

RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN

Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham



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MEDIEVAL TRINITARIAN THOUGHT FROM
AQUINAS TO OCKHAM

How can the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit be distinct and yet identical? Prompted by the doctrine of the divine Trinity, this question sparked centuries of lively debate. In the current context of renewed interest in trinitarian theology, Russell L. Friedman provides the first survey of the scholastic discussion of the Trinity in the 100-year period stretching from Thomas Aquinas' earliest works to William Ockham's death.

Tracing two central issues—the attempt to explain how the three persons are distinct from one another but identical as God, and the application to the Trinity of a “psychological model,” on which the Son is a mental word or concept, and the Holy Spirit is love—this volume offers a broad overview of trinitarian thought in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, along with focused studies of the trinitarian ideas of many of the period's most important theologians. An “Annotated bibliography” points the reader to further secondary literature.

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Symbols, abbreviations, and conventions

| | |
|--------------|--|
| a. | articulus |
| BN(C) | Biblioteca nazionale (centrale) |
| c. | caput |
| d(d). | distinctio(nes) |
| f(f). | folio(s) |
| ms(s). | manuscript(s) |
| <i>Ord.</i> | <i>Ordinatio</i> |
| <i>OTh</i> | <i>Opera theologica</i> |
| prin. | principium |
| q(q). | questio(nes) |
| <i>Rep.</i> | <i>Reportatio</i> |
| resp. | responsio |
| <i>Sent.</i> | <i>Sententiae</i> |
| un. | unica/us |
| < <i>x</i> > | (in a Latin text): I have added <i>x</i> to the text |
| [<i>x</i>] | (in a Latin text): I have deleted <i>x</i> from the text |
| [<i>x</i>] | (in an English text): I have added <i>x</i> to the text |

References to published Latin texts are abbreviated according to the editor's or the series name and keyed to the "Bibliography of primary sources"; line numbers in modern critical editions are indicated in superscripts to page number references.

Translations into English of central Latin texts are numbered and are cross-referenced by means of this numbering system.

"At n. *x*" indicates that the reader should see the main text at footnote indicator *x*.

Introduction

My purpose in this book is to give a broad overview of some of the central aspects of and developments in the trinitarian theology written in the Latin West between roughly 1250 and 1350 AD.¹ The emphasis here will be on philosophical theology, on the rational investigation of the Trinity by later-medieval theologians using the full range of tools available to them from especially the Aristotelian tradition of philosophical analysis. Nevertheless, the philosophical nature of the discussion as it is presented here should not obscure the fact that the intense interest with which later-medieval theologians approached the issue is an indication primarily of the immense *religious* importance it had for them. For the doctrine of the Trinity is at the heart of the Christian faith. On the basis of statements from especially the New Testament that suggested that the savior, Jesus Christ, is the very same God as the Father who sent him and yet is in some way distinct from the Father,² the doctrine of the Trinity was formulated by the early Church Fathers and in the Creeds issuing from the ecumenical councils of the second to the fourth centuries

¹ On a number of issues, the Latin and the Greek Christian traditions had (and have) rather divergent trinitarian views; I touch on one of the points of contention – the *Filioque* controversy – in Chapter 1 below, at and around n. 39.

² Statements like the one from John's Gospel found in Quotation 2a, in Chapter 2 below.

AD. According to this doctrine, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinct and yet identical: distinct as persons, identical as God. Once the doctrine was formulated, however, the major goal in trinitarian theology would be to explain precisely how three *really* distinct persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, can be *essentially* identical, i.e. identical in the one, simple divine essence. Identity and distinction: that is the major issue in trinitarian theology. This issue drove the trinitarian discussion in the Latin West from Augustine of Hippo and Boethius through Anselm of Canterbury and up to the figures who will be dealt with in the present book. How can it be that the Son is identical to the Father and the Holy Spirit as one God, while really distinct from both the Father and the Holy Spirit as a person? To see just how much is riding on this doctrine, consider that in order to explain how God the Son was able to take flesh as Jesus Christ, while God the Father and God the Holy Spirit never took flesh, you have to explain how these three persons can be really distinct from each other and yet all one God. This example, moreover, shows that the doctrine of the Trinity is closely tied to the theology of the incarnation, and through that to the issues of redemption and salvation that are of immediate concern to all the faithful.

Given the enormous significance of the Trinity to the Christian faith – its biblical roots, its patristic elaboration, and its centrality to the Christian message – it cannot be wondered at that later-medieval theologians approached trinitarian theology with the utmost seriousness, and wrote a great deal about it. In fact, the trinitarian literature written during the hundred years between 1250 and 1350 is immense. Basically every theologian from the period had to think about trinitarian theology in the course of his theological education, and a large portion of the various genres of medieval theological literature – the period’s *Sentences* commentaries, quodlibetal

questions, and disputed questions³ – deal with trinitarian issues. Given the enormity of the later-medieval literature on the Trinity, I will be concentrating in the four chapters of the present book on two major aspects of the discussion. The first aspect is the metaphysics of identity and distinction in the Trinity, that is to say, what “mechanism” – if any – brings about the real distinction of the three divine persons, while still allowing them to be essentially one. In short, how is it even possible to explain the fact that the three divine persons are really distinct from one another but the same in the divine essence? Roughly speaking, Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 deal with this metaphysical issue of identity and distinction. The second aspect of our period’s trinitarian theology that I will deal with is the application to the Trinity of a “psychological model,” according to which the Son is a mental word or concept, and the Holy Spirit is a gift or love. The psychological model was a major resource that theologians in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries relied upon in order to clarify or to explain how the persons in the Trinity could be personally distinct yet essentially identical. Indeed, in the later-medieval period the psychological model was probably the means most frequently turned to when attempting to prove that there is a Trinity of persons. I will deal with the psychological model in Chapters 2 and 3, in Chapter 2 detailing how several theologians used theories of concept formation to explain how the Son is distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit, and in Chapter 3 discussing reactions to that view, including reactions from a number of theologians who claimed

³ The *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (†1160), the standard theological textbook at the medieval university, was lectured or “commented” on by all students pursuing their doctorate in theology; written *Sentences* commentaries are a major source for studying medieval thought. Disputations, from which disputed questions come, were a form of medieval university exercise presided over usually by a master of theology. Quodlibetal disputations, the source of quodlibetal questions, were a special form of disputation held twice a year, during which a master might be asked questions on any subject by anyone in attendance (*de quolibet a quolibet*).

that the psychological model was of little or no use in clarifying or explaining the Trinity. Throughout the book I will give the big picture, describing how the period's trinitarian theology evolved, but I will always illustrate the trends under discussion by explaining the actual positions and arguments of a few selected medieval theologians. In this way, while giving an overview of some of the major issues in later-medieval trinitarian theology, simultaneously I mean to show something of the large variety of views defended in the period's trinitarian thought.

It should be noted that the conclusion to Chapter 4 is also a conclusion to the entire book. I have included in the footnotes what I consider to be the minimum necessary Latin text, and have translated as much of that text as practical, in order to indicate what I think the highly technical jargon of later-medieval trinitarian theology actually means. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. References in the footnotes to editions of the Latin texts are abbreviated according to the editor's (or the series') name and keyed to the "Bibliography of primary sources"; line numbers in modern critical editions are indicated in superscripts to page number references. I do not necessarily respect the orthography of any edition I use. I have mostly avoided discussing secondary literature in the main text or the footnotes of the book, instead including an "Annotated bibliography of selected secondary literature," where I point the reader towards the most important work currently available on later-medieval trinitarian theology. This bibliography is by no means exhaustive, but the works referred to there can in turn lead the reader to much further useful literature. Finally, in an appendix to the book I have presented a list of "Major elements in Franciscan and Dominican trinitarian theologies."

The Trinity and the Aristotelian categories: different ways of explaining identity and distinction

The task in trinitarian theology is to explain how three really distinct persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, can be essentially identical. In the present chapter, I describe the later thirteenth-century origins of two different, and indeed rival or competing, ways of explaining that most basic trinitarian fact. In particular, I discuss a theory that appeals to the Aristotelian category of relation to explain personal distinction and essential identity. From Thomas Aquinas (†1274) and on, most Dominican theologians held a version of this theory, which I call the “relation account” of personal distinction. I also discuss a rival theory that, in order to explain identity and distinction, appeals to emanation, that is to say the way that the divine persons are put into being or originated. This “emanation account” of personal distinction is closely related to the Aristotelian categories of action and passion, and, as we will see, following a tendency in Bonaventure’s (†1274) thought, most Franciscan theologians adhered to this view. Significantly, the confrontation between the respective adherents of each of these two major views drives many of the most important developments in late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century trinitarian thought. For this reason, this chapter really sets the stage for the rest of the book.

The chapter is structured as follows. First I give some background information on the two trinitarian views, the primarily Dominican relation account and the primarily Franciscan emanation account; in this first section I also provide the most important trinitarian terminology. Then I show how the two views are visible in early work of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, specifically in their *Sentences* commentaries from just after 1250. After that, I focus on authors in the Franciscan current, showing the development of the emanation account in John Peckham (†1292) and in Henry of Ghent (†1293).

BACKGROUND, AND THE RELATION ACCOUNT

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, then, there were rival ways of looking at the Trinity, one way that appealed to relations, the other to emanations. Before I specify how these two ways differ, I would like to point out what they have in common. What these two explanatory approaches to trinitarian identity and distinction agreed upon was that each divine person was *constituted*; that is to say, each person took on his own distinct personal being, on account of a single characteristic that is unique to that one person and distinguishes that person from the other two persons. This single characteristic was called a “personal property” (*proprietas personalis*), and according to both the relation and the emanation account the personal properties bring about some type of real distinction between the persons. The three divine persons, then, according to both the relation and the emanation account, are essentially identical (i.e., they share completely the same divine essence) apart from one difference, which is the unique personal property that makes each of the persons distinct from the other two persons. The personal properties thus bring about “merely” personal distinction, that is, a *real* but not an

essential distinction. It is worthwhile noting that here, as basically everywhere in medieval theology, the trick was to avoid heresy, and in trinitarian theology the most significant heresies to avoid were, on the one hand, the Sabellian heresy, which maintained that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit were merely different names for one and the same totally undifferentiated God, and, on the other, the Arian heresy, which maintained that the Father was God, but the Son and the Holy Spirit were not God.

The disagreement, then, between the relation and the emanation account was over the nature of these personal properties: are they relational in nature or are they emanational in nature. Interestingly, these two ways of explaining trinitarian identity and distinction have their remote origins in the thought of the pagan philosopher Aristotle, since they are based on the categories of relation, on the one hand, and of action and passion, on the other.¹ The relation account itself descends ultimately from Augustine of Hippo (†430) and Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius († ca. 525), who in their respective works *De trinitate* examined which of the ten Aristotelian categories can be applied to God or said about God and which cannot.² To make a longer story short, Augustine and Boethius claimed that only two categories can be said about God: substance and relation. Substance is the category that describes things that have an independent existence of their own, like individual members of a natural kind, e.g., John the human being, Fido the dog, Lucy the cow. God clearly has independent existence, and so for Augustine and Boethius God is substance to the highest degree. What about relation? This is more

¹ Aristotle's ten categories are: *substance*, quality, quantity, *relation*, *action*, *passion*, place, time, posture (or position), state (or habit). The ones in italics are those that are of greatest relevance here.

² For Augustine, see in particular Book V of his *De trinitate* (ed. Mountain and Glorie); for Boethius, especially Chapters 4–6 of his *De trinitate* (ed. Moreschini).

complicated, but the problem with predicating any accident – and relation is an accident – of God is that Aristotelian accidents inhere in their subject, they exist in it, and they are different from their subject, since accidents can come and go while the subject remains. But the fact that, for example, the whiteness in one particular white thing inheres in the white thing and is different from it implies composition, i.e., two different things being put together, the whiteness and the thing that is white. Such composition cannot be found in an utterly simple God. Thus, God cannot be great by some accidental greatness, nor can he be wise by some accidental wisdom, since if God’s greatness and wisdom were accidents inhering in God and distinct in some way from God, this would compromise God’s simplicity. But relation is different from the other categories of accident. Boethius sums up the difference: “Some of the categories point to the thing itself, others point to the circumstances of the thing.”³ Relation says nothing about the thing itself, but only about a particular disposition that the thing is in with respect to other things. For example, if someone standing to my right moves to my left, it seems obvious that nothing has truly changed about that other person or about me, that is to say, about our substances; what has changed is the spatial arrangement between us. As Boethius says, it is the circumstances of the thing that the category of relation points to, not the thing itself. Aristotle actually noted this characteristic of relation when he named the category: the particular characteristic of relation, what sets it apart from the other categories, is that it is *toward something* (Latin: *ad aliquid*; Greek: *pros ti*), and hence relation indicates nothing about its subject or foundation besides the extrinsic circumstances in which that subject or foundation finds itself. For

³ Boethius, *De trinitate*, c. 4: “Aliae <categoriae> quidem quasi rem monstrant, aliae vero quasi circumstantias rei . . .” Ed. Moreschini, p. 177^{369–71}; ed. Stewart, Rand, and Tester, p. 22^{99–101}.

Augustine and Boethius, then, special *divine relations*, possessed of no accidentality and inherence, and therefore implying no composition, are compatible with God's simplicity; in fact, these relations explain how the Father and the Son (and, by extension, the Holy Spirit) are distinct personally but identical essentially. How do the divine relations do this?

Augustine and Boethius capitalized on the fact that 'father' and 'son' are relative terms. This is just to say that a father is a father only because he is the father of a child (in this case a son), and hence father and son are always said relatively to each other. Put succinctly: you will never find a father who has not had either a son or a daughter. Now, a father is related to his son by the relation paternity or fatherhood (*paternitas*); a son is related to his father by the relation filiation or sonhood (*filiatio*). The relation account of personal distinction claims that the Father and the Son are personally distinct in God since the Father is the Father only because he has the Son. If the Father did not have the Son, then he would not be the Father. If the relations between them are real and not mere mental constructs, then Father and Son must be distinct in some way – not distinct essentially (since they share everything else and they are one God), but distinct as persons. These divine relations, then, are the personal properties that bring about non-essential but nevertheless real distinction between the Father and the Son: that the Father has a Son and that the Son has a Father, these are the differences that make the Father and the Son personally distinct from each other. Boethius encapsulated this theory in a phrase used in virtually every later-medieval trinitarian discussion: "Substance preserves unity, relation multiplies the Trinity."⁴ In this way, later-medieval theologians

⁴ Boethius, *De trinitate*, c. 6: "Substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem." Ed. Moreschini, p. 180³³⁹⁻⁴⁰; ed. Stewart, Rand, and Tester, p. 287⁻⁹.




Diagram A: Relation account of personal distinction

inherited from Augustine and Boethius an explanation for the way that the Father and the Son were distinct persons: by appealing to paternity and filiation, the very relations between them.

As the relation account of personal distinction developed over time, a stress came to be laid upon the fact that not only are these relations that constitute the persons real, they are also *opposed*. *Opposition of relations* became the most important element in explaining the distinction between the persons. In modern terms we might describe opposed relations as “mutually implicative,” i.e., the existence of one of two opposed relations necessarily implies the existence of the other. Thus, because paternity and filiation are opposed to or toward each other, they are the constituting properties of the Father and the Son. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same is true concerning the Holy Spirit’s passive spiration (*spiratio passiva*, the Spirit’s being “breathed”): it is because passive spiration is opposed to the Father and Son’s active spiration (*spiratio activa*, their active “breathing” of the Spirit) that passive spiration is the constitutive property of the Holy Spirit, although active spiration does not constitute a person in its own right, since it is shared by the Father and the Son. Diagrammatically, the relation account of personal distinction, relying upon the opposition of relations between the persons, can be set out as in Diagram A.

