

ANNE FAIRCHILD POMEROY

PROCESS, DIALECTICS,
AND THE CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

Marx and Whitehead

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*Process, Dialectics, and the
Critique of Capitalism*

Anne Fairchild Pomeroy

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*For Irene who taught me about creativity
For Ruth who taught me about justice
For Edith who taught me about care*

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of works by Karl Marx

C, I	<i>Capital: A Critique of Political Economy</i> , volume 1
C, II	<i>Capital: A Critique of Political Economy</i> , volume 2
C, III	<i>Capital: A Critique of Political Economy</i> , volume 3
CM	<i>Communist Manifesto</i> (with Friedrich Engels)
CW	<i>Collected Works</i>
EPM	<i>Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844</i>
G	<i>Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy</i>
GI	<i>German Ideology</i>
POP	<i>Poverty of Philosophy</i>

Abbreviations of works by Alfred North Whitehead

AI	<i>Adventures of Ideas</i>
MT	<i>Modes of Thought</i>
PR	<i>Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology</i>
RM	<i>Religion in the Making</i>
S	<i>Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect</i>
SMW	<i>Science and the Modern World</i>

INTRODUCTION

This is an attempt to read Marx through a very specific lens—that of process thought. In some ways, this book would serve as an excellent introduction to Marx’s critique of capitalism although, to be quite honest, it should serve as more of a reintroduction. I intend to return to what I consider to be the basics of Marx’s position and to enhance the understanding of those basics through a novel approach. While much of the ground covered will be familiar to Marxists, the added language of process is meant to provoke reconsideration and development. A space is opened up by this approach which will suggest that the perennial debates in Marxism may require thorough reconsideration. Many of those debates are simply undercut by this analysis and “melt into air.” Likewise, for those familiar with Whiteheadian process philosophy, this project is meant to imply a radical politics emerging from taking that philosophy seriously. We must start here. If we do not get the basics right, then the foundation of our understanding will be faulty and this would be the greatest misfortune because nothing is more essential at present than an adequate understanding of the basics of the critique of capitalism. Such understanding, I argue, constitutes class consciousness and class consciousness is the basis of our future. In service of presenting this foundation clearly and systematically, I have often had to curtail my own articulation of the results of the approach for specific problems, but the implications should be obvious to the astute reader.

I do not believe that I am breaking any radically new ground herein. Many theorists have read Marx in the way I have but what is new is that I have sought to give that reading a solid philosophical foundation and thus to repudiate the positions of those who take Marx to be a mere materialist or historical determinist, of those who would engage in critiques of Marx’s economics based on a-temporal models, of those who believe that new historical manifestations of the presence and operation of capitalism in any way change the fundamental correctness of Marx’s critique, and, finally, of those who neglect to see in the practice of capitalism anything other than the grossest violation of the human essence. Our current form of social relations is not triumph but tragedy, except as it may present the conditions for what will lie beyond it. May this work aid in coaxing our understanding of those conditions—the understanding of ourselves and of our potential.

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I want to thank Dave Kaplan, Paul Cheung, and Agnes Curry for their support and friendship lo these many years. I thank Rodger Jackson for serving as my personal philosophical guru during the writing of this manuscript and Kenneth Dollarhide for keeping me continually challenged with his philosophical curiosity and his dogged dedication to overcoming oppression. To Vic and Tim, thanks for trying to keep me real. Jane Bunker at SUNY Press has been extraordinarily helpful in seeing this project through with me, Judith Block has done an excellent job on the book's production, and the professional staff at the press are to be commended for their fine work.

Finally, boundless gratitude goes to my comrade, Peter Amato.

PART ONE

Creativity

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: MARX AND WHITEHEAD

A clash of doctrines is not a disaster—it is an opportunity.
—Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*

There is no doubt that, at the outset, this appears a most curious undertaking. What would motivate anyone to venture a union as unlikely as that between Marx and Whitehead? What can possibly be gained by linking a process metaphysics to a critique of capitalism? Providing at least some preliminary answers to these questions will be the task of this chapter. It will be the case, of course, that only the completed project can serve as a final answer, that the developed union of these positions will stand as its own reason. And so, if the answers given here in this preliminary justification do not wholly satisfy, I beg indulgence and patience. I see what follows as a pathway. Only one completing the journey can judge whether it was worthwhile.

These appear to be unsettled times indeed. The globalization of capitalism is well underway. International trade agreements and loans to developing nations have opened the doors of the global economy and yet protests have raged in Prague, Seattle, Quebec, and Genoa. New York's World Trade Towers were reduced to rubble and the security of this nation's capital has been breached, thousands have lost their lives. A new war has been declared on the United States; a new war has been declared on terrorism. We must wonder, we must ask—where do we stand? Recently some intellectuals have declared the end of history while others decry the injustice of the New World Order. It should not seem strange to find that, the recent expansion and development of capitalism and its concurrent public scrutiny, have led to some considerable discourse regarding the theories of Karl Marx. Word seems to have emerged from conservative, liberal, and radical camps alike: Marx is more relevant than ever.¹ But who is this Marx who is so relevant? Often we find that it is not the critical or revolutionary Marx. In this regard, a 1997

article by John Cassidy in *The New Yorker* magazine entitled, “The Return of Karl Marx,” is most enlightening.² Cassidy, himself a Wall Street broker, praised Marx for his analysis of the functioning, operation, and trajectory of capitalism and for his recognition of the importance of economics as a social force. The irony is obvious—somehow I doubt that Mr. Cassidy’s appreciation for the accuracy of Marx’s analysis has led him to quit his lucrative job in order to join the worker’s struggle. In fact, in the final analysis, his article rejected Marx’s analysis of the source of surplus value in capitalism. So, how is it possible for someone who is and remains thoroughly ensconced in the world of financial capital to simultaneously discuss the relevance of Karl Marx? Ironically enough, this same tendency to separate the theoretical from the revolutionary Marx is seen in Jacques Derrida’s *Spectres of Marx*. Derrida, however, wants to keep the radical spirit of Marx alive while jettisoning the theoretical analysis of the economics. But, how can anyone seriously treating Marx’s works separate the economic analysis and the revolutionary critique? Yet, as these examples show, it is done and that it is done signals that something may be very wrong in our understanding of Marx.

Oddly enough, I believe that Marxists themselves are at least partly and perhaps mostly responsible for the division between the theoretical and revolutionary Marx in public discourse. My direct and indirect engagements with various Marxist writers and thinkers over years past have been highly fruitful and yet I have, all too often, left these encounters with a rather subtle sense of emptiness. I have repeatedly had the feeling that something was missing, that an aspect of vital import was, for the most part, being omitted. I have heard a great deal of complex, nuanced, precise analyses of the structure and content of the political-economic critique, which has seemed partially or wholly accurate enough, yet strangely lifeless in a way that Marx’s work never was. I could find in these analyses none of the fire, little of the sheer amazement and anger at the irrationality and inhumanity of the capitalist system, practically none of the disgust and fury that resonates throughout Marx’s writings. Had we grown complacent? Where, I wondered, was the outrage expressed in statements like, “Capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt” (C, I, 926). Discussions remained theoretically potent but affectively empty and, because of that emptiness, often took on the form of mere academic quibbling about who had the proper “formula.” The body of the material was present but the heart and soul quite absent. Did this mean that the economic analysis was not the heart of Marx’s critique? Why did the discussion of the economic critique appear so often in a barren form? And why did it not appear this way for Marx himself?

On the other hand, some Marxists have emphasized, often to the exclusion of the economic analysis, the idealistic or humanistic aspects of Marx’s

thought. And, as will be familiar to anyone versed in the Marxian corpus, this debate played out in myriad variations regarding the division between the early, humanistic writings and late, political-economic writings, discussion on justice versus interest, religious versus atheistic Marxism, and so on. Whitehead says that the history of philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. We might say the same for the history of Marxism. We still hash out the old problem of the one and the many, form and content in these new guises. Yet, for Marx himself, the idealist and materialist aspects of the critique belonged together as a whole. The *Grundrisse* alone provides ample evidence that the earlier theory of alienation and the later economic critique are part and parcel of the same programmatic. These notebooks, written in 1857–1858, well after Marx’s purported break with his early “humanistic” theory of alienation, contain numerous references to that self-same theory, discussing again the alienation of labor from its products and act of production, from the natural world, from self and others, from species life, but this time as the emergent result of the capitalist mode of production. Thus, the *Grundrisse* seriously calls into question any interpretation claiming a radical break between Marx’s work in political economy and his earlier work in alienation, and strongly supports the claim that Marx had therein developed “his theory of alienation as political economy.”³

Further, the essential link between the historically specific critique of the capitalist mode of production and the existential alienation that it produces is intended even in the early writings. The very first statement in the section on alienated labor in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* is quite clear in this regard:

We have proceeded from the premises of political economy. We have accepted its language and its laws. We presuppose private property, the separation of labor, capital and land, and of wages, profit of capital and rent of land—likewise division of labor, competition, the concept of exchange-value, etc. On the basis of political economy itself, in its own words, we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, and becomes indeed the most wretched of commodities. (EPM, 69)

It is from this point that the discussion of alienation begins. In other words, we start with capitalist social relations, they are presupposed, and this condition of estrangement is their result. Thus, Marx situates the analysis of the condition of alienation within the material conditions of the capitalist economy, which very conditions are the subject of analysis in both the *Grundrisse* and the three volumes of *Capital*. It indeed seems that in the early writings Marx is uncovering the fundamental problematic existential outcome of the capitalist form of political economy and, in the later writings, elucidating the

structure that leads both into and out of that outcome. Thus, he moves from the general result to the specific conditions that produce that result; alienation is a philosophical ontological problem, a condition of estrangement from forms of relatedness proper to human life, but it is simultaneously one that is produced as a specific historical/material form of social relations.

Carol Gould captures the point well, seeing the whole of Marx's work as a "radical transformation of traditional philosophy . . . accomplished by means of Marx's striking synthesis of systematic philosophy and social theory"⁴ and she reconstructs this synthesis in the form of a social ontology that "provides a single foundation both for his analysis of capitalism and of other social forms, and for his theory of being human—of the nature of human activity, its alienated forms and the possibilities that may be realized by this activity."⁵

But what does this mean for the development of Marxism? I regret to say that, as far as I can tell from current discussion, Gould's work seems to have meant little. The same debates rage unabated. The sides are staked out and the parties rarely move. They merely take on new forms with the passing years. There are certainly exceptions, but they are, I fear, few and far between. Even Jürgen Habermas, the self-proclaimed "last Marxist," has difficulty seeing a clear connection between the levels of economic and social production.

Marx does move at the two analytical levels of 'system' and 'lifeworld,' but their separation is not really presupposed in his basic economic concepts . . . the interconnection between the two types of theoretical *statements* could be explained . . . only if it is assumed that there is a logical (in the Hegelian sense) connection between the development of the system and the structural transformation of the lifeworld.⁶

Habermas claims that Marx's distinction between the two levels remains merely formal and semantic and that, in order to forge a real link between the formal analysis of the economic system and its application to the lifeworld, "it would have been necessary to engage in empirical investigations of real abstraction, that is, of the transformation of concrete into abstract labor."⁷ As much as I disagree with a great deal of Habermas's reading of Marx's work, particularly with his interpretations of the labor theory of value, I must admit to understanding and supporting his demand for a formal, logical, and especially, a real connection between the political economy and the form of life it produces.

Gould correctly indicates that Marx has undertaken "a radical transformation of traditional philosophy" but we seem still to be catching up to this transformation.⁸ Sartre diagnoses the difficulty as follows:

Marx's originality lies in the fact that, in opposition to Hegel, he demonstrated that *History is in development*, that *Being is irreducible to Knowledge*, and, also, that he preserved the dialectical movement both in Being and in Knowledge. He was correct, *practically*. But having failed to *re-think the dialectic*, Marxists have played the Positivist game.⁹

What Marx himself left unspoken and undeveloped or underdeveloped has understandably been the source of great consternation, much debate, and egregious errors by Marxists and, finally, is the impetus behind my assertion that the critique of capitalism needs to be grounded in an adequate dialectical metaphysics. Marx cannot have understood "economic" in the one-sided and truncated form that it takes within a capitalist mode of production but rather as a historical expression of the way in which human life produces itself. There must be an ontological significance to the economics that is not merely an accidental result but is its essential nature and, for this to be the case, economic production has to be directly expressible as ontological production. But such expression would require an ontological/metaphysical groundwork within which economics and ontology could be understood as coterminous or at least concomitant notions. This underlying foundation can, I believe, be found in Whitehead's process philosophy.

Now, as capitalism reaches into new labor markets, as it ensconces itself ever more deeply in dependent peripheral nations, as NAFTA and GAAT loosen the legal fetters that bound the progress of its globalization in the past, as we contemplate implementing the MAI to further liberate "trade," as the "project for a new American century" is underway in The Middle East, now more than ever, if we are going to turn to Marx at all, we need to get Marx right. This improbable alliance of Marx and Whitehead may well constitute my desperate measure for what I consider to be a time of desperate need to see Marx aright, to understand the absolute inseparability of the economic analysis from the radical critique. It is my attempt to prepare and present a framework for re-vision, to develop a deeper understanding of dialectics and dialectical being, to allow that understanding to inform our analyses and critiques of our capitalist form of social relations and our visions beyond those relations.

Sometimes, our ways of seeing become too well worn, too familiar, and we see no more. Sometimes, therefore, we need new ways of seeing. William James suggests in "The Sentiment of Rationality" that philosophers "desire to attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on the whole be more rational."¹⁰ My work here constitutes a frame for the Marxist critique of capitalism which is, I believe, more rational—both in terms of its consistency with the whole of Marx's works and in terms of an appropriate unfolding of

the philosophical implications of that work. It is more rational in the pragmatic sense of that term. Through this rational frame I hope to spur creative advance and perhaps even to lure feeling, to open a new door into the continuing work of critique and construction.

Thus, the use of Whitehead's metaphysical system for this fundamental project on Marx is not gratuitous or arbitrary; it is, I will show, the most adequate articulation of a metaphysical vision which provides the deep connection between the ontological and economic spheres. Process philosophy will help to expose aspects of the critique hitherto suppressed, neglected, or misread, it will explicate and provide the solid foundations necessary to ground the ontological statements made by Marx throughout his writings, it will link these to the critique of political economy, and it will allow the critique to reach effectively into the present reality of capitalism and into the projective envisionment of a socialist future. Therefore, implicit in my work here will be a suggestion that process philosophy, if it is to remain honest to its own claims, is, or should be, economically, politically, and what amounts to the same thing, socially radical.¹¹

I should note that the concentration in this project on the ontological features in Marx's work by no means suggests that the analyses of capitalist economics (in the strict sense of that term) are secondary or unimportant. In fact, it should be obvious from what I have said above that they are inextricably linked, and this point should become even more clear as I proceed. The beating heart of the economic analysis and critique in *Capital* will be ontological and coming to the critique of capitalism though its ontological roots is intended to make such critique even more urgent. It is intended to provide the "reason" behind the necessity of continued vigilant struggle in the demystification of the inner workings of capitalist economics as it twists and turns through its various historical manifestations and local and national and international postures; but also to stand as a warning that we never forget why we undertake such work, why we quibble about the formulae, why we struggle over the proper articulation of a possible socialist future: "No actual entity, then no reason" (PR, 19). The demystification of the form of economic production is an ontological uncovering: *alethia*.

REGARDING METAPHYSICS

But can one really fruitfully combine the work of two thinkers who seem to be so fundamentally different? Marx certainly appears to be the vehement and violent critic of his, and our, times while Whitehead is a gentle and calm exponent of a relational world in process. Marx fixes his attention on the material conditions of a particular socioeconomic reality while Whitehead soars in the realm of generalizable metaphysical propositions. Marx is the out-

spoken critic of metaphysical abstractions but Whitehead is the metaphysician par excellence.

I am motivated in part by precisely these contrasts because they focus our attention on what is not articulated or, perhaps, inadequately articulated in each system. Marx needs Whitehead to ground his claims regarding the proper ethos and telos of human life and its productive-processive interaction with, for, and as a part of the world as a relational unity; Whitehead needs Marx to focus on the destructive aspects of capitalism as a form of world productive-process. To begin with, however, we must ask how accurate the characterizations above truly are. Is Marx simply and, more important, solely the critic of metaphysical thinking? Is Whitehead simply and solely the abstractive metaphysician?

Let us begin with Marx. The *Poverty of Philosophy* contains a particularly clear articulation of his critique of metaphysical thinking. His attack is primarily directed at Proudhon, who, he says, has a particularly bad habit of divorcing categories from their historical situatedness or simply failing to see that they are historically situated. And, because Proudhon ignores historical context in this manner, he takes the further step of transhistoricizing those selfsame categories. In this manner, in the manner of crude metaphysicians, he abstracts the categories of political economy from the real individuals and real practices and real relations. One can certainly understand why such a move would so distress Marx. If one fails to see that the categories of political economy arise out of historical practice, then one will simultaneously fail to see, or outright deny, the possibility that the system in which these categories are manifest can be overcome in practice.

It is, Marx insists, relations of production that constitute our social relations and produce the ideas and categories of these social relations. Because relations of production are dependent on the productive forces (the material conditions of such relations), the categories are “historical and transitory products.” There is, in fact, continual movement. “There is nothing immutable but the abstraction of the movement—*mors immortalis*” (POP, 119). But here, of course, is the only general statement made possible by Marx’s dialectics.¹²

A parallel critique is launched against the classical political economists (Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Say, and J.S. Mill, for example). The error of these thinkers is the ontologizing, naturalizing, transhistoricizing of the conditions specific to capitalism. Their tendency is to project the relations of capitalism onto all past forms of social production. The exemplary statement of this position occurs in the Robinson Crusoe example as recounted in volume one of *Capital* wherein Robinson, all alone on his island, isolated from all social contact, initiates all the activities productive of the elements of capital: labor,

value, exchange value, and so forth. According to the political economists, the human being is naturally a capitalistic animal. Nothing, according to Marx, could be more absurd, for “[a]ll Robinson’s products were exclusively the result of his own personal labour and they were therefore directly objects of utility for him personally” (C, I, 171). There are, for Robinson, no relations of production, no social production, therefore no possible determination of the exchange-value of either labor or commodities, hence no capitalism.

The critiques are quite similar. Bourgeois political economy refuses to acknowledge the historically specific character of the material conditions, social relations, and categories of capitalism. The mistake is one of classifying the concrete as abstract, whether in origin or outcome. In committing this error, capitalism is naturalized: so it is, so has it always been, so shall it always be. This is the danger of crude metaphysical thinking for Marx. It bears a striking resemblance to Whitehead’s first formulation of the notion of misplaced concreteness in *Process and Reality*; which neglects “the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought” (PR, 7–8). Or, as he says more succinctly in *Science and the Modern World*, “it is merely the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete” (SMW, 51), and this, of course, can take place in one of two ways: either by concretizing the abstract, as Whitehead claims occurs in the formulation of simple location, or by abstracting the concrete as is, according to Marx, the case with Hegel, the classical political economists, and French socialists. Marx’s critique is that Proudhon, Ricardo, and others mistakenly classify that which is concrete, specific, historically produced in a given form of social relations as abstract, universal, and trans-historical. Of course it will, in the final analysis be not at all surprising that the articulations of philosophy, economics, or socialism emerging from within capitalism, which Marx classifies as ideological and mystifying, should exemplify misplaced concreteness because such misplaced concreteness lies at the heart of capitalism’s form of social relations. But this discussion can only be fully presented later.

Now, given that Marx indeed engages this critical stance toward abstract ontologizing of historically specific conditions, are we then to conclude that he is opposed to all general ontological or metaphysical formulations? We need to ask whether it is possible for metaphysical thinking to avoid committing such misplacement of its abstractions. Did Marx think it possible?

Marx is no mere critic of metaphysical thinking; he is its reformer. But such reformation needs considerable clarification and development. So, the question becomes: Is there any metaphysics that meets the conditions required by his re-vision? It is my claim that the implicit ontology that would

meet such conditions can be explicitly found in a process metaphysics. But this leads to our second preliminary question: Is Whitehead simply and solely the metaphysician? Is his metaphysical position the kind of trans-historical, abstract, philosophical meta-ideology that Marx so vehemently denounces in his critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* or the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* or *The German Ideology*? Because, if it is, it should rightly be disqualified for use in this project.

Marx's critique is specifically aimed at metatheorizing that either abstracts the concrete or concretizes the abstract in such a way as to yield a merely one-sided position. He specifically denounces any philosophical, socioeconomic, or political formulations that advocate idealizing or trans-historicizing the historically specific. Therefore, for any metaphysical conception to be acceptable it would have to meet two interrelated conditions: (1) it would have to proceed from the real, historically specific empirical condition; (2) it would have to admit that the generalizations obtained from such an empirical starting point could not be abstractly universalized into trans-historical claims.¹³ In other words, to be justifiably used in conjunction with Marx's work, we would need to find a metaphysics that declares a pragmatic connection to its own specific historical/material epoch, that admits of the fallibility emergent from its own empirical origins, and therein, can unite with the very specific, situated dialectical material/historical critique of social, political, and economic relations.

Whitehead's process metaphysics meets the first of such conditions by expressing primary dependence upon real, material facts of experience. In the first chapter of *Process and Reality* Whitehead says,

Our datum is the actual world, including ourselves; and this actual world spreads itself for observation in the guise of the topic of our immediate experience. The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of our experience. (PR, 4)

Metaphysics is nothing but the description of generalities which apply to all the details of *practice*. (Italics mine) (PR, 13)

These statements are of the utmost importance. For Whitehead, as for Marx, abstraction and generalization are permitted only on the condition that they proceed from an observation of empirical reality (see, G, 85 and GI, 42, 46–48). Ideology, as an exemplification of misplaced concreteness, is the inevitable result of an inversion of a project's genesis—of believing that you have access to that which you do not. This is not to say that we have no access to metaphysics, to generalizable claims as to the nature of reality, but

rather, in Kantian fashion, it states that we can only begin with human experience for we have no other data to access; it is an empirical world, one, therefore, which we are always already within.¹⁴ I stress this point, because acceptance of a Whiteheadian metaphysics or a Marxian dialectic requires having made the fully critical turn. If we precritically believe there to be some unmediated access to a “real world” as it is apart from all human experience, we will not only subvert our project by beginning from an unreal abstract starting place, but also will be unable to understand the radical alteration of the very notions of generalization, abstraction, categorization which Whitehead and Marx have accomplished, and in so doing we will be forced back to the undialectical disjunctive view of the real and ideal, concrete and abstract that result in misreadings of each philosopher. It is such misreadings that allow us to classify Marx as the simple critic of metaphysics, and Whitehead as simply the metaphysician. But to believe that all metaphysics is necessarily ideological is itself ideological thinking. Therefore, the defense of the philosophical fusion that I am proposing requires an understanding that critical thinking and metaphysics undergo complete transformations in the hands of Marx and Whitehead respectively and that their unity lies precisely in the nature of these transformations as based on the similar starting point of their projects.

On the basis of such empirical origins, Whitehead is required to meet the second of our conditions for unification with Marx’s corpus: a denial of the trans-historicity or universality of the metaphysical project. He insists on the epoch specificity and fallibility of any metaphysical scheme.

Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities. . . . [the philosophical] scheme is a matrix from which true propositions applicable to particular circumstances can be derived. We can at present only trust our trained instincts as to the discrimination of the circumstances in respect to which the scheme is valid. (PR, 8–9)

Philosophy and specifically metaphysics, starting with and based on experience, searches for “better and better metaphors”—searches, progresses, but does not claim completion or finality, does not “desituate” itself. “Rationalism is an adventure in the clarification of thought, progressive and never final” (PR, 9). Thus, Whitehead’s process metaphysics meets the two conditions required for a consolidation with Marx: it begins with the real conditions of an empirical material reality and always measures the success of its findings by reference back to that reality and it expresses itself in generality and fallibility instead of abstractive dogmatic universality. Here we seem to have found the only kind of metaphysics of which Marx could possibly approve.

As an initial expression, therefore, we see three similarities between Marx and Whitehead's projects. First, there is a similarity of method whereby each recognizes the necessity of beginning the philosophical/scientific project from an analysis of empirical reality. Second, and necessitated by this method, there is a denial of the possibility of uncritical universality and an acceptance of the historical or epoch specificity of the project. Third, and as an expression of the first two, there is a similarity of critique of those positions that commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness either by beginning with the abstract and uncritically determining the concrete by it, or by universalizing or trans-historicizing the concrete determinations such that they are torn out of their processive form of being-becoming or, in Marx's terms, out of their production within specific material-historical conditions.

THE PROCESS OF DIALECTICS

A final question must be posed. I have stated that at least part of my intent in this work is to present Marx's critique of capitalism in such a way as to adequately integrate the political economic critique with the more philosophical-ontological elements presented in his earlier works. I have indicated that this task will be accomplished by reading the critique of capitalism through the lens of a processive metaphysics. Process philosophy is a philosophy of historical movement and, as a philosophy of temporality and movement, it is deeply dialectical.¹⁵ For this reason, I believe, it provides a grounding adequate to the Marxian critique. But the question arises: Why not utilize Hegel for this purpose? After all, didn't Marx himself adopt elements of the Hegelian dialectic and does not Hegel's system itself provide a dialectical metaphysics? Why not use the material in the *Science of Logic*; why not use the *Philosophy of Nature*? Is this work merely a redundant reformulation of the Hegelian system?

There are several obvious answers to this question. The first is already implied in my opening pages: Marxists themselves have been turning to Hegelian dialectics for some time and yet many still seem to be involved in particularly undialectical and one-sided readings of the Marxian corpus. We are still engaged in arguments that treat Marx as a one-sided thinker. In short, as far as I can see, many who have already interpreted Marxian dialectics with the aid of the Hegelian system have yet to fully grasp Marx. Therefore, the work that has been accomplished via Hegel, and there has been a great deal of it, has yet to lead us fully to Marx.¹⁶ This may mean one of two things. Either Hegel's material is itself inadequate to this task, or the use to which it has been put by Marxists has been less than completely effective. Regardless of which of these may be the case, on a pragmatic level, this work has colored

Marxists' historical understanding of the Hegelian dialectic and, therefore, I would maintain that we are simply better off, in a purely practical sense, to begin anew. When it comes to language and meaning, philosophers need to be particularly sensitive and careful. Precision of expression is of the utmost importance if subtle nuances are to be adequately communicated. If Wittgenstein is correct and the meaning of words lies in their use, then the very words of Hegel's system are already loaded with meanings that have yet to capture adequately the thrust of Marxian dialectics.¹⁷ Whitehead's metaphysics will present us with new language (and far too much of it for most people's taste): language of feeling and relation, language of mutual constitution and creativity, language of organicism and materialism, language as appropriate to the discussion of productive power as it is to the discussion of exploitation. And, because relatively little work has been done on political-economic theory and Whiteheadian metaphysics, the language is, in this regard, "use-less" and rich with developmental possibilities. In other words, meanings are not yet attached in this particular use. This language can, therefore, be more easily infused with novel signification that will certainly facilitate my attempt to coax from it new ways of listening to and speaking of Marx but that will also give room for interpretive development by the reader. I have absolutely no desire to have this work be a final word regarding Marxism. That would be entirely dishonest for a dialectician. Rather, it is my deepest hope that this will constitute the first words in an ongoing dialogue.

With that said, however, another advantage of this project suggests itself. If there have been inadequacies in the readings of Hegel that have come from within (or without) the Marxist camp, then the following pages may have the unforeseen benefit of serving as a corrective or at least a helpful addendum to the secondary literature on Hegel. I can indicate briefly how this benefit may arise.

Certainly the feature of Hegel's philosophy most often maligned is the statement of its own finality as regards the philosophical/historical project. Some say that, according to Hegel, we have reached the moment where there has occurred an identity between the Notion and Existence. Knower and known have achieved unity in Absolute Spirit. In its most immoderate eschatological articulation, this identity means that the project of Absolute Spirit is completed. But, because Absolute Spirit's self-development is history, this identity indicates the end of history. Additionally, because philosophy can only reflect on history accomplished, this identity indicates the end of philosophy as well. According to this reading of Hegel, the circle has been closed. We stand at the stillpoint.

Critics of this view have pointed out that there are numerous signs that this identity has not, in fact, been achieved. Marcuse, for example, argues that

the division within capitalism of intellectual from physical labor indicates that the conceptual and material are still separated in practice. Moreover, he claims that we have not reached, on the political level, the consciousness proper to true freedom because the individual and general wills remain divided. Hegel is forced, says Marcuse, to support an authoritarian state that will act as final mediator/authority when conflicts arise.¹⁸ But finally, I think that it is the present condition of human life itself that speaks most forcefully against Hegel's claims of finality. The lived reality of exploitation and starvation, suffering and inequality, the fact of child labor, industrial slavery, disease, and famine for so many millions, can only mean that the real is not yet rational—the rational, even if known, is certainly not yet actualized.

Thus, if Hegel is indeed claiming that we have reached the end of history and philosophy through the achieved identity of the Notion and Existence, if he is claiming that the revolutionary ideals of human freedom have been actualized in social-political practice, if he is claiming that his is the final word on the workings of history, then we must say that Hegel is incorrect. Even if he has overcome the distinction between notion and existence in thought it has not been achieved in practice.

[I]f philosophy sees the rose in the cross of the present, this can only be because it sees the cross, the pain which cries out for some kind of reconciliation. This means that philosophy not only apprehends "the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present" in "the show [*Schein*] of the temporal and transient," but also the degree to which the substance remains transcendent and the eternal absent.¹⁹

"Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts."²⁰ And, ironically, Hegel, who was himself so aware of context, would turn out to be a child of *his* own times, declaring on the one hand "contradiction to be the 'definite fundamental basis of all activity and self-movement'"²¹ and yet proclaiming the contradiction to be overcome. If indeed this was true, then there could have been no movement to his own thought—his existence itself would be superfluous. As Kierkegaard pointed out, "Existence must be revoked in the eternal before the system can round itself out."²² But it turns out that the irony runs even deeper. Hegel's own time is factually rife with contradiction and this is itself apprehended in the dialectic as the moment of opposition. Therefore, in order to be self-consistent in his reflection on what has been achieved, Hegel must declare his own thought to be occurring within a moment of opposition and, therefore, itself still contradictory. In either case, his claims to finality must overturn themselves. Therefore, his philosophical position needs to be seen as ideological and necessarily so but also, in that, revealing.

But here a more generous reading of Hegel's supposed eschatology emerges. When Hegel speaks repeatedly of the end constituting a return to and reconstitution of the beginning, perhaps we ought take him at his word and understand the end which he reached in thought (through his idealism) as the beginning of a new project of fully overcoming the distinction between materialism and idealism. Perhaps we might say that dialectical reason as *thought* is a child of its times that serves as a self-diagnosis of the social contradictions still actual. After all, would it not be the case that if the contradictions between notion and existence were indeed overcome already *in reality* (in practice) we would no longer need to articulate a unity in difference because the difference would *be* no more? As long as thought performs dialectically, as long as it still moves through the moment of opposition, even if only temporarily, it reads the disunion off of reality; and then, the owl of Minerva is indeed flying at dusk and thought is operating ideo-logically.²³ But in reading union in and, in fact, from out of the disunion which is exhibited as the actual, thought has moved beyond the actual, and has, in that, realized that it possesses the key to the prison of the actual contradiction. But then, everything changes.

Perhaps self-knowledge of the notion is the actual freedom of thought — consciousness recognizing itself as freedom. In the achievement of dialectical thinking, thought presents itself to itself as free of the contradictions still present as actual. But in so doing, it knows itself as dialectical and is, through this knowledge, freed from the fetters of mere reflection. In achieving dialectical reason, thought need no longer be satisfied with description, it now can, nay must, in and through its achieved freedom, fly before and usher in day-break. Thought thinking itself is freed from the dictates of the actual: dialectical reason must prescribe. Thus, when dialectical reason looks back on the conditions that deny the rationality of the real, it is the role of reason to truly “seize the day,” and issue forth as a praxical guide.

[N]ow we see that knowledge is always beyond itself, that it can never be complete in itself inasmuch as social praxis is the condition of its possibility. What then can it mean for knowledge no longer to need to go beyond itself? . . . Knowledge corresponds to its concept by being embedded in social praxis.²⁴

[O]nly a social praxis which no longer needs to go beyond itself could ground a knowing which could legitimately rest at its goal.²⁵

So what now is the role of philosophy? It must become praxical. There are two prongs to this role. As long as thought is dialectical it reveals the actuality of contradiction. Therefore, it recognizes (in and as its own being)

that subject and substance are yet to *be* united and in this very recognition, the role of philosophical thought is defined. It must leap ahead and lead the creation of the actuality of unification. But precisely because the actuality is yet to be achieved, such thought must necessarily take the form of flying ahead; it must be speculative. Speculative philosophy must articulate the metaphysical-ontological unity of subject and object, conceptual and material, notion and reality. The sublation of Hegel's passive reflective philosophical idealism is a praxical (pragmatic), speculative metaphysics of dialectical being. "Thought must discover its own necessity in its material object."²⁶ As will emerge in the second chapter, this is an adequate description of the speculative offering of process metaphysics.

But this is only half the story. Once such a speculative unity of being is articulated it must serve first as a critic of the disunity of actuality and then as a lure to the praxical realization of such unity.²⁷ Late in his career, Sartre saw this necessity clearly.

We are dealing with a *materialist dialectic*; and by this I mean—from a strictly epistemological point of view—that thought must discover its own necessity in its material object, at the same time as discovering in itself, *in so far as it is itself a material being*, the necessity of its object. . . . This inevitably refers us from thought to action. Indeed, the former is only a moment of the latter.²⁸

And so, Whitehead will lay out the metaphysics as "speculative" indicating precisely its idealistic source and its practical role. It cannot be other than speculative and yet it can simultaneously constitute the "best" account both in terms of adequacy of explanation and in terms of pragmatic-ethical recommendation. It will articulate the rational yet to come in the real as actual. His position constitutes both a speculative account of and a recommendation for ontological-metaphysical solidarity.²⁹ Once the unity of subject and object have been achieved in thought, then thought must turn back on itself and carry the weight of responsibility for its sublation by unifying in praxis with its object.

And so, with regard to Hegel, what is presented here does not so much constitute a negation of or even a correction of his philosophical achievement, as it constitutes a fulfillment of the promise of the dialectical method. The question, "Why not Hegel?" contains an error. My intent is not to reject the Hegelian dialectics but to explore what I believe is the adequate extension of that very project. This was the extension that Marx himself needed to perform to ground the unity of humanism and critical economic analysis. This is the extension required to link in actuality the systemic and lifeworld analyses. The dialectic of ideality and materiality is praxical movement.

“Dialectic as a movement of reality collapses if time is not dialectic.”³⁰ In recognizing dialectics as a diagnosis of social contradiction and an acknowledgment of the role of thought in reference to such contradiction, thought comes full circle; it returns from its idealistic flight to apply itself to praxical (temporal-material) being. In this several favorable achievements emerge.

We are able to return from the macrocosmic metaphysics of the Absolute Spirit to a concrete microcosmic metaphysics of actual entity and thereby to recover the ground in between—the ontological as the apparent level of human (social) practice. “The effort to uncover a concept that truly identifies the thing for what it is plunges the mind into an infinite sea of relations. . . . The relations . . . must be seen as created by the object’s own movement.”³¹ Thought, in its self-knowledge, looking at the actual through the prism of the Absolute now sees itself shattered into the glinting fragments that are every possible manifestation of being. “[T]he Idea *freely releases* itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise. By reason of this freedom, the form of its determinateness is also utterly free—the *externality of space and time* existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity.”³² The realization that dialectical thinking signals the lack of completion of its own project, frees us from any position that would assimilate the moving life of the individual subject to an abstract or totalizing objectivity or a mere particular instantiation. As Kierkegaard points out, subjective life (faith) is indefinable and cannot be made the object of knowledge. But does this necessarily mean that there is no totality? On a Whiteheadian metaphysics, each individual itself is its own achieved totality but because such totality is achieved as the unique relation to all being, the subject is a totality within totalities—totalized totality. Likewise, each individual determines itself as a part of its relational totality to all other being. Each subject is absolutely singular and absolutely universal in its very singularity. In this act of return, we regain (retrieve) the ineffability of each individual subject. All being reflects itself as a self-determined aspect of the dialectical totality. Not determinations of the absolute, but absolute self-determinations. “If we refuse to see the original dialectical movement in the individual and in his enterprise of producing his life, of objectifying himself, then we shall have to give up dialectic or else make of it the immanent law of History.”³³ “[T]he dialectic, if it exists, is the individual career of its object.”³⁴ All being, top to bottom, simultaneously subject and substance, simultaneously conceptual and material. All being relational. All being life and movement. All being free.

We see that the restoration of the subject as a self-determined freedom and movement makes praxical relation the category of prominence. Relationality is historicity. The unity in difference of the ideal and real, subject and substance, freedom and necessity is praxis. The idealism sees itself *as*

idealism—as an aspect of the whole. The unity of subject and substance is not spirit, it is dialectically relational being, it is praxis: the subjective and free mediation that moves objectivity to objectivity. Thus, returning to one of our original points, if self-knowledge of the notion involves the recognition of the lack of achievement of dialectical unity, then thought recognizes in this its own freedom. It is beyond the actual, yet responsible for it. The achievement is creativity become self-conscious. Not a creativity that escapes materiality through ideality but one that knows itself to be the movement of reality and now sees the task of a philosophy that has just begun. The end that constitutes the beginning and real unity of ideal and real is praxis. Again Sartre captures this point well.

This inevitably refers us from thought to action. Indeed, the former is only a moment of the latter. We must therefore inquire whether, in the unity of an apodictic experience, every praxis is constituted, in and through the material universe, as the transcendence of its object-being (*être-objet*) by the Other, while revealing the *praxis* of the Other as an object. But, at the same time, a relation must be established, by and through the Other, between each *praxis* and the universe of things, in such a way that, in the course of a perpetual totalisation, the thing becomes human and man realises himself as a thing.³⁵

The move from Hegel to Marx is not a movement from idealism to materialism, but a movement from idealism to dialectical (historical) materialism—itsself a sublation that moves us from thought to constitutive action. The important move that Hegel has made is not the end of philosophy or the end of history but is, in fact, exactly the opposite, the beginning of the possibility of human history as genuine self-appropriation and self-conscious historical being. Thinking change, thinking the movement of spirit, is the beginning of thinking being as self-creative. The efficacy of the subject is realized. The actual practice of such thought is the end of that epoch of philosophical thought and the beginning of philosophy anew. The achievement of Hegel is the achievement of freedom. Not freedom from, but freedom for what is yet to be achieved.³⁶

And so, finally, the importance of Hegel's idealism lies not in what it accomplishes for once and for all, but in what it dialectically reveals in its claim to actualization—its own lack of actualization. But in this it reveals also its own limits as idealism. It turns over to become the beginning of a task. And, strange as this may sound, this overturning of Hegel is perfectly consistent with Hegel. "As soon as the ideologist speaks, he says more and something different from what he wants to say; the period steals his thought from him."³⁷ But Hegel, of all philosophers, would be well aware that this theft would necessarily happen. When the period steals his thought, when his thought reveals itself as other,

what is seen is the possibility of the unity of being through praxis. Speculative metaphysics posits that being is unified through its self-constitution as relation. And this is dialectical being (being dialectical). What needs to be accomplished now is the realization of such unity. The first step to such realization is the diagnosis of and analysis of the modes of relational being in which such unity is not-yet, therefore, an analysis of the praxical form of our contradictory social relations: a critique of capitalism.

For Hegel, freedom in thought apart from the movement of existence is not real freedom.³⁸ The end is a beginning. The finality of Hegel's project is the beginning of the movement of existence itself toward freedom. "Before it can be a *motive force*, contradiction is a result; and, on the level of ontology, the dialectic appears as the only type of relation which individuals, situated and constituted in a certain way, and on account of their very constitution, can establish amongst themselves."³⁹ We need to explicate and develop the result (the dialectical metaphysics) and make of it a motive force (critique). The first task is the subject of the first two parts of this work. Part I is speculative and explicates the dialectical metaphysics as process/production. Part II is practical and develops the ontological ramifications of this metaphysics. The second task is the subject of Part III wherein constructive critique emerges as the content of the metaphysical and ontological analyses.

We live in desperate times. So many feel so utterly empty. So many live in want. The more we want the more our very wanting reveals how little we truly have. A dialectical image is set to explode in the human heart—revolutionary promises have not been kept and the great humanistic ideologies and the great emancipatory discourses still hang unfulfilled and empty, beckoning.⁴⁰ We want so desperately to believe.⁴¹ We want so desperately to be free and fulfilled as members of a common humanity. We want the freedom of others but are told that theirs is the price of our own. We no longer believe. We want truth. We want ourselves. Marx calls suffering a sense of self in the human person—suffering loss, feeling unrealized potential, mourning what might have been. If human consciousness is indeed freedom, then perhaps this is genuine Sartrean scarcity—this lack of freedom, this lack of self.

This finally is the primary motivation for this project. If we construct ourselves through our mode of social relatedness, then we cannot see ourselves or see our way to ourselves until we understand the construction that we are—our mediation as our being. We need to understand the want that pervades that being and know how it opens before us, in us, the chasm that is a path for those of us who will be lucky enough in these desperate times to live to take it.

Far from being exhausted, Marxism is still very young, almost in its infancy; it has scarcely begun to develop. It remains, therefore, the philosophy of our time. We cannot go beyond it because we have not gone beyond the circumstances which engendered it.⁴²

We have not gone beyond exploitation; we have not gone beyond hunger and starvation; we have not gone beyond crippling poverty and homelessness; we have not gone beyond incarceration and the death penalty; we have not gone beyond the inhumanity so often evident in our social relations. We will not be done with Marx until we are done with capitalism and so, I offer another page in the ongoing dialogue, another way of looking and of seeing and of speaking. What follows constitutes ground-clearing and preparation for the ongoing project of addressing our condition of alienation. “[I]t is not enough to describe the working of capital or the system of colonization. It is necessary that the questioner understand how the questioned—that is, himself—exists *his alienation*, how he surpasses it and is alienated in this very surpassing.”⁴³ I hope to offer tools for such understanding.

CHAPTER 2

THE DIALECTICS OF PROCESS

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow . . .

Between the desire
And the spasm
Between the potency
And the existence
Between the essence
And the descent
Falls the Shadow . . .

For Thine is
Life is . . .

—T. S. Eliot, *The Hollow Men*

FROM INTERNAL RELATIONS TO DIALECTICS

Marx and Whitehead share a common method, one that begins with human experience and analyzes the adequate explanatory grounds of that experience. The subject of our thinking is human experience but this is certainly not meant in any precritical empiricist sense as the examination of a distinct external, objective world by the subject. Such separation of the subject from object is entirely antithetical to both Marx's and Whitehead's descriptions of "reality" and inevitably result in an unacceptable dualism of the positivist or idealist forms.¹

The difficulty for these dualisms always becomes one of access and this difficulty leads to the inadequacy of an objectivism that is unable to account for the activity of the subject in the process of knowing, or to a subjectivism that is unable to account for the shared objectivity of the world and hence falls prey to relativism. Notably, these positions are critiqued both by Whitehead, on the grounds that they are unable to account for the real transmission of data from one occasion of experience to another and simultaneously for the change that pervades the fabric of reality, and by Marx, as symptomatic philosophical ideologies emergent from capitalist social relations.² These criticisms are, as will become evident later, facets of the self-same position.

Thus, instead of the precritical and dogmatic distinctive-dualism of subjectivism or objectivism, my references to the empirical world are intended to refer to a structure of experience much more similar to, if not identical with, Bologh's dialectical phenomenology, which

treats objects as objective conditions for the accomplishment of some activity. Conversely, it treats the activity as a condition for the knowledge of the object. For this type of analysis, no object exists as an abstraction, a meaning that is removed from all purposive activity, all history. Rather, every object is seen as grounded in its form of life. . . . This active unity of subject and object constitutes a purposive activity, a form of life.³

Instead of a duality, dialectical phenomenology posits a unity. However, this unity is not the result of reducing the objective to the subjective or the reverse. . . . Rather, both are united in a process, an active relation of subject to object.⁴

Thus, the empirical world as I refer to it is the active phenomenological encounter that is our being-(t)here, the intersection of relations (mit-sein) that constitute this particular material/historical/epochal form of life (da-sein). These descriptions are meant to highlight two features of this type of position: dialectic and process; the real unity of apparent opposites and this unity itself as generating change from the settled history of past fact. Such is the sense of the empirical and material used by Whitehead and Marx.

INTERPRETING EXPERIENCE

I am sitting in my garden on a beautiful summer day. As the morning sun gains in intensity my face begins to warm, small beads of sweat rise on my brow. A slight breeze is pushing the branches of the fig tree, moving its leaves in and out of the sunlight dappling through the elm tree above, allowing

them to alternately receive and not receive the light for their photosynthetic processes. I notice an earthworm that has surfaced from last night's rain and is burrowing again into the soil of the garden to receive nutrients. The tomatoes are further along than yesterday, some are just beginning to blush red; some of the grapes hanging beneath the shade of their arbor leaves are ripening translucent. The redwood stain applied last year on the garden fence is beginning to fade along the edges; it will need a new coat this fall. I am relaxed and pleased to be sitting in this lovely environment, yet I notice a slight tension in my neck and shoulders—the result of my concentration on this writing. These observations are so simple, so basic to our daily encounter with the world, yet they lead us to several more general determinations: a transmission of qualities from one thing to another—the sun to the air, the leaves, my face, the soil, a reaction of one thing to such transmission from the other—the earthworm digesting the soil's nutrients, growing, moving, the rain and light slowly eating away the redwood varnish; perspiration rising on my brow, my act of writing creating an almost imperceptible tension and my sense of well-being as the pervasive emotional tone of this environment, and yet, simultaneously, a permanence is revealed—the tomatoes are still those planted in midsummer despite their new form and color; these grapes will be the ones that I eat in several weeks when they are fully ripe. Organic process, change, and permanence. How would a Marxian adequately explain these features of our experience?

We might borrow a page from Bertell Ollman and say that Marx accounts for these features with a philosophy of internal relations whereby “[e]ach part is viewed as incorporating in what it is all its relations with other parts up to and including everything that comes into the whole.”⁵ In other words, the active relations carried on by any part are constitutive of (internal to) what that part is, and, of course, what it can become. Therefore, a philosophy of internal relations is one in which there is real transmission of historical data and a constitution of each “entity” by its particular relational incorporation of that data, yielding process (what I will later designate on the social scale as production for Marx) as the organic movement of inheritance and productive relationality to, of, and by that inheritance. It is thus that any part examined can be analyzed at the multiple levels of its constitutive relations.⁶

However, adhering to a philosophy of internal relations requires a very specific kind of abstractive method. This is due to the fact that a philosophy of internal relations focuses on the features of interaction and, issuing from such interaction, change. The dominant question for method is: How do we proceed using the abstraction necessary to think about any topic, which appears to require fixing, delineating, categorizing features of generality and

permanence, and still retain the features of specific relationality and change necessitated by a philosophy of internal relations? Marx's answer, according to Ollman, is dialectics.

[F]ew would deny that everything in the world is changing and interacting at some pace and in one way or another, that history and systemic connections belong to the real world. The difficulty has always been how to think adequately about them, how not to distort them and how to give them the attention and weight that they deserve. Dialectics is an attempt to resolve this difficulty by expanding our notion of anything to include, as aspects of what it is, both the process by which it has become that and the broader interactive context in which it is found. . . .

Dialectics restructures our thinking about reality by replacing the common sense notion of "thing," as something that *has* a history and *has* external connections with other things, with notions of "process," which *contains* its history and possible futures, and "relation," which contains as part of what it is its ties with other relations.⁷

Thus, dialectical thinking issues in a philosophy of internal relations, and a philosophy of internal relations presupposes and requires dialectical thinking.

If the subject matter of our thinking is human experience as the totality of our phenomenal encounter with the myriad relations that constitute our empirical reality, if that empirical world exhibits predominate features of processive relation, the concomitance of permanence and change, if the method of thinking adequate to that totality as both relational (involving inheritance) and changing (involving creative novelty) is dialectical, then would not such a pattern of thought be adequate and coherent on a multitude of levels of analysis: from that of human society to that of individuals to that of animals, plants, inorganic "things," molecules, atoms, subatomic particles . . . all the way to the ultimate microcosmic entities of metaphysical thought? Would not the application of such analysis need to exhibit adequacy and necessity?

The adequacy of the scheme over every item does not mean adequacy over such items as happen to have been considered. It means that the texture of observed experience, as illustrating the philosophic scheme, is such that all related experience must exhibit the same texture. Thus the philosophic scheme should be 'necessary,' in the sense of bearing in itself its own warrant of universality throughout all experience, provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with immediate matter of fact. (PR, 3–4)

Marx's study of the historical socioeconomic forms of internal relations confined his application of dialectical analysis to at least the seven levels of

abstractive generality applicable to that analysis: the unique individual, modern capitalism, capitalism as such, class society, human beings in general, the animal world, and nature.⁸ But it seems that the requirements of adequacy and necessity dictate that such levels be extended to the metaphysical. The level of the metaphysical should, in fact, provide an analysis of the most general features pervading all the other levels thus illuminating yet unconsidered characteristics of all the other levels and extending the critique of capitalism into the totality of internal relations. The level of the metaphysical is the totality of totalities.

