**The Trilateral Commission: Effect on the Middle East**

Arlene Johnson

<http://www.truedemocracy.net/sample/>

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To the people who want to understand a portion of the information that I possess on the U.S. government, below you will be able to read the original research I completed in 1987 for a political science professor at UCLA from whom I received the grade of "A" and was told that she provided my references to another student.

For any of you who feel that I am catering to the Shah of Iran, I have been made aware by a Yemenese gentleman that the Shah was beloved by poor nations. Please don't allow the disinformation of the west, specifically the United States, to influence you as the poor nations of the world know better and revered him because he provided grants of money to them, not loans as the IMF and World Bank do.

Enjoy my research below. A modified much easier version is the first edition of my unique magazine comprising 7 pages in it. This research has 17 pages (5 web pages). The seven pages hold everything that this holds.

**The Trilateral Commission: Effect on the Middle East**

Arlene Johnson
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Preface
Whereas this paper deals primarily with First World activity directed toward the Middle East, and every effort is made to confine the paper to that end, the possibility that this can be achieved is severely limited. The Middle East is only one component of the vastly larger Third World, all of which has been exploited by the developed nations including, but not limited to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Therefore, the material which is elaborated herein does, by necessity, tend at times to include other regions of the world.

      This paper will attempt to prove that the Trilateral Commission, because of its desire for high profits, exerts a major influence in U.S. policy to the extent that other government institutions will go to any lengths to maintain the world system as it is at the present time.
      The advent of capitalism in the Western world in the 18th century marked a tremendous change not only in terms of the economic situation within the countries affected but in terms of political reality as well. The growth of the capitalist mode of production caused the political structure to become subservient to it. Many sources have documented the facility of the corporate structure to greatly influence governmental institutions. The extent to which the large transnational corporations have become involved in international political organizations is not well known, however, despite the fact that capitalism is a phenomenon which affects each nation in the world by exploiting the Third World nations thereby adding wealth to First World economies.
      Moreover, with the beginning economic crisis in the early 1970's, the conditions existed for the creation of an organization designed to maintain core nation superiority. This coalescence of power by the countries representing the Trilateral Commission was the result of the disintegration of the European Economic Community (considered a political unit) due to the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Other factors include the Soviet Union's increased military capabilities and Cuba's support for developing countries. The developments in the oil rich nations enabled them to directly invest heavily in foreign lands thereby threatening a significant loss of ownership control by the First World community (Kowalewski and Leitko, 1983).

CREATION OF THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION1

      All these circumstances culminated in the formation of the Trilateral Commission, a relatively secret organization composed of elites from the core power nations consisting of Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. Headed by David Rockefeller, who was considered at that time to be "the most widely recognized leader of transnational enterprises" (Kowalewski and Leitko, 1983:94), the Trilateral Commission was formed to achieve cooperation in policymaking in an age of post nationalism. Rockefeller (1980:xii) claimed that "the Trilateral Commission is, in reality, a group of concerned citizens interested in fostering greater understanding and cooperation among international allies in the present day international political climate."
      However, the foregoing statement is vague and misleading. How much cooperation among international allies is needed; enough to maintain a dependence among Third World countries far into the future? Indeed, the "trilateralists are saying: (1) the people, government, and economies of all nations must serve the needs of multinational banks
      These elites cannot be members of their governments, e.g. President, cabinet members, members of legislative bodies, or the military establishment. However, one's ideology does not change simply because one is elected to a government post or they are in the military. In fact, the loyalty given to the commission for its support in obtaining a prestigious position seems to prompt reciprocal action to perpetuate the effectiveness of the commission. Therefore, prior to their elections or appointments, many high officials in government were active Trilateral members. In fact, Jimmy Carter, whose Trilateral membership was the result of an invitation by the group at large, was elected president despite his relatively unknown status, because the commission provided the means by which he could be elected (Shoup, 1980). In fact, several members of Carter's early support group in Atlanta, Gambrell, Kirbo, Austin, and others maintain close links with the Rockefeller family or with the broader Eastern Establishment. The Gambrell family is a major stockholder in Eastern airlines, where Laurence Rockefeller is the single biggest individual stockholder. The elder Gambrell is on Eastern's board of directors, and his law firm is general counsel for Eastern. Laurence Rockefeller has long been on the Eastern board with Gambrell and the other Rockefeller families as the two main elements of the group controlling Eastern Airlines. This is the link between Carter and the Rockefellers (Shoup, 1980).
      Although the membership includes persons from academia, law, labor, organizational interests and political circles, (Kowalewski and Leitko, 1983) the largest proportion is from transnational economic enterprises as defined below:

United States       34 per cent
Western Europe       39 per cent
Japan       65 per cent

  Moreover, the range of industry is unlimited with "mining, petrochemicals, agriculture, garments, paper, rubber, plastics, and many others" (Sklar, 1980:99).
      The organizational hierarchy (in addition to the general membership) consists of thirty people who form an executive council with proportional representation from the three regions. They meet several times per year to coordinate their work and prepare the agenda.
      Additionally, the Council of Foreign Relations which holds considerable influence on American foreign policy makers (Kegley and Wittkoff, 1982) assisted in the formation of the Trilateral Commission. The Trilateral Commission has been called the "multi-national arm" (Oye, 1979:217)) of the Council because several of its members such as U.S. Congressman John Anderson, Senator Alan Cranston, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Bill Brock, and Anne Armstrong, a former Co-Chairperson of Ronald Reagan's campaign organization have been active political power holders.
      With so much interest in controlling national politics by multinational corporations, it is a very logical move to translate this philosophy to international politics as well. To be able to prevent competition internationally as well as nationally, the large multinational corporations can secure the huge profits they desire.
      Interlocking directorates and world market shares provide the greatest political power because individual transnational corporations participate not as individual or autonomous companies but as parts of a whole network or integrated systems. The Trilateral Commission is the further extension of this network.