In the Latin West, the relation account of personal distinction was the dominant theory for explaining the distinction between the

divine persons from the time that Augustine and Boethius first set it down. We can see what the relation account looked like in the mid-thirteenth century by briefly examining Bonaventure's and Thomas Aquinas' descriptions of how the divine persons are personally distinct from each other and yet identical in the one divine essence. The views of Bonaventure and Aquinas on this topic are, superficially at least, really quite similar, and both are based upon the divine personal relations having a twofold or dual nature: compared to the divine essence, the relation's subject or foundation, the relation itself "vanishes," it disappears, since it is really the same as the essence. This is merely to say that the divine relations do not inhere in the divine essence, they are not different from the essence, and there is no composition in God. That is one part of the dual nature of the divine relations. Nevertheless, when one of the divine relations is compared to the divine relation opposed to it (note the "opposition of relations"), e.g., paternity to filiation, then the relation is distinct in some minimal way from the divine essence and it is really distinct from its correlative opposite, i.e., the relation opposed to it. It should be noted that the type of "comparison" that Bonaventure and Aquinas are talking about is not a merely psychological or mental comparison, but has ontological or metaphysical significance. It is not we who are doing the comparing, but rather this is how things are in God. Thus, to give an example, paternity becomes really distinct from filiation when paternity is compared to filiation, but compared to its foundation, the divine essence, paternity vanishes, since it is the same as the divine essence. This is how Bonaventure puts it:

(1a) Relation, by reason of comparison to its subject [i.e., divine essence or substance], vanishes into (*transit in*) substance, and so the property is the divine substance. But by reason of comparison to its term or object it remains, and with respect to this it is distinctive and differs from the essence – not because it indicates another essence but because it is another

mode of reference (*modum se habendi*), and in comparison to the essence or the person this mode of reference indicates a mode that adds nothing. But in comparison to its correlative, the relation truly indicates a thing and distinction. And thus neither is there futility in the way that we understand things nor is there composition in the thing (*in re*), but true distinction.⁵

For Bonaventure, relation can found distinction in God without causing any composition whatsoever, because the divine relations have this type of twofold or dual nature. When the relations are compared to the essence, they vanish into the essence and become one with it, but when the relations are compared to their terms, they differ from the essence by what Bonaventure calls here a “mode of reference.” This mode of reference is precisely what makes a relation relate; it is the particular characteristic that all relations have, the relation’s being toward something (*ad aliquid*), and since the relation has this particular characteristic while the divine essence does not (the essence has a different particular characteristic), when the relation is considered as relation, i.e., in comparison to its correlative opposite or the relation opposed to it, it differs from the essence by this mode of reference. Further, when a relation is compared to its correlative, true distinction arises between these two relations, because they have opposing modes of reference. The Father and the Son arise as distinct persons from comparison of paternity with filiation, and it is

⁵ Bonaventure, *I Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 2, solutio: “Relatio ratione comparationis ad subiectum transit in substantiam, et ideo proprietas est divina substantia; ratione vero comparationis ad terminum sive obiectum remanet, et quantum ad hoc est distinctiva et differt ab essentia, non quia dicat aliam essentiam sed alium modum se habendi, qui per comparationem ad essentiam vel personam dicit modum, nihil addens; in comparatione vero ad correlativum vere dicit rem et distinctionem. Et ideo non est vanitas in ratione intelligendi nec compositio in re, sed vera distinctio.” *Opera Omnia*, vol. I, p. 575b. For similar claims, see Bonaventure’s *I Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 1, solutio (*Opera Omnia*, vol. I, p. 573a) and his *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio trinitatis*, q. 3, a. 2, conclusio (*Opera Omnia*, vol. V, pp. 75b–76b). It should be noted that Bonaventure’s views on relation and its role in the distinction of the divine persons are notoriously difficult to pin down, and he has been accused of inconsistency on the matter; I offer my own interpretation in the present section and the next, but see also n. 14 below as well as the Bonaventure section of the Annotated Bibliography.

precisely on account of the opposition of the relations between them that they are distinct (see Diagram A). On this basis, the persons are really distinct from one another, while nevertheless not essentially different. This is Bonaventure's version of the relation account of personal distinction.

Aquinas' theory differs terminologically from Bonaventure's, but is otherwise quite similar. This is what Aquinas says:

(*ib*) Relation's particular characteristic (*ratio*) is to refer to another. Thus, a relation can be considered in two ways in the divine: either through comparison to the essence, and in this way it is only rationally distinct (*est ratio tantum*) [from the essence]; or through comparison to what it refers to, and in this way the relation is really (*realiter*) distinguished from that [to which it refers] by the particular characteristic (*ratio*) proper to relation. But the persons are distinguished through comparison of a relation to its correlative opposite, and not through comparison of the relation to the essence.⁶

As for Bonaventure, so for Aquinas, relation can found distinction in God without causing any composition whatsoever because it has a twofold nature. Compared to the divine essence in which they subsist, the divine relations differ from the essence in a merely rational way (to be exact, Aquinas says that in this way the relation "is only a *ratio*"). This is because a relation's particular characteristic (its *ratio*, in Aquinas' terminology) is to refer to another, but when a divine relation is compared to the divine essence, it is referring not to another, but rather to itself, since when compared to the essence the relation *is* the essence, differing in a merely rational way. This

⁶ Aquinas, I *Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 5, solutio: "Ratio autem relationis est ut referatur ad alterum. Potest ergo dupliciter considerari relatio in divinis: vel per comparisonem ad essentiam, et sic est ratio tantum; vel per comparisonem ad illud ad quod refertur, et sic per propriam rationem relationis relatio realiter distinguitur ab illo. Sed per comparisonem relationis ad suum correlativum oppositum distinguuntur personae, et non per comparisonem relationis ad essentiam."

is equivalent to saying that the divine relations do not inhere in the divine essence and make no composition with it. The divine relations, however, can also be compared to the term to which they refer—all relations are toward something, since that is their particular characteristic. When a divine relation is so compared, it is, according to Aquinas, really (*realiter*) distinct from the correlative opposite to which it is being compared. This is how the real distinction between the persons comes about.

Bonaventure and Aquinas thus offer typical thirteenth-century relation accounts of personal distinction. Opposition of relations is the way that they settle upon to explain how the divine persons can be both essentially identical and really personally distinct. Compared to the essence, each divine relation is the essence; that is to say, relation and essence are identical. Compared to its correlative opposite, each divine relation is really distinct from that correlative opposite. The Father and the Son are distinct from each other because their relative properties, paternity and filiation, are relatively opposed. In this form, the relation account is predicated upon the dual or twofold nature of the divine relations. Indeed, the twofold nature is a crucial tool in the endeavor to explain how the very same divine relations both differ from each other and are the same as the divine essence. The motivation behind the postulation of the twofold nature of the divine relations is that the relations must have some reality of their own apart from their foundation, the divine essence, in order for a *real* distinction between the persons to arise. Without there existing some sort of difference between the relations and the essence, there appears to be no way to explain how the persons can also differ really from one another. Still, it cannot be said that the relations are different from the essence without qualification (*simpliciter*), for if that were the case composition with the essence would result. The dual nature of the divine relations fills the gap:

identity with the essence when compared to it, distinction from the correlative opposite when compared to it. That this is the motivation for the dual nature of the divine relations becomes absolutely clear in the trinitarian theology of the Augustinian Hermit Giles of Rome (†1316), who developed a nuanced description of just how the dual nature of the divine relations works.⁷ But the dual nature of the divine relations has a potential weak point: it requires the acceptance of the view that a relation can indeed have some reality apart from its foundation, a view that we will see Henry of Ghent rejects, and on that basis Henry rejects the relation account of personal distinction.

THE EMANATION ACCOUNT AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
TRINITARIAN TRADITIONS

In the Latin West, then, the relation account was the dominant theory for explaining the distinction between the divine persons from the time that Augustine and Boethius first set it down. Nevertheless what drove a great deal of the later-medieval trinitarian discussion was a struggle for precedence between the relation account and a rival to it: the emanation account.

The resources to develop a rival to the relation account are already to be found in Aristotle's description of the category of relation. In his philosophical dictionary in Book V of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle presents an account of three different types of relation.⁸ Here, only the second type is relevant: the causal relation of producer to product.

⁷ This description appears throughout Giles's trinitarian theology, but see esp. his I *Sent.*, d. 33, prin. 1, q. 3 (ed. 1521, ff. 171rbH–172vbO).

⁸ *Metaphysics* V, c. 15 (1021a15–27). The three types of relation that Aristotle describes are: (1) relations founded on number and unity (e.g., likeness, identity, double to a half); (2) causal relations of a producer to what is produced; (3) psychological relations (e.g., of the measure to what is measured).

The paradigmatic example that Aristotle offers of this is the relation of father to son: “a father is called father of his son, for the one has acted and the other has been acted upon in a certain way.”⁹ Thus, the second Aristotelian type of relation, the relation of producer to product, is founded on action and passion, on acting and being acted upon, and in particular the relation of a father to a son is founded on the father’s originating the son, on his having contributed to giving the son existence. Aristotle indicated, then, that it makes no sense to talk about the relation of a father to a son without talking about the action and the passion upon which the relation itself is founded – before there can be a relation between two things, those two things have to exist, and hence, in the case of relations of the second type, the production, the action and the passion, must come first, and only then can the relation between the producer and the product arise. This is the intuition that later-medieval proponents of the emanation account of personal distinction were to capitalize on: production is the reason for there being a relation in the first place, and hence in some logical, non-temporal sense, the origination or the production of the Son from the Father must be “prior” to the relations between them. That is to say, some later-medieval theologians reasoned that, just as all categorial relations of the second kind are posterior to (and dependent upon) the corresponding productions, so the divine relations are logically posterior to (and dependent upon) the divine productions.¹⁰ Accordingly, for these theologians the focus in trinitarian theology shifts from the divine relations to the divine emanations. ‘Emanation’ is the term the medieval

⁹ Ibid. (1021a24–25). The translation follows that found in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Barnes.

¹⁰ This view assumes, of course, that there is parallelism between God and creatures in this regard, and opponents of the view strenuously denied that that is the case, claiming that proponents confused God and creatures. See, e.g., the text in n. 29 below.

scholastics commonly used to describe how the divine persons originate or receive their being. On the emanation account of the distinction or constitution of the persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the very same divine essence in three irreducibly distinct ways, the way that each one emanates or originates.¹¹ Thus, on the emanation account, the Father is the divine essence in a fundamentally different way than the Son is, and the Holy Spirit is the very same divine essence in a third totally different way, these three different ways being how each one originates or has being. Specifically, the Father has the divine essence from no other because the Father is *unemanated* – this is a property unique to the Father that gets its own name: it is the Father’s “innascibility” (*innascibilitas*). The Son, on the other hand, is born (*natus est*), and hence he has the divine essence naturally by the emanation “generation” (*generatio*), and medieval theologians will also often say that the Son is emanated by way of nature (*per modum naturae*). Finally, the Holy Spirit, who is a gift willingly given by the Father and the Son, has the divine essence voluntarily by the emanation “spiration” (*spiratio*), and the medievals will also say that the Holy Spirit is emanated by way of will (*per modum voluntatis*).¹² Thus, three irreducibly distinct emanational properties account for the fact that the three divine persons are emanationally distinct, yet essentially identical. Diagrammatically, the emanation account can be set out as in Diagram B.

As illustrated here, on this later-medieval emanation account of personal distinction, the opposition of relations that was a key part of the relation account does indeed exist between generating Father and

¹¹ Or: ‘proceeds’. Medieval theologians also use the terms ‘proceed’ or ‘procession’ to denote either of the two emanations, although strictly speaking these terms denote exclusively the emanation of the Holy Spirit.

¹² For more on these different ways of emanating, *per modum naturae* and *per modum voluntatis*, see Chapter 2, below, especially at and around nn. 5–6.




Diagram B: Emanation account of personal distinction

generated Son, as well as between Father and Son (as one spirator) and spirated Holy Spirit. Just as with Aristotle's example of a father's production of his son, in the emanation account the relations are indeed opposed. Nevertheless, in contrast to the relation account, this opposition does not play the central role; the stress in the later-medieval emanation account is on the three irreducibly distinct ways in which the persons originate: unemanated, emanated by way of nature, and emanated by way of will. What is important on the emanation account, then, is that the persons are distinct because of their three different ways of holding or receiving the divine essence, these three different ways being the irreducibly distinct ways the persons emanate.

The later-medieval emanation account itself had its roots in various texts by Augustine, by John Damascene (John of Damascus, † *ca.* 750), by Anselm of Canterbury (†1109), and most particularly by Richard of St. Victor (†1173) in his work *De trinitate*.¹³ It was only in the middle of the thirteenth century, however, that the relation account and the emanation account began to be considered mutually exclusive, so that a theologian could not be a proponent of both the one and the other. As mentioned above, Dominicans overwhelmingly held the relation account, whereas Franciscans held the emanation account. In fact, in the late thirteenth century there arose

¹³ See Richard's *De trinitate* (ed. Ribailier), esp. Books IV–VI.

rival trinitarian traditions, a Dominican trinitarian tradition clustered around the relation account, and a Franciscan trinitarian tradition centered on the emanation account. It should be noted that here I am employing the terms ‘Dominican’ and ‘Franciscan’ as very broad shorthand for two basically different approaches to trinitarian theology. Thus, not all those who held a roughly “Franciscan” trinitarian theology were necessarily Franciscan, nor did they all agree in every detail. *Mutatis mutandis* for “Dominican” trinitarian theology. With that said, these groups of theologians form ‘traditions’ in the sense that each involved a different general approach to the Trinity that in turn led to a relatively stable complex of views; these views were handed down from scholar to scholar within the tradition and were further developed in conscious opposition to the views of the other tradition.

This divergence of views is already clear in Bonaventure and Aquinas. I noted above that these two theologians present similar versions of the relation account of personal distinction and both appeal to the dual nature of the divine relations (the fact that relation compared to its subject or foundation, the divine essence, is the same as the essence, while compared to its correlative opposite it has true distinction from that opposite). Central, then, to both Bonaventure and Aquinas is the view that opposition of relations brings about the distinction between the persons, and both appear to think that in reality the divine properties are relations. Nevertheless, there is a systematic disagreement between the two theologians regarding the way in which we conceive the Trinity, and at issue here is whether the personal properties that bring about the distinction between the persons are best thought of as relations or as emanations. I want to stress, however, that, as I read it, the dispute between Bonaventure and Aquinas is about the way we *conceive* of the personal properties

(as emanations or as relations), not about what the properties in actuality are (relations).¹⁴

We can see how this plays out by examining a “flashpoint”, i.e., a specific issue in the trinitarian debate on which the relation and the emanation accounts, as they were developed in the second half of the thirteenth and in the fourteenth centuries, were fundamentally at odds with each other, leading to controversy between the proponents of the rival views. This particular flashpoint concerns the place of God the Father in the inner-trinitarian life. Recall that on the relation account of personal distinction, the Father is the Father because he has a Son; the Father and the Son are constituted as persons due to the opposition of relations between them, and so they are constituted as an opposed pair. On the emanation account of personal distinction, on the other hand, the Father is constituted more on the basis of his not being from another than by his relation of paternity to the Son. That is to say, the Father’s unique mode of emanating is that he is *not* emanated. (Compare Diagram A with Diagram B, above.) The divergence between these two views is clearly visible in the way that Aquinas and Bonaventure conceive the Trinity, Aquinas opting for the relational view of the Father’s constitution,

¹⁴ See n. 5 above for a caveat about the interpretation of Bonaventure’s views on the divine relations and emanations. The interpretation presented here – that, when it comes to the personal properties, the difference between Bonaventure and Aquinas is on a conceptual level – is based on the following observations. First, Bonaventure presents the two accounts, relation and emanation, in close proximity to each other, so outright inconsistency seems unlikely. Second, Bonaventure claims rather consistently that emanational distinction between the persons comes about in terms of the way we understand things (*secundum rationem intelligendi* – see, e.g., Quotation 1d [= n. 19], Quotation 1e [= n. 20], Quotation 1f [= n. 25], and the text in n. 21 below), but he does not make that sort of claim when he writes directly about the relation account of personal distinction. Thus, Bonaventure seems to be maintaining that, on account of the limitations of our cognitive powers, we humans distinguish in God emanational distinction from relational distinction, and attribute an order to them in which the former precedes the latter; in reality, in God there is only substance and relation, and the persons are distinct on the basis of opposed relations (as in Quotation 1a [= n. 5]).

Bonaventure for the emanational view. Let us examine the two positions.