Based on the preceding discussion, it should already be quite evident to anyone who has studied the process metaphysics of Whitehead that it is also a philosophy of internal relations. The actual entity, the ultimate metaphysical unit of process thought, receives data from the past world of settled achievement and constitutes itself by way of its particular prehensive integration of that data. The “part is viewed as incorporating in what it is all its relations with other parts up to and including everything that comes into the whole.”⁹ The “what it is” of an actual entity is precisely the “what it does” with its historical inheritance, the how it constitutes itself from its historical situation; the actual entity is its mode of relatedness to its world, is constituted by those relations which, therefore, are internal to its being. This much seems fairly straightforward, however, the claim has already been made that the form of thought required by any philosophy of internal relations is dialectical and so our question becomes: Is process metaphysics in any meaningful way dialectical?

One of the important features of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism is that it is formulated as based on and in response to metaphysics and epistemology as they have been articulated in the history of philosophy. Most are aware of Whitehead’s statement that the history of philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. This statement is viewed by some as merely enigmatic, by others as highly controversial, but I take Whitehead to mean that there has been a continued attempt to grapple with and reconcile quite ancient problems, at very least among these, the relation between the universal and particular, the relation between the one and the many, the ideal and the real, the homogeneous and heterogeneous, equity and freedom, and so on. Whitehead sees these themes as persistent, dogging and often bogging down metaphysical thought, yet unreconciled. The philosophy of organism is Whitehead’s attempt to reconcile these dualisms without losing the unique contributory function of each and he does so with a dialectical metaphysics.

Of particular applicability to this discussion is Whitehead’s encounter with the modern philosophical tradition, particularly with Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant. Some of the most revelatory insights into the philosophy of

organism are to be gained by studying how, in Whitehead's eyes, it differs from and is similar to the modern tradition, what it accepts and rejects in these positions, how its differences make it a more consistent and more adequate position.¹⁰

In the final analysis, the philosophy of organism takes its subjectivism from Descartes, the communication between existents from Locke, the notion of repetition from Hume, and from Kant, the relational conditioning of experience by the subject but, in order to combine these into a coherent and adequate system, Whitehead must reject modernism's distinction between mental and material substance, qualities as inhering in substances, the sensationalist doctrine, and Kant's formulations of "the objective world as a construct from subjective experience" (PR, 156).¹¹ In other words, Whitehead rejects those notions that force philosophy into the dualistic corners of subjectivism or objectivism and opts instead for real relation. But in order to remain faithful to his own critiques, he needs to achieve relation between individual achievements without falling into the trap of either having subjective contribution eradicated by objective repetition or objective content erased by arbitrary subjective conditioning. Thus, Whitehead, like Marx, seeks to overcome one-sided dualistic objective positivism and subjective relativism or idealism and does so through a philosophy of internal relations that takes the form of dialectical metaphysical expression.

The difficulties incurred by the philosophers of the modern era are, according to Whitehead, two-pronged: their metaphysical views produce both rational and empirical problems (see PR, 3). The logical difficulty for any philosophy that proposes absolute, real distinctions (whether of mind and matter, or between individual substances, or between perceiving subject and perceived object) is one of explaining connection between relata. It becomes necessary to bring in a "third thing" that will effect the relation, but then, proceeding logically, we must explain how it is that this "third thing" is related to each of the first two, and ultimately we are left with a situation of "turtles all the way down." "Incoherence is the arbitrary disconnection of first principles" (PR, 6) and, once they are disconnected, we are faced with the difficulty of how to reconnect them. Descartes tried to accomplish this by way of a God who ensures the correlation between the subject's ideas and the objective world and the pineal gland, which relates the mind and body of the human being; Locke used the notion of power, but the assumption of sensationalism made this notion untenable. To try and get out of the logical muddle, Hume tried to do away with the distinctions entirely by attributing the relations to the functions of the subject. Kant, according to Whitehead, also placed the relation on the side of the subject and thus effectively reduced objectivity to mere appearance. The difficulties created by these

positions are of empirical applicability and adequacy: relation, transmission, repetition . . . are fundamental features of our immediate experience—the datum for the speculative project. By retaining modernism’s metaphysical distinctions they fail exemplification; we “catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway” (PR, 4).

The answer to this conundrum seems quite evident: do away with the distinctions. Begin with a monism and then determine how it is possible that these monads can be internally related and how such internal relation could lead to their mistaken analysis as distinct—how misplaced concreteness is possible. Part of the adequacy of the scheme will be its ability to explain how other mistaken analyses are made possible and perhaps even expected within it. (This fact, of course, Marx knew quite well, as is evidenced by his analysis of the ideological function of certain articulations of political economy.) The adequate explanation for Whitehead will be attained by the bipolarity and duality essential to each actual entity: these aspects constitute the dialectics of his metaphysics. In other words, the apparent dualism uncovered and reified in certain forms of analysis, is built into the very fabric of reality—synthesized in the being/becoming of each actual entity. The abstraction is mistaken for the concrete which it presupposes; the abstractive separation dialectically requires the connection which can be separated.

THE ACTUAL ENTITY

Each processive monad of experience, each actual entity is an individual act of becoming and in that being which is its becoming, each actual entity has a dual nature. The fundamental expression of this duality is that each actual entity is simultaneously subject and superject.

It is fundamental to the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophy of organism, that the notion of an actual entity as the unchanging subject of change is completely abandoned. An actual entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is subject-superject, and neither half of this description can for a moment be lost sight of. The term ‘subject’ will be mostly employed when the actual entity is considered in respect to its own real internal constitution. But ‘subject’ is always to be construed as an abbreviation of ‘subject-superject.’ (PR, 29)

This means that each actual entity is the subject integrative of the data of its actual world and at the same time an achievement that is projective (superjective) beyond itself. Upon the completion of its satisfaction, the completion of its act of concrescence, it has become objective data as a member of the actual world for other actual entities. The reason that Whitehead insists that we think of subject as subject-superject is because the superjective destiny of

each act of becoming is not separable from the act itself; the superject is not merely what the actual entity is as completed, but is an effectual feature of the act of concrescence.

[The term 'subject'] is misleading. The term 'superject' would be better. The subject-superject is the purpose of the process originating the feelings. The feelings are inseparable from the end at which they aim; and this end is the feeler. The feelings aim at the feeler, as their final cause. The feelings are what they are in order that their subject may be what it is. Then transcendently, since the subject is what it is in virtue of its feelings, it is only by means of its feelings that the subject objectively conditions the creativity transcendent beyond itself. (PR, 222)

In other words, the being-toward and being-for others as superject is an essential element of the way in which the entity becomes. Part of the act is the aim of the act.

It is also particularly important to note here that the act of becoming of any actual entity is nontemporal. "[I]n every act of becoming there is becoming of something with temporal extension; but that the act itself is not [temporally] extensive, in the sense that it is divisible . . . [means that the] creature is extensive, but that its act of becoming is not extensive" (PR, 69). The ultimate metaphysical being must be temporally nondivisible, otherwise it would not be ultimate. This point reverts to Whitehead's critique of the substance-quality metaphysics of Descartes and Locke. If metaphysical substance endures change of its accidental qualities, then we are again thrust into a problem of consistency. Is substance changing or unchanging? What is the relationship between the unchanging substratum and the changes that the qualities inhering in it undergo? There is an inability to explain how a substratum, unchanging in its essence, can endure change of accidents through time. The nontemporal nature of the act of becoming of the entity as subject and the temporal extension of the entity as superjective in other acts of becoming is the way in which process thought resolves this problem. The synthesis of the subjective and objective roles of the actual entity as its becoming-from, becoming-of, becoming-for, allows for both the repetition and the novelty exhibited in ordinary experience.

We have certainly to make room in our philosophy for the two contrasted notions, one that every actual entity endures, and the other that every morning is a new fact with its measure of change.

These various aspects can be summed up in the statement that *experience* involves a *becoming*, that *becoming* means that *something becomes*, and *what becomes* involves *repetition* transformed into *novel immediacy*. (PR, 136–137)

We note here the applicability of the word “occasion” that Whitehead often uses synonymously for actual entity; each actual entity is an occasion for experience, an occasion of experience, and an occasion to experience and, therefore, being these aspects simultaneously it is an *actual* occasion.

Thus process philosophy holds that the actual entity, because it is simultaneously subject and superject, is also therefore simultaneously nonextensive (intensive) and extensive, simultaneously nontemporal and temporalized, the subject of its experience and the object of experience to come, simultaneously active in its becoming and passive as data for becoming. The notion of entity as subject expresses the act of becoming. The act by which the actual entity synthesizes its actual world as the internal relations that are its achievement. The notion of actual entity as superject expresses that same entity as complete, as ‘perished,’ as settled fact for the world. The duality of each actual entity is a synthesis of opposites, a unity in difference. This unity, it should be noted, requires the concomitance of the notions of passivity and activity. The entity is never merely one or the other and cannot, therefore, be merely active or merely passive. Activity and passivity become descriptive of aspects of the totality of the becoming/being of the actual entity.

This fundamental duality of the actual entity allows two possible abstractive metaphysical analyses to be carried out: the genetic analysis of the entity from the perspective of its intensive adventure of becoming that subject—its concrescence, and the morphological or coordinate analysis of that entity from the perspective of its extensive completion as being that superject—as concrete. I call these forms of division abstractive in order to highlight that such analyses necessarily abstract from the concrete entity that must be both simultaneously. It is a surprising, yet all too common, error among Whitehead scholars to neglect this fact when embarking on a discussion that focuses on aspects emergent from one or the other mode of analytic division. And this error is part of the reason that I am choosing to express the dual existence of the actual entity as a dialectic of being, or a dialectical being. It can become all too tempting to treat dualism not as the analyzable aspects of the same being, but rather as the different and therefore separate kinds of being recognized in analysis. Often our Cartesian heritage is quite difficult to shake. Whereas, if we begin by emphasizing the dialectical unity in difference which the actual entity is, it becomes much more difficult to fall prey to that form of misplaced concreteness committed by taking the separations incurred in the analysis and foisting them back on the actual entity as concrete. Whitehead himself warned against this error often enough; we would do well to heed that warning. I suggest that, by indicating the similarity of process thought to a form of thinking in which a real unity of opposites is not automatically taken as a contradiction, we may be able to avoid such errors.

THE GENETIC ANALYSIS

“In the genetic theory, the cell is exhibited as appropriating for the foundation of its own existence, the various elements of the universe out of which it arises” (PR, 219). Thus the genetic analysis is “the formal consideration of an actual entity” (PR, 220); it treats the prehensive appropriation by an actual entity of the data of its actual world. The “initial data” are sources for feeling and the concrescence of an actual entity is the integration of its various feelings into one final satisfaction, which is the entity as complete. The form of relatedness between this initial data and the subject feeling that data is essential to our discussion as again it will reveal a complex of unified opposites.

A feeling is the appropriation of some elements in the universe to be components in the real internal constitution of its subject. The elements are the initial data; they are what the feeling feels. But they are felt under an abstraction. The process of the feeling involves negative prehensions which effect elimination. Thus the initial data are felt under a ‘perspective’ which is the objective datum of the feeling.

In virtue of this elimination the components of the complex objective datum have become ‘objects’ intervening in the constitution of the subject of the feeling. In the phraseology of mathematical physics a feeling has a ‘vector’ character. A feeling is the agency by which other things are built into the constitution of its one subject in process of concrescence. (PR, 231)

The initial data, and even the nexus which is the objective datum, may have served other feelings with other subjects. But the subjective form is the immediate novelty; it is how *that* subject is feeling that objective datum. (PR, 232)

Thus, the feeling of the initial datum involves already simultaneously an objective and a subjective component. The feeling can only be of that datum which the settled universe is at that moment from the perspective of that actual entity but, in feeling that datum, the actual entity is necessarily feeling that datum under its unique perspective. There is, therefore, simultaneous inheritance and novelty, repetition and change. There is simultaneous determination by the datum and freedom in the perspectival appropriation of that datum. There is a manner in which the subject of the feeling is simultaneously decided and decider. And, because of this, the datum itself as datum is dual—it both limits and supplies: it can be no other than that particular datum but that particular datum is the opportunity for the possibility of its being felt from innumerable varied perspectives.

These dual characteristics of the concrescence emerge even more clearly when we consider the three primary types of feelings: simple physical feelings, conceptual feelings, and transmuted feelings.

In a simple physical feeling, the initial datum is a single actual entity; in a conceptual feeling, the objective datum is an eternal object; in a transmuted feeling, the objective datum is a nexus of actual entities. Simple physical feelings and transmuted feelings make up the class of physical feelings. (PR, 232)

The simple physical feeling of one entity by another is a causal relationship. It is a nonconscious, direct physical transference of the feeling of the entity that is the initial datum to the feeling of the concrescent entity.¹² It is by way of simple physical feeling that there is repetition, reproduction, reenactment of the past in the present. But again it must not be overlooked that the physical feeling of this initial datum is, because it is felt by just that subject, also felt under perspective. There is a “partial identification of cause with effect, and not a mere representation of the cause” (PR, 237). Thus there is in the simple physical feeling “a double particularity in reference to the actual world, the particular cause and the particular effect” (PR, 237). So, the activity of the concrescent actuality is a concurrent preservation of the achievement of another actuality and an addition of itself as novel relationality to that achievement. It is a conservation of the past and a present inroad to the future.

But Whitehead designates each actual entity dipolar, and this is because each entity has both physical and mental poles. In addition to simple physical feelings (and transmuted feelings), an entity also entertains conceptual feelings as another species of primary feeling. Thus the physical/mental distinction is eradicated by their real unity in the prehensive occasion, and, of course, by extension, in any entity prehended.

The difference between the function of physical and conceptual feelings lies in their data. The data of a physical feeling are other actual entities, the data of conceptual feelings are eternal objects. Because of this difference in what the type of feeling feels, there is a difference in the role of that feeling for the actual entity. A settled actual entity is necessary datum of the simple physical feeling.

An actual entity in the actual world of a subject *must* enter into the concrescence of that subject by *some* simple causal feeling, however vague, trivial, and submerged. Negative prehensions may eliminate its distinctive importance. But in some way, by some trace of causal feeling, the remote actual entity is prehended positively. (PR, 239)

This is not the case with eternal objects. The “actuality” of an actual entity as initial datum or a nexus of actual entities as objective data, is balanced by the “potentiality” of eternal objects as objective data. Eternal objects are pure potentials for ingression. They are “forms” of relatedness—universal features exhibited in the fabric of reality and potential for conceptual feeling. There is no necessity that any eternal object be positively prehended. Therefore, the unity of physical and conceptual feeling in the actual entity is a prehensive unity of actuality and potentiality: what must be felt and what can be felt. The dipolarity of the actual entity accounts for both the necessity of physical repetition and the individual conceptual decision, which can be productive of a variety of degrees of novelty.

It is unnecessary to the discussion at hand to proceed with the analysis of the phases of concrescence any further at this point. What is essential to Whitehead’s analysis, is the manner in which the actual entity, viewed genetically, is a unity in difference. I have already shown how this is the case with the dual nature of actual entity as subject/superject, as nontemporal and temporal according to the epochal theory of time, and now have shown how, within the genetic analysis of that entity as subject, such duality is also evident in the ingression of data in physical feeling as both an inheritance through repetition and novel perspective, and in the dipolar nature of the initial feelings as physical and conceptual.

THE COORDINATE ANALYSIS

Whereas “[g]enetic division is division of the concrescence; coordinate division is division of the concrete” (PR, 283), of the actual entity as superject. The coordinate division treats the possibility of analysis of individual feelings in the concrete subject and the divisibility of the extensive continuum itself. The consideration of an actual world provocative of the data for feeling by an actual entity is a component of the genetic analysis. Thus, by extension there is a sense in which the genetic analysis is already inclusive of the coordinate analysis. Since the intensive relations of the concrescent actuality incorporate actual entities as superject, fulfilling their role as objective datum, the extensiveness of the concrete actuality is in some sense entailed in its analysis.¹³ “The ‘extensive’ scheme is nothing else than the generic morphology of the internal relations which bind the actual occasions into a nexus, and which bind the prehensions of any one actual entity into a unity, coordinately divisible” (PR, 288). Nonetheless, the coordinate division contains the full articulation of the internal relations constitutive of each concrete actual entity, of nexūs of actual entities, and of the extensive continuum in general. Thus, it exhibits how each element in the metaphysical system is and indeed

can be related to every other. "In other words, the perspective of one sub-region from the other is dependent on the fact that the extensive relations express the conditions laid on the actual world in its function of a medium" (PR, 288). It expresses how it is possible that the individual prehensions of a concrete entity are related to one another and how it is possible that actual entities are related to one another such that there is a solidarity to the epoch. In this expression, the coordinate analysis draws our attention to several very important features.

First, whereas the genetic division focused on the becoming of an individual actual entity, on its specific, private attainment, the coordinate division fixes our attention on the publicity of each entity: "it arises from the publicity which it finds, and it adds itself to the publicity which it transmits" (PR, 289). Whereas the genetic division analyzed the self-enjoyment of the actual entity, the coordinate division analyses the enjoyment of a world by that entity and the enjoyment of that entity by the world.

Secondly, because of this intensive and extensive relationality of the actual entity, the [e]ternal objects have the same dual reference. An eternal object considered in reference to the publicity of things is a 'universal'; namely, in its own nature it refers to the general public facts of the world without any disclosure of the empirical details of its own implication in them. . . .

An eternal object considered in reference to the privacy of things is a 'quality' or 'characteristic'; namely, in its own nature, as exemplified in any actuality, it constitutes an element in the private definiteness of that actuality. It refers itself publicly; but it is enjoyed privately. (PR, 290)

We thus conclude . . . that the general fact of the synthetic prehension of all eternal objects into every occasion wears the double aspect of the indeterminate relatedness of each eternal object to occasions generally, and of its determinate relatedness to each particular occasion. (SMW, 163)

Thus the eternal objects also have a dialectical function. They are the objective data of the private conceptual feelings of the subject and, because this subject is also superject, they are universal features of extensive relationality of actual entities to one another. They are determinate as regards their conceptual prehension by an actual occasion and indeterminate by their appearance in occasions generally.

Here we have, in some sense, returned full circle to the beginning of the discussion of the actual entity wherein each form of conceptual division expresses the unity of oppositional characteristics: the entity as subject and superject, the actual world as determining limit of possible physical feeling and the subject as feeling that determinate "objective" data in its own "subjective"

way, the subject/superject as a private self-attainment and as a public fact for the attainment of others, as having both internal and external enjoyment, the eternal objects as universal features and potentialities for individual conceptual feeling. The description of process metaphysics is rife with such dualisms and its discussion is not possible without them. But are these really dialectical designations, and if so, what makes them such?

The difference, I maintain, between a philosophy that is merely dualistic and a philosophy that is dialectical lies in whether the relations between these oppositional dualities are determined externally or internally. The feature that makes a process philosophy dialectical is the dependence of the oppositional features on one another, their real unity, their internal synthesis. The actual entity cannot be superject without being subject. It cannot be anything definite, contributing to the becoming of other entities (extensive), without having attained its own individual status—otherwise it is no contribution at all. The elements of the actual world cannot be determining data for the becoming of some entity without simultaneously being integrated under the perspective of that individual—otherwise there is no becoming. Eternal objects cannot be universal features of *nexūs* of actual entities or of the extensive continuum without having been or being felt by some concrescent actuality. This real unity in difference, this synthesis of analytic opposites, is no more than the expression of the ontological principle of process metaphysics: “no actual entity, then no reason.” In other words, each actual entity, because it can be analyzed in myriad ways, is already the synthesis of the indefinite elements of analysis. This is why the list of unified opposites attributable to actual occasions is seemingly endless: subject/superject, subjective/objective, enjoying/enjoyable, individual/relational, nontemporal/ temporal, static/dynamic, determined/free, final cause/efficient cause, private/public, material/conceptual, limited/limitless, singular/multiple, and so forth. “Inconsistency is the fact that the two states of things which constitute the respective meanings of a pair of propositions cannot exist together. It denies a possible conjunction between these meanings. But these meanings have been brought together in the very judgement of inconsistency” (MT, 53). Within the analysis of features of reality as opposite, contradictory, inconsistent with one another, we are already encountering them as together such that this opposition is analyzable. The dualisms found in analyses (genetic and coordinate) could not be possible without their original synthesis. The contradiction can only be emergent from a given standpoint. Thus it is that process philosophy accounts for the very possibility of distinctive dualisms. Such positions cannot be thought except out of the originary synthesis of opposites.

Now process is the way by which the universe escapes from the exclusions of inconsistency.

Such exclusions belong to the finitude of circumstance. By means of process, the universe escapes from the limitations of the finite. Process is the immanence of the infinite in the finite; whereby all bounds are burst, and all inconsistencies dissolved.

No specific finitude is an ultimate shackle upon the universe. In process the finite possibilities of the universe travel towards their infinitude of realization. (MT, 54)

But what is this “process” whereby the limits of finite inconsistency are overcome with the infinitude of realization? I would suggest that the unity of opposites itself is process and that such unity is accomplished by and required by feeling. This is but another articulation of the ontological principle:

How can the other actual entities, each with its own formal existence, also enter objectively into the perceptive constitution of the actual entity in question? . . . The answer given by the organic philosophy is the doctrine of prehensions. (PR, 56)

The ontological principle can be expressed as: All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality. So if there be a relevance of what in the temporal world is unrealized, the relevance must express a fact of togetherness in the formal constitution of a non-temporal actuality. (PR, 32)

Prehension of the world by each entity is the sole reason for the solidarity of the universe. It is the reason for the dialectical nature of each entity, it is the reason why there must be eternal objects as universals which are particularizable and which are universalizable because they have been particularized, it is the reason for stability and creative novelty, it is the reason for universal relativity. “No actual entity, then no reason.” The actual entity is its prehension of its physical and conceptual perspectival integration of the universe, and this prehension is the becoming of its being. Its form of relatedness is constitutive of its being. Process philosophy is a philosophy of internal relations. Thus it is that “[t]he many become one, and are increased by one” (PR, 21).

Because the ultimate ontological principle is a principle of prehensive relatedness, a principle of internal relations, there can be no element of the universe that escapes this characterization. Therefore, the analyzable ontological features: the one and the many, the subject and the object, the universal and the particular, the homogeneous and the heterogeneous . . . must also be relational: being must be dialectical, a unity of opposites by virtue of internal relations. So the creative advance of process is vibratory existence: vibration between the poles of the self and the other (subject and superject), vibration between the universal and particular (eternal objects and actual entities), vibration between the one and the many (integration of the diversity of the

world in one satisfaction), a rhythmic process that “swings from the publicity of many things to the individual privacy; and it swings back from the private individual to the publicity of the objectified individual” (PR, 151). Each actual entity is the agent of such vibratory existence by virtue of its dual function. Each actual entity is the agent and result of generative relation. The dialectical nature of each aspect of existence is an expression of this generative relationality. The world around us is a familiar home and a continual surprise.

There is no better expression of the position that I have attempted to elucidate in the previous pages than that of Whitehead himself:

[A]ll these kindred dualisms are here found within each occasion of actuality. Each occasion has its physical inheritance and its mental reaction which drives it on to its self-completion. The world is not merely physical, nor is it merely mental. Nor is it merely *one* with many subordinate phases. Nor is it merely a complete fact, in its essence static with the illusion of change. Wherever a vicious dualism appears, it is by reason of mistaking an abstraction for a final concrete fact.

The universe is dual because, in the fullest sense, it is both transient and eternal. The universe is dual because each final actuality is both physical and mental. The universe is dual because each actuality requires abstract character. The universe is dual because each occasion unites its formal immediacy with objective otherness. The universe is *many* because it is wholly and completely to be analyzed into many final actualities—or in Cartesian language, into many *res verae*. The Universe is *one*, because of the universal immanence. There is thus a dualism in this contrast between the unity and multiplicity. *Throughout the universe there reigns the union of opposites which is the ground of dualism.* (Final italics mine) (AI, 190)

But perhaps Whitehead’s language of “duality” is unfortunate here, perhaps Vlastos is correct when he says that: “Had Whitehead explained the dialectical nature of this ‘blurring’ between particulars and universals, he would have obviated . . . criticism; or else he forces his critics to deal with the notion of organic relatedness from the ground up.”¹⁴ However, given Whitehead’s self-professed ignorance of Hegel’s philosophy, the omission of the terminology of dialectics should not be surprising.

FROM MICROCOSM TO MACROCOSM

The final issue to be developed before embarking on the discussion of the processive character of production in Marx’s work, is the movement from the microontology of Whitehead to the social ontology of Marx: from the metaphysics of actual entity to the analysis of human social relations. For this project to be valid, it must be shown that process thought is amenable to a

categoreal expansion to the levels of the natural world, human individuals, and social interactions between such individuals, their natural world, and one another. The key to this possible extension of the metaphysics is, appropriately, internal to the project itself and is to be found in its clearest articulation in the coordinate analysis.

The coordinate analysis expresses the divisibility of an extensive region. As indicated in the previous section on coordinate division, such a region could be the satisfaction of an actual entity or a spatiotemporal portion of the extensive continuum. And so there is “one basic scheme of extensive connection which expresses on one uniform plan (i) the general conditions to which the bonds, uniting the atomic actualities into a nexus, conform, and (ii) the general conditions to which the bonds, uniting the infinite number of coordinate subdivisions of the satisfaction of any actual entity, conform” (PR, 286). Thus, according to Whitehead there is a continuity or identity between the bonds that unite the prehensive phases of the satisfaction of any given actual entity and the bonds that unite actual entities to one another. In other words, the forms of relatedness which make an entity a unity are the same as the forms of relatedness which make a collection of entities a unity. “[F]or some purposes, one atomic actuality can be treated as though it were many coordinate actualities, in the same way, for other purposes, a nexus of many actualities can be treated as though it were one actuality. This is what we habitually do in the case of the span of life of a molecule, or of a piece of rock, or of a human body” (PR, 287). The life span of a molecule, the piece of rock, the human body, are all what Whitehead calls enduring societies of actual entities. “A Society is a nexus which ‘illustrates’ or ‘shares in,’ some type of ‘Social Order’” (AI, 203). The members of the nexus share a common form or defining characteristic. But the notion of society is a very broad one for Whitehead. “Thus an army is a society of regiments, and regiments are societies of men, and men are societies of cells, and of blood, and of bones, together with the dominant society of personal human experience, and cells are societies of small physical entities such as protons, and so on, and so on” (AI, 206). So also we could say that a mode of production is a society of human beings. And because the forms of unity constitutive of each actual entity are identified with those between nexūs of actual entities, and a society of actual entities is a nexus, and a mode of production is such a nexus exhibiting a certain kind of social order, we are encouraged to apply those categories of process thought applicable to the internal relations constitutive of the actual entity also to the internal relations constitutive of the society: in this case to production in general and to the capitalist mode of production. The fluidity of categorization from microcosmic to macrocosmic is validated. It is such interlocking forms of internal relatedness, applicable from the

smallest non-temporal droplet of existence to the extensive totality of the universe itself, which make possible the extension of the processive/dialectical analysis from the level of the metaphysical, to the analyses of the unique individual, modern capitalism, capitalism as such, class society, human beings in general, the animal world, and nature. It is because internal relations constitute the being/becoming of the world in ever expanding spheres of inclusion that Marx is able to analyze processive/productive activity on a series of analyzable but ultimately connected levels ranging from the ontological to the socioeconomic. The philosophy of internal relations provides the unity to Marx's corpus and such a unity can only be adequately grounded by a metaphysics of organic process.

So, we have arrived at a point where we are able to speak of Whitehead's process philosophy as a dialectical metaphysics, to understand the philosophy of organism as the processive pulsation of creativity generated by the unity in difference that is each actual entity in its internal constitution of and for its world; we have come to understand that on a process view, life itself, being itself is the space between isolated dualisms—the shadow—the relational concomitance of each individual striving and how these metaphysical individuals, by virtue of their relational solidarity, are analysable on innumerable social levels.

In this, we discover the continuation of the Hegelian project: the first articulation of the real unity of universal and particular. The Whiteheadian metaphysics indicates how the absolute is realized (both in the sense of appropriation and in the sense of re-creation) in the praxical becoming of the particular. But even in the Whiteheadian system this articulation still occurs only in thought—in the metaphysical speculation. Like Hegel's thought, and as must be the case, it will point beyond itself to its meaning for existence itself—a meaning that constitutes critique and a critique that places us at the threshold of a new human being: liberatory praxis. "once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be criticized in theory and transformed in practice" (CW, vol. 5, 7).

If dialectical Reason is to be possible as the career of all and the freedom of each, as experience and as necessity, if we are to display *both* its total translucidity (it is no more than *ourselves*) and its untranscendable severity (it is the unity of everything that conditions us), if we are to ground it as the rationality of *praxis*, of totalisation, and of society's future, if we are then to *criticise* it as analytical Reason has been criticised, that is to say, if we are to determine its significance, then we must realise the situated experience of its apodicticity *through ourselves*.¹⁵

So, returning to our starting point, we see that process metaphysics is a metaphysics of internal relations and that internal relations can only be con-

stitutive of an entity or a society of entities if, at the metaphysical level, actuality is dialectical. But further, the processive philosophy of organism indicates that the internal relations constitutive of each actuality are the result of an act of self-construction. Therefore, it is the “praxis” of each occasion of experience that grounds relational being and thus the process metaphysics serves as the logical continuation of the Hegelian project.

Roslyn Bologh says that phenomenologists “do not do dialectical phenomenology if they fail to show how the alienation and hence their own inquiry as critique are made possible, the conditions of their own existence.”¹⁶ If dialectical phenomenology is able to uncover the possibility of its own critique, is there not a more fundamental assumption lying unspoken behind this very ability? Must it not be the case that the reality that is present to us in the phenomenological encounter and of which we are ourselves a phenomenological part is metaphysically dialectical? How are we to account for the phenomenological unity of subject and object, for the possibility of such complete isomorphism between knower and known, unless every strand of being is already such a unity in difference? This is the grounding that process philosophy provides.

And thus, it is appropriate that process thought should obey the four rules that Bologh sees as governing Marx’s method:

1. “Recognize and treat concepts as grounded in an historically specific form of life. This is the *principle of analysis*.” Process thought admits its own applicability as epoch specific.
2. “Recognize and treat individuals as grounded in an historically specific form of life. Individuals both reproduce and are produced and limited by the totality of which they are a part. This is the *principle of action*.” In process philosophy, each actuality emerges from its world which is the data that both limits and supplies. There is physical inheritance from the settled world which the entity reproduces, a novel integration of the data that is that entity’s production, and a limitation of the possibilities of that production based on the data supplied.
3. “Recognize and treat a form of life as a totality of internal relations. That which enables one to see phenomena as internally related, that which makes them into a self-moving being or totality, is the *principle of subjectivity*.” This is accomplished by Whitehead with the notions of intensive and extensive relations. Each entity is its unique way of relating to all others; all entities are unified in a totality either directly or indirectly through such modes of relatedness.
4. “Recognize and treat a concrete form of life as contradictory. The contradictions are embodied in internal struggles of opposition. This is

the *principle of growth*, hence of change.” This rule has been the primary topic of this entire chapter. The actual entity as a dialectical unity in difference, as subject/superject is the reason for growth from what is to what will be.¹⁷

These rules “are not discrete steps in a process, but aspects of an accomplishment.”¹⁸ The metaphysical articulation of that accomplishment is process philosophy; we must now seek out the articulation of that accomplishment from Marx’s perspective, from the level of social production.

CHAPTER 3

THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION

Hence also the grasping of his own history as a *process*, and the recognition of nature (equally present as practical power over nature) as his real body. The process of development itself posited and known as the presupposition of the same.

—Marx, *Grundrisse*

Process philosophy is based on the conception of the constitution of each actual entity by its unique perspective on and integration of the data provided for it by its settled actual world. Thus, each occasion inherits a settled past that provides the datum for the physical and conceptual feelings that are its nontemporal self-actualization. Each actual entity is its self-creative activity of physical inheritance from a unique spatiotemporal perspective on the datum and conceptual valuation of that inherited datum; it constitutes itself by the way in which it is related to and relates itself to its world: each actual entity is its internal relations to all other entities.

Marx's basic ontological vision is also, I believe, grounded in a philosophy of internal relations but this claim requires further elucidation and defense. Since dialectics is the most appropriate method by which to articulate and explicate a philosophy of process and process philosophy is a philosophy of internal relations, one might be tempted to ascribe a philosophy of internal relations to Marx on the basis of his use of a dialectical method. But this move would be premature given that it has yet to be demonstrated that the dialectical method is inappropriate for philosophies that do not ascribe to the theses of internal relations or process.

Instead, the connection should be adequately constructed by providing textual evidence of a philosophy of internal relations in Marx's writings and indicating the structural similarity to the Whiteheadian scheme.¹ This should sufficiently establish a solid and direct link to the Whiteheadian metaphysical

vision such as will allow the latitude of fluid movement between Marxian and Whiteheadian terminologies necessary to the later stages of this project. It will facilitate the extension of each system into the other. To exhibit conclusively that Marx relies fundamentally on a philosophy of internal relations, requires identifying a category that possesses functional equivalence to the category of process in Whitehead's metaphysics. If such a functionally equivalent category can be found in the Marxian corpus, then it will become obvious that other commentators have located and accepted the ontological priority of internal relations because Marx's philosophical framework is progressive. This functional equivalent for Marx is, I will claim, production.

PRODUCTION

The delineation of the category of production in Marx is not unproblematic and the difficulties that it presents are due in large part to Marx's method of analysis and the philosophical framework from which that analysis proceeds. A seemingly straightforward term like *production* in Marx's hands can often appear to contain a nest of contradictions, but this is the case only because of the multiple levels of analysis within which any given term may appear for Marx. Sometimes he is quite careful to use different terminology on different levels of analysis or to add a qualifying term or phrase when moving between levels, but often the identical term will be used on a number of different levels. One could just chalk this up to carelessness or imprecision, but I think rather that it is a necessary feature of the relationships that occur between the different levels: both that widening spheres of analysis include one another and that certain functions on a more general level will appear in specific modes or forms on another. For example, labor is referred to very generally in the *Grundrisse* as "value-positing activity" and "purposive activity" (G, 274, 298, 311) and, in the third volume of *Capital*, Marx speaks of "[l]abour as such . . . as purposive productive activity" (C, III, 964), but such labor appears in very different forms depending upon whether the value created appears primarily as use-value or exchange-value.² Therefore, Marx can simultaneously use the same term for both the general activity and for the historical modes of or analytic stages of that activity and does so because the abstractive conceptual generality is inclusive of the varied specific determinations and because the specific determinations exhibit themselves as modes of the general concept. Such is the case also with his use of the term *production*.

The Introduction to the *Grundrisse* opens with a typical Marxian lambasting of the political economists who project conditions of production in capitalist society into an originary human nature (G, 83). Production, Marx tells us, is always production within specific sociohistorical conditions and it is the

gravest ideological error to naturalize and trans-historicize such conditions. It would seem that any discussion of production that prescind from the specific social determinations within which it takes place is invalid. However, this is not the case, for in the following section he goes on to say that

all epochs of production have certain common traits, common characteristics. *Production in general* is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out and fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition. Still, this *general* category, this common element sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented many times over and splits into different determinations. Some determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few. [Some] determinations will be shared by the most modern epoch and the most ancient. No production will be thinkable without them; . . . nevertheless, just those things which determine their development, i.e. the elements which are not general and common must be separated out from the determinations valid for production as such, so that in their unity—which arises already from the identity of the subject, humanity, and of the object, nature—their essential difference is not forgotten. (G, 85)

This is a truly remarkable and quite complex statement. It is not, as seemingly indicated by Marx's critique of the political economists, that all discussion of production in general is invalid: this rational abstraction really does "bring out and fix the common elements." In fact, Marx tells us, we will even find within our analysis of different determinations of this generalization that "[s]ome determinations belong to all epochs." But simultaneously he cautions us that, when we find it necessary to pass in our discussion between the common elements found in all modes of production and those manifestations specific only to given modes, we must be very clear as to which level we are operating on and as to the differences between them, and that we must never, like the bourgeois political economists, formulate the general features of production simply from one historical determination. Confounding the general and the specific, the abstract and the concrete leads, according to Marx, to the crudest forms of bourgeois apologetics.

Thus, it is appropriate and necessary to fix and explicate the notion of production in general, to discover those elements common to historically differentiated modes of production which arise "from the identity of the subject, humanity" and "the object, nature." And it is just as necessary to fix the specific determinations of any given mode and to never "forget" the "essential difference" (G, 85) between production in general and specific modes of production.

[T]he capitalist process of production is a historically specific form of the *social production process in general*. This last is both a production process of the material conditions of existence for human life, and a process,

proceeding in specific economic and historical relations of production, that produces and reproduces these relations of production themselves, and with them the bearers of this process, their material conditions of existence, and their mutual relationships. (*Italics mine*) (C, III, 957)³

Therefore, we can see already that the terminology of “production” operates for Marx on numerous levels: (1) on the level of the general conditions found in all production as the interchange between, indeed identity between, human life and nature; (2) on the many levels of historical forms of production: communal, feudal, capitalist, (3) within each of these, on the levels of different branches of production, and (4) on the levels of the activity of the social subjects who are “active in a greater or sparser totality of branches of production” (G, 86).⁴

Here already we note a commonality between Marx’s use of “production” and Whitehead’s use of “process.” Process is both the designation of the scheme of philosophical generalities applicable to the “texture of observed experience” (PR, 4) and refers to the activity of becoming/being of each actual entity. It can apply to the fact of the creative universe as a whole, to the creative advance of any given nexus or society of actual entities, to each actual entity, even to the nontemporal but analytically distinct phases within the concrescence of any entity. “Each actual entity is analyzable in an indefinite number of ways” (PR, 19), both intensively and extensively. So also we could say, each productive activity is analyzable in an indefinite number of ways: from its commonalities with some or all other acts of production to its distinctive differences from these same others. “Each fact is more than its forms, and each form ‘participates’ throughout the world of facts” (PR, 20). Each mode of production is more than production in general and production in general participates throughout the world of modes of production. There is, therefore, a preliminary similarity of function between process and production. Each of these terms operates for its respective author on the variety of levels of analysis from the general and abstract to the specific and concrete.

But as we shall see both in this chapter and in chapters to come, whereas Whitehead’s primary consideration takes place on the level of philosophical generalization internal to which is the articulation of the application of process to each specific realization of actuality, Marx conducts analyses of both production in general and specific historical modes of production. He develops his critique of the capitalist mode of production by way of his realization of the inconsistency between the universal and particular, and formulates the conditions of maximally valued production as the realized unity of their seeming difference.⁵ It is precisely because of this difference in primary task and focus, that is, precisely because Whitehead’s use of the terminology

of process remains general in scope, even in its applicability to each particular and unique act of becoming, that it is necessary to begin this comparison by way of Marx's notion of production in general.

THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION IN GENERAL

According to Marx, “[a]ll production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within and through a specific form of society” (G, 87). Simultaneously, or as contained in the same overall activity, it is the objectification of that individual in, through, and resulting from the productive activity. Individuals, already within certain specific historical social relations, appropriate the “material” of the natural world that such contexts make available to them, unify their “subjective” (social and individual) purposes with the objects of appropriation, the outcome of which is the objectification of that active subject in the world.

Thus there appear to be three moments common to all forms of production: appropriation, active individualization or productive activity, and objectification. These are not separate or separable activities; they are rather aspects of the one unified *process* of production.⁶ While keeping their essential unity in mind, each of these moments needs to be examined to designate both how it is common to all modes of production, and how it is necessarily connected to the other moments.

Appropriation, Activity, Objectification

The fundamental condition for all human activity is the existence of an objective world within which each individual is specifically located and within which/from which his or her activity takes place. Such activity can never be separated from its existent world, further, it cannot even be thought of in isolation from such a world, and I would challenge anyone to adequately conceive of any human activity so abstracted. All sensory perception requires an organ of sense and an object sensed, all thought requires subject matter, all feeling is feeling of something or in relation to something (someone); each time we conceive human ‘being’ we necessarily presuppose a whole host of previously existent objective relations.⁷

Each of his *human* relations to the world—seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, being aware, sensing, wanting, acting, loving—in short, all the organs of his individual being, like those organs which are directly social in their form, are in their *objective* orientation or in their *orientation to the object*, the appropriation of that object, the appropriation of the *human* world. (EPM, 106)

In reference to production in general, it is important to recognize how broad the sense of appropriation is here. If we think one-sidedly within the specific mode of production of capitalism, appropriation will tend to call to mind the taking-up of raw materials from the environment for use within the production process. However, this is merely one, rather specific form of appropriation. When Marx uses the term generally, it carries the sense of any and all human relatedness to the objective world: from building a table, to savoring a meal, to reading a book, to appreciating something of beauty, to loving another person. In fact, if we take the statement above seriously, then all of human living always involves appropriation.

The universality of man is in practice manifested precisely in the universality which makes all nature his *inorganic* body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life-activity. Nature is man's *inorganic body*—nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself the human body. Man *lives* on nature—means that nature is his *body*, with which he must remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature. (EPM, 75–76)

Nature is the human being's inorganic body, the means and instrument of his or her life without which he or she would cease to live, but each human being is also nature therefore, without nature there is no nature, without life no life. "Productive life is the life of the species." It is "life-engendering life" (EPM, 76) or, as Whitehead says, "life is robbery" (PR, 105). Thus, appropriation refers to the existence of an objective world as it is related to the life activity of individuals; it involves the necessity of objectivity taken up into the productive act of the individual: the subject's dependence on the object, the object's continuation in the activity of the subject, the necessary unity of subject and object in the process of the production of each social life.

If appropriation as a feature of production in general is to be taken in this broad sense as relational activity to the existent natural world, then it should become evident that the forms of activity that appropriate the objective world must also be interpreted as all of those "*human* relations to the world," which are "in their *orientation to the object*, the appropriation of that object" (EPM, 106). In other words, the human activity whose object is appropriated is each and every human relation to that appropriated world: thinking, feeling, making, acting, sensing . . . in short, human "being."

This productive power acquires many designations throughout Marx's writings. In its most general usage, Marx describes it as essential power, productive capacity, productive activity or ability, but each of these characterizations draws attention to two primary features of this activity. First, as a

power, capacity or ability, it is a purposive activity. Marx indicates that we are made aware of power first through our needs. Thus, the capacity for such productive activity is directed toward meeting certain needs. Second, it is creative activity. The objective material that is appropriated is both retained and simultaneously transformed. The encounter of the active social individual with the objective world is both a transformative and generative encounter.

Once again, as occurred above in the discussion of appropriation, we are forced to the next moment of the unfolding of production in general. Just as appropriation was appropriation of objective material for and within relational activity, so also, productive activity is directed creative activity: objectification of and by the subject. In understanding appropriative production as goal-directed creative activity, we are immediately forced into the discussion of the outcome of such activity. In the broad sense suitable to our general discussion of the process of production, this can be nothing short of the creation of the objective human world itself.

The creation of sight is the object as seen, the creation of human making is the object made, the creation of thinking is the thought, the creation of acting is the action, the creation of love is the beloved, and so on. However, simultaneously such productive activities also create and re-create the subject his- or herself as this novel productive being. "He acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature" (C, I, 283). Thus, appropriative-productive activity is first the creation of the novel objective world for subsequent appropriation both by the self and others: "The material of my activity [is] given to me *as a social product*" (EPM, 105). And second, it is also the creation of the novel self of subsequent productive activity: "My *own* existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself" (EPM, 105).

Production in general expresses the transformative subjective mediation of a given or settled actuality into a novel objective given. The individual is the catalytic agent of processive transformation of both self and world. And thus, like the actual entity in Whitehead's work, Marx's human being is the appropriator/creator/objectifier of his- or herself. There is an objective world of data taken up by the subject, there is creative activity by which that subject purposively modifies that data into a novel objective expression: subjective appropriation that is superjective being.

Therefore the agent is at once subject and object. Insofar as he or she is constituted in part by the objects of past making, that is by the environment that has been created in the past, the agent incorporates this past in him or herself; and insofar as the agent is creative, that is, both world-transforming and self-changing, he or she incorporates his or her intentionality or future-directedness in present activity.⁸

Whether it is raw material worked up into a new object to meet a need or the relaxation produced by enjoyment of the ocean's surf, the process of production is the unity of the thoroughly interdependent moments. There is no activity without appropriation, there is no objectification without activity, no further appropriation without objectification, and so forth. "The process of creation is the form of unity of the Universe" (AI, 179).

Thus, production is a *process*. It is processive production. Production is the generative ebb and flow from objectivity to subjectivity and back, the bridge between past and future, "the active connection or mediation between final and efficient causes, . . . the active mediation between formal and material causes."⁹ "All that exists, all that lives on land and in water, exists, lives, only by some movement" (POP, 116). "[T]here is nothing immutable but the abstraction of the movement—*mors immortalis*" (POP, 119). But precisely because production in general is processive, there has been something misleading, or rather something incomplete about our discussion thus far. The processive activity has been repeatedly referred to the individual. In one sense this is correct, but in another quite deceptive.

THE PRIMACY OF PRODUCTION

The stress laid on the active role of the individual within the process of production is correct in that it draws attention to the primacy and ultimate importance of that role. The movement of the process of production is effected by such individuals. They actively mediate between objectivity and objectivity. They are the efficacious agents who take up appropriative objectivity of this world and transform it into the newly objectified world. They are the motor force of the process of production, the creators of the world as human world: of the world as it was to the world as it is to the world as it will be. In the productive activity of these individuals, therefore, the moments of appropriation and objectification are already contained and thereby it is a production *in process*.

This point, I believe, lies at the heart of Marx's enigmatic section of the *Grundrisse* entitled: "The General Relation of Production to Distribution, Exchange, Consumption" (G, 88–100). The main focus of this section is a critique of the political economists for either breaking apart the moments of production, consumption, distribution, and exchange, or for insisting that one of the moments is as or more important than the others, and this again includes taking their separation for granted.

The opponents of the political economists—whether inside or outside its realm—who accuse them of barbarically tearing apart things which

belong together, stand either on the same ground as they, or beneath them. Nothing is more common than the reproach that the political economists view production too much as an end in itself, that distribution is just as important. This accusation is based precisely on the economic notion that the spheres of distribution and of production are independent, autonomous neighbors. Or that these moments were not grasped in their unity. As if this rupture had made its way not from reality into the textbooks, but rather from the textbooks into reality, and as if the task were the dialectic balancing of concepts, and not the grasping of real relations! (G, 89–90)

Both these positions miss the point precisely because each is a reflection of bourgeois social/economic relations in which the moments appear to have gained independence. The political economists wrongly assume from the outset that each moment is distinct and independent and then quibble as to the functions and importance of each as opposed to the others. “[B]ourgeois relations are then quietly smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society in the abstract is founded” (G, 87). Where are the bourgeois relations smuggled in? They appear in the assumption of the independence of the moments. Therefore, in the section on the relations between these categories of political economy, Marx sets out to show that not only are these indeed moments of one whole, not only are these moments not independent, but that their interrelations are so complex that the discussion of them will wind us into a tangled web of interrelatedness, shot through with dependence. This point is well illustrated in the section on “Consumption and Production.”

“Consumption,” Marx tells us “is also immediately production” (G, 90) and is so in a dual way. First, the consumption of the object is the production of the physical subject as active producer.¹⁰ Second, because that which is necessary for such production of the subject has been consumed, it also produces need for the production of future objects of consumption. “Production is also immediately consumption” (G, 90) and also in a dual way. First, it is the consumption of the subjective activity that was produced originally by consumption. Second, it is the consumption of the objective world within the productive act (e.g., means of production in the production of commodities).

In addition to the immediate identity between production and consumption, there is also a mutual mediation of one by the other wherein each is revealed to be dependent upon the other. “Production creates the material, as external object, for consumption; consumption creates the need, as internal object, as aim, for production” (G, 93). Production is, therefore, a means to consumption and consumption a means to production.

Finally, in addition to the immediate relation and the mutual mediation, each creates, accomplishes, or *produces* the other. Consumption produces

production (1) because the object produced receives its identity by its consumption, by its being used and (2) because “[c]onsumption creates the motive for production” (G, 91) in the needs, both ideal and real, of the subject. Production produces the content of consumption by furnishing its object. It also produces the form of consumption that will vary depending on what that object of consumption is: “the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth” (G, 92), and it produces the “motive” of consumption because the object produced creates the subjective form of need for that kind of product.¹¹

In summary, production is immediately consumption and consumption immediately production, production mediates consumption and consumption mediates production, production creates consumption and consumption creates production. “Thereupon,” Marx says, “nothing simpler for a Hegelian than to posit production and consumption as identical” (G, 93). But as one-sided as it is for the economists to posit them as independent and lacking in identity, it is equally one-sided to posit them as identical. What Marx suggests instead, is that we recognize just how tangled this web is and that we understand what this implies.

Determinations are not and cannot be “simple” given such complex interdependence and mutual constitution. There can be no simple independence of the moments just as there can be no simple identity. Even in their immediate identity, productive and consumptive aspects are distinguishable. For example, in one of the processes that produce my physical being, my productive act of ingesting food for nutrition is simultaneously consumption. However, the nature of this act as consumptive and its nature as productive, although simultaneous, are indeed different aspects of the one activity and their differentiation is vital to understanding the nature of the process as a whole. What Marx wants us to ask is: What makes this the case? What sort of structure must we be dealing with for it to exhibit these features? How are we to understand a structure whose moments are immediately, mediately, and productively relational? If the answer to these questions is not going to exhibit the simplistic one-sided identity of the Hegelians or the ideological distinctions of the bourgeois political economists it must involve a genuine sublation—a retention of unity in difference.