THE MIDDLE EAST

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| 2 Some texts appropriately term the "West" the North. These authors identify a "North/South conflict" because they rightly include the Soviet Union as an industrialized power which, furthermore, seeks to make profits using the resources of the Third World just as Western nations do. |

      The Middle East represents world energy sources. Oil, and to a lesser extent, natural gas are resources which the region can use to bargain for an equal position with the West.2
      However, from the end of the Second World War until 1960, the major Western oil companies controlled the international oil market due to their capital, their technological expertise, and their distribution activities. The formation of the Organization of Oil Producing Exporting Countries (OPEC) which was founded in 1960 by Venezuela, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait, was due to the major oil companies' decreasing the price of oil twice within an 18 month period. this move infuriated the oil producing countries and prompted them to defend their interests. Thereafter, during the 1960's, the organization provided a forum for the exchange of ideas and the general coordination of the national policies of the states toward the companies.
      During this decade, the states of Libya, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi joined the organization. This resulted in 90 per cent of the world's oil exports emanating from the OPEC members. This growing organizational strength provided the means by which the region could attempt to create an equal status with the industrial nations.
      In September, 1969, Muammar Khadafi leading a group of radical military officers successfully deposed the Libyan monarchy. This action was the catalyst for a process of rapid change during 1970 to 1973. It permitted the consolidation of a radical front within OPEC composed of Iraq, Algeria (which only had joined the organization in 1969), and Libya, and it set in motion a process of negotiation that produced the first general increase in oil prices in 13 years (Mortimer, 1984).
      Fortunately for Khadafi, Libya held a secure enough financial position to allow a substantial momentary cutback in oil production so they could demand from Occidental Oil (an independent oil company) a price hike from $2.34 to $2.53 per barrel thereby increasing their revenues by 30 per cent. The Persian Gulf states thereafter, agreed to demand of the consortium of 23 oil corporations that their prices also rise by the same approximate percentage.

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| 3 Please refer to [Appendix B](http://www.truedemocracy.net/sample/app.htm#b) for Middle Eastern members' crude oil prices extending from 1950 through 1983 as available.  |

      This joint negotiation, the first of its kind, was held in Tehran, Iran during January and February 1971. In mid-February the companies accepted the OPEC propositions and a 20 per cent increase was instituted, roughly equal to the increase for Libyan oil.3
      This negotiation which was lead by Iran was the major turning point in the international oil economy. For the first time the producer states acting together had significantly increased their revenues (Mortimer, 1984). The spectacular price hikes of Fall 1973 were the culmination of a series of political and economic developments that transformed OPEC in the early 1970's.

Moreover, the cumulative impact of embargo, price hikes, and unilateral OPEC decision making constituted the first major blow against the international economic structure that had long prevailed between the developing and the developed states. Coupled with the nationalizations and participation agreement of the previous few years, these moves represented the first consequential implementation of the idea of Third World control over its resources. The OPEC decisions were a concrete expression of the demand for economic change.
      Two other associations which formed as a result of the impetus provided by OPEC are called the Group of 77 and the Nonaligned Movement. However, these organizations would play a major role on OPEC's loss of control because of their association with the United Nations. While these two associations could not combine into one association because of political differences with the individual states' ideologies, they nevertheless created a "credible capacity for joint action" (Mortimer, 1984:2). They constitute the Third World Coalition and have the goal of structural change. However, two questions must be answered. Can a group of heterogeneous countries maintain or even achieve a cohesion for very long? More importantly, how can a body of poor countries (regardless of however many members they possess) hope to achieve change in the face of more powerful countries joining together, as in the Trilateral Commission thereby enabling the more powerful countries to co-opt the elites in the poor countries?
      Nevertheless, the Group of 77 and the Nonaligned movement set about to attain a unity by ordering a Special Session of the United nations to be held in the Spring of 1974. In drafting a position paper for this session, the countries of Yugoslavia, Algeria, India in association "with one significant newcomer, Iran, whose growing prominence with OPEC gave its voice weight," (Mortimer, 1984:52) drafted what became the New International Economic Order (NIEO) resolutions.
      While the Third World was perfectly well aware that General Assembly resolutions have no binding effect, they still exercised their majority power in the interest of systemic consciousness raising. The passage of the NIEO resolution established neither a new order nor even a new idea. But the framers gave a new rhetorical force and political salience to the Third World's longstanding claim of the right to development.
      However, the challenge facing the Third World coalition now was to transform the exhortations of the NIEO resolutions into concrete acts. Given the existing international economic structures and the distribution of power that lay behind them, the Third World countries were well aware that this task would not be easily accomplished. "It implied multilateral North-South negotiations, individual and collective initiatives by the developing states, the eventual creation of new international institutions (for example, in the field of commodity trade regulation), and persistent political pressure to give weight to the interests of the Third World" (Mortimer, 1984:57).
      President Ford at the time declared that "production restrictions, artificial pricing, and the prospect of ultimate bankruptcy" (Mortimer, 1984: 57) would victimize everyone, including the OPEC nations. However, Third World unity during the 1974 General Assembly made it clear that the developing states were determined to maintain a common front in the face of Northern intransigence on the energy/development issue.
      For the Third World it was critical that this show of unity remain alive outside the General Assembly as well. As the West and particularly the United States, continued to focus upon oil, OPEC remained at the very center of the confrontation. Because of its condemnation of OPEC's collective policies, the United States initiated even closer relations with the biggest producer of all, Saudi Arabia. The extensive role of U.S. oil companies in the development and management of Saudi Arabia's enormous resources coupled with the Saudi monarch's fervent anticommunism had affected an intricate network of political and economic ties between the two states. Given Saudi Arabia's weight within OPEC, the organization was far from immune to U.S. pressure for a cutback in prices. However, the more radical OPEC members were sensitive to the potential consequences of internal division. They knew that a crack in OPEC ranks would bring about the disintegration of the larger third World coalition.
      In early 1975 the Algerian government proposed an unprecedented OPEC summit conference. It sought to close ranks within OPEC by reconfirming at the highest level that the OPEC states would defend their won policies as the vanguard of a larger Third World movement for economic development. Saudi Arabia was cool to the proposal, arguing that a summit would escalate tensions, but eventually concurred. The summit conference was scheduled for March 1975, shortly after two other Third World conferences already on the diplomatic calendar for February. The combination of these three meetings provided a political framework suitable to the evolving diplomatic situation. This joint conference affirmed the solidarity of the Third World oil importers with their OPEC counterparts (Mortimer, 1984).
      However, on the eve of the OPEC summit, President Giscard d'Estaing announced that France was inviting a group of representative states to a preparatory meeting for an international convergence on energy problems. The participants were to be the United States, the European Economic Community (as a single delegation), Japan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria, Venezuela, India, Brazil, and Zaire. Of the Third World invites, Saudi Arabia (which in fact has proposed exactly this list of countries several months earlier) and Iran immediately announced that they would attend the preparatory meeting. The political task of the summit was to define a position that could reconcile Saudi Arabia's desire for a more conciliatory stance toward the North with Algeria's concern to make OPEC the spearhead of the Third World. Algeria was ready to modify its position on prices so long as OPEC forcefully defended the larger concept of NIEO. This concession seems to be the opening that gave the industrialized powers the feeling that the organization of Third World countries would compromise thereby preempting their solidarity.
      "Constructive waiting" (Mortimer, 1984:53) therefore, was the United States' answer to OPEC. Additionally, the United States wanted to organize an anti-OPEC coalition, and preferred to operate outside United Nations institutions precisely because these institutions lent themselves to a show of Third World unity. The General Assembly was the preferred forum of the developing countries because it could register one of their few sources of power, the fact of number The very idea of the Special Session in effect represented a clash between OPEC's voting power and U.S. economic defiance, however, it knew that real economic change could come about only with the U.S.'s acquiescence, no matter what the General Assembly might resolve. The United States counted upon its economic power as an eventual countervailing force with which the developing states would have to reckon before substantive international action on the energy/development crisis could be taken (Mortimer, 1984).
      Therefore, the gap between Algeria's Boumediene's and Kissinger's conception could hardly have been greater. They were diametrically opposed on the basic rules of the game of North/South economic exchanges. Each demanded a fundamental revision of the other's position. For Boumediene, structural change was a prerequisite for North-South cooperation; for Kissinger, cooperation was feasible only if the Third World exhibited political moderation (Mortimer, 1984). This moderation can only be construed as a desire by Kissinger and all the other trilateralists for the OPEC nations to return to their dependent status.
      The United States was in a position to pursue an unbending policy of "energy first" (Mortimer, 1984:64). Just before the preparatory meeting opened, (which President Gistard d'Estaing organized in Paris in April, 1975) Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders declared that the industrial states were participating in Paris in order to "hasten OPEC's demise" (Mortimer, 1984:65). His colleague, Under Secretary of State Charles Robinson revised this remark with a less inflammatory formulation of the U.S. aims, but he observed that the meeting had more than enough to handle with the energy problems. The meeting ran for nine days without any significant change in the U.S. position, except the addition of other matters to the proposed agenda, but stood by the notion that energy issues must be preeminent. The political question became whether the seven developing states would acquiesce to this condition (Mortimer, 1984).
      The mutual determination of the United States, on the one hand, and the seven Third World representatives, on the other, in standing by their divergent emphases brought the meeting to an impasse. The talks ended without agreement, a diplomatic setback for France, a deadlock so far as the United States was concerned, but something of a victory for the Third World coalition. So far as the developing countries were concerned, the stakes in Paris were the durability of the coalition as it had stood since the Sixth Special Session (Mortimer, 1984).
      The Third World representatives in Paris wielded a power that was new for the developing countries. The forum was different from the United Nations, and their stand had an immediate impact that General Assembly resolutions lacked. They were able to exercise the kind of blocking power that had previously been the province of the industrial states. The power, therefore, of the seven was rendered credible (Mortimer, 1984).
      The U.S. decision makers drew the conclusion after Paris that the conservative members of OPEC were going to join the radical ones in bidding for the political leadership of the Third World. Not only had the U.S. hard line failed to crack OPEC or the Group of 77, but it also had encouraged the predominance of the radical wing of the coalition. As Roger Hansen (1976:58) states, "As long as the United States responded negatively to almost all developing country requests in almost all international conferences, the moderates with the Group of 77 had no hand to play." Kissinger now logically concluded that this was counterproductive. It was now in the U.S. interest to allow the moderates to reenter the bidding.
      Therefore, about one month after the collapse of the Paris talks, Kissinger declared that "Our thinking on the issue of raw materials...has moved forward." The United States was now ready to envisage an international conference to discuss a broad range of North-South issues. Such a conference could be organized, as the Third World had proposed, into three or four commissions of equal status. This shift in U.S. policy opened the way to the North-South Conference, which eventually got underway in December 1975. More generally, it constituted the first major turning point in North-South relations since the oil revolution.
      The Third World succeeded, therefore, in bringing about a change in U.S. foreign policy in the Spring of 1975. The U.S. policy shift was definitely tactical, but it was attributable to a coherent Third World strategy of solidarity. The durability of the Third World coalition placed the United States in a diplomatically untenable position from which it was obliged to retreat. The Third World triumph, limited as it was to an essentially procedural issue, the agenda of North-South negotiations, was nevertheless of considerable significance. It was the first time that the joint action of the developing countries had affected such a change. It pushed North-South relations to a new plateau by virtue of the explicit recognition that the international economic crisis entailed the entire issue of the relationship between rich and poor (Mortimer, 1984).