An important question for theologians lecturing on the twenty-seventh distinction of the first book of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* was whether God the Father is the Father because he generates or whether he generates because he is the Father. This may seem like a strange, even a useless, question, but, as I hope to show, it is in fact a question that indicates a great deal about whether a theologian holds an emanation or a relation account of personal distinction. How, then, do Bonaventure and Aquinas answer this question? Bonaventure holds that the Father is the Father because he generates.¹⁵ The absolutely fundamental reason that the Father is established in being as the Father, according to Bonaventure, is that he generates the Son. The focus for Bonaventure, then, is on generation as the reason that the Father is the person he is, a stress on the emanation and, I would add, on the Aristotelian category of action.

Aquinas, on the other hand, argues firmly against this position. How can the Father have the personal operation of generating the Son, he asks, if the Father is not already established in being? In order to generate, the Father must be a distinct individual – Aquinas uses the technical term ‘hypostasis’ to describe a distinct individual like this¹⁶ – and the source of the Father's distinction, claims Aquinas, is the relation paternity:

¹⁵ Bonaventure, I *Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, a. un., q. 2, solutio: “Et propterea est alia opinio, quod ideo est Pater, quia generat. Et quod illud sit bene dictum patet per differentiam assignatam inter generationem et esse Patrem. Nam secundum propriam rationem generatio dicit emanationem sive originem, paternitas dicit habitudinem. Constat autem quod origo est ratio habitudinis, non habitudo ratio originis est. Et ideo generatio est ratio paternitatis, non e converso.” *Opera omnia*, vol. I, p. 469b.

¹⁶ The terms ‘hypostasis’, ‘supposite’, and ‘person’ are often used basically as synonyms in later-medieval trinitarian texts, although, as will be clear in the next section of this chapter, Franciscan thinkers tried to draw a distinction between hypostatic distinction, based on emanations, and personal distinction, based on opposed relations.

(1c) If it were said that “it is through origin alone that the hypostasis is determinately brought about,” one understands by ‘origin’ either relation of origin, and this is our view, or origin is signified as being an operation (*per modum operationis*), and, [understood in the latter way], origin does not at all make the hypostases distinct, indeed, [origin understood as a personal operation] comes from a distinct hypostasis, because every operation comes from a distinct individual, according to the Philosopher. And thus we say that in the divine there is no other source of distinction except relation.¹⁷

Actions, Aquinas reminds us, only come from actors, so how could the Father generate if the Father was not first constituted? Bonaventure’s view, Aquinas suggests, makes no sense, since it requires that the Father gives himself being through the action of generating. On the contrary: in terms of logical (i.e., non-temporal) succession, the Father must “first” be established in being, and only “thereafter” does he generate. For Aquinas, then, the Father generates because he is the Father, and he is the Father because of the opposition of the relations paternity and filiation. The Father and the Son are constituted in being as an opposed pair, just as the relation account of personal distinction claims. In this way, an order among the concepts attributable to God the Father becomes discernible in Aquinas’ thought: paternity then Father then generation; relation then person then emanation. And, indeed, Aquinas tells us explicitly that “our understanding of relation precedes our understanding of the personal operation.”¹⁸

¹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *I Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, solutio: “Si autem dicatur quod ‘haec est sola origo per quam determinate efficitur haec hypostasis’, aut per originem intelligitur ipsa relatio originis, et hoc est quod ponimus; aut origo significatur per modum operationis, et sic nullo modo habet quod distinguat hypostases; immo quod sit ab hypostasi distincta quia ‘omnis operatio est individuorum distinctorum’, secundum Philosophum. Et ideo dicimus quod nihil aliud est principium distinctionis in divinis nisi relatio.” See also the text in n. 18 below.

¹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2: “Operatio . . . est individuorum distinctorum vel singularium. Sed non est distinctum quod in divinis nisi per relationem. Ergo intellectum operationis personalis praecedit intellectus relationis.”

Bonaventure does not agree with Aquinas' view at all. For Bonaventure, the Father is the Father because he generates. The type of argument Aquinas uses is countered by Bonaventure by claiming that it might seem to make sense when it comes to the Father, the actor or producer in the Father–Son relationship, but:

(*id*) if we were to consider it in the case of the Son, it seems utterly unintelligible that because he is the Son, he is generated. For it is generally said, and reason concurs, that [1] the Son has through generation both that he is and that he is the Son. Therefore [3] generation precedes filiation according to the way we understand things, and [since] [4] things that are relative to one another are understood as at once by nature (although they do not exist [at once by nature]), therefore [7 and 8] generation is the basis of our speaking about paternity in God the Father. For [9] just as passive generation relates to filiation, so active generation relates to paternity.¹⁹

The argument offered in this passage hinges on the logical order between the relations and the emanations, and it takes its point of departure in the fact that, “before” he takes existence, the Son cannot have a relation to the Father. To make it somewhat more transparent, before discussing it I will sketch out the argument, referring to the steps in it as numbered in italicized square brackets in the translation and filling in some of the unstated steps (NB: all temporal terminology is to be understood as a type of logical ordering; God is not subject to time):

¹⁹ Bonaventure, *I Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, a. un., q. 2, solutio: “Sed quamvis illud posset aliquo modo capi ab intellectu ex parte Patris, tamen si illud consideremus in Filio, omnino non videtur intelligibile, quod ideo, quia Filius, generetur. Nam communiter dicitur, et ratio concordat, quod Filius et quod sit et quod Filius sit, hoc habet per generationem; ergo generatio secundum rationem intelligendi praecedit filiationem. Et relativa sunt simul natura in intelligendo, non tamen in essendo; ergo generatio est ratio dicendi paternitatem in Deo Patre. Sicut enim se habet generatio passiva ad filiationem, ita activa ad paternitatem.” *Opera omnia*, vol. I, p. 469b. The notion that “relatives are at once by nature” descends from Aristotle’s *Categories*, c. 7 (7b15–8a12).

1. The Son takes his existence through passive generation (premise).
2. Filiation, the relation of the Son to the Father, can exist only when the Son exists (unstated premise).
3. Therefore passive generation must precede the relation of the Son to the Father, i.e., it must precede filiation (from 1 and 2).
4. But opposed relations, like paternity and filiation, are understood as simultaneous or at once, since, as Bonaventure tells us, we understand things related to one another as simultaneous or at once (premise; this builds upon an Aristotelian metaphysical axiom, formulating the fact that we cannot understand, e.g., a son to exist without understanding a father to exist; rather, we have to *understand* them as at once or simultaneous, although Bonaventure carefully notes that things related through opposed relations do not have to *exist* at once, since, e.g., a father can (and, indeed, must) exist before his child does – relatives like this are mutually implicative, but not with regard to existence).
5. Therefore both paternity and filiation are after passive generation (unstated conclusion from 3 and 4 and transitivity, since paternity is simultaneous with filiation, and filiation is after passive generation).
6. But passive generation must be after active generation (unstated premise).
7. Therefore, paternity must be after active generation (from 5 and 6 and transitivity).
8. Therefore, active generation is the constitutive property of the Father and the Father is Father because he generates (consequent upon 7).
9. Bonaventure sums up the argument by stating the basic parallelism between passive generation and filiation, on the one hand, and active generation and paternity on the other: in both cases, emanation precedes relation (in opposition to Aquinas' view).

How could the Son possibly be constituted as a person distinct from the Father prior to the emanation of the Son from the Father? That is Bonaventure's starting point in this argument. For Bonaventure, the emanation of the Son from the Father, i.e., generation, is precisely that which establishes the Son as a person distinct from the Father, and the relations filiation and paternity cannot come about before that. Thus, falling back on Aristotle's intuition about relations of the second kind, like paternity and filiation – the intuition that these relations “follow” (non-temporally, logically) the actions and passions upon which they are based – Bonaventure argues that the emanation generation must be the conceptual foundation of the relations paternity and filiation. The Father is thus established in being as the Father because he generates. This passage, then, shows that Bonaventure adheres to an order of concepts very different from that of Aquinas: generation, Father, paternity; emanation, person, relation.

This example concerning the Father's constitution is illustrative of the divergent tendencies in the trinitarian theories of the two theologians. Aquinas, taking his point of departure in the view that an act can proceed only from a distinct individual, consistently places the constitution of the persons prior (conceptually speaking) to the active emanation of one person from another. For Aquinas, the relations take on an existence of their own “prior” to the emanations of the persons. The persons are established as really distinct in God only by the opposition of relations, the personal acts follow only “after” the persons have been made distinct. Hence, as we have seen, for Aquinas, the Father generates because he is the Father, and he is the Father because of opposition of the relations paternity and filiation. Bonaventure, on the other hand, speaks for the conceptual priority of the emanations: the emanations or origins of the persons, upon which are founded the relations of origin, account for the

distinction between the persons, the distinction between the persons is in no way prior to the emanations. In fact, Bonaventure makes this order among the concepts of emanations, persons, and relations quite explicit:

(1e) It should be noted that although to arise and to be and to refer to another are the same in the divine persons, nevertheless according to the way we understand things they are ordered, so that to arise is first, then to be is understood in those things that have being from another, and then [follows] to refer to another. But because they are the same in God, they are designated by the same name. Thus, generation indicates origin and reference (*habitudinem*); nevertheless, properly speaking, generation indicates origin, and paternity indicates reference (*habitudinem*).²⁰

According to Bonaventure, speaking strictly and on the level of our concepts, paternity and filiation are *not* the source of distinction between the Father and the Son; rather, the generation of the Son is the basis (*ratio*) of the corresponding relations.²¹ Again, for Bonaventure, the order among our concepts is emanation or origin, then person, then divine relation.

Of course, Bonaventure still must reply to Aquinas' criticism of a trinitarian theory that emphasizes the emanations or operations. Aquinas had argued that acts are performed only by distinct individuals, but, for Bonaventure, the Father is the Father because he generates. Bonaventure's problem, then, is to explain exactly *what* generates, if generation is what makes the Father the Father.

²⁰ Bonaventure, I *Sent.*, d. 26, a. un., q. 3, solutio: "Sed notandum quod cum idem sit *in* divinis personis oriri et esse et ad alterum se habere, tamen secundum rationem intelligendi sunt ordinata, ut primum sit oriri, deinde esse intelligatur in his quae habent esse ab alio, et deinde se ad alterum habere. Quia vero idem sunt in Deo, ideo eodem nomine designantur. Unde generatio dicit originem et habitudinem; tamen proprie loquendo generatio dicit originem, et paternitas habitudinem." *Opera omnia*, vol. I, p. 458a (the italicized "in" is a variant reading in the edition).

²¹ Bonaventure, I *Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, a. un., q. 2, ad 2: "Tamen secundum rationem intelligendi, origo sive emanatio originis est ratio relationis, sicut in his inferioribus est ratio secundum esse." *Opera omnia*, vol. I, p. 470a.

Aquinas' criticism points out that if generation is what distinguishes the Father from the Son and gives them being as persons – even on the level of our conceptualization – then the act of generation has to come from some actor: who or what is that actor, since it clearly cannot be the Father (since that would be tantamount to saying that the Father gives himself being through the act of generation)? Bonaventure's answer is that, at the level of our concepts of God, we must understand there to be a potentiality for generation in a type of "proto-Father" (my term). It is from the proto-Father that the act of generation comes, and it is "after" the act of generation that the proto-Father "becomes" the Father. So, for Bonaventure we must understand a potentiality for generation in the very proto-Father that "after" the generation of the Son "will be" the Father. It cannot be stressed enough that, despite the necessity of using temporal language here, Bonaventure is not assigning any kind of temporality or change to eternal God: it is our language and our cognitive faculties that are inadequate to the task.

This view that there is a proto-Father from which generation comes is itself predicated upon Bonaventure's notion of "primity" (*primitas*) or "firstness". The Father's primity, according to Bonaventure, is the ground upon which we conceive the Father generating, thereby establishing both himself and the Son in being. It is on account of primity that "a person is fully disposed (*nata est*) to produce another out of himself"; primity is the readiness for that person to emanate another person, and Bonaventure identifies primity with innascibility, "by reason of which, as the ancient position claims, in the Father there is to each emanation a fontal plenitude,"²²

²² Bonaventure, I *Sent.*, d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, solutio: "Ratione primitatis persona nata est ex se aliam producere; et voco hic primitatem innascibilitatem, ratione cuius, ut dicit antiqua opinio, est fontalis plenitudo in Patre ad omnem emanationem." *Opera omnia*, vol. I, p. 54a. Here Bonaventure seems to regard primity as referring to the Father and as being

that is to say, an immediate readiness to issue into action, in the way that a font full to the brim is immediately ready to overflow. Thus, in virtue of not being from another (i.e., being innascible), the proto-Father has primity, and primity just is the complete disposition to bring about the emanations, and particularly generation; it is generation, on Bonaventure's view, that then brings about (on the conceptual plane) the constitution of the Father and the Son.

Aquinas viewed the property of innascibility – the Father's not being from another – as being predominantly negative in significance. Innascibility indicated what the Father is not, and it indicated nothing further.²³ Aquinas explicitly rejected the type of position Bonaventure set forth concerning innascibility as primity, saying that “with paternity removed ‘ungenerated’ (*ingenitum*) would remain in God, not as a property or a notion of some person, but as an attribute of the essence, like ‘immense’ and ‘uncreated’ [are attributes of the essence].”²⁴ For Aquinas, the Father is constituted by paternity and paternity alone, and innascibility (here labeled “ungenerated”) contributes nothing to the constitution of the Father, even at the level of our conceptualization of the Trinity.

For Bonaventure, on the other hand, innascibility and primity serve to establish (conceptually speaking) the “proto-Father” in being, allowing Bonaventure to reply to an objection to his conceptual ordering very similar to the one Aquinas raised:

the basis upon which the Father generates and spirates, but he sometimes sees primity as applying to the proto-Father “before” the proto-Father is fully distinct as Father (e.g., below, Quotation 1f [= n. 25]).

²³ See, e.g., Aquinas, *I Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, aa. 1–2.

²⁴ Aquinas, *I Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3: “Nihilominus tamen, etiam remota paternitate, remaneret ingenitum in Deo, non quasi proprietates vel notio alicuius personae, sed quasi attributum essentiae, ut immensus et increatus.” The term *notio* used in this quotation is a rough synonym for the term *proprietates*; the notions are the characteristics of the persons that make them known to us (*notio* comes from the Latin verb *nosco*, meaning “to become acquainted with”).

(if) In reply to what is objected to the contrary that only a distinct person generates, it is to be said that it is true that, according to the way we understand things, it is necessary that a hypostasis be understood before generation – I am speaking according to the way we understand things – but it is not required to first understand (*praeintelligere*) the person as actually distinct, because through the property of generation the person is distinguished with complete distinction . . . nevertheless, according to the way we understand things, the basis for that distinction (*ratio distinguendi*) is inchoate in innascibility, and thus [the hypostasis, i.e., the proto-Father] generates, not as made distinct beforehand (*ut prius*) by paternity, but as made distinct in some way by innascibility.²⁵

According to Bonaventure, speaking conceptually, the property of innascibility gives a certain amount of being to the proto-Father, enough being for the proto-Father to act as the source of the Son's generation; only then do the Father and the Son become fully distinct. Conceptually speaking, "before" the proto-Father generates – therefore "before" the proto-Father is the Father – the proto-Father exists on the basis of not being from another. It is in virtue of this fact that primity serves to deal with Aquinas' objection to Bonaventure's type of order among concepts: because of primity, it is not necessary for God the Father to be the Father in order to bring about generation and the resulting actual distinction of the persons; instead it is the proto-Father who brings this about, and primity is the readiness for the proto-Father to generate. Thus, for Bonaventure, the Father is Father because he generates, and he generates because he is God innascible. The Father's primity, then, is really the foundation

²⁵ Bonaventure, I *Sent.*, d. 27, pars I, a. un., q. 2, ad 1: "Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium quod non generat nisi persona distincta, dicendum quod verum est quod secundum rationem intelligendi necesse est ante generationem intelligi hypostasim – secundum ordinem intelligendi loquor – sed non oportet praeintelligere eam actu distinctam, quia ipsa distinguitur per proprietatem generationis distinctione completa . . . tamen secundum rationem intelligendi ratio distinguendi inchoatur in innascibilitate, et ideo generat, non ut prius distincta paternitate, sed ut distincta quodam modo innascibilitate." *Opera omnia*, vol. I, pp. 469b–470a.

of Bonaventure's emanation trinitarian theology, and it retains this role, in even stronger form, in the later thirteenth-century Franciscan trinitarian tradition.