The important thing to emphasize here is only that, whether production and consumption are viewed as the activity of one or of many individuals, they appear in any case as *moments of one process*, in which production is the real point of departure and hence also the predominant moment. Consumption as urgency, as need, is itself an intrinsic moment of productive activity. But the latter is the point of departure for realiza-

tion and hence also its predominant moment; it is the act through which the whole process again runs its course. (*italics mine*) (G, 94)

Marx is talking here about the *process of production*.

The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality, distinctions within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well. (G, 99)

It is important to note that Marx is using production in two ways here, both as the moment of productive activity within the totality of moments, and also as the process as a totality in which the other moments are united. The production to which he is referring is both the same and not the same. When we focus on any one of its moments, we find that on examination it begins to spill over into the others. This is absolutely necessary because we are treating a subject matter that is in process, that is in motion, and one whose dialectical character is necessitated by that motion. The features are complexly relational because they are moments of a movement and the movement occurs through the complex relationality of its moments and this complex relation is the process of production. Consumption as a moment, production as a moment, are occurring for the sake of the movement itself, process itself. The generative force of creativity that is productive activity, is “the act through which the whole process again [and again] runs its course” (G, 94).

This final statement brings us back to our point of departure, which was the emphasis placed on the individual productive act. What the preceding analysis makes quite clear is that there is an inclusivity, an overarching quality provided by the productive activity. Consumption, whether of raw materials or of sustenance or of the energy of the subject, is for the sake of the productive activity. The production of the self and of an objective world is the realization of this activity, which returns to a place that is both the same (abstractly) and not the same (concretely). “Marx identifies production as the subjectivity that unites the categories [of political economy: production, consumption, distribution, and exchange] and makes them into moments of a whole.”¹² “The individual produces an object and, by consuming it, returns to himself, but returns as a productive and self-reproducing individual” (G, 94). This serves to exemplify what was said above about production in general: appropriation and objectification can be viewed, as are consumption and production, as moments whose focal point and motive agency is to be found in the productive activity of the individual—in an “ongoing and self-transformative subjectivity.”¹³

An emphasis upon the individual's productive ability here is quite appropriate. However, we must not take this emphasis on individual activity to imply its independence. Just as it was tempting to separate the moments of productive activity, it may also be tempting to separate the individual productive acts or actors. To fall prey to the latter temptation would involve the smuggling in of bourgeois relations as natural laws just as much as the former did. The isolated producer, the Robinson Crusoe, the legal person, the atomistic Cartesian ego, are products of and thus reflections of capitalist *social relations*, not "natural" or originary productive subjects. In fact, should such an absolutely nonrelational subject exist in the wildest of our speculative fantasies regarding some alternate universe, he or she could not be "productive" at all. He or she could not live.¹⁴

Therefore, the emphasis on subjective productive activity must not be taken to imply the independence or separation of individuals. The process of production is itself a unity of its moments of appropriation-creative activity-objectification in which each, although analytically distinguishable, is absolutely concretely dependent on the others by way of their unification within one subjective productive activity. It should be evident, however, that there is a circularity, or rather, a continuity to the process because the world available for appropriation is, at least in part, the resultant objectification of past productive activity; and the objectification of the present activity will become part of the world available for future appropriation.

The whole process therefore appears as *productive consumption*, i.e. as consumption which terminates neither in a *void*, nor in the mere subjectification of the objective, but which is, rather, again posited as an *object*. This consumption is not simply a consumption of the material, but rather consumption of consumption itself; in the suspension of the material it is the suspension of this suspension and hence the *positing* of the same. (G, 300–301)

To further complicate the matter, productive activity not only makes "things" or objects in the natural world, but also objectifies the form of the subjective activity itself. It is a production of a certain kind of individual. Likewise, the self-production of that individual in the past is part of the objective world available for her appropriation. Therefore, in a very real sense there is neither a simple "subject" nor a simple "object." We speak of the subject of the experience in necessary and useful abstraction but there is, in the final synthetic unity, only the movement itself. The notion of the subject will, in the long run, possess its greatest significance in personal reference to human praxis.

But there is still more; the settled actual world contains for appropriation not only the past objective and subjective production of an individual, but

that of all other concurrent individuals as well: the totality of objectified social production to that point in time. Because the world available for appropriation includes the objectification of past productive activity (both of that individual and of others) it further follows that each individual productive activity is always already social production. Therefore, each and every individual act of production is also an act of social appropriation and social objectification. The world available for objective appropriation is, therefore, one that is simultaneously created by us and created for us. The form and the content of that world are simultaneously dependent on our spatiotemporal location and the productive activity (including our own) preceding the act of appropriative production that each of us is at that moment. And these designations of location and prior activity, we will discover, are expressions of the same fact.

Any given process of production occurs through individual activity whose productive objectification is effected by, or simply is, the relating of her subjective formative powers to the objective datum appropriated. But since the subject, and thereby this subject's mode of relationality, is also self-created within such activity, there is a very real sense in which the forms of social relatedness already objectified by the self and others "determine" the possibilities of present forms of productive activity. The individual, therefore, is the primary agent of the process but the process is thoroughly social: we are creative individuals within our forms of social relatedness. We are productive social subjects.

An example may be very helpful here. Let us say that I go down to the ocean to look at the surf. I am appropriating that datum and, remembering that Marx considers sensation and emotion to be among human powers, this is a productive act. But the way in which this takes place, the quality of the activity, will be highly dependent upon the forms of personal and social relatedness that are simultaneously available for appropriation.

Perhaps I recently had a close friend who drowned in the ocean, a memory so forceful that I cannot shut it out. My sensate and emotional appropriation of the surf may produce myself as devastated, lonely, despondent, maybe even desperate. Perhaps I first met my best friend in an oceanside community. The view makes me elated, fills me with longing; spontaneously, I smile to the surf. Perhaps I just had a particularly bad day on the job and cannot even concentrate on seeing the ocean at all. I look but I do not really see, my activity is overwhelmingly dominated by exhaustion and frustration.

In each of these cases there are prior forms of social relatedness that are determinate features of the way in which I might appropriate this moment. But imagine additionally that another person is present with me. Not only might my objectification of this experience influence that person but his or

hers might influence mine. As I think of my drowned friend, I look to see my child playing tag with the waves and my experience changes.

Now, instead of such grossly oversimplified examples, think of the complexity of the ongoing movement of human productive activity. In ordinary experience it would be perfectly possible for each and every one of the examples given above to be appropriatively available to one individual simultaneously. There is in any experience a welter of contrasting appropriative determinants, there are predominant features that are picked out and enacted, others ignored, there are a multitude of social influences that each moment of each life has on others. In innumerable overlapping spatiotemporal, personal, inter-personal, social, cultural, historical spheres of activity, appropriation/productive activity/objectification, “[t]he many become one, and are increased by one” (PR, 21).

[B]oth the material of labor and man as the subject, are the point of departure as well as the result of the movement. . . . Thus the *social* character is the general character of the whole movement: *just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him.* Activity and consumption, both in their content and in their *mode of existence*, are *social*: *social* activity and *social* consumption; the *human* essence of nature first exists only for *social* man; for only here does nature exist for him as a *bond* with *man*—as his existence for the other and the other’s existence for him—as the life-element of the human world; only here does nature exist as the *foundation* of his own *human* existence. Only here has what is to him his *natural* existence become his *human* existence, and nature become man for him. Thus *society* is the consummated oneness in substance of man and nature—the true resurrection of nature—the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature both brought to fulfillment. (EPM, 104)

Again, we see the striking similarity to process philosophy. For Whitehead there is ingression of objective data of a settled actual world, subjective prehensive valuation of that data as relational-creative activity, and superjective being of that particular relational accomplishment as data for the becoming of other actual entities. For Marx production is appropriation of the social-natural world, productive activity, and objectification of that unique relational mode of being.

THE SUBJECTIVIST BIAS

Given this processive structure operative for both Marx and Whitehead, it is not surprising that, although each of them views the individual as social individual, as thoroughly relational being, they also both locate the agency of process in the activity of the individual subject. Thus as Gould says,

for Marx, although such individuals do not exist apart from their relations, and in fact develop and change themselves through these relations, yet the existence and mode of activity of these individuals is the ontological presupposition of the relations into which they enter. These individuals, who are agents, according to Marx, may be regarded as constituting these relations by their activity.¹⁵

Just as the individual human being is the locus of the movement of productive process for Marx's analysis of social relations, so is the actual entity the active agency of processive becoming for Whitehead. The primacy of this active creative prehension by the actual entity in process philosophy is expressed in a variety of ways in Whitehead's writings. Certainly the ontological principle itself contains such statement—the actual entity is the only reason—so also do the eighteenth, twenty-second, and twenty-third Categories of Explanation and the first and eighth Categorial Obligations (PR, 24–27). It is also at the heart of what Whitehead terms his “reformed subjectivist principle.”

The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects. Process is the becoming of experience. . . . This is the ontological principle. (PR, 166)

Finally, the reformed subjectivist principle must be repeated: that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness. (PR, 167)

In this sense the “experience of subjects” serves as the totality within which the moments or phases of the experience are analysable in myriad ways. Within the experience of a subject there is the objective datum, the subjective activity of valuation of that datum, the concrescence, and so on. Of course, simultaneously for Whitehead, each actual entity is creative only because of its *social* relatedness to other relational productive accomplishments, and each actual entity is so related both as a unique perspective on those accomplishments and as an evaluative (creative/productive) appropriation of them. The datum of prehension is social datum, the actual entity's activity is the creation of its unique relational being to that datum, the superjective accomplishment is its social creation.

Thus, for both Marx and Whitehead, we have individuality without independence, unique activity without isolation, subjective development from and for objectivity, novelty emergent from and becoming the given, change from and towards settled actuality: productive process.

DETERMINISM AND MATERIALISM

Finally, by developing our understanding of Marx's notion of production in this way, such that it expresses the role of the human being as agent within

the movement of relational process, we are in a position to shed light on one of the controversies plaguing Marxist dialogue: the role of determinism or materialism within his philosophy.

The most extreme position takes Marx's "dialectical materialism" or "historical determinism" to say that historical and/or dialectical development is strictly determined by the material conditions existing at any given time, that there is an internal logical necessity to historical development because its dialectical unfolding is determined by the material mode of production. In other words, this position maintains that there is an a-priori necessity to the movement of history. We shall see that this is indeed true but that, if it is taken to be the whole story, then it is merely as one-sided, undialectical, and ideological as would be any contrasting notion of absolute unrestricted freedom.

To speak of determinism in Marx, therefore, is to mistakenly look at the process of production from the standpoint of one of its moments: the appropriation of the given world. It is absolutely correct, from the point of view of this moment, to say that the agent is "determined" by such data. The settled world available for appropriation is given. It is the "objective" product that is the material for subjective activity. I, as subject, cannot change what is available for my appropriation. The efficacy of the given is not to be denied. I may be able to direct my attention this way or that, but this is merely a shift of appropriative focus from one part of the given to another. What has already been accomplished is insistent. As the accomplished product of previous social productive activity, its objectivity consists in its stubborn insistence in the experiences beyond it. As agent appropriating what is completed, I am limited, determined by what is objectively available to me, which includes, of course, the settled completed objectification of myself as socially related being. In this sense, I am "determined" by the material conditions.

At the same time, because such a settled actual world is material *condition*, it is likewise the *condition for* the subjective production, the "objective moment of the existence of labour's vitality" (G, 362). It provides the "material," and only *that* material for the productive activity. Thereby the world as given determines (and we must mean this now in a very specialized sense), in addition to what can be appropriated, also the whole realm of possibilities of subjective modification of what is appropriated. In other words, the material conditions, the given relations of the world available for appropriation, determine the possible contents and, therefore, the possible forms of its appropriation. This determination is its continued efficacy. It will be determinant of that experience beyond it and so its "gift" to the becoming is the possibility of the future occasion. This does not mean, of course, that processive creation of this unique perspectival individual is determined to be just *this one* given form, but rather that the processive creation is limited in its possible forms

because it is the appropriation of just *this* datum. There are an indefinite multitude of productive ways in which I can create myself and my world for objectification as I sit here writing. There are innumerable emotional tones, a multitude of ways in which I can effect this activity, but right now all those ways are ways of production from within this particular objective space that I occupy right now.

Thus, there is an inescapable material determination of the possible content of appropriation and a formal determination of productive activity by the peculiarity of that datum appropriated. However, this certainly does not mean that the production of the subject can be mechanistically determined in advance. This would mean foisting the determination arising from the moment of appropriation off onto the moment of productive creation. It would mean conflating the two, thereby neglecting the difference necessary to the movement of the unity. Although the possibilities of the subjective becoming are indeed limited by the content in the strict sense—I simply *cannot* produce myself right now as an ancient Greek citizen wandering in the Athenian agora, nor can I produce myself as seeing the ocean instead of this computer screen and the bookshelves that surround it. But I can get up and move through this given space and thus change my data, or I can simply turn my attention elsewhere, or I can even negate the vision by closing my eyes and breaking my concentration with a pleasant visualization of a forest, or *countless* other possibilities. There is determination without determinism or as Whitehead says, “[t]he datum both limits and supplies” (PR, 110). There could be no process, no history, no movement, no life if this were not the case.

The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each other . . . are conditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them; conditions under which these definite individuals, living under definite relationships, can alone produce their material life and what is connected with it, are thus the conditions of their self-activity and are produced by this self-activity. (GI, 87)

Individuals producing in society—hence *socially determined individual production*—is, of course, the point of departure. (*italics mine*) (G, 83)

Finally, the productive activity itself becomes a part of the given world by its objectification. Thus, like Whitehead, Marx’s productive individuals are simultaneously determined and free, subject and superject, individual and relational, private and public, and so forth. The movement of history is the productive generation of novelty from the given then objectified as a new accomplished given for appropriation. Pin down any one moment, stop the process, forget the necessary movement, and your analysis will be incomplete,

one-sided, undialectical. You will either take determination to be determinism or productive capacity to mean unlimited freedom. Neither is adequate; both are incomplete. The seemingly contradictory moments are united in the space that is the processive movement of life itself.

This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the material production of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production . . . as the basis of all history. (GI, 58)

It shows . . . that in [history] at each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, and historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces . . . which, on the one hand, is indeed modified by the new generation, but also on the other prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances. (GI, 59)

This is certainly only a preliminary discussion of this topic and one that cannot be adequately completed until I have presented what specifically human, conscious productive activity entails by way of creative addition to the appropriated world. However, it does provide important clues as to how the processive philosophy operative within Marx's category of production, makes sense of the claims of how productive activity is "determined" by and "determines" material conditions.

Thus there are at least three different though interlocking ways in which Marx's notion of production is functionally equivalent to Whitehead's category of process.

1. Both Marx and Whitehead use their respective terms to refer both to the general abstract character of all productive processive activity and to any specific concrete instance or moment of that activity.
2. Production and process both refer to and serve to explicate the movement of becoming that is the temporal or historical world and do so through a markedly similar structure of appropriation/prehension, productive activity/prehensive valuation, objectification/superjective being.
3. Both process and production are effected by socially related individuals such that (a) there is a subjectivist bias or focus on the social subject as agent of such movement and simultaneously (b) a recognition of the data as both supplying and limiting the possibilities of such activity.

It has been of the utmost importance to examine and understand what Marx means by production and its deep similarities to Whitehead's use of

process. Only within such understanding of the most general features that drive world process will we be able to comprehend the workings of any specific mode of such activity. Only by understanding the most general category of process as the adequate explanation for the movement of change and permanence in the world can we begin to see how each specific act is both described by such a category and how its concrete being is abstracted from to reach such description. As Marx says of such common traits of production: "No [specific mode of] production will be thinkable without them" (G, 85). In other words, we cannot begin to "think" about any specific historical form of production without being perfectly clear about the general category and the features shared by all modes. Only by grasping the commonalities can we even begin to articulate what is unique to any given mode, that is, what makes it both an exemplification of production and what makes it a unique exemplification. Only within the understanding of the activity that is essential to world process can we evaluate those that may be unessential.

This is, as we shall see, particularly true of that historical mode of production that is capitalism and this is the case because the capitalistic mode of production *appears* to exhibit qualities directly opposed to the general notion. But this is precisely the point of Marx's project: to show how such features are a form of appearance and how capitalism is, precisely by way of such appearance, articulating something quite fundamental about its own structural activity in relation to the essential features expressed in the general category.

It is essential to the understanding of Marx's work to recognize that the underlying philosophical structure of process-production is processive and that, because processive, this structure is necessarily interpreted and explicated by way of a dialectical method that uncovers the dialectical structure necessary to internally related acts of generative production. Several features of great importance stand out from this explanation: productive ability as the driving force behind world process (creativity), creative dependence on the given as its source and product (actuality), and thus deep interdependence of all elements of reality on all others as mutually constituting (being as fully relational). From the outline of this general philosophical framework it is now possible to move to a level of greater specificity. We turn, therefore, to the unique role of the human being in processive becoming and the analysis of the structure of capitalism as one such mode of production.

PART TWO

Justice

CHAPTER 4

BEING AND BEINGS

The last clear definite function of man—muscles aching to work, minds aching to create beyond the single need—this is man. . . . For man, unlike any other thing organic or inorganic in the universe, grows beyond his work, walks up the stairs of his concepts, emerges ahead of his concepts.

—Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath*

The analysis thus far has operated at a very high level of generality, concentrating on the broadest categorial similarities between process and production and the congruence of their conceptualization and articulation through dialectic. But given that Marx's analysis, and his analysis of capitalism in particular, operates on the level of human social productivity, we need to move toward more specific ontological and sociohistorical levels. First, we need to understand what a processive/productive philosophy contributes to ontology in general and then we must tackle the difficulty of how and whether a metaphysical scheme which, in order to maintain consistently thoroughgoing relationality, asserts that the fundamental occasions of all forms of being are on some deep level the "same," can adequately account for the differences of ontological and functional "kind" among enduring social nexūs. In other words, the question is, on a processive model, a model dominated by internal relations, what is being and what accounts for the difference between forms of being? The problem here is one of individuation and differentiation on the macrocosmic scale. If Marx's critique can be adequately philosophically grounded in such a processive philosophy, then we should find his answers to the above questions to be, in important ways, quite similar to those of Whitehead.

One of the similarities between the category of process and that of production is the way in which each concept operates on numerous levels. Process applies to the generality of movement itself and to the self-creation of

each occasion of being; production describes the “rational abstraction” applicable to all historical modes and each individual historical-social mode as well. It is necessary to explore the levels of ontological differentiation. Only upon the completion of the ontological picture, only when the nature of inorganic, organic, animal, and human being and the specific kinds of productive functioning that belong to and serve to differentiate each are understood, will we be prepared to discuss that particular sociohistorical mode of “economic” production called capitalism. For this mode of productive activity is a social interaction or relation between and within ontological levels which, I will ultimately claim, apparently perverts and inverts essential functional differentiation. This point lies at the heart of the unity of the Marxian corpus. The early writings, those designated by some commentators as the “humanistic” or “idealistic” works, provide the essential philosophical foundations, in light of which the analysis of capitalism laid out in the later “economic” and “scientific” writings is transformed from mere reactionary polemic to true revolutionary philosophical critique.

PROCESS, PRODUCTION, AND THE MACROCOSMIC ONTOLOGY

The link already articulated between the metaphysics of process and Marx’s category of production in general already provides some very specific considerations for the articulation of an ontology. For both Marx and Whitehead the world is a world in process and that process is effected by the productive activity of its individuals. Whether those individuals are designated as microcosmic actual entities or macrocosmic human persons, these individual agents appropriate the datum of their actual or objective world and, through self-creative activity, produce that world anew. The individual is the link between the totality already produced in process and the totality to be produced in process and is, therefore, by way of its own productive becoming, the relational link between the appropriation and the new objectification. In other words, the individual is internally and socially related to its datum for becoming and by that becoming produces itself in and as a social relation afresh.

The first conclusion to be drawn from this is that there is no individual in isolation. All individuals are always already social individuals due to the very fact that their activity is dependent upon the socially objectified datum that provides both the material and formal possibilities for that activity. From this we can conclude that any reference to an individual is necessarily a reference to a social individual and that any reference to a society is necessarily a reference to individuals in social relation.

What is to be avoided above all is the re-establishing of ‘Society’ as an abstraction *vis-à-vis* the individual. The individual is the *social being*. His life, even if it may not appear in the direct form of a *communal* life carried out together with others—is therefore an expression and confirmation of *social life*. (EPM, 105)

Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real *individual* social being), is just as much the totality—the ideal *totality*—the subjective existence of thought and experienced society present for itself; just as he exists also in the real world as the awareness and the real enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality of human life-activity. (EPM, 105)

This necessary dialectical link between the individual and society is, of course, no more than an explanation of what it means to hold a philosophy of internal relations. Given that this is the case, it should become clear how the movement between individual and social levels is not only easily accomplished but actually an integral feature of the philosophical framework.

Every actual entity is in its nature essentially social; and this in two ways. First, the outlines of its own character are determined by the data which its environment provides for its process of feeling. Secondly, these data are not extrinsic to the entity; they constitute that display of the universe which is inherent in the entity. Thus the data upon which the subject passes judgement are themselves components conditioning the character of the judging subject. It follows that any general presuppositions as to the character of the experiencing subject also implies a general presupposition as to the social environment providing the display for that subject. (PR, 203)

The process itself is the constitution of the actual entity; in Locke’s phrase, it is the ‘real internal constitution’ of the actual entity. (PR, 219)

Or, as Marx says, the human individual “[i]n its reality . . . is the ensemble of the social relations” (G1, 122). Society “expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand” (G, 265).

A second conclusion emerges regarding the act of creative self-production of human individuals. Since the datum relationally appropriated by and for such activity is not restricted to other persons but also includes the natural world as a whole in all its many-faceted modes of being, we must conclude that there is a similarity between the datum and the producer that makes such internal relational appropriation possible. In other words, experience tells us that the datum available for appropriation is diverse in form. Any moment of the integrative, self-creative activity has for its material a

vast array of apparently distinct kinds of data: “material” objects, vegetative life, animals, persons, language, ideas, emotional tonalities, and so on. There must be a deep-rooted continuity between all these different “types” such that they can serve as the material for the social act of becoming of an individual of a given type and by which they can be integrated internally with one another in that single experience. This integrative unity is expressed in Whitehead’s categories of Subjective Unity and Subjective Harmony.

The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject. (PR, 26)

The valuations of conceptual feelings are mutually determined by the adaptation of those feelings to be contrasted elements congruent with the subjective aim.

Category (i) and category (vii) jointly express a pre-established harmony in the process of concrescence of any one subject. (PR, 27)¹

Now, if we hold, as Marx does, that such individual processive production takes place as the historical being of persons and if we maintain a notion of production in general as the feature shared by all historical modes of human productive activity, then we must simultaneously accept the foregoing continuity between all forms of being such that this constitution by internal relations is possible. In other words, there cannot be, as many Marxists claim, an ontological discontinuity between the human being and the natural world, otherwise dialectical production would not be possible. Furthermore, if we hold that such individualized self-production is the adequate explanation for temporal existence, then we must hold this for all types of being that are temporally continuous whether in apparent permanence or radical change. In other words, the metaphysics of internal relations becomes the only adequate explanation for the general feature of temporal duration in all our experience.² We have moved here from enduring society back to the metaphysical as we have already moved from the metaphysical to the social. Thus, not only is the notion of production in general a processive notion, but process metaphysics is its adequate grounding.

It may be noted that this observation seems to run counter to one of Whitehead’s most fundamental points regarding the empirical (and particularly the scientific) method. For he often insists on the inadequacy of taking those macrocosmic “objects” clearly delineated within perceptual experience to be the model for our metaphysical conclusions. This is, of course, expressed in his “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” “This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought” (PR, 7–8).

When we dogmatically model the metaphysical reality upon the necessary and useful abstractions emerging from certain modes of our cognitive operation on the macrocosmic level, we commit this fallacy.

On this point Marx may be said to go beyond Whitehead because he finds within the macrocosmic empirical analysis of social production in general the selfsame conditions operative at Whitehead's metaphysical level: inherited conditions, creative activity, thoroughgoing relationality. But it should not be at all surprising that Marx's analysis of the social relations on the macrocosmic scale should be more developed than Whitehead's given his specific concerns. As inadequate as Whitehead may be in the development of the social philosophy of internal relations, Marx is certainly as inadequate when it comes to the metaphysical. What is required is a recognition of the continuity and a simultaneous attention to the differentiation between the levels of specificity and generality. We must, however, never forget that each depends on, is grounded in, emerges in the investigation from the other. Although it is true to say that we often abstract from Whitehead's metaphysical conditions for given purposes, we still concretely, empirically live in *all* modes of productive activity in self-creative relational solidarity. Marx would also go a step further to maintain that our concentration on the distinct, abstract, and atomized manifestations of cognitive or perceptual experience is not the result of any careful critical empirical analysis, but rather, is the uncritical ideological offspring of one historically particular material mode of distinct, abstract, atomized social relatedness. Thus we could say that misplaced concreteness is a cognitive, and all too often cognitivistic, expression of the capitalist mode of social relations.

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.—real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. (GI, 47)

This point is, I maintain, necessary to make even Whitehead self-consistent. If “speculative philosophy is,” as he maintains, “the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted,” if “the philosophic scheme should be ‘necessary,’ in the sense of bearing in itself its own warrant of universality throughout all experience” (PR, 3), if “[t]he elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought” (PR, 4), then it is

human experience to which the scheme must ultimately answer. How does one arrive at a processive metaphysics if its character is only with great difficulty discovered within our experience? Of course, even for Whitehead it is and indeed must be discovered within experience, but then whence and why the historical prevalence of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness? Why do substance metaphysics and a Newtonian space-time dominate the modern era—that era that accompanied the decline of the feudal economy? Why are we moving away from them now? To be coherent, the commission of the fallacy must be explained from within the processive viewpoint. This is precisely what Marx explicitly does.³

One final point of utmost importance arises from the processive/productive viewpoint—a point that serves as the starting place for our discussion of ontology proper. The individual is self and world creative by virtue of its integration of settled actuality as providing the material (datum) for its creative (productive) activity, which then constitutes or reconstitutes what is the actual world at that moment, including the constitution of that individual microcosmically as novel datum for subsequent environmentally proximate and remote individuals, or macrocosmically as the reconstituted enduring individual along that line of inheritance. What then is the “being” of such an individual? Certainly, we can abstract from process and pin down the individual at a given moment of its self-actualizing act. This is what Whitehead does in the genetic division of the concrescence in which different phases of prehensive integration are considered. But is it possible to talk of the “being” of an individual without abstracting completely from process?

Most certainly we run into difficulty here due to the tendency (ideological or otherwise) of our language concerning being to be rooted in the subject-predicate form of expression. We say of a thing: “it is this; it does that,” as if these were really separate and distinct features. In order to arrive at an articulation even approaching adequacy to the processive scheme, we must maintain that the processive or productive individual *is what it does*, that the being of the individual is its act of becoming.⁴ Marx’s most striking articulation of this point occurs in *The German Ideology*.

This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is . . . a definite *mode of life* on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce. (GI, 42)

The existence of men is their actual life-process. (GI, 47)

The specific form of productive activity is, therefore, a mode of life; this *mode of life* is what any individual is. Likewise, what any individual is, is her activity of

relational production. What the individual is, is what the individual does. To examine the individual's being is, therefore, to examine the individual's doing.

This point is also articulated repeatedly in practically all of Whitehead's writings. It receives the august designation of the "principle of process" in his ninth Category of Explanation: "how an actual entity *becomes* constitutes what that actual entity is; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming'" (PR, 23, 166). But granted that we accept that any articulation of an individual's form of being is determined by its activity, what exactly are we looking for or looking at when we seek out such doing? The answer has already been given in the previous analysis of process/production. An individual's processive activity is its self-constitution as its mode of relatedness to the settled actual world and for the world to come. Its appropriation-evaluation-objectification is its productive activity. The doing that constitutes the being of any individual is his or her continually created self-relation to the natural world.⁵ The being of the individual therefore is self-constitution by her internal relations. "There are not 'the concrescence' *and* 'the novel thing': When we analyze the novel thing we find nothing but the concrescence" (PR, 211). The concrescence "is thus nothing else than the 'real internal constitution' of the actual occasion in question" (PR, 212). The analysis traces circles on itself and yet they are expanding circles. Because it now becomes evident that the link between the individual and society is not merely one of social determination of the possibility of an individual's productive activity and determination of the social relations by that activity, but also now that any social determination of the possibilities of activity is simultaneously a determination of the possibilities of being and that the constitution of emergent social relations as the being of any individual is determinant of the possibilities of future activity and thus future being.

The identity between being and doing also accounts for and strengthens our previous observation regarding the solidarity of all forms of being. And this returns us to the place where the ontological inquiry began: if there is this deep internal relationality constituting the universe in process, implying the metaphysical likeness of actual entities, how is it that there appear differentiated "beings" on the physical level? There can be, on this scheme, only one answer to this question. If what constitutes the being of an individual in process is its activity and the philosophy of internal relations maintains that all individual beings are self-actualizing through such activity, then the differentiation cannot be due to a real distinction of kind but, rather, must imply a relative difference within the functional activity. And such difference, at very least on the metaphysical level, cannot manifest any real distinction in ability but must be a difference of degree of realization of abilities potentially shared by all.⁶

METAPHYSICAL BEING

All actual entities are dipolar, each possessing both physical and conceptual poles. The solidarity or relational continuity of the world in process requires that this be the case, otherwise the metaphysics risks an arbitrary disconnection of first principles of the kind which has led, particularly in modern metaphysics, to the incoherence of radical dualisms that runs headlong into the problem of establishing relation between the disconnected and supposedly independent principles by positing a "third thing" to effect the relation. As previously discussed such forms of explanation at best explain away the problem and at worst simply multiply it by requiring further explanation of the link between *relata* and *relatum*. It is vastly more coherent to posit a duality of analyzable but essentially concomitant physical and conceptual functions unified within each metaphysical occasion of productive experience.

But it is precisely this feature of Whitehead's process metaphysics that has led to the charge of panpsychism. As to whether the process view is panpsychist, my answer would have to be yes and no. If panpsychism is to be determined by the presence of conceptual operation in all entities, the answer must be yes. However, if such presence is taken to imply that every actual entity or every society of actual entities is conscious, rational, or intelligent in the way in which we apply those terms to specifically human cognitive functioning, then the answer must be no. We shall see how this can be the case as levels of being become differentiated. Just as process thought must account for permanence and change, so also it must account for sameness and differentiation and, for the reasons given above, must do so without disconnecting its first principles. Again, the question becomes how different sorts of enduring objects appear on the macrocosmic level when, on the level of metaphysical actuality, we have such seemingly radical nondifferentiation.

Since the actual entity is what it does and what it does is to constitute itself as a unique social relation of its actual world, a truly radical differentiation appears in one sense already on the metaphysical level. First of all, each entity occupies an entirely unique spatiotemporal region with respect to its actual world. It is, therefore, a unique perspective and its actual world is, by virtue of such perspective, different from that of any other entity. This perspectival prehensive appropriation is this entity and no other. Second, the mode of relatedness to that unique data is self-determined. So, not only is there absolute perspectival uniqueness of the material for appropriation and therein absolute uniqueness of the possibilities for integration that it supplies, but the choice as to how that particular data will receive prehensive integration is also unique because it is this entity's actualization and no other's. Although each actual entity is radically the same as all others in the abstract consideration of process

in general, it is also radically unique in the concrete consideration of its process in particular. Again we see the dialectical unity of sameness, continuity, and relationality with difference, atomism, and individuality.

The point about each actual entity's unique perspective on its actual world seems clear enough, but how does the actual entity effect its own prehensive activity in a way that is different from others? If it were only the spatiotemporal position of the actual entity with respect to its datum that was to account for the particularity of its act of becoming, then the scheme would reduce the uniqueness of the entity ultimately to a determination by the settled past. We need also real freedom and creativity in the present, otherwise even the past events become mechanistically or finalistically determined and temporality loses all meaning.⁷ It is here that the dipolar nature of the actual entity becomes important as it will ultimately account both for relational integration of the settled past and simultaneously for relational creativity beyond such past wherein temporality regains its meaning. "Thus an actual entity is essentially dipolar, with its physical and conceptual poles and even the physical world cannot be properly understood without reference to its other side, which is the complex of conceptual operations. . . . No actual entity is devoid of either pole; though their relative importance differs in different actual entities" (PR, 239).

It is this difference that makes all the difference. "[F]or some specific purpose, the proportion of importance, as shared between the two poles, may vary from negligibility to dominance of either pole" (RM, 118). The difference in the integrative-productive act of each entity will depend not only on its unique position relative to its actual world, but also on the way in which these poles are functional within the concrescence. We must, therefore, clarify how the operation of each of these poles manifests itself within the becoming of an entity. We must find out how the functioning of each pole as a form of activity differentiates the ontological character of each emerging entity—how its doing constitutes its being.

The primary difference between the operation of the physical and conceptual poles lies in their respective data. The initial datum of a physical feeling is one or more antecedent actual entities, the corresponding objective datum is the feeling entertained by such entity or entities. Thus a simple physical feeling, one whose "initial datum is another single actual entity," "is one feeling which feels another feeling" (PR, 236). "An actual entity in the actual world of a subject *must* enter into the concrescence of that subject by some *simple* causal feeling, however vague, trivial, and submerged. Negative prehension may eliminate its distinctive importance. But in some way, by some trace of causal feeling, the remote actual entity is prehended positively" (PR, 239).

Thus it is by reason of simple physical feelings that there is a necessary continuation of the past in the present such that the settled actual world effectively conditions the act of becoming, or as phrased earlier, such that there is a “determination” of the present (and future) by the past. “A simple physical feeling is an act of causation” (PR, 236). Thus, it is by reason of the operation of physical feelings in the initial phase of concrescence that the past is a “determining” feature in the present, that there is efficient causation.

By contrast, the datum of a conceptual feeling is an eternal object. Eternal objects are “pure potentials for the specific determination of fact” or “forms of definiteness” (PR, 22). The reference in these definitions to “facts” and “definiteness” tells us something very important about eternal objects. They do not originate as separate from such facts. They are the forms of such facts and such facts are the prehensions or “concrete facts of relatedness” (PR, 22), that constitute the final realities or actual entities. Thus, the eternal objects are the forms already instantiated by actual entities as datum or potentially instantiated in the concrescence of a novel entity. They are the “how” of a feeling. Two related conclusions are to be drawn: because the conceptual data are thus derivative from the physical data, (1) the fact of a feeling is united with the form of that feeling in the data and (2) the fact of a feeling is united with the form of a feeling in the concrescence of any entity. Upon instruction from the Category of Conceptual Valuation, which states that, “[f]rom each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object determinant of the definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt” (PR, 26), we conclude the real unity of the physical and conceptual within each actual entity. The poles are not distinct features of an entity, they are rather aspects of a unity. They are the “what” and “how” of the relatedness which that entity is. This is why the act of concrescence itself is necessarily nontemporal.

However, even though conceptual feelings are derivative from physical feelings in this way, this does not imply that they are necessarily causal in the manner in which the physical feelings are. This is because the datum of the conceptual feeling, the eternal object, is not an actual entity as a settled determination of fact but a pure potential of that determination. Because the eternal object is such a pure potential, it is not necessarily attached to just *that* determination. Therefore although, according to the Category of Conceptual Valuation, the initial conceptual datum originates from the physical feeling of the actual entity or nexus in its determinateness, there is also the possibility of entertainment of the eternal object apart from that definiteness. “The actualities *have* to be felt, while pure potentials *can* be dismissed” (PR, 239). Whereas the Category of Conceptual Valuation expresses the immanence of the eternal object “as a realized determinant,” the eternal

object can also be entertained in its transcendence “as a capacity for determination” (PR, 239), as a decision to be made. This is expressed in the Category of Conceptual Reversion.

There is a secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the mental pole. The diversity is a relevant diversity determined by the subjective aim.

Note that category (iv) [the Category of Conceptual Valuation] concerns conceptual reproduction of physical feeling, and category (v) [the Category of Conceptual Reversion] concerns conceptual diversity from physical feeling. (PR, 26)

Thus, the Category of Conceptual Reversion provides for the novel creativity beyond mere causal inheritance. “This is the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives.”⁸

To summarize, the physical pole of prehension is the operation whereby there is causal inheritance or reproduction of the settled actual world in the act of becoming of each entity. There is also a simultaneous operation of the conceptual pole whereby the physical determinateness of that datum is felt in the mode of its immanent formal constitution and “subsequently” a subjective conceptual valuation of those potentialities presented to the conceptual pole. This valuation is referable only to the decision of the concrescent entity. It is the self-creative act of the individual. Therefore, in the becoming of each concrescent metaphysical individual, there is a causal inheritance and a creative decision on that inheritance. When the operation of the physical pole and its attendant conceptual valuation dominates the concrescence, there is primarily repetition of the past in the emergent entity. When the operation of the conceptual pole dominates the concrescence there is a higher degree of subjective creativity beyond that inheritance.

It must be noted that there is considerable disagreement among Whiteheadian scholars regarding the extension of the metaphysical language and structures from microcosmic to macrocosmic levels. However, I think that one can make a very strong case that the material to be found in chapters 3 and 4 of *Process and Reality* encourage this move by indicating that the analysis of an individual can take place on numerous levels. Reality consists of nested and interlocking sets of social nexūs. The fundamental character of these nexūs as self-created social relations derives from the metaphysical character of actual entities. In fact, it is a condition of the coherence and adequacy of the metaphysical scheme that “all related experience must exhibit” its “texture.” “[T]here is an essence to the universe which forbids relationships

beyond itself, as a violation of its rationality.” (PR, 4) In the articulation of his metaphysical system, Whitehead sought those metaphors by which he could adequately express the reality of concrete experience. I beg indulgence in extending those metaphors. As long as care is taken not to misplace the level on which we are operating, I believe that to do so is not only justified but worthwhile.

SOCIETIES

A movement from this microcosmic picture to the macrocosmic level, involves the notion of society. A society is “a nexus of actual entities which are ‘ordered’ among themselves” (PR, 89). The order shared by the members of such a nexus is an expression of their likeness which,

consists in the fact that (i) a certain element of ‘form’ is a contributory component to the individual satisfaction of each member of the society; and that (ii) the contribution by the element of the objectification of any one member of the society for prehension by other members promotes its analogous reproduction in the satisfactions of those other members. Thus a set of entities is a society (i) in virtue of a ‘defining characteristic’ shared by its members, and (ii) in virtue of the presence of the defining characteristic being due to the environment provided by the society itself. (PR, 89)

But the kinds of societies with which our macroontological questions are primarily concerned are those “enduring objects” or “enduring creatures” that are structured societies. Structured societies are highly complex societies of societies or nexūs of nexūs. The character of a structured society will be determined by the character of the dominant or regnant nexūs.

To combine this with our previous discussion, if the regnant nexūs of a structured society consists primarily of occasions ordered such that physical inheritance dominates their internal relations, the enduring spatiotemporally extended society will display a high degree of stability. Such is the case with those structured societies which we call nonliving. Such societies elicit “a massive average objectification of a nexus, while eliminating the detailed diversities of the various members of the nexus in question. This method, in fact, employs the device of blocking out unwelcome detail” (PR, 101).

On the other hand, living societies, which, in our experience so far, involve subservient nonliving societies, are dominated by occasions ordered such that conceptual reaction issues in the origination of novelty (see, PR, 102-104).

The purpose of this initiative [in conceptual prehensions] is to receive the novel elements of the environment into explicit feelings with such subjective forms as conciliate them with the complex experiences proper

to members of the structured society. Thus in each conrescent occasion its subjective aim originates novelty to match the novelty of the environment. (PR, 102)

In short, the nonliving is dominated by reiteration or repetition of its physical inheritance and the living is dominated by a novelty of reaction by operation of its conceptual initiation. The differences in the forms of being are determined by the differences in the degree of dominance of the prehensive poles of its constitutive occasions.

There are two important points to note here: first, living societies of the type present to our ordinary experience are not devoid of nonliving societies. They display, therefore, a degree of repetition sustained by physical inheritance even though the regnant nexūs are living.⁹ Second, the mere designation of living and nonliving outlined above requires a great deal of development not possible in this work at present because, if “types” of being are indeed expressions of degrees of operative dominance by the physical or conceptual poles, we would expect not just two such expressions but rather a whole spectrum, a continuum of being along the line from nonliving to living. And such is, of course, just what we find in our experience.

We can, as Whitehead does, distinguish perhaps “four types of aggregations of actualities”: (1) the nonliving or inorganic aggregation, which “is dominated by the average,” (2) the vegetative, whose “predominant aim within the organism is survival for its own coördinated individual expressiveness,” (3) the animal, which “includes at least one central actuality, supported by the intricacy of bodily functioning,” and (4) the human grade of animal life, which “immensely extends this concept [of importance], and thereby introduces novelty of functioning as essential for varieties of importance” (MT, 27–28). However, the shadings in-between, the movement along the sliding scale of being make even such seemingly modest categorization difficult. Where does the energy transmission of the atom end and the living cell begin? Where do the nutrients from the soil end and the tree’s root begin?

Consider one definite molecule. It is part of nature. It has moved about for millions of years. Perhaps it started from a distant nebula. It enters the body; it may be as a factor in some edible vegetable; or it passes into the lungs as part of the air. At what exact point as it enters the mouth, or as it is absorbed through the skin, is it part of the body? At what exact moment, later on, does it cease to be part of the body? Exactness is out of the question. It can only be obtained by some trivial convention. (MT, 21)

Where does intelligence begin in the animal kingdom? Is it with the primates trained to use sign-language, the dolphins that recognize symbols and appear

to comprehend sentential chains of commands, or just with the human being? This is not to say that differentiation cannot or should not be made, but that increasingly the shadings of the scale found within our ordinary experience seem to favor the continuity of the differentiated development over the discontinuity of any “real distinction.” Precision carries a cost here of which we need be aware.

Thus an indication of difference on the macroontological scale is not indication of independence or nonrelationality on the microontological scale. Therefore, when such differences of ontological type or function are made in analysis, they cannot be taken to imply any absolute separation such as would jeopardize real relationality.¹⁰ We should remain aware that the objects of our thought themselves are part of our intercourse with the world. Both Marx and Whitehead are quite clear on this point.

It is a false dichotomy to think of Nature *and* Man. Mankind is that factor *in* Nature which exhibits in its most intense form the plasticity of nature. Plasticity is the introduction of novel law. The doctrine of the Uniformity of Nature is to be ranked with the contrasted doctrine of magic and miracle, as an expression of partial truth, unguarded and uncoördinated with the immensities of the Universe. Our interpretations of experience determine the limits of what we can do with the world. (AI, 78)

But *nature* is the immediate object of the *science of man*: the first object of man—man—is nature, sensuousness; and the particular human sensuous essential powers can only find their self-knowledge in the science of the natural world in general, since they can find their objective realization in *natural* objects only. The element of thought itself—the element of thought’s living expression—*language*—is of a sensuous nature. The *social* reality of nature, and *human* natural science, or the *natural science about man*, are identical terms. (EPM, 111)

. . . for man is a part of nature. (EPM, 76)

MACROCOSMIC BEING

With this proviso regarding the solidarity and continuity of the natural world kept firmly in mind, it is still necessary, particularly as we move toward the critique of the capitalist mode of production, to attain a clear picture of the functions that comprise different macroontological expressions within that natural world. Especially, we need to know what we mean when we speak about things as opposed to animals as opposed to persons.

All forms of macroontological being are productive/processive by virtue of their social constitution by relational actual entities as outlined in the pre-

vious section.¹¹ If any form were not processive, it would not have temporal existence or, to put it more succinctly, it would not be. But the mode of its social processive activity can vary according to the way in which it produces. The activity of repetition or reiteration of pattern gives the being of inorganic objects their character of stability and continuity over such lengthy temporal stretches. The conceptual pole of activity in such objects is almost entirely negligible. It operates primarily in the mode of conceptual valuation, therefore, there is a minimum of productive novelty. This desk reiterates the formal pattern of its inherited datum such that it displays astounding permanence of pattern. Such permanence is to be seen as the predominant feature of the object and, in fact, provides the reason whereby we can apply scientific “laws” of behavioral pattern to such forms of being. That these laws only operate strictly under certain ideal (read nonrelational) conditions, such as in a vacuum or in a frictionless environment, indicates the presence of a conceptual pole even in the seemingly most “physical” or “dead” matter. Therefore, this permanence must not be taken to imply the absolute absence of activity or change. Even though the desk is a object displaying permanence, we know that, on the atomic level, it is a whirlwind of energy transferal and that, on the physical level, given the imposition of environmental changes, there will be changes of its form. I may mar its surface with the sharp edge of a key, it may chip, the veneer may fade, the wood may be eaten away by termites. Eventually, the entire structure may collapse, but the predominant route of such movement is the avoidance of such formal intrusion by its environment. Production in the form of reproduction ensures maximal survival amid “external” changes with the most minimal degree of novelty of expression. It has traded off novelty for lasting impact of its values.

But stubborn reiteration is not the only way in which a structured society can ensure endurance amid the intrusion of environmental changes. The society can alter the patterns of its environment in order to increase its own patterns—it can live. The plant hanging in my window alters and adjusts patterns such that it grows and develops. It “robs” the patterns of the air and sunlight and soil and makes them its own by creating them anew. It not only reiterates patterns from the environment, but also reacts to them, turning toward the sun, reaching roots into the soil, sometimes even shutting down function to accommodate and outlive extreme climatic changes.

This flexibility of form that adjusts to environmental changes is heightened in animal life. The domination of the animal by the living society, and particularly that conglomeration of societies called the brain, procures mobility, behavioral adaptation, regulation of bodily functions, sensitiveness, and so forth. Its productive activity is not merely reiterative or reactive, but also responsive. In the face of environmental intrusion the desk can merely

insistently assert its form; the plant can either function or not; the animal, on the other hand, can modify its form in fight or flight. The difference is not the presence or absence of conceptual entertainment of form, it is its heightened operation that provides greater plasticity and adaptation. The difference is not whether there is conceptual operation, but how such conceptuality operates.

The possibility of primarily responsive production lies in the character of the datum of conceptual feeling. As previously mentioned, eternal objects are the forms of the causal physical feeling and, therefore, are not necessarily conceptually adherent to just that physical feeling. Thus there is the possibility of eliminating the conceptual feeling of a given form (presumably this is what occurs in negative prehension) or of integrating a given form in reference to a different aspect of the physical feeling or of entertaining that form in abstraction from any particular data as a pure potential. Thus, the operation of the conceptual pole can also be evaluative; it is the relating of this occasion to these physical feelings in this way. As mentality increases, so does aim. "The qualities entertained as objects in conceptual activity are of the nature of catalytic agents . . . [t]he operation of mentality is primarily to be conceived as a diversion of the flow of energy" (MT, 168). Responsive production in the animal is made possible by the operation of consciousness whereby formal elements are not merely inherited but considered in their modal potentiality such that subjective emphasis is heightened.

The objects are the factors in experience which function so as to express that that occasion originates by including a transcendent universe of other things. Thus it belongs to the essence of each occasion of experience that it is concerned with an otherness transcending itself. The occasion is one among others, and including the others which it is among. Consciousness is an emphasis upon a selection of these objects. Thus perception is consciousness analyzed in respect to those objects selected for this emphasis. Consciousness is the acme of emphasis. (AI, 180)

This final unity of animal intelligence is also the organ of reaction to novel situations, and is the organ introducing the requisite novelty of reaction. Finally, [however,] the overlord tends to relapse into the conventionality of routine imposed upon the subordinate governors. (MT, 25)

When we come to consider the human being, such relapse into conventionality is greatly minimized. In the human being, consciousness appears to reach the height of its development. The conceptual pole takes full advantage of the potentiality of its formal datum, even to the extent of considering possibilities as possibilities.

[T]here is the introduction of novelty of feeling by the entertainment of unexpressed possibilities. This second side is the enlargement of the con-

ceptual experience of mankind. The characterization of this conceptual feeling is the sense of what might be and of what might have been. It is the entertainment of the alternative. (MT, 26)

Thus, it is this heightened development of conceptual consciousness or conscious conceptualization, this highly amplified ability to entertain possibilities, that distinguishes the human consciousness from the animal consciousness and thus the human activity from the animal activity. The human being physically appropriates the material of the natural world and that material is fraught with possibility. The objects of human life-activity are released from their conventional singular application to singular need to the novel possibilities engendered by their availability to human consciousness. The human needs thus become as multiform as the human imagination.

The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is *its life-activity*. Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life-activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity. It is just because of this that he is a species being. Or it is only because he is a species being that he is a Conscious Being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. (EPM, 76)

Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, while man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, while man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces only itself, while man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal's product belongs immediately to its physical body, while man freely confronts his product. An animal forms things in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, while man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms things in accordance with the laws of beauty. (EPM, 77)¹²

Thus, the human productive activity is essentially free activity and is free in the sense of being the least bounded by physical or conceptual reproduction. In this sense human consciousness is indeed freedom. The degree of consciousness operative in the human being potentially unfetters the form of her productivity from the givenness of the contents. The human world is fluid and rich, universally apprehended in its formal diversity, laden with opportunity for novel valuation.

