THE TESTAMENT OF ADOLF HITLER 


A.K.A. THE HITLER - BORMANN DOCUMENTS 

This is the last document sent out of the bunker. Five days 
later, all passage from Berlin was blocked and the final 
siege began. These are the last words of Hitler. 

"It is necessary that I should die for my people; but my spirit 
will rise from the grave and the people will know I was 
right." -Adolf Hitler 

These documents were recorded from February 4 th , 1945 
to April 2 nd , 1945. 


Churchill seems to regard himself as a second Pitt. What a 
hope! In 1793, Pitt was thirty-four years old. Churchill 
unfortunately is an old man, capable, and only just capable 
at that, of carrying out the orders of that madman, Roosevelt. 
In any case, the situations are in no way comparable. Take 
your mind back for a moment to the conditions in Pitt's time. 
From England's point of view, he was perfectly right in 
refusing to have any truck with Napoleon. By maintaining, as 
he did, a firm attitude under impossible conditions, he was 
safeguarding for his country such chance as it had of playing 
the role that subsequently fell to its lot in the nineteenth 
century. It was a policy designed to preserve the existence 
of his country. Churchill, by refusing to come to terms with 
me, has condemned his country to a policy of suicide. He 
has made the same mistakes as those generals make who 
wage a war according to the principles of the preceding war. 
There are now elements for which it is impossible to fit into 
such a scheme of things. The crucial new factor is the 
existence of those two giants, the United States and Russia. 



Pitt's England ensured the balance of world power by 
preventing the hegemony of Europe - by preventing 
Napoleon, that is, from attaining his goal. Churchill's 
England, on the other hand, should have allowed the 
unification of Europe, if it wished to preserve that same 
balance of power. 

At the beginning of this war I did my utmost to act as though 
I believed Churchill to be capable of grasping the truth of this 
great policy; and in his lucid moments he was indeed, 
capable of grasping it. But for a long time now he has been 
bound hand and foot to the Jewish-chariot. My object in 
trying to come to terms with England was to avoid creating 
an irreparable situation in the West. Later, when I attacked 
eastwards and lanced' the communist abscess, I hoped 
thereby to rekindle a spark of common sense in the minds of 
the Western Powers. I gave them the chance, without lifting 
a finger, of making a contribution to an act of catharsis, in 
which they could have safely left the task of disinfecting the 
West in our hands alone. But the hatred felt by these 
hypocrites for a man of good faith is stronger than their 
sense of self-preservation. I had underestimated the power 
of Jewish domination over Churchill's England. They 
preferred, indeed, to perish by default, rather than to admit 
National Socialism to their midst. Under pressure, they might 
have tolerated a facade of anti-Semitism on our part. But our 
absolute determination to eradicate Jewish power root and 
branch throughout the world was far too strong meat for their 
delicate stomachs to digest! Pitt's genius lay in the 
implementation of a realistic policy, in harmony with the 
conditions of the epoch, which allowed his country to make a 
truly extraordinary recovery and which ensured for it world 
supremacy in the nineteenth century. The servile imitation of 
this policy that Churchill is now pursuing - and with a 
complete disregard for the fact that conditions are not in the 



least the same - is a sheer absurdity. The fact is that the 
world has progressed since Pitt's day! For a whole century, 
changes, it is true, came slowly; but the first war increased 
the pace, and this war has led us to a presentation of the 
bills and a final settlement! 

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, from the point of 
power, Europe alone counted. The great Asiatic empires had 
fallen into a sleep that resembled the sleep of death. The 
New World was still nothing more than an excrescence on 
the end of the old, and no one could reasonably have 
foreseen the prodigious destiny that awaited the thirteen 
British colonies that had just gained their freedom ... 

Thirteen! I'm not superstitious, but that story tempts me to 
become so! That new State of four million inhabitants, which 
grew so immeasurably in the course of a hundred years that 
at the beginning of the twentieth century it had already 
become a world Power! During the decisive period between 
1930 and 1940, the situation was quite different from that 
which obtained at the time of Pitt and Napoleon. Europe, 
exhausted by a great war, had lost her pride of place, and 
her role as leader was no longer recognized. It was still one 
of the centers of attraction on earth, but one which was 
steadily losing its importance in the face of the growing might 
of the United States of America, of the Russo-Asiatic 
colossus and of the Empire of the Rising Sun. If fate had 
granted to an ageing and enfeebled Britain a new Pitt 
instead of this Jew-ridden, half American drunkard, the new 
Pitt would at once have recognized that Britain's traditional 
policy of balance of power would now have to be applied on 
a different scale, and this time on a worldwide scale. Instead 
of maintaining, creating and adding fuel to European rivalries 
Britain ought to do her utmost to encourage and bring about 
a unification of Europe. Allied to a united Europe, she would 
then still retain the chance of being able to play the part of 



arbiter in world affairs. Everything that is happening makes 
one think that Providence is now punishing Albion for her 
past crimes, the crimes that raised her to the power she was. 
The advent of Churchill, at a period that is decisive for both 
Britain and Europe, is the punishment chosen by 
Providence. For the degenerate elite of Britain, he's just the 
very man they want; and it is in the hands of this senile 
clown to decide the fate of a vast empire and, at the same 
time, of all Europe. It is, I think, an open question whether 
the British people, in spite of the degeneration of the 
aristocracy, has preserved those qualities that have hitherto 
justified British world domination. For my own part, I doubt it; 
because there does not seem to have been any popular 
reaction to the errors committed by the nation's leaders. And 
yet there have been many occasions when Britain could well 
have boldly set forth on a new and more fruitful course. 

Had she so wished, Britain could have put an end to the 
war at the beginning of 1941. In the skies over London she 
had demonstrated to the entire world her will to resist, and 
on her credit side she had the humiliating defeats that she 
had inflicted on the Italians in North Africa. The traditional 
Britain would have made peace. But the Jews would have 
none of it. And their lackeys, Churchill and Roosevelt, were 
there to prevent it. 

Peace then, however, would have allowed us to prevent the 
Americans from meddling in European affairs. Under the 
guidance of the Reich, Europe would speedily have become 
unified. Once the Jewish poison had been eradicated, 
unification would have been an easy matter. France and 
Italy, each defeated in turn at an interval of a few months by 
the two Germanic Powers, would have been well out of it. 
Both would have had to renounce their inappropriate 
aspirations to greatness. At the same time they would have 
had to renounce their pretensions in North Africa and the 



Near East; and that would have allowed Europe to pursue a 
bold policy of friendship towards Islam. As for Britain, 
relieved of all European cares, she could have devoted 
herself to the well being of her Empire. And lastly, Germany, 
her rear secure, could have thrown herself heart and soul 
into her essential task, the ambition of my life and the raison 
d'etre of National Socialism - the destruction of Bolshevism. 
This would have entailed the conquest of wide spaces in the 
East, and these in their turn would have ensured the future 
well being of the German people. 

The laws of nature follow a logic that does not necessarily 
always conform to our own ideas of logic. We ourselves 
were disposed to compromise. We were ready to throw our 
forces into the scales for the preservation of the British 
Empire; and all that, mark you, at a time when, to tell the 
truth, I feel much more sympathetically inclined to the 
lowliest Hindu than to any of these arrogant islanders. Later 
on, the Germans will be pleased that they did not make any 
contribution to the survival of an outdated state of affairs for 
which the world of the future would have found it hard to 
forgive them. We can with safety make one prophesy: 
whatever the outcome of this war, the British Empire is at an 
end. It has been mortally wounded. The future of the British 
people is to die of hunger and tuberculosis in their cursed 
island. British obstinacy and the desperate resistance being 
put up by the Reich have nothing in common. In the first 
place Britain had a freedom of choice, and nothing forced 
her to go to war. Yet, not only did she go to war, but she 
actually provoked war. I need hardly say that the Poles, had 
they not been urged on by the British and French war 
mongers (who were themselves spurred on by the Jews), 
would certainly not have felt themselves called upon to 
commit suicide. Even so, and even after having made this 
initial error, Britain could have pulled her chestnuts out of the 



fire, either after the liquidation of Poland or after the defeat of 
France. It would not, of course, have been very honorable on 
her part to do so; but in matters of this kind British sense of 
honor is not too particular. All she had to do was to place the 
blame for her defection squarely on the shoulders of her ex- 
allies-just as she and France did with Belgium in 1940, and, 
furthermore, we ourselves would have helped her to save 
face. At the beginning of 1941, after her successes in North 
Africa had re-established her prestige, she had an even 
more favorable opportunity of withdrawing from the game 
and concluding a negotiated peace with us. Why, you may 
well ask, did she prefer to obey the orders of her Jewish and 
American allies, people, indeed, who were more voracious 
than even the worst of her enemies? I will tell you; Britain 
was not waging her own war, she was waging that which 
had been imposed on her by her implacable allies. 

Germany, on the other hand, had no option. Once we had 
declared our desire of at last uniting all Germans in one 
great Reich and of ensuring for them a real independence - 
in other words, freedom to live their own lives - all our 
enemies at once rose against us. War became inevitable if 
for no other reason that in order to avoid it we should have 
been compelled to betray the fundamental interests of the 
German people. As far as our people were concerned we 
could not and would not be content with the mere semblance 
of independence. That sort of thing is all right for the Swedes 
and the Swiss, who are always prepared to subscribe to 
dubious and tortuous formulae, provided that they can at the 
same timeline their pockets. Nor, for that matter could the 
Weimar Republic lay claim to any more worthy pretensions: 
That, however, is not an ambition worthy of the Third Reich. 

We were, then, condemned to wage war - some time or 
other; and our sole preoccupation was to choose the least 
unfavorable moment. And once we were committed, of 
course, there could be no question of a withdrawal. It is not 



to the doctrines of National Socialism alone that our 
adversaries take exception. They hate National Socialism 
because through it the qualities of the German people have 
been exalted. They therefore seek the destruction of the 
German people - of that there can be no shadow of doubt. 
For once in a way, hatred has proved to be stronger than 
hypocrisy. We can only express our thanks to our enemies 
for having thus clearly exposed their minds to us. To this 
all-embracing hatred we can retort only by means of total 
war. Fighting for our very survival, we are fighting 
desperately; and whatever happens, we shall fight to the 
death to save our lives. Germany will emerge from this war 
stronger than ever before, and Britain more enfeebled than 
ever. History shows that for Germany misfortune and 
adversity often constitute an indispensable prelude to a great 
renaissance. The sufferings of the German people - and in 
this war they have suffered incomparably more than any 
other people - are the very things that, if Providence wills, 
will help us to rise superior to the heady influence of victory. 
And should Providence abandon us, in spite of our sacrifices 
and our resolute steadfastness, it only means that Fate is 
subjecting us to ever greater trials, in order to give us the 
chance to confirm our right to live. After fifty-four months of 
titanic struggle, waged on both sides with unexampled fury, 
the German people now finds itself alone, facing a coalition 
sworn to destroy it. War is raging everywhere along our 
frontiers. It is coming closer and ever closer. Our enemies 
are gathering all their forces for the final assault. Their object 
is no merely to defeat us in battle but to crush and annihilate 
us Their object is to destroy our Reich, to sweep our 
Weltanschauung from the face of the earth, to enslave the 
German people - as a punishment for their loyalty to National 
Socialism. We have reached the final quarter of an hour. The 
situation is serious, very serious. It seems even to be 
desperate. We might very easily give way to fatigue, to 



exhaustion, we might allow ourselves to become 
discouraged to an extent that blinds us to the weaknesses of 
our enemies. But these weaknesses are there, for all that. 

We have facing us an incongruous coalition, drawn together 
by hatred and jealousy and cemented by the panic with 
which the national socialist doctrine fills this Jew-ridden 
motley. Face to face with this amorphous monster, our one 
chance is to depend on ourselves and ourselves alone; to 
oppose this heterogeneous rabble with a national, 
homogeneous entity, animated by a courage that no 
adversity will be able to shake. A people that resists as the 
German people is now resisting can never be consumed in a 
witches' cauldron of this kind. On the contrary, it will emerge 
from the crucible with its soul more steadfast, more intrepid 
than ever. Whatever reverses we may suffer in the days that 
lie ahead of us, the German people will draw fresh strength 
from them; and whatever may happen today, it will live to 
know a glorious tomorrow. 

The will to exterminate which goads these dogs in the 
pursuit of their quarry gives us no option; it indicates the path 
that we must follow - the only path that remains open to us. 
We must continue the struggle with the fury of desperation 
and without a glance over our shoulders; with our faces 
always to the enemy, we must defend step by step the soil of 
our fatherland. While we keep fighting, there is always hope, 
and that, surely, should be enough to forbid us to think that 
all is already lost. No game is lost until the final whistle. And 
if, in spite of everything, the Fates have decreed that we 
should once more in the course of our history be crushed by 
forces superior to our own, then let us go down with our 
heads high and secure in the knowledge that the honor of 
the German people remains without blemish. A desperate 
fight remains for all time a shining example. Let us 
remember Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans! In any 



case, we are not of the stuff that goes tamely to the 
slaughter like sheep. They may well exterminate us. But they 
will never lead us to the slaughterhouse! No! There is no 
such thing as a desperate situation! Think how many 
examples of a turn of fortune the history of the German 
people affords! During the Seven Years' War Frederick 
found himself reduced to desperate straits. During the winter 
of 1762 he had decided that if no change occurred by a 
certain date fixed by him, he would end his life by taking 
poison. Then, a few days before the date he had chosen, 
behold, the Tsarina died unexpectedly, and the whole 
situation was miraculously reversed. Like the great 
Frederick, we, too, are combating a coalition, and a coalition, 
remember is not a stable entity. It exists only by the will of a 
handful of men. If Churchill were suddenly to disappear, 
everything could change in a flash! The British aristocracy 
might perhaps become conscious of the abyss opening 
before them - and might well experience a serious shock! 
These British, for whom, indirectly, we have been fighting 
and who would enjoy the fruits of our victory... We can still 
snatch victory in the final sprint! May we be granted the time 
to do so! 

All we must do is to refuse to go down. For the German 
people, the simple fact of continued independent life would 
be a victory. And that alone would be sufficient justification 
for this war, which would not have been in vain. It was in any 
case unavoidable; the enemies of German National 
Socialism forced it upon me as long ago as January 1933. 

Any people that desire to prosper should remain linked to 
their own soil. A man should never lose contact with the soil 
upon which he had the honor of being born. He should not 
go away except for a short while and always with the 
intention of returning. The British who became colonizers of 
necessity, and who, indeed, were great colonizers, have 



generally obeyed this rule. As far as continental people are 
concerned, I am sure that it is important that they should 
expand only in those directions where it is certain that the 
soil of conquerors and conquered are contiguous. 

This need to become properly en-rooted applies to all 
continental peoples and particularly, in my opinion to the 
German people. And that most probably explains why we 
have never really felt the urge to become colonizers. A 
glance at history, both ancient and modern, will show that 
overseas enterprises have always in the long run 
impoverished those who undertook them. They have all, in 
the end, been exhausted by their efforts; and, in the 
inevitable nature of things, they have all succumbed to 
forces to which either they have themselves given birth or 
which they have themselves re-awakened. What better 
example of this than the Greeks? What was true for the 
ancient Greeks remains equally true for all Europeans in 
modern times. To prosper, a people must concentrate its 
efforts on its own country. A scrutiny of any reasonably long 
period of history will reveal facts that confirm the truth of this 
contention. Spain, France and Britain have all enfeebled, 
devitalized and drained themselves in these vain colonial 
enterprises. The continents to which Spain and Britain gave 
birth, which they created piece by piece, have today 
acquired a completely independent way of life and a 
completely egoistical outlook. Even so, they are but artificial 
worlds, with neither a soul, a culture or a civilization of their 
own; and judged from that point of view, they are nothing 
more than excrescences. It is, of course, possible to make 
out a case for the success achieved in peopling continents 
that before had been empty. The United States and Australia 
afford good examples. Success, certainly - but only on the 
material side. They are artificial edifices, bodies without age, 
of which it is impossible to say whether they are still in a 



state of infancy or whether they have already been touched 
by senility. In those continents that were inhabited, failure 
has been even more marked. In them, the white races have 
imposed their will by force, and the influence they have had 
on the native inhabitants has been negligible; the Hindus 
have remained Hindus, the Chinese have remained 
Chinese, and the Moslem's are still Moslem's. There have 
been no profound transformations, and such changes as 
have occurred are less marked in the religious field, 
notwithstanding the tremendous efforts of the Christian 
missionaries, than in any other. There have been a few odd 
conversions the sincerity of which is open to considerable 
doubt-except, perhaps in the case of a few simpletons and 
mentally deficient. The white races did, of course, give some 
things to the natives, and they were the worst gifts that they 
could possibly have made, those plagues of our own modern 
world-materialism, fanaticism, alcoholism and syphilis. For 
the rest, since these peoples possessed qualities of their 
own which were superior to anything we could offer them, 
they have remained essentially unchanged. Where 
imposition by force was attempted, the results were even 
more disastrous, and common sense, realizing the futility of 
such measures, should preclude any recourse to their 
introduction. One solitary success must be conceded to the 
colonizers: everywhere they have succeeded in arousing 
hatred, a hatred that urges these peoples, awakened from 
their slumbers by us, to rise and drive us out. Indeed, it looks 
almost as though they had awakened solely and simply for 
that purpose! Can anyone assert that colonization has 
increased the number of Christians in the world? Where are 
those conversions en masse which mark the success of 
Islam? Here and there one finds isolated islets of Christians, 
Christians in name, that is, rather than by conviction; and 
that is the sum total of the successes of this magnificent 
Christian religion, the guardian of supreme Truth! 



Taking everything into consideration, Europe's policy of 
colonization has ended in a complete failure. I have not 
forgotten the one instance of apparent success, but a 
success that is purely material, and it is of that monster 
which calls itself the United States that I wish to talk. And 
monster is the only possible name for it! At a time when the 
whole of Europe - their own mother - is fighting desperately 
to ward off the bolshevist peril, the United States, guided by 
the Jew-ridden Roosevelt, can think of nothing better to do 
than to place their fabulous material resources at the 
disposal of these Asiatic barbarians, who are determined to 
strangle her. Looking back, I am deeply distressed at the 
thought of those millions of Germans, men of good faith, who 
emigrated to the United States and who are now the 
backbone of the country. For these men, mark you, are not 
merely good Germans, lost to their fatherland; rather, they 
have become enemies, more implacably hostile than any 
others. The German emigrant retains, it is true, his qualities 
of industry and hard work, but he very quickly loses his soul. 
There is nothing more unnatural than a German who has 
become an expatriate. In the future we must guard against 
these hemorrhages of German blood. It is eastwards, only 
and always eastwards, that the veins of our race must 
expand. It is the direction which Nature herself has decreed 
for the expansion of the German peoples. The rigorous 
climate with which the East confronts them allows them to 
retain their qualities as hardy and virile men; and the vivid 
contrasts they find there helps to keep fresh their love and 
their longing for their own country. Transplant a German to 
Kiev, and he remains a perfect German. But transplant him 
to Miami, and you make a degenerate of him - in other 
words, an American. 

Since colonization is not an activity that Germans feel called 
upon to pursue, Germany should never make common 



cause with the colonizing nations and should always abstain 
from supporting them in their colonial aspirations. What we 
want is a Monroe doctrine in Europe. 'Europe for the 
Europeans!' a doctrine, the corollary of which should be that 
Europeans refrain from meddling in the affairs of other 
continents. 

The descendants of the convicts in Australia should inspire 
in us nothing but a feeling of supreme indifference. If their 
vitality is not strong enough to enable them to increase at a 
rate proportionate to the size of the territories they occupy, 
that is their own look out, and it is no use their appealing to 
us for help. For my own part, I have no objection at all to 
seeing the surplus populations of prolific Asia being drawn, 
as to a magnet, to their empty spaces. Let them all work out 
their own salvation! And let me repeat - it is nothing to do 
with us. 

I have sometimes asked myself whether we were not wrong, 
in 1940, not to have drawn Spain into the war. It would have 
been too easy for words to do so, for Spain was burning to 
follow Italy's example and become a member of the Victors' 
Club. Franco, of course, had very exaggerated ideas on the 
value of Spanish intervention. Nevertheless I believe that, in 
spite of the systematic sabotage perpetrated by his Jesuit 
brother-in-law, he would have agreed to make common 
cause with us on quite reasonable conditions - the promise 
of a little bit of France as a sop to his pride and a substantial 
slice of Algeria as a real, material asset. But as Spain had 
really nothing tangible to contribute, I came to the conclusion 
that her direct intervention was not desirable. It is true that it 
would have allowed us to occupy Gibraltar. On the other 
hand, Spain's entry into the war would certainly have added 
many kilometers to the Atlantic coastline that we would have 
had to defend - from Saint Sebastian to Cadiz. Then there 



was the further possibility of a renewal of the civil war, 
fanned by the British. We might thus have found ourselves 
bound for better or for worse to a regime for which I have 
now, if possible, less sympathy than ever, a regime of 
capitalist profiteers, puppets of the clerical gang! I shall 
never forgive Franco for not having reconciled the Spaniards 
once the civil war was over, for having ostracized the 
Phalangists, whom Spain has to thank for such aid as we 
gave her, and for having treated like bandits former foes, 
who were very far from all being Reds. To put half a country 
beyond the pale of the law while a minority of pillagers enrich 
themselves, with the blessing of the priesthood, at the 
expense of the rest is no solution at all. I am quite sure that 
very few of the so-called Reds in Spain were really 
Communists. We were badly deceived, for, had I known the 
real state of affairs, I would never have allowed our aircraft 
to bombard and destroy a starving population and at the 
same time re-establish the Spanish clergy in all their horrible 
privileges. 

To sum up, by ensuring that the Iberian Peninsula remained 
neutral, Spain has already rendered us the one service in 
this conflict that she had in her power to render. Having Italy 
on our backs is a sufficient burden in all conscience; and 
whatever may be the qualities of the Spanish soldier, Spain 
herself, in her state of poverty and unpreparedness, would 
have been a heavy liability rather than an asset. This war 
will, I think, have clearly demonstrated at least one thing - 
the irremediable decadence of the Latin countries. They 
have shown beyond dispute that they are no longer in the 
running and that they therefore no longer have the right to 
participate in the settlement of the world's affairs. The 
easiest thing would have been to occupy Gibraltar with our 
Commandos and with Franco's connivance, but without any 
declaration of war on his part. I am convinced that Britain 
would not have seized this as a pretext for declaring war on 



Spain. She would have been only too pleased to see Spain 
continue to remain non-belligerent. And from our own point 
of view, this would have eliminated all danger of any British 
landing on the coasts of Portugal. It was one of the 
achievements of National Socialism that it was the first to 
face the Jewish problem in a realistic manner. The Jews 
themselves have always aroused anti-Semitism. Throughout 
the centuries, all the peoples of the world, from the ancient 
Egyptians to ourselves, have reacted in exactly the same 
way. The time comes when they become tired of being 
exploited by the disgusting Jew. They give a heave and 
shake themselves, like an animal trying to rid itself of its 
vermin. They react brutally and finally they revolt. It is an 
instinctive reaction, a reaction of repugnance against a 
stranger who refuses to adapt himself and become part of 
the whole, a parasite that clings to the host, imposes on it 
and exploits it to the utmost. By nature, the Jew is a parasite 
that cannot and will not be assimilated. A distinguishing 
feature of the Jew is that, unlike other foreigners, he 
everywhere claims all the rights of citizenship in the 
community that shelters him - and at the same time remains 
always a Jew. He regards it as his right to be allowed to run 
with the hare and hunt with the hounds; and he is the only 
man in the whole world to claim such an extravagant 
privilege. National Socialism has tackled the Jewish problem 
by action and not by words. It has risen in opposition to the 
Jewish determination to dominate the world; it has attacked 
them everywhere and in every sphere of activity; it has flung 
them out of the positions they have usurped; it has pursued 
them in every direction, determined to purge the German 
world of the Jewish poison. For us, this has been an 
essential process of disinfection, which we have prosecuted 
to its ultimate limit and without which we should ourselves 
have been asphyxiated and destroyed. With the success of 
the operation in Germany, there was a good chance of 



extending it further afield. This was, in fact, inevitable, for 
good health normally triumphs over disease. Quick to realize 
the danger, the Jews decided to stake their all in the life and 
death struggle which they launched against us. National 
Socialism had to be destroyed, whatever the cost and even if 
the whole world were destroyed in the process. Never before 
has there been a war so typically and at the same time so 
exclusively Jewish. I have at least compelled them to 
discard their masks. And even if our endeavors should end 
in failure, it will only be a temporary failure. For I have 
opened the eyes of the whole world to the Jewish peril. One 
of the consequences of our attitude has been to cause the 
Jew "to become aggressive. As a matter of fact, he is less 
dangerous in that frame of mind than when he is sly and 
cunning. The Jew who openly avows his race is a hundred 
times preferable to the shameful type, which claims to differ 
from you only in the matter of religion. If I win this war, I shall 
put an end to Jewish world power and I shall deal the Jews a 
mortal blow from which they will not recover. But if I lose the 
war, that does not by any means mean that their triumph is 
assured, for then they themselves will lose their heads. They 
will become so arrogant that they will evoke a violent 
reaction against them. They will, of course, continue to run 
with the hare and hunt with the hounds, to claim the 
privileges of citizenship in every country and, without 
sacrificing their pride, continue to remain, above all, 
members of the Chosen Race. The shifty, the shamefaced 
Jew will disappear and will be replaced by a Jew 
vainglorious and bombastic; and the latter will stink just as 
objectionably as the former - and perhaps even more so. 
There is, then, no danger in the circumstances that anti- 
Semitism will disappear, for it is the Jews themselves who 
add fuel to its flames and see that it is kept well stoked. 
Before the opposition to it can disappear, the malady itself 
must disappear. And from that point of view, you can rely on 



the Jews: as long as they survive, anti-Semitism will never 
fade. In saying this, I promise you I am quite free of all racial 
hatred: It is, in any case, undesirable that one race should 
mix with other races. Except for a few gratuitous successes, 
which I am prepared to admit, systematic crossbreeding has 
never produced good results. Its desire to remain racially 
pure is a proof of the vitality and good health of a race. Pride 
in one's own race - and that does not imply contempt for 
other races - is also a normal and healthy sentiment. I have 
never regarded the Chinese or the Japanese as being 
inferior to ourselves. They belong to ancient civilizations, and 
I admit freely that their past history is superior to our own. 
They have the right to be proud of their past, just as we have 
the right to be proud of the civilization to which we belong. 
Indeed, I believe the more steadfast the Chinese and the 
Japanese remain in their pride of race, the easier I shall find 
it to get on with them. This pride of race is a quality that the 
German, fundamentally, does not possess. The reason for 
this is that for these last three centuries the country has 
been torn by internal dissension and religious wars and has 
been subjected to a variety of foreign influences, to the 
influence, for example, of Christianity - for Christianity is not 
a natural religion for the Germans, but a religion that has 
been imported and which strikes no responsive chord in their 
hearts and is foreign to the inherent genius of the race. 

When pride of race manifests itself in a German, as it 
sometimes does and in a most aggressive form, it is in 
reality nothing more than a compensatory reaction for that 
inferiority complex from which so many Germans suffer. 

This, I need hardly say, does not apply to the Prussians. 
From the time of Frederick the Great they have possessed 
that quiet and simple pride which is the hallmark of people 
who are sure of themselves and who have no need of 
ostentation to bear witness to what they are. Thanks to those 
qualities that are inherently theirs, the Prussians were able, 



as they well showed, to create a united Germany. National 
Socialism has tried to give to all Germans that pride which 
hitherto has been possessed by the Prussians alone among 
us. The Austrians, too, have in their blood a pride very akin 
to that of the Prussians, a pride born of the fact that for 
centuries they have never been dominated by any other 
race, but had, on the contrary, been for a very long time the 
ones who gave orders and were obeyed. They possess the 
accumulated experience of domination and power, and to 
that is attributable that panache of Atticism, which no one 
can gainsay. In its crucible National Socialism will melt and 
fuse all those qualities which are characteristic of the 
German soul; and from it will emerge the modern German- 
industrious, conscientious, sure of himself yet simple withal, 
proud not of himself or what he is, but of his membership of 
a great entity which will evoke the admiration of other 
peoples. This feeling of corporate superiority does not in any 
way imply the slightest desire to crush and overwhelm 
others. We have, I know, on occasions exaggerated our cult 
of this sentiment, but that was necessary at the outset and 
we were compelled to jostle the Germans pretty roughly in 
order to set their feet on the right road. In the nature of 
things, too violent a thrust in any direction invariably 
provokes an equally violent thrust in the opposite direction. 
All this, of course, cannot be accomplished in a day. It 
requires the slow-moving pressure of time. Frederick the 
Great is the real creator of the Prussian type. In actual fact, 
two or three generations elapsed, before the type 
crystallized and before the Prussian type became a 
characteristic common to every Prussian. Our racial pride is 
not aggressive except in so far as the Jewish race is 
concerned. We use the term Jewish race as a matter of 
convenience, for in reality and from the genetic point of view 
there is no such thing as the Jewish race. There does, 
however, exist a community, to which, in fact, the term can 



be applied and the existence of which is admitted by the 
Jews themselves. It is the spiritually homogeneous group, to 
membership of which all Jews throughout the world 
deliberately adhere, regardless of their whereabouts and of 
their country of domicile; and it is this group of human beings 
to which we give the title Jewish race. It is not, mark you, a 
religious entity; although the Hebrew religion serves them as 
a pretext to present themselves as such; nor indeed is it 
even a collection of groups, united by the bonds of a 
common religion. The Jewish race is first and foremost an 
abstract race of the mind. It has its origins, admittedly, in the 
Hebrew religion, and that religion, too, has had a certain 
influence in molding its general characteristics; for all that, 
however, it is in no sense of the word a purely religious 
entity, for it accepts on equal terms both the most 
determined atheists and the most sincere, practicing 
believers. To all this must be added the bond that has been 
forged by centuries of persecution - though the Jews 
conveniently forget that it is they themselves who provoked 
these persecutions. Nor does Jewry possess the 
anthropological characteristics that would stamp them as a 
homogeneous race. It cannot, however, be denied that every 
Jew in the world has some drops of purely Jewish blood in 
him. Were this not so, it would be impossible to explain the 
presence of certain physical characteristics which are 
permanently common to all Jews from the ghetto of Warsaw 
to the bazaars of Morocco - the offensive nose, the cruel 
vicious nostrils and so on. A race of the mind is something 
more solid, more durable than just a race, pure and simple. 
Transplant a German to the United States and you turn him 
into an American. But the Jew remains a Jew wherever he 
goes, a creature that no environment can assimilate. It is the 
characteristic mental make-up of his race that renders him 
impervious to the processes of assimilation. And there in a 
nutshell is the proof of the superiority of the mind over the 



flesh! ... The quite amazing ascendancy which they 
achieved during the course of the nineteenth century gave 
the Jews a sense of their own power and caused them to 
drop the mask; and it is just that that has given us the 
chance to oppose them as Jews, self proclaimed and proud 
of the fact. And when you remember how credulous the 
Germans are, you will realize that we must be most grateful 
for this sudden excess of frankness on the part of our most 
mortal enemies. I have always been absolutely fair in my 
dealings with the Jews. On the eve of war, I gave them one 
final warning. I told them that, if they precipitated another 
war, they would not be spared and that I would exterminate 
the vermin throughout Europe, and this time once and for all. 
To this warning they retorted with a declaration of war and 
affirmed that wherever in the world there was a Jew, there, 
too, was an implacable enemy of National Socialist 
Germany. The disastrous thing about this war is the fact 
that for Germany it began both too soon and too late. From 
the purely military point of view, it would have suited us 
better if it had started sooner. I ought to have seized the 
initiative in 1938 instead of allowing myself to be forced into 
war in 1939; for war was, in any case, unavoidable. 

However, you can hardly blame me, if the British and the 
French accepted at Munich every demand I made of them! 

As things stand at the moment, then, the war came a little 
too late. But from the point of view of our moral 
preparedness, it has come far too soon. My disciples have 
not yet had time to attain their full manhood. I should really 
have had another twenty years in which to bring this new 
elite to maturity, an elite of youth, immersed from infancy in 
the philosophy of National Socialism. The tragedy for us 
Germans is that we never have enough time. Circumstances 
always conspire to force us to hurry. And if at this point time 
is lacking, it is primarily because we lack space. The 
Russians with their vast expansion can afford the luxury of 



refusing to be hurried. Time works in their favor, but against 
us. Even if Providence had allotted to me a span of life 
sufficiently long to allow me to lead my people to the 
complete degree of development that National Socialism 
desires, you may be quite sure that our enemies would 
never have permitted me to take advantage of it. They would 
have done their utmost to destroy us before they found 
themselves face to face with a Germany, cemented by a 
single faith and national socialist in body and soul, which 
would have been invincible. Since we lacked men molded in 
the shape of our ideal, we had perforce to make what use 
we could of those whom we had. The result has been 
obvious. Thanks to this discrepancy between conception and 
realization, the war policy of a revolutionary state like the 
Third Reich has of necessity been the policy of petty 
bourgeois reactionaries. Our generals and diplomats, with a 
few, rare exceptions, are men of another age; and their 
methods of waging war and of conducting our foreign policy 
also belong to an age that is passed. This is just as true of 
those who serve us in all good faith as it is of the rest of 
them. The former serve us ill through lack either of aptitude 
or enthusiasm, and the latter do so deliberately and of 
malice aforethought. Our greatest political blunder has been 
our treatment of the French. We should never have 
collaborated with them. It is a policy that has stood them in 
good stead and has served us ill. Abetz thought he was 
being very clever when he became the champion of this idea 
and persuaded us to pursue it. He thought he was two 
moves ahead of events, whereas in reality he was well 
behind them. He seemed to think that we were dealing with 
the France of Napoleon, with a nation, that is, which was 
capable of appreciating the importance and far-reaching 
effects of a noble gesture. He failed to see what is an 
obvious fact, namely, that during the last hundred years 
France has changed completely. She has become a 



prostitute, and she is now a raddled old strumpet, who has 
never ceased to swindle and to confound us, and has always 
left us to foot the bill. Our obvious course should have been 
to liberate the working classes and to help the workers of 
France to implement their own revolution. We should have 
brushed aside, rudely and without pity, the fossilized 
bourgeoisie, as devoid of soul so it is denuded of patriotism. 
Just look at the sort of friends our geniuses of the 
Wilhelmstrasse have found for us in France - petty, 
calculating little profiteers, who hastened to make love to us 
as soon as they thought that we were occupying their 
country in order to safeguard their bank balances - but who 
were quite resolved to betray us at the first possible 
opportunity, provided always that no danger to themselves 
was involved! We were equally stupid as regards the 
French colonies. That, too, was the work of our great minds 
in the Wilhelmstrasse! Diplomats of the old, classic mold, 
soldiers of a bygone regime, petty country squires - of such 
were those who were to help us to revolutionize all Europe! 
And they have led us into waging war as they would have 
waged it in the nineteenth century. Never, at any price, 
should we have put our money on France and against the 
peoples subjected to her yoke. On the contrary, we should 
have helped them to achieve their liberty and, if necessary, 
should have goaded them into doing so. There was nothing 
to stop us in l94o from making a gesture of this sort in the 
Near East and in North Africa. In actual fact our diplomats 
instead set about the task of consolidating French power, not 
only in Syria, but in Tunis, in Algeria and Morocco as well. 
Our 'gentlemen' obviously preferred to maintain cordial 
relations with distinguished Frenchmen, rather than with a lot 
of hirsute revolutionaries, with a chorus of musical comedy 
officers, whose one idea was to cheat us, rather than with 
the Arabs, who would have been loyal partners for us. Oh! 
You needn't think I don't see through the calculations of 



these Machiavellian professionals! They know, their job and 
they have their traditions! All they thought about was the 
dirty trick they were playing on the British, for they were still 
under the ban of the famous alleged antagonism and rivalry 
between Britain and France in the colonial field. What I'm 
saying is perfectly true - they are still living in the reign of 
Wilhelm II, in the world of Queen Victoria and that of those 
artful sharpers named Poincare and Delcasse! In actual fact 
this rivalry has ceased to be of any significance. That it still 
seems to exist is due to the fact that there are still some 
diplomats of the old school in the ranks of our adversaries 
too. In reality, Britain and France are associates, each of 
whom is playing his own game with considerable asperity, 
neither of whom react to any appeal to friendship, but both of 
whom unite again against a common danger. The 
Frenchman's deep-seated hatred of the German is 
something deeper and different. Therein lies a lesson on 
which we should do well to ponder in the future. As regards 
France, there were two courses open to her. Either she 
could have abandoned her alliance with Britain, in which 
case she would have been of no interest to us as a potential 
ally, since we knew that she would also abandon us on the 
first opportunity; or she could have pretended to make this 
change of partners, in which case she would have been of 
even more dubious value to us. On our side, some of the 
wishful thinking about this country was quite ridiculous. In 
reality there was only one possible policy to adopt vis-a-vis 
France - a policy of rigorous and rigid distrust. I know I was 
right about France. With prophetic foresight I gave an 
accurate picture of France in Mein Kampf. And I know 
perfectly well why, in spite of all the representations that 
have been made to me, I have seen no reason at all to 
change the opinions I formed twenty years ago.* 


* Hitler was frequently urged to suppress or to change the 



passage on France in the later editions of his book, Mein 
Kampf, but he consistently refused to do so - even after 
Munich. It is to this that he is alluding here. 

No decision which I have had to make during the course of 
this war was graver than that to attack Russia. I had always 
maintained that we ought at all costs to avoid waging war on 
two fronts, and you may rest assured that I pondered long 
and anxiously over Napoleon and his experiences in Russia. 
Why, then, you may ask, this war against Russia, and why at 
the time that I selected? 

We had already given up hope of ending the war by means 
of a successful invasion of Britain. Furthermore that country, 
under the guidance of its stupid chiefs, would have refused 
to recognize the hegemony we had set up in Europe as long 
as there remained on the Continent a Great Power which 
was fundamentally hostile to the Third Reich. The war, then, 
would have gone on and on, a war in which, behind the 
British, the Americans would have played an increasingly 
active role. The importance of the war potential of the United 
States, the progress made in armaments - both in our own 
camp and in that of our enemies, the proximity of the English 
coast - all these things combined to make it highly 
inadvisable for us to become bogged down in a war of long 
duration. For Time - and it's always Time, you notice - would 
have been increasingly against us. In order to persuade 
Britain to pack up, to compel her to make peace, it was 
essential to rob her of her hope of being able still to confront 
us, on the Continent itself, with an adversary of a stature 
equal to our own. We had no choice; we had at all costs to 
strike the Russian element out of the European balance 
sheet. We had another reason, equally valid, for our action - 
the mortal threat that a Russia in being constituted to our 
existence. For it was absolutely certain that one day or other 
she would attack us. Our one and only chance of 



vanquishing Russia was to take the initiative, for to fight a 
defensive war against her was not practical. We dared not 
allow the Red Army the advantage of the terrain, place our 
Autobahns at the disposal of its swiftly on-rushing armor, 
and our railways at the disposal of its troops and its supplies. 
But if we took the offensive, we could, indeed, defeat the 
Red Army on its own ground, in the swamps and in the vast 
and muddy expanses; but in a civilized country we could not 
have done so. We should simply have been providing it with 
a springboard with which to leap upon the whole of Europe 
and destroy it. Why 1941? Because, in view of the steadily 
increasing power of our western enemies, if we were to act 
at all, we had to do so with the least possible delay. Nor, 
mind you, was Stalin doing nothing. On two fronts, time was 
against us. The real question was not, therefore: 'Why 22 
June 1941 already' but rather: 'Why not earlier still?' But for 
the difficulties created for us by the Italians and their idiotic 
campaign in Greece, I should have attacked Russia a few 
weeks earlier. For us, the main problem was to keep the 
Russians from moving for as long as possible, and my own 
personal nightmare was the fear that Stalin might take the 
initiative before me. Another reason was that the raw 
materials that the Russians were withholding were essential 
to us. In spite of their obligations their rate of delivery 
decreased steadily, and there was a real danger that they 
might suddenly cease altogether. If they were not prepared 
to give us of their own free will the things we had to have, 
then we had no alternative but to go and take them, in situ 
and by force. I came to my decision immediately after 
Molotov's visit to Berlin in November, for it then became 
clear to me that sooner or later Stalin would abandon us and 
go over to the enemy. Ought I to have played for time in 
order that our preparations could have become more 
complete? No - for by so doing I should have sacrificed the 
initiative; and again no, because the brief and precarious 



respite that we might have gained would have cost us very 
dear. We should have had to submit to the Soviet blackmail 
with regard to Finland, to Rumania, to Bulgaria and to 
Turkey. That, of course was out of the question. The Third 
Reich, defender and protector of Europe, could not have 
sacrificed these friendly countries on the altar of 
Communism. Such behavior would have been dishonorable, 
and we should have been punished for it. From the moral as 
well as from the strategic point of view it would have been a 
miserable gambit. War with Russia had become inevitable, 
whatever we did; and to postpone it only meant that we 
should later have to fight under conditions far less favorable. 

I therefore decided, as soon as Molotov departed, that I 
would settle accounts with Russia as soon as fair weather 
permitted. 

By not liberating the French proletariat at once in 1940 we 
both failed in our duty and neglected our own interests. And 
that is equally true with regard to French subjects overseas. 
The French people would certainly have borne us no grudge, 
had we relieved them of the burden of Empire. In this: 
respects the people have shown much more common sense 
than the self styled elite, and they have an instinctive and 
much truer appreciation of the nation's real interests. Under 
both Louis XV and under Jules Ferry the people revolted 
against the absurdity of colonial adventures. I have yet to be 
convinced that Napoleon became unpopular for having rid 
himself cheaply of Louisiana. But there was unprecedented 
indignation when his inefficient nephew tried to balance 
matters by waging war on Mexico! 

I have never liked France or the French, and I have never 
stopped saying so. I admit, however, that there are some 
worthy men among them. There is no doubt that, during 
these latter years, quite a number of Frenchmen supported 



the European conception with both complete sincerity and 
great courage. And the savagery with which their own 
countrymen made them pay for their clear vision is of itself a 
proof of their good faith. 

When I pass judgment, objectively and without emotion, on 
events, I must admit that my unshakeable friendship for Italy 
and the Duce may well be held to be an error on my part. It 
is in fact quite obvious that our Italian alliance has been of 
more service to our enemies than to ourselves. Italian 
intervention has conferred benefits that are modest in the 
extreme in comparison with the numerous difficulties to 
which it has given rise. If, in spite of all our efforts, we fail to 
win this war, the Italian alliance will have contributed to our 
defeat! 

The greatest service that Italy could have rendered to us 
would have been to remain aloof from this conflict. To 
ensure her abstention, no sacrifices, no presents on our part 
would have been too great. Had she steadfastly maintained 
her neutral role, we would have overwhelmed her with our 
favors. In victory we would have shared with her all the fruits 
and all the glory. We would have collaborated with all our 
hearts in the creation of the historic myth of the supremacy 
of the Italian people, the legitimate sons of the ancient 
Romans. Indeed, anything would have been preferable to 
having them as comrades in arms on the field of battle! 

Italy's intervention in June 1940, with the sole purpose of 
aiming a donkey-kick at a French army that was already in 
process of disintegration, merely had the effect of tarnishing 
a victory that the vanquished were at the time prepared to 
accept in a sporting spirit. France recognized that she had 
been fairly defeated by the armies of the Reich, but she was 
unwilling to accept defeat at the hands of the Axis. Our 
Italian ally has been a source of embarrassment to us 
everywhere. It was this alliance, for instance, which 



prevented us from pursuing a revolutionary policy in North 
Africa. In the nature of things, this territory was becoming an 
Italian preserve and it was as such that the Duce laid claim 
to it. Had we been on our own, we could have emancipated 
the Moslem countries dominated by France; and that would 
have had enormous repercussions in the Near East, 
dominated by Britain, and in Egypt. But with our fortunes 
linked to those of the Italians, the pursuit of such a policy 
was not possible. All Islam vibrated at the news of our 
victories. The Egyptians, the Iraqis and the whole of the 
Near East were all ready to rise in revolt. Just think what we 
could have done to help them, even to incite them, as would 
have been both our duty and in our own interest! But the 
presence of the Italians at our side paralyzed us; it created a 
feeling of malaise among our Islamic friends, who inevitably 
saw in us accomplices, willing or unwilling, of their 
oppressors. For the Italians in these parts of the world are 
more bitterly hated, of course, than either the British or the 
French. The memories of the barbarous, reprisals taken 
against the Senussi are still vivid. Then again the ridiculous 
pretensions of the Duce to be regarded as The Sword of 
Islam evokes the same sneering chuckle now as it did before 
the war. This title, which is fitting for Mohamed and a great 
conqueror like Omar, Mussolini caused to be conferred on 
himself by a few wretched brutes whom he had either bribed 
or terrorized into doing so. We had a great chance of 
pursuing a splendid policy with regard to Islam. But we 
missed the bus, as we missed it on several other occasions, 
thanks to our loyalty to the Italian alliance! In this theatre of 
operations, then, the Italians prevented us from playing our 
best card, the emancipation of the French subjects and the 
raising of the standard of revolt in the countries oppressed 
by the British. Such a policy would have aroused the 
enthusiasm of the whole of Islam. It is a characteristic of the 
Moslem world, from the shores of the Atlantic to those of the 



Pacific, that what affects one, for good or for evil, affects all. 
On the moral side, the effects of our policy were doubly 
disastrous. On the one hand we had wounded, with no 
advantage to ourselves, the self-esteem of the French. On 
the other hand this, of itself, compelled us to maintain the 
domination exercised by the French over their empire, for 
fear that the contagion might spread to Italian North Africa 
and that the latter might then also claim its independence. 
And since all these territories are now occupied by the 
Anglo-Americans, I am more than justified in saying that this 
policy of ours was a disaster. Further, this futile policy has 
allowed these hypocrites, the British, to pose, if you please, 
as liberators in Syria, in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania! From 
the purely military point of view things have not been much 
better! Italy's entry into the war at once gave our enemies 
their first victories, a fact which enabled Churchill to revive 
the courage of his countrymen and which gave hope to all 
the Anglophiles all the world over. Even while they proved 
themselves incapable of maintaining their positions in 
Abyssinia and Cyrenaica, the Italians had the nerve to throw 
themselves, without seeking our advice and without even 
giving us previous warning of their intentions, into a pointless 
campaign in Greece. The shameful defeats that they 
suffered caused certain of the Balkan States to regard us 
with scorn and contempt. Here, and nowhere else, are to be 
found the causes of Yugoslavia's stiffening attitude and her 
volte-face in the spring of 1941. This compelled us, contrary 
to all our plans, to intervene in the Balkans, and that in its 
turn led to a catastrophic delay in the launching of our attack 
on Russia. We were compelled to expend some of our best 
divisions there. And as a net result we were then forced to 
occupy vast territories in which, but for this stupid show, the 
presence of any of our troops would have been quite 
unnecessary. The Balkan States would have been only too 
pleased, had they been so allowed, to preserve an attitude 



of benevolent neutrality towards us. As for our paratroopers I 
would have preferred to launch them against Gibraltar than 
against Corinth or Crete! Ah! If only the Italians had 
remained aloof from this war! If only they had continued in 
their state of non-belligerence! In view of the friendship and 
the common interests that bind us, of what inestimable value 
to us such an attitude would have been! The Allies 
themselves would have been delighted, for, although they 
never held any very high opinion of the martial qualities of 
Italy, even they never dreamed that she would turn out to be 
as feeble as she was. They would have considered 
themselves lucky to see remain neutral such power as they 
attributed to the Italians. Even so, they could not have 
afforded to take chances, and they would have been 
compelled to immobilize considerable forces to meet the 
danger of an intervention, which was always menacing and 
which was always possible, if not probable. From our point of 
view this means that there would have been a considerable 
number of British troops, immobile and acquiring neither the 
experience of battle nor the fillip derived from victory - in 
short, a sort of 'phony war', and the longer it continued, the 
greater would be the advantage that we gained from it. A 
war that is prolonged is of benefit to a belligerent in that it 
gives him the opportunities to learn to wage war. I had 
hoped to conduct this war without giving the enemy the 
chance of learning anything new in the art of battle. In 
Poland and Scandinavia, in Holland, Belgium and France I 
succeeded. Our victories were swift, were achieved with a 
minimum of casualties on both sides, but were yet 
sufficiently clear-cut and decisive to lead to the complete 
defeat of the enemy. If the war had remained a war 
conducted by Germany, and not by the Axis, we should have 
been in a position to attack Russia by 15th May 1941. 

Doubly strengthened by the fact that our forces had known 
nothing but decisive and irrefutable victories, we should have 



been able to conclude the campaign before winter came. 
How differently everything has turned out! Out of gratitude 
(for I shall never forget the attitude adopted by the Duce at 
the time of the Anschluss) I have always abstained from 
criticizing or passing judgment on Italy. I have on the 
contrary always been at great pains to treat her as an equal. 
Unfortunately, the laws of nature have shown that it is a 
mistake to treat as equals those who are not your equals. 
The Duce himself is my equal. He may perhaps even be my 
superior from the point of view of his ambitions for his 
people. But it is facts and not ambitions that count. We 
Germans do well to remember that in circumstances such as 
these it is better for us to play a lone hand. We have 
everything to lose and nothing to gain by binding ourselves 
closely with more feeble elements and by choosing into the 
bargain partners who have given all too frequent proof of 
their fickleness. I have often said that wherever you find 
Italy, there you will find victory. What I should have said is - 
wherever you find victory, there, you may be sure, you will 
find Italy! Neither my personal affection for the Duce nor my 
instinctive feelings of friendship for the Italian people have 
changed. But I do blame myself for not having listened to the 
voice of reason, which bade me to be ruthless in my 
friendship for Italy. And I could have done so, both to the 
personal advantage of the Duce himself and to the 
advantage of his people. I realize, of course, that such an 
attitude on my part would have offended him and that he 
would never have forgiven me. But as a result of my 
forbearance things have happened which should not have 
happened and which may well prove fatal. Life does not 
forgive weakness. Japan's entry into the war caused us no 
misgivings, even though it was obvious that the Japanese 
had made a present of a cast-iron pretext to Roosevelt for 
bringing in the United States against us. But Roosevelt, 
urged on by Jewry, was already quite resolved to go to war 



and annihilate National Socialism, and he had no need of 
any pretexts. Such pretexts as were required to overcome 
the resistance of the isolationists he was quite capable of 
fabricating for himself. One more little swindle meant nothing 
to him. The magnitude of the Pearl Harbor disaster was, I 
am sure, balm to his soul. It was exactly what he wanted in 
order to be able to drag his countrymen into a total war and 
to annihilate the last remnants of opposition in his own 
country. He had done all in his power to provoke the 
Japanese. It was only a repetition, on a vaster scale, of the 
tactics employed with such success by Wilson at the time of 
the first war: the torpedoing of the Lusitania, provoked with 
diabolical skill, prepared the Americans psychologically for 
the entry of their country into the war against Germany. 

Since the intervention of the United States could not be 
prevented in 1917, it is obvious that their intervention now, 
twenty-five years later, was both a logical premise and 
unavoidable. It was only in 1915 that World Jewry decided to 
place the whole of its resources at the disposal of the Allies. 
But in our case, Jewry decided as early as 1933, at the very 
birth of the Third Reich, tacitly to declare war on us. 
Furthermore the influence wielded by the Jews in the United 
States has consistently and steadily increased during the 
last quarter of a century. And since the entry of the United 
States into the war was quite inevitable, it was a slice of 
great good fortune for us to have at our side an ally of such 
great worth as Japan. But it was also a slice of great good 
fortune for the Jews. It gave them the chance they had so 
long been seeking to implicate the United States directly in 
the conflict, and it was a masterstroke on their part to have 
succeeded in dragging the Americans unanimously and 
enthusiastically into their war. The Americans, mindful of 
their disillusionment in 1919, were by no means anxious 
once again to intervene in a European war. On the other 
hand they were more obsessed than ever with the idea of 



the Yellow Peril. Trying to teach the Jews a trick or two is 
like carrying coals to Newcastle, and you can be quite sure 
that all their plans are conceived with Machiavellian 
astuteness. I myself am quite convinced that in the case we 
are discussing they took a very long view which envisaged 
the overthrow by a white Power of the Empire of the Rising 
Sun, which had risen to the status of a world Power and 
which had always sternly resisted contamination by the race 
of Jewry. For us, Japan will always remain an ally and a 
friend. This war will teach us to appreciate and respect her 
more than ever. It will encourage us to draw more tightly the 
bonds that unite our two countries. It is of course regrettable 
that the Japanese did not enter the war against Russia and 
at the same time as ourselves. Had they done so, Stalin's 
armies would not now be besieging Breslau or squatting in 
Budapest. We should have liquidated Bolshevism by the 
time winter came, and Roosevelt would have hesitated to 
take on adversaries as powerful as our two selves. In the 
same way I am sorry that Japan did not capture Singapore 
as early as 1940, immediately after the defeat of France. 
The United States was then on the eve of a presidential 
election and would have found it impossible to intervene. 
That, then, was one of the turning points of the war. 

In spite of everything, we and the Japanese will remain 
staunchly side-by-side. We will conquer or die together. 
Should we be the first to succumb, I can't see the Russians 
continuing to maintain the myth of 'Asiatic solidarity' for the 
sake of Japan! 

Taking advantage of the enthusiasm we had aroused in 
Spain and the shock to which we had subjected Britain, we 
ought to have attacked Gibraltar in the summer of 1940, 
immediately after the defeat of France. 

At that time, however, the awkward thing was that it would 



have been difficult to prevent Spain entering into the war on 
our side - and particularly so as we had failed, a few weeks 
previously, from preventing Italy from flying to the rescue of 
our victory. These Latin countries bring us no luck. Their 
overweening conceit is in direct proportion to their 
weakness, and that always confuses the issue. We failed 
entirely to curb the Italians' desire to shine on the field of 
battle, even though we had shown ourselves willing to confer 
upon them an honors degree for heroism, to bestow upon 
them all the fruits of military glory and all the advantages 
accruing from a war that has been won-provided always that 
they took no part in it at all. The British, of course, were 
duped even more completely by their Latin ally than we 
were. Chamberlain, obviously, would never have declared 
war, had he realized the full extent of French demoralization 
and inadequacy. For the British undoubtedly expected 
France to bear the whole brunt of the land campaign on the 
Continent. For Chamberlain nothing would have been easier 
than to shed a few crocodile's tears for Poland and then to 
leave us to carve the country up at our leisure. To material 
weakness the Latin countries add a quite fantastic 
pretentiousness. Friendly Italy or hostile France - it makes 
no odds. The weakness of both of them will have been 
equally fatal to us. 

The only disagreements that have ever occurred between 
the Duce and myself arose from the precautions that from 
time to time I had felt constrained to take. In spite of the 
complete confidence I had in him personally, I felt compelled 
to keep him in ignorance of my intentions in any case where 
indiscretion might have prejudiced our interests. Just as I 
had complete confidence in Mussolini, he had complete 
confidence in Ciano - and he, of course, had no secrets from 
the pretty ladies who fluttered like butterflies around him. 
That we know to our cost, and as the enemy was anxious for 
information regardless of costs, they learnt a goodly number 



of secrets through this channel. I had good reasons, 
therefore, for not telling the Duce everything. I am only sorry 
that he did not appreciate the fact, that he resented my 
attitude and paid me back in my own coin. There's no doubt 
about it - we have no luck with the Latin races! While I was 
occupied, first in Montoire, buttoning up a futile policy of 
collaboration with France, and then in Hendaye, where I had 
to submit to receiving fulsome honors at the hands of a false 
friend, a third Latin - and one, this time, who really was a 
friend - took advantage of my preoccupation to set in motion 
his disastrous campaign against Greece. 

We had need of peace in order to carry out our program. I 
always desired to maintain peace. We have been jockeyed 
into war at the desire of our enemies. In practice, the threat 
of war has existed ever since January 1933, from the time 
that I came to power. 

On the one hand, there are the Jews and all those who 
march in step with them. On the other, there are those who 
adopt a realistic attitude towards world affairs. And 
throughout history we have had these two families of wholly 
irreconcilable outlook in the world. On the one hand, there 
are those who strive for the happiness of mankind in the 
abstract and who pursue the chimera of a formula applicable 
the entire world over. On the other, there are the realists. 
National Socialism is interested only in the happiness of the 
German race and strives only to secure the wellbeing of the 
German man. The Universalists, the idealists, the Utopians 
all aim too high. They give promises of an unattainable 
paradise, and by doing so they deceive mankind. Whatever 
label they wear, whether they call themselves Christians, 
communists, humanitarians, whether they are merely sincere 
but stupid or wire-pullers and cynics, they are all makers of 
slaves. I myself have always kept my eye fixed on a 
paradise that, in the nature of things, lies well within our 
reach. I mean an improvement in the lot of the German 



people. I have restricted myself to making promises that I 
knew I could keep and that I had every intention of keeping. 
Hence the universal hatred which I have aroused. By 
refusing to make impossible promises, as do our enemies, I 
was not playing the game. I was holding myself aloof from 
the syndicate of the world's leaders, whose aim, un-avowed 
but tacitly accepted, is the exploitation of human credulity. 
The National Socialist doctrine, as I have always proclaimed, 
is not for export. It was conceived for the German people. All 
the objectives at which it aims are, of necessity, limited - but 
attainable. It follows, then, that I can put as little credence in 
the idea of universal peace as in that of universal war. It 
was on the eve of Munich that I realized beyond doubt that 
the enemies of the Third Reich were determined to have our 
hide at all costs and that there was no possibility of coming 
to terms with them. When that arch capitalist bourgeois, 
Chamberlain, with his deceptive umbrella in his hand, put 
himself to the trouble of going all the way to the Berghof to 
discuss matters with that upstart, Hitler, he knew very well 
that he really intended to wage ruthless war against us. He 
was quite prepared to tell me anything that he thought might 
serve to lull my suspicions. His one and only object in 
undertaking this trip was to gain time. What we ought then to 
have done was to have struck at once. We ought to have 
gone to war in 1938. It was the last chance we had of 
localizing the war. But they gave way all along the line and, 
like the poltroons that they are, ceded to all our demands. 
Under such conditions it was very difficult to seize the 
initiative and commence hostilities. At Munich we lost a 
unique opportunity of easily and swiftly winning a war that 
was in any case inevitable. Although we were ourselves not 
fully prepared, we were nevertheless better prepared than 
the enemy. September 1938 would have been the most 
favorable date. And what a chance we had to limit the 
conflict. 



We ought then and there to have settled our disputes by 
force of arms and disregarded the inclination of our 
opponents to meet all our demands. When we solved the 
Sudeten question by force we liquidated Czechoslovakia at 
the same time-and left all the blame squarely on Benes' 
shoulders. The Munich solution could not have been 
anything but provisional, for, obviously, we could not tolerate 
in the heart of Germany an abscess, and small though it 
was, like an independent Czech State. We lanced the 
abscess in March 1939, but in circumstances that were 
psychologically less favorable than those which would have 
obtained, had we settled the issue by force in 1938. For in 
March 1939, for the first time, we put ourselves in the wrong 
in the eyes of world opinion. No longer were we restricting 
ourselves to reuniting Germans to the Reich, but were 
establishing a protectorate over a non-German population. 

A war waged in 1938 would have been a swift war - for the 
emancipation of the Sudeten Germans, the Slovaks, the 
Hungarians and even of those Poles who were under Czech 
domination. Great Britain and France taken by surprise and 
discountenanced by the course of events would have 
remained passive - particularly in view of the fact that world 
opinion would have been on our side. Finally, Poland, the 
main prop of French policy in Eastern Europe, would have 
been at our side. If Great Britain and France had made war 
on us in these circumstances they would have lost face. In 
actual fact, I'm quite sure they would not have gone to war; 
but they would have lost face all the same. Once our arms 
had spoken, we could have left till later the settlement of the 
remaining territorial problems in Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans without fear of provoking the intervention of the two 
Powers, already discredited in the eyes of their proteges. As 
far as we ourselves were concerned, we should thus have 
gained the time required to enable us to consolidate our 
position, and we would have postponed the world war for 



several years to come. In fact, in these circumstances I 
doubt very much whether a second world war would, indeed, 
have been inevitable. It is by no means unreasonable to 
presume that in the breasts of the well-founded nations 
degeneration and love of comfort could well have proved 
stronger than the congenital hatred they bore us - 
particularly when it is remembered that they must have 
realized that all our aspirations were, in reality, orientated 
eastwards. Our adversaries might even have deluded 
themselves with the hope that we might perhaps exhaust 
ourselves in the pursuit of these eastern aspirations of ours. 
In any event, it would, for them, have been a case of heads I 
win, tails you lose, since it would have ensured for them 
maintenance of peace in the west, and at the same time 
would have allowed them to take advantage of the resultant 
weakening of Russia, whose growing power had been a 
source of preoccupation for them, though to a lesser degree 
than had been our own resurgence. 

This war against America is a tragedy. It is illogical and 
devoid of any foundation of reality. It is one of those queer 
twists of history that just as I was assuming power in 
Germany, Roosevelt, the elect of the Jews, was taking 
command in the United States. Without the Jews and without 
this lackey of theirs, things could have been quite different. 
For from every point of view Germany and the United States 
should have been able, if not to understand each other and 
sympathize with each other, then at least to support each 
other without undue strain on either of them. Germany, 
remember, has made a massive contribution to the peopling 
of America. It is we Germans who have made by far the 
greatest contribution of Nordic blood to the United States. 
And it is also a fact that Steuben played a part that decided 
the issue in the War of Independence. 

The last great economic crisis struck Germany and the 



United States at more or less the same time and with the 
same force. Both countries rode the storm in much the same 
way. The operation, though extremely difficult, was crowned 
with success on our side. In America, where, after all, it 
presented no difficulty at all, the operation achieved only a 
very mediocre success under the guidance of Roosevelt and 
his Jewish advisers. The failure of the New Deal is 
responsible in no small measure for their war fever. The 
United States as a matter of fact could survive and prosper 
in a state of economic isolation; for us, that is a dream which 
we would love to see come true. They have at their disposal 
a vast territory, ample to absorb the energies of all their 
people. As far as Germany is concerned, my hope is one 
day to ensure for her complete economic independence 
inside a territory of a size compatible with her population. A 
great people have need of broad acres. Germany expects 
nothing from the United States, and the latter have nothing 
to fear from Germany. Everything combines to ensure the 
possibility of peaceful co-existence, each in his own country 
and all in perfect harmony. Unfortunately, the whole 
business is ruined by the fact that world Jewry has chosen 
just that country in which to set up its most powerful bastion. 
That, and that alone, has altered the relations between us 
and has poisoned everything. I am prepared to wager that 
well within twenty-five years the Americans themselves will 
have realized what a handicap has been imposed upon them 
by this parasitic Jewry, clamped fast to their flesh and 
nourishing itself on their life-blood. It is this Jewry that is 
dragging them into adventures which, when all is said and 
done, are no concern of theirs and in which the interests at 
stake are of no importance to them. What possible reason 
can the non-Jewish Americans have for sharing the hatreds 
of the Jews and following meekly in their footsteps? One 
thing is quite certain - within a quarter of a century the 
Americans will either have become violently anti-Semitic or 



they will be devoured by Jewry. If we should lose this war, it 
will mean that we have been defeated by the Jews. Their 
victory will then be complete. But let me hasten to add that it 
will only be very temporary. It will certainly not be Europe 
that takes up the struggle again against them, but it certainly 
will be the United States. The latter is a country still too 
young to have acquired the maturity conferred by age and 
exaggeratedly lacking in political sense. For the Americans, 
everything has so far been ridiculously easy. But experience 
and difficulties will perhaps cause them to mature. Just think 
for a moment what they were when their country was born - 
a group of individuals come from all corners of the earth 
hastening forward in pursuit of fortune and finding at their 
disposal a vast continent to appease their hunger and all 
theirs for the taking. National conscience is a thing that 
develops very gradually, especially in vast territories such as 
these. Nor must it be forgotten that these individuals had 
been drawn from a variety of races and had not yet been 
fused by the bonds of a national spirit. What an easy prey for 
the Jews! The excesses in which the Jews indulged in our 
country are as nothing in comparison with the excesses in 
which they have indulged and in which they will continue to 
indulge in ever increasing measure on their new hunting 
grounds. It will 'not be very long before the Americans 
realize that the Roosevelt whom they have adored is an idol 
with feet of clay and that this Jew-ridden man is in reality a 
malefactor - both from the point of view of the United States 
and of humanity as a whole. He has dragged them along a 
path on which they had no business to be, and in particular 
he has forced them to take an active part in a conflict that 
does not concern them at all. Had they possessed even a 
minimum of political instinct they would have remained in 
their splendid isolation, content in this conflict to play the role 
of arbiter. Had they been a little more mature and a little 
more experienced, they would doubtless have realized that 



their best course in their own major interests would have 
been to have entrenched themselves firmly with their faces 
towards a shattered Europe and in an attitude of vigilant 
neutrality. By intervening they have once again played into 
the hands of their Jewish exploiters; and the latter are 
worldly wise and know exactly what they are doing - but, of 
course, from their own particular Jewish point of view. Had 
Fate so willed that the President of the United States during 
this critical period were someone other than Roosevelt, he 
might well have been a man capable of adapting the 
American economy to the needs of the twentieth century and 
of becoming the greatest President since Lincoln. The 1930 
crisis was brought on by growing pains - but on a worldwide 
scale. Economic liberalism showed that it was nothing more 
than an outdated catch phrase. Once the signification and 
the potentialities of the crisis had been appreciated, all that 
was required was the discovery of appropriate remedies. 
That is the task on which a great President would have 
concentrated, and by so doing he would have placed his 
country in an unassailable place in the world. Naturally a 
wise President should have fostered among his countrymen 
an interest in international affairs and should have 
encouraged them to turn their eyes to the great world at 
large; but to have flung them into the middle of a dog fight, 
as this criminal, Roosevelt, has done, was sheer lunacy. He, 
of course, has quite cynically taken advantage of their 
ignorance, their naivete and their credulity. He has made 
them see the world through the eye of Jewry, and he has set 
them on a path that will lead them to utter disaster, if they do 
not pull themselves together in time. American affairs are 
no business of ours, and I should be completely indifferent to 
what happens to them, but for the fact that their attitude has 
direct repercussions on our destiny and on that of Europe. 
The fact that neither they nor we have any colonial policy is 
yet another characteristic which should unite us. The 



Germans have never really felt the imperialist urge. I regard 
the efforts made at the end of the nineteenth century as a 
fortuitous accident in our history. Our defeat in 1918 had at 
least the fortunate consequences that it stopped us from 
pursuing the course into which the Germans had foolishly 
allowed themselves to be led, influenced by the example of 
the French and the British and jealous of a success which 
they had not the wit to realize was purely transitory. It is to 
the credit of the Third Reich that we did not look back with 
any nostalgia to a past that we have discarded. We have on 
the contrary turned our eyes resolutely and bravely towards 
the future, towards the creation of great homogeneous 
entities and a great Continental policy. It is, incidentally, a 
policy on all fours with the traditional American policy of not 
meddling in the affairs of other continents and forbidding 
others to meddle in the affairs of the New World. 

It is a fact that we always bungle everything through being 
forced to act in a hurry. With us, to act swiftly is always to act 
with precipitation. To acquire the gift of patience, we should 
have both time and space, and at the moment we have 
neither. The Russians are lucky in possessing both, quite 
apart from that inclination towards placidity that is a 
characteristic trait of the Slav temperament. 

Furthermore, thanks to the Marxist religion, they have 
everything required to make them patient. They have been 
promised happiness on earth (a feature which distinguishes 
Marxism from the Christian religion) but in the future. The 
Jew, Mardochee Marx, like the good Jew that he was, was 
awaiting the coming of the Messiah. He has placed the 
Messiah conception in a setting of historic materialism by 
asserting that terrestrial happiness is a factor in an almost 
endless process of evolution. 'Happiness is within your 
reach,' he says, 'that I promise you. But you must let 
evolution take its course and not try to hurry matters.' 
Mankind always falls for a specious trick of that sort... Lenin 



did not have the time, but Stalin will carry on the good work, 
and so on and so on ... Marxism is a very powerful force. But 
how shall we assess Christianity, that other child of Judaism, 
which will not commit itself further than to promise the faithful 
happiness in another world? Believe me, it is incomparably 
stronger! I myself am fated to being compelled to try and 
accomplish everything in the short space of a human 
lifetime. To help me I have but a realistic idealism based on 
tangible facts, from which flows a promise that can certainly 
be fulfilled, but which forbids me to promise the moon. 

Where others have all eternity at their disposal, I have but a 
few short, miserable years. Those others know that they will 
be succeeded by yet others who will carry on where they left 
off, plowing with precision exactly the same furrow with 
exactly the same plough. I have now reached the stage 
where I wonder whether among my immediate successors 
there will be found a man predestined to raise and carry on 
the torch, when it has slipped from my hand. It has also been 
my fate to be the servant of a people with so tragic a past, a 
people so unstable, so versatile as the German people, and 
a people who go, according to circumstances, from one 
extreme to the other. From my own point of view, the ideal 
thing would have been, firstly to ensure the future existence 
of the German people, then to form a youth imbued deeply 
with the national socialist doctrine - and then to have left it to 
the generations of the future to wage the inevitable war, 
unless, of course, our enemies recoiled when they found 
themselves faced with the newly acquired might of the 
German people. In this way, Germany would have been well 
equipped both materially and morally. She would have at her 
disposal an administration, a foreign policy and an army all 
molded from infancy in the principles of National Socialism. 
The task I have undertaken of raising the German people to 
the place in the world that is their due is unfortunately not a 
task that can be accomplished by a single man or in a single 



generation. But I have at least opened their eyes to their 
inherent greatness and I have inspired them to exaltation at 
the thought of the union of Germans in one great 
indestructible Reich. I have sown the good seed. I have 
made the German people realize the significance of the 
struggle they are waging for their very existence. One day 
the harvest will come, and nothing on earth will be able to 
prevent it from coming. The German people are a young and 
strong people, a people with its future before it. 

In actual fact, my decision to settle the issue with Russia by 
force of arms was taken as soon as I became convinced that 
Britain was determined to remain stubborn. Churchill was 
quite unable to appreciate the sporting spirit of which I had 
given proof by refraining from creating an irreparable breach 
between the British and ourselves. We did, indeed, refrain 
from annihilating them at Dunkirk. We ought to have been 
able to make them realize that the acceptance by them of 
the German hegemony established in Europe, a state of 
affairs to the implementation of which they had always been 
opposed, but which I had implemented without any trouble, 
would bring them inestimable advantages. 

Even by the end of July, one month, that is, after the defeat 
of France, I realized that peace was once again eluding our 
grasp. A few weeks later I knew that we should not succeed 
in invading Britain before the advent of the autumnal gales 
because we had not succeeded in acquiring complete 
command of the air. In other words, I realized that we should 
never succeed in invading Britain. The attitude of the 
Russians during the summer of 1940, the fact that they had 
absorbed the Baltic States and Bessarabia while we 
ourselves were busy in the west left me with no illusions 
regarding their intentions. And even if I had retained any, 
Molotov's visit in November would have been sufficient to 
dissipate them. The proposals that Stalin submitted to me 



after the return of his Minister did not deceive me. Stalin, that 
incomparable and imperturbable blackmailer, was trying to 
gain time in order to consolidate his advanced bases in 
Finland and the Balkans. He was trying to play cat and 
mouse with us. The tragedy, from my point of view, was the 
fact that I could not attack before 15th May, and if I were to 
succeed in my first initial onslaught, it was essential that I 
should not attack later than that date. Stalin, however, could 
have launched his attack much earlier. Throughout the 
winter of 1940, and even more so in the spring of 1941, I 
was haunted by the obsession that the Russians might take 
the offensive. In the event, the Italian defeats in Albania and 
in Cyrenaica had roused a minor storm of revolt in the 
Balkans. Indirectly, they also struck a blow at the belief in 
our invincibility, that was held by friend and foe alike. This 
alone was the cause of Yugoslavia's volte face, an event that 
compelled us to drag the Balkans into the war; and that was 
something which at all costs I had desired to avoid. For once 
we had become involved in that direction we might well have 
been tempted to go still further ahead. I need hardly say that 
in the spring of 1941 we could rapidly have liberated the Near 
East with only a small fraction of the forces that we were 
about to employ against Russia. But to remove the 
necessary forces from their place in our order of battle at 
that juncture would have been to incur the indirect danger of 
giving Russia a signal to attack. They would have done so in 
the summer, or at the latest in the autumn, and under 
conditions so disastrous from our point of view, that we could 
never have hoped to win the day. Where the Jew-ridden 
democracies are concerned, the Russians have the patience 
of an elephant. They know with absolute certainty that 
sooner or later and without recourse to war, they will 
succeed in establishing dominion over them, thanks to the 
internal dissensions that rend them, the succession of 
economic crises from which they seem unable to escape 



and the powerful lure of Marxism to which they are 
particularly vulnerable. But they also know that in the case of 
the Third Reich the situation is very different. They know that 
in every field of endeavor, and more so in peace than in war, 
we shall everywhere outclass them. The explanation of this 
patience which the Russians exhibit is to be found in their 
philosophy, which allows them to avoid taking risks and to 
wait - a year, a generation, a century, if necessary - until the 
time is ripe for the implementation of their plans. Time 
means nothing to them. Marxism, certainly, has promised 
them a paradise on earth - but certainly not today, not even 
tomorrow, but some time in the dim, indefinite future. 

Notwithstanding this patience which is the backbone of their 
power, the Russians could not stand idly aside and watch 
the destruction of Great Britain, for in that case, with the 
United States and Japan cancelling each other out, as it 
were, the Russians would find themselves face to face with 
us - and alone. And that would mean without any doubt that, 
at a time and a place of our choice, the long-outstanding 
issue between us would be settled in our favor. If I felt 
compelled to decide to settle my accounts with Bolshevism 
by force of arms, and, indeed, arrived at my decision on the 
very anniversary of the signing of the Moscow pact; I have 
every right to believe that Stalin had come to the same 
decision before even he signed the pact. For a whole year I 
adhered to the hope that an entente, at least honestly 
sincere if not unreservedly friendly, could be established 
between the Third Reich and Stalin's Russia. I imagined that 
after fifteen years of power Stalin, the realist, would have rid 
himself of the nebulous Marxist ideology and that he was 
preserving it merely as a poison reserved exclusively for 
external use. The brutal manner in which he decapitated the 
Jewish intelligentsia, who had rendered him such signal 
service in the destruction Tsarist Russia, encouraged me in 



that belief. I presumed that he did not wish to give these 
same Jew intellectuals the chance of bringing about the 
downfall of the totalitarian empire which he had built - that 
Stalinist empire which, in all its essentials, is only the 
spiritual successor to the empire of Peter the Great. In a 
spirit of implacable realism on both sides we cot have 
created a situation in which a durable entente would have 
been possible - by defining precisely the zones of influence 
to be attributed to each party, by rigorously restricting our 
collaboration to the field of economics and in such a manner 
that both parties would have derived benefits therefrom. An 
entente, in short, watched over 1 an eagle eye and with a 
finger on the trigger! 


I have been Europe's last hope. She proved incapable of 
refashioning herself by means of voluntary reform. She 
showed herself impervious to charm and persuasion. To 
take her I had to use violence. Europe can be built only on a 
foundation of ruins. Not material ruins, but on ruins of vested 
interests and economic coalitions, of mental rigidity and 
perverse prejudice, of outmoded idiosyncrasy and narrow 
mindedness. Europe must be fashioned in the common 
interest of all and without regard for individuals. Napoleon 
understood that perfectly. I, perhaps better than anyone 
else, can well imagine the torments suffered by Napoleon, 
longing, as he was, for the triumph of peace and yet 
compelled to continue waging war, without ceasing and 
without seeing any prospect of ceasing - and still persisting 
in the hope eternal of at last achieving peace. Since the 
summer 1940 I have myself been suffering the same 
torments. At always it has been this Britain who barred 
Europe's way to prosperity. But now she is aged and 
enfeebled, though not less vicious and wicked. Finally, she is 
being supported in this negative and unnatural attitude by 



the United States, themselves inspired and urged on by the 
who forces of international Jewry, which has flourished an 
hopes long to continue to flourish as the result of our 
dissentions. 


If we are destined to be beaten in this war, our defeat will be 
utter and complete. Our enemies have proclaimed their 
objectives in a manner that leaves us no illusions as to their 
intentions. Jews, Russian Bolshevists and the pack of 
jackals that follows, yelping at their heels - we know that 
none of them will lay aside their arms until they have 
destroyed and annihilated national socialist Germany and 
reduced it to a heap of rubble. In a ghastly conflict like this, 
in a war in which two so completely irreconcilable ideologies 
confront one another, the issue can inevitably only be settled 
by the total destruction of one side or the other. It is a fight 
which must be waged, by both sides until they are utterly 
exhausted; and for our part, w know that we shall fight on 
until victory is achieved o until our last drop of blood has 
been shed. It is a cruel thought. It fills me with horror to think 
of our Reich hacked to pieces by the victors, our people; 
exposed to the savage excesses of the Bolsheviks and the 
American gangsters. Even this prospect, however, doe; not 
shake my invincible faith in the future of the German people. 
The more we suffer, the more glorious will be the 
resurrection of eternal Germany! That characteristic of the 
German mind, to plunge into lethargy when it seem; certain 
that the very existence of the nation is at stake will once 
more stand us in good stead. But as far as I personally am 
concerned I could not bear to live in Germany during the 
transition period that would follow the defeat of the Third 
Reich. The ignominies and the treachery we experienced in 
1918 will be as nothing in comparison with what we may now 
expect. It is beyond comprehension that, after twelve years 



of National Socialism, such a thing could happen. My 
imagination boggles at the idea of a Germany, henceforth 
deprived of her elite which led her to the very pinnacles of 
heroism, wallowing for years and years in the mire. What 
advice can we give, then, what rules of conduct can we 
recommend to those who survive, with their souls 
untarnished and their hearts unshaken? Battered, left alone 
to work out its own salvation, existing solely as a custodian 
during the grim darkness of the night, the German people 
must strive its very utmost spontaneously to respect those 
racial laws which we laid down for it. In a world that is 
becoming more and more perverted through the Jewish 
virus, a people that have remained immune to the virus must 
in the long run emerge supreme. From this point of view, 
National Socialism can justly claim the eternal gratitude of 
the people for having eliminated the Jew from Germany and 
Central Europe. Post-war Germany's second preoccupation 
should be to preserve indissoluble the union of all the 
German races. It is only when we are united that our 
qualities expand to their full stature; only when we cease to 
be Prussians, Bavarians, Austrians, Rhinelanders and 
become just Germans. The Prussians were the first to gather 
the Germans into one Reich under Bismarck, and by so 
doing gave the German people their opportunity to show that 
they were the premier people in Europe. I myself by uniting 
them all in the Third Reich, set them on the path to become 
the architects of a new Europe. Whatever the future holds, 
the German peoples must remember that it is essential that 
they should cast out all elements that make for discord 
among them and should indefatigably pursue every measure 
which contributes to the maintenance of their unity. As far 
as foreign countries are concerned, it is not possible to lay 
down rigid rules, for the situation is in a constant state of 
change. Twenty years ago, I wrote that there were only two 
possible allies in Europe for Germany-Britain and Italy. The 



course of events during this period has not been such as to 
permit the implementation of a policy that would have been 
the logical sequence to my statement. The British, admittedly 
still wielded imperial power, but they no longer possessed 
the moral qualities requisite for the preservation of their 
empire. They seemed to dominate the world; in reality they 
were themselves dominated by the Jews. Italy had tried to 
emulate ancient Rome. She had all the Roman ambitions, 
but she lacked the two essential adjuncts of a determined 
spirit and material power. The only trump card she had was 
the leadership of a true Roman. What a tragedy for that man! 
And what a tragedy for that country! For a people, as for an 
individual, it is tragic to have ambitions and to lack both the 
means essential to their fulfillment and any hope of acquiring 
those means. These remains France. Twenty years ago I 
wrote what I thought of France. She was and is the mortal 
enemy of the German people. Her steady degeneration and 
her frequent crises de nerfs have sometimes led us to 
minimize the importance of her actions. Should she continue 
to become more feeble, as seems probable; that will be no 
reason for us to become less distrustful of her. The military 
might of France is now nothing but a memory, and purely 
from that point of view you may be quite sure that she will 
never again cause us a moment's anxiety. Whatever may be 
the issue of it, this war has at least put France in the 
category to which she belongs - that of a fifth-class Power. 
Even so, thanks to her unlimited powers of corruption and 
her inimitable skill in the art of blackmail, she can still be a 
source of danger to us. Our watchwords therefore must be: 
Mistrust and vigilance. Let the Germans take care never to 
allow themselves to be lulled by the voice of this Aryan! 

While, therefore, it is not possible to adhere to rigid 
principles in dealing with foreign countries and one must 
always be prepared to adapt one's policy to the changing 
conditions, it can nevertheless be asserted with confidence 



that Germany will always recruit her staunchest friends from 
among those peoples who are actively resistant to Jewish 
contagion. I am sure that the Japanese, the Chinese and the 
peoples of Islam will always be closer to us than, for 
example, France, in spite of the fact that we are related by 
blood. It is a tragedy that France has consistently 
degenerated in the course of centuries and that her upper 
classes have been perverted by the Jews. France is now 
condemned to the pursuit of a Jewish policy. With the defeat 
of the Reich and pending the emergence of the Asiatic, the 
African and, perhaps, the South American nationalisms, 
there will remain in the world only two Great Powers capable 
of confronting each other - the United States and Soviet 
Russia. The laws of both history and geography will compel 
these two Powers to a trial of strength, either military or in 
the fields of economics and ideology. These same laws 
make it inevitable that both Powers should become enemies 
of Europe. And it is equally certain that both these Powers 
will sooner or later find it desirable to seek the support of the 
sole surviving great nation in Europe, the German people. I 
say with all the emphasis at my command that the German 
must at all costs avoid playing the role of pawn in either 
camp. At this juncture it is difficult to say which, from the 
ideological point of view, would prove to be the more 
injurious to us - Jew-ridden Americanism or Bolshevism. It is 
possible that under the pressure of events, the Russians will 
rid themselves completely of Jewish Marxism, only to re¬ 
incarnate pan-Slavism in its most fierce am ferocious form. 
As for the Americans, if they do no swiftly succeed in casting 
off the yoke of New York Jewry (which has the same 
intelligence as a monkey that saw through the branch on 
which it is perching), well - it won't be long before they go 
under, before even having reached the age of maturity. The 
fact that they combine the possession of such vast material 
power with so vast lack of intelligence evokes the image of 



some child stricken with elephantiasis. It may well be asked 
whether this is not simply a case of a mushroom civilization, 
destined to vanish as quickly as it sprang up. If North 
America does not succeed in evolving a doctrine less puerile 
than the one which at present serves as; kind of moral vade 
mecum and which is based on lofty but chimerical principles 
and so-called Christian science it is questionable whether it 
will for long remain a pre dominantly white continent. It will 
soon become apparent that this giant with the feet of clay 
has, after its spectacular rise, just sufficient strength left to 
bring about its own downfall. And what a fine chance this 
sudden collapse will offer to the yellow races! From the point 
of view of both justice and history they will have exactly the 
same arguments (or lack of arguments) to support their 
invasion of the American continent, as had the Europeans in 
the sixteenth century. Their vast and undernourished 
masses will confer on them the sole right that history 
recognizes - the right of starving people to assuage their 
hunger - provided always that their claim is well backed by 
force! 

And so, in this cruel world into which two great wars have 
plunged us again, it is obvious that the only white peoples 
who have any chance of survival and prosperity are those 
who know how to suffer and who still retain the courage to 
fight, even when things are hopeless, to the death. And the 
only peoples who will have the right to claim these qualities 
will be those who have shown themselves capable of 
eradicating from their system the deadly poison of Jewry.