EMERGING TRINITARIAN TRADITIONS IN THE LATE THIRTEENTH
CENTURY: THE CASE OF JOHN PECHAM

The important point to see in this altercation between Aquinas and Bonaventure is that, despite their surface agreement on the relation account as the way to explain essential identity and personal distinction, they nevertheless have very different ways of conceptualizing the Trinity and especially the trinitarian personal properties. For Aquinas, the personal properties are relational, and all distinction in God comes about on account of opposition of relations. For Bonaventure, when we think about God, it is the emanational character of the personal properties that is emphasized, and the properties are best described as the way the persons originate in God.

The disagreement between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the level of our conceiving the Trinity was to have an immense impact on trinitarian theology for the rest of the thirteenth century and well into the fourteenth. In short, as noted above, Dominicans followed Aquinas in conceptualizing the personal properties as relational and in explicitly holding that all distinction in God comes about on account of opposition of relations. The list of thinkers in the Dominican trinitarian tradition – not necessarily all of them belonging to the Dominican order – is long and impressive: from little-known early thinkers like Bombolognus of Bologna (fl. 1260) and Roman of Rome (†1273), to major figures from the late thirteenth century like Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines (†1307?), and John of Paris (†1306), to such diverse fourteenth-century theologians as Hervaeus Natalis (†1323), Durand of St. Pourçain (†1334), and John of Naples

(† ca. 1350). There has in fact been a good deal of high-quality scholarly literature written about the late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Dominican trinitarian tradition,²⁶ and so here I will concentrate on the Franciscan trinitarian tradition of the later thirteenth century, while nevertheless always trying to show the motivations and the arguments behind the Dominicans' disagreement with the Franciscans.

What we see happening among the Franciscans in the period is a "reification" of Bonaventure's conceptual ordering of emanations *vis-à-vis* relations. For these thinkers, then, emanation or origin is the actual and not merely the conceptual source of the distinction between the persons, and the relation account of personal distinction is thereby relegated to the background. There are several theologians whom I could have chosen to represent this group – Walter of Bruges (†1307), Eustace of Arras (†?), Matthew of Aquasparta (†1302), Roger Marston (†1303?) – but I have decided to focus on John Pecham (†1292). Pecham was an important theologian, regent master of theology in the 1270s at both Paris and Oxford, and later Archbishop of Canterbury. There are three main reasons why I have chosen to focus on Pecham. First, he was extremely influential in shaping Franciscan trinitarian theology: it appears that it was Pecham who pulled it together into a relatively coherent whole, and his influence, direct and indirect, can be traced in the

²⁶ See, e.g., Bruno Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz: Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1967); Isabel Iribarren, *Durandus of St Pourçain: A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Concetta Luna, "Essenza divina e relazioni trinitarie nella critica di Egidio Romano a Tommaso d'Aquino," *Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 14 (1988), pp. 3–69; Michael Schmaus, *Der "Liber propugnatorius" des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, II Teil: *Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1930); and Richard Schneider, *Die Trinitätslehre in den Quodlibeta und Quaestiones disputatae des Johannes von Neapel OP* (†1336) (Munich, Paderborn, and Vienna: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1972).

Franciscan trinitarian tradition throughout the later thirteenth century and beyond. Second, Pecham takes as his opponent in trinitarian theology (as elsewhere) Thomas Aquinas, so concentrating on Pecham offers us a chance to see a direct Franciscan response to the most prominent defender of Dominican trinitarian theology. And third, Pecham's *Sentences* commentary is unedited – it exists only in two manuscripts in Italian libraries and has never been printed – and thus his views are basically unknown and his importance is accordingly underestimated.

A good place to start is with Pecham's position on the "flashpoint" examined above: the place of the Father in the inner-trinitarian life. Pecham, just like Bonaventure and Aquinas, discusses whether the Father is the Father because he generates, or whether he rather generates because he is the Father. Pecham begins his treatment by discussing one of the most powerful arguments that Aquinas had offered for his view. As mentioned above, Aquinas had claimed that the Father generates because he is the Father, and he is the Father because of opposition of relations. The focus was on the relations and their opposition. Aquinas' major argument for his position – the one that Pecham mentions – was that generation is an act and any act must proceed from an actor, a distinct individual, and thus the Father generates because he is the distinct person, the Father.²⁷ Bonaventure, as we saw, had countered Aquinas' argument by pointing out that the Son cannot have a relation to the Father before having been put into being through generation; from there, Bonaventure had

²⁷ John Pecham, I *Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, q. 2 ("Quaeritur de secundo utrum, scilicet, ideo sit Pater quia generat, vel e converso, ideo generet quia est Pater"): "Contra: generare est actus procedens a persona distincta. Ergo cum actus non distinguat agentem, immo praesupponit in agente distinctionem, sequitur ut Pater sit personaliter distinctus prius secundum rationem intelligendi quam generet. Sed paternitate distinguitur personaliter, quia est eius proprietas personalis. Ergo etc." Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, ff. 80vb–81ra; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 66vb.

argued that paternity must also follow generation, and hence the Father is the Father because he generates. In his later *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas had somewhat modified his view so that it could deal with an argument like Bonaventure's. Recognizing that the Father has the relation paternity only when the Son is established in being, Aquinas maintained that the Father's personal property could be understood in two ways: on the one hand, as the property constitutive of the Father, and in this way the personal property precedes the generation of the Son; and, on the other, as the Father's relation to the Son, and in this way the property follows the generation of the Son. By modifying his view like this, Aquinas guaranteed that the act of generation proceeds from a distinct individual – the Father established by the constitutive property paternity – while at the same time answering Bonaventure's criticism that, since the Son's existence is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of the relation of paternity, the relation paternity must follow the act of generation.²⁸ John Pecham concentrates on precisely this aspect of Aquinas' theory, claiming that Aquinas had maintained that the term 'paternity' can signify several different functions with respect to the Father. It signifies, first of all, a type of form for the Father by which the Father is constituted in being; it also signifies the power by which the Father brings about his act of generation, i.e., it is the generative power; further, it signifies the generative act itself; and, finally, it signifies the reference (*habitus*) that distinguishes the Father from the Son. Thus, as Pecham puts it, on Aquinas' view "the same relation [paternity] is first the constitutive form, then the

²⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 40, a. 4, solutio: "Proprietas personalis Patris potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo ut est relatio; et sic iterum secundum intellectum praesupponit actum notionalem [scil., generationem], quia relatio in quantum huiusmodi fundatur super actum. Alio modo secundum quod est constitutiva personae, et sic oportet quod praeintelligatur relatio actui notionali, sicut persona agens praeintelligitur actioni."

generative power, third [it exists] as the act of generation, and finally as relation.”²⁹

Pecham finds Aquinas’ view to be deeply problematic for several reasons, the most important of which is that he thinks that Aquinas’ position requires one and the same relation, paternity, both to precede and to follow the very same act of generation. That is to say, it appears to Pecham that Aquinas had argued that paternity as constitutive property precedes generation, and that generation in turn precedes the very same paternity, this time considered as relation. Clearly, according to Pecham, one and the same relation of paternity cannot *both* precede *and* follow one and the same act of generation.³⁰

Why would Aquinas have come up with (in Pecham’s view) such an obviously untenable theory? Pecham says: “They are forced to say this, because, according to them, with paternity set aside, innascibility in the Father says nothing that is not proper to the divine essence.”³¹ It is clear from the many times he mentions it that Pecham believes that Aquinas’ faulty evaluation of innascibility and its trinitarian role is the source of all of what he sees to be Aquinas’ problems. Indeed, as we saw above, Aquinas had denied rather categorically that innascibility had positive significance; innascibility, for Aquinas, indicated what the Father was not, i.e., not generated,

²⁹ John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, q. 2: “Quidam dicunt quod aliter est de relationibus creaturarum, quae suppositis accident, et relationibus divinis, quae supposita constituunt. Dicunt ergo quod paternitas est quasi forma Patris qua personaliter subsistit, et est potentia per quam agit, et est operatio quam elicit, et est habitudo quae gignentem a genito distinguit, ita quod eadem relatio est primo forma constitutiva, demum potentia generativa, tertio ut actus generationis, ultimo ut relatio.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 81ra; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 66vb.

³⁰ John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, q. 2: “Quomodo est intelligibile quod una relatio secundum intellectum diversum praecedat et sequatur generationem?” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 81ra; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 66vb.

³¹ John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, q. 2: “Et coacti sunt hoc dicere, quia circumscripta paternitate, nihil dicit innascibilitas in Patre quod non sit proprium essentiae divinae secundum eos.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 81ra; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 66vb. Cf. the text by Aquinas in n. 24 above.

and nothing more. Aquinas maintained that paternity, relatively opposed to the filiation of the Son, was the only constitutive property of the first person, and the Father generated, i.e., had the act of generating the Son, because he is the Father. Without paternity, according to Aquinas, innascibility would be an essential (and not a personal) property in God. For Aquinas, when it came to the person of the Father, innascibility had no constitutive force or functionality whatsoever.

Pecham could not disagree more. For him innascibility has not only the negative meaning of “not generated,” but also the positive meaning of “primity”: innascibility means that the Father is from no one, and this implies that all other things are from him, and hence, innascibility means that there is a fontal plenitude or fullness in the Father.³² This fontal plenitude or primity is full potentiality or full readiness to emanate.³³ Thus, innascibility indicates, according to Pecham, an “aptitude” to actively generate,³⁴ since on account of innascibility a person is “apt to elicit the act of generation.”³⁵ At the most basic level, primity – not, as Aquinas had said, paternity

³² John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, q. 2: “Et ideo, cum prima emanationum sit generatio, ratio primitatis in Patre aliter notificari non potuit quam per generationis abnegationem, quod enim non est ab alio per generationem nec generationem consequitur primum esse. Convincitur igitur primitas Patris innascibilitate significatur, et quia eo ipso quo innascibilis, est a nullo, sequitur ut omne aliud et omnis alia res quaecumque sit ab ipso, sicut docet Richardus, *De trinitate* V, c. 4. Hinc est quod dixerunt antiqui quod innascibilitas dicit fontalem plenitudinem in Patre.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 81ra–b; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, ff. 66vb–67ra.

³³ John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 28, pars 1, q. 2 (“An <innascibilitas> sit eadem notio cum paternitate”): “Innascibilitas est notio differens a paternitate . . . ratione eius quod habet positionis ad principium, quae ponit, ut saepe dictum est, primitas, quae ponit plenam fecunditatem respectu utriusque emanationis.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 86ra; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 70va.

³⁴ John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, q. 2: “Generat igitur ex innascibilitate quae privat generationem passivam et ideo, ut declaratum est, ponit aptitudinem ad generationem activam.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 81rb; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 67ra.

³⁵ See the text in n. 37 below.

taken as a constitutive property – is the form on account of which the Father generates.³⁶

For Pecham, then, the Father is the Father because he generates, and he generates on the basis of innascibility as primity. This view is in fact a first element in the complex of positions that I am calling here Franciscan trinitarian theology (see the Appendix for a list of these elements; this is element *a*). Pecham accepts unapologetically the consequence of this position: since acts come only from distinct individuals, the property of primity must give some being to the “paternal hypostasis”, i.e., the “proto-Father,” “before” it takes full being as the Father on the basis of its active generation of the Son. Using language that he undoubtedly found in Bonaventure, Pecham says outright that “the distinction of the paternal hypostasis is begun in innascibility and is completed in generation or paternity, for innascibility suffices to constitute a person as it is apt to elicit the act of generation.”³⁷ Indeed, Pecham makes this claim with all the clarity that one could want:

(1g) A person can be understood in two ways: [as] having divine nature either as communicable or as communicated, in other words as having divine nature with an aptitude to communicating or [as] having it with the reference (*habitudine*) accompanying the act of communication. In the first way, the paternal hypostasis [i.e., the proto-Father] is constituted by the property of innascibility, which is an incommunicable property, as has been seen.

³⁶ John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, q. 2: “Ad tertium dicendum quod forma per quam Pater generat radicaliter est primitas ad omnem operationem, virtus enim infinita non indiget aliqua dispositione contrahente, quia ex sua plenitudine sufficit ad omnem operationem.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 81rb; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 67ra.

³⁷ John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 27, pars 1, q. 2: “Ad primum dicendum, sicut ita melius patebit, distinctio paternae hypostasis inchoatur innascibilitate et completur in generatione vel paternitate, sufficit enim innascibilitas personam constituere ut apta sit actum generationis elicere . . . ex ingenerato igitur est ratio generalis originis, sed ex generatione est ratio determinatae habitudinis.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 81rb; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 67ra. Compare this to the language used by Bonaventure at n. 25 above (= Quotation 1f).

In the second way, it is constituted by paternity, which puts the hypostasis in a referring connection (*connexione habituali*) and in a special order to the other persons in the Trinity, and this reference (*habitus*) completes the nobility and the dignity of the person . . . On account of this, paternity is correctly taken to be the Father's personal property, which indicates a special reference (*habitudinem*); but although innascibility distinguishes a person from the others, nevertheless it does not [do this] by a special reference (*habitudine*), but rather by general primity and fontal plenitude [i.e., a disposition to emanate].³⁸

One thing to note here is that primity is doing real trinitarian work by genuinely contributing to the constitution of a divine person. Pecham claims that “the paternal hypostasis is constituted by the property of innascibility” and “innascibility distinguishes a person from the others.” Certainly, Pecham admits that the Father, properly speaking, is constituted by paternity, which is his personal property; this makes sense, since the Father's having the Son (and hence having the relation of paternity) is *sine qua non* for the Father to be the *Father* in the first place. Nevertheless, Pecham also insists that there would be no Father if it were not for the incommunicable property of innascibility, that is to say, primity. Primity is the starting point of the Father's distinction, since it gives the proto-Father enough being to allow the Father's full distinction to come about through the generation of the Son. For Pecham, then, both paternity

³⁸ John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 28, pars 1, q. 3 (“An innascibilitas sit Patris relatio personalis”): “Ad quaestionem sic respondeo sine praeiudicio distinguendo quod persona potest intelligi dupliciter: vel habens naturam divinam ut communicabilem vel ut communicatam (vel per alia verba ut habens naturam divinam cum aptitudine ad communicandam vel habens eam cum habitu concommitante communicationis actum). Primo modo constituitur hypostasis paterna proprietate innascibilitatis, quae est proprietas incommunicabilis, ut visum est; secundo modo constituitur paternitate quae ponit hypostasim in connexione habituali et ordine speciali aliarum personarum in trinitate, et haec habitudo complet nobilitatem et dignitatem personae . . . Propter quod paternitas recte ponitur Patris personalis proprietatis quae dicit specialem habitudinem; sed innascibilitas, licet personam ab aliis distinguat, non tamen speciali habitu sed primitate generali et fontali plenitudine.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 86rb; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 70vb.




Diagram C: Nested distinctions

and primity are involved in the constitution of the Father. This is obviously different from Aquinas, for whom innascibility had no role to play in the constitution of the Father. It also seems significantly different from Bonaventure, who used primity to explain how we *conceive* the trinitarian properties, frequently adding caveats about how primity established the proto-Father “according to the way we understand things.” Thus, more than offering just a particularly forceful presentation of Bonaventure’s view, Pecham appears to have genuinely reified Bonaventure’s emphasis on the emanational character of the personal properties, since for Pecham primity is an indispensable part of the explanation of the Father’s real (as opposed to conceptual) personal constitution.