When we come to mankind, nature seems to have burst through another of its boundaries. The central activity of enjoyment and expression has assumed a reversal in the importance of its diverse functionings. The conceptual entertainment of unrealized possibility becomes a major factor in human mentality. In this way outrageous novelty is introduced, sometimes beatified, sometimes damned, and sometimes literally patented or protected by copyright. The definition of mankind is that in this genus of animals the central activity has been developed on the side of its relationship to novelty. (MT, 26)

In mankind, the dominant dependence on bodily functioning seems still there. And yet the life of a human being receives its worth, its importance, from the way in which unrealized ideals shape its purposes and tinge its actions. The distinction between men and animals is in one sense only a difference in degree. But the extent of the degree makes all the difference. The Rubicon has been crossed. (MT, 27)

Such relation to novelty is not merely conceptual. This enduring structured society that we call the human being is dominated by that type of living society that we call human consciousness but also contains nonliving societies. The body seems to require the kind of high-level reproductive function that certain inorganic societies exhibit. It exhibits a certain degree of stability of form and most of the functions of its organs appear to require very little intervention by consciousness. Yet consciousness still seems to direct the whole. Its purposes seem to obtain maximal importance but they do so only by way of their operation with, in, and through the physical being as a whole.

The human conceptual feeling . . . emphasizes the sense of importance . . . [a]nd in this sense exhibits itself in various species, such as, the sense of morality, the mystic sense of religion, the sense of that delicacy of adjustment which is beauty, the sense of necessity for mutual connection which is understanding, and the sense of discrimination of each factor which is consciousness.

Also it is the nature of feeling to pass into expression. Thus the expression of these various feelings produces the history of mankind as distinct from the narrative of animal behaviours. History is the record of the expressions of feeling particular to humanity. (MT, 26–27)

Mankind and the animals with analogous abilities are distinguished by their capacity for the introduction of novelty. This requires a conceptual power which can imagine, and a practical power which can effect. (MT, 30)

Therefore, the formal possibilities emergent from the appropriated actual world in which we live and move and have our being, receive their expression in that world anew. The cycle of processive productivity spills forth again and again. But let this not suggest any essential division between con-

scious productivity and physical productivity. Just as physicality and mentality are two poles of an essentially unified activity of productive relationality, so are the expressions of that life activity. Anything we make is as infused with conscious intent as it is with physical being. The poem is never merely the words on paper, the pen is not just a hollow stick filled with dark liquid. Our products carry in and with them the intent of their creation and issue forth their own wealth of suggestive potential and these two are intimately linked. The toothpaste is not just a tool with which to clean my teeth; it is, in this mode of productive activity, also a commodity. Thus it is that what may appear on one level to be the same object or product or type of being or even the same conceptual entity, can assume, under the aspect of its evaluation within the processive/productive activity, many different modal forms and its being depends on the form of its relatedness. Such modal expression can be benign, or as we shall see, it can carry within it a destructive power that can revert even on its producer. The Rubicon that has been crossed with the development of human consciousness and the ultimacy of its freedom may lead to a bank of quicksand. The indeterminate character of the limit on the forms that such a consciousness can entertain and effect, leaves open to its freedom all possibilities, even the possibility of denying its possibilities.

CHAPTER 5

THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE

History is more complex than some kinds of simplistic Marxism suppose; man has to struggle not only against nature, and against the social environment which has produced him, and against other men, but also against his own action as it becomes other. This primitive type of alienation occurs within other forms of alienation, but it is independent of them, and, in fact, is their foundation. In other words, we shall reveal, through it, that a permanent anti-*praxis* is a new and necessary moment of *praxis*.

—Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, vol. 1

We now begin the move inward toward the historically specific form of processive production called capitalism. Processive activity involves the becoming of each individual as a determinate social relatedness: appropriating and integrating an already given form of social relations, engaging such data as its own self-determined relational activity, objectifying that relation for the processive activities beyond itself. The intensive self-creating is extensively world-creating. Thus, the individual is the processive constitution of an already constituted social past and that act of self-constitution is a self-relation to that previous social relatedness that issues in new sets of social relations. All processive activity is social activity. Production, in the Marxian sense, is processive productivity. Any specific or historically particular mode of processive productivity, such as capitalism, can be analyzed according to the predominant forms that its social relations take in reference to a given society. Capitalism, therefore, refers to a dominant mode of social relations. Such relations are necessarily constituted by the relatedness of the individuals within their processive activity. Therefore, to analyze any given individual (whether human or non-human) is to look at its modes of productive relatedness; and to recognize capitalism as a form of social relations is to see the necessary internal connections between the relations constructed by

each individual such that there is an overall historical pattern. It is to see capitalism as a totalization in process. This point is expressed in process philosophy by the recognition of the necessity of varying degrees of conformation of processive individuals to their social environment. Where a large scale social environment is dominated by specific modes of relatedness, non-conformation by a given individual can spell weakened intensity or even elimination of that individual from the environment. Overall patterns must pervade the whole for social-relational coherence.¹

So, the analysis of capitalism will involve an analysis of its dominant modes of social relations, but also focuses our attention on the social relations of this historical epoch as they are specifically constituted in and through the activity of human beings. This is not to say that the analysis will ignore or minimize the roles of animals, vegetation, or material objects but rather recognizes their roles as they are constitutively mediated by human activity. This is again a recognition of the necessary philosophical validity of the critical turn that dictates its starting point as it was also so dictated for our microcosmic and ontological investigations. Any speculative attempt to slough off the skin of mediated experience results in philosophical incoherence and necessary contradiction due to the very impossibility of that task. A perspective outside human experience stands nowhere and speaks nothing or, more accurately, it can neither stand nor speak. We must, therefore, begin again within this experiential skin, no matter how uncomfortable it may become.

If capitalism is a specific social constitution effected by the dominant historical form of interactivity among human beings or, to say the same thing, is a mode of processive productivity, then the question with which the inquiry into our capitalist present must begin is, What do we do? Our doing is constitutive of those social relations which are our being. But this question leads us immediately back to the ontological discussion: What do we, generally, as human beings do? Generally, we produce and the way in which we produce, as opposed to the way in which other natural "societies" produce, indicates a particularly powerful operation of a highly developed conceptual apparatus called human consciousness which, through its entertainment of alternative possibilities, allows for an extreme productive flexibility and heightened creativity. We produce "outrageous novelty" (MT, 26). We occupy a position of extremity on the sliding scale of being toward the side of maximal novelty. Whereas nonliving objects primarily reproduce or reiterate their environmental patterns and plant life primarily produces reactively and animals primarily adapt and respond to their environment, human beings primarily produce creatively.

The human capacity to entertain formal elements of a given reality apart from the reality in which they are given, to retain such formal features in

memory, to envision their attachment to or realization in different realities through imaginative projection, to scrutinize even one's own past, present, and future acts of becoming with these same conceptual abilities, makes possible this effusive productive novelty. No natural object merely stands before us stark or blank. We always ask of it, What can I do with you?—even if such doing is a mere visual registration of its presence or a contemplation of its beauty. Everything presents us with choices to be made. “Shall I part my hair behind? Do I dare to eat a peach?”² We even shut out such choices only by choice.³ Because I can abstract form from content so effectively and do so even with my own activity, this tree could be just another in the periphery of my consciousness, an object to be painted or written about, a plank in a home or a book or a bat. I can watch it or touch it, hug it or spit on it, ignore it or cut it down; our relationship is mine for the taking and making. Such is the most general character of human doing. The entirety of such doing, its appropriative-productive-objectifying functioning taken as a whole process is the specifically human form of production in general; the moment of production that stands as the middle term of this process is what I have called productive activity.

Thus, we have the following general framework. The world is a world in process. Such process is expressed by production in general in which each individual appropriates the data of its objective world, productively relates itself uniquely to that data, and becomes a new objectification for process beyond itself. The unique productive relation of itself to that data is its free productive activity. This production is both a self- and world-production, therefore, how any individual relates itself to its world constitutes its own being and subsequent becoming. Experience reveals to us that there are different general ways in which societies of individuals carry out such activity and these different forms of social relations appear as different forms of being. The revealed hallmark of human productive activity is the ability to produce abundant novelty.

THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION AND LABOR

Here the shift begins, because we want to examine not just process nor production in general, nor specifically human productive ability, but the specific historical mode of that activity within which we find ourselves living—capitalist production. We need, therefore, to move inwards toward greater specificity without losing sight of the more general categorizations. Marx has a very interesting and also, as we shall see, a somewhat problematic method for effecting this shift which is complicated by the fact that his critique of capitalism is

dual. It is both a critique of the activities which constitute capitalism's social relations and a critique of its formal self-expression in contemporary political economy. These two are, of course, just aspects of a totality, that is, it is one critique with two prongs. However, because one prong of the critique seeks to engage the political economists, it must address them in their own language. For this reason the language of "production in general" and "productive activity" receives additional terminological articulations.

Most evidently in the first volume of *Capital*, we have a transposition of the categories of the process of production into the historical categories of bourgeois political economy. We might say that, between the writing of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, Marx moves from a discourse regarding the process of production, to one regarding the production process. The notion of production in general expressing the whole of the processive movement of human appropriation-activity-objectification is now identified as the "labor process."

The labour process, . . . in its simple and abstract elements, is purposeful activity aimed at the production of use-values. It is an appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of man. It is the universal condition for the metabolic interaction between man and nature, the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and it is therefore independent of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to all forms of society in which human beings live. (C, I, 290)

"In the labour process, therefore, man's activity, via the instruments of labour, effects an alteration in the object of labour which was intended from the outset. The process is extinguished in the product" (C, I, 287). We notice immediately the similarities of expression here to the articulation in the *Grundrisse* of production in general which also "brings out and fixes the common element" (G, 85) in which "the members of society appropriate (create, shape) the products of nature in accord with human needs" (G, 88). In fact, Marx himself indicates the connection between the two categories.

Looking at the process of production from its real side, i.e. as a process which creates new use-values by performing useful labour with existing use-values, we find it to be a *real labour process*. As such its elements, its conceptually specific components, are those of the labour process itself, of any *labour process*, irrespective of the mode of production or the stage of economic development in which they find themselves. (C, I, 981)

Several important and complementary moves are indicated in this quotation. First, there is an identification between the process of production and the labor process which indicates a reciprocal translation of their terms. Second, Marx indicates that such terms will be applicable to all modal exemplifications of the labor process. In other words, processive productivity and its spe-

cific components, the labor process or labor as process, lurks behind and within each and every historical mode of production, including capitalist production and the capitalist labor process.

This metabolic exchange that is the labor process holds within itself, as did production in general, the necessity of designating the mediating agency. The process is the entirety of the movement from the taking up of articles of the natural world to the activity of transforming them to the termination in the product. Since it is the middle term, the activity itself, that will become of vital import in the critique, it is necessary that Marx be able to signify this activity of working up in contradistinction to the process as a whole. In the case of the process of production, I have called this productive activity; within the labor process, it is now called labor. Again, the notion of labor first takes the form of a general designation of the activity itself. "Labour, then, as the creator of use-values, as useful labor, is a condition of human existence which is independent of all forms of society; it is an eternal natural necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and nature, and therefore human life itself" (C, I, 133). Labor in this general use is, therefore, that creative activity that "effects an alteration in the object" (C, I, 287) and thus serves as the mediating agency between the appropriation and the objectification as the activity of the agent within the labor process as a whole.

As a "condition of human existence," labor generally is "an eternal natural necessity" and, therefore, a capacity possessed by all human beings. If, as Marx says, it is what mediates "human life itself," which amounts to saying that human productive activity mediates itself with and within the natural world, then all human life has (or is) this mediating ability. This ability or capacity is what Marx calls labor-power. Every human being, as a condition of his or her life, which requires and in fact is the metabolic interaction with nature, possesses this energizing-transformative capacity. "This labour-power . . . is a *self-activating capacity*, a *labour-power that expresses itself* purposively" (C, I, 980). When this self-activating capacity is actually activated, it is labor occurring within the labor process. Thus "labour is labour-power in action" and labor is the mediating activity of the labor process as a whole and, note well, of *any and all* labor processes.⁴

I indicated earlier that Marx's adoption of the terminology of labor specifically within the critique of political economy carried with it some nascent difficulties. The problems arise because in addition to the general use that he makes of the terms labor process, labor, and labor-power as applicable to all modes of processive production, Marx will also freely use the same terms specifically within his discussion of the capitalist mode of production and will all too often do so without specifically designating them as "capitalist labor" or the "capitalist labor process." Some commentators have seen this

free application of singular terms to both general and specific cases to be sloppy or unsystematic, a careless and confusing use of terminology. Many bemoan his lack of clarity and precision. Sometimes an effort is made to clarify Marx to himself (and to us) by adhering to different terms in each of the applications. For example, Bertell Ollman suggests that we adhere to the term *work* when we are speaking of the general activity or creativity of human persons and *labor* when speaking of capitalist labor.⁵ In support of such a suggestion he cites a footnote in *Capital* wherein this distinction is made.

The English language has the advantage of possessing two separate words for these two different aspects of labour. Labour which creates use-values and is qualitatively determined is called 'work' as opposed to 'labour'; labour which creates value and is only measured quantitatively is called 'labour,' as opposed to 'work.'⁶

C. J. Arthur also seems to favor this option, arguing that Marx adopts an exclusively negative attitude in the later works toward that which is designated "labour." The indication of this, argues Arthur, is to be found in Marx's call for the "abolition of labour" ("*Aufhebung der Arbeit*").⁷ Although such practice might be helpful in terms of keeping our heads straight about which analytic level we are operating on in any given discussion, I believe it is also quite misleading and runs the risk of putting us into a position from which we can miss the critical thrust of the "labor theory of value" or at least minimize it.

In the first place, Ollman himself indicates that the footnote distinguishing labor from work was not written by Marx but was added by Engels to the English (and German) edition. Given that Engels' understanding and employment of the dialectical method so often falls short of Marx's, I have some doubts as to whether Marx would have agreed with its contents. Second, I believe that Marx's call for the "*Aufhebung der Arbeit*" indicates precisely the retention in the overcoming. *Aufhebung* in the Hegelian sense in which Marx would have used the term never involves "abolition." Rather it is "sublation": a simultaneous overcoming of the opposition and retention of the content. It is the overcoming of the contradiction inherent in the specific modal appearance and the retention of the laboring activity. This could only be accomplished by an achieved agreement between the new particular instantiation and the universal form. Third, given the numerous quotations that I have called attention to in the previous pages indicating that the labor process, labor, and labor-power are "eternal," "natural," and "everlasting" conditions of the human life process, are we simply to accept that, within the German language, one of the most malleable of philosophical languages, Marx was unable to gain greater linguistic precision? Was he simply too lazy

to qualify “labor” with “capitalist” as he was writing? And what are we to make of passages where he clearly seems inclined to dovetail the notions of work and labor? “Work is the eternal natural condition of human existence. The process of labour is nothing but work itself, viewed at the moment of its creative activity. Hence the universal features of the labour process are independent of every specific social development” (C, I, 998).⁸

Moishe Postone also insists that the term *labor* apply to labor as it is constituted by capitalist social relations. He expresses the need to undertake a critique of labor in capitalism instead of a critique of capitalism from the standpoint of labor.⁹ In one sense I certainly agree with this position. If the critique of capitalism is undertaken solely from the standpoint of abstract labor in general, as occurs within the positions of so many classical Marxists (Lucaks in particular), then such critique would indeed be highly problematic and we should certainly opt for the critique of capitalist labor. But is Postone perhaps overlooking another option? There is, I believe, a false dichotomy or, perhaps more accurately, a vicious dichotomy, at work within the debate itself. If we see the general notion of labor as one that stands outside of capitalism then we are adopting a view from nowhere; if we see labor within capitalism as the only standpoint, then we are undermining the possibility of critique. However, if instead we critique capitalism from the standpoint of labor (productive activity) as the condition for the possibility of capitalism’s own productivity within the specifically capitalist labor process, are we not simultaneously undertaking the critique of labor within capitalism? This would seem to be the option that adequately expresses the dialectical interplay between the general and particular and one with which, I believe, Postone could ultimately agree. The impact of such a dialectical position, and part of the reason Marx insists on it, lies precisely in the fact that it can accomplish both critiques simultaneously.

Although it is of vital importance to understand the difference between labor as an “eternal” condition of human productive process in the world and its specific historical manifestation as capitalist labor, it is also equally important, or perhaps more important, that we understand the dependence of one on the other. The capitalist labor process is a specific historical mode of *the labor process in general* and it is only by understanding it to be such that we can fully grasp the power of Marx’s critique. While in contradiction to its essential ground, capitalist labor has not and indeed cannot eradicate its functioning as a mode of creative, active labor and it is only by fully grasping this fact that we will see that the contradiction is not benign but self-destructive. If we separate the two terminologically, we run the risk of missing this point entirely. However, if we leave the linguistic ambiguity as it is and pay careful attention to the analysis which shows how the capitalist mode of production runs into

direct contradiction with its own natural ground, then there is very little risk of committing the opposite mistake of transhistoricizing capital.¹⁰ Therefore, in the discussion that follows, I will retain the language of labor when speaking of both the natural condition of human processive production and capitalist production and will avoid the term *work*. If anything, the English word *work* has, at this point in time, received a common usage almost synonymous with specifically capitalist labor. Nowadays every good capitalist citizen gets up and goes to “work,” not to labor. Therefore, using *work* to denote creative human activity could be quite misleading. For the sake of clarity however, I will use the qualifying term *capitalist* when describing the labor specific to our historical epoch.

LABOR AND VALUE

What received articulation as production in the opening pages of the *Grundrisse*, moves toward the language of labor and in so doing, moves toward capitalist production or the capitalist labor process in its self-articulation. But by adopting the language of the labor process the emphasis has quite subtly altered. Whereas speaking of the process of production indicates a focus on a process and specifically a process that is productive, speaking of the labor process indicates a focus on the labor that is processive. In other words, the former addresses the productive activity as movement, the latter addresses the movement as productive activity. This transition to the language of the labor process, therefore, is an indication that we need to shift our focus ever so slightly, like shifting one’s weight from one foot to the other while remaining in the same spot and never lifting either foot off the floor. What such a shift accomplishes is to bring the activity of labor into greater relief. It is “looking at the process of production from its real side, i.e. as a process which creates new use-values by performing useful labour” (C, I, 981). In the process as a whole we start to recognize its engine: human creativity and performance. Process is productive but production is accomplished by labor and labor is useful because it involves human activity meeting human needs.

The usefulness of labor lies in its productive capacity and, as has already been discussed in the previous section in connection with the ontological features of processive reality, this productive capacity, this particularly effusive creative activity, is specific to human beings. Because this is the distinguishing ontological feature of human being, it is common to all modes of human labor.

Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls

the metabolism between himself and nature. . . . Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature. . . . We presuppose labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human characteristic. . . . [W]hat distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes his own purpose in those materials. (C, I, 283–284)

The labor process, therefore, involves conceptual entertainment of the possibility inherent in the natural world for us (to meet our needs), undertaking the labor to realize this project that effects change in the materials of nature in which that original intent becomes realized through its instantiation in the product of the laboring activity. It is the conceptual entertainment leading up to the labor, effected within the labor, and realized from the labor that makes it specifically human and makes the possible form of its products so indefinitely varied. The variety of the possible needs, the variety of the possible ways of effecting the natural world in order to meet those needs, the variety of possible natural outcomes from that activity, express the novelty of the creative activity. The conscious, self-conscious, intelligent conceptual entertainment makes the variety possible and the variety manifests itself in the natural world as novelty: new ideas, new activities, new outcomes. All human labor has this capacity. The power of labor is its ability to produce novelty, to be the “living, form-giving fire” (G, 361).

Human productive activity is able to accomplish this feat due to the heightened operation of the conceptual pole within the regnant societies of human beings. This tells us something interesting about the operation of the physical pole in the process. Specifically, that it cannot occupy the whole of that temporally extended, societal activity of becoming/being. In other words, in any given stretch of time in which there is processive, productive activity on the part of a human being, only a portion of that time will be occupied by the reiterative functioning of the physical pole necessary for the reproduction of what we call the physical body. Or perhaps more accurately we could say that what we call the physical body is the manifestation of the social nexūs that provide the causal inheritance necessary to providing data for the heightened conceptual operation of the regnant nexūs, but that, given the predominance of this conceptual activity, we know that the physical reproduction cannot be entirely or partially dominant in this type of being/becoming.

If the process of labor and the laboring activity that occurs within this process is an “eternal” and “natural” condition of human being, then this

fact regarding the balance between the physical and conceptual poles, the reproductive and the novelty-productive activity is also “eternal.” It is therefore to be stated as a general condition that any human being in any given temporal duration both reproduces him or herself and produces novelty above and beyond his or her mere physical reproduction. This general, ontological observation of the condition pertaining specifically to our own activity as we experience it lies at the base of what has been called Marx’s “labor theory of value.” To be that kind of being that is human being is to produce above and beyond mere self-reproduction, to be a transformative mediating agency in the natural world, to be the creative source of immense novelty.¹¹ The human being envisions relevance and adds it to the world produced. The productive becoming of the human being is additive—I create myself beyond myself. And because this is the general condition of human being, because it is the feature of the labor process that is common to all modal instantiations of that process, it is essential. No labor process has existed, exists, or can exist in which such a condition does not pertain.¹² It is the secret hidden away within capitalism. It is capitalism’s primary contradiction from which all the other contradictions flow.

But how is it that this productive ability becomes covered over in the capitalist production process? How is it that this very simple and seemingly obvious trait becomes obscured from our own consciousness? The explanation requires going back to the material regarding commodity exchange and labor from the beginning of *Capital*. We must be clear about the basis of the critique in order to articulate how the practice of capitalism constitutes the ontological inversion that allows us to lose sight of ourselves. Certainly from a processive viewpoint we need to say that our productive/creative ability cannot have become hidden from our consciousness unless it were simultaneously hidden within our practice, unless somewhere within our social relations it has been buried. The story of such neglect begins for Marx with the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. This distinction is a necessary feature of commodity exchange.

The use-value of a commodity, as an expression of the benefit to be derived from its particular use, is conditioned both by the physical properties of the commodity (C, I, 126) and also by the person or persons to whom the use of the commodity is referred. This is a reciprocal conditioning. For example, a swimsuit may be useful to someone living in Florida but useless to someone living in Alaska. Likewise it could have little or no use-value for the person in Florida if he or she already possesses just such a swimsuit or never goes to the beach or sunburns very easily, and so on. And it could have a great use-value to the person in Alaska if he or she is a swimsuit model or likes to tan under a sunlamp or is sewing a quilt exclusively from swimsuit

fabric. The use-value of any commodity is, therefore, an absolutely specific relationship between the commodity in question and the individual who is judging its usefulness and thus is also specific to an entire range of conditions pertaining to that individual: location, interests, age, hobbies, employment, tastes, activities. Even if a winter coat would be useful to both you and me, the size, style, weight, fabric, and so forth will effect, even if minutely, our estimation of that use-value in reference to any particular coat.

When it comes to commodity exchange, the estimation of the worth of a commodity based on use-value would be far too cumbersome to serve as a value-measure. How would exchangers even begin to measure the usefulness of their respective commodities in reference to one another? And such exchange would be nigh to impossible if either exchanger desired to get rid of a quantity of commodities. How would one begin to estimate the use-values relative to the different individuals to whom each commodity might ultimately fall? Either exchangers would have to settle for the fact that their commodities have some use for one another and not “sweat the details,” or a less variable measure would need to be found. The difficulty lies in the fact that use-value is a qualitative measurement and thus will not suffice as a generalizable quantitative measure of exchangeability. On this point Marx quotes Aristotle, “‘There can be no exchange,’ he says, ‘without equality, and no equality without commensurability. . . .’ ‘It is, however, in reality, impossible . . . that such unlike things can be commensurable,’ i.e. qualitatively equal” (C, I, 151). Therefore, the common substance of the commodities is sought: socially necessary labor time. If, on the average, it takes a person one day to make a coat and one day to make a swimsuit (given that all other things are equal), the exchange of one for another will be an equal exchange with reference to socially necessary labor time. The coat and the swimsuit can be exchange-values because they each have a value.

So far, *in terms of commodity exchange*, so good. We may not be entirely thrilled by measuring the temporal productivity of each unique individual by a social average, but if the goal is to find a quantitative measure whereby commodities can be rendered commensurable in order to be fairly exchanged, then the socially average labor time necessary for their production will be a useful abstraction. It is a general and average way of accounting for the amount of human productive ability or labor that went into the creation of that kind of commodity.¹³ The measurement of social labor time may not and most probably will not be the exact quantitative equivalent of anyone’s specific labor time for this productive activity, but if this commensurability is the goal, then close enough will have to suffice. If we are to require commensurability for commodity exchange, then leveling-down of individual productive activity will occur.

Within this specific sphere and mode of commodity exchange so far, there is no great injustice occurring, nor have we lost sight entirely of the productive capacity of labor. Certainly we have taken a step away from the subjective uniqueness of the productive activity but have done so for the sake of the exchange. Socially necessary labor time already expresses this level of abstraction. We have, for the sake of ease in one kind of activity, substituted for the unwieldy measure of use-value the more facile measure of exchange-value. Instead of saying, “specifically this much creative activity was expended in the production of this object,” we say, “generally this much social creative activity was expended in the production of this kind of object.” The productive activity, the creative labor, is still in our sights, albeit now in the opaque social articulation. It steps behind a more solid curtain only when the human being is forced by social circumstances to sell his or her labor on the market. At that point the useful abstraction becomes harmful misappropriation.

The person who comes to the market without money, without commodities, without means of production has only one thing to sell, his or her creativity, productive ability, processive life-force. It is an act of desperation—the person begs for a sale. Without the exchange he or she might not survive.

When we leave this sphere of simple circulation or the exchange of commodities, which provides the ‘free-trader *vulgaris*’ with his views, his concepts and the standard by which he judges the society of capital and wage-labour, a certain change takes place, or so it appears, in the physiognomy of our *dramatis personae*. He who was previously the money-owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his worker. The one smirks self-importantly and is intent on business; the other is timid and holds back, like someone who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but—a tanning. (C, I, 280)

The tanning is the exchange itself because the exchange requires commensurability. In order for there to be an exchange of labor power for money, the common measure of the two must be found. Money is a commodity like any other which, because of its specific properties, has been given the privileged status of universal medium of exchange. In other words, it is the commodity into which all other commodities’ values are translated, but its value is determined just as is the value of any other commodity—by the social labor time necessary to produce it.¹⁴ So, in order to find out how labor can be exchanged for money, we need to answer the question, What is the value of labor-power? and must do so in such a way that the exchange can occur. We must measure the value of labor-power exactly as we measure the value of money—as a commodity. We must render them at least apparently commen-

surable, otherwise (1) the exchange cannot take place and (2) the exchange will not appear to be a “fair” one. The value of labor-power therefore must be determined by the quantity of social labor time necessary to produce it. The purchaser of labor power is receiving the use of that human being for a certain time, just as he or she receives the use-value of a commodity when he or she exchanges for it. So the question is generally, on the average, how much labor time does it take to produce a human being for that stretch of time? The answer is that it took the values of all the commodities that were necessary to make that human being exist for that time. If I buy the value of a day’s worth of labor, I should pay for a day’s worth of subsistence. And just like that, just that easily, human productive ability is hidden.

What was paid for in the exchange was the value of the physical subsistence; what was obtained was the creativity of the physical/conceptual being. The human being was paid for as a commodity, as a nonliving thing (in the Whiteheadian sense). The person was paid the value of the subsistence of that kind of being which primarily repeats its patterns but was used precisely for the fact that he or she is creative. The person was bought as reproductive (reproduced) and used as productive, bought as object (objectified) and used as subject. A material object as human object is an objectification of past activity and will remain by and large measurable in that respect as long as no more human activity engages it. This desk is not “going” anywhere in the short-run unless I give it a shove. The human subject, however, is a different matter. “*Not-objectified labour, not-value, conceived positively, or as a negativity in relation to itself, is the not-objectified, hence non-objective, i.e. subjective existence of labour itself. Labour not as an object, but as activity; not as itself value but as the living source of value*” (G, 296).

The sad fact of the matter is that, in order for the *exchange* to take place, the person selling labor-power *had* to be treated as a nonliving, noncreative thing. Otherwise the exchange could not have taken place because there would be no commensurability. There would be no commensurability because there can, in reality, be none: *there cannot be a quantitative measure of creative activity*. There is no, can be no “common” measure of the activity as such because the activity *as such* is always unique, always just this activity. It obtains even its temporal duration only in retrospect. The moment the labor was offered up for exchange, it compromised its essence. The moment the exchange took place, the creativity of that labor was handed over *gratis* to the capitalist who, while greedily snatching this offering keeps repeating her or his mantra: “the exchange was equal, the exchange was fair.”

Unfortunately, once the exchange has taken place, the cards are dealt. Once the human being has been purchased, his or her use-value belongs to the purchaser. Yet the heart of what is essential to *all* human labor processes

is the productivity above and beyond mere self-reproduction. The use-value for the capitalist of the being that has been purchased is precisely this excess creativity, this creative novelty. Within the capitalist production process, capitalist laboring activity produces value.

[T]he value of labour-power, and the value which that labour-power valorizes in the labour-process, are two entirely different magnitudes; and this difference was what the capitalist had in mind when he was purchasing the labour-power. . . . What was really decisive for him was the specific use-value which this commodity possesses of being the source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself. (C, I, 300–301)

The use-value of labour-power, in other words labour, belongs just as little to its seller as the use-value of oil after it has been sold belongs to the dealer who sold it. The owner of the money has paid the value of a day's labour-power; he therefore has the use of it for a day, a day's labour belongs to him. On the one hand the daily sustenance of labour-power costs only half a day's labour, while on the other hand the very same labour-power can remain effective, can work, during the whole day, and consequently the value which its use during one day creates is double what the capitalist pays for that use; this circumstance is a piece of good luck for the buyer, but by no means an injustice towards the seller. (C, I, 301)

Here Marx reiterates the point made above. The injustice lies not in the use of the labor, but in that very first moment when labor stepped onto the market seeking exchange. At that moment, at the point at which the terms for exchange are considered, the human being has committed him or herself to and been committed to an injustice. The use-value of that kind of thing which is a reiterative physical object can be roughly translated into exchange-value.¹⁵ When we consider the object qua object, not as mediated by human use (and note well the abstraction involved), how such an object is constituted by its past can serve as a relative measure of its current value.¹⁶ It can and does predominately repeat or reiterate that “value” in the future (as its future) but it does not (generally) increase it. The use-value of human labor, on the other hand, cannot be so measured because its precise mode of predominate functioning is to increase the “values” that it appropriates, to create novel “values,” to create a “surplus.” The use-value of human labor, the creative activity that is of the essence of the being of human being, cannot therefore, under any circumstances, be made commensurable with the exchange-value of commodities. From the microcosmic standpoint, the emergent ontological difference in the processive change wrought by the human being and the commodity may be only a difference of degree, on the macrocosmic scale of practice it appears as a difference of kind.¹⁷ The mea-

suring of the general temporal quantity of the social, subjective creativity that has gone into the production of objects is absolutely different from measuring the quantity of objects that have gone into the physical production of the creative subject.

The turn into its opposite therefore comes about because the ultimate stage of free exchange is the exchange of labour capacity as a commodity, as value, for a commodity, for value; because it is given in exchange as objectified labour, while its use value, by contrast, consists of living labour, i.e. of the positing of exchange value. The turn into its opposite arises from the fact that the use value of labour capacity, as value, is itself the value-creating force; the substance of value, and the value-increasing substance. In this exchange, then, the worker receives the equivalent of the labor time objectified in him, and gives his value-creating, value-increasing living labour time. He sells himself as an effect. He is absorbed into the body of capital as a cause, as activity. (G, 674)

Here then is the critique of capitalist labor from the standpoint of labor. It is not that the laborer is not being fairly compensated for his or her labor; it is that persons *cannot* be fairly compensated for their labor if such "compensation" involves exchange for money as the universal medium of commodity exchange. The sale and purchase of labor within capitalism is where the injustice takes place and must take place and it is the general feature of the creativity of labor which makes this the case. This is why any discussions of better or fairer wages or appropriation of surplus value by the proletariat miss the mark.¹⁸ Such measures certainly may help to decrease the suffering occurring within capitalism and, as long as we are within a capitalist mode of socio-economic relations, we should most certainly struggle for higher wages, shorter working days, and better work conditions. At the same time, we need to be aware that the implementation of these measures does not constitute the overcoming of capitalism itself or of the fundamental injustice of the sale and purchase of labor power. The essence of its, and hence our, contradiction lies in the exchange of labor for objectified value. It is such exchange that must be eliminated for capitalism to be overcome.

The difference between the proportional degrees of physical and conceptual activity in the processive movement of different nexūs of societies is being used here within the analysis of capitalism to critique the misapprehension that lies at the bottom of the sale and purchase of labor power and that the expression of the proportion of reproductive and productive activity occurring in the human labor process fills out the labor theory of value. The sale and purchase of labor in capitalism is critiqued on the grounds of the incommensurability between a measure of value based on the objectification of a certain amount of past labor in the immediate physical presence of a thing or person

and a receipt of "value" based upon the potential future productivity whose effusive nature is unique to persons. This latter is really a not-value, an other-than-value because it is not an objectified determinate achievement, but rather a subjective potentiality. It is "not-objectified, but rather living labour, labour existing as process and as action" (G, 298). "As the not-being of values in so far as they are objectified, labour is their being in so far as they are not-objectified; it is their ideal being; the possibility of values, and, as activity, the positing of value" (G, 297-298).

Likewise, it is this realization of productive potential of nonobjectified, nonobjectifiable labor that reflects back on what exactly is being objectified in the measure of labor as value. "[T]his objectivity can only be an objectivity not separated from the person: only an objectivity coinciding with his immediate bodily existence" (G, 296). Again, the capitalist pays for reproduction and gains production. This means that in the capitalist labor process the laborer, who by his or her nature is simultaneously reproductive and productive, is only being compensated for physical reproduction.¹⁹ Laborers in capitalism are paid for that labor which is necessary to reproduce themselves physically but not for the labor beyond this which issues in a creative surplus. Therefore, in the capitalist labor process, the laborer is continually reproduced *as objectified*, as the value that is taken to be value-less beyond this sheer physicality and that is really "value-less" beyond sheer physicality: labor entered this absurd "exchange" because of the lack of the values of means of production or means of subsistence; the individual laborer exits the process as impoverished as when he or she entered and thus is really reproduced as without value(s).

We know all too well what happens to the objectified achievement of novelty within the capitalist labor process. Since the product is the objectification resulting from the productive activity which was the use-value of labor bought by the capitalist, that product also belongs to the capitalist. Upon the realization of the novel value by the capitalist, the original values entering the capitalist production process can be replaced (reproduced) and the excess (surplus) can be thrown into another process anew. Thus, within the capitalist production process, the creative achievement of human labor is necessarily transferred as objective value that includes a surplus (objectified novelty) and this novelty does not belong to its creator.

That which is the condition for the possibility of any and all particular labor processes, that which is essential to all processes of production, that which is, from a processive viewpoint, the way in which each and every human being creates in, for, and through the world, is made inessential to the being engaging in the productive activity. In other words, the individual's processive activity: of becoming itself and being that objectification which is

the unique self-relation to the world, these are both usurped. What is essentially a process by which the relational self is “valorized” becomes, under this modal instantiation, a process by which capital is valorized. Self-realization becomes the realization of capital. The human essence is sold to set the essentially dead in inessential motion. “Thus at the level of material production, of the life-process in the realm of the social—for that is what the process of production is—we find the *same* situation that we find in *religion* at the ideological level, namely the inversion of subject into object and *vice versa*” (C, I, 990). Capital, therefore, is the way in which human social relations are carried out in this particular historical mode of processive activity. It is the form taken by the objectification resulting from the capitalist production process; it is the form taken by that objectification in projective reference to process beyond itself. Thus it is that Marx says,

The *articles* which are the material conditions of labour, i.e. the *means of production*, and the articles which are the precondition for the survival of the worker himself, i.e. the *means of subsistence*, both become *capital* only because of the phenomenon of *wage-labour*. Capital is not a *thing*, any more than money is a *thing*. In capital, as in money, certain *specific social relations of production between people* appear as *relations of things to people*, or else certain social relations appear as the *natural properties of things in society*. Without a *class dependent on wages*, the moment individuals confront each other as free persons, there can be no production of surplus-value; without the production of surplus-value there can be no capitalist production, and hence no capital and no capitalist! Capital and wage-labour (it is thus we designate the labour of the worker who sells his own labour-power) only express two aspects of the self-same relationship. (C, I, 1005-1006)

Wage labor represents the relationship whereby the productive activity of a human being is exchanged for the equivalent of its value as a commodity; capital represents the same relationship from the aspect of its product, surplus-value.

Several important points should now be evident. Primary among these is that what is known as the labor theory of value is not simply a statement regarding the source of value in capitalist labor. It is not merely a critique of capitalism from the standpoint of labor (either general labor or particularly capitalist labor), nor is it merely a critique of capitalist labor itself. It is a highly sophisticated dialectical analysis of the relationship between grounds and exemplification, conditions for the possibility of an occurrence of social relatedness and a particular historical manifestation of social relations, possibility and actuality, idea and reality. The “labor” that is referred to in the labor theory of value is that labor in general that is the ground of every and all particular labor processes because it is only such labor that can account

for the surplus that is a fact of capitalism. It is the ontological difference between degrees of productive novelty issuing from the processive activity of human beings as opposed to that of material things that forms the basis of the critique. Those material objects that enter into the capitalist production process as means of production and instruments of production cannot be the source of the surplus. It is their "nature" as physical objects to primarily repeat or reproduce or reiterate their inherited formal patterns. Only the living, active human being is that kind of being that produces such novelty in such temporal duration. In capitalism, therefore, only human labor can account for the surplus value.

It is the same ontological difference of degree of creativity that issues in the critique of wage labor as based on the sale and purchase of labor power or exchange of money for labor power. That which is already accomplished is, from the standpoint of the being/becoming to come, objectified. The nature of its efficacy has shifted from that of subjective activity to that of objective datum. The exchange measure of the human being according to prior objectification as a settled physical being cannot be equated with that individual's creative capacity. The measure of the physical objectifications entering into the reproduction of his or her subservient nexūs cannot be equated with the creative capacity of the regnant nexūs. In the capitalist phenomenon of wage labor, therefore, we have an exchange of the inessential for the essential, the settled for the moving, the content for the formal possibilities, the dead for the living.

Supplementing Marx with the process philosophy begins to "pay-off" here. The background of a world in process and motion in which each element of that becoming is constituted by its internal relations, the specific role of the human being as the most prominent catalytic agent of change and novelty within such process, now reveals its critical purpose. This specific philosophical framework is implicit in Marx's work: a processive philosophy of internal relations in which each individual is constituted by its unique self-relation to its immediate environment, wherein the difference in types of beings can only mean a difference in degree of dialectical equilibrium between stability and novelty. It is only by way of full realization of and analyses of such philosophical underpinnings that we can begin to really understand the critique of capitalism. Capitalism reveals its secrets only in light of this philosophical framework. The capitalist production process is unmasked; what was hidden in its particularity, nay even in its own articulation of itself, is brought to light. The value realized in its productive process can only have one source—the source that we bring to it, the source that we are. And because we are this source, capital is our social relations. The practice of capitalism itself can cover this fact over but it cannot eradicate it without simultaneously eliminating itself.

At the same time, and because of this, its grounds of exchange as manifest in wage labor are self-contradictory and from this a multitude of contradictions flow. But if capital is human social relations, if capitalism is a specific mode of the social relatedness of human beings, and if capitalism is marked by contradictions within the labor process and the exchange process, then we are carrying out social relatedness in contradiction with ourselves. And if, as the philosophy of internal relations maintains, our being is constituted by the modal form of our doing, then the contradictions in such modes of relatedness will be manifest in our being. Only the analysis of capitalism by way of process can show that this is not contradiction in thought, but real, lived, suffered contradiction of our doing, our being, our becoming.

An important point bears repeating here. I have said that the labor theory of value is an expression of the revelation of the labor within capitalism as sharing necessarily the features that all labor possesses generally as creative activity. This revelation, however, does not occur from outside the capitalist framework. It refers beyond it, but emerges from the analysis of capitalism itself.²⁰ It does not and cannot command a “view from nowhere.” Thus, the general notion of labor is not an uncritically a-historical or an uncritically trans-historical notion. It emerges from within the analyses of this experience, which is itself inclusive of our encounter with other historical forms of labor processes, and it is this experience that yields the only valid trans-historical character to the general notion.

Thus, when we critique capitalist labor from the standpoint of labor, we are not using an abstract speculative notion to critique a particular notion. We are critiquing a specific social practice from the standpoint of the analyzable conditions for the possibility of that practice (social relations/form of life). But these conditions are not just the conditions for the possibility of the capitalist labor process, but the conditions for the possibility of all labor processes, of all processes of production of human life, or world process—those past, those present, and those to come. Because of this, the consequences of the critique for us are great, the contradictions are deep and manifest in a multitude of aspects of our being. They are the reason that this historical skin can so chafe our emotional and rational psyches and can cause such discomfort as to explode into myriad manifestations of genuinely, in terms of destructiveness to our relational social fabric, socio-pathic behaviors.

We can now see quite clearly the tight internal link between Marx's early and late writings, between the “humanistic” and the “political-economic” writings. The heart of the critique of capitalism is, in actuality, formulated within the philosophical framework constructed in the earlier writings and would be woefully incomplete, even incoherent without them. The progressive-productive activity of human beings is essential to each and every

labor process. This essence is what capitalist wage labor seeks to hide, but is also the necessary condition of the capitalist production process. Thus, there is a sense here that Marx is, in these later “political-economic” writings, returning to the place where he started to know it fully for the first time.²¹ The road in is (as we shall see) the road out. No productive individual, then no capitalism. Thus capitalism, by denying the validity of the claim to “value” of such individuals, denies its own necessary ground.

This point about the link between the early and late writings expresses the way in which the analysis of capitalism completes the project of the early work, but it also reflects back on the nature of that critique itself—making it more than it appears at first glance. Repeatedly Marxian commentators have referred to *Capital* as a work in political economy, but given that its critique is entered by way of the natural grounds of human productivity—the way in which each processive human life creates him or herself, world, and others as social relatedness, this is only true if we understand “political economy” in the broadest possible sense. We must understand the political and economic applications as expressive modes of the whole realm of social relatedness. In fact, we might say that it is a critique not just of this historical form of political economy, but also of the narrowing of the definition of political economy itself. When did we begin to define our relations of mutual support with others, of creative interaction with the natural world, of dreaming and envisioning and making the world anew as mere economics? Does not doing so tell of a foreshortening of our productive activity from the qualitative to the quantitative that can only be the result of a form of social relations which separates the two and sets them at odds against one another? Have not such relations, then, fragmented our metaphysical being as the dialectical unity of settled and creative, and our ontological being as primarily novelty producing and set us up against ourselves, against one another, and against our natural world? We are the heart of capitalism’s contradictions. We are capitalism’s contradictions.

I spoke in the first chapter of my sense that something vital was missing from the typical Marxist dialogue, particularly the academic dialogue. I can begin to suggest now why that was and what it was that I felt was missing. Focusing solely on Marx’s later writings and taking them to be mere economics or mere politics is a grave error that overlooks material essential to the full understanding of that work. If other writings (both earlier and later) that contain more material indicative of the processive philosophical position from which Marx was inherently operating are ignored, then the critique of capitalism loses its force. This is not to say that economic analyses are useless, but rather that they operate within a larger context and that they ignore that context only on pain of weakening their own radical conclusions by

losing their ground. The impact of the critique lies directly in the connection between Marx's two approaches: capitalism contradicts its own grounds and we are those grounds. The power of Marx's words, the depth of his disgust, the extent of his fury, the intensity of his rage, emerge because of the depth, extent, and intensity of the critique itself. The contradictions of capitalism are revealed in the depth of our very being, extend through every strand of our webs of relation, manifest themselves in the most intense symptoms. The critique that uncovers these contradictions pleads to what is most essential to us and uses this to rage against our self-destruction. If we refuse to acknowledge that what is essential to capitalism and thus essential to us is the very core of the critique against capitalism, then we do not participate in Marxian critique but practice mere liberal scolding. We cannot express its power because we have refused to be touched by it. We avoid the acceptance of this indictment of the very form of our doing/being by hiding safely away in the cold atmosphere of number crunching. We will not have to face the metaphysical if we bury our heads in the sands of pure economics. But to face the metaphysical in this case is to come to grips with a conclusion that allows little political latitude. Nothing short of a cessation of this historical form of productive activity will suffice to remove us from this self and world-destructive form of being. The essentially inviolable dignity of the creative being of each and every human being, existentially violated on a daily basis, produces the totality of capitalism as irrational at best, tragic, most certainly, and not, as some would have it, amoral but clearly, decidedly, and incontrovertibly immoral.

The metaphysical is itself the indictment. Process philosophy is the critique. It says of capitalism, "You tear asunder all my unities, you set all relational being against itself, but I am your heart and I am your soul, therefore I must survive you because you cannot survive without me." We are the contradictions, therefore, we are the critique.

CHAPTER 6

TIME AND LABOR

Economy of time, to this all economy ultimately reduces itself.

—Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*

The critique of capitalism has thus far received an articulation emphasizing the quality of human labor as creative/self-creative activity. This essential productive-processive capacity is usurped without return of equivalent; indeed, further, such an exchange equivalent for activated labor power cannot be found as the activity itself is *essentially* inalienable and unique.¹ Thus, I have maintained that the central core of Marx's critique of capitalism as it is expressed in the labor theory of value (and its implicit critique of wage labor) relies upon an ontology that distinguishes differences of being according to degree of productive novelty and that takes the productive (creative) ability that extends far beyond mere self-reproduction to be the ontological characteristic peculiar to human being. The critique then focuses on the illegitimacy of treating one as the equivalent of the other and reveals, as necessary outcome of such a practice of misappropriation, a fundamental injustice.

But there is another dimension to and level of this critique, another standpoint from which it can be articulated and this additional articulation allows also the expansion of the critique. Marx's statements regarding necessary and surplus labor as constitutive qualities of human productive activity are simultaneously expressed as temporal functions: necessary labor time and surplus labor time within the temporal extension of a workday. It is now necessary to explore how it is and why it is that the expression of the ontological character of human activity in the world must necessarily receive additional expression as a function of temporal activity. This exploration will elucidate the continuity underlying Marx's move from the labor market to the sphere production. The qualitative ontological features expressed in the labor theory

of value that render the sale and purchase of labor power invalid, reappear in a quantitative temporal form that will itself receive expression both as intensive, characterizing labor power in the sphere of exchange, and as extensive, characterizing labor power activated in the sphere of production. It is the shift to this temporal form that facilitates the move into the sphere of production and the subsequent critique of capitalistic exploitation.

The capitalist mode of production is an extensive act of human self and world constitution through the appropriation, productive activity, objectification and is, therefore, a mode of temporal being/becoming: the appropriation brings the past into the present, the productive activity enacts a new valuation of that data, the objectification indicates the value of this achievement for the future. It should not be surprising that, on a process view, how we make ourselves as beings is how we make ourselves in time, how we are time, and how time is us. The human being is a temporally extended social unity of a multitude of processive societies. To be, on the macroontological scale, is to be a relational unity of acts of becoming. The unity of such extensive, non-contemporaneous relations constitutes temporality. This is the equivalent of saying that being constitutes temporality or that being is temporal. Thus, a specific socio-historical mode of being will reveal itself through and as its temporal structure. It is because being and doing are concomitant notions, it is because the essential nature of human labor is existed as temporally extended that the human activity can be exploited in the ownership of the workday. The critique is, therefore, not merely directed at the real robbery of creative life itself, but also shows how such robbery is indeed itself a mode of life, a form of social relations, a specific way in which we constitute ourselves, our world, and others in, through, and over time, that is, historically.

METAPHYSICS AND TIME

It should be evident straight off that temporal being must be macroontological. In other words, beings that appear in time are what Whitehead would call enduring societies of actual entities. However, since it has been a basic claim throughout this work that the macroontological level is emergent from or only properly explained by the metaphysical level, it is only appropriate at this juncture to say a few introductory words about the meaning of time on the metaphysical level before launching outward to the discussion of the temporality of capitalism's social relations. Such metaphysical analysis is no small task, and not one for which I will claim to provide any ultimate answers. What I will attempt is to briefly explore the topic in order to provide what I hope may be helpful or provocative suggestions that will be consistent both with my previous analyses of process and with later suggestions regarding ide-

ological conceptualizations dominant within capitalism and their overcoming in socialism.²

For those who ascribe to philosophies of process or philosophies of internal relations, questions concerning the nature of time are both of the utmost importance and the utmost difficulty. It is said that process philosophy, more than any other, really “takes time seriously”³ and yet Whitehead’s own brand of process thought seems to make the issue highly problematic. Indeed, there is a sense in which one is led to wonder whether, on the level of the metaphysical, there can really be any such thing as time. Such uncertainty is generated by claims made within process philosophy itself. For example, Whitehead maintains that “in every act of becoming there is the becoming of something with temporal extension; but . . . the act itself is not extensive, in the sense that it is divisible into earlier and later acts of becoming which correspond to the extensive divisibility of what had become” (PR, 69). “[T]he genetic process is not the temporal succession: such a view is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory of time” (PR, 283). The becoming that is the self-constitution of the being of that actual entity, cannot be an “act” that is extended in time, otherwise the actual entity would be temporally divisible and thus could not be the ultimate metaphysical atom. “[W]here there are no constituent parts there is possible neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility.”⁴ Furthermore, and supporting this first point, Whitehead holds that contemporary occasions do notprehend one another. “It is the definition of contemporary events that they happen in causal independence of each other. Thus two contemporary occasions are such that neither belongs to the past of the other. The two occasions are not in any direct relation to efficient causation” (AI, 195). This is to say that contemporary occasions (actual entities “present” together) are not directly related to one another via mutual prehension. At best we might be able to say that they are indirectly related by way of their shared prehensions of “antecedent” occasions.⁵ Thus, the data present in the feeling of a concrescent occasion is the “past” of that occasion. The satisfaction of that entity can only be prehended by entities “beyond” it, in its future, for which that entity as concrescent is not immediately related but which, in a sense, it is “preparing for.”⁶

These two claims, (1) that the act of becoming of an actual entity is not temporally extended and (2) that contemporary occasions do notprehend one another, constitute the atomism of Whitehead’s system. Each entity in its act of concrescence is really alone, intensive, atemporal. But what then becomes of process? How is the relational flow of process to be achieved amidst this independence of contemporaries? Can we have this a-temporality of the act of becoming without jeopardizing the relationality of entities and, if

we jeopardize the status of real internal relationality, do we not risk falling right back into the same kind of substantial atomism that process was designed to eliminate? We seem to be faced with unacceptable and mutually exclusive alternatives: either actual entities are not temporal, in which case their relationality is compromised, or they are temporally extended, in which case the atomism and its implied freedom of self-constitution is compromised.

As should already be evident from the material in chapter 2, I think that Whitehead himself seeks to provide a path through both alternatives, suggesting, through his description of the actual entity as subject-superject, that these alternatives are not, in fact, mutually exclusive. What I think is most important here is Whitehead's insistence that the actual entity is not first subject and then superject, not one and then the other, but always simultaneously both (See, PR, 29). Taking this seriously, taking Whitehead at his word here, means *really thinking unity in difference* and difference in unity. This is not always an easy task. At the level of the most concrete, conceptualization often finds itself tongue-tied. We stubbornly fall back onto easy dichotomies and then again find our abstractions inadequate to describe the concrete flow of life. We should not be so taken aback. Indeed we need to seek "better and better metaphors," the kind which will allow us to strive beyond the limits of an understanding that produces the conceptual offspring of our alienated social relations.⁷ This linguistic difficulty is not merely a function of the abstraction endemic to language itself, the expressive inability symptomatic of a relational disconnection between existence and essence is heightened and indeed reproduced by the form of our social relations.

The satisfaction of an actual entity cannot be its closing up, otherwise the being for entities beyond it cannot really be a part of its subjective aim. A "completed" entity cannot become dead, inefficacious datum awaiting appropriation or there are no real internal relations. If process is not to resemble actual entities strung out like "beads on a necklace," then the values of the achieved feelings of one entity must really be *in* another entity.⁸ The process of achievement that is the universe up to this point must conspire to make possible *just this* new occasion of experience.⁹ The actual entity must be solely the free subject of its own creative experience of its dative past and must actively, as part and parcel of that subjective experience, be *in* the experience of the entities beyond it. The perishing of the entity must simultaneously be its real objective immortality. In short, each actual entity must be a really relational atom: it must be subject-superject.

Thus, the achievement of each and every actual entity is the real coming into being of the entities beyond it. The creativity of the entity refers not merely to its individual satisfaction but to that satisfaction as a genuinely efficacious catalyst of the "next" moment. Being and becoming are united in the

same active creativity. Perhaps we could speak of a kind of metaphysical care-structure at work in process. Because the superjective role of any actual entity is an operative part of its subjective aim, its act of becoming as a self-enfolding into just this definiteness is simultaneously a self-unfolding and opening out and an offering up. This specific achievement of value, because it “cares” about its beyond, becomes as an offering and acts as an enticement goading the next act(ualitie)s to their concrescence. Being conjures becoming.

Where then does this leave temporality? On the level of the abstract discussion of a concrescent actual entity we must, I believe, understand that there is no “time,” so to speak. Even on the morphological analysis we do not have temporal extension of the entity, but we do have, in the dual analysis of the actual entity as concrescent and as concrete, the metaphysical framework providing possibility of extensive relationality. In other words, because each actual entity is simultaneously subject-superject, because each actual entity goads the becoming of the next being, there can be coherent “societies” of entities with temporal extension and endurance. The actual entity is, as Whitehead insists, the reason. We can work this in two directions: because temporality is a feature of ordinary human experience, this metaphysical framework serves as its only adequate explanation; because this metaphysical framework allows for extensive social solidarity, we can account for the seamless flow of temporal experience. Either way, however, temporality is an emergent feature of such social solidarity which, although not appearing on the level of the metaphysical atoms-as-relational, comes into view on the level of the ontological atoms-in-relation. Thus, we might say: time is the manifestation of the being of process. As such, the meaningful discussion of time occurs on the ontological/macrocsmic level as the temporality of beings.

Temporality is an emergent feature made possible/actual by the relationality of metaphysical atoms. The identification of any society of entities is possible only because the constituted entities are simulatneously related to one another and absolutely unique in their self-constitution as relational. Thus is the macrocosmic level in which temporal extension emerges directly a result of the microcosmic analysis. In this way the movement between the levels is again justified—its possibility explained. Temporal extension is a feature that, according to a view of relational being/becoming, is emergent on the ontological level. To “locate” temporality is always to examine a particular social segment of process,¹⁰ but the temporality is not a “feature” or “quality” of that segment. It is not as though this society of entities exists in time or as temporal. The entities’ relationality is (their) temporality. Time is the intensive constitution of each processive atom by its internal relations of the entirety of its antecedent universe for the sake of the entities to come. Each atom, though not itself extended, is the occasion by which such extension is

achieved; it is the universal particularized and the particular universalized. The productive dependence of each atomic occasion on all others is the basis of the intricate webs of horizontal and vertical relationality that are temporal and spatial extension. The processive/productive structure of appropriation-productive activity-objectification emerges from the very character of the fundamental metaphysical units and specifies, within the movement of process, that from-which, in-which, to-which that we call the past, present, and future. Thus, the activity of self-relation and creation that is the engine of processive being/becoming constitutes time.

THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTION

Let me restate this point about processive production in the Marxian terminology of the human labor process. Marx says, “[l]abour . . . is the transitoriness of things, their temporality, as their formation by living time” (G, 361). Thus it is that “labour is motion, [and] time is its natural measure” (G, 205). Production is process and time the designation of productive-processive relationality. The process of production that was outlined in chapter 3 as appropriation of given (objective) conditions, productive (subjective) activity, new objectification, is the motion of labor. In other words, the productive activity considered as present activity mediates objectivity to objectivity, mediates that past to this past. The labor process is life process, which is time. Therefore, when one says that both physical reproduction and novel creativity are ontological characteristics of human life activity, one is simultaneously saying that any given stretch of such life activity, any analyzable portion of such productive process, will include both reproductive and productive time, time for reenactment of pattern and time for creativity beyond mere physical reproduction. These segments can be separated in analysis. Within the capitalist productive process, Marx calls these segments necessary labor time and surplus labor time.

They must perform some kind of surplus labour. This is the subjective condition. But the objective condition is that they also *can* perform surplus labour: that natural conditions are such that a *part* of their available labour-time is sufficient to reproduce and maintain them as producers; that the production of their necessary means of subsistence does not consume their entire labour-time. (C, III, 773)

The duality of the quality of the life activity is expressible as a duality of a temporal quantity. A certain quantity designated as necessary labor time expresses the extension of that qualitative aspect of human life activity which primarily reproduces the person as physical; a quantity designated as surplus

labor time expresses the extension of that qualitative aspect of human life activity that is primarily creative according to enhancement of inherited data by heightened conceptual activity. As we shall see, the ratio of the quantitative extensions of these two aspects is going to be of the utmost importance both to the development of capitalism and ultimately, therefore, to the development of socialism as well.

While we insist on the dual character ascribed to each of the two aspects of a working day or a given segment of capitalist labor process, at the same time it is imperative that we not forget that the descriptions are really angles in at or perspectives on one and the same reality. Additionally, even though each aspect of the duality (repetition and novelty, necessary and surplus labor) is expressible both in qualitative (ontological) terms and in quantitative (temporal) terms, according to the process view, there can be no hard distinction, no real separation between being and doing. A processive individual constitutes itself by its activity of self-relation to its antecedent environment. Therefore, the self-creative process itself is simultaneously activity and actuality: actuality activating itself or the activation of actualization. Being is necessarily temporal. On the metaphysical level we can indicate this real duality by saying simply subject/superject; on the macroontological scale we must continually indicate the real dialectical unity in difference of quantitative, extensive temporal activity and the qualitative form of being, which is the actualization engaging in and emergent from such activity. Being and doing constitute each other.

The difficulty involved in remembering such essential unity is not trivial. It is, in fact, highly symptomatic of capitalism's alienated social relations. For, as we shall see, it is not merely the case that capitalist social relations set the dialectical poles into contradiction with one another, but further still, perhaps even more to the point and closer to the heart of the critique, it is this mode of social relations that separates the elements to begin with. One of our tasks therefore in revolutionary writing is a demystification of this tendency that entails a continual re-remembering of essential unities.¹¹

Our focus at present is to understand not only that each aspect of capitalist laboring activity is of such dual intensive and extensive nature, but that such duality is necessary and ultimately an expression of the same productive-processive reality. Many Marxists have too long maintained that *Capital* is Marx's work in political economy in contradistinction to his earlier philosophical writings. This analysis is meant to dispel that myth. The expressions of the ontologically dual character of human labor as reproductive and productive appear both in the labor market in the distinction between exchange value and use value and in the productive sphere in the distinction between necessary and surplus labor. Once we understand that the philosophical

vision underlying the analysis is processive, we simultaneously see that both these sets of distinctions must be expressions of the ontological character of the human being. The focus is on the creativity of human being that finds adequate expression both in terms of being (self-constituting) and in terms of doing (world-constituting). Therefore, statements by Marx regarding time, the length of the working day, the ratios of surplus and necessary labor in capitalism, and so on, *are* statements regarding processive activity and thus are also statements regarding ontological self/world constitution or the form and mode of life itself. The dual nature of the two aspects cannot be truly isolated, even within the analysis and critique any more than they can be truly isolated in concrete lived fact. Of additional importance here is the fact that human beings are not only the beings maximally productive of temporal change but also those who are self-conscious and therefore conscious (or potentially conscious) of their own nature. And, as Whitehead says, “[t]he first principle of epistemology should be that the changeable, shifting aspects of our relations to nature are the primary topics for conscious observation. This is only common sense; for something can be done about them” (MT, 29). The forgetting of unity is ideological self-mystification. To sum up, the ontological character specific to human being is expressible as a function of the temporal mode of becoming that reveals also a determinate ratio of necessary to surplus labor time. We need to examine how the illegitimacy of the exchange examined in chapter 5 is expressive as and of temporal contradiction as well.

The determination of common substance that allows for commodity exchange within capitalism is what Marx calls value. The value of a commodity is the average labor time required to produce that kind of commodity: it is determined by socially necessary labor time. “What determines value is not the amount of labour time incorporated in products, but rather the amount of labour time necessary at a given moment” (G, 135). The designation of labor time in this formulation as “socially necessary” says two things. First, that the determination is situated within a given social space, within a designated historical development of economic forces of production and this area of manufacture.¹² Second, “socially necessary” also indicates the abstraction involved in the determination of commodity value: not this or that particular act of production but the average determination within this social space. “The value of commodities as determined by labour time is only their *average value*. This average appears as an external abstraction.” (G, 137). “[I]t is posited as a *relation*, more precisely as a relation in general, not to one commodity but to every commodity, to every possible product. It expresses, therefore, a general relation; . . . Exchange value presupposes social labour as the substance of all products, quite apart from their natural make-up” (G, 205).

Simultaneously, however, it is a determination of socially necessary *labor time* and the question of greatest concern in the analyses of this chapter is, What kind of temporality is manifest by socially necessary labor time? How does time or temporal self-world constitution reveal itself when understood as “socially necessary”? There are at least two reasons why the exploration of this question is of such importance. The first has already been alluded to in the beginning of this chapter but bears repeating at this point: process manifests itself on the macrocosmic scale as production, human processes of production are labor processes, any labor process is a constitution of self and world and hence a constitution in, through, and of time. The specific capitalist labor process is, therefore, a certain mode of temporal constitution and can be analyzed as such—it is a mode of life. The second reason why the analysis of time is so important to the critique of capitalism lies in the role or roles of value within a capitalist mode of production. The metabolic exchanges occurring within capitalism: the exchange of commodities for money, of money for means and instruments of production, of labor for wages, of wages for means of subsistence, and so on, can only occur because each of the terms has received a common determination as value or socially necessary labor time. Therefore, in order to fully understand the nature and role of commodities, wages, means of production, instruments of production, means of subsistence, and, of course, wage labor itself, we must understand them as bearers of or representatives of a shared temporal substance and understand what kind of temporality it is that can be so shared. However, to really understand the difference between past, objectified, or socially average labor and present labor as activity requires an articulation of how and why the present is creative, how such creativity is its potentiality as an orientation to the future, and how that creativity becomes past as objective. We turn again to the process model for clues as to how this must be the case.

On the macrocosmic level of process the past is indicated by objective datum. It is the offspring, the outcome, the *product* of processive-productive activity available for prehension. This does not mean that the past is not a part of process or that it has no active role. However, it does indicate the specific kind of role that it possesses within the movement of process. The past does not have a creative role as subject, but its creative “activity” is as objective, as available data for subjective activity.

I am preserving the language of activity in reference to objectivity here because I think the temptation is to see the objective product of processive activity as really distinct *in kind* from the subjective activity.¹³ This tendency misses crucial aspects of the philosophy of internal relations: (1) that if there is such a real distinction of kind such as would imply *real* independence or non-relation, then there can be no real internally constituting relations, and

(2) therefore, that temporal constitutions cannot be absolutely separated from one another; they can only be seen as the same relational universe acting in a different capacity. In other words, the temporal designation is another expression of the analysable sort of activity carried out by that individual or society of individuals in process. We note again the unity of being and doing. Even if the past serves the role of datum of subjective experience, it still possesses two forms of activity. First, it has been constituted by subjective activity hence its being is an achievement of relationality. Second, as objective, it is always already appropriated in experience beyond it and therefore possesses a role within present activity. To have a role is to be, in a very particular way, active. Thus, the past is really the form that the activity of the present subject is as realized achievement for the world presently constituting itself. Time is, therefore, indeed relative. The past is past only from a given perspective. The datum is “dead” only in relative terms of its subjective activity having completed itself and passed into objective activity. In terms of its continuing role within process, it is quite “alive” and, according to Whitehead, possesses, in fact, objective immortality: as objective, it is *always*.¹⁴

With this in mind, however, we can most certainly discuss the differences between the roles played by processive being as present and as past. As already indicated, processive being/activity as past is object for and of other active present experience. Thus, in reference to that experience, it is datum of the experience and its being past is only relatively expressible. To be datum of an experience on the process model is to be felt by entities in the process of self-constitution. The primary mode of feeling, that mode of feeling that is prerequisite to any further integral feelings, is physical feeling which, as discussed in chapter 4, is a simple reproduction or reiteration of the feelings already achieved in the datum in the presently concrescent entity. Physical feelings are causal feelings. This means that the relative role that the processive being as past plays is as objective, as object, as physical and not conceptual.¹⁵ This is what makes the past different from the present. The conceptual pole is no longer subjectively engaged, thus the activity of self-constitution is complete. This means, further, that all datum of a subject's experience is the physical condition, objective condition, or, as Marx says, material condition for the possibility of the subject's own conceptual enhancement in the activity of creative self-world-production.

Thus, in reference to the analyzable role of the past as opposed to the present within process, we can say that the past is settled, actual, objective, mediated, unfree, and achieved value (the fact of this value); whereas the present is underway, potential, subjective, mediating, free, and achieving of its valuation (creative of wealth as the potentiality of creative valuations). The past is available for appropriation, the present is the activity of appropri-

ation and the creative activity on the appropriated. The object is the actual material that is reproduced for the subject's potential creation. The past is what the living present has/is produced for the sake of life, the gift of each achieving individual to the processing-producing universe to come.

The present, on the other hand, is precisely the activity of the subject, his or her own act of self-world creation. It is the middle term, *productive activity*, of the process of production. It is the perspective upon the processive being/becoming as subject. The present is always necessarily unique to a given individual (society of metaphysical individuals). Although the present designates that activity upon processes available as past, objective datum, and such activity in its primary phase is appropriative and reproductive, the present activity that works on the material can *never be solely* reproductive. If it were, there would be no process. It can be primarily reproductive, as we have already seen in chapter 4, but if it were entirely reproductive there would be no difference between past and present, hence no time and no being. At very least, the datum there is datum here; the datum then is datum now. But even this is not entirely correct and we see how our abstract language slips away from us and away from the concrete at crucial moments. In fact, to be datum, to be object or product is to be *there as here*, to be *then as now*. "The creativity of the world is the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a new transcendent fact" (AI, 177).

The subjective activity goes beyond merely causal and receptive physical reproduction of datum. The datum as reproduced in this subject, within this subject's experience, presents itself as object-for. The in-formation of the past poses a task for the subject, which is its presentness. The past as present poses a question as to how it will become part of this experience for this subject or, better yet, how this subject will become as the relational totality of this datum, what decisions it will make (of) itself regarding how it is to become/be this relation of these data.

The reference to decision here is quite important because it indicates the operation of the conceptual pole. The function of the conceptual pole is to evaluate the objective datum presented in physical feeling according to the subjective aim of the concrescent individual.¹⁶ Physically felt elements may be valued-up or valued-down, placed in contrast with other feelings and in contrasts of contrasts, and so forth with the aim of an intensification of that subject's individual experience both of its own achievement and in reference to the future beyond it for which it will be objective datum. The futural reference of enjoyment of the occasion is part and parcel of the self-enjoyment. The conceptual pole accomplishes these contrastive and valuative tasks by entertaining the objective datum as presenting alternatives. A variety of ingressed physical feelings present themselves clothed in a variety of formal

characteristics. The conceptual pole operates “freely” within the data and its formal elements, entertaining diverse combinations, eliminating unwanted contrasts, choosing the relational configurations of its past as its achievement. The present activity is, therefore, dipolar: both reproducing the objective datum in physical feeling (how the object is efficacious in the present) and simultaneously entertaining the possibilities presented by those objective contents as its potential relational arrangements and valuations with reference to the subject as achieved “value” for its own future objectivity.

Thus, the present contains a vital reference to the future. In fact, the present is active, productive, creative, and processive only by virtue of such reference. It is precisely the conceptual entertainment of those relational complexes potential within the forms of the datum and the self-realization of the individual as an achievement of such relational complex that is the subjective activity as present. The present is productive of novelty because the heightened operation of the conceptual pole allows for the entertainment of yet unrealized possibilities in the constructive becoming of the individual.

INTENSIVE EXPLOITATION

Whereas our previous analysis allowed us to speak of the injustice of capitalism in reference to the disregard with which the human creative essence is treated in the exchange of labor for wages, we can now continue that line of critique on the basis of the disregard for the creativity of present time. This realization allows us to see additionally how capitalism’s further exploitative maneuvers possess a real “logic” toward maximization of profits.

In the exchange that takes place within capitalism of wages for labor, the value of labor is necessarily determined by the value of the means of subsistence that have been socially necessary to produce the labor(er) for that day. Socially necessary labor time is the common substance of all values. It designates a social average in reference to a given branch of production at a given time, but the determination of an average requires that the quantitative data of the acts of production and their labor times be available for calculation of such an average. This means that the social acts of production entering into the calculation of socially necessary labor time be already completed—they must be *past*. If, as indicated in chapter 3, the process of production entails the appropriation of objectified data and productive activity that issues in new objectification, then determination of the labor time that has issued in any given objectification requires that the process be completed and therefore itself already objectified data. It cannot be process underway, it cannot be *present* in the form of living productive activity because the present is not yet datum of any experience. Present process is, rather, processive experience

itself—unique, living and lived, singular, located always just here, just now, just as this activity of just this subject.¹⁷ It cannot, by definition, be objective and so cannot be available for consideration or utilized for abstract or average or general determination. Only a productive process past can be so utilized. Within the capitalist form of social relations, “[a]ctivity, regardless of its individual manifestation, and the product of activity, regardless of its particular make-up, are always *exchange value*, and exchange value is a generality, in which all individuality and peculiarity are negated and extinguished” (G, 157).

Such a determination may be legitimate for specific purposes (as a useful abstraction) when applied to products that are physical objects because the present activity of those kinds of things that we call physical objects are only negligibly productive of novelty, only negligibly creative. In fact, what makes such products physical objects or “things” is that they exhibit themselves in our ordinary experience as only negligibly productive of novelty—they endure. Thus, to determine the exchange value of a physical object based on the socially necessary labor time that went into the production of its kind on the average and then to use that product in a present activity or to have that object available for use in a future activity is or may be, although not an exchange of exact equivalents, an adequate exchange based on the determination of reproduction as characteristic of the physical object. In other words, the present and future of a physical object largely resemble its past.¹⁸

However, when the same kind of exchange is considered in reference to the human being, the situation is drastically altered because of the quality of human subjectivity as present. The extraordinarily heightened conceptual functioning of the human subject greatly enhances entertainment of potentiality inherent in the given objective material and issues in, at very least, the possibility of massive alteration of the past in and through the present into new forms: human conceptual activity erupts in novelty. The physical inheritance is formed and reformed. The futural envisionment, which operates to such a high degree in human conceptuality, is the primary organ by which the present becomes creative of the new.

The difference between these temporally distinct modes of productive process are identified by Marx as objectified and living labor.

The only thing distinct from *objectified* labour is *non-objectified* labour, labour which is still objectifying itself, *labour* as subjectivity. Or, *objectified* labour, i.e. labour which is *present in space*, can also be opposed, as *past labour*, to labour which is *present in time*. If it is to be present in time, alive, then it can be present only as the *living subject*, in which it exists as capacity, as possibility; hence as *worker*. (G, 272)

Now, since wages are determined by the socially average labor time necessary for the production of the means of subsistence to reproduce the laborer for

the following day of productive labor, the illegitimacy of the exchange involved in capitalist wage labor is that it is an exchange of objectified labor in the form of wages, as a determination of and by past activity, for living labor, which is necessarily present and therefore the very potentiality of creative activity. Therefore, the exchange of a determination that is past for the human activity that is present(ed) is absolutely illegitimate. The very nature of human present is to be enormously creative, that is, to produce the future precisely as different from the past. We do not have that acceptable margin of minimal alteration from past to present as occurs with physical objects; we have, rather, extreme essential incommensurability. The essential nature of the human temporal being makes the exchange unequal. Given that it was precisely equality that was sought in the determination of value as the common substance of all things, this inequality should, in essence, negate the exchange of a wage for labor. If, as Bologh observes, “[p]articlar (use) value corresponds to a unity of purpose and production” and the purposes of the human subject play a vital transformative role in the individual production, then the exchange of such subjective present human activity for a general value wherein particular purpose must be separated and abstracted from production cannot be valid.¹⁹ The surplus labor time that is the hallmark of human subjective productivity or present activity, is purposefully abstracted from in the exchange of wages for labor and then is taken in exchange by the capitalist and used precisely as productive of novelty. Essential human productivity is usurped and depleted.

Therefore, what occurs in the exchange of wages for labor is a treatment of present activity as adequately re-presented by the past on the part of the capitalist and an acceptance of this treatment on the part of labor. Acceptance here is not meant to indicate blame, even though labor is in a very real sense “responsible.” Rather, I point out that the activity engaged in by labor as wage labor is, as social-relational operation within the conditions of such treatment, an acceptance of that form of life. Because laboring for a wage is a very real lived form of social relation, it is also primarily accepted theoretically within capitalism as the normal or natural state of affairs of labor itself.²⁰ The illegitimate exchange of wages for labor and the subsequent exploitation of that labor as productive labor time involves an acceptance on the part of labor of the “equivalence” of the past and present: a reduction of subject to object, a relinquishing of self-creative conceptual activity for mere physical reproduction, a selling of mediating activity for immediacy, a trade of freedom of self-determinate creation for unfreedom of mere determinate presence (see G, 295–296). The laborer accepts the condition only because he or she may believe that the exchange is equal and valid and/or because the only alternative may well be physical death. It is my guess that the first

belief, for the most part, takes the form of an unquestioned assumption; the second, is usually far more explicit. And so, the laborer quite literally "sells herself short." At very least, demystification is in order as class consciousness is the absolutely necessary prerequisite for liberation.

EXTENSIVE EXPLOITATION AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM

This is the first injustice from which all the further injustices flow. Here the exchange between capitalist and labor, the exchange of wages for labor, which in the last chapter appeared as the qualitative nonequivalence of physical reiteration with the human capacity to produce novelty, now appears as the nonequivalence of past labor time ossified in objectivity with the living present time of the creating human subject. Whereas the labor theory of value appeared in the last chapter as a statement regarding the quality of capitalist labor as productive of novelty that becomes congealed in the value of products, here that labor receives its designation as temporal, as activity that is temporalization in a specific way because it is an activity of a certain type. The laboring activity, precisely because it is utilized in the sphere of production by the capitalist as present, goes beyond its having been reproduced as extant (past) physical being. There are here, two expressions of the same injustice: that injustice arising because the qualitative type of being of the quantitatively extended activity as present is different from the qualitative type of being of a quantitatively extended activity as past.

This discussion, by indicating that actuality is defined within, is constructed by, and is a form of temporal activity, adds the new dimension of extension to the critique. The present activity of the human subject that is appropriated by the capitalist without equivalent exchange is a dual activity. Any extended segment of processive activity, wherein we are focusing specifically on the creativity emerging from the activity of a human being, will therefore reveal itself as analyzable into two further extensive segments: a reproductive segment and a productive segment.²¹ What is vital to note here is that the ratio of these purposively differentiated active-temporal segments is not constant and that the malleability of the ratio is due to the creativity of human life itself.

This malleability is utilized to its utmost within capitalism. Since the primary motivation is profit, or the self-expansion of capital, and because the objectifications achieved by surplus labor time are realized as capitalist profit, the maximization of profit can only be achieved by a maximization of surplus labor time through the extension of the working day, the introduction of machinery, the division and cooperation of labor, and so on. Because,

however, surplus labor time is a temporal designation whose extension is relative to necessary labor time, to maximize surplus labor time is to minimize necessary labor time.

It should be noted that I did not say that one must minimize necessary labor time in order to maximize surplus labor time, although this is certainly true. Rather, I said that to minimize necessary labor time is to maximize surplus labor time and, I should add, vice versa. To increase the creative production of a human being in a given segment is the equivalent of that person requiring less activity devoted to physical reproduction. An increase in the alteration on an objective inheritance is the same thing as a decrease in the reiteration of that objective inheritance; an increase in conceptually enhanced novelty is a decrease in physical repetition. This must be the case according to the ontology outlined in chapter 4. What emerges from this, however, is one of capitalism's deepest contradictions. A lessening of the value of labor in terms of wages (as representing socially necessary labor time for the reproduction of labor) is necessarily an increase in the creative output of that labor—an increase in that feature that stands out as the hallmark of its processive being. But, this increase does not belong to its creator. The robbery involved in capital's exchange therefore becomes increasingly visible, the extensive injustice increasingly intense.

Another piece of the puzzle of capitalism's temporalization emerges here. Necessary labor time is a determination based on the calculation of socially necessary labor time to produce the laborer. Therefore, whereas capitalism's exchange with labor involves a determination of present value by generalized past objectification and whereas the laborer is asked to measure the value of his or her present activity according to the value of his or her past actuality, simultaneously capitalism works to reduce this necessary or past labor time to a minimum, that is, to minimize the past temporality (represented in wages) and maximize the creativity of the present (represented in surplus value). In other words, while capitalism insists that the laborer accept the commensurability of past and present, the motivational structure of capitalism itself drives the past and present farther and farther apart. The contradiction is built into the process of production itself and increasingly manifests the original ontological incommensurability of persons and things.

Additionally, because both surplus and necessary labor time are proportional extensions of a segment of macrocosmic processive production, the absolute extension of one over the other has its logical limit in the extension of the segment itself. "The identity of surplus gain with surplus labor time—absolute and relative—sets a qualitative limit on the accumulation of capital, namely the *working day*, the amount of time out of 24 hours during which labouring capacity can be active." (G, 375). This means, of course, that there

is a quantitative limit on surplus labor and that, therefore, capitalism cannot take its desires to the logical (abstract) limits here without encountering the real (concrete) limits. The minimization of necessary labor time involves a minimization of physical reproduction. As it is pushed farther and farther toward its logical limit, the physical person is, we could say, decreasingly reproduced. But this amounts to an increasing devastation of the physical life of the human being and, by extension emotional life and interpersonal-life, and so forth. The real result is malnutrition, starvation, disease, and, at the extreme, death.²² Capitalism cannot completely realize its dearest desires without losing the source of its surplus value. The human being as the real unity of the productive and reproductive prohibits such realization by its very nature: "If either surplus labour time or necessary labour time = 0, i.e. if necessary labour time absorbed all time, or if production could proceed altogether *without* labour, then neither value nor capital, nor value-creation would exist" (G, 539). However, what capitalism cannot accomplish completely in the production process itself through intensive or extensive exploitation, it often attempts to realize through circulation time (see, G, 659).²³

The limits and contradictions toward which the logical trajectory of capitalism drives in reference to temporality emerge: a drive toward the minimization of necessary labor time taken to its extreme would eradicate that very labor on which capitalism depends, a drive toward the absolute eradication of circulation time (time for realization of profits and labor itself) again would, if realized, eradicate capitalism. Finally, a drive toward a maximal surplus value by way of conceptual enhancement of given objective material conditions on the part of the subjective individual could lead to an eradication of those conditions themselves through emergent novelty.

But let us not hold a premature celebration of capitalism's inherent limits. First, an eradication of reproductive labor time spells not just the simultaneous eradication of capitalism but also the elimination of human life itself. This is necessarily the case because processive being is dialectical. Each pole is absolutely dependent on the other. There is no conceptual enhancement without physical reproduction and no physical reproduction without conceptual enhancement; the conceptual pole must have its data the data must be modified. The drive of capitalism therefore, while self-destructive, is also destructive of all processive being. It destroys its own grounds.

Second, the maximization of surplus labor time, of time for conceptual creativity, may be greater cause for hope, the development of productive forces might entail liberation, but it must not be forgotten for one moment that such time, while increased by capitalism, is also, through the exchange of wages for labor, usurped and placed in service of objectification. Creative time in capitalism's productive process creates products for sale, products

whose realized values belongs to the capitalist and directly or indirectly come back to be reinvested to purchase labor again.

The fact that the worker must work surplus labor time is identical with the fact that the capitalist does not need to work, and his time is thus posited as not-labour time; that he does not work the *necessary* time either. The worker must work surplus time in order to be allowed to objectify, to realize the labour time necessary for his reproduction. On the other side, therefore, the *capitalist's necessary labour time* is *free* time, not time required for direct subsistence. Since all *free* time is time for free development, the capitalist usurps the *free time* created by the workers for society, i.e. civilization. (G, 634)

If surplus labor time is increased in capitalism, it is realized only as additional, congealed past objective values, a portion of which serves to reenslave the wage laborer and a portion of which serves the enhancement of the creative life of the capitalist (the enslaver of labor) herself.

Thus those drives of capitalism that seem most promising to its eventual downfall are, in a revolutionary sense, merely latent, merely potential. Within the forms of social relation itself, this modal economy, this historical manifestation of our metabolic exchange with the rest of the natural world, the creativity of the present is enslaved to the past. The novel productivity of life is trapped in the amber of value. The unique, self-creative temporality of subjective present activity of the individual is bartered off to the congealed objectivity past. The futural reference of that creative act finds its form only in the increased value of the product. The creative ability of the laborer that could and indeed should find expression in the intensification of his or her human creativity itself (*free* time), winds up as the value of the bottle of dishwashing liquid or the can of disinfectant, the tube of toothpaste or the roll of toilet paper. Present creativity sparked by future envisionment has been reduced to the abstract monetary expression of the generalized past labor of my brothers and sisters. Their creative lives have paid my wage and mine has paid theirs. We are the price of and we pay the price of one another's enslavement.

In a modal form of metabolic exchange whereby all elements receive expression as and are transformed into forms of value, wherein value is an abstract designation of objectivity and such objectivity is the general form of average social labor time, we see clearly now that value is really congealed labor—that it is the life blood, the potential and real creativity of the human being hardened into mere physicality—into the not-human.²⁴ Subjective creativity is the absolutely unique and free self-expressive, self-creative, temporally extended activity of the individual, and capitalism requires that it be treated as what it is essentially not and traded off for this absolute other. Capitalism requires the ultimate sacrifice. Therefore, leveled down in capital-

ism is the unique "value" of just this self-creative being just here. Leveled down is the freedom of self-determination, the exhilaration of free creative expression in the becoming of the self and world, the becoming of a self for the world, the becoming of the self externalized as a world for others. Leveled down is the feeling of each individual's unique relational acts. Leveled down is the absolute irreplaceability of the individual and the conspiracy of the universe to prepare a space for just this unique achievement.

If Whitehead is correct that "[i]t is by reason of average expression, and of average reception, that the average activities of merely material bodies are restrained into conformity." (MT, 29), that "[t]he inorganic is dominated by the average" that "[i]t lacks individual expression in its parts" (MT, 27) and if it is simultaneously the case that "[i]n so far as an average dominates, expression fades" (MT, 21), then indeed a mode of social relations whereby individual expression of the freely creative subject is exchanged for an abstract physical representative (money) of a socially average determination of the labor necessary to produce kinds of physical objects would constitute a multilayered domination by the average. It appears that within capitalism, expression, the hallmark of that which is not the inorganic, is increasingly diminished. But the present activity is not the past, the unique is not average. The present is constituted from its past and the past is the present as it has become: processive movement is the absolute interdependence of the two, one might even say their identity as process and their diversity as different manifestational expressions of reality. As we live, so we are creative process. As we compromise our temporality, so we compromise our own being-becoming.

PART THREE

Care

CHAPTER 7

ALIENATION

The terrible thing about poverty is less that it starves than that it stagnates as it starves. Never were there so many hollow people in the world, like a huge and mounting shore of empty cockleshells.

—John Fowles, *The Aristos*

There is no radical or even partial break between Marx's early and later writings. The existing continuity between dialectics and process metaphysics based on the actual entity as a dialectical unity in difference links the categories of process and production along methodological and functional lines. A metaphysics of process and the ontology that it supports operate implicitly throughout Marx's critique of capitalism. Such a processive viewpoint is evidently operative within the later political-economic writings: in the *Grundrisse* it appears as the processive notion of production common to all historical manifestations of production and in the comparison between labor and capitalist or wage labor; in *Capital* it appears in the notion of human labor as "naturally" and necessarily surplus- (novelty-) producing as the ground of capitalist profit and in the distinction between living or present productive activity of the individual and the reiterative stability of settled past objects of exchange that invalidates the exchange of a wage (dead labor) for living labor.

Completion of this task of integration is now before us and requires only a return to the early "humanistic" writings to show how they are an expression of the experience of living such discord, such dis-ruption between essential ontological human processive life-activity and its capitalistic form, between the necessary conditions for the possibility of capitalist production as a process and capitalism's process of production itself. As the representative work in this vein, I turn to the theory of alienation as it appears in the section "Estranged Labor" in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (EPM, 69–84).

ALIENATED LABOR

We have proceeded from the premises of political economy. We have accepted its language and its laws. We presupposed private property, the separation of labor, capital and land, and of wages, profit of capital and rent of land—likewise division of labor, competition, the concept of exchange-value, etc. (EPM, 69)

We begin already within capitalism. We are speaking therefore about labor within capitalism: wage labor, labor used for its ability to both reproduce the value of the means of production and to produce a surplus, labor used and abused for its power to both mediate the objective world from appropriation to new objectification and to produce novelty such that the latter is infused with the human life-blood of present activity vitalized by the conceptual entertainment of future possibility. Thus, in this specific discussion, Marx tells us from the outset that the labor under consideration is capitalist labor, wage labor: alienated labor is wage labor and vice versa. The subject matter of the inquiry is that historically specific form of labor already dis-possessed, that which has already accepted the invalid exchange of effusive productivity for a wage-value, of the individual's presently active and future-directed creativity for past average determination. Under discussion here is labor that has surrendered "its *creative power*, like Esau his birthright for a mess of pottage" (G, 307). It should already be quite evident, especially given the content of preceding chapters, that labor within capitalism, wage labor, and alienated labor, are synonymous terms. However, it will add greatly to the viability both of any claim as to the essential unity of Marx's writings and to any claim that the processive viewpoint operates as the underlying philosophical foundation of his critique, if it can be shown how the process philosophy appears clearly within this original articulation of the various aspects of alienation. This will demonstrate a real connection between the theory of alienation and the labor theory of value; between the humanism and the 'economics.'¹ I will endeavor to show that, given a philosophy of internal relations, economics is humanism and the labor theory of value is just the political-economic expression and analysis of alienated social relations.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF LABOR

We begin the investigation here as we began the metaphysical investigation and the economic investigation and the ontological investigation, with experience as it presents itself. "We proceed," Marx tells us, "from an *actual economic fact*. The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces" (EPM, 71). The more commodities the worker produces, the more impover-

ished he or she becomes. This is quite literally a strictly “economic” fact within capitalism for the following reason. The wage paid to labor, the exchange-value of labor, is determined by the cost of the means of subsistence deemed socially necessary to produce (reproduce) that human being as physically extant for that day. Thus, if the laborer is able to increase productivity, if he or she is able to produce more commodities in less time, then the exchange-value of these commodities has been reduced. Since among the commodities produced are the means of subsistence for the laborer him or herself, a reduction in the exchange-value of the commodities is simultaneously a reduction in the total cost of reproducing the laborer and, therefore, a fall in wages. Hence, an increase in productivity on the part of labor is a self-improvement. The presence of the product of labor as means of subsistence, therefore, is an affront and a threat of absence to the labor that produced it. As the quantity of the product increases, so the sustenance of labor decreases; as the product is realized so the laborer is derealized. The product stands as an alien presence over and against the labor that produced it. The product is that with which labor is not congruously conjoined.

In addition to this strict quantitative relationship of inversion between increased productivity and poverty, there are a host of interrelated economic facts concerning the qualitative relationship between labor and its product. The product of capitalist labor as commodity is realized by way of exchange. Once the exchange of the commodity for money takes place, once the product is realized as capital, it can begin its life anew in a multitude of different forms. (1) A portion of the capital realized as the final stage of the production process may serve to replace the means of production for further acts of production, thus effectively chaining the laborer again into the capitalist labor process and reinforcing her dependence on the capitalist to provide the means of production. (2) A portion of the realized capital may be used to purchase machinery for the production process. As Marx demonstrates so effectively in chapter 15 of *Capital*, volume I, the introduction of machinery into the production process, first increases productivity and thus, as outlined above, impoverishes labor by driving down the wage and, second, makes the worker an appendage of the machine causing his or her labor to be repetitive, mind-numbing, crippling, and highly dangerous. The laborer working in conjunction with the machine has an impoverished life both within and without the workplace. (3) Another portion of capital may be used to pay labor’s wage itself. Such wage as exchange is inequitable and essentially improper but once accepted, because the wage will only allow labor to reproduce itself physically for the next working day, it enslaves labor to the exchange as a way of life as, in fact, the only way for labor to live.² Finally (4) a portion of

the realized product of labor, the realized surplus product, the congealed life-blood of labor is its own product as pure capitalist profit. The creative ability of labor sits, quite literally, in the pocket of another, buying luxury that the laborer cannot afford, buying the “civilized” and “cultured” existence as labor ekes out a mere existence of survival, buying free time with labor’s unfree time.

Thus, the product of capitalist labor, once realized, reappears in many guises: as the means of production on which further labor will be performed again and again, as the machinery that impoverishes and enslaves labor, as the wage itself—the ultimate basis of capitalist injustice, and finally, as the profit that buys for the few what passes for the “good life” within capitalism. The laborer produces all these but ultimately possesses none of them. Even the wage, once spent on means of subsistence, ends up in the capitalist’s pocket and serves only to reproduce and return the laborer to the site of his or her enslavement again.

But it is not just the products of labor realized as capital that can stand against the laborer. Those products themselves are commodities and, once sold, they return again in new roles within the capitalist system of social relations. Whatever can be bought with realized capital is itself a commodity (an exchange-value) standing at the end of some process of production and, therefore, standing in the same alienated relation to labor. The commodity produced may serve, therefore, as means of subsistence for labor by which it is reproduced for the next laboring day. The commodity produced in one production process may also appear as means of production in another production process or it may appear as machinery with all the horrific attendant consequences listed above. It may just appear as a luxury item for the capitalist class: another expensive toy, distraction, costume, cosmetic, and so on. When one realizes the source of surplus value it does indeed seem a bit obscene that those who possess the most of it hardly know what to do with it, that this tremendous excess becomes, in a sense, almost meaningless. It is not then difficult to explain the enormous expenditures that go into diversions and appearances; there is, it appears, good reason to hide.

The products of labor, therefore, either directly or indirectly, in all these various manifestations, face that labor as alien and hostile, as one more means of enslavement to capitalist production, one more torture to be endured, one more insult to be borne. They appear coming and going: on one end they appear as means of production or machinery or tools appropriated for productive activity, on the other end they appear as the product, the commodity that may appear again at the start of a new production process. The two objective poles of the process of production, appropriation and objectification, within the capitalist production process confront labor as

alien: “objectification as *loss of the object* and *object-bondage*; appropriation as *estrangement*, as *alienation*” (EPM, 71). Only looking at a *given* production process at a *given* moment could tell us whether this object here is an object of appropriation or a resultant objectification. In general, it matters not to the analysis. They are both the products of labor. They are both the objects on which and with which labor produces. Labor is alienated from its objects—that very objective reality that it alone *creates*.

It should be evident at this point that this analysis is operating within the paradigm of production outlined in chapter 3. The objects/objectifications resulting from the productive activity are simultaneously available for appropriation in further processes of production. Objectivity is the alpha and omega of processive activity on the ontological level. Yet neither an object appropriated nor an object produced is, in any strict sense, a beginning or an end, but rather each is analyzable by the functional role in which it appears as this or that object of appropriation or objectification. The object is here or there only in reference to its concrete, material operation in relation to a specific productive activity. But, whether in abstract analysis or in its concrete manifestation, the objectivity as appropriation or as objectification, as means or as outcome, is always already referent to productive activity. According to the processive scheme, the object is, after all, the self-created internal relations of the active subject as available for appropriation. The object is truly both the product and the to-be-produced. Given that the specific capitalistic forms taken by the object as product in its reappearance as means of production, means of subsistence, wages, and so on, are alien and alienating, given that their hostile alien character is a primary fact of capitalism, such character must, because capitalism is a mode of processive production, be referent to the productive activity of the subject as well. Alienation from the object is alienation of activity.

THE SUBJECTIVITY OF LABOR

“*The direct relationship of labor to its produce is the relationship of the worker to the objects of his production*” (EPM, 73).

Till now we have been considering the estrangement, the alienation of the worker only in one of its aspects, i.e., the worker’s *relationship to the products of his labor*. But the estrangement is manifested not only in the result but in the *act of production*—within the *producing activity* itself. . . . The product is after all but the summary of the activity, of production. If then the product of labor is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. (EPM, 73–74)

The product of production is constituted by the activity. Therefore, if the product is alien to the producer, then the activity must be the activity of constituting the object as alien. It is the “activity of alienation.”

Marx tells us that what first constitutes the alienation of labor is “the fact that labor is *external* to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being” (EPM, 74). The “essential being” of human being is self-creation through a unique relational configuration of the available world. Such creativity is charged with novelty due to the heightened operation of conscious conceptual activity. Through such conceptual activity, alternate formal possibilities for relational configurations of the given data are entertained as available with conscious reference to the future efficacy of the intensive pattern (production) as data for the world to come. Therefore, the self-world-creativity that is the productive activity of human being is essentially *free* (1) by virtue of the conscious (and hence self-conscious) conceptuality operative within it and (2) by virtue of its self-creative conscious reference to purpose as self-production for others.

Within the capitalist form of social relations, due to the specific form that labor takes as wage labor, the productive activity is external to the worker in that it, quite literally, belongs to another. Once purchased, it is the property of the capitalist. And, of course, since the productive activity of wage labor is the property of the capitalist, so also is the product that it yields. Therefore, from the standpoint of the laborer within capitalism, productive activity is, first, not self-motivated activity because its outcome is not the unique relational self-creation of the subject as self but rather surplus-value for the capitalist. In fact, the laborer is absolutely coerced into such self-sacrificial activity only because he or she must be physically reproduced in order to be subject at all.³ The productive activity of the subject therefore is not an end in itself, *self-activity* as *self-creation*, but merely a means to the most meager physical survival. “His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is *forced labor*. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a *means* to satisfy needs external to it” (EPM, 74).

Second, the productive activity of the laborer within capitalism is not creative production based on one’s own conscious conceptual operation. Therefore, the purpose of such activity cannot be referred to the conscious activity of the laboring subject. Again, because capitalist labor is wage labor, the use of which belongs to the capitalist, the conscious direction of the activity and the determination of its purposive outcome belongs to the capitalist and not to labor. Therefore, such consciousness is alien to labor.

[T]he external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, that

in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates independently of the individual—that is, operates on him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity—in the same way the worker's activity is not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self. (EPM, 74)

Because such activity is not self-determined activity either in its inception or its operation or its outcome, because the productive activity of the individual laborer is not an act of self-creation but occurs merely for the sake of self-preservation, because the act of production is alienated, its products must be alienated as well. But the ultimate product of the process of production is essentially supposed to be the self-world relation as self-creation: *the self as objectified*. If the product of the capitalist labor process is capital and not the productive human being as subject/object of the processive world, then the act of production is the act of producing the nonessential being of labor. The act of production within capitalism as performed by wage labor is, therefore, necessarily self-alienating: “it does not belong to his essential being” (EPM, 74) and is *external* to that being and that being is external to the activity. It is not that the productive activity of self-creation is not occurring; it is that it is occurring as alienated/alienating and so, by way of his or her own productive activity, the laborer is self objectified as not-self, self created against the self. Time for self-determination and free self-creation only occurs outside of work during those hours left for the physically reproductive activities of eating and sleeping.

As a result, therefore, man (the worker) no longer feels himself to be freely active in any but his animal functions—eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal.

Certainly drinking, eating, procreating, etc., are also genuinely human functions. But in the abstraction which separates them from the sphere of all other human activity and turns them into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal. (EPM, 74–75)

Therefore, the laborer's time that is free from laboring activity is primarily occupied with the necessary activities involved in self-reproduction and the time that is genuinely productive in terms of creative novelty is not free. In both cases the laborer is enslaved: in the first to his or her physical being, in the second to the capitalist. It is of particular interest in the contemporary setting to question the role that television plays in occupying our “free time.” As capitalism proceeds and the forces of production are developed, as legislation

controls the length of the working day, fewer of labor's nonworking hours are spent with purely reproductive functions. It might be argued that the time procured is effectively occupied with the creation of needs, manufacture of consent, systemic legitimation, and so forth through television viewing. Recently, however, technological development has allowed the work of many jobs to become highly decentralized. The result is a less effective ability to monitor or control the length of the workday.

SPECIES LIFE

So far we have examined capitalist labor from the analyzable aspects of the process of production and have found labor to be alienated from its objects (its objectivity) and, because of this, to be necessarily engaging in productive activity as self-alienation. When we combine these two aspects of alienation, when we inquire as to what the processive movement of appropriation-productive activity-objectification means as specifically human production, we understand that the movement as a whole is the way in which human life as a species is engaged as an agent (agency) among all others in the processive development of the world. And so it is that the aspects of alienation appearing in the process of production as the capitalist production process taken together indicate alienation of labor from species life.

The species life of human being is determined as that mode of processive life-being which is shared by each and every human being and differentiates the human species from others. In other words, the species life of human life is determined by those ontological features that delineate the human being as a functional "kind" of being. The first feature of specifically human processive activity that stands out and sets it apart from that of other species is the universality of its appropriative operation. Human being appropriates all of its natural world in its processive productive life-activity. There is no object which is not appropriated by the species, no object left untouched whether it serves to meet physical or theoretical needs.

The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the fact that man (like the animal) lives on inorganic nature; and the more universal man is compared with an animal the more universal is the sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives. . . . The universality of man is in practice manifested precisely in the universality which makes all nature his *inorganic* body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, object, and the instrument of his life-activity. (EPM, 75–76)

The human needs are universal and so too, therefore, are the objects of human active appropriation and creation. In fact, strictly speaking, this is what it means to be an "object" within human experience.

But to say that a species is one that conducts a universal intercourse with the natural world is simultaneously to indicate further features of that species. That human needs and human appropriation operate universally within the natural world means that they are not restricted, that there is no character of the function of this species limiting the possible interaction with the natural world and that, therefore, its functional character extends such interaction indefinitely. As we have already seen on the process model, it is physical reproduction or causal physical feelings that serve to limit and determine processive production while, conversely, heightened conceptual operation frees causal inheritance from strict repetition. When, therefore, we note the fact of the universality of human needs and appropriation and production, we indicate that the production of this species is marked by its freedom from physical need.

