of the poor as the legacy of earlier failed national development. From this perspective the renewed emphasis on development as a source of conflict management amounts to a form of "riot control" of the aggrieved global poor. As Michael Brzoska argues, "development assistance has been given a new lease of life as a structural form of conflict prevention" (Brzoska 2004: 121). In this paradigm the poor (civilians) are made the justification for humanitarian intervention as well as create the opportunity of the development process to provide protection, psychosocial care, and undertake peace building. The poor are viewed as victims and therefore the natural partners of those intervening to provide humanitarian relief.

However, the construction of the poor as victims requiring humanitarian assistance and protection is conditional. They are denied support if they express their grievances or oppose intervention policies through resort to violence. The legitimacy of the use of violence rests with the sovereign power of the intervening state or coalition, not with the local leaders of the new wars. In fact the local political leaders of the new wars are generally regarded as problematic and non-legitimate because they are seen as entrepreneurs of violence, using violence for their own interests. Under the watchwords "Do No Harm" international NGOs have sought to provide humanitarian and development assistance that "rather than exacerbating conflict, aid helps local people to disengage from violence and develop systems for settling the problems which provoke conflict in their societies" (Gaigals and Leonhardt 2001). "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment" (PCIA) guidelines have been developed by an international NGO network engaged in conflict zones to help fieldworkers implement humanitarian and development projects so as not to make things worse. For this reason many NGOs have avoided working with state institutions and sought to work

directly with "the poor" to restrict any flow of resources into the hands of corrupt leaders and warlords whom they suspect of wanting to perpetuate conflict for greed, war as business.

The aim of the development–security paradigm of "the project of liberal peace" is to transform war-torn societies into stable ones by creating global networks between governments, NGOs, militaries, and the business sector which operate "beyond the conventional competence of territorially defined governments" (Duffield 2001: 13). The project of "liberal peace," then, is more focused on building global networks rather than recovering national sovereignty and the state's monopoly over violence.

The new wars, it is important to understand, are not occurring at the historical moment of new nation-state formation, as happened during decolonization. Rather the new wars are occurring at a moment of state crisis, fragmentation, and failure. According to the new war literature, "once states are weakened global economic factors means politically controlled development of national economies becomes impossible" (Brzoska 2004: 110). Interestingly "liberal peace" and the "new wars" resemble each other in their networked character, even becoming inter-related as "co-operative conflict" (Duffield 2001: 117). The new wars have revealed that military intervention can change regimes but national reconstruction, development, and democratic government are much longer-term projects. Thus "in the name of humanitarianism, not only military action is taken, but international protectorates are created, guaranteed by the presence of armies, and even the actions of NGOs are subordinated to the logic of military control" (Marconi and Pianta 2000).

Another characteristic of the new wars is the very distinctiveness of war, its capacity to be the means of its own fulfillment, is denied as a vehicle for conflict resolution and peace-making. The political significance of war is that it can produce effects which outlast its termination. "A military contest," according to Scarry, "differs from any other contest in that its outcome carries the power of its own enforcement" (Scarry 1985: 96). The political significance of war is its ability to produce outcomes, which appear incontestable even if defeat is not absolute. "The question that confronts us is not how does injuring … create an incontestable outcome, but how does it—or why does it—give rise to the fiction that its outcome cannot be (or should not, or must not be) contested?" (Scarry 1985: 108). The new wars have revealed that durable political outcomes have been made very difficult to achieve. This is especially the case as total military defeat is largely prevented by constraints on the use of the most destructive and indiscriminate weapons and by the deterrence of international laws of war and creation of international courts.

The privatization of violence means that conflicts can continue in different forms and the apparent legitimacy derived from military victory can quickly evaporate, as President George W. Bush revealed when he described US military victory in Iraq as a "catastrophic success" (Gordon 2004). The victory

won by the USA and the "coalition of the willing" through overwhelming military superiority and rapid military success could not sustain the idea of liberation premised on the belief that the "people" were the natural allies of their liberators once their leaders were removed. The USA had planned for a transition in which the "people" (victims of Saddam's repression) would embrace the new US-sponsored leadership. They had modeled their intervention on Afghanistan rather than Kosovo, which led to a serious underestimation of the forces required to provide the security to effectively launch the military, NGO, and business-networked reconstruction effort. The resistance and *jihadist* violence launched against USA and coalition troops, and subsequently anyone seen as supporting the US project, transformed the US "liberation" into an "occupation." This in turn denied the USA and the coalition military victory and the possibility of fulfilling its political goals.

Peace and Sovereignty

What do the new wars mean and what are the pre-conditions for peace? If "global liberal peace" is conceived as the mobilization of state, NGO, military, and business networks then how is peace achieved? In the new wars conflict is constructed as occurring between groups and requiring mediation and reconciliation making it hard to locate a political centre. By contrast in the liberal conception of the state, peace is achieved through the establishment of a social contract between state and citizens based on the state's monopoly over the use of violence. Historically the very capacity to make war in the exterior depended on the state's ability to constitute order within its boundaries (Tilly 1985). In the case of the new wars intervention in the name of human rights and democracy may project the recovery of sovereignty as the basis for peace. However, the transition may in fact require long-term surrogate or external sovereignty because the state is too weak and cannot monopolize violence.

Peace as the recovery of sovereignty confronts the dual crisis of the erosion of state autonomy brought about by the impact of economic globalization on the one hand and the crisis of legitimacy arising from the loss of the monopoly over violence on the other. International recognition of the difficulty of recovering sovereignty of weak states in crisis has even led to the proposal for reviving UN political trusteeships. "(W)hile it was once politically difficult," as Edward Newman observes, "to even raise the idea of trusteeships for regions that defy sovereign responsibility, today the idea may be unavoidable" (Newman 2004: 187).

Peace as the recovery of sovereignty is even more problematic if we see the new wars as not having specific causes. Rather, wars can be seen as a political mechanism available for the mobilization of people and resources for social reordering and integral to the history of nation-state formation shaped by "the restructuring and globalizing effects of war" (Duffield 2001: 13). In the environment where state capacity is limited conflict prevention becomes

a series of localized and networked activities rather than a purely national one. "Global liberal governance," Duffield (2001) argues, is not just a response to the "new wars" but in fact resembles them structurally and organizationally notably as privatized networks of state and non-state actors operating transnationally and beyond the competence of any single government. "With contrasting results, liberal peace and the new wars have blurred and dissolved conventional distinctions between peoples, armies, and governments" (Duffield 2001: 130). He uses the term "co-operative conflict" to describe this emerging symbiosis between the protagonists.

Rather than the recovery of sovereignty of weak states we are witnessing the extension of sovereignty of strong states, or "empire." While the emergence of humanitarian intervention was first justified in the early 1990s on humanitarian and human rights grounds, following the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, national security became the underlying justification for intervention and then pre-emptive war. Western militaries, stood down from the Cold War frontier, reinvented themselves as peacekeepers in the context of the new wars where they provided security for humanitarian and reconstruction missions in "complex political crises."

The fear that failed states, the sites of new wars, could become the breeding ground for international terrorism was used to justify the expansion of US executive authority at home and to extend its sovereign power beyond the constraints of the Geneva conventions and international law. Examples include the anti-terrorism legislation at home, the use of pre-emptive war against "terrorists or those who harbor terrorists," the creation of the category "non-combatants" in order to avoid legal obligations under the Geneva Conventions, and *de facto* presidential permission to use "harsh interrogation techniques" to get information from detainees in Iraq that could "save American lives" (Humphrey 2004).

The premise of "global liberal peace" is that where states cannot create internal peace by re-establishing their sovereignty and preventing serious internal violence then the USA and its allies may choose to intervene to impose order. The War on Terror is an extension of sovereignty in the name of national security to failed states. With the adoption of pre-emptive war as a strategy in the "War on Terror" President George W. Bush "has expanded the notion of the state as a domain of peace" such that democratization and human rights become "ideological instruments for the perpetuation of war and ideological methods for the legitimate incorporation of other states and societies within a "new global order" of empire" (Kapferer 2004: 65). Even though the justification of pre-emptive war against Iraq as part of the "War Against Terror" was exposed as false through US Congressional hearings after the declaration of military victory in 2003, the Iraq war remained popular as a war against an evil dictator and for American values until late 2006. Support for the war eroded only when the rising insecurity and US casualties finally undermined confidence in the war's purpose and opened questions about how and when the war would end.

The project of "global liberal peace" is premised on the idea that peace-making is the domain of states, even if they are expansionist or imperial ones. Yet this intervention is not primarily focused on the recovery of sovereignty but the control and containment of violence. Kapferer (2004) describes this intervention as "wild sovereignty" acting against social categories, thereby defining them, without constraint and with no protection from law. Hence humanitarian–military intervention is constitutive of a global rather than local sovereign power. "The War on Terror," as Kapferer writes, "has created the space of Islam not merely as a domain of threat but as a region vital to the demonstration of the emergence of a new constituting global sovereign power: spaces of legitimate destruction" (Kapferer 2004: 68). Moreover, the USA, by rejecting the international authority of the UN, international law, and the International Criminal Court, refuses to subject its sovereignty to the authority of law and thereby constrain it.

The movement from "humanitarian intervention" to "pre-emptive war" links national security at home with military intervention abroad. After September 11 the world came to be seen as a dangerous place threatening the American homeland and requiring "new strategies for the reproduction of American sovereignty … characterized as de-territorialized campaigns of public safety" (Feldman 2004: 73). The global circulation of invisible dangers has produced a paranoid deterritorialized space whose targets include "drug dealers, terrorists, asylum seekers, undocumented immigrants, and even microbes" (Feldman 2004: 74). Public safety wars conflate "the policing of social surfaces with effective governance" while home and international security converge through the "mass circulation of images of public safety enforcement" (Feldman 2004: 79). Through this visual culture of threat and violence intervention becomes normalized. Mediatized images of danger are circulated as "risk-events" open to manipulation by both states and terrorists. The spectatorship of events is central to the public safety wars as well as being available for the terrorist to challenge the legitimacy of war-making and peace-making that such events are designed to enhance.

Intervention produces the "terrorist" (unlawful combatant) and the "refugee" (asylum seeker), both the object and the consequence of intervention, as apolitical entities outside the political community. By contrast the poor (victims) receive humanitarian assistance and aid designed to strengthen civil society, democracy, and "create spaces for peace" (Paley 2001: 135). Those recognized as victims become constitutive of civil society, but not necessarily of political community.

Therapeutic Security as Peace

The project of "global liberal peace" as the imperial extension of sovereignty and the local containment of conflict has produced the "treatment state," namely "a specialist apparatus in the psycho-social custodial control/care of anti-societal populations" (Feldman 2004: 77). The "treatment state," or

what I am calling the "therapeutic state,"[1] resembles earlier social psychological approaches to modernization and conflict prevention to help societies cope with rapid change. The "therapeutic state" promotes what Pupavac (2004) describes as the "politics of emotionology." The state's appeal "to the emotive self and trauma is invoked to authenticate suffering, and validate political, social and moral claims" (Pupavac 2004: 151). Injustice is reconceived as "psychological injury" and "exclusion" and made a question of interpersonal communication. Pupavac for instance contends that "Rights too are becoming re-conceptualized in therapeutic terms as fulfilling psychological needs and fostering the rights-holder's self esteem" (2004: 149). The state, through affirming by focusing on individual wellbeing, has adopted "the politics of emotionology" as a new source of legitimacy.

Internationally a "therapeutic security paradigm" justifies external intervention on the grounds that trauma in war-affected populations is in turn potentially conflict-producing. "Individual emotions," writes Pupavac, "have become a legitimate target of external intervention" (Pupavac 2004: 156). The subject is constructed as "a vulnerable damaged victim" requiring third-party support for self-empowerment. From this perspective grievances such as revenge for grief and loss are looked at as obstacles to an individual's sense of wellbeing which is amenable to "emotional management." Thus psychosocial management promotes self-disciplining while using the "therapeutic language of self-actualization, participation, empowerment and self-esteem" (Pupavac 2004: 156). In other words, manage conflict therapeutically by adapting the individual to fit into the new environment rather than change the environment to match individual expectations.

Another dimension of the therapeutic security paradigm has been the focus on the most vulnerable sections of the population, particularly women, children, and the elderly, as the natural allies of peace-making and reconciliation. This was quiet explicit in the international military intervention in Afghanistan, where women, constructed as the most oppressed by the Taliban, were identified as a group to be "liberated" and protected. This repeated the logic of earlier Soviet intervention for communist social transformation in Central Asia in the 1920s where women were viewed as the most oppressed and therefore the natural vehicle for radical social change (Massell 1974; Northrop 2004). In post-war Bosnia women were also identified as the natural "home-makers" and "peace-makers" by foreign donors for local reconciliation initiatives and to facilitate refugee return (Helms 2003). Yet despite their increased moral authority arising from their new recognition and capacity, the same gender essentialism that constructed them as non-combatants, homemakers, and peacemakers also largely kept them marginalized from formal politics.

The limitations of the therapeutic security paradigm is that it seeks to prevent conflict by addressing the relationship of particular individuals to the state rather than making peace. The distinction I am seeking to draw here is between the conflict conceived as individual and group grievances

and peace as the achievement of the state based in justice, order, and reconstituted political community. The idea that therapeutic strategies can deliver legitimacy and promote peace has been closely associated with the project of truth commissions in political transitions to democracy. In this case the victims are made the fulcrum of political transition through the exercise of the therapeutic power of the state. Instead of producing the victim through violence, the state seeks to redeem the victim through healing recognition and reparation (Humphrey 2002).

Truth commissions have been adopted by successor regimes as a political compromise to ease the transfer of power between old and new elites. The new regime anchors its legitimacy not in its capacity to deliver justice but in the therapeutic recognition of wrongs (human rights abuses) done to victims by the previous regime in an attempt to bring closure on the effects of past violence. The limitation of truth commissions has been the extent to which perpetrators have been publicly identified and the inadequacy of reparations, both symbolic and material (Humphrey 2005).

If therapeutic strategies have had limited effectiveness in national reconciliation projects then they are even more problematic in the case of international intervention. The new wars are therapeutized by constructing conflicts as the product of the "irrational" behavior making them appear politically meaningless or purposeless and not readily amenable to mediation or resolution. Ethnic cleansing, genocide, and suicide terrorism are seen as expressions of culturally embedded behavioral irrationality. The political solutions are therapeutized by shifting from "state-based international security" towards "human security" provided by a transnational network of state, NGOs, and business actors.

Peace becomes the achievement of experts rather than the achievement of negotiations and agreements by a political community. What the therapeutic model legitimizes are the actions of those intervening and those providing expertise. Thus through the therapeutic model health professionals have gained significant standing "to comment on international security matters" (Pupavac 2004: 157). Victims' acceptance of the therapeutic construction of healing and conflict has the benefit of legitimizing their individual claims. For instance, Croatian veteran associations have claimed war pensions for their members on the grounds of trauma, and Albanians in Kosovo have opposed the return of non-Albanians on similar grounds. In response, humanitarian NGOs have warned "how extensive external interference erodes a population's self-respect and impacts negatively on their mental health" (Pupavac 2004: 164). Consequently the international therapeutic strategy paradigm serves to undermine political rights and freedoms rather than promote them.

However, as has become apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan, the therapeutic security paradigm is highly dependent on physical security and public support and therefore easily targeted by those opposing the new state-building project. Nearly all major international NGOs have withdrawn from

Iraq, and many from Afghanistan, because aid workers have become targets for kidnapping and murder. After 24 years of continuous service in Afghanistan Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was forced to pull out. What is now at risk in Iraq is not just the health of Iraqis but the legitimacy of the humanitarian ethic itself. Commenting on MSF's decision to also leave Iraq Mark Joolen commented to the BBC that, "It's becoming increasingly difficult to operate as an international NGO in a situation ruled by the "war on terror" (BBC News 2004; MSF 2004).

The fact that international humanitarian NGOs such as the Red Cross and MSF have been forced out of war zones is a measure of the extent to which the humanitarian ethic has been undermined by the international therapeutic security paradigm. This is a consequence of the progressive transformation of intervention in the new wars of the 1990s shifting from humanitarian relief focus to development assistance with a conflict prevention focus. Once military forces were made indispensable to humanitarian intervention it has become extremely difficult to claim humanitarian neutrality, even if true. Because NGOs are now overwhelmingly dependent on donor government funds that prioritize project aims and military forces have themselves expanded their roles to include humanitarian programs, NGOs are easily linked to the political aims of intervention in the eyes of their opponents. Consequently, the different participants in networked peace including the state and international agencies, NGOs, and business become sources of vulnerability which can be targeted to undermine the political legitimacy of the project of "global liberal peace."

Conclusion

The present "public safety wars" launched by the USA and adopted by its allies are global wars which have emerged from the post-Cold War intervention in the new wars of the periphery. However, these public safety wars are primarily about the reproduction of US sovereignty through its global projection, not the recovery of the sovereignty of failed states. The new wars are not so much the product of internal ethnic or religious conflict as the failure of states in the periphery to produce peace as an expression of their recovered sovereignty. The earlier failure of national development and effective governance in many postcolonial states was only exacerbated by the savage impact of economic globalization on state autonomy creating the conditions for the new wars. "Global liberal governance," the Western consensus that poverty alleviation is the key to conflict prevention, is producing a new form of globally networked governance and dependencies based on states, international institutions, NGOs, and business. A dimension of the development–conflict prevention imperative is the "therapeutic security paradigm" which seeks to manage conflict through political legitimacy derived from healing victims rather than securing their rights through a revived national political community and national institution.

The "public safety wars" of the USA and its partners police social surfaces at home through expanded executive power and encroachment of civil rights and through perpetual war abroad against deviant and threatening social categories circulated through a visual culture of war. The risks associated with terrorism at home are displaced onto others through the declaration of zones of destruction through humanitarian interventions and pre-emptive wars. But pre-emptive war does not carry the means of its own fulfillment; military victory does not readily translate into "liberal peace." The War on Terror implies that war is perpetual—at least for a generation. As the crisis in Iraq and increasingly Afghanistan reveals, political legitimacy cannot easily be anchored in therapeutic security, in the wellbeing of individuals as the basis for peace. The humanitarian ethic has its own validity and its co-option as a source of legitimacy only imperils it. The resistance and terror against the occupation in Iraq demonstrate that there were no reliable natural allies defined by poverty or victimhood. Instead "the USA and Britain, together with the United Nations and international NGOs, have been unprepared for the feeling of righteous anger expressed by Iraqis against foreign presence in their country" (Pupavac 2004: 165). The second war in Iraq, the unanticipated one, has challenged the viability of the whole therapeutic security paradigm. The violence of the new wars is a failure of the national reconstruction and reconciliation project because of social fragmentation, social cleavages produced through conflict, and the implementation of global liberal peace as networked intervention decentering the political project and therefore the legitimacy of the state under reconstruction.

Notes

1 The term "therapeutic state" was coined by Thomas Szasz as a critique of US big government encroaching on individual autonomy through the use of health and drugs. The therapeutic state replaced "the rule of law and punishment" with "the rule of medical discretion and 'therapy'" (Szasz 2001: 486). Ironically the contemporary "therapeutic state" is the project of the shrinking or weakened state promoting global liberal governance and individual "responsibilization."

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6 Beyond the construction of consent in the war on terror

Kirsty Best

Paradoxically, after a moment of utmost insecurity—11 September 2001—the USA gained a moral standing that for a short time legitimized the beginnings of a globalizing war. Condemnation of the attacks of September 11 and the outpourings of fellow human feeling generated a brief and unprecedented consensus on a global scale. This consensus made the job of legitimizing acts of counter-aggression relatively easy for a time, effectively resuscitating the standing of US military extension into the Middle East and Central Asia. However, the relationship between insecurity and security, sympathy and consent, is unstable. Almost every action taken by the USA since September 11 to obtain greater security has whittled away the nation's capacity to draw upon that initial moral outrage and sympathy, particularly as actions taken in its name have relied on divisive models of collective identity.

The present anthology is directed towards uncovering the sources of the profound insecurity in the world today, including that experienced by the West. Within this brief I want to concentrate on the paradoxical and ever-shifting relationship between sympathy, consent, and insecurity—and how this relates to the uneven effects of a self-projection of insecurity through the Western media. The focus of this chapter is on the post-2001 US response to insecurity and the way in which consent has been both produced and diminished in relation to the Iraq War. In an all-too-obvious sense, the unraveling of consent to the war has gained momentum in the last couple of years as the casualty lists have grown and the conflict has turned into an intractable civil war. However, the unraveling of consent also occurred earlier as alternate perspectives and images were made available through various digital means of communication. This is not how the story of the mass media usually goes. Channels of communication are not uncommonly associated with methods of securing and destabilizing consent. The argument is often made that contemporary forms of highly technological warfare have, alongside modes of managing news flow and imagery, engineered greater consent to military responses to insecurity. This chapter examines this claim and the part played by technologies of communication in relation to consent to the Iraq War.

Two main points are presented. The first addresses a central mandate of this volume: to question the commonplace claim that it is reassertions of older forms of tribalism and traditionalism or civilizational difference that are the wellspring of contemporary global violence. In the War on Terror there is indeed a constant reminder of the terrorists as savages; however, I argue nevertheless that collective models of identity, particularly national identity, *are* in fact crucial sources of insecurity. The double meaning inherent in *sources of insecurity* needs to be made clear. A source of insecurity is something which has created conditions for anxiety and a lack of control—the origin of a threat. A source of insecurity is also a position from which one experiences that lack of control, a perspective of fear and anxiety. Insecurity, *at one level*, springs from a particular source, embodied and territorialized. It is insecurity *experienced*—personally or collectively. Since experience is never unmediated, it needs to be continually made understandable through language and meaning. The way in which the experience of insecurity is made legible, fleshed out, and territorialized is crucial to the generation of consent to particular political and military responses to that insecurity. Hence, what I am suggesting is that collective models of identity *are* sources of insecurity, not because aggression springs from essentialized collective identities such as ethnicity, nation, or civilization, as for instance Samuel Huntington argues. Rather, it is because generating consent to responses to insecurity—particularly to military responses—still heavily relies on constructing the experience of insecurity from the point of view of reified collective identities such as the nation. In the case of the Iraq War, a variety of communication technologies have helped to create and sustain these networks of meaning. The most important have been the narratives of collective identity which have been provided to make sense of images of destruction, death, and even torture. The national privileging of the USA as both undeserving victim and beacon of freedom has not emerged directly from communication technologies or imagery, but from the ways in which the US experience of insecurity has been characterized in relation to a dehumanized Other.

Secondly, I argue that there exists a powerful drive to find meaning, including attempts by the public to understand the intentionality, origins, and responses to insecurity. This drive to find meaning often coalesces with dominant narratives of collective identity, but is fundamentally ambiguous. This means that various means of communication, particularly novel media, have a chance of destabilizing fixed patterns of consent, and generating greater critical awareness of policies adopted to address insecurity. In the case of the Iraq War, three uses of digital communication technology have been particularly important in generating alternative images of the war: the satellite broadcasts and Internet postings of the Arab network Al Jazeera; the reporting on a variety of Internet weblogs, including www.memoryhole.org; and the digital photographs taken at the Abu Ghraib prison. It is not these media themselves which potentially whittle away at consent, but the

way in which they are embroiled within ongoing language wars. As Jeff Lewis (2000, 2005; see also his contribution to the present volume) has argued, the various parts played by the multiple actors in the language wars of contemporary democratic culture—including mass and networked media, interest groups, and politicians—are as likely to manufacture *dissent* as consent. In particular, the greater the concentration of meanings and intentions which accumulate around key signifiers in these wars—signifiers such as "terror," "freedom," "security"—the more these highly charged signifiers are likely to become dissociating.

Dissociating signifiers are those signifiers which lose even their already tentative grip on signified meaning, as they are weighed down by warring ideologies. They become subject to conflicting meanings, ripped apart by the ferocity of the battles around their use. They are torn away from everyday experience. Against those who suggest that the populace is beset by an "active refusal to know," I argue that there exists a drive to find meaning, particularly in the face of dissociating signifiers such as the images of soldiers' caskets, dead civilians, or tortured Iraqis. It is this drive to find meaning which, although it can lead back to comfortable narratives of identity, is also always contaminated by spirals of dissent.

Abstract Weaponry, Abstract Imaging and the Construction of Consent

War is an extreme reaction to sources of insecurity. A common idea among scholars of war and the media is that those seeking consent to war need to justify that it can and will address the source of insecurity, while at the same time concealing the humanity of that source. Except for casualties immediately caught up in the violence of war, modern military technology and mediated communication have increasingly abstracted human experience from its palpable effects. Furthermore, while human experience continues to struggle to come to terms with military violence, such as through graphic written descriptions and most recently visual imaging, the intensification and sophistication of censorship has kept pace with the technologization of warfare to consolidate this process of abstraction. As the story goes, Vietnam wrenched open a gap in both these forms of control. From state-based territorialized conflict, warfare migrated to distributed networks of terrorism. From the relative distancing of journalism from the atrocities of war, Vietnam brought war into US living-rooms (Woodward 1993; Denton 1993). At the opposite extreme from this failure of control, the First and Second Gulf Wars are said to illustrate new heightened forms of control—over warfare through abstracted smart bombs and surgical air-strikes; and over media-reporting through a variety of techniques such as visual imagining of those strikes with computer graphics. Even embedded journalism, conducted with a patrol-unit that allowed television viewers to see embodied action on the ground, constructed the standpoint of that view within an abstracted

frame in keeping with the perspective of the media strategy of the US military.

The bird's eye view of the airplane provides an abstracted vision of human life. As Don Ihde (1990) argues, the bird's eye perspective is a very particular and in many ways peculiar perspective to take, born out of Western forms of navigation. Reading "from above" requires a double hermeneutic act which abstracts the reading subject from other forms of perceptual experience, most specifically the line-of-sight perspective adopted by tribal navigators such as Polynesians, which paid direct attention to the feel of the waves, the sounds of birds, and other embodied experiences. Modern warring technologies increasingly perfect action-at-a-distance, operating through cybernetic systems of command and control continually enhanced through growing computer power (see De Landa 1991; Cooper 2003; James 2002; Coker 2002). Diagrammatic representation is at home with the aerial perspective. For a war overwhelmingly conducted by air assaults, it is no wonder the Gulf War was abstractly imaged in the media with electronic maps and diagrams set apart from the casualties and destruction on the ground. Reporters and the public alike were dependent on military explanations of high technology, on evaluations of the effectiveness and precision of these military technologies (Smith 1992; Hallin 1994).[1] Even in the case of aerial assault, however, the pilot's or the computer-simulator's abstracted perspective is not the only possible perspective for visual depiction. For those on the ground, the targets of bomb showers and exploding projectiles, the danger, horror, and blood of the experience is extreme and present. For this reason, the Second Gulf War also saw the employment of other strategies of containment, including news pools, military censorship, and self-censorship by media outlets (Smith 1992; Woodward 1993).

The visual imagery common during the Gulf War was not the product of a one-way flow of rhetorical devices and censorship, but a more complex machinic assemblage of various technical and human agents, delegated in more or less effective and autonomous ways to particular tasks (Wise 1997; Latour 1993; Deleuze and Guatarri 1987). Human agents such as military personnel and high-level US government officials do not have direct command over the visual representations of warfare, but instead operate to constrain representations of the body by relying on a variety of techniques and material apparatuses whose technological and structural properties (what Ihde calls "multistable possibilities") make certain outcomes more likely. The abstract and surgical qualities of precision bombing and aerial strikes, the distancing qualities of the diagram, the complexity of technology requiring expert translation—these qualities were profitably harnessed in the Gulf War rather than structurally administered and directly controlled. They were compounded by news demands for constant media flow—the type of coverage facilitated by the satellite feed and instant live television, connoting a reality and presence which made the absences (the human costs of war) even more absent.[2] The various planes of technology worked to accrete layers of

abstraction between the raw bodies of tens of thousands of Iraqi casualties and the US viewer.

According to this narrative, the war on Iraq could be read as a mixing of these two classic cases. On the plane of military technology, although the war began with abstract aerial combat, it was soon forced to migrate to messy ground combat. Deterritorialized ambushes of guerilla resistance continue to whittle away the territorialized practices of the sole global superpower. On the plane of communication technologies, there were a number of strategies of information control. Reporters worked under a new model of embedded journalism, where they are attached to military movements. This technique has created yet another aporia of the visible, where what reporters saw and related as present to them (such as cheering Iraqis) made the absences of fatalities and dissention elsewhere even more marginal.[3] One particular coup for information control has been the censoring of images of soldiers' caskets.[4]

However, the grip over the visual image has not been vise-like, with breakthroughs of dramatic footage, including the satellite broadcasts and Internet postings of the Arab network Al Jazeera, the reporting on a variety of Internet weblogs, and the digital photographs taken at Abu Ghraib. At play here are the networking potentials of Internet and satellite technology which can circumvent to a certain extent channeled information flows. In particular, all three examples reveal the body in all its rawness.

Al Jazeera has come under numerous attacks in the USA, particularly by Donald Rumsfeld, for the graphic images of casualties, both Arab and American, shown on its broadcasts and websites. Various weblogs have displayed photographs of dead and wounded, including www.memoryhole.org, whose creator posted the images of US caskets after making a request under the Freedom of Information Act. The Abu Ghraib incident is a particularly interesting case. It was extensively covered in US media and provoked something of a turn in public opinion, which was not entirely dispelled by subsequent coverage of the beheadings of Americans (including, immediately following, Nick Berg). The images are of Iraqi prisoners being subject to torture by US soldiers, including violent, sexual and psychological abuse. They were taken on digital cameras and digital video-cameras by the soldiers themselves and circulated among them before being leaked to *60 Minutes II* in April 2004. In this case, an attempt to turn the Iraqis into savages rebounded on the US military making Abu Graib an instance of savagery from above.

In the Second Gulf War, I suggest, the various planes of technology have not accumulated as felicitously to abstract the raw human form as was the case in the First Gulf War. They collide across many realms, including war technology and cybernetics, photography and distributed peer-to-peer networking. In various ways, human experience seems to have been able to break through, fuelling an already vigorous international opposition to the war, but also fomenting dissent domestically. But does this qualifying narrative explain enough?

Near-distance and the Visual Image

Susan Sontag (2003) punctuates the opening of her most recent book with a question mark: do images really work? In this powerful essay, she documents not only the history of the censorship of war photography since the invention of the camera in 1839 and its first use in the Crimean War. She also documents how many images were circulated, seen, experienced. A common mistake we make is to think that if the images are gory enough or true enough or vivid enough, people will be so outraged that they will stop war, or at least this war, or at least call for a more just war. This sentiment is beautifully expressed by Virginia Woolf, who argues that a shocked reaction to photographs of mutilated bodies and dead children must certainly be shared by all moral people: "War, you say, is an abomination; a barbarity; war must be stopped at whatever cost. And we echo your words" (quoted in Sontag 2003: 5). Almost half a century earlier, in 1892, the *New York Times* published an editorial regarding an exhibition of war photographs:

> The living that throng Broadway care little perhaps for the Dead at Antietam, but we fancy that they would jostle less carelessly down the great thoroughfare, saunter less at their ease, were a few dripping bodies, fresh from the field, laid along the pavement … Mr Brady [the photographer] has done something to bring home to us the terrible reality and earnestness of war. If he has not brought bodies and laid them in our dooryards and along the streets, he has done something very like it
>
> (quoted in Sontag, 2003: 62–63).

These comments suggest that images might have the power to move a common human spirit toward recognizing the profound inhumanity of war. However, as Sontag makes plain, the images keep coming and war has not stopped. The realness of suffering is never real enough. This is not necessarily a problem with the visual image and its ability to make human suffering present, to make it real. It is in part a problem with experience itself. Experience is always-already mediated. As decades of cultural theory keep underlining, it is always framed by particular discourses. Experience is then just as much about the recuperation of meanings as it is the perception of the real.

Idhe calls the media a "near-distant" technology. This is a good description inasmuch as media technologies allow us to interface with events and people at a distance through a rendition of the world that brings distant things close to us. In one sense, near-distance is the condition of *all* experience. We stand at varying degrees of distance and presence to all of life. We are more or less close to particular individuals and events, and so are affected to different degrees. This argument does not imply that the different ways of taking hold of the abstraction characteristic of modern life should be ethically collapsed into a homogenizing practice of near-distance. The

material reality of "the people" is one such abstraction that we live with on a daily basis in democracies, and how we consider either the needs of "our people" or the needs of strangers remain profoundly ethical questions. In one sense there is no body-politic nor indeed a body-corporate as such, but we live through such material abstractions all the time; the nation-state continuously appeals to a larger body than any individual can experience palpably and it is lived as one of our current dominant realities (for example, see Anderson 1991; James 1996). Neither is all abstraction necessarily conducive to affective distance. The abstraction of nation can be ferociously experienced, particularly when it is interpreted as the body of friend or neighbor. Conversely, you do not need the visual perception of bodily presence to feel sympathy. The recurring image of a small shadowy plane bursting into a building—although visually distant and almost iconographic—generated very strong visceral responses for many people.

What this means is that words or pictures make very little difference on their own. They need to be set within a framework of meaning and practice. Simon Cooper (2003) argues something similar. Contrary to the argument advanced by Noam Chomsky that all we need to do is to "tell the facts to the people," facts on their own are not enough to cultivate ethical responsibility. Similarly, against the hopes of those such as Virginia Woolf, images are not enough either. However, I disagree with Cooper that contemporary Americans are beset by what Slavoj Zižek (2003) calls an "active refusal to know." As the war has dragged the weakness in this argument has become clearer.

Our deepest desire is perhaps to give the responsibility for that desire to someone else.

Certainly facts will never be enough because reality will never be enough—it needs to be made relevant. However, rather than a refusal to know, there is a strong will to make sense of things, to attribute definitive meaning. This search for meaning grows more desperate as the weight of dissociating signifiers gets heavier and heavier. Images do not have the capacity for engendering shock and horror in themselves—it is humanity's capacity. However, because of the active nature of that capacity, we also bear direct responsibility for our ability to be moved to action. The drive to meaning often operates toward a comfortable reconciliation of disturbing visual images with familiar narratives of identity. It also potentially disrupts those narratives.

The Drive to Meaning: Identity and Narrative

The diffuse sense of insecurity pervading The USA since September 11 has seen the experience of this insecurity fleshed out and made real in relation to a particular narrative frame and identity-construct. The USA has been represented paradoxically as both a victim laid low in a despicable manner, and the strongest warrior for freedom (see also Coker 2002). The presidency

has been particularly certain of its moral justification in taking any and all actions against the enemy due to its status as victim, as well as its might in eventually securing a victory.

Abu Ghraib lifted the lid off any continuing certainty. The freeze-frame of photographs momentarily defied meaning. These were images screaming for explanation. They seemed to belie the United States' image as both victim and freedom-fighter. In the gap before verbal narrative, what is most available are the resources of everyday experience. An initial response might be to imagine ourselves in the position of torturer or tortured. Where most people cringe at the idea of directing physical violence against another, we can readily relate to the pain, suffering, and confusion permeating the images of a tortured body. This is the gap opened by the images before a rush to fill in missing meanings. This is one way in which images have the capacity to destabilize certainties and consensus.[5]

George W. Bush was careful to tell a story of "humiliation" by "those folk in Iraq" who do not represent the "the true nature and heart of America," or even proper US soldiers who are "honorable, decent, loving people." This narrative confirmed the identity of America, characterized by "courage, love of freedom, compassion, and decency."[6] Whereas the populations of two entire countries had been made to pay for particular acts of violence by certain members of their population, the American people and polity were not held to be accountable for what happened at the prison. This typical move defines identity as inclusive of wrongdoing for the Other and exclusive of it for the self. As David Campbell relates, John Dower once argued that the "propagandistic deception lies, not in the false claims of enemy atrocities, but in the 'pious depiction of such behaviour as peculiar to the other side'" (Campbell, 1993: 79). Although the US media exposed the full extent of the story, seemingly an oppositional move, this comfortable narrative of exceptional and individualized wrongdoing was a hallmark of the coverage. Not considered were more fundamental structural and cultural reasons, tied to new forms of material and discursive treatment of so-called unlawful combatants, and a culture of growing acceptance of previously unthinkable measures for obtaining information.[7] In the blogosphere, opinion was even more quickly recuperated. A number of posts echoed Bush's language, while iterating even more forcefully the divide between Americans as "humane," "a very caring people," "a loving people" and the Other (a twisted knot implicating all Iraqis, terrorists, the beheaders of Nick Berg, and Islam in general) as "barbarians," "animals," and "savages."

The body of the Other is not revealed as bare, naked, pulsing. It is clothed in narratives of identity which moderate the reception even of torture. If we understand the Other as perpetrator, aggressor, deserving—and the source of our own insecurity—an image of torture becomes one of punishment, an image of increased security. Is it any wonder then that there has been a disowning of responsibility for human loss and damage accrued through the chosen responses of a democratically elected polity to sources

of insecurity—responses which at the same time attribute responsibility for the actions of unelected, unwelcome terrorists and dictators to entire populations?

Nevertheless, ethical responsibility for the consequences of responses to sources of insecurity can re-emerge. First, the shock of the new offered through new communication technologies offers such a possibility. Online discussions and media commentary in relation to Abu Ghraib demonstrate not an active refusal to know, but a real drive to read meaning into the motives and the intentionality behind the photographs. Comfortable narratives which make sense of the images are actively implicated in this drive to meaning, and attempt to rationalize what they portray.

The images themselves create a problematic excess which restrains capture within these narratives. The photographs were taken with personal digital equipment, and lack the authority and context of journalism. They step over the journalist's role as messenger. They are an index of the actual event, taken by the actors themselves. Because of these qualities, they shout a very forceful question—how can these images possibly be justified? The moment of reception involves an interpretive, creative act and actively seeks out the same creative act in the photographs' production. It searches in its mirror-image the intentionality which might shed light on the existence of this imagery. In a second essay specifically addressing Abu Ghraib, Sontag suggests that this performance for the camera, the amateur nature of these photographs makes their presence even more obscene, immoral (Sontag 2004). However, I would argue that the indexical quality of the images coupled with their inexplicability also worked positively to disrupt more flattering and heroic images of warfare. The very fact that they were taken and distributed by soldiers themselves, the perpetrators of the acts, leaves a trace on the images which may serve to affect viewers more deeply than journalistic depictions of civilian damage and bloodshed.

Secondly, the drive to meaning leads toward identity, and identity has a Janus-faced character. In making sense of unstable meanings, narratives of particularist collective identity such as nationhood are the most culturally available. Collective identities collect meanings and assemble them in familiar patterns; however, they cannot completely contain the nature of identity. The human capacity for morality means that identity is also the ability to identify. This is the ability to find commonality beyond particularities and to sympathize. Sontag (2003) agrees that images can provoke sympathy, but she warns against seeing this as progressive, pointing out that the ability to feel sympathy suggests innocence from wrongdoing and thus creates an ethical distance from responsibility. This is not necessarily always the case. As a counterpoint, consider Zygmunt Bauman's remarks that "Moving back to that incurable ambivalence of 'for the Other' means also moving away from the comforting security of being to the fearsome insecurity of responsibility" (Bauman 1993: 78). For Bauman, morality impels us toward responsibility in the face of the Other. I am not as optimistic as Bauman about the innate

orientation of the self toward the moral; however, there is always the *possibility* of responsibility in settings of the face-to-face.[8]

The search for intentionality and the search for identity in visual images of suffering are both part of a drive to meaning, intensified by the dissociating impulse of signifiers such as violence, freedom, security. Simon Cooper might misinterpret these impulses as an active refusal to know because the type of knowing is not the rational, deliberative knowing aspired to in democratic debate. The problem, however, is not of an active refusal to know but of a drive for meaning which takes its route through *alternative* ways of knowing—identity, intentionality, affect, visceral ethics.[9] It is true that the drive to go beyond the bewilderment of personal experience seems to lead inexorably to the familiarity of the collective, and its closure of the self/Other narrative. Nonetheless, the possibilities for sympathy created by the shock of new forms of communicated imagery and the ambiguous nature of identity are possibilities that flicker with varying degrees of intensity and can be fanned into a strong flame.

This is precisely the sympathy that the USA evoked by the images and story of September 11. The US government channeled this intensity into global co-operation with its war on terrorism. The flicker has dimmed progressively, as the USA has attempted to hold on to its moral privilege. Indeed, much of the consternation caused by Abu Ghraib was about losing this high ground, and how to regain it. As for the project of minimizing human suffering from unjust wars, sympathy and identification again hold out a possibility. The possibility is in the deepening of experience. The role that images play will always be in augmenting rather than recreating experience, but so do all our experiences at different levels of abstraction from the embodied. The media reveal what would otherwise be absent—even if in a near-distant way. They are also nodes in larger networks of connections, which slot these into narratives. With digital-imaging technologies and computer-networking of communication, these networks are expanding, again potentially toward a greater level of ethical responsibility.

Looking at Vietnam again, what mattered were not so much the images themselves but the frameworks of meaning around them. Daniel Hallin (1986) argues that while support for the war was high, the images were interpreted and framed as signifying courage and national valor. While support for the war was low, the images were interpreted very differently. On the other hand, a particular technological aspect of the Vietnam images increased their impact: their color. In terms of shock and effect, this communication development was potent, particularly as it was as yet a new layer of our technological skin, not yet fully accommodated or naturalized by repetition. Certainly, the images from the Abu Ghraib scandal were quickly filed into a network of pre-existing identifications as well as new images such as videotapes of beheadings. However, they also had a technological impact, as a media form which bears a strong imprint of its indexical origins. And if they had not been released to the public, they would have had a very different effect.

The battle for ethical responsibility in war, for a security that comes from greater human compassion and justice, can take advantage of aporias such as these. The images are important not because they are more graphic in their depiction of the reality of war than statistics and words. Nor do they do show the brutal reality of dead and dismembered children and Iraqi civilians. However, they have unfurled narratives of certainty and security over identity, even as they have created new layers of them. They are connected, in an as yet still novel manner, to common modes of producing and distributing photographic images. They create a near-distance that would not otherwise have been able to break through layers of indifference and structured distance.

Conclusion

The way in which policies are adopted to respond to sources of insecurity is fully contaminated by the way in which those sources are imagined, communicated, made present or absent, and fought over in the language wars. We will never know the origins of insecurity distilled from our attempts to construct our experiences of insecurity. War is the ultimate response to insecurity, and in the case of the Iraq War one in which experiences of insecurity have been compounded by constructions of clashing collective identities. A democratic polity may be justified in responding to sources of its own insecurity. However, it also has an ethical responsibility over the consequences which flow from the kind of response it elects to employ based on its imaginings of these sources. We continue to organize ourselves on the basis of historically given categories of identity in order to negotiate limitations of geography and history, but our moral obligations do not stop at the border of those identifications. Democracy needs to be opened outward, beyond these particularities. The way in which democratic consent can be moved toward effective and ethical responses to insecurity involves its constant unraveling, challenge, and dissociation. This allows us to cast multiple lenses on the consequences and implications of our collective actions.

Notes

1 According to Hallin and Gitlin (1994), technology was aestheticized to such a degree that brute destruction and bloodshed were transformed into awe and beauty as the site of warfare was transferred to clean, professionalized warring technology. When the perspective of combat was imaged at all it was in the aloof manner of a third-person shooter video game—an interface, iconic targets, and schematic representation supplanting the richness of experience. The imbalance in modern technology between the two warring sides quite obviously made the fight an uneven one from the start and prompted Baudrillard (1995) to write that the first Gulf War did not take place.

2 As Mimi White describes it, "audiences were treated to the banality of obsessive live coverage of the activities of the network's own reporters while, off screen, elsewhere, the fatalities mounted" (1994, p. 139); also see Engelhardt (1994).

3 John Donovan's experience is particularly instructive in this regard: see Long *et al.* (2003).
4 In March of 2003, just prior to the Iraq War, the Bush administration issued a directive enforcing a policy banning distribution of images of soldiers' coffins to the public. The military-wide ban was created in 2000 but unenforced. Dover Air Force Base, the primary destination for caskets has faced restrictions since the end of the Gulf War.
5 A caveat is in order—I have presented this gap chronologically when it is in fact concurrent. The photos were first exhibited to the public by 60 Minutes II, which immediately swathed the images in its own covers of meaning. Ever since then, explanations, contextualizations, excuses, rationalizations have all been forthcoming, all arranging narratives around the bare images. However, since narrativity takes place through the progressive accumulation of meaning, as stories are told, reworked, and internalized, it is more dependent on time than the instant snap-shot. The more explanations, interviews, discussions, and other verbiage that accumulated on the photographs, the more the gap of meaning was closed by familiar narratives of identity.
6 This was Bush's language during the 5 May 2004 press conference with Jordanian King Abdullah, and has been consistently adhered to since then. He used similar language as well addressing Iraqi audiences on Al-Arabiya and Al-Hurra, such as "the actions of these few people do not reflect the hearts of the American people" and "This is not America."
7 Compounding this complicity is the lack of investigative reporting or even of follow-up to uncover the remaining photographs and videos which important American officials have revealed are even worse, depicting rape and murder. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld himself has said "First, beyond abuse of prisoners, there are other photos that depict incidents of physical violence toward prisoners, acts that can only be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel, and inhuman," (opening statement in the Senate committee, 7 May 2004) and Republican Senator Lindsay Graham has told reporters "The American public needs to understand, we're talking about rape and murder here. We're not just talking about giving people a humiliating experience. We're talking about rape and murder and some very serious charges" (7 May 2004).
8 Bauman would also argue that our innate drive to morality occurs not through identification but through our recognition of the complete alienness of the Other. I think, contrary to much poststructuralist thought on identity, that there is still much commonality in humanity, and it offers the constant possibility of sympathy. Nevertheless, I very much appreciate Bauman's formation that the pull of the Other creates the "fearsome insecurity of responsibility."
9 Regarding visceral ethics, cf. William Connolly's (1999) discussion of the visceral in morality, and Jeff Lewis's (2005) formulation of visceral democracy.

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7 Environmental security, climate change, and globalizing terrorism

Robyn Eckersley

The foreign policy priorities of the Bush administration present us with a stark puzzle. As the human costs of the Iraq war mount, and as scientific warnings of the catastrophic risks of human-induced climate change become more severe (Stern 2007; IPCC 2007), it is timely to ask: why has the Bush administration pursued such an aggressive policy of prevention and pre-emption in its "War on Terror" yet rejected a concerted, risk-averse approach in response to climate change? It is increasingly acknowledged that human-induced climate change represents a far more serious and enduring threat to national and global security than terrorism or the possession of weapons of mass destruction by so-called "rogue states." Yet by 2006, the costs to the USA of the Iraq War had exceeded the anticipated costs of the USA conforming to its Kyoto commitments of a 7 percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2012 (Sunstein 2007). At the same time, the Iraq War has fanned the flames of resentment against the USA that have helped to foster terrorist networks.

The profound disconnect between the Bush administration's national security strategy and climate change strategy provides a useful entry point for critically assessing recent attempts to locate environmental degradation in general, and climate change in particular, within a security framework. My purpose is not to juxtapose a scientifically informed risk assessment against the neoconservative politics of miscalculation of the Bush administration. Rather, it is to explore critically the discursive practices of "securitization" and the associated material practices that such discourses seek to legitimate in order to highlight the interests, communities, and values that are served (Weaver 1995).

Security, as Ken Booth (2005: 23) observes, is a primordial and deeply politicized concept. Security is something that everyone desires (indeed, who is *against* security?). However, there is little agreement about what it is except that it is vital—indeed, sometimes more vital than democracy, freedom, or justice. Framing an event as a security matter rather than a criminal or political matter imbues the event with a sense of gravity and urgency. Ole Weaver (1995) argues that "securitizing" an event provides the basis for justifying special measures outside normal political practices, such as military retaliation and the suspension of civil liberties. If the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 had been framed as *criminal*

acts that took place in New York and Washington, then the events would have become a police matter (Smith 2005: 34). The appropriate response would have been to bring a transnational criminal network to justice. Instead, the attacks were construed as an invasion of American territory and against the "American people." This construction turned the events into a matter of national security and justified a major military retaliation and new laws that sanction an encroachment on civil liberties.

In contrast, climate change has *not* been successfully securitized in America (although it is emerging as a security issue in Europe). Moreover, there is a lively debate in the environmental scholarly community about whether the environment ought to be brought within the security frame. Is anything really to be gained, skeptics ask, that could not have been achieved by working with discourses of sustainability or environmental justice? Is it not merely a rhetorical ploy to capture the attention of political leaders? And might this not backfire by providing a justification for the military to increase its role in ecological problem solving? Although there are certainly dangers associated with securitizing environmental problems, this chapter proceeds on the premise that abandoning, rather than contesting and rethinking, the security frame will concede too much ideological ground to anti-environmental forces (Dalby 1992: 122). As Dalby explains, "linking a multiplicity of non-military threats to the theme of security might have some potential as a political strategy to democratize the state by broadening the ambit of security to prevent its appropriation by secrecy-bound state military structures" (Dalby 1992: 120).

This chapter will unfold as follows. First, I briefly trace the emergence of the environmental security debate against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War and clarify the main fault lines that have emerged. Building on the new field of "critical security studies," I outline a "critical environmental security" framework. This provides a basis for scrutinizing the policy trade-offs and unexamined assumptions embedded in conventional national security strategies that often undermine efforts to promote ecologically sustainable development. I then critically explore Cass Sunstein's behavioral analysis of the divergent public reactions to terrorism and climate change in the USA, and show how it fails to address the role of political and military elites in managing risks and security threats. Instead, I argue that a critical environmental security framework is able to contest traditional practices of securitization, which typically conceal policy trade-offs and ecologically problematic assumptions about "the national interest" from public scrutiny. Linking this back to the USA, I show how the securitization of energy policy has prevented a concerted response to climate change by the world's biggest carbon polluter.

The End of the Cold War and a New Security

The end of the Cold War has served as a major catalyst for rethinking the traditional concept of national security which has been typically understood

as a set of conditions that guarantees the ability of a state to pursue its national interests, free from both real and imagined impediments and threats. Against the old idea of "national security" based on nuclear deterrence that characterized the rivalry between East and West during the Cold War, there has been a range of efforts to develop new and broader notions of security that transcend national interests, take account of both military and non-military threats and, in some cases, seek to redirect military expenditure towards peace-building and sustainable development. However, not all of these efforts succeeded in breaking free from old ways of thinking.

Robert Kaplan's (1994) grim assessment of "The Coming Anarchy" identified a wide-range of non-military threats in the post-Cold War period, including resource scarcity, environmental degradation, population growth, poverty, tribalism, and disease. From this list, he singled out the environment as "the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century" and, invoking a Schmittian friend/enemy distinction, he went so far as to characterize the environment as "a hostile power" (Kaplan 1994).

In a similar vein, Marc Levy argued that although most environmental problems should be dealt with via the normal processes of treaty negotiation, climate change was different and "more like the problem of containing the Soviet Union; it requires a grand strategy to guide actions in the face of distant, uncertain threats, and an overarching commitment from high levels of leadership to stay the course through the ebbs and flows of popular sentiment" (Levy 1995: 54). Of course, Kaplan's suggestion that the environment is a hostile power, and Levy's idea of "environmental containment" both continue to betray a Cold War mentality that effectively treats non-military threats *as if* they were military threats that emanate from "outside" the nation-state. On this understanding, environmental threats are something that foreigners do to Americans or to American territory.

Against these attempts to replace the Soviet menace with an environmental menace, there has been a proliferation of attempts to loosen the grip of realist Cold War thinking on security studies, highlight a wide range of neglected areas of vulnerability and marginalization, underscore global economic and environmental interdependence, and emphasize the need for international co-operation. New discourses of human security, societal security, comprehensive security, global security, and environmental security have challenged the conventional distinction between high and low politics and the zero-sum thinking of the Cold War period. Moreover, these new discourses have shown in various ways how existing militarized models of national security are inconsistent with long-term ecologically sustainable development (Dalby 2002).

The 1987 Brundtland Report gave official recognition to the idea of environmental security and Principle 25 of the 1992 Rio Declaration stated that peace, development, and environmental protection are indivisible. The United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) *Human Development Report* (1994) provided a radical reinterpretation of human security as

universal, interdependent, preventative, and people-centered and based on no less than seven inter-related dimensions: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP 1994). One year later, the Commission on Global Governance argued for a new focus on "planetary security" while sustainable livelihoods also emerged as a key theme at The Hague Conference on Environment, Security and Sustainable Development in 2004 (IES 2004).

In the wake of increasingly dire scientific assessments of the consequences of climate change, in April 2007 the UN Security Council held its first ever meeting to discuss the international security implications of climate change, following the circulation of a discussion paper by the United Kingdom (UNSC 2007). The discussion paper identifies a range of threats to international peace and security resulting from climate change including: border disputes, the movement of "environmental refugees," potential conflict over of energy supplies, arable land, water and food, societal stresses, and humanitarian crises resulting from extreme weather (United Kingdom 2007; see also Barnett 2003).

Ecological Security Fault-Lines

Despite these significant developments, a consensus on the scope and application of environmental security has yet to emerge. Over the last two decades, debates about environmental security have become increasingly fractured around two major fault-lines. The first division concerns the relationship between population growth, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and violence. On one side of the divide there are those who suggest that growing natural resource scarcity (particularly water), environmental degradation and increasing numbers of ecological refugees are likely to generate growing conflict and violence both within and between states (Homer-Dixon 1991; 1999).

On the other side, there are those who argue that such claims are vastly exaggerated, that environmental problems typically only play a minor role in such conflicts, and that linking environmental deterioration and scarcity with conflict represents a crude form of environmental determinism (Deudney 1990; Barnett 2001; Haas 2002). Indeed, some of these critics have emphasized the potential for shared ecological problems to present peace-making opportunities by providing a basis for conducting collaborative research, stimulating dialogue, building trust, and transcending differences by working towards common environmental goals and strategies (Conca 1994; Conca and Dabelko 2002).

The second area of disagreement concerns whether linking environmental problems with security is likely to lead to a broader and more enlightened national security agenda that will also "green" the military and enhance international environmental co-operation. The contrary view holds that such

a linking will merely play on traditional security concerns and possibly facilitate militarized solutions to the sustainability challenge. Here it is possible to discern at least four positions.

Predictably, there are the traditionalists who insist on maintaining a relatively restrictive definition of security in order to protect the conceptual and substantial integrity of security studies as a discipline. On this view, overburdening the security frame with every conceivable threat known to humankind (of the kind outlined by the UNDP's *Human Development Report* 1994) can also defeat the purpose of enlisting a security framework because everything becomes urgent and prioritizing becomes impossible.

Against the traditionalists are those who believe that states must now understand environmental problems and resource scarcities as serious security threats and respond by developing environmental security strategies (Myers 1993). The Clinton administration responded to these arguments by introducing environmental security as a component of US foreign policy and defense planning (White House 1995). However, critics such as Barnett have shown how these efforts were mostly based on a narrow framing of environmental problems as outside "threats" to US interests. Such a framing obscured the US's own complicity in, and responsibility for, the production of environmental risks (Barnett 2001: 84).

The state-centric security frame enlisted by both traditionalists and proponents of national environmental security has been fundamentally challenged by radical environmental scholars who seek human and environmental security on a planetary scale. Yet these more radical scholars are themselves divided about the wisdom of enlisting a security framework to work towards these goals. On the one hand, many radical environmental scholars see very little advantage, and considerable dangers, in securitizing our understanding of ecological problems in order to elevate them to the status of "high politics." As we have seen, Ole Weaver (1995) has argued that the security frame provides a justification for taking exceptional measures to deal with particular problems (elite strategic planning, suspension of democratic rights), rather than dealing with them in more routine, rule-bound ways. Securitization can pave the way for "political triage," enabling the urgent to always displace the important. This raises challenges for those who seek to utilize discourses of security to expose the ecological contradictions of the modernization process. Environmental degradation typically emerges slowly and rarely has the character of an imminent threat requiring immediate action.

In the most influential critique of environmental security, Daniel Deudney (1990) has argued that environmental and military threats are of a fundamentally different order and therefore require fundamentally different responses. Military threats are usually discrete, specific, deliberate, and involve a zero-sum game (or "us" versus "them" mentality). Environmental threats are typically diffuse, common and transboundary, unintended, operate over longer time-scales, implicate a wide range of actors (both "us" *and*

"them"), and their resolution usually carries common benefits. We might add that most environmental threats do not require a military or paramilitary response and are best dealt with through various forms of societal and state co-operation.

Finally, there are those who defend the subversive potential of the ecological security discourse by highlighting the ways in which it might undermine traditional ideas of territorial defense and promote international co-operation towards long-term sustainability (Dalby 1992; 1994: 43). Deudney's (1990) critique is directed towards those such as Robert Kaplan and Marc Levy, who see environmental problems as threats to national security rather than global security, and who seek to treat environmental threats as if they were military threats. However, thinking of ecological security within the framework of comprehensive or human security can direct attention to value-conflict and value-complexity in security policy-making (Stern 1999), enable a more critical scrutiny of the role of the military as a source of insecurity (Finger 1994), and possibly deliver an "ecological dividend" from the conversion of military spending to sustainability spending.

The argument of this chapter is most closely aligned with the last-mentioned position that sees considerable advantage in contesting, subverting, and, where appropriate, redefining security. Contestation is essential because of the way in which the security frame has been used to justify anti-democratic policy trade-offs and exceptional measures. As Weaver points out, the "discourse on 'alternative security' makes meaningful statements not by drawing primarily on the register of everyday security but through its contrast with national security" (Weaver 1995: 49). These alternative discourses effectively seek to rework elements of the classical concept—in particular threat and sovereignty—and show how they can take on new forms under new conditions, while maintaining the codes of urgency (Weaver 1995: 51). In *Security: A New Framework*, Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde develop this constructivist framework further, suggesting that securitization is a discursive practice of particular social actors designed to persuade a particular audience that some valued referent is exposed to an existential threat (Buzan *et al.* 1998). Securitization is successful when the target audience accepts the claim that the existential threat to the referent exists.

The more expansive security discourses that have emerged in the post-Cold War period have reframed at least four key themes. First, there has been the reframing of the *sources* of insecurity, for instance to include non-military threats such as ecological risks. Secondly, the security *referent* has been redrawn so as to now include non-state elements such as the biosphere, regions, localities, ecological communities, and individuals. Thirdly, *responses* to insecurity have been expanded so as to include dialogue and co-operation across all levels of governance. Fourthly, the *conditions* for long-term security have been broadened so as to include communicative justice, ecological justice, and sustainable development (Stern 1999).

These alternative discourses carry the potential of transforming state security policies (as once constituted nationally) so that they take on the interests of wider communities in space and time and become more cosmopolitan or globally oriented. This outside-in approach—starting with the interconnected whole, and then looking at the location and dynamics of the parts such as the regions, nation-states, local communities, and individuals—provides a means of exploring how the parts might contribute to collective security. From the perspective of Critical Security Studies, the underlying normative purpose of this exercise is emancipatory. As Ken Booth explains:

> Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people's lives. This allows for individual and collective becoming—the capacity to have some choice about living differently—consistent with the same but different search by others.
>
> (Booth 2005: 22)

Moreover, Booth goes on to explain that security threats must be understood as non-elective risks, a point that connects with a Critical Political Ecology approach to ecological risks. Elsewhere I have argued that this approach regards the global ecological crisis as raising a double challenge: how to reduce ecological risks, and how to prevent their unfair externalization and displacement through space and time onto innocent communities (Eckersley 2004: 8–10). Addressing this challenge necessarily requires the moral recognition of an expanded community beyond the nation-state, political participation of the entire community-at-risk in collective efforts to reduce risks, and a risk-averse or precautionary approach to ensure that the interests of future generations are not sacrificed for the benefit of present generations.

In the case of climate change, it is now widely acknowledged that the human communities in the Global South that are the least responsible for carbon emissions are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Moreover, they have the weakest capacity to adapt. Yet the world's biggest carbon-emitter in the Global North, the USA, has denied responsibility for imposing non-elective ecological risks on the rest of the world, especially the most vulnerable, and has failed to co-operate in the key international regime that is designed to reduce global emissions according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. In the final part of this chapter, I grapple with the question why the USA has rejected a risk-averse strategy to climate change. The primary focus will be on how traditional security discourses and practices have thwarted a robust response to climate change.

Climate Change, Terrorism and Securitization

Cass Sunstein has argued that we can understand the divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate change according to his model of "bounded rationality." He argues that this model shows that people's risk or threat

perceptions are influenced by factors such as availability heuristics (the familiarity and vividness of risks), probability neglect (for instance being overwhelmed by the familiarity and vividness of a particular risk while failing to take into account the probability of risk), outrage (which increases when there is an identifiable perpetrator of a risk) and myopia (Sunstein 2007). Applying this model, Sunstein shows that Americans support an aggressive response to terrorism because the threat is judged to be immediate and a concerted military response is expected to deliver immediate benefits at acceptable cost. In contrast, he argues that Americans regard an aggressive response to climate change as too costly, only likely to deliver benefits in the distant future, and that foreigners would ultimately benefit more than Americans.

In this analysis, the September 11 terrorist attacks are argued to have played a key role in shaping these different threat perceptions; terrorism is thus perceived to be more salient, more immediate, more controllable and to evoke a more visceral response from Americans than the risks of climate change. Sunstein argues American attitudes towards climate change are not likely to shift in the absence of a major and vivid incident—an event that is taken to be a "9/11 for climate change" (Sunstein 2007: p. 552).

Sunstein's analysis provides important insights into the mental shortcuts, emotions, and biases that influence threat perceptions and risk assessment, which are relevant to practices of securitization. However, his analysis takes Americans as he finds them. He also assumes a *nationalist* security framework and takes it as normal that Americans assess threats, risks, costs, and benefits in terms of their impact on Americans rather than the world at large. His primary concern is to understand American behavior rather than to offer a normative evaluation of the diverging American responses to terrorism and climate change. Although he acknowledges that political leaders and political campaigns can influence public perceptions of risk, he does not critically explore the different ways in which risks are framed and managed by political and military elites.

Even if we accept Sunstein's limited brief, there is a great deal that is missing from his analysis that would help to explain why terrorism has been successfully securitized in the USA whereas climate change has not. First, Sunstein's analysis is based on a simplistic public pressure–political response model of policy change. This underpins his argument that if there had been a major vivid incident that can be attributable to climate change, then public concern would mount and prompt a more concerted climate change policy response. Curiously, he dismisses Hurricane Katrina in 2005 as a "9/11 for climate change," arguing that too few Americans—"only 39 percent" according to one poll—connected this event with global warming (Sunstein 2007: 540).

Whereas a cynic might observe that the biggest concern to Americans following Katrina was the long queues and higher prices at the gas pump rather than the humanitarian and ecological disaster in New Orleans, it is difficult to imagine what else might qualify as "a 9/11 for climate change."

Most climate change scientists and activists have argued that it is not necessary to prove that Katrina was caused by climate change; it is enough to point out that this is the kind of extreme weather that is expected to occur with increasing frequency in the future. Nor does Sunstein mention Al Gore's traveling climate change road-show and his award-winning documentary movie *An Inconvenient Truth,* which has done much to make the impact of climate change salient and vivid to Americans. The movie includes a simulated inundation of the site of the former Twin Towers in New York by a rising ocean, suggesting a different and much more enduring kind of invasion than the September 11 attacks.

Secondly, although Sunstein's focus is confined to the USA, a comparative analysis of responses to climate change and terrorism in other countries might have been revealing. Europeans take climate change much more seriously than Americans, and the Madrid and London bombings have not displaced this concern. As we have seen, the UK has sought to securitize climate change by bringing it before the UN Security Council. Britain's Foreign Secretary Margaret Becket has called the security threat posed by climate change "more comprehensive than any single conflict" (Associated Press 2007). The Europeans have also played the role of green leaders in the international climate change negotiations and (alongside California) in domestic efforts to reduce emissions.

Thirdly, there has been enough public pressure in the USA to prompt many mayors and state governors to take concerted action against climate change. Since the Congressional elections in November 2006, there has been a proliferation of new climate change proposals on Capitol Hill, and climate change is shaping up to be a key issue in the next Presidential race. Given the USA's increasing dependence on imported oil from unstable parts of the world, the onset of peak oil and the immense risks of climate change the question must be asked: why has the US executive *not* pursued exceptional measures to reduce domestic energy demand, promote radical energy efficiency, and aggressively promote renewable energy sources?

These developments suggest there is something more to the story of divergent reactions to terrorism and climate change than Sunstein's account, and to understand this "something more" we need to look to the powers and privileges of the US executive in relation to security matters, rather than simply focus on the risk perceptions of the American public. In drawing this chapter to a conclusion, I argue that the Bush administration has securitized energy policy at the expense of climate change by linking energy policy with its national security strategy rather than environmental policy in ways that are not only bad for the environment but also bad for democracy.

The securitization of energy policy did not begin with the Bush administration—indeed, at least since President Roosevelt, the USA has used oil as a strategic resource in its foreign policy (Klare 2004; Bromley 2005). However, it has become more pronounced as a result of a confluence of factors, including America's growing dependence on oil from the Middle East,

growing competition from China for the world's dwindling oil reserves, and the rise to power of a circle of politicians and executive officers with deep links with the powerful US oil industry, which has conducted major campaigns against the Kyoto Protocol and against the development of an alternative energy policy in the USA. Although Congress has responsibility for domestic energy policy and ratifying international environmental treaties, responsibility for foreign petroleum policy rests with the executive, and the primary focus of the Bush–Cheney national energy strategy has been to secure supply, rather than dampen domestic demand, by using the full gamut of executive privileges and intelligence-gathering services.

According to Ran Goel (2004), the puzzle as to why the USA has not pursued a comprehensive policy aimed at curbing domestic petroleum consumption in the face of immense environmental and security costs associated with the USA's dependence on imported oil may be understood in terms of a bargain between the US executive and US oil industry. Indeed, this special arrangement—dubbed the "petro-military-industrial-complex" (Boal *et al.* 2005)—has seen the executive working to overcome obstacles to US investment and the oil industry providing the investment capital and technologies to extract and transport the oil (Klare 2004: 62).

US energy policy has formed an important thread in the US's invasion of Iraq in 2003, and regardless of whether oil was a primary motive or not, the invasion has nonetheless paved the way for the restructuring of Iraq's oil industry. One of the first tasks of the US occupation was to secure the oil ministry and occupy oil fields and installations. This was followed by the granting of lucrative reconstruction contracts to the US oil service industry (such as Halliburton Co.) and the USA has been engaged in a major effort to ensure the enactment of a petrochemical bill that gives effective control of Iraq's oil fields to globalizing oil corporations without any formal transfer of ownership (Schwarz 2007; Klare 2005). The USA has also negotiated, via the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the forgiveness of a significant proportion of Iraq's international debts in return for the opening up of Iraq's economy and the oil sector to foreign investment (Schwarz 2007: 6).

Joining the dots between the US climate change, energy, and national security strategies reveals two important insights: that the risks posed by climate change pose a serious challenge to US grand strategy and that key elements of US grand strategy (the ongoing quest for military supremacy, the heavy dependency of the US military and economy on cheap oil, the use of oil as a strategic resource, and the promotion of economic neoliberalism) have increasingly constrained the ability of the USA to adopt a proactive response to the most serious international environmental problem of our times.

Conclusion

Marc Levy's suggestion that the USA needs a grand strategy to deal with climate change is somewhat prescient in light of the foregoing, even though

we may disagree with his resuscitation of the notion of "containment" and his idea of leadership as somehow above "the ebbs and flows of popular sentiment" (Levy 1995: 54). Although environmentalists have been critical of the distinction between high and low politics that dominated the Cold War period, securitizing environmental problems depends on the maintenance of some kind of distinction between the urgent/fundamental versus the non-critical/mundane. Al Gore's (1992: 297–301) call for the equivalent of a "Global Marshall Plan" to respond to the global ecological crisis conveys the notion that we are living in extraordinary times and therefore require extraordinary measures to restructure the global economy on more sustainable lines.

Of course, from the perspective of a critical environmental security framework, extraordinary measures should never mean the suspension of the civil and political rights of citizens and should rarely involve military action. Apart from ecological disasters like the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown or extreme weather events that produce humanitarian crises, which would justify an emergency or paramilitary response (Eckersley 2007), there are very few ecological problems that constitute a high level of threat, a short period of warning *and* the need for rapid, military-style response (Imber 1994: 19). This should not remove ecological problems from the field of security studies; rather it merely directs attention to the importance of non-military organizations and responses.

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8 Recasting Western knowledges about (postcolonial) security

Phillip Darby[1]

It is a fundamental theme of this book that the disasters and deceits of the War on Terror attest to the shortcomings of the dominant approaches to security at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Far from delivering greater security, they have generated insecurity across much of the world, a paradox closely associated with the changes wrought by globalization. As has been argued in earlier chapters of this book, globalization reaching back to the processes of colonization has introduced new sources of tension and exacerbated old ones in many parts of the world. Globalization has also profoundly shaped our perceptions of both the causes of violence and what should be done to set things right. Overturning such thinking will not come easily. In the concluding section of the book attention will be directed to local attempts in post-conflict societies to pursue new security agendas through processes of mediation. At this midway stage it is instructive to reflect on some of the closures that have come to be associated with "top-down" approaches to security conceived in the Western tradition. This in turn helps prepare the way for accounts in later chapters of more grounded initiatives located mostly in the periphery of the global encounter.

Taking its cue from these reference points, this chapter sketches a schema for rethinking security and insecurity. It is structured in three parts: first, ethnocentrism and Othering; secondly, insecurity and the self; thirdly, victims and suffering. The chapter is positioned in relation to the established literature in security discourses, most of all critical security studies. It also keeps company with human security in its insistence that more attention be directed to ordinary people, although the approach adopted here differs quite substantially from that taken by human security advocates. Crucially, the chapter draws on postcolonial perspectives to broaden the archive of knowledge about security and to directly address issues of interculturality and dialogue across difference. To this point very few postcolonial scholars have taken up questions related to security (for exceptions see Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Darby 2006). It is therefore a matter of selecting from the tool box of postcolonialism those strategies and concepts that are appropriate to the task at hand. This said, the general pertinence of postcolonialism could scarcely be in doubt. More and more, the dilemma of security has come to be located in

the former frontiers of the European empires and to focus on the role of the state (Maroya 2003). This is home territory for postcolonial scholars.

There is one other point that should be made by way of introduction. The problems associated with thinking about security in the established mode can no longer be laid simply at the door of the military establishment, if they ever could. Post-September 11 developments suggest that security critics need to do some rethinking about whom to target. Disclosures in Britain, the United States, and Australia over the past few years intimate that the military and intelligence establishment has less to answer for about the grand strategy pursued in Iraq and against terrorism, and the lies that were told in support, than the political leadership.

This is certainly not to give strategic thinking a clean bill of health, but it does go to show that rethinking security needs to go forward on a much broader basis than has often been thought. Critiquing strategic thinking is a necessary part of the project. However, it must be partnered by an enquiry into the Western political mindset and the way the representations of the world external to that so often play on fears and insecurities. The roots of the problem, in other words, are embedded in the culture. This reading runs in parallel with John Kenneth Galbraith's denunciation of the ugly side of what he calls "the culture of contentment," and it is sharply at odds with the idea of Francis Fukuyama and his fellow travelers that democracies are essentially peace-loving (Galbraith 1992). It is my contention that, all too easily, democracy can be used to legitimate an approach to security that is plainly counter-productive.

In turn, a brief summation of my argument is needed because it may be thought to raise questions about the whole thrust of this chapter. Over the past decade or two the sense of self-satisfaction that permeates Western societies appears to have been accompanied by a marked impatience with the developing world and its problems. Alongside the survival of militarist attitudes and orientalist tropes from an earlier era, numerous critics have pointed to a growing assertiveness and intolerance taking the form of the "new racism" or the recent revival of interest in imperial overlordship. Here it is useful to recall a line from Slavoj Zižek (1999: 186), "ruling ideas are *never* directly the ideas of the ruling class." With relative affluence now the norm in the developed world, the pursuit of material benefit has produced a negativity towards those who have not succeeded, not least internationally. This indifference to the welfare of others has been powerfully reinforced by the way that neoliberalism has changed our understanding of politics, substantially narrowing the range of permissible debate. At least as expressed in elections, the wishes of the majority are taken to proscribe the nature of the political and in turn perpetuate a profoundly unequal world with the insecurity that necessarily results. Yet such is the pull of democracy that there is a deep-seated reluctance to critique how it serves to justify intervention in its name. A similar argument can be made with regard to development, which also puts a lock on opening-up the debate about security.

Ethnocentrism and Othering

In the circumstances in which we find ourselves, ethnocentrism goes to the heart of the dilemma of security. No doubt some ethnocentrism is needed if a society is to survive, but in excess it warps strategic paradigms and, by downgrading the interests and potentialities of the Other it stands in the way of dialogue and accommodation. In a pioneering work, Ken Booth (1979) argued that strategists have never concerned themselves with ethnocentrism and that strategy is a peculiarly ethnocentric business. In support, he quotes T. E. Lawrence that many strategists appear to have a "fundamental crippling incuriousness" about their adversaries (Booth 1979: 26). In Booth's diagnosis, a major part of the problem was the idea of rationality that lay at the heart of Western strategic thinking. His prescription was to move away from stereotypes and abstract categories, and to take account of actual governments and real people. Strategy with a human face, as he called it, would enable recognition of distinctive cultural heredities.

It is now quite clear that the case for studying other peoples and cultures is broader than Booth presents. Certainly it is in part to come to grips with what happens "out there," to understand how people different from ourselves actually think and why they behave as they do. That is the traditional rationale of area studies, an expansion of which would help. But we have also come to realize that through an engagement with the Other we are better able to understand ourselves and the culture and politics of home. By proceeding in this way we may be able to break through the hard crust of ethnocentrism, to problematize that which we took for granted and to subject the self to interrogation.

Since Booth's study was published, a new generation of critics has shown that the problem of ethnocentrism is more intractable than was earlier thought. With ethnocentrism intertwined with the making of the modern state, the state today has continued to naturalize the distinctive identity of its people and its territorial writ. In this, the state has been aided by the metaphor of home, arrogating to itself the role of protector. However, as feminists and others have pointed out, the home held out by the state is often not very homely at all, being built on a system of exclusions. Moreover, the state's claim to provide protection overlooks the violence of its creation and the fact that the state is the primary dealer in violence. Feminists have gone on to take issue with the way the state has represented the menacing nature of the international, the masculinity of its own construction, the feminization of the nation, and the gendered understanding of the nature of power (Tickner 1992; Pettman 1996; Peterson and Runyan 1999).

More diverse but in some respects related perspectives were taken up by a school of writers that emerged from the dissenting flank of disciplinary international relations in the 1980s and 1990s (Campbell 1992; Campbell and Dillon 1993). Critical security studies scholarship showed how difference is figured and danger represented in foreign policy. It postulated that war is a

cultural problem more than a structural one. It demonstrated how danger "out there" is used to consolidate the order at home, hence highlighting the need to move from the supposedly objective to the subjective. By working along these lines, the practices of mobilizing threats that had seemed so distinctive of the period of the Cold War were revealed as generic in nature. With the end of the Cold War, critical security studies began to engage in a somewhat fitful manner with the way difference and danger were reconfigured and relocated in the South.

In retrospect, it is notable that neither feminist critics nor critical security advocates have moved in any substantial way to loosen the links between the state and security by examining strategies of self-securing on the part of local communities. This would have meshed with their strong indictment of the role of the state as the self-appointed custodian of security working from the top. Such a devolution of responsibility for security should now be on the agenda. It carries the prospect of winning activist partners as well as changing the parameters of public debate. It might even engage the mainstream security community, which after all has not noticeably been influenced by feminist or critical security perspectives. Almost surely, taking up this challenge would involve having less regard for the Euro-American canon—think of all the energy that has been directed to discredit realism by critical security scholars—and taking up more fully non-European precedents and practices.

This brings us to another facet of Western ethnocentrism: elements of an Orientalist mindset which continue to inform much thinking about security in the developing world. That is to say that something remains with us of that way of knowing the world outside of Europe that Edward Said (1978) proposed undergirded the colonial project and constituting both the identity and the power of the Occident. In this tradition of thought the Other was characterized by lack. The lacks were many and changed over time: from the lack of cultivation in the early days of colonization to the contemporary concern with the lack of good governance and, after September 11, the lack of adequate security arrangements that might dovetail with global strategic paradigms. Such thinking is anchored in the rejection of difference. Indeed difference is very often taken to signify danger. Recall the frequency with which the Third world has been represented in strategic discourse as a site of violence and disorder—an "immense slowly boiling cauldron," as one account put it (Singer and Wildavsky 1993:37). Such tropes serve to legitimize contemporary Western intervention and the business of recasting identities and reconstructing whole societies. This is interventionism on a scale never contemplated by the empire-builders of an earlier time.

The other part of the story is that Western categories of thought have traveled easily to the non-European world, being pushed upon and at times embraced by many of the elites. Writing of nationalism, Partha Chatterjee has used the phrase "derivative discourse" to discuss the process of transmission and the problems that have ensued (Chatterjee 1986). The body of Third World thinking about security can be similarly characterized. So viewed,

it would seem that on one level Western knowledge about power and strategy have been among the most successful of Third World importations, largely supplanting indigenous traditions and initiatives taken during the struggle for independence. Yet whereas in some spheres, notably history, the challenge of decolonizing knowledge has been taken very seriously (Nandy 1995; Chakrabarty 2000), in matters pertaining to security little headway has yet been made.

Insecurity and the Self

It might be thought that insecurity is mainly of concern to the weak, small states without much military capability and the like. Paradoxically perhaps, there is a case to be argued that insecurity has a particular pertinence to the apparently powerful—states we once called great powers. It is worth quoting Gladstone here. Writing in 1877 about the likely consequence of a British occupation of Egypt he observed that "with a great empire in each of the four corners of the world … we may be territorially content, but less than ever at our ease" (Gladstone 1877: 159). In a very different register, there are elements of a similar psychology in the practice of democracy in Asia where the majority develops a minority complex, as has happened in India and more often in Sri Lanka.

One of the first works to pursue insecurity systematically at the international level was Harold Lasswell's *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, written in the early 1930s. It is a quirky book in some respects,[2] but an important one. Prophetically, Lasswell writes that insecurity would increasingly shape American foreign policy and that it needed to be monitored and checked. It could not, however, be handled in national isolation (Lasswell 1965: 176 and 178). And so it was that insecurity pervaded America's approach to the Cold War and beyond, although not much was written about it. There was Senator Fulbright's contention that "lack of self-assurance seems to breed an exaggerated sense of power and mission" (Fulbright 1967: 32). Otherwise, it was mostly novelists—above all Norman Mailer in *The Armies of the Night* and *Why are we in Vietnam?*—who were alert to its significance.

As an aside, it was the same in the British case much earlier. It was the novelists of empire who picked up the unease, doubt, and guilt that lay behind the outward assurance and brought them into public consciousness (Darby 1987). I take this as confirmation, if this is needed, that the conclusions we draw depend on the sources we use, and further, that there is a manifest need for security studies to broaden its archive in this respect.

However, even if we rely on in-house sources, it is apparent that insecurity deeply marked American strategic doctrine during the Cold War. There was the commitment to dominant weapons to avoid being drawn into the messiness of the outside world; if the United States could no longer have isolationist ends, it could at least have isolationist means. This was closely associated with what Bernard Brodie once called "the wish for total solutions" (Brodie 1959: 223–63). Brodie's analysis was primarily in terms of war

options, but I prefer to see it as representing the desire to escape from politics. We might reformulate it today as meaning to keep out of other peoples' politics for reason of the politics of home. Then there was the belief in masculine values such as action, will, and the need to make a stand. To these we could add "shock and awe" as a recent variant—although it has a precursor.[3]

These comments on the American material point to the need to engage more searchingly with the relationship between security and insecurity than has been the custom. It has long been acknowledged that security and insecurity are mutually constituted: that they intertwine. However, in the practice of statecraft, in the evolution of strategic doctrine and within disciplinary enclosures they are mainly kept apart. Deprived of the insights that come from an engagement with insecurity, the search for security tends to become an end in itself. Thus insecurity's potential as a basis for connecting with others and thereby promoting greater understanding are forgone. Instead, insecurity is taken as a condition to be remedied—creating the illusion that it can be eradicated from international life.

The body of knowledge about Western involvement in the non-European world offers rich insights into the movement between security and insecurity and how this relates to the relationship between Self and Other. It also provides a corrective to the view held in some quarters that the diplomacy of security, anchored in the strategy of containment, played a key role in making the post-World War II period one of the more orderly and stable of modern times. Perhaps this is so if one's gaze is restricted to the level of the central balance. But the paradigms of security developed for what was seen as the crucial arena were extended outward to cover the world. And following the precedent of imperial times, stability in Europe was achieved at the expense of instability and violence in the colonial and former colonial world (Samaddar 2002: 166–69). Space does not permit a systematic exposition of the ways in which the history of Western involvement in non-European societies is relevant to the broader politics of rethinking security. In its place, the following short montage—revealing fragments, images recalled, leads that might be pursued—should be suggestive.

The—or Our—Starting Point: Tzvetan Todorov's *Discovering America*

He begins with the claim that this is "certainly the most astonishing encounter of our history." And ends with "the astonishing fact that the other remains to be discovered." He moves through conquest, genocide, love that takes possession. There is nothing directly on security and insecurity but they have a subterranean presence and add a further dimension to his claim that the conquest of America "heralds and established our present identity." We jump to the second expansion of

Europe when security became the name of the game—"the Great Game." The horse-trading in the tropics between the powers. India as an "English barrack in the Oriental seas"—which increasingly comes to consume security. So much so, if we are to believe Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, that annexation and partition in Africa were driven by the need to protect India and the routes of imperial communication. Fast forward to the period of decolonization and after. New intruders, familiar responses. Michael Herr recounts that in Vietnam the French maps weren't very useful to the Americans but nor were their own—"reading them was like trying to read the faces of the Vietnamese, and that was like trying to read the wind. What sense could be made of it? A soldier sums up, "We are here to kill Gooks. Period." Shades of Conrad's Heart of Darkness, and the note in Kurtz's manuscript, "Exterminate all the brutes!" Hardly an exercise in power; rather an expression of powerlessness. Somalia 1993—Conradian also but with a difference—Blackhawk Down. Over time, early post-war hopes of "winning hearts and minds" were undercut by the doctrines and technologies of security—the belief in fire-power, strategic mobility and more recently "reduced dependence on the human element." As I write, the problem of the Other in Iraq is to be held off by building a wall whereas half a century ago it was tackled by digging a great ditch in Kenya to seal off the Mau Mau.

The narratives and critiques of Western intervention in the Third World are unlikely to prove so useful when it comes to following up the need for change which they demonstrate with such clarity, or to fleshing out the kind of alternative approaches to security which at times they gesture towards or prefigure.

Here the most promising sources lie in the South, in the banks of knowledge, mostly local in nature, grounded in everyday life and drawing on traditional thought and practice. It may be that the knowledges of indigenous peoples is of especial importance in this regard because they are most removed from the modern state—the state by which they have been so scorned (Shaw 2002). Indicative of the kinds of knowledge that bear on security and insecurity are those concerned with encounters with the Other that are mediated through ceremony in many indigenous communities in Australia. Most such knowledges we would now put under the head of conflict resolution and mediation. Needless to say, many of these knowledges and practices have been lost or depleted through the processes of colonization, modernization, and assimilation. There is, however, a growing movement to recover traditional knowledges and to relate them to contemporary needs and issues—including international security—so there is ground for optimism on this score.

Victims and Suffering

For the most part, the experience and testimonies of victims of violence have not been accorded much significance in mainstream narratives of war. There is a strong case to be argued that they are an important part of the story about security and insecurity, and that they need to be brought into conversation with the more familiar lines of approach.

There are, of course, problems about how to give voice to victims and survivors. They may not wish or be able to speak of their experiences—as was the case for many years with the survivors of the violence that accompanied the partition of India in 1947. There are the problems of language, representation, and narration, so well brought out by Veena Das, Michael Taussig, Allen Feldman, and others. It has also been claimed that sometimes pain finds its outlet, not in words, but in art and music, as was the experience of the Jaffna Tamils in Sri Lanka (Daniel 1996: 145). Nonetheless, the difficulties must be confronted, and they may indeed prove very productive in themselves in that they challenge the privileging of the state, the rational, and the normal that is characteristic of so much disciplinary discourse. Amrit Srinivasan (1990: 307–8) has stressed the significance of the testimony of survivors, speaking as ordinary members of society from their private memories and experiences, as a corrective to the conventional understanding of history—and one might add, security studies—as an exclusively specialist activity. It should also be said that if the accounts of survivors or victims are incomplete, uneven, or perhaps contradictory, they may better catch the disorder of things and more effectively challenge the power of a master narrative. That is the burden of Gyanendra Pandey's argument in defense of the fragment (Pandey 1992).

It is evident that bringing survivors and victims into discourse will open out our understanding of security. It has been observed that victims try to universalize their suffering (Das 1990: 360). Even when they don't, there are times when we, as scholars, will wish to make connections across space to better understand the phenomenon of violence and to do something about it. Veena Das (2002: 207) does exactly this in a recent essay in which she asks about the tightly contained nature of America's public suffering after September 11, and the need to show the tattered body of the "enemy" as a *rational* response to the terrorist attacks. It is Das' view that the theoretical display of sovereign power provides only part of the explanation. There is also the refusal of Americans to confront the relationship between their pain after September 11 and the pain of others, in particular those who have suffered as a result of American policies in the Middle East over a long period of time. The problem, as Das sees it, is the inability of American society to acknowledge human vulnerability. Or rather vulnerability, expressing a sense of powerlessness, is recast in terms of strength. In this way, the experiences of those Americans who suffered or who were not safe even before September 11 are obscured from view.

Bringing Americans (and other Westerners) into the picture is important for several reasons, not least that it helps to break down many of the binaries that for so long have structured our thinking: winners and losers, perpetrators and victims, order and anarchy, here and there, us and them. Two specific illustrations come to mind. The first is prompted by the George Gittoes film, *Soundtrack to War*, released in 2004. It features the popular music played by GIs as they shot and were shot at in Iraq. Gittoes brings home how many of the ordinary American soldiers are Black or Hispanic, with little formal education and a record of drug addiction. The army provided an escape from the back streets of Chicago or Harlem and an institutional home. In Das' terms, they are people "who were never safe even before September 11th" (Das 2002, 2007). Hence, in a number of registers, we might think of them as victims of a kind.

The other case is that of the "human shields," some 800 of whom went to Iraq after an appeal by former US marine and Gulf War veteran, Ken O'Keefe, in December 2002. Their aim was to protest against the impending war, to protect essential sites, and to bear witness. Their experiences are relevant in several respects, including the returns that might flow from studying activist knowledges gained in the course of political struggle. Although not victims themselves, their often fraught relationship with both the Coalition of the Willing and the Iraqis, their role through the global media in directing attention to victims and potential victims, and the risk of violence that they ran, positions them in the in-between. Surely there are lessons here about how a relatively small band of activists challenged the settled lines of the protagonists, both on the spot and much more widely.

We might broaden our understanding of victimhood further by putting the accent on pain and suffering. This would bring more people to think about the politics and psychology of the nexus between security and insecurity, often in a very personalized way, relating to everyday life. It could also work to encourage rethinking on the part of people who wield power. In his study of the psychology of colonialism in British India and the resistance it provoked, Ashis Nandy asserts that colonialism damaged the colonizers more than the colonized. There is reason to question the generality of this assertion. Still, Nandy is right to insist on the costs to the colonizer, who turns out to be "but a self-destructive co-victim with a reified life style and a parochial culture caught in the hinges of history he swears by" (Nandy 1983: xv).

More recently other scholars have taken up the theme of victimhood as a shared experience, the recognition of which could help further understanding across difference. Judith Butler (2003) has reflected on how the experience of vulnerability and loss might contribute to an awareness of dependence upon anonymous others, and therefore provide a basis for imagining a different form of political community. Despite her pessimism about the prospects, Das writes compellingly about the possibility of a tolerable peace given acknowledgement of "the vulnerability and fallibility to which we are all

subject" (Das 2002: 209). These lines of thinking could connect with Julia Kristeva's proposal to engage with what she has called "the foreignness within ourselves" (Kristeva 1991). Pursuing these ideas and attempting to apply them is overdue.

It might be thought, however, that opening the door to pain and suffering in the First World would marginalize the Third World even more so than now. Moreover, Third World suffering could so easily be appropriated by the First World, not to mention by international agencies and non-governmental agencies that fall within its orbit. Nandy's writings on victimhood provide a possible way out of the dilemma. For many years Nandy has identified himself with the losers in global politics. His concern is to build upon the civilizational perspectives of the defeated. It is his view that "man-made suffering … has given the Third World both its name and its uniqueness" (Nandy 1987: xvi). However, in endeavoring to give voice to the Third World, Nandy insists that one cannot stop there. It is not his purpose to raise a new collectivity. The Third world must become, he argues, a collective representation of victims everywhere.

Conclusion

In this chapter a case has been presented for rethinking security as a "bottom-up" rather than a "top-down" process. This involves a movement from the state to the everyday and from North to South. As was suggested at the outset, grassroots culture is by no means always progressive. Hence there is a need to be selective in drawing from the everyday, recognizing that securing the self is tied to accepting the other. Turning to the South calls for an engagement with non-European pasts. These pasts, like those of Europe, were seldom tranquil for long periods, and here again it will be a matter of looking for enabling traditions and practices. In our analysis of the paradigms and practices of modern security, it has emerged that all too often it has been forgotten that insecurity is security's Other. Mostly insecurity has been seen as detracting from security, as something we can live without. I have attempted to show that this view is mistaken; insecurity is a part of life and contains within it elements which can be transformative. Bringing victims and suffering into discourse is a contribution to that end.

Notes

1 It is a pleasure to acknowledge the stimulation of conversations with Paul Carter and Marcia Langton and the help of Damian Grenfell, Greg Lavender and Edgar Ng in getting this chapter together.

2 Consider for instance: "It is well known that English administrators possess certain patterns of speech and intonation which enable them to give commands in different parts of the world without giving offence." (Lasswell 1965: 161).

3 I am thinking here of the "air control method" developed by the Royal Air Force in the 1920s and 1930s to police the Middle East through bombing to instil fear.

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Part III

Rethinking localized transnational conflicts

9 Zones of conflict and the global War on Terror

Martin Griffiths

The events of September 11 provided the United States, and indeed the international community as a whole, with a unique opportunity to begin to shape a new world order to enhance global security. What in the 1990s had been framed primarily as a moral imperative of humanitarian intervention to deal with a growing list of "failed states" was now a strategic issue in which the security of the core was linked to the periphery via the ability of al-Qa'ida to establish a foothold in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unfortunately, the Bush administration has not taken that opportunity. Whether it still exists remains an open question, but there is little doubt that the window is closing fast.

This chapter elaborates the distinction between core and periphery that was a central metaphor for the post-Cold War period among many commentators. Building on this distinction, the chapter examines how since September 11 the United States has recognized a link between its security and "failed states" but has failed to respond effectively to the challenge that they represent. Indeed, its military strategy in both Afghanistan and Iraq has exacerbated these countries' existing problems. Finally, I suggest that the key failing of this change in American grand strategy is not only the substitution of multilateralism and containment with allegedly novel forms of unilateralism and military pre-emption (Gaddis 2004). Rather, its fundamental flaw lies in the United States' simultaneous and contradictory support for cheap military victories, nation-building, and a neoliberal foreign economic policy designed explicitly to weaken the state in the periphery.

Core and Periphery: The Two Worlds of Security and Insecurity?

In the 1990s there was a distinct trend in the study of international relations to replace the terms "First World" and "Third World" with "core" and "periphery" (Breslauer *et al.* 1990; Weiss and Kessler 1991, Webber 1993). Following the demise of the Second World, the terms "First World" and "Third World" lacked descriptive value. Although the Third World referred to a group of countries commonly associated by their underdevelopment, the term was primarily political in origin, referring to an ideological alternative

between the First and Second Worlds (Harris 1995: 7). Without recourse to ideology or misleading geographical metaphors of global inequality, a number of scholars argued that the terms "core" and "periphery" were analytically more useful in describing the differential impact of the end of the Cold War, at least on patterns of peace and war (Goldgeier and McFaul 1992; Holsti 1996; Singer and Wildavsky 1996).

Many observers noted that among core states interstate war has become obsolete, the result of changes in society, economics, and politics since 1945 (Mueller 1989, Van Creveld 1991). National prosperity is the key goal, and the primary objective of diplomacy is the promotion of economic growth. Wealth and security are no longer clearly linked to territorial sovereignty and military power. The relationship between the costs of war and the benefits of conquest has also changed. Costs have risen exponentially among all nuclear powers. Equally, the benefits of conquest have declined to the point where it is doubtful whether there would be any gain sufficient to warrant war.

Equally, economic growth in the core is primarily dependent on forms of production that in turn require a skilled, free population, and on the unencumbered movement of knowledge, trade and investment (Nau 2001: 582). As the national economies of core states have become increasingly interdependent, mutual economic interests serve as a powerful deterrent against the use of force. Complex interdependence serves as both cause and effect in the obsolescence of war. Although globalization enhances economic competition within the core, economic issues tend to be susceptible to non-zero sum solutions to be determined in boardrooms and courts rather than on the battlefield.

Finally, some commentators noted the development of a set of shared values within the core. Unlike the 1970s, it is no longer an ideologically divided world that is becoming increasingly interdependent, but one in which the norms of economic liberalism and (to a lesser extent) political democracy are widely shared and where the domestic characteristics of core states have a remarkably similar hue. As Buzan points out, "liberal capitalism, despite its faults … now commands a broad consensus as the most effective and desirable form of political economy available. The difficult formula of political pluralism and market economics has many critics, but no serious rivals" (Buzan 1991: 436). The predominant absence of war between democratic states since 1945 indicates that there are features inherent in democratic societies that militate against them using force against one another (Brown *et al.* 1996; Weart 1998). Deepening ties of interdependence facilitate the orderly transaction of exchanges and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The dominant feature of the post-Cold War era was a security community among the major centers of power for whom security was inseparable from its political and economic environment.

In the periphery, however, things were different (Kaplan 2001). War, conflict, and instability are as characteristic of the periphery as interdependence and stability are of the core. During the Cold War analyses of conflict in the periphery tended to focus not on the local roots of instability but on the

great game being played out by the superpowers (Ayoob 1991; Freedman 1991). This disguised the possibility that with the lifting of ideological overlay, conflict could increase. A range of problems was identified as potential sources of violent conflict. Historical mistrust, territorial disputes, ethnic heterogeneity, regional hegemonic ambitions, and religious and nationalist rivalries have long been features of the periphery, and have all, at one time or another, been the cause of interstate and intrastate war. The changes in society, economics, and politics that have led to the creation of a zone of peace characterized by economic interdependence and liberal democratic norms have not taken place in much of the periphery. Similarly, the change in the cost–benefit equation that has served to make war less likely in the core has, in the periphery, been far less pronounced (Kaldor 1999).

More importantly, the dynamics of conflict are to be found primarily in the political, economic, and social conditions of periphery states themselves (Black 2004: 26–68). The state tends to be weak, characterized by domestic instability, and subsequently vulnerable to both internal and external threats (Holsti 2000). Where national security has traditionally been conceived in terms of a cohesive state defending its territorial boundaries from external threats, in the periphery security needs to be defined in relation to vulnerabilities that threaten state structures, both territorial and institutional, as well as the regimes that preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally. Indeed, the status of the nation-state is itself uncertain and insecure. Where the very idea of the nation-state is in question, and its basic structures contested or simply not accepted, the potential for violent conflict remains high. If we take Seton-Watson's (1977) definition of a nation as "a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness", and the state as "a legal and political organisation with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens", then it is clear that many of the political entities of the periphery are neither nations nor effective states (Seton-Watson 1977: 1).

Here a comparison with the core proves useful. The processes of state-making and nation-building in the core European countries have taken place over a period of three to four centuries, with central power and legitimacy being arrived at after long periods of violence, coercion, threat, and resistance. European state-makers sought for centuries to monopolize the means of violence and establish territorial control and the institutions of the state (Keegan 1994; Howard 1976). The competitive pressures and dynamics of the international system compelled national governments to consolidate their political and economic position domestically, for not to do so risked being swallowed up by stronger neighbors (Tilly 1975, 1985). The struggle for national existence and the drive for political and economic development became inextricably linked. Sovereignty, or independence, in the classic European experience, reflected an internal reality—the existence of a political structure with sufficient authority and power to govern a defined territory and its population. Over time these conditions have developed to the

point where the core states are characterized by an internal cohesion, rational bureaucratic structures, and a high level of consensus on fundamental issues of political, economic, and social organization.

By contrast, peripheral states continue to have few of the empirical features of statehood associated with the European model (Jackson 1990). The infrastructural penetration and administrative capacity that is expressed in the notion of sovereignty, for example, is completely absent in Afghanistan. The task of state consolidation and the creation of a national identity and common purpose have proved difficult for a number of reasons, not least of which is the peripheral status of "failed states" in the global economy. Compared with the European experience, most periphery states have had little time to consolidate their position and authority. Another factor complicating the task of state consolidation in the periphery has been the colonial legacy of arbitrarily imposed borders that often bore little resemblance to the boundary lines of indigenous societies, such as in Iraq. Here the political legacy of a state without a nation has often been joined by an even more difficult reality: a state with many nations.

Perhaps the most significant factor in the range of difficulties confronting state-making and nation-building in the periphery has been the uneven economic development that has provided the context in which political development must take place. Integrated into the world economy as suppliers of raw materials (including oil) and as markets for core manufactured goods and the capital equipment for basic infrastructure, much of the periphery has remained dependent upon core economic activities (Brett 1985: 183). The conditions of uneven development continue to determine the conditions of stability and legitimacy, for without a sufficient level of economic development together with some form of equitable distribution, the terms of a societal consensus on the contract between ruler and ruled will prove elusive.

The allocation of scarce resources is, of course, a source of conflict in any society. In the periphery, however, domestic patterns of uneven economic growth have militated against national unity. The process of economic change and development thus tends to become a major cause of domestic instability as governments, unable to meet the aggregate demands of their rapidly increasing populations, privilege particular groups. One expression of this form of favoritism is the tendency for governments to favor urban populations and development over rural investment. This in turn complicates the task of nation-building and provides a source of domestic friction, increasing the alienation of large sections of society both from their ruling elites and quite often from the state structures over which these elites preside.

Alienation is most immediately expressed in the weakness of legitimacy. Legitimacy is at the core of the state-making problem, for it relates to whether the citizens accept the authority of the state and believe the existing institutions to be "functionally competent, legally right, and morally proper" (Huntington 1993: 81; also see Hurd 1999). A public commitment to the state derives not only from the public's estimation of state competency in meeting

basic material needs, but also from the psycho-political need for the state to be an expression of common identity, of shared values and shared culture.

Where states lack legitimacy they are ruled by regimes with narrow support bases, sustained more through patronage and coercion than by ability or mandate. Rather than rendering their citizens secure, such states may directly violate the security of their own populations and create the conditions for powerful resentments and oppositional forces (Reno 1999). Authoritarian rule merely serves to exacerbate and focus the conflicts that arise in the domestic context. Where legitimacy is weak, the state is constantly under threat as any number of problems can escalate to threaten the very existence of the state. In most cases, however, it is the institutions of the state itself that are the site of conflict as oppositional forces do not wish to do away with the state, but rather to control it.

Following the process for instance of political independence of former colonies, the struggle for state power has become virtually the only issue of politics in the periphery. This is because the state "provides a source of power and wealth entirely disproportionate to that available from any other organised force within society" (Clapham 1985: 40). Whereas the state in the core is essentially a bureaucratic body providing political goods such as law and order, security, justice, and welfare, the state in contemporary Iraq, for example, is "more a fountain of privilege, wealth and power for those who control it" (Jackson 1987: 527). Consequently, those who control the state will not relinquish their hold lightly. As incumbents and rivals resort to varying degrees of political violence, and as weapons have become more readily available for purchase by both governments and dissidents, intrastate political violence has increased dramatically. Thus it has tended to be the case in the periphery that political competition has been dominated by a "winner takes all" struggle in which the institutions of the state are implicated. In such cases the state begins to disintegrate, producing either populist revolt or uncontrolled political violence and civil war.

In short, the central feature of the political landscape in the periphery is the continuing challenge, faced by state-makers, to consolidate state structures (Fukuyama 2004). The unfinished processes of state-making have been responsible for much of the domestic conflict and political instability that has beset the periphery. Hence one of the primary security challenges for periphery states is to overcome the crises of political and economic development that so often end in violent conflict and war. More than ever, the security agenda of the core must address the problem of how periphery states can meet the psycho-political, cultural, and economic needs of their constituents.

Core and Periphery Relations after September 11: A Shotgun Marriage

Prior to September 11, and despite some optimism that the post-Cold War era would usher in a "New World Order" after the 1991 Gulf War (Roberts

1991; Lister 1990), the pattern of international relations in the core did not translate into stronger collective security and regional management regimes. Nor did the liberation of periphery states from superpower rivalry result in the strengthening of linkages to the systemic security of the core. By and large, core security interests in the periphery were insignificant. Most regional conflicts remained at a sufficiently low level of intensity ensuring the relative indifference of the core states. Exceptions to this included the decisive action taken against Iraq in 1991 that reflected the particular importance of the balance of power in the Middle East, the supply of oil, and the unambiguous nature of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. That special combination of features was not replicated elsewhere. Despite calls for the core to throw its weight behind an array of UN initiatives and deal decisively with conflict and instability besetting the periphery, the foreign policy of core states was determined primarily by their strategic and commercial interests.

A shift occurred post-September 11, however, not least where the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan resulted in—at least initially—an unexpectedly swift and crushing victory (although it failed to capture or verify the deaths of most of the top terrorist leaders). Thanks to a pre-existing Afghan opposition force on site, the US war effort could be limited to air-cover and special operations. This victory enhanced the pre-eminent power and status of the United States in world affairs and the domestic popularity of the Bush administration, stimulating ambitious anti-terrorist efforts along a broad front. Indeed, Bush indicated that the campaign against terrorism would continue indefinitely, playing the same defining role in American foreign policy as had anti-communism during the Cold War.

Thus, post-September 11, there was a growing recognition that "failed states" could no longer be ignored, although some such as Afghanistan were obviously of more concern than others. American military interventions in or against "failed states" over the past decade, however, have been reactive rather than proactive. Political and economic efforts to obviate the need for military intervention have been substituted with the use of force. The tendency has been to ignore or procrastinate until intervention becomes the least unattractive course of action.

For instance, the US interest in Afghanistan evaporated with the defeat of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. The United States abandoned the Afghans to civil war and, ultimately, to the Taliban. Aversion to even minimal nation-building in Afghanistan and other failed states has exacerbated the threats posed by such states. Iraq too is an excellent example of this. In 1991 the United States was not prepared to take any political responsibility for a post-Saddam Hussein regime and therefore did not pursue a conclusive military victory. It did not intervene when the Kurds and Shias arose against Saddam in the war's wake; it essentially abandoned the Iraqi people to Saddam's vengeance.

The incomplete victory of the Gulf War not only necessitated the retention of a large and politically obtrusive residual US military presence on the

Arabian peninsula, but also condemned the Iraqi people to prolonged destitution. The issue now is how much effort the United States is prepared to make in the political and economic reconstruction of states, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, whose regimes have been toppled by American military power. The United States has fastened upon a formula for going to war—in which American casualties are minimized and protracted engagements are avoided—that requires the massive use of American firepower and a speedy withdrawal from the scenes of destruction. Prior to 2003 and the invasion of Iraq, the formula was a popular one, but it enabled the United States to go to war while simultaneously allowing it to walk away from the ruins without feeling a commensurate sense of responsibility. It allowed the United States to assume an imperial role without discharging the classic duties of imperial rule.

Today, there is no American public support for running the internal affairs of overseas states. On the other hand, the United States has a clear strategic interest in preventing Afghanistan from reverting to its former status as a haven for the likes of the Taliban and bin Laden, and this means at least an Afghanistan where the people enjoy a reasonable level of security and a reasonable level of prosperity. Thus, some measure of post-intervention economic and technical assistance will be necessary, but it is far from clear whether Afghanistan will rise permanently above its "failed-state" status.

If small wars within insecure or "failed states" have dominated demands on US military power since the Cold War's demise, and especially since the attacks of September 11, a profound aversion to incurring American casualties has come to dominate decision-making in the United States. A strong aversion to casualties is rooted in American history and culture where the individual is valued much more than the state. Hence, the use of American military force has always sought to substitute technology for blood in battle.

However, it has only been a recent phenomena that this aversion has become so strong as to elevate the safety of American troops above the missions they are assigned to accomplish. The phobia is rooted in the Vietnam War, which produced a generation of political and military leaders that is much more reluctant to use force than those for whom Munich and World War II were the great foreign policy exemplars. The message of Munich was the imperative of using force early and decisively against aspiring conquerors; the perceived message of Vietnam is that the risks—both on the battlefield and in the domestic political arena—of using force more often than not outweigh the benefits, especially in cases of prospective interventions in other people's civil wars. Casualty dread is most acute among the military leadership, especially that of the Army, which is still in the grip of the Vietnam syndrome. The taproot of that syndrome as it has evolved since the war is a conviction that the public has no stomach for casualties, and, therefore, that policy-makers using force in situations of optional intervention should be prepared to sacrifice operational and even strategic effectiveness for the sake of casualty minimization.

But what if there was a way of war that delivered decisive strategic effects at little cost in US casualties—a way of war that stripped casualty phobia of its adverse strategic consequences by permitting the use of force without significant risk? The US Air Force in particular has long been attracted to a vision of waging strategically decisive war based on scientific analysis and requisite air (and subsequently) space technologies—and the Gulf War of 1991 seemed to constitute a major step toward realization of that vision. Before the first Gulf War, the primary conventional military challenge—the defense of NATO's Central Front against a short-warning massive Warsaw Pact attack—was predominately a ground force one. Because the object was territorial defense, air-power was relegated to a supporting role. Air-power would be employed mainly to disrupt and destroy the flow of Warsaw Pact forces moving across Eastern Europe before they could make contact with defending NATO ground forces; air-power would not be employed independently against strategic targets in the Soviet Union itself.

To be sure, the 1991 Gulf War was also a war for territory and involved the deployment of massive US Army and Marine Corps forces. However, it was an air-campaign first, and only then a land battle. The 100-hour land component was accompanied by continuing air-operations, but for all practical purposes the antecedent 38-day air-campaign had already beaten frontline Iraqi ground forces into a near comatose state by the time coalition ground forces began to roll. The latter essentially finished off or chased out of Kuwait most of those remaining Iraqi divisions that had not been fatally weakened by air-strikes.

Air-power, it seemed, had finally lived up to its promise; if it had not won the war single-handedly, it had certainly been the dominant arm of victory. Revolutionary surveillance and precision-strike technologies had enabled air-power, in less than six weeks, and unassisted by ground combat operations, to destroy at least 50 percent of the Iraqi frontline divisions' equipment and lesser though still substantial percentages held by the Republican Guard and other divisions maintained in operational reserve. Similarly, in Afghanistan, there was careful operational and tactical co-ordination between US air-power and anti-Taliban forces. Indeed, there were small contingents of US special operations forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces on the ground directing air-strikes and performing other military tasks.

In short, the gravity of the September 11 attacks temporarily transformed casualty phobia into a casualty aversion among US policy-makers, the requirements for which could be satisfied by the presence of local surrogate forces bearing the brunt of the ground war in Afghanistan, but the absence of any equivalent force in Iraq remains a central obstacle to US strategy.

State-Building and State-Busting: the Paradox of American Foreign Policy

Since September 11, the most consistent critique against the Bush administration revolves around its substitution of containment and multilateralism

by allegedly novel strategies of unilateralism and military pre-emption (Anderson 2002; Eland 2002; Nye 2002; Goh 2003). However, even if the United States adopts a more co-operative stance towards other states in its attempt to escape from the quagmire that Iraq has become, a deeper problem must be confronted. This is the fundamental contradiction between its rhetorical commitment to state-building via the spread of electoral democracy, and its on-going support for neoliberal economic restructuring at a global level. In this context, what is happening in Iraq is symptomatic of a broader contradiction in core–periphery relations (Looney 2004; Klein 2004).

Since the 1980s, the United States has advocated a development model based on the primacy of individualism, market liberalism, outward-orientation, and state contraction. The organizing principle of what became known as the Washington Consensus was the notion of a minimal state whose principal role was confined to that of securing law and order, macro-economic stability, and the provision of physical infrastructure (Williamson 1990). The new orthodoxy identified state interventionism as the primary cause of weak economic progress. The implication of this diagnosis was to liberate the market from the distorting influences of large public sectors, pervasive controls, and interventionism. Such thinking, in turn, exercised a key practical influence on the policy discourse of key Bretton Woods institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The state was the problem rather than the solution to "good governance" in the periphery. The universal policy proposal was to pursue a systematic program of decreasing state involvement in the economy through trade liberalization, privatization and reduced public spending, freeing prices, interest rates and exchange rates, and lifting exchange controls. Efficient allocation of resources would be guaranteed by relative prices determined through the impersonal forces of the free market.

The corollary of this line of thinking was that the cost of "government failures" arising from rent-seeking and price distortions associated with excessive protectionism would always outweigh "market failures" associated with imperfect competition and the under-provision of public goods. Unfortunately, overall growth in the world economy has been strikingly lower and unstable during the neoliberal era than in earlier periods. Even those who claim that the poverty rate has fallen over the past decade concede that this record was due mostly to good performance in Asia, particularly China. The experience of many countries under neoliberal reforms has clearly demonstrated that economic growth *per se* was insufficient to deal with the problem of endemic poverty. Premature exposure to the vagaries of financial globalization has been costly for many economies in the periphery that found themselves trapped on a highly fragile growth path based on short-term and highly speculative inflows of capital. Reliance on debt-led growth rendered such economies increasingly vulnerable to speculative attacks and frequent financial crises. Indeed, the very frequency of financial

crises primarily, if not exclusively, in the periphery has been one of the most striking features of the global economic environment in the post-1990 era.

Conclusion

The very foundations of the neoliberal orthodoxy that has informed the thinking of the key Bretton Woods institutions have been dramatically shaken in the context of the 1990s. The process of neoliberal restructuring has been associated with a weak growth performance, persistent poverty, rising inequality, and endemic crises with costly ramifications. Countries that performed better than average have typically been those (such as China and Malaysia) that have managed to deviate from rigid neoliberal norms. In this chapter, I have argued that there is a fundamental tension between American support for neoliberal forms of economic globalization and the global war on terror. There is compelling evidence that although inequality and poverty do not in themselves cause terrorism, when combined with the absence of what Michael Mousseau (2003) calls "market civilization" in many developing countries, they feed much of the anti-American resentment that sustains sympathy for, if not participation in, terrorist organizations such as al-Qa'ida. The consequences of neoliberal policies at the global level have been the subject of much academic debate in recent years, but it is clear that the benefits of globalization are distributed in an extremely uneven fashion. Large parts of the periphery are left behind entirely. At the level of global economic governance, there is a growing imbalance in rule-making. Those rules that favor global market expansion have become more robust and enforceable: intellectual property rights, for example, or dispute resolution in the World Trade Organization. However, rules intended to promote social objectives, such as labor standards, human rights, environmental quality, or poverty reduction, lag far behind.

In short, processes of globalization promote "military de-globalization" in the core, where military expenditures (with the marked exception of the United States) are in decline, incentives for war are reduced (particularly among democracies) and supra-territoriality is on the rise. However, the same processes that have helped to create and maintain "zones of peace" in the core have contributed to chronic insecurity for people within states in the periphery. Glossing over this co-constitutive relationship between zones of peace and zones of violent conflict has practical implications for policy-making. It renders it difficult if not impossible for the "zone of disorder" to join the "zone of peace," notwithstanding the Bush Administration's rhetorical commitment to state-building, democratic freedom and economic liberalization on a global scale.

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10 Political regimes in Southeast Asia and the War on Terror

Garry Rodan

The US-led "War on Terror" has been depicted as necessary to protect not only human security but a set of values and way of life that are said to be under attack. Given that Southeast Asia has been referred to as the "second front" in the war against terror, there would appear to be much at stake in this region. Can we understand the struggles here as symptomatic of a clash between resurgent tribal and traditional values and ascendant modern, progressive values accompanying social, political, and economic revolutions across the region? And precisely where do democratic values fit within such a dichotomy?

This chapter examines developments in Singapore and Malaysia: two cases where authoritarian regimes have not only survived but flourished under conditions of modernization and globalization. This immediately throws into question the simple tribal–modern dichotomy referred to above. In these countries the advent of the War on Terror has provided opportunities for authoritarian rule. In particular, it has availed authorities of a timely new rationalization for, and bolstering of, repressive apparatuses of the state that have traditionally been directed as much, if not more, at political threats. If the end of the Cold War finally put paid to the rationale of the communist threat, the notion of an "Asian way" as a defense for repressive state powers also lost political currency following the 1997 Asian financial crisis when it became too closely associated with corruption. Yet the consolidation of authoritarian rule in the context of the War on Terror has coincided with increased rhetorical and practical support for regimes in Singapore and Malaysia from the US administration. To be sure, though, these regimes have their differences which are important to the precise impact and conduct of the War on Terror.

By definition, all authoritarian regimes systematically block political competition, but the means by which the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore has achieved this has become more sophisticated over time. Increasingly, emphasis has been on administrative and legalistic means of repression on the one hand and expanded structures of political co-option on the other. At the ideological level, cultural justifications for the virtual one-party state were introduced and emphasized from the late 1980s (Rodan

1996a,b). The Asian financial crisis represented a challenge to authority structures which was especially felt by PAP ideologues. For this reason, the War on Terror has been especially functional in synthesizing and updating core themes of the city-state's vulnerability, rationalizing a variety of existing and new social and political controls and discretionary powers by the political elite and state officials.

In Malaysia, civil society's suppression has never been as effective as in Singapore, with pockets of independent activism surviving and the internal cohesion of the ruling party subject to periodic strain by virtue of its more complicated and dynamic alliances (Khoo 1995; 2003). Therefore, blatantly repressive legislation such as the Internal Security Act (ISA), which provides for detention without trial, as well as the Official Secrets Act (OSA) and the Sedition Act, has been more central to ruling *Barisan Nasional* (*BN*) coalition political controls in recent years. This was especially evident in authorities' attempts to contain the political crisis associated with former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's sacking and imprisonment in 1998. However, following the events of 11 September 2001, the use of the ISA in particular enjoyed a new respectability in influential international quarters while previous human rights concerns waned.

Yet while the threat of terrorism has been functional for the consolidation and extension of repressive powers, prosecuting the struggle against militant Islamists has not been unproblematic. To differing extents in Singapore and Malaysia, this has placed stresses on official ideologies championing multiculturalism, religious freedom, and secularism. These kinds of tensions, brought forth by the complex intertwining of domestic political demands with global shifts in both the patterns and the treatment of violence, will be explored through this chapter in relation to these two Southeast Asian nations of Singapore and Malaysia.

Rewards to Authoritarians Fighting Terror: Singapore

It did not take long for Singapore authorities after the September 11 attacks to demonstrate how seriously they took the threat of terrorism, with the first of four major operations under the ISA occurring in December 2001 and resulting in 15 arrests. There were subsequent arrests in January and September 2002, January 2004, and between March and May in 2006. By late 2006, a total of 34 people were in detention, with another 21 on restriction orders following conditional releases. In the first of these security operations, detainees were allegedly plotting to bomb embassies and commercial interests of the USA and other Western countries.

Although these and other subsequent arrests involved Muslims who were Singapore nationals, they were understood to be part of wider regional activities involving one or other militant group with pan-Asian caliphate designs. In the case of the September 2002 arrests, for example, the Singapore government maintained that no fewer than nine different militant

groups were being led by *Jamaah Islamiah* (JI) to generate instability in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (Ministry of Home Affairs 2003). Since logistic and financial support was thought to have come from outside Singapore, the Singapore government thereafter took measures to curb the capacity for money laundering and financial transactions facilitative of terrorism.

Importantly, the extensive powers of state surveillance and intimidation have the potential to be enhanced through an even more centralized and co-ordinated set of structures as a result of the war on terror. New agencies such as the Homefront Security Office and the Joint Counter Terrorism Centre are but part of a strategy of "tighter networking and inter-agency co-ordination," according to the government's official document *The Fight Against Terror: Singapore's National Security Strategy* (National Security Coordination Centre 2004: 15). Indeed, it advocates "a strategy that brings together the whole of Singapore—the Government, businesses, civil society and individuals" (National Security Coordination Centre 2004: 16).

Long before the advent of the War on Terror, Singapore had been a strong US defense and security ally, including at times when others in the region were becoming more wary about too close an alliance. When US forces were withdrawn in the early 1990s from the Clark Air Base and the Subic Naval Base in the Philippines, for example, the Singapore government offered the USA access to military facilities in the city-state. More recently, Singapore developed the largest dock in the region, designed specifically to accommodate and support US aircraft carriers.

However, in the wake of September 11 co-operation intensified. In October 2003, President Bush and then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong together announced a joint Framework Agreement for the Promotion of Strategic Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, which was subsequently signed in July 2005. This expanded bilateral framework includes co-operation in counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, joint military exercises and training, policy dialogues and defense technology (Acharya 2004: 4). During the US invasion of Iraq, the Singapore government offered transport and equipment support, as well as police and health care workers to assist with reconstruction. It also allowed US aircraft to fly over Singapore air space and to use Singapore's military bases.

Thus, leading up to and beyond the signing of the United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) in early 2003, the alignment between the respective governments on security matters went from strength to strength. The USSFTA had first been agreed to in principle during late 2000. However, negotiations became protracted as critical US attention focused on Singapore's government-linked companies (GLCs)—which dominate the commanding heights of the domestic economy—and the governance mechanisms shoring them up and militating against a level economic playing field. The Singapore government's steadfast refusal to give ground on its right to impose capital controls in the event of an economic crisis was also a stumbling block.

The issues at stake here were not simply economic. The vast economic and social reach of the GLCs, and an equally important array of statutory bodies, is integral to the political economy of the authoritarian regime in Singapore. Ultimately, the capacities for political reward and punishment are affected by the control over resources embodied in these institutions. However, the dynamics of the deliberations altered after 11 September 2001. From this point on, the willingness in Washington to conclude a deal intensified and the agreement took just a few months to be completed. It became the first such accord by the USA with any Asian country.

Crucially, the security context meant that the major sticking point in negotiations towards USSFTA—the Singapore government's insistence on the right to impose capital controls in the event of a crisis—was one that the USA was prepared to concede new ground on. The US Treasury had consistently taken a hard line on the need for provisions to "ensure that US investors have the right to transfer funds into and out of the host country using a market rate of exchange" (quoted in US Chamber of Commerce 2003). However, after September 11 the Americans settled for an agreement under which both countries guaranteed investors free transfer into and out of both countries, but which also gave Singapore the right to restrict capital flows via the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Although the agreement also contained a number of provisions intended to introduce a more level playing field for competing with GLCs, they were also modest and are unlikely to fundamentally reduce the power of GLCs within the domestic market (Rodan 2004).

Emphasis on the security dimension of US–Singapore relations was a feature of the lobbying in the USA by business interests associated with investment and trade between the two countries, not least from the USSFTA Business Coalition. The right-wing Heritage Foundation's political campaigning for the deal also highlighted security arguments. Meanwhile, attempts by critics of the Singapore government's human rights' record to influence debate were ineffectual. Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) secretary-general Chee Soon Juan's efforts in particular to raise such issues aroused little interest among US politicians (Chee 2003a). The considerable resources and networks of the Business Coalition and other supporters of a rapid conclusion to the agreement also helped ensure such questions were marginalized.

Rewards to Authoritarians Fighting Terror: Malaysia

In contrast with Singapore, ISA detentions in Malaysia were already extensive before the September 11 attacks in the USA and had occurred within the context of a domestic political crisis precipitated by Anwar's arrest and imprisonment. Criticism from the USA about Anwar's treatment and human rights in Malaysia more generally were robustly rejected by the then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. After September 11, though, ISA arrests

were to not only escalate but to also enjoy much less scrutiny from the USA and other governments in the West. Furthermore, despite the Malaysian government's criticisms of the US-led invasion of Iraq, it soon became a significant ally in US counter-terrorism measures within Southeast Asia.

Anwar's political demise produced widespread alienation among ethnic Malay supporters with the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the lead party within the *Barisan Nasional*. This combined with, and bolstered, attempts already in train by assorted *Barisan Nasional* opponents and critics who had seized on the 1997–98 economic crisis to call for political change. Out of these circumstances emerged a *reformasi* movement (Hilley 2001). Consequently, the late 1990s and early 2000s were marked by extensive mass political mobilizations and public protests in Malaysia. Against this background, in April 2001 authorities enforced the ISA to arrest 10 prominent figures. These included Ezam Mohamad Nor, Youth Chief of the opposition *Keadilan* (National Justice Party). His stirring speeches around the country lambasting the government over bailouts of UMNO cronies helped attract thousands of people to demonstrations (Holland 2001).

After the detention of strategic *Keadilan* organizers reduced public demonstrations, an increasingly vocal student movement became a new focus of authorities. Thus, in July 2001, two student leaders involved in anti-ISA protests were detained under the ISA. However, the major targets of repressive measures by this time were organizers within the *Parti Islam SeMalaysia* (PAS), which had made substantial electoral inroads into the traditional UMNO support-base among ethnic Malays in the 1999 general elections. Thus, at least six members of PAS were among the ten new detainees in another wave of ISA arrests in August 2001. Authorities claimed that they had netted a group of Islamic militants, allegedly belonging to the *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* (Malaysian Mujahideen Group) or KMM, trained in Afghanistan by the Taliban and plotting terrorist activities in Malaysia. Whatever the security risks were, the government used the arrests to try and discredit PAS by depicting it as violent and dangerous. Those arrested hotly contested the existence of any KMM while various human rights groups remained skeptical and called for the charges to be tested in court (Leong 2002).

Following the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, the number of people held under the ISA in Malaysia increased significantly. By January 2004, around 90 suspected Islamic militants had been detained (although some were subsequently released, by the end of 2006 the number detained was still approximately the same due to subsequent arrests). This included a dozen Malaysians, Indonesians, and Filipinos allegedly planning bombings in Indonesia and belonging to *Daral Islam* (DI), an organization founded in 1947 and dedicated to the formation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Ironically, none of this has prevented current Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah from calling on the USA to close the Guantanamo Bay detention centre and appealing for two Malaysians there to be given a fair trial (Human Rights Watch 2007). And far from official US–Malaysian relations

deteriorating as detentions without trial escalated in Malaysia, they improved dramatically.

Indeed, Mahathir was quickly back in favor after 11 September 2001 as he adeptly exploited the new security climate for political purposes. In July 2002 he observed that the "dilemma that the Malays and the peoples of Malaysia face is whether we should in the name of democracy, allow the country to be destroyed or we ensure that people are not subjected to the point where they will use democracy to destroy democracy" (Mahathir 2002). It was the threat of Islamic extremism that Mahathir used to make his point, with PAS the unmistakable exemplar inferred in his warnings about how "Malays are willing to vote and support a Party which advocates and practices violence" (Mahathir 2002).

This struck a chord in important places, as it was intended to. After all, the talk was delivered at a Harvard Club of Malaysia dinner. In the context of the USA's global War on Terror, Mahathir was now an ally and a force for Islamic moderation. A new appreciation of his authoritarian rule reflected in the formation of a Malaysia–America Friendship Caucus in the American Congress initiated by Pete Sessions, a Dallas businessperson and friend of President George W. Bush. According to Sessions: "The caucus will assist in educating and informing other members of Congress and government officials about the benefits of a cooperative, anti-terrorist, pro-democracy, free trading, and pro-economic growth relationship with the country of Malaysia" (quoted in Lee 2002).

Consequently, Malaysian government criticisms of the US-led invasion of Iraq have not prevented it being a significant ally in US counter-terrorism measures. Co-operation includes establishment of a Kuala Lumpur-based Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counter Terrorism, suggested by President Bush in October 2002, and military exercises conducted between the Malaysian Navy and US Coast Guard personnel and sailors in July 2004. Since Abdullah replaced Mahathir as Malaysia's prime minister in late 2003, relations between Washington and Kuala Lumpur have further improved. In May 2004, the USA signed the trade and investment framework agreement. This was in turn followed in March 2006 with the USA launching formal free trade agreement negotiations depicted by the deputy US ambassador to Malaysia as a reward for "a very strong partnership already in a wide range of areas—counter-terrorism, defense, counter-narcotics, education" (Bhatia 2006).

The shift in emphasis from the US government towards praise of the Malaysian government has been mirrored in influential sections of the international media that had previously been at the fore of the attack on both crony capitalism and human rights abuses in Malaysia. An *Asian Wall Street Journal* editorial in mid-July 2004 generously bestowed the virtues of the regime thus:

> The country is mainly Muslim, but it is also multireligious and multi-ethnic. Even more important, it has burnished its free-market credentials

> and has a working democracy where the military has always understood its role is to serve civilian leaders … Malaysia is an example to other Islamic nations of progressive Islam.
>
> (*Asian Wall Street Journal* 2004)

In the new security context, it seems, certain authoritarian regimes can assume model status.

Ethnicity, Religion and Ideological Replenishment: Singapore

In Singapore, state powers have not only been consolidated and extended in the context of the new security environment, but often linked to the idea that the sustainability of Singapore's multicultural society—in which ethnic Chinese account for 77 percent, Malays 14 percent and Indians 8 percent—derives from careful state management. More generally, a strong and cohesive state capable of swift and co-ordinated initiatives has been presented as a security imperative. Where there has been contestation over such powers, responses from authorities have highlighted the authoritarian nature of the regime.

Security concerns, for example, were used to justify amendments in November 2003 to the Computer Misuse Act empowering authorities to take pre-emptive action against "cyber-terrorism." The amendment, carrying sentences of up to three years' jail and a maximum fine of S$10,000, gives authorities extensive powers to scan the Internet and make arrests in anticipation of possible security threats. The likeness to the ISA prompted criticisms from opposition groups, with the SDP's Chee describing the law as "another disguised attempt by the ruling party to control the use of the Internet by Singaporeans and to curtail the spread of discussion and dissent in Singapore's cyberspace" (Chee 2003b).

The immediate background to this accusation by Chee included a directive in January 2002 by the Singapore Broadcasting Authority to a group calling itself "Voice of the Singapore Muslim Community" to register as a political organization to continue its seven-month-old website, Fateha.com. The site contained a press release by Zulfikar Muhamad Shariff criticizing the Singapore government's alignment with the USA and for having "trivialised the concerns of the Muslim community for too long" (Zulfikar 2002). He also called for the detainees under the ISA to be brought to trial (*Associated Press* 2002). Zulfikar subsequently found himself under police investigation for postings on the website, including material relating to the banning of Muslim headscarves in schools and the performance of the minister-in-charge of Muslim affairs. With the specter of charges for criminal defamation—carrying the prospect of up to two years' jail—Zulfikar fled Singapore to reside in Australia, claiming he had no confidence in the independence of Singapore's courts.

Amongst other things, the confrontation with Fateha.com and Zulfikar's experience highlights the problematic and structural nature of the PAP's brand of multiculturalism. Despite absolute economic gains, ethnic Malays

continue to be politically, economically, and educationally marginalized relative to the dominant ethnic Chinese communities, thus they have historically constituted a disproportionate percentage of the non-PAP vote (Rahim 1998). Government attempts to limit conflict over the relationship between ethnicity and socio-economic distribution include: ethnic quotas for Housing Development Board flats, diluting the electoral impact of ethnic Malay opponents of the PAP, and state-sponsored ethnic community self-help groups such as Mendaki and other pseudo-corporatist forms of political co-option (Brown 2000). However, the formation of the independent Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) in 1990 out of dissatisfaction with Mendaki, and its periodic friction with the government thereafter, suggests that these measures have not completely worked. Moreover, the accelerated pace of economic restructuring associated with Singapore's fuller embrace of globalization—and the increasing structural unemployment and social inequality accompanying it—poses additional challenges for corporatist techniques of ethnic conflict management.

The Singapore government has been quite determined, though, to separate issues of social and economic inequality in Singapore from terrorism. The government has argued, for example, that since the 2001 ISA detainees included small business, skilled, and semi-skilled people it is religious and ideological extremism and not socio-economic factors that underlie the detainees' motivations (Lim 2002). Moreover, the regional nature of terrorist networks has given governments in Singapore—and Malaysia—a pretext for continued vigilance, irrespective of apparent progress in containing terrorism. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong observed in 2006 that in some ways "the Government is now more concerned than in 2001" (quoted in Zuraidah 2006), partly because the terrorist "centre of gravity" lies outside Singapore and partly because of the ability of extremist groups to purvey their ideas of hatred and violence to vulnerable young Singaporeans through the Internet (Zuraidah 2006).

In terms of the PAP's own ideology, the terrorist threat resonates powerfully with the ruling party's long-fostered notion of the city-state as exceptionally vulnerable to sudden and unexpected adverse forces. This specter has been alluded to over recent decades to rationalize highly elitist power structures. Its first manifestation was the ideology of "survivalism" expounded by Lee Kuan Yew and colleagues in the immediate aftermath of separation from the Federation of Malaysia in the mid-1960s (Chan 1971). Subsequently, the need to be constantly alert to pre-empt and/or address unforeseen threats has become a pervasive and more generalized aspect of official ideology. As the impact of this ideology waned in the context of social and political stability and rising economic prosperity, it was supplemented by propositions about how Asians were culturally predisposed towards elitist political orders (Rodan 1996b).

The advent of the war on terror has thus presented the PAP with new opportunities to give expression to this ideology of imminent threat—or a

politics of fear—and the necessity of powerful political elites to protect against this. In *The Fight Against Terror*, for instance, the war on terror is incorporated into a broader narrative of state mythology. "Our Singapore story is the account of how a small island-nation overcame its vulnerabilities and prospered, despite overwhelming odds," it reads, adding that, "Like our forebears, all of us who call this island-nation home must work together to build a lasting legacy and write another shining chapter in the Singapore story" (National Security Coordination Centre 2004: 66). Historically, though, state rhetoric about "working together" and "political consensus" has been accompanied by the blunting of political pluralism through which genuine consensus might be arrived at.

Ethnicity, Religion and Ideological Replenishment: Malaysia

Reconciling a secular state with an attempt to undercut the electoral appeal of opposition parties—notably PAS—to Muslim authenticity has been a delicate and dynamic exercise performed by the BN. However, in the context of the war on terror, tensions in this balancing act have become more intense, and contradictions inherent in the state's different regulations on, and policing of, religious matters have become more apparent. Thus, while Prime Minister Abdullah has rhetorically championed a progressive brand of Islam, the state has also presided over various forms of suppression of religious freedom, Islamist inspired moral policing of citizens and insipid efforts to protect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to defend the concept of the secular state.

In the immediate post-September 11 period, UMNO benefited politically from opposition bickering exacerbated by PAS's insistence that Malaysia must become an Islamic state. The predominantly ethnic Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP) walked out of the opposition coalition *Barisan Alternatif* over this position. PAS's subsequent call for a *jihad* (holy war) against the USA served also to alienate non-Muslims and help UMNO leaders' attempts to cast the ruling coalition as one of Islamic moderation. Against the background of a string of political debacles for UMNO that year, government depictions of PAS as the Taliban of Malaysia were resonating with the electorate in by-elections (Martinez 2002). However, after Abdullah succeeded Mahathir as prime minister in October 2003, he sought to more concertedly mark out the lines of an enduring distinction with PAS by annunciating his concept of *Islam Hadhari*.

Abdullah used the occasion of his December 2004 speech in India as Chairperson of the Organisation of Islamic Conference to advocate what he referred to as *Islam Hadhari*—premised on the idea that Islamic faith has inevitably been shaped by historical processes and needed to be interpreted accordingly. Among the ten principles he identified as central to this progressive Islam were the need for protection of the rights of minority groups and women, a vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge and a balanced

and comprehensive economic development. Abdullah thought that a line in the sand needed to be drawn with fundamentalist variants of Islam. As he stated, "It is our duty to demonstrate, by word and by action, that a Muslim country can be modern, democratic, tolerant and economically competitive" (quoted in Walker 2005). Having released Anwar Ibrahim from prison in September 2004, Abdullah was keen to neutralize the former deputy prime minister's potential appeal as the principal voice of moderate Islam.

Subsequently, though, a gap between the rhetoric of *Islam Hadhari* and the actions of the Malaysian state has emerged as UMNO appeased Islamists hostile to the principles of *Islam Hadhari*. This appeasement has deep roots. As far back as 1988, Prime Minister Mahathir amended the Constitution to elevate the status of the *Sharia* courts to "co-equal" status with the civil law courts (Kessler 2005). Muslims in Malaysia thus require the permission of a *Sharia* court to renounce Islam. Recently, Malaysian woman Lina Joy, who converted to Christianity and was baptized a Catholic, has discovered how the power of *Sharia* courts is reinforced through other state institutions. Her application to have her national identity card acknowledge her religious conversion was rejected by the National Registration Department on the grounds that she was ethnic Malay. A series of civil court challenges against the jurisdiction of *Sharia* courts preventing her from marrying another Catholic have also all gone against her, forcing her to take the matter to the Court of Appeals, where her case was unsuccessful.

A further development raising questions about the legal protection of non-Muslim religious beliefs concerns the authorities' response to a physical attack in July 2005 on 45 members of the Sky Kingdom religious sect in Terengganu, a federal state governed by PAS. Sect members are followers of Ayah Pin, who claims to be a reincarnation of the holy figures of Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. Not only were there no arrests in relation to the attack, but in August that year all 45 members of Sky Kingdom were charged with violating Islamic precepts under section 10 of the Terengganu Sharia Criminal Offences Enactment of 2001 (Kessler 2005).

Public meetings thereafter organized by NGOs to discuss religious freedom in Malaysia were targeted by a coalition of Muslim groups called the Anti-Interfaith Commission, which in May 2006 prevented one such meeting from taking place in Penang. On this occasion the two PAS leaders involved were charged with illegal assembly for taking part in a demonstration against the forum. However, a subsequent forum organized for the city of Johor Bahru was stopped on the advice of police owing to a demonstration outside the venue by Islamic groups. Rather than taking action to protect such meetings, Prime Minister Abdullah decreed that there would be no more public meetings to discuss inter-faith issues (Human Rights Watch 2007).

Also in contradiction of *Islam Hidhari*, the *Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan* (Islamic Department and Islamic Police) raided a night club in Kuala Lumpur in January 2005, detaining around 100 youths for suspected deviations from Islamic morals. Detainee treatment and the summons for

Islamic religious counseling were challenged in a letter to the Malaysian Attorney-General by the Secretary-General of the *Persatuan Kebangsaan Hak Asasi Manusia* (National Human Rights Society) as constituting sexual harassment and possible criminal acts warranting investigation. Meanwhile, an online petition under the heading of "Malaysians against Moral Policing," was formed in March calling for the repeal of provisions in religious and municipal laws obstructing citizens' rights to privacy. The signatories included 52 NGOs and 22 parliamentarians. The Addullah government responded by announcing that the Religious Affairs Department would now require police permission before conducting raids and that a senior police officer would need to be present during future raids. However, the powers of the department would not be repealed.

The next month, 11 English-language foreign books with religious content were banned by the Internal Security Department, deemed detrimental to public order under the Printing Presses and Publications Act. Included was Karen Armstrong's *A History of God*, a *New York Times* bestseller that had been available in local bookshops since its initial publication in 1993. Abdullah, also Minister for Security, offered no explanation as to how the books were detrimental to public order.

By now, his assertion that *Islam Hadhari* builds on "Islam's traditions of justice, tolerance and intellectual inquiry" was at stark odds with the actions of his government and state officials. Importantly, though, this process has involved more than appeasement of UMNO opponents for electoral reasons. Attacks on *Islam Hadhari* have been mounted from within UMNO—not so much by directly challenging the Prime Minister but by groups embodying the progressive values he has bestowed. Among these, the Sisters In Islam NGO, a women's and human rights group, has been a particular focus for critical attention on the websites of UMNO-related groups such as UMNO-Reform (www.umno-reform.com/).

Conclusion

The above account identifies various ways in which the context of the War on Terror has given a new lease of life to, and expanded scope for, repressive legislations and created opportunities for the revitalization of state ideologies justifying authoritarian regimes in Singapore and Malaysia. However, although this has alarmed various opponents of authoritarian rule within Singapore and Malaysia, it has not aroused the same concerns from the USA and other Western governments who appreciate co-operation in the War on Terror. Importantly, the regional nature of terrorist networks has given the Singapore and Malaysian governments a pretext for continued vigilance, irrespective of apparent progress in containing or obliterating domestic terrorists.

The experiences of Singapore and Malaysia invite reflection on exactly what values are at stake in the War on Terror. Although governments in Singapore and Malaysia have taken decisive measures to blunt radical

Islamists, none of these measures have involved concerted attempts to foster or extend values and institutions of political pluralism. Indeed, the absence of any clear and consistent articulation of the values and ideologies that are under attack from Islamists makes it possible for authoritarian regimes to enjoy new respectability in the eyes of Western governments—both within and beyond Southeast Asia.

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11 Insecurity, risk, identity, and violence in Kosovo

John Tulloch

The threat of violence continues in Kosovo, even after its declaration of independence supported by the U.S. and much of the European Union, with renewed fighting in Mitrovica in March 2008. Just four years earlier, on 16 and 17 March, major violence had erupted in Kosovo which both international reports and academics described as "a flashing warning light" for Europe as a whole (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 579). A major resurgence of inter-ethnic unrest occurred after three young Albanian Kosovar children were drowned trying to swim across the river Ibar near the divided city of Mitrovica. There is a Serb Kosovar enclave north of the river; Albanian Kosovars inhabit the southern part of the city, and NATO KFOR (Kosovo Force) soldiers guard the bridge between them. The only surviving boy told television reporters that they had been chased into the water by hostile Serbs with savage dogs.

Following closely on tensions surrounding the earlier shooting of two Serb Kosovar youths, this event triggered the growing social, economic, demographic, religious, and ethnic discontent in Kosovo, with riots in many parts of the province on 17 and 18 March. Groups of up to 50,000 people—many of them school or university-age students—were reported looting Serb homes, burning Serb churches, and attacking UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) vehicles. The riots left 19 dead, some 900 injured, and over 700 Serb, Ashkali, and Roma homes, up to ten public buildings and 30 Serbian churches and two monasteries damaged or destroyed. Roughly 4,500 people were displaced from their homes.

This chapter examines the condition of violence, via a study of Kosovo at a time of renewed violence five years after NATO air forces went to war in Serbia and Kosovo. It compares various academic theories with "administrative" reports from international bodies. In many academic quarters, especially in criminological and risk theory, "administrative" reports and associated research have a bad name. This, as Wilkinson explains, is especially when "the genuine voice of suffering people is effectively silenced by the translation of their experiences into the language of science and technical expertise. Through this process, politicians and policy makers find it easier to turn away from what suffering does to a person's humanity" (Wilkinson, 2006: 4). However, in this chapter, the notion of

administrative research is given a different inflection, representing the opportunity to draw systematically on voices on the ground—from "below" so to speak.

The chapter therefore moves through several phases. The first section critically examines the attempts by different theorists—notably Samuel Huntington and Benjamin Barber—to understand the nature of violence in the world today, and finds that such attempts seem to fail to grapple with the realities of Kosovo. The chapter then moves to a consideration of how such violence is analyzed, namely from the perspectives from "above" and from "below," and the ramifications of analysis that is begun from each of these perspectives. The final stage of this chapter turns to the reports produced through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society actors, notably the International Crisis Group, as a way of bringing together academic and on-the-ground "administrative" research in examining the Kosovo riots of March 2004.

Theories of Contemporary Violence

Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis has been highly influential in both academic and administrative circles. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Huntington argued that the "clash of civilisations will dominate global politics" (Huntington 1998: 1). Huntington's thesis, although widely known, is worth briefly restating. He argues that an international process of economic modernization and social change has separated people from long-standing identities, weakened the nation-state, and encouraged the rise of various religious fundamentalisms providing for young, tertiary-educated, middle-class professionals and business people "a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations" (Huntington 1998: 5).

Huntington's controversial thesis has been much criticized, not least from within other "civilizations." Scholars from Africa, India, Pakistan, and South East Asia, such as Ali Mazrui, Abul Kalam, Amit Gupta, Tariq Ali, C.J.W.-L. Wee, Chandra Muzaffar, and Chaibong Hahm, have attacked Huntington on a combination of empirical, conceptual and theoretical grounds (see for instance Salim 1997 and Ali 2003). Wee (1997: 75–95), for example, criticizes an essentialism in Huntington's thesis that ignores the hybridity and heterogeneity of cultures and civilizations, and argues for an analysis that understands East Asia's "Confucian revival" within the continuing narrative of capitalism. Supporting this, Muzaffar (1997) argues that the conflicts which Huntington describes as civilizational are more racial, embracing three stages of Western economic exploitation: firstly the *labor imperative*, namely the trans-Atlantic slave trade; second the *territorial imperative* with the West's occupation of lands as colonizers; and third the *market imperative* in which the West struggles with the non-West for control of the global market place (Muzaffar 1997: 39–63).

Forming a different line of critique, Gupta criticizes Huntington for ignoring the fact that despite the much publicized Chinese weapons sale to the Middle East, "the United States is by far the largest supplier of weapons to the entire Arab world and Israel" (Gupta 1997: 69). And continuing the capitalist-critique, Tariq Ali dismisses Huntington as a US "state intellectual," noting two things in the thesis that have "provided an extremely useful cover for policy-makers and ideologues in Washington and elsewhere" (Ali 2003: 299). Firstly, "the world of Islam has not been monolithic for a thousand years," and second, among the more recent historical reasons for this has been the USA's "veteran imperialism that has single-mindedly pursued its own interest—economic, political and military—for a long time" (Ali 2003: 300–301). In helping construct "the world of Islam," the USA has followed the line of backing "the most reactionary elements as a bulwark against communism or progressive/secular nationalism" (Ali 2003: 301). Hence the systematic US support historically for hard-line religious fundamentalists—including Osama bin Laden and in Iraq, where the Communist Party was the most significant social group—allowed, for example, "the gangster wing of the Ba'ath Party … to decimate first the communists and then the oil-workers' trade unions" (Ali 2003: 301).

In terms of explaining Kosovo's March 2004 riots, Huntington's theory might seem plausible on the face of things, given the overt focus by the primarily Muslim rioters on burning Serb churches and other cultural and religious icons. But in fact, as Gupta and Ali emphasize, the Islamic world is by no means a civilization unity, and Albanian Kosovar Muslims have little or no affinity with any Islamic "block." Kosovo was one of the few places in the world in March 2003 where there were demonstrations supporting the US invasion of Iraq, and the USA remains enormously popular in Kosovo, where it is the United Nations that has been seen to lose the peace through the failure of reconstruction.

It is also important to note the single-minded pursuit of its own interests by the USA in the region where, as Ignatieff (2000) has described, the USA was especially concerned with Albania as a "failed state." This had caused fears in Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece of a move towards a greater Albanian state, threatening to make the whole region combustible (Igantieff 2000: 21). The role of the USA in Kosovo sits in contradiction with Hungtington's broad thesis, especially in illustrating the way in which the heterogeneity of cultures and civilizations within the Islamic world, and within the "West," where a neo-imperialist shift in Putin's Russia, and his "natural" alliance with Serbia is likely to make Kosovar Albanians look even more desperately to the USA as an ally to support their claims for state independence.

Mapping the intent underpinning US involvement in the Balkans also allows for thinking anew on the 1999 air-strikes. It was especially the USA's concern about its own domestic voters which underpinned President Clinton's resistance to pressures from Britain and France for a ground offensive to support the air-strikes. Bideleux and Jeffries are convincing in

their conclusion that, "instead of simply relying on the American strategy of smashing Kosovo's economic and societal infrastructure to smithereens through colossal aerial bombardment and then naively hoping that the liberated province would be administered by law-abiding liberals rather than by thugs," a ground war may have prevented the ethnic cleansing events which followed the war (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 561). Bideleux and Jeffries go on to write that:

> There were no quick and easy "technological fixes" for political and societal breakdown, as the USA belatedly began to learn the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simple-minded reliance on bombing and pounding an already run-down society into submission naturally created a power vacuum which, in the absence of adequate ground forces and police, were most readily filled by corrupt and clientelistic gangster networks and warlords.
>
> (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 561)

In contrast to Huntington's work, Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs McWorld* offers a major pluralist critique from within Huntington's own "civilization." Barber argues that world violence arises from a "dialectical interdependence" and "collision between the forces of disintegral tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism" that he calls Jihad (Islam itself not being the issue) and "the forces of integrative modernization and aggressive economic and cultural globalization" he calls McWorld and for which the USA is not solely responsible (Barber 1996: xii). For Barber (1996: 7), terrorism emerges out of "a retribalizing politics of particularist identities" though Jihad and McWorld do still share particular commonalities.

> Jihad and McWorld have this in common: they both make war on the sovereign nation-state and thus undermine the nation-state's democratic institutions. Each eschews civil society and belittles democratic citizenship, neither seeks alternative democratic institutions. Their common thread is indifference to civil liberty.
>
> (Barber 1996:7)

Barber writes from within a reformist capitalist position. His interest in the nation-state is embedded in his critique of what both tribalist localism and capitalist globalization do to civil society. For Barber, the notion of

> Civil society, or civic space, occupies the middle ground between government and the private sector. It is not where we vote and it is not where we buy and sell; it is where we talk with neighbours about a crossing guard, plan a benefit for our community school, discuss how our church or synagogue can shelter the homeless, or organize a summer softball league for our children.
>
> (Barber 1996: 281)

Barber's examples of civil society are themselves US-parochial and redolent of an affluent Western society. They seem ludicrous when applied to Palestine, or Iraq, or Kosovo today. But we can see what he means: that civil society is "public without being coercive, voluntary without being privatized" (Barber 1996: 281). Unlike Huntington, Barber focuses centrally on the media, tracing in detail the links between increasing global monopolization of ownership and the privatization of the public sphere.

His analysis of the synergistic relationship between old, reappearing forms of tribalism and a Western colonizing culture may seem appropriate in some ways to Kosovo's recent violence. On the one hand, many Albanian Kosovars readily admit to the profound and increasing influence after 1999 of clans (especially relating to the former KLA) in the political parties, in the media, and in organized crime. On the other hand, most Kosovars seem also completely sold on an as-quick-as-possible a conversion to a US-style "free market" with one of the greatest complaints against UNMIK is its failure to deliver this.

As in Gupta's example in criticizing Huntington's "civilization clash," there is in Kosovo an aspiring middle class whose tastes and preferences are those of the American middle class; from the joggers they wear, to the particularly rural-Kosovar inflection of US country-and-western music "turbo-rock" enjoyed by the KLA-oriented youth flocking to Kosovo's cities since the War of 1999. One finds a reflection of Barber's notion of a tribalism which recreates ancient sub-national and ethnic borders from within, while making national borders porous from without in Kosovo.

Reflecting a common discourse, the editor of *Bota Sot,* a Kosovo national newspaper, said in interview that his paper would continue to support a virulently, even violently anti-Serb Kosovar position. He accused UNMIK of incompetence and corruption and emphasized that it is the "organized crime" of the internationals not the US free-market that controls his country's "porous" borders.

> I fear that our country might remain a permanent transit route for organized crime in the future. And at some point, I guess, the best thing for my country would be simply to be occupied by a country, a government, by a strong national discourse, otherwise this is basically going nowhere. Today I was in Macedonia, and literally no truck was waiting to enter Macedonia [from Kosovo] because basically we have nothing to send Macedonia, and even if we had we would be prohibited doing it. On the other hand, there were a lot of trucks waiting to enter Kosovo … The international mafia doesn't really try to give any hopes to Kosovo producers. They cannot produce anything and they cannot employ anybody.
>
> (Abdullah Bytyci, Managing Editor, *Bota Sot)*

However, in fact it is traditional and modern formations of power—including the growth of organized crime elites—rather than "primordial" religious and

tribal fundamentalisms which account for this mix of simmering ethnic violence and middle-class consumerism in Kosovo. Certainly, as various historians of Kosovo indicate, clan particularism has been an important part of Kosovo's ethnic-nationalist struggles through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Malcolm 1998; Duijzings 2000; Bideleux and Jeffries 2007). However, this has always been embedded in regional power struggles as Albanian–Kosovar peoples have frequently faced horrific "cleansing" in the fight for territory between regional enemies (Serbia, Macedonia, Austria–Hungary, and Turkey up to the World War I; Serbia, Russia, and NATO powers during the 1990s). In the Balkans during the 1990s, the Western obsession with "failed states" and "rogue states" accompanied by severe and rigorously policed economic sanctions have created

> huge and highly profitable opportunities … for smugglers and criminal gangs to become rich and powerful through arms- and drug-trafficking, sanctions-busting, racketeering and dealing in contraband, to the vast long-term detriment of the great majority of the population … Once entrenched, these increasingly mafia-like criminal organisations are fearfully difficult to uproot.
>
> (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 591)

This is not only because of the on-the-ground power vacuum left in Kosovo immediately after the 1999 war, as Bideleux and Jeffries describe, but also because of the *systemic* operation of Western neoliberal economic and political demands for "free-market" sell-offs of former state enterprises, many of which fall into the hands of mobilized and uniquely solvent organized crime groups.

The Consequence of Orientation: Analysis From Above or Below

Most academic writing on the "post-conflict" situation of Kosovo focuses either on "top-down" (international community) attempts at reconstruction (including Western differences over what Huntington calls human rights imperialism) or on "below-up" theories and institutions (like local NGOs). For example, Mitchell (2000), in a special issue of the *International Journal of Human Rights* on Kosovo, emphasizes that the international community's democratization project must be assessed from a "top-down" perspective, insofar as the emergence of a political culture supportive of democratic political life has depended in significant part on decisions by the international community [in this case NATO, KFOR, UNMIK and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe)], and thus on differences *between* these different political–ethical positions during the decisive "transition" stage in Kosovo. Thus, after the riots of March 2004 in Kosovo, significant differences were noted between these "Western" agencies, and indeed *within* them; for instance with different national units of KFOR being seen to side with Serb or Albanian Kosovars during the riots.

In contrast, in the same journal issue, Husanovic takes a "bottom-up" analytical tack, arguing that it is precisely the top-down "media-facilitated and politically easily utilised ideology of victimisation" which has so far led to the post-Cold War failure of "militaristic humanism" in both Bosnia and Kosovo (Husanovic 2000: 263). It is crucial, in Husanovic's view, to get past the exclusionist "web of crude identity/territory politics" which still underpins both "militaristic humanism" and the ensuing administrative-bureaucratic process of "mechanical democracy-building" (Husanovic 2000:263). For alternative pluriformed and multi-ethnic kinds of community and identification of the kind Barber wants to see achieved, Husanovic looks for more international focus on the "deradicalising" sections of civil society such as the remnants of non-violent NGO resistance from the early 1990s.

Like Husanovic, but from a cultural anthropological perspective, Duijzings (2000) has spoken clearly against all forms of "top-down" rather than "from below" approaches to citizenship, identity, civility and democratic political culture. In his book, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*, he challenges ethnic engineering as "myths of suffering" which "reflect real historical experiences—of oppression and exploitation, of violence and existential insecurity and of people's lack of control over their own lives." Such myths are "exploited politically in order to justify further violence, making people insensitive to the suffering they induce upon others" (Duijzings 2000: 203–4). Duijzings (2000: 206) calls for a recognition of discrepant "universes of discourse" and the "productivity of myth"; and focuses in his book on religious pilgrimages (in contrast, for example, to state manipulation of popular cultural religious myths of violence). He argues that pilgrimages such as those to the Serbian Orthodox monastery at Gracanica, near Prishtina, had been sites of "from below" production of "health, well-being and happiness" (Duijzings 2000: 84) which *crossed* religious and cultural divides and therefore resisted "top-down" constructions of ethnicity. It is Duizings' thesis that identities can be "mixed, heterogeneous, contradictory, fragmented and incoherent" while it is the often violently modernist projects of religious regimes, nationalism and state-building elites which seek to close off boundary crossings (Duijzings 2000: 207).

Duijzings emphasizes media control, what he refers to as "the nationalistic environment media function," far more than theorists such as Ulrich Beck do. Beck's various risk society theses tend to underplay the fact that "the modernist project of creating nation-states is still a very important force in the world" (Duijzings 2000: 209), and this, related to an obsession with "scientific uncertainty," leads to a serious under-estimation of the past as against the future of risk. Focusing more on memory than Beck, Duijzings argues that media and popular culture can perform a profound role in *extinguishing* the fluidity of identity play and dissimulation in situations of extreme personal risk. In particular, he intuits a potential role for popular representations of violence as one of suppressing the agency of situated, everyday memory.

> Especially brutal and personalised violence is a kind of "counterpoint to culture" … capable of creating "blank spaces," erasing old memories, and altering mental categories and beliefs … In such situations victims as well as perpetrators lose the images of previous coexistence and are made to forget how things used to be.
>
> (Duijzings 2000: 33)

Renewal in Kosovo requires, as Barber would argue, the emergence of a new kind of public sphere, new ways of thinking about the democratization of the media as forums of public debate, and a recasting of the civic responsibilities of journalists. In fact, though, as every report on the March 2004 riots indicates, Kosovo's television and newspapers were strongly or partially implicated in an extension of Albanian Kosovar identity-politics, with the sufferings of Serb Kosovars—and other minorities such as the Romany and Ashkali—going largely unreported. Moreover, the Serbs, together with UNMIK, were seen as responsible for the riots and the very same Serb area of Gracanica, where Duijzings found his "from below" production of "health, well-being and happiness" in pilgrimage was at the centre of Muslim mob violence (Duijzings 2000: 84). The monastery, but not Serb houses, was saved only by determined KFOR action.

Views from Civil Society

Early Warning reports had consistently indicated increasing dissatisfaction in Kosovo. For example, data for the period November 2002 to March 2004 indicated that perceptions of family wellbeing marked a decrease of about 20 percent, the level of registered unemployment increased by 30 percent, satisfaction with the Government of Kosovo decreased by 5 percent, whereas satisfaction with the performance of UNMIK decreased by a massive 40 percent (UNDP/US AID 2004a). Even so, Kosovo, UNMIK, and KFOR were caught unprepared by the March 2004 riots. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) saw it in its report, *Collapse in Kosovo*,

> The riots were more spontaneous than organised, with extremist and criminal gangs taking advantage, particularly on day two. Frustration and fear over the international community's intentions for Kosovo, UNMIK's inability to kick-start the economy and its suspension of privatisation, and Belgrade's success over recent months in shredding Kosovo Albanian nerves all built the tension that was released with explosive force by the inciting incidents of 16 March.
>
> (ICG 2004: i)

Thus, in the ICG's view, Huntington's "human rights imperialism," the failure of Kosovo to enter Barber's "universalizing markets," and Serbia's continuing media construction of "ethnic/tribalist" threats all played their part in generating the violence of the riots. The report warned that

> The international community urgently needs new policies—on final status and socio-economic development alike—or Kosovo instability may infect the whole region … If the underlying causes of that violence are not dealt with immediately and directly—through political, developmental and security measures alike—Kosovo risk becoming Europe's West Bank.
>
> (ICG 2004: i)

The ICG report is widely respected within both Kosovo and Europe. Much of it was written by young Albanian Kosovar professionals, working in local NGOs. As Muslims they are operating quite outside the "clash of civilization" frame that Huntington pictures for the new world of non-Western middle-class. It is here that Barber's concerns for renewed civil society thinking and Husanovic's call for "below-up" local NGO activity is best represented in Kosovo today. The ICG report is very clear about the security, economic, demographic, and social root causes of the March riots, and blames both "humanitarian imperialism" and local organized crime.

With regard to security, the ICG report notes that Kosovo emerged into the twenty-first century out of two recent militarisms: that of the Serb military against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and that of the NATO bombing of 1999. The sense of downgrading by the international community of what Albanian Kosovars see as the libratory agency of the KLA has been felt as a keen humiliation in Kosovo. At the same time a combination of factors was seen to further exacerbate the security situation. These included the incomplete disarming of the KLA after the 1999 war, the uncertain status of the KLA's successor organization (the KPC), the decreasing of international troops in Kosovo from 45,000 to 17,500, and Kosovo police service personnel's subsequent feeling of being scapegoats for UNMIK's own incapacity in relation to the riots. During the March riots, the level of hostility towards UNMIK was intense. "Its flags were removed, its buildings attacked, and at least 70 cars were burned—a very specific targeting that passed by EU, OSCE and UNHCR," and there were insider reports that UNMIK staff, particularly with the UN's Baghdad bombing experience in mind, were imagining the possibility of closing down and evacuating (ICG 2004: 24 and 29).

Interweaving with the security dimensions are of course those relating to the economic condition in the territory. Kosovo remains crippled by lack of national status under UN protection. UNMIK's official policy of "standards before status" insisted that Kosovo meet eight standards before being ready for talks about its future status. These standards include: functioning democratic institutions, rule of law (including the disruption of organized crime networks), the right to remain in or return to Kosovo of Serbs and other minorities, sound institutional and legal foundations for a market economy, the privatization of socially owned assets, and dialogue with Belgrade. Yet many Kosovars argue that key standards cannot be met without first having

national status. Without nation-state status there can be no SWIFT bank transfer system, no international Green Card car insurance system, no ownership of a telephone code, no generally recognized passport, no sovereign lending from international development banks, and so forth.

Meanwhile the economic statistics presented in the *Early Warning* and ICG reports paint a staggering picture. For example, in early 2004 there was 60 to 70 percent unemployment, only 4 percent of imports are covered by exports, many families are dependent on the humiliating "black economy" of Europe's illegal immigration and forced returns, 30 percent of the GDP depends on the diaspora, and 50 percent depends on donors who have been withdrawing their funding for new "post-conflict" places like Iraq. The potential for further insecurity can be located in the mix between such economic statistics and the demographic data that puts 50 percent of the Kosovo population under the age of 20. It is of no great surprise that the ICG report comments that this key demographic factor, connected with economic downturn:

> ensures that generational change occurs with the rapidity of an express train. Those who joined the KLA six or seven years ago are already being bypassed by an aggressive, disaffected and rudderless successor generation
>
> (ICG 2004: 32)

The last factor bought into consideration here is the role of the media. The ICG report criticized Kosovo's media for its part in whipping up anxieties and passions at the time of the March riots, but left the main charge against the media to what it called the OSCE's "devastating critique on 'The Role of the Media on the March Events of Kosovo (published in late April 2004), and to the equally critical report by the Temporary Media Commissioner in Kosovo, which laid particular blame at the door of the public broadcaster, RTK. More valuably (since the *casus belli* claims and implications of these other reports tended to resurrect an outmoded, single-claim theory of television violence, and alienated many media professionals in Kosovo), the ICG report embedded its critique of the Kosovo media in analysis of the "separate understandings" of the March events as "read" by the Kosovar–Albanian provisional institutions of self-government (PISG) on the one hand and UNMIK on the other.

The danger of these separate understandings "opening a chasm of mutual incomprehension and disgust," contextualized across a broad range of risks, was the ICG report's most incisive feature, and is probably why it has been accepted so broadly (though not all of it, and not by everybody in Kosovo journalism). On the one hand, the ICG report argued that the

> violence revealed Kosovo Albanian society as dangerously unstable. Within hours, virtually all the domestic institutions [including the

> government and media] built up over five years with international tutelage and money to act as bulwarks of "democratisation" gave way and joined the baying pack.
>
> (ICG 2004: 24–25)

In part, this was recognition by the ICG report of the reality of organized criminal activity just beneath the surface of "democratization." Yet, on the other hand,

> For its part, the self-reproducing, self-maintaining reflexes of UNMIK are tending to eliminate the possibility of radical thinking and critical appraisal from within the mission … International civil and military officials have seized on an orthodoxy that the violence was pre-planned and organised by a coherent, unified, clandestine group of extremists, a notion that massively accelerates the process of containing and disposing of 17–18 March as an anomaly … Instead of acknowledging, even protesting, that the policy and mandate the international community gave them to work within is explosively inadequate, UNMIK is starting again to paint reality to fit the policy. It is a recipe for disaster.
>
> (ICG 2004: 24–25)

The ICG report is too schematic in constructing just one "chasm of mutual incomprehension and disgust" between two (top-down) governances: the "PISG and UNMIK … in states of denial, dangerously detached from reality" (ICG 2004: 24) And it is too pessimistic in its unilinear "baying pack" conceptualization of the media during and after the March riots (ICG 2004:24). The issue is, of course, that these "separate understandings" *are* a reality. Nevertheless, the ICG report, with significant everyday experiential, research, and writing input from local journalists and NGO activists, and with its support for "Kosovo's thin, largely Pristina-based, donor-funded civil society NGO community … and the Kosovo Women's Network" for speaking out against the violence and "setting up a fund to support both the families of the drowned children and a Serb family whose house was burned down in Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove" (ICG 2004: 27), indicates very clearly the importance of sustained NGO "administrative" intervention which is based on close contact and co-operation with local civil society.

Conclusion

This chapter has begun to bring together "academic" with "administrative" research and scholarship which have attempted to explain and design policy for local situations of globalized violence. I have used inverted commas here around the terms because academic and administrative analyses are seldom mutually exclusive categories. Tariq Ali accused Huntington of being a state academic serving US strategic interests; while certainly academics, media

workers and many other professionals co-operate as part of the various agencies such as UNMIK, the International Crisis Group (ICG), the International Commission on the Balkans, and the European Stability Initiative (ESI) which have all produced important research reports on Kosovo both before and as a result of the March 2004 riots. Neither as apocalyptic nor as devoid of on-the-ground institutional or audience-oriented research as the academic world of Huntington, Barber or Beck, this policy-oriented research is nevertheless embedded in broad concepts of ethnicity, gender, class, global and local relations of power, and often offers a strong synergy of "top-down" and "below-up" understandings.

More recent and certainly more incisive academic analyses of the 1999 war and the 2004 March riots in Kosovo, such as Bideleux and Jeffries' *The Balkans: A Post-Communist History*, draw significantly on INGO and NGO reports (including the ICG's), or on the coverage of these reports in the Western media. Common to both academic analyses such as Bideleux and Jeffries' and to NGO reports like that of the ICG is a focus on local and international power, rather than on "civilizational clash" or "tribalism." Thus Bideleux and Jeffries emphasize both the important role of organized crime in the Balkans, including Kosovo, and, like the ICG report, the arrogance and failure of reflexivity in international bodies themselves. They note the

> glaring discrepancy between the rhetoric of Western liberalism, democracy, equal rights and equal respect, on the one hand, and the harsh realities of arrogant, self-serving and paternalistic Western tutelage, on the other. The often damaging and humiliating degrees to which the post-Communist Balkan states have been told "what to do," boxed in, patronized and used by innumerable highly paid Western officials and executives (often in the name of liberalism, democracy and human rights) is very disturbing
>
> (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 594).

Underpinning this top-down "paternalistic Western tutelage" there are the successive failures that Bideleux and Jeffries point to, in the Balkans in general and in Kosovo in particular: the economic and military action which allowed the rapid growth of racketeering and organized crime; the failure in Kosovo to put military forces on the ground quickly enough to prevent local infrastructure (including political parties) falling into the hands of organized criminal-military groups; the use of the prospect of EU membership as a bait to local assemblages of political power to establish standards (of human, social, legal, ethnic, and human rights) before status. This is occurring even while the current Treaty of Nice (2000) prevents further expansion of the EU beyond its current 27 members amidst growing paranoia about "economic migrants."

In this context, Bideleux and Jeffries speak of Bosnia and Kosovo having "latterly been 'lorded over' by Western quasi-colonial regimes" and of how

the EU states and international financial institutions "have become ever more insistently prescriptive and inclined to monitor very closely the degrees to which the post-Communist Balkans states are complying with their demands, so that they can be rewarded or punished as the West sees fit" (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 594).

However, although these authors are right in their conclusion, like the ICG report they say little or nothing of the globalized neo-classical economics bank-rolled by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and, during the 1980s and 1990s, translated stridently into the political wisdom of neoliberal governance. It was this neoliberal discourse which established, as Finlayson *et al.* (2005) and Green and Huey (2005) have argued, the "common sense" of the reform package that has been offered globally following the "new wars" of the post-Soviet world order, and which dominates the human rights/economic growth "standards before status" EU rhetoric determining Kosovo's future independence. It is here, in the *normal* "security/development" neoliberal rhetoric (Duffield 2001) of globalized capital, that the links between the dual threats to Kosovo's people—of organized crime and neocolonialism—are to be found. It is here, much more urgently then in theories of "civilizational clash" and "neo-tribalism" that the social formations and technologies of savage globalization operate.

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12 Beyond ethnocracy and conflict in Israel/Palestine?[1]

Oren Yiftachel

Given both the intense ethnocratic forces currently present within Israel/Palestine and the pressures of global geopolitics from without, can we imagine a path forward in which national and ethnic communities in this troubled land might enjoy greater legitimacy, security, peace, and equality? The main contention of this speculative chapter is that a theory and praxis of the *demos*—creating a legitimate, inclusive and stable political community of communities—is necessary to transforming Israel from an *ethnocracy* (a state based on a singular ethnic claim to prior political rights) to a *democracy*, and to begin healing the deep injuries marring ethnic relations in Israel/Palestine. As the term is used here, an ethnocracy involves the institutionalizing of ethnic difference and privileging one of ethnic groups politically.[2] Ironically, it becomes in time a confirmation of the politicized prejudices carried by approaches that talk of the "clash of civilizations" or the "return of repressed primordial differences." Although the chapter engages in rethinking the bases of a transnational local conflict, it also segues into Part IV of the present volume, "Renewal in the Aftermath of Violence." Without ignoring the importance of global geopolitics, the rethinking goes against the usual emphasis on developing a road-map for a conventional two-state solution from without to suggest a pathway from within.[3]

The *Demos* and the *Ethnos*

The chapter will outline six possible scenarios for the creation of a future in Israel/Palestine. It will conclude by elaborating on the preferred option—gradual bi-nationalism—arguing that a transformed Israeli regime, characterized as moving from a centralized settling ethnocracy to a multicultural decentralized democracy, is difficult but viable. Despite the recent powerful processes of globalization, economic liberalization, and growing migration, it appears that in the foreseeable future, the modern state will continue to form the main allocator of power and resources, especially in the non-Western world. Hence, the concept of the *demos* appears as important as ever, especially as many of these states are grappling with processes of democratization. In many respects, the *demos* provides competing

organization principles to the *ethnos*, from whom ethnocratic regimes draw their main political and moral authority. This is not to suggest that questions of identity do not and should not continue to run deep; it is rather to argue that "primordial" divisions are not essential, and for the active possibility that democratic processes can overlay ongoing cultural differences and at one level provide for an integrative framework for a national politics.

The political geography of a democratic state depends on the demarcation of clear boundaries for the political territory in question, where the "law of the *land*" can be applied equally to all members. As shown by numerous studies and theories, the creation of a relatively stable community of equal residents–citizens is also a necessary condition for the establishment of civil society. Such a social condition operates in the space between state, capital, and household, and creates webs of organizations, institutions, parties, and networks as a foundation for democratic rule. These assertions require two important qualifications. Firstly, the political geography of the *demos* is a necessary, but by no means sufficient, foundation for democracy, which requires an additional set of legal, political, and material conditions. Second, I do not wish to advocate the fixity of territorial political communities. Obviously, in today's "network society," and within the context of a globalizing economic and political world, the state is no longer a tight political container or the supreme controller of resources. Nevertheless, it is still a main shaper of most people's lives, and a major determinant of the distribution of resources and power.

Powerful ethnocratic processes have undermined the making of a *demos* in Israel. These have included, first and foremost, the rupturing of Israel's borders through long-term occupation and settlement of the Occupied Territories and through the empowerment of Jewish diasporas in key policy arenas. The inferior citizenship of Palestinian-Arabs in Israel, and the lack of legal and cultural foundation for an inclusive polity, have also worked to diminish the perception and empowerment of an Israeli (as distinct from Jewish) and Palestinian *demos*. Israel/Palestine also has a painful legacy of ethnic cleansing, violence, terror, Arab rejectionism, as well as ethno-class stratification, and ethnic political polarization. Added to that, Israel/Palestine is located in a part of the world that has borne the brunt of the War on Terror. US support for Israel has come to be seen as inextricably linked to the Second Gulf War. All of this works against the reinforcement of a *demos* as a foundation for an inclusive and active civil society.

Who then should be the members of the Israeli and Palestinian *demos*, using that term in the plural and open sense of the word? Who are the main claim-makers for political power in Israel/Palestine? On a basic level, it is possible to list six major ethno-political groups, marked by their different histories and geographies, which possess the main claims to political power in Israel/Palestine, as follows: Jewish citizen–residents of Israel, Palestinian

Arab citizen–residents of Israel, Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories, Palestinian residents in the Occupied Territories, Jewish diasporas, and the Palestinian diasporas.

These groups can also be seen as advocating various political geographical configurations as possible futures for Jews and Palestinians. They can be articulated here as six scenarios.

Repressive Consolidation

In the near future, repressive consolidation is the most likely scenario. It assumes that present orientations and processes will persist, because of the dominance of nationalist politics in Israel and in the United States. Palestinian weakness, both locally and internationally, will remain a main factor in the lack of movement towards structural change. On the other hand, Israel will avoid annexing the Occupied Territories (except the *de facto* annexation of remaining Jewish settlements). This will enable the state to deal with the Palestinians (often militarily) as a "neighboring" nation, thereby by-passing the need to share power and resources. This scenario may include several future Israeli "disengagements," as occurred in Gaza, in order to improve Israel's ability to control Palestinian population concentrations. The Palestinian Authority may turn into a "provisional" state, but would exercise only limited autonomy in fragmented parts of the territories, over which Israel would retain control. The territory of Israel/Palestine would remain open to Jewish immigration and settlement, but largely closed to Arabs, who will remain confined in their traditional, residential enclaves, with the aid of military power, planning law, and the new "separation barrier." This combination of policies and regulation is likely to hasten the process of "quiet transfer" whereby Palestinians residing in isolated pockets, where it is impossible to conduct normal life, move to larger Palestinian towns and cities. In other words, the situation will result in neither two independent states, nor one, in Israel/Palestine. Such dynamics create an unsustainable process of "creeping apartheid," and a further retreat from democracy, accompanied by persistent ethnic conflict, deepening economic crisis, and internal fragmentation.

Two Ethnic States

This scenario entails the repartitioning of Israel/Palestine and Jerusalem, most likely along the Green Line, and the creation of "two states for two peoples"—a Palestinian–Arab state and an Israeli–Jewish state. Jewish and Palestinian diasporas will have free access (only) to their respective states, meaning that returning Palestinian refugees would settle only in the Palestinian state. It is the most common prescription for the settlement of the conflict, among both peoples and in international circles.

This scenario does present a reasonable possibility for the creation of legitimate Israeli and Palestinian *demos*es, although it leaves several key

issues unresolved. These include the evacuation of (most) Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories; the viability of a fragmented and weak Palestinian state, likely to remain largely dependent on Israel; and the status, rights, and capabilities of Palestinian citizens in the (self-declared) Jewish state. These are not mere technical details, but major stumbling blocks, which may cause ongoing instability and undermine the establishment of stable and legitimate political communities. Further problems may result from the likely ethnocratic nature of both states, which may see the persistence of anti-Jewish or anti-Arab policies and rhetoric, and lead to a precarious and conflict-riddled type of Israeli–Palestinian coexistence.

Greater Israel

This scenario resembles the existing situation, where Israel controls most of historic Palestine, between Jordan and the sea. The main difference is that unlike the post-Oslo situation, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza will neither enjoy a status of "state in the making" nor "provisional" statehood. This agenda is held by Israel's ruling Likud Party, which passed a resolution in its 2002 conference that "there shall be no second state in Eretz Yisrael.[4] Under this scenario, the land will be open to Jewish immigration and settlement, but closed to Arabs, who will remain in this scenario constrained in their residential enclaves, exercising only municipal and cultural autonomy.[5]

This scenario will see the abandonment of the Oslo framework and the disbandment of the Palestinian Authority. As the platform of most rightist Zionist parties suggests, Palestinians will hold Jordanian citizenship and participate in Jordanian electoral politics. It may also lead to the implementation of the goal of population transfer, prevalent among Jewish rightwing parties, that is, the encouragement or coercion of Arabs to leave Israel/Palestine and settle in other countries. In whichever version, the "greater Israel" agenda, which has dominated Israeli politics since the 1970s, will continue to transform the state into an apartheid society, with a near-certainty of escalating ethno-national conflict and economic decline. No legitimate *demos* or stable regime can eventuate under this scenario.

Greater Palestine

This scenario entails the regaining of Palestinian (and/or Islamic) control over historic Palestine, with free return of refugees to the West Bank and Gaza as well as Israel proper. Jews would be allowed to stay as a minority, exercising cultural autonomy, but free Jewish immigration to the land will cease. This was the consensus Palestinian vision during the rise of their national movement. However, following the acceptance of a two-state solution by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1988, it has now remained the platform of most "rejectionist" Palestinian organizations,

including the increasingly popular Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It has also gained popularity during the al-Aqsa Intifada in the Gaza Strip and among the Palestinian diasporas. Radical versions of this scenario, mainly held by Islamic organizations, call for the transfer of most, or some, Jews from the land, where their existence is perceived as illegal and illegitimate.

A sub-version of this scenario is the PLO's historic demand for "a secular and democratic state" over historic Palestine, which is still held by several nationalist Palestinian organizations, such as the Democratic and Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine, and among the Sons of the Village in Israel. Despite the democratic potential of a secular state, the material expression of this scenario, in terms of ethno-national relations, may not be substantially different from the vision of "Arab-Islamic Palestine." The mass return of Palestinian refugees (and, perhaps, the ongoing presence of Jews in West Bank settlements) are sure to sharpen ethnic conflict. The demographic advantage of Palestinians in a one-state situation, coupled with a lack of constitutional guarantee of Jewish self-determination and other key collective rights, would make the chance of creating a legitimate *demos*, and hence democratic rule, improbable.

One Bi-national (and Multicultural) State

This scenario calls for establishing a consociational state over the entire historic Palestine, with political parity between Jews and Palestinians. Each nation will exercise full self-determination and autonomy in most aspects of communal life. Within Jewish and Palestinian nations, the existence of ethnic and religious minorities will be respected and protected. Following the settlement of the Palestinian refugees, future immigration of Jews and Palestinians would be determined jointly and evenly between the two national communities. Most resources, including land, will be distributed according to the principles of proportionality and need, while respecting the validity of current property arrangements. The state will be decentralized both geographically (into administrative regions) and ethnically. Freedom of movement, residence, and employment will be protected. Local authorities (Arab or Jewish) will have the autonomy to shape the public space. Jerusalem–al-Quds will be an open, joint, and shared capital.

This scenario has its roots in the Jewish thinkers of the 1920s, and later among both Jewish and Palestinian groups. Lately, it has received renewed attention among Palestinians, mainly in Israel and the diaspora. It possesses a good potential to create a legitimate *demos* in Israel/Palestine, although, in the short term, it appears highly unlikely that any major Jewish body would accept this scenario, which amounts to a major loss of power, notably the end to Jewish sovereignty and a sharp decline in Jewish control over territory and resources. Because a democratic bi-national state can only be established by mutual agreement, the sweeping Jewish opposition renders this option, at this point in time, highly unlikely.

Gradual Bi-nationalism

This scenario envisages a phased resolution of the conflict, beginning with a two-state-like arrangement, but simultaneously moving to create confederational bi-national institutions to manage the joint and small Israeli/Palestinian territory. For a set period (perhaps for a generation; for example, 25–35 years), immigration will be mainly restricted to a "mother" state; that is, Palestinians would have free access to Palestine and Jews to Israel (with some exceptions regarding Palestinian refugees, as detailed below). In parallel to the establishment of two states, arrangements enabling increasing Israeli–Palestinian integration will be put in train in many spheres of state governance. These will gradually increase the accessibility of the two political spaces to one another, and establish joint processes, agreements, and institutions for managing the economy, employment, trade, environment, and security. It is envisaged that after such a period, with cessation of violence between the two peoples, and the new consciousness of coexistence, the most logical and efficient next move for both states would be the establishment of a highly decentralized federation. This would preserve their national self-determinations, while improving the management, security, openness, and prosperity of their joint land.[6]

In such a scenario, the joint metropolitan region of Jerusalem–al-Quds would have a pivotal role in establishing a groundbreaking example for bi-national management of space, first on an urban level, and later on regional and state-wide scales. In addition, such a gradual framework will give legitimacy to multicultural arrangements vis-à-vis minorities inside Israel and Palestine, most notably autonomy of the Arab and ultra-orthodox groups in Israel, and special arrangements with the Christians, Bedouins, Armenians, and other minorities in Palestine.

These are six of the most prevalent options for the future political geography of Israel/Palestine. Several other scenarios no doubt exist, but probably not with the same level of acceptability to large constituencies. The main point here is not to recite a well-known list of political agendas, but rather to open up the question of the deliberate redesign of the *demos* as an intellectual and political path to transform *ethnocracy to democracy*. In that vein we can ask: which configuration is best suited for the creation of an inclusive and stable political community? Which will create the best conditions of reconciliation and development for Jews and Palestinians?

It is clear that the first, third, and fourth options (namely, "repressive consolidation," "greater Israel," and "greater Palestine") harbor severe difficulties. The last two would be driven by goals of ethnicization (either Judaization or Arabization), and hence are likely to exacerbate the conflict. Option 2 ("two ethnic states") is held internationally as the best scenario for peace, and indeed has potential for enhancing reconciliation. Yet, it is likely to create two ethnocracies between Jordan and the sea. This is no doubt preferable to the existing situation of one-sided occupation, oppression, and

reciprocal violence, but is not considered the best platform to achieve a stable *demos*. This scenario would especially be difficult to implement inside Israel, with an increasingly assertive Arab minority and deepening conflict between secular and orthodox Jews on the meaning and geography of the "Jewish" state. A stark illustration of this difficulty (and by no means the only one) was the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by an Orthodox Jew, opposing both Rabin's willingness to retreat from Eretz Yisrael territories and Rabin's willingness to form a political partnership with Israel's Palestinian citizens.

We are then left with the fifth and sixth options, both accepting, at a deep level, the bi-national structure of the land, and attempting to reconfigure political frameworks to reflect and to legitimize this structural reality. As already noted, the fifth option ("one bi-national state") also appears problematic, as the immediate creation of a bi-national state may be fraught with conflicts due to the disruptions associated with rapid redistribution of major resources (especially land, housing, and employment), and due to the fierce opposition likely to arise from most Jews. It should be remembered that the collective Jewish psyche is still driven by the memory of genocide, dislocation, and fear, and that communal security and self-determination of the Jewish nation is a goal that will not be relinquished by the vast majority of Jews. Hence, the theoretical democratic design of one state may result not in the creation of a legitimate *demos* but in additional rounds of communal violence.

Therefore, the most politically sustainable scenario, is *gradual* bi-nationalism. It is based on long-term creation of new frameworks and consciousness of coexistence, premised on the legitimacy of both the Jewish and the Palestinian bond to their common, relished, homeland. It is also premised on dealing with the denied root causes of the conflict, such as the return of Palestinian refugees, and the Jewish right for self-determination; and on the creation of new spaces for shared management of Israel/Palestine, with a potential to gradually blunt Jewish–Palestinian dichotomies.

This scenario challenges the very logic of the ethnocratic state, by—first and foremost—granting *equal status* to the Palestinian and Jewish–Israeli nations. As explained below, it also attempts to create a long-term framework of an open homeland to both people, which is diametrically opposed to the ethnocratic endeavor to impose an endless set of ethnic boundaries, barriers, and obstacles for the development and mobility of weakened groups. It also endeavors to envisage a new Israeli *demos* which would empower a range of ethnicities and individuals in a new democratic and multicultural Israeli polity.

The first stage under this scenario is the ending of Israeli occupation, the evacuation of most Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, and the creation of two sovereign political entities—Israel and Palestine, based on the Green Line.[7] One of the most urgent tasks of the two states will be to settle the complex refugee question, especially concerning issues of property and citizenship, while not undermining the self-determination and security of

the two nations. This requires open negotiation between conflicting rights and conflicting decisions of international bodies. Under the "gradual bi-nationalism" scenario, the arrangement will be based on acknowledgement of Israeli's historic responsibility for the plight of the refugees, as well as Arab and Israeli responsibility for mutual violence and terror.[8] This will be accompanied by statements of public apology and recognition of the right of the two nations to rightfully exist securely in Israel/Palestine.

Under this scenario the Palestinian right of return will be acknowledged by Israel as manifestation of the *collective* and unbroken bond of the Palestinians to all parts of historic Palestine. However, the individual implementation of Palestinian return into Israel proper will be constrained—by agreement—by two major factors: (a) recognition of the full set of internationally recognized decisions (including UNGA 181, 194 and UNSC 242), which recognize the right of Jewish self-determination (based on the arrival of most Jews in Palestine/Israel as refugees or coerced migrants during the twentieth century), with its territorial manifestations, including Israeli control of immigration within its sovereign boundaries; (b) the likely problematic consequences of large-scale Palestinian immigration into Israel proper, namely the danger of chronic and violent instability, born of ethnic conflicts over history, property, resources, and political rights.

Given these constraints, it is envisaged that under this scenario of reconciliation, a system of gradual refugee return would be initiated, based primarily on criteria of individual needs. Under such a setting, it is likely that several hundreds of thousand refugees—chiefly stateless communities from Lebanon—would be allowed to settle in Israel. The majority of refugees, however, would either resettle in the Palestinian State or remain in their current locations, gaining full compensation for their lost property and sufferings. The right of Jewish settlers to remain in a Palestinian state as citizens without collective territorial claims will also be acknowledged. It is further envisaged that the majority of Jewish settlements and their elaborate infrastructure would be used for the settlement and development of Palestinian refugees, thereby providing (indirect) Israeli assistance for resolving the refugee question. In order to stabilize the population, the two states would also declare a particular period—possibly a decade—after which the Palestinian and Jewish right of automatic immigration into their homeland state (the Right of Return and Law of Return, respectively) would cease to exist, followed by the establishment of a joint immigration agreement.

Under "gradual bi-nationalism" the Jerusalem–al-Quds "Capital Region" would form a model for creating bi-national (and bi-state) frameworks, to manage the multiplicity of joint civil and urban affairs with which the two intertwined states would have to deal. It is envisaged that in a later "phase," perhaps after two to three decades, as security mobility and accessibility improve, both states would become increasingly open to one another, for employment, investment, tourism, marriage, leisure, study, and even residence. As noted earlier, the arrangements between the two states would then

move towards a decentralized federation—two sovereign entities jointly managing many areas of life, ensuring freedom of movement, as well as the self-determination of each national community. It is also envisaged that at that time, with the increasing impact of globalization and interstate co-operation in the Middle-East, the emotional power attached to ethno-national sovereignty would subside, enabling the new confederational arrangements to be accepted by most Jews and Palestinians.

One of the main features of the bi-national framework is the legitimacy, and hence security, it would endow to the existence of a Jewish–Hebrew nation in the Middle East. Given the tragic history of Jews, and the persisting rejection of Israel and Jewish nationalism in parts of the Middle East, this would be a major step towards allaying the existential fears of many Jews, thereby quelling most Jewish aggression. We should not lose sight that one of the most profound long-term issues related to the Zionist–Palestinian conflict is the acceptance and legitimacy of Jews in the Middle East as a legitimate national and political collectivity. This legitimacy will also allow Jewish public discourse to move away from its recent preoccupation with "demographic danger" or "the need for separation" (manifest in the brutal and internationally condemned "separation barrier" constructed in the West Bank). Notably, Jewish voices—many from the Zionist left—have often used the "demographic danger" and "the need for separation" as possible reasons for retreating from some Palestinian territory in order to improve security and advance towards peace. However, ironically, the steps taken by Israel have fed the conflict with new waves of anxiety, following ever-harsher security measures imposed on Palestinian movement and political freedom in the name of security and peace. This has had the effect of destroying trust, thereby making Jews even less secure.

The "gradual bi-national" framework would address this concern by granting historical and moral recognition to Jewish nationalism by its most belligerent nemesis—the Palestinian national movement. This will open the way for broader and deeper acceptance and legitimacy in the Middle East, provided, of course, Israel ends the occupation of Palestinian territories and the massive use of violence, and assists in settling the refugee problem. This will also depend on Palestinian society finding ways to restrain most of its anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish public rhetoric, and especially suppress Palestinian terror against Jewish civilians.

It is recognized, of course, that the gradual bi-nationalism approach is, at present, a distant, almost utopian, scenario, likely to be constantly undermined by state aggression and ethnic violence. Movement towards such a scenario will probably be slow, and require deep transformation in a multitude of societal spheres, including education, mass culture, land policies, the impact of militarist and religious elements on politics, and patterns of economic development and resource distribution. It will also require the leadership among Jews and Palestinians to firmly adopt a strategy of peace, as well as direct intervention of international bodies and military forces (ending

Israel's exceptionalism in defying the legitimate decisions of the international community on Palestine, while assuring its security in the Middle East).

Despite its remoteness at present, the articulation of such a normative scenario is vital for the construction of resistance against the current oppressive order, and for the formation of new social, economic, cultural, and political agendas. For the short term, it is expected that the "repressive consolidation" approach will dominate the political geography of Israel/Palestine, exacerbating the process of "creeping apartheid" and ethnic conflict. It is also expected that these conflicts would be tempered by several short-term measures, such as security barriers and tightening surveillance, or, at times, with selective easing of the grip over Palestinians, or even the declaration of a provisional Palestinian state. Yet, none of these measures can get to the root of the Jewish–Palestinian conflict, and thereby address the conditions for long-term co-existence, as does the gradual bi-nationalism approach.

To sum up, I argue that lasting Jewish–Palestinian reconciliation is impossible without a long-term vision that includes the creation of a legitimate, inclusive political community (a *demos*). This would entail the introduction of political arrangements, which would end Israeli occupation, enfranchise all permanent residents of Israel/Palestine, and ensure the security and legitimacy of both Palestinian and Jewish nations on that land. The most promising possibility of progressing towards such a future, I contend, lies in imagining, planning and implementing the vision of *gradual* bi-national*ism*, where two "*demos*es" are initially created—while in parallel, joint Israel–Palestinian institutions and frameworks would progress towards establishing a "thin" confederation which may later turn into a federation over the entire land.

Gradual Bi-nationalism and the Israeli *Demos*

Beyond this broad Israeli–Palestinian framework, the normative considerations require further comment on the nature of the Israeli *demos*. The geography, demography, and power arrangements of the *demos*, on which we focused above, are necessary but not sufficient conditions to create a democratic polity with sufficient legitimacy. Three additional factors—the place of the Palestinian minority, the impact of resource distribution, and the making of a multicultural polity—are all critical for the making of the Israeli *demos*.

Within two decades, the Palestinian-Arab national minority will approach a quarter of the Israeli citizenry, creating in effect a bi-national situation inside Israel proper. This reality is not likely to quickly receive official recognition or political legitimacy among Jewish elites. Yet, within the framework of an Israeli–Palestinian agreement, and as part of the legitimacy to the bi-national reality of Israel/Palestine, it is envisaged that the democratization of Israeli society should be significantly enhanced, especially as regards the rights and capabilities of Arab citizens. The new political framework, and improved security for both Jews and Palestinians, would allow

a variety of aspects to be reformed "from below" and reshape the Israeli polity. The Arabs have been creating what can be described as a "fractured region" within Israel. This process is likely to continue with piecemeal moves towards cultural autonomy and devolution of certain regime functions to the Arab communal, economic, and political leadership. These measures may resemble some of the arrangements enjoyed by the ultra-orthodox sector, which protects its cultural and material autonomy within Israel.

Under this scenario, it is likely that Israel will be reshaped as a multicultural (plural) state, with the Palestinian-Arabs and ultra-orthodox sectors forming two important non-assimilating, autonomous communities of Israeli citizens. The recognition of these sectors, and the allocation of collective rights and capabilities, by their very nature, would devolve the highly centralized nature of the Israeli state. At the same time, however, they may be compatible with the desire of most non-orthodox Israeli Jews to maintain a Jewish–Hebrew public sphere in many of the state's arenas. Whichever arrangement is achieved, the existence of a prominent and autonomous Palestinian community in Israel, which should receive a constitutional status as a national minority, is sure to strengthen the bi-national framework for the entire Israel/Palestine, and the transformation of the Israeli state into a more devolved and democratic regime.[9]

The Israeli Demos: A Question of Resources

The deep materiality of ethnic, social, and political relations should never be ignored. Discussions of rights, identities, cultures, and political configurations, must be constantly framed within the concrete reality in which they are enmeshed. Hence, the recreation of a legitimate Israeli *demos* profoundly depends on the nature of allocating scarce material resources between the state's ethnoclasses. One of the main characteristics of the Israeli ethnocracy has been the uneven allocation of resources, most notably land, development, municipal areas, employment, services, facilities, and hazards. This has created long-term patterns of conspicuous ethno-class stratification. It is clear that part of the ethnic divergence and polarization of Israeli society relates to this long-term stratification, and any future reform must seriously address these issues.

Moreover, the dominant processes at present lead in the opposite direction, with the gradual, but profound, liberalization of the Israeli economy. This process began in the mid-1980s and has accelerated during the last five years. The state has attempted to reduce its welfare "safety net," by shrinking public allowances and expenses and by selling off government assets and companies. At the same time, it has increased the incentives for capital investment and reduced taxes. The state has also weakened organized labor, deregulated money markets, reduced tariffs, and allowed the mass importation of foreign labor.

The retreat of the state from the market, and the opening up of the economy, may have a positive potential for individual members of peripheral

groups. On a structural level, however, it reinforces the gaps between ethnoclasses, as a result of what could be termed "the ethnic logic of capital." This is particularly true in times of economic crisis, as experienced in Israel since the year 2000.

Although the liberalization of the Israeli economy may (or may not) improve several economic arenas, such as gross domestic product, inflation, and average income, repeated analyses show that this will have little effect on the critical gap between groups, and on the welfare of the lower socio-economic rungs. In terms of the Israeli *demos*, it is clear that existing processes will further undermine the creation of a legitimate political community with a high degree of legitimacy. Therefore, it is imperative that the state remains a strong actor in the market, that it regulates the distribution and use of public lands according to transparent and just criteria, that labor remains organized, and that public policies work to equalize the material existence of all Israelis.

The Israeli Demos: Several Forms of Israeliness?

The creation of an Israeli *demos* is further complicated by the multiplicity of groups whose cultures, ideology, and goals diverge greatly. Several of these are non-assimilating groups or have rigid ethnic, religious, or geographical boundaries. The multiplicity of cultures, ethnic groups, and sectors seriously impede the crystallization of an overarching "Israeliness," and the construction of solidarity and tolerance. The development of a sense of "Israeliness" is particularly hampered by the Judaization project, which promotes "Jewishness" in the public sphere at the expense of peripheral minorities. The sense of Israeliness is also undermined by the growing disengagement of Israel's Palestinian citizens, by strengthening their aversion of state symbols, duties, and identity.

Given this setting, the Israeli *demos* can no longer be perceived—descriptively or normatively—as a "melting pot," into which all immigrants and minorities could assimilate. This was the dominant approach among Jewish-Ashkenazi policy-makers until the 1990s, causing much tension among ethnic and religious groups who were expected to adopt Israeli-Ashkenazi culture. A similar approach attempted to turn the Palestinian citizens into "Israeli Arabs," devoid of their history, nationality, and collective aspirations. By the same token, the Israeli *demos*, and the promise of full and equal citizenship, cannot ignore the connections that need to be fostered between groups. Citizenship cannot rest solely on legal equality and group identity. It has to rest on the making of a common political space, and a degree of mutual solidarity and trust. This stands in contrast to the conspicuous politics of identity recently advocated by several minority leaders, mainly between Arab and ultra-orthodox groups. Such an approach is often enhanced by a deliberate process of "othering," whereby identity is shaped by emphasizing the tension with the "other" groups. Given the very different,

and often conflicting, definitions of the collective good by these groups, an overemphasis on identity is likely to generate separatism and result in protracted conflicts and oppression of minorities.

Therefore, the Israeli *demos*—if it is to genuinely emerge—needs to balance ethnic identity and citizenship. The new "Israeliness" must respect group identities, histories, and visions, but create institutions and processes that promote a degree of common citizenry, joint societal goals, ideologies, and interests. It can possibly be promoted through introducing a new language of coexistence to the official public discourse, through revised education curriculum, more accessible forums of resource allocation, and restructured sites of communal representation.

This transformation may be assisted by the devolution of the Israeli state in two main directions. Firstly, geographically, the management of many aspects of life should be devolved to regions and cities. This would encourage groups to co-operate and form regional and metropolitan (multi-ethnic) institutions, parties, and interests and come into closer contact, not as rivals, but rather as partners in common struggles. Israel should decentralize its highly centralized administrative, legal, economic, and electoral structure, and promote the development of regional and urban, cross-cultural, and multi-ethnic identities. Past experiences in deeply divided societies, such as Malaysia or Canada, show that geographic (non-ethnic) regionalism assists in the management of protracted conflicts.

Second, Israel should recognize several *founding communities* as forming the cultural bases for this multicultural society. At present, there appear several obvious candidates:

1 mainstream secular Jews (who hold a Hebrew culture),
2 ultra-orthodox Jews (Jewish culture), and
3 Palestinian citizens (Palestinian-Arab culture).

These groups are large, relatively stable and would serve as durable communal foundations. The state should be restructured to reflect the depth and aspirations of these founding cultures, which would be protected and resourced under a new constitution. This could be achieved by the sanctioning of communal (ethnic) education system, electronic and printed media, housing development, and local government areas. It is therefore possible to imagine a future Israel as having several autonomous communities in partnership, simultaneously promoting their respective Hebrew, Jewish, and Arab cultures, yet "held together" by a common Israeli "layer" of civil and political activity and identity.

The state's recognition of these founding cultures, however, should not be premised on their incorporation as separatist, but as groups integrating into the Israeli polity. The Israeli polity state should be designed as an expression of collective needs and identities within the realms of Israeli citizenship, resembling the "asymmetric federalism" established in recent years in post-Franco

Spain, in which autonomous ethnic communities, such as the Catalans, Galicians, or Basques, enter into specific "tailor-made" constitutional arrangements with the central State. Under such settings, the fierce debate about the nature of the Jewish state would lose much of its venom, since the point of contention would focus less on the state's formal definition, and more on the collective rights and capabilities it endows to each community. From the perspective of the scenario sketched here, the best option would be to define Israel as an *Israeli*, or to a lesser extent *Hebrew* (but not Jewish) state.

The Israeli definition would maintain a special link to Jewish and Hebrew history, through the special meaning attached to the word "Israel." But such a state would also allow a "path of entry" for non-Jewish minorities, currently denied under the state's official Jewish definition. Even if the state continues to be defined as "Jewish," the *federal-type regime* structure suggested here would allow each community to secure its own identity and culture, and possess formal impact on state decision-making. Crucially, the state would then cease to be a "Judaizing" state, thereby losing many of its conflict-inducing ethnocratic characteristics.

Beyond the founding communities, whose autonomy and sustainability should be enhanced, the state should also enable the articulation and protection of other (sub)cultures and communal lifestyles. These will depend on the mobilization of sufficient demand, and will entail "softer" forms of cultural autonomy, not constitutionally guaranteed, but enabling the initiation of education programs, media outlets, residential communities, and communal institutions. Candidates for such collective arrangements are Russian, Mizrahi, religious (Jewish, Muslim), Druze, kibbutz, and gay communities, to name but a few.

It should be stressed, however, that these arrangements, regarding both "founding" and other cultures, must be premised on *voluntary* association. Members of all groups should maintain at all times an "exit" option; that is, they should be able to exist as individual Israelis, enjoy full civil rights, without institutionally belonging to any specific sub-state cultural community. In terms of regime principles, the proposed scenario is close to the recent ideas of the philosopher Iris Marion Young, who articulated a vision of "nondominating self-determination" as a fundamental collective right, and "differentiated solidarity" as a normative vision of group coexistence within a deeply divided political system.

Clearly, this chapter is designed to provoke thought and promote debate. What is clear, however, is that without serious thinking of the possibilities of creating a legitimate and sustainable *demos*, the Israeli polity itself will be under severe stress, constantly struggling against disgruntled minorities. The current "repressive consolidation" approach which dominates Israeli policy-making is amplifying the currently situation and grievances. It is never too early to start thinking about a moral, effective, and workable design for the troubled land of Israel/Palestine. Gradual bi-nationalism and a new perception

of the Israeli *demos* have the potential to establish legitimate political communities, which are the prerequisite for the different, democratic, and peaceful future both Israelis and Palestinians deserve.

Notes

1 Owing to its speculative and normative style, this chapter is presented without the usual academic conventions of referencing.
2 A theory of ethnocratic regimes is fully outlined in O. Yiftachel, (2006), *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine*, Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
3 The emphasis here is on carving a new analytical and political space between the traditional two-state solution—which has failed for decades, and the renewed emphasis on a one-state solution, which is increasingly present in the critical discourse, without a detailed enough analysis or convincing political design. It assumes that democratizing Israel will have a pacifying ramification on the surrounding territories and states. Hence, the bi-national and multi-cultural arrangements proposed for "Israel-Proper" (within its 1949 borders) is likely to reduce the current resistance of most Jews to integrate within the Middle East, and at the same time soften the resistance of many Arab societies—first and foremost the Palestinians—to accept Israel as an integral part of the region.
4 In a similar vein, Likud member led a Knesset resolution in July 2003, following the launch of the international "road-map" peace initiative, claiming that "the territories liberated by Israel in 1967 do not constitute, and shall never constitute, occupied territories" (*Haaretz* 18 July 2003).
5 Yet, it should also be noted, however, that former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has repeatedly advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River. He has held this position against his party's stance, including during the 2003 elections when he achieved a landslide victory. Notably, though, Sharon remained vague on the geographical extent of such a state, and continued to support Jewish settlement in most parts of the Occupied Territories.
6 The inclusion of Jordan in this confederational agreement is also a long-term possibility.
7 Here it may be possible to think of small modifications to the Green Line so as to incorporate some Jewish settlements into Israel Proper in exchange to land of equal size and quality. The confederational setting, which will enable freedom of movement within the two states, will assist the Palestinians to accept certain border changes, based on equal exchange of land (but not people), as commonly demanded by Israel.
8 This does not imply that the responsibility is equally shared. Israeli expansion and occupation has been the main source of the conflict, but Arab violence and aggression has also played a critical part.
9 In other words, the democratization of Israel and its transformation into a multicultural regime is envisaged as a major step in the gradual "bi-nationalization" process. This scenario creates a viable (if at present almost idealistic) option between the failed two-state solution, and the somewhat a-political one-state hope by many in critical circles. Only by working through the current state system, while transforming it from within, is there a realistic possibility of mobilizing both national communities to the process. Imperative here is a sense of mutual security, whereby both traumatized communities will cease fearing annihilation or renewed conquest. A confederational setting, with regional Arab League and international guarantees, has the potential to provide this sense of mutual security as a stepping stone towards a genuine future co-existence.

Part IV

Renewal in the aftermath of violence

13 Governance

Rule and reconstruction after war

Richard Caplan[1]

The end of the Cold War has been marked by an unprecedented degree of interventionism in response to civil strife worldwide. Since 1991, the UN Security Council has authorized the use of force to address threats associated with intra-state conflicts in more than a dozen states and territories. States have also intervened unilaterally—without Security Council authorization—in response to a number of violent civil or transnational local wars. This "new interventionism" has manifested itself in other ways as well, including the international prosecution of war crimes committed in the context of internal wars; the creation of a permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity; and the adoption of a wide range of post-conflict, peace-building measures by the United Nations, the World Bank, donor states, and non-governmental organizations that have had as their aim the consolidation of peace in the wake of civil unrest.

There are several reasons for this heightened international activism in the face of civil strife. With the end of the Cold War, the vast majority of major armed conflicts have been of an internal nature. These conflicts have given rise to savage atrocities often involving large numbers of civilian non-combatants, many of these atrocities the consequence of flagrant violations of humanitarian law (Kaldor 1999: 9; *Human Security Report* 2005: 23). Internal conflicts, moreover, have sometimes so incapacitated states that they have rendered them incapable of performing even the most basic governmental functions, further exacerbating the humanitarian plight of civilians. States have also been motivated to intervene out of strategic considerations, notably concerns about the spill-over of conflicts into neighboring states and the potentially destabilizing consequences of refugees fleeing from war zones. Increased international engagement in the rehabilitation of war-torn societies, meanwhile, reflects recognition of how fragile a peace may be and how easy it is for terminated conflicts to restart.

It is this latter area of international intervention with which this chapter is chiefly concerned: post-conflict peace-building and, in particular, some of the more ambitious efforts that have been made in an attempt to create a sustainable peace in the wake of violent conflict, extending to the establishment

of virtual trusteeships in the cases of Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor. The chapter situates these efforts in the broader context of post-Cold War security trends and discusses the debate over their effectiveness. Analysts are divided in their assessments of the contribution these efforts have made to building a stable peace (compare Chandler 2006 and Barnett 2006 with Caplan 2005 and Dobbins *et al.* 2005). Yet what achievements there have been, it will be argued here, are qualified in two important respects: first, internationally led peace-building has often inhibited the development of the local capacity for self-government, which is vital for maintaining a durable peace; and, second, the achievements often owe themselves to local conditions that may not obtain elsewhere, thus rendering these efforts limited in terms of the wider application they may have.

Post-conflict Peace-Building

It is useful to situate current international efforts to consolidate peace after conflict in the broader conceptual framework of peace-building. The term itself is not a new one: it was coined by peace researcher Johan Galtung in the 1970s (Galtung 1975: 282–304). It gained wide currency with the publication of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992. In the *Agenda*, Boutros-Ghali described the range of conflict management tools available to the United Nations: from conflict prevention and peace-making to peace-keeping, enforcement and post-conflict peace-building. Boutros-Ghali described peace-building as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali 1992: §21). He elaborated on this concept in his *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* in 1995, where he defined peace-building as "the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace" (Boutros-Ghali 1995: §49).

The importance of peace-building is underscored by findings that attest to the fragility of war-torn states. Between one-third and one-half of all terminated conflicts reignite within the five years of the establishment of a peace (Collier *et al.* 2003: 83). Armed conflicts that end in a negotiated settlement, moreover, have nearly a 50 percent chance of relapse. Indeed, negotiated settlements revert to conflict at roughly three times the rate of violent disputes that have ended by outright victory or defeat. This is not to suggest that negotiated settlements are unwelcome outcomes. They may bring a conflict to a conclusion sooner and with less loss of life. Negotiated settlements also tend to produce less retributive violence. In view of these conflict patterns, however, it is apparent that external interventions aimed at institutionalizing a peace can, if successful, make a significant contribution to stability within a state and the wider region.

Peace-building in the post-Cold War period has been characterized by a broad range of activities that embrace three functional areas. The first area

involves activities that are concerned with the maintenance of peace. This is the "military-security" side of peace-building and is sometimes also referred to as "stabilization." Activities in this area may include security-sector reform, demining, arms control, police training, human rights monitoring, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of rebel and national armed forces. In this arena, peace-builders attempt to reduce the means available, and the opportunities for, actors to revert to conflict. Peace-building shares much in common with the aims of peace-keeping in this regard but it goes beyond peace-keeping in trying to effect fundamental, even radical, changes that will result in a durable peace.

The second functional area of peace-building is concerned with the "socio-economic" aspects of institutionalizing peace. This area encompasses a wide range of activities that typically include the repair and reconstruction of homes, bridges, railroad lines, and highways, the repatriation and reintegration of refugees, the establishment of reconciliation processes and transitional justice mechanisms, land reform, the introduction of fiscal policies, and the formulation of economic development strategies more generally.

The third functional area of peace-building is concerned with the restoration of state institutions and with governance more broadly. This is the "political-administrative" dimension of peace-building. A basic function of the state is the provision of public goods and services but states emerging from conflict are often unable to provide such goods and services—if indeed they ever did. Peace-builders may assist the state to rebuild basic facilities, public administration, educational and health infrastructure, as well as advise on and facilitate the drafting of constitutions and the conduct of elections to public office. They may even replace the state authorities—as they do in the case of transitional administrations—and administer the territory on behalf of its inhabitants.

Transitional administration represents one of the more radical forms of peace-building. It refers to the temporary assumption of responsibility of the principal governance functions of a state or territory by a formally constituted international body, often but not always the United Nations (Caplan 2008). In the context of post-conflict peace-building, transitional administration constitutes an international response to an internal conflict whose severity is thought to have rendered it difficult if not impossible for the local parties to govern themselves. In such cases, either violent conflict has generated an acute administrative, political, and strategic vacuum, or local structures have remained intact but the internal situation is deemed to be a highly unstable one. The purpose of the transitional administration is twofold: to administer the war-torn territory while at the same time fostering the development of local autonomous capacity for stable self-government. In some cases an unresolved dispute between the parties may be an obstacle to achieving full self-government and the transitional authorities will thus also have responsibility for promoting a resolution of the dispute, as it has in Kosovo for instance (status of the territory), or for helping to implement a

decision or a settlement when one has been reached, such as in Eastern Slavonia (reintegration into Croatia).

Transitional administrations differ from one another with respect to the degree of authority or control that the transitional administrator and associated international bodies may possess. At one end of the spectrum are *supervisory* administrations, which have responsibility for monitoring the governance of a state or a territory by the local parties. An example of a supervisory administration was the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 1992 to 1993. At the other end of the spectrum transitional administration takes the form of *direct governance*, as exemplified by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), from 1999 and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), from 1999 to 2002. Operations between these two poles exhibit varying magnitudes of authority, such as the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), from 1996 to 1998, and the international administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 1996, which has no formal name. In all cases, the scope of a transitional administration's interest in—if not actual responsibility for—the functioning of a state or territory is extensive. Indeed, never before in recent history have multilateral organizations had such broad authority for the governance of a state or territory.

How does transitional administration, and post-conflict peace-building more generally, map onto the dominant security concerns and paradigms of the late-twentieth/early-twenty-first century? The idea of "international trusteeship" gained currency among scholars and analysts after the Cold War as a possible means of coping with the problem of so-called state failure (Helman and Ratner 1992–93: 3–20; Lyon 1993: 96–110). Of course, a number of states (for example, the Congo and Sudan) were arguably failed states from the time of their inception more than three decades earlier but the problem of state failure became especially acute with the end of the Cold War when, particularly following September 11, the major (Western) powers came to believe that it was no longer possible to assume that weak or failed states could be ignored. Robert Cooper (2000) nicely captured this shift in thinking. He described what he called the "pre-state post-imperial chaos" in reference to regions of the world that, no longer of strategic importance to major powers, had succumbed to political disorder, desperate poverty, and civil conflict at the end of the Cold War. "The existence of such a zone of chaos is nothing new but previously such areas, precisely because of their chaos, were isolated from the rest of the world. Not so today," Cooper (2000: 11) maintains. As a broad consequence of globalization, these zones of chaos, it is thought, are now fertile ground for the establishment of drug, crime, and terrorist syndicates whose reach is no longer contained by boundaries in the way they were in the past (Wolf 2001).

Such views have come to be embodied in official thinking. The US National Security Strategy of 2002, for instance, observes, "The events of

September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states" (National Security Strategy 2002: 2). Similarly, the European Security Strategy the following year acknowledges "state failure" as a key threat in the current strategic environment: "state failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional stability" and "can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime and terrorism" (European Security Strategy 2003: 4). The aims of post-conflict peace-building, to the extent that they seek to redress the problem of state weakness, have thus converged with the strategic interests of the major (especially Western) powers.

In this age of interventionism, however, post-conflict peace-building also reflects a sense of responsibility among at least some of the intervening states and their supporters to rebuild the states and societies that their interventions have weakened or destroyed. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared in April 1999, at the height of the NATO war over Kosovo, "In the past we talked too much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over" (Blair 1999). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) articulated a similar view in its report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, two years later:

> The responsibility to protect implies the responsibility not just to prevent and react, but to follow through and rebuild. This means that if military intervention action is taken—because of a breakdown or abdication of a state's own capacity and authority in discharging its "responsibility to protect"—there should be a genuine commitment to helping to build a durable peace, and promoting good governance and sustainable development.
>
> (ICISS 2001: 5.1)

If contemporary post-conflict peace-building is motivated by a combination of strategic and humanitarian concerns, it is also predicated on a number of assumptions about the desirability of ends sought and the means by which those outcomes can be achieved. Although it is difficult to generalize about experiences as varied and numerous as these, it is fair to say—as Roland Paris has observed—that peace-builders have been guided in their interventions by the attraction of liberal models of governance. In the political realm this has meant electoral democracy, the separation of powers, constitutional limits on the exercise of authority, and respect for civil liberties. In the economic realm this has meant movement towards a market-oriented economy that entails limiting governmental interference and creating opportunities for private capital investment (Paris 2004: 5). These ends have not been very much debated, either by the international agents responsible for their implementation or within the affected communities, except perhaps at the margins of both. There are two reasons for this.

First, many of these ends represent settled norms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is now generally considered to be part

of international customary law, contains explicit support for electoral democracy, whereas various other norms contained in it—for instance, universal suffrage, equality, and individual rights—are arguably premised on liberal conceptions of democracy as well (UDHR 1948: Art 21, 3). Although the United Nations, an ecumenical body made up of democratic and non-democratic states, claims not to promote any particular model of democracy (Boutros-Ghali 1996: §10), in its peace-building and other activities the organization propagates structures and practices of political life that are broadly liberal in character. There are notable exceptions: in the context of its assistance efforts to post-Taliban Afghanistan, for example, the United Nations has served as midwife to the birth of an *Islamic* republic. However, where it has exercised plenary authority—notably in UN-administered territories—the United Nations has tended to favor liberal democratic models of governance. As Roland Rich and Edward Newman observe, "the member [states] appear to accept this view, or at least the UN's espousal of this view" (Rich and Newman 2004: 5).

The second reason, closely related to the first, for this general acquiescence in the promotion of liberal democratic norms, is that these norms reflect broadly accepted models or theories of conflict management and international relations (Paris 2004: 5; Newman 2004: 189–90). Liberal democratic states, it is thought, do not suppress the rights of their minorities or ethnically cleanse their populations; rather, they achieve and maintain stability through the inculcation of tolerance and the accommodation of difference. Liberal democratic states, it is also thought, do not go to war with one another and do not support terrorism. Related claims are made with regard to liberal economic norms and policies. Whatever the validity of these claims—and a number of them are contested—they represent an orthodoxy that informs the construction of peace-building ends.

The debate, such as it is, tends to be more about the means rather than the ends of peace-building. The issue, for instance, is not whether to promote electoral democracy in a particular state or territory but when to hold elections, in what sequence and so forth. This may be perfectly reasonable but it is worth noting—to cite just one example—that while the United Nations was endeavoring to build an electoral democracy in East Timor from 1999 to 2002, many East Timorese, scarred by the violence associated with the only two democratic ballots that they had experienced in their lifetimes, were wondering quietly whether it might be advisable to defer "normal" political party competition to the future and instead to establish a government of national unity for an indefinite period. The violence that erupted only four years after independence seemed to confirm these suspicions but it would have been hard to imagine that the United Nations could have promoted a "Museveini-style" democracy, for instance.[2]

Debates that revolve around means rather than ends tend to be largely technocratic, and that has often been the case with post-conflict peace-building. Consider the elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in its

first year under international administration in 1996. Electoral rules and procedures can have a significant impact on political outcomes, and the choice of electoral arrangements, therefore, may be anything but neutral (Reilly 2004). In the case of BiH, it is not as if no consideration was given to the possible political implications of the elections. To the contrary, it was hoped that early elections might serve as an instrument to blunt the forces of militant nationalism, since candidates associated with the war and opposed to the reconciliation of ethnic groups after the war might be seen now by voters to be an impediment to peace. However, little thought was given at this early stage to designing electoral rules—requiring, for instance, that winning candidates attract support from all ethnic groups—that would have had the explicitly political aim of encouraging voters to favor moderate outcomes.

A similar tendency is evident on the economic side of peace-building, where the international financial institutions (IFIs) often put forward a familiar mix of neoliberal prescriptions that emphasize monetarism, privatization, deregulation, and foreign direct investment in an effort to achieve macroeconomic stability and to stimulate economic growth. Approaches that are at odds with this orthodoxy—for instance, import controls to stimulate local production or government intervention to generate employment—are given scant consideration (Pugh 2004: 146). However, it is not at all clear that the orthodox approach is always the most suitable one for war-ravaged, underdeveloped economies.

This is not to suggest that there is no scope in theory or actual practice for making normative decisions or for pursuing unorthodox approaches in the context of post-conflict peace-building. Electoral reforms were in fact adopted for BiH in 2000 that sought to increase the likelihood that more moderate candidates would succeed but these reforms failed, in part because nationalists were able to exploit the evident attempt at manipulation by the international community (Manning and Antić 2003: 53). Gradually, the United Nations and other international organizations have come to appreciate the need to navigate deftly with the aid of a political compass but many international civil servants remain uneasy about normative (that is, non-technical) engagement in peace-building.

Assessing Post-conflict Peace-Building

Analysts are divided in their assessments of the effects of post-conflict peace-building efforts. Peace-building "does not have an impressive track record," Michael Barnett observes in *International Security* (Barnett 2006: 88). By contrast, the authors of a RAND study on UN post-conflict "nation-building" operations refer to the UN's "significant achievements" in this field (Dobbins *et al*. 2005: 249). The lack of consensus is evident with respect to specific operations as well. Jean-Christian Cady, the former deputy special representative of the UN Secretary-General in East Timor, hails the UN

operation there as "an undeniable success" (cited in Goldstone 2004: 83), whereas Jarat Chopra, the former head of district administration in the same operation, castigates the UN for having "given birth to a failed state" (Chopra 2002: 979).

Analysts diverge in their assessments largely because there are no agreed criteria by which to evaluate peace-building operations. Some analysts judge the operation against the specific responsibilities laid out in the mandate. That would seem to be a reasonable measure in so far as it would be unfair to judge an operation against extraneous requirements. However, these are complex operations whose mandates often comprise long lists of tasks, the ranking of which, again, analysts tend to differ over. Such an approach, moreover, makes cross-case comparison difficult, as different operations will have different mandates. Other analysts employ general indicators of success, such as a "stable and lasting peace" or the "establishment of an electoral democracy." Such indicators have the merit of being applicable to a large number of operations. The difficulty of assessment on this basis is that, similar to Chou-en Lai's verdict on the French Revolution, the success (or not) of any given operation may not be apparent for some time. BiH was judged by many analysts to be a peace-building failure in the first five years of the operation; today it is considered to be a relative success.

What achievements peace-building—especially its more ambitious forms—can be credited with are qualified in two important respects. First, these efforts, internationally led, have often inhibited the development of the local capacity for stable self-government. Such capacity is critical for the maintenance of a peace that can endure well beyond the termination of a peace-building operation. Second, where peace-building has been successful, it often owes its success to local conditions that may not obtain elsewhere. This raises questions about the general applicability of some of the peace-building models.

Peace-building has as its ultimate objective the establishment of a stable peace, a healthy economy and effective state institutions and practices—all capable of sustaining themselves following the withdrawal of the international authorities. An extensive international presence can keep the peace, contribute to economic revival and administer a territory but what is important is to be able to create the conditions and to build the capacity that will make it possible for local actors to do the same. The difficulties are several. First, and most fundamentally, deep-seated structural conditions may militate against such outcomes. Societies with little democratic experience, for instance, may find it difficult to institutionalize democratic norms. This may explain the 1997 coup in Cambodia and that country's slide towards "restricted democratic practice," in the judgment of Freedom House (1999), only four years after the withdrawal of the UN's peace-building operation. Liberal democratic norms and practices may even be at odds with indigenous traditions, as was the case in East Timor (Hohe 2004). Second, the resource requirements of success can be quite considerable: large numbers

of peacekeepers (or combat troops) and international police, high levels of per capita external assistance and a long-term commitment on the part of third parties, among other inputs (Dobbins *et al*. 2005: ch. 12).

Another reason why peace-building may not succeed is because although there is broad recognition of the importance of building local capacity, international agencies often rely principally on their own human resources to implement their peace-building mandate. International authorities confront a genuine dilemma in this regard. Sensitive to the pressure and impatience of donors and to the watchful eye of the global media, international organizations are under great pressure to demonstrate steady progress and thus will often prefer to take matters into their own hands rather than lose time to consultation and negotiation with local representatives and the mentoring of indigenous civil servants, although significant efforts have certainly been made in this regard. In the absence of local, competent individuals to perform governmental functions, moreover, there may be little alternative to international self-reliance. Or where local capacity exists it may have been "compromised" by the divisiveness of the war and be incapable of functioning in a fair and impartial fashion. These reasons do not entirely explain, and they cannot excuse, the insufficient efforts made by international authorities to bolster local capacity, the result of which may be the establishment of a weak state. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed with respect to East Timor seven months before the termination of the UN transitional authority there:

> The professional bureaucratic skills and capacity of many civil servants remain limited, particularly in the areas of senior management and in highly technical and professional areas of government administration. Of particular concern are the areas of public finances, the judiciary, senior management and the development of and maintenance of central administrative systems of government.
>
> (UN 2001: §12)

Given the time constraints within which the UN was operating, it was always expected that East Timor's administrative capacity would be weak initially. However, the UN's failure to take capacity-building seriously enough, some critics charge, compounded the problem. As one senior official of the new East Timorese government would later observe, "Capacity-building was never actually done. The UN did not want to develop policies or work with the CNRT [the East Timorese political leadership] until [May 2000]. Even then there was no clear policy for capacity-building. This has become a country of consultants with no real development of civil service cadres" (cited in International Policy Institute 2003: 251).

Insufficient support for capacity-building is one reason to call into question the merits of international peace-building efforts. Another reason is the limited applicability of the approach, especially in its more ambitious form.

"Neo-trusteeship" works best, Stephen Krasner (2004: 105) observes, for the easiest cases. The easiest cases are those where the territories are small and thus relatively manageable; where there is widespread local support for peace-building and little likelihood that spoilers will be able to subvert the operation; where there is some prior experience of "positive sovereignty" such that the international community is engaged in *re*building political and other institutions; and, finally, where third parties are prepared to commit considerable resources for an extended period of time.

For these reasons it is questionable how much utility extensive peace-building efforts may have beyond the few cases to which they have already been applied, although new candidates will likely present themselves in the future. Although there are many war-torn states or territories around the globe that would conceivably qualify for international administration, the option will often not be a feasible one. Nor is such a mechanism suitable for fighting the "Long War" against terrorism, as conceived by the US Pentagon, notwithstanding the commitment to long-term and substantial engagement in state-building that this campaign entails (at least in theory). The broad international and local support that peace-building requires for its legitimacy is clearly lacking with regard to the Long War, not least because of the manner in which the USA has prosecuted that war in Iraq. Tempted though the USA has been to create a greater role for the United Nations in peace-building efforts associated with its counterinsurgency operations, there has been and there is likely to remain only limited interest among the other UN member states in deploying international capital for this purpose.

Notes

1 This chapter draws upon some material published previously in Caplan (2004, 2005, and 2007).
2 The special feature of Uganda's democracy under President Yoweri Museveni has been the prohibition of party campaigns.

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14 Reconciliation

Violence and nation formation in Timor-Leste

Damian Grenfell[1]

In early 2006, tensions within the East Timorese armed forces resulted in nearly 600 soldiers—around one-third of the military—abandoning their barracks over accusations of discrimination. They claimed that the military was dominated by the *Lorosa'e,* a name used to describe those from the three eastern-most districts of Timor-Leste, who were said to be discriminating against *Loromonu*: namely those from the 10 western districts.[2] The government responded by dismissing the soldiers who had left their barracks. A protest by the sacked soldiers at the end of April turned violent, and over the following month the security apparatus of the state fractured into complex sets of groupings and alliances. Violence occurred between the two factions of the military: soldiers massacred police, military police ambushed soldiers, civilian groups armed by Members of Parliament attacked both military headquarters and homes, and the houses of parliamentarians were burnt and members of their families killed.

In the vacuum created by the collapse of the security apparatus, the intra-state violence was accompanied by widespread gang violence across Dili. To a significant degree gang-related violence mirrored the ethnic-territorial dimensions of the *Lorosa'e* and *Loromonu* division in the military, but it was also shaped by the interests of political parties and the control of local urban territories by the gangs themselves. By mid-year the state was largely paralyzed, many tens of thousands of people were living in refugee camps, a large number of houses had been destroyed, and an international military and police force were required to stabilize the security environment.

The "success story" of post-conflict Timor-Leste had become suddenly and disastrously undone. With hooded youths and the use of darts, arrows, and other home-made weapons, and factions based on ethnic and familial lines, it would not be difficult to read the crisis into the kinds of tribalizing violence that many writers suggest have come to dominate conflicts around the world. At its broadest level, this chapter is underpinned by an argument that such violence is not adequately described as a "retreat into savagery from below," and is better understood as a response to a kind of disjuncture created between the two modernizing processes of nation-formation and state-building. More particularly, I will take what might appear to be a

counter-intuitive path by using a discussion of the often-positive nation-building effects of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Reception (CAVR) as a way into discussing the implications of the inter-state violence of the 2006 crisis. By examining the uneven integrative effects that a body such as CAVR has on a new national community, it becomes possible to understand how violence can emerge as a nation is brought into being—and while the state remains relatively distanced from the various developments that are unevenly drawing together that nation. This kind of dual development could be described in terms of a relatively unembedded state presiding over a fragile nation-in-formation.

For all the literature on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions very little is framed by debates of either security or nationalism studies. The first might seem the most obvious gap in the existing literature given that such bodies are designed to break cycles of violence and ensure longer-term forms of security. Similarly, while nationalist rhetoric commonly frames the work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, including CAVR, the vast array of literature rarely crosses explicitly into the domain of nationalism studies. The aim of this chapter is to draw arguments around Truth and Reconciliation Commissions into a broad discussion around security through an understanding of how such bodies work to integrate peoples into a national community. In order to do this it is important to tap into key discourses in nationalism studies, notably the work of Benedict Anderson. This is in part so as to argue that, well beyond the particular community reconciliation and truth-seeking programs, a body such as CAVR can have integrative effects through, for instance, the production and distribution of textual material. Using Anderson's arguments concerning the link between the temporal and the textual, I go on to argue that in post-conflict and agriculturally dominant societies the abstract nation can be constituted through a process that significantly includes embodied interaction.

These arguments are not meant to suggest that the process of nation-formation does not give rise to other forms of violence, but it is to argue that the integration of people into a community through a subjective self-orienting identification is typically a necessity in preventing future violence over a given territorial form. However, as evidenced by the violence in 2006 and 2007, this is not enough to ensure a post-conflict peace, in that violence can emanate from other struggles and from other quarters. This, as is argued at the conclusion of the chapter, can occur for instance when the state has yet to be embedded sufficiently within a given territorial setting.

Security and Nation-Formation in Timor-Leste

Born in "flames and blood" like so many other nations before it, on 30 August 1999 the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly against autonomy within Indonesia. This in effect set the stage for future national independence, which came only after the last devastating throes of the 24-year

Indonesian occupation when pro-Indonesian forces looted and destroyed much of the country's infrastructure. Approximately 1,500 people were killed and a third of the population forcibly deported into Indonesia.

The level of destruction across 1999 meant that although Timor-Leste existed on the world map there were none of the usual means to sustain the new nation from within. A plethora of institutions led by the United Nations began the slow and uneven process of nation-formation—namely establishing those mechanisms which could carry and propagate the idea of the new nation over the longer term. Massive resources went into forming a centralized state, a market codified in relation to the national territorial form, and the symbolic means to carry the idea of the nation. In effect, the processes were being put in place to convey the day-to-day reminders, from bank-notes to the time on the clock, that both territory and sovereignty had been brought into a sustainable unison.[3]

Security was a key part of this process, and not only in terms of preventing continued militia and Indonesian military incursions from across the West-Timor border. It was also necessary to secure Timor-Leste from within, especially as many East Timorese who had previously and violently supported the Indonesian occupiers remained within the new country. Without a local police force or a judiciary, there was a genuine concern that the new country may be plagued by cycles of violence triggered by revenge and paybacks. One response to this dilemma included the formation of the CAVR. Although its formation overlapped with concerns for transitional justice and the welfare of people who had suffered acute violence, even the earliest calls for such a body were, at least at an elite level, framed in terms of national security and stability (CNRT 2000: 15).

From 2003 until its formal closure in late 2005, CAVR concentrated its activities around two key mandates. The first of these was its Community Reconciliation Program (generally known as the CRP process), which aimed to reintegrate into the community former perpetrators of certain "less serious" human rights crimes committed in 1999. By drawing the perpetrator, victim, and community together, the CRP process attempted to find a way to bind those persons once violently opposed to one another into peaceful coexistence. Former perpetrators who admitted their "less serious crimes" received a guarantee never to be prosecuted by the state for their human rights crimes as long as the admission of guilt was not disproved by new evidence in the future. Similarly "truth-seeking" sought to construct a truthful account of human rights abuses from 1974 until 1999. It had a longer-term effect on securing peace and preventing violence by clarifying human rights abuses publicly and attributing responsibility to those at blame, again undermining the potential for false accusations and cycles of revenge.

In thinking about security within a post-conflict society, it is important to move the discussion beyond the immediate programs and to consider the broader though less obvious social effects of a body such as CAVR. What I want to demonstrate here is that such institutions have the potential to

negate violence by integrating people in quite unique ways into a new national form. Although this argument has consequences for nationalism studies, the real point in terms of this chapter is that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission can in effect produce forms of security, especially in places such as Timor-Leste, by shifting the subjective-identity boundaries of people towards a particular national form which at the very least helps mitigate further violence *at that national level.* Before these arguments can be made there is a need to discuss how, on the one hand, nation-formation has been theorized—with a special emphasis on the work of Benedict Anderson—and how, on the other hand, nation-formation has occurred in practice in Timor-Leste.[4]

For Anderson (1991), ontological shifts across early modernity—new developments both social and scientific—stimulated social changes that made possible new forms of community, including the nation. He notes a shift from the way that time is understood in pre-modern societies, namely as a "simultaneity along time, where the past and future are bound to an instantaneous present, marked by prefiguring and fulfilment" (what he calls Messianic time). Changes across early modernity result in "homogenous, empty time," marked by a temporal coincidence, and measured by the clock and calendar (Anderson 1991: 24). According to Anderson, this change in temporal perception towards homogeneity enabled people to imagine themselves as living alongside other people *simultaneously*.

Although nationalists subjectively call upon less abstract forms of social integration—for example, through the embodied connection of blood and belonging—the nation remains understood as a bounded community of strangers moving simultaneously across time. Although Timor-Leste is a world away from the nations that Benedict Anderson wrote of in the initial chapters of *Imagined Communities*, his comprehension of the importance of print and also temporality allow for some of his ideas to be carried forward into a very contemporary example of nation-formation.

To begin firstly with the question of print, a whole range of textual outputs produced by CAVR presented the nation as nothing other than a *fait accompli*. Unlike any other number of possible subjects that could still invoke a sense of simultaneity, the content of CAVR material carried maps, lists of commissioners, laws, mandates, programmatic structures and explanations are all presented graphically or literally within the legal-territorial logic of Timor-Leste. For example, a reader of the CAVR booklet *Hear Our Voices* may sense a relation to one person in the book as they come from the same district, yet that person is presented alongside a whole range of others, distinct and limited to Timor-Leste, and yet fused as equals as part of a national whole. Moreover, the words lift readers out of their immediate embodied world and present them as being linked together across the abstract national time and space.

> In public hearings in villages and sub-district towns across the country, and at the national hearings, the CAVR placed victims of violations at

> the centre of the national story of Timor-Leste. The voice of our sisters and brothers who suffered, and who were silenced for so many years, is a vital voice which must be heard in independent Timor-Leste. We believe that only through understanding and appreciating the impact of violence upon people's lives we as individuals and as a nation remain vigilant to ensure that this behaviour is never repeated in our land.
>
> (CAVR 2005: Preface)

Drawing people into the national form—"we as individuals and as a nation"—takes people's localized and immediate histories and experiences and redraws them into a "national story of Timor-Leste." However, the content of such documents is only one element in an integrative process that also requires a consideration of the mass-produced and identically printed texts that are being circulated.

For Anderson, the nation came into being due significantly to what he famously refers to as "print capitalism"—namely a process whereby the intersection between modes of communication (mass print) and production (capitalism in search of new markets) gave rise to print languages that were below the elite use of Latin and above the multiple day-to-day vernaculars. These new markets acted as a kind of disembodied field of exchange in which the reader was linked across a territory with countless unknown others. In the process, they "gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language-field, and *at the same time* that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belong" (Anderson 1991: 44).[5]

At first glance the applicability of Anderson's ideas to contemporary Timor-Leste would appear limited. This is not least the case as access to mass-communication systems have remained severely limited because of the destruction across the territory in 1999. Moreover, literacy remains extremely low in Timor-Leste and the reality is that the majority of people still live in subsistence-agricultural conditions where printed materials, such as newspapers, remain few and far between. However, in the absence of a mass communications infrastructure, an institution such as CAVR was one of the few organizations that was able to distribute identical materials across the entire country *and* to have these materials carry explicitly national content.

While literacy remains low, organizations such as CAVR (along with the United Nations for instance) have helped consolidate the idea of language-fixity in relation to territory. Circulated textual material came in either one or all of the four constitutionally designated languages: Portuguese and Tetun as the two official national languages, and English and Indonesian as working languages. Although there was a narrow plurality in the languages used, a sense of language fixity has been created, not least as these are the officially designated languages of Timor-Leste (therefore limiting the many other languages and vernaculars spoken in Timor-Leste to their specific regions). Moreover, whichever language is used it still provides a sense of

differentiation from a colonial past—Tetun is not spoken in Portugal and Portuguese is not spoken in Indonesia. In effect then, this meant that the circulation of textual objects, from posters and pamphlets to various booklets, created an opportunity for a subjective recognition of living simultaneously with a distinct number of unknown strangers within a defined territory through the use of set languages.

The sense of simultaneity that Anderson argues is created through the consumption of replicable objects should not be confined to the consequence of reading in the context of a print culture. The importance of textual production—namely of books, leaflets, posters, and banners—is amplified by both the relative permanence of such objects and their transferability. However, other forms of mass communication were still used by CAVR as a way of both carrying information about its programs and also inculcating a sense of nation:

> the whole purpose of our program was to foster this notion of, this is the whole country doing this. So Los Palos listening to Suai, Manufahi listening to Dili, Liquica listening to Viqueque and Oecussi listening to Ermera, and so people can say, particularly around the CRP process, we're all part of this, this is bigger than the single community … At the local *local* level, and at the national level, and at how the two mix through the sharing of experiences through people being brought from all different villages and regions to the national level … And that was our design, that people would feel that in doing this local thing they were part of the national process.[6]
>
> (CAVR, 2003: Interview with Participant 4)

This quote neatly reflects the arguments made thus far in this chapter. In the first instance, people are both learning about a national program and learning about the nation itself—"Liquica listening to Viqueque and Oecussi listening to Ermera"—identifying those different places within the territorial confines of the new nation. Here we also see an oral equivalent to the impact of print languages: namely a radio program held together by the one language of the broadcaster to which all the people are "listening," simultaneously undertaking the same activity and comprehending the same material with a set of strangers within a distinct territory. However, for all its importance, mass-mediated information remains only one way in which the idea of a nation is invoked through the practices of CAVR, and in broader terms is only one pattern of social practice that allows for a cohesive national community to be built. As the next section will highlight, when addressing the question of how a national body coheres into a secure and peaceful territory, it is important to consider not just the disembodied, but also the embodied-corporeal—that is, the sense of the body as carrying the nation into being.

Embodiment and National Security

Thus far the argument has been made that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission can provide forms of security through the process of integrating people into a new national formation. Through the process of confirmation of a new territorial form, security is provided at the national level by mitigating tendencies for either further divisions internally, or for instance in the case of Timor-Leste, attempts to agitate for reintegration with Indonesia. Those arguments, however, work overwhelmingly within the framework that Anderson (1991) set up in *Imagined Communities,* and this, I suggest, is only a partial way of understanding how such a process of integration occurred in Timor-Leste.

In a short article written during the period of the Indonesian occupation, Benedict Anderson asked why Indonesia's attempt to absorb Timor-Leste had failed. As part of his answer, he argued that from 1975 East Timorese nationalism grew massively for two reasons. First, a "profound sense of commonality emerged from the gaze of the colonial state. Indonesian power is infinitely more penetrating, infinitely more widespread, than Portuguese colonial power ever was" (Anderson 1993: 25). Working in tandem with this was, secondly, the ability to form a common opposition via the practice of a Catholic faith, at once permissible under the Indonesian regime of *Pancasilia* while simultaneously in opposition to Islam as the dominant faith of the oppressor.

> The Catholic commonality in some sense substitutes for the kind of nationalism I have talked about elsewhere, which comes from print capitalism. Moreover, the decision of the Catholic hierarchy in East Timor to use Tetun, not Indonesian, as the language of the Church has had profoundly nationalizing effects. It has raised Tetun from being a local language or *lingua franca* in parts of East Timor to becoming, for the first time, the language of "East Timorese" religion and identity.
>
> (Anderson 1993: 26)

For Anderson, creating a field of common fixed language through the use of Tetun allowed for the establishment of a domain where a person will participate in a like activity with a distinct group made up of thousands of unknown others. However, if we take Anderson to be right that East Timorese nationalism also grew at least in part out of the coercive effect of the Indonesian state—of being subjected to its gaze—it is then possible for a sense of modern simultaneity to be freed from the focus that Anderson gives to language. The knowledge that "like activity" is occurring across a fixed territory—including the living under a repressive regime and all that that entails—can be replicated in other ways. The idea of a "Sunday Mass" is a perfect example of this. People may never have the need to enter other churches across the territory in order to receive communion, but if so they

would know when and how to do so, and feel bound into a Catholic community at least in part by the shared knowledge of this community. A secularized equivalent is the Independence Day ceremony, where people across a country stop at the same time and participate through ceremonial processes in almost identical activities involving songs, flags, and salutes, that give rise to a sense of co-presence, of people linked by the likeness and purpose of their activities with unknown others.

The emphasis given by Anderson and other modernist thinkers to the abstract character of the nation, necessary for the sense of co-presence and shared temporal and spatial relations with others, allows us to understand a key process in how nations are formed and sustained. Yet nations cannot simply be understood if they are left at the level of the imagined, as if taking place only in the "lair of the skull" (Anderson 1991: 35). For all the emphasis given to the disembodied, or a whole series of epitaphs such as "imagined," "industrial," "mass," "modern," and "abstract" social relations constituted at the face-to-face also remain crucial to understanding nation-formation and in turn how a national community is rendered secure in the aftermath of war. By face-to-face, or embodied extended relations, it is meant those forms of social relations that are integrated by regularized, meaning-generating contact either conducted in person or through the modalities of co-presence (James 1996: 23–25).

The relationship between the nation and a sense of corporeality, as being "in the body," is important in two ways. First, there is the sense of the embodiment of simultaneous activity, for instance the choice of participating in a reconciliation hearing, not for the sake of spectacle alone but because the event is seen to be important to a broader society. This then extends the importance of the ceremonial beyond its own immediate logic by giving corporeal significance to an act that is felt across locales rather than within a particular place. In this way, we enter a kind of two-way process linking the corporeal and the nation, where activities such as community reconciliation hearings and truth-seeking activities help bring the nation into being at the same time as the nation bears back upon the physical body of its participants, and activities are redefined as being "national."

Secondly, a sense of the corporeal is also important to consider in relation to how information was transmitted across territory. With a lack of mass-communication systems, CAVR operations were centered in the capital, which in turn co-ordinated regional offices and then sub-district teams. As one CAVR worker explained, it was these sub-district teams which would carry CAVR programs to the most localized levels.

> They work sub-district by sub-district. Any sub-district of operations will work for three months. Normally in the first week or two the team will go around the villages and socialize the commission's work, gives a series of speeches about the team's mandate, about the reconciliation mandate, about the help that the victim support team may be able to

> provide and they'll then start implementing. For the truth-seeking side of things, it involves taking statements about violations of human rights which can be any degree of violations from minor violations to gross violations of human rights, and they'll typically be working with victims of those atrocities.
>
> (CAVR 2003: Interview with Participant 11)

Organizational activities that in other instances may have been significantly co-ordinated via mass communication systems were carried into the communities by people traveling and conveying information in an embodied way. In such instances people come to be informed about the nation in which they live not just through the limited circulation of printed materials for instance, but via the carrying and imparting of knowledge of the nation by embodied others who make "speeches." In this sense the nation is formed through the innumerable tracks and pathways made across the land that connect otherwise isolated communities into a nation as a whole. As one CAVR worker explained, the embodied character of such relations was in fact crucial to the establishment of lines of communication that in turn allowed for the development of the national program.

> Up until the end of the commission we did not have phone lines to these people. … So people had to come once a week, people from the regional offices and the district team co-ordinators came to Dili, and the week after that the regional coordination unit from Dili went to the regional offices … That is how we communicated and that is how we got statements in. We physically had to do our communication face-to-face, like the rest of Timor-Leste.
>
> (CAVR 2006: Interview with Participant 16).

This narrating of the nation sees a disembodied–embodied transferal of information about the national form to a myriad number of persons within the territory, embedding, shaping, and further consolidating a conscious sense of integration. In the case of CAVR, members of the community hear the embodied voice of the conveyor of information, but the information itself is authored and authorized from afar. This is one way in which a kind of mutual dependence can be understood to occur between the corporeal ushers of the nation and the disembodied forms of mass organization and communication. The kind of mutual dependence is particularly prescient in the case of significantly agricultural societies where a mobile industrial workforce has yet to significantly dislodge people from traditional lands. And this kind of embodied–disembodied mutuality is incredibly important in terms of providing for security in a post-conflict society by producing a coherent and integrated sense of nation, and hence at that level mitigating the likelihood of domestic insurrection and further division based on counter-national identities. However, this does not mean

that an institution such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission is the only entity that can bring such a process into being, but as argued above, it is to say that this is one of the key effects of such a body. However, as the next section will show, such integration cannnot resolve all forms of violence.

A State of Crisis

Thus far I have argued that Truth and Reconciliation Commissions can help achieve peace at a national level, particularly through the integrative effects that such processes have on constituting a nation. In closing this chapter, I now want to link the discussions above in a way that helps understand one level of the violence of 2006. I am mostly interested in the violence that occurred within the state, notably that which arose both from within and across state institutions resulting in various acts of violence in the capital, including the massacre of police, killings outside of the parliament, attacks on the homes of senior military figures and on the military headquarters. Although the subsequent gang violence was intertwined with the collapse of the state security apparatus, the point of interest in this final section is to explain the violence that occurred directly through the state.

Critical to this discussion is a differentiation between nation-formation and state-building. As discussed in the opening of this chapter, nation-formation is the process of putting in place the integrative processes that hold a community together and enable sovereignty to be expressed. State-building, although intersecting with the nation-formation process, is the development of practices and processes of governance through institutional forms with regard to a particular territory. Although organizations such as CAVR have contributed to integrating people into the nation, the integration of the state has not occurred nearly to the same extent in post-occupation Timor-Leste.

CAVR was never going to be an institutional form that could carry the state with anything of the force that it was able to carry the nation. While mandated by law, a strong sense of neutrality was required between CAVR and the state, as senior government and military elites from Timor-Leste needed to give testimony, including about their role in human rights abuses. From the perspective of the state, neutrality was also required so that no matter how critical CAVR was of the Indonesian invasion, relations between the two nations could be maintained by distancing CAVR. This separation between nation and state in CAVR practices is evident for instance in the publication of *Hear our Voices*. Although this booklet carries the words and pictures of those from across the whole nation, this book is overwhelmingly framed by demands made to the new state, "I ask the government to take care of the disabled," "I ask the State to take care of those of us who are still unwell," "I was raped by the militia … I ask the government to take care of those of us who have suffered in this way."

Such appeals to the state are not unusual across a range of societies and could in fact represent an engrained faith that the state is worth appealing to. However, the argument here is that the sentiment framing *Hear Our Voices* is representative of a more general condition in Timor-Leste, where people see themselves as so beyond and outside the systems of state power that they feel the need to appeal to it rather than through it. Beyond CAVR, other organizational processes have not been able to embed the state in a way where people—through the education system and school curriculums, laws and policing, citizenship, the development of taxation, and perhaps most importantly elections—come to see it as something that reframes their lives in a day-to-day way. This has been significantly due to both the level of socio-material destruction of 1999 and a subsequent centralization of political power in Dili, and hence the new state has not been able to replicate anything like the "gaze" of its Indonesian predecessor, even in a benevolent form.

Rather than the state being seen as generalized and integrated across society, the basis for its relationship is often seen to exist through patrimonial and familial linkages that distribute security in the form of resources, wealth, and opportunity to people. Hence for those who want to gain access to the state—and in a society where there is immense poverty there is an obvious attraction in doing so—the options are either to mimic the patrimonial form in an attempt to locate an in-road, or otherwise to turn to options associated with the use of force. Hence, with the crisis in 2006 it should not be surprising that violence began *within* the state over access to resources—in this instance through claims over discrimination with regard to promotion and opportunities—with favoritism seen to be given to one ethnic-territorial grouping over another.

The final argument of this chapter, and bringing together its various parts, is the point that what was peculiar about the 2006 crisis is that the national form was not more seriously challenged by the violence or by key aspects of the state. Although a violent and politically driven competition over state resources spread beyond the state to the nation, the already existing identification *with* the nation in its contemporary form did not shift. Suggestions of an alternative national form—such as a further division of Timor-Leste for instance along *Lorosa'e* and *Loromonu* lines, or a reconnection with Indonesia—did not surface as a narrative during the crisis. Instead these ethnically framed identity formations were used to justify the rights of groups of people—for instance through the claim that it was *Lorosa'e* who won the war for independence for the whole nation or that it was *Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente* (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) that should determine the access and control of state resources through the military or the parliament. Hence, the crisis of the embryonic state came in part via demands framed by the nation, suggesting that many East Timorese have come to see the nation as a natural and assumed domain, even when large-scale conflict occurs within its boundaries.

In concluding, it is important to be clear about several arguments made in this chapter. One is that CAVR typified a form of nation-formation in a post-conflict and agricultural community, and importantly its presence helped to rethread communities across the land through both disembodied and embodied processes. Multiple processes and innumerable organizations and networks of people need to be taken together in order to understand the full process at hand, a task well beyond the confines of this chapter. The argument here is that CAVR has an unusually influential role to play in such a process, not just in the fact that its programs are geared towards securing the nation, but that both the form and content of CAVR's institutional activity is nationally framed. This process of national integration has occurred to an extent that has helped embed the nation in its current form as the logical domain for life, including during the violence that erupted across 2006. As a second key argument, this violence, complex as it is, can be said to not have put the nation in jeopardy in that it has been aimed at either disrupting or consolidating access to state resources. A fracture may have opened up providing the basis for a division or collapse of the nation in the future, but for the present time Timor-Leste has been secured domestically even while the state has been torn apart.

Notes

1 I would like to thank my Globlism Institute colleagues in Timor-Leste, especially Anna Trembath, for their support with the arguments that I am trying to develop across this paper. I would also like to thank the various staff members at the (Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Reception) CAVR who gave me so much time when they had so many pressing things to attend to.

2 *Lorosa'e* and *Loromonu* are Tetun words, with *Loro* and shortening of *Loron*, meaning day or sun, and *sa'e* meaning to rise up and *monu* to fall, respectively indicating what elsewhere is called East and West.

3 The influence here is straight from Gellner (1983).

4 The intellectual influence of Benedict Anderson is immense, but then so it is in the case with Paul James whose work on the nation has significantly underpinned the thinking in this chapter. In particular see James (1996).

5 Italics added for emphasis.

6 Italics added. The speaker used the word local twice to emphasize the sense that this was at the most localized level possible.

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15 Recovery

Taming the *rwa bhineda* after the Bali bombings

Jeff Lewis and Belinda Lewis

The 2002 Kuta nightclub bombings and the subsequent attacks in 2005 have been devastating for the communities of Bali. As the exception to foreign travel warnings for Indonesia, Bali had for decades maintained its reputation as a safe, peaceful tourist destination. These events however catapulted the island paradise into the international spotlight and into the arena of global terrorism. While the mass exodus of international visitors crippled the island's tourist industry, the bombings also triggered an unprecedented social, economic, and spiritual crisis.

For many Balinese, the bombings evinced a critical cosmological imbalance. In Hindu–Vedic Balinese cosmology, the *rwa bhineda* delicately suspends the forces of good and evil in an infinite and irresolvable dialectical combat. For many Balinese, this balance was somehow disturbed, creating the conditions for an outbreak of evil that killed over 200 unsuspecting people. Within this cosmology, however, evil cannot be subjugated, redeemed, or eradicated from the material or spiritual world, since it is always and inevitably the predicate of good. To this extent, even the *bhuta kala* demons are not considered intrinsically evil, nor are their spiritual nemeses considered entirely wholesome. The *rwa bhineda* conceives of good and evil in terms of a mutual identification, whereby the faithful will seek merely to minimize the harm that evil may inflict on the living and the dead.

Clearly, the *rwa bhineda* has survived the ravages of the rapid social and cultural changes that have accompanied the modernization of Bali. The principle has nevertheless had to accommodate significant community dislocation and the strain of new ideas, meanings, and global cultural interaction. As numerous commentators have noted, Bali's integration into the global economy has produced considerable refurbishments in traditional lifestyles and the Balinese symbolic environment. Anthropologists such as Annette Hamilton (1990) and Adrian Vickers (1990, 2003) have argued that tourism has transformed the Balinese people and their culture into a "created paradise" for consumption by international visitors. This imagining converts the realities of the island, and its sanguine and violent history, into an idyllic and secure destination, a place of spiritual and sensual elevation.

The 2002 and 2005 bombings radically irrupted these imaginings, along with the institutional and discursive frameworks which support them.

Indeed, the ontology of *rwa bhineda* has been forced to make further accommodations. In the wake of the bombings, the economy and self-confidence of the Balinese rapidly collapsed as tourist arrivals declined dramatically, unemployment escalated and community tensions increased (ICG 2003; UNDP 2003). While the Balinese themselves sought to harness the outbreak of evil through various cleansing rituals, international donor organizations and the Indonesian and provincial governments were developing more material and secular responses, including plans for economic recovery and intensified security. In particular, these plans were constituted around tourism and a "business as usual" motif that sought to restore the impression of harmony and security. As Indonesia's second most important foreign capital earner after oil, tourism in Bali underpins economic security for the country as a whole. In seeking to restore the sense of security, the recovery plans have endeavored to tame the *rwa bhineda*, subsuming it under a mantle of harmony while the complex tensions arising in the wake of the tragedy have been played down.

Within the cataclysm of the bombings and against the background of rapid social transition and community volatility, the complexity of the interests and attitudes of the Balinese themselves seems largely to have been ignored or at least parenthesized. In particular, there has been a tendency in much of the recovery planning to collapse the various Balinese communities—Hindu, Muslim, secular, Indonesian transmigrant, expatriate, urban, rural—into a single and homogeneous community of needs. The aim of this chapter is to reinstate this complexity in order to illustrate the ways in which Balinese communities are experiencing the recovery process.

Using qualitative and textual research methods, our research has sought to interrogate the assumptions which underpin much of the "official" recovery discourse, matching them against the views of community members themselves. We suggest that the official discourse, which is focused on tourism, masks serious and unresolved concerns about social, environmental and economic problems which have been a source of insecurity for Balinese communities since well before the bombings (see also Lewis and Lewis 2007). This chapter aims to shed further light on some of the challenges and opportunities for restoring security and strengthening the resilience and sustainability of communities in Bali.

Bali Harmony

Commentators from within and outside Bali claim that the island's reliance on tourism has significant implications for Balinese culture and politics (Lewis and Lewis 2007; Vickers 2003; Connor and Vickers 2003; Karyadi 2003; Macrae 2003; Darling 2003). Bali's tourism-led recovery is dependent upon the restoration of the island's reputation as being safe, peaceful, and

harmonious. The multi-million dollar post-bombing tourism promotion campaign and even the widely respected United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report draw heavily on the discourse of Bali harmony to give legitimacy to their vision for the recovery: the report stated that "immediate social tensions were managed effectively by community leaders" and "Bali has proved its reputation as a peace-loving island in the face of a monumental tragedy" (UNDP 2003: 38).

Within this Bali harmony discourse, notions of hegemony, dispute, or discontent are treated as aberrations, indeed risks, for the restoration of a sustainable progress. The social and cultural agonisms inevitably generated by Bali's modernization, increasing cosmopolitanism, and engagement with a globalizing economy are played down. Instead, the Bali harmony discourse focuses on the unique characteristics of traditional Balinese culture which have contributed to Bali's capacity to deal effectively with the tragedy and with the processes of modernization in general.

According to (Vickers 2003), the active production of a commodified social harmony in order to protect the island's tourist industry distorts the underlying realities of Bali. There are long-standing tensions between the Balinese and Indonesian internal migrants which remain simmering beneath the surface. The economic pressures following the bombings have deepened these tensions and, increasingly, people from outside the island are seen as a threat to Bali's economic, social, and cultural stability (Karyadi 2003). The International Crisis Group (ICG 2003) report claimed that heightened security measures implemented in response to bombings have fuelled anti-migrant sentiment, intensified social tensions, and paradoxically created a new threat to law and order. The report claims that the Bali harmony discourse masks substantial issues and tensions with which Balinese communities must productively engage as part of the restoration process.

For MacRae (2003), the reliance on a tourist-based economy is also problematic because it creates the conditions for an apolitical modernization. Although Bali's traditional Hindu religion, cultural practices, and spectacular rituals are considered to be the backbone of tourism, they also generate their own form of political and intellectual compliance (Darling 2003). As we discuss later in this chapter, the entrenched Hindu caste system and the *adat* (traditional forms of community management, rituals, and responsibilities) are underpinned by hierarchical power structures which legitimize and maintain unequal distribution of resources and power in traditional Balinese society. The active production of a commodified social harmony to protect the island's tourism industry, combined with adherence to the practices and hierarchies of the traditional *adat*, supports an intrinsic cultural predisposition to silence, obedience, and apoliticism (Lewis 2005). This disinclines the Balinese to civic and political debate and constrains the possibilities for democratization, political reform, and, as will be discussed, the resolution of Bali's multi-dimensional problems (Connor and Vickers 2003).

The Political Context for the Recovery

The wider political context for the recovery and restoration process in Bali is one of considerable transition and regional instability. Indonesia is facing a significant economic and security crisis as successive national governments struggle to implement political reform after 32 years of corruption, nepotism, inter-ethnic violence, religious conflict, and separatism under President Suharto's New Order regime. In Bali, government policies around demilitarization, decentralization, and the transition to civil society have generated significant tensions over the roles of *Negara* as the "state" and *rakyat* as "society" or "the people" (Reuter 2003).

Although demilitarization of the police and government authority structures has devolved some police functions to civilian security groups and empowered local residents to protect their villages from crime, it has also given rise to locally defined vigilante-style security. Jurisdictions are unclear, and there have been clashes and problems which undermine the authority of the police. This has tended to exacerbate rather than reduce security problems and, according to the 2003 report by the International Crisis Group, poses a new source of insecurity for local communities (ICG 2003). The extensive decentralization process, shifting power from the Indonesian central government toward local provincial autonomy, has also created new debates about the ways in which the people of Bali might take greater control over the island's governance, development, and economic prosperity. However, economic instability and differential participation in the tourist economy continue to privilege the interests of outside investors, marginalize the Balinese, and magnify social inequalities (Reuter 2003, Connor and Vickers 2003).

Modernization, Globalization, Fragmentation

During the past three decades Bali has become increasingly integrated into the global economy. This has produced significant social transformations, including urbanization, community dislocation, and intense population growth, especially around the Denpasar–Kuta–Sanur triangle. Although Bali has been more prosperous (4 per cent poverty) compared to Indonesia in general (16 per cent poverty), its citizens are now beginning to confront the heavy price it has paid for its position as "the jewel in the crown" of Indonesia's tourist industry. The explosive pace of unrestrained development has been facilitated by extensive foreign investment and World Bank loans for roads, water works, and other infrastructure necessary to support a mass-tourism industry. Years of Jakarta-led developmentalism and official corruption have provided the context for inadequate development planning and scant regard for the environment and social sustainability of Balinese communities (Foster 2003; Reuter 2003).

People living in Bali face ongoing problems surrounding inadequate sanitation, waste management, scarce water supplies, and an antiquated

healthcare and education system (Foster 2003). Proliferating social problems include dramatic increases in crime, drug abuse, prostitution, HIV/AIDS, youth unemployment, and social unrest (Connor and Vickers 2003; Setiawan *et al.* 1999). There are also critical and unresolved environmental issues resulting from Bali's rapid transition from agriculture to tourist development including mass farmland conversion, illegal forest clearing, coastal degradation, and environmental pollution (Foster 2003).

While Bali's participation in a globalizing economy through international tourism has offered new opportunities for prosperity, it has also generated economic insecurity for the Balinese. Despite moves toward greater provincial autonomy, most of the income generated in Bali is still siphoned out of the province. The majority of Balinese continue to be excluded from the wealth generated by the tourist economy and the decision-making processes which shape the future of the island (Reuter 2003). Moreover, changing legislation regarding land registration and taxes has facilitated the leasing and disguised purchase of land by non-Balinese interests and has given rise to escalating land scarcity, the growth of a new class of landless and disempowered, and a new set of socio-political tensions. Economic instability and differential participation in the tourist economy have magnified class differences and exacerbated social inequalities (Macrae 2003).

Bali's population has increased rapidly over the last two decades. Transmigrants from other Indonesian provinces, such as Java, Lombok, and Timor, have relocated to the island in search of the relative security and economic and employment opportunities associated with tourism and related industries. Population pressures, dramatically escalating crime rates, and increasing competition for employment have contributed to a growing anti-migrant sentiment (Reuter 2003).

Increasingly, the island has become home to various communities of people with diverse religions, cultural practices, and values. Balinese culture has had to accommodate significant community dislocation and the strains of new ideas, meanings, and global cultural interactions. Inevitably, this "crisis of contiguity" is generating a range of social and cultural agonisms (Lewis and Lewis 2004). It is therefore not surprising that, for the Balinese, the terrorist attacks have generated new levels of complexity in debates about their engagement with modernization, cosmopolitanism, and a globalizing world economy. The tensions which have been foregrounded in the wake of the bombings are, for the communities of Bali, an important underlying dynamic in the process of recovery and restoring the *rwa bhineda*. The following discussion will focus on three key issues: firstly the discourse of Bali harmony, then the reassertion of traditional *adat*, and finally Balinese apoliticism and the transition to civil society.

The discourse of Bali harmony

> Bali is not paradise! Can you imagine looking at your child dying and you cannot do anything about it? … That is the reality and that is

> happening here in Bali. That is unthinkable for me … The development over the last 30 years is not a harmonious balance between God, humans and the environment. Look at the beaches now. Plastic bags, garbage, awful things, syringes, broken bottles. We get all kinds of disease. The world is changing. It's not just about ceremony and the temple. Bali is not paradise … .
>
> (Viebeke Lengkong, Balinese political activist)

Bali's tourism-led recovery is dependent on the restoration of its peaceful image and the discourse of Bali harmony. Paradoxically, although the tragedy of the bombings has generated the need for a strengthened Bali harmony discourse, it has also inevitably interrupted its power. Although social tensions and political concerns continue to be silenced in order to protect the tourist industry, the cracks in the "harmony" discourse are being exposed as the people of Bali sort through the implications of the bombings. To this extent, there are substantial tensions as people seek to reconcile the public imagining of "harmony" with the challenges of restoring the spiritual balance of the *rwa bhineda*.

Recent analyses of the impact of the bombings argue that economic pressures have deepened pre-existing inequalities and social tensions in Bali and intensified negative sentiments toward outsiders, particularly Javanese migrants (ICG 2003). According to Karyadi (2003), the bombings have also intensified the sense of a broader Islamic threat and generated an increasing xenophobia amongst the Hindu Balinese that cannot be publicly expressed. As we demonstrate below, people in Balinese communities explain social tensions as having more complex and contradictory origins. Although social tensions were associated with the problem of "outsiders", their origins were also considered to be from the "inside", that is, internal community tensions associated with modernization and its influence on traditional values, practices, modes of social organization.

Any sense that the bombings had intensified social tensions between Balinese and Muslims or non-Balinese was played down. The Bali harmony discourse was still asserted strongly with claims that Bali is coping well with ethnic and religious diversity. Although expressing private concerns about issues such as increases in crime perpetrated by "outsiders" and the need for tighter regulation over migration, people clearly wanted to shift the focus away from ethnicity, "I just keep it inside. Because I don't want to talk too much. If talking too much there will be problem for me. Better no talking, ya?" (Wayan, market-worker)

However, non-Balinese interview respondents, such as Raoul, described increased discrimination and marginalization since the bombings which reveal the double-edged nature of the harmony discourse:

> The Balinese think all Muslim are shit. They hate us too because we are not from Bali … We are scared of the Balinese. We are miskin (poor) so

> we try to make some money here in Bali but they are number one here. And now they hate us … All trouble in Bali—they think we make it. So for people like me, from other islands, it's really changed. Maybe if the tourists come back like before, they (will) have good ethnic relationships again.
>
> (Raoul, unofficial transmigrant, Sumatran, Christian)

For most Balinese, insecurity about "outsiders" appears to be far more strongly associated with concerns about Javanese and international investors who are threatening their capacity to control their own territory and destiny. These concerns have been intensified in the wake of the bombings:

> The bombing is not a problem for us now. But in the long term, I think there will be tensions between local people and outsiders. Our research found that almost 80 per cent of the total assets in Kuta and surrounding areas belongs to outsiders. So that's a problem. If this cannot be stopped, there will be another social conflict … because local people don't have any power. The Balinese are being pushed out … marginalized.
>
> (Professor Ardika, Balinese academic)

As other recent studies have found (Karyadi 2003, Connor and Vickers 2003, Reuter 2003), there are signs that a new social structure is emerging in which the Balinese, with the exception of a small group of elites, are becoming a lower social echelon, marginalized both economically and culturally within their own territory:

> The Balinese have not been showing the level of benefit they should have gained from tourism. It is largely an extractive industry … People buy up land from the Balinese and then sell it on for thousands … The common situation is where Balinese sell off all their land to send their kids to tourism college. They are completely dependent on the remittances from their kids. They are landless, their children have lost jobs or have large cuts in their income. These people are stuffed.
>
> (Donna, AusAID worker)

> When you come to the hotels, the developments, who's your general manager? He's not Balinese. Who is Balinese? The Balinese are the sweepers … That's all we are. The sweepers of Bali.
>
> (Viebeke, activist)

As people in Balinese communities talked with us about the restoration process, they were, at the same time, expressing concerns about the fracturing effects of rapid globalization and modernization. In the wake of the bombings, the Balinese perceive a future which is rich in opportunities

associated with economic participation and political reform, yet still characterized by threat and insecurity.

In particular, the bombings have generated an intensified sense of cultural insecurity for the Balinese. The commodification of Hindu Balinese culture for the tourist industry positions traditional culture as an asset to be preserved and protected from modernization and "outside" cultural influences. At the same time, the economic security offered by tourism has enabled the Balinese to maintain the rituals, ceremonies, and practices which maintain their distinctive Hindu identity within a predominantly Muslim Indonesia. Balinese culture is threatened by modernization and, paradoxically, also sustained by it. Thus, culture (*kebudayan*) has become central to Balinese initiatives in dealing with crisis. The restoration of harmony in Bali continues to be guided by the five *Pancasila* principles which underpin the Indonesian state constitution (one God, civilized humanity, unity, democracy, social justice). However, in the wake of the bombings, significant struggles are occurring between various overlapping and contradictory meanings about religious and cultural diversity.

A common theme emerging from the interviews was a pervasive sense of the need to reassert Balinese culture as being distinctive, Hindu, and traditional. The reassertion of the traditional Hindu-based *adat* is seen as a buffer against the influences of alternative perspectives which may have created the conditions for the terrorist attacks in the first place:

> After the bombing there is more crime. You know five years ago there is almost none Balinese in the police jail. Now, maybe 50 per cent. Before, narcotics is only for foreigners. Now almost 30 per cent of narcotics traffickers are Balinese. This is very dangerous for Bali … The breakdown in cultural values by tourism, by TV, by consumerism. They don't understand about karma any more. These people who come and live here in Bali bring their own values, their own culture, their own money … A lot of things are changing … We need to manage our own culture. We have culture and religion that is Hindu. So in this place you must be united. Otherwise all these values become lost … Foreigners want to come to Bali to see Hindu-Balinese people … If this changes, then Bali will not be distinguished in Indonesia any more.
>
> (General Pastika, former Chief of Bali Police)

The assertion of a unified, distinctive, Hindu identity for Bali is problematic. Bali is increasingly becoming home to diverse communities of transient, migrant, and indigenous peoples and the homogenizing discourse of a single Hindu–Balinese community denies the deep diversity of the island's population. As we have outlined earlier, the notion of essentialized cultural collectives has given rise to new forms of marginalization and discrimination in the name of "protecting culture" (see also Santikarma 2003, ICG 2003).

In contrast to Vickers (1990), who argues that Bali harmony is a false, commodified version of the "real" Bali, our research finds that during the recovery Bali harmony is a necessary imaginary for the Balinese. In a context of profound insecurity, it confirms the possibility that the island might once again be *aman* (safe), that tourism is recovering, and economic security will be restored. The harmony discourse also offers the possibility of restoring the spiritual balance of the *rwa bhineda*, confirming the resilience and durability of Hindu–Balinese culture and helping to mediate the tensions thrown up by modernization and the associated challenges to security. Nonetheless, these tensions are generating a new politicism in Bali. This politicism centers on the division of meaning and power and is associated with complex interactions of social change, hierarchy, and discrimination.

Reassertion of the *Adat*

Balinese communities are exhibiting many of the strains that accompany (post) modernization processes and these have been highlighted in the wake of the bombings. Various hierarchies, modes of organization, and modes of social value are interacting and competing with one another as they seek to form a durable though accommodating cultural condition (Lewis and Lewis 2004). Over recent years, as part of the government's decentralization program, the traditional structures of the *desa adat* have been strengthened politically and financially, giving local people greater control over law and order and the civic management of their village communities. In the wake of the bombings, the reassertion of the *adat* is being harnessed as part of a social movement, *Ajeg Bali,* which aims to reunite the Balinese and strengthen their distinctive Hindu Balinese identity. We argue that the *adat* also has a powerful political dimension. Increasingly, it has become a political mantra, an ideology which is invoked to protect traditional values against the assault of alternative perspectives.

Paradoxically, while the *adat* seeks to protect traditional culture from the influences of rapid modernization and mass tourism, people in Balinese communities are also well aware that their participation in the tourist economy provides financial support for many *adat* rituals and practices. Nonetheless, the reassertion of the *adat* is problematic. Modern business management practices and inflexible employment structures limit the ability of Balinese workers to fulfil their community and religious responsibilities and marginalizes them from local decision-making.

> The Balinese have religious and ritual responsibilities and they have to go. They need that sort of flexibility. In the past, these things were managed quite effectively, but now you've got external business ownership. They don't understand the culture … It's a big issue.
>
> (Donna, AID worker)

According to many of our respondents, the reinvigorated *adat* is also contributing to the economic marginalization of the Balinese. Tighter requirements for participation in traditional rituals and duties are limiting the ability of Hindu Balinese to participate fully in business and employment. According to Professor Ardika, "The adat is very strong. Too strong. They bind the people." Many are critical of its rigid and forceful power structures:

> The Balinese will always go to the ceremony because it's linked with religious issues and community responsibilities. In fact the consequences upon them if they don't attend those sorts of things are very strong. The way relationships within communities and families are dealt with is actually quite brutal … It's a very strong form of social control.
>
> (Donna, AID worker)

As documented elsewhere, the entrenched hierarchies and authority structures of the *adat* are essentially politically conservative (Darling 2003; Connor and Vickers 2003; Reuter 2003). The *adat* governs many aspects of communal and private life for the Hindu Balinese, but it also provides a vehicle for silencing conflict and dissent, and coercion to participate in customary business and religious rituals. Punishments include excommunication, sanctioned bullying, discrimination, and violence.

Thus, within the context of increasing local autonomy, the *adat* appears to be strengthening local anti-democratic tendencies. The *adat* is an important element of the transition to greater autonomy but, as we will go on to argue, its everyday practices are themselves struggling with the influences of modernization. This is generating new tensions and expressivities. Our findings suggest that "Balinese culture" is becoming increasingly volatile, even as the *adat* would assert itself as the unifying and overarching cultural referent.

Transition to Civil Society

Reassertion of the *adat* and a unified Hindu–Balinese identity is also taking place within a broader political transition toward civil society in Indonesia. As political power and control is being transferred to local communities through the *desa adat* and the larger *desa pakraman*, significant challenges are emerging around changing authority structures and community organization. Although the decentralization and regional autonomy have given more political and economic power to local government, there are no clear guidelines for devolution of finances and decision-making responsibilities. The 1999 autonomy laws allocate primary resources to the *kabupaten* (district) level of administration and not the whole province of Bali. Even as Bali struggles to build new forms of cosmopolitan democracy and civil society, large inequalities exist between the island's nine districts. Many functions, such as environmental management which should be at the

province level are now being managed at a district level with no province-wide integrated planning, co-ordination, or regulations.

As Connor and Vickers (2003) argue, the role of the *adat* as a countervailing pressure against globalization's increasingly deterritorialized cosmopolitanism appears to be contributing to a new localism in Bali. Autonomy devolves power to the districts. For Bali, this has facilitated further devolution of government and administration functions to local communities. Combined with the historical rigidities of the *adat* and the Hindu caste system, this devolution appears to be intensifying local politics. The increasing disparities in wealth, income, and levels of development across the island are also placing strain on the unity of the island's social and political infrastructure. Although the context of increasing autonomy should provide more opportunities for the whole province of Bali to control its own territory and destiny, it is also creating the conditions for significant social fragmentation.

Just as Connor and Vickers (2003) have observed, Bali has not yet developed a clear political map or vision of how popular democratic participation can be enacted. The provincial government is seeking to mobilize the *desa adat* as part of the process of strengthening civil society. However, its structures and hierarchies are in tension with civil society models and more democratic forms of political participation. There is considerable concern, even from within, about whether the *desa adat* are equipped with the capacity, skills, and political will to enable Balinese communities to take a more active role in their own self-determination:

> With the government, with the stakeholders, there is no co-ordination. We don't have any mapping. So we don't know what the problems really are … We need a common structure for participation in local government, community management. A plan according to the needs of the people. It needs to be implemented well. So people feel they are doing something for themselves, by themselves. Not *to* them."
>
> (Viebeke, activist)

The civil-society model requires new modes of leadership and organization, which are themselves problematic because they destabilize the hierarchies of the *adat*. It is also argued that the *adat* in its current form is essentially anti-democratic. Participation in local government is highly selective, dominated by powerful men in the community and commonly without any representation of women, youth, or non-Hindu residents.

As Reuter (2003) has argued, the hierarchies of the *adat* contribute to a civic community in which authority is delegated upward and problems are subsumed within a culture of silence. Interview respondents also described the problem of "false consensus" which constrains genuine processes of participation and empowerment:

> People get trapped with this "consensus" thing. It is very dangerous … The Balinese have a traditional fear of authority … This is the culture and tradition of Bali. Right now in Kuta with the World Bank Drainage project. It's not planned well. It's badly managed. Decisions are all top-down. They got all the local people together and they just say "Ya, ya, OK, I agree". Great, but its not participatory. They are just looking for consensus. *That* is the problem.
>
> (Viebeke, activist)

In general, there is considerable cynicism about the rhetoric of democratization and participation in civil society. There is much disillusionment about the wealth generated by the tourist economy with concerns that the state has failed to manage and distribute the prosperity properly. Serious social inequalities, health, and environmental problems remain unaddressed and there is widespread concern that poverty and lack of education are continuing to underpin the Balinese' lack of political participation:

> How can you undergo any kind of political life when you do not even have clean water for goodness sake? Basic needs, the chance to work, find food for your children, send them to school. Only then can you be a normal person and have a political life.
>
> (Viebeke, activist)

In summary, there is a fundamental tension between the reinvigoration of a unified Hindu Bali and the transition toward more secular, modern forms of civil society. Although the transition to civil society provides an opportunity for the Balinese to play a stronger role in their own self-determination, local communities are facing significant challenges as they try to accommodate more democratic and participatory forms of political engagement without destabilizing the fundamental structures of the *adat* and the values around which it functions. To this extent, even the "transition to civil society" constitutes a source of insecurity for these communities.

Conclusion

Battles over the meaning of Bali and its culture(s) are being vigorously waged and the stakes are very high. Within a context of continuing discrimination and entrenched hierarchical divisions between and through communities, ethnic groups, gender, castes, and districts, the bombings have intensified the fracturing effects of rapid globalization and modernization. It is within this context that the bombings are being viewed by a number of academics, environmentalists and activists in Bali as "a blessing in disguise" (Kasman-Entus 2003; Foster 2003). As an exposition of the *rwa bhineda* the bombings are being conceived as an opportunity to rethink the island's development priorities, reflect on the sources of Bali's proliferating social

problems, and "build a better social and economic order, free of fear, in an atmosphere of democracy, justice and responsibility" (Karyadi 2003).

But just as Jean Baudrillard (2002) has spoken of terrorism in terms of a Manichean contradiction, the *rwa* principle directs us to consider the problematics of material success and a democratic momentum which replicates the fallibilities of (Western) modernization within the specific context of a non-Western cultural history. If Bali is to be integrated into the global economic order and a national democratic system, then it must be under the conditions of the communities' own decision-making and cultural determinations. A genuine recovery is only possible through a reconciliation process which acknowledges that the benefits of material success and the restoration of tourism must be reconciled with aspirations for a culturally resilient but diverse community with inclusive modes of governance.

If Bali is to avoid further tragedies, then it must be allowed to seek its own modes of conflict management and power redistribution. In our view, the problems facing Bali are immense. What is clear though is that the island province has established a considerable history of self-management and ritual community co-operation. The mediation of these traditional practices with new modes of governmentality seems essential for an effective political evolution. The equilibrium of the *rwa bhineda* might well be restored if the excesses that produce terrorism and outbreaks of political violence can be managed within a protocol of cultural expressivity, development, wealth distribution, and collaborative governance.

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16 Resilience

Wantoks, transnational traders and global politics

John Handmer and Wei Choong

The selection of Solomon Islands Prime Minister Snyder Rini by the parliament in April 2006 was met with derision by large crowds outside, who accused him of being in the pocket of Taiwan. As Snyder Rini walked out of the parliament triumphant, his election was met with cries of "Waku," a pidgin term typically used to describe people of Asian origins but used in this instance to accuse the new prime minister of being too tightly connected to foreign interests. Despite heavily armed police from the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), a riot developed and most of Honiara's Chinatown and other Chinese-owned enterprises were destroyed. With one stroke the violence in 2006 undermined the livelihoods of thousands of Solomon Islanders by disrupting local employment and depriving them of their primary source of cash for food, education, and medical expenses. In summary, that is the newspaper headline level description of the event. However, there is an intriguing disjuncture in the story that suggests other layers. This devastation needs to be set against the recent history of violence verging on civil war that enveloped the Solomons for several years, ending in 2003 with the arrival of the regional intervention force known as RAMSI. During this period most of the major commercial activities (apart from the banks) closed down. The Chinese traders, almost none of whom are from Taiwan, remained in the country and kept their businesses open throughout the violence. Many of those same businesses were destroyed in the 2006 riots under the noses of RAMSI.

RAMSI, the international response to the years of violence and lawlessness in the Solomon Islands—known locally as the "ethnic tensions" or simply the "Tensions"—had been formed three years earlier in 2003. It was another of the many "humanitarian intervention" forces of the last decade, instituted to counter an instance of what this volume calls "localized transnational conflict." Led by Australia with modest contributions from southwest Pacific countries, RAMSI had worked from the "top down" to eliminate violence and install systems of governance with the aim of controlling illegal activities of all types including diversion of government funds. However, its success as a peace-enhancing force can be questioned.

At the centre of this chapter is the argument that localized networks of reciprocal relations remain at the core of understanding both resilience and

risk within and between communities within the Solomon Islands. Resilience is taken to mean those ways in which people are able to sustain their livelihoods in the face of sustained forms of social pressure and violence. Formed through tribal–traditional relations, this system of reciprocated relations carried by "*wantoks*," has been in part reframed by modernizing practices, not least as they intersect with a local trading system largely controlled by traders of Chinese origin. The term *wantok* literally means "one talk." Although it is possible to speak of a *wantok* system, on an individual basis a *wantok* is typically a person who speaks the same local language (of which there are over 100 in the country) and is bound to another through extensive kin-based relations that are connected via networks of reciprocity.

The intersection between the *wantok* system and localized transnational capital, we argue, provides for a kind of resilience that is rarely talked about. In other words, in the Solomon Islands, flows of modern commodities and services, as well as at times even hard currency, are mediated through an ethnic minority (local Chinese traders) and are distributed through a relatively durable system (the *wantok* networks) based on embodied reciprocity. It is not that violence cannot break out, including across this intersection; however, the long-term stability and durability of this system suggests that we need to look elsewhere for the fracturing sources of insecurity. The violence of 2006 demonstrates how, for instance, globalizing processes such as migration, the formation of diasporic communities and financial transfers can create political instability that lead to both local conflict and the disruption of patterns of resilience. This chapter examines these issues paying special attention to the evolving role and influence of the Chinese in the Solomon Islands and the governments of China and Taiwan.

The Global–Regional Context

To casual observers the Solomon Islands—devoid of global chain-stores and franchises—may seem as far as possible from the influences of globalization. However, through an examination of the violence in 2006 it is possible to argue that global forces have a pervasive influence on the country and the livelihoods of its people. The area now known as the Solomon Islands has long been drawn into processes of globalization through trade, proselytizing by missionaries, migration, and warfare. From the first documented contact with Europeans in the form of Spanish explorers, led by Alvaro de Mendana in 1568, the Islanders engaged in trade with whalers and sealers, and with Chinese seeking food and sandalwood. The British Empire made the islands a protectorate in 1893, in part to limit German ambitions in the region, and Australia played a role in linking the Islanders to the world through indentured labor in the Queensland sugar fields in the 1860s. Laborers from across Asia, principally from China, followed in the tracks of European colonialism as skilled workers and small-scale traders. Whereas Christianity and trade entrenched the Islanders into a global system, war propelled

them onto the global centre stage during World War Two because of the battles between the Japanese and the US-led Allies in places such as Guadalcanal.

As a nation-state the Solomon Islands emerged from the British Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1978. The collection of some 990 islands is divided into nine provinces based around major islands and ethnic groups, with the country extending over 1,600 kilometers in a southeast direction from Papua New Guinea. Solomon systems of governance face many challenges: national leaders have to confront regularly the issue of ethnic loyalty being asserted over national interest, the failure of development to deliver prosperity or even basic services to most of the scattered population of about 500,000, and the frequent recurrent "natural hazards" of floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic activity, and in some areas cyclones—said by some to be intensified by global climate change. Most Solomon Islanders are either outside or only partly within the cash economy. Most depend to at least some extent on their own food gardens or subsistence fishing, and many depend on remittances or cash support from relatives with paid jobs. The capital, Honiara, is the only major urban centre and the focus of most government, commerce, transport, and much tourism.

The overriding contextual issue framing any discussion of the Solomon Islands is the Tensions and the regional intervention force, RAMSI. Some have argued that the ethnic tensions had been brought about in part by the forced restructuring of the public sector lauded by Australia and the World Bank, putting many out of work with no other employment options. However, the obvious manifestation of the crisis was conflict over land between settlers from the nearby Province and island of Malaita and their Gwale (the people of the Province and island of Guadalcanal) hosts, further compounding long hostility between the groups. The militants on both sides had no trouble gaining personnel, actively encouraged by leading politicians and agitators both inside and outside the country. By early 1999, the government had effectively lost control of most of the province of Guadalcanal as militants tightened their grip on Honiara (Moore 2004). The impact on an already-weak economy was devastating with major employers closing one by one, including the oil terminal and the major food importer. Tourism halted, education, and medical facilities shrunk enormously (DFAT 2004), and most cash employment halted apart from that provided by local Chinese enterprises, especially in the provinces of Guadalanal and Malaita.

Eventually, following a report by the Australian Strategic Studies Centre (2003), *Our Failing Neighbour*, Australia used the Pacific Islands Forum to announce that it was sending in an armed force to restore law and order. This was at the request of the Solomon Islands government, even though that government had come to power following a coup in 2000. RAMSI arrived on 24 July 2003 and although a regional mission it was entirely dominated and run by Australians who were careful to define its role as policing rather than military. This was a way of undermining arguments for

a UN-based intervention and to counter potential assistance from France (Da Silva Ramos and Handmer 2006).

Quelling violence was only the first task for RAMSI. It has pursued a strong development agenda centered on improved governance, reducing corruption, and enhancing the judicial system and trade. However, there is limited evidence of significant improvement and the economic policy appears to be largely ignoring the village economies that service most Islanders. The national transport system is in its worst state for two decades, no major enterprises that closed during the Tensions have reopened, and those in the villages have seen little change since RAMSI in terms of economic and social development.

Some elements of the Solomon's government are antagonistic to RAMSI and have suggested that it is running what is in effect a parallel government.[1] The current (as at early 2007) Prime Minister, Sogavare, has long opposed the extent of Australian involvement in government, asserting that he is seeking to broaden the country's aid base. The Australian Government attempts to place Australians in key government positions and has also worked hard, unsuccessfully, to block an enquiry into the April 2006 riots, while RAMSI police have raided the prime minister's office and arrested a minister.

Although RAMSI has successfully managed to halt much of the violence, with a clear exception being the 2006 riots, many local people are very anxious that should RAMSI leave the violence would resume in short order. According to the *The People's Survey*, a report published in 2006, approximately 65 percent of people believe that violence will erupt again if RAMSI leaves. Thus we find ourselves with a peace-keeping (military) intervention rather that a peace-enhancing force.

Resilience and Livelihoods

The Solomon Islanders are among the world's poorer people economically and the country is ranked at 128 on the Human Development Index, between India and Burma (UNDP 2006). The majority of the population exists on the margins of the cash economy, with no cash employment and very limited access to medical facilities and education. Approximately 80 percent of the population depends on 5 percent of the gross domestic product (Firth 2007). The other 20 percent place their immediate livelihoods in the urban centers where most of the development aid is invested, opportunities for formal employment are more accessible, and where basic services such as education and healthcare are located.

Given the financial poverty, it is legitimate to ask how people access the services available through the cash economy. There are a number of explanations, but two key factors stand out: many Islanders are well networked with their kin, and local economic activity dominated by ethnic Chinese provides a source of modest income. It is the interaction between these two factors that helps us to understand the nature of resilience in the Solomon

Islands; this interaction has proved sustainable over the longer period of the tensions, even as it has been challenged by the very particular violence of the 2006 riots.

A minority of people have the ability to move between the worlds of the village and the more urban-based economy. This flexibility has proven to be important during times of crisis, such as the Tensions, when people need to seek refuge and sustain their livelihoods by moving back to their villages. The ability to negotiate the social and economic norms of both worlds allows for a kind of continuum in the security of individuals and communities, at least to a limited degree where loss of work in one location does not leave a person entirely without the means to sustain him or herself. Conversely, when food supplies become strained, basic services need to be accessed, or children need to go to school, people will venture into urban areas where a relation will be obligated to take in and look after their *wantoks*. These networks can work very well in times of personal or communal crisis by enabling those who find themselves without access to food, shelter, education, and so on, to call on more fortunate kin who are obliged to look after them. This may at times create a dependency (Turnbull 2002), but when urban areas become hostile, as during the Tensions, people from different ethnic groups will at different times travel to their home villages calling on their *wantoks* there. These *wantok* networks are drawn into other lines of social integration, including those based on the church, women, and youth groups, and importantly also in the form of trade and business systems.

Long-settled Chinese traders have provided a source of income to Islanders through the purchase of products from islanders and through employment in their stores. *Wantok* networks have helped ensure that the benefits of this are spread widely. The relationships and responsibilities dictated by the cultural capital invested in the *wantok* system forms a large social network across geographic locations that allow the flow of people, goods, and capital between the rural and the urban sectors. More recently, as some Solomon Islanders have become wealthier, they are able to use their personal networks to access better services abroad, such as from Australia and New Zealand.

The interaction between the *wantok* system and local Chinese traders provides access to all types of resources in non-crisis and crisis periods when it allows strategic investment in resilience through for example, education, health care, maintaining networks, insurance, and so on. The Solomon Island's Chinese have fostered a number of important economic linkages for local people with significant implications for resilience. First, as the primary small traders in the country they provide livelihoods through paid employment for many Solomon Islanders: over 2,000 persons in Honiara, who in turn use the cash to support many thousands through their *wantok* networks, in particular by paying for school fees and medical treatment, as well as by purchasing additional food. Secondly, they link the urban centers to the rural islands, supplying goods to remote villages and taking surplus production to sell. In doing this they provided a means of exchange and a way for

villagers to obtain cash. Thirdly, they have retained economic linkages to source cheap household goods made in China as well as specialized goods from Australia and New Zealand. Fourthly, some Chinese have established key infrastructure such as transport and schools. These activities help local resilience in a generic sense: for example, transport enables people to travel for work and to draw upon their *wantok* networks. Fifthly, and more specifically, many Chinese traders assist affected people after natural events such as floods or cyclones as was evidenced after the tsunami that hit the Solomon Islands in early 2007 (Caritas 2007). Another point that was made about the Chinese by almost all Solomon Islanders and other officials interviewed was that they remained trading throughout the Tensions when most other enterprises closed down. This helped ensure that many people continued to have some income at a time when essentially other forms of paid employment ceased or became very unreliable.

In terms of understanding local resilience, and how it is effected by conflict and broader patterns of globalization, it is important to consider the settlement patterns of those coming from China, and in turn to read those in terms of local and global political competition. The point of intersection between the *wantoks* and the "old" Chinese is of critical importance. There is little knowledge of exactly when the first Chinese arrived in the Solomon Islands. Laracy (1974), in one of the few examinations of the Chinese in the Solomon Islands, noted that the first documented "Asiatic" traders arrived around 1910 as part of their contractual agreements with commercial firms. Most of these visitors departed upon completion of their commitments as indentured labor. From about the 1920s onwards Chinese started to settle more permanently and have over time become integrated into the society through trade and personal relationships, although the Chinese continue to maintain their own business association separate from the Honiara Chamber of Commerce. Today, many of this "old" Chinese generation are married to Solomon Islanders, have mixed children, speak pidgin, English, and generally Mandarin or Cantonese, and know no other life than the one they have in the Pacific with its strong links to Australia and other Pacific and Southeast Asian countries.

There is a now a second wave of Chinese migrants from mainland China, termed "new" Chinese who have arrived over the past 10 years. The perception is that the way these new migrants live, and their attitudes and behaviors towards both other Chinese and the Solomon Islanders, is not seen in a positive light. Negative sentiments towards the increasing number of newly arrived Chinese migrants has also been caused by illegal logging and similar activities that are destroying forests on which people depend for food and natural products, a problem as often there is no alternative supply. Moreover, the new wave of Chinese seems to be able to obtain trading licenses and citizenship to begin setting up shop almost immediately on arrival. Their ability to access large quantities of cheap household goods and food items from China serves to give them a market advantage over the old

Chinese, and many set up in competition. Resentment is caused by the belief held by many that not all of these new Chinese migrants obtained their official status legitimately and yet are able to benefit considerably in the access to local markets that they quickly achieve.

Factions have started to emerge in the Chinese communities as the agendas of the new and the life of the old see few similarities in their once shared homeland and new-found land. The new Chinese lived through the political changes of the Cultural Revolution, whereas the old Chinese were shaped by a China built on the ideals of Confucianism. Of the Solomon Islander's interviewed in our research, almost all make the distinction between the old and new Chinese and many trust the old in the social and economic realms, but at best are unsure about the new Chinese. To speak at a general level, the new Chinese tend to be characterized as having shorter-term economic interests and have no obligations, despite ethnicity, to the old Chinese and have no problem undercutting them, and undercutting locally produced goods. Competition in the local economy is now rife, but there is also anger and resentment. Shifts in the character of diaspora communities such as that in the Solomons can cause lines of conflict to emerge, and as discussed, this has happened in terms of general perceptions of the newer Chinese migrants. However, on its own this is not enough to help understand the riots in 2006 which left Chinatown in Honiara devastated, nor how such violence can affect local systems of resilience.

The New Chinese Context: China versus Taiwan

The attacks on Chinese businesses in 2006 and the public response to Snyder Rini becoming prime minister are both in part a consequence to the local political effects of the international competition for the official recognition of Taiwan as an independent nation-state. Since 1971 Taiwan has been targeting mainly micro-states and islands, particularly in the Pacific and Caribbean regions, in an attempt to gain their support for diplomatic recognition of their independence from mainland China at the United Nations. The People's Republic of China (PRC) severs diplomatic ties with all countries who take up diplomatic recognition with Taiwan. Yet, over the past few years, there has been an increasing time-lag between recognition and severance, depending on whether the PRC sees a strategic reason for keeping countries on side. The trend has been for the two countries to respond to each other's actions by trying to woo back each state, often through supporting key politicians.

From the 1970s and early 1980s as the Pacific micro-states such as the Solomon Islands gained independence and British influence dissipated, the diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan began to deepen. Both Taipei and Beijing extended hospitality both formally through official diplomatic visits and informally by developing personal networks with senior politicians and government officials (Biddick 1989). By 1988, the PRC had secured diplomatic relations with Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Western

Samoa, and retains friendly relations with Kiribati and Vanuatu. Taiwan had gained the support of Tonga and the Solomon Islands, and maintains ties with Nauru and Tuvalu (Biddick 1989). In 1982, Taiwan opened a consulate-general in Honiara that later became an embassy. The PRC started engaging in economic interests such as a joint venture fishing project (Biddick 1989). The PRC also initiated symbolic links between the Solomon Islands Province of Guadalcanal and Guangdong Province, where many of the local ethnic Chinese community once originated.

However, the PRC's interests in the Pacific do not remain as simple as a pre-emptive response to Taiwan's global diplomatic campaign. The PRC at the time had a policy directed at developing countries that highlighted "common" interests in "facing the common task of combating superpower hegemonism" (Biddick 1989: 811). This position allows the PRC, like other donors, to deliver aid in its national interest. The activities of both China and Taiwan have promoted formal and informal linkages where capital can flow from Asia to the Pacific. Not just cash, but human capital and infrastructure can be easily shifted based on formal and informal social, economic, and political networks. And such aid has helped develop the physical infrastructure behind such things as the tarmac on the runway at the international airport, many roads, the hospital, sports stadium, and other infrastructures which may not otherwise exist.

On the other hand, one result of this transnational competition is a growing number of organized operational and distributional networks being set up for various illicit and illegitimate activities (Hill 2006). Transnational crime is rife in the Pacific, and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have identified China to be a key source of illegal migrants holding fake Japanese, Malaysian, Singaporean, and Taiwanese passports able to move between islands with relative ease (Janes Intelligence Review 2006). The interests of China and Taiwan in the region are seen to have motivated the initiation of a shadow economy that ultimately undermines developments made to reform the political process, revitalize the local economy, and benefit the population.

The informal relationship between China, Taiwan, and Solomon Islands officials does lead to the funding of some useful projects. However, as part of these relations, cash payments totaling millions of dollars are transferred to the funds of specific politicians as a form of development "aid"—for example, to the Rural Constituency Development Funds—a form of corruption that is becoming accepted as normal practice. Over the last few years this issue of cash from China and Taiwan has come to occupy an increasingly high profile in the local media and concerns many people, including a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to monitoring the return to stable democracy. The concern from these quarters is that such corruption undermines the democratic process and much of the intended work of RAMSI, and it is argued by Australian government officials and Solomon Islander activists that the large money flows to Solomon

Islands politicians are contributing to the country's poor governance. Local people expressed their concerns most vividly through the riots of April 2006, following the election of Prime Minister Snyder Rini.

> In a broad sense, the Solomon Islands is the site of an international tussle between Australia, the Republic of China [Taiwan] as proxies of the US global sphere of influence, and the People Republic of China. Recent uncontrolled immigration of ethnic Chinese nationals is one clearly identified cause of the 2006 unrest in Honiara.
>
> (Government of the Solomon Islands 2007: 17)

Hence what appeared to be a very localized conflict stands as a testimony to the main arguments of this volume more generally; namely, that what appeared to be a wild and chaotic savagery from below—an ethnically based pogrom against Chinese traders—in fact was intensely shaped by the process of globalization. Not only was the violence shaped by a growing discontent over the shifts in the character of the Chinese diaspora as trade networks carried "new Chinese" into the Pacific, but because of the corrupt practices born from the global competition between the "two Chinas."

The other side of this process saw an intersection between the tribal–traditional local and the localized transnational as providing an alternative basis for recovery and resilience. In relation to the localized transnational it is important to note that all of the shops left standing after the 2006 violence belonged to socially established, accepted, and generations-old Chinese families. It suggests that there was a clear focus for the anger of those involved in the destruction, one politically framed by a frustration with the perceived agendas of the new Chinese and the links with local politicians, rather than a spontaneous show of anger (Dobell 2007).

As we move towards the conclusion of this chapter, the impact of these globalizing movements of people and commodities, especially in corrupt forms, we return to the question of *wantoks* and ideas of resilience. Old Chinese trade stores support thousands of Solomon Islanders directly and through *wantok* exchange. Yet many of these same stores were destroyed in the Honiara riots of April 2006, potentially significant in the longer-term disruption of the social relations based on kinship, language, and reciprocity. The riots revealed a likely fragility in the junction between two fundamentally different socio-economic and cultural systems—the *wantok* system and the cash economy. Following the riots in Honiara, the destruction to these businesses meant that it was difficult to secure goods in Honiara, putting pressure back onto the *wantok* system that had adjusted through is intersection with the Chinese trading community. In particular, the *wantok* system is under pressure to provide the means of achieving basic needs in the urban environment, where cash is an essential component to accessing essential goods and services. Whereas, in the village setting, *wantoks* are still very well looked after and essential goods are distributed more equitably, the

wantok crossover between the rural and urban areas is increasingly being disrupted, just as the overall system of reciprocity is being reconstituted in terms of more abstracted relations of exchange.

Conclusion

Outside intervention in the form of RAMSI may have stabilized the situation in terms of overt violence, but there is little sign of the broader economic and social recovery and development necessary for longer-term resilience. Secondly, although it had no direct role in the ethnic Tensions, the geo-political tussle between China and Taiwan that has brought much money into the Solomon Islands' economy may now be inhibiting post-conflict recovery and development, possibly undermining the strategic development aims of RAMSI for good governance. The three-way relationship that has been labeled "dollar diplomacy" as Beijing and Taipei engage with Honiara parliamentarians, business representatives, affluent and powerful local individuals, is just one example of the manifold global pressures. These broader global political processes create multiple problems and exacerbate existing lines of tension. Thirdly, this is redoubled when violence breaks out. Violence has its own generative force, drawing lines of conflict ever sharper. The simple fact of large-scale violence profoundly damages many of the key sources of resilience: localized systems that enable the accessing of goods and services are particularly vulnerable to breakdown. In the longer term, while the wantok system remains relatively stable in the isolation of rural villages, it is becoming more complex and unstable in Honiara as the dynamic of the society is changing with the arrival of new global forces. And herein, paradoxically, lies a new source of insecurity. Traditional systems of exchange, distribution, collectivism, and sharing that have operated in favor of the Solomon Islanders—for centuries offering sustainable networks of resilience—now may be coming to contribute to their vulnerability.

Notes

1 The shadow government issue was raised during an interview with Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sogovare by Barrie Cassidy of the ABC (7/5/07). Sogovare agreed that it was a possible issue. Hilary Charlesworth also raised the issue in her 2006 Cunningham Lecture "Building democracy and justice after conflict." Academy of Social Science

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