In fact, what Pecham is describing here is a series of two “nested” distinctions (see Diagram C). On the one hand, there is between the divine persons *relational distinction* that “completes the nobility and the dignity of the person.” This relational distinction, based upon opposition of relations, is the actual state of affairs in God: person does come from person and hence there truly are opposed relations between the persons, just as the relation account of personal distinction has it. On the other hand, in addition to relational distinction, Pecham also claims there to be *emanational distinction*. Pecham says

“the paternal hypostasis [i.e., the proto-Father] is constituted by the property of innascibility,” the emanational property. Pecham is explicit that the emanational distinction is in some sense prior to or more basic than the relational distinction, since the distinction of a person begins in emanational distinction and is completed in relational distinction (see at n. 37). But we will see in Quotation 1h below that Pecham even suggests that emanational distinction on its own could (counterfactually) suffice for constituting a divine hypostasis; significantly, this is a suggestion that one will not find in Bonaventure. Thus, nested distinctions reflect the fact that the emanational properties are doing real trinitarian work in Pecham’s system, and, moreover, that the emanational distinction is indispensable and nested inside the (counterfactually) dispensable relational distinction.

The use of nested distinctions is a second element that characterizes Franciscan trinitarian theology (see the Appendix: element *b* under “Franciscan trinitarian theology”). Indeed, one can see continuity in Franciscan thought on this issue: from Bonaventure to John Duns Scotus (†1308), one of the most characteristic features of Franciscan trinitarian theology is the attempt to introduce nested levels of distinction between, on the one hand, the divine hypostases (i.e., the “proto-persons”), and, on the other, the divine persons. On this understanding, the distinction between the hypostases is based on the emanations and the distinction between the persons is based on the relations.

This typically Franciscan tack in trinitarian theology has several proximate causes, but I will mention just one: for the Franciscans, who focused on emanation and action, the challenge was to introduce *order* into God, because actions have agents and products. As we have seen, this is especially pressing in the case of the Father, where, prior to the act of generation that brings about the full distinction of the person of the Father, it is necessary for there to be some agent to bring

about the act of generation itself. This is a need that Bonaventure had recognized, and he postulated primity to explain how, in terms of our concepts about God, the Father could generate “before” he was a Father established on the basis of relational distinction (i.e., the generation of the Son). Later theologians in the Franciscan current, including John Pecham, reify this trait of the Father: in their theories, primity was no longer a merely conceptual tool but played a significant role in the actual constitution of the person of the Father, an indispensable foundation for the relational distinction that “completes the nobility and the dignity of the person.” In this way, nested distinctions, emanational and relational, answered a pressing need for the Franciscan trinitarian tradition.

We can see nested distinctions at work in Pecham’s trinitarian theology in a second “flashpoint” between the two trinitarian traditions and their different understanding of the trinitarian properties. This flashpoint concerns the issue of the Son’s role in the spiration of the Holy Spirit (see the Appendix: element *c*). The issue is as follows: would the Son and the Holy Spirit still be distinct from each other if they each emanated from the Father alone, as the Franciscans maintained they would; or are the Son and the Holy Spirit distinct only if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and the Father together, so that there are opposed relations between the Son and the Holy Spirit, as the Dominicans held? Since, for the Franciscans, the way in which each person took being is the distinctive property of that person, on the Franciscan view whether the Holy Spirit emanates from the Son or not, the Holy Spirit still could be distinct from the Son, because the Son and the Holy Spirit would each still emanate in a fundamentally different way from the Father alone. This is equivalent to saying that each of the three divine properties is on its own account irreducibly distinct from the other two. In this context, Franciscans often called the emanations *disparate*




Diagram D: Personal distinction (counterfactual) by disparate relations

relations, maintaining that not only opposed relations, but also non-opposed, disparate relations, could bring about personal distinction. In contrast to opposed relations, disparate relations are not mutually implicative, that is to say, the existence of one disparate relation does not necessarily imply the existence of another (just as, e.g., one thing's similarity to another thing does not imply its equality with that other thing). If disparate relations were the source of personal distinction, then diagrammatically the Trinity could be set out as in Diagram D.

The Dominican view, on the other hand (see Diagram A, above), was that the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit can be explained exclusively by the fact that there are directly opposed relations between them. Thus, unless the Holy Spirit comes from the Son, there is no opposition between them, and hence no distinction between them. Clearly, this flashpoint in the later-medieval trinitarian discussion was particularly sensitive because one of the unresolved issues between the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox Churches was (and still is) the *Filioque* clause, the Greeks contending that the Holy Spirit does *not* in fact proceed from the Son, the Roman Catholics maintaining that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father *and the Son* (*Filioque*). Thus, Dominicans sometimes accused Franciscans of having abandoned the only clear reason to maintain the *Filioque* clause:³⁹ for the Dominicans, for the Son and

³⁹ This is exemplified by the Dominican Thomas of Sutton, writing sometime around 1310 against the Franciscan Robert Cowton: “Si salvari potest distinctio trium personarum

the Holy Spirit to be distinct from each other at all (and hence for there to be a Trinity of persons) it was a necessary condition that both the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit. The Franciscans, on the other hand, were always careful to stress that the Holy Spirit does in fact proceed from both the Father and the Son, as the Roman Catholic faith required them to confess; the question of the Holy Spirit not proceeding from the Son was strictly a hypothetical or counterfactual one. Nevertheless, it is telling of the divergence between the Franciscan and Dominican trinitarian theologies that, as a group, the Franciscans grant that counterfactually the state of affairs represented by Diagram D (which in fact depicts the Greek Orthodox position on the matter) could obtain.

John Pecham supports the view that the Son and the Holy Spirit would be distinct even if the Son did not spirate the Holy Spirit:

(1*h*) Although some say that in the divine there is distinction through opposition of relations alone, and not through disparation, and thus that, with the emanation of the Holy Spirit removed from the Son, [the Holy Spirit] would not be distinct from him, nevertheless it seems more probable to others, just as authoritative passages of the saints expressly say, that *since all that the Son has he accepts through being born, so that, with the Son set aside, the Father has the fullness of the essence, so also [with the Son set aside, the Father would have] the fullness of the spirative power.* Therefore, with it posited as the Greeks say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, even though there would remain neither their mutual germanity [i.e., opposition of relations] nor everything that suitably accompanies (*congruentia concomitatur*) their connection, nevertheless there would remain a sufficiency of distinction, because the Spirit is distinct from the Son by a

absque hoc quod ponatur quod Filius spiret Spiritum Sanctum, sequitur quod positio Graecorum potior est et rationabilior quam positio Latinorum; melius est enim ponere pauciora quam plura et salvare omnia quae sunt salvanda per illa pauciora . . . Frustra igitur poneremus nos Filium producere Spiritum Sanctum, cum absque hoc possumus omnia salvare; immo cum in Deo nihil sit ponendum frustra, positio nostra est irrationalis, et Graecorum rationalis, non contra fidem neque contra rationem." Ed. Friedman, p. 162²⁰⁸⁻¹⁸.

twofold reason, as we have seen. For just as with it posited *per impossibile* [i.e., counterfactually] that in the divine there would be only one hypostasis, while still the essence would be fully present (*consisteret*) in it, where nevertheless it would not have everything that suitably accompanies (*congruentia concomitatur*) personal distinction, so it is to be understood in the matter at hand.⁴⁰

The main argument operative here is marked in italics in the text. The intuition behind the argument is quite simple: one person cannot give another person something that the first person did not already possess. This appears to Pecham to be especially true in the case of the Father and the Son in the Trinity: since through generation the Son receives his very existence from the Father, quite literally everything that the Son has he gets from the Father. Since one of the things that the Son has is the power to spirate the Holy Spirit, the Son has gotten this power from the Father, and this in turn implies that the Father had the spirative power to give to the Son. Pecham concludes: the Father on his own has the spirative power completely, and he could (although in fact he does not) spirate the Holy Spirit without the Son. The argument can be generalized and summed up quite concisely: since the Son gets his existence from the Father, the Father can depend on the Son for nothing at all; given this, it would

⁴⁰ John Pecham, *I Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2 (“Posito per impossibile quod <Spiritus Sanctus> non procedat a Filio, utrum distinguatur ab ipso”): “Responsio: quamvis aliqui dicant quod in divinis sit distinctio per solam relationis oppositionem et non per disparationem, et per hoc quod circumscripta emanatione Spiritus Sancti a Filio non habet ab eo distinctionem, probabilius tamen videtur aliis, sicut auctoritates sanctorum dicunt expresse, quod, cum Filius non habeat nisi quod nascendo accepit, sicut circumscripto Filio Pater habet plenitudinem essentiae, sic et plenitudinem potentiae spirativae. Quamvis ergo, posito ut Graeci dicunt Spiritum Sanctum a solo Patre procedere, non remaneret germanitas eorum mutua nec omnis congruentia quae connexionem illam concomitatur (mss.: concommutatur), maneret tamen distinctionis sufficientia, quia duplici ratione distinguitur Spiritus a Filio, ut visum est. Sicut enim posito per impossibile quod in divinis esset sola una hypostasis, adhuc tamen essentia plenarie in illa consisteret, ubi tamen deesset congruentia quae personalem distinctionem concomitatur, sic in proposito intelligendum.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 41ra; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, ff. 37vb–38ra.

be illogical to claim that the Father depended on the Son for the ability to spirate the Holy Spirit.⁴¹

Thus, Pecham supports the position that the Son and the Holy Spirit would still be distinct from each other if each came from the Father alone. Pecham says that, if we accept as true the Greek claim that the Holy Spirit does not come from the Son, it is indeed the case that the mutual “germanity” – i.e., the very fact that the Holy Spirit comes from the Son, and hence that there are opposed relations between them – would no longer remain, but nonetheless there would be a sufficient ground for their distinction from each other. That ground is the disparation (*disparatio*) between their ways of emanating. Moreover, so much weight does Pecham put on his view that the disparation between the emanations could be a source of the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, that he repeats at several junctures in his treatment of trinitarian theology the claim that we find in Quotation 1h above, namely, that “the Spirit is distinct from the Son by a twofold reason (*duplici ratione*),” i.e., both by disparation and by opposition. In this way, Pecham endorses outright the nested distinctions that we have seen already: even if there were no opposition between the Son and the Holy Spirit, i.e., even if the Holy Spirit did not come from both the Son and the Father but only from the Father alone, the difference of disparation that arises from the different ways in which the Son and the Holy Spirit come from the Father would suffice to preserve their distinction from each other. In other words, for Pecham, indispensable emanational distinction

⁴¹ In reply to this argument, Dominicans will claim that although the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit as two distinct persons, nevertheless they do so by means of one and the same spirative power, and hence the two persons are the one and only source of the Holy Spirit in God and neither need nor depend upon any other source (e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 5, ad 10 [ed. Bazzi, p. 275b]; Thomas of Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae*, q. 9, ad 16–17 [ed. Schneider, pp. 289–90]). This is roughly equivalent to saying that spiration is by definition from two persons (i.e., the Father and the Son), which is, as we have seen and will see again in Chapter 2, precisely what the Dominicans hold.

is nested inside counterfactually dispensable relational distinction. This, in turn, is equivalent to claiming that counterfactually the situation represented in Diagram D could obtain, although in reality it does not. Especially in the final sentence of Quotation 1h, Pecham stresses the counterfactual nature of his claim, by noting that through emanational distinction alone a hypostasis would not have all that it ought to have (in particular, relational distinction), which, in a perfect God, is clearly impossible.

This brief look at the case of John Pecham shows that by the 1270s an emanation trinitarian theology had become a standard part of the Franciscan trinitarian tradition. A complex of positions had been settled upon, motivated by an understanding of the trinitarian properties as emanational, and these positions were set in explicit contrast to the relation trinitarian theology of the Dominicans in general, and of Thomas Aquinas in particular. The three elements of the Franciscan emanation trinitarian theology that we have seen are (a) that the Father is the Father because he generates, (b) the use of nested distinctions, and (c) the claim that the Holy Spirit could still be distinct from the Son, even if the Holy Spirit did not come from the Son. To each of these elements, the Dominicans had a corresponding one that took its point of departure in a relation trinitarian theology (see the Appendix for a list of these elements).

HENRY OF GHENT AND THE REJECTION OF THE RELATION ACCOUNT

To round out this chapter on the Aristotelian categories and the late thirteenth-century trinitarian traditions, I would like to address one further thinker: Henry of Ghent. Henry was a dominant thinker at the University of Paris from the time he became regent master in theology there around 1276 until his death in 1293, and his thought

was extremely influential well into the early-modern period, both directly through Henry's many quodlibetal questions and *Summa of Ordinary Questions* (*Summa quaestionum ordinariorum*) and indirectly through his major impact on the thought of John Duns Scotus. I will be dealing with Henry at some length in the next chapter, but in order to give a sense of where he stands in the developments I have been tracing, I want to briefly discuss his appraisal of the relation account of personal distinction, and the way in which he thought identity and distinction in the triune God could be explained. Despite the fact that he was not affiliated with a religious order (he was a secular priest), Henry falls squarely in the Franciscan trinitarian tradition, as I have illustrated it in Pecham. And interestingly, Henry rejects the relation account of personal distinction in part because it is incompatible with his ideas concerning the Aristotelian category of relation.

The relation account of personal distinction as we saw it in Bonaventure and Aquinas was predicated upon the dual nature of the divine relations: the fact that, compared to its foundation, i.e., the divine essence, a divine relation is merely rationally distinct, while compared to its term, i.e., the relation opposed to it, it is really distinct. As mentioned above, the motivation for postulating the twofold nature of the divine relations was that the relations must have some reality of their own apart from their foundation, the divine essence, in order for a *real* distinction between the persons to arise. But supposing a theologian categorically denied that it is even possible for a relation to have some reality of its own apart from its foundation, what consequences would that have for the relation account? Henry of Ghent's trinitarian doctrine offers an example of this. For Henry, any reality (*realitas*), any "thingness," a relation has, it acquires from its foundation, whether that be a substance, a quality, or a quantity. If we wanted to describe this in another way, we could say that relation for Henry is simply an intrinsic aspect or

disposition of its foundation: one white thing is by its very nature similar to another white thing. The similarity is not anything on its own, added on top of the whiteness; it is merely one way in which its foundation (e.g., the whiteness) exists on account of the foundation being the type of foundation that it is (e.g., white). The important point is that relation never has any reality apart from its foundation.