  However, the power to stalemate a conference, even the power to shape the agenda, was not equivalent to the power to affect structural change in the international economic system. The developing countries recognized that innovations in international trade and augmentation of the flow of developmental resources implied negotiated agreements with the north (Mortimer, 1984).
      The Third World had gained the ground it had, namely, a genuine recognition of the existence of a development crisis, through solidarity. By the spring of 1975, the North felt the cutting edge of a solidarity painstakingly honed by Third World conferences and other forms of collective advocacy. The commitment toward the resolution of certain Third World grievances taken at the Seventh Special Session, limited as it was, was the result of the pressure mounted through solidarity (Mortimer, 1984)
      This rise in the bargaining power could not be tolerated by the Trilateral regions, however. The commission's overriding concern is that Trilateral nations remain the vital center of management, finance, and technology, i.e. power and control for the world economy which would embrace and coopt the Third World and gradually reintegrate the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China (Sklar, 1980).
      Additionally, the trilateralists hope that the USSR will join the community of the developed nations in defending the global interests of the industrialized rich countries against those of the Third World. Moreover, the trilateralists are confident that they can win the ideological and economic competition with the Soviet Union. They believe that the Soviet economy is declining and will reach a crisis state in the 1980's.
      The debt dependency4

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| 4 Please refer to [Appendix C](http://www.truedemocracy.net/sample/app.htm#c) for debt information on selected nations in the Middle East and North Africa (which some sources consider an integral part of the Middle East.  |