An animal produces only itself, while man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal's product belongs immediately to its physical body, while man freely confronts his product. An animal forms things in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, while man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. (EPM, 77)

Thus, what makes this species the specifically human species is the production that is *free* from physical need. The freedom from such immediate physical needs, as the ability to engage in active processive productivity extending beyond physical reproduction is, as we have seen in the previous pages, dependent on the operation of conceptual activity. Where such conceptual activity is heightened to the point of intelligent, reflective, conscious conceptuality, the productive activity pulls away from repetition and bursts forth in novel creativity. The productive activity of such a species is a genuine "working-up" of the objective world where conscious conceptual operation allows, through the entertainment of possibilities, real alteration and addition to the given: not a reworking but a *working-up*. "It is just in the working-up of the objective world, therefore, that man first really proves himself to be a *species being*. This production is his active species life. Through and because of this production, nature appears as *his work and his reality*" (EPM, 77). The universality of human needs and human appropriation indicates a breaking away from the dictates of mere repetition based on physical needs which, in turn, indicates the operation of purposive (future directed) conscious conceptuality. This makes the productive life-activity of the human species truly free activity. Thus, as Marx says, "[t]he whole character of the species—its species character—is contained in the character of its life-activity, and free, conscious activity is man's species character" (EPM, 76).

So, there are two predominant features to the productive activity of the human species, and they are closely interrelated. First, human species activity is conscious activity, truly productive when free from physical need. Second, because it is conscious activity, it is a truly productive working-up of the objective world by way of going beyond mere reproduction. These are really different aspects of the same processive formula: human processive productivity creates novelty above and beyond mere physical reproduction. It is the same statement that we have seen operative in the ontology, the underlying claim of the labor theory of value, that which receives further expression in the temporal distinction between past and present labor.

Within capitalism the productive activity of the species takes the form of wage labor as the bartering away of creative productivity for the sake of a wage that allows only physical survival. As a result, the unique character of the human being and species being has been forced to be utilized by the laborer as a mere means to physical survival, the meeting of physical needs alone, a mere means to self-reproduction. It is not, for the laborer, the free, conscious activity of species production. Her or his productive novelty as human being is not the object of his or her will and consciousness. In fact, the species-specific conscious, conceptual ability creates the surplus-value of the capitalist's commodity that the laborer has given away for the privilege of mere physical life. But mere physical life is not human species life. It is the not-human species. Thus, the laborer is reproduced in a form alienated from the species and the unique creativity of his or her species production is alienated and belongs to another. If "[t]he object of labor is, therefore, the *objectification of man's species life*" (EPM, 77), then the capitalist process of production is the alienation of labor's object and hence the alienation of labor's species life. "In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his *species life*, his real species objectivity, and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him" (EPM, 77).

Additionally, however, we must remember that human species being, as conscious activity, appropriates the object of its conscious life-activity universally. As a species being, the human being "adopts the species as his object (his own [species] as well as those of other things)" (EPM, 75). "He duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in the world that he has created" (EPM, 77). This amounts to saying that such conscious life-activity involves consciousness of the objects of appropriation. The given world available for appropriation is objectification of previous process and among the objects of consciousness for the human being is the objectification of the self as a relational complex already achieved. In other words, consciousness is

self-consciousness. But, we note, self-consciousness is not a consciousness of self apart from all other objects of consciousness. This would be a derivative abstractive possibility of entertainment, but the self is always constituted by internal relations to its own objective world. Thus, as wage labor produces itself as alienated it is also conscious of its own self-world production. Alienation is lived and therefore is lived as physically and conceptually felt. We sacrifice our human essence, know that we do so, and feel our loss.

SELF AND OTHERS

I, as capitalist laborer, as the producer of my alienated objective world, am the one engaged in alienating productive activity. I am the being producing myself as antithetical to the essence of myself as species being. I am the producer of myself as relational objectification; and this alienated, alienating self-production is an appropriative object of my conscious conceptualization. I am conscious of myself as productive processive being who is self-produced as alienated.

To be conscious of a feeling that has entered one's constitution as a physical causal inheritance is to be able to contemplate alternative formal possibilities for the realization of that object as a part of the self-created relational complex in present process. This is the future reference to alternative patterns of internal relations. Therefore, to be presently conceptually aware (even in barest consciousness or even subconsciously) of having processively produced oneself as a mere means to physical reproduction, is to be feeling conceptually the contrastive antithesis between conceptual awareness and physical reproduction as alienation from oneself. It is to be engaged in self-relation as conscious alienated relation. In other words, as the "labor process" within capitalism physically reproduces the condition of alienation, it is also necessarily, simultaneously, conceptually produced: it is felt as self-alienation.⁴ Alienation from my object, my activity, and thus from my species being, is alienation from myself. I do not recognize myself or, worse yet, I recognize myself as not myself. Because I have the ability to recognize myself, I can see that this appropriated objectification of myself as this constitution of social relations is not congruous with myself as possessing this ability.⁵

Such self-estrangement occurs because of all the previous levels of alienation or, more accurately, the previous levels of alienation are expressions of different aspects or manifestations of self-alienation. (1) Alienation from my appropriation and objectification is a form of alienation from myself because as processive being I am always the self-created relational configuration as novel objectification. In this way, I am both self-appropriated as my own product, and my products are always part of the totality of my self-created

relational objectification. (2) Alienation from my act of production is a form of self-alienation because as processive being my productive activity is always an act of self-relational self-creation. (3) Alienation from my species life as possessing the specific character of effusive productive creativity is a form of alienation from myself because I am of such species and my essential activity manifests itself as both particular and general. I labor within capitalism only to confront every aspect of my processive-productive being as I would that of a stranger. I am unable to find *myself* as a processive-productive being in my appropriated natural world or in the activity or in my objectifications or in my own species life and, at the same time, I do “find” myself as that form of active productive-processive being who accounts for my inability to find myself. My own processive creation undermines and strips from me my creativity. The laborer who produces within capitalism stands against him or herself as removed from the productive act. As this laborer produces for and as capital, there occurs a self-derealization, a production not-for and not-as his or her essential productive being because the essence of human processive production is *free*: self-creation, self-determination, self-possession as self-relation.

Such activity as unfree indicates that its creation, determination, and possession belong to another. The other in this scenario is dual. First, and most obviously, the other who causes the unfreedom of the laboring activity within capitalism is the capitalist: that person who pays the unjust wage, owns the means of production, reaps the creative output of labor’s productive process. But there is another, one less obvious and a great deal more unsettling: capitalist labor itself. Each and every wage-laborer within that labor as a whole contributes to the unfreedom of laboring activity within capitalism. This must be the case because if I, as capitalist laborer, am unable to face my essential productivity except as a hostile stranger, if I am unable to recognize myself as essential processive human being in my practical activity within capitalism, then I will likewise be unable to recognize my essential being in any other wage laborer. As my appropriation of the natural world stands against me, it does so as the product of previous wage labor. As my objectification stands against me, it does so as the product of wage labor. My means of subsistence, my tools of production, my place of production, my wages themselves, all are congealed labor time, all are the products of previous wage labor, all are measured in socially average labor time. They are produced, they have been produced by them, by us, by me. And if each and every element involved in my alienated productive self-world creating activity is ultimately the product of wage labor, then so also is each and every element involved in the alienated activity of another wage laborer ultimately the product of my activity of laboring for a wage within capitalism. The alienated relations are appropriated, produced, and reproduced by each human being

whose activity is that of wage labor. Thus self-alienation is also necessarily alienation from all others involved in capitalist social relations.

The medium through which estrangement takes place is itself *practical*. Thus through estranged labor man not only engenders his relationship to the object and to the act of production as to powers that are alien and hostile to him; he also engenders the relationship in which other men stand to his production and to his product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men. (EPM, 80)

And so each and every wage laborer produces the shackles that bind all other laborers to the capitalist system of social relations. They produce their own relation *as alienated* in their processive-productive creative activity and the capitalist stands here as the mediator who sets up and sets into motion those alienated relations by bartering the creativity of human life and distilling it into its congealed form as exchange value. To be an activator and conduit of the alienated human relations of laborers is no more essentially human productive-processive being/becoming than is the activity of those laborers itself. And so, “everything which appears in the worker as *an activity of alienation, or estrangement*, appears in the non-worker as a *state of alienation, of estrangement*” (EPM, 83).

THE MEANING OF ALIENATION

These four aspects of alienated labor, these four manifestations of alienated labor: alienation from objectivity as appropriation and as production, alienation from productive activity, alienation from species life, and alienation from self and others, all express the real being of labor-as-alienated as a result of laboring-as-alienated. What is expressed here, therefore, is real alienation: alienation as the form of relational being of capitalism. The being of capitalist labor is alienated because the doing of that mode of laboring activity is alienating.⁶ In other words, the form that labor takes within capitalism as wage-labor that is used without exchange for its creative capacity to produce objectivity infused with novel “value,” that very form of labor analyzed by Marx in the “political-economic” writings, that use and abuse of labor expressed through the labor theory of value, is alienated labor. In fact, the labor theory of value is clearly Marx’s social-economic demystification of the ideological treatment of capitalist value presented by the political economists, based on the fact that labor within capitalism is alienated. Only because labor is alienated, only because capitalist labor is wage labor, is capital as capital possible. The labor theory of value is the analysis of labor as those alienated social relations that we call capitalism.

This is real alienation: living an existence antithetical to the very essence of your ontological being and knowing such precisely because you have the capacity to live such an existence, because you are able to alienate your own productive activity. It is capitalist labor as the active doing that is the self-estrangement from the being of labor as capacity. It is thus the activity of existentially alienating oneself by the activity of being alienated ontologically. It is my specific realization of the potentiality of creativity of my ontological being that is self-alienated because it is (1) turned over to another; (2) exchanged for its ontological other (creativity for stagnancy, novelty for reproduction, present as future for past as accomplished); and (3) used to reproduce the alienated/alienating social relations of myself and others.

Alienation is the lived material condition of labor within capitalism. This is the condition that we make available to one another as the material world to be appropriated. This is the condition out of which we are invited to build ourselves and our world ever-*anew*. Every product we make, every commodity we buy, every dollar we spend or receive, every person we encounter is a manifestation of these relations, a material result of capitalist labor, a token of alienated social relations. Not unique valuation as real wealth but value as capital and capital as real poverty on all human fronts. The objective world available for appropriation to each human being within capitalism's alienated social relations is a world which, in our most primitive encounter with it, is not simply an object for the senses nor an object of cognitive reflection. As we have seen already on the processive model, the most primitive and primary encounter with the objective world available for appropriation is by way of conformal or simple causal feelings. The material world as it is available for our appropriation, for our self-relation and our self-creation, is first-off causally efficacious.⁷ There is, in other words, a direct feeling, which Whitehead calls conformal feeling, of the relational patterns that are available for modification.

To feel a previous feeling conformally is necessarily to admit that feeling in the originary encounter as causally efficacious. Subsequently, that feeling can be valued-up or valued-down, placed in contrasts, ignored, pushed aside, or even buried, but it is there. And so we might say of alienation that it is not just a condition of internal relational configuration of labor to its products, its activity, its species life, itself and others, but that it is also alienated labor as that configuration of social relations available for self-creative appropriation and as such is *felt*. Alienation as the condition of labor's self-productive self-relation is also *as such*, on a processive view, a felt condition. Alienation is, if you will, the conformal feeling of capitalist social relations. The relations are alienated relations and are felt as such. And so alienation is more than just an analysis of capitalist relations but also, because it is an analysis of such

relations and because relations are modes of feeling, alienation is a description of the phenomenological experience of capitalism. Alienation is a feeling of non-relation, of not-being-at-home with the world, of disconnection from the very tools of my creativity, those very items I created, those very persons who should be my closest allies, disconnection even from my life itself. Everything feels not-related and so, because I am relational being, everything feels strangely 'other'. Everything and everyone is really withheld from me as I am from myself: they are *private* property.

Thus we find the reason why Marx ends this section of the Manuscripts with private property, here meant not in the narrow sense circumscribed by the discourses of the political economists, but in the fullest philosophical sense.

Through *estranged, alienated labor*, then, the worker produces the relationship to this labor of a man alien to labor and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labor engenders the relation to it of the capitalist, or whatever one chooses to call the master of labor. *Private property* is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of *alienated labor*, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself.

Private property thus results by analysis from the concept of *alienated labor*—i.e., of *alienated man*, of estranged labor, of estranged life, of *estranged man*.

True, it is as a result of the *movement of private property* that we have obtained the concept of *alienated labor (of alienated life)* from political economy. But on analysis of this concept it becomes clear that though private property appears to be the source, the cause of alienated labor, it is really its consequence. (EPM, 80–81)

Private property here refers to all from which labor is estranged. That which is proper to (and “property” to) labor and what belongs to human life as productive life is not ours.

But a universe driven by the movement of process is necessarily a relational universe. In fact, the processive movement itself is the self-generation of relationality. Processive becoming occurs as each self-related individual in its relational configuration to all others presents itself as the landscape of opportunity that is the becoming of events beyond it. There can, on this view, be nothing private, and if there were any genuine privacy, there no process would occur. Privacy is the death of process.

What then are we to make of private property as “the necessary consequence of *alienated labor*” (EPM, 81)? How can private property be the alpha and omega of capitalist social relations? The question really answers itself: the privacy of property within capitalism is first a mode of relationality, not its absence. The way in which the laborer is related to his or her own products, productivity, species life, self and others, is as if they belonged to

another, as if they were not public property. But in fact, in the strongest sense they do *really belong* to labor. They belong to us—to human life itself as *our* property. If these alienated elements did not belong essentially to labor, there would be no injustice in their existential privacy, and the labor theory of value would be an explanation of capitalist profit and not the beating heart of the critique of capitalism. Yet, at the same time, within the capitalist mode of relational being, the property of labor is made private by its “sale” and so the contradictions of capitalism on the levels of essence/existence emerge. Capitalist relations take a form that undermines relationality itself and thus capitalism really is an “economy of death” and is such on numerous levels.

First, as shown in chapters 5 and 6, for labor to exchange its creative capacity for a wage requires that labor be treated as a commodity both by the capitalist and by the laborer. The productive capacity of labor is ignored in the exchange and labor is treated as merely reproducible and merely reproduced like a thing. Second, as the labor theory of value shows, the creativity of the human being is usurped for commodity production. Thus, the creative time that could be used for self-determined self-development is funneled into the rigid outlines of commodity production. Subjective productive activity is ossified in the objectivity of the product. Third, the natural world is appropriated for and emerges from the capitalist production process as commodity. We barter off all natural resources as commodities to enter the production process and with them create more commodities. Even the profit, that surplus necessarily created by labor, is thrown back into the next commodity-producing cycle such that capital is truly self-expanding value.

In capitalism, growth, increased expansion, and movement appear to belong to commodities. But in reality we move, increase, and expand them. We give our creative life over to that increase. Commodities are not productive of novelty in the way in which we are and therefore, cannot move themselves. And yet, as we give our capacity to produce novelty to the task of expansion of commodities, we are in fact creating the world as more populated by things which, in their essential ontological natures, are primarily reproductive and reiterative. “With the *increasing value* of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the *devaluation* of the world of men” (EPM, 71). This is genuine commodification: the derealization of human creativity and novelty through its productive task of realizing commodities. And as the human being is derealized the productive task, so that person becomes more and more like a commodity, going home in the evening to eat and sleep and generally reiterate the laborer of the previous day for tomorrow’s workday. “Labor’s realization . . . appears as *loss of reality* for the workers” (EPM, 71). We should note well the word *appears*.

Thus, if the privacy engendered by capitalist social relations is, by its sheer relationality, not the death of process, it is most certainly its impoverishment. Because, if the human being is the ontological font of the novelty of vital change, then the commodification of the human being is the movement in process from greater novelty to greater repetition. Capitalist process, therefore, generates the impoverishment of the processive universe. If “whatever merges into actuality, implants its aspects in every individual event” (SMW, 150), then capitalism produces a ripple effect of lost novelty and lost intensity throughout the fabric of all being. “The human being is inseparable from its environment in each occasion of its existence. The environment that the occasion inherits is immanent in it, and conversely it is immanent in the environment which it helps to transmit” (AI, 63).

As we create the world as commodified and as reiterative, so we create ourselves as commodified and reiterative as well. And so we create ourselves in capitalism as antithetical to our essential ontological being: we are self-alienated. We relate to ourselves and feel ourselves as incompatible with ourselves.

When . . . societies decay, it will not mean that their defining characteristics cease to exist; but that they lapse into unimportance for the actual entities in question. . . .

But there may evidently be a state in which there are no prevalent societies securing any congruent unity of effect. This is a state of chaotic disorder; . . . Chaotic disorder means lack of dominant definition of compatible contrasts in the satisfactions attained, and consequent enfeeblement of intensity. It means the lapse towards slighter actuality. (PR, 92–93)

So as we produce in capitalism, novelty and human intensity are slowly ebbing, aesthetic patterns are enfeebled, sheer stability seems to dominate. Capitalism is the decay of society as human society. But as we breed novelty so also do we need novelty, and if as we create in capitalism we strip creative novelty from the environment, then we are deteriorating the environment from which emerges our own creativity. Yet, as the labor theory of value so clearly shows, capitalism itself requires the unique creative capacity of the human being. Therefore, if capitalist production itself produces the human being and world as commodified, as primarily reiterative, then it is (1) the death of the laborer as productive of surplus value and hence (2) it undermines capitalism’s own form of relations, that is, capitalism is an act of suicide. It is a self-destructive form of processive production.⁸

Here then, at last, we have what was so long promised: the real link between the later “political-economic” writings and the earlier “humanistic” writings. We have the real link insisted on by Habermas, between the labor theory of value and the theory of alienation. An understanding of the

processive-productive viewpoint underlying Marx's work as a whole, reveals that the labor theory of value and alienated labor are mutually dependent concepts. Capitalist labor is the source of capitalist value because such labor is alienated and capitalist labor is alienated labor because it is the source of capitalist value as wage labor. There is no break between the lines of thought. The alienation of labor occurs as an expression of the exchange of subjective creativity for the settled objectivity of wages as they are determined by what is socially necessary for mere reproduction. It occurs as an expression of the lived condition of exchanging production for reproduction and the ontological impropriety of such an exchange. From this it follows that if human life is the source of effusive productive or creative novelty, then only labor can be the source of the increased value of the capitalist's commodity. In other words, wage labor is alienated because, as labor, it is essentially not commodity, and only because such labor is alienated is capitalist profit possible.

And so, in a rather strange twist that again refers us back to the opening pages of this project, we see that process philosophy itself has become a critical tool. Only a philosophical system that holds the primacy of relationality to be constitutive of all being(s), that holds such relationality to be the result of the self-productive and world-productive activity of each individual, that understands levels of being as differentiated by their dominant modes of mediating relational productivity—only such a system can look on the reality of the relations of capitalism and see the damage inflicted by such relations upon relational being by way of the mode of human productivity that produces them. Only the processive viewpoint can be appropriately horrified at the loss of creative novelty for the human form of being, that being for whom it is most essential. Only the processive viewpoint can suitably appreciate the ramifications for all being that such a loss of intensity entails. Only the processive viewpoint can adequately mourn as the world shudders under the weight of its increasing objectification, “not with a bang but a whimper.”⁹ Only the processive viewpoint can truly say that the social practices of capitalism “degenerate” what is most essential to human life and thereby damage the creative movement of process itself. As capitalism operates, the world grinds toward stagnation.

CHAPTER 8

MISPLACED CONCRETENESS

Suffer me not to be separated.

—T. S. Eliot, *Ash Wednesday*

There is a certain uncanny quality to the processive being/becoming of the human person. The dominant organization of our experience according to the conceptual entertainment of alternative formal possibilities presented within our given actuality allows for a high degree of plasticity in our becoming. It even, as indicated in the previous chapter, makes alienation possible. Heightened conceptuality provides us with alternatives—even with the alternative of reifying our very ability to abstract. And here is the greatest irony: that the remarkable extension of conceptuality operative in human being, that which serves as the organ of novelty and therefore as the ground of our effusive creative ability, also simultaneously presents us with the possibility of creating ourselves as less or more productive of novelty.

Our plasticity, our malleability, the ease with which we can change ourselves, mold our environment, shift gears, or just dream, the flexibility of our purposes and the purposiveness of our flexibility, are functions of the dominant role played by our intelligence within our self-creation. Our human conceptuality insinuates itself in every fiber of the fabric of our self- and world-creation; it touches and retouches, shapes and reshapes our projects. And precisely because it is the organ of novelty, of change and difference, it is a key that can turn two ways: it can lock or unlock, or, more important, it can lock as it unlocks and vice versa. One door opened necessarily means others closed. As Whitehead points out, “selection belongs to expression” (MT, 21) and expression is “the activity of finitude impressing itself on its environment” (MT, 20). To be is to be as this relational selection and not that. It will be the purpose of the present chapter to investigate what doors appear closed and locked within capitalism as a historical mode of social

production; it will be the purpose of the next chapter to show how that locking is simultaneously an unlocking of productive alternatives.

The underlying foundation of this project has been the explanatory framework provided by the intersection between the philosophy of internal relations and dialectics. This framework was examined from the perspective of metaphysics. Process metaphysics was found to be a metaphysics of internal relations whereby each and every metaphysical occasion was a relational-aesthetic patterning of the data provided by its unique perspective on the actual world and thus an achievement of relational valuation. Additionally, because such occasions are both constituted by their internal relations and simultaneously metaphysical, they are fully dialectical individuals, their being is constituted by their activity of relating (doing) which, on "completion," is always already data for the actualities of becoming beyond them. The metaphysical individuals are thus unities in difference: simultaneously actualities and actualizing, intensive and extensive, subject and superject, relational integrations of many actualities and achievements of a singular actuality, and so on. The dual or dialectical character of the ultimate metaphysical individuals makes them the only "reason" for process. Each actual entity is the "between" generating both the continuity and the change of the processive universe; actual entities are the relationally generative universe.

Process is generated by the internal relations of metaphysical actualities. These internal relations reveal the dialectical character of being that serves to ground the ontological paradigm of production. In keeping with their fully dialectical nature, each metaphysical individual exhibits the operation of a physical pole responsible for the causal transmission from past data of simple physical feelings and the concurrent operation of a mental pole responsible for the introduction of novelty by way of entertainment of alternative arrangements of formal possibilities inherent in that data. Thus, where a society of such metaphysical entities is found, it will exhibit the operative dominance of one or the other of these poles. The pervasive character of any enduring macroontological society will, therefore, be explainable by the degree of such polar dominance.

Physical objects that exhibit massive stability are directed almost exclusively by those constitutive societies dominated by the reiterative physical pole. Living beings that display traits of adaptation to changes in their surrounding environment are composed of societies wherein the conceptual pole achieves prominence. The ontological landscape is populated with every conceivable degree of equilibrium between physical reiteration and conceptual novelty. Within our experience, just as rocks or mountains stand out as paradigms of societal dominance of the reiterative physical pole, so on the other end of the spectrum, the human being stands out as the archetype

of dominance by the conceptual pole and hence of the production of effusive novelty.

Upon analysis, the physical pole, because its role is to causally reproduce prior achievements of feeling, can be said to exhibit the continuity of the past in the present, and thus a certain immediacy of sheer physical transmission, whereas the operation of conceptual pole is most certainly one of thoroughgoing mediation whereby futural reference infuses the present act by coaxing potentialities out of the data. Thus, on the ontological scale, a dominance of the physical pole exhibits itself as “objective” stability, and a dominance by the conceptual pole exhibits itself as “subjective” modification.¹ However, and this is where the metaphysical foundation of the ontology becomes absolutely crucial, even on the ontological level the two poles are always, necessarily present simultaneously. Just as there can be no subjective modification without physical inheritance of objective data to be modified, so also there can be no physical endurance without the subjective mediation of the feeling there as the feeling here. The opposition between the poles is found in abstract analysis only. Therefore, the concrete differences between inorganic, organic, plant, animal, or human being is never a matter of the absence or presence of one pole or the other, but always only a matter of dominance of operation. As long as this primary fact is kept firmly in mind, we can talk all we want about different kinds of being, but never about ontological real distinctions (except as useful abstractions.)

Thus it is that the articulation of the nature of the concrete, whether on the level of the metaphysical or on the level of the ontological, strives to express the dialectical structure that allows for and is the movement of the real. We seek to convey that ontological beings can only reveal themselves within our experience as they do if their metaphysical ground is found in individuals that constitute themselves and their world by way of their real internal relations to one another. We push at the limits of monolectical thought and its abstract utterance through disconnected referents toward those words which, acting as metaphors, may be able to better disclose the thoroughgoing relational dependence that alone can serve as the adequate explanatory and logical account of the phenomena. We try to think and speak dialectically. Captured by the erotic urge, we strive to utter the real.²

In this, we desire neither to degrade nor to devalue those abstractions that serve to separate and distinguish aspects of experience, but we refuse to take this as the whole story or the ultimate story of the real, as much of the history of Western philosophy and particularly the tradition of substance metaphysics has tended to do.³ In this way, we hope to come to understand, as if for the first time, the unique roles played by the concrete and abstract in

relation to each other—their absolute interdependence. We come to see that the real concrete, when understood as itself fully dialectical, as it is in process metaphysics, is the interplay between individuation and relation, between independence and dependence, between the one and the many, and thus provides the real dialectical unity that is the ground of the possibility of abstracting any moments for purposes of analysis.

CAPITALISM AS ABSTRACTION

These interrelated themes of internal relations and dialectics, the claims that processive-productive actuality is generated by the self-constitution of each individual through its internal relations to all others, and that actuality is therefore necessarily dialectical, have served as the foundation for the critique of capitalism. But to say that these notions have provided the basis of our critique is really just to say that concrete, dialectically relational actuality provides the critique. Capitalism does not adequately express such actuality or, perhaps more seriously, it impedes or subverts such actualization. My claim is that it does both and that, in fact, it is unable to adequately express such actuality because in practice it subverts such actuality. If the actuality is dialectical, if the fabric of such reality is the real unity of opposites, then what subverts such reality in practice must be undialectical.

There are at least two steps that lead from the dialectical to the undialectical. First, because that which is dialectical is a real unity in difference, the undialectical would have to disunite the moments of the unity. Second, because the real unity in difference requires the maintenance of each of the dual moments as different despite their thoroughgoing dependence and in fact sees such moments as dependent precisely because of their difference, the undialectical would have to eradicate such difference by collapsing one into the other and in this again eradicate their interdependence. In other words, the undialectical involves separation and reduction.

It should be fairly evident based on the analyses and arguments proffered thus far, the ways in which the structural operation of capitalism's social relations exhibit themselves as undialectical. However, it can do no harm to lay out the abstractive practices clearly at this juncture even if, in so doing, we risk some reiteration.

The Abstraction of Commodity Exchange

First, let us look at commodity exchange. As indicated in chapter 5, the exchange of commodities requires the determination of exchange value as opposed to use value. The use value of any commodity splits itself into highly

particularized determinations that consequently cannot serve adequately as a basis for large-scale social commodity exchange. For purposes of the ease and social extension of commodity exchange, a common substance must be abstracted from such particularity. Where we find commodity exchange operating on a large-scale social level, there also necessarily do we find the common substance that facilitates such exchange. The common substance of all commodities is labor, and the abstraction from particular laboring acts of varying qualitative and quantitative measurements to socially necessary labor time allows for a rough equivalence of commodities. The abstract determination of exchange value serves a purpose, the facilitation of exchange but also, in the sphere of exchange (the commodity market), the exchange value stands out as distinct from and separated from use value.

Thus already within commodity exchange we have separation of concretely and dialectically united moments. For example, there is a separation of that commodity as exemplifying a particular substance from that commodity as exemplifying the common substance. The substance of corn is not that of wheat nor is the substance of clothing that of paper products. But corn and wheat and clothing and paper products all share their substance by virtue of being the products of labor. Concretely, each commodity's particular substance and common substance are dialectically linked. This absolutely particular coat is clothing because of its relation to other particulars and it is clothing and coat because of the quality of the laboring activity that informed its production. Thus, it is also the product of labor like (and unlike) other products of labor and shares (and does not share) in their substance. But commodities could not share in their substance without each being what it is at each of its relational levels of particularity.

So also this particular coat that I own was the product of an absolutely specific productive activity and because of the specific character of that activity it is also an activity of coat making like (and unlike) other acts of coat making and so also is a productive laboring activity in general. Each of these analyzable relational frames is dialectically linked to the others, different yet absolutely dependent and in such dependent difference, generative of the reality that is commodity producing "labor" in our experience. Within commodity exchange, it is necessary to split these moments off from one another. In order for this coat to become an exchangeable commodity, I must focus on those aspects of the labor that created it and are common to others; I need to understand the difference between those aspects that make it an absolutely specific particular act and those that are common and need to focus solely on the latter. I need to separate the general and particular aspects out from one another and, for the purpose of the commodity exchange, I need to ignore or at very least minimize particularity in favor of commonality.⁴

So it is that the separation occurs between use value and exchange value. Use value primarily reflects the specificity of the commodity and the specific utility that commodity has for its possessor. Certainly an individual commodity or type of commodity may be said to have a general social use value but the use of an object is a form of active relationality. Even a common designation stating that, for example, this kind of commodity is one that we find to have a general social use value, is dependent on the totality of the individual acts of its use. Exchange value, on the other hand, refers in the first place away from such particular active relations of consumption (and production) toward the shared substance emerging from the productive acts, away from the particular intensive laboring activity that created *this* product and toward the general, socially average fact of that labor time as quantitatively extensive like all others.

Again, we see that the determination of socially average labor time depends absolutely on the productive acts from which its calculations emerge, but the focus, in the case of exchange value as a determination of commodities, must be on the result of such social averaging. The separation of the two designations as different from one another stands out: exchange value serves a purpose that use value cannot. Use value needs to be relegated to the background in consideration of large-scale social commodity exchange. But when we look once more to what is neglected or forgotten in such separation, we find that the necessary dialectical interplay between the moments is suppressed. In a form of social relations dominated by exchange for the purpose of the valorization of value, in which the commodity stands as the middle term between value and valorized value (M-C-M'), the commodity veritably becomes its exchange value. Within the commodity exchange, if any commodity did not possess use value in the first place, it would not be exchangeable and thus would not require any calculation of exchange value; if any commodity were not exchanged in the first place, it could not be used and a commodity must be usable to have a use value. Even if a certain commodity goes unexchanged and unused it can only be designated as not-exchanged and not-used because of the expectation and intention that it will be used (possess use value) based upon previous acts of commodity use. In other words, there is a thoroughgoing dialectical relation between the different designations of use and exchange value that risks being overlooked when the two are separated and their differences taken to imply nonrelation. Indeed, in capitalism the reduction of one to the other is required.

The Abstraction of Labor

Within the structure and practices of capitalism a further step is taken whereby labor itself becomes the subject/object of such exchange. Without explicitly discussing at this juncture the injustice involved, we can see again in

the exchange of labor for wages the same separation of dialectical moments that we witnessed in the commodity exchange, because, in fact, in its sale and purchase, labor-power is treated as and must be treated as a commodity.

The sale and purchase of labor-power requires the separation of the particular individual with his or her capabilities, speed of productivity, infirmities, talents, desires, and so on, from all persons as (potential) laborers capable of productive activity. There is thus also the separation of the quality of my particular laboring activity, its speed, its attentiveness or nonattentiveness, the quality of its handiwork, and so forth, from all laboring activities as being generally productive. For the laborer to be an item of exchange, the particularity must be separated from the universality, and the latter as different from the former achieves prominence in the activity of exchange. And so also, finally, there is separation between the use value and exchange value of labor, but this separation is based on and expresses another separation.

When I purchase (exchange for) a commodity, the use value of that commodity is, for me, quite specific. What I use it for, how I use it, how much I use it, how long it lasts me, whether it suits my needs, all of these features are quite specific and highly variable from person to person. But I am still engaged in the use of a commodity as object and the specificity and malleability of that object's use value is referent not to that object as object, but to that object as used, as in a specific relation of utility *for a subject*. The object qua object does not change its own relationality but that relationality changes only because of its engagement with this or that person. It is my purposes, my utilizations, my mediations that determine and alter the use value. The differential between the exchange value and the use value lies with me, with my relation to the object, not with the object itself apart from such use.

When, on the other hand, an exchange value is given for labor-power, in the exchange, as in any other, the specificity of its use value must be separated off and primarily disregarded. But, in this case, we are not dealing with the same sort of "thing" as we were with the commodity. In this case we have a person and just as the difference between the exchange value and the use value lay on the side of the person in commodity exchange, so also here it lies on the side of the person, except that now the user and the "object" used are both persons and, therefore, relational production of difference, production of novelty, lies with the laborer as well. Therefore, what we have in the first place is not really a commodity at all, if by commodity we mean an object of utility. So, in the case of the original act of exchange of wage for labor, the objective, physical, reproductive character of the person needs to be separated off from the subjective, conceptual, productive character. But more than this, not only are these absolutely dialectically interdependent moments of personal existence separated from each other, but additionally, the latter

characterization is denied in the exchange. This abstraction involves an ontological error. The articulation of capitalism emerging from bourgeois economics states that the use value of labor is equivalent to its exchange value; it denies that the use of labor produces anything other than the preservation of the value of the means of production (including the laborer herself). Marx's exposition on the exchange of wages for labor highlights the separation between reproduction and production and shows us how it is possible to treat a human being like a commodity for the purpose of exchange. The labor theory of value calls into question capitalism's denial of the novel productivity of the laboring activity—it states that you can separate the dialectical moments via abstraction but you cannot deny the relationality of those moments in the concrete and hence cannot in practice eradicate either one. Therefore, capitalism's teleological aim toward greater and greater surplus-value depends precisely upon what it attempts to deny. Capitalism is self-mystifying.

The separation appears as quite helpful in the case of commodity exchange. The abstraction of common from particular substance serves as a highly useful tool for the facilitation of commodity exchange. With objects that, within our experience, exhibit their ontological social organization as physical and reproductive, we have abstracted out from the dialectical unity of their physical and conceptual poles and from the dialectical unity that is their relation of utility for subjects to highlight their objective character in order to serve the purposes of our social productivity. But within the relations of capitalist wage labor we have taken that useful abstraction and applied it in practice to one another as human beings. In the wage we have "valued" labor as objective, dead, settled actuality, achieved and past as constituted by previous labor, and so have "devalued" labor as subjective, living, active actualization, achieving and present as constituting through its novel valuations. But the living human being is, like all things, the dialectical unity of both objectivity and subjectivity, physical reproduction and novel creation, past and present, and so on, and additionally, the prominent display of its ontological character is as conceptually productive of effusive novelty. Therefore, we have applied the abstraction in the way that is maximally inappropriate to and damaging of human ontological concreteness. The reduction of the dialectical moments has been accomplished in a direction more appropriate to commodities and less appropriate to human beings.

THE CRITIQUE OF ABSTRACTIONS

"Philosophy," Whitehead tells us, "is the criticism of abstractions which govern special modes of thought" (MT, 48–49; see also PR, 15). But Whitehead himself did not extend this critical role for philosophy as far as he

might have. What we mean by abstractions are those moments that can be separated off from one another, abstracted out from their necessary unity in process, abstracted out from the concrete. The concrete found by process, with which it criticizes the modern philosophical tradition from Descartes to Kant is the real unity in difference of the “moments” of appearance of actual occasions, primary among them the subject-superject.⁵ But as this dialectical unity applies to the metaphysical occasions, so also we have found, it must operate on the macroontological level. In fact, as Whitehead points out, experience at the macroontological level becomes the final judge of the adequacy of the metaphysical scheme and this is the case precisely because metaphysics has become speculative. Is it, therefore, enough for philosophy to act as the critic of *philosophical* abstractions? Do any abstractions merely govern special modes of *thought*? Given the doctrine of bipolarity, can process philosophy make any hard distinction between what is accomplished in thought and what is accomplished in practice, or must it understand human conceptualization as part and parcel of human processive being-becoming? If indeed the human being is the real unity of physicality and conceptuality, if the human being as an enduring social complex is, like the metaphysical individual, a mediating agent of processive-productive being carrying out her creativity through the appropriation-productive activity-objectification of human production in general, then is it not appropriate for process philosophy to serve as the critic of any and all forms of processive-productivity wherein abstraction takes place? And would this not be the very being of human being itself—the very form of social relatedness that is its processive being?

If the concrete is the real unity of differentiable moments, then to serve as the critic of abstractions means (1) to criticize any mode of being-producing in, of, and for the world that actively separates those moments from each other (and certainly, therefore, any mode that reduces one moment to another); and (2) to criticize any mode of emergent thought that does not focus its critique on processive-productivity itself as the necessary source of the production of abstraction. These are two sides of the same coin: the focus of the critique of abstractions, in order not to be itself *invalidly* abstract, must begin with processive-productive activity. And it may, from that starting point, serve as the critic of both the mode of processive production as it appears in general and as it appears ideologically. Only in this way does it not neglect its own degrees of abstraction. We shall see shortly why this is of such importance to critique.

So, the form of processive production that is capitalism proceeds by way of abstraction. In the case of commodity exchange, the qualitative designation of relationally specific use value is separated from the quantitative designation of socially average labor time. Likewise, in the exchange of wages for labor, the

labor must be treated as commodity for purposes of exchange and so also must be taken as disengaged, passive, objectified, product of past labor, settled value, and so forth over its consideration as engaged subject mediating its own productive becoming in the present with reference to the future.

Capitalism's *telos* is the valorization of value, the expansion of surplus value, which is accomplished through the combination of these two forms of exchange: commodity exchange and the exchange of wages for the labor-power realized in the production process. Both require the separation of dialectically linked moments by way of abstraction, both require also the consideration of the moment of objectified, settled, past, physical being as primary designation, also by way of abstraction. In other words, the abstraction is the separation twice over: first, the designation of the moments as different and then the designation of the moments as independent such that they can be set against one another—separation and reduction. The commodity is calculated as exchange value abstracted from its use value; labor is treated in practice as exchange value. Labor, however, behaves in its utilization so differently from settled value as to make the exchange absolutely invalid.

What occurs in the form of processive productivity that is capitalism is the separation of concretely dialectical moments and their reduction to one of the moments, and this occurs not merely in thought but in practice, in the unity of the physicoconceptual human processive-productive activity of being-becoming.

These *objective* dependency relations also appear, in antithesis to those of *personal* dependence (the objective dependency relation is nothing more than social relations which have become independent and now enter into opposition to the seemingly independent individuals; i.e. the reciprocal relations of production separated from and autonomous of individuals) in such a way that individuals are now ruled by *abstractions*, whereas earlier they depended upon one another. The abstraction, or idea, however, is nothing more than the theoretical expression of those material relations which are their lord and master. (G, 164)

But what does it mean to be “ruled by abstractions”?

MISPLACED CONCRETENESS

Whitehead describes the fallacy of misplaced concreteness thus:

This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. There are aspects of actualities which are simply ignored so long as we restrict thought to these categories. Thus the suc-

cess of a philosophy is to be measured by its comparative avoidance of this fallacy, when thought is restricted within its categories. (PR, 7–8)

Misplaced concreteness is the “accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete” (SMW, 51).

The designation of the human person as an accomplished, settled, actual product of a productive-processive act past is not entirely incorrect but it is grossly incomplete. Certain essential aspects of that actuality of human being are simply ignored in the abstract designation. If I mistake this designation for the whole story of the human person, then I have committed the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. To commit the fallacy is to allow oneself to be ruled by abstractions and to allow oneself to be ruled by abstractions is to commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Therefore capitalism, which sustains its drive toward valorization by way of an internal logic that dictates its absolute dependence on taking physical reiteration as the whole story of the human being, is an active, lived form of this fallacy. Capitalism is lived misplaced concreteness, except that in this case, mistaking the abstract for the concrete is no accidental error and the neglect of awareness of the degree of its abstraction is no mere oversight. The logic of the valorization of value absolutely requires it.

The separation as abstraction, in the case of labor, is lived misplaced concreteness. It is “neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when [I am] considered merely in so far as [I] exemplify certain categories of thought” (PR, 7–8). This neglect is the neglect of the concrete. It is, therefore, the neglect of myself as a dialectical unity that is a processive being and becoming of process. Misplacing abstraction for my own concreteness in the exchange of my labor is none other than real alienation.

In capitalist production, objectification takes the form of alienation. Alienation designates this separation or externality between living labor, which appears as pure subjectivity or as poverty, and capital, which appears as ownership of objective wealth or as property; here capital is “master over living labor capacity.”⁶

Labor’s poverty is capital’s property. Labor’s lived impoverishment from its concrete being is the increase of abstract objective property. The concrete movement of process as the metabolic relational creativity of the universe in which each individual mediates objectivity in his or her unique manner, becomes private property: poverty and property, poverty as property.

Such misplaced concreteness occurs on two levels. There is the commodity exchange that requires treating commodities as mere objects embodying past labor. Because all ontological being is both physical and conceptual, this is an abstraction even on the level of “things.” Granted, it is not as misplaced

an abstraction as it is for the human being, but is misplaced concreteness nonetheless. The natural world around us becomes in capitalism populated by mere objects, mere stand-ins for value, mere means to capitalism's valorization. The particularity of each natural object is misplaced and displaced by its general character as exchangeable. This unique tree right here, the last of its kind in this area of this socially relational environment that we call a rain forest, is, for capitalism, just another potential log or chair or ream of paper, just another exchangeable commodity. It is separated off from its dependent relational being. This particular coal, having taken thousands of years for the relational environment of these Appalachian Mountains to form, is just another lode of fossil fuel to be sold. It is separated off from its dependent processive becoming.

Additionally, things are separated off not only from their natural and historical relatedness but also from their concrete relations to individual persons or groups. In the commodification of natural objects, in the fetishization of the commodity form, we forget our unique mediative appropriation of these objects. We forget personal and cultural values placed upon land; we forget the religious significance of natural objects; we devalue beauty for its own sake. We all too often cease to see any other possibility for a natural object than its service as a means of production.

And so capitalism, by taking its abstractions to be the whole story, disregards that dialectical relationality of each to its other that we call the natural ecosystem, rapes and devastates the natural world, uses nature as its storehouse and dumping ground, foreshortens our vision of the wealth of possible relations offered to us by nature and culture. By consciously misplacing the abstract for the concrete, it does not look to the necessary connectedness of all, but to the independence of each as a value: the common capitalist substance of all natural objects is their disconnection and their disconnection is the mistaken abstraction from their necessary concrete relatedness. Environmental destruction is no accident resulting from inattentiveness to the human impact on the natural world, but is the mode of relatedness to the natural world beginning with the fetishization of the commodity as exchange value and proceeding according to capitalism's logic directly through every additional dollar of surplus value.

Likewise, for labor subjected to the commodification of exchanging for a wage, the absolutely unique self- and world-creating individual is displaced by a calculation of worth according to the "cost" of reproduction. In this, not only is that individual's processive concreteness, as always only this particular and unique act of being-becoming, abstracted from, not only is the temporal location of that particular productive laboring activity as present abstracted

from in its measurement by the past labor that provided the commodities for daily reproduction, but also, even his or her general ontological character as human individual, as that kind of enduring society that produces novelty in great excess over and above merely dominant repetition, is abstracted from to render equivalence to the thing, the commodities that make up labor's reproduced value, its valuation as a commodity. The individual is abstracted from both as particularity and as generality, abstracted at least twice over.⁷ Thus is labor alienated through a lived misplaced concreteness. And thus we feel perfectly comfortable and justified in arguing regarding the nature and implementation of social welfare policies based on cost-benefit analyses. We who are living, producing, reproducing, laboring within capitalism have misplaced our own concreteness and socially produce ourselves as so misplaced.

So, within capitalism's form of social relatedness, there is a real reduction of every processive being to abstraction. Each human being, concretely productive of effusive novelty through heightened conceptual activity, is reduced through wages and labor to the reproductive value of a thing; the novelty of adaptability belonging to animals is reduced to their value in work as machines or in our homes as pets or on our dinner tables as commodities; the interdependence of the organic production of nature is simply harvested as exchange value as is the inorganic. The concrete differentiations of ontological being are reduced to their common substance: individuals are abstracted as types, types are abstracted as common values and finally, of course, the commonality of values receives its ultimate abstract expression in the form of money. Money, finally, stands in as the absolutely abstract symbol of the abstraction of all being to the common substance of socially average labor time. "*Money . . . as the individual of general wealth, as something emerging from circulation and representing a general quality, as a merely social result, does not presuppose an individual relation to its owner; possession of it is not the development of any particular essential aspect of his individuality; but rather possession of what lacks individuality*" (G, 222). As we move from the individuals (natural objects or animals or persons) to use values to exchange values to universal exchange value, we are moving increasingly away from the concrete.⁸ Money is the abstraction of an abstraction of an abstraction. Where the valorization of value is the motivation of a form of social relations and value's most mobile expression is also its most abstract, the form of being-becoming is a continual process of pulling away from the concreteness of the dialectical individuals. Because what makes value mobile is its abstraction and capitalism is value in process, therefore, the repeated process of replacing the concrete with the abstract is lived misplaced concreteness.⁹

ANTIPROCESS, ANTIPRAXIS, ANTIHUMANISM

On the processive view this is an absolute nightmare. This form of self- and world-production really alters the face of reality because all processive-productive activity receives its ultimate expression as objectification and so the very nature of relational being itself is altered. As we alienate ourselves from ourselves, we re-create ourselves as commodified. As we “value” the natural world by exchange, we create it as commodified.¹⁰ And so we live as dominated by abstractions and we live as misplacing the concreteness of all processive being. But to abstract is to separate-off from necessary particularity as it is determined by relatedness and so we are also reproducing the world as antirelational.

It is not the *unity* of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process, but rather the *separation* between these inorganic conditions of human existence and this active existence, a separation which is completely posited only in the relation of wage labour to capital. (G, 489)

The valorization of abstractions, the valorization of separation, the valorization of nonrelationality, is the form of being that is produced under capitalist social relations because on the processive view productive activity is the valuation of the elements of the appropriated objective world that is self-creation as a relational complex and capitalism “values” such elements as abstract. But because processive being-becoming is necessarily relational, capitalism is a production of the world as valorized nonbeing.¹¹ A processive universe absolutely requires the dialectical relation of permanence and change, reproduction and novel production, physical reiteration and conceptual creation. Within capitalism’s form of social relations there is a reduction of each and every objective appropriated element to value, to socially average labor, to its money form. Each particular human being is misplaced with its abstractions as merely reproduced and the concrete relationality of nature is misplaced with its abstraction as settled value. Thus, within capitalism, social relatedness involves a real loss of change, novel production, and conceptual creation. This social relation of capitalism is a real reduction of the processive universe to socially average labor time, a real reduction to abstract value, a real reduction of novelty to physical reproduction, and thus, a reduction of change to permanence and conceptuality to physicality. If the hallmark of human being is conceptually enhanced production of effusive novelty, then this is the real dehumanization of the processive universe and a real stagna-

tion of the creative movement of process; and thus it is no exaggeration to say that capitalism is an “economy of death.”

The processive universe lives and moves and has its being in the real dialectical interplay between analyzable opposites. Abstracting the moments from one another to aid in or enhance one aspect of our relational being is the engagement of our powerful and malleable conceptual ability. We utilize the conceptual abstraction to create our relational being anew. As Whitehead says in “Mathematics and the Good,”

Our exact conceptual experience is a mode of emphasis. It vivifies the ideals which invigorate the real happenings. It adds the perception of worth and beauty to the mere transition of sense-experience. . . .

We cannot understand the flux which constitutes our human experience unless we realize that it is raised above the futility of infinitude by various successive types of modes of emphasis which generate the active energy of a finite assemblage.¹²

And thus our ability to abstract is a way in which our appropriated world is productively “valued.” But when we misplace those abstractions for the concrete as our form of social relations, we engage in a destructive form of self- and world-creation. We live as separate what cannot be lived as separated, what cannot *be* as separated, and thus disintegrate the relational solidarity of all being. Likewise, by reifying the abstraction, we obliterate the absolutely particular individual as the *only* vehicle by which such relationality is achieved.

In the concrete, there is no process “in general.” In the concrete, each actual entity right here, right now is the locus of the relationality of all being. Without this absolutely unique intensive gathering of all relational being to this point, in this actualization, there is no concrete process. Without this absolutely unique e-valuation, without this particular conspiracy of objective datum, there is no concrete process. There is no concrete processive value “in general,” just as there is no individual “in general.” There can only be processively the dialectical dependence of the general on the particular and vice versa. In capitalism, every aspect of reality becomes a form of appearance of socially average labor time. Capitalism separates and reduces. All is measured by the past. All value is determined by this social form. The unique processive “value” which is just the emergence of *this here*, this absolute unique *presence* that is coming to present itself as this absolutely irreproducible emergent “value” right here and right now, the being of this singular achievement as the resultant realization of the gift of potentiality of prior achievements, all this is leveled down in the abstraction. No actual entity, then no reason. Misplacing the abstract for the concrete is death to process.

If capitalism is lived misplaced concreteness, then capitalism is an economy of death. It is lived irrationally.

This is not mere theoretical reflection. Real commodification by way of such misplaced concreteness produces a ripple effect of lost novelty throughout the processive universe or, rather, the novel is always the novel commodified. Thus we enjoy the option of twenty new brands of detergent while Marcuse decries the one-dimensionality of thought. We relish the ability to choose between thirty new fragrances for our brand of deodorant while critical theorists mourn the loss of self, loss of faith, or loss of culture. We eagerly await the new clothing styles and fashions to hit the runways each spring while Foucault traces the reductionistic quantification of human beings by disciplinary practices.¹³ We snatch up the newest gas guzzling sport utility vehicles while plant and animal species teeter on the edge of and finally fall into extinction.

Loss of relationality via such misplaced concreteness is the real estrangement of beings from one another. Not only have we quite obviously lost our sense of connectedness with and coextensiveness with nature (“for man is a part of nature” [EPM, 76]), as witnessed in the disregard with which we treat the very environment that sustains us, but additionally, we have lost the sense of our dependent relations on one another to the extent that in the eyes of capitalism each human life is always expendable for the sake of profit. We hear it again and again—no one in the capitalist workplace is irreplaceable. Here concrete creativity serves abstract value, specific productivity serves average labor time, the property of capital is the poverty of life. The populace is divided against itself as social prejudices are manipulated to encourage scapegoating, especially of the poor—those individuals who are taken to be lesser persons because they literally possess lesser “value.”¹⁴ In a world of mechanical and technological marvels, human lives are lost to workplace accidents. In a world of medical advance, malnutrition and starvation and preventable diseases claim the lives of millions. The internationalization of capitalism leaves bodies in its wake. Covert and overt military operations clear the way and “settle regions” for U.S. incursion into cheap labor markets under the guise of making the world safe for democracy.¹⁵ The lives and livelihoods of indigenous peoples are sacrificed to the quest for further profits. Downsized First World laborers are encouraged to vilify Third World laborers who have “taken their jobs” when, in reality, those jobs have merely been moved to eke out more profit.¹⁶ Meanwhile the rugged, autonomous individual is touted as representative of the human ideal. It is “each person for his-or-herself,” a “dog-eat-dog world.” We are encouraged to see the mission of life as a struggle, a competition to get ahead. To “make it” requires that we

climb over and on the heads of others to the top. Cooperation, kindness, generosity, or modesty are seen as weaknesses in the workplace. But the clearest sign of the destruction of our relational being is the utter disregard for life that appears to be a necessary feature of our capitalist present.

[T]he dirty truth is that there exists a startling amount of hardship, abuse, affliction, illness, violence, and pathology in this country. Figures reveal a casualty list that runs into many millions. Consider the following estimates. In any one year,

- 900,000 children, some as young as seven years old, are engaged in child labor in the United States.
- 5,000,000 workers are injured on the job.
- 14,000 workers are killed on the job.
- 7,000,000 to 12,000,000 people are unemployed.
- 3,000,000 additional workers are unemployed but uncounted because their unemployment benefits have run out.
- 12,000,000 of those at poverty's rock bottom suffer from chronic hunger and malnutrition.¹⁷

Our “economy” is our system of metabolic exchange, of mediation with one another and with the natural world. Why, we are led to ask, must so many lives be ruined or destroyed in the process? And this is only national, within our own very privileged corner of the First World. The international picture is much bleaker.

For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the “end of ideologies” and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on earth.¹⁸

When did we begin to believe that the loss of human life was the “cost of doing business”? And when did we forget that the reason for doing business in the first place was to promote human life?

The notion of a mere fact is the triumph of the abstractive intellect . . . there is no such fact. Connectedness is the essence of all things of all types. It is of the essence of types, that they be connected. Abstraction

from connectedness involves the omission of an essential factor in the fact considered. (MT, 9)

If indeed the world is processive and each occasion of experience is relationally linked to all others, then the loss of even the most minute occasion of being will reverberate throughout the whole of the potential universe to come. Capitalism as a practice genuinely alters the face of reality. It trades the living for the dead. It trades novelty for stagnation. It trades individual expression for average determination. It trades intensive valuation for extensive value.

It can only accomplish these trades because it is lived misplaced concreteness. It can only alter the face of processive reality in these ways because misplacing concreteness is the separation of moments of relational being and such separation is the destruction of being that is necessarily metaphysically relational. It can only trade off the living creativity of that intensive valuation of individual being for the dead, settled, average determinations of extensive value by gnawing away at the life of the former. The lost life of the former is real commodification, real reification of value: poverty become property.

Capitalism is a disaster for processive reality expressed adequately, I believe, in Whitehead's description of evil as

exhibited in physical suffering, mental suffering, and loss of the higher experience in favour of the lower experience.

Evil, triumphant in its enjoyment, is so far good in itself; but beyond itself it is evil in its character of a destructive agent among things greater than itself. In the summation of the more complete fact it has secured a descent towards nothingness, in contrast to the creativeness of what can without qualification be termed good. Evil is positive and destructive; what is good is positive and creative. (RM, 95–96)¹⁹

Part of the positive aspect of capitalism is the way in which it has accelerated the development of the forces of production and the variety of products available. Critics of Marx praise the tremendous productivity of the capitalist system and emphasize the ease and comfort that it has provided for its citizens. No other economic system, we are told, can possibly provide so much for so many. There are several points to be made in this regard.

First, the process reading sees quite clearly that the increase in productivity is strictly an increase in the production of commodities and that the crucial difference between the ontological status of commodities as opposed to human beings makes such an upsurge in productivity philosophically problematic. In fact, as I have been pointing out all along, the massive production of commodities is accomplished only at the cost of human creativity.

Second, the tremendous development of the forces of production in capitalism is not, unfortunately, accompanied by a correlative increase in leisure time. In fact, as we have painfully witnessed in the United States in recent years, downsizing has caused more laborers to be working longer hours (sometimes at multiple jobs) for less pay. If the reason to increase productivity is to provide, with greater ease for all, the necessary conditions for the good life, then the accomplishments of capitalism in this regard should have greatly decreased our socially necessary labor and hence the length of the workday for all. We should be, according to capitalism's own claims, producing the social wealth to allow (1) higher overall wages and (2) greater free time for every citizen. Such is, simply, not the case. The American dream is just that.

Where great profits are realized those who benefit are not the laborers. Leisure time and profits fall almost entirely into the hands of the upper class. Trickle-down economics really means that more of us are trickling to the bottom. "The combined wealth of the top 1 percent of American families is nearly the same as that of the entire bottom 95 percent."²⁰ "Wealth is being redistributed *upwards*. Between 1977 and 1989, the top 1 percent of American families more than doubled their after-tax incomes, adjusting for inflation, while the bottom 60 percent of families lost income."²¹ A 2001 article in *Business Week* boasts, "Nobody beats the U.S. when it comes to the difference in pay between CEOs and the average worker. On average, CEOs at 365 of the largest publicly traded U.S. companies earned \$13.1 million last year, or 531 times what the typical hourly employee took home."²² The figures could go on and on. The point is that if capitalism is producing great riches, they are falling into the hands of the few on an ever-increasing scale and, therefore, cannot be said to constitute real wealth for anyone.

But even what is produced is at issue here. All the money in the world does me no good if I cannot use it. And the only way to have real human use of anything is to have it freely. If I do not own my time, I do not own myself. If I do not own myself as a self-creative temporally extended being, then I do not produce freely. If I do not produce freely, then I have no human wealth. Real wealth is human creativity as objectified in the world, but human creativity, in order to be truly human, must be free—it must be mine because only I can create myself.

Capitalism does increase the forces of production and in so doing may have made life somewhat or perhaps even a great deal easier for some of us, but this in no way alters the fact of the injustice of its practices. Where human creative activity is directed by another, a human life is robbed. The real tragedy of capitalism is that it presents the possibility of its own overcoming. Through its level of productivity we see the possibility of a tremendous

increase in free time, but specifically capitalist productivity allows little time that is free. What, I expect, liberal apologists see and praise in capitalism is not the actualities of its present operation but the possibilities that it presents for a quite different future, one that has been promised but can never, within the operation of that system, be delivered.

*DISJECTA MEMBRA*²³

And so, capitalism separates and reduces. It is a practice, a mode of processive being/becoming, a mode of social relations carrying out its internal logic, its “reason,” by way of active alienation through misplaced concreteness. But the human being is still nonetheless dipolar—a unity of physical and conceptual poles. Therefore, if capitalism is an economy of death, it cannot be just death of our physical being and the physical being of the natural world. It must also, in a very real sense, re-produce and manifest misplaced concreteness in our conceptual being.

We should not, therefore, be surprised that much of the recent history of philosophical thought has manifest itself one-sidedly. Analytic thought has all too often revealed itself as a devaluation of the vagueness of the concrete in a dispossession of all experience that is not “clear and distinct.”

The primary method of mathematics is deduction; the primary method of philosophy is descriptive generalization. Under the influence of mathematics, deduction has been foisted onto philosophy as its standard method, instead of taking its true place as an essential auxiliary mode of verification whereby to test the scope of generalities. (PR, 10)

Within logical positivism the abstract receives its ultimate conceptual reification. The stagnant is raised above the moving, the simply located “valued” above the multiply located, the independent elevated over the dependent, the isolated over the relational, fact over value.²⁴ The logical subject is a simple, abstract, unchanging, atomistic individual ($A = A$); truth determinations do not belong to the subject as complex, concrete, changing, or fully relational. But in a processive universe temporal continuity requires real multiple location, this distinguishable individual can only be located by its relations to all others around it. Thus the “fact” of this individual is indeed its relational valuation of/for/to all other beings. (A , as this concrete processive subject is always already also A as this concrete superject. Therefore, in the concrete, A is both here and there: $(A = A) \ \& \ [A \neq A]$.) And so purely analytic designations of truth are functional as powerful tools of our conceptual valuation of experience, but in capitalism as a form of processive being-

becoming in which misplaced concreteness dominates the material mode of production, this conceptual tool of abstraction has itself been reified and misplaced for the concreteness of relational and dialectical being.²⁵

Likewise, within the debate between modernism and postmodernism the two positions all too often present themselves (and one another) in their crudest articulations as merely opposite sides of the same coin. The response to one-sided dominating discourses of unification that merely mask intentions of power is an equally one-sided cry for “différance.” Each position reduces the other and simultaneously reduces itself in its form of argument as “against” the already reduced other. Each becomes as one-sided as the other. But the greatest tragedy for much postmodern discourse is that, in the attempt to liberate the unique individual from hegemonic domination by univocal being, it falls into an equally one-sided position and in that eradicates the effectiveness of its social-political sympathies. Too often, with the best of intentions, the liberation of each and every absolutely unique and different individual to his or her own self-development has led to a denial of real relationality. The result is different individuals (or cultures, or races, or genders) atomized, separated, and isolated, an ideological dream-come-true for capitalism and a real conceptual reflection of capitalist social relations. Misplaced concreteness is not limited to unity or difference: reduction of individuals to generality is misplaced concreteness but then so is reduction of relationality to particularity. On the processive view, on a fully dialectical view, the individual is different and unique only as a very specific relation to all others. Each individual is an achievement different from all others but is such only because of her real internal relations to all others: in fact, that achieved difference is his or her relationality. The individual is unique as just this relational unification of the datum which has been. Therefore, the individual is determined and self-determined, dependent and independent, the same and different, and so on. Novel self-creation as the appearance of difference is only possible because there is an inheritance causally available for the enactment of the new valuation. By a strange twist, much of postmodern thought, in its valid attempt to escape modern universalization, lands itself in an isolationism as abstract as that of analytic thought. It has, not surprisingly, “forgotten” relationality.²⁶

Even critical theory has found itself trapped on occasion in the web of its capitalistic expressions. While diagnosing the one-sidedness of those very relations, it all too often finds itself expressing the relations as inescapable—as closed into that very one-sidedness. In other words, it falls into the trap of inconsistency because it fails to account for its own position or at very least for the position that it calls for ideally. Critical theory neglects to see that the

reality underlying the possibility of creating such relations as one-sided must necessarily be dialectical and that one-sidedness can only be criticizable if we are able to think dialectically.

But the conceptualization of misplaced concreteness, or the misplaced concreteness of conceptualization, is evident not merely in philosophical discourse but in the social-political discourse as well. The separation and reduction of abstract moments appears nowhere so clearly as in the discussion and debate regarding the intersection, interaction, and balance between society and the individual. This debate takes many forms from the call for less government intervention to the insistence upon socially regulated equality of educational opportunities, from the right to privacy to the right to equal treatment under the law. But we see in these cases the same misplaced concreteness that we saw in the philosophical debates between universality and particularity: each position one-sidedly expressing itself in antithesis to the other. Either the individual is self-determined or the society intervenes. Again, the mistake lies in the reification of the abstract moments, and again it is not surprising that political debate takes these one-sided forms. Hegel saw this point quite clearly. Real freedom is not freedom from society but the freedom provided for one another by and through our social being. The misfortune is that often we operate within such one-sided notions to such an extent that we no longer truly know whereof we speak. Thus, well-intentioned liberal notions of freedom or equality, individuality, or community remain abstract and often mutually exclusive because their one-sided form is taken to be their only form. But we have instead in these forms only abstract thought and abstract talk about abstract freedom and abstract equality, abstract individuality and abstract community. Living misplaced concreteness means objectifying misplaced concreteness in and as every aspect of our being.²⁷

But if, as I have maintained all along, reality itself is dialectical and progressive, then the abstractions that are the moments separated from one another and reduced to one another emerge from such a dialectical reality and can only emerge from that reality. Therefore, if they undermine that reality, as I have maintained the social relations of capitalism do, then they undermine their own source. But this is indeed a dangerous race because the reality undermined is ourselves. We are involved in a self-destructive and world-destructive form of process and because the world is internally related to us as always relational social beings, these are, of course, the same thing. An organism that deteriorates its own environment commits suicide (see SMW, 109–110). By the time capitalism has eradicated the grounds of its own possibility, it will have eradicated us. We will have eradicated ourselves. Evil may indeed be unstable but

[t]his instability of evil does not necessarily lead to progress. On the contrary, the evil in itself leads to the world losing forms of attainment in which that evil manifests itself. Either the species ceases to exist, or it sinks back into a stage in which it ranks below the possibility of that form of evil. (RM, 96)

Capitalism could fade out in the face of a novel practice and vision, or we could fade out in the face of capitalism. I assume that the latter is an unacceptable option for most of us, therefore, we need to see how the former is indeed a possibility. We turn to the open doors.

CHAPTER 9

SOLIDARITY

Finally, there is deity, which is that factor in the universe whereby there is importance, value, and ideal beyond the actual. . . . We owe to the sense of deity the obviousness of the many actualities of the world, and the obviousness of the unity of the world for the preservation of values realized and for the transition to ideals beyond realized fact.

—Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*

The preceding chapters have painted a bleak picture of the contemporary reality that is the productive process of capitalism.¹ The metaphysical and ontological structure provided by process philosophy as the philosophy of internal relations most appropriate to an articulation of Marx's analysis renders the labor theory of value as a statement regarding the usurpation, exploitation, and misdirection of the most essential feature of human processive production: the human self-determined creation of novelty. We see therein that capitalism, as the valorization of value, depends absolutely on the creativity of the human being as productive of novelty above and beyond mere self-reproduction, but that by transferring the creative production of labor to commodity value, it reduces creative labor to mere reproduction. Thus, within the processive productive activity of capitalism, the human being is alienated from her essential nature and activity. Labor is merely reproduced, like a thing, valued only by the direct physical transmission of inherited past. The forward thrust of time present as infused with time future is minimized as the creative activity of present flows into the already constituted commodity value past. Thus capitalism itself appears as a form of lived misplaced concreteness in which human beings are literally ruled by abstractions, particularly the abstraction of value. As we labor within capitalism, we allow our very being/becoming to be dominated by the reitera-

tive dative inheritance, we allow ourselves to be constituted by past value and thereby misplace our concrete processive activity in abstract commodity value. In this, we have alienated not merely our own being but the creative unfolding of the processive universe itself. Capitalism's productive process is processive production increasingly commodified, individuality increasingly generalized, intensity increasingly reduced to repetition, creativity increasingly stifled, the concrete increasingly "valued" merely by and as abstract value. Capitalism is a process whereby we live (survive) by misplacing abstract commodity value for the achievements of "value" of the creative individuals. As such, capitalism is essentially antithetical to process itself. By "devaluing" the human creativity in the present, by "valuing" human life according to the commodity value of its labor power, its value as product of past labor, its money value, capitalism stagnates process, turning the adventures of novel becoming into the anaesthesia of repetition.²

Where the "value" of processive creativity is actively displaced into the physically reiterative value of the commodity, where the present act of creativity is "valued" merely by how it can increase commodity value (and increase itself as commodity value), there external relations alone achieve an affirmation of status. Where the unique self-relating self-constituting of each occasion of experience as just this achieved and achieving valuation is misplaced in abstract value, there internal relations are devalued. The necessary internal bonds that are the very fabric of processive reality are "forgotten."³ Each individual occasion is seen not as absolutely dependent upon and constituted by its relations to all other occasions, but as autonomous and independent: a value achieved, stagnant, simply located. Within capitalism, any moment of any labor, any commodity is, as a value, just like any other: just another dollar amount waiting to be realized. Each concrete occasion, as a relational achievement, is recognized only through the lens of its abstraction as a mere individual alongside others—none is irreplaceable and each concrete occasion is mediated and brought into relation only when it functions as abstraction. Within capitalism, valorization is only possible when concrete relations are abstracted from. In fact, because the capital-relation is only possible when the relata are so abstracted, it becomes quite easy and natural, within this form of social relations, to hold out individualism, autonomy, independence, and competition as ideals. Strictly speaking, within capitalism, these ideals may be the only lures to any novelty at all; they certainly appear to be the primary lures. Where the abstraction of our lived experience makes creative novelty as an achievement of self-impossible, where the creativity of human life is purchased, redirected, and ossified in commodity value, there creative novelty as a quantitative achievement of status through increased "possession" of property values may be the only goad to advancement. This is

a paltry substitute indeed for the creativity of the self-determined individual-in-relation. And, as we have seen, it is one which operates at cross purposes because absolutely independent achievement is, in a processive universe, a contradiction in terms. This is the irony of poverty as property.

We do not seem to be occupying a place of great comfort regarding the “progress” of humanity at present. Our abstractions appear to be in the process of burying us.

[I]n the nineteenth century, when society was undergoing transformation into the manufacturing system, the bad effects of these doctrines [substantial independence and mechanism] have been very fatal. The doctrine of minds, as independent substances, leads directly not merely to private worlds of experience, but also to private worlds of morals. The moral intuitions can be held to apply only to the strictly private world of psychological experience. Accordingly, self-respect, and the making the most of your own individual opportunities, together constituted the efficient morality of the leaders among the industrialists of that period. The Western world is now suffering from the limited moral outlook of the three previous generations (SMW, 195–196).

In regard to the aesthetic needs of civilised society the reactions of science have so far been unfortunate. Its materialist basis has directed attention to *things* as opposed to *values*. The antithesis is a false one, if taken in a concrete sense. But it is valid at the abstract level of ordinary thought. This misplaced emphasis coalesced with the abstractions of political economy, which are in fact the abstractions in terms of which commercial affairs are carried on. Thus all thought concerned with social organisation expressed itself in terms of material things and of capital. Ultimate values were excluded. (SMW, 202–203)⁴

It might be all too tempting at this point to give in to a form of despair and contradiction that has plagued so much recent critical and radical thought. The difficulty is this: if we are actually involved in a form of life, a social practice that recreates ourselves and our world as primarily commodified, drastically reduces our creative abilities, occupies and preoccupies the time in which we could have the leisure to reflect, turns that present creative temporality into stagnant reiterative value, and so forth, then (1) How is it possible to think the critique that we are presently articulating? and (2) What will be the mechanism whereby this self-generating spiral toward alienated, abstract being is reversed? Can we be the authors of our downfall and salvation simultaneously? Or have we, in thinking the critique of capitalism, undermined that critique itself?

Two related tasks must be accomplished by any critical project that desires and deserves serious consideration. First, it must account for the possibility of its own standpoint in the situation of which it provides a critique

(i.e., there can be no “view from nowhere”). And second, it can only accomplish this first task by way of making the emergence of the critique internal to the situation being critiqued. In other words, in our case, the increasingly prevalent lived abstractions of capitalism must be providing the envisionment beyond capitalism whereby its critique is made possible.

The social practices by which the concreteness of creative human processive production is misplaced by the abstractions of the capitalistic productive process are possible precisely because human persons are creative in a way that goes beyond the primarily reiterative social processive being of things. This creativity is the source, the only source, of the surplus value with which such things become endowed in capitalism. But this creativity itself is made possible because of the unique role that specifically human consciousness plays in the self-creative activity that is the processive being of the *human* being. The degree of malleability, and hence the degree to which novelty within processive production is possible, depends on the degree to which the mental pole dominates the occasions within a given society and which societies are regnant within the enduring society. For that enduring society called the human being, the domination by consciousness and the specific functions that human consciousness performs, allows for maximal adaptability through the creative production of novelty. But the role of consciousness is to go beyond the mere physical reiteration of inherited data. Its role is to entertain the elements of that data in novel combinations, to detach the formal elements such that they can be entertained in new aesthetic contrastive combinations. In other words, human consciousness abstracts. But isn't abstraction precisely the function that we have been criticizing within capitalism? Wasn't it the practices of abstracting from concrete use-values to general exchange-values for the sake of commodity exchange, and the application of this original abstraction to the human being from whose concrete creative essence was further abstracted his or her mere reproduction, which began the spiral of commodification? Certainly this is what I have maintained in the previous chapters, but a clarification is in order.

The critique of misplaced concreteness, whether in thought or in practice, is the critique of “mistaking the abstract for the concrete” (SMW, 51). In other words, it is the critique of a certain functional use of or role played by abstraction and it designates this use to be both misleading and destructive. But the misuse of the abstractive tool does not necessitate its elimination except as regards that particular use. After all, the abstractive function is itself the source of novelty. It is no more than an “omission of part of the truth” (MT, 138) and we engage in such omission all the time. In fact, processive valuation requires such selective omission and human perception absolutely

depends on it. Therefore, when abstraction is employed, there is no reason why it must, in and of itself, misplace itself for concreteness. It is an abstraction from concreteness, to be sure, but not necessarily a mistaken designation of the nature of the concrete. Therefore, as unfortunate as misplacing concreteness can be in thought, as devastating and destructive as it is in capitalistic practice, so also, abstraction can serve more fortunate and constructive purposes.

Thus a fortunate use of abstractions is of the essence of upward evolution. But there is no necessity of such good use. . . .

It is interesting to note that in the entertainment of abstractions there is always present a preservative instinct aiming at the renewal of connection, which is the reverse of abstraction. This reverse process, partly instinctive and partly conscious, is wisdom of that higher life made possible by abstraction. (MT, 123–124)

In other words, abstraction itself can uncover the necessity of relationality—they are dialectically linked. It will be the purpose of this final chapter to seek out this “fortunate use of abstractions” as the critical tool and as the constructive tool. We need to find our way to the abstractions that seem to goad us to realizations and self-discovery and the desire for higher experience. We need to discover the abstractions that lure us to the intensity of experience that will constitute our upward evolution. We need to uncover “[t]he factor in human life provocative of a noble discontent [which] is the gradual emergence into prominence of a sense of criticism, founded upon appreciations of beauty, and of intellectual distinction, and of duty” (AI, 11).

ETERNAL OBJECTS

In order to understand how the abstractive ability functions in human being/becoming, we need first to gain a clearer picture of the conceptual operations specific to human consciousness. However, as has already been discussed in chapter 4, human consciousness is the highly complex functioning of embedded nexūs. In other words, by the time we reach the macrocosmic scale wherein our discussion can focus on the phenomena of human consciousness, we are already operating at a level of extreme social complexity. Once again, in order to discern in what ways a processive philosophy can inform us regarding the operations of such complex conceptual activity, it is necessary to begin at the metaphysical level: to construct the social macroontological from the atomistic-relational metaphysics. We need to briefly review, therefore, what has already been discussed regarding the ontological intersection of these two levels.

I have already had the opportunity to sketch out Whitehead's scheme of the phases of concrescence wherein a distinction is made between the primary phase of physical inheritance and the secondary and subsequent phases of conceptual valuation to show how domination in any given entity or society of entities by the physical or conceptual poles will alter the functional ontological designation of that entity or society or nexus. A complex, enduring society whose regnant nexus is dominated by high level conceptual activity is productive of greater novelty than one dominated by physical inheritance. Living societies are marked by the originality of their responses to environmental alterations. Human beings, of course, display the predominance of extremely complex mentality that allows for maximal novelty of creativity amidst the levels of processive ontological beings.

Thus, it is the dialectical bipolarity of the actual entity on the metaphysical level that allows us to functionally distinguish physical activity from conceptual activity. Each occasion of concrescence has a primary phase consisting of physical feeling which is conformal or causal and embodies "the reproductive character of nature" (PR, 238), and secondary phases of conceptual valuation (see, PR, 236–268). These phases and their functions are absolutely concomitant in the concrescence: there can be no conceptual (subjective) valuation without a real causal (objective) ingression of the actual world, but likewise a physical feeling without conceptual valuation would grind processive creativity into dumb repetition.⁵ However, while both poles, as operative in their respective phases of concrescence, are always present in every occasion of experience, the schema still allows for the emphasis or domination of one or the other of the poles and for increasing levels of complex operation as we build up from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic—from the processive atoms-in-relation to societies of such atoms.

From this processive schema, several features emerge that are of particular importance to our discussion of human consciousness and to our discovery of fortunate abstractions. If the physical feelings of the primary phase are reproductive and conformal, if "[i]n the conformal feelings, the *how* of feeling reproduces what is felt" (PR, 164), then, even though the novel actual entity is the effect, it is (at this phase) novel in terms of being the newly emergent actuality *reproducing* the data of its actual world under *its* spatiotemporal perspective. In the phase of conformal feeling alone there is only perspectival novelty but not yet the novelty of decisive valuation. Such novelty emerges only by way of the phases of conceptual valuation.⁶

The difference between the conformal and conceptual feelings has to do with the "diverse modes of ingression of the eternal objects involved" (PR, 163).

A simple physical feeling enjoys a characteristic which has been variously described as 're-enaction,' 'reproduction,' and 'conformation.' This characteristic can be more accurately explained in terms of the eternal objects involved. There are eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of the objective datum which is the 'cause,' and eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of the subjective form belonging to the 'effect.' When there is re-enaction there is one eternal object with two-way functioning, namely, as partial determinant of the objective datum, and as partial determinant of the subjective form. In this two-way rôle, the eternal object is functioning relationally between the initial data on the one hand and the consescent subject on the other. (PR, 238)

On the other hand, "[a] conceptual feeling is feeling an eternal object in the primary metaphysical character of being an 'object,' that is to say, feeling its *capacity* for being a realized determinant of process" (PR, 239). "The subjective form of a conceptual feeling has the character of a 'valuation'" (PR, 240).

Therefore, the conformal feelings are those by which there is a reproduction of the past occasion as superject in the present occasion as subject. Such conformal, physical feelings constitute the element of the experience whereby there is dative continuity, whereby there is real transmission of feelings from one occasion to another, whereby the many actualities functioning as objective data become the novel entity, and whereby there is extension and solidarity in the processive universe.⁷ The conceptual feelings, on the other hand, introduce the valuative operations of the mental pole on this inherited data. The perspectival novelty of the primary phase is how *all* processive being produces novelty or is a novel configuration of the data despite a weak or negligible operation of the mental pole, but when the secondary phases achieve heightened operation, we can account for the novelty that constitutes creative environmental adaptability and the higher levels of experience.

The differences of the operation of the eternal objects in the respective feelings amounts to this: in the first phase there is dative ingression to which the physical feeling of the emergent entity conforms. The eternal objects in this case are reenacted in the intensive patterns derived from the actual world. They transmit directly the character that they achieved as that data. They are still clothed in their objective forms. (I suspect that this is how there is a feeling on the part of the experiencing subject of the dative ingression as the real imposition of the "other".) In the conceptual feelings, however, the eternal objects derived from the physical feelings are entertained as separable from the actualities from which they are ingressed. The eternal objects become free of their dative determinations and become available as

pure potentials. In other words, the eternal objects functioning in the first mode of ingression are forms of the definiteness of the data physically felt as objective; in the second mode, the eternal objects are forms of potential definiteness conceptually felt as possibilities for the subjective valuation.

Additionally, there are two phases to the operations of the mental pole. In the first, there is a conceptual reproduction of the physical pole. This is the operation that Whitehead calls conceptual valuation (see PR, 248). The eternal objects reproduced apart from the patterned realizations imposed by their dative origins become available for the concreting actuality's subsequent conceptual operations whereby it will become as *this* patterned contrast. They become freed of their dative constitution and offered as pure potentialities for the self-determination. The eternal objects are thus abstracted from their actual origins. "A conceptual prehension is a direct vision . . . of some possibility as to how actualities *may be definite*. There is no reference to particular actualities, or to any particular actual world" (PR, 33). The eternal objects truly serve here as "pure potentials for the specific determination of fact" (PR, 22). They serve as forms abstracted from actual definiteness, available as potential for definiteness. It is, therefore, the eternal objects as actually ingressed in contrastive patterns (aesthetic valuations) and as potentials for ingression in contrastive patterns, which lend to the processive universe both its formal continuity and simultaneously its formal malleability. The detachment of the formal elements of a reproductive actual physical prehension by means of the conceptual pole allows for free self-creation by the subject from out of its actual world.

In the second phase of the operation of the conceptual pole there is conceptual reversion "by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives" (PR, 249). Here the eternal objects, now as subjective forms, are placed into contrasts and contrasts of contrasts, and so on. By virtue of conceptual reversion "novelty enters the world" (PR, 249).

To sum up:

Eternal objects express *how* the predecessor-phase is absorbed into the successor-phase without limitation of itself, but with additions necessary for the determination of an actual unity in the form of individual satisfaction. . . . The *how* of the limitations, and the *how* of the additions, are alike the *realization* of eternal objects in the constitution of the actual entity in question. An eternal object in abstraction from any one particular actual entity is a potentiality for ingression into actual entities. In its ingression into any one actual entity, either as relevant or as irrelevant, it retains its potentiality of indefinite diversity of modes of ingression, a

potential indetermination rendered determinate in this instance. . . . Potentiality becomes reality; and yet retains its message of alternatives which the actual entity has avoided. In the constitution of an actual entity:—whatever component is red, might have been green; and whatever component is loved, might have been coldly esteemed. (PR, 149)

The conceptual phases of the concrescence are still a long way from human consciousness, but we have located, at the metaphysical level, the account of how actuality itself provides the formal elements which, as detachable from that actuality, become available for novel arrangement and the valuational contrasts which provide formal (and finally actual) alternatives.

FROM HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS TO RADICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Reconstructing some sort of theory of human consciousness from *Process and Reality* is no small task but the construction of such a theory is absolutely necessary if we are to provide some kind of viable notion of subjective praxical agency in capitalist society and to locate the methods of “fortunate abstraction” that might be available to provide both vision and productive practice beyond our present form of social relations.⁸ I have laid out Whitehead’s basic scheme regarding the metaphysics of conceptual operation and its relation to formal possibilities in order to show that process metaphysics is able to ground potentiality as emergent from actuality (and vice versa), and novelty as emergent from the inheritance of a settled past.⁹ Since, “[c]onceptual feelings and simple causal feelings constitute the two main species of ‘primary’ feelings” and “[a]ll other feelings of whatever complexity arise out of a process of integration which starts with a phase of these primary feelings” (PR, 239), these metaphysical elements constitute our starting point. By supplementing these metaphysical foundations with some of the material on consciousness, extension, and higher experience, I hope to be able to provide, at very least, the kind of preliminary groundwork that will push us over the hump of internal inconsistency threatening the critical project. I will show how the formal elements, provided by capitalism itself, make its critique by human consciousness possible.

“Consciousness,” Whitehead tells us, “is not necessarily involved in the subjective forms of either [physical or conceptual] type of prehension” (PR, 23). This means that although the concrescence of all actual entities involves the operation of both physical and conceptual poles, not all occasions exhibit consciousness. This is because consciousness does not emerge in the first mode of conceptual feeling: conceptual valuation (See PR, 241).

Thus, consciousness emerges in subsequent modes and “arises when a synthetic feeling integrates physical and conceptual feelings” (PR, 243). Such integration involves a kind of recollection of or reflection on the physical feeling but “the abstract element in the concrete fact is exactly what provokes our consciousness” (PR, 242). There appears to be, therefore, both reflective and comparative operations within consciousness or, more appropriately, we could say that consciousness is that conceptual activity whereby there is a re-collection of the physical feelings and a reflection on that datum in a comparative contrast with its inherent formal potentiality.

In [conscious] awareness actuality, as a process in fact, is integrated with the potentialities which illustrate *either* what it is and might not be, *or* what it is not and might be. In other words, there is no consciousness without reference to definiteness, affirmation, and negation. Also affirmation involves its contrast with negation, and negation involves its contrast with affirmation. Further, affirmation and negation are alike meaningless apart from reference to the definiteness of particular actualities. Consciousness is how we feel the affirmation-negation contrast. Conceptual feeling is the feeling of an unqualified negation; that is to say, it is the feeling of a definite eternal object with the definite extrusion of any particular realization. Consciousness requires that the objective datum should involve (as one side of a contrast) a qualified negative determined to some definite situation. (PR, 243)

Thus, within consciousness, propositions are operative. Propositions are hybrid entities “between pure potentialities and actualities” (PR, 185–186). They are the entertainment of eternal objects as applicable to a certain definiteness or actuality. Thus it is that a proposition must be conformal (true) or nonconformal (false).

When a conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the reaction to the datum has simply resulted in the conformation of feeling to fact. . . .

When a non-conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the reaction to the datum has resulted in the synthesis of fact with the alternative potentiality of the complex predicate. A novelty has emerged into creation. (PR, 186–187)

This point is particularly important. It is by way of non-conformal propositions admitted into feeling that novelty enters the processive universe. This is why the Category of Conceptual Reversion is “the category by which novelty enters the world” (PR, 249). This is why Whitehead says that “in the real world it is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true” (PR, 259).

We can see why this would be the case, particularly with the high-level operations of human conceptualization: the entertainment of non-conformal

propositions is the consideration of alternative possibilities in reference to the given actuality. By way of the entertainment of non-conformal propositions, our “interest” in the actuality is generated. By way of the entertainment of non-conformal propositions we ask ourselves, What if it were otherwise?

The triumph of consciousness comes with the negative intuitive judgement. In this case there is a conscious feeling of what might be, and is not. The feeling directly concerns the definite negative prehensions enjoyed by its subject. It is the feeling of absence, and it feels this absence as produced by the definite exclusiveness of what is really present. (PR, 273)

Such consideration generates our interest not just in a merely contemplative manner, but because of our conscious reflection on our own role in the generation of process as its “producers” and because of the dialectical character of processive being, the consideration generates our *active* interest. “The ideals cherished in the souls of men enter into the character of their actions” (AI, 42). The non-conformal propositions lure us to our own creative novelty as our potential (and actual) creation of novelty. “A propositional feeling is a lure to creative emergence in the transcendent future” (PR, 263). It is the way in which the actuality given in present activity becomes infused with the potentiality of the future emergent from the given.

We note here again the statement of the materialist principle. The eternal objects within the actuality of physical inheritance are given as the datum of the experience. Yet that very datum as emergent from and given to dialectical being (bipolar actuality) contains the possibility of its own transcendence. Through conceptual reversion, through the entertainment of propositions, novel combinations of the potentiality and actuality of the given are entertained. The data is inherently value-laden in several ways: as already this achievement of value (subject), as potentially any of the perspectival achievements of value from it (superject), and as all the potential valuations of this data open to any given perspectival entity in process (superject of that subjective becoming). Thus the future already infuses the present as its potentiality and the present is already a realization of the offerings of the past. The present already contains its possible futures, and the past can be found in the present, which is one of its achieved values.

With human consciousness, we have burst the boundaries of novel entertainment and, therefore, creativity. Human consciousness with its high-level operations of intellect, imagination, judgement, and so forth, appears to occupy the pinnacle of conceptual development by a social nexus in this processive universe. And it is precisely this adept, malleable, explosive, conscious conceptuality of the human being that makes his or her creativity reach such heights

of novelty. In particular, this intellect allows our effusive entertainment of those non-conformal propositions that result in novelty.

The materialist principle stated above and the notion of human consciousness emergent from the processive viewpoint give the critical project its internal consistency. Because the formal possibilities (as eternal objects) are given in the data that is the actual world and because they are detachable from the actuality in which they are given, because the operation of the conceptual pole can involve entertainment of contrasts, conceptual reversion, and the feeling of non-conformal propositions, and because human consciousness involves the best-developed and most complex forms of conceptuality, we are able to entertain the possibility of the actualization of what is "not yet" in the present but potential to it by virtue of its specific content. But more than this, human being in particular does, and indeed must, entertain the "not yet." According to the process view, this is what we are: maximally creative beings. And such novelty emerges from the entertainment of alternatives. Any social practice, any form of social relations which seeks to quell our physical/conceptual entertainment of possibilities, must necessarily fail because it will be presenting to us, because of the very beings we are, the possibility of its being other than the case. We are the being that entertains the "other." Human consciousness is anticipatory consciousness.

Capitalism is not merely a form of social relations, but is also the datum out of which we are invited to construct our processive future. It gives us the physical inheritance of the content of its social relations. Through its practices we are reproduced as capitalist labor, but simultaneous with this inherited content, it gives us the forms of that content. And so, capitalism provides the notion of private property but simultaneous with that we receive the detachability of the forms and the entertainment of the non-conformal proposition: the possibility of property as not private. It gives us the freedom to sell our labor and the possibility of not selling our labor. It gives us wealth in the hands of the few and the possibility of wealth in the hands of many. It gives us wealth as commodity value and the possibility of wealth as not-commodity "value." It gives us domination and exploitation and the possibilities of our freedom from domination and exploitation. In fact, I would maintain, that the more capitalism becomes itself, the more obvious these conceptual reversions are for consciousness.

Lest this sound too idealistic, let me make perfectly clear that the possibilities of which I speak are not simple possibilities presented to practice. It is most certainly not that easy. They are non-conformal propositions whose entertainment is made possible by the social reality of the practice of capitalism. However, at the same time, they are lures for feeling and therefore the entertainment of the possibilities inherent in the actuality serves, even if

slightly or very slowly, to alter the becoming of the entity. Not only do “propositions grow with the creative advance of the world” (PR, 188), but the creative advance of the world grows with propositions. And this would explain why Marx insisted that the demystification of the formal structure of the capitalist form of social relations was vital to the revolutionary effort. Such demystification makes the formal possibilities inherent in the structure leap forth in consciousness. It is also why the media manipulation of public consciousness has become such an important part of the operation and continuation of capitalism as a social-economic system.

If capitalism, in its very development, produces the possibilities of thinking beyond it, if in fact, the further development of capitalism over time merely serves to make its formal structure more visible and thus more accessible to conscious conceptual reversion, then it is absolutely necessary for the continuation of capitalism that those whose personal interests are served by capitalism dominate the public consciousness. If human beings, by their very nature, entertain formal possibilities given in their inherited actuality as detachable from that reality, then it is in the capitalist’s interest to control either the presented actuality or the formal characteristics of that actuality or both. Attempts at such control by capitalist-owned and operated media can and do occur in numerous ways. The media can co-opt the formal possibilities in its own conceptual frameworks as Marcuse says happens with political and social assimilation,¹⁰ or they can present the social reality as already meeting the needs of anticipatory consciousness as occurs with the spectrality of advertising, or they can simply control the availability and content of information as occurs with “brainwashing under freedom” and the “manufacture of consent”¹¹ In this day and age of the expansion of U.S. capitalism’s imperialist adventures, it is, therefore, not surprising that mainstream and alternative media sources are increasingly owned by large corporations and that such control of information has reached an almost frenzied pitch. The good news from the process standpoint is that such control must necessarily be, in the long run, unsuccessful. It can only serve to goad the increase of its presented alternatives: the more clearly it states what is the case, the more clearly we are able to think about how that case could be otherwise. It exposes itself in its repetition.

Human consciousness cannot help but engage in conceptual reversion in the form of the entertainment of the “not yet” and the “other than actual.” This functional consciousness is our very nature; it is what we do and how we become from our dative origination. All processive being is dialectical and could not be without being dialectical. Dumb physical reiteration without conceptual operation would mean absolute spatial and temporal reiteration. In other words, it would mean no spatial or temporal extension—it would

mean the absence of process, because it would mean the absence of all change and thus the absence of all being. For there to be change there must be conceptual operation, even if it involves the reiteration of the physical feeling as under a specific spatiotemporal perspective. Being is dialectical. What makes human beings unique is that we think dialectically. We think the other and thereby we think being. And I mean this quite literally. Our dialectical conceptual operation makes it possible that we both think what might (will) be and in that thinking, because there is no conceptual operation abstracted from physical feeling, we become as that thinking being. By thinking dialectically, by entertaining potentiality in the way we do, we think (and become) novelty: new being, new material relations, new social relations. We turn and overturn reality. Human consciousness, as anticipatory consciousness, is dialectical consciousness.

In relation to capitalism, dialectical thinking is anticapitalistic thought in several ways. As already pointed out, it is thought that engages in the entertainment of the non-conformal propositions. Taking the “facts” of capitalism, human consciousness entertains their dialectical overcoming. But additionally and on a deeper level, dialectical thinking is anticapitalistic. As I have pointed out in the preceding chapters, capitalism involves a reification of the past, but dialectical thinking is always necessarily oriented to the potentiality of the future: nonconformal propositions entertain the “not yet.” Capitalism reproduces labor as primarily reiterative but dialectical thinking explodes in novelty: the entertainment of potentiality is the hallmark of human productive novelty. Capitalism reduces use value to exchange value and re-presents all exchange values as money but dialectical thinking serves to multiply the possibilities of realizing alternative “values”: contrasts elicit depth.

It will be said that this is idealistic, impracticable, that we should buckle down and be realistic. But we need to look very carefully as what realism is according to the position we have been holding. On a processive view, to ascribe to realism is to ascribe to a repetition of the past. It is to allow what will be to be dictated by what has been. It is to relegate process and progress to the dustbin of dead datum. It is, therefore, the height of capitalist ideology.¹² There is, in fact, no lack of realism in the ideal since the ideal can, on the process view, only arise from the datum provided as formally entertained. In a sense, therefore, it already “is.”

When we are told to be realistic, to give up on the vision of the ideal, we are being asked to wrench the efficacy of future possibility out of the present. We are being asked to kill the present. But more insulting yet, we are asked to leave the sweatshops as they are, to leave the teenagers working in the Nike factories in Indonesia, to leave the streets of the South Bronx as they are, to leave the children who live in and on the garbage dumps of the

Philippines or Guatemala as they are, to leave injustice as it is. We are being asked to turn away from the likes of Harriet Tubman or Ghandi, Rosa Parks, Zapatista Commandante Marcos, or Daniel Berrigan—they are crazy idealists. But if these ask too much, then realism is a view toward nowhere. We are told that our ideals are currently impossible to realize but this misses the role of the ideal in human consciousness entirely.

Impracticable ideals are a program for reform. Such a program is not to be criticized by immediate possibilities. Progress consists in modifying the laws of nature so that the Republic on Earth may conform to that Society to be discerned ideally by the divination of Wisdom. (AI, 42)

Such ideals may be impracticable, at present, but are most certainly practical. We stand with Kant meaning by the practical “everything that is possible through freedom.”¹³

So, capitalism is destructive to the essence of the human being because it is nondialectical, but because it is nondialectical it is also antiprocessive. It is felt as alienation because it is antihumanism. It is felt as alienation because it is antiprocessive and so also it is the negation of being that is processive, dialectical, and mediated by productive subjectivity. But human consciousness, as anticipatory consciousness and as dialectical consciousness, is also, therefore, radical consciousness: anticapitalistic consciousness, the union of thinking and being, the union of the ideal and real—true humanism.

There is one more conclusion to be drawn from this line of thought. If dialectical consciousness is consciousness of being as becoming, and if, as shown in chapter 2, processive being itself is the real unity in difference of the physical and conceptual, of being and becoming, of subject and superject, and so on, then processive thought itself is dialectical thought and is, therefore, radical thought. A philosophy of internal relations like process philosophy is already radical, anticipatory, dialectical consciousness. Process thought itself is an articulation of the conceptual revolution necessary to the real reversion of capitalism in practice.

What Marx perhaps failed to realize, was that the conceptual scheme of internal relations underlying his use of terminology, his conceptual categories, his use of the dialectics, his limits and extensions of abstraction, and his envisionment of a communist future was already revolutionary, and was just as revolutionary as the critique of capitalism that was based on it as its ultimate articulation. Process philosophy, a philosophy of internal relations, is already radical consciousness because it is necessarily dialectical and thus anticapitalistic consciousness. Perhaps Marx’s purpose in the early writings was to articulate this revolutionary conceptual groundwork, but perhaps also he overestimated the public’s understanding of the Hegelian dialectic from

the start. Perhaps his purpose in the proposed ethics was to come full circle and articulate these revolutionary grounds of the critique of capitalism as also grounding the possibility of human being (and being human) finally realized. We see, therefore, that abstractions need not be misplaced for the concrete. We see that abstractions may, indeed be fortunate. "The idea is a prophecy which procures its own fulfillment" (AI, 42). "Plato's idea . . . has a creative power, making possible its own approach to realization" (AI, 42).

BEYOND CAPITALISM

But given that process thought is revolutionary thought, or thought of the actual as containing the potential alternatives to capitalist social relations, the next question becomes, What exactly are those alternatives? We have, in a sense, already provided the answer. To think beyond capitalism is to think dialectically; to think dialectically is to think processively. Therefore, the process framework is the beyond of capitalism. The inner logic and tendency of capitalism is to maximize profits by maximizing surplus labor time, to minimize reproductive time for the productive human being and to maximize time for production above and beyond reproduction (novelty). By way of process thought we understand that the development of the forces of production given in capitalism can lead to a maximization of the creative ability of the human being. By way of process thought we understand creative novelty as the processive becoming of the individual in community. Thus, maximization of surplus labor time in capitalism is, in and of itself, the potentiality of the creative social-self. Capitalism offers up its own solution.

Although limited by its very nature, [capitalism] strives towards the universal development of the forces of production, and thus becomes the presupposition of a new mode of production, which is founded not on the development of the forces of production for the purpose of reproducing or at most expanding a given condition, but where the free, unobstructed, progressive and universal development of the forces of production is itself the presupposition of society. (G, 540)

[The] antithetical form [of capitalism] is itself fleeting, and produces the real conditions of its own suspension. The result is: the tendentially and potentially general development of the forces of production—of wealth as such—as a basis. (G, 541–542)

The beyond of capitalism, provided by the data of capitalism itself, is the possibility of fully processive being understood as such.

Carol Gould provides a particularly clear articulation of the three historical stages of production described by Marx in the *Grundrisse*. (1) In the stage

of precapitalist formations, she says, the form of social relations is one of “personal dependence” characterized by “internal relations that are concretely particular” and are “relations of inequality” among members of a “community.” (2) In the stage of capitalism, she says, the form of social relations is one of “personal independence based on objective dependence” characterized by “external relations that are abstractly universal” and are “relations of formal equality” between individuals with mere “external sociality.” (3) In the stage of communal society the form of social relations is one of “free social individuality” characterized by “internal relations that are concretely universal” and are “relations of concrete equality” between “communal individuals.”¹⁴ What is striking here is the final description. It is the description of full communism. It is also, I believe, nothing more than a description of processive being.

Actual entities are “free social individuals.” Each entity emerges out of its given actual world and therefore is always already a social individual; yet, that entity is a self-creative valuation of that data and therefore free from any deterministic coercion by the data. The actual world is the social context that provides the opportunity for the self-creation which that emergent entity is. The “internal relations are concretely universal” because each entity is constituted by its internal relations to all other entities. The aesthetic patterning of those relations is the entity’s concreteness and those self-same relations project the entity beyond itself as objectively immortal. The unity of the universal and particular (the eternal objects and the actual entities) make internal relations (as being/becoming) possible. Finally, the relations of these “communal individuals” (individuals that, for their very individuality, depend on their relational community) are relations of “concrete equality” because each individual is as “valuable” an achievement in the processive universe as any other.¹⁵ But their achievements of “value” are absolutely concretely related to their relational configurations of data and aim. ‘Each according to his or her needs, each according to his or her ability.’

Marx’s description of communism is a description of processive human being that knows and realizes itself as such. There is no antithesis between the social and the individual because processive human being is aware of arising from a social nexus as a configuration of and contribution to that nexus. And so the community is the opportunity for the “all-round development of individuals” (GI, 117) and each individual adds to the character of the community. The interest of the community is to allow maximal intensity of development to each of its constitutive members. Only in this way does the community itself reach the heights of its creative potential. The harmonization of ends between the social individuals, the eradication of conflicting tendencies, is absolutely in the interest of each individual because that individual’s potential to realize

the self as a developmental intensity depends absolutely on the social environment out of which that development proceeds. Dative conflict requires elimination from feeling; dative harmony allows for greater inclusion, greater and more intense contrasts.

Each serves the other in order to serve himself; each makes use of the other, reciprocally, as his means. Now both things are contained in the consciousness of the two individuals: (1) that each arrives at his end only in so far as he serves the other as a means; (2) that each becomes means for the other (being for another) only as end in himself (being for self); (3) that the reciprocity in which each is at the same time means and end, and attains his end only in so far as he becomes a means, and becomes a means only in so far as he posits himself as end, that each thus posits himself as being for another, in so far as he is being for self, and the other as being for him, in so far as he is being for himself—that *this reciprocity is a necessary fact, presupposed as natural precondition for exchange.* [italics mine] (G, 243–244)

Only in community [with others has each] individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. (GI, 83)

The realization of our processive being is a realization of the thoroughgoing relationality of the processive universe. It is the realization that the achievement of each processive occasion of experience effects the becoming of all others. It is the realization that each individual accomplished intensity shoots through the fabric of processive being as an impulse lights up a neural net. It is the realization that the individual achievement can become only out of the entire network of previous relations and that it will become as part of that expanding network. As the individual is constituted by its internal relations of the totality, so also the totality is the extensive relation of all individual achievements. Thinking beyond capitalism is realizing that a social totality claiming to achieve human emancipation by way of the rerouting of creative novelty into reproduction is no “achievement” at all. Thinking beyond capitalism is realizing that the social totality achieves only as its individuals achieve *themselves*.

Freedom means that within each type the requisite coördination should be possible without the destruction of the general ends of the whole community. Indeed, one general end is that these variously coördinated groups should contribute to the complex pattern of community life, each in virtue of its own peculiarity. In this way individuality gains the effectiveness which issues from coördination, and freedom obtains power necessary for its perfection. (AI, 67)

This is Marx's notion of real wealth.

[W]hen the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than . . . [t]he full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development. (G, 488)

If thinking the beyond of capitalism is thinking process and we, as human beings, are processive beings, then thinking the beyond of capitalism is thinking the human essence. Anticipatory consciousness, dialectical consciousness, radical consciousness, is self-consciousness. Thinking the beyond of capitalism is an act of conscious self-appropriation and self-affirmation. It is the affirmation of the human being as processive, as a creative subject/superject of process. Therefore, to think the beyond of capitalism is to think of myself as the processive agent of that beyond; it is the appropriation of my own productive being as the source of that beyond. It is my self-awareness of my radical praxical being.

I understand myself as an intimate liaison of all processive being. I affirm myself as the creative source of the novelty of future process. I have authentically appropriated my own being.

The basis as the possibility of the universal development of the individual, and the real development of the individuals from this basis as a constant suspension of its barrier, which is recognized as a barrier, not taken for a sacred limit. Not an ideal or imagined universality of the individual, but the universality of his real and ideal relations. Hence also the grasping of his own history as a process, and the recognition of nature (equally present as practical power over nature) as his real body. The process of development itself posited and known as the presupposition of the same. (G, 542)

[W]ith the positing of the activity of individuals as immediately general or *social* activity, the objective moments of production are stripped of this form of alienation; they are thereby posited as property, as the organic social body within which the individuals reproduce themselves as individuals, but as social individuals. (G, 832)

Because the human being is that being that produces effusive novelty, self-appropriation is the appropriation of my productive-processive being and my understanding of that being as my "ownmost" possibility in, of, and for the world. This is the first step to becoming and being the beyond of capitalism.

So also, self-affirmation and self-appropriation is real freedom. To affirm my processive being is to understand myself as a subject of process, in process,

and for process. To understand myself as a processive subject is to understand that I create myself from the relational totality of my actual world, that what I am is my active self-relation to and of that totality. It is also then, to understand that I am a thoroughly and absolutely unique perspective on that totality: no other individual can be this particular here and now. My creative self-relation cannot therefore be the equivalent of any other. And so, understanding myself as a processive being is understanding that I cannot *be* wage labor. Because my creative stance is *unique*, it cannot *belong* to any-one else. Understanding myself as a processive subject is, therefore, a reappropriation of my creative potential as *mine*. It is a freeing of myself for myself and, by extension, for others. Self-affirmation is self-appropriation as real freedom. This is the true content of class consciousness and the reason why the proletariat (wage labor) is indeed still the universal class. They are the ultimate representation of the universal human bondage occurring within capitalism, their essential poverty is capital's private property. Therefore, class consciousness is human consciousness—the consciousness of this bondage (capitalism's bondage of the human essence and human potential) is the key to real freedom. The liberation from wage labor (the liberation of the proletariat) is, therefore, the liberation of all human life for itself.

Furthermore, since this transformation is carried out by individuals in social relations and this is a social activity, the conditions for this individual self-transcendence are themselves social conditions. Thus for Marx, freedom as the process of self-realization is the origination of novel possibilities, acting on which the social individual creates and recreates him or herself constantly as a self-transcendent being.¹⁶

We do not require capitalism's value as the medium of exchange. We are the medium of exchange—we are the mediators of the relationality of the universe. When we understand ourselves as such, when we appropriate ourselves, our own creative essence, we free ourselves for the world. We achieve ourselves as “free social individuals.”¹⁷

When we think of freedom, we are apt to confine ourselves to freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom for religious opinions. Then the limitations to freedom are conceived as wholly arising from the antagonisms of our fellow men. This is a thorough mistake. The massive habits of physical nature, its iron laws, determine the scene for the sufferings of men. Birth and death, heat, cold, hunger, separation, disease, the general impracticability of purpose, all bring their quota to imprison the souls of women and of men. Our experiences do not keep step with our hopes. The Platonic Eros, which is the soul stirring itself to life and motion, is maimed. *The essence of freedom is the practicability of purpose. Mankind has*

chiefly suffered from the frustration of its prevalent purposes, even such as belong to the very definition of its species. [italics mine] (AI, 66)

Those purposes which belong to “the very definition of” the human “species” are, of course, creativity itself. The beyond of capitalism frees ourselves for ourselves.

What Marx calls full communism is a realization of processive solidarity: the absolute concomitance of the social and the individual. Since processive thought is already radical, anticapitalistic thought, the real overcoming of capitalism is the actualization in human social relations of process. “Only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals” (GI, 93). It is the actualization of our essential being but this essence does not reduce us to commonality, it frees us for the full development of our individuality. It is the actualization of our absolute difference from each other but such difference does not separate us from one another because it arises as our gift to one another. It is actualization of our uniqueness but such uniqueness is not self-centered because each achievement is a relational-ization of and for the whole. “The many become one, and are increased by one” (PR, 21). Such easy dichotomies are to be actually overcome.

Communism . . . as the real *appropriation of the human* essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e., human) being—a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully-developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully-developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the *genuine* resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution. (EPM, 102-103)

A genuine dialectical unity is achieved finally for human life and because we are beings-in-relation to one another, this is not just self-appropriation and self-affirmation as freedom for myself, but the freedom that I gain by appropriating my own creative ability is also an act of freeing others. Only when I feel the solidarity of myself and all others will I really feel the suffering of the other as (necessarily) my suffering.

We do not yet live such being-in-solidarity. Real solidarity as process in actuality is not yet, but it is real as the potential future of the present and as such, the entertainment of the nonconformal proposition of full communism, of social solidarity, is a lure for feeling. “The entire movement of history is, therefore, both its *actual* act of genesis (the birth act of its empirical existence)

and also for its thinking consciousness, the *comprehended* and *known* process of its *coming-to-be*" (EPM, 103). And so, in the present we live the future only as the not-yet-potential and in that know ourselves to be the processive agents of this coming-to-be. As we think processively, as we think dialectically, we are thinking beyond capitalism and in thinking beyond capitalism we are affirming ourselves, in affirming ourselves we are freeing ourselves for this potential. "*Communism* is the necessary pattern and the dynamic principle of the immediate future" (EPM, 114). "[W]e characterize *communism* itself because of its character as negation of the negation, as the appropriation of the human essence that mediates itself with itself through the negation of private property" (EPM, 123). And so, in the present, we strive to speak of the not-yet. We struggle and stumble, our tongues are tied and our minds battle with this thought that is our real freedom and our real possibility. We need to speak in metaphors in order to speak through all the one-sided conceptualizations that crowd our consciousness. We find it so difficult to think dialectically, we find it so difficult to express the character of processive reality, because we live still in tension with these articulations. We find it difficult to say what is not yet actual, but we hint and try and find ourselves on the brink of saying but not yet being able to say clearly. When we live process, we will no longer need to say it. True social solidarity would be a true revolution in consciousness and thus an ability to conceptualize in entirely novel ways. It would not, therefore, constitute an ideal end point but the starting point of a new epochal processive adventure of becoming anew. Not the end of history but its true beginning, the beginning of human history.

And, in the final analysis, it is possible that we cannot characterize full communism except to speak of it as the realization of dialectical and processive being. And that, in keeping with the truly dialectical nature of processive being, actually living process, actually uniting our essence with our existence, will necessarily mean already thinking beyond that actuality, but this time, with our windows of potentiality wide open and our potential for novelty limited only by the possibilities given in our actuality and not by imposed scarcity. Lived solidarity may well constitute a real evolutionary leap.

Religion is founded on the concurrence of three allied concepts in one moment of self-consciousness, concepts whose separate relationships to fact and whose mutual relations to each other are only to be settled jointly by some direct intuition into the ultimate character of the universe.

These concepts are:

1. That of the value of an individual for itself.
2. That of the value of the diverse individuals of the world for each other.

3. That of the value of the objective world which is a community derivative from the interrelations of its component individuals, and also necessary for the existence of each of these individuals. (RM, 59)

Dialectical consciousness, processive consciousness, radical consciousness, self-consciousness and self-appropriation as real freedom, are all instances of the concurrence in thought and in potential actuality of these three concepts. Therefore, full communism may be the realization in consciousness and in actuality of the sacred character of the universe. The absolute end is the “evocation of intensities” (PR, 105). Real solidarity as lived process and lived process as the freedom of the human being to creativity bounded only by the data might be our conceptual noesis with the boundlessness of the primordial graded envisionment: the realization of the sacred character of the universe and that realization as the appropriation of our role in its creation.

According to Isaac Luria’s Kabbalist doctrine of *Tikkun*, the breaking of the “vessels” of God’s attributes scattered divine sparks in fragments throughout the material world. The task of healing these broken vessels, an enterprise in which “man and God are partners,” reestablishes the “harmonious condition of the world” not as a restoration, but “as something new.”¹⁸

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. As an example of this newfound popularity, for the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the Marx and Engel's *Communist Manifesto*, Verso Books released a special "anniversary edition" of the text suitable for display on one's "coffee table." See Alexander Cockburn, "The Communist Manifesto Part Deux: A Leftist Mind at Sea, Commie Manifesto," *The Nation*, June 15, 1998 and Barbara Ehrenreich, "Communism on Your Coffee Table," Salon Books Website http://www.salon.com/books/feature/1998/04/cov_30feature.html.

2. John Cassidy, "The Return of Karl Marx," *The New Yorker*, October 20 and 27, 1997.

3. Carol C. Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology: Individual and Community in Marx's Theory of Social Reality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), p. xxv.

4. *Ibid.*, p. xi.

5. *Ibid.*, p. xxv.

6. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, *Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), pp. 338–339.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 339.

8. Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology*, p. xi.

9. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason, I, Theory of Practical Ensembles*, trans., Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: NLB, 1976), p. 23.

10. William James, *Essays in Pragmatism*, ed. Alburey Castell (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948), p. 3.

11. Even though this enterprise seems unconventional, it is not without precedent in the field. First, Whitehead himself wrote on social, political, and economic

issues and numerous secondary sources have treated these views exclusively or at length. See in particular, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Free Press, 1967); *The Aims of Education* (New York: Free Press, 1967); *Modes of Thought* (New York: Free Press, 1968); *Science and the Modern World*; and *Whitehead's American Essays in Social Philosophy*, ed. A. H. Johnson (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959).

For works combining the thought of Marx and Whitehead, see Russell L. Kleinbach, *Marx via Process* (Washington, DC: Washington University Press of America, 1982); James L. Marsh and William S. Hamrick, "Whitehead and Marx: Toward a Political Metaphysics," *Philosophy Today* 28 (Fall 1984): 191–202; James L. Marsh, *Process, Praxis, and Transcendence* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999); Howard L. Parsons, "History as Viewed by Marx and Whitehead," *Christian Scholar* 50 (Fall 1967): 273–289; James Leyor Smith, "On Whitehead, Marx, and the Nature of Political Philosophy," *Tulane Studies in Philosophy* 24 (1975): 101–112; Clark M. Williamson, "Whitehead as Counterrevolutionary: Toward a Christian-Marxist Dialogue," *Process Studies* 4 (Fall 1974): 176–186. Some of these works focus attention primarily on the historical aspects of the two philosophies. Kleinbach's *Marx via Process*, for example, utilizes Whitehead's notion of consciousness to elucidate Marxist praxis. Several of the others concentrate on the theological aspect of process and its implications for liberation theology or critical socioeconomic theory, but none so far has attempted the thoroughgoing integration of the two philosophers on the level of the ontological-metaphysical.

It might surprise some to discover a connection between Marx and Whitehead lurking within Bertell Ollman's *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) I was quite thrilled to find out from Professor Ollman a short time ago that the original version of his dissertation contained numerous references to Whitehead's philosophy. Unfortunately, those were removed from the final version. But one can still see the remnants in Professor Ollman's elucidation of the philosophy of internal relations.

12. This general statement is all important and will constitute the basis on which Marx builds his dialectical materialism, but this cannot be adequately dealt with at this juncture. We will return to it again after the dialectical metaphysics has been laid out.

13. It should be noted again that Marx's prohibition against the use of transhistorical and universal notions only applies to those which do not themselves emerge from our concrete experience. It is not that one cannot make such claims, but that they must be grounded in the real. As I will show later in chapter 3, Marx himself employs general or universal categories. The point is not to avoid abstraction but to make sure that the levels of abstraction retain their thoroughgoing dependence on each other.

14. It is interesting and helpful here to note the similarity of this claim to Heidegger's formulation of *Dasein* as always already *Mitsein*. See his *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962).

15. This claim as to the dialectical nature of process philosophy will be the subject matter of chapter 2.

16. In a sense, and against my own claims here, I am going to suggest by the end of this project that it is not at all surprising that we have not yet fully understood dialectics. We are in the process of coming to an understanding (knowledge) of dialectics but are prevented from such full insight precisely by the capitalist form of social relations which is itself one-sided and undialectical. See chapter 9.

17. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968).

18. See, Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, 2nd ed., (Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 284.

19. Merold Westphal, *Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 89.

20. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 11.

21. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, p. 148.

22. Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 111.

23. See, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, p. 13.

24. Westphal, *Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity*, p. 83.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

26. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason, I: Theory of Practical Ensembles*, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: NLB, 1976), p. 36.

27. These moments: speculation, critique, and lure are, of course, not separate. They are, in combination, the role of post-Hegelian philosophy. They are facets, aspects of a whole.

28. Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, p. 36.

29. It might be clear at this juncture that the speculative role of reason (thought, philosophy) means, precisely, that there can be no distinction between an account of what is and a recommendation as to what should be. With the achievement of the freedom (self-knowledge) of consciousness the fact/value distinction dissolves, not in the idea but in praxis.

30. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method*, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 92, footnote.

31. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, pp. 68–69.

32. Hegel's *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989), p. 843.

33. Sartre, *Search for a Method*, p. 161.

34. Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, p. 37.

35. Ibid., p. 36.

36. This is the point that was recognized by Raya Dunayevskaya and explains her veritable obsession with the final lines of the final paragraph of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. See, Raya Dunayevskaya, *The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx*, eds. Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002).

37. Sartre, *Search for a Method*, p. 113.

38. See, Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, p.119.

39. Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, p. 37.

40. The reference to the dialectical image here is meant to evoke Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1999).

41. So desperately do we want to believe that we have a history of prematurely announcing the conclusion of history.

42. Sartre, *Search for a Method*, p. 30.

43. Ibid, p. 180.

CHAPTER TWO

1. See Roslyn Wallach Bologh, *Dialectical phenomenology: Marx's Method* (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 5.

2. Ibid, pp. 6–10.

3. Ibid, p. 4.

4. Ibid, p. 6.

5. Ollman, *Dialectical Investigations*, p. 35.

6. Ibid., p. 36.

7. Ibid., p. 11.

8. See, Ollman, *Dialectical Investigations*, pp. 53–67.

9. Ibid., p. 35.

10. For Whitehead's account of the four conditions that the speculative philosophical scheme must meet: coherence, logical perfection, applicability, and adequacy, see *Process and Reality*, pp. 3–6. I should also note, for the sake of clarification of the section that follows, that I believe Whitehead to be excessively generous in his readings of the modern tradition. It appears, that he chose often to overstate the similarity between notions like Descartes' "subjectivist principle" or Locke's conception of "power" and his own appropriations and alterations of these. The "reform" that the subjectivist principle undergoes in Whitehead's hands is quite significant. So much so, that by the time he is finished, I do not think that anyone would be tempted to mark

any significant similarity between his and Descartes' philosophies. Whether such excess is an attempt on Whitehead's part to appear consistent with the history of modern philosophy, or simply the expression of a generosity of intellectual spirit is difficult to say, but the point is worth noting so that we understand that the finished product of the processive view is really a second "Copernican Revolution" away from modernist atomism and isolationism.

11. I should note here that I do not agree with Whitehead's reading of Kant, although it is a common misreading that does not take the fully critical turn. In order for him to designate the objectivity achieved in the "subjective" construction of experience as merely "apparent" objectivity, he would need to be able to designate a non-speculative objectivity outside such construction that is "really" objective. This, as Kant points out in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is simply not possible: "We are brought to the conclusion that we can never transcend the limits of possible experience . . . we find that the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction." Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 24. Therefore, the pre-critical standard of objectivity in comparison to which Kant's sense of objectivity would be merely "apparent" simply cannot be thought. Objectivity itself is always necessarily mediated—always already "in relation to" some prehending subject. There is then a greater similarity between Kant's and Whitehead's projects than Whitehead himself sees: the fully critical turn in Kant's philosophy contains an expression of the "principle of relativity" and acts as a critique of vacuous actuality. (See the categories of explanation iv and x–xiii in *Process and Reality*, pp. 22–24 and the critique of vacuous actuality p. 28–29.) Whitehead, of course, expands considerably on this by showing that metaphysics can indeed be thought as both practical and as transcendental conditions for the possibility of the kind of experience we encounter. This is the importance of his denial that sensibility is the primary form of experiential encounter with the world.

12. As I shall show in the following pages, the fact that the simple physical feeling is designated here as nonconscious, indicates only that, within the genetic analysis of the prehension, this prehensive phase can be analyzed as necessarily "preceding" the additional operations of the conceptual pole. Consciousness, according to Whitehead's account, constitutes extremely high-level conceptual activity. Therefore, the primary ingression of data is still "purely" physical or causal.

13. For a complete explication of this primacy of intensive relations, see Judith A. Jones, *Intensity: An Essay in Whiteheadian Ontology* (Nashville and London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998).

14. Gregory Vlastos, "Organic Categories in Whitehead," in *Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy*, ed. George L. Kline (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 160–61.

15. Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, vol. 1, 39.

16. Bologh, *Dialectical phenomenology*, p. 24.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

CHAPTER THREE

1. The evidence of a philosophy of internal relations has certainly been provided by other Marxian commentators. See in particular Ollman, *Alienation*; Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology*; and Bologh, *Dialectical phenomenology*.

2. For further discussion on this analysis see chapter 5 on the Labor Theory of Value.

3. It is interesting and perhaps somewhat surprising to see this reference to “the social production process in general” articulated in the final volume of *Capital*, a volume whose subject matter is some of the most rigorous “scientific” political-economic analyses; but such reference is not unique and its appearance lends further credence to claims regarding the unity of Marx’s corpus.

4. It is important to note that the levels of production from generality to specificity could extend even farther than this list suggests. Within the level of the social body of a given historical socio-economic mode of production, we could designate and differentiate spheres of productive activity: the family, the political structure, religion, language, and so on. In fact Marx himself designates these as modes of production. And within those we could proceed to the level of individual persons as they produce some or all of these structures, and we could examine those individual lives indefinitely in differentiated temporal frameworks, and so forth. But it is also quite important to note that these different levels are not exclusive of one another. There is inclusivity and determination of the more general levels within the more specific. There is mutual determination and overlap of agency between levels and within any given level. In other words, even these levels are internally related to one another and are themselves constituted by their internal relations.

5. Needless to say this statement is immensely anticipatory. The discussion of the contradictions between capitalism and the production in general will be found primarily in chapters 4–6 and the discussion of the possible unity of a mode of production as maximizing the conditions of production in general will be found in the final chapter on socialism.

6. Although the moments of production in general are not separable they most certainly can *appear* within a specific modes of production as separate. This is precisely what occurs in capitalism.

7. Not even such seemingly minimalist assertions as Descartes’s *cogito* are immune from this realization. The activity of producing this utterance already presupposes Descartes’ entire personal history (a fact that he himself admits in the *Discourse on Method*), the prior development of language, the development of the history of human thought to that point, the prior production of the ink and paper that made his act of writing possible, and so on. This goes a long way to explaining how Marx can claim in *The German Ideology* that material production precedes the production of ideas, if by material production we understand the objective “settled” conditions within which thought is produced. See Marx, *The German Ideology*, pp. 47–48, 58–59. Also see my later discussion in this chapter on materialism, determinism, and history.

8. Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology*, p. 61.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

10. Later in *Capital*, vol. 1, when referring to this consumptive-productive identity as the consumption to produce the physical subject as laborer for the following day, Marx will refer to this as “reproduction.” See chapter 5.

11. For example, the capitalist mode of production, in which it is necessary to flood the market with commodities, produces some very strange consumptive needs indeed. We “need” the choice between fifty different brands of shampoo, we “need” the box marked “new and improved,” we “need” the food that is “low-fat,” we “need” that cleaner, bleach, detergent, freshener that smells like mountain air or spring rain, potpourri, or flower fresh, and so forth.

12. Bologh, *Dialectical phenomenology*, p. 54.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

14. We are quite fond of thinking that such speculation actually means something and often overlook the quite obvious performative contradiction that it implies, because even the production of such fantastic flights of our imagination occurs within a relational context of the thinker’s given form of life: material, social, linguistic, ideational, and so on.

15. Gould, *Marx’s Social Ontology*, p. 38. It should be noted here in conjunction with what I have laid out to this point that if “the existence and mode of activity of these individuals is the ontological presupposition of the relations into which they enter,” then process philosophy is the metaphysical presupposition underlying this ontological presupposition.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. See also Whitehead’s *Categories of Explanation* ii, iv, vi, xiv, xvi, xix, xx, xxiv, and xxv, in PR, pp. 24–26. Also, as we shall see in the following chapter, such ontological solidarity lies at the heart of the possibility that within any given process of production human labor transfers the value of the means of production to the product.

2. On this point see Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1911), especially pp. 298–313.

3. I do not think that ultimately Whitehead would disagree with this point. He seems to take the commission of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness to be a tendency in our patterns of thought and within our specific historical development (see in particular regarding this point, *Adventures of Ideas*). But on grounds of descriptive adequacy, Marx’s explanation is superior in that it answers more completely why and how such a tendency arises and does so within the system itself. In other words, even if we ascribe the abstractive function to one mode of cognition and the apprehension of the concrete to another as someone like Bergson does with intellect and instinct, it still remains to be explained how two different functions of one unified consciousness have become practically disconnected such that they operate at cross purposes and such that the conclusions emerging from one mode are mistaken for the other and

taken to be more important than the other. See Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 98–185.

4. We shall see later that the separation of being and doing, the separation of the subject from her activity, the separation of essence from existence, is indeed an ideological product of the capitalist mode of social relations. As Marx says, “The difference between the individual as a person and what is accidental to him is not a conceptual difference but an historical fact” (GI, 86).

5. We note here how radically this changes even what is meant by the “individual.” An individual constituted by its internal relations is never simply or fully isolated. We also remember that “man is nature” so that this reference to the natural world must always already include the self and others.

6. This is not to be taken to imply that the differences between kinds of beings do not appear on the macrocosmic level. Indeed they do. The point is that such distinction is an emergent feature of the temporally and spatially extensive relationality that occurs on the societal level. Process philosophy allows for such difference and for human operation within it. However, it simultaneously militates against any metaphysical “real distinction” of the Cartesian brand that might imply the nonrelationality or independence of being. “Connectedness is the essence of all things” means that, at base, all things are really and thoroughly connected, or it means nothing at all. (See MT, 9.) Therefore, the warning is, again, against misplaced concreteness. We are not to foist the emergent abstractions of distinction off onto the concrete fabric of metaphysical reality. This point allows that there never be any independence except by decision of operative abstraction and that, in fact, such decision is a formative moment of the act of self-creation from which the macrocosmic differences emerge.

7. On this link between radical mechanism, radical finalism, and the eradication of temporality, see Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 36–55. Of particular interest is his statement that “[r]eal duration is that duration which gnaws on things, and leaves on them the mark of its tooth. If everything is in time, everything changes *inwardly*, and the same concrete reality never recurs.” (italics mine), p. 46.

8. Donald W. Sherburne, ed., *A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 48.

9. The importance of this point will become evident in the next chapter in the discussion of the labor theory of value.

10. The result of this viewpoint is a critical sense of difference and distinction and a critical sense of essence.

11. From this point on, all references made to being or thing or animal or person will refer to enduring structured societies of actual entities.

12. It is interesting to read the last line of this passage in light of Whitehead's statement that “The qualities entertained as objects in conceptual activity . . . modify the aesthetic process by which the occasion constitutes itself out of the many streams of feeling received from the past” (MT, 168).

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Ultimately this point reverts back to actual entities as the ultimate facts of process. There can be no emergent spatially or temporally extended societies of entities without such conformation of pattern. Reality is, therefore throughgoing relational embeddedness: societies of entities and societies of societies, and so forth.

2. T. S. Eliot, "The Lovesong of J. Alfred Prufrock," in *Selected Poems* (New York & London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1934), p. 15.

3. This is one of Whitehead's main points in the chapter on "Importance" in MT. Even to say that something has no importance is to attach an importance to it; it is to value it down in the experience. There are no mere matters of fact. Facts are always infused with valuation.

4. I note here that the importance of Marx's designation of human productive activity/ability as "labor" is that it establishes the terminological engagement with political economy and the political economists for the sake of their critique.

5. Ollman, *Alienation*, pp. 99–105.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 138 n.

7. C. J. Arthur, *Dialectics of Labour: Marx and His Relation to Hegel* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 12–19.

8. It should be noted that this passage occurs within a discussion of the way in which capitalism is naturalized by political economists. However, these first premises are, according to Marx, valid. The invalid move made by the political economists occurs when the universal features of the labor process, means of labor, and objects of labor, are assumed to be capital because they appear in the form of capital within this specific historical labor process.

9. See, Moishe Postone, *Time, labor, and social domination: A reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 5–15.

10. I want to point out here that I do not believe that Ollman himself misses this point at all. In fact, his chapter "With words that appear like bats" is a remarkable exposition of precisely this point: that these terms must operate on numerous levels so that we can truly understand capitalist modes of relations as specific forms of the more general relations. See Ollman, *Alienation*, pp. 3–12. Only by way of such understanding can we see what attributes are specific to capitalism and hence nonnecessary features of any process of production, and how some such features enter into direct conflict with and contradiction to the essential features of all processes and hence constitute a self-undermining of the determinate mode.

Additionally, the reader is referred to chapter 2, where I indicated that an important functional similarity between Marx's category of production and Whitehead's category of process is the analytical applicability of the category from the most concrete and specific to the most general. For Whitehead the borders of such range are defined on one end by a single real actual entity itself in its particular act of becoming/being, and on the other end by the most general metaphysical notion of process as the condition of the universe; for Marx such a concept ranges from a specific activity

of a real human individual to the general, natural conditions of human existence. The claim being made here is that such a multileveled applicability is retained when Marx moves from the language of production in general to the language of the labor process.

11. It should be noted here that the specific balance between physical reproduction and creative novelty will vary depending on the development of the forces of production within a given historical social epoch. The point here is that on the ontological level it cannot ever be the case that the reproduction of the physical pole is regnant in the human being. Otherwise it is not *human life*.

12. This, of course, sounds like a universal claim and in one sense it is but it should be remembered that such claims carry with them the fallibility and epoch specificity dictated by speculative metaphysics and therefore are not totalizing in an uncritical manner. Such is also certainly the case with Marx's claims regarding the "eternal," "natural," and "everlasting" conditions of the labor process and of labor. However because this kind of general claim applies specifically to our experience of our own condition, in order for the claim to not apply, the role and conduct of human life would have to alter so as to be unrecognizable to us at present. This, of course implies all manners of contradiction; therefore the claim is genuinely universal in the only way in which any claim can be.

13. It might be useful here to point out that such measure need not necessarily be abstracting. If I am the only one producing that kind of commodity, that is, if my creation is unique, then my labor is the only element of the determination of the social average. From this we may conclude, at very least, that mass production of like commodities necessitates the abstraction of socially necessary labor.

14. I am referring here to Marx's analysis of money as the universal medium of exchange to be found in the chapter on Money in the *Grundrisse*. Although today the standard of value of paper money that used to be set by the value of precious metal has been almost completely abstracted from, it still stands as the basis of the abstraction. Therefore, the form and function of money is essentially the same.

15. Whether we choose to, desire to, or have any need to effect such a translation is a matter for social consideration. See on this point chapter 9.

16. The operative term here is *can*. Strictly speaking the exchange value of a commodity is not a representation of its use value at all. And we might want to say that the processive viewpoint, wherein each individual act of becoming is in an absolutely unique relational configuration to its environment, makes this inequity clear. It could even be argued that seeing this essential difference on the level of the inorganic objects could be a necessary first step to the realization of the gross injustice involved in the sale and purchase of labor power.

17. The importance of this point should not be underestimated. On the metaphysical scale for the purposes of coherent and complete explanation of experience, it is absolutely necessary that being is one, that the composition of reality is the processive activity of actual entities from top to bottom. There can be no exceptions. However, when we move to the scale of the macroontological, the difference between functions takes on a vital importance relative to our own activity in the world. Never do we want to say that there are any "hard lines" between beings, never do we want to

say that there are any distinctions that might imply either nonrelation or separation or independence. But, especially as we view one end of the scale of permanence and change relative to the other end, we need to be able to speak of such difference in no uncertain terms. The dialectics requires that sameness and difference are both necessary and concomitant.

18. This point is at the heart of Marx's repeated criticisms of the Socialists. See POP and CM.

19. We can see in this how the mode of social relations that is capitalism exemplifies the mind/body dualism of substance metaphysics. The capitalist believes that she pays for the laborer's bodily activity and therefore pays fairly. Process metaphysics corrects this: no being is merely physical nor merely conceptual. All being is dipolar. Therefore any given temporal duration of human being can only involve an engagement in the becoming which is that being. The physical activity is necessarily creative. For further discussion of these points see chapter 8 on Misplaced Concreteness.

20. We shall see that the critical approaches to capitalism from within capitalism are many faceted and spring from many sources. In keeping with the processive viewpoint, contradictions will be manifest from within this experiential framework metaphysically, ontologically, epistemologically, ethically, existentially, phenomenologically, and so on; they will be experienced in our physical, psychical, emotional, and intellectual states; they appear in individual, familial, community, national, and international relations, and so forth.

21. The phrase is, of course, a paraphrase of T. S. Eliot's in "Little Gidding." See T. S. Eliot, *Four Quartets* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1943), p. 59.

CHAPTER SIX

1. A question might arise here as to how then alienation is possible. Doesn't wage labor really alienate its own abilities? The answer, of course, is yes. However, labor power is not alienated as essential but as inessential. In other words, it must be taken to be inessential in order to be alienated. When what is essential is treated in real practice as inessential the result can only be the partial or full loss of human essence—a greater or lesser eradication of the human being. This is, certainly, alienation in the most serious sense. See my discussion in chapter 8 on capitalism as an economy of death.

2. See chapter 9.

3. See Bergson, *Creative Evolution*.

4. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics and the Monadology*, trans. George R. Montgomery (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992), p. 67.

5. Whitehead indicates that this is the nature of spatial extension. "There are experiences of joint association which are the spatial experiences. There are the experiences of origination from a past and of determination towards a future. These are temporal experiences" (MT, 103).

6. The preparation of an entity for the prehension of those entities beyond it, refers here to the role that the entity's extensivity plays in the formation of its subjective aim.

7. As indicated earlier in this chapter, I will offer suggestions as to why this is the case in chapter 9.

8. See, Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 3.

9. I am deeply indebted to the work of Judith A. Jones for the tonality and expression of this very important point. See her work, *Intensity*.

10. The extension of this point about the "location" of a temporal segment of process mirrors the previous discussion of societies and levels of dialectical analysis. There are temporalities within temporalities within temporalities, each extension indicating another mode of being. For this reason, analysis of temporal being can, like the analysis of social being, occur on numerous levels.

11. For the development of this point, not merely in reference to the quality/quantity contradiction but many other such related tendencies of capitalism to separate dialectical unities, see chapter 8. If beings really are the actualizations of the social solidarity made possible by the metaphysics of internal relations that is essentially dialectical, then the contemporary tendency to "forget being" may indeed be explained as an ideological manifestation of capital's social relations wherein the dialectical unities are split asunder. But, in keeping with Marx, I am showing throughout this work that this separation is, first of all, really lived (material) and therefore can enter consciousness as such a "forgetting."

12. Moishe Postone has particularly astute observations in this area. In particular his analysis of the "treadmill" effect is a fascinating study of the constitution and reconstitution of socially necessary labor time as a value baseline and the way in which the re-constitution of this baseline serves to hyperextend the effects of exploitation. See his, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*.

13. This, of course, does not mean that no distinction can be made, but rather, indicates that distinction itself must be characterized in a different way. The distinction between past datum and present activity is (1) referent only to a specific given processive-productive activity and (2) emergent from the analysis of what is, at the metaphysical level, seamless process. Thus, we might say that where there is no *real distinction* in the Cartesian or precritical sense, there is indeed distinction emergent in analysis on the physical level.

14. This means that we must be wary of accepting statements that might declare an absolute separation between past (as objective) and present (as subjective). For example, whereas I agree on one level with Gould's claim that "for Marx circumstances or the objective world have no causal efficacy. They must rather be regarded as conditions or presuppositions of purposive human activity. . . . Thus causal efficacy lies only with agents," I would also be want to nuance the statement with a distinction between the appearance of the ontological level and the real creativity which must be operative throughout the universe in process. See Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology*, p. 83.

15. Again, it needs to be indicated here that such designations are fully appropriate only on the ontological level where the analysis of the subjective and objective, and the physical and conceptual is possible. Such abstractions are of course derivative from the metaphysical schema. The full seamlessness of internal relations on the microcosmic or metaphysical scale makes possible the analytic distinction on the macroontological scale.

16. In order to avoid confusion between the very different senses in which Marx and Whitehead use the terminology of *value*, I will try to use the active terms of *valuation* or *valuing* or *evaluation* to indicate the individual's self-constitution within process and retain the term *value* for the strict Marxian sense of capitalist value. When I am forced to use the term *value* in reference to process philosophy I will always place it in quotation marks.

17. In a metaphysical sense it "isn't"—it does not have being as its becoming. This is captured by Whitehead's statement that the actual entity "never really is" (PR, 85).

18. In this regard note Marx's statement that, "Two things are only commensurable if they are of the *same nature*. Products can be measured with the measure of labour—labour time—only because they are, by their nature, *labour*. They are objectified labour" (G, 613).

19. Bolgh, *Dialectical phenomenology*, p. 81.

20. In other words there is an ideological conception of labor itself generated within the social relations that are the laboring conditions of capitalism itself. Thus, within the critique of capitalist labor itself, we can both understand and explain how conceptions of labor that assume that all laboring activity is alienated labor are possible and expected. See my critique of Postone's notion of labor in chapter 5.

21. I should reiterate here that metaphysical creativity could not be such a temporally extended segment. Only on the ontological level can we speak in this manner and in so doing we must understand and remind ourselves constantly that we the feature of such temporally segmented extension of present creative activity emerged out of analysis that is necessarily abstract and therefore cannot adequately represent the concrete fact. We shall return to this baffling point and explicate it further in chapter 9.

22. It would be comforting to say at this point that capitalism would not push toward the logical limits to the extent of threatening the life of its laboring force. Unfortunately however, capitalism is not always so rational nor so proud as to avoid such limits. As it develops and becomes more itself, the tendency through division of labor, cooperation, machinery, and so on is not only to intensify production but also to make labor itself increasingly general in each branch of production and thus make each and every laborer more easily replaceable. It is the dearest wish of capitalism that no one be irreplaceable. With such production increasing devices and practices in place, a "reserve army" of paupers can be kept on hand to replace any labor that falls to capitalism's "logical" excesses (See C, I, 781–794).

23. It is interesting to note the role not only of money as abstract and of credit as a further abstraction of the presence of money, but also, in contemporary capitalism of the speed at which the "idea" of money is transferred electronically. This indeed

seems to be circulation at the speed of thought, or perhaps even faster than the speed of thought.

24. I am deeply indebted to Enrique Dussel's work *Ethics and Community*, trans. Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993) for the expression of labor as "life-blood." The phrase expresses perfectly the ethical implications of capitalism's exchange: the tragedy and indeed "sin" of the theft of human essence.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. This connection is precisely what was demanded by Jürgen Habermas in *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, pp. 338–339. Therefore my response to Habermas's demand is that if he had understood the underlying philosophical framework of Marx's writings, he would have seen that such a "real" connection was already, at least implicitly, present. See my chapter 1.

2. It should be noted that this explicit statement of the labor theory of value is not present in the EPM and only emerges fully in the labor theory of value in C, I. However, as I have maintained both here and in chapter 1, given that we are told to presuppose both wage labor and profit of capital in the opening lines of the section on "Estranged Labor" in EPM, the explanation of capital's profit and its relation to wage labor is implicit. I reintroduce it at this juncture to make the point that if capitalism is the operative mode of social relations, then a multitude of factors play into the alienation of labor from its products.

3. There is an interesting sense in which one could say that we are able to be enslaved to the capitalist wage-labor exchange precisely because we are embodied, physical and physically reproducible beings. We are objectifiable even if our own objectivity is only half the story. The other half, of course, is that we do not appear as objects except by virtue of our self-creation. This dialectical dependency is absolute.

4. There will be a great deal more to be said about such self-consciousness and the role it plays in dialectical thinking, especially as regards the possibility of social relations beyond capitalism. See chapter 9.

5. I believe it would be most interesting to pursue the notion that this self-alienation that Marx describes is really the adequate explanation for and articulation of the phenomenon that Heidegger diagnosed as *Angst*, an awareness of freedom and inauthenticity. The difference here, of course, is that this emotional phenomenon as a feeling of one's activity of self-relation as self-corruption is specific to capitalism or, at very least, takes its most extreme and pernicious form only within capitalism. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, especially pp. 312–348.

6. See chapter 4 on "Being and Doing."

7. Whitehead often makes this point by way of his distinction between causal efficacy and presentational immediacy. For this articulation of the primacy of causal efficacy see S and PR, particularly chapter VIII.

8. I would suggest that many critiques of contemporary capitalist society can be understood as explained by my observations concerning the development of real

alienation and real commodification. For example, the real objectification of human life (especially as self-appropriated) may help us to understand the ease with which a “disciplinary” society of the kind described by Foucault, has been historically installed. See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). Real commodification also goes a long way to explain how many of the more negative developments observed by the members of the Frankfurt School are not only possible but expected developments of capitalism—loss of faith, one-dimensionality, media control and manipulation, and so forth. However, as we shall see, the processive viewpoint itself will ultimately allow us to avoid the ideology of negativity and despair into which so many members of that school were logically forced to spiral. See chapter 9, on “revolutionary consciousness.”

9. This quote is from T. S. Eliot’s “The Hollow Men,” in *Selected Poems*.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. The terms *objective* and *subjective* have been placed in quotation marks here because, as indicated in the explanation that follows, there occurs a shift of our abstractive use of language as we move from the metaphysical to the macroontological levels. Whereas such terminology is inappropriate on the level of the metaphysical it may be appropriate as an indication of the appearance of types of societal beings on the macroontological level. What is, of course, most important is our awareness of the level of abstraction involved as we move from one level to another. Therefore, the quotation marks here serve to remind us of what, given the history of modern philosophy, is so often, and so easily, forgotten.

2. This sense of *eros* is quite beautifully outlined in William Desmond’s article “Being, Determination, and Dialectic,” in *Being and Dialectic: Metaphysics as a Cultural Presence*, eds. William Desmond and Joseph Grange (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), pp. 5–11.

3. The possible exception to the reification of abstraction in the history of substance metaphysics might be Aristotle for whom the physical system was also dynamic system. It is interesting to note, however, how often interpreters render Aristotelian metaphysics quite “modern” by downplaying the relational dynamics in favor of the categorical abstractions. Also interesting is the fact that Marx was never tempted to do so.

4. The ultimate representation of this reduction to commonality within capitalist exchange is, of course, money.

5. For a brief summary of this critique, see chapter 2.

6. Gould, *Marx’s Social Ontology*, p. 18. The final quote within this quote is from G, 453.

7. I say “at least” here because there are forms within the particular and general forms. See the previous chapter on Alienation.

8. This statement should be read in light of the claims in chapter 3 that process philosophy and Marx’s notion of production share a similar subjectivist bias. The individual, even as the sum of its internal relations to other individuals, stands out with a

certain finality in both schemes as the creative force behind the movement of the processive-productive universe.

9. It should be noted that the increasingly abstract designations of value most certainly serve a facilitating role within the economic system. This point is not being disputed and, in fact, the detachability of eternal objects from the particular existents wherein they are exemplified in the data of the actual world makes this abstraction possible. Therefore the abstraction (taken now as conceptual entertainment of possibilities inherent in the data) is the ground of novelty and creativity. The difficulty lies not in the abstraction itself, but in forgetting the necessary link between the abstract quality and the particulars in which it must be exemplified and the subsequent reduction of the concrete to the abstract.

10. There is thus misplaced concreteness even on the level of the commodity. Marx insists on this point where he lists the way in which the commodity in its natural existence is different from its value where he discusses the ways in which labor time is qualitatively different from the commodity (G, 141–143).

11. For a superb discussion of capitalism's ideological valorization of nonbeing, see Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert 1821–1857*, vol. 5 trans. Carol Cosman (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). See also my paper, "Sartre's Flaubert: Literary Criticism and Process-Praxis as the Recovery of Marx's Dialectic" (unpublished) for a discussion of the valorization of nonbeing as antipraxis and antihumanism.

12. Whitehead, "Mathematics and the Good," in Paul Arthur Schlipp, ed., *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1951), p. 674.

13. For reference to these positions see, Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.

14. It is interesting to reflect on the ambiguity of the word *value* at this point. The shift from processive self-creation through aesthetic patterning of data as an achievement of "value" to the leveling down of that "value" by way of capitalism's designation of value is an appropriate reiteration of the point regarding misplaced concreteness. This concrete "value" is reduced to abstract value.

15. For remarkably sobering discussions of U.S. intervention and the internationalization of our economic interests see Noam Chomsky, *Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace* (Boston: South End Press, 1985) and *World Orders Old and New* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

16. The profit gained by the "downsizing" of American labor can be enormous. There is the direct gain achieved by the lower wages paid to Third World labor, but also the money saved by not having to uphold harsh U.S. environmental standards, and further profits achieved by playing First and Third World markets off against one another. For an excellent discussion of tactics of transnational capitalism see Enrique Dussel, *Ethics and Community*, trans. Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), pp. 135–157.

17. Michael Parenti, *Dirty Truths: Reflections on Politics, Media, Ideology, Conspiracy, Ethnic Life and Class Power* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1996). The

figures quoted above are only a small sampling of the long list provided by Parenti that has been gleaned from U.S. Census Bureau, F.B.I., U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Public Health Service reports among others.

18. Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 85.

19. Please note the importance of the difference between the positive and destructive and the positive and creative as it is exemplified in the discussion at the end of this chapter. Capitalism is positive because it emerges from the creativity of the processive universe but it is still destructive. This is the ground of the dialectical nature of capitalism itself as the source of its own overcoming.

20. Holly Sklar, *Chaos or Community? Seeking Solutions, not Scapegoats for Bad Economics* (Boston: South End Press, 1995), p. 5.

21. Ibid.

22. Eric Wahlgren, "Spreading the Yankee Way of Pay," *Business Week*, April 2001.

23. I have always found this to be a most effective phrase for describing the results of alienation, abstraction, misplaced concreteness, and so on. I first encountered it reading Aaron Copeland who described twelve-tone composition in the following manner: "One gets the notion that these boys are starting again from the beginning, with the separate tone and the separate sonority. Notes are strewn about like *disjecta membra*; there is an end to continuity in the old sense and an end to thematic relationships. . . . The so-to-speak disrelation of unrelated tones is the way I might describe it." See Aaron Copeland, *Copeland on Music* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1960), p. 48. I was later not surprised to find that Marx himself used this term in describing capitalist laborers as "*disjecta membra poetae* ready to hand, and only waiting to be collected together." See Capital, vol. 1, p. 485.

24. See for an example of this position, Alfred Jules Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic* (New York: Dover Publications, 1952).

25. Another example of the one-sidedness of philosophic thought is found by Whitehead himself in "contemporary" (modern) epistemology's attempt to determine components of experience in abstraction from the subject and in the assumption that sensation is the primary mode of experience. Such erroneous assumptions are the reason he expresses primary experience in his schema as "feeling" that preserves both subjective form and apprehension of the object. There are, on such a scheme, no *disjecta membra* (see AI, 220–251). See also, chapters on "Nature Lifeless" and "Nature Alive" in MT, 127–169. Notable also in this regard is his enigmatic statement appearing both in AI and in PR that "it is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true." With an understanding of the processive viewpoint this statement is, as Whitehead says, "almost a tautology" (See AI, 244 and PR, 259.)

26. It should be pointed out that no thought escapes manifesting itself more or less ideologically in this regard. No thought at present can escape being an expression of capitalist social relations because all thought at present is necessarily an objectification of those social relations. Marx knew this very well when he criticized the one-sided analyses of the political economists and the utopian visions of the socialists and this is

true for us as well. But what we shall explore in the next chapter is how such a statement can be true and how simultaneously the critique of one-sided thought is possible.

27. This topic of abstract, one-sided thought in capitalism could be, of course, a book unto itself and unfortunately can only be touched on in the most preliminary way here. Its full treatment, in addition to expansion on the subjects mentioned, would also require an exploration into the role of the mass media in the propagation and transmission of abstract conceptions. I should note, however, that a fuller discussion of abstract freedom, equality, individuality, and community and my expression of their concrete forms awaits the final chapter. I have developed some thought on the subject of freedom in my article “Capitalism and the Possibility of Freedom” in *Values in the Age of Globalization* (forthcoming).

CHAPTER NINE

1. Portions of this chapter have been reproduced with the permission of the publisher from my article entitled, “Process Philosophy and the Possibility of Critique,” *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. 15, no. 1, 2001, Penn State University Press, pp. 33–49.

2. Regarding the value of the human being as measured in money, the money fetish, and the inversions produced by that fetish, see EPM, 135–140. Of particular interest is Marx’s description of money as “[t]he overturning and confounding of all human and natural qualities, the fraternization of impossibilities—the *divine* power of money—lies in its *character* as men’s estranged, alienating and self-disposing *species-nature*. Money is the alienated *ability of mankind*” (EPM, 138). Money is able to invert the world and turn everything into its opposite precisely because it is itself the alienated ability of mankind: the initial inversion of essence from which the other inversions flow. Regarding the contrast between adventures and anaesthesia, see AI, Part IV: Civilization, especially chapters XVII–XX, 252–298.

3. It might be an interesting and fruitful project to pursue the notion of our forgetfulness of being that appears in Heidegger’s texts through this more radical interpretation. It might be claimed that such forgetfulness is a direct function of our alienated and alienating social practices—that such forgetfulness is a kind of existential ideology, a philosophical symptom of the reduction of essential human capacity to inessential commodity value that is the very life and “being” of capitalism. As a function of carrying out social relations that are primarily external relations (value as the mediator of human relations), we pull ourselves away from (alienate ourselves from) the internal relations that are necessarily the *being and creativity* of the processive universe. For examples of Heidegger’s views on our forgetfulness of being see Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1959); *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975); *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971).

4. Of course, according to the philosophy of internal relations, we need to see views of substantial independence, mechanism, private morals, psychology, the

dichotomy between facts and values, and so forth, as expressions of capitalism's form of social relations. They are various manifestations of the same alienated productive activity.

5. The concomitance of physical and mental poles in the Whiteheadian schema should remind the reader of the concomitance of intuitions and concepts in the Kantian scheme, expressed in the famous phrase, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 93. The difference, of course, is that Whitehead moves the interdependence of the features of inherited data and organization of that data to the metaphysical level to account for permanence and change as it appears in the fabric of our experience.

6. It should be noted that the discussion here of the abstracted phase of conformal feeling is not meant to imply that such a phase could, in the concrete, ever occur "alone." The concrete becoming of an actual entity is always dipolar and atemporal. This discussion is for purposes of analytic clarity only. It is a discussion that can only occur within the genetic division.

7. For a superb treatment of these notions see Jorge Luis Nobo, *Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).

8. I am deeply indebted to Russel Kleinbach's work in *Marx Via Process* wherein he delineates a Whiteheadian theory of human consciousness and explicates its importance for understanding a Marxian theory of freedom.

9. In this regard see also my previous discussion in chapter 3 on dialectical materialism.

10. See Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, pp. 19–34.

11. See Noam Chomsky, *The Chomsky Reader*, ed. James Peck (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), pp. 121–136. The notion of "the manufacture of consent" was, Chomsky points out, coined by Walter Lippmann to indicate a "revolution" in "the practice of democracy" (p. 136). Needless to say, what Lippmann saw as a great advance, Chomsky sees as fundamentally antithetical to freedom.

12. See chapter 6 on time. We would do well to remember the infamous realists of the Platonic dialogues, Thrasymachus in *Republic* and Callicles in *Georgias*.

13. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 632.

14. Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology*, pp. 4–5.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

17. See Bologh, *Dialectical phenomenology*, p. 92.

18. Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 235. The quotations within Buck-Morss's text come from Gershom Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism, and Other Essays in Jewish Spirituality* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 13, 46.

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