Henry's view of the ontology of the Aristotelian category of relation has an immediate effect on his opinion of the relation account of personal distinction: the relation account cannot get off the ground. In particular, according to Henry, the dual nature of the divine relations is impossible, since a relation always takes all of its reality from its foundation. I will give two examples of specific arguments that he uses against the dual nature of the divine relations. First, if the relations are nothing when compared to their foundation, but have reality when compared to their terms, then in what sense do the relations exist in God? How can it be claimed that the category of relation is found in God at all, if it vanishes when compared to its foundation? This way of speaking, Henry maintains, makes it seem as though the divine relations are some kind of *ad hoc* addition, extrinsically attached to the essence solely in order to explain the distinction between the persons.⁴² According to Henry, only if the

⁴² Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariorum*, a. 55, q. 6: "Si <relatio in divinis> absque determinatione diceretur res – cum non sit res in se existens (quia non substantia), neque in se subsistens (quia non est persona), neque alteri inhaerens in divinis (quia in divinis non est accidens), neque similiter in creaturis (quia tunc non transferretur manens in divinis) – <relatio divina> esset ergo necessario, secundum opinionem Porretani, res extrinsecus affixa, quemadmodum et ille modus videtur esse quiddam affixum substantiae in quantum res est, secundum dictam opinionem, quae non ponit quod istam realitatem habeat a subiecto, sed potius ab obiecto, licet aliam realitatem habeat a fundamento, ut scilicet quod plures respectus habeant a fundamento quod sint res et una res, sed a diversis obiectis quod sint diversae res." Ed. Badius, vol. II, ff. 111vR–112rS = ed. Flores, pp. 214²⁴²–215²⁵⁶ (see Juan Carlos Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity* [Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006]). The opinion Henry is castigating here (*opinio Porretani*) is that of Gilbert of Poitiers (†1154).

divine relations take all of their reality from their foundation, the divine essence, and hence do not vanish when compared to it, can we truly claim that the relations are in God. This presents a clear problem for proponents of the dual nature of the divine relations. A second argument: if it were the case that relation had this sort of dual nature, we could just as well say that something could be an accident in one way and a substance in another. Bonaventure, for example, had said (see Quotation 1a) that relation compared to its subject is substance, while compared to its correlative opposite it is really distinct by opposition of relations, i.e., it is relation. But this makes no sense to Henry.⁴³

Thus, as a ramification of his ideas on the Aristotelian category of relation, Henry of Ghent rejects that the divine relations can have the type of dual nature that the relation account of personal distinction required them to have. Henry proceeds to take the consequences of his rejection and at a very basic level denies that relation (and especially opposition of relations) can be used to explain the distinction of the persons from one another. Having rejected relation, however, Henry must look elsewhere for a way to account for the distinction between the divine persons, and he turns to the emanations and the Franciscan trinitarian tradition. He says:

(ii) The properties of the emanations are distinguished among themselves . . . because they flow in diverse ways, or rather they are, as it were, diverse flows from the same substance. Thus, also the persons are diverse among themselves not so much because one proceeds from another, but because they proceed in diverse ways from the same [person] . . . Thus, although one person does emanate from another, they are nevertheless

⁴³ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 55, q. 6: "Praeterea, si relatio ex se eo quod est respectus et ad aliud esset res, tunc comparata ad substantiam non esset nisi modus tantum, et sic uno modo esset res, alio modo tantum modus, quod est inconveniens, sicut est inconveniens quod aliquid uno modo sit accidens, alio modo substantia." Ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 111rO = ed. Flores, p. 211¹³⁸⁻⁴¹.

diverse not because one person is from another, but because they are constituted from diverse properties of emanations.⁴⁴

For Henry, it is the way that the divine persons emanate or are given being that is the basis for their distinction: although one person does emanate from another (and hence there is opposition of relations), nevertheless it is the diverse ways in which they emanate that bring about the distinction between the persons. And with a point of departure in this view, Henry accepts all three of the elements that we have seen to be characteristic of the Franciscan trinitarian tradition. Thus, Henry claims that the Father is the Father because he generates, and that the basis of generation is primity in the first person, who is God innascible. Further, Henry accepts nested distinctions, as can be seen in Quotation 11 above, where indispensable emanational distinction is nested inside (counterfactually) dispensable relational distinction. And he claims that the Holy Spirit would be distinct from the Son, even if the Holy Spirit did not come from the Son, since they would be distinct on the basis of their disparate ways of emanating from the Father. While supporting all of these typically Franciscan views, Henry also injects a new element into Franciscan trinitarian theology: he claims that the emanation of the Son is the emanation of a mental word or concept from the paternal intellect, and that the emanation of the Holy Spirit is the emanation of zeal or enthusiasm from the will of the Father and the Son. In this way, Henry moves a psychological model of the Trinity into the heart of his trinitarian theology. That is the subject of the next chapter.

⁴⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinarium*, a. 55, q. 6: "Proprietates emanationum inter se distinguuntur . . . quia diversimode fluunt, vel potius sunt quasi diversi fluxus ab eadem substantia. Unde et personae inter se sunt diversae non tam quia una procedit ab altera quam quia diversimode procedunt ab eadem, ut dictum est supra. Unde cum una persona ab alia emanat, non tamen sunt diversae quia una ab altera est sed quia constituuntur diversis proprietatibus emanationum." Ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 111vR = ed. Flores 2006, p. 214²³⁰⁻³⁶.

The Trinity and human psychology: “In the beginning was the Word”

Thus far we have traced the origins and the development in the later thirteenth century of two approaches to the major challenge in trinitarian theology. That challenge is to explain how the three divine persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, can be distinct from one another personally, and yet identical with one another in the one simple divine essence. As detailed in Chapter 1, the two rival ways that arose of tackling the challenge were the relation account of personal distinction, held to mostly by Dominicans, and the emanation account of personal distinction, held to mostly by Franciscans. These groups each developed a set of fairly stable positions and arguments flowing out from a conception of the divine personal properties as relational or as emanational, respectively, and in this sense one can claim that they were rival trinitarian traditions.

There is yet another immensely important element in the trinitarian theology of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and it is this element that I will discuss in the present chapter as well as in Chapter 3: the psychological model of the Trinity. According to the psychological model, human psychology – the study of the human soul, and particularly the human mind, its architecture and its activities – can be employed to explain or clarify the Trinity.

The present chapter deals with the rise among Franciscans of the psychological model of the Trinity as *the* major way to explain the identity and distinction of the trinitarian persons. The psychological model, as we will see, was used in different ways by the two trinitarian traditions described in Chapter 1. In particular, the Franciscan trinitarian tradition, relying on an emanation account of personal distinction, came to use the psychological model in what I call a “strong” way: the Franciscans thought that the Son quite literally is a Concept produced by the Father’s intellect, and that the Holy Spirit is Love produced by the will shared by the Father and the Son. For the Franciscans in general, psychological theory, for example theories of concepts and their formation, could and should be used to answer trinitarian questions, and there is an incredibly close interaction in their writings between trinitarian theology and what we would today call the philosophy of mind. In the present chapter, then, I will first describe the psychological model of the Trinity and how the psychological model came to be used in a strong way in the Franciscan tradition. The most important player in this part of the story is Henry of Ghent, but I will illustrate how Dominicans disagreed with Henry concerning the proper interpretation of the model by also looking at John of Naples († *ca.* 1350) and Durand of St. Pourçain (†1334). In the second part of the chapter, I will concentrate on a giant of medieval thought, the Franciscan John Duns Scotus, many of whose ideas were influential well into the seventeenth century. In particular, I will examine Scotus’ views on the way in which the Son is a Word or Concept, and particularly the role that concept theory plays in trinitarian theology, as well as Scotus’ critique of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent on this issue. Thus, in the second part of the chapter the material that I will be dealing with is on the boundary between trinitarian theology and the philosophy of mind, and is intended to show precisely

how closely those two areas were linked for the later-medieval theologian.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE TRINITY AND
ITS PROPER INTERPRETATION

According to the psychological model of the Trinity, human psychology can be employed to explain or to clarify the Trinity. Why human psychology? The model takes its point of departure in the New Testament, and hence it has biblical authority behind it. In particular, there is the passage in John's Gospel:

(2a) In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made . . . And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father. (John 1.1–3, 14, Revised Standard Version)

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” The word that is here translated as ‘Word’ is *Logos* in the original Greek, and this was translated into Latin as *Verbum*. From the way the text runs in John's Gospel, it is clear that this Word, this *Verbum*, became flesh and walked on earth as Christ incarnate, so the divine Word is the second person of the Trinity, the Son. Beyond that, the text is enigmatic, and theologians in the early Christian era made quite a few divergent attempts at interpretation. The voice in Western Christianity who came up with the compelling interpretation was Augustine of Hippo. Augustine's view, elaborated in his *De trinitate*, was an attempt to clarify the identity and distinction of the divine persons in part by appealing to a psychological model of the Trinity, itself based on the words from John's Gospel.

Augustine posited that as a function of our minds there is an intellectual memory in which is contained all of the knowledge that we have ever gotten and hence all of the knowledge that is currently at our disposal. According to Augustine, because this knowledge in the memory is merely dispositional – that is to say, it is knowledge that we are able to think but are not thinking at the moment – the knowledge is prelinguistic in every way, belonging to no language. Augustine claims further that when we will to do so, we can focus the gaze of the mind, the mind's eye, on one particular piece of knowledge held in the intellectual memory, and, when we will in this way, that particular piece of knowledge is born as what Augustine calls the word of the heart (*verbum cordis*) or the mental word (*verbum mentis*), what we would today call a concept. For Augustine, the most important point to be recognized about the concept is that it is exactly like the knowledge in the memory from which it comes, including its being prelinguistic:

(2*b*) The human mind, therefore, knows all these things which it has acquired through itself, through the senses of its body, and through the testimonies of others, and keeps them in the treasure-house of its memory. And from them a true word is begotten when we say what we know, but the word is anterior to every sound and to every thought of sound. For then the word is most like the thing that is known . . . This is the word that belongs to no language, the true word about a true thing, having nothing from itself, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born.¹

¹ Augustine, *De trinitate* XV, 12, 22: “Haec igitur omnia, et quae per se ipsum et quae per sensus sui corporis et quae testimoniis aliorum percepta scit animus humanus, thesauro memoriae condita tenet. Ex quibus gignitur verbum verum quando quod scimus loquimur, sed verbum ante omnem sonum, ante omnem cogitationem soni. Tunc enim est verbum simillimum rei notae . . . quod est verbum linguae nullius, verbum verum de re vera, nihil de suo habens sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur.” Ed. Mountain and Glorie, pp. 493⁸⁷–494⁹⁶. Throughout this book, I have used the translation by Stephen McKenna, CSSR, *The Trinity (The Fathers of the Church, vol. 45)* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963).

The word and the knowledge in the memory from which the word is born are identical in every way except for the fact that the word is formed while the knowledge is not formed (since the knowledge in the memory is merely dispositional, i.e., ready to be formed); as Augustine says in Quotation 2b, the word has “nothing from itself, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born.” This is why the mental word is prelinguistic for Augustine: for him, the dispositional knowledge in memory is clearly prelinguistic (since it is not even being thought, let alone thought in language), and therefore the mental word is also prelinguistic, since they are precisely the same except for the fact that the word is formed while the knowledge in memory is not formed. The word, then, and the knowledge from which the word comes are identical except for this one minimal difference: that the one is formed or born and the other is not. In a famous phrase from the *De trinitate*, the mental word is *scientia de scientia, visio de visione* (“knowledge from knowledge, vision from vision”).² In a diagram, Augustine’s theory of the mental word would look something like Diagram E. Of the many pieces of knowledge contained in the intellectual memory, a_m (= piece of knowledge “a” in the memory), $b_m \dots x_m$, our will focuses the mind’s gaze on just one: x_m , that is to say: x in the memory. The result of this is that x_m is born as x_t , x as thought, and when that happens we are actually thinking x , and the only difference between x_m and x_t is the fact that x_t is actually being thought while x_m is not.

How does Augustine relate his theory of concept formation to trinitarian theology? Just as the mental word is identical with the knowledge from which it is formed or begotten, differing only insofar as it has been formed or begotten, so the Son is identical

² Augustine, *De trinitate* XV, 15, 24 (ed. Mountain and Glorie, p. 498²⁶).




Diagram E: Augustine's theory of the mental word in a diagram

with the Father who generated him, differing only on account of his having been generated by the Father. In fact, the divine Word is the Father's knowledge born, and since (on account of divine simplicity) the Father's knowledge *is* the Father's essence, the Word of God born from the Father's knowledge is the divine essence generated or begotten.³ Accordingly, the Father and the Son are one and the same divine essence, totally similar and totally equal, differing only because the Son or Word comes from the Father:⁴ they are the same essentially, distinct personally, and they are distinct personally on the basis of this one minimal difference. In this way, Augustine's psychological model clarifies part of the central trinitarian mystery, i.e., the identity and the distinction of the persons of the Father and the Son in the Trinity. The psychological model of the Trinity was extended by Augustine and later authors to include the Holy Spirit as the Love freely given between the two other divine persons, the Father and the Son.

³ Cf., e.g., Augustine, *De trinitate* XV, 13, 22 (ed. Mountain and Glorie, p. 49)³⁸⁻⁴⁹.

⁴ Augustine, *De trinitate* XV, 14, 23: "Verbum ergo Dei Patris unigenitus Filius per omnia Patri similis et aequalis, Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, sapientia de sapientia, essentia de essentia, est hoc omnino quod Pater, non tamen Pater quia iste Filius, ille Pater . . . Proinde tamquam se ipsum dicens Pater genuit Verbum sibi aequale per omnia. Non enim se ipsum integre perfecteque dixisset si aliquid minus aut amplius esset in eius Verbo quam in ipso." Ed. Mountain and Glorie, p. 496¹⁻¹⁰.

Before exploring the psychological details of this model of the Trinity as it was developed in the later Middle Ages, it is necessary to step back and examine just how the psychological model became a regular part of the Franciscan trinitarian tradition. In Chapter 1 we saw that Henry of Ghent, on the basis of his own theory of the category of relation, denied that any relation account of personal distinction could succeed. For Henry, relation on its own could not be used to explain how the persons were essentially identical but personally distinct. Therefore, Henry turned to the emanation account of personal distinction that the Franciscans roughly contemporary with him – like John Pecham – had been elaborating. As we saw Henry say in Quotation 11 above:

(2c) The properties of the emanations are distinguished among themselves . . . because they flow in *diverse ways*, or rather they are, as it were, diverse flows from the same substance. Thus, also the persons are diverse among themselves not so much because one proceeds from another, but because they proceed in *diverse ways* from the same [person] . . . Thus, although one person does emanate from another, they are nevertheless diverse not because one person is from another, but because they are constituted from *diverse properties* of emanations.

In order to further explain the “diverse properties of emanations” and the “diverse ways” in which they flow, Henry followed earlier theologians with Franciscan trinitarian tendencies who had appealed to texts from, among others, Augustine, John Damascene, Anselm, and Richard of St. Victor, suggesting to them that the emanation of the Son is by way of nature (*per modum naturae*), since the Son is born (*natus est*), and the emanation of the Holy Spirit is by way of will (*per modum voluntatis*), since the Holy Spirit is a Gift, and gifts are given voluntarily.⁵ This is, in fact, how the Franciscan trinitarian

⁵ See, e.g., for one authoritative text appealed to in this regard, Augustine, *De trinitate* V, 14, 15 (ed. Mountain and Glorie, p. 222⁹⁻¹⁰): “Exit enim <Spiritus Sanctus> non quomodo

tradition in general explains the differing ways the persons emanate: the difference between the emanation of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit is on account of the Son being emanated by way of nature through generation, and the Holy Spirit being emanated by way of will through spiration. John Pecham offers a good example of this:

(2d) It must be said that the emanations differ really because they are differing origins of differing persons; thus, formally the emanations differ in and of themselves, but they have [that they formally differ in and of themselves] from the fecundity of nature and of will – I would not say causally, but by way of origin (*originaliter*), not as things coming into being (*orientes*), but as ways of coming into being (*modi oriendi*).⁶

For Pecham, the emanations are the most basic distinction in God: he claims that the emanations differ really (*realiter*) and in and of themselves (*se ipsis*). But – and this is the important point here – the reason that they differ really and in and of themselves is that they are two different ways of coming into being, one emanation by way of nature, the other by way of will. The emanations differ on the basis of the fact that generation comes, as Pecham says, from “the fecundity of nature” while spiration comes from “the fecundity of will.” All of the Franciscans from the late thirteenth century whose works I have looked at would agree with Pecham on this point. On this Franciscan view, then, the persons are distinct because of their irreducibly distinct emanational properties (see Diagram B in

natus sed quomodo datus, et ideo non dicitur Filius” (“For the Holy Spirit went forth, not as one born, but as one given, and for this reason he is not called the Son”). It should be noted that describing the Son’s emanation as “natural” and the Holy Spirit’s as “voluntary” was not in itself an issue between the Franciscan and Dominican trinitarian traditions; what was at issue was the meaning of the terms ‘natural’ and ‘voluntary’ in these descriptions.

⁶ John Pecham, I *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 3: “Dicendum igitur quod <emanationes> differunt realiter, quia sunt origines differentes personarum differentium; ergo emanationes se ipsis differunt formaliter, sed a fecunditate naturae et voluntatis habent hoc – ne dicam causaliter, sed originaliter, non ut orientes, sed ut modi oriendi.” Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 44vb; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 40rb.

Chapter 1), and what is irreducibly distinct about the emanational properties is the way in which the person emanates: the Father is unemanated, the Son emanates by way of nature (a natural emanation like a child is born), and the Holy Spirit by way of will (a voluntary emanation like the way a gift is voluntarily given). In Quotation 2d Pecham makes explicit this link between the emanations, on the one hand, and their sources or points of origin, divine nature and divine will, on the other. Divine nature and will, in other words, are the sources in virtue of which the two emanations arise in fundamentally diverse ways and therefore are irreducibly distinct.