of the Third World nations is a profound concern to those nations. The international banking community gains billions of dollars in interest payments alone from countries which are caught in a vicious cycle of borrow and borrow again to pay back the interest the following year.
      An analysis of the debt balance among the selected countries shows that during the peak years of OPEC's strength, namely prior to the fall of the Shah, while the debt was substantial, it mushroomed after the Iranian Revolution started. The virtual shutdown of oil production by Iran greatly reduced if not precluded the payment of any grants to non-oil producing countries within the Third World.
      Indeed, the percentage of GNP money given to the developing nations by the OPEC powers starting in 1974 vastly exceeded that of the industrialized nations. With OPEC, the percentages ranged form 3 and 4 percent of their GNP. however, Iran gave 10 per cent of its GNP. The United States on the other hand gave much less than 1 per cent (Mossaver-Rahmani, 1980). Not only is this an embarrassment or the wealthy industrialized nations but the OPEC action dealt a blow to their banking institutions.
      Moreover, if all of this activity was not enough, Iran advanced several huge loans to Britain and France during the 1970's in order to "finance their balance-of-payments deficits, a problem normally regarded as a distinguishing feature of under development" (Girvan, 1980:437).
      These events serve to reinforce the developed countries" desire to revert back to conditions as they stood prior to the rise of OPEC. The events which follow demonstrate how the trilateralists achieved this goal.
      Government officials, influenced by trilateralists (who comprised the majority of Carter's ranking officials) are well aware that to divide and thereby conquer was an extremely useful tool to use in achieving their goals. Kissinger proposed that the United States attach a food and agricultural assistance program to its demands for oil price relief. In this way the United States would secure the leverage it needed to break the OPEC community.
      Another measure the North used was to strengthen an agency of the United Nations known as UNCTAD (United nations Conference on Trade and Development) so as to deem it an international decision maker. The debate on this turned into an all encompassing discussion as to where the responsibility for the global economic problems of the day actually lay according to the trilateralists, and provided an opening for a reconsideration of the ever divisive energy issue (Mortimer, 1984).
      As a result of this action by the United States, Costa Rica and several other Latin American countries supported the North in this issue. They requested that the OPEC pricing policy be placed on the agenda. After an acrimonious intergroup of 77 discussion, Costa Rica withdrew its request. However, the North raised the issue again in its draft resolution. This action demonstrated the fragility of the Group of 77 in the face of oil costs. Moreover, this action occurred just before the June 1979 price meetings.
      Another goal desired by the Third World coalition was the Common Fund. If such a fund could be funded, the Third World countries would definitely benefit. The Group of 77 submitted a draft of provisions for the Fund, calling for a "working capital of $3 billion in borrowing authority) that would be used to finance...anticipated commodity arrangement" (Mortimer, 1984:119).
      However, the industrial states also drafted a proposal the results of which did not at all match the Group of 77's proposal. In November 1978 and in March 1979 two further negotiating sessions were held. The Third World states had to make vast concessions. Two funds were created. The first Common Fund was endowed with $400 million while the second was endowed with $70 million plus a targeted voluntary contribution of $280 million. Clearly, this agreement was attributable to the limited power the Third World nations, including OPEC, had at this time.
      Poor countries cannot afford to ignore their present needs. This creates problems in maintain unity, a weakness that the rich and powerful can exploit by offering slightly better terms in the existing system in exchange for abandoning challenges to the system itself (Mortimer, 1984).
      To reiterate the hypothesis at the beginning of this work, governmental institutions will go to any lengths to maintain the status quo. To this end, this author would like to propose another group of theories for consideration.
      We know that Saudi Arabia was "cool" (Mortimer, 1984:61) to some of the ideas proposed by OPEC. However, no one provides a valid reason why. Some excuses are proposed and this author assumes that the casual reader might accept them. A more valid reason could be that the United States co-opted Saudi Arabia in the early 1970's. King Faisal's nephew assassinated him. This is not unknown. It is also not unknown that the nephew was educated in the United States. What is unknown is that in all probability the nephew was cleverly co-opted by the CIA in one of the numerous schemes they employ. Thereafter, Saudi Arabia succumbed to the pressure of the West to some extent while attempting to maintain an image of unity with the other OPEC nations.
      The West's recognition that Saudi Arabia could be controlled by western interests was an extra gift to the West. Although Saudi Arabia did exert some influence upon OPEC, its influence was minimal to that of Iran. One reason for this is the difference in the two countries' populations. Saudi Arabia, now only has about 10 million people. Iran in 1978 had 36 million people. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, while a large country, is fairly uninhabitable, being mostly if not a completely arid desert country. Iran, conversely, is a large country in addition to being strategically placed so as to protect the entire Middle East from invasion by the Soviet Union. Should conditions make it possible for Iran to fall to Russia, the entire Middle East and the resulting oil would be lost to the West. Additionally, Iran has the natural resources to become a major power and therefore, could compete with the West for industrial production.
      For all his faults, the Shah was trying to assist the Third World countries to experience a more prosperous existence. This, the Trilateral powers could not accept. Two arguments can be proposed however, against this argument. Why did the oil prices continue to rise after the fall of the Shah? This author imagines that not only do the wheels of government move slowly, but the other radical OPEC nations of Algeria and Libya exerted power over OPEC and the North, but an image had to be maintained as well. If oil prices had plummeted after the fall of the Shah, people all around the world would have understood that the First World nations were responsible for his exile and eventual death. The First World nations seeking to prevent this knowledge, played a waiting game.
      Moreover, the oil industry in the United States was enjoying the increased profits it made on the higher OPEC prices. There was no extreme need to drastically reduce oil prices right away.
      An argument can be proposed as to why President Boumediene of Algeria, who was so radical, was not exiled from Algeria. here again, we are dealing with a country whose population is only half of the size of Iran's and is not strategically situated any more than Saudi Arabia's is.
      The power, therefore, of Iran was substantial. The monetary wealth of the country of Iran, which was either lent or given out in grants, was an extreme embarrassment to the Trilateral powers, not to mention the fact that had it continued, would have seriously undermined the transnational banking industry.
      Therefore, as we have observed with the Iran-Contra scandal, the behind the scene activity which Congress may or may not have aware, was being completed. The writers of Middle Eastern history are very quick to point out that in 1953, the Shah was brought into Iran by the CIA, deposing the existing government of that nation. Evidence exists however, to dispute this statement. However, now no one will admit that the CIA agents could easily have instigated unrest in this proud country in order to save the existing economic system for the North. Many other factors exist to substantiate this claim, however, the economic factor is a strong consideration in and of itself.

CONCLUSION

      It appears that the First World powers have won through the auspices of the Trilateral Commission. The successful co-optation of some leaders of Third World nations and expulsion and or deaths of others has led these nations into either being subdued to the stronger force of aligning with it. This procedure by the First World powers has made it possible to maintain the status quo for the present.
      However, five variables exist to alleviate conditions as they stand now: (1) continued struggle by the people of the poor nations with the resulting media attention; (2) economic pressure against the international banking community; (3) democratic pressures against government leadership; (4) continued education for democratic societies; and (5) time. Nothing remains deadlocked and static in terms of political determinants. The seeds of destruction lie with the organism itself.
      The First World would be wise to truly heed the needs of the Third World because it probably will experience a reversal at some time. When that happens, it will be the First World which will suffer.

Author's note: On July 3, 1987, three weeks after turning in this research paper to the professor of political science at UCLA, the U.S. deliberately blew up a passenger plane flying from Iran to Kuwait with vacationers. Over 300 people were killed. The U.S. didn't apologize for their action and deliberately deceived the American people saying that they "thought it was a military plane which was going to attack." Every other press in every country reported the truth, though possibly not the reason. This author knows that the U.S. blew up that plane because the U.S. wanted to stop the Iran-Iraq War, a war that was instigated by the U.S. On December 20, 1988, Iran blew up the Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in retaliation for the July 3, 1987 incident. The CIA knew that this explosion was going to happen and didn't board the plane as a result.

Appendix A

ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION IN THE U. S.

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| I. W. Abel |  | Emmett Dedmon |  | Elliot Richardson |
| David M. Abshire |  | Hedley W. Donovan |  | John E. Rielly |
| Gardner Ackley |  | Daniel J. Evans |  | Charles W. Robinson |
| Graham Allison |  | Thomas S. Foley |  | David Rockefeller |
| John B. Anderson |  | George S. Franklin |  | John D. Rockefeller IV |
| Ernest Arbuckle |  | Donald M. Fraser |  | Robert V. Roosa |
| Anne Armstrong |  | Richard N. Gardner |  | William Roth, Jr. |
| John Paul Astin |  | John H. Glenn, Jr. |  | Carl T. Rowan |
| George W. Ball |  | Patrick E. Haggerty |  | John C. Sawhill |
| Lucy Wilson Benson |  | Philip M. Hawley |  | Henry B. Schacht |
| W. Michael Blumenthal |  | Charles B. Heck |  | J. Robert Schaetzel |
| Robert R. Bowie |  | Walter W. Heller |  | William W. Scranton |
| John Brademas |  | William A. Hewitt |  | Mark Sheperd, Jr. |
| Andres Brimmer |  | Carla A. Hills |  | Gerald C. Smith |
| William E. Brock III |  | James F. Hoge, Jr. |  | Anthony M. Soloman |
| Harold Brown |  | Richard C. Holbrook |  | Edson W. Spencer |
| Zbigniew Brzesinski |  | Hendrik Houthakker |  | Robert Taft, Jr. |
| John F. Burlingame |  | Thomas L. Hughes |  | Arthur R. Taylor |
| Arthur F. Burns |  | Robert Ingersoll |  | James R. Thompson |
| George Bush |  | J. K. Jamieson |  | Russell E. Train |
| Philip Caldwell |  | D. Gale Johnson |  | Philip H. Trezise |
| Hugh Calkins |  | Edgar F. Kaiser |  | Cyrus R. Vance |
| Jimmy Carter |  | Henry Kissinger |  | Paul A. Volker |
| Sol Chaikin |  | Joseph Kraft |  | Martha R. Wallace |
| Lawton Chiles |  | Sol M. Linowitz |  | Martin J. Ward |
| Warren Christopher |  | Winston Lord |  | Paul Warnke |
| Alden W. Clausen |  | Wilbur D. Mills |  | Glenn E. Watts |
| William S. Cohen |  | Walter F. Mondale |  | Casper Weinberger |
| William T. Coleman, Jr. |  | Lee L. Morgan |  | George Weyerhaeuser |
| Barber B. Conable, Jr. |  | Kenneth D. Naden |  | Marina von Whitman |
| Richard N. Cooper |  | Joseph S. Nye, Jr. |  | Carroll L. Wilson |
| John Cowles, Jr. |  | Henry D. Owen |  | Thorton A. Wilson |
| Alan Cranston |  | David Packard |  | Arthur M. Wood |
| John C. Culver |  | Gerald L. Parsky |  | Leonard Woodcock |
| Gerald L. Curtis |  | William R. Pearce |  | Andrew Young |
| Lloyd N. Cutler |  | John H. Perkins |  |  |
| John C. Danforth |  | Peter G. Peterson |  |  |
| Archibald K. Davis |  | Edwin O. Reischauer |  |  |

[Author's note: Since the original research was performed in 1987, the following new members of the Trilateral members have been added according to documentation sent to the author in 1999 by the Trilateral Commission's secretary who is in the New York City office:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Paul A. Allaire |  | Susan V. Berresford |  | André Desamarais |
| Dwayne O. Andreas |  | John H. Bryan |  | Dennis Dammerman |
| Michael Armacost |  | Gerhard Casper |  | John H. Deutch |
| C. Michael Armstrong |  | John H. Chafee |  | Peter C. Dobell |
| Euan Baird |  | Richard B. Cheney |  | Paul Dobriansky |
| Riley P. Bechtel |  | E. Gerald Corrigan |  | Wendy K. Dobson |
| Jessica P. Einhorn |  | James R. Houghton |  | Robert D. Putnam |
| Jeffrey E. Epstein |  | James A. Johnson |  | Franklin Raines |
| Robert F. Erburu |  | Vernon R. Jordan |  | Charles B. Rangel |
| William I. Esrey |  | Thomas Labrecque |  | Lee R. Raymond |
| Senator Dianne Feinstein |  | Kenneth L. Lay |  | Charles S. Robb |
| Martin S. Feldstein |  | Jim Leach |  | George F. Russell, Jr. |
| Stanley Fischer |  | Gerald Levin |  | Kurt L. Schmoke |
| George M.C. Fisher |  | E. Peter Lougheed |  | Raymond G. H. Seitz |
| Richard B. Fisher |  | Whitney MacMillan |  | C. J. Silas |
| L. Yves Fortier |  | Jessica Tuchman Mathews |  | Gordon Smith |
| Stephen Friedman |  | Deryck C. Maughan |  | George Soros |
| Leslie L. Gelb |  | Jay Masur |  | Ronald D. Southern |
| John A. Georges |  | H. Harrison McCain |  | Wilson H. Taylor |
| David R. Gergen |  | Hugh L. McColl |  | Laura D'Andrea Tyson |
| Louis V. Gerstner |  | William McDonough |  | Henry Wendt |
| Peter C. Godsoe |  | Robert McNamara |  | L. R. Wilson |
| William C. Graham |  | Lucio A. Noto |  | Robert C. Winters |
| William H. Gray III |  | Michel Oksenberg |  | Paul D. Wolfowitz |
| Maurice R. Greenberg |  | James A. Pattison |  | Robert Zoellick |
| Robert D. Haas |  | William J. Perry |  | Mortimer Zuckerman |
| Lee H. Hamilton |  | Michael E. G. Phelps |  |  |

Former Members in Government Service: Bruce Babbit, Stephen W. Bosworth, Bill Clinton, William S. Cohen, Thomas Foley, Alan Greenspan, Roy MacLaren

For original Trilateral members in Western Europe and Japan please consult the book entitled Trilateralism edited by Holly Sklar ©1980; for current Western Europe and Japanese Trilateral members consult either the Trilateral office in New York City or in the periodical entitled True Democracy, 1:1 to be released soon. Thank you, The author.]

APPENDIX B

ALGERIA

|  |
| --- |
| Posted or Tax Reference Prices |
| 1964 | 2.35 |
| 1969 | 2.65 |
| 1971 | 3.36\* |
| 1972 | 3.60\* |
| 1973 | 6.64\* |
| 1974 | 16.22 |
|  |  |
| Official Selling Prices |  |
| 1974 | 13.10\* |
| 1975 | 12.17\* |
| 1976 | 12.97\* |
| 1877 | 14.38\* |
| 1978 | 14.18\* |
| 1979 | 22.36\* |
| 1980 | 35.47\* |
| 1981 | 38.75\* |
| 1982 | 36.25\* |
| 1983 | 30.50\* |

IRAN

Posted or Tax Reference Prices

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Iranian light |  | Iranian heavy |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| 1954 |  | 1.86 |  | 1.67 |
| 1957 |  | 1.99 |  | 1.80 |
| 1959 |  | 1.81 |  | 1.62 |
| 1960 |  | - |  | 1.65\* |
| 1965 |  | 1.79 |  | - |
| 1970 |  | - |  | 1.72 |
| 1971 |  | 2.22\* |  | 2.18 |
| 1972 |  | 2.47 |  | 2.42 |
| 1973 |  | 3.68\* |  | 3.54 |
| 1974 |  | 11.68\* |  | 11.44\* |
| 1975 |  | 12.50 |  | 12.36 |
| 1976 |  | - |  | 12.22\* |
| 1977 |  | 13.77 |  | 13.43 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Official Selling Prices |  |  |  |  |
| 1974 |  | 10.67 |  | 10.45 |
| 1975 |  | 11.62 |  | 11.45 |
| 1976 |  | - |  | 11.37\* |
| 1977 |  | 12.81 |  | 12.49 |
| 1978 |  | - |  | - |
| 1979 |  | 19.95\* |  | 19.13\* |
| 1980 |  | 33.19\* |  | 32.32\* |
| 1981 |  | 35.80\* |  | 34.70\* |
| 1982 |  | 32.20\* |  | 30.30\* |
| 1983 |  | 28.00 |  | 27.00\* |

IRAQ

Posted or Tax Reference Prices

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Kirkuk |  | Basra |
| 1950 |  | 2.41 |  | - |
| 1953 |  | 2.34 |  | 1.90 |
| 1956 |  | 2.46 |  | 1.85 |
| 1957 |  | 2.59 |  | 1.98 |
| 1958 |  | 2.49 |  | - |
| 1959 |  | 2.31 |  | 1.80 |
| 1960 |  | 2.18\* |  | 1.70 |
| 1962 |  | - |  | 1.72 |
| 1970 |  | 2.41 |  | - |
| 1971 |  | 3.19\* |  | 2.21 |
| 1972 |  | 3.32 |  | 2.45 |
| 1973 |  | 5.03 |  | 3.58\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Official Selling Prices |  |  |  |  |
| 1974 |  | - |  | 10.48 |
| 1975 |  | - |  | 11.53 |
| 1976 |  | 11.65 |  | 11.43 |
| 1977 |  | 12.77 |  | 12.58 |
| 1979 |  | 19.84\* |  | 19.22\* |
| 1980 |  | 30.18\* |  | 29.96\* |
| 1981 |  | 35.18\* |  | 34.96\* |
| 1982 |  | 34.21 |  | 34.83 |
| 1983 |  | 29.08 |  | 28.46 |

KUWAIT

Posted or Tax Reference Prices

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Export |  | Khafji |
| 1953 |  | 1.60 |  | - |
| 1957 |  | 1.85 |  | - |
| 1959 |  | 1.67 |  | - |
| 1960 |  | 1.59 |  | 1.42 |
| 1970 |  | 1.68 |  | 1.55 |
| 1971 |  | 2.14\* |  | 2.02 |
| 1972 |  | 2.37 |  | 2.24 |
| 1973 |  | 3.47 |  | 3.28\* |
| 1974 |  | 11.35\* |  | 11.26\* |
| 1975 |  | 12.15 |  | 11.99 |
| 1976 |  | - |  | 11.88 |
| 1977 |  | - |  | 13.09\* |
| 1978 |  | - |  | 12.94 |
| 1979 |  | - |  | 18.94\* |
| 1980 |  | - |  | 31.40\* |
| 1981 |  | - |  | 35.94\* |
| 1982 |  | - |  | 33.37 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Official Selling Prices |  |  |  |  |
| 1974 |  | 10.37 |  | 10.29 |
| 1975 |  | 11.30 |  | 11.15 |
| 1976 |  | 11.23 |  | 11.05 |
| 1977 |  | 12.37 |  | 12.17\* |
| 1978 |  | 12.27 |  | 12.03 |
| 1979 |  | 17.93\* |  | 17.61\* |
| 1980 |  | 29.50\* |  | 29.20\* |
| 1981 |  | 34.25\* |  | 33.43 |
| 1982 |  | 32.30 |  | 31.03 |
| 1983 |  | 27.80\* |  | 29.51\* |

LIBYA

Posted or Tax Reference Prices

Libyan light

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1961 |  | 2.23 |
| 1970 |  | 2.53 |
| 1971 |  | 3.42\* |
| 1972 |  | 3.58\* |
| 1973 |  | 5.46\* |
| 1974 |  | 15.19\* |
| 1975 |  | 16.06 |
| 1976 |  | 16.35 |
| 1977 |  | 18.52\* |
| 1978 |  | 18.26 |
| 1979 |  | 27.41\* |
| 1980 |  | 49.08\* |
| 1981 |  | 55.57\* |
|  |  |  |
| Official Selling Prices |  |  |
| 1975 |  | 12.32 |
| 1976 |  | 12.62 |
| 1977 |  | 14.06\* |
| 1978 |  | 13.91\* |
| 1979 |  | 20.47\* |
| 1980 |  | 36.11\* |
| 1981 |  | 39.50\* |
| 1982 |  | 36.20\* |
| 1983 |  | 30.40 |

SAUDI ARABIA

Posted or Tax Reference Prices

Arabian light

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | FOB Ras Tanura |  | FOB Sidon |
| 1950 |  | 1.75 |  | 2.41 |
| 1953 |  | 1.93 |  | 2.35 |
| 1956 |  | - |  | 2.54\* |
| 1957 |  | 2.08 |  | 2.55 |
| 1958 |  | - |  | 2.45 |
| 1959 |  | 1.90 |  | 2.27 |
| 1960 |  | 1.80 |  | 2.17 |
| 1970 |  | - |  | 2.37 |
| 1971 |  | 2.18 |  | 3.16\* |
| 1972 |  | 2.48 |  | 3.34\* |
| 1973 |  | 3.62\*(\*) |  | 4.20\*(1\*) |
| 1974 |  | 11.45\* |  | 13.36\* |
| 1975 |  | 12.38 |  | - |
| 1976 |  | -\*\*\* |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1977 |  | 13.00 |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1978 |  | - \*\*\* |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1979 |  | 18.74\* |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1980 |  | 31.19\* |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1981 |  | 36.56 |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1982 |  | - \*\*\* |  | - \*\*\* |

Official Selling Prices

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1974 |  | 10.46 |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1975 |  | 11.51 |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1976 |  | - \*\*\* |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1977 |  | 12.09 |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1978 |  | - \*\*\* |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1979 |  | 17.47\* |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1980 |  | 29.00\* |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1981 |  | 34.00 |  | - \*\*\* |
| 1982 |  | - \*\*\* |  | 34.55\* |
| 1983 |  | 29.50\* |  | 29.75\* |

\*
      Average compiled from various rates set for the fiscal year.
(\*)
      Indicates an unrepresentative average. Saudi oil actually rose from $2.59 in January

      to $5.04 in December.
(1\*)
      Indicates an unrepresentable average. Saudi oil actually rose from $3.45 to $7.03 for
      the same period as above.
\*\*\*
      Oil was obtained from other locations of country.

Important note: Various prices established by different countries exist because of different grades of oil quality which require different levels of refining. The higher priced oil (example Libya, known as sweet oil) costs much less to refine compared with lower priced oil (example Saudi Arabia). In fact, the lower priced crude may cost the refiner more overall to make market ready than the higher priced crude oil. Oil, in its natural state is not useful. It must be refined.

APPENDIX C

" " " In Millions of Dollars

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 |
| Algeria \*\* | 3304 | 5934 | 13426 | 16127 | 16334 | 15359 | 13897 | 12915 |
| Egypt\*\* | 2850 | 5775 | 9942 | 11461 | 12785 | 14271 | 15468 | 15530 |
| Pakistan\* | 4633 | 6000 | 7583 | 7999 | 8780 | 8812 | 9164 | 9465 |
| Syria\*\* | 505 | 1001 | 1978 | 2286 | 2405 | 2512 | 2616 | 2660 |
| Tunisia\*\* | 922 | 1184 | 2457 | 3023 | 3229 | 3281 | 3471 | 3427 |

\*Classified by the United Nations as a low income country with GNP per capita of $405 or less.
\*\* Classified by the United Nations as a middle income country with GNP per capita of over $405.

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