

**Germany
Will Try It
Again**

SIGRID SCHULTZ

To those who fight the battle for freedom
in war and peace

INTRODUCTION

SINCE I RETURNED to my native shores after almost a quarter of a century on duty in Berlin, I have been deeply alarmed by the romantic conception of the German of today and the optimistic interpretation of the events of the past twenty-five years which I found prevalent in wide circles of the United States, even after two years of war.

Despite the fact that America is the best-informed country of the world, our enemies have succeeded in camouflaging the real facts and forces which led to the Second World War. The purpose of this short book is to remove some of this camouflage and prevent our enemies from exploiting the war-in-peace strategy which they developed and found useful in interwar years and which they are using against us now. They are constantly perfecting it and will continue to apply it after the end of World War II. The social, military and economic struggle will be fully as fierce as the military, naval and air battles we have witnessed. The German battalions of war-in-peace are at work.

I was in Berlin for the Chicago Tribune from 1919 until 1941. As chief of its Central-European bureau and as Berlin commentator for the Mutual Broadcasting System I reported

on all major events in my territory in war and peace. My war experience includes shrapnel injuries sustained in the first British air raid over Berlin and a long bout with the usually deadly spotted war typhus, not to mention clashes with the Gestapo.

Through a chain of lucky circumstances I was able to gather a great deal of inside knowledge, some of which has been put down in this eyewitness report, in the hope of making those who read it get a clearer picture of the difficulties confronting us now and in the future.

I know Europe well. My father was a portrait painter who, in my childhood, reversed the usual procedure of artists—he went from America to Europe to paint portraits of the wealthy, the important or the beautiful. We lived mostly in Paris but my father did a great number of portraits in England, Egypt and Germany. When he painted the King and Queen of Wurttemberg, there was quite a storm in the little court of Stuttgart because this painter Schultz was not of German birth but of Norwegian origin. In later years, when I became a reporter, my father's acquaintances provided me with valuable contacts usually barred to foreigners.

World War I broke out when we happened to be in my father's Berlin studio. We were supposed to return home, but illness detained my parents and I could not leave without them. I managed to go to Berlin University and attend courses in history and international law. After the United States entered the war, the Schultz family had to report to the local police as "enemy aliens" at least once a day.

I witnessed World War I and the Revolution in Berlin. I escaped the gunfire of wild-eyed revolutionaries when attempting to cross streets that had suddenly become battlefields. My first newspaper boss, Richard Henry Little of the Chicago Tribune, to whom I owe a greater debt of gratitude

than to anyone else I know, went through the Berlin riots of 1919, and I trotted by his side, an eager cub reporter. We travelled through many parts of Germany in that crucial year. Dick Little taught me to let facts speak for themselves. I have tried to do this in the following chapters.

I knew, interviewed and respected most of the leaders of the German republic. When I was made chief of the Berlin bureau of the Chicago Tribune, nobody in the new Germany seemed surprised to find a woman in charge. The only one to worry occasionally about my status was the Chief of Protocol. What to do with a woman at the launching of Germany's spectacular first ten-thousand-ton battleship when men were required to wear either their military uniforms or top hats had been quite a serious subject of debate to judge by the fact that years later he told me of the negotiations between his office and the Navy about the clothes the lone woman correspondent was to wear. By that time, infinitely more serious problems confronted us.

In 1930 I realized that the Nazis would play a decisive role in European history and I began studying them most closely. Until then they could have been defeated by a militant democracy. In the first interview I had with Hitler he staggered me by asserting, at the top of his voice: "My will shall be done," and by showing very clearly that he felt he had the right to speak in religious terms. At a dinner at my house the president of the Reichstag, a certain Captain Hermann Goering, gave me an insight into Nazi mentality by describing in detail the joy he had felt in 1914 when his sword had cracked through the bones of his first French adversary. I interviewed Hitler's chieftains and I know leaders of Germany's underground movements, who I hope will be able to escape the persecutions of their Nazi tormentors and live to see their country and their families free of Nazi fetters. I have seen German

generals bow to Hitler and do his will, just a short while after they had denounced him to me as a threat to their own country and to civilization.

In the flush of Blitz victories in 1939 and 1940, the real leaders of Germany, who had willed the Second World War, cast aside all caution. They boasted of their past activities and their future plans, these Nazis, industrialists, professors and militarists. Suddenly, as they talked, the full picture of the past quarter of a century came into perfect focus, the pieces of the German puzzle clicked into place, even for one who had spent the past quarter of a century studying it. No one who has witnessed the triumphant joy of the vast majority of Germans in their conquests and in the loot of their soldiers and their businessmen can ever consider them free of guilt. No one who has heard them expound their plans for the future and seen evidence of their preparations, can remain quiet in the face of the countrywide campaigns unleashed on America in an attempt to make us believe that once we have defeated the Nazis we can again live in peace. This is not true.

Nobody sympathizes more deeply than I do with the Germans who had no part in preparing World War II, but their number was heartbreakingly small. We shall not be able to help them or ourselves if we allow false sentimentality to befuddle our minds. Men and women who knew the old Germany, before the lust for conquests was turned into her national credo, seem to be indulging in a certain nostalgia for the dim past and they are allowing it to color their thinking. Even German refugees who suffered at the hands of the Nazis try to ignore the tremendous changes German mentality has undergone and the real nature of the present-day German. In their fondness for their native country they, and those whose spiritual roots are in Germany, cast about for an alibi for their countrymen, just like the relatives of a man who sud-

denly turns criminal. They meet with a certain response from Americans who are desperately eager to be fair and who have not seen the new German in action. Those in quest of an alibi for Germany find it in the claim of the German Nationalists that the Versailles Treaty is the root of all evil. The Treaty, they say, was responsible for the new German aggressiveness, therefore probably also for the crimes committed in the name of the German people by their Hitler Guards and by their soldateska. The facts of the past quarter of a century show this to be untrue. We should allow nobody's sentimental nostalgia to blind us to the hard realities of the present and of the future.

I had hoped to sidestep the temptation of writing a book, but I have seen at work again the same forces which started preparing World War II when Germany laid down her arms in 1918 determined to deprive the fighters for peace and freedom of the just reward for their sacrifices. I felt it my duty to write what I know of these forces and their activities in the hope of helping our country, and those fighting at our side, to avoid the traps being set for us now by Germany's experts in the war-in-peace. To be fooled once is tragic. To be fooled twice is unforgivable.

CONTENTS

| | |
|------------------------------------|-----|
| INTRODUCTION | vii |
| 1. WAR WITHIN A WAR | 1 |
| 2. THE GERMAN SECRET GENERAL STAFF | 15 |
| 3. HOW THE REPUBLIC WAS FOOLED | 36 |
| 4. THREE ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE POWER | 50 |
| 5. HITLER'S SYSTEM | 69 |
| 6. "IMPENDING CHAOS" AS A WEAPON | 99 |
| 7. WOMEN NAZIS ARE THE WORST | 121 |
| 8. GERMAN AND RUSSIAN REARMAMENT | 151 |
| 9. NAZISM IS CONTAGIOUS | 177 |
| 10. GERMAN TROJAN HORSES | 202 |

1

WAR WITHIN A WAR

LONG BEFORE the Second World War could be finished, when in fact it had only really begun, another war was launched in Berlin. It was not declared, nor would it ever be, for this was a secret war, a war within a war.

The men and women who fight it are both soldiers and civilians. They take their orders from military and civilian leaders of daring and vision, with wide knowledge of human beings and the world, and an utter contempt for anything that does not serve their common cause—German world supremacy. These leaders include military experts, heads of industry and business, scientists, artists, influential clergymen, women, professors, and key men in foreign countries. They wear no distinguishing uniform, use no lapel buttons or mystic handclasps for identification, but they are inescapably bound together by their community of purpose. As members die, or become useless, new members are added. It is an efficient body. It should be, for it has been working together to perfect its strategy since August, 1918, when General Ludendorff gathered the original conspirators together to save the German army.

Since then its membership has quietly directed the crea-

tion of world-encompassing political and financial structures. It knows that the lethal power of the new weapons is confirming the rest of the world in a horrified determination to outlaw war. It plans to exploit our hunger after peace for its own ends.

The new secret war dates from October of 1940. I was then correspondent in chief for Central Europe of the big morning paper of my native Chicago, the Chicago Tribune, and the Berlin commentator for the Mutual Broadcasting System. I had many old friends and confidential contacts among the German underground. As soon as the secret orders were issued, they saw to it that I was quietly informed.

During that period, one of my most trusted informants arrived many hours late for our appointment. He had that evening survived his third Gestapo-contrived automobile accident within a week.

He told me of the summons sent out by Heinrich Himmler, chief of the Gestapo, to every agent who had worked in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Denmark, and France. From them the most successful were to be trained for new campaigns in new countries. Added to his information came other details, each fitting neatly into the jigsaw. I learned of the school in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, which specialized in training agents for Africa.

Aside from these there were the law professors, who had their orders to examine the old Chinese penal codes, to prepare a "scientific work to be used as a propaganda tool in Asia." Trusted Berlin lawyers, called into conference with Himmler, were requested to develop cases and business connections for good alibis in traveling to still neutral countries; they were promised special plane transportation to Spain and South America. If they could find plausible excuses, they would be sent to Mexico and the United States.

Insurance companies, moving firms, travel agencies, and artists' bureaus, which had already been useful in Southeastern Europe, worked out detailed reports on their practical experience. These were submitted in turn to propaganda experts in the liaison staff of Rudolf Hess, and to the foreign-service staff of Heinrich Himmler. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch ordered his military espionage service to get ready to "branch out beyond the countries assigned to them," and to "report on political and economic possibilities." Great rivalry spurred on the three groups to write the report which would win Hitler's approval. There was no doubt about the importance of these various memoranda—they were to guide picked experts in the kind of warfare in which the Germans excel: war-in-peace.

That was the word swiftly relayed to the selected men in all the requisite departments of the nation's life, and to key men throughout the world.

In the preceding June, the British had incredibly snatched their trapped armies off the bloody beach of Dunkerque. The unexpected rescue disconcerted the Germans. But not as much as what followed.

For weeks the strategy officers of the German High Command, the air and navy experts of the general staff, conferred on French soil along the Channel, plotting their course: their next invasion should give them England, the giant aircraft carrier from which German's planes would complete her conquest of the world.

While they were polishing up their new Blitz, British planes dared the long flight from London to Berlin to bomb the German capital. It was a comparatively small raid, but the German tacticians knew that if England were given time her air power would grow, and with it her raiding strength. Further, not only would the German people see the emptiness

of Goering's boast that England could never bomb Germany, but for the first time in more than one hundred years, densely populated Central Germany would be made to feel the devastation of war on its own soil. This would never do, for the German people might become permanently pacifist.

Miraculously, England secured the time she needed, through the heroism of her people—and through the watchfulness of her navy. In the dense fog of a dark September night, fully manned barges of a trial German invasion fleet set out from France, destination England. Nearly all of them went up in flames. One of the few survivors, who was brought to Berlin, told his relatives that eighty per cent of the assault force perished. According to his account, his barge was in the rear, and so escaped. For the British had flooded the sea around the barges with oil. Then they set fire to the oil.

The evacuation from Dunkerque, the bombing of Berlin, the loss of their preliminary invasion force—three blows in succession at the army, the air force, the navy—gave pause to the German High Command.

The generals suddenly remembered that other day, in 1914, when the Kaiser's troops were turned back from the gates of Paris by the battle of the Marne. At the time, ranking generals had warned the Imperial High Command that Germany could not hope to win. And that war had been lost. Might not this one, too, be lost?

Then make ready, far in advance. Prepare for the battles-in-peace before the open war can fail. Prepare for "all eventualities," so that in victory or in seeming defeat Germany will win the object of her repeated aggressions.

Put the best brains in Germany to devising new undercover strategies. Miss no single detail in plotting the chart of intrigue, speculation, exploitation, vilification, fake love and fraternization, revolt, arson, class warfare, race riots, bribery,

murder and general Kultur with which to carry on the German battle for domination when the world shall trustingly lay down its arms again, as it did in 1918.

The plan was simple. The militarists had worked it before. They had won the peace, with double-edged secret weapons of their own perfecting—propaganda, penetration, economic sleight of hand, political intimidation.

To the small number of Americans who watched and worked among the Germans from the Kaiser's time through the days of the Republic, through the coming of Hitler and of World War II, the realization came slowly that it was not Germany, as we had always been told by the Germans, but the Allies who had been tricked in the peace. It was hard to believe, after the hardships the German people had endured in World War I and the spectacular recovery they had achieved by 1928, that a large proportion of the nation could be laboring systematically, ruthlessly and, to a great extent, selflessly, to get ready for a new war.

The trend began early enough. The Nationalist vote steadily increased during the early Republican years, although reactionary leaders like Alfred Hugenberg did not even try to conceal their martial spirit; they were proud of it. By 1930 their rowdy brothers, the Nazis, had rolled up a vote of almost 6.5 millions. Altogether—counting the Nationalists, the Junkers, their sympathizers in variously labeled kindred groups, and the army officers directing the work of experts in German industrial plants and universities—it is safe to assume that 10 million Germans, or approximately one-fourth of the electorate, were imbued with military aspirations. This was the situation even before the big Nazi campaigns of intimidation and terror. And the Nationalists of all camps formed the aggressive element of the population. Therefore their influence far exceeded their numerical strength. Further, many of

them belonged to the moneyed classes and were able to use the pressure of their wealth for political purposes. But they did so quietly, surreptitiously.

Even those of us whose job it was to observe, to have contact with all groups and to watch the changes they underwent, could learn only slowly; a hint here, an indication there, a piling up of intangibles, to weave carefully into a ladder over the wall of official secrecy.

Thus, through the information which came into my hands during nearly a quarter of a century as second and then head of the Tribune bureau, it gradually became clear to me that months before the provisions of the Versailles Treaty were known, an organized, small, and powerful group under General Ludendorff determined to utilize the period after the inevitable surrender of the German forces to prepare a new attack and seize the military victory so nearly won.

There was a time limit goading on the men determined to make a second try for world mastery within one generation, and that was the age of their fighters. General von Reichenau admitted this fact freely when victory seemed near in the summer of 1940. "This war had to be fought," he said, "while the men who learned the warrior's trade in the First World War were still young enough to make full use of their knowledge in forming the strategy of World War II."

There is, however, no time limit on the will-to-conquer which animates the German militarists. They looked ahead to a new war as long ago as the fall of 1918 when they sacrificed the Kaiser to allay the suspicions of the Allies. They also looked ahead to a contrived armistice when they started their new war-in-peace preparations in October, 1940.

The first peace emissary to emerge from Germany in World War II, Rudolf Hess, insisted on German supremacy in Europe when he landed in England in May, 1941. Little more

than a year later, leaders who were determined to save German armed strength let it be known—in diplomatic, banking, and business circles in neutral centers in Europe as well as in England and in the United States—that they were ready to sacrifice Hitler for peace. These men belonged to the same school of power politics as the men who sued for an armistice in 1918.

The analogy is unmistakable. As the Kaiser was thrown to the lion, the eagle, and the Gallic coq, Hitler was to be thrown to the lion, the eagle, and the bear. The negotiators failed. They did not paint a thick enough camouflage over their design for conquest. But they'll try again. They have been perfecting booby traps disguised with olive branches ever since they saw that they could not invade England.

The German experts laboring overtime on the new war-in-peace strategies are clever and ingenious. They can draw again on the deceptions which worked quite well enough between 1918 and 1939. They have devised innumerable new ones, banking on the credulity, the tolerance, the love of peace among their democratic enemies and the fanaticism of their own followers in Germany and abroad.

The broad outline of the campaign aims at a "scientifically provoked and directed chaos," with which they feel certain to win ultimate victory.

Such an idea perches uneasily in the mind of the average American, prodding his protesting, easy-going spirit to constant watchfulness and caution. But however unwelcome, it is true. I saw us lose the last peace. I saw our own reluctance to face just such unpleasant truths trick us into betraying our own dead. For the men and women now gone forth to war, the women condemned to barren lives, are our generation's victims as well as the enemy's—because we let the peace which our soldiers had won for us slip through our fingers.

If in spite of all our brave planning for it we are not to lose the next peace, if we are not to betray our new war dead, we must be wiser than we were before.

We can be wiser—but only if we uproot from our minds every notion planted there by fecund German propaganda, well watered and tended by Germany's dupes, by her accomplices, and by some of our kindest and best-intentioned citizens; only if we set ourselves to a cool and dispassionate appraisal of the last twenty-five years; only if we seek out the bypaths we followed in an effort to be "fair" to the Germans, which ended in the most monstrous injustice to ourselves.

THE UNITED STATES IS MY WORST ENEMY,
SAYS HITLER

We do know, and we should never forget, that the German militarists consider us Germany's principal enemy. Not only Hitler, but his General Staff as well, have left no doubt of this in conversations with men whose word I trust. Our democracy is a symbol of hope to the oppressed. As long as it survives, the nations the Germans are determined to subdue will never resign themselves to German domination. Complete subjugation of Europe, conquest of the rest of the world, is impossible as long as we retain our freedom.

Consequently, Hitler's friends ceaselessly attack our democracy from within as well as from without. We will constantly remind ourselves of this fact.

And we must draw the logical conclusions from our knowledge, calmly but quickly. As late as the summer of 1943, German propaganda still triumphed in the belief of an appalling number of Americans and Britishers that the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty fathered the German aggressive spirit which brought about the Second World War.

Certainly the Treaty of Versailles was far from perfect.

Certainly, too, the sufferings of the German people were intense. But only a small fraction of that suffering came from the terms of the Treaty. A great part of it came as an aftermath of the war itself and from the German militarists' determination to bootleg Germany a new army.

But the Germans blamed us, and our peace treaty. The more sentimental of us echoed the plaint. If we had not been so unkind to the poor Germans at Versailles, we said, they would not have felt the need to rearm, they would not have fallen prey to a demagogue like Hitler. On such lopsided, literally Jerry-built logic, we based a whole theory of war guilt, in which we were both judge and villain.

The truth is that German militarism never meant to give up the fight when the German army sued for armistice in 1918. It only went under cover to lick its wounds. Our alleged unkindness at Versailles had nothing whatever to do with Germany's dedication to another war and, should that war fail, to still another.

The truth is that in August and September of 1918, when they were privately told by General Ludendorff that defeat was imminent, Germany's cleverest, most ruthless men, the German General staff, the top-ranking industrialists, and some of the most astute university professors, came together with a strong common purpose: to form a cabal powerful and fanatic enough to make ready a new army and to sweep Germany to victory after a short armistice.

Long before they could know the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, hence before they could feel any special resentment over its terms, several dynamic groups in Germany were preparing the battle of the future.

I give you five representative witnesses: the soldier, the sailor, the pastor-politician, the industrialist, and the generalissimo.

Many of the soldiers and sailors of the Kaiser's army and navy were eager for peace in the days of 1918, when victory had fled the German colors. They had only one thought in mind—to get home to their families for Christmas.

Yet side by side with them were many others, men who had enjoyed the adventure, the kill. Among them was the Austrian corporal who on Armistice Day lay in a hospital near Berlin and whose name was Adolf Hitler. In his book, *Mein Kampf*, which later became the political Bible of Germany, Hitler speaks at length of his disgust with the revolution, and the sudden peace. He expresses his determination to fight it, born on Armistice Day, in the laconic words: "I, however, resolved now to become a politician."

To Hitler, the World War which he precipitated in 1939 was the same war in which he had fought as a young man. He proved this, in the Reichstag at dawn of September 1, 1939, while his troops were invading Poland. Attired in field gray, he pointed to the coat he was wearing and said, "I have put on again my old soldier's coat, and I shall not take it off until ultimate victory is won." The same coat, and for its wearer the same goal as in 1914—German world domination.

It has been said that if life had been easier for such as Hitler in the transition months after the Armistice, the German militaristic spirit might not have thrown aside its shroud and struck out for Greater Germany. But Hitler could never have stamped his armies out of the ground if German militarism had been dead. The martial fanaticism of the tens of thousands who packed the secret military and semimilitary organizations created for them immediately after the war showed that at least this large body of voters wanted no truck with peace.

And the Worker's Party, which later became the Nazi Party, was founded on January 5, 1919, long before its founders knew what would be in the Versailles Treaty. According to the Party records, the seventh inscribed member was Adolf Hitler.

THE SAILOR

During the early months of 1919 Richard Henry Little, of the Tribune and I interviewed literally dozens of German officers. None was more truculent than Admiral von Tirpitz or Admiral Scheer, who absolutely refused to accept the defeat as final. And their attitude was identical with that of nearly every naval officer we met.

The most outspoken of them was a sour, disagreeable little man in navy blue, whose name was Raeder. "You Americans need not feel proud of yourselves," he rasped at us. "Within twenty-five years at the latest, your country and my country will be at war again. And this time we shall win, because we will be better prepared than you will be."

Raeder was a good prophet as to time. And there is no doubt that he and his fellow officers devoted the interval between 1919 and 1939 to providing Germany with as powerful a navy as they could devise.

I well remember how, on that day in 1919, we felt sorry for vengeful little Raeder. He was taking defeat so hard. He was, we felt, simply consuming himself with hatred.

When, almost twenty-two years later, Adolf Hitler declared war on the United States, the man commanding the German navy was Grand Admiral Dr. Erich Raeder.

THE PASTOR-POLITICIAN

Friedrich Naumann was accounted one of the foremost leaders in German liberal thought from the turn of the cen-

ture until long after World War I. In his *Mitteleuropa*, or Middle Europe, a best seller in 1915, Naumann advocated the creation of a central Europe, combining Austria-Hungary and the surrounding states under a German continental hegemony. His ideas woke a tremendous echo in Germany, as did his challenge: "If we are only half victorious, then we shall be obliged to fight again."

In one voice with the German High Command, Naumann proclaimed that "Everything has to be made subservient to preparations for the next war!" Since this frank Naumann dictum antedates the Armistice by three years, it testifies, loud and clear, that the German will to wage a second war for German expansion could not have been the ill-begotten child of the Versailles Treaty.

THE INDUSTRIALIST

As I traveled around Germany in the raw early spring of 1919 it was evident that German industry rebelled at the loss of the war even more bitterly than the army or the navy. During the half century before World War I, the colossus of industry had begun to shoulder the German sky. It had counted on the conquests of the Kaiser's armies for new room, new markets. Logically, then, when the High Command was actually forced to acknowledge defeat, German industry turned about to save what could be saved of Germany's war machine, for the sake of future conquests. Every concern that had ever had a state order co-operated, so that their number was legion. I shall mention only one.

In the spring of 1919, German armament plants were supposed to have stopped war production. A few English and American newspaper correspondents managed to arrange a tour of Germany's formidable war plant, the Krupp works in Essen. The newsmen returned, to report a gratifying German

compliance with disarmament orders. Then indignant German pacifists came to us and insisted that although the newsmen had passed close to parts of the plant where guns were still being manufactured, they were too innocent of industrial processes to recognize what was going on. All Berlin laughed at the unsuspecting correspondents.

Years later, I met and talked with the very Krupp official who had chaperoned the correspondents on their inspection tour. His name was Hohmann. "I sweated agonies," he said reminiscently. "There they were, those sharp-nosed news hawks. What if one of them should see that we were really still at work on a war job, finishing the models to be stored away in case of need? But they did not pry much. The war was won, and there the thing ended." He paused, and then added, "But it was not ended for us."

THE GENERALISSIMO

Historians have debated hotly for years as to whether the German master strategist of World War I was Field Marshal von Hindenburg, Field Marshal von Mackensen, General Hoffmann, or General Erich von Ludendorff. Whoever they eventually decide on, what is important here is that Ludendorff was the master strategist of the war-in-peace which began in 1918, that his brain conceived the nightmare now known as total war. It was not only that he early realized the war had been lost. Others did, too. What singled Ludendorff out from his fellows was that he had the vision to prepare a viciously clever plan against the day when the German forces should have to surrender.

In August, 1918, Ludendorff tendered his resignation as quartermaster-general to the Kaiser. The Kaiser refused to accept it. Ludendorff was not a coward. Only one thing could

have induced him to leave his post while his troops were in difficulty: he felt he had a higher duty.

The German financial councillor, Dr. Paul Bang, a Ludendorff intimate, emphatically repeated to me on several occasions that in 1918, "Ludendorff felt it imperative to concentrate on preparations for the war to be fought when Germany had regained her strength."

That last phrase is significant. The peace was never intended to be permanent, but merely an interval during which Germany "regained her strength."

There was a later period in which Ludendorff violently denounced those who had not fought to the finish, but he was a responsible general staff man who knew when his troops had cracked. He would not have led such troops into a new battle. The call for resistance to the end, however, salvaged the prestige of the German army safely enough, since the Armistice was already in view.

If the framework of the army was to be saved, there was much for Ludendorff to do in those last weeks, and the general was tied to his post. Secretly he went ahead as quickly as possible within the galling limitations of time and distance, summoning key men to confer with him at his headquarters on immediate steps to set the conspiracy in motion. Despite the gravity of the front-line situation, he also managed to get to Berlin for long enough to see, as he said, "a great many people."

Always the message was the same. Ludendorff warned every discreet and powerful friend in the army, among the diplomatic, political, and industrial leaders, that Germany would have to ask for an armistice. He urged that they "prepare for all eventualities."

Thus, under the pressure of impending defeat on the field, disaffection on the home front, and the conviction that on the

success of his plan depended the future ambitions of Germany, months before the Versailles Treaty was known, General Ludendorff laid the foundations for what I call the German Secret General Staff.

2

THE GERMAN SECRET GENERAL STAFF

EVERY MAN in Ludendorff's group had to possess certain special values of use to the others and to their common purpose. He must have attained prominence in the army or the navy, in industry, banking, business, science, letters, or teaching—and he must ruthlessly exert every ounce of his power to the re-creation of a mighty, armed Germany.

So that while Ludendorff did not, and indeed could not, build a well-defined, set organization with a formal title, the members of the secret general staff were inexorably bound together by their mutual interest. For each man wanted personal power, and only in a Germany both strong and militant could he have it.

Ludendorff was crystal clear as to the direction he and his associates must take, marked out many years before by von Clausewitz, when he wrote in his *Vom Krieg* that "Even the final decision of a war is not to be regarded as absolute. The conquered nation often sees it as only a passing evil, to be repaired in after times by political combinations."

All around Ludendorff in that tense autumn of 1918, how-

ever, there was indescribable national confusion. The various cliques seethed in a ferment; the cabinet members despairing of favorable armistice terms if the Kaiser did not withdraw; the old-time, feudally trained men among the army officers supporting the Kaiser's defiance; and the Kaiser himself swaying from one bewilderment to another as the popular discontent became too apparent to be ignored. For the people had learned that it was the Kaiser's refusal to abdicate that was keeping the longed-for peace dangling just out of their reach.

The press maintained careful discretion with oblique references in influential papers like the *Frankfurter Zeitung* to the "question of the Kaiser." But discretion gave way to pressure from the radical Independent Socialists in such blunt statements as "Germany is risking destruction for the sake of one man."

The moderate Social Democrats, however, while they favored a republican form of government, joined the demand for abdication only when Wilson's various notes stressed Allied rejection of the Kaiser as the representative of the German nation. Then they advocated a regency which would be strong enough to weather the crisis.

It is not impossible that the dynasty might have saved itself if the Kaiser's son, Prince August Wilhelm of Hohenzollern, "Prince Auwi," had been just a little brighter. When the chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, conferred with him on a projected joint regency, Prince Auwi, already set in patterns of arrogance and stupidity, "failed to understand." As a mature man he later allowed himself to be used by the Nazis with a startling lack of dignity. The Nazis rewarded him with the wartime job of distributing fish in Potsdam.

In any case, Prince Max von Baden had to abandon Prince

Auwi as regency timber, and he hadn't the courage to take on the job himself.

During all these hazardous days the industrialists, who had always actively but discreetly directed the government, kept themselves far in the background. But they were busy. All the men whom Ludendorff had tipped off as to a possible German defeat used what private pressure they could to bring about the abdication. Konrad Haussmann, secretary of state under Prince Max, wrote to his daughter on October 15, 1918: "The chief representatives of German industry and finance all hold that the only hope for the state and the dynasty is renunciation of the throne by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince."

Friedrich von Peyer, vice-chancellor under both Chancellors von Hertling and Prince Max, also speaks of the agitation in favor of the abdication by "German manufacturing interests."

Conversations with numerous industrialists in the course of many years have confirmed this historical fact. Their uncharacteristic modesty was an important element in the secret general staff scheme, nebulous as yet, to allow the erection of a papier mache Republic, use it as a facade, then to erode even its slender underpinnings until it perforce collapsed.

Nor did General Ludendorff share openly in the decisive drama preceding the Kaiser's abdication. His activities during the months of August and September had aroused the distrust of both the Kaiser and the chancellor, who knew, of course, nothing of his plans. After the Kaiser sent for Ludendorff on October 25 and summarily dismissed him on a pretext, there were two alternatives open to the general. He could attempt to seize dictatorial power. Or he could efface himself to work full time on the perfection of his secret staff plan. The choice was an easy one.

The differences between the closing days of World War I

and World War II are bound to be many. One of the fundamental dissimilarities lies in the persons of the heads of state. As king and emperor, the Kaiser automatically commanded the absolute loyalty of his officers, just as his forebears had commanded the loyalty of their ancestors. But, in the eyes of the master-powers of Germany, who has Hitler ever been? Just a rather vulgar little man who was useful, whose daring, whose visionary qualities and extraordinary insight emboldened him to take steps which the more respectable if equally ruthless military commanders feared to take. Further, being a commoner, he could reach the mind of the masses. Separating from the Kaiser was a hard wrench, like parting from a close family member—getting rid of Hitler, only a pleasure to many of the key men who have followed him obediently enough, but with murder in their hearts.

Many as the differences must be, in circumstances and in background, the one great similarity remains the same: the reason for making the change—to despoil the victors of the fruits of victory.

When finally, in the dense morning fog of November 10, the Kaiser fled, Prince Max von Baden, back in Berlin, hurriedly thrust the leadership of the state into the hands of the Social Democrat, Friedrich Ebert. With tears in his eyes, Prince Max begged him to "Do whatever you can for the German Reich."

To this Ebert replied, "I have already given it two sons."

Both Ludendorff and his friends hoped that the fourteen-point program of President Wilson would soften the terms imposed on Germany. But they took no chances. Everything within reach that could be of use in future war was effectively hidden: blueprints for new arms, models, materials, and molds suddenly vanished. Ludendorff himself supervised the removal of part of the general staff files from the red brick

staff building near the Victory Column. He also won the heart of his industrialist friends by ordering the removal of most of the documents of the Kriegsamt, the War Office branch responsible for the manufacture of German war equipment. These files contained proof of the profiteering which had made the rich industrialists richer, indignantly collected and compiled by General Groener while he was in charge.

Once the Kaiser had fled, Ludendorff felt he could move more freely, for the high officers on whom so much of his plan depended were no longer divided between their obedience to him and their allegiance to their king or emperor.

MEN WHO WORKED WITH LUDENDORFF

General Ludendorff took stock of the situation, of what had been accomplished and what steps had yet to be taken. Among the efficient staff secretly enrolled were officers, some of them from his own quartermaster staff, leading industrialists, and reactionary politicians. They included Colonel Walter Nicolai, chief of the German secret service; Colonel Max Bauer, High Command artillery expert; Colonel Wilhelm von Faupel—the same Faupel who proved so valuable to the Nazis in Spain; Colonel Heye; and a young, very energetic major, Kurt von Schleicher. Among the industrialists were Hugo Stinnes, August Thyssen, Albert Voegler, Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, and the future Nationalist leader, Alfred Hugenberg. The politicians included many Junkers, among them Herr von Oldenburg-Januschau. Then there were the fanatic pan-German leaders, Dr. Heinrich Class, Financial Councillor Paul Bang, and the race theorist Albrecht von Graefe. Ludendorff's connections with the universities were close, and before long some of the most influential professors and scientists, like Karl Haushofer and Ewald Banse, were to join the ranks.

These men formed a kernel of leaders whose self-chosen work was to save the German officer corps so that it could train new troops when the time came; and to make German industry strong enough to survive, so that in turn it could arm the new forces.

The stage was set, the broad outline of the program worked out. The malnourished, spindly Republic was gallantly fighting for life under sincere and hard-working men. But Ludendorff had seen how handicapped those same men had been when suddenly given the task of creating the state for which they had nothing ready but idealistic concepts. He resolved to be ready when his time should come.

He managed a spectacular "flight" to Scandinavia, disguised with a beard and smoked glasses. Actually he left with the approval of the new government head, Friedrich Ebert, and was accompanied by a young German officer ostensibly on an official mission to Denmark. He had, of course, arranged to keep in contact with the men who remained in Berlin—through the young Major Kurt von Schleicher.

From Sweden, where he found a refuge, Ludendorff cautiously wrote his wife, "I want to write and write." What he wrote piled up on his desk into voluminous notes for a book called *Total Warfare*, a masterly, detailed outline for the war loosed by his pupil, Adolf Hitler. Everything is there—the theory of mobilizing and regimenting every aspect of life for war, the preliminary work for the *Blitzkriegs*—nothing was overlooked.

Ludendorff and his friends met first problems first. How could they stir up the people to fight again after a lost war? The answer was astonishingly simple. Make them believe that the war was not lost, that they had just missed victory by their refusal to fight on to the end.

This deception, which almost out-hitlers Hitler, was made

possible by the Allied failure to carry the war onto German soil. The German masses, who hated having lost anyway, were glad to believe, and the deception made it easier for the secret staff to revive their martial spirit.

That was luck. But most of the successes of the German secret general staff were the immutable results of calculation. Thus, the first deliberate victory of the military group came from a clever sort of blind-man's-buff, by which a member of the fledgling Republican government, Dr. Matthias Erzberger, was compelled to sign the Armistice in the name of the German government instead of a military leader. This maneuver accomplished, the militarists promptly started spreading the word that "the Republic had stabbed the German army in the back."

To be able to keep the reins of government in hand behind the back of the Republic, the reactionary forces decided they must keep useful men in useful places. While the masses were still rioting in the streets of Berlin, they prevailed upon the Republican leaders to "act for German unity" by inviting the former imperial officials to stay on in office. Only a few refused the invitation. The most trusted secret staff members, who held strategic positions in the Reichsbank, the Finance Ministry and, naturally, the War Office, took care to keep their jobs.

By one stratagem or another, the leading Republicans had by the end of the year been led to entrust the protection of the new government to imperial officers who were either secretly or openly disloyal.

One thing that made it relatively easy for the secret staff to save the German army was the eagerness of the Republic's heads to retain a strong military force. Their reason was that to them an army symbolized law and order, infinitely necessary after four years of war and the disorders of revolution.

But their motives were unimportant; their attitude was welcomed.

Because of the Republic's faith in the army leaders, in the two short months before the end of the year, the solidly entrenched secret staff had acquired a military whiphand.

Knowing that the best of general staffs, though buttressed by the best of economic organizers, is relatively powerless unless it has behind it the weight of a vast body of men to be manipulated according to the needs of the moment, the junta now turned its attention to assembling just such a force.

Its members had early induced the Republicans to rule that soldiers returning from foreign battlefields could re-enlist as volunteers. They thus escaped demobilization. And from the seeds of this innocent-looking measure grew the Free Corps, and later the Black Reichswehr, both of which heavily weighted the whip already in the hands of the militarists.

Under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty large numbers of officers were demobilized. The demobilization looked like a peace move. Actually it made it easier for the secret staff to remobilize them without detection. Many of the highest ranking men received pensions adequate for a decent if not luxurious living. Many officers went into posts especially created for them in industry or big business. Wherever they were, however, all the officers remained instantly available for assignments on the multiple problems of the coming war.

Their contact man was Ludendorff's crack undercover liaison officer, Major Kurt von Schleicher. His chief in the War Ministry, the superefficient organizer, General Hans von Seeckt, could not risk being too prominently seen in conference with the "former" officers. And the young major possessed an unusual and valuable quality—he was a born politician. By the time he had finished telling a general what

the War Office wanted of him, the general would be convinced that he had thought up the idea himself.

This arrangement worked well enough for a time. Then Ludendorff and his co-workers decided centralization and a more rigid organization would speed the intricate work. They must find a headquarters, a kind of glorified beehive.

REICH ARCHIVES IN POTSDAM

They selected the Potsdam Reich Archives, an extremely subtle choice, since the Archives had been enormously enlarged by the unsuspecting Republic to "simplify the study of the World War."

From then on, historians and officers from all parts of the world who flocked to the Reich Archives for research were hospitably received. And why not? They furnished excellent protective coloration.

I myself interviewed many officers there from time to time on some phase of the war, but not until the full tide of the Second World War could I confirm the true importance of the Archives. Discussing the thorough planning of the German campaigns with the Berlin correspondent of Goering's paper, the Essener National Zeitung, I pumped him systematically.

His usual line was to extol Nazi efficiency over that of other, mere Germans. But today he said, "After all, the strategy experts working in the Reich Archives ever since the end of World War I have had plenty of time to work out problems from all angles."

I tried to feel my way. "They certainly did remarkable general staff work in the Archives," I said.

"Why shouldn't they?" he replied testily. "They were members of the general staff."

On the same trains that carried the millions of war-weary German troops back from the fronts in 1918, men who wildly

cheered the slogan "Nie wieder Krieg" (no more war), were other soldiers who felt quite differently. Officers who refused to accept the defeat went among these others, picking the toughest and the most aggressive. Some of them spoke eloquently of defending the Fatherland against the "Red rabble that had caused the revolution." Some promised expeditions to the eastern border, to push the Poles back out of their newly reconquered territory. In this way they assembled the first units of what soon came to be called the Free Corps, whose actual strength was never known.

The soldiers who longed for peace hurried home—"Heim zu Muttern zu Weihnachten" (home to mother for Christmas), as the Prussians put it. The adventurous ones had to be quartered somewhere, and in hiding. At first they stayed in improvised barracks, on troop trains with their shepherding officers, or in country homes of officers' relatives. During this interval the Ludendorff group utilized its Junker members. For the Republic had generously allowed them to retain their estates. Some of these vast holdings sagged under heavy mortgages, but they were still secluded and big enough to shelter large numbers of men.

Every old-time regiment disbanded by order of the Versailles Treaty had its "tradition company" in the Reichswehr (which legally numbered no more than 100,000 men, but was never in fact reduced to that treaty figure). The tradition companies were like green trunks, which could quickly branch out in full regimental leaf, ready for war.

With the formal demobilization, the War Office created a new, elaborate separate office which Major von Schleicher dominated, to "take charge of veterans' welfare," with complete files listing every man in need of help. Complete? They were exhaustive, indexing and cross-indexing the personal

data of every individual male who could in the future swell the ranks of a reconstructed German Army.

Officers banded together in their old Deutsche Offiziersbund, maintaining their own welfare funds and courts of honor. Every regiment had its club, and noncommissioned officers their separate associations. Thus each group could arrange meetings to formulate martial policies and to receive necessary directives without arousing suspicion. For most of the Socialists in the Government were against war, and yet were very much needed to deal with the victorious Allies. Still, what could they say against old soldiers foregathering for a social evening now and then?

Secret societies of various descriptions suddenly sprang up all over the country to "carry on the sacred military traditions of Germany." Some of the societies were not secret, but centered apparently about some cultural or civic enterprise with no semblance of military connection. Respectable burghers in small towns and cities formed themselves into patrol services. Their laudable purpose was said to be protection of their homes and families from the criminals who always spring up from nowhere in the wake of wars and revolutions. Perfectly innocent, one would say. But such groups were actually utilized for the formation of military cells.

VETERANS WORK TO SAVE WAR SPIRIT

A proposed veterans' organization took shape. But the militarists were too wise to head it with one of their own men. Officers who lived near Magdeburg, a district teeming with disgruntled Junkers and "retired" General Staff members, found the ideal person for the job: Franz Seldte, a comparatively wealthy soda-pop and liquor manufacturer. Magdeburg was convenient enough to Berlin for the officers to run up to the capital for conferences whenever they wanted to, and for

their War Office friends to pay them protracted week-end visits. Seldte typified the reserve officer, dear to Germany's middle classes, who is so grateful at being taken into the officer clique that he tries to be more militaristic than the professional soldier.

And so, under Seldte, the powerful Steel Helmet society went into action. Like the Kyffhaeuserbund and its hundreds of smaller imitators, it was designed to embarrass and undermine the Republic.

All these things came to pass quickly. By Christmas of 1918 the Ludendorff group felt so sure of themselves that Seldte was permitted to issue his first proclamation. It characterized the revolution as "swinish." Nobody protested this insult to the legal government, the Republic which the revolution had brought to life. Apparently only the army jealously guarded its prestige.

Every one of the thousands of new societies, from the Steel Helmets to the most innocuous-sounding social club, consistently urged the German people to cherish and foster their precious military spirit—the same spirit which later was said to have risen, phoenixlike, from the ashes of German humiliation at Versailles.

In the meantime, a considerable number of German soldiers had, instead of going home, stayed on in the Baltic states, in eastern Europe, and in Finland, to carry on their own private campaigns, in open defiance of the Republican government. Their many leaders there had almost as many aims; some wanted to wipe out Bolshevism, some wanted to join forces with the Russians. Still others planned to establish a German realm around the Baltic in memory of the Teutonic Knights.

Nothing could be more convenient for anybody with pan-German ambitions than those ubiquitous Knights. Whenever

an up-and-coming army commander decided to "reclaim" a place for Germany, anywhere from Finland to the Black Sea, he could always unearth some professor to testify that that particular spot had been "won to civilization" by the Knights of the Teutonic Order.

In any case, even their memory was still potent in 1918, as was the lure of campfires, secret plots, and sudden forays. Arms and ammunition from Germany kept the Free Corps men well supplied. A friend of mine, talking with General Ludendorff in his study in the spring of 1919, heard him give orders to the commander of Koenigsberg to rush guns to the Iron Division in the Baltic states. Again, a certain deputy Haase of the German National Assembly asked in open session how it was possible that troops, war equipment, and field kitchens were traveling through Memel to German units in the Baltic districts, when the men were supposed to be at home demobilized and disarmed?

It happened that the Free Corps men, doing as they pleased in eastern Europe, were behaving exactly as the secret staff wanted them to. The Allies were just as worried about them as the German Republican government, for nobody knew what it would please them to do next. Finally the Allies lost patience. Under their pressure, the government called them home on September 28, 1919.

One of the returned adventurers told me condescendingly that it was a good thing for the Republic that it had ordered them home in the fall. It was getting cold and the men had begun to worry about supplies for the winter. Had the recall come in the spring, he said, nobody would have paid the slightest attention to it.

Once home, the newcomers made their presence felt. Whether formally demobilized or not, they gravitated toward the local Free Corps camps, swelling their numbers danger-

ously, and adding to the already seething unrest all over Germany.

REACTIONARIES HELP FEHME MURDERERS

The Fehme rituals, with their concomitant brutal murders, contributed strongly toward keeping the secret societies secret, and the Free Corps free. Anyone who purposely or accidentally betrayed any information about the associations forfeited his life. Many a man working for a peaceful Germany, who came up against the network of Free Corps, also died at their hands. Years after the Corps were supposedly disbanded, details of ruthless executions kept leaking out. The Reichstag appointed a special committee to investigate. But, with a few exceptions, those criminals who were caught fared relatively well with the reactionary German judiciary which the Republic had allowed to remain in office.

The Free Corps have had many apologists. Their chief poet, Ernst von Salomon, declared to me that their rule of iron was necessary "to save the men from becoming democratic weaklings."

"What, in your opinion, is a democratic weakling?" I asked.

"Why, any German," he answered scornfully, "who forgets that his sole duty is to fight for Greater Germany."

One of the Free Corps, the Organization Consul, specialized in political murders. Its members killed Dr. Matthias Erzberger in August, 1921, and Foreign Minister Dr. Walter Rathenau in June of the following year. Erzberger was dispatched because he had signed the Armistice, although at von Hindenburg's request; Rathenau was a Jew, albeit a very nationalistic one. Ironically enough, Rathenau was just about to announce his new conviction that another war with the

Allies seemed unavoidable. So the Free Corps murderers deprived themselves of a prominent spokesman.

The purely military value of the Free Corps was negligible. The secret general staff knew well enough that they were not crack units. On the half-a-loaf theory, however, they felt the rough and tumble military discipline served the men better than no training at all.

Second, merely to quarter one of their groups in a region was to create a center of unrest. The political leaders within the secret staff established and dispersed these centers at will.

Third, the Free Corps furnished, by their very nature, a vast pool for the secret staff to draw on for any new military venture.

And fourth, Free Corps men were invaluable from the very beginning in spiriting away the active and reserve German armaments. Thanks to them, perhaps the most effective bit of juggling in the whole secret staff scheme was also probably the easiest to accomplish—the vanishing act of the German military machine. A large percentage of the guns turned in to the authorities were outmoded. The Free Corps men cached parts of guns, so that an even bigger percentage of the modern ones surrendered were incomplete.

Whenever a cache had been discovered and its guardians warned in time, members of the nearest Free Corps would be rushed to the spot to carry away everything of importance before the Interallied representatives could get there. The Dutchman, Fokker, in his book, *The Flying Dutchman*, tells how his whole airplane factory was furtively dismantled, loaded on special trains, and shipped out to Holland almost under the noses of the Interallied Control Commissioners.

The secret staff saw to it that the Free Corps remained in a ferment as a means of pressure against the Republic. For a long period all they had to do, to keep both the Republican

leaders and the Allies in line, was to threaten a rising of the Free Corps, by the truculent Reds, or by both. It worked very well, indeed.

Naturally the Free Corps men and their leaders had to be financed. This task was comparatively easy.

MONEY FOR THE FREE CORPS

Before World War I, German industry had made heavy contributions to the various organizations devoted to arousing the necessary patriotic war frenzy. Ruhr industrialists called their special fund the Niebelungen Hort, or Niebelungen treasure. Lesser-ranking Germans made regular donations to the sundry nationalist associations. The many "friends" on whom Ludendorff's men could call were all neatly catalogued on these membership lists.

There was the Flotten Verein, with five thousand branches all over Germany, which had worked with Admiral von Tirpitz to promote a huge navy. The Wehr Verein had performed the same service for the army. The Kolonial Gesellschaft agitated for more and better colonies. This trio were the most powerful and all three were closely tied in with the Pan-German Association, whose avowed purpose was "to bring to life the German nationalistic creed throughout the world."

During the war, von Tirpitz had sought to unite all these groups into the single Party of the Fatherland. It disbanded hurriedly with the revolution, fearing action against its branch leaders. All financial records "disappeared." In reality they were well hidden. Shortly after the Armistice one branch reopened—the Munich German Workers' Party, which later became the Nazi Party.

The Ludendorff secret circle diverted these membership lists to their own use. All they needed was a new slogan. This

time it was "the danger of Bolshevism," which, with its twin, "the danger of chaos," sprung the locks on the industrialists' coffers. On January 15, 1919, five million marks subscribed for an anti-Bolshevist fund made at least a beginning toward supporting the Free Corps.

Later a sort of inverted checkoff system insured a regulated flow of money. Each employer paid so much for each worker in his plant. Recalcitrant employers had "labor" trouble.

Labor then still dreamed of socialization. Many workers made barely enough to support their families in the meagerest fashion. Agitators sent out to organize sabotage or a strike had no difficulty at all. And whatever happened, it could plausibly be blamed on Communists. The Communists themselves created enough trouble on their own to be suspected of guilt even in disturbances about which they knew nothing.

All the employer had to do to regain peace was to pay up. Sometimes Reichswehr soldiers or Free Corps men were sent in to restore quiet. After one such visitation, the employer usually learned his lesson. From then on either he or an associate paid promptly.

The importance of the labor agitators hired by the secret general staff cannot be overestimated. I knew several German liberals who had cautiously gathered together bulky files on their activities and on the agitators sent abroad. One collection was entrusted to me for some weeks during World War II. Its owner wouldn't allow me to copy or photograph the documents but promised, when he came to retrieve them, to let me have copies "at the propitious moment." A month or so later he committed suicide. The porter at his house told me that the shot had come "just as the Gestapo were coming up the stairs to arrest him."

Once in a while the Republicans succeeded in catching an

agent provocateur—with a War Ministry pass in his pocket. A protest would fly to the War Office. The officers responsible would simply evade. Further protest was acknowledged only with an icy silence. In the end nothing would come of it.

In this way, with the utmost secrecy, every industrial plant in Germany developed its own plant cells which co-operated directly with the militaristic German leaders behind the backs of the labor unions.

Thorough as was the system of voluntary and forced levying of money from the industrialists, its plan and execution constituted but one phase of the economic preparations for war organized by experts working with General Ludendorff and his reactionary associates.

ECONOMIC BRAIN TRUST FOR FUTURE WAR

It was, oddly enough, Air Minister Goering who inadvertently dropped the crumbs along the trail I later followed. We sat at lunch at a party given for him and his fiancée, Emmy Sonneman, by the Foreign Press Club of Berlin. Goering was full of his plans for the new German air force, whose existence he had publicly revealed only a few days before.

"From now on," he said, "you in America will never be able to catch up with us. You build a plane. If it is not satisfactory, you scrap the whole thing. We have all our parts carefully standardized. And what does that mean?" he went on. "Why, when we find something wrong in a plane, we just remove that part and design a new one, which is also standardized. Gradually we reach the point where our standardization speeds up production at a terrific rate. Again, we don't store away whole planes. We check the parts and store them separately. That way, nobody knows how many planes we have!"

What was all this talk about Normung (standardization),

T wondered. Goering's manner had indicated that ignorance of such an important topic was rather shameful. I started to enquire, not guessing that the woods on both sides of that path were full of danger. An officer, who had been removed from the War Office on the charge of being a Freemason, warned me off. "You'd better stop asking about standardization plans," he said. "Those are purely military matters, and you might come to grief."

But I found out. Der Normen Ausschuss der Deutschen Industrie, or the Standardization Committee of German Industry, known as Dinorm, dated from the days of World War I, when German generals and economic specialists like Walter Rathenau sought an all-out mobilization of German resources. Firms working for the War Ministry, gradually increasing their power, reaching into new fields with their "vertical expansion," agreed that to standardize the norms of German industry would help them and speed up production.

When the Versailles Treaty came along with its restrictions on German armament manufacture, the standardization committee didn't shut up shop. On the contrary, it specialized and expanded. Its job was to co-ordinate the blueprints for future German weapons and for the gauges, machines, materials and plants required for their production. The process of mobilizing German plants was one of the numerous long-range schemes that General Ludendorff and his associates developed step by step.

Dinorm's offices occupied number 40 Dorotheenstrasse, close to the old German War Office. Under pressure of vastly increased secret work it spread out from there in a chain, each link of which shaped itself to the same end, the perfection of war preparations. One of the statistical offices, on the Luetzow Ufer near to the present War Office, was a link.

Dinorm and this statistical department were in turn joined to the Heereswaffenamt, or Arms Office for Weapons. The Arms Office for Weapons regulated German domestic and foreign manufacture of munitions, the latter notably in Russia.

Another link connected the Heereswaffenamt with the Berlin Technical High School, where some of the most important German Research laboratories were kept running full out.

I passed the Technical High School in 1940 after a big British air raid. An unobtrusive cordon of police kept me from going near. A British dud had landed in the neighborhood and was expected momentarily to go off.

That wasn't all the story. The next day I met a man who was one of the Heereswaffenamt officials, working at the Technical High School. He kept looking over his shoulder nervously, the way people do when the Gestapo is on their trail. His trouble was different. A sample bomb of a brand-new type, more viciously explosive than any other known and sensitive to the slightest shock, had been delivered to a Heereswaffenamt building for a formal viewing by Herr Hitler. The British dud had picked out the courtyard of the same building to fall in. If the thing had chosen to explode, that whole section of Berlin would have disappeared. But it didn't; it was 1940 and the Germans were still playing in luck.

They were after the First World War, too. To the German layman there was nothing extraordinary about a standardization committee being called into his neighborhood factory to increase the working efficiency of the men and machines, to reduce production and repair costs. Nor to anybody else, unless he had also known that the Normen Ausschuss der Deutschen Industrie was taking its orders from the War Ministry, that it was, in fact, the economic branch of the German secret general staff.

That staff worked with such speed and energy that within

less than six months after the German army asked for an armistice in 1918, the secret circle had succeeded in the following preparations for its own rule and for a future war:

It controlled all official army offices. The Weimar Constituent Assembly had empowered the army leaders to create the Reichswehr. The secret staff controlled those leaders and, so, the Reichswehr.

It controlled the unofficial armed veterans of the Free Corps, who were spoiling for a fight.

It controlled key positions in all universities and government offices.

It had induced Germany's main industrial concerns to prepare with it the planned total war. These industrial co-operators included the Krupp directors, the steel Magnate Fritz Thyssen, the German Dye Trust, and innumerable big and small companies which had produced for the military machine during World War I.

It managed to cry murder at the mention of Bolshevism and at the same time to work in the diplomatic, military, and economic fields hand in hand with Moscow.

It had evolved a magically powerful propaganda slogan, effective with both the Republican leaders and the Allies: "Chaos cannot be avoided unless Germany is saved," which meant, "unless the will of the secret staff is done."

3

HOW THE REPUBLIC WAS FOOLED

NEITHER THE ALLIES, who were far away, nor the Republican leaders, who were right in the middle of it, were fully aware of the forces at work behind the facade of the young Republic. Both suspected that there must be some secret obstructive group, but there was never any proof. That is, not until it was too late.

Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, men of courage and integrity, had been part of a last-minute pseudoparliamentary cabinet with which the Kaiser had hoped to deceive the Allies into believing Germany a democracy. Now, they and the Socialists they headed needed time to organize a government program; but there was no time. Up until the last moment they were kept in ignorance of the seriousness of the German army's plight. Meanwhile, the secret staff had three whole months in which to plan. When the time came, it was diabolically easy for the Ludendorff group to exploit Republican unpreparedness in any way they chose. And the time came on November 9, 1918.

On that day, in their Party room in the Reichstag building, the head men among the Social Democrats had been closeted for hours in earnest debate as to what they should do. The world had just watched the overthrow of the Tsar, had seen what a real, bloody revolution could be. Such a terror must not come to Germany. On the other hand, the Allied troops were steadily pressing the German army back, ever closer to

the German border. The Social Democrats knew, therefore, that if they did not quickly restore order, the Allies would certainly invade. But how to go about it?

The Party leader, Friedrich Ebert, who had started life humbly enough as a saddlemaker, still groped for some solution combining democracy and monarchy, not dissimilar to the British pattern.

Compounding the unbearable tension among the Socialists in the Reichstag building was the knowledge that not far away, in the Kaiser's palace, the Independent Socialists, under Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were making the walls ring with calls for a Bolshevik Germany.

In the street below, the bewildered leaders could see the anxious, angry crowd, now muttering, now shouting in a rising crescendo for action, but always in ceaseless motion from the Reichstag to the palace and back again.

Suddenly, secretly, word reached Philip Scheidemann that in a matter of minutes, Karl Liebknecht would appear on the historic balcony of the Kaiser's palace and proclaim to the waiting masses the rule of a Soviet Germany.

REPUBLIC PROCLAIMED TO FORESTALL BOLSHEVIKS

Without taking time either to inform or consult his colleagues, Scheidemann strode to the window, flung it open and hailed the surging crowd. Raising his hand for silence, he shouted a long exhortation to his countrymen, ending with the cry, "Long live the Republic!"

Thus, abortively, was the Republic born.

The leaders of Imperial Germany were shocked. Or so they said. Actually, those in the inner ring were relieved. At least Bolshevism had been avoided.

The Social Democrats were truly stunned. They had no

tools of government ready. The difficulties facing them loomed terrifyingly large. Perhaps the most immediate was the danger of Communism, which was quite real and not faked as it was later, when Hitler had to have something from which to "save" the country.

Anyone who went about Berlin in November of 1918 knows how close the Soviets came to proclaiming their rule in Germany. In the period of prerevolutionary unrest in Russia, German agents there had been as thick as raisins in a pudding. They had plenty of money to spend. Russia returned the compliment in 1918. The Soviet agents had just as much money and a much smaller country to cover. The difference was that the Russians, unlike Ludendorff, failed to find a Lenin. They did find, however, the radical Independent Socialists Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, who, working together, came pretty near to success.

I saw Communist agitators haranguing the desperate masses in the streets of Berlin. And the people had every reason to be desperate. They were cold and hungry and their soldiers had fought in vain. I saw a ravenous mob slaughter a starving horse where it fell, and carry away dripping slabs of meat. I saw half-grown rowdies attack uniformed officers, and hysterical women try to yank off their mustaches or beards. I hurried through the Berlin streets under a crossfire of Red guns on one side and Republican soldiery on the other.

The workers were weary of war, rebellious at further privations. They wanted speedy and energetic action. They were promised both by the radical speakers.

Friedrich Ebert realized that if the Republic were to crush the Red menace and restore law and order, he needed help. Where to find it? There was still the German army. On the night of November 10, he telephoned from his new office in the Chancellery to General Groener over the private wire to

High Command headquarters. The two men made a solemn

compact by which Ebert promised to co-operate closely with the High Command, and Groener pledged himself to range the strength of the army back of the Republic.

Confronted by famine and inflation, fighting Communists with the left hand and reactionaries with the right, trying to comply with Allied demands and, at the same time, to stabilize the economy of a country exhausted, disrupted by four years of war, with the upper classes offering at their best a passive resistance, the German Republican leaders had every reason to be awed by the problems ahead. In solving most of them as well as they did, in even surviving as long as they did, the Republicans achieved a near-miracle.

Most of them realized, even at the beginning, that it was foolhardy to continue in office men of the former autocratic imperial regime. But they had no men trained to replace them. So the old appointees stayed on: in the judiciary, the judges who interpreted the law to the Republic's disfavor; in the Reichsbank, the men who intensified and manipulated the inflation to their own purposes; in the Finance Ministry, among others, a young man called Count von Schwerin-Krosigk, who later juggled the Republic's budget to pay for secret German rearmament; in the War and Navy Offices, enemies of the Republic too numerous to mention. Altogether the ruling on officials was as signal a victory for the reactionaries as the signing of the Armistice by a Republican, or Ludendorff's "flight" to Sweden.

Certainly, the Republicans felt, they could rely on their well-organized labor unions and their consumer and other groups.

But, just as the Republicans had hesitated—questioning and apprehensive of the real strength of the pro-Bolshevist radical elements in the country—so likewise had the domi-

nating groups in the army, navy, and industry. And what of the soldiers' and workers' Soviets growing stronger all over the country? More, which way would labor swing? They had to find out. Hugo Stinnes, Ludendorff's friend, took the lead. By means of careful, lengthy negotiations, he prepared a pivotal industry-labor conference. The meeting took place on November 11, 1918, while the revolution still threatened to engulf the country. Albert Voegler, of the United Steel Works, an arch-reactionary, and the oleaginous Alfred Hugenberg, representing the Krupp works, flanked Stinnes when he received Carl Legien, the leader of the German labor unions, and his companions.

By the end of the conference, Stinnes, Voegler, and Hugenberg knew that neither they nor their army and Junker friends need fear the mass of German workers.

Of that day's decisions which have become known, two are extremely interesting here.

The labor leaders assured the industrialists that they would do everything in their power to defeat the radicals, whom they hated.

The industrialists, whose war profits had mounted so high by 1916 that General Groener had demanded their investigation, now claimed that unless the new government paid all the bills of the Empire quickly and in full, they could not carry on. It was a patriotic duty, the industrialists pointed out, to provide industry with ample funds for the reconstruction of Germany—and before the Allies could formulate their financial demands.

The labor leaders were able men, sincerely proud to show what they could do to help their country. In "reconstruction," the industrialists had unerringly selected the perfect psychological approach. Trustingly, the labor men promised their help.

The bulk of the German people have never known that in 1918, 1920, and 1921, the Republican government had to pay out 300 million gold dollars to settle the legal bills left owing by the army to German business concerns. This staggering figure is vouched for by Albert Grzesinski in his *Inside Germany*. Grzesinski was, during those very years, Reich commissioner in charge of "Liquidation of Military Affairs." The Republic was always overmodest, and this information was tactfully mentioned only in a murmur so as not to offend the monarchists.

There again the Republicans unwittingly aided the secret general staff conspiracy. Out of idealism, out of eagerness to consolidate their government, they tried always to conciliate the various classes in caste-ridden Germany. But they followed the method least likely to impress the German mind. There had been, they knew, much too much flagrant boasting under the Kaiser's regime. Instead of making public the lamentable mess which the Imperial Government had grandly left the country as its royal legacy, the Republicans felt that if they concentrated on their work, the results would speak eloquently for themselves.

Instead, the result was a seeming uncertainty, a lack of the proper self-confidence. It has often been said that had we supported the Republic more strongly, it would not have been so timid. But I doubt whether further concessions, beyond the considerable ones which were made, would have availed with the internal forces massed against the Republic.

FORCES OPPOSING THE REPUBLIC

The word "forces" can mean almost anything. In this case a brief look around clarifies the formidable strength represented. Obviously the industrialists wanted an aggressive government to conquer new markets for them. Not only were

sizeable sections of the official class pitted against the Republic, but also equally big groups among leading Germans, the aristocracy, the upper bourgeoisie, in the churches, the schools, and the universities.

It is, of course, dangerous to generalize about large numbers of people. There are always the exceptions, peace-loving German officers, industrialists, Junkers, ministers and professors. Yet, on the whole, from what I saw and experienced, I am convinced that the active elements in these sections of the population automatically co-operated with the secret general staff, either openly or secretly, knowingly or unknowingly, to prepare for a new war.

The groups which sincerely hated all that the Republic stood for had two other things in common. First, they were upper-class Germans. The caste system has been breaking down gradually in more recent years, but in 1918 and 1919, its imprint could be seen wherever one went. Most of the Republican leaders were men and women of the lower or upper middle classes. Their knowledge of the minds of upper-class Germans was limited. That was one reason why they could be fooled by the men supposed to be working with them.

Second, most members of the inimical groups had had access to higher education, which made them part and parcel of the pan-Germanic order.

To non-Germans the medieval symbolism of German universities even then seemed old-fashioned and slightly ridiculous. But their hold on the national mind had not loosened, because to Germans they spoke of a Greater Germany. Both teachers and students believed fiercely in Germany's right to rule the world. And it was certainly no part of the secret staff plan to relax the indoctrination of German youth, but rather to intensify it. What better fountainhead than the teacher's desk, the lecture platform?

And why devote laboratory hours to abstract problems when there were concrete ones to be solved? In the technical and chemical university laboratories trusted scientists supervised countless studies and experiments without which the new war would have been impossible. They imposed a double check on secrecy by assigning each technician only a small section of any experiment so that he could have no idea of the exact nature of the whole, or where his part fitted into it.

Not only in scholastic confines was the word spread and embellished. Many ordained men of God did everything they could to discredit the Republic. During its brief lifetime, I never heard a Protestant sermon that did not contain either a sly or an open insult to the Republic, coupled with a glorification of "the old days, when Germany was strong."

Through both the school and the church, then, the home was contaminated with a hatred of the Republic. Hatred is contagious, and when women start to hate, they do a thorough job. They also infect their children.

Always after wars, when the people have lost many of their loved ones, belief in the mystic encourages a mushroom growth of astrologists, fortune-tellers and what have you. Superstition can be an ally, and the German militarists made it one, lining up the soothsayers as their unofficial prophets. Everywhere one heard of the impending collapse of the Allies, often from relatives of officers, who nearly as often were the mildest looking old ladies. The Germans are nothing if not logical, no matter how unsound their premises. So, the Allies divided, England tottering and on the brink of disintegration, logically what then? Why, soon—always very soon—Germany would step in, finish off the British Empire and take over the leadership of the world.

Childish the method undoubtedly was; it was also fantas-

tically effective. For word-of-mouth propaganda spreads fast, and who doesn't want to belong to a master race?

Despite their need for a strong army to back them up and to maintain law and order, some of the most prominent Republicans voiced their fear of the military drift visible in the country. They were unheeded: partly because of the dexterity of the men working with the secret staff, men like General von Seeckt and Major von Schleicher, who later also became a general; and partly for a more important reason—the pan-Germanism of the vast majority of the people.

REPUBLIC UNDERESTIMATES PAN-GERMAN DANGER

The credo of pan-Germanism—that Germany has not merely the right but the duty to rule the world—had permeated the nation much more thoroughly than the Republicans knew. Whereas before World War I pan-Germanism enjoyed its main strength among the upper classes, it now had seeped down through the humbler folk, leavening their lot with a feeling of at least racial superiority.

Among the few papers which the Gestapo allowed me to take out of Germany in 1941 is a reprint of the by-laws of the Pan-German Association of May, 1898. Reading them, one can hardly tell them from Nazi pamphlets. Even some archaic words which are used in the by-laws reappear in Nazi terminology: the word Gau, meaning district, for one.

And the Pan-German Association was no local affair. It had branches in a great number of cities throughout the world, for the purpose of seeing that Germans abroad remained useful to the Fatherland. This network had only to be enlarged and perfected by the Nazis when they came to power.

Within Republican Germany, pan-Germanism was the abracadabra of the secret general staff. It explains more than any

other one thing how it was possible for such a small group of men to co-operate so effectively at the war's end and to rebuild the German armed forces. Then, the militarists on the secret staff belonged to a caste which still exercised very special prerogatives, enforced by its own traditions.

And even before the war, close friendships had sprung up between many of the ranking officers and their counterparts in industry and politics. It is no secret that the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie (National Association of German Industry) has long been fully as pan-German as the German army or the Nazi Party.

In 1918, therefore, these same men easily drew closer together, tied sometimes by common background, oftener by common education, common aspirations, common creed, common hopes, and common disappointments. Together they had pulled through many a tight place during the course of the war. With the war lost, there was no need for lengthy meetings to decide what they should do. Their minds ran in the same channels. Comparatively few plans and instructions confirmed each man in his place and function.

This identity of purpose extended far outside the actual membership of the secret general staff, and resulted in many bizarre situations. Perhaps the strangest concerned one activity of the reactionary judiciary. When a man reported to the authorities the discovery of a cache of arms, as was his duty as a citizen, who was brought to trial, the man who found the arms? Or the lawbreaker who had hidden them? Why, the informer! Furthermore, he was often tried for treason to the state.

Always the coloring of the joint purpose was military. This or that would or would not be done, depending on its effect on Germany's future military strength. Very early in the Republican game indeed, the first skirmish had been won for

the army in what has been called the battle of the epaulettes. President Ebert and his fellow government heads had forced through a vote calling for the election of a German Constituent Assembly on January 19, 1919. But there was an impasse. Soldiers' and workers' Soviets had sprung up in the army, navy, and all over Germany to try to direct the course of the revolution along more radical lines. In Hamburg, a soldiers' Soviet demanded that the army and navy be controlled by peoples' deputies under the Executive Council; further, that as proof of the end of militarism, officers be "forbidden to wear epaulettes and the old insignia of rank."

SHOWDOWN BETWEEN HIGH COMMAND AND SOLDIERS' SOVIETS

The High Command welcomed the chance of a showdown with the soldiers' Soviets. At von Hindenburg's order General Groener and Major von Schleicher, in full regimental regalia, went to Berlin. They were hissed as they alighted at the station, and again when they stood before the gates of the War Ministry demanding entry. The sentry barred their way. A few civilians detached themselves from the crowd. Major von Schleicher shouted at them, "Arrest this man!"

The plain-clothes men arrested the sentry for "resisting orders"! The army already had power enough to maintain secret-service men on duty to protect its officers.

In the Chancellery, General Groener and Major von Schleicher confronted the leaders of the Republic. They threatened that unless the Republic supported their right to wear their insignia and epaulettes, they would withdraw the communications officers directing the return of the troops from all parts of Europe. It was December 20, 1918. What man in Germany would want to be blamed for a single sol-

dier failing to arrive home for Christmas? The threat worked; the epaulettes were forgotten.

Years later, Groener told me he thought such marks of rank were unimportant. "And I thought so in 1918," he said. "But in those days we could not allow anything to weaken our prestige. We had to keep the Germans aware of the importance of officers and their rights."

Groener, however, was an honest man whose sincerity in co-operating with the Republic he later demonstrated beyond question. But his aide, Major Kurt von Schleicher belonged to Ludendorff's secret general staff. Von Schleicher utilized the time he spent in Berlin as Groener's aide in long conferences with former comrades in key positions, organizing the whole set-up by which the military leaders could direct the nation's affairs right from the Chancellery, without the Republicans knowing. He arranged that some of these men became liaison workers between the Chancellery and the War Office. One of them was Oberleutnant Plank, who later became a power in the president's office.

Von Schleicher saw too much evidence of growing Republican strength in Berlin for his own peace of mind. Trainloads of sailors from Kiel had established themselves in a big building called the Marstall, near the Kaiser's Palace, grimly determined to guard the Republic they had helped to create and for which so many of their comrades had lost their lives.

THE BATTLE OF CHRISTMAS

It was not for nothing that the secret staff had kept key men in all the ministries. Without Ebert's knowledge, von Schleicher arranged to have the sailors' pay stopped.

The sailors had earned their pay and they meant to have it. They marched to the Chancellery, occupied it, and took the members of the Socialist Government prisoner by the simple

expedient of surrounding the place and cutting off the telephone connections. At the same time a Socialist deputy named Wels was taken to the Marstall as hostage. Ebert's group negotiated with the leader of the sailors, while in a back room a minor official rushed to the secret telephone line, still undiscovered, by which Ebert had reached the High Command wherever it had happened to be.

Now, in Kassel, General Groener took the frantic calls and, in no more than a few seconds, had ordered the Berlin garrison to free the President and his government from the hands of the Naval Division. The officers of the Corps Lequis, hidden in secret quarters about Berlin, were delighted. This was their chance to crush the Republic's forces and to resume command in the German capital. Equipped with flame-throwers and heavy guns, the Corps Lequis moved eagerly through the Tiergarten toward the Chancellery.

The sailors saw them coming, through the library windows, saw that the field-gray troops far outnumbered them. They became alarmed. Ebert promised he would hold the Corps men in check, and the sailors withdrew from the Chancellery.

But the deputy, Wels, was still a hostage in the Marstall. All through the night the government leaders conferred. General von Scheuch, the former war minister, still held the job. He stood there now like a figure carved of stone, waiting for orders to storm the Marstall, for restoration of military power in Berlin depended on the decision made that night.

Ebert knew that if he gave the order for the attack, there would be much loss of life and the masses would feel he had betrayed them. But how could he forsake Wels? Every time he started to order the Corps Lequis back to quarters, a telephone call would come through, supposedly from the Marstall, warning him that Wels was in danger.

Finally, late in the night, he capitulated. General von Scheuch was to storm the Marstall in the morning.

A few hours later, other Socialists rushed to the Chancellery to say that a compromise with the sailors was possible. Nobody quite knows who the man was who perjured himself by saying that Ebert had left the building.

At eight o'clock in the morning, December 24, an army lieutenant stood before the Marstall with his troops, demanding surrender. His demand was rejected. The battle was joined. The sound of the guns could be heard all over Berlin. Heavy artillery was brought up and used against the Marstall. Women and children, who had thronged to the spot, threw themselves in front of the guns and the shooting stopped. But enough men had been killed to destroy the nucleus of the Republican army. The High Command and the militarists had scored their first military victory over the Republic—on Christmas Eve.

The soldiers had fought badly, however, and Major von Harbou rushed to Kassel to report to headquarters. When he had finished, one of the officers said, "There's no use going on. Let us dissolve the High Command and go home to our families, as our soldiers are doing."

From among the group a young major jumped to his feet "The fight has just begun!" he shouted. "From now on we shall have new, devoted troops in our hands—the volunteers. These volunteers don't know any soldiers' Soviets. They know only their rifles and their captains!"

The speaker was Major Kurt von Schleicher. He finished with an impassioned protest: "It would be a disgrace to give up because of one setback!" His comrades, electrified, jumped to their feet and gave him an ovation. No, the German army would not give up. Whatever obstacles lay ahead, it would try and try again until eventually it did regain power.

It is not impossible that in Major von Schleicher's words lay the genesis of the Second World War. For the men who heard him never forgot what he said. They were, remember, the High Command of the German army. Had they really disbanded then, before they were ready for a prepared, fake dissolution, it would have been impossible to create the secret general staff, and thus impossible to resurrect the German army.

The battle of Christmas was only one of many in the post-war period, but it is a perfect example of the tactics employed by the German militarists. It occurred six months before the terms of the Versailles Treaty were made known, long before any of the men involved in it could have felt any special bitterness over the Allied peace conditions.

4

THREE ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE POWER

THE ALLIES wanted peace in 1918.

The German masses wanted peace in 1918.

But the German General Staff merely wanted a breathing spell in which to rearm.

And its successor, the German secret general staff, although not altogether a military organization, was above all a militaristic one.

Three times within the first five years after the end of World War I, the German militarists believed their chance

had come to overthrow the Republic and precipitate a glorious new war. Each time they felt the hour was propitious. Each new attempt, they were convinced, would by its combination of surprise and audacity overwhelm both the Republic and the Allies at one blow. They counted on docility from the German people, who by then were experiencing the full impact of the Versailles Treaty.

General von Ludendorff was back' in Germany by February, 1919, although no one except his cronies knew his whereabouts. He was discovered to be playing possum in the Adlon Hotel, in the same building with most of the Allied diplomats and officers on duty in Germany, all of whom were anxious to find him.

The Ludendorffs had tucked themselves away in a suite of a separate wing with its own private entrance on the Wilhelmstrasse, which was guarded by heavy iron doors and manned by detectives and porters. More than once I bribed my way into this wing. A can of sardines or a few American cigarettes would induce a friendly porter to look the other way while I slipped inside and sped toward the Ludendorff salon. I cornered the general several times but he was determined not to talk. An onlooker would have been amused to see me firing questions at the stony-faced general while he tried to walk away as fast as possible without actually breaking into a trot.

It wasn't funny to me. Everybody knew Ludendorff was up to something, but what? I recognized a lot of his visitors, however. My friend Raeder, the navy man, came and went; and Fritz Thyssen, who later admitted he had financed both Ludendorff and Hitler; Hugo Stinnes, the coal king of the Ruhr; Karl Helfferich, who organized the inflation which was to bring more suffering to Germany than anything in her history—all these frequented the little salon. Ludendorff and his wife never appeared in the hotel lobby. But he often used to

slip out by the private entrance with friends whose military bearing belied their civilian clothes. They would stride along to one of the little Weinstuben in Berlin to meet other "friends" who, for some reason, did not dare go to the Adlon—high and minor officials, professors, and presidents of every kind of club, all eager for instructions.

I had lived in Berlin for quite a while, and there would always be someone to report the general's mysterious meetings to me.

THE FIRST SKIRMISH

In order to know the enemy's approximate strength, one must test it. The militarists found the young Republic stronger than they had expected in their first skirmish—over the signing of the Versailles Treaty.

Some of the militarists still held that—with luck and a few weeks of rest—the German forces could stand up against the Allies on Germany's western border. Field Marshal von Hindenburg sided with them against the Treaty; he went on to advocate a fight to the finish in the face of certain defeat, rather than accept a dishonoring peace. The military realists knew that indeed they must lose, and losing, suffer annihilation of the officer corps and the framework of the army, both of which must be saved if Germany was to remain a big power.

At a stormy session of the commanding officers of the army, General Groener stood up in the midst of the icy hatred of his fellow officers, reminding them that the government's failure to sign the Treaty would certainly entail further loss of life, and that Germany needed the whole of her remaining manpower to found the army of the future.

General von Luetwitz, chief of the Berlin garrison and several Free Corps, who headed the movement against accepting

the Treaty, presented an ultimatum to the government, demanding among other things that the officer corps be given a voice in matters of state. But the parliamentary system was beginning to work in Germany, better than many had expected, and the leaders of the young Republic had the courage to stand firm.

In July, 1919, after the signature of the Versailles Treaty, General von Luetwitz and his sympathizers tried to seize power. He made a rabble-rousing speech, calling for a *levee en masse*, a general rising of the people against the government. His fellow officers and his soldiers cheered. The population just ignored him. The German people didn't like the Versailles Treaty, but they wanted war even less.

Any militarist, any pan-German, retreats when the resistance against him is found to be too strong. General von Luetwitz accordingly called back his plotters and decided to bide his time.

And he could afford to wait. For the Reichswehr, created by the Republic, was run by reactionary officers under the extraordinarily efficient General Hans von Seeckt. Theoretically, von Seeckt took his orders from the Defense Minister, Gustav Noske, but von Seeckt managed him with an adroit combination of flattery and trickery.

By the beginning of 1920, when Germany still had a considerable unofficial army hidden away here and there, the Ludendorffs had moved just around the corner from the War Office, to the elegant, discreet Victoriastrasse. This was a convenient rendezvous for the officers of the Reichswehr Ministry—including General von Seeckt. The Ludendorff house, consequently, bulged with conspirators. Frau Ludendorff objected strenuously to the number of ladies who came to see her husband, but he explained that they were all "working for the German cause."

Meanwhile, the Republican police had begun to grow suspicious of Ludendorff. When von Seeckt became his intimate, it was clear that they would both bear watching. But, for the time being, all that the police could do was watch.

They couldn't prevent the reactionaries from launching a campaign of anti-Semitism, flooding the country with leaflets demanding, "Germans, are you happy, are you free?" And answering, "Only the Jew is free and the German is his fettered servant!" One group published a biweekly anti-Semitic paper, the *Voelkischer Beobachter*. The monarchists and the pan-Germans found the Jews convenient scapegoats for all past and present wrongs.

By February, 1920, the militarists in the Defense Ministry were all set for a declared war on the Allies. The United States, France and England, they felt sure, would not dare send troops into Germany because of possible contamination by the well-advertised Bolshevism. General von Seeckt had sent special emissaries to Moscow and thought that the Soviets would prove "friendly" to Germany. But he left the active leadership to Ludendorff, von Luetwitz, and Captain Ehrhardt of the famous Ehrhardt Brigade. He did not dare endanger his position in the Reichswehr and give the government an excuse to supplant him with a loyal Republican.

THE KAPP PUTSCH

During the night of March 12, the Republic found out how few of its ranking military collaborators could be depended on. Ehrhardt's Brigade, in Camp Doeberitz, had been ordered to disband. They had responded with an ultimatum. On that March night, there was a conclave of Republican leaders and army chiefs.

The High Command, which had been at such pains to ingratiate itself with Gustav Noske, froze into Prussian stiffness

when Noske requested the army to step in and crush the mutiny.

"There can be no question of making men of the Reichswehr fight against men of the Reichswehr," said General von Seeckt in his harsh voice, thus in one sentence incorporating the Ehrhardt Free Corps into the Republican army. Von Seeckt's fellow officers rallied to his support and glared at Noske. All but two, kindly General Reinhardt and Major von Gilsa.

In his ultimatum Captain Ehrhardt stated that his troops would be at the Victory Column in the Tiergarten at five o'clock that morning to accept the government's capitulation. At five o'clock Ehrhardt and his men were there. General Ludendorff stood on a corner near the Victory Column and watched them march through the gray dawn into the heart of the city.

But the government had gone. A few hours earlier, taking labor union leaders with them, they had left the city by car for a secret destination.

For a whole day Ludendorff, Ehrhardt, and the "dictator" they had picked out thought they had won. With a military government, possibly recognized by the Allies, they could start a new war. Troops filled the streets around the government buildings.

Most of us who were in Berlin in those days were so used to seeing guns drawn up Unter den Linden that we thought there had been just one more of the many minor revolts. Then a soldier in field gray thrust a proclamation into my hands. It was a bold announcement of the conquest of power in Germany by a Generallandschaftsdirektor, a provincial district director by the name of Kapp.

Kapp was a nobody from East Prussia, plucked out of the air by General Ludendorff as a front man. Despite the assur-

ances of peace in the proclamation, I felt sure there was trouble ahead.

I tried to turn into the Wilhelmstrasse to find out what was going on. Grim-faced sentries stopped me. They pointed to signs behind barbed-wire entanglements that read, "Whoever goes farther will be shot."

The soldiers sneered at my passes. I insisted on seeing one of their superiors. It was my job to get behind that barbed wire as fast as I could. The officer was affable. Certainly the American press was welcome. Could he escort me to the new press chief? We walked toward the Chancellery through a street full of tents and field kitchens, like a military camp. Opposite the Chancellery, the Palais Prince Leopold, which later became the Propaganda Ministry of Joseph Goebbels, looked like an ant hill, with men in field gray, civilians, and women of the Junker classes scurrying about.

The press chief's room was quiet enough. A dark man, who introduced himself as Trebitsch-Lincoln, was pleased to announce the birth of the new Germany. I was assured of cable service for whatever I cared to send—as long as it met with his approval. Trebitsch-Lincoln, I learned, had been a star spy in the war. I went back to our office in the Adlon.

I found the Hotel Adlon in an uproar. I had a tip that the labor unions were on the verge of calling a general strike. From the office I managed to get in touch with a few Republican leaders. They confirmed it. A general strike would "show the world how strong the German Republicans are." And it did. The Republican workers saw to it that the gas and electricity, the water services, the street cars, and the railroads stopped functioning. All the shops and factories closed. No food could be found. Hotel service ceased. The telephones went dead all over Germany. To get my calls through, I cooked up a mysterious disease, making it necessary to con-

sult various doctors to save my life. Everybody I called answered to "Herr Doktor" and exchanged bulletins with me in a wonderful mumbo-jumbo of medical terms.

But it wasn't long before Kapp and his backer, General Ludendorff, were the patients, and very sick men they were. For their friends in the Defense Ministry—who had been so warmly encouraging before the putsch—now coldly refused to co-operate. The realistic von Seeckt had seen the whole German people back the government's call for a general strike. Obviously, no man can send out a few squads and shoot the ringleaders if it is the whole nation in rebellion. He retreated from the responsibility of arch-conspirator, to wait for another day.

But Ludendorff and his pathetic figurehead, Kapp, stubbornly continued to believe the Allies would strengthen their position. The very clique which had so passionately denounced the "abysmal wickedness" of the Treaty now just as passionately hoped for succor from its perpetrators.

Rumors, bulletins, and reports filled the air. The Nationalists intensified their anti-Jewish pressure; the Communists added to the general turmoil by a mighty effort to overthrow Friedrich Ebert and the Socialist labor unions, which to them symbolized bourgeois conservatism. "Rise to arms!" they cried, "Fight for dictatorship of the Soviets!" Some workers obeyed: the Red groups and the Free Corps clashed all over Germany.

Those stormy days of early 1920 thus contained an odd paradox. In February, General von Seeckt was ready to go to war against the Allies, hoping to have Russia for a partner. In March the Kapp Putsch, which von Seeckt's colleagues had brought about, placed men in the Chancellery who needed support from those same infamous Allies to stay in power.

It took a great many years and infinite patience to establish

the background of these strange events. I could not take the account of just one man, no matter how much he was supposed to know, but talked to many men who had participated, and pieced all their stories together in relation one to the other. Following this method, comparing notes with intimates of von Seeckt and of Ludendorff, with Republicans of the different factions, I arrived at the conclusion that both attempts were the work of the same militaristic groups, alarmed at increasing Republican strength. For if the Republic was allowed to bring them peace and prosperity, the people would refuse to go to war again.

Where Ludendorff and Kapp got the idea that the Allies would side with them is a mystery. Of course, the Englishmen and Americans on official duty in Germany at the time consorted with a great many of the conservatives who played the international society game. Therefore Ludendorff's group undoubtedly felt that the Allies would prefer to deal with conservative (reactionary) leaders than with the "proletarians of Ebert's government." And they gave fulsome promises to better the reparations payments. But the Allies were not impressed.

Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, who had been German foreign minister during the Versailles negotiations, had the courage to break the news. He told me later that he had cornered Kapp in the Chancellery, where Ludendorff was begging the little man to order out the soldiers against the strikers endangering the regime. "It will cost some lives," said Ludendorff, "but the end justifies the means. And we can count on our friends in England."

Brockdorff-Rantzau interrupted. The English were not behind them, he said, and added that the British charge d'affaires in Berlin, Lord Kilmarnock, had just told him that any

such claim was a "sacre mensonge," in other words a damned lie.

That got the two gentlemen. Kapp fled to Sweden. Ludendorff fled too, but only to Bavaria, hoping that the Republic would again be generous. He was right.

When President Ebert and his associates returned from Stuttgart, where they had spent the days of the Kapp Putsch in the tower of the new railroad station guarded by volunteer soldiers, they relied once again on the golden rule.

This was all very well as a matter of personal virtue. By refusing to punish the conspirators, they hoped to restore harmony to the country. But what they actually accomplished was to arouse resentment in the masses of Germany, who had suffered great hardships in the general strike. Only a few officers were cashiered. Furthermore, in many parts of Germany, officers persecuted the soldiers who had resisted the Putsch. Protests in the Reichstag proved vain. Nothing was done to protect the loyal Republican soldiers. The confidence of the masses in their leaders waned, along with the prestige of the government.

Both the officers and the men of the Free Corps felt their contempt for the Republic doubly justified. What sort of weaklings were these, anyway, who sought to rule Germany? I saw one demonstration of that contempt on the part of the frustrated troops under Captain Ehrhardt, as shocking an example of ruthlessness as can be imagined.

The Ehrhardt Brigade, with its commander, was allowed to march out of the city after the Kapp Putsch in regular military formation. I hung out of a window in the Hotel Adlon to watch them go by. As the rearguard rounded the corner from Wilhelmstrasse into Unter den Linden, they raised their rifles and without hesitation fired point blank into the hundreds of unarmed civilians on the sidewalks. As a result of

that action which took, in time, only a few minutes, the Adlon lobby was filled with the dead and the wounded.

The next day I was alone in the office when a dark man with a beard came in. He took off his hat and removed the beard and asked if I recognized him. It was Trebitsch-Lincoln. I had seen notices in all the papers stating that he was to be arrested on sight. He asked me to tell one of my colleagues to meet him at the Fuerstenhof Kaffeehaus during the next hour. He had hardly left when a police detective arrived, pulled out his badge, and demanded to know where I had hidden Herr Trebitsch-Lincoln. I told him to look around. Would money help me to remember where the gentleman might be found? I told the man to get out, fast.

He made up for it some months later with a tip on a story we were investigating, "to apologize for his insult." It was also a hint as to how closely the authorities observed our activities.

As for Trebitsch-Lincoln, he eventually escaped; the last I heard, he had become a monk in a Buddhist monastery in China. Somebody has suggested that he might be there as an advance agent for the German fifth column.

The Kapp Putsch of 1920 provided an important dress rehearsal for the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, and for the men who were to become notorious as Nazis.

While the Kapp Putsch had collapsed and had taken with it as an aftermath a measure of the government's prestige, the secret general staff realized the need for greater steps really to undermine the Republic. The financial section of the staff decided to speed up inflation. Then the propaganda wing could direct the people's resentment over their mounting distress against the Republic and the victorious Allies.

One of the reasons why General Groener had insisted that Germany accept the Versailles Treaty in 1919 rather than risk another war was the fear of the French wish to split Germany into small states, along the old Habsburg principle of "divide and rule." To lose a fight-to-the-finish war would certainly mean the secession of the Rhineland and the Catholic states, which had their own separatists.

But as month after month of inflation aggravated the suffering of the people, the country seemed almost ready to disintegrate of itself, without any pressure from outside. If the people were to find unity again, it must be the magic unity of facing a common foe.

Why not, the secret circle wondered, entice France into doing something that to the German people would make her appear their common national enemy? England and the United States were already following the German propaganda red herring: that France was insisting on unreasonable demands to crush poor, helpless Germany. Reliable witnesses have since stated that German industrialists deliberately curtailed their reparations deliveries of coal and wood to France, precisely in order to goad the French to action. Germany had plenty of both materials; she just didn't send what she owed.

Like so many German ruses, this one worked to perfection. The exasperated French and Belgians marched into the Ruhr. Their Allies grew cool, the German factional frictions dissolved in the need for a solid front. With the Socialists and the nationalists pulling together on the same team, the Free Corps achieved the dignity of open recruitment and of joint training with the Reichswehr to point the men for active combat with the French. Then came the compromise, reached through the clever negotiations of Chancellor and Foreign

Minister Gustav Stresemann and the wide esteem he enjoyed among the Allies.

The German militarists found themselves, however, with trained troops on their hands at the peak of a well-cultivated patriotic frenzy. What to do with them? There were a few Communist outbursts to fight in Hamburg, in Thuringia, in Saxony, but not enough to keep all the troops busy. To some of the leaders it seemed like a fine time to get rid of the hated Republic, especially to the Black Reichswehr groups in Bavaria (which was then run by a reactionary government anyway), to General Ludendorff, and to his pupil, Adolf Hitler.

Moving in the nimbus of the general, the former lance corporal had succeeded in welding together the three biggest, most militant nationalistic organizations into one body under his orders. On September 25, 1923, they had proclaimed him their "Fuehrer." Now they were ready to strike.

Neither Ludendorff: nor Hitler realized at the time, however, that the Ruhr crisis had strengthened the Republican government, not weakened it. General von Seeckt had seen how zealously the Republican leaders had labored for German unity, and how the labor unions had fought the French in the Ruhr as fiercely as had the Nationalists. There was henceforth no reason why he and his associates could not work with the Republicans.

Then, too, the Bavarian authorities had compelled the local Reichswehr to transfer its allegiance from the national government to the Bavarian state. As a result of this and the general Bavarian unrest, the Republicans had come to the point of empowering von Seeckt to declare martial law. The High Command would then openly control direction of all military forces. It would be able to discard useless elements and build the rest into a healthy foundation for the future German Army. In addition, the Fehme murders and the other

unsavory scandals implicating the Free Corps had more and more often assailed the nostrils of the old-school, meticulous military leaders. So when Hitler and the lesser Munich plotters sought support from army headquarters in Berlin, they got cold-shouldered.

THE BEERHALL PUTSCH

This rejection made General Ludendorff and his protege, Adolf Hitler, all the more frantic to act. Under the pretense of organizing "field exercises," they summoned their soldiery to Munich for November 10. Two days before, Hitler sensed a certain distrust among the Bavarian conservatives. He decided not to wait for his reserves to arrive from the Bavarian mountains and the small town beerhalls, but to seize power in a surprise-and-bluff attack. State Commissioner von Kahr had called the small businessmen of the district together in the Buergerbraeukeller, a Munich beer hall, for a lecture on economics. What could be easier, thought Hitler, than to surround the place with the available Storm Troopers, win over the men inside and move on to the government buildings, pursuing the Kapp Putsch technique?

That is what happened, or almost. Hitler, attired in a Prince Albert coat, brandishing a pistol, proclaimed the revolution to the three thousand astonished burghers, and took State Commissioner von Kahr, General von Lossow, and the police chief, von Seisser into an anteroom. There, while Goering soothed the crowd in the main hall, Hitler outlined the form of the new government in which each of them was to have a fat job under his orders. They remained impassive. Then he started to plead with them for their co-operation and ended, to their disgust, with an hysterical threat to commit suicide if he failed.

In the meantime, General Ludendorff, who hadn't known

of the change in schedule, was hastily summoned from his villa in near-by Ludwigshoehe. And while he tried to persuade Commissioner von Kahr and General von Lossow to join forces with Hitler, Reichswehr officers on duty in Munich heard about what they called the "Wild West scene" in the Buergerbraeukeller. They promptly reported to General von Seeckt in Berlin.

The general entertained quite different feelings about the Munich putsch and the Kapp affair. After all, the earlier effort had been the work of fellow officers, of gentlemen. Who was Hitler, except a rather dubious political friend of Ludendorff's? Besides, the Republic had just given von Seeckt the power to proclaim martial law, had entrusted, in effect, its safety into his hands. General von Seeckt informed the Munich Reichswehr officers that he could not tolerate insubordination of any kind.

Back in Munich, in his beer hall, Hitler was told that Reichswehr soldiers had refused to surrender to his men. He rushed off to the barracks. Immediately Commissioner von Kahr and General von Lossow clicked their heels, saluted General Ludendorff, and went off to fight the Putsch.

Hitler and Ludendorff waited desperately for Berlin to order the Reichswehr to support them. It was nearly dawn. Emissaries were rushed to the barracks; they were all imprisoned. However, the provincial reinforcements would soon begin pouring into town. The Nazi chiefs determined to go ahead and take over the government buildings. General Ludendorff volunteered to lead the Storm Troopers. His popularity with the Reichswehr men and with the police, he felt, would keep them from firing, induce them to join his side, and allow the coup to succeed.

But the police did fire. The brave Nazis scattered in all directions. The one hero of the moment was Ludendorff's

orderly, who, by throwing himself in front of the general, died of the bullet meant for his superior. Ludendorff marched straight ahead, and in the end was arrested by the police.

Hitler, who had talked so glibly about heroism and suicide only the night before, rushed to one of the Nazi cars and fled to the suburban home of the American-born mother of his friend Ernst Hanfstaengel.

While Hitler and company had failed in their Putsch, they had actually won a significant victory in having kept themselves all in one piece. The militarists, of course, had gained immeasurably by preserving the Republic in the crisis.

By running the country under martial law for five months, they were able to camouflage their military centers more carefully. They utilized their new power to weed out Republicans they distrusted from the army. The pacifists carried on a press campaign denouncing the machinations of the military. Their warnings were not believed. General von Seeckt succeeded in re-establishing quiet, partly because inflation had ended, and partly because even the enemies of the Republic were eager to show the Dawes committee how deserving and trustworthy they were.

Most important, the German people were once again reminded of the value and power of the army.

So, indeed, was the Republic. When President Ebert asked General von Seeckt if the Reichswehr were loyal to the Republic, the general replied, "The Reichswehr is loyal to me." I admit that I didn't hear him say those words, but later when I asked him about the truth of the report, he said, "Yes, it is true. And I would be ashamed of my ability as a leader if it Were not."

INFLATION ON THE HOME FRONT

After the failure of the Kapp Putsch, when General Ludendorff said to Karl Helfferich of the Finance Ministry that he feared the German people wouldn't fight another war, Helfferich gave him a typically cynical reply. "Let them suffer a little longer," he said. "When they feel the full brunt of inflation, they will start hating. And we shall see to it that their hatred is concentrated on the Republic, on the Jews, and on the foreigners."

This conversation was related to me by a witness to it, the Secretary for State in the Reichsbank, Herr Brinkmann. During the inflation he had sworn all kinds of oaths that only wicked foreign forces and speculators were breaking German currency. But during the Hitler regime, Herr Brinkmann proudly stated at a reception for some American businessmen that he and his official colleagues had deliberately accelerated inflation. He told us what a thrill it had been to smuggle currency into the Rhineland, from where it automatically spread to foreign countries.

But to the leaders of the Republic, the financial experts leagued with the secret general staff said that inflation need not necessarily be disastrous, it could in fact be eminently beneficial. Controlled inflation, they pointed out, would wipe out the huge internal debt left behind by the imperial government. This goal was achieved. While the Allied nations staggered under the load of war debts, Germany freed herself of them—at the expense of her people.

The British member of the Interallied Council, General J. H. Morgan, in his book *The Present State of Germany*, published in 1923, speaks of the economic-military manipulation of inflation in Germany. He characterizes it as "utter callousness to the suffering of the individual," and continues,

"Never since the worship of Moloch have so many victims been sacrificed on that altar of 'the state' which German philosophers have sought to idealize as a kind of mystic expression of the 'general will.' There is a mark fodder, just as there is a cannon fodder."

Turning the financial security of the German people into "mark fodder" achieved many aims desired by the secret general staff. They used inflation both as a foreign political weapon and as a weapon on the home front.

Inside Germany itself, inflation, by wiping out the carefully accumulated savings of the lower and middle classes, destroyed their faith in the Republic. The rich suffered less, but even among them, the individuals who had no chance to speculate, or no talent for it, or who did not belong to the group possessing inside information, saw their safety swept away just as did the widow of the little greengrocer who had relied on her life's savings.

Inflation wiped out Germany's wealth, but enabled the inner ring to become richer and richer at the expense of the people.

Inflation brought disorders that discredited the Republic and made it appear unable to cope with its own population.

Inflation brought work to the factories that were dumping their goods on foreign markets—but the worker himself was paid in paper marks, and the price of essentials continued to rise almost out of reach.

Inflation furnished funds for the secret general staff, since the industrialists had to ante up out of the profits for the Free Corps and other secret military groups.

Inflation made it easy for the chosen few to gain control of any industry they wanted. Hugo Stinnes, for instance, would pick out some promising concern and would offer a generous price. Say the deal went through. Stinnes would go to his

bank, mortgage some of his own property, and sign notes for the money. Sixty or ninety days later he would pay them off in marks which, in the meantime, had depreciated in value. It was a good trick, and with it Stinnes acquired an industrial empire before the majority of the other boys caught on. Such deals conformed to the letter of the law, but they were bound to raise the devil with the economy of the country.

It wasn't long before the people of Germany, who hadn't really had enough to eat since the middle of the war, found it almost impossible to buy the barest necessities. They sold their shares, their mortgages or small holdings, their precious heirlooms. They received in return paper money which, within a few hours, became worthless. At one time it took millions of paper marks to buy a loaf of bad bread. While the decent Germans who had no resources beyond their work or their savings were harassed by anxiety, the shady dealers, the speculators, indulged themselves in an orgy of licentiousness and hysterical spending.

Destruction of Germany's moral fiber, completed in Hitler's time, began during inflation, when mothers had not enough money and food to keep their children at home, when the aged had to beg on the streets for scraps of bread.

Yet despite their daily sufferings, the masses in Germany clung to the hope that the Republic would bring them better times if only they worked hard enough. And it did. But enjoyment of the prosperity which the people and the Republic achieved was to be denied them by the small compact band of conspirators who deliberately aggravated the economic, social, and political difficulties confronting Germany.

Thus in 1924, after the people had resisted the Beer Hall Putsch, after the attempt to precipitate a war over the Ruhr occupation had met with firm resistance from both the Repub-

lic and the Allies, the militarists were compelled to make a strategic retreat.

Despite the humiliation of a treaty which had proved to everyone but the Germans that they had lost the war, despite five years of steadily accelerated inflation; despite, further, the calculated agitation of the militaristic leaders, the people wanted no new war.

5

HITLER'S SYSTEM

"I KNOW the mistakes I made. I had to pay dearly for the lesson," a much-subdued Adolf Hitler told General Luderendorff after his release from Landsberg, when he called on the general. Then he added quickly, "Never mind, Mussolini did not succeed until his fifth try." This was Hitler acting the chastened pupil to the former master—who still had his uses.

Despite the difficulties confronting him, including the rebellion of some of his followers, Hitler knew that he was infinitely stronger and better equipped than when he had engineered the Beer Hall Putsch. During their stay in the fortress at the expense of the state, he and his fellow prisoners had worked hard and well, polishing up their plan to seize power from that state.

Hitler's system always followed the same fundamental course. That system enabled him to advance in Munich and in Bavaria, served him well in his rise to national power in Ger-

many, in the conquest of Austria, and on the international front—where he played the big and small powers of the world against each other and exploited their weaknesses.

If we are to protect ourselves from Hitler's system we must thoroughly know his technique. There cannot be the slightest doubt that in the period of unrest and revolution following World War II, imitators of Hitler will spring up like toadstools all over the globe. His method seems almost a fool-proof way to success for the man who can create enough uncertainty and chaos to make a bewildered people lose all sense of responsibility and initiative.

Soon after the Armistice of 1918, Hitler went to Bavaria to rejoin his regiment, possibly to be demobilized. His first step toward becoming a politician made him that lowest of political tools, an agent provocateur.

The army group to which Hitler returned was in a precarious position. The Red Soviets (not to be confused with the soldiers' and workers' Soviets) were in power in Munich. Death and terror ruled the Bavarian capital. The army officers had been caught unprepared, for the revolution came to Munich a few days earlier than to North Germany. They had been unable to grasp the secret reins as quickly as their comrades in Prussia, who had been better informed by General Ludendorff.

No officer dared show himself in Munich for fear of apprehension or execution by the Red Soviets. Yet, if they were to regain power, the officers had to know what was happening. They picked soldiers whom they trusted, who had friends in the revolutionary mob—Adolf Hitler among them—and sent these men out with orders to report. Witnesses who knew Hitler in those days have testified that he was in the thick of the struggle, first fraternizing with Reds, then denouncing them.

One of the officers who investigated Hitler's background

when General Ludendorff saw in him a potential leader of the people, later confessed to me, "I am one of the criminals who made it possible for Adolf Hitler to become the master of Germany. I helped whitewash him and his evil-smelling early activities!" Certainly without the gratitude of the officers who used him, Hitler could not have made the jump from informer to minor politician.

As a spy, Hitler first went to the little Bierstube where the Workers' Party met. Munich, the capital of the beer-drinkers of the world, with big and little saloons all over the city, had at least one political faction in every Bierstube. All the factions felt certain that they knew how to handle the problems of the day better than anyone in Berlin—a city to be distrusted anyhow, since it was inhabited by Prussians, whom every stout-hearted Bavarian hates.

Each little faction jockeyed for position with its neighbors, while the local leaders of the German army watched closely, intent on picking the winner for their support. One of their most gifted and daring officers, Captain Ernst Roehm, was in Munich. With the funds of his old regimental purse, which anti-Republican industrialists replenished whenever necessary, Captain Roehm wanted to finance the most promising of the new parties to help him build up a new secret army, a Black Reichswehr.

In an army training course for speakers, Captain Roehm found Adolf Hitler. Spouting his hatred of Jews and Marxists, Hitler scored an instant success with his superiors and his comrades. He was less lucky with the Munich citizenry, until he worked out a technique of promising everything to everybody. That secured him a regular following and the springboard he needed.

Already Hitler had developed what might be called his Nietzschean technique, although he probably knew little about

Nietzsche. In German initiated circles, it is known as his "als ob" or "as if" formula, based on the theory that you must act as if you already had what you wanted. Hitler spoke to the Munich mob as if he were a great political leader. In 1940, he boasted to his aides that he had successfully used this technique all his life. Then he ordered them to take all necessary measures as if Germany were at war with the United States.

When Hitler started out as an orator, anti-Semitism was the fashion of the day in Munich. Russian Communists, employing Russian Jews among their agitators for their knowledge of German, had made it possible for the anti-Semites to claim that all Jews in Germany were Communists. None was more deeply convinced than General Ludendorff, who was then directing the enemies of the Republic throughout Germany. Under the influence of one of his women admirers, Dr. Mathilde von Kemnitz (whom he later married) Ludendorff had swung from friendship with a number of prominent Jews, Albert Ballin for example, to fierce hatred of both Jews and Freemasons.

When Hitler ranted against "Jewish Marxists," his superiors decided that he would please General Ludendorff. They gave him special assignments that could be used to build up a future career.

The German Workers' Party assignment was one of these. A branch of the wartime pan-German Fatherland Party, it had risen from dissolution during the revolution to resume active work in January, 1919. Adolf Hitler went there to spy, and remained to lead. The German Workers' Party before very long became the hothouse of National Socialism. It was also the proving ground for the Hitler system.

THE HITLER SYSTEM

Step One: Reconnaissance.

Who had money? Who had power? Captain Ernst Roehm controlled the funds of the Black Reichswehr. The German Workers' Party contained a dynamic force malleable to Hitler's purpose. How to impose his will on the Party? Hitler was an Austrian. Austrians know all about flattery. Flattery was to be his weapon.

Step Two: Flattery.

The little men who ran the Workers' Party welcomed Hitler as a member, but they naturally wanted to keep leadership in their own hands. He flattered this one and that, telling them what great men they could be, if they just gave him a little more power. He had taken care to learn things about each one, and used the information to alienate them from each other in his own interest.

Hitler also pursued Captain Roehm with flattery. And Roehm responded to his glowing admiration. He liked the young soldier's "patriotic fervor and his eloquence, which, even when the grammar was faulty, stirred his listeners." At first the other officers suspected that Hitler was just another homosexual friend of the captain. Then they decided he had merely enlisted the "womanish technique" of all-out flattery. Hitler didn't mind what they thought, as long as he got what he wanted from the most notorious homosexual in Munich. For Roehm possessed a keen military mind, a generous sense of comradeship and a genius for organizing—all of which Hitler bent to his own advantage.

Step Three: Promises.

Hitler lavished promises both on the Workers' Party and on Captain Roehm. He made himself bold to create the vast secret army and the political machine his protector wanted.

To the Workers' Party, Hitler promised many new members. He kept the promise, thanks to Captain Roehm, who ordered the soldiers and officers of his and other units to join the Party, with instructions always to side with Hitler. At first the Party leaders were delighted by the influx of new members. By the time they discovered the newcomers were to be used against them, it was too late.

Captain Roehm, confident that he would be able to control his protege, found Hitler's stratagem amusing. Hitler saw to it that the Captain remained confident, at least as long as he was useful.

Step Four: Intimidation.

Control of the Party was not to be had cheaply. It entailed endless quarreling and threats of both political and physical violence. Hitler united the huskiest of his friends in strong-arm squads, with orders to beat up anyone in the way, from hecklers in public meetings to politicians who failed to heel quickly enough. Such brutality was called "virility." Sometimes denunciations and calumnies made physical violence unnecessary.

Even Captain Roehm, on whom Hitler built his career, learned early that his protege could become dangerous. Their first row developed over the Storm Troopers who had been recruited as part of the Reichswehr. Naturally, Roehm wanted them under his orders. Hitler wanted them under his own command, as a political weapon. A sufficient number of stormy scenes won Hitler's point for him. Even then one of Hitler's favorite mottoes, "Terrify them, and you rule them," served him well, as it did all through his career, both at home and on the international front.

Step Five: Barrage before Attack.

As he wormed his way forward, Hitler was bothered by his inability to launch the huge propaganda barrage of his

dreams. He scoured Munich until he found the poet-newspaperman, Dietrich Eckart, who knew all about propaganda. He, too, longed for a Greater Germany and a man who could bring it about. When he saw Hitler entranced by his own vision of himself as a great political leader, the poet Eckart was the first to address him as "mein Fuehrer," my leader.

Dietrich Eckart went to work to improve the grammar, the oratory, and the education of his Fuehrer. It was an advantage to the newspaper man in the little town of Munich to be close to an intimate of a Black Reichswehr leader who had enough money to procure him a newspaper of his own, as Roehm did. The paper was a weekly by the name of the Voelkischer Beobachter. Hitler bought it a short while later, partly with American dollars loaned to him by his half-American follower, Ernst Hanfstaengel.

By March, 1920, Hitler had advanced far enough for Captain Roehm to send him to Berlin by military plane together with Dietrich Eckart, to report on the Kapp putsch. The general strike had cut Berlin off from the rest of the world and the Black Reichswehr in Munich desperately needed instructions from the secret general staff. Hitler and Eckart arrived at the Chancellery after Kapp had fled. But they met Trebitsch-Lincoln, Kapp's press chief, who was scurrying out of town in the wake of General Ludendorff, with whom he was to co-operate in Bavaria. Thus Trebitsch-Lincoln entered the anti-Semitic camp—the Jew who had been a rabbi, who then impersonated a Protestant minister, who had stood for the English House of Commons, who was last reported a Buddhist monk in the Bubbling Well monastery in Shanghai.

Hitler's and Eckart's propaganda campaign worked. By July, 1921, they had succeeded in getting their first hold on a German group outside of Germany, by accepting the name of the Austrian anti-Semitic National Socialist Party. Hitler

became its Fuehrer. Most of the original members had either resigned or had accepted minor posts. But Hitler had surrounded himself with friends: the student Rudolf Hess, the poet Dietrich Eckart, the officer Ernst Roehm, the organizer Gregor Strasser.

The Nazis worked out a Party ritual and Party histrionics, to give the masses the circus performance which the Republic was too proud to provide. Finding bread for the masses, rather than circuses, demanded the Republic's whole attention. While his Storm Troopers paraded, Hitler continued his boring from within, going from one rival faction to the next, picking the members' brains and leaving seeds of ambition and distrust. Watching his success, Captain Roehm took him to General Ludendorff as a potential successor to Kapp. The general followed Napoleon's principle: "I cannot create men; I must use those I find."

Hitler had already used the first step of his system on Ludendorff, by studying everything written or said about him. Using step two, he (again) glowed with admiration for "the greatest man in the Fatherland." Hitler's awkwardness and shyness won both the general and his wife. Step three: Hitler knew how the general deplored the lack of discipline in Germany. He dwelt on the subject, promising that he, Adolf Hitler, would know how to restore discipline to the country. It was not yet time for the other steps.

Moving up to the final stage, Hitler used every secret he had ferreted out of his victim in a very effective form of blackmail. He divided the man from his own friends by clever intrigue, malicious gossip, or sheer trickery. Often the spirit of adventure, or the victim's cupidity was played upon. If he rose to the bait, he was lost. Then Hitler moved in to take whatever he wanted.

Step Six: Open Attack.

Hitler first attempted his sixth step on a big scale in November, 1923, when he ordered his henchmen to seize power and compelled General Ludendorff to support him in the crisis, using him as a bludgeon against his friends.

Ludendorff never recovered the prestige lost during the Beer Hall Putsch and the subsequent trial. His increasing racial fanaticism further weakened him, until many observers forgot the tremendous work he had done to entrench his militaristic and industrialist associates in impregnable positions.

But Hitler gained by both the Beer Hall Putsch and the subsequent trial. True enough, the Putsch had failed, but it also removed Ludendorff, his potential rival, into the background. Turning failure into a kind of victory, Hitler utilized the trial to gain not merely national but world-wide publicity.

When the trial took place in 1924, the general situation had quieted down in Germany, following a time when every other day had provided a sensation—the marriage of the Kaiser in his miniature court in Holland, or arson, or a plot, or a minor war which threatened the peace of the world. The Dawes Committee was getting under way, the speculators felt there was nothing more to be gained through inflation, while the Republican leaders had steadily improved conditions. But the story of constructive achievements always draws less attention than accounts of freak events.

To see General Erich von Ludendorff, one-time quartermaster general of the Imperial German army, forced to defend himself in a Republican court, together with a half-illiterate agitator, foaming at the mouth in a cold, calculated fury—this spectacle was a sensation indeed. Some of the papers which were known as the "Jewish-controlled" section of the German press gave it the amplest possible space. Most of them were democratic organs, and many of their writers were

gifted German, Austrian, or Hungarian intellectuals of Jewish origin. They believed that if they reported the statements of the accused verbatim, including the exaggerations and the boasts, they would compromise the prisoners in the eyes of the German reader. To a sensible observer, these speeches sounded like the ravings of madmen.

These men greatly misjudged German reaction, as many of them have done ever since, out of loyalty to Germany. They entirely misunderstood German character. They underestimated Germany's love for her army. Ludendorff had been one of the people's wartime heroes. Hitler stood in court as the symbol of the common soldier in field gray who had fought bravely for his country. The general and the soldier deserved to be punished for their plot against the state. A dignified judiciary and a perceptive press could have convinced the people of this necessity. But irony and jeers only aroused their protective instincts and intensified their latent anti-Semitism. And the judge, who twisted every rule and law for the benefit of Hitler, made him seem almost worthy of protection in the eyes of the bewildered citizens.

General Ludendorff had exulted to his wife in 1918 that the Republic was already lost because it had failed to execute him and his associates. Hitler had an equal right to triumph during the Munich trial. The judge, who was in the pay of the Republic, who had taken an oath to the Republic, displayed such utter servility to Hitler that a Reichswehr officer, who had been called in as a witness, left the court in protest. And it took a great deal to make an officer resent anything done in favor of any nationalist.

The people's response showed the depth of their feeling, for the fortress of Landsberg-on-Lech, where Hitler was sentenced as an "honorable political prisoner," was flooded with flowers and gifts. It was a remote place, but Hitler had a con-

stant stream of prominent visitors both from Germany and from abroad.

HITLER'S "UNIVERSITY" AT LANDSBERG - ON - LECH

With his fellow plotters, the Fuehrer-prisoner decided to write down and analyze his experiences; then to work out in detail methods of carrying on their plan. For this latter purpose he summoned to Landsberg all the experts eager to cooperate in supplying the learning and technical knowledge the conspirators needed.

Gibing at Hitler's knowledge of geography years later, Prime Minister Winston Churchill said, "He must have been very loosely educated." Indeed, Hitler had the little man's profound admiration for higher education, and his lack of university training always ate into his soul like a canker. Strangely enough, it was probably an asset. His mind had not been submitted to the rigid teachings of German universities, which drill the students along prescribed channels. So Hitler was able to face every problem with a fresh mind. When he wanted technical or scientific knowledge, he selected the best available man to give it to him. Then he would pick out what suited his own purposes, what could be brought into line with his own practical knowledge.

After World War II had started with a triumphant series of German successes, the Nazi leaders who had been close to Hitler and the others in Landsberg talked more freely about the work done there.

Hitler, they said, had mapped out a gigantic program of study, starting with the world and going down the line to continents, races, states, nations, minorities, religions, political parties, organizations, clubs, schools, factories, and finally reaching the individual—the male, the female, and the child. The individual was nothing, the state was all, and they meant

to be the state. But the individual ciphers add up to the sum of the state; therefore they must learn the manipulation of the ciphers, how they reacted to given situations, to different varieties of propaganda. Every human emotion that could be exploited to political advantage, from the lowest to the finest, was to be brought into play.

Meanwhile there were the other lessons Hitler had learned, to be reviewed and applied.

THE LAW

Hitler had seen the canons of the law adroitly perverted to help him during the Munich trial. If he were clever enough, therefore, he could win his victory legally. Plucking the ripest and biggest legal brains he could reach, Hitler accumulated in time quite an impressive staff of lawyers, Jew and Gentile. Hitler didn't mind the Jews being Jewish as long as they were useful; and the Jews did not believe the Nazis really meant to disfranchise them—that was just "election talk."

Part of the blueprint for domination perfected in Landsberg called for calculated vilification and calumny of the Republic in the persons of its leaders. Then there was the money check-off from the industrialists and bribes pressed out of Jews trying to buy their future safety. How far could the Nazis go without being charged with libel, blackmail, and extortion? They needed expert legal advice.

DISCIPLINE

From Ludendorff Hitler had learned the necessity of striking with a small, closely knit, well-disciplined group. He learned that even a small party, if blindly obedient to its leader, can undermine bigger factions that lack unity and aggressiveness. But how could he extend that obedience to a whole nation?

Rudolf Hess, the former officer and student who worked with Professor Karl Haushofer at the Munich University, had induced his teacher to go to Landsberg with him and meet Adolf Hitler. The professor was rather apprehensive and so were his hosts. But Hitler had lost some of his shyness. He started propounding his theory that "by compelling even the hesitant to become accomplices in acts of violence, you automatically make them your slaves." Emil Maurice, then acting as Hitler's secretary, later told of the incident.

"After Hitler had spoken, the professor got up and looked at him for a moment," Maurice said; "then he smiled. We knew that from then on there was nothing the professor would not do for our Fuehrer."

Developing this technique, Hitler was to involve the entire German nation of sixty-five million people as his accomplices in crime. The Nazis never denied the existence of concentration camps on their own soil; they made no secret of crimes committed in countries conquered by the Germans—in the name of the German people. A subtler form of coercion can hardly be conceived. It brings with it a terrifying fear of retaliation which, in turn, acts as an incentive to fight. Haushofer, the master of geopolitics, became one of Hitler's original partners.

GEOPOLITICS

Since the Nazis would be content with nothing less than the world, geopolitics was a vital subject in the curriculum at Landsberg. For hours on end, Professor Haushofer lectured the "students." He brought other professors to help formulate new plans for the conquest of the world in peace and in war. As Hitler's knowledge of geography enlarged, he would call for Germans or nationals from the different countries under

study, to sound out local possibilities for his future expansion.

Many of Hitler's lieutenants had been born abroad; others had useful family connections outside Germany. They pooled their news of developments. Rudolf Hess, born in Alexandria, had not reached Germany until he was in his teens; the German Balt, Alfred Rosenberg, pointed to the riches of Russia, to the vast stretches of land that could be opened up to German exploitation; Ernst Hanfstaengel, the half-American, had studied at Harvard. He became Hitler's expert for the United States. Incidentally, Hanfstaengel used to offer interviews with Hitler at ten cents a word when the party funds ran low.

Hanfstaengel kept up a wide acquaintanceship in American diplomatic and artistic circles.

GERMANS ABROAD

Rudolf Hess built up the whole organization of Germans living abroad. He utilized some of the branches and the experiences of the Pan-German Association of prewar days, and developed them into powerful units to further the Nazi cause. Even in the early days, plenty of Germans abroad sent in checks and presents, although at that time they could have known very little about the Nazi creed. This showed the closeness of the tie between Germany and many Germans who lived abroad before the Nazis started swinging them into line.

RACE

Naturally, since the question of race ranked high in the Nazi dogma, it also figured prominently in the Landsberg discussions. Those of Hitler's men who had been born or lived abroad could inform him on the friction which already existed between the different racial groups. They sat long hours

evolving ways to increase and exploit this friction to their own ends.

And questions of race or nationality cannot be separated from the Jewish problem.

ANTI-SEMITISM

Anti-Semitism had provided Adolf Hitler with his first real success in the barracks outside of Munich. His cosmopolitan associates remembered that just as they had met Germans wherever they traveled, they also met Jews. The Nazis early chose the anti-Semitic platform because, as Hitler's first press chief, Adolf-Viktor von Koerber put it after he had separated from the Fuehrer, "It furnishes an excellent international vehicle. There is a certain measure of anti-Semitism in almost every country of the world. By assuming leadership over the anti-Semitic movement, Hitler intended to get his finger into every national pie throughout the world. And he was right."

Hitler even deceived his anti-Semitic followers. For many years a number of Jews held important posts in Nazi Germany. To mention only one—Robert Ley, in a book circulated in 1933, frankly admitted that his original name had been Levy, but that in view of the great services he had rendered to the Nazi Party, the Fuehrer had allowed him to retain both the name of Ley and his post. As chief of the Labor Front, Robert Ley controlled the fate of 26,000,000 Germans. The book admitting Ley's racial origin vanished from circulation when the more rigid anti-Semitic laws were issued.

Professor Haushofer has a Jewish or partly Jewish wife. If the Nazis were really as anti-Semitic as they claim, he would have been ousted. Their use of Jews does not in the least reduce the Nazi inhumanity against Jews whom they do not consider "useful."

There is another angle to anti-Semitism which the Nazis have worked overtime: cupidity. By promising the small dealer, the unsuccessful doctor, that Jewish-controlled department stores and Jewish doctors would disappear under Nazi rule, they won the allegiance of the mediocre dealer or doctor whether his lack of success had anything to do with Jewish competition or not.

PREPAREDNESS

When Hitler went to Landsberg, he could not know whether his followers and his party organization would remain loyal to him. But he planned as if power would be his to grasp on his release. The men under his orders began the creation of a Nazi constitution, so framed that it included the bones of a skeleton government able to function at a moment's notice.

Special committees were formed which were to be the nuclei of future ministries, organizations and policing bodies, built around the key men already picked by the secret general staff. At first all military problems were reserved for General Ludendorff and Captain Roehm. Later, as more and more officers secretly joined the Party, the military staff increased. The Republic attempted to prevent the creation of Nazi cells in the Reichswehr, and tried a few officers for Nazi activities, but it was too late. The Nazis had dug themselves solidly into key positions.

Hitler did not have enough specialists to fill all the offices of the Party government which was to become the state. But he prepared as carefully as if he had, giving the governmental plan almost as much energy as he used in working out his huge octopuslike propaganda campaign.

During his rapid rise from paid informer in 1919 to leader of a party that was winning seats in parliamentary elections only four years later, Hitler had fully realized the astonishing power that words have over men. With this realization came his craving for publicity—for propaganda. He seized greedily on the studies of psychologists submitted to him in Landsberg; on them he based his mammoth campaigns to win control, first of Germany, then of the world.

The psychologists talked much about the dissatisfied elements. Hitler knew them well. He himself had been tortured with dissatisfaction in his days of poverty. But he knew that conditions other than poverty alone bred unhappy restlessness. His propaganda must reach every dissatisfied person in Germany and magnify his frustrations, whatever the cause. Women seemed more brittle, more imaginative than men. Openly the Nazis excluded them from politics, covertly they elaborated schemes with which to exploit women. The Nazis had won the lower middle-class women of Bavaria by pledging to respect the "sanctity of family and religious life." (Their men had succumbed to promises of spoils from the future expropriation of Jews.) In their thorough quest of dissatisfaction, they sought out young women artists, not quite good enough to succeed alone, but glad to listen to men who told them of future wealth—when the Nazis seized power. They went after idle rich women, harnessed them to their evil-smelling cart of slander and intrigue, and found them docile and useful.

"We had to reach all the dissatisfied elements," Gottfried Feder, one of the fathers of the Nazi Party, told me once. Then he realized his indiscretion and tried to cover it up. "We felt," he said, "that among the dissatisfied there must be a

great deal of genuine talent and efficiency that had no chance under the Republic." He added sanctimoniously, "We want every German to have a fair chance," He failed to say, "Provided he is useful to the Nazi Party."

PERVERSION

While some Nazis traded on sentimentality, others deliberately turned male and female perverts into agents for the Nazi cause. The fact that many homosexuals held high posts in Hitler's Party, Captain Roehm for example, made the Nazis popular with abnormal elements in other countries.

Hitler was fully aware that the captain was a notorious pervert. I have seen photostats of letters addressed to Hitler in 1923 warning him that co-operation with Roehm and his clique endangered the national cause. Sworn statements attached to the photostats said that Hitler had shrugged off the warning as "old stuff." His opponents tried to use the perversion in the Party against him in the early 1930's. But Hitler needed Roehm to coerce and intimidate the Reichswehr leaders who turned refractory.

By 1934, however, Hitler realized that Captain Roehm had secured a dangerous hold on the Storm Troops and on many members of the Party. He knew himself strong enough to come to terms with the Reichswehr leaders on his own. So he suddenly remembered Roehm's perversion. On June 30 of that same year, Hitler personally arrested the man who had befriended him when he was penniless, to whom he owed much of his career, had him thrown into jail and executed. Nor was that enough. The chancellor of the German Reich ordered his propaganda chief, Joseph Goebbels, publicly to revile Captain Roehm as a pervert, broadcasting some of the most unsavory details ever heard over a radio.

Being convinced that he himself had strong occult powers, Hitler directed the activities of astrologers and fortune tellers as Nazi propaganda tools. Soon after the Putschists swagged out of Landsberg fortress, all sorts of small magazines cropped up on German newsstands, purporting to reveal the message of the stars, forecasting happiness for Germany, provided of course, that the local Nazi chieftains won whatever point they were fighting for at the moment.

Hitler learned to draw up horoscopes and interpret them and, early in his career, he tried hypnotism very successfully on the little-minded men turned Storm Troopers. Most of the correspondents saw him demonstrate his technique at mass meetings at the Sports Palace in Berlin. After some fulminating speech, he would descend into the audience where the Storm Troopers stood lined up with their swastika flags. He would go from one to the other, grasping the hand of each man in both of his, staring into his eyes for seconds on end. When he moved on, the young man would stand there as in a trance.

By 1932, after a series of great internal victories, Hitler decided to try out his powers on some foreigners. I was one of twelve American and English correspondents who received a telephone call from Ernst Hanfstaengel, then Hitler's press chief, inviting us to hear some vitally important statement from the Fuehrer at the Kaiserhof. Hanfstaengel ushered us into a small room and arranged us along three sides of it, carefully spaced so that we couldn't nudge each other. I was placed pretty far down the line, possibly because I was the only woman present, probably because I had made fun of Hanfstaengel's air of mystery.

Hitler came in. Hanfstaengel introduced him to the man

just opposite me. Hitler gave him the big act, clutching both his hands and staring into his eyes. My colleague was a good Anglo-Saxon and he merely squirmed. I wondered what technique he would use on me. All I got was a brief, manly handshake, with no fancy trimmings.

Then Hitler reached one of the correspondents who was known for his caustic wit. I stepped out of line to get a good view of the expected explosion. I could see the man's face as Hitler went into his routine and, to my horror, those usually cynical eyes responded adoringly to whatever message Hitler was giving out. This incident is interesting in the light of the common opinion that hypnotism requires the subject's cooperation.

The Fuehrer's remarks, which had been heralded as "vital," turned out to be unimportant and not worth making us rush to the Kaiserhof. Perhaps there were too many skeptics in the gathering for Hitler to become inspired. But perhaps it was worth it to him, if he gained one convert.

Shortly afterward I asked Goering about the scene. He sighed. "You people try to understand us with your heads," he said. "We must be understood with the heart." I wondered how many in Germany wished that they hadn't thought "with their hearts" when they entrusted their lives to the Nazis.

Hitler, like the Kaiser, was certain that his mission came from God. He made that quite clear in another interview I had with him, when he stepped forward and proclaimed loudly, "My will shall be done." I glanced quickly at Hess and Hanfstaengel, both of whom stood near by. They gazed at Hitler raptly, as though indeed the Deity had spoken. Hitler repeated, "My will shall be done," and I had no doubt that the sacrilege was deliberate.

Then he dropped the oracular tone and explained very sensibly just why his will should be done. "I have 750,000

men behind me, all eternally sworn to me. They are blindly obedient to me," he said. "The Republicans are more numerous. But they are divided. Therefore I shall be the strongest. My will shall be done."

There have been many others who felt they were closer to God than anyone else. The insane asylums are said to be full of them. But these sacrileges were uttered with full knowledge by a powerful politician who commanded the loyalty of grown men of experience and standing, including German officers. For quite a while General Ludendorff himself was impressed by Hitler's "mission." During World War II, men like General Keitel and Admiral Raeder said, with shining eyes, "He has a sixth sense, and it is a military sense."

On more than one occasion I have seen big husky men like Ernst Hanfstaengel, who dwarfs six-footers, and Captain Hermann Goering, whose weight must be around 250 pounds, tremble at the mere thought of angering Hitler. That was in 1932, before he was dictator of Germany. The idea of these two specimens of masculine strength quailing before Hitler struck me as funny.

"You're so much bigger and heavier than Hitler," I said, "why are you actually scared of the man?"

"You don't understand," was the answer, "he is our Fuehrer. And besides, you've never seen him in one of his attacks of fury. Anything can happen then."

FOUR KINDS OF REARMAMENT

All through the time devoted to laying the groundwork for Nazi domination, Hitler worked tirelessly, strictly adhering to the counsel of the German scientists who were coaching him and his friends for the job designed by the secret general staff. The military experts concentrated on their professional tasks. Hitler did most of the political work. To achieve a

Greater Germany in four giant steps, that was their goal. (1) Psychological rearmament, to be followed by (2) political rearmament, carried out simultaneously with (3) economic rearmament, the whole to be topped by (4) open military rearmament when the time should be ripe.

The Nazi cells in every factory, in every office, in every school, reported regularly to their Party superiors, working like termites to undermine the Republic. Storm Troopers organized the men for training and auxiliary Party work, while the stronger men were enrolled in the Schutz Staffel. Training courses for future political leaders, for subleaders, for youth groups, for women, for informers; health services, cabarets, press and propaganda services, all spread the Nazi creed of German superiority to the rest of humanity and of Nazis to the rest of the Germans. Superiority is indeed a glorious feeling and the Germans relished it. The reasonableness of the Republic held no appeal for them. Lusty hatred directed against the Republic made them "different" and superior. Authority vested in Nazi Party officials, however low their rank, secret instructions handed down the line, made all of them feel the conspiratorial lure of political intrigue. Although conditions in Germany in the late 1920's were better than they had ever been, the slogans about "fake" prosperity, the threats of "imminent chaos," kept dissatisfaction at fever pitch.

Think back to the undermining and seizure of Austria, to the weakening of unity among the small powers of the Little Entente, among the big powers of the Allies, to the fifth-column activities in France and every other country conquered by the Germans, and you will find the same pattern wherever you turn; on one side, only complacency in the guardians of the law; on the other, deceit, intrigue and calumny, terrorism and intimidation—every step accompanied by scientifically

controlled propaganda campaigns, and climaxed by the thrust of a compact, carefully co-ordinated body of trained men. That was the system through which the Nazis came to dominate Germany—the Hitler system.

NAZI FOREIGN RESERVES

How was the Hitler system applied in foreign countries? Through many channels. There were:

(1) Germans or hyphenated Germans living abroad who could be coerced into working for the Nazis.

(2) Groups won to Nazi thinking by anti-Semitism.

(3) Groups which fell for the Nazi claim that Nazism was a protection against Communism. They forgot the story about the difference between Communism and Nazism, between Moscow and Berlin. Answer: Moscow is colder. Add to this another, a difference in training. The Germans are more systematic and less conspicuous than the Russians, therefore the danger of infiltration is greater.

(4) Groups believing they could gain bigger profits by co-operating with the Germans. Juggling the currency and proffering advantageous deals to businessmen who could be useful helped enormously to put over Nazi propaganda.

(5) Occupational groups hoping for success through Nazism. In Germany, Nazi decrees gave the state precedence over the individual. Abroad, they reversed the propaganda. A mouthpiece in each group complained about the way the government sabotaged their professional interests. If they would co-operate with some (camouflaged) Nazi group, it would find means of compelling the local state to favor them. "You must organize," they were told, of course under some unsuspected Nazi agent.

The peasants and farmers of every European country with-

in reach heard much about the superiority of the soil tiller and how under the Nazis he got his just dues in Germany.

The French farmer, for instance, is known to be a man who never travels if he can help it. But as soon as the Nazis took over Germany, we suddenly saw French farmers' delegates turning up at the annual Peasants' Congress in Goslar. These men merely claimed to be farmers. Most of them were shady little politicians, bought for fifth-column work long before the war started. Norwegians, Swedes, Arabs, Rumanians, Yugoslavs, Dutchmen, were Pied Pipered to Germany to the tune of "Farmers of the World, Unite!" Many of them either succumbed to Nazi oratory, or became paid agents of the Nazis.

(6) The World War I veterans, in all countries of the world.

The veterans wanted no more wars; they wanted a lasting peace. At their conventions in the important European cities, they fraternized, and they rejoiced when friendly Germans assured them that Hitler's monumental architectural projects would take several generations to complete. Veterans convened in Germany fell as hard for the German myth as any of the starry-eyed "Peace is wonderful" boys and girls who traveled around dispensing fine thoughts.

If one went to the trouble of pointing out indications of imminent Nazi aggression, many of them would burst out, "But the Nazis all say they love peace."

French friends of my childhood came to Berlin in 1938 from the veterans' meetings in Nuremburg full of happiness that their sons would not have to go to war as had the previous generation. I spent three days trying to convince them that the Germans only talked peace, that they wanted war. My friends left, sadly warning me against unwarranted distrust. Their eldest son, by far the handsomest young man I

have ever seen, was an officer in the Chasseurs Alpains. He died fighting with the Free French in the first battle of Bir-el-Hakim.

Very many veterans and professional soldiers were attracted and impressed by the superlative efficiency of the German army and its officers. Then, to see an officer corps get what it wanted without being vivisected by a parliament, made the Nazi system seem quite appealing to many a foreign officer whose superiors were compelled to fight for every cent needed for maintenance, not to speak of rearming.

THE NAZI CLUB

Germany has always been the country of innumerable clubs and Vereins. As soon as the Nazis assumed power every single club, association, or institution in the country, without exception, was forced to accept Nazi supervisors or directors. This move was not purely a local one, for many of these organizations had foreign connections.

An example of the way the Nazi muscled in on foreign commercial groups forms the subject of Nazis in the Woodpile, by Egon Glesinger. He speaks in this case of the lumber business, where their tricks were only partly successful. The details are revealing, for the technique applied to other trades followed the same Nazi pattern. Since it succeeded in a number of instances, undoubtedly the Germans are all set to try it again.

Regularly the Germans organized big congresses to be held in Berlin or in some famous city or spa. The members were superbly dined and wined. The women had their hands kissed by barons and counts, the men were pursued by countesses and princesses apparently smitten with their masculine superiority. Babbitt on a Nazi-organized spree usually furnished a sad enough spectacle. American correspondents

weren't concerned much with the English lords and ladies, although some of them made fools of themselves, too, nor with the antics of small-country representatives. But we did try to tip off our own countrymen. The result was often disastrous. Many of those who branded us killjoys or cranks have since seen their sons go off to battle.

The Nazis naturally did not always stand in the receiving line; they went to other people's parties, too. Their delegates traveled to congresses abroad, increasing their knowledge of foreign layouts. They were as affable guests as they were lavish hosts.

The bulky files of inside information procured by Nazi agents cannot all be destroyed by British, American, and Russian bombs. The agents can't all be killed in action. Nor will the pan-Germans give up the dream of German expansion just because Germany will have suffered "one more setback."

Hitler surely has more than one set of files and one set of spies. Once you start with agents and agitators, you have to have others to check on them, and ultimately a whole network of secret services. The Nazi plan has been carried out or furthered abroad by people in at least twelve major classifications :

(1) Organizations of Germans living abroad and affiliated local German clubs; colonial associations.

(2) Official German diplomatic representatives, consuls, military, air, and naval attaches.

(3) Nazi Party representatives among the diplomats, the special espionage services of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, of Hitler, of Goering, of Goebbels.

(4) Gestapo agents masquerading as factory foremen, machinists, bridge-tenders, postmen, air-raid wardens, and the like.

(5) The local equivalents of the former National Socialist clubs, under various aliases.

(6) The German military espionage service under Colonel Nicolai.

(7) The commercial espionage service of German big industry, making use of their American connections in cartels, trusts, agreements to exchange news. This service acts to restrict foreign production and create trouble. It has been directed by Schacht and the central economic organization in Germany.

(8) So-called patriotic associations with pro-Nazi backers, including also what one might call political hopheads, men who are out for personal power through Nazi pull.

(9) Perverts and criminal elements which must obey the Nazis or risk exposure—the blackmail guard.

(10) The Kultur groups, barefoot dancers, musicians, singers, so-called discussion clubs, professors, and students who think they are being brave and unusual by espousing Nazi theories.

(11) Anti-Semitic associations and their pro-Nazi, pro-Fascist collaborators.

(12) The individuals whose riches or prominence entitle them to special cultivation. Traveling to Germany, they received the finest luxury suites and the best of good times at the expense of the German government. Even rich people are extraordinarily grateful for a free junket and the entertainment and flattery that goes with it. For some mysterious reason such people are less subject to suspicion than the less wealthy. Their minds having been conditioned along Nazi lines, an occasional broadcast will do the rest. The pattern is there, and conspiring is fun when it is done in gangs.

And back in Berlin, in Stuttgart, in Hamburg, in Erfurt, in Munich, in Vienna, little mouselike men and women study

their reports from abroad. And as they index and cross-index them, they feel that they have their fingers on the pulse of the world.

YOU'RE IT

The average American may say, "That's very nice for the Nazis, but what has it got to do with me?"

It has everything to do with him, because the system has already been worked on him, and succeeded only too well—up to a certain point.

The factory worker might be surprised to learn that Germans employed by the German secret staff know as much about his plant as he does, what machines make what, and even perhaps where he keeps his tools, or that his liking for beer can be exploited to serve the Nazi cause.

At the time when unemployment ran high in this country, many workers were lured into taking jobs in Germany through German consulates and fraternal organizations on the promise of big wages and ideal working conditions. Naturally, people of German origin or birth were the first to accept. A lot of them came to us in Berlin for help in getting back to the United States—because, they said, they were unhappy, or because the German promises had been so much air. We could do nothing for them. There was no way to know which people were being sent back by the Nazis as spies and saboteurs.

Intimate knowledge of American plants and plant management has been of vital importance to the war planners; that's reconnoitering.

THE BUSINESS MAN

Suppose our average American does white-collar or executive work. Representatives of his business or professional life or of his Legion post will have been entertained abroad by

Germans—German businessmen who combined flattering admiration for American get-it-done methods with alluring pictures of how German efficiency and American efficiency could divide the world; by the German military, who needed no sales talk to impress former soldiers with their efficiency.

Some of the less critical Americans whom our average man knows very likely snapped up the lucrative contracts proffered by Nazi business interests. Sometimes the commission was more than liberal. The director of an American advertising agency told me after the Advertising Congress that he had never gotten such commissions anywhere, nor promises of such contracts. The Germans did things in a big way, he said—yes, sir!

But the Nazis expected a certain "co-operation" for those extra profitable deals, those astonishing commissions. If it was not subsequently forthcoming in the way of political favors and friendly propaganda, they didn't hesitate to apply intimidation. Threat of arrest or exposure of the "deals" sometimes worked. If not, there was harsher intimidation. All the undercover Nazi sympathizers, from Gestapo agents to prominent citizens, would go to work to exert disguised pressure to prepare for the next blow.

Suppose our American is an investor who has loaned money to German firms. Or a small shareholder in a corporation which has made loans. Whether he has ever set foot in Germany himself or not, he was certainly affected by the numerous concessions we made to the Germans on what they owed us. The Nazis proclaimed a moratorium. Then we had to make more concessions to get any of our money back.

Our American had to do without a new car, or even without a new roof for his home, but the Germans used the money gained through concessions to go into the world markets and buy raw materials for war.

The last step of Hitler's system—the kill—didn't come off. But the average American could not help his whole life being turned inside out, perhaps losing his own or his son's life, simply because the Germans were sure that one of three things would happen when they declared war on us. Either we would simply collapse, or we would burst into civil war, or we would sue for a negotiated peace. In any case, they'd have us.

Professor Karl Boemer, foreign press chief for Joseph Goebbels, told me, "If America does go to war, there will be the bloodiest revolution the world has ever seen. The vast majority of Americans do not want to fight."

"How do you know?" I asked.

"I know," he said, "because I toured the whole of the United States." Boemer went on to prove his point. We were a democratic nation, weren't we? Then we must be afraid of war. Further, the Nazis were convinced that racial frictions and class hatred could be so intensified by their men on the spot that even without war we were on the verge of blowing up. Boemer said, "The discrepancy there between the poor and the rich is much too great. It is bound to make for an explosion. And when I toured the country, especially the South, the people just loved our racial theories. When America starts slaughtering the Jews and the Negroes, the little pogroms we had in Germany will look like nothing. The true patriots of America feel just as we do."

That is one time we fooled the Nazis; we didn't have a civil war or sue for a negotiated peace. But the Nazis have fooled us for a long time. Our average American may be poor or prosperous, Jew or Gentile, yet in ways of which he himself may not even be aware, he has been subjected to some of the many Nazi-inspired pressures.

In many foreign groups German influence has shrunk as its

innocent dupes have come suddenly to the knowledge that they have been fooled. But the connections still exist.

To those who have never knowingly been up against Nazi intrigue, this expose of the Nazi system can give no idea of the thrilled enjoyment that Hitler's recruits feel in mapping out their strategy, in cheating those who were "stupid" enough to trust them. The habit of political intrigue is like a drug—once a man becomes addicted to it, the habit is hard to break.

No matter who is master of Germany after World War II, Hitler's Nazi ideas will still live on in some greedy hearts within Germany and without. Eager carriers of the Nazi disease, of the pan-German fever, are merely hibernating. It is up to us to keep them impotent.

For they know how the racket is worked—from the inside. And they'll try it again.

6

"IMPENDING CHAOS" AS A WEAPON

A COOL and dispassionate appraisal of the last twenty-five years is indispensable if we are to better our record with the new peace. For it is startling to realize with what lack of coolness and dispassion we reacted in the past—swinging from an extreme war hatred to an extreme in sentimentality.

Both England and the United States succumbed very

quickly last time to German propaganda aimed at our Christian ideals of forgiveness and compassion. We had won; we must be generous. A lack of generosity would mean that we were vindictive. Quite a number of observers in Germany warned that a new war was in the making. But the Allies felt that since they had won, their victory was both complete and permanent. They were also war-weary and haunted with horror at the thought of a new conflict. Meanwhile the Germans searched out the chinks in our armor. Where they saw weaknesses, they made use of them. Whereas victory lulled the victors, defeat only sharpened the wits of the vanquished.

They found weaknesses in our eagerness to forget and make up, in our embarrassment about our war hatred, in our disregard of the letter of the treaty law, which we made ourselves, in the distrust that always springs up between Allies, in our sympathy for themselves because we believed them to be underdogs, and above all, in our yearning for "better business than usual."

"Hang the Kaiser," we had said, and with our Allies solemnly included clauses in the Versailles Treaty calling for the punishment of German war criminals. But when the Germans protested and their officers rattled their swords, we changed the subject. We accepted a trial of war criminals that was no more than a farce.

Our own indifference to these clauses convinced the Germans that given time and a little help from their foreign sympathizers the whole treaty could be scrapped. Until then, they would emasculate it as quickly as possible. And they determined that we should help them.

"Hang Hitler" has not been heard often from us in World War II, yet the future will depend greatly on our care in enforcing punishment of the new war criminals. If we have learned to assess guilt, our determination will be firmer and

less clouded than in 1918. Some fear has been expressed at our lack of hate. But since I witnessed our mad scramble from hate to sentimentality at the end of the last war, I am hopeful that in the long run the absence of excess emotion may advance the cause of justice. To shield a criminal is not Christian; it is merely to become an accessory after the fact.

But we shall be asked to shield criminals. Hardly had the first tentative signs of a United Nations victory shown themselves when the arguments in favor of forgiveness and leniency to the still undefeated enemy assailed at the same time our eyes, our ears, and our hearts. We can scarcely avoid a concerted sympathy-offensive with the new peace treaty.

It will be much more powerful than the one to which we were subjected last time. And that was effective enough. The minute we laid down our arms in 1918, the friends of Germany and the Germans themselves went to work on our respect and affection for the old-fashioned, nonmilitaristic German, which he deserved, trading on our belief in the peaceful intentions of those other Germans who deserved neither. To atone for our days of hatred, we went in passionately for good works. So did the English, whose Labor groups had an added incentive since they believed that their friends, the Social-Democrats, were the real masters of the German Government.

I am afraid that many of us who were on duty in Germany after World War I were taken in. Inadvertently we supported the Germans in their sympathy drive.

ORGANIZED SYMPATHY

Our soldiers, diplomats, businessmen and newspapermen in Germany in 1919 could see with their own eyes how thin the people were, how shabbily clad.

All the Germans we met blamed the Allied blockade for their misery. That saddled us with a feeling of guilt, although

a blockade is a war weapon like any other, and when were war weapons ever pleasant? The Germans had done all the blockading they could, with their U-boats and their raiders indiscriminately sinking ships. That blockade wasn't mentioned. We were busy being tactful.

But there were other causes for the German plight. In those cold winters of World War I, when Americans in Berlin learned to eat crow (and the young birds are really not bad), the Germans were diverting quantities of their staples, potatoes and grain, to the manufacture of alcohol and other military synthetics. The population got whatever potatoes were left over, often frozen and half rotten because of the breakdown of transportation. What rolling stock remained in working shape was used to carry troops wherever the High Command wanted them, from Brussels to Kiev, from Riga to Bagdad. Strangely enough, the Imperial government had developed railroad reserves and repair facilities against war strain as little as did the Nazis later.

Then there were the black markets. People who had money and who knew a farmer or two in the country could buy whatever they wanted. The rich hoarded, and so reduced everybody's rations. Much of the hoarded food spoiled from improper storage. But the German people were hungry and had been hungry for years. It was easier to blame outsiders than to look for the real cause. The Jews came in for an unjust share of abuse, and above all, the "criminal blockade." Not until the late 1920's did American officers, studying at the Berlin Technical High School, become aware of the extent to which foodstuffs had gone into industrial war exploitation. Then it was too late. We had already enjoyed being "Christian" to the full.

The superb physical condition of the German troops as they invaded country after country in World War II astonished

all military and journalistic observers. The old-timers remembered the prophecy of serious medical experts in and after 1919 that the generation born near the end of the war would forever be puny because of malnutrition in their youth. They did look peaked and frail in the postwar years. Those that survived, largely because of food rushed to them from foreign donors, became the superwarriors of 1939, men who showed only contempt and cruelty toward nations which had distinguished themselves in their humanitarian attitude toward Germany.

We know the Germans now too well to believe that had they been victorious in World War II they would have succored the children of the defeated. They have systematically turned malnutrition into a sadistic weapon, used to wipe out the children of the vanquished countries and to destroy the stamina of the adults.

ARMIES OF OCCUPATION: FIRST-LINE PROPAGANDA TARGETS

Unlike present-day Germans, who have gone through Nazi courses regardless of their age, sex, or trade, the German population of 1918 had not been trained in propaganda. They, nevertheless, immediately realized the importance of winning sympathy from the Allied armies of occupation in the Rhineland. They concentrated on the Americans. We were happy. We had won, and were ready to be friends. The Germans were unhappy. They needed new friends. Our soldiers there furnished ready-made targets conveniently close to home-made propaganda.

Their commander, General Allen, has referred repeatedly to the way the Rhineland Germans tried to make friends with our troops. He added that "their overzealous attempts to gain the good will of Americans often accomplished the opposite,"

since the soldiers felt that "this mode of reception had been instigated by the German army."

By nature, the Rhinelanders are the most friendly Germans. Americans are friendly, too. And besides they were good business, lavish in rewards for services and hospitality, distributing luxuries like soap or chocolate, corned beef or coffee, and bestowing an occasional wedding ring.

The presence of Allied troops in the Rhineland provided the Germans with an excellent opportunity to arouse friction in their ranks, and through them, in their homelands. Once the Versailles Treaty was signed we no longer presented a united front. The French and the Belgians, who had suffered the most from the Germans, advocated energetic measures against them. The English were less bitter, and as for us, no German shells or bombs had fallen on our homes. Our soldiers loved to be told, as they were in the Rhineland, that they formed the model occupation force. They also liked hearing that it was they who had actually defeated the German army.

The Germans knew all about the strains and stresses inevitable between Allies. There was a time in 1918 when they had threatened to fire on the Austrians to force them to fight on. They knew there had been some discord between the Allied countries. Now that the emergency had ended, they proposed to make more. Subtle tricks were worked in several ways, tricks too small to be exposed, too insidious to be forgotten.

There was, for instance, the pinprick affair of the toy soldier in the Cologne Cathedral. Herr von Heintze, who had worked in Coblenz on occupation problems, told me this version. Cologne was occupied by the British. Tommies on a sightseeing tour saw a small model of a mouse and a toy American soldier on a side altar. The guide said that in olden days Cologne had been overrun by rats, and the saint whose

altar contained the mouse had delivered the city from them. That explained the model mouse.

"And what about the American soldier?" asked the Tommy.

"Coblentz women dedicated that toy soldier to the saint," was the reply, "hoping he would rid them of the Americans."

When Americans visited the Cathedral, the soldier wore an English uniform and the story was turned against the Tommies. Then the Allied soldiers got to comparing notes in some Weinstube. This led to plenty of name-calling and fist fights. The Germans delighted in both. Herr von Heintz thought it a fine illustration of typical Cologne humor.

No expedient was too small for the nationalists and pan-Germans if it would create bad blood between the English, the French, and the Americans.

Behind the backs of our soldiers, the Germans slandered them. In the late 1920's, long after our troops had left, I went to the Rhineland to do a story on occupation forces in general, since the day approached for the last of the French to return home. From what I saw, I concluded that occupation is extremely hard on the occupiers, especially if their stay is lengthy. In Coblentz I talked with German officials who had dealt with American occupation problems. "Americans like to think that their army behaved especially well in Germany," said Dr. Knoch of the Foreign Office, with a sneer. "We don't think so."

I felt this was an insult to our military honor. I bristled. The gentleman bristled too, and claimed that the slums of Coblentz were full of little American bastards. I retorted that I didn't believe it, but that if it were true it might have improved the blood-strain.

Then I went to the Coblentz Town Hall to see the old-fashioned local officials. They could speak of illegitimacy only in

bated breath. Instantly they discerned the source of the calumny. That rumor had been started, they said, by German Nationalists to smear the poorer classes of Coblenz who had no interest in joining the secret military campaign of various organizations. "Then, of course," they added, "it serves to discredit the Americans with whom the population was friendly."

My informant admitted that an occasional loose lady, when she got into trouble, claimed that the child was half American. "But," he said, "it kept right on happening to them long after the Americans had left."

INFLATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL WEAPON

The disarmament of Germany, which was never completed, began while our soldiers were still in the Rhineland. Inflation gathered momentum and the Germans groaned ever more loudly that never could they pay the huge, the fantastic sums demanded from them in reparations. Returned American occupation soldiers told at home of the sufferings they had seen. Many Americans, eager to be fair, conceded that the figure of 90 billion marks seemed astronomical. They could not know that Germany was hiding her resources, that her wealthy classes had smuggled billions out of Germany to safety in Switzerland. Kindly people throughout the world brought pressure to bear on the Allies to reduce the reparations payments.

Nor could they know that only six years after Hitler became Germany's master he would have spent the exact sum for rearmament which the postwar Germans had declared would enslave them for generations—90 billion marks. Instead of paying up, the financial experts allied with the secret general staff speeded up inflation for use as a political and economic weapon on the international front.

With the mark toppling in Germany and on foreign markets as well, going up in smoke under the very eyes of the Allies, how could they expect Germany to pay reparations? Everybody from politician to industrialist wept crocodile tears over Germany's poverty. And, with each paroxysm of grief, succeeded in getting big slices slashed from the reparations demands. Six months after the Allied representatives met in Boulogne in 1920, and agreed on a reparations demand of 85 billion marks, the amount was reduced to 53 billion, then to 50 billion.

Meanwhile, the industrialists had regained entry for their goods on foreign markets and, making use of inflation, were accumulating foreign cash abroad, spending it to buy businesses, to start key men picked by the secret general staff in companies placed strategically throughout the world.

And, as German businessmen went abroad to consolidate their profits, foreigners came to Germany to look for business openings. Inflation had translated the purchase price of German property and shares into fabulous bargains in foreign currency. And the many speculators who took a fling on the German stock market automatically acquired with their dividends a personal interest in German enterprises. They could be relied on to use their influence in favor of Germany. Later the Germans were to complain about the "sell out" of German plants, but not until the foreign investors—among them 300,000 Americans—had done their bit.

On the street corners of London and other cities, dealers sold German paper marks. According to John Maynard Keynes, the British economist who underplayed German depredations believing that the "reparations scheme was insane," the sale of such notes ran up to a total of eight or nine billion marks in the two years between 1919 and 1921.

One of the smallest of European countries, Czechoslovakia,

showed that energy and integrity can keep a country out of inflation, even though it is surrounded by neighbors in the grip of it. The finances of Czechoslovakia, newly released from centuries of Habsburg oppression, were still tied to a certain extent with Austrian economy. The Czech financial expert, Dr. Rasin, decided to stop the flood at the borders. Alone and in secrecy he prepared his plan. He went late one evening to the Czechoslovak General Staff and demanded that all borders be closed and a cordon be thrown around the country to prevent the entrance of smugglers. Simultaneously he called in all the old Austrian banknotes in circulation. From then on, the only legal tender was money bearing the official Czechoslovak stamp.

But in Germany, the inner circle had a good reason to promote inflation. It made them richer. Hugo Stinnes, for instance, who had been one of the busiest of the men smuggling out German currency to foreign countries, built up an industrial empire, with enterprises in Switzerland, shipping lines in Sweden, Dutch colonial companies, factories in China, Austrian-Alpine mining interests, Bosnian coal mines, the big combination of Bismarckshuette and Kattowitz Bergbau foundries, and many others, including South American holdings. His is just one case.

In the meantime, the poor grew steadily poorer. They worked long hours overtime and got, for the money they earned, almost nothing. They became increasingly restless, and that unrest among the hungry, desperate masses was used to perpetrate one of the greatest international hoaxes of all times, the threat of "imminent chaos" unless Germany were given the help she wanted.

"IMPENDING CHAOS" NETS VAST PROFITS

The threat worked. The businessmen among the western powers were terrified that chaos might engulf Germany and deprive them of that vast Central European market just then beginning to open up. The Russian market had already been lost through the revolution. The businessmen agreed that one could not jeopardize the German market just for the sake of reparations. Who would get the money anyhow?

The French were admittedly entitled to reparations, but weren't they being too insistent? The people who asked that question came from countries which had not been ravaged by the Germans. Clever propaganda had inclined them to sympathy with the German plaint. With the United States and the British Empire willing to forget the war, anxious to get on with business, and the French insisting on repayment for their losses, it was easy for the Germans to drive a wedge between the former Allies. Their story was that strong, powerful France was persecuting poor helpless, upright Germany. And wasn't France, whispered the Germans, becoming so strong that she was endangering British supremacy?

When the rest of us realized that Germany had dodged her reparations payments, that she had not disarmed, that on the contrary she was bootlegging herself a new army, the British were charged with failing to co-operate with the French in enforcing the Versailles Treaty. England had clung, it was said, to the old balance-of-power formula, preferring a strong Germany to an overbearing France.

There is no doubt that some among the English upper classes had many ties in Germany. English aristocrats sorrowed for the plight of their titled German kinfolk, supposedly having to live under a proletarian rule. Invitations to ancient German castles and hunts stuffed the mailboxes of British diplomats and officers stationed in Germany.

For the visiting foreigners who belonged to society only by a process of wishful thinking, there was another technique. German aristocrats entertained them just as though they had been to the manor born. That gesture worked like a charm, and equally well with Americans or any other nationals. Naturally these people became sympathetic to Germany's cause. The social climbers had money, both to invest in German enterprises and to command an audience at home.

And every foreign convert won to German sympathy was an ally of the German secret general staff.

It was finally agreed that only businessmen could straighten out the gigantic problems involved. Under the leadership of General Charles Dawes, they set the new reparations figure at 41 billion gold marks—less than half the money invested by Germany in rearmament under Hitler, not to mention the vast sums spent for military purposes before his advent. To make sure the Germans would not compromise the businessmen immediately by defaulting, the Dawes Commission provided ample loans for Germany. The slogan of "reconstruction" attracted international businessmen and investors as it had appealed to the labor-union leaders.

Promptly foreign bankers descended on Berlin in droves, offering whatever sums the Germans wanted at profitable rates of interest. The Germans didn't mind the high rates. They didn't intend to pay up anyway.

Experts don't quite agree on the exact amounts loaned to Germany and invested in that country. Some of them, like George Creel, put the total up to the end of the 1920's at \$6,436,000,000 against which Germany paid only \$4,462,976,000 in reparations. The balance went, not to improve the lot of the German people, but to prepare Germany's rearmament, first under direction of the economic experts, then under the military leaders of the secret general staff.

The vast majority of banks that loaned money to Germany thoroughly investigated the claims of their prospective debtors, in an effort to lend only to concerns submitting sound economic programs and promising enough profit to guarantee repayment of the loans. When these conditions were fulfilled, or seemed to be, it was good business practice to extend the loans.

Naturally, most bankers protest that many of the loans were purely business transactions with no military significance as far as they knew. Indeed they did not know: the Germans don't tell. The Germans went to a lot of trouble to camouflage their intentions.

But the world was warned. Many an observer in Germany raised an alarmed voice. Nobody, however, seemed to care. As early as 1923, General J. H. Morgan pointed to the pattern of Germany's economic rearmament. "Germany's reconstruction is the name for the vastest, the most far-seeing enterprise ever undertaken even by the nation which in Lord Birkenhead's memorable words 'thinks of everything,'" General Morgan wrote. He added that the subsidizing of key industries, "the development of interior lines of communication, the reduction of railway rates, the promotion of state factories and aluminum manufacture, the contribution to vast electric power stations, all these are but a few of the undertakings upon which public moneys have been lavishly expended, and all of them, be it remarked, have a military usefulness." General Morgan was the British representative on the Interallied Military Council.

Promotion of state factories, manufacture of aluminum? All kinds of latest-design, streamlined factories rose out of the money loaned to Germany. The old plants had been worn out, outgrown. They had run overtime to supply the Kaiser's armies. They ran full out during inflation, when Germany

flooded the world with her products. The industrialists replaced them with factories which were the admiration of engineers and businessmen from abroad. These plants were ready in plenty of time to build up a huge reserve of weapons and equipment for World War II.

GERMANS SAY THEIR PROSPERITY IS FAKE

Although under the Republic Germany made miraculous strides toward recovery and had much for which she should have been grateful, it was no part of the secret general staff's intent that either the German people should know how well off they were, or that the outside world should realize it fully. In the years between the revolution and the world depression Germany became a totally revitalized country. Despite the obstacles put in their way, men like Friedrich Ebert and Gustav Stresemann had labored successfully to improve internal conditions and had solidified German relations with the former Allies.

There are many examples of German achievement. Look at the railroads. Under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was made to hand over 8,000 locomotives and 230,000 cars. By 1923, with government subsidies, she had 8,400 new, modern locomotives and 247,000 new, first-class cars. These and other facts did not prevent Dr. Hjalmar Schacht from traveling around the United States saying that while England and France could and should be made to pay their war debts, Germany couldn't, not possibly.

Between 1924 and 1930, the standard of living of the German masses rose until the individual income was 15.5 per cent higher than in 1913, and only Scandinavia had a higher level of real wages. Germany was gaining leadership in natural science and industrial technique, in chemistry, shipbuilding, and development of power projects. Yet, under the gen-

eral pan-German influence and the secret general staff's agitators, dissatisfaction spread like a cancer through the body of the people.

Americans were usually taken in. Didn't they know many nice Germans who wept over the harshness of the Versailles Treaty, over how it would lead to war? Many of the "nice" Germans sincerely believed they were being martyred by the Treaty, and thus were very convincing. Neither they nor the Americans knew of the systematic preparations for war even then going on in secret German workshops, and in the minds of powerful pan-Germans, inspired to reach a goal by General Ludendorff and confirmed in their purpose by General von Seeckt and by von Schleicher. There were the militant German industrialists and Junkers, too, making their weight felt in all the important clubs and meetings.

One of our wisest diplomats, Consul General Hathaway in Munich, who knew Germany well, summed up the question of the "nice" Germans. "The Germans are very nice people," he said. "The only trouble is that they always end up by doing what the wicked Germans want them to."

There continued to be unemployment, of course, and the agrarian situation did not improve. The bulk of the people didn't know why, they only knew it was so. Food was scarce because the Junkers found it cheaper to demand government subsidies than to develop adequate farm production. The Republic attempted to force them to allow small farmers to settle on the unused portions of their vast estates, but was prevented by loud indignant cries of "Bolshevism!"

Periodically serious riots continued to break out, sometimes Communist, sometimes Nazi-inspired. The chauvinists employed such signs of unrest both to persuade the more prosperous elements that their prosperity was a fake, and to

remind foreigners that Germany had to be given special consideration because of that "impending chaos."

ALLIES IGNORE DANGER SIGNS

When Germany elected Field Marshal von Hindenburg president in 1925, the world was willing to forget not only that he had commanded the German Armies of World War I, but that to the Germans he was the symbol of military strength.

The world further shut its eyes to the facts of life by welcoming Germany into the League of Nations like a long-lost friend. Before she could get in, according to the by-laws, Germany should have presented evidence that she had fulfilled all her contractual obligations. What about reparations?

Why be small about reparations? eloquently asked Aristide Briand, successor to the hard-fisted, clear-thinking Poincare. Wasn't the Dawes Plan taking care of all such matters?

Then how about rearmament?

The Interallied Military Council furnished a report. It showed that Germany was in the process of rearming. That was unpleasant. The report was quickly marked military secret and filed away, unpublished. Germany entered the League. The Interallied Control Commission disbanded. Everybody forgot German disarmament.

To secure peace, the Allies made one concession after another to the Germans. For as soon as this reparation demand had been reduced, that political ruling rescinded or modified, new loans arranged, suddenly it seemed that whatever had just been done was no longer enough to "save peace." The end effect was that Germany suffered so little from her first bid for world domination that she had no hesitation in embarking on a second.

This time, however, she meant to lessen the gamble by

making it a total war, planned and executed along the bold Ludendorff pattern.

First emphasis came on economic preparations. General Hans von Seeckt, who had built up the Reichswehr, stressed the importance of an economic foundation and he got the idea during a tour of the United States. While in America, von Seeckt and his aides had been struck by one phase of American mobilization for the World War I—the speed of industrial conversion. We ourselves had been somewhat critical of the cost of the switch from peace to war production, but then we were not war-minded.

General von Seeckt went home and immediately ordered the economic section of his staff to concentrate on production and business problems. He held that Germany's advantage lay not in secretly accumulating large stores of weapons, which might become obsolete, but in building her factories in such a way that within the shortest possible time the plants could turn to mass production of the most modern arms and munitions.

As early as 1928 German bankers whom I know were asked by officer friends of theirs to explain the intricacies of the stock exchange, of financing corporations, and kindred mysteries. One of them, in a talkative mood, said to a banker, "I need all the information I can get to handle my job."

The banker was puzzled. "But why should you become an economic and financial expert in your job?" he asked.

"I'm sure I don't know," the officer replied, "but an enormous new section has opened in the War Office, exclusively for money problems. It occupies two whole floors, good floors, so it must be important." Before long, the young officer, starting from scratch, amazed the banker with the extent of his technical knowledge of finance. As he said, it was significant that the new section got especially fine quarters. Anyone who

has had any contact with government offices knows what pitched battles go on behind the scenes for good quarters.

When the wonderful structure of world prosperity crashed in 1929, the ringmasters of Germany recognized the approach of their opportunity. Now, while the world was completely absorbed in its own problems, Germany could "shake off the last fetters of the Versailles Treaty."

Gustav Stresemann, the Republic's most brilliant foreign minister, had gradually lost his health under the concerted campaign of Nazi calumny and Nationalist opposition, and had died before his time. Men who described themselves as Front Fighters of World War I controlled the helm of the government under Chancellor Bruening, assisted by ambitious von Treviranus, General von Schleicher's friend.

Germany, too, felt the crash. Crisis followed upon crisis. Was it purely by accident that Bruening's government suddenly organized autarchy in Germany? Or were the men directing him remembering the principle of the famous von Clausewitz, that autarchy is of great importance in wartime?

By this time, even before Hitler assumed power, the ascendancy of the militarists in Germany was so complete that the country's military expenditures surpassed those of France, whose army was supposedly five times greater. Meanwhile the German masses were being driven to despair by unemployment.

Bruening's cabinet of front fighters was succeeded by the cabinet of barons, under Franz von Papen, responsible to the executive alone. This cabinet, which included General von Schleicher, allowed itself to be moved about like puppets by Adolf Hitler. When it removed the Bruening ban on the Storm Troopers, the Hitler Party, which had already rolled up a big vote, gained tremendous momentum.

Before very long, Papen's cabinet was overthrown through

Hitler's intrigues, and General Kurt von Schleicher stepped in as chancellor—the same von Schleicher who had been Ludendorff's aide, and key man for the secret general staff in the War Office.

Suddenly, while in the midst of negotiations with French and English representatives, von Schleicher realized that Germany could actually get whatever she wanted by merely applying diplomatic and economic pressures. Then, inner reforms and concessions foreshadowed by the Allies made the old secret staff man believe war could be avoided. That opinion sealed his doom. The Junkers and Nazis had become too strong. By their combined forces, he was overthrown and, on June 30, 1934, Hitler had him assassinated. He knew too much.

Four years before, Germany's most eloquent spokesman to the businessmen of other countries about Germany's poverty and imminent chaos, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, had resigned from his post in the Reichsbank, abandoning the Young Plan, which he had helped formulate. At the time Schacht announced that he was through with politics. He intended to become a gentleman farmer and raise pigs. He promptly began extensive secret conferences with Adolf Hitler.

Schacht went to the United States. To all of his numerous friends he talked persuasively about the Nazis. They were not, it seemed, nearly as bad as the wicked newspapermen made them out. The Nazis would not interfere with our doing business. On the contrary, business would be just as good as usual. He reconnoitered the circle of his acquaintances for co-operative spirits. He made vast promises.

Then Hitler became chancellor of Germany. In power at last, the Nazis were able to toss their economic bombshell—proclamation of a new moratorium.

They allowed foreign businessmen to negotiate with Ger-

man interests in an effort to secure what small payments on their loans they could get. They froze and unfroze the foreign balances in their banks to suit their political purposes. They were too poor to pay their debts, but they had plenty of money to buy raw materials for war. And they bought freely, on the world markets.

Why not? The world let them. The former Allies heard Goering proclaim "guns instead of butter," and apparently did not wonder if perhaps they were not meant to be the targets for those guns. They saw, almost overnight, the German wonder-factories into which their own money had gone, converted into model plants for war production. It occurred to few that the transformation came so rapidly and with such ease because the plants had been designed that way.

The Nazis also got huge reserves of supplies by barter arrangements with neighboring countries. They even took in exchange goods that they didn't need; these they sold on the world markets for gold—with which they bought more raw materials. And, in the meantime, Germany was willing to send on barter only the manufactured articles or machinery which kept her factories busy, whether the recipient country could use them or not—radios, cameras, mouth organs, aspirin, for instance, to agrarian lands—she managed it so that she was always a clearing debtor. The credit for thinking up this ingenious racket goes to the same Dr. Hjalmar Schacht who had "retired." Dr. Schacht's reasoning was simple. If Germany always imported more than she exported, and therefore always owed clearing balances, she could delay paying up for months, even years. During that time she would enjoy extensive credit, without interest. Then if, rarely, she paid in cash, the payment would be made in Germany, in Reichsmarks, so that the creditor could use it only to purchase more German goods.

Quite often she settled, at length, by altering the clearing rate of the Reichsmark to her own advantage. Or she forced goods she couldn't sell elsewhere on countries by threatening to withdraw German trade, or by suddenly discovering that a German minority was being ill treated. However Germany worked it, she always came out ahead in money and materials.

Internally, the vastly enlarged economic section of the War Office steered German companies toward producing for the new total war.

The American, the British, the average businessman of the United Nations, thinks of his office, or his enterprises in relation to his competitors and the general market. The Germans have been taught to consider their enterprises as vehicles for the aggrandizement of Germany. They have been trained to use their foreign connections for economic, then political, ends, toward the greater end—permanent German conquests. During the Hitler regime all the business barons of Germany used to meet once a year at Nuremburg to plan the national economic strategy at home and to co-ordinate it with the strategy abroad. In the days of the Republic, the industrialists were fully as systematic in their planning and co-ordination, working at it in confidential meetings of their own social clubs and professional associations, both in the German capital and in Germany's main industrial centers.

The Germans stole a march on the rest of the world in using economic legerdemain to bemuse their victims. They have had twenty-five years of successful practice. Their land conquests in World War II gave them, even if temporarily, new resources—raw materials, factories, foundries, and finishing plants for industrial exploitation.

It also provided their leaders with a new, first-hand knowledge of foreign hideouts and enabled them to explore native

populations for future renegades and quislings for the coming war-in-peace. For that new war will be primarily an economic conflict, and what then is more necessary than business stooges conveniently placed in strategic trading centers? Men who, on their own home ground, will be ready to guide, for their personal profit, the German industrialists and businessmen in the vanguard of the new German invaders. Many German representatives of the very companies which co-operated with the secret general staff in bringing about World War II, have for some time been slipping out of Germany, with Nazi permission. They go to Switzerland, to Portugal, to Spain, to Turkey, to Sweden. Everywhere they become, miraculously, anti-Nazi. But they loudly pipe the Nazi tune: "Chaos will engulf Europe," they cry, "if the German economic system is not saved. The democratic nations must win, of course, but they must be merciful, they must leave us our holdings."

These Nazi agents trust that we won't recognize the old sympathy gag, or noticing, will still be afraid to ignore it.

In the conquered lands, the German systematic mobilizing of secret quislings will bring undeserved misery to thousands of innocent people, because suspicion must fall on even the most loyal citizens. But I believe that most of them will think it should be so. Underground leaders both in Germany and in non-German countries have told me repeatedly that they would welcome suspicion; they need not fear it in the long run, as the quislings must. "It will be a curse, but also a blessing for all of us. Healthy suspicion will make it possible for the true democrats to avoid the German traps. Gradually," they said, "we will be able to establish ourselves by our works. But for the first ten years after the war, universal suspicion will be absolutely necessary."

Hitler's deputy leader, Rudolf Hess, demanded "a free hand in Europe" as the price of peace in 1941. The neutral

businessman who came to the United States in 1942 with his Nazi peace offer—as well as his successors—proved that the Germans mean to keep economic control of Europe if they can. If they can't, they will bring to bear all their experience to regain it—as the foundation on which to build conquest of the economy of the world.

7

WOMEN NAZIS ARE THE WORST

WITHOUT THE ACTIVE co-operation of German women, the unofficial total-war general staff of Germany could never have toppled over the Republic nor rearmed the country for war. Without the women it would have been impossible to transform the desire for peace among the masses into pride in mere force, or to undermine internal and foreign resistance with disingenuous propaganda.

No generalization is more dangerous than one concerning women. But the decent German women know only too well that they form a small minority in the second World War, and that their number has steadily shrunk under the machinations of the Hitler regime. These women deserve the deepest sympathy, for they have not even the consolation of sharing their unhappiness openly with each other.

They have felt a mortifying shame for their sex as they watched the women surrounding them yield to and then passionately espouse the worst features of the Nazi creed. They

know better than anyone else how much responsibility for World War II lies with the German woman. They know, too, how eagerly she has prepared herself for war-in-peace.

To the outsider, German women have always seemed meek and unassuming, the pan-German woman as much so as her sisters. But in her case, the meekness was only a mask. Just as the wives of the typical middle-class reserve officer, like Franz Seldte of the Steel Helmets, are prone to be even more proudly militaristic than their husbands, so they and the other nationalistic-minded women were often more fanatically pan-German than their menfolk. The smallest children learned at their grandmother's knee that some day red-bearded Emperor Frederick Barbarossa would come out of his cave in the Harz mountains and restore Germany to her rightful greatness. In these tales the ambition of an early German imperialist still lived, for Frederick led countless expeditions of conquest to re-create the Roman Empire for his people.

When the child reached school, the dogma of all-encompassing German superiority received intensive cultivation. Before World War I, pleasant German spas were filled with finishing schools for the butcher's and the town clerk's offspring, and with swank academies where the student's blood-line counted for more than her I.Q. The more advanced girls of prewar days attended the same high schools and universities as the boys; they were the exception. Richer parents sent their daughters to be "finished" in Switzerland, England, or Northern Italy. But no school, domestic or foreign, received German patronage unless it taught German superiority. As Emanuel Geibel put it in 1861, and every Maedchen still repeats:

Und es mag am deutschen Wesen,
Einmal noch die Welt genesen.

Or, freely translated, "Sometime the world will recover through the German spirit."

As a youngster, newly arrived from the United States, I had to spend some months in German schools while my father painted the portrait of the King of Wuerttemberg. Few foreign painters were invited to German courts in those days and the other little girls in the German school tried to be nice. But it was clear that to be non-German was a deficiency. Any foreigner who failed to be dazzled and humbled by German Kultur or efficiency was, at best, an object of pity.

Naturally, chauvinism and racial conceit exist in all countries. But I spent most of my school days at a lycee and a university in France. There I saw the youth of that country brought up to feel that France had been wronged by Prussia in 1871 and would some day have to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine. They were ready for that fight. But as long as France was left alone within her rightful borders to enjoy her pleasant pattern of life, she would be content. The young French people had no national ambitions involving the rest of the world.

The imagination and aspirations of German youth stretched far beyond the German borders. Through pan-German teachings, they were constantly reminded of German groups in other countries, groups which were clearly expected to spread German power to distant horizons.

WORLD WAR I FINDS WOMEN READY

After many years of such indoctrination, it was inevitable that the German woman should accept German victories in World War I as the natural honors due the German people. One heard much about Germany's place in the sun, and the imminence of the German Day, der Tag. Who could not bear

home-front hardships stoically with so superb a reward in view?

Early twentieth-century educators, like their successors, concentrated on developing mental and physical discipline among the Germans. They neglected the faculty of self-criticism to a certain extent before 1914, and during the Nazi regime sought to stifle it. The first World War generation showed infinitely greater civic courage than their children. For instance, German women's associations protested the deportation of Belgian and French women to Germany during the first war, but did nothing to counteract the brutality of the Schutz Staffel in the second.

This change in the attitude of the German women largely came about through such leaders as General von Ludendorff, who for years perverted the truth to prove that the Allies had determined to annihilate the German people. The belief grew during the inflation. Under the Nazis it was encouraged to the point of obsession. From it grew resentment of foreign nations. When Germany attacked, they felt she was justified in striking first. Nothing else explains why so many women were ready to believe Germany to be waging a "defensive" war. And since they were being "persecuted," they rejoiced in the prior destruction of their enemies.

It was the women who protested most loudly in 1940 when the first bombs fell on Germany. The raiders were "inhuman," they said, ignoring completely the inhumanity of German bombing raids which had preceded them. This time the women will know what war in the homeland means. In World War I, East Prussia and a few western strips of land experienced it, but the bulk of the Germans were spared battles on their own soil. If they had seen a victorious enemy marching into their capital, they might have believed that they were defeated. At that time it was, perhaps, not too late. Kaiser Wil-

helm's pan-Germanism was mild compared to the Hitler variety.

In their early reaction to the 1918 Armistice terms, as I see it, German women can roughly be divided into four categories:

The broad masses, the wives and mothers of the common soldiers, wanted an orderly state governed by middle-class ideals of law and order, and the little joys of slowly increasing welfare.

The radical element in labor, groups around Rosa Luxemburg and Klara Zetkin, loudly endorsed pacifism but were ready to embark on a violent world revolution.

The liberal women, usually professionals, saw in the Republic a chance to demonstrate female ability in sociology and politics.

And lastly, the most influential group, the women of comparative leisure among the middle and upper classes—the relatives of officers, officials, war profiteers, professors, big businessmen and industrialists—these women, like their husbands, regarded the Armistice as simply another proof of the conspiracy against Germany's rightful aspirations. The Republic, drab and hard-working, seemed a poor substitute for the pomp and glitter of the court and army of the Kaiser, of the innumerable small principalities with their ancient traditions.

Women of all classes who were bereft worshiped the heroic traditions for which their loved ones had died.

The women of the masses who gloried in the tales of war-time exploits gradually influenced their returned soldiers to forget that they had been defeated, to lose their hatred of war.

The radicals lost ground rapidly after Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were killed on January 15, 1919. They could not have continued a menace, anyway, since the middle-

class German loves his possessions, and Communism at that time recognized no individual's property rights.

The professional women set to work organizing health agencies, framing legislation to restore the national health, directing the successful attack on venereal diseases, the training of youth—neglected in wartime—and furthering big housing and rehabilitation projects.

But the irreconcilables managed within a few months of the Armistice to persuade, by their example, the average German woman that there had been no defeat at all, but merely a treacherous betrayal of the German Army by (1) the Republic, (2) the Allies, (3) the Communists, or (4) the Jews.

DEFEAT WAS TABOO

To mention "defeat" in front of a group of German women was to jeopardize one's reputation. At the least one was branded a Bolshevik—and who wanted to be called a Bolshevik in 1919? Although the ruling classes of the Kaiser's era were officially out of power, they still ruled through the General Staff and through their womenfolk. The women of the upper classes showed infinitely more viciousness in slandering the Republican leaders than did the men. By destroying respect of the persons heading the Republic, they destroyed respect for their offices. I often remember their activities when I hear people in the United States repeating off-color stories about American statesmen without bothering to substantiate them. Sometimes one can distinctly see the Nazi earmarks.

Upper-class German women in particular decided to use their new franchise to defeat the Republic which had given it to them. Their first thought was to impress every foreigner within their reach with the importance and justification of Germany's grievances against the Versailles Treaty and

against the Republic. American correspondents and military representatives were besieged with invitations—of all varieties. Dual-nationality gals, part-Russian, part-Polish, part-French, part-Rumanian or part-Scandinavian, exploited their foreign connections—the vanguard of the half-foreigners later used to such effect by the more systematic Nazis.

I never heard anyone talk more glowingly about the beauties of peace than the leaders of Berlin society in front of foreign diplomats. The instant the foreigners had left, they would burst out in orgies of hatred and fierce, warlike speeches. They forgot me, because they had known me for years as the daughter of a popular foreign portrait painter who was not interested in politics. When I protested, the ladies would gang up on me. Since, however, I was neither a politician nor a diplomat who needed their good will, I could afford a first-class verbal battle. Sometimes they would try to cover themselves and insist that I had "misunderstood." But to this day the mere mention of Wilson's Fourteen Points will make me rise up ready for a fight, in memory of those clashes.

A WOMAN OF COURAGE

The dignified and courageous Frau Ebert, wife of Germany's first president, stood in sharp contrast to these aspiring conspirators.

I met Frau Ebert first at a tea given by a Chicago friend, Mrs. Robert Kohlhamer, who had come to Berlin with funds for charities. German aristocrats gathered there put on a show to display their social advantages, talking for one thing about art. It was a joy to discover that Frau Ebert knew a great deal more about it than they did. One of the "ladies" asked her sharply how she came to be informed on such matters. Without embarrassment, the president's wife replied that

before her marriage she had worked in Italy and had spent all her free time in Italian museums trying to improve her education. When the conversation swung to peace Frau Ebert's voice was the only sincere one among the German women present.

As I filed this story I stressed the simplicity of the president's wife, knowing that the Americans who were contributing generously to collections for the distressed Germans would be interested. I mentioned that Frau Ebert had arrived at the party on foot.

Less than a week later, Frau Meissner, wife of the secretary of state in the Chancellery (who has since turned Nazi), telephoned me and staged a superlative scene, charging that I had insulted German dignity. How could I dare to say that the wife of the German president had walked to a party! Later, Frau Ebert spoke of the incident and of how hard it was to make people realize the dignity of simplicity.

Frau Ebert's life exemplifies the fate of the best element among German women. Her husband suffered slander and abuse, and finally died before his time because he had given all his strength to the cause of peace in Germany. Under the Nazis, Frau Ebert herself endured persecution. Two sons had died in World War I. The third was arrested and tortured in one concentration camp after another. Kurt Luedecke tells of these tortures in *I Knew Hitler*,

Young Ebert never mentioned them. After his release he could not get work—any kind of work—and when he did find a tiny job, the Gestapo hounded him until his young wife committed suicide. The Nazis stopped Frau Ebert's pension and confiscated the modest little house she had bought.

I last saw her on the street, shortly before I sailed for home. Proud, erect, and quiet, she went her way. I tried to smile quickly as I passed. If I had stopped and spoken, the

Gestapo could not have done anything to me. But there was no way of knowing what they would do to her if she had been seen even greeting a foreigner.

IGNORE GERMAN GUILT

When, after the other World War, the first meeting between German, French, Belgian, English, and American women took place in Geneva, the German delegation vehemently denied that their soldiers had committed any atrocities. That charge was, they said, part of the war-guilt lie. They were, however, confronted with irrefutable evidence of a number of crimes, which the French and Belgian women had collected and brought along. The German woman leader, deeply shaken, apologized in the name of her countrymen.

But in order to save the German contingent from embarrassment when they went back home, no publicity was given the incident. At that time such tactful silence was a victory for the German militarists. Thus, although a few German liberals knew the facts, the vast majority of German women are still convinced that any reference to atrocities in World War I is slander. They have instilled this conviction in all their friends in other countries. Their present callousness to wholesale bestialities since 1939 shows that they wouldn't care any more.

One of the finest of the German liberals, a tiny slip of a gray-haired woman named Regine Deutsch, worked energetically for civic betterment. She had, in fact, helped draft the Republican Constitution. She was in her seventies when the Nazis came to power. She was not even allowed to sit on a park bench to warm her old bones in the sun. The only bench Jews were permitted to use stood far from the small room allowed her, much too far for her to reach it on foot.

The liberal women deserved better of Germany than that

Yet many of them came to share with the pan-Germans the desire for national power. As ardent a democrat as Dr. Elisabeth Lueders, member of the Reichstag, vowed passionately at the time of the French Ruhr invasion that Germany would avenge herself on France "even if it costs the lives of a whole German generation." She repeated that statement in front of foreign correspondents.

While most Republican women were trying to make their sisters appreciate the democratic privileges conferred on them by the Weimar Constitution, Adolf Hitler, in Munich, was talking so as to win support from the womenfolk of the returned soldiery. Everything he said showed that he understood their worries about their families. Many of the women had reason for concern in the new restlessness of their sons and husbands, irritable in the unaccustomed quiet of home life after the excitements of the war. To all women, Hitler said that the family was the kernel around which the new, the all-powerful Germany would be built by him and his friends. He was the man who would save Christianity from the onslaught of the wicked, godless Reds and Republicans. The bewildered middle-class women, who felt they were too fine to join the workers in the Socialist Party, who distrusted the democrats and got few new ideas from their old clerical Centrist Party, flocked to Herr Hitler.

So did the frustrated, restless spinsters—after Hitler organized the Storm Troopers and paraded them up and down the streets, plainly spoiling for a fight or for a romance. With the shortage of some four million men of marriageable age, the women loved to hear the Nazis promise a husband for every German woman—when they became masters of Germany.

Women, said Hitler, were too sacred to the real he-men of Germany, the Nazis, to be allowed to sully their souls with

such lowly matters as politics. To permit a woman to run for parliament was a desecration of womanhood—and the millions of women who could not make the parliamentary grade thought there must be something in it. They didn't even resent it when the Nazis talked about the inferiority of the female brain. Instead, forbidden politics, the German woman quite naturally broke her neck to get into the Nazi political Party, working twice as hard to prove herself.

Before long a certain prestige attached to consorting with Nazis. Frau v. Ludendorff invited Hitler to her house, and through the aristocratic leaders of anti-Semitism, Hitler made the acquaintance of many society women. He spoke less of the sanctity of family life for their entertainment, but appealed to their pan-German prejudices, to their craving for new sensations, to their ambition, and strangely enough, to their maternal instinct. There are today a score or so of aged women in various places, each of whom thinks she was the one who really made Hitler's success possible. There is the American-born Frau Hanfstaengel, nee Sedgwick, who was a great admirer of the budding Fuehrer. In Berlin there is also Frau von Dirksen, who feels certain that without her introductions to the wealthy men who financed Hitler, he would never have prospered. Frau von Dirksen had a number of mediocre diplomats in her family, who could benefit by her co-operation with Hitler.

As one of Hitler's feminine sponsors in Berlin put it, "It was really touching, the way he clicked his heels and kissed his hostess's hand. He was feeling his way then, and was so grateful for any help we could give him."

When Hitler toured Germany in the early 1930's by plane, or raced by car from one rally to the other, women would fight for the privilege of touching his mustard-colored rain-coat, some would even try to kiss its hem. Eva Braun, the

young woman who was closer to him than any other, asserted that Hitler loathed these performances but that he and his friends decided they had "political value."

If you ever tune in on a radio broadcast of a political speech and hear only the hysterical shrieks of women; if you ever go to a rally where women have just one thought in mind, to touch the coat of their political idol—then please for the sake of your country remember the example of what this same hysteria did to Germany. Step back, take a cool look at the orator, and at your fellow listeners, lest you too be engulfed in their mass excitement.

Adolf Hitler, the lady's man, remained a shrewd politician. When Dietrich Eckart took him to Bayreuth to commune at the shrine of Richard Wagner, Hitler became the great friend of the younger members of the family. After Siegfried Wagner died there was a great deal of talk about a possible marriage between Hitler and Siegfried's English widow, Winifred. It reached the point where a venturesome diplomatic attache asked one of her daughters, "Is it true that your mother is having a romance with Hitler?"

The young daughter replied moodily, "He isn't having any."

Later Hitler invited this same girl, then grown, to luncheon so frequently that a new wave of talk started.

But ever since 1929 Eva Braun has been at Hitler's side. After the war broke out she moved into the Chancellery. This caused the rumor that the Fuehrer had married her. It has been said that Hitler promised her good middle-class mother that he would marry her "after securing victory for Germany." Eva became involved with Hitler as a very young girl when she studied photography with Heinrich Hoffman, Hitler's court photographer. She is as lonely and unhappy a woman as ever lived in the shadow of an all-powerful tyrant.

Hitler, convinced that he is an artist at heart, always surrounded himself with artists. One was the singer, Margarete Slezak, who enjoyed the protection of the Fuehrer, in spite of having a Jewish mother. Margarete used to impress visitors at her suite in the Hotel Hessler just before the war by pointing to a chair with a dramatic gesture and saying, "Look at that chair. HE just sat on it!" Margarete Slezak was one of the two dozen artists who received from Herr Hitler, for Christmas, 1940, "tastefully wrapped" packages containing real coffee.

Leni Riefenstahl, the movie star, worked very hard to prove that she was the light in Hitler's life. Her pull got her appointed official photographic recorder of the Nuremberg Party rallies. She directed the filming of the Olympic games. Starting in Greece, her technical crew followed her throughout eastern Europe, supplying German espionage centers with invaluable photographic material.

But it is not enough for the modern Nazi woman to be efficient or beautiful. She must also render services to the Fatherland.

STATE-CONTROLLED WELFARE

Social welfare has long been a concern of German governments, and no less of the Nazis than of their predecessors. For a healthy nation produces healthy babies, who grow up into hardy soldiers. Quite a number of the measures envisaged by the Nazis for the improvement of national health and national cohesion contained excellent possibilities. But by twisting them all to serve a single purpose, the aggrandizement of their own power in Germany and the world, the Nazis nullified much of their worth.

They removed the Jewish women who had been active in social work and many of the democratic women, replacing

them with Nazi women, whose principal interest lay in their own advancement within the Party hierarchy. The Nazis covered the whole of Germany with a network of Party organizations run by women under direction of Nazi men. Frau Scholz-Klink, who called herself Reichsfrauenfuehrerin, or the Reich's leader of women, took orders from Dr. Erich Hilgenfeldt, the chief of all welfare organizations. Frau Scholz-Klink was a woman whose ruthlessness and driving ambition were surpassed only by the unsavoriness of her reputation among her own collaborators. She worked very closely with the Gestapo. She appointed a woman representative to each one of the 92,696 cells and 481,875 blocks which formed part of the vast chain in which Germany was bound by the Labor Front leader, Robert Ley, and Heinrich Himmler of the Gestapo. With the outbreak of the war, cell leaders got keys to every flat in their districts. Theoretically, they were to be used in case of bombings.

Nazi women's organizations supervised the life of the German woman from the cradle to the grave. Expectant mothers received "mental and political training." A representative of the Frauenschaft called upon the young wife who had no baby to find out why she was remiss in her duty to the Fatherland. I once heard two Nazi women at a meeting argue violently about the effect of prenatal political training on the minds of future young Germans.

In the first years of Hitler's reign, women of Nazi organizations displayed extraordinary activity, descending on every foreigner they could reach in a concerted campaign of conversion to the wonders of the Nazi Party and of denunciation of the "immoral" life under the Republic. And what they didn't say the Fuehrer was going to do for the German home!

They didn't mention the flat contradictions that lie in the

Nazi slogans urging the Germans to "live to the hilt," or to live as "true he-men."

Hitler did make a few attempts to help his female followers acquire husbands. It quickly became known that a married man had a better chance of getting a job through the Nazi Party than a single one. Then the government introduced a bachelor tax for both men and women.

A system of state dowries was perfected with a double purpose—to make marriages easier and to get girls out of jobs which young Nazis coveted. If a girl could prove that she had a prospective husband, and if she promised to resign her position and not take another, the couple could obtain loans totaling a maximum of \$400, repayable in ten years, with a big rebate for each child. In view of German prices, state dowries barely bought minimum requirements for a new home. And on a small salary the young couple could hardly pay their expenses. Whenever an emergency arose, they had perforce to turn to the Nazi welfare organizations.

However, the government profited greatly. The system made jobs for unemployed men and it raised the national birth rate. When the population failed to increase as much as the Nazis expected, the rebates for babies went up from time to time. More important still, the program created a whole new lower middle class which had to rely entirely upon the good will of Nazi administrators. It provided a solid block of enslaved voters who had to be loyal to the Party for the sake of their daily bread.

Though it was obvious that the Nazis were not in the least keeping their pledge to protect the sanctity of family life, but were systematically destroying the moral fiber of Germany, they commanded a hysterical fanaticism among some foreign women, Americans included.

We used to see such women—and foreign men, too—join in the raucous cheers of "Heil Hitler." I remember Elizabeth Dilling. I might not have, except that during one Nuremberg caucus she wore a bright red hat and went from table to table in the dining room where the foreign press ate with the rest of the multitude, pointing to us and doing a lot of agitated whispering. It was amusing after that to see how silent certain groups would fall when any of us came near. Then suddenly I observed another woman, a youngster who very often accompanied Mrs. Dilling, going through the same performance. I went after her and asked point-blank what the game was. "You are an enemy of Germany," she said, "and we must see that our friends do not speak in front of you."

"And what makes you think I am an enemy of Germany?" I asked.

"Because of the reports you write against us." Yes, this young woman used the word "us." A few hours later Rolf Hoffmann, the Nazi in charge of the Munich propaganda office, came to me and apologized. "These foreign sympathizers are so swept away by their emotions, they don't know how to express their enthusiasm," he said, smiling. "When Mrs. Dilling got here, she told us that you and Wallace Deuel of the Chicago Daily News should both be thrown out of Germany. I had to tell her that you were being watched, but that as far as we could see you try to be fair, even if you don't approve of our ways."

Perhaps the least self-conscious of Hitler's personal admirers among foreign women, Lady Unity Mitford, was among the guests at a tea given by Hitler during the Nuremberg Party rally of 1938. We saw her looking longingly at her idol, her mouth half open and her eyes shining. Before

the reception broke up Captain Fritz Wiedemann, who was then Hitler's adjutant, went to her and delivered a message. She beamed. When Hitler left, she followed. The adjutants standing about gritted their teeth. One of them said, "When that hysterical woman is around, we can't get any work done."

Hitler's departure was the signal for the smokers to get out their cigarettes. No one could smoke in his august presence.

Whether Unity Mitford is hysterical or not, she has been an excellent Nazi agent, agitating in England and in Czechoslovakia. By carrying messages to the Sudeten German cliques she conveyed the impression that England was in sympathy with the Nazi cause.

Foreign women married to Germans often became fervent Nazis. One American-born countess refused to be introduced to me because I "maligned Nazi Germany." Later, after the war had started, she cultivated Americans in Berlin. She was "homesick," she said. Her husband held a high Nazi post, and he would never have allowed his exceedingly beautiful and charming wife to spend so much time with foreigners unless she could be useful. Of course, she told all Americans that she and her husband were really anti-Nazi. But after the United States entered the war, she left Germany for Switzerland—and nobody can leave Germany without Nazi permission.

The American Women's Club, which I regret to say I helped to found, became a regular rendezvous for American women married to Germans and for their Nazi intimates. Any visitor heard wonderful stories about the joys of life under Nazi rule. I resigned from the club some time before the war because it had turned into a hot-bed of Nazi propaganda. By the time I left, few good American members remained. The others made their children study English seri-

ously, remembering that bilingual agents were in great demand.

For years the Propaganda Ministry issued periodical calls to its officials asking for the names of any attractive women who could speak foreign languages and would go abroad on a trip. Wives of officials were eligible, too, at least those who were beautiful or intelligent enough. All these women received intensive training for their assignments.

DESTROY FAMILY LIFE

One of the hardest blows struck against the German family was the mobilization of labor, forcing thousands of workers to leave their homes and families and accept jobs on Hitler's highways and later on the fortifications which were to become known as the Siegfried Line. Occasionally the men would go home A.W.O.L. The Nazis fixed that difficulty by rounding up the streetwalkers from all the German cities and establishing them in the Rhineland for the entertainment of the Siegfried Line workers.

With the war, the men joined their military units. The streetwalkers were shipped to districts where Czech and Polish workers toiled at forced labor. Two German officials openly talked about the deliberate purpose of this measure. It was on the Berlin-Basle train as I was leaving Germany. A Luftwaffe colonel and a Nazi Party official, sporting the big gold Nazi button meaning that he ranked very high, shared my compartment. When we reached Mannheim, the official was moved to remark on the number of Poles and Czechs brought to that city to replace German workers because of the bombings. He laughed. "Those men won't be any good to their families if they ever get back," he remarked.

"Why won't they?" the colonel asked.

"All the diseased women who worked the Siegfried Line

are on their trail," the official replied, with a smirk. The colonel was shocked—not at the idea, but that the official should speak so freely in front of a foreigner. They were both able to see the labels on my luggage, and moreover I had told them that I was an American correspondent on my way home on leave. I took this precaution because if either man should be too indiscreet and start worrying about it, he might have me held up at the border.

Their conversation touched on home life. "I love my wife and my children," said the air-force colonel, "but when we soldiers get home, all our families can talk about is how many potatoes they get and what kinds of sandwiches other people have in the air-raid shelters. Most of us joined the Party," he went on, "because we felt the Nazis would protect family life. But now we're being sent all over the map, and we no longer have anything in common with our families. I'll be glad to get back to France and the thrill of service."

The Party official had his own interpretation of the officer's words. He said that French women weren't in it compared to Rumanians—there you found both looks and temperament.

I was reminded of a talk with a clever little German woman surgeon a few weeks before. She came to me, looking very prosperous, with a message for some people in Chicago. I knew that women get very little chance at surgery in German hospitals and asked her some questions. "I do war work. I am a plastic surgeon," she said. "I ought to be prosperous; I'm working hard enough beautifying bustlines."

"What have bustlines got to do with the war?"

"Why, when the German men come home from France and the Balkans, they criticize the figures of their wives. All the Nazis have money, you know, so I operate."

It was Hitler who was responsible for the beauty operations. When he made a conqueror's tour of France, he de-

lighted in the numerous castles built in happier days by French nobility. "We are now over our era of iron necessity," he said on his return. "We must evolve a new joyous architecture, something like a German rococo. And our women—they must become the most beautiful women in the world. Beauty is a political asset. And we have use for it."

BEAUTY AS A POLITICAL WEAPON

So German female beauty is not regarded as belonging necessarily to the German home. Few plain women can succeed as agents or spies. And the Nazis have plenty of candidates for such work. Alfred Rosenberg, the quisling trainer, once said to me, "It seems incomprehensible that so many women should want to be political agents—nice women, women we consider ladies. We tell them the job is often far from ladylike and they still want to take it on. Many of them are aristocrats. They live up to the old tradition that nothing is too good for the Fatherland. That's real heroism for you."

They have to work hard, these women agents training for the war-in-peace. They must watch their weight, improve their looks and style, study the backgrounds of the jobs assigned them, learn the details of each task. While they're being groomed, they have every possible aid. But forever after, their lives are rigidly supervised, especially as to their choice of intimates.

One of the inducements to German women to join up as agents is undoubtedly the amount of money at the disposal of any accepted candidate. Carte blanche at the big Paris dress-makers, coaching in any interesting subject, and swanky cars—all these are perquisites.

Baroness von Einem, who in the interests of the Gestapo pretended to a film career in Paris, compelled a French traitor to buy movie theaters and small radio stations for the

Germans. She had her own plane at Le Bourget, near Paris. In that plane she escaped the country when the French police were on her trail and Foreign Minister Bonnet could no longer protect her. Other women had yachts, on which they entertained. Princess Stephanie von Hohenlohe, nee plain Steffi Richter, commanded the use of the whole castle of Leopoldskron, near Salzburg, once the show place of Max Reinhardt.

DOCUMENTED VICES

Hitler has repeatedly boasted about the thoroughness of his personal files on the vices and weaknesses of prominent people throughout the world. Women have helped him accumulate them: entertainers in German night clubs, well-born hostesses, and abroad, his foreign agents—private secretaries, barefoot dancers, artists, businesswomen. This man likes liquor; that one can't stay away from the races, or from dope, or from the poker table; another has some very effeminate men friends. From servant girls to princesses women have worked, first for the coming of the new war, and then for the war-in-peace.

One of the first Nazi campaigns enlisting numbers of women centered about the big festivals given to impress the home populace and the foreign visitors. Tall, well-built young girls, called the Corps of Pages, wearing skin-tight silk hose up to the thigh and short, fitted trunks and bodices, acted as guides for the guests who attended receptions, or they lined the marble staircases holding staffs or lighted torches.

These girls made a deep impression on the members of the diverse congresses in Berlin, especially at those for which Herr Goebbels entertained at what was formerly the royal Island of Peacocks. Most American delegates were accompanied by their wives and left the party without going on to

other centers of festivity with the "page-boys." Their Latin colleagues made up for their absence.

Long stories appeared in the German papers stressing the strict purity of the pages' lives. I sent a young American on my staff to interview some of the beautiful girls, but their duennas refused to disturb their cloistered privacy. A diplomat of a Latin nation, who had gone to many functions at which the young ladies had appeared, squealed with delight when I told him of our vain attempt. He left no shadow of a doubt as to the freedom they were allowed in dating foreign delegates, nor about their efforts to obtain information from their dates. Every girl spoke some foreign language; many of them had been born or brought up abroad. They were the special charges of a government department that called itself the Office of Strength and Beauty.

At the Nuremberg Party rallies the whole Grand Hotel was turned over to the guests of the Nazi government, with princesses, dancers, artists, and what have you almost throwing themselves at the delegates. If one of the state guests failed to find a "congenial partner" officials of the Propaganda Ministry would hold hurried conferences. Then they would try to find out from his countrymen what were his special tastes. Some of the page-boy hostesses have turned up in South America since the outbreak of the war, as anti-Nazis. But they are still Nazi agents—doing peace work, for the new undercover war.

GLORIFIED ILLEGITIMACY

Confronting the next German government is the serious problem of the unwed mothers encouraged by the Nazi regime as a means of breeding future warriors.

The Nazi Party has always made a great point of the virility of its members. I have seen the sex instinct deliberately

aroused in many ways. At mass meetings, speeches dwelling on the copulative prowess of the Nazi male would send the Storm Troopers marching out of the hall all set for a demonstration. They never had to look far for a partner. German women would wait outside the meeting places. Very little preliminary courting was then required.

At the movies, I have seen pictures whose only purpose could have been to turn the spectator's thoughts toward procreation, with long love passages and subsequent scenes depicting the joys of parenthood.

Hence, besides the large number of women who joined the Nazi forces out of mistaken patriotism, or from reactionary instincts, or from greed, or out of craving for adventure, there arose another sizable group—the women who clung to Nazism because only the Nazi Party would protect their illegitimate children. Theoretically, the fathers are the "young German heroes" who have been fighting Hitler's war. Actually, they are often the married bosses of little secretaries, filing clerks, and saleswomen.

There was the young unmarried woman working in the Propaganda Ministry who frankly talked about her newborn child to the foreign correspondents. She had been away for a few weeks. On her return she told us of the confinement and of the fine new German. She was only one of a large number. Usually such women tried to brazen out the situation, making fun of the "old-fashioned, backward Christians." Often enough this little set speech would be accompanied by abuse of the wives who would not give divorces to the men who had fathered the concubine's un-Christian children. If the fathers could have got divorces, the thought ran, then the unmarried mothers could marry and start new families.

As the war progressed, more and more women were compelled to go to work in factories, leaving their children and

homes to the supervision of Nazi representatives. Frau Dr. Elisabeth Lueders, the former democrat, became one of the labor experts of the German army, moving from factory to factory studying the possibilities of employing women workers. She became, in fact, so important that Frau Scholz-Klink jealously denounced her potential rival to the Gestapo. It was reported that Dr. Lueders had been arrested, but after a while the High Command succeeded in obtaining her release. She never mentioned her experiences.

With all their prating about the German home, the Nazis have systematically destroyed its security, increasing thereby their hold on the population. No one realized this contradiction more bitterly than the decent women who saw their ideals degraded every day, sometimes by their own daughters.

Yet a great deal of the blame rests with the decent women, too. For they had their chance to vote, to do something about Hitler before Hitler came to power, and even thereafter for some time, until the Gestapo attained its all-powerful position. But the glittering mirage of Nazi conquests blinded many of these women to the danger to themselves and to their country.

THROUGH STRENGTH TO JOY

Early in World War II it was quite common to hear women who had been anti-Nazi say that, "in view of these victories, I can see now that we had to go through the Nazi regime to acquire the greatness that belongs to us."

The lust for conquest is there, deep in the heart of the German woman. The wife of a professor I knew was a violent anti-Nazi. She resisted for a long time before yielding to her son's desire to enter the Hitler Youth. Afterwards he advanced rapidly with the organization until he got to be seventeen. Then, late one night, the parents came running to me for advice. Their boy had not come home from the Party

meeting, but one of his pals had told them of his arrest by the Gestapo for homosexuality and misleading minors.

I urged them to find a prominent Nazi lawyer and to try to save the boy by huge fees and promises of generous Party donations. I also mobilized one of our Nazi contacts, a man not averse to making a little extra cash. He invited the Nazi boss to a superlative dinner at Horcher's and talked about the Nazi fervor of the boy who would "do anything for his Fuehrer." The boss promised to do what he could, because "The concentration camp for discredited Party members is truly an inferno." Then casually he asked, "By the way, the father, the professor, is a Nazi, is he not?"

My emissary said that the father was only too anxious to become a Party member. By dint of perjury and bribes, the boy was released. He had had a row with another youth who resented his "friendship" with his immediate superior. His mother quite naturally hated the people who had led her son into perversion.

Yet, during the invasion of Norway, she called on me, jubilantly excited over the German successes. My Schultz family hails from Norway, so that I felt more than the average indignation at the newest German violation of international law. This same woman who had seen her son turned into a pervert by the Nazis, whose husband had been blackmailed into joining the Party, said calmly, "Maybe it was meant for us to go through Nazism—it has made us strong. It has brought us great military victories, and it will bring us more."

How will such women react after the German victories have become merely a memory? Many of them will be disillusioned. But not with Nazism—only with its failure. They will be eager advocates of the next cult that promises them success. They will be bitter. But not at themselves, for making

Nazism possible—only that once more the "conspiracy" against Germany has given the Germans another "setback."*

To us they will swear that they have always been anti-Nazi. Not because they will be ashamed of having been pro-Nazi. But because they will insist on standing for something which the rest of the world esteems, and which will disarm suspicion. Being thought an anti-Nazi will give them the feeling of superiority that being a Nazi once did.

And, they will be convinced, the next time it will work. Germany will win her rightful place as master of the world. Then it won't matter what we think of them. They know that still greater plans are being worked out for the future, plans for German domination, if not to be won by open war, then by hidden war.

AMAZON BATTALIONS

The young German women who have been brought up in the Nazi creed, the older women who spent twenty years preparing for the second World War will not give up the fight. Besides their own determination, they have years of indoctrination and schooling behind them in special courses conducted by the Propaganda Ministry, the War Office, the Labor Front, the Gestapo, the Association of Germans Living Abroad, Alfred Rosenberg's school for hyphenated and other Germans, the Colonial Schools of General von Epp; schools directed by the various women's organizations, in the cultural groups, in university classes. They have taken courses in countries under German domination, some of them learning how to impersonate nationals of those countries, others to exploit special values there for German benefit.

Groups of Amazons have been graduated from athletic academies, from art schools, and from business academies. For athletes and artists are supposed to be nonpolitical, and

a woman in business does not yet arouse the suspicion that a man might. Whatever her specialty, each Amazon has been trained to organize other women and men.

The experienced women who may have become too well known to foreigners through past activity, or who are beginning to fade, coach the young sisters. Sometimes they are withdrawn into innocent-seeming commercial enterprises—with foreign connections.

THE WOMAN WHO CONQUERED RUMANIA

By far the most dexterous graduate "representative" who ever worked for the Nazis was the petite, gentle, blond Edit von Coler, Himmler's cousin and an intimate friend of Prince Auwi, the Kaiser's son. Edit was undoubtedly as close to the secret general staff as any woman.

One of Edit's husbands had, in the early days, been involved in Reichswehr attempts to procure money by staging fake business enterprises. These businesses had a way of failing after the capital had been absorbed. The officers responsible would be dismissed in disgrace; the money listed as lost through their peculations or irresponsibility; and another few million marks would be available for hidden rearmament operations. Apparently no sacrifice was too great for a true member of the secret general staff, not even being branded a crook.

After a series of jobs in various Nazi organizations and ministries, Edit von Coler was sent to Bucharest as a journalist, although she knew no Rumanian. Through a propaganda minister in Bucharest, Edit launched into business in a big way. She was perfectly willing to let the minister use his friendship with her as Himmler's cousin to cloak his mixed ancestry (he was partly Jewish); he made it possible for her to reach into every circle and align all the elements that could

be useful to Germany. She succeeded in bringing together a great number of foreign and part-German women whom she trained as expert Nazi agents against the time of her own departure. They worked in Rumania and radiated all over the Balkans; they went to Turkey, to Iran, to North Africa, even to South America.

Rumanian patriots discovered the Nazi plot to convert Rumania into a German vassal and tried to assassinate Edit. Even had they done so, it would have been too late. Edit von Coler had already welded together all the forces that could be used to prepare German rule. She escaped the country, taking with her fabulous gifts of jewelry and furs.

Edit had now become too well known, however, for another foreign assignment. She received an executive post in an insurance company specializing in deals with South America and Spain. There is not the slightest doubt that this gifted woman was one of the key workers mobilized in 1940 for the war within a war.

As foreigners begin again to visit Germany, it will be arranged that they meet women trained by Edit von Coler and her like, women especially picked out to appeal to the tabulated preferences of prominent men from every country.

Synthetic or natural blonds have always been on tap for the pleasure and proselytizing of Latins or Balkanites. On Mussolini's first trip to Germany, for instance, whole trainloads of movie actresses were conveyed to Munich for his triumphal reception, then whisked back to Berlin under supervision of propaganda officials to work on the Italians at the festivities in the capital.

But the bigger job, because of its wider scope, has been the preparation of thousands of attractive women to win the hearts and sympathy of the foreign soldiers expected to invade the European continent. The French *poilu* is not likely

to forget the third invasion of his homeland, the calculated theft of almost all food from fertile France. But the British and United States soldiers, who are characterized by kindness and chivalry and whose countries have not suffered bodily invasion—they are the targets at which the Amazons will aim. Knowing the extent to which women have been used in the past in Nazi work, it is unthinkable that they should not have been enlisted and set to work readying themselves for ingenious assaults upon the generosity of the invading and occupying forces.

UNINHIBITED GENERATION TO THE FORE

In 1918 it was not quite correct to talk about sex. The German women who lost their husbands and sweethearts in the war resigned themselves as well as they could to loneliness, to church activities, and to social-welfare work. They were still Christian. But after years of Hitler-encouraged pagan licentiousness and political mysticism, the situation differs radically today. It has not been an uncommon sight around Berchtesgaden to see German women pluck the grass on which Hitler had walked and kiss it. They were not even abashed to be seen.

Great numbers of German women have lost their men during World War II. But where is the religion to console them? They have no religion, except their "duty to the state." Women of other countries will also have to face celibacy. But they will not have been taught that their sole function is to perpetuate the race. Other societies still prize Christian restraint. Hysteria will strike the German woman twice as hard as the women with traditions of emotional control.

Any United Nations soldiers who cross the German borders must be prepared to experience determined feminine attack. The German woman who can go to a United Nations country

as the wife of a returned soldier can carry on there, with impunity, the work of the secret general staff. And she will consider her children German.

The woman who cannot help produce the next German generation will find other ways to serve the nation, in business and in politics, fighting with woman's weapons for Germanic world domination. And countless organizations already set up to utilize their desperate energies will provide whatever help is needed to facilitate their conquests.

There is always the possibility that the women and the young people who have now experienced the real horrors of war on their home soil will come to protest against war. They may even teach their children to hate it, as the mothers of young Americans, Englishmen, and Frenchmen taught their children to hate war after 1918. But there remains the war within a war, toward which the efforts of the political organizers in the German nation have been directed ever since 1940.

Only when the women realize that the old sex and sympathy appeals no longer get them anywhere, that the ammunition for the secret war-in-peace is powerless, then—and only then—will they change. With the help of the small minority of good women among them, and paralyzed by lack of response from the outside world, they can be made slowly to revert to the standards of their decent forebears of long ago, the old-time Germans, not yet poisoned with the virus of pan-Germanism.

8

GERMAN AND RUSSIAN REARMAMENT

IF EVER HYPOCRISY profited by gullibility on a gigantic scale, German hypocrisy did in rearming behind the general, blinding fear of Communism in the rest of the world. Behind, too, the Allied fear that if pushed too far, the defeated colossus of Germany would join with the revolutionary colossus of Soviet Russia.

Back of this curtain of fear, the Germans worked with impunity.

The German secret general staff evolved four campaigns in one, to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty:

- (1) Improvement in design and performance of the weapons, and exploration of the military possibilities allowed by the Treaty clauses.

- (2) Methods of nullifying the clauses by rearmament at home.

- (3) Utilizing foreign countries as German rearmament bases.

- (4) Co-operation with Russia in joint rearmament, to train officers and soldiers, to evolve new war weapons, to secure new markets for German goods, to obtain new sup-

ply sources, and to use trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviets as heavy artillery on the international battlefield.

All four campaigns went forward simultaneously.

Loopholes in the Versailles clauses furnished opportunities for cheating within Germany, but not enough to prepare for a full-fledged total war. Since undoubtedly the Allies would do some checking, there was but one thing to do—find sanctuary for German war industry in foreign countries. Within a few months billions of marks had been smuggled out of Germany. The reliable *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* set the figure of this "emigrated capital" cached in Switzerland at 35 billion marks, in June, 1919, when the mark was approximately fifteen to the dollar. Even if the amount is exaggerated, subtracting a few billions still leaves a tremendous capital. The many German companies started outside of Germany in the first years after the war proved the existence of foreign resources, and quite a number of them were open or masked armament concerns. The Dornier Airplane Company, with headquarters near the Zeppelin works in Friedrichshafen, simply moved across Lake Constance to Switzerland. The Rohrbach plant transferred to Denmark, Heinkel and Junkers established themselves in Sweden and Russia, all with the help of the German army. The Dutchman, Fokker, returned to Holland.

Germany had been forbidden submarines—her submarine experts went abroad. Captain Canaris, now of the German secret military service, worked with shipyards and plants in Vigo, Spain. Captain Manfred von Killinger, who had justified his name as a Free Corps leader, founded a company in 1924 in Echevarria, in Spain, to experiment with submarines. Other men went to Russia. In 1939 the German High Com-

mand expected to receive from its Russian treaty partner submarines built in Russian docks established by Germans, at great expense, during the time when they were allegedly too poor to pay reparations.

Wherever the Interallied Commissions, appointed to supervise German disarmament, went in postwar Germany, they met opposition. General John H. Morgan put it this way: "For three years the Interallied Commissions, engaged in the invidious task of disarming Germany, met with every kind of resistance that German ingenuity could devise, and every kind of excuse German naivete could invent. Obstruction there was always, duplicity often, and evasion not seldom."

The Commission, which had no American members, tried to find all the hidden weapons, but generally it received assistance only from some of the Republican authorities and from individual pacifists.

By the time it became known that Germany was actually rearming, many foreigners had already picked up the German propaganda line that the Treaty of Versailles had been forced on Germany, and that no self-respecting nation would fulfill obligations it had not accepted of its own free will. The new thought was: work out something agreeable to everybody, even to Germany. That would at least keep her from a coalition with Russia.

At the Genoa conference the same Germans who had proclaimed themselves the only bulwark against Communism stepped forth arm in arm with Chicherin and Litvinov, and announced the signing of the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo of April, 1922.

Faith in the Germans survived the blow so well that in 1925 the powers accepted as Germany's new president her wartime Field Marshal, Paul von Hindenburg, and his reactionary associates: the rabid Oldenburg-Januschau; the presi-

dent's son, the colorless but dangerous schemer, Major Oscar von Hindenburg; and Oscar's closest friend, Kurt von Schleicher of the Reichswehr and War Office. And the following October they signed the Locarno Treaty with the Germans. The next year, instead of being grateful for admittance to the League, Germany insisted that being restricted as to armaments, she could not agree to clause XVI of the Covenant, which provided for military co-operation in case of sanctions, nor would she allow transit rights to foreign troops. This reservation was a reassurance to Russia, with whom Germany's ties had been strengthened by new, additional treaties and agreements. Germany made her arguments sound convincing enough, but even then the Allies knew she was not adhering to the "restrictions," and allowed her thus completely to emasculate the League. The hope of peace, it seems, dies hard.

RUSSO-GERMAN REARMAMENT REVEALED IN REICHSTAG

On September 26, 1926, Philip Scheidemann rose in the Reichstag and gave to his country and the rest of the world a solemn, authenticated warning of the German militaristic conspiracy with Soviet Russia. Scheidemann, the same Social-Democrat who had proclaimed the Republic, provided names, figures, and dates. He based part of his accusation on a memorandum of the Junkers Works, builders of all-steel planes. It showed that agreement had been reached with the Russians (through Ludendorff's associates, Nicolai and Schleicher), for the manufacture of German planes in Russia, of which the Russians were to retain part.

"According to this memorandum," Scheidemann said, "the Reichswehr Ministry has a section known as Special Group, or SG." He then listed the names of the men in the group.

"Since 1923, the SG has disposed of sums amounting to 70 million gold marks [\$16,666,666 gold] per year," he continued. "One of Berlin's big banks holds a certain account under the name of Oscar Buchold. The signatures for the account are certified by the War Office, the army High Command, the Arms and Ammunition section of the War Office." New firms had been created to carry out the numerous transactions involved, Scheidemann revealed, known under alphabetical names (GEFU and, later, WIKO). "Their purpose is to organize armament industries abroad, especially in Russia."

Referring to the Reichswehr's secret plans to increase German military strength, Scheidemann quoted from a speech of General von Tschichwitz in December, 1924: "Our people must again become soldiers. The training cannot be carried out in anybody's part time. Therefore one must find courses that will devote to it full time."

Scheidemann stated that as a result of private collections to finance the work, for example, more than forty officers were working in Silesia as instructors in two small governmental districts, and in Pomerania thirty-six officers; in Halle, the Reichswehr maintained intimate connections with reactionary organizations; in Hanover, one Oberleutnant Voigt, an ex-Putschist, conducted sports courses; in Kiel, the trustee of the Naval Station, an officer named Lieder, had once directed the Organization Consul in Schleswig-Holstein (the Organization Consul trained Free Corps men for political murder); Captain Ehrhardt's Organization Consul had been given machine guns for target practice. Everyone who knew anything about the situation knew that Scheidemann's accusations were only a small part of the truth.

The Rightists cried treason. Chancellor Wilhelm Marx, a Centrist, promised to investigate.

In March 1927, the Executive of the Social-Democratic Party published a brochure, *Soviet Shells*. The writer quoted from the Manchester Guardian sensational revelations of military relations between Germany and Soviet Russia, naming German munitions plants in the Soviet and chemical factories manufacturing poison gas. Further, it cited the arrival in Stettin in November, 1926, of Russian ships loaded with arms and ammunition for the German Army.

The Social-Democrats found ample substantiation. They published details of the poison-gas factory in Trotsk, built by the Hamburg firm of Dr. Hugo Stolzenberg through GEFU. A Social-Democratic deputy named Kuenstler interviewed a number of men who had worked there. They had been compelled to sign contracts pledging secrecy. Some of them went to the GEFU office at Keithstrasse 11 in Berlin about a wage delay. The man in charge there was General von Borries, formerly a ranking officer, and a member of the Reich Archives secret general staff.

Deputy Kuenstler confirmed the report of Russian shipments of munitions to Stettin by interviewing Stettin dock workers.

The pamphlet quoted a letter of General von Seeckt's about GEFU, addressed to the Junkers Works, and saying that von Seeckt approved of its behavior "in every part." A further letter dated October 10, 1925, and signed by Lieutenant Colonel Senftleben states that the GEFU represented "the interests of the Reichswehr Ministry."

Note the dates. They show that while Germany was signing peace pledges with the Allies, her army was already circumventing them.

The Scheidemann speech and the pamphlet were two responsible warnings. There were many others. In 1930 the wife of a German captain, Frau Elfriede Amlinger, com-

mitted suicide out of grief over the death of her husband in an airplane crash while on duty in Russia. There was a flurry of excitement. A German officer on duty in Russia? When questioned in the Reichstag the War Ministry lied clumsily and only attracted more attention. It was further learned that Captain Amlinger was but one of many German officers who had taken part in Russian army maneuvers.

What lay behind these events?

There are certain similarities between the Germans and the Russians. Both are endowed with extraordinary vitality. Both talk much about social justice. Both accept regimentation more easily than other nations. The rest of the world has long been afraid that these two dynamic forces will merge to control the earth. Perhaps this is a hangover from the period when the wild Germanic tribes descended on western Europe from the vast East. Whatever the reason for the fear, there it is. The German secret general staff made use of it.

THE BACKGROUND

Chancellor Otto von Bismarck early advocated co-operation between Germany and Russia. Together they could thumb their noses at the French Second Empire or Third Republic, at the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as at Great Britain and her empire.

Although the Kaiser disliked Bismarck's pro-Russian policy, many groups of Germans, like the Socialists, sympathized with the masses "suffering under the knout of the Czar." Whenever unrest appeared in Russia, these men rushed money to the revolutionaries. Germany's Intelligence Service, according to Colonel Nicolai, maintained a great many operatives in Russia. Certainly without German help the Bolshevik revolution could not have succeeded; it was the German High Command, in the person of General Ludendorff, which trans-

ported Lenin through Germany to Russia in a sealed train. This service was not philanthropy—the High Command mistakenly believed Lenin would be their puppet.

Relations between the two countries were naturally strained after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but Lenin figured that if the Germans could pave the way for his revolution in Russia, Russian agents could prepare a revolution in Germany. For that he must be on correct terms with Berlin. Consequently he appointed a diplomatic representative, Joffe, a man close to the German Independent Socialists.

Soon, however, the secret police in Berlin became suspicious of the big cases of "food" Joffe received from Russia. One of them "accidentally" tumbled down the steps of the railroad station. It disgorged piles of Communist propaganda. The German Government asked the diplomat to go home. Before he could get there, the German revolution broke out. He returned to Berlin, claiming to have contributed vast sums to promote the revolution.

Such statements delighted the German Nationalists. They angered the Socialists, with the implication that the founders of the Republic had been bought.

During a session of the German Constituent Assembly in Weimar, it was stated by a Socialist that investigation showed the Soviet donations rather unimportant. Anyone who lived in Germany in those days knows that there was no need of foreign money to provoke the revolution. There was enough of hunger, cold, disappointment, and enough resentment over the lost war to start a dozen revolutions.

The victorious Allies seemed to be mesmerized by the Russian sphinx. On looking over the files of my paper I find that on November 15, 1918, America felt deep uneasiness about reports of an impending alliance between the German Junkers and the Bolsheviks. A month later eleven Russian divi-

sions were reported marching toward Germany along the Gulf of Finland and the Dnieper. What was coming, a Russo-German alliance?

In March, 1919, President Ebert's cabinet considered a proposal by some German leaders that Germany, as the German Soviets, ally herself with Russia. They rejected it because of the probable resistance of the labor unions and consequent loss of life. Communists and Socialists hate each other as only brothers can.

In the East, from what was to be reborn Poland, General Max Hoffman, ordered to withdraw his troops, kept in constant touch with the Russian military leaders. One point on which both the German and the Russian generals agreed was their dislike of the Poles. The Germans suggested that if they could draw the Russians along with them as they gradually moved homeward, it would be difficult for any Polish state to spring up between them. In February, 1919, the Russians, on the heels of the Germans, had reached the line running through Vilna-Baranovich-Pinsk, close to the position they occupied in 1939 by agreement with the Germans.

The Allies suddenly woke up to the trick. They compelled the Germans to leave enough space for the Poles to rebuild their state. The Germans obeyed. But by 1920 the Russians had again pushed westward and fought the Russo-Polish war. The Germans pretended to be neutral and smuggled arms to the Russians. With French help, the Poles won. After their defeat, the Russians asked German assistance in rearming and training their forces. Nothing could have suited the secret general staff better. They instantly envisioned the possibilities—a foothold in Russia, with as many production and training bases out of reach of the Allies as they could finance.

And while the co-operation between the German militarists and the Russians became ever closer, General Ludendorff talked extensively with the British military representatives in Berlin about the Bolshevik menace. The only way to meet it, said the Kaiser's former chief of staff, was to allow him to head an army of Germans, Englishmen, and Frenchmen in a campaign against the Soviets. Ludendorff was too intelligent a man to believe that the Allies would place their defeated adversary in command of a big armed force at the same time when they wanted peace—nothing but peace. His efforts added to the general confusion which helped to camouflage Germany's rearmament schemes.

General Ludendorff's allies, the same German nationalists who sent their officers and engineers to Russia for military purposes, encouraged Adolf Hitler and his group in their violent anti-Communist campaigns. Pitched battles between the Republican forces or the Nazis and the Reds in numerous German centers somehow only rarely interrupted the cordiality of German and Russian relations. Both Moscow and Berlin found their economic and military co-operation too valuable to disturb.

And what did the Germans get from co-operation with Russia? Just what they will get from any nation willing to further Germany's imperialist purposes after World War II. In Russia she had factories scattered all over the country—in Leningrad, Moscow, Kuibyshev, the Don Basin, the Kerch Peninsula, Perm, Sverdlovsh, Kherson, Kazan on the river Kama, Lipeck, Tambov, Luga, near Leningrad, Borisoglebsk—these are the names of only a few of the regions in which German industries established themselves. The Krupp plant leased no less than five arms factories from the Russians. The

Krupps secured huge concessions at Izevsk, Okhtonsk, Putlivosk, Izhorsk and Armavir. Cecil F. Melville states, in *The Russian Face of Germany*, that the Krupps "extended their interests over the Leningrad Steel Factory, the Perm factory, the Zlatoust plant in Samara [Kuibyshev] and erected a dockyard for submarine construction in Kherson, managed by German naval experts." Final consolidation of the Krupp domination in Russia came with the formation of a separate company, Manych, to which the Soviet government granted a long-term concession.

This close partnership was dissolved by mutual agreement in the middle 1930's—but the factories, mines and agricultural plantations which the Germans hoped to exploit at some future date remained in existence. The Germans subsequently took great care to obtain as much information as possible about the plants they had helped to start in Russia, as well as about enterprises begun without their help. In the crucial moment their knowledge proved defective, but not because of any lack of industry on the part of their economic intelligence service, or because of any laxity on the part of the government.

In addition to the Krupps, the German Dye Trust, the Hugo Stinnes organization, and other concerns directed or owned plants in Russia. The German Army ran training and experimental centers for artillery, aviation, tanks, mortars, flame and mine throwers, poison gas, in Russia—while Germany was supposed to be disarmed and forgetting war.

Trade between the two countries flourished. It has since been revealed that Germany opened up credits for Russia totaling 250 million dollars, partly with the help of English and American financiers who shied at the idea of dealing directly with the Russians.

The Soviets had by far the best-informed military attaches

in the German capital. From the days of the Republic down to the reclamation of Germany from the "Bolshevik menace" by the Nazis, the Russian embassy was one of the most active and interesting centers in Berlin.

In 1937, after the execution of the eight Soviet officers, including Marshal Tukhachevski, charged with conspiring with a "foreign power" (Germany), a coolness became perceptible between the two countries. If the former Allies had been realistic then, they could have won Russia as their ally.

As it was, by the spring of 1939 we knew that negotiations had been started between Russia and Germany. With the signing of the treaty in August, Nazi officials and German officers were exultant. Herr Dr. Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Office pointed to a map of the world with his pudgy fingers, "Our Minister simply took a big map," he said, "and drew one long line all across the continent of Europe from Narvik to the Black Sea. East of the line is the Russian sphere; west of the line is the German sphere."

Despite this grandiose simplicity which, as Schmidt put it, "shows that Hitler and Stalin think only in great terms," there were Nazi leaders who feared the implications of the Russo-German treaty. Although it secured the German eastern front, Rudolf Hess and Professor Haushofer took their courage in hand and remonstrated with the Fuehrer. Hitler told them not to worry, that he had a whole branch of the general staff working out details for the conquest of the Soviet Union—when he deemed the time ripe for attack.

Toward the end of 1940 men in the Berlin Propaganda Ministry were full of an imminent Russian revolution. "We have key men in every Ministry," they said, "and when the time comes, they'll overthrow the Soviets and proclaim the government we have prepared for them." Some of the officials who traveled back and forth between Moscow and Berlin

were certain of success. Karl Boemer, Herr Goebbels' foreign press chief, said, "Then the world will see what German power really is. Just imagine what we can do with Russia's resources. She squanders them almost as badly as America does hers." He was so carried away that when I asked him if Germany expected to take over the United States' resources, too, he replied, "Why, yes."

The Nazis, who had worked hard to reduce the influence of the church in Germany, suddenly negotiated a church agreement with Moscow. They proclaimed an access of deep grief at the lack of Christian ministers in centers populated by descendants of the Germans who emigrated to Russia in past centuries. Moscow was not taken in. It knew well enough that Berlin would send in stalwart, trained Nazi agents, in the guise of men of God. It allowed the new "ministers" to enter Russia, figuring that it would be easier to keep an eye on newly arrived, easily recognizable agents than on those already at work in the country. Judging by the enticing misinformation with which the Germans were armed when they invaded their ally's territory, Russia must have out-smarted the confident Nazis.

There came a strange period in the fall of 1940 when Nazi officials would tell us, as though imparting a state secret, "The Russian system must have its good points. Otherwise it would not have survived so long." Soviet Premier Molotov was in town, straightening out a few differences.

It seemed that Germany had failed to deliver goods as per her trade agreements. She was trying to work the same old trick, delay deliveries until she had everything she wanted, letting her partner whistle for German goods. Then Germany would invade, wipe out the balance she owed, and help herself to whatever was in reach.

Comrade Molotov had come to Berlin to tell the Germans

they could not get away with such schemes with Russia. While he was there the Russian N.K.V.D. [the Cheka] and the Gestapo were both on duty, getting in each other's way and itching to arrest one another.

Right in the middle of the Russian visit, the British made one of their biggest air raids of 1940. We were in the lobby of the Esplanade Hotel, where we had our office, and I recognized several Gestapo men. They were all green with fright. The Russians simply eyed them with cold contempt.

In that same winter, the old die-hard conservatives did a great deal of worrying. Wasn't Russia getting too strong? The story went, "In sports, when both players lose three games, the score is even. In this war, when Germany loses three planes and England loses three, it is six to nothing for Russia."

Just how far the Soviets trusted the Germans, I don't know. But the Finnish campaign must have shown them where they stood. At its beginning a German officer, who happened to be an anti-Nazi, said to me, "Germany is completely dishonored. We, the Germans, the old friends of the Finns, have given the plans of the Finnish fortifications to the Russians. Our engineers helped to build them, so we had the plans." He added, "I don't think it is possible for a country to sink any lower."

The next time I saw him, his mood was much happier. "My government is not as bad as I thought," he said. "We gave the Russians false plans. This is bound to give them a lot of trouble."

Shortly before I left the German capital, this same man came to me with information. He had just come back to Berlin from protracted conferences with Hitler and several generals. They had warned Hitler that Stalin had been heard to say, before witnesses in German pay, "Within two years we shall be strong enough to take up the fight against Germany."

My informant was terrifically impressed with Hitler's response. The Fuehrer had slapped his thigh in high spirits. "Calm yourselves, gentlemen," he said. "I shall not give Stalin the two years he wants!" The German officer went on to describe the coming campaign against Russia. "He is a real military genius," the man said, "his plan is full of simplicity and grandeur." I asked him why Hitler should send his crack motorized units to Rumania and establish them along the Black Sea.

"I can tell you," said my man. "It is so simple, only a genius could have thought of it. From Rumania, our motorized units can push right through to the Russian oil fields and occupy them. Russia has not enough oil reserves in the rest of the country, and what she does have will be fired by our agents. Then the big Russian motorized army will be powerless. Besides, a campaign against Russia will enable Germany to reconquer the popularity she lost through her alliance with that country. All the capitalists of England and America will be on our side."

A number of factors contributed to Hitler's decision to invade Russia. He had long marked off part of the Ukraine for the German supermen, and the claim to western Russia was a heritage from the pan-German Mitteleuropa teachers.

Then, the German larder was running low. Looted food from blitzed countries enabled the Germans to get through the winter of 1941, but Food Minister Darre had made it emphatically clear that more resources must be acquired. Even the conquest of fertile Yugoslavia was to prove insufficient.

There was the need for motor fuel. When I called on the German charge d'affaires in Washington in July, 1941, for a return visa to Germany, I asked him outright why Hitler had invaded Russia. One rarely gets an honest answer from a

Nazi diplomat, but often an interesting one. I had known Dr. Hans Thomsen since the early days of the Republic. He said just one word: "Oil."

Naturally the Nazis coveted the Russian oil fields. But since they had large synthetic reserves and had taken over the Rumanian output, there must have been some more impelling motive than just a general need for oil to make Hitler undertake the big push into the Soviet Union, to disregard the one great German fear—a two-front war. Even knowing that to begin with the Rumanian yield was small, amounting to only 6.5 million tons a year compared to the Caucasus flow of 24 million tons for Russia, knowing also that the drying Rumanian wells produce less each year, that Rumanian patriots consistently sabotaged production for the hated Germans and the Antonescu clique, Hitler must have wanted oil, lots of it, for a specific purpose.

Early, in the flush of summer victories of 1940, Hitler had instructed certain officers of his staff to prepare as if war with the United States were imminent. Germany could not carry out raids against America without astronomical reserves of oil. Her failure to capture the Caucasus fields has prevented the big raids against the United States on which Hitler and his chieftains counted.

And what kept them from it? Therein lies a story.

At the end of 1940, the German agents in Russia, whom Boemer had mentioned, sent word that they and their underground were ready to rise and overthrow Stalin. Hitler had won many triumphs through traitors, from the beginning of his crooked political climb to the big humiliation of the French at Compiègne. Now he felt himself on the crest of another tidal wave.

Shortly after the Germans had attacked Russia, there came a week end when both Hitler's press chief, Dr. Otto Dietrich,

and Propaganda Minister Dr. Joseph Goebbels forecast announcements of "overwhelming importance." The German radio blared martial music for hours on end, as it always did before spectacular victory reports. Foreign correspondents were told to be ready to "go on a sensational trip."

No news came, either good or bad. The radio fell silent. The foreign reporters were sheepishly told to stay home.

Then messages that leaked out from Russia through Sweden reported the arrest by the Russian secret police of a number of men suspected of sympathizing with the Germans. There would be no new Russian revolution.

If Hitler had not believed a German coup attainable in Russia, he would not have changed his plan of attack, and he might have succeeded. Instead of throwing the whole of his offensive forces eastward in a drive on the Caucasus, he had split them, sending part of them north toward the capitals of Leningrad and Moscow, counting on quisling aid. There were no Russian traitors. And the German forces in the Caucasus were too weak to break through.

This was not the only error Hitler had made. But the secret general staff also miscalculated. They had co-operated with Russia and located indispensable plants on Russian soil because they counted on dictating to the Kremlin in case of war. With Russia passive or neutral, Germany could wipe out all other countries in the path of her world supremacy. But to keep Russia on their side, the General Staff must control the man it had made master of Germany. And Hitler would not be controlled.

Instead he succeeded in dividing the High Command into two clearly defined factions: officers of his own personal general staff and the regular General Staff men. The latter group, reviewing their achievement in the extraordinary political and military rearmament of Germany, wanted a greater share

of influence than Hitler allowed them in the crucial days of the 1940's. Both sides were stubborn.

Ranking army officers disapproved violently of some of Hitler's strategies. General von Hammerstein, Germany's foremost expert on Russia, who had worked in that country in the 1920's developing German and Russian rearmament, was no longer on active duty when Hitler started preparing his invasion of Russia. He was one of the few leading officers of Germany who absolutely refused to take orders from Hitler. He resigned and withdrew to his country estate, where incidentally, the Nazis tried to assassinate him on a number of occasions. Despite these experiences, General von Hammerstein emerged from retirement and asked for an audience when he heard that Hitler was planning to attack Russia. The Nazis were delighted. They thought he had come to climb on the bandwagon.

Instead, von Hammerstein said in icy tones, "I came to you because as a German officer, I felt it my duty to warn you." He went on to insist that Hitler must not be deceived by the Russian showing in Finland; that if any power invaded Russia, it might win initial victories, but that the army and the people would eventually annihilate the invader. Then he left.

General von Hammerstein has since died. Nobody outside Germany knows whether he died a natural death or not. The old army man had estimated correctly the great heart and spirit of sacrifice of the Russian people. Hitler was blind to them both, as he was to the endurance of the British and the patriotism of the United States.

GERMAN INTERNAL REARMAMENT

Under the Versailles Treaty about twenty German factories were allowed to continue producing war equipment for the

Reichswehr and the number of the standing army was set at 100,000 men.

As the creator of the Reichswehr, and consequently of the Wehrmacht, General von Seeckt put it, "We know how to make the best of the situation." In the early 1920's ranking German officers told my father, while sitting for their portraits, that they had evolved a perfect system of training men for two years and then sending them out to other parts of the country to drill recruits. The Allies had stipulated that Reichswehr soldiers must serve twelve years, in order to prevent the short-term enlistments which the Prussians had introduced to raise the army with which they chased Napoleon out of their territory. But making a rule and enforcing it are two different things. By the end of the 1920's, there should have been a great number of men in the Reichswehr nearing or over thirty. Nobody watching a Reichswehr parade ever saw more than a few. The Allies had also forbidden Germany an air force, big guns, antiaircraft guns, tanks, armored cars, or heavy mine throwers. Only a few heavy guns were allowed to remain in fortifications and on ships.

The Germans used every loophole they could find in the Versailles Treaty and, where there was none, they could always make use of the lack of unity among the Allies.

Before long the restrictions on the construction of German planes, on their speed and power, were dropped. They had to be commercial planes, of course. But the most casual traveler in Europe soon knew that Germany flew passenger planes without any passengers, to innumerable towns where there could be no air freight, so that the crews could gain experience. When commercial planes got to Russia and were re-outfitted, they became good experimental military ships. In World War II old Ju-52 crates ferried German troops to all

the invasion centers of Europe—to Holland, to Greece, to Crete.

Nobody needs reminding of the importance of the gliders which German "enthusiasts" took up to compensate for lack of regular planes with engines. We know how their use was co-ordinated with powered planes for war transport. By means of lavish subsidies to airplane manufacturers, the industry speedily centralized itself, with the main firms pooling their discoveries and accelerating production.

Often at army maneuvers I saw odd little cardboard contraptions bearing huge signs, "TANKS," they said. The Germans pointed to them indignantly as symbols of the humiliation and shackles of Versailles. This complaint was fine propaganda to stir up German resentment. In reality German tank builders circumvented those restrictions, too.

In 1920, in the note of Boulogne, the Allies allowed the Germans to build a number of small armored cars for the police. The next year they gave them permission to construct small armored troop-transport cars for the Reichswehr—not a large quantity, but adequate for experimental use. Allied inspectors could not visit all the plants in Germany to make sure that she was keeping her promises. And, of course, many factories were hidden. But building armored cars and armored transport cars made it possible for the Germans to experiment also with tanks.

During the 1920's we saw huge busses on German city streets, with six- and eight-wheel chassis. The authorities assured us that they had no military significance. But those undercarriages had been designed for war trucks and were developed and so used after 1939.

The Germans never meant to remain satisfied only with the heavy guns they built in Russia. They constantly improved on the models concealed by General Ludendorff. After the

German blitz in Poland, I asked a German officer how it was possible for Nazi Germany to have evolved the superguns of which he raved, in such a short time. He threw back his head and laughed. "The Versailles Treaty allowed us to retain some heavy artillery in our fortresses and on our ships. The Allies were not fussy about what we did with our vessels. We made many trips," he said, "to try out our guns. It was on our ships that we perfected our anti-aircraft artillery."

The Rheinmetall-Borsig works always kept a skeleton staff of experts, who were, while the Interallied Commissions stayed on duty, very cagey.

The Voelkischer Beobachter of April 15, 1943, quotes a speech given by Dr. Karl Waninger to members of the Technisch-Literarische Gesellschaft on his experiences as an armament manufacturer with the Rheinmetall-Borsig Company. "The prohibition of development of any new guns in Germany led to a cautious and farsighted measure when in July, 1921, at the demand of the Reich Naval Command, the firm opened a construction branch on the Friedrichstrasse in Berlin disguised as a transfer office. Because of an anonymous denunciation," Dr. Waninger said, "the Interallied Military Control Commission attempted to locate the artillery construction office. This naturally met with no success." In 1922 the office moved to Duesseldorf and continued, "under the very eyes of the French occupation authorities." From there, headquarters transferred to "our artillery range in Unterluess, in the Lueneburger Heide (a vast almost uninhabited heath near Hanover), where it divided into two sections, one for naval construction and the other for manufacture of army guns."

Then, "A new and small gun factory was set up and started work in 1925, despite all sorts of difficulties. The first artillery order actually carried out by Rheinmetall after 1918 was

destined for the cruisers Koenigsberg, Karlsruhe, Koeln, Leipzig, and Nuernberg. We fulfilled this task to the complete satisfaction of the German navy, at the same time creating a precedent in the building of triple turrets in Germany. . . . Rheinmetall took a decisive part in equipping the artillery with guns up to the heaviest caliber. Afghanistan, Argentina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Holland, Rumania, San Salvador, Turkey, and Hungary were among the nations which we supplied after 1933."

It is easy to see why Rheinmetall-Borsig and plants like it were fully equipped to produce war materiel when the pretense of disarmament was thrown aside. They are demonstrations of the efficiency and intelligence of the secret general staff and its economic and industrial subdivisions, pouring foreign loans into Germany's industrial machine and utilizing every kind of dodge and camouflage to hide its military intent.

Colonel Konstantin Hierl, who served under General von Seeckt, said in a speech before the Nuremberg Party Caucus in 1929, "A government that is aware of its responsibilities will not fail to crank up its armament industry in secret when it sees war approaching." The approach of war could best be seen by the men who meant it to come and they "cranked up" the German armament industry to good effect. When manipulations of the Herrenklub, which united most of the secret general staff socially, helped put Franz von Papen in the chancellor's chair, he did his best to ring into his cabinet as vice-chancellor the man who had the huge National Socialist Party and the semimilitary Storm Troopers behind him.

Hitler refused the vice-chancellorship as well as a later offer of the chancellorship with limited powers. He wanted all or nothing. When he finally became chancellor on January

30, 1933, he had what he wanted, including Papen under his thumb.

He also found everything ready for open rearmament.

The western world was then struggling through the aftermath of the depression. It presented a tempting picture of weakness to the conquest-minded Germans. As General von Seeckt said in his *Thoughts of a Soldier*, "A defenseless neighbor is the strongest inducement to war." (The phrase was coined in an effort to make the world feel sorry for Germany, allegedly so weak, but the lesson implied was understood by the Nazis and the general's successors.)

In the Reichswehr, Hitler found an instrument of extraordinary power. Because it was small, its commanders had greatly developed the striking power of each individual man, carefully co-ordinating at the same time the new equipment and the new services required. The noncommissioned officers had been trained as officers. And in addition to the army, Hitler could draw on the vast reservoir of half-trained men in the different semimilitary organizations.

The German pacifist Carl Mertens estimated that in 1930 Germany had 374,000 trained soldiers. This figure breaks down into:

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|--|---------|
| Effectives in the Reichswehr | 99,000 |
| Military police, border guards, railroad guards— bodies in which the Reichswehr camouflaged some of its illegal manpower | 110,000 |
| Men in semimilitary units like the Steel Helmets and the Storm Troopers..... | 150,000 |
| Civilian employees of the Reichswehr (who car- ried out military tasks which other armies assign to soldiers) | 15,000 |

Thanks to the four-part plan of the secret general staff, the German factories were only awaiting the word. When Goering began his airplane program, most of the necessary plants

were already nicely co-ordinated in the holding company of the German government itself. The Reich's Vereinigte Industrie Aktien-Gesellschaften, or VIAG, included metal works, huge electrical plants, aluminum concerns. That is just one example. Among many others, there is the fact that the German Dye Trust, the I.G. Farbenindustrie, shared in or controlled innumerable foreign chemical plants, oil refineries, plastic factories, all of them sources of war materials—besides their incredibly extensive domestic industrial empire. Through cartel agreements they were not only able to draw on the resources and inventions of foreign countries, but they were also able to restrict production of essential supplies in countries the Germans planned to attack.

With open rearmament, with the German Army constantly enlarging and training its personnel, and backed by the full industrial might of the nation, Hitler took three bold steps. He invaded the Rhineland, he proclaimed conscription, he announced through Goering the creation of a superlative air force.

But with the Beer Hall Putsch General Ludendorff's pupil had learned one indelible lesson in caution. How could he be absolutely sure that the armaments, the troops, were as fine as the High Command said they were? He must try them out before he risked the big gamble.

REHEARSAL FOR WORLD WAR II

Secretly, by devious methods, German soldiers reached Spain. Ambassador von Stohrer, General von Faupel, the whole considerable body of Germans in Spain, reinforced by all the young men who could, under some pretext, claim Spanish or South American citizenship, prepared the big rehearsal of the German army. When the friction between the different Spanish groups broke out, the Germans were there,

ready to try their organizations and successive deliveries of weapons.

The weapons were good. The men and the reinforcements which followed the first groups got battle training. The officers' tactics were found satisfactory, although some of the new ones had still to be kept secret. Germany was ready for war.

When the new German antiaircraft guns, used against Barcelona, forced the town to surrender, Hitler in Berlin was triumphant. To his intimates, he boasted. "The fall of Barcelona means that all of Europe will be ours. I shall be master of 350 million people." Even his intimates were shaken. Could he be mad? But his confidence was so tremendous that despite the doubts which the more cautious expressed, he went ahead, certain that the stars were with him.

Those naval antiaircraft guns which reduced Barcelona were perfected to the point where they were both land and air weapons, weapons both of defense and offense, on war vessels far out at sea in the days when the Allies "were not fussy" about what the Germans did with their ships.

To lull the world into a feeling of security the Nazis signed a pact of friendship with Poland even before they sent their troops to Spain. In fact, pacts between Germany and the diverse states of Europe became the order of the day. The die-hard peace lovers grew very angry at the President of the United States for wanting Hitler to guarantee that he had no plans for aggression against his neighbors. How could anyone doubt his peaceful intentions? Even if he was rearming, even if the men called to the colors were steadily increasing in number, even if the guns, the airplanes, the weapons the Germans displayed at their parades, were the newest, the most threatening-looking weapons ever seen—still they talked peace.

Hitler signed a naval pact with England, promising to limit his naval armaments. What more could anyone expect? Why mention reports about the secret construction of submarines in violation of this agreement?

Hitler still talked of peace. The labor camps of Germany were merely physical training centers for boys. The Hitler Youth, the Storm Troopers, the Schutz Staffel—they practiced with rifles, maybe, even sometimes with guns—but they still loved peace, said the optimists.

Then Hitler lunged out and took Austria, with its mineral resources and war plants. He mutilated and conquered Czechoslovakia, and seized her powerful armament industry, fortifications, and reserves.

Officially Germany had 70 divisions in 1939, but a few months later the official figure was 260 divisions and 8 million men, including the labor battalions and the Schutz Staff el.

But Germany didn't want war; she was "encircled" by her enemies, who "forced" war upon her.

Nobody who has seen German officials and German businessmen work overtime, for very little money, will insult his own intelligence or their industry by assuming that they had no plan. We will hear again and again for years after the Second World War that we wronged them, that they had no military ambitions, no dream of world conquest.

But there was a time when they gave themselves away. During the period when victory seemed to be within grasp, the Nazis in Berlin not only gloated over their triumphs, but they even talked freely of the long preparations they had undertaken and of the limitless horizon of their future campaigns.

It was then that fierce rivalries sprang up in the Nazi Party over who should be Gauleiter of England, or of Africa; when the wife of Philipp Bouhler (on duty in Hitler's Chancellery), had plans drawn for the Gauleiter's palace in Kenya and

bought 60,000 marks' worth of furniture for it; when more than one important Nazi let slip remarks about the international currency Germany would establish; when the Germans discussed how they would use Russia's resources: when they talked about the great number of business and apartment buildings seized in Berlin to provide administrative quarters for their new Empire.

And not only the big fellows talked. Little men who had grown colorless in their work, men of the Ministry of Economics, plant officials, people who had never made enough money to keep their teeth in repair, suddenly came to life. They talked about the glittering future of Germany, or the years of secret preparations, of study and scheming behind them, and they made one realize that nothing in the world would make them give up their vision of world mastery for Germany.

They were the unknown soldiers of bureaucracy, humble men, yet dangerous enough. For they have worked for the German secret general staff to bring about World War II and to win it. And they will continue to work during the war-in-peace to follow.

9

NAZISM IS CONTAGIOUS

MANY PEOPLE try to interpret developments in Europe, and especially in Germany, through their knowledge of old-time, upright Germans. Yet the German character, both na-

tional and individual, has in the last fifty years changed to such a degree that what was a logical estimate of character in World War I is sheer foolishness in World War II.

It can be said immediately that fundamental character does not change. True, it does not. But if for years expert psychologists, teachers, rabble rousers, organizers, and orators concentrate on developing and enlarging certain traits of the people under their control in a carefully concerted campaign, they will be able to achieve very important alterations in the character of those people. If, furthermore, they choose characteristics which already reside in the minds of the people, tendencies which educators of preceding eras had sought to eradicate, they cannot fail.

That is what has happened in Germany and, to a certain extent, to Germans in foreign countries.

The German met the pan-German creed in every department of his life even before Hitler—in his office, his coffee house, his newspaper, his poetry, his wife's conversation, in the talk of his children home from school. To be a pan-German conveyed a special sense of superiority. As its teachings trickled down from the upper classes, it made the lower classes feel that they, too, belonged to the elite.

In World War I, "Berlin to Bagdad" was no longer merely the Kaiser's pet slogan; it became a reality. German soldiers penetrated deep into Russia, into Palestine, into Iraq—they got to Bagdad. And wherever they went they were told of Germany's claims to all land ever inhabited by persons of German "blood."

These men had, all their lives, been the obedient subjects of His Imperial Majesty the Kaiser. Now, as they advanced from country to country, they were taught to feel superior to the local populations. Suddenly the lowest among them was

told that he was better than the rest of the world. That assurance was comforting indeed.

It was hard to take defeat—more, to be forced to relinquish not only land they had conquered, but also some that their fathers had won. Among the adventurous, pan-Germanism was only intensified by the failure of the war. For the sake of future conquests, they accepted the leadership of the secret general staff and later of the Nazis.

The German army, its drillmasters, Hitler, Himmler, et al have aroused, stimulated, and exaggerated traits and instincts which have slumbered in the German people for centuries, to the point where the friendly German in whom so many Americans still believe has ceased to be an important factor in any German group. He is the German of yesterday. It is the German of today with whom we have to deal, the arrogant, ruthless, intelligent schemer who either suavely hides his intentions or openly boasts of his brutality.

It must be stressed that this new German has nothing in common with the descendants of old-time Germans in the United States and other countries. Early German immigrants left their native land because they wanted to build up a new and different kind of life. Generally, their grandchildren have had the advantage of other than pan-German education. They owe no loyalty to the Germany of today, for it is not the same nation from which their forebears stemmed. And despite the high-pressure campaigns of the Nazis and their affiliates, the vast majority of German-Americans know as much.

Re-education of the people—that was the thing. General Ludendorff and his inner circle started on it immediately by making them believe the fable that German arms had not been defeated. And they had the structure of pan-Germanism on which to build: a pan-German is superior; superior beings are invincible; Germany is a superior body—therefore Ger-

many was not defeated. True, some features of the Versailles Treaty made it easy for the reactionaries to stir up resentment among the German people. But even had there been no Polish Corridor, nor any suspicion of figure-juggling in plebiscites, the people had felt close to victory for four years and they would still have been resentful.

They were further trained to resent the treatment of German groups outside of Germany. Some of the minorities separated from the body of the German people in 1919 may have had a rather thin time for a while. But they fared infinitely better than the liberated foreign minorities had done under German rule. Such information, however, was not part of the new-German education.

German history books have been made to disguise or glorify the ancient German thirst for expansion, to claim that the other fellow was unfair in having a finer place in the sun than the Germans. Therefore Germany had a right to be restless.

Christian forces in the old Germany worked to curb and guide the dissatisfied, restless German spirit. The secret general staff and later the Nazis, exploited it with a masterly insight into the character of their own countrymen.

In our era, outside influences have come close to us through the radio, the newspapers, movies, publicity campaigns, and easy transportation. As a result something interesting has happened to the mass mind. Ready-made opinions and entertainment and predigested literature are now part of our lives, along with ready-made clothes. Often the mechanical wonders of our age become all-important in themselves, to the detriment of thought.

But the point is that in Germany the militarists have perverted the trend to their own use. I heard Hitler expound his theory of the mass mind several years before he started World War II.

One of the officials of Hitler's Chancellery had told me I might get an interview with the German chief of state if I turned up at the right moment at the Automobile Show in Berlin. I joined the official party unobtrusively. Evidently the Black Guards had been tipped off, for they only eyed me for a minute and decided I was not dangerous.

Hitler was absorbed in contemplation of some engine part. As I watched, he turned from it and, staring blankly into space, muttered, "Strange that these machines and all the thousands of other machines in our factories should be changing the human character. But they are. The man who drives his car at top speed has developed a totally new set of reflexes. He does not think any more before he makes a move—there is no time to think. For his own safety he must react with lightninglike speed. Therefore he must act automatically, almost like a machine. A good part of his energy goes into automatic reflexes instead of into thought. That is why in our day and age the number of people who think for themselves is dwindling. They don't have time for thought. That makes it possible for the men who know what they want to lead the masses more easily than ever before." As he turned away, I saw the gleam of satisfaction in his eyes.

After that, whenever I watched the effects of the Nazi campaigns to mold the mind and character of the German people, I remembered Hitler rejoicing over the machine age, over the robot-like response of the people who no longer had "time for thought."

CHARACTER CHANGES REVEALED BY WORLD WAR II

I was in Berlin in 1914 when the Kaiser called his nation to arms. In 1939, I was present in the Reichstag at that early hour of September 1 when Hitler announced the invasion of

Poland. No other contrast could have underlined so well the changes in the German character.

In 1914 a young Norwegian cousin and I roamed through the Berlin streets, quite evidently foreigners, and experienced nothing but friendliness from the people. We saw the Kaiser address the crowds from the balcony of his castle. We saw the citizens bring bouquets of the chubby little red roses that bloom in August and throw them to the uniformed troops with their spiked helmets, marching to war with their bands blaring, the brasses glittering in the sunshine. The crowds always shoved us ahead to help us see what was going on.

All through the early part of the war my mother and I could see how convinced the Germans were that they would win. They celebrated the fall of Liege, of Antwerp, the advance into France, the sinking of the Lusitania. Church bells pealed, banners floated from nearly every window, children were dismissed from school because of some success that promised victory. After the United States had joined the Allies, mother and I had to report daily to the police as enemy aliens. Yet, although our movements were restricted, we seldom felt in actual danger.

On that September day of 1939, however, when the Fuehrer gave the order to march, Germany was a grim, a purposeful country. Troops left the Berlin railway station without cheers. In fact the only cheers heard in the streets came from a few people who had been ordered out in organized groups by their Nazi cells. The streets leading to the temporary Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House where Hitler was to speak were lined with police, and with Schutz Staffel men in field gray battle dress instead of their customary black uniforms.

In that somber Berlin one could realize only too clearly that what had remained of *gemuetlich Deutschland* had now been swept away. The atmosphere hung heavy with suspicion

and hatred of all foreigners, including representatives of neutral countries.

Only the young people celebrated when the Germans marched into Paris, when the French Armistice was signed at Compiegne in 1940. Their elders, whether they were Nazis or not, remembered that wars can be lost after many big victories. The non-Nazis whispered dejectedly, "Do you think that means the end of the war?" The Nazis said grimly, "This is a total war. Every ounce of energy must be mobilized in the war effort. None must be lost in celebrations."

"Don't misunderstand the lack of cheering crowds," the Nazi Prince Auwi said to me in the lobby of the Reichstag. "It only means that this time we are conserving our energy for victory. Everyone concentrates on the task assigned to him."

The Nazis tried to maintain a correct footing with the foreign correspondents, who had just seen their French and English colleagues hurry away to escape detention in Germany. Still, relations were strained. Nor did they improve as we realized that the Gestapo, together with all the different agencies detailed to supervise foreigners, had become more active than ever. Traps were set for us. If we had failed to sidestep German and foreign agents provocateurs we would have landed in Nazi prisons.

During World War I a hushed silence would greet the mention of the invasion of Belgium. I remember the German professor of international law at the Berlin University under whom I studied before the United States entered the war. Professor von Martitz marched up and down the classroom literally tearing his gray hair because German troops had violated Belgian neutrality. "This is a crime," the old man said, "and you will see—Germany will be punished for it."

I looked around the classroom at the other students, about

five young men in field gray, evidently soldiers at home on sick leave. They seemed to share the anxiety and shame of the professor. And nothing happened to the old man for expressing freely his regret at an act of aggression by the Imperial government.

But the average German of 1939 and 1940 apparently felt no compunction when Hitler's troops invaded one ill-armed neutral country after another without formal declaration of war. When German ships masquerading under foreign flags sailed into peaceful harbors, as they did in Denmark, in Norway, in Holland, and then turned their guns on defenseless populations, the average German had no qualms of conscience nor did he bemoan the betrayal of human decency. When so-called "tourists" visiting Copenhagen suddenly emerged from their hotel rooms in German uniforms and helped Nazi troops seize Denmark, when German sailors stole Norwegian uniforms and tried to march on Christiansand in violation of all military law, no protest was heard.

Conversation among most Germans centered about just how much food and other loot they would be getting out of the conquered countries. I tried to speak of this dietary reaction of the population over the radio to the United States when Norway and Denmark were invaded. My broadcast was so slashed by the censors that I refused to go on the air.

Granted that if anyone had dared to voice objections as Professor von Martitz did he would have been drawn and quartered or sent to a concentration camp, which is rarely better. The fact that Hitler and Himmler had to resort to concentration-camp methods to enforce their rule showed that there were Germans who rejected their teachings. They were numerous enough to convince the Nazis that they must be cowed by terrorizing and persecuting their potential leaders. But they were not numerous enough to form an effective force.

I met nobody of importance in the political scene who displayed the slightest embarrassment, much less shame, for Hitler Germany's acts of aggression against almost unarmed neutral nations. The fine and decent people who were disturbed could do nothing, because they were so few and because they were without influence.

They were, in fact, the exceptions who gave point to the rule. The militarists and the Nazis had conditioned the German nation to condone any action the government or its agents might take as long as it furthered German aggrandizement. Disregarding the apprehensions of some and objections of others among its more moderate leaders, the army made good use of the instrument placed ready to its hand—the mass power psychosis, instilled in the people by the Nazis to supplant the "weakness of Christianity."

ATROCITIES CONDONED IN WORLD WAR II

The war had barely started when we began hearing from anti-Nazis about the crimes committed by the black-uniformed Schutz Staffel in Poland, in the wake of the regular army. Then we heard of a few officers insisting on the court martial of Black Guards caught massacring Polish and Jewish men, women, and children. One court decreed the death sentence for these Black Guards, but Heinrich Himmler interceded with Hitler in their behalf before any of them was executed. The few officers who expressed their indignation were removed to minor posts and deprived of any hope of advancement. As far as the Germans were concerned, the matter was settled.

One did not have to rely on non-Nazis to learn of German atrocities in invaded countries. All during the campaigns in the East, all one had to do was to go to one of the waiting-rooms of the railroad stations in eastern Berlin and listen to

the Black Guards arriving from or leaving for the front. They seemed to enjoy describing how they had locked Poles and Jews into cellars and then thrown hand grenades through windows left open for the purpose.

A few people discussed the necessity of making some kind of protest. But if the attempt of the army officers had met only with punishment, what could anyone else do?

The Nazis found a simple way of handling foreign reaction. They told their agents abroad to brand any report of crimes an "untrue atrocity story, reminiscent of the propaganda campaigns of World War I." They knew that anything labeled "propaganda" is disbelieved in America. The method worked perfectly—at least until Pearl Harbor. Many people in the United States read the reports of crimes perpetrated by the Nazi troops as if they were detective stories, horror stuff, that might raise some gooseflesh, yet need not be taken seriously.

But the German people learned with surprising speed the truth about the German bestialities in Poland, as it had known about the murder of Czechs after the rape of Czechoslovakia. And why? They were told by their government—to compel them to share the guilt of what was done. On the whole the people reacted with unforgivable indifference. The Catholics displayed a little more compassion for the Poles than the rest of the citizenry, possibly because the Poles are Catholic.

There was one Black Guard who boasted freely, within hearing of terrified Catholic nuns, about the number of Poles and Jews he had liquidated. When his wife bore a crippled baby in a Berlin Catholic hospital, the Catholics whispered, "It is God's punishment for his crimes." But that was all.

"Follow me blindly. I am your leader," Hitler demanded. "Believe what I tell you." And the masses did believe. My maid arrived one morning with red eyes, swollen from weeping. Her husband had been enlisted as a stretcher bearer at a

hospital near Berlin. He had told her for hours of the night how horribly the Poles had mutilated Germans in Polish territory before the German troops had gone in. He described in gruesome detail how they had burned off the skin of their victims, bit by bit, until the limbs were just charred stumps.

I thought it rather strange that a stretcher bearer on duty near Berlin could know so much about wounds which must have been well bandaged for the trip from Poland. I questioned the maid.

"Are you sure those stories are true?" I asked. "How could a stretcher bearer in Berlin see so much?"

She was offended that I should doubt her word. But later she confessed that her husband had not actually seen any of the things he had spoken about so vividly. However he had seen "authentic" slides on the subject accompanying a lecture by one of the Black Guards. My questioning her husband's word convinced my maid that I lacked the proper sympathy for the Nazi cause. But she didn't, and couldn't, realize that that lecture accomplished two steps in the molding of minds along the Hitler pattern—it aroused hatred of the Poles, and it provided graphic lessons in administering torture.

It wasn't long before my maid was one more servant in the Gestapo system keeping tabs on the activities of the correspondents. Our mail, our telephone conversations, our visitors, were all regularly reported to the police.

THEY LAUGHED TOO EARLY

The Black Guards were not the only Germans to rejoice at the suffering of the Poles, both Jewish and Gentile. At the preview of the first official newsreels of the war, arranged at the Propaganda Ministry for our benefit, I was struck by the squeals and shouts of delight from leading German officials at sight of pictures of those anguished Polish prisoners. Pur-

posely I went to see the same newsreel at a public theatre. The images of unhappy Jews in caftans or merely in rags were flashed on the screen—poor helpless souls, evidently terrified of their German captors. Immediately there were loud guffaws and shrieks of laughter. Apparently no one in the audience wondered how their own people would look as defeated prisoners.

After the first reports of the mass murders committed by the Nazis in Poland, I happened to meet the leader of the women in Germany, Dr. Erich Hilgenfeldt, at an official reception in Berlin. He talked a lot about the constructive welfare work done by the Germans. I used that as a starter for some discreet questioning.

He was not in the least reticent. Instead he seemed eager to talk. He called over two other Schutz Staffel officers to satisfy my curiosity. After some conversation, the officer with the most silver braid on his black uniform said petulantly, "I don't see why you Anglo-Saxons get so excited about what happens to a few Poles. Your reaction shows you and your countrymen do not have the scientific approach to the problem."

One of the men in the group was Dr. Roland Freisler, secretary of state in the Ministry of Justice. One always had to be careful in talking with men of his type, but science is a safe subject for starting a Nazi off to say more than he means to. The three men gave me a revealing lecture when I accepted the bait and asked, "And what is the scientific approach?"

MURDER FOR THE WHITE RACE

"Do you people realize what is happening to the white race?" This was the near-sighted Nazi with thick-lensed glasses. I admitted that I did not know the German "scientific" version.

"For every twenty-two persons of pure white blood born every minute, there are eighty-five Slav births. If that should go on, by 1960 the Slav populations, including the Poles, would have double the numbers of the white populations." Hilgenfeldt looked at me, obviously expecting me to be shattered by this revelation. Years of reporting had taught me that one can do anything with statistics. I merely said, "Do you mean to say that the Slavs do not belong to the white race?"

"Certainly not. Or at least on a very inferior level." Hilgenfeldt, the racial "scientist" of the Schutz Staffel, almost snarled as he moved away. Freisler took his leaving as a signal that he could speak freely.

"We indulge in no false sentimentality," he said. "We shall not allow any of our neighbors to have a higher birth rate than ours, and we shall take measures to prevent it. The Slavs outnumber us." It seemed that the Slavs and the Jews would be permitted to survive if they worked for Germany. "But only if they work for us," he repeated. "And we'll see that they work as we want them to. If they don't they can starve."

Then Freisler touched on the crux of the matter. "We'll see that none of their men will ever get enough education to become leaders." And added, "When 1960 comes, we'll see that the birth rate is in our favor, not that of any Slavs."

Like many another Nazi, Freisler was ready to commit any crime to forestall "racial extinction."

If one of our leg men had brought in such a story, I would have been skeptical. But I was there, hearing the statements made deliberately by a powerful Nazi, a man so full of his scheme to exterminate the race he feared that he didn't realize, or care, how horrifying his remarks appeared to an American.

SCIENTIFIC "NORDIFICATION" (AUFNORDUNG)

Freisler even told me of a plan prepared by the Schutz Staffel racial office to incorporate blond Poles into the German family. A big proportion of the Black Forest population is squat and dark and falls short of the Nazi dream of the Germanic type. The idea was to transfer forty thousand healthy, clearly Nordic Poles into the Black Forest to improve the strain.

"How would your people react to such a move?" I asked.

He was amazed that anyone should care what the "people" thought. "We have commissions traveling now through Poland picking out the young men. We tell them they are the descendants of Germans who settled long ago in eastern countries. We tell the same to the Black Forest People. The girls will welcome them, because with the war, their chances of marrying are slim. The Poles will learn German," he continued, "and we'll have a good Nordic population in the Black Forest. You don't know how much trouble we have in keeping our lonely women and the Polish war prisoners apart."

That much was true. At least once a week German papers published reports of court sentences imposed on women who had ignored the orders to treat all Poles as "subhuman," and had instead succumbed to the charms of some poor prisoner slaving at forced labor.

I sent reliable Germans to the Black Forest in 1940 to check on the progress of the Schutz Staffel scheme. It hadn't worked very well. For one thing, a lot of the Polish men, even those from tiny villages, hadn't liked the idea of being Germans. Then, although the local women were glad to have them around, the local men, who had been cocks of the walk with the soldiers away, organized minor riots with the help of soldiers home on leave. The last I heard, the Nazi race officials

were still "working" on the plan, but proceeding very carefully.

In pre-Hitler days even the thought of applying such stud-farm methods to human beings would have aroused storms of indignation in Germany. But the constant hammering home of racial teachings had proved effective. For the sake of a possible numeric superiority in some distant future the Germans under Nazi domination accepted the stud-farm plan. They even made jokes about it.

German churchmen were appalled. But what could they do against the all-pervading Nazi propaganda based on appeals to the lowest human instincts? What could they do with Sunday congregations who were being systematically divorced from Christianity the rest of the week?

MERCY KILLINGS

On the strength of long and learned recommendations drawn up for the racial office by university professors working for Heinrich Himmler, Rudolph Hess, in the name of the German Government, issued regulations encouraging the bearing of illegitimate children. Another professorial memorandum contained provisions for the so-called mercy killings, by which the aged, the sick, the cripples, and the insane sheltered in homes were wiped out in special mass-murder centers in Germany and Austria.

To the Nazis, this measure was justified by the assertion that for every three ill or aged persons, the services of one healthy German were needed. And, in wartime, all able-bodied Germans were required in war work.

At the same time a Nazi agency, the Society for Eugenics and Against Infant Mortality, began carrying off children left in nursing homes by their parents. We first got word of it when in several cases parents, who believed their children to

be recuperating in the country or the suburbs of Berlin, suddenly received their ashes. Others were merely sent a postcard announcing the death of the child in an "epidemic." I traced the whispered reports about these deaths very carefully. I found that the same company which had shipped German soldiers to fight in the Spanish Civil War had charge of transporting both the old and the young mercy-killing victims. Its offices were located on Potsdamer Platz, in the Columbus Haus.

In one instance, a child had died mysteriously while recuperating from the measles. I found the parents to be anti-Nazi. The only explanation I could obtain indicated that the Nazis had sought to discipline the parents, indirectly, by killing their child.

Fear for their own safety has become the predominant consideration in the life of every German under Nazi rule. Certainly no other German government of the past century was as ruthless. But non-Nazi Germans within the country firmly believe that in the old days the citizenry would have stood together. They would not have allowed a Himmler time, first to build up and then to entrench a Gestapo, as modern Germans have done. Such a step could have been achieved only through the gradual undermining of German character.

NAZISM IS NOT ONLY A GERMAN DISEASE

Although the Nazi germ was cultured in Germany through changes in the national character during the past half century, it has developed many possibilities for infecting the national health of other countries. Nazism is, in fact, an international disease. It is, further, all the more likely to attack in unexpected places, since under the impact of the war its carriers have gone underground.

The creators of Nazism built their credo deliberately to

awake response among the most widely divergent human groups. The machine-age trend, of which Hitler spoke at the Automobile Show, has touched even comparatively feudal countries.

While for years the Nazi propagandists insisted that Nazism was not intended for export, at the same time they carried forward concerted efforts to enlist followers in every single foreign land. They reached into each social level, to secure success under any possible change in internal politics.

Way back in Landsberg days the Nazi Party chieftains purposely picked out men with special foreign connections to work on susceptible groups abroad. As the Party grew in power, volunteers turned up or were ferreted out to be absorbed into skeleton organizations within the Party framework, each organization specializing in a specific country. The political emphases in each case differed with the varying national characteristics involved.

NAZIS EXPLOIT ANTI-SEMITISM

The original plan evolved at Landsberg called for the use of local anti-Semitic leaders as Nazi pioneers in foreign lands. In time a vast net of organizations sprang up to exploit the political possibilities of anti-Semitism, including the Alliance Chretienne Arienne, with its first headquarters in Paris, the Anti-Jewish World League, founded in Nuremberg, and the World Service, branching out from Erfurt, with millions of marks to spend on propaganda.

One might call these bodies holding-companies of Nazi anti-Semitism. In addition there were the innumerable subsidiary groups, the little fellows who, as mouthpieces for anti-Semitism in their local centers, sought power and wealth. They, too, organized secret societies, just as the Nazis did.

The members paid dues, which were then expended by unscrupulous leaders as they liked.

The age-old racket of anti-Semitic secret cabals may not be important in itself. But co-ordinated by wealthy organizers and big Nazi-controlled concerns, it menaces any decent tolerant community. Especially since it is often forgotten that tolerance must be firmly protected.

LOCAL LEADERS

The Balt German, Alfred Rosenberg, who ran the Foreign Political Office and the institute known as the Schooling House in Dahlem near Berlin, was not content with but one Nazi headquarters in neighboring countries. He visualized the advantages of maintaining two groups—an open organization, and a secret one that would work effectively under cover of the publicity inevitably aroused by its blatant brother. These were, of course, in addition to the business leaders won by promises of huge profits, and occasionally an actual deal to further whet their appetites.

The Netherlands, for instance, had an official Nazi Party under Dr. Anton Adrian Mussert. Then the secret, more radical, party was launched and the Nazis were able to keep Mussert under their thumb by threatening him with his rival. I interviewed Mussert in Utrecht in 1936. He made a point of mentioning that he rejected some Nazi tenets; Holland was satisfied with her queen, for instance, and could not therefore subscribe to Nazi condemnation of women as inferior in official posts.

Sir Harry Deterding, the Dutch oil king, in a class apart but still a Nazi sympathizer, had his own uses to the Party. Believing that Nazism stood as a bulwark against Communism, Deterding financed many Nazi economic-infiltration schemes in Southeastern Europe.

The Nazi set-up in the Netherlands can be taken as characteristic of developments in nearly every other foreign country, including the United States of America.

American correspondents and radio commentators in Berlin had reason to know that Nazi supporters have long carried on their work side by side with decent citizens. We would receive sharp reproofs and even threats from the ministries. "We have received word from America," the officials would say, "that your reports are too sarcastic." Or too inimical, or whatever the charge. "We can no longer allow you to refer to Germany and Norway as you have been doing," I was told. "Our friends in America have complained." This was the official of the Propaganda Ministry whom we called the Big Oaf speaking. "You always refer to 'little Norway' and 'big Germany,'" he went on angrily. "That must stop."

From his tone it was plain that if I didn't stop I was in danger of being expelled. I couldn't resist saying, however, "Why, isn't Germany big?" (Actually I went right ahead, and the Nazis "reconsidered" the expulsion order.)

At the time I thought the Big Oaf was lying about the complaints from America. Since then I have seen a copy of one denunciation, sent from the United States to two of the Nazi Party bosses in Germany.

In November, 1939, George Sylvester Viereck, who was sentenced as an enemy agent in August, 1943, violently protested the lack of enthusiasm for the German war effort shown by American radio commentators from Germany. In his weekly report, number 20, he referred to "the outrageous broadcasts of American correspondents in Berlin. I listened to Shirer and S. Schultz the other day. Neither had one word of praise for the heroism of the German people, for her splendid organization, nor a word of gratitude for the free speech permitted to them."

After complaining about the tone and some parts of a broadcast of mine, Viereck waxed sarcastic: "Neither of the two correspondents was ever friendly to the New Germany, but they would not sputter forth such unredeemed gloom if they were better fed. They should either receive additional food cards, or be expelled. In any case they should not be permitted radio facilities." Where Mr. Viereck got the idea that we were enjoying free speech is a mystery. Four censors read our scripts before we went on the air. But his remarks show that our efforts to get part of the truth past the censors proved successful.

STUDY FOREIGN PSYCHOLOGIES TO FURTHER CONQUESTS

There was nothing haphazard about German preparation of the same psychological weapons which had succeeded so well in Germany for use in foreign countries. Specialists traveling from country to country accumulated a vast store of psychological knowledge, some of which was published in an amazing number of books, some of which was carefully kept secret. Such reports proved invaluable in establishing infection centers abroad.

Then there was a special corps of historians. The historical traditions of a country under "treatment" would be twisted to suit Nazi Party propaganda.

I remember Ambassador William Dodd, historian by profession, gritting his teeth at some diplomatic function when a Nazi said seriously in a speech that Carl Schurz, the American liberal, had really been a Nazi at heart. Schurz, it appeared, had forecast the whole Nazi movement—which was after all the ultimate perfection of democracy.

German "science" stands so well in the minds of most Americans that such bizarre claims might very well influence

ill-informed persons. Especially those visitors who had enjoyed the hospitality of Goebbels' Carl Schurz Haus. (Incidentally, this propaganda body has absolutely no connection with the Carl Schurz Association in the United States.)

Perversion of science has been an influential factor in the molding of the German mind along Nazi lines. And it can serve to good effect in other countries.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

The Nazis obviously prize conquest of the United States above other countries. They have, however, encountered so much opposition to their best tactics that they established, in addition to their direct centers of infiltration within the country, indirect affiliates outside it, against the day when the war would curtail too-active internal work. Instead of employing Germans, in this instance, they exploited the many agencies functioning in Spain and in South America. They counted on using our sister continent as a springboard against us.

Ever since World War I, German aristocrats and big businessmen, preceding official German propaganda agents, have cultivated aristocrats and businessmen in Spain, Portugal, and South America. General Wilhelm von Faupel, an associate of General Ludendorff in 1918, spent years in South America building up sympathy for the German cause and inaugurating activist centers. Whatever mistakes the United States made he and his aides promptly enlarged and distorted. They reached far into the aristocracy, the business groups, the soldiery, and the German enclaves. General von Faupel's selling point was the superiority of Spanish culture; his follow-up arguments appealed to the national pride.

With Nazi accession to power in Germany, von Faupel returned to co-operate with Hitler in Berlin.

The extraordinarily active Ibero-American Institute operated under von Faupel's guidance. It convinced many a good Spaniard that only the Germans appreciated the greatness of their Spanish heritage, and the justice of their claims in Europe and South America. When the Spaniards finally realized that they were merely being used and tried to break away, they found themselves in a secure trap which they had helped to build: the Falange, modeled on the Nazi Party, enforced the German will in Spain.

To further increase their hold on Spanish-language countries, the Nazis devised the Consejo de Hispanidad, which was supposed to be a purely Spanish organization to spread Spanish culture to North Africa and South America, but which in reality was directed by Germans.

The Falange Exterior repeated for Spaniards abroad the tactics used by the Nazis to control Germans in other countries. After most Central and South American states broke off relations with Germany, Nazi agitators hid behind the chieftains of the Falange Exterior. German pressure on Spanish companies and organizations forced them to become tools, often without their knowing it. The Nazis exploited their patriotism and their love for old traditions, just as they had perverted those same forces at home.

Having cached tremendous sums of money in South America in the bank accounts of wealthy and aristocratic friends, many of the leading Nazis hope that if they have to flee Germany they may find refuge below the Panama Canal. From Central and South American hide-outs, they could then finance future pan-German exploits.

When the Nazis say, "Tomorrow the world!" they mean the whole world. The other continents have received their earnest attention. I saw innumerable Indian leaders passing through Berlin, accepting German favors and guidance. We saw young

Arab leaders arrive, and leave full of admiration for Nazi Germany and of gratitude for German promises of assistance. Exploiting the general ignorance in all countries of the new German's true character, the Nazis have turned resentment of the English and the Americans into an effective ally.

Like the Spaniards, so the Arabs, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Indian leaders heard from Nazi lips that their civilization was the only one which could share the world with the German. This assurance was a mellowing confirmation of superiority and expertly paved the way for German "advice." The Germans also generously threw in promises of personal advancement as bait.

One can have no pity for fools. Yet I came to feel deeply sorry for some of the Asiatic leaders in Germany during the war. These men were clever enough to realize that should their country ever succumb to German propaganda, it would fare no better than Poland, Czechoslovakia, or France. They wanted to leave, to get home. The cooling of their Nazi ardor made the Germans all the more determined to keep them in Germany. Some of the Asiatics slipped into my office on the quiet, hoping for some help in escaping the country. They had, they said, refused to broadcast under German auspices. The young students were virtually prisoners.

Naturally enough, there was nothing we could do.

QUISLINGS IN ASIA AND AFRICA

After the Germans started their World War II there were certain sections of the East which their agents of German nationality could not enter freely. They had, however, prepared for just such an eventuality by training renegades from various countries to work for them among the Arabs, the Indians, the Moroccans and the South Africans. In a boastful mood Nazi propagandists claimed that their expert Danish

and Swedish agents, for instance, traveled openly to Palestine as Christian ministers and missionaries, supposedly on pilgrimages to the Holy Sepulchre. From Palestine they slipped easily into Iran, Iraq, India, or wherever they were assigned.

Even before the war the Germans had flooded Arab countries with radio sets, underselling British and American makes. But the German radios received clearly only broadcasts beamed from Berlin. And the German radio propaganda line proved to be enormously effective, largely through the application of the old Nazi trick of combining large promises with patent flattery.

In view of the inherent Nazi ingenuity and adroit un-morality, it will be even harder to wipe out the seats of Nazi infection in non-German countries than it will be either in Germany or in German-occupied countries. Where the Nazis are in power, everyone knows them and their methods. Abroad, their affiliates and supporters have sought safety in protective coloration.

It is also to German advantage that the people of distant continents have not suffered from Nazi ruthlessness as bitterly as have the non-Nazi Germans and other Europeans. These populations will therefore seek out Nazi agents with less energy.

In Germany the saboteurs, the subversive underground men and women, are the true patriots. Their enemy is plain to be seen: it is the government and much of the people. The patriots who have escaped being sent to Himmler's concentration camps are trying desperately to survive—to help rebuild the country.

In foreign, non-German lands, the saboteur, the undercover agent, the pro-Nazi, is the traitor. He is the enemy, and he is well concealed. But he is just as intent on survival—to help betray the country.

North and South Americans are dangerously apt to underestimate the virulence of the Nazi poison, the thoroughness of the German enemy's designs on their welfare. This undervaluing occurs partly because only a small number of their nationals actually saw the new Germany in action in the countries Germany conquered, exploited, and oppressed. It occurs also partly because only a fraction of those North or South Americans who were in Berlin during World War II had an opportunity to hear the Germans speak openly, proudly, about their plans and aspirations, and thus to realize to what lengths even the average German will go to achieve his pan-German aims.

Furthermore, the idea of a war of infiltration, of fifth-column activities, has a certain conspiratorial aspect which apparently makes it seem romantic and unreal—and therefore negligible—to the average North and South American, especially to those who have not witnessed the gradual change in the German mentality and methods.

It is only human to feel that one knows something about a country, even that one is an expert, because one has spent some time visiting or working there. But people who knew the Germany of the Weimar Republic, even those who knew the Germany of the early Nazi days, cannot know it now. Any expert's knowledge, to be of constructive value, must correctly estimate the increasing changes brought about and intensified by the victories and the defeats of World War II. Until Germany has re-educated herself, we must remain aware that we are dealing with the German who allowed himself, his family, and his country to be used by Adolf Hitler.

No amount of justifiable sympathy for the German of yesterday must cloud our perception of the German of today.

10

GERMAN TROJAN HORSES

IN 1938, just after Germany had invaded Austria, I talked with the man who later became Chief of the German army's General Staff, General Franz Haider. I heard from him many of the usual protestations of Germany's peaceful intentions, despite the invasion. Then the general began to criticize the High Command of World War I.

"It was stupid of the German High Command not to have considered the possibility of defeat more systematically than they did," he stated.

"But I have been under the impression," I said, "that General Ludendorff took quite a number of effective steps when he realized that the war could not be won."

"Yes, that's quite true. But infinitely more could have been done. A staff man must consider all military and political contingencies. We have learned that. Nobody can imagine the plans we have worked out for all possible eventualities."

What General Haider meant by "infinitely more could have been done" became quite clear when, in 1940, the German leaders faced the possibility of military defeat and launched the secret war-in-peace.

Innumerable incidents in neutral countries, and an incautious German officer speaking in Paris, have revealed that the Germans have broadened the scope of their preparations since the start of that hidden war. Talking to a Frenchman whom he wanted to impress, the German officer happened to

speak in the presence of another Frenchman who recorded the conversation in *La Libre France*, July 15, 1943: "Peace? There will be no peace anywhere in the world after the guns cease firing," said the German, and added that "the battle of the fifth columns will follow the battles of tanks and armored cars." He pointed to what he called "technocratic engineers" of all professions which the Germans have placed in special training schools in Chile and Argentina to work for the German cause all over the world. He admitted that the conquests of these forces will be slower, but probably more effective and lasting than victories won by the German army.

The Nazis are not afraid to warn us. They rely on our disregarding the warnings as we did before, shrugging them off as the utterances of crackpots and cranks, and forgetting that both can be dangerous.

From what I heard from responsible Nazis in Berlin, they have neglected no measure of infiltration for the inner war. The men of the secret general staff have sent big squads of industrialists, bankers, labor organizers, women, professors, and aristocrats to various countries to arouse sympathy, to secure underground hideouts in case of need, and to enlist future quislings.

They have honeycombed South America with agents trained in their new, enlarged fifth-column tactics. Everywhere, in both Americas, they have incited racial groups, anti-Semitic groups, university professors and students, and the numberless, formless, frustrated people who hope for advancement with Nazi help. American newspapers have recorded case after case of arrests of Nazi and Japanese sympathizers in this country—air-raid wardens, professor's wives, heads of manufacturing concerns. But these were simply the individ-

uals who were careless or reckless. We must anticipate that they are only a small part of the big whole.

The Germans confidently count on their political influence increasing in the United States and in the other Americas because of the high birthrate of the Germans and German-Americans living there, forgetting that large numbers of them descend from Germans who left the Fatherland precisely because they objected to regimentation. And they have not been subjected to German education. These new denizens of other lands will, the pan-Germans feel sure, never deny the call of their superior German blood, and their numerical advantage can be turned to use in the German cause.

Thus, the total-war strategists of Germany plan ahead not only for tomorrow but for generations to come.

WE, TOO, CAN PLAN

Napoleon once said, "If I appear always ready to meet every emergency, to confront every problem, it is because before undertaking any enterprise I have long considered it, and have foreseen what could possibly occur."

This philosophy of preparedness is the quintessence of the Ludendorff-Hitler-Nazi system. But two can play at that game. And in the interest of the first law of life, self-preservation, we must "consider and foresee" from now on.

Had we and our allies faced reality a little sooner, there would have been no occupation of Manchuria, no conquest of Ethiopia, no Spanish Civil War, no Munich Pact. And there would obviously have been no Pearl Harbor, and no declaration of war against the United States by Adolf Hitler.

Our enemies have deliberately confused the issues. We can formulate them simply and clearly.

While we in the United States and our allies of the United Nations were pursuing peace and happiness, the ruling

cliques of Germany, of Japan, and of Italy were developing war machines with which to wrest land and wealth from other nations, mobilizing the full strength of their populations and resources for war, and turning lust for conquest into the national religion.

After they attacked us, we mobilized, too, and our soldiers moved swiftly from the defensive to the offensive. They know what they want—a world free from aggression—and they are willing to fight to attain it.

But our enemies fight with more than men and military weapons; they use treachery and deceit. They fight war in peace. This new type of war offends our deepest instincts. We find it beneath contempt. So we have tried to ignore it.

We can no longer afford to ignore it, because the enemies' aim is the destruction of our freedom and our pattern of life, and the theft of our wealth and our resources. To this end they have perfected their secret army, their hidden strategy, with campaigns of moral, mental, economic and political subversion.

When they precipitated World War II, German militarists had a start of twenty years on their best-armed neighbors, because of the complacency of most of the rest of Europe. And whatever one thinks of the Germans, one must concede that they have always known how to evolve and adapt new strategies. They realized early that the experience of war on their home soil would tend to make the German masses unwilling to follow their leaders into a new—a third—World War. Thus they again have a start on the rest of the world in their war of peaceful penetration.

Most of the world is as yet unarmed against such tactics, and unless we foresee the attack we will be more vulnerable to it than any other nation. That is not necessarily to our discredit, for it comes from our eagerness to be friends, and our

impatience with distrust and suspicion. Yet it is a wise nation that knows its own friends.

By utilizing existing world trends to camouflage their real intentions and merely exploiting and shaping them with propaganda, the Germans have already achieved a fair measure of success. One might call these propaganda carriers Trojan horses. The Germans have a whole stable full of them.

Behind the call for "leadership," the delusion that Nazism protects private property, the fear of Communism, racial friction, misconceived religion, mistaken admiration for German efficiency, misapplied tolerance, the need for German industries, distrust of our allies, fear of chaos, one can trace the influence of those minds which, whether they realize it or not, have become infected with the Nazi virus.

FIRST TROJAN HORSE: WE WANT A LEADER

The exasperated business or professional man who says, "What we need is a leader," is calling for the death of his cherished democracy. It was precisely by wishing for a "leader" to command them that the German people let themselves be sucked into the maw of Nazism.

We enjoy as a republic the privilege of choosing our representatives freely every few years. If the men we elect annoy or disappoint us, then it is not the representative system which is at fault, but our own judgment. It is the duty of our representatives to debate, to discuss, before reaching a decision. This makes for a certain slowness, a certain clumsiness. But with all its admitted faults, would we want to exchange our system for the public as opposed to the secret ballot, or for the single, Party candidate?

We can mourn the funeral of democracy if the day ever comes when we do not criticize our representatives. And we

will hasten it if we only criticize, without proffering better solutions. Blind, destructive criticism, leading to indifference in the voters, is just what the Germans would like to see here, automatically leading to the yearning for a "leader."

Sheep need leaders. Republicans need free debate and constructive co-operation.

SECOND TROJAN HORSE: NAZISM PROTECTS PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

The Nazis won capitalist support in Germany by claiming that they would protect private enterprise. Then they introduced a system more severely regimented than Communism.

For many years of the interwar period foreign businessmen on whom the Nazis wanted to make a good impression came to admire the Nazi version of German economy. They got, of course, a rosy-hued view. It is to Germany's advantage to have potential foreign investors believe that the Nazis reserve special privileges for capitalists. They do—but only for the capitalists who benefit the Nazi Party.

Vast amounts of money have been made in Germany by enterprising men and women. But these deals were at the expense either of the masses or of conquered populations. And they were invariably somewhat crooked, placing the businessman at the mercy of Nazi supervisors, for each transaction could be completed only with Nazi approval. And before giving its approval the Party must not only have gotten "its share," but the supervising Nazi official had to be rendered "co-operative."

The man who failed to attend to those little details discovered that the authorities were extremely anxious that each transaction be "correct." He might find himself threatened with a lawsuit for "harming Germany's good reputation." If he was lucky, he was allowed to kick in the proper share to

the Party; then the matter became a "regrettable misunderstanding." But in spite of the compromise, fear thenceforth colored his every action.

Actual laws to govern any given situation instantly ceased to exist when a Nazi official, however minor, declared that they interfered with the requirements of the state.

But such sordid particulars have never been a part of the propaganda handed out to foreigners.

German big business has not dared to open its mouth. Its representatives often, in my hearing, talked glowingly to foreigners about the wonderful Nazi system. I taxed Baron Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach about it once at a reception in Berlin. He was groaning about how hard life was under the Nazis. "Why then," I demanded, "do you and men like you do your best to convince our American businessmen how fine it is?"

"Well, you see, these Americans who come over here," he said, "have a habit of going home and making speeches about what they have learned. If we told them that we are no longer masters in our own plants, the Gestapo would hear what we have said. Then what do you think would happen to us?"

I came up against the Nazi double-faced policy in connection with one of my broadcasts. Shortly after World War II had begun, a wave of unrest started among the workers. They felt that they had to work too hard for too little pay and food, while quite evidently their Nazi bosses were enjoying loot from foreign countries. Labor Leader Robert Ley could not pacify them.

Hitler was requested to address them. The workers, gathered in a huge factory hall in Spandau, gave him a cool reception. Then Hitler swung into an impassioned declaration that profits from the war would be restricted, that unlike

World War I this war would not enrich war profiteers. The workers rediscovered their Nazi enthusiasm and cheered.

I filed my cable on curtailment of profits in Germany and late that night I was to broadcast to the United States. We always handed our scripts to the censors about two hours before we were to go on the air. They called me in. There were four men on duty; radio, War Office, Propaganda Office, and Foreign Office representatives. I was informed that all references to restriction of profits would have to be deleted. I was furious. That was the big development of the day.

I protested. "I heard Hitler make those statements," I said. "Are you going to censor the remarks of your chief of state?"

They handed me the late evening papers. "Here is the official text of the Fuehrer's speech," they said. "There is no reference to any cut in profits, as you will see." I did see: there was none.

I had brought with me from my office, however, a copy of the full text of the speech which I had gone to some trouble to secure in the course of the afternoon. I handed that to the censors.

It was then after 2 A.M. and I was almost due on the air to reach the evening listeners in America. The censors were frantic. They had orders to cut all references to profit restrictions, but did they dare wake up their respective bosses at such an hour? They decided that they did not. So at the last minute I was able to make my attempt to counteract Nazi propaganda.

There are many other and infinitely less subtle examples of how the Nazis violated ownership rights, besides expropriation of Jews, or of non-Jews who happened to own property coveted by Nazis. I shall mention only one—the case of the nephew of Fritz Thyssen, the man who confessed I Paid Hitler. This hapless young Herr von Remnitz owned

the very beautiful castle of Fuschl, within reach of Hitler's Berghof residence in Bavaria. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop wanted it for a summer residence. The von Remnitz family was informed. They were foolish enough to hesitate. The next thing they knew von Remnitz had been sent to the Dachau concentration camp. He died there.

During the crises preceding World War II many American and foreign politicians and businessmen were entertained extensively by the von Ribbentrops in "their" castle of Fuschl. Many of them were favorably impressed with the fine Nazi style displayed.

If admiration of the better Nazi business methods fails to gain their point, the propagandists talk about the Slav menace, the threat of Bolshevism in general.

THIRD TROJAN HORSE: SOVIET RUSSIAN DANGER

Their system of frightening the western powers with the specter of Bolshevism served the Nazis well during interwar days and during much of World War II. But no matter how serious our economic problems, there is no reason for panic.

The international craving of the masses for security is greater than it has ever been before, and they look for protection to their unions, to business organizations, or to their governments. I believe that we have enough initiative, intelligence, and ability to safeguard the security of those who want to work, and at the same time to preserve our freedom. If we cannot do this, we do not deserve to survive.

Both the German and the Russian systems of regimentation promise security to their workers, both include labor unions, and both utilize them for political purposes. Despite the absence of Nazi soap-box orators, like the soap-box Communists on Union Square, Germany's Labor Front propaganda has reached an astonishing number of Americans.

Within the past two years I have met more workers in the United States who believed that German treatment of workers shamed the American treatment than men who claimed the Communist system superior for the workers.

These men haven't been to either country. They know only what they have heard, glowing reports of workers returned or writing from Germany, from German relatives of other workers, from Swedish, Danish, Irish and other renegades who were Nazi agents, bursting with tales of labor's happiness under the Nazi regime.

I never hear evidence of the Nazi germ among American workers without remembering an agent of the Gestapo in Berlin who made a bit of pocket money now and then by providing me with news. Sometimes the tips were faked, so as to get me into trouble. But I had had years of practice in telling planted stories from real information. And I made doubly sure by carefully checking whatever he told me.

My Gestapo tipster talked repeatedly about the tremendous organization the government had built up to collect data on American industry, to foment labor trouble in the United States in the event of war. The organization files and the offices of the supersaboteurs filled one huge red brick building in Berlin on Kurfuerstenstrasse, behind the Luetzow Platz. Even the minor clerks of the Kurfuerstenstrasse headquarters had been sworn to absolute secrecy. My Gestapo informant revealed that the few who had talked were dead.

"Have you read *The Dark Invader* by Captain von Rintelen?" he asked. "That's required reading in the Kurfuerstenstrasse, but that story of our activities in the United States during the last war will pale into insignificance when the Fuehrer issues the order to create havoc this time. We shall spread terror from the North Cape in Norway to Capetown in South Africa," he went on. "When the whole western coast

of Europe and all of Africa is in our hands, with fires and explosions all over the place, then America will know what is in store for her from the Kurfuerstenstrasse!"

Such extensive preparation for sabotage was not intended for wartime use alone. In peacetime, while we are "co-operating" with Germany, to be Christian and kind (and also to regain our markets), German agents who are thoroughly familiar with our procedures will exert every effort to hamper our output, to weaken us internally and to cripple us as a competitor.

The propagandists who point only to the "Communist danger" are trying to make us look the other way while they stick a knife into our ribs. Remembering the great man who said that if we were all good Christians there would be no need for Marxism, I have no doubt that if we use to the full our democratic duties and privileges, we can make our democracy immune to any danger from Communism or Nazism.

The angle to the Russian problem which truly alarms the Germans is the Slav birth rate. How can they dominate the European continent if the Slavs continue to multiply so much faster than the Germans? The Slavs in Russia, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria have always been the most fecund Europeans. In the decade after 1926 the population of Soviet Russia alone rose 15.9 per cent, compared to a German increase of 7 per cent.

The Germans have tried to combat the menace of the Slav birth rate by two means, both carefully thought out by German professors. The first is to raise the German birth rate artificially, handing out medals and tax rebates for big families, glorifying concubinage and unmarried motherhood.

The second method, carried out by Himmler's Black Guards, is scientifically organized starvation and mass murder.

German determination to keep the numerical lead over the Slavs should not be forgotten. The Germans are planting and will continue to plant suspicion and resentment against the Slav countries in the non-Slav United Nations. But the high Slav birth rate is a reality with which we must reckon.

If we let the Nazi intrigue succeed, mistrust will work to keep the racial groups of the world from learning to live peacefully together after the holocaust of World War II.

FOURTH TROJAN HORSE: RACIAL FRICTION

The men of the secret general staff rely on the racial prejudice which is in all of us, whether we will admit it or not or whether we even know it. We betray it unwittingly in public and private conversations: "Oh, he is a Jew, but very nice," or "He's a good soldier for a Negro." Then there is the "arrogant" Englishman, the "lazy" Italian, the "mysterious" (meaning untrustworthy) Chinese, the "sex-mad" Frenchman. All these mistaken concepts provide a fine culture for the Nazi virus. Most of us, according to the lofty and mythical Nazi standard, would be branded mongrels, but the number of us who feel that our own particular racial mixture ranks somehow superior to the next man's is appalling. And it is an open invitation to Nazi propaganda—even to our eventual conquest by Nazi ideas.

Race friction in the United States which has reached the explosion point, for example among factory workers under wartime stresses, has delighted the Germans. Whether or not the friction is instigated or encouraged by disguised Nazi agents in the United States, as the Sojourner Truth riots were said to be, every such racial rift is another wedge into the unity of the American people.

We must foresee the continued threat, and close up our ranks.

Just as the professional soldier, reared on von Clausewitz or Treitschke, could not but be impressed by German Blitzkriegs, so the schoolteacher, the professor, who went to Germany was often deeply impressed by the regimentation of youth which made the youth subleader and the Nazi teacher more powerful than the family. We heard a great deal of talk from visiting teachers about German efficiency and German Kultur, especially after Goebbels' Carl Schurz Haus had taken them on personally conducted tours of Nazi Germany.

Traveling about in the United States, I have been struck by the number of university students and graduates who argue for the German cause—often indoctrinated by professors trained in German universities.

Students of the fashionable geopolitics are extremely likely to show signs of German influence. I was present at a teachers' convention in Trenton, New Jersey, on November 7, 1942, when one of the professors of Teachers' College, Columbia University, said that the only reason Germany had declared war on us was that we had sent old ships and guns to England after the battle of Dunkerque. Thus did this professor echo Nazi propaganda to teachers who in turn teach the youth of America.

"Look at the great achievements of German scientists, German inventors," we hear, from people who think of the other fellow before their duty to their own people. Yes, one should look at German science and German universities and see what they have done in the last twenty years. They helped make Nazism possible.

The best technical brains in Germany concentrated on just those inventions, those sciences which could be useful in war-time. "Science that is not useful to the state does not have the right to exist," decreed the Nazis. Since all German universi-

ties are state-run, only "useful" scientists were allowed to keep their jobs.

There have been Germans who resented the prostitution of science, of course, but they are few in number and it has been some time since they had any influence. Therefore, whatever comes from German universities, scientists, writers, and inventors in the near future must be analyzed very critically to eliminate its hidden use to the Nazi cause, or to whatever name the next incarnation of pan-Germanism bears.

Intellectual tolerance can be turned into an implement of destruction by enemies of democracy, working on the idealistic people among us who have forgotten that too much tolerance opens the way to deceit and brings inevitably a lowering of standards.

SIXTH TROJAN HORSE: WE MUST BE "CHRISTIAN"

We have already been subjected to Nazi propaganda about who started the war; sometimes it is the Jews, then again British imperialism making us "pull English chestnuts out of the fire"; it is often laid at the door of big business—but never, no, never is it the Germans.

The Germans didn't want the war, we are told; it was forced upon them. Therefore we must be very kind to them or they will revolt. Never is there any mention of the overweening pride of the German people in each new success of their armed forces, in each shipment of loot from invaded countries.

It is never said that the only period in Germany resembling peace came after the definite French victory in the Ruhr in 1923, when the Allies forced the Germans to sign the Dawes agreement, financially much more stringent than the Versailles Treaty. Firmness is something the Germans understand.

We hear also a great deal about the difference between the Nazis and the Germans. But the secret general staff who spawned the Nazis, and the Nazis themselves, are Germans. And they have decimated the decent elements of the population with cold precision.

As William Penn said, "If men be good, government cannot be bad."

What we do hear is a concerted chorus of sincere friends of the Germans in our country protesting that their special acquaintances, their relatives in Germany, were never Nazis. But we cannot take their word for the truth of these claims. I have been assured by Americans of the reliability of their German friends; then they named people whom I knew for a fact were fanatics, so high up in the Nazi hierarchy that they were allowed to share in the Nazi loot.

There has been enough voluntary co-operation with the Nazis among the German people to make it imperative for us to remain on guard for years to come.

The exalted conviction that no crime was a crime if it furthered German aggrandizement has actuated the vast majority of German businessmen, diplomats, politicians, and officers during the whole of World War II. The first three groups may have less blood on their hands than the Schutz Staffel men who slaughtered helpless men, women, and children, but they are fully as responsible for the ruin of conquered countries through starvation and depredations.

Any attempt to belittle or gloss over the dark deeds of the Germans against citizens of foreign lands, and against some of their own countrymen, would be to throw away the peace in advance. The Nazi agents who try to persuade our Christian groups to think only of forgiveness try at the same time to make us forget that Christianity is not only merciful; it is also militant, and Christian righteousness is a vital part of

Christ's teachings. If we do forget it, our Christianity will be dead.

While German sympathizers urge "brotherliness toward the enemy" wherever they can, they seek at the same time to spread hatred and distrust among the United Nations.

SEVENTH TROJAN HORSE: DISTRUST OF OUR ALLIES

When we hear this or that supposedly well-informed person claim that the "British are ready to fight to the last American," or that "the Russians are just waiting to drive the Germans out, then they'll sign a separate peace with them," how many of us insist on learning our informant's sources or evidence? Few of us bother to figure out the ultimate purpose of the claim, or what parallel line might be used in allied countries to discredit our own war effort.

Some of us worry about being "cheated" by Lend-Lease. Can we doubt that the nations which enjoy Lend-Lease privileges hear enemy-inspired whispers to the effect that "America is getting rich at the expense of her allies"?

It is only human for allies to mistrust each other. It has always been so. And the Germans can draw on years of experience and psychological training in that very subtle business of poisoning the minds of allies against each other.

Colonel Walter Nicolai, in his *Secret Powers*, gloats over the German success in setting the World War I Allies against each other in many ways. According to him, upper-class Frenchwomen helped the Germans because of resentment against England and America, and "professional American officers were not anti-German, but they showed tact in not displaying their pro-German feelings."

The intention of *Secret Powers* is quite plain. Published in the early 1920's, Colonel Nicolai used it to foster suspicion, to divide Allied unity, and to enable Germany to shake

off Allied control. Nicolai claims, for instance, that Americans taken prisoner had revealed that they had entered the war "under compulsion and against their will."

As a member of the secret general staff, one of Colonel Nicolai's contributions was the creation of what he called "information services," as espionage and agitation centers. His book disappeared from circulation in Berlin after the Nazis seized power. It was used instead as a textbook for men and women being trained for work abroad.

For people among us who cannot be reached by political innuendo, there are plausible economic arguments.

EIGHTH TROJAN HORSE: ONLY GERMAN INDUSTRIES CAN REBUILD EUROPE

While American, British, and Russian planes were bombing the industrial centers of Germany, one could hear well-meaning people urge that they must quickly be rebuilt for the rehabilitation of the rest of Europe.

They were unwittingly furthering the pan-German cause.

How many of us said, "We must help the French to get back from the Germans the machinery stolen from their factories"? Or "We must help them rebuild their ruined industrial plants"? Or the Poles? And what about the Czech industries? Why must German industries supply most of the manufactures for Europe? The very core of the Nazi plan to make Europe a German continent centered around domination by German industry, relegating all other countries to raw material or agricultural supply areas.

We have seen how the Nazi Dr. Schacht used barter schemes to force semiagricultural countries to concentrate on raw materials to feed German industries, how if Germany did send industrial machinery as per contract, it was either

delayed or delivered only with German experts to secure eventual control of the plants.

Centralization can be efficient. But in this case, who would benefit but Germany?

The whole economy of each European country will have to be reconstructed, perhaps to conform to the needs of some kind of federation or federations. But, in de la Meurthe's words, it would be "Worse than a crime, it would a mistake," to use any scheme which the Germans evolved for their own aggrandizement.

So much for the trends on the home front which our enemies hope to exploit to undermine our democracy. What of the major problem, which preoccupies us all?

A DURABLE PEACE

Walter Lippmann says in *US. Foreign Policy*, "A man must earn his security as he has to earn his living." Our security both at home and abroad can only be earned by our keeping our own bastion strong at all times. And a false peace is more dangerous than no peace at all.

Because the countries which oppose German and Japanese aggression have shown that they would pay high for peace, the Germans believe that they can be bluffed into accepting terms tailored to suit Germany's goal of ultimate world conquest.

The Nazi Party's flair for histrionics came into play when Hitler's deputy leader, Rudolf Hess, flew a Messerschmidt single-handed from Augsburg to a remote part of Scotland. He brought with him a truce offering, suggested peace terms identical with the big-time visions of his former geopolitics professor, General Karl Haushofer, member of Ludendorff's secret general staff.

The offer was timed to arrive when England had defended

herself heroically against the German air blitz, but when the German Air Force could still claim to be all-powerful, could still threaten larger and deadlier attacks. In the name of Germany, Hess demanded a "free hand in Europe"; control of Iraq (the bridge to India and to Asia in general); England's approval of German plans against Russia, which was to be "thrown back to Asia"; return of German colonies, giving Germany bases in many parts of the world; and elimination of the Churchill government. In exchange, Britain would, supposedly, be allowed to retain her empire.

The alternative offered was destruction of the British Isles and permanent subjugation.

England refused the false peace offer, even though at the time Hitler was at the zenith of his power. And, like his secret general staff predecessors, Hitler retreated on encountering fierce resistance, resistance more moral this time than military. He neglected his "duty" to subjugate Great Britain, and turned east. He believed Russia to be weak and thoroughly undermined by his agents.

Continually meeting not only military but also moral and civilian resistance, Hitler has gradually pared down his demands. He even hides behind emissaries who claim to be willing to overthrow him.

Ever since the Germans suffered their first serious setbacks in Russia they have been launching one campaign for peace after another along three different lines—economic, diplomatic, and military. On our wisdom in seeing through the false offers depends the durability of the real peace.

The economic campaign started first, to secure German acquisitions and holdings throughout the world. Businessmen from Germany or from occupied countries descended on towns in Switzerland and Spain, Turkey and Sweden. In a lawyer's office, for instance, a group of quislings would meet

with one of these men, found a holding company of some sort and issue bearer certificates to specified individuals. Then they would all depart, leaving a minimum of records of their transactions. But their purpose would have been accomplished. They had created legalistic caches for dishonestly acquired property which the German representatives meant to hold after the war, either directly or indirectly.

Other Germans started regular black markets in neutral countries. They came as "anti-Nazi refugees," and often told heartrending tales of Nazi persecution. They brought jewels, shares in German and French concerns, shares in foreign industries seized by the Germans. Everything they had brought they sold cheaply—they were refugees, and they had to live. Oddly enough, many of them were the very men and women who had been the most fanatically Nazi when we used to meet them in Berlin as late as 1941.

These people were not merely Nazi rats fleeing the sinking ship. Many of them were sent by Berlin to do a dual job: to get foreign cash, which finances Nazi propaganda and purchases abroad, and to get investors interested in the welfare of German concerns. The men who invest in German-controlled industries may not think of themselves as receivers of stolen goods. But they will be effective—and unpaid—propaganda agents for Germany in the peace.

The second German peace offensive came to us in the persons of several diplomats, businessmen, and churchmen. I shall take one man from a neutral country as their prototype.

In the fall of 1942 this important businessman arrived in America with introductions from even more important personages and instructions to confer with leading bankers. He carried a trial balloon—a postwar plan for division of world markets between Germany and the United States. If the United States would agree to the terms, Adolf Hitler would

be dethroned, perhaps even handed over to the United Nations.

Germany realized, this man said, that with our tremendous economic machine we would need enormous markets. As for Germany, after her intense sufferings in this war, she would be content with very modest markets and business transactions. Germany would persuade Japan to be reasonable. And if Japan refused, Germany would be delighted to join with us to defeat her. The emissary added that if we were wise, we wouldn't help England to become strong; she would never let us have the advantages that Germany would.

The visitor was asked what Germany proposed to do about the countries she had conquered? Germany was willing, he replied, to withdraw from her western conquests, perhaps even from Norway, but she insisted on retaining Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and a great part of the Ukraine.

Germany further insisted, according to the "neutral" businessman, on keeping every economic holding acquired through the years in France, in Belgium, in Holland, and elsewhere, because "Germany naturally requires economic control of Europe."

The emissary vainly waited for some encouragement; he received none. While he sat around here, his colleagues in a neutral country in Europe became impatient. They made the same proposal to Great Britain, pointing out that Americans were Shylocks and that England would get fairer treatment from Germany.

The British told them the game wouldn't work. The Americans and the English compared notes. The trial balloons collapsed.

In the next peace offensive the Germans tried "firm" tactics. Their emissaries stated that no matter what we did they would retain economic control of Europe; they would make

peace only if the United States recognized their right to do so. In the next phase, the German negotiator boasted that even if the United Nations should win the war, they would never be able to disentangle property rights in Europe, what with dummy sales, "legal" purchases of controlling shares, and "legal" expropriations.

Churchmen, too, began slipping out of Germany. They sounded a warning, which also has a familiar sound. Peace must be made soon, they said, or chaos would break out in Central Europe with the Nazi collapse. We must, they claimed, at all costs avert this threat to civilization.

The militarists played another tune, a medley of several well-worn motifs—the strength of the German army. To the Russians it was described as the "bulwark against aggression from the capitalistic countries, which hate the home of Communism." The inference is that the German army loves Russia. It has chosen a rather unpleasant way of showing it.

England, the United States, and China were urged to remember that unless the German army remained intact, how could they hope to destroy Communism, or restore order in Europe and Asia?

Would Russia perhaps exploit her great victories to establish Soviets in Central Europe? Would this development then lead to the formation of that Russo-German colossus which the western powers have feared ever since Russia began making her weight felt in Europe?

Undeniably, much of the stronger underground movement in Germany is Communist. It is equally true that the kinship between the Nazi and the Communist systems is very close—in both countries all the power is held by the central government and the one party. Both countries are run by superlatively astute politicians well aware of the value of their mu-

tual national co-operation, developed between 1918 and 1941.

But even should Russian and German leaders consider it expedient during the transition period after the war to renew their collaboration, the populations of both countries would still have to be won to the idea. The average German has a deep, instinctive fear of the Russian, and of Russian occupation. The simple people of north Germany showed their feelings plainly during the first years of World War II. They said thankfully that "this time there is no danger of Russian invasion." They recalled the days of 1914 when Russian troops occupied East Prussia. Further, they talked of the Russian troops who fought with the Germans against Napoleon. They left no doubt that they feared the Russians as allies and as enemies.

Possibly even more powerful in its way, the hatred of the Russians for the Germans who have ravaged their land, tortured and massacred their countrymen, would undoubtedly make it difficult for Stalin to take his nation into any sort of voluntary co-operation with them, should he perchance want to. To the Russians more than to any other people, except perhaps the Chinese, this has been a people's war. They will want also a people's peace, with the right of choosing their own allies.

And, in the end, the extent to which the Soviet government will seek to strengthen its hold on Central Europe will depend on the ability of Britain and the United States to strike the right note both with the Russians and with the Germans. A desire for hegemony in any of the United Nations camps would be disastrous to future peace.

Meanwhile, all through 1943, rumors allowed to leak out of Germany reported that the army High Command was so at odds with Hitler that the whole Nazi system would break

down momentarily—fine propaganda to slow down our war effort by raising hope of an early peace. An uprising of the generals is possible, but only after Germany has suffered such major military defeats that even the most sanguine of optimists must perforce recognize there is no hope for victory—not even through a poison gas or germ war.

WHAT WE FACE IN GERMANY

When we realize that we shall face a new German totally different from the man of the nineteenth century, different again from the man of 1918, a German molded by pan-German extremists and Nazis into a very intelligent tool for conquests, then we shall have gone a long way toward "foreseeing what could possibly occur" in Germany. But we must foresee further. For this same German will try desperately to convince not only foreigners but his neighbors that he was never truly a Nazi. Millions of such people will shed their Nazi creed outwardly—the same millions who foreswore allegiance to Republican ideals as soon as Nazism looked more profitable.

We shall meet in Germany the leaders and the adherents of the underground, unbelievably brave men and women who have fought silently and passionately the heartbreaking battle against the Nazis. In the few of us who saw their small, desperate groups almost swallowed by the vast ocean of fanaticism, they aroused only the deepest respect.

A number of these underground leaders have talked freely to me of the day of liberation, a day for which they prayed and yet which they dreaded, as do many men and women in countries under German rule. Would not the Nazis, in their death throes, lash out, destroying everyone in their reach? It was not for nothing, they feared, that Hitler and through

him the Nazis had adopted the cult of the Wagner Ring heroes who, going down, would pull all the world with them.

From the wisest, the most severely tried of the German underground leaders, after many conversations, my own ideas of the only solution of the German problem came. Not a solution imposed from foreign concepts, from a feeling that we must teach the Germans what we failed to teach them once before, but the somber realization that any nation which repeatedly cries "Chaos!" must at last be allowed to have its chaos—to effect a cure.

These conclusions came to me in conversations with some of the very few men fighting for life until they can be of use to their nation—decent and brave Germans, speaking carefully, never in front of German witnesses. I remember them best, therefore, in an approximate dialogue form.

"The German people themselves," said one, "must be made to take the law into their own hands and destroy the evil which betrayed them. If the other nations compel the Germans to punish their own criminals themselves, or surrender them voluntarily to punishment in the lands where they committed their crimes, the real cause of peace would be furthered by decades."

I hesitated. "But how can it be done? How can one be sure that the criminals are really punished?" I asked in disbelief.

"When victory is seen to be within reach, the Allies would have to surround Germany by occupying the countries along the western borders of Germany and another block along the eastern border. Then let them fly troops in, or march them into the countries where they will be greeted as saviors, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia—yes, Austria, or at least part of it."

"And then what?"

"Why, within that cordon sanitaire let the Germans fight it out among themselves."

"You mean," I said, "that then whatever happens in Germany could not spread to the surrounding countries?"

"Yes. They have suffered enough at the hands of the Germans. Within the ring of iron, the real battle for a decent Germany must be fought."

"Many of us," another said, "hope that at least some of the army leaders are against the Nazis, even if some others furthered the Nazi cause. They must prove their worth under fire. The army is the only group besides the Schutz Staffel which possesses arms. If the army wants to show that it is anti-Nazi, it will disarm the Nazi hordes."

The underground has had to retain its faith in part of the army in order to keep any faith at all. For where could they ever hope to get the weapons needed to rise up in arms against the Nazis, if not from army stores? Therefore the underground has watched for the day when soldiers and army groups would mutiny and then give the populace guns to use with them against the oppressors. They have been certain that the mutiny would come. They knew, also, that it would come only when Germany had suffered severe military reverses.

Even the hope of securing weapons from the anti-Nazi underground in other countries could not be realized until German troops had been driven back, close to their own borders. But once armed, the German underground leaders feel an inspiring confidence that in time they would be able to rally the anti-Nazi elements of the population and subdue the Schutz Staffel—working with the army, for many soldiers and officers hate the Himmler assassins almost as bitterly as the opposition does.

I asked several men, including a Communist underground leader, "Why should foreign countries, knowing that it was

the army, backed by the industrialists and the Junkers, which fathered Hitler and the Nazis, suddenly assume that the army has changed and is fighting for a decent Germany?"

Two of the three men answered the question this way: "They should not bank too strongly on that. But it's worth a try."

"And if it should fail, it will still be time to act," another added. "What happens when an army knows it is defeated? The army wants peace. It wants to go home. The Nazis will fight to retain their grip on Germany. They have been trained for the last fight, trained for civil war. What will happen if allied soldiers rush in? They won't reduce the bloodshed. On the contrary. They will suffer losses that might be avoided by making the German army do the cleaning up. And their presence might help the Nazis to stir up resentment and increase the strength of their guerillas."

Those men know, as do the few foreigners who were in Germany long enough after the start of the war, that the Nazis have prepared very well indeed for the time when they might have to fight to keep their power. They have made ready to battle to retain power very much more fiercely than they fought to gain it.

BLACK GUARDS SWORN TO HIMMLER

Out of fear of uprisings, Hitler has steadily increased the power of Heinrich Himmler, chief of all police forces in Germany, head of the Gestapo, of the Schutz Staffel, of the racial office, of the concentration camps: Himmler—the real master of life and death in Germany and in all countries under Germany. In wartime the Schutz Staffel swore loyalty to Himmler personally. Himmler, moreover, has maintained other paid assassins, in many lands.

Himmler's Schutz Staffel, or Black Guards, have been

trained for direct action in any popular uprising; his Death's Head crews are experts in torture at the concentration camps; and his uniformed and civilian gangs are past masters of street fighting—Himmler's squads have been established in all German cities, in apartment houses, at strategic points, to rake the citizens with machine-gun fire if they should rebel. Often the machine guns have been deliberately displayed to cow the people.

The German army, by cleaning out the armed Nazis first, would atone a little for having long supported the Nazis. Even if it does only part of the job, at least we shall know where we stand. And that course of action might evidence the sincerity of the inevitable peace pledges.

Every one of the German underground leaders whose confidence I enjoyed felt very deeply about exemplary punishment of Nazi criminals. The underground for years has collected evidence on the crimes and depredations of the Nazi Party members, of sympathizers among their countrymen of all classes. The great burden of guilt, however, is shared by the people who have had some measure of power: the Junkers, aristocrats, professors, industrialists, businessmen, officials, besides the army. There is no way of knowing, of course, how many such files, whose mere existence constitutes a menace to the holder's life, will have survived the war.

But without exception these underground men insisted that punishment be administered by Germans, either directly or through transfer of those recognized as criminals by German courts martial. They spoke time and again of the danger that the Nazified minds among the masses might elevate to martyrdom men and women executed by foreigners, without German co-operation, whether or not they deserved death. "The masses would accept the ruling of German courts martial," one of the underground workers added. "That is one of the few ad-

vantages of dealing with a nation of a militarized mentality." During the period of internal German cleansing, the United Nations forces, with their steel ring around the German borders and their air superiority over the country, would run no extraordinary risk. They would, however, have to remain adamant in their determination to see the criminals punished, even before the final peace terms are worked out.

The non-Nazis within the German army have weapons and access to weapons. When it becomes sufficiently clear to them that they cannot hope for peace as long as Nazi criminals are at large, they can and will make use of their weapons if proper psychological pressure is applied. And after the wholesale bombing of German cities they will find not only the genuine anti-Nazis but also large sections of the population eager to co-operate with them. This must under no condition be understood to mean that we countenance the establishment of a German militaristic government. For German army leaders should never be given a chance to repeat their performance of 1918 and of the following years, when they were able to hide behind the Republic, claim they had not been defeated, and regain power. They will not be able to do so if we make use of them to enforce the consequences of defeat.

German army leaders who, in collaboration with the underground, mete out court martial sentences to German war criminals will automatically do everything in their power—for the sake of their own personal safety—to convince the population that the punishment is just. This will reduce their chances of organizing one more conspiracy against whoever tries to build up a sane government in Germany. And the new government chiefs, knowing how the Republic was tricked by the army in the past, will be on guard against an army camarilla even if it has helped bring about the overthrow of the Nazis.

German psychology being what it is, there can be no doubt that the decent German elements would have a better chance to take over governmental responsibility with a certain amount of prestige if there were no open occupation of Germany by the United Nations. That rigid control will be necessary is self-evident. But this control could probably be exerted more effectively from bases in the ring of iron surrounding Germany than it could be from within.

I have seen how occupation worked in Germany after World War I, before the whole of the country was trained for nationalistic propaganda. As a consequence of observations made at that time, I am deeply convinced that the quicker the Germans are made to run their own show, with responsibility placed squarely on their shoulders, the more quickly pacification can be enforced, provided they are made to realize that none of the tricks which worked after World War I can serve them after World War II.

When the German internal cleansing is finished, we must know which groups within the German borders we can trust. There are the underground leaders and their affiliations. There are also the natural leaders who often emerge from great national crises. Such men have been feeling their way both in Germany and in German-dominated lands. I believe that they will be recognizable by the size of their followings, the strength and the preparedness of their organizations.

The churchmen of Germany have been mentioned as a body with whom we might co-operate. But there, too, we shall have to be exceedingly cautious, partly because quite a number of churchmen worked with the secret general staff to weaken the Republic, partly because even when they tried to, the Protestant pastors, for instance, failed to rally their congregations in critical moments. Pastor Martin Niemoeller, with his signal courage, is one of the few exceptions.

Niemoeller, however, spent years in the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen. By 1941 his health had suffered seriously. Even if he survives, will he be able to wage a political battle, to direct the fate of Germany? Will he, indeed, survive? Anyone who has seen and talked with members of Himmler's Death's Head squads, who run the concentration camps, has reason to fear that, facing doom, they will first massacre all those within reach.

The Catholics also have produced a few outstanding leaders of courage, Cardinal Faulhaber for example. But there remains the fact that many prominent Catholics couldn't come to terms with the Nazis quickly enough. Franz von Papen, of the Catholic Center Party, did more than his share to secure Nazi victory and betray human decency.

The Vatican was the first power to sign a treaty with the Nazis—in the summer of 1933, after the first state-organized crime wave in Germany. As early as March, 1933, the German prelate, Ludwig Kaas, now in the Vatican, appealed to the Germans to cease resistance to Nazi rule. In June, 1933, the Centrist Party dissolved itself to please the Nazis, supposedly on the advice of Pope Pius XI.

All of these steps were taken before the Gestapo had achieved its stranglehold on Germany, at a time when brave men, banded together, could have fought effectively. But the brave were few and they had to fight without strong support from any church.

A COUNTRY HAS THE GOVERNMENT IT DESERVES

Within their cordon sanitaire the Germans can decide on the form of government they want. They have, after all, tried a variety of experiments. Nazism is only the most spectacular.

I cannot see how any amount of "teaching" of the Germans by outsiders could be effective. No soul can be saved unless

it wants to be. The real reform cannot be imposed from without. We can see that the remaining constructive elements in Germany are encouraged, perhaps by regulating the size of food and clothing allotments, but anything remotely resembling foreign regimentation will arouse resistance. Such resistance would greatly simplify reclamation of power by the Nazis who might still be undiscovered but who would be no less ambitious.

Some individuals, who consider themselves experts on Germany, feel that we should protect German unity; others urge the division of Germany into its component parts of Prussia, the Rhineland and Wuerttemberg, Bavaria and Austria. The question of German unity, however, can be settled by no one but the Germans themselves. If they want to be together, the cleverest scheme for division will not work. If they want to be separate, national unity cannot be enforced by outsiders.

As for division, during the first phase of World War II, actually through at least part of 1941, the non-Prussian Germans themselves thought seriously about overthrowing Prussian hegemony. They resented intensely the behavior of the tens of thousands of Westphalians and North Germans who fled from their bombed cities to the safety of South Germany, living in the best hotels if they were rich, or on pittances as refugees if they were poor. The wealthiest went to Austria, where the population loathed them so heartily that if in 1940 it could have broken free of German domination it would gladly have done so.

These resentments may have died down in time. But, on the other hand, mass evacuations will have brought their own complications, with the arrogance of the North Germans perhaps intensifying the hatred against them.

By keeping the German conflict restricted within German

borders and sending liberation forces into the occupied lands, the United Nations can establish recuperation centers for the reclamation of Europe.

EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS BORN IN PAIN

Despite the fanatic resistance of the European nations to the creation of a German-dominated Europe, those nations have developed a new consciousness of European entity even as they suffered grief and persecution worse than anything in the darkest of the Middle Ages. The decimation of their peoples by sudden murder and slow starvation, the loss of their lands and resources, have been experienced in common. The Europe of today has but little left of the old continent most of us knew in the dim past of a decade ago.

Europeans used to say that only when they reached the shores of another continent were they conscious of being other than Frenchmen, Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, Norwegians—in short, Europeans. That state of mind has changed. Those who would not unite for Hitler have attained a spiritual unity against him.

We shall be greeted warmly in the new non-German Europe. But we must be wary. International businessmen and speculators who hope for the type of deals they put over after World War II must be screened out by the leaders of the United Nations. The Germans have deliberately mixed property rights into a maze. If we don't want to be caught in the German net, they will have to be straightened out very gradually and the countries involved allowed to recover their balance, even at the risk of slowing up business progress. There should be a cooling period preceding both business and political decisions.

For a long time to come Europeans will suspect anything emanating from Germany. But they will also view with cool

deliberation any plans to come from United Nations leaders. Distrust of outsiders is very strong. German propaganda against "Shylock" America, "business as usual" England, "grasping" France, has gone deep. Whether or not it is justified does not matter. It is there.

The old continent will want help from us, will—I think—be willing to repay us, but it will want to make its own decisions. If we forget this fact, we will only be simplifying things for the pan-Germans and their front men who will utilize any pretext or discontent to climb back to power.

I have found this consciousness of Europeanism co-existing in people who had suffered terribly under the Germans. And they hated their oppressors as we cannot conceive hatred. Friends from Norway have told me, "We shall throw off the yoke of the conquerors and we shall kill them," they said. "Then we can have a decent Europe." A Czech mother who had come to Berlin to find out whether her son had succumbed to Gestapo tortures talked to me. "The hour of retribution is coming," she said. A French prisoner to whom I sneaked a loaf of bread said, "On les aura, quand merae," and looked at me, his eyes begging for confirmation. Yet they all, and many others, felt that they were Europeans, that they would find ways of living together in peace, when the Germans can be stopped from bullying the rest of the world.

Any Nazi would smirk and call people weaklings who can even think of such things in wartime. But the spirit of such people can be a wonderfully constructive force. For they know the Germans, better than we can, and if they are firmly banded together to keep the restless German elements in line, they will help the decent Germans to gain and keep power.

For even a pan-German can be taught realism. In their early attempts to destroy the Republic for their own advantage, the German strategists retreated quickly enough when resistance proved too strong.

One more defeat will not be enough. But defeats need not be military. A setback on the war-in-peace front will tell fully as much as the loss of a fighting war salient. And if anyone doubts that the Germans will continue their struggle for world supremacy in war and in peace, he should visit the camps where German prisoners are interned in the United States.

The groups between eighteen and twenty-five still chant, "This year Russia, next year England, and the United States in 1946!" Many of them firmly believe that Moscow has been occupied by the Germans since Christmas, 1942; that New England, New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia have been reduced to rubble by German planes. The older men are cautious in expressing their views. But the young ones, when asked what they will do when Germany is defeated, when there is peace, looked amazed. "But Germany is not being defeated," they say scornfully.

"But if she is, what then? What will you do?" they were asked.

"Why, we'll go home, pick up our guns, and fight again," is the unvarying answer.

Afrika Korps men have been heard to declare loftily that they were not beaten in North Africa. They were simply told to cease fighting. An English officer who returned from Tunisia and had talked with many German prisoners confirmed this report. The men he met were crack units, with plenty of guns and ammunition. He asked them "Why did you surrender?"

"We were ordered to."

"But why?" he persisted.

"The Fuehrer knows. He knows all such things. Perhaps he wants to save us to be able to fight later," they replied. Naturally, these men were the exception. The vast majority of the Afrika Korps men had lost and could not have fought on. But they will be as eager to fight again as their fellows.

There is an echo here of the German decision in 1918 to sign the Versailles Treaty without further bloodshed, so as to save all available German manhood for the future German army.

ONLY THE STRONG CAN SAFEGUARD VICTORY

We spent twenty-five years being frightened of chaos in Germany and making concessions to the Germans because of that fear.

Now the Germans have brought chaos and agony to every country within their long reach.

They will cry chaos again, and still again. Yet why should we send a single United Nations soldier to save them from the chaos they have invoked?

We want to help. Then let us concentrate on helping the emaciated people in Germany's neighboring countries, the innocent victims of pan-Germanism.

The Germans are nothing if not realistic. They are practical and orderly people. They are eminently intelligent people. They have preserved their own country from the worst upheavals, while they have, since the first World War, incited riots, unrest, and revolutions in foreign countries. When they see that crying "Chaos! Chaos!" will not bring us running to help them out, they will promptly settle down and control the chaos themselves. Certainly there will be bloody clashes, but they would be and should be Germany's affair. It

is not our task to prevent the Germans from slugging it out among themselves as long as they want. Similarly, when they find that their strategies for world domination through war-in-peace meet with absolute resistance, they will drop them—until the next propitious moment. Our resistance can be effective only if we keep our own defenses strong, if we buttress those defenses with a militant democracy, continually improving our internal political, economic, and social conditions.

We have taken up the challenge of the Germans and the Japanese against our security. To defeat them permanently we must remember that our security lies in working out a way of life within the framework of our democracy so well designed that no totalitarian attack, either open or insidious, can shake it.

We will have to remember that Nazism will retain a great appeal for the Germans, even in defeat. It taught them to coordinate the power of the whole nation. And they will never forget that for a time they almost ruled the whole of Europe. They have been thoroughly indoctrinated with the thought that German strength is the basis of all life. Their decent, humanitarian instincts have been buried in decades of wrong teaching, wrong thinking. They won't accept correction from us.

Under some stable form of government, chosen by themselves, the better German elements can emerge again and assume the direction of Germany's re-education. They can teach the Germans to fulfill their genuine talent for co-operation and constructive work, which is evident whenever they abandon their dreams of conquest and aggression.

Our contribution toward real world peace is to keep on guard—unremittingly—eternally. At the first sign of weakness on our part, they'll try it again.