Henry of Ghent accepted this explanation for divine personal distinction, but, in contrast to the Franciscans prior to and contemporary with him, he overlaid on to the explanation the Augustinian psychological model of the Trinity. In order to understand this, it is important to recognize that in medieval philosophy and theology the intellect was commonly considered a “natural” faculty: presented with an intelligible object, an intellect understands that object “automatically” and in precisely the same way that it would understand any other intelligible object. Of course, in this context, “natural” is opposed to “voluntary”: the will does not act in a natural manner but in a voluntary manner characterized by freedom (although just what the term ‘freedom’ meant was a topic of debate). Capitalizing on this view of the intellect as a natural faculty, Henry linked emanation by way of nature with emanation by way of intellect, probably reasoning along the following lines. From Augustine (and others) he knew that the Son’s emanation is natural (because the Son is born) and that it is intellectual (because the Son is the Word); moreover, he knew that the intellect is a natural faculty; therefore he concluded that the Son’s natural emanation literally is intellectual, i.e., an emanation by way of the divine intellect. Henry developed the link between the emanation account and the psychological model extensively. Thus,

for Henry, the Father is unemanated, the Son is emanated by way of the divine intellect as a Word or Concept, and the Holy Spirit is emanated by way of the divine will as “Zeal” (*zelus*). Indeed, Henry claimed that it is the very fact that the Son’s emanation is an *intellectual* emanation that explained why the Son is distinct from both the Father and the Holy Spirit. Likewise with the Holy Spirit’s voluntary emanation: the very fact that it is voluntary (i.e., by way of the will, *voluntas* in Latin) explained why the Holy Spirit is distinct from both the Father and the Son. Intellectual and voluntary, then, are the diverse properties of the emanations that Henry was talking about in Quotation 2c, the properties that make the emanations distinct from one another and hence bring about the distinction between the persons. As a consequence, for Henry, the Son literally is a Word or a Concept and this explains the Son’s distinction from the other two persons.⁷

I want to describe as “strong” the way that Henry used philosophical psychology and the psychological model in trinitarian theology.⁸ Generally speaking, a theologian making strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology utilizes Augustine’s psychological model of the Trinity as the starting point in dealing with trinitarian theology, but more specifically a strong use is characterized by two major features. First, it stresses a tight link between the divine attributes and the divine emanations – the Son’s generation is, on this view, literally an intellectual emanation, an emanation by way of the divine intellect; the Holy Spirit’s emanation is literally an emanation by way of the divine will, and in this sense it is “voluntary.” Second,

⁷ The most condensed presentation of this theory is to be found in Henry’s *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1 (ed. Wilson, pp. 1–32, see esp. pp. 25–26 for Henry’s summing up), but the theory is found throughout his works, e.g., *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 54, q. 10 (ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 105vL).

⁸ In this book, I use as synonyms “strong use of the psychological model in trinitarian theology” and “strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology.”

a strong use is characterized by the attempt to consistently make a theory of, e.g., concepts and concept formation answer trinitarian questions – the Son is a Word or a Concept, therefore concept theory should in some way be directly applicable in the study of the Son in the Trinity; likewise, a theory of willing and volitions should be directly applicable in the study of the Holy Spirit. I will give a specific example of the strong use of concept theory in trinitarian theology toward the end of this chapter when we reach John Duns Scotus.

With his strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology, that is to say, his insistence that the emanations by which the Son and the Holy Spirit are constituted or given being (and hence are distinct from one another) are an intellectual and a voluntary emanation, Henry of Ghent injected a new element into the Franciscan trinitarian tradition of his day (see element *e* of Franciscan trinitarian theology in the Appendix). Indeed, the strong use of philosophical psychology became a standard part of Franciscan trinitarian theology until around the year 1320, when it began to decline in importance for several Franciscan theologians, including William Ockham. But from 1280 until 1320, for nearly all theologians sharing a Franciscan approach to the Trinity, and for many theologians writing after 1320, Augustine's psychological model became the point of departure in explaining identity and distinction in the Trinity.

But whereas Henry's strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology was a success among Franciscans, the Dominicans as a group rejected it. In fact, the Dominicans disagreed sharply with the Franciscan trinitarian tradition concerning the proper interpretation of the psychological model. Before discussing their reasons for doing this, it seems right to make two points about this fundamental disagreement between the two trinitarian traditions.

The first point is that Augustine was by no means explicit as to how he meant the psychological model to be taken: did he think it should be accepted literally as a statement about God's trinitarian reality, or did he think of it rather as a helpful analogy used to clarify a particularly difficult piece of Christian doctrine? Augustine does not really say. With this in mind, both the strong interpretation that Henry of Ghent (and many Franciscans) advocated and the less literal Dominican interpretation of the psychological model should be viewed as honest attempts at coming to grips with the available theological data, including Augustine's foundational works.

The second point to be made about the divergent tendencies in the Franciscan and Dominican trinitarian traditions is that, when one considers the fountainheads of the two traditions, Bonaventure and Aquinas, the historical development can seem a bit surprising. Bonaventure certainly mentions the psychological model when dealing with trinitarian theology in his *Sentences* commentary and his *Itinerarium*, but his discussions of it are relatively brief and do not go much beyond the point where Augustine left off.⁹ Moreover, when Bonaventure explicitly brings up the emanation of the Son, he describes it consistently as being "by way of nature" (*per modum naturae*) and not "by way of intellect" (*per modum intellectus*). In short, the psychological model and its application to the Trinity were not at the center of Bonaventure's trinitarian project. The same is true of the Franciscans who picked up on Bonaventure's stress on the emanations and reified it: theologians like John Pecham used the psychological model in their trinitarian theology in a rather elementary form. When one turns to Thomas Aquinas, the situation is very different. In his later works, for example in the first part of his

⁹ See, e.g., *Itinerarium mentis ad Deum* III, 5 (*Opera omnia*, vol. V, p. 305a–b); more diffusely *I Sent.*, d. 27, p. 2, a. un., qq. 1–4 and dubia (*Opera omnia*, vol. I, pp. 481–94).

Summa theologiae, not only does Aquinas adopt “by way of intellect” (*per modum intellectus*) as his nearly exclusive description of the way that the Son emanates; he uses a highly developed theory of concept formation to explain how human psychology can help clarify the trinitarian mystery.¹⁰ For Aquinas, in stark contrast to Bonaventure, the psychological model became the favored way of describing the distinction between the persons, and his use of the psychological model is correspondingly much more robust than is the Franciscan’s. To this extent, one can say that Aquinas’ heavy interest in and extensive employment of the psychological model contributed to Henry of Ghent’s development of the strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology: Henry merged Aquinas’ psychological insights with the Franciscan emphasis on emanations. In effect, the rejection of one crucial element in Aquinas’ trinitarian theology – the relation account of personal distinction – allowed Henry to link the emanation trinitarian theology of the early Franciscans with Aquinas’ development of the psychological model of the Trinity as a crucial aspect of trinitarian theology. As mentioned, after Henry made this link, most Franciscans picked up on it and adopted the strong use of philosophical psychology, linking in turn their emanation trinitarian theology – an inheritance from Bonaventure and his milieu – with philosophical psychology. Aquinas, on the other hand, despite the importance that he clearly attributed to the psychological model in trinitarian theology, would never have accepted Henry’s strong use of philosophical psychology as I have described it above. In this, Aquinas was setting the stage for most later Dominicans, who, however, did have the opportunity to subject Henry’s ideas to scrutiny and to reject them explicitly.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 27, aa. 3 and 5; q. 28, a. 4; q. 93, a. 6. These examples could be multiplied. For a description of the concept theory used by Aquinas, see below, at and around n. 24.

The best way to illustrate why the Dominicans as a group rejected the strong use of the psychological model is by examining yet another “flashpoint” between the Franciscan and Dominican trinitarian theologies, i.e., yet another specific issue in the trinitarian debate on which the two accounts, relation and emanation, were fundamentally at odds with each other, resulting in controversy between proponents of the rival views. This is the third flashpoint we have looked at, and it concerns the distinction between the two emanations – the distinction between the generation of the Son, on the one hand, and the procession or spiration of the Holy Spirit, on the other. Why are these two emanations distinct? For the Franciscans in general, holding to an emanation trinitarian theology, the persons are distinct on account of their three irreducibly distinct emanational properties, or rather, on account of the fact that the persons emanate or take being in three fundamentally different ways (see Diagram B in Chapter 1). Accordingly, the Franciscan tradition held that the emanations are distinct on the basis of something intrinsic to each of them, and this intrinsic distinguishing characteristic is the way the emanation came about. As mentioned above, normally it was claimed that the two emanations are distinct because the Son’s emanation, generation, is “natural” or by way of nature (since the Son is born, *natus est*), while the Holy Spirit’s emanation, spiration, is voluntary or by way of will. (The Father’s emanational property, it should be remembered, is that he is *unemanated*.) According to the strong use of philosophical psychology that Henry of Ghent introduced, the intrinsic characteristic that makes generation distinct from spiration is that generation is an intellectual emanation while spiration is a voluntary emanation. In other words, for Henry of Ghent and the Franciscans there is some kind of tight link between the divine attributes and the divine emanations; e.g., the Son is distinct from the other two persons because he emanates by way of intellect. And

the Franciscan trinitarian tradition means this literally: the Son is a Word or Concept emanated by way of the divine intellect, and the intrinsic property of that emanation is that it is intellectual. Moreover, the intellectual emanation of the Son is distinct from the voluntary emanation of the Holy Spirit precisely because the one is intellectual (i.e., coming from the divine intellect) and the other is voluntary (i.e., coming from the divine will). On the Franciscan view, then, there are no properties distinguishing of the Son and the Holy Spirit more basic than the ways in which these persons emanate, and these ways are linked with the divine intellect and the divine will, respectively.

In contrast, for the Dominicans – and they are quite explicit about this – the distinction between the emanations is at least definitionally posterior to the distinction between the persons, and the distinction between the persons is in turn brought about by opposition of relations. Thus, if we were to ask a Dominican theologian from the period why the emanations are distinct, the most popular response would be: because in generation one person comes from one person, while in spiration one person comes from two persons, that is to say, because in generation the Son comes from the Father alone, while in spiration the Holy Spirit comes from both the Father and the Son (see Diagram A in Chapter 1). The Dominicans claimed, then, that generation and spiration are distinct on the basis of the different arrangements between the persons (one person from one person *vs.* one person from two persons), and opposition of relations is built into the Dominican explanation for how the emanations are distinct. In this way, to the Dominicans, the distinction between the emanations is logically or definitionally posterior to and dependent upon the distinction between the persons, and the distinction between the persons is explained by opposed relations. Here we see again the ordering of trinitarian concepts that we saw above in Thomas

Aquinas:¹¹ opposed relations, then the persons, then the emanations. For the Dominicans, the most basic properties distinguishing the persons are the opposed relations, and fundamentally distinct ways of emanating, like “by way of nature” and “by way of will,” were of strictly secondary importance in their trinitarian scheme. In reply to the Franciscan insistence that there must be something intrinsic to the emanations that makes them distinct from each other, the Dominicans would claim that these intrinsic properties are precisely that, in generation, one person comes from one person, and, in spiration, one person comes from two persons. For Dominicans, this is the sole reason why the two emanations are distinct from each other.¹²

How does this Dominican view of the emanations affect their stance on the proper interpretation of the psychological model of the Trinity? When Dominicans discuss the productions or emanations of the persons in God, they insist, following up on hints found in Thomas Aquinas, that the power productive of the persons in God is the divine essence or nature, and not the intellect and the will as such.¹³ For the Dominicans, then, the Son’s generation cannot be “intellectual” if that is understood to mean that generation truly comes from the divine intellect, i.e., that the intellect is the source of generation, since the source of the Son’s emanation according

¹¹ See Chapter 1, at and around n. 18.

¹² For an example of this type of argumentation, see Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 7: “Dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur personaliter a Filio in hoc quod origo unius distinguitur ab origine alterius. Sed ipsa differentia originis est per hoc quod Filius est solum a Patre, Spiritus Sanctus vero a Patre et Filio. Non enim aliter processiones distinguerentur.”

¹³ For Aquinas’ hints, see, e.g., *Summa theologiae* I, q. 41, a. 5, solutio (on the Son); *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 15 (on Holy Spirit) and *passim* (ed. Bazzi, esp. pp. 259a–262a). For a more explicit statement, see, e.g., Thomas of Sutton, *Quodlibet* I, q. 4: “Unum et idem est principium omnium divinarum actionum, scilicet essentia divina. Unde una et eadem forma absolute est potentia generandi et potentia spirandi.” Ed. Schmaus and Haba, p. 39^{121–23}.

to the Dominicans is the divine *essence* and not the divine intellect. Likewise for the Holy Spirit: the source of the Holy Spirit's emanation is the divine essence, not the divine will. As far as the Dominicans were concerned, the Franciscans had gotten this completely wrong. Indeed, the Dominicans have some very strong arguments against the Franciscan position. One argument, which I will examine in some detail in Chapter 3, is that the merely rationally distinct divine attributes cannot act as the source of a real distinction like the real distinction between the divine persons, for the weaker cannot be the source of the stronger.¹⁴ But here we can examine two other Dominican arguments in response to this Franciscan view.

The first of these could already be found in Aquinas but was used at least into the fourteenth century. The argument runs like this. Through their respective emanations, the Son and the Holy Spirit receive the entire divine essence, and this is the reason that each of them is God. But the divine attributes of intellect and will are each just one aspect or facet of the divine essence and of the divine essential activity. Does it make sense, then, that an aspect of the essence is the source through which the entire divine essence is given to a divine person? Does it make sense that the divine essence in its entirety, including the divine intellect and the divine will and all the other divine essential attributes, is given to the Son and the Holy Spirit through the divine intellect and will respectively? For Aquinas and the Dominican trinitarian tradition, this made no sense, and they drew the conclusion that the source through which the essence is communicated to both the Son and the Holy Spirit must be, as just mentioned, the essence itself. If the divine intellect were the source of the Son, argued the Dominicans, then the Son would

¹⁴ See below at and around Quotation 3a (= Chapter 3, n. 2).

receive only what pertained in God to the divine intellect. *Mutatis mutandis* for the Holy Spirit: he would receive only what pertained in God to the will, if he were given his being by way of the divine will.¹⁵ To put it into more modern terms, the Dominicans thought that, on the Franciscan position, there would be a log jam preventing the communication of the entire divine essence to the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the divine intellect and the divine will are simply not comprehensive enough “delivery devices” to communicate the entirety of the essence of which they are attributes.

There is a second argument that I want to examine that was employed by the Dominicans against the Franciscan view that the Son’s emanation is an emanation by way of the divine intellect and the Holy Spirit’s emanation is an emanation by way of the divine will. This argument has to do with the precise meaning of the Holy Spirit’s “voluntary” emanation. Normally, when we think of the voluntary or of the will, we think of freedom, and a common-sense understanding of ‘freedom’ would seem to involve being able to act differently or otherwise than one actually does act. As we have seen, however, the Franciscans claim that the Holy Spirit emanates voluntarily by way of the divine will, and some, like Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, even claim that the most basic characteristic of the Holy Spirit’s procession by way

¹⁵ E.g., Aquinas, *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 2, resp.: “Cum enim oporteat in procedente inveniri similitudinem eius quod est processionis principium, sicut in rebus creatis similitudinem formae generantis necesse est esse in genito, oportet quod, si processionem in divinis distinguuntur per hoc quod principium unius est natura vel intellectus, alterius vero voluntas, quod in procedente secundum unam processionem inveniantur tantum id quod naturae est vel intellectus, in altero vero id quod est voluntatis tantum, quod patet esse falsum. Nam per unam processionem, quae est Filii a Patre, communicat Pater Filio quicquid habet, et naturam et intellectum et potentiam et voluntatem, et quicquid absolute dicitur.” Ed. Bazzi, pp. 259b–260a. For a fourteenth-century version of the argument, see, e.g., John of Naples’ *Quaestio disputata* 13 (ed. Schmaus, pp. 135^{*40}–136^{*13}), where John (p. 135^{*40}) calls this argument the better (*melius*) of those that he offers there against the Franciscan view.

of will is its freedom. For Henry and for Scotus, this was merely taking seriously the fact that the persons are distinct on the basis of their different ways of emanating: the Son's natural, intellectual emanation *vs.* the Holy Spirit's free, voluntary emanation. But the Dominicans quite sensibly ask Henry and Scotus: what is entailed by the fact that the Holy Spirit's voluntary emanation is free? Does this mean that the Father and the Son were able to have chosen *not* to spirate the Holy Spirit? Since freedom is usually characterized by the ability to do otherwise, that would seem to follow.¹⁶ And yet the conclusion is clearly absurd: all medieval theologians maintained that the spiration of the Holy Spirit is strictly necessary and could not be otherwise. Given the Dominican insistence that necessary and free are mutually exclusive, they maintain that 'voluntary' in the phrase "the Holy Spirit's voluntary emanation" must mean something other than what we normally mean when we talk about "voluntary" and about "will." It cannot be, as the Franciscans claim, that emanation by way of will involves a free will through which the Holy Spirit is in some way emanated.¹⁷

¹⁶ In reply to this criticism, some Franciscans advocate on this issue a form of compatibilism on which a free act of the will is perfectly compatible with that act's full determination. Thus, for thinkers like Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, the Holy Spirit is necessarily freely emanated by the Father and the Son by way of the divine will. These thinkers hold, then, that *natural* and free are mutually exclusive, while *necessary* and free are not.

¹⁷ For an argument and a conclusion like this, consider Hervaeus Natalis, *De personis divinis*, q. 5: "Per comparationem ergo principii activi ad actum eliciendum quo producitur Spiritus Sanctus, dico quod Spiritus Sanctus non procedit per modum voluntatis, immo aequae per modum naturae sicut Filius. Nunc autem in divinis nulla actio intrinseca vel productio subiacet voluntati agentis sic quod sit in potestate sua producere vel non producere sive producere hoc vel illud, immo ex natura sua producens personam divinam est determinatum necessario ad eam producendam. Et ideo per comparationem principii activi ad actum eliciendum nulla productio potest dici voluntaria, sed simpliciter et absolute omnis productio sic accepta est naturalis." The text is quoted from Michael Schmaus, *Der "Liber propugnatorius" des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, II Teil: *Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1930), p. 212.

For reasons like these, the Dominicans deny that the emanation of the Son has anything to do with the divine intellect and that the emanation of the Holy Spirit has anything to do with the divine will. It is easy to see that, if the emanations of the Son and the Holy Spirit have nothing to do with an intellect and a will, respectively, then the Son's intellectual emanation as a Word and the Holy Spirit's voluntary emanation as Love or as a Gift have to be understood in a way strikingly different from the Franciscan intrinsic way. How do Dominicans understand the psychological model? I will give two examples.

The first example comes from the Dominican theologian John of Naples. When John inquires into the reason why the emanation of the Son is the emanation of a Word and why the emanation of the Holy Spirit is the emanation of Love, he claims:

(2e) The Son is truly and properly called the Word, not because truly and properly he has only or more principally that which belongs to the intellect than that which belongs to the will, as is the case with the word of our intellect, but because [the Son] truly and properly has that which is found in the word of our intellect, namely that it emanates through an emanation not presupposing another emanation. And something similar must be said about the Holy Spirit with respect to Love.¹⁸

For John, what is most important about the Son, the divine Word, is not that he has something inherently to do with an intellect (he

¹⁸ John of Naples, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 30, ad 1: "Dicendum est quod Filius dicitur vere Verbum et proprie, non quia vere et proprie habeat solum vel magis vel principalius id quod est intellectus quam id quod est voluntatis, sicut est de verbo intellectus nostri, sed quia vere et proprie habet id quod invenitur in verbo intellectus nostri, quod scilicet emanat secundum emanationem non praesupponentem aliam, et simile est dicendum de Spiritu Sancto respectu Amoris." Text quoted from Richard Schneider, *Die Trinitätslehre in den Quodlibeta und Quaestiones disputatae des Johannes von Neapel OP* (†1336) (Munich, Paderborn, and Vienna: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1972), p. 45 n. 55. This way of accounting for the distinction between the emanations can already be found in Aquinas, e.g., *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 7, ad 11 (ed. Bazzi, pp. 260b–261b).

does not), but rather that, like a human word, his emanation does not presuppose another emanation. Likewise, the Holy Spirit is called Love, not because the Holy Spirit's emanation is voluntary or comes from the will, but rather because, like human volitions, his emanation presupposes another emanation, i.e., the emanation of the Son. What lies behind this view is the intuition that you cannot will something without knowing it, and so you have to first form a concept by which you know something (that is the first emanation) and only then do you form a volition by which you will or love that thing (that is the second emanation). So, just as the emanation in our minds of a volition concerning some object always presupposes the prior emanation of a concept concerning that same object, so the emanation of the Holy Spirit presupposes the emanation of the Son, and this is the reason why the Son's emanation is intellectual and the Holy Spirit's is voluntary. It should be emphasized that, true to the Dominican trinitarian tradition, opposition of relations is built into this view as John understands it, and the Holy Spirit must come from both the Father and the Son in order for generation and spiration to be distinct from each other (see Diagram A in Chapter 1). Indeed, John's scheme for the reason that the emanations are distinct from each other is functionally equivalent to the Dominican scheme mentioned above (at n. 12), on which generation is the emanation of one from one, while spiration is the emanation of one from two.¹⁹ Most importantly, John's explanation has the effect of undermining the strong use of the psychological model. Thus, for John of Naples, the Son's emanation is an intellectual emanation not because it has anything to do with the divine intellect, but rather

¹⁹ In line with this, John holds the typically Dominican view (see element $\sim c$ under "Dominican trinitarian theology" in the Appendix below) that the Holy Spirit would not be distinct from the Son, if the former did not come from the latter; see John's *Quaestio disputata* 13, "Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio, si non procederetur ab eo," ed. Schmaus.

because it is the first emanation in God, just as the emanation of our concepts is the first emanation in our minds. Likewise with the voluntary emanation of the Holy Spirit: it is not because the will is the source of the Holy Spirit's emanation, but rather because the Holy Spirit's emanation presupposes the Word's emanation just as human voluntary emanations presuppose the emanation of the concept. Simply put, there is nothing particularly psychological about the psychological model of the Trinity in John of Naples, since it is based on resemblance between the way that the persons emanate in God and the way that human psychology works. There is no intellect or will at work on this Dominican view of the psychological model: the simple divine essence is the source of the emanations, and the distinction of the persons is based on opposition of relations.

When in Quotation 2e John of Naples says that "the Son is truly and properly called the Word," we should pay particular attention to the term 'properly', since in medieval trinitarian theology it is opposed to "by appropriation." An "appropriated" divine name truly denotes a common (i.e., an essential) divine attribute, but for specific historical or theological reasons we nevertheless say this name about, or "appropriate" this name to, one of the three persons more than the other two. Standard medieval examples of appropriated names would be 'power' and 'wisdom', both of which are truly said of all three persons (since God is omnipotent and wise), but which are appropriated to, or said most particularly about, the Father and the Son, respectively. This is what the Dominicans wanted to guard against: they did not want to be seen to be saying that 'Word' is a name "appropriated" to the Son, since they knew from Scripture that "In the beginning was the Word" and that the Word *is* the Son, i.e., 'Word' is a proper name of the Son. So, Dominicans, like John of Naples, attempt to say that the Son is *properly* a Word, while

nevertheless denying that the Son's way of emanating has anything to do with the divine intellect. John was engaged in a balancing act on which the emanation of the Son as a Word was basically understood metaphorically (that is to say, according to resemblance alone), while nevertheless 'Word' itself was a proper name for the Son. There is, however, one Dominican, Durand of St. Pourçain, who did not hesitate to say that the entire psychological model, even the name 'Word', is appropriated:

(2f) I say that 'Word' properly from its very meaning (*vi nominis*) indicates something essential and not personal, nevertheless from appropriation it is drawn to the personal, as 'wisdom' is . . . No one, then, ought to imagine that the Son proceeds from the Father through a mental act of saying, and that thereby the Word properly comes about; nor [ought they imagine that] the Holy Spirit [proceeds] from the Father and the Son through an act of the will, and that thereby Love properly comes about. This is because, with all acts of the intellect and the will set aside, still the Son's generation and the Holy Spirit's procession would be in the divine . . . but such names are apt for them on account of those things that we see in the created trinity.²⁰

Durand rejects entirely the idea that the psychological model can properly be applied to God; it is merely appropriated. This is true not only for the ways in which the Son and the Holy Spirit emanate, by way of intellect and will, respectively, but even for the names 'Word' and 'Love'. Nearly all Dominicans contemporary with Durand will disagree with him on the latter point – like John of Naples, they will claim that the term 'Word', for example, is a proper name of

²⁰ Durand of St. Pourçain, I *Sent.* (C), d. 27, q. 3: "Dico enim quod 'Verbum' de vi nominis et proprie dicit aliquid essenziale et non personale, ex appropriatione tamen trahitur ad personale sicut 'sapientia' . . . Nullus ergo debet imaginari quod Filius procedat a Patre per actum dicendi mentalem, et ideo fiat Verbum proprie, et Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio per actum voluntatis, et ideo fiat amor proprie, quia circumscriptis omnibus actibus intellectus et voluntatis adhuc esset in divinis generatio Filii et processio Spiritus Sancti . . . sed talia nomina eis aptantur propter illa quae videntur in trinitate creata." Ed. Venice 1571, f. 79rb–va.

the Son – but Durand’s view is at a very basic level simply taking a (significant) step further the Dominican position that there is nothing psychological about the psychological model.²¹

For the Franciscans, the Dominicans were completely missing the point. According to John’s Gospel, the Son is a Word, and that meant that the Son’s emanation is quite literally intellectual; moreover, Augustine had made it clear enough (see the text in n. 5 above) that the Son is emanated by way of nature and the Holy Spirit by way of will as a Gift. On the basis of these authoritative statements, the Franciscans insisted that the intrinsic property of the Son’s emanation is that it is by way of nature or (this is the same) by way of intellect; the intrinsic property of the Holy Spirit’s emanation is that it is by way of the divine will. The sources of these emanations, then, are divine nature (intellect) and divine will, respectively. This difference in sources is the ultimate explanation as to why the emanations are distinct. The Dominican way of distinguishing the emanations could never explain why the Son is a Word that proceeds by way of intellect and nature, and the Holy Spirit a Gift and Love proceeding by way of will. For the Franciscans, the Dominican view was based on a loose extrinsic resemblance to human psychological makeup, and this made the psychological model and the entire emanation account of personal distinction metaphorical or appropriated. The altercation between the two groups could get quite nasty: consider what John Pecham says when he argues against Thomas Aquinas’ view that generation is distinct from spiration because in generation one person comes from one person, while in spiration one person comes from two persons:

²¹ The situation is complicated by the fact that at Paris sometime between 1268 and 1272 the regent masters of theology (including Pecham, Gerard of Abbeville [†1272], and Aquinas) had condemned the view that ‘Word’ is not a purely personal (i.e., proper) name for the Son.

(2g) If [the two emanations] only differ because [generation] is from one while [spiration] is from two, then the Son's emanation is no more by way of nature than is the Holy Spirit's emanation, except by appropriation. Likewise, neither will the Holy Spirit's emanation be by way of love except through appropriation, nor will the Holy Spirit be Love properly [speaking]. If, therefore, it is heretical to say this, then the above-mentioned position [of Aquinas!] is not far removed from heresy.²²

According to Pecham, the Dominican way of looking at the distinction between the emanations approaches heresy! The Son has to be properly emanated by way of nature; the Holy Spirit has to be properly Love because of the Holy Spirit's emanation by way of will. The emanations must be distinct on the basis of properties intrinsic to them, not because of the types of extrinsic resemblances posited by the Dominicans.

Pecham did not use the psychological model of the Trinity in a strong way: he was writing before Henry of Ghent had suggested the strong use. But John Duns Scotus adopted Henry's strong use. This is what Scotus has to say about Dominican views concerning the psychological model of the Trinity:

(2h) This explanation [i.e., the Dominican] does not seem tenable when we consider what the saints say, for they attribute these productions properly to the intellect and the will. This is because, if the [productions] ought to be understood to be distinct only because one production [spiration] does presuppose another production, while the other production [generation] does not presuppose one, then there seems to be no reason why on the basis of their productions the Son on account of the way he is produced (*vi suae productionis*) is more the Son or the Word than the Holy Spirit is, nor why the

²² John Pecham, I *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 3: "Item, si per hoc differunt tantum, quod iste ab uno, ille a duobus, ergo emanatio Filii non est per modum naturae plus quam emanatio Spiritus Sancti nisi per appropriationem. Similiter nec e converso emanatio Spiritus Sancti erit per modum amoris nisi appropriative, nec Spiritus Sanctus erit amor proprie. Si ergo hoc est haereticum dicere, praedicta positio non est ab haeresi multum remota." Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 44vb; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 40rb.

Holy Spirit on account of the way he is produced (*vi suae productionis*) is more Love than the Son is, and that seems absurd . . . a person is truly produced by the act of the intellect as a productive source, and another person by the act of the will as a productive source, and not just metaphorically on account of some type of extraneous likeness, for example to be produced with another presupposed or not presupposed.²³

Scotus rejects outright the type of view that we saw defended by the Dominican John of Naples. According to Scotus, the only way in which the Son can properly be the Word, as John the Evangelist and Augustine and other saints tell us he is, is if he is produced by an act of the divine intellect, and the same is true of the Holy Spirit being produced by an act of the divine will. The way the Dominicans interpret the psychological model is metaphorical, according to Scotus, and their metaphorical use is set in explicit contrast to Scotus' own (in my terminology) strong use. For Scotus, the Son is literally a Word or Concept produced by the divine intellect, and this, as we have seen, is a defining characteristic of the strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology.

CONCEPT THEORY AND TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

In the remainder of this chapter, I will use Scotus as my guide in giving a case study of how a strong use of the psychological model

²³ John Duns Scotus, *I Ord.*, d. 13, nn. 21, 23: "Ista expositio non videtur valere secundum intentionem sanctorum, attribuentium istas productiones proprie intellectui et voluntati; quia si tantum debeant intelligi distingui per hoc quod una praesupponit aliam productionem et alia productio nullam praesupponit, non videtur ratio quare ex productionibus Filius sit magis Filius vel Verbum ex vi suae productionis quam Spiritus Sanctus, nec quod Spiritus Sanctus ex vi productionis suae magis sit amor quam Filius, quod videtur absurdum . . . vere produceretur persona per actum intellectus ut principii productivi, et alia persona per actum voluntatis ut principii productivi – et non tantum metaphorice, propter talem similitudinem extraneam, scilicet produci, alia praesupposita vel non praesupposita." V, p. 74¹⁴⁻²¹, p. 75⁹⁻¹³. (All references to Scotus in the present book are to volumes in the Vatican *Opera Omnia*.)

actually affected the period's philosophy of mind and trinitarian theology. For Western Christianity, Augustine is the one who tied the Trinity and philosophy of mind together, by formulating a compelling way of discussing how the Son is a Word or Concept, how the Holy Spirit is Love or a Gift. In the university world of the thirteenth century, Henry of Ghent made this a major element of Franciscan trinitarian theology. But how did it work in practice? How was concept theory used in trinitarian theology in the later Middle Ages to explain the way in which the Son was distinct from the other two persons? This is what I want to address by looking at Scotus' use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology and his criticism of the views of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. What I hope to show is that philosophical psychology and trinitarian theology blend or merge, so that, for a proponent of the strong use of the psychological model, a theory of concepts not only has to explain in a satisfactory manner how we human beings understand the world, but it also has to give a satisfactory interpretation of what Augustine said about the mental word (it becomes very much a matter of Augustine exegesis), and it further has to give a persuasive explanation of trinitarian identity and distinction. Let us turn, then, to philosophical psychology, and the background in later-medieval cognitive theory necessary in order to understand Scotus and his view.

First, we need to recall Augustine's theory of concept formation (see Diagram E above). For Augustine, a concept or mental word is formed when the will focuses the gaze of the mind on one particular piece of knowledge contained in the intellectual memory. The mental word, then, is the active thinking of the merely dispositional knowledge contained in the memory. Very important for Augustine was that the word and the knowledge in the memory from which the word is born are identical in every way except

for the fact that the word is formed while the knowledge is not. The word is “knowledge from knowledge, vision from vision” (see n. 2 above). Now, in the thirteenth century, the major motor of change in medieval cognitive theory was the increasing availability in Latin translation of Aristotle’s psychological works, and especially his *De anima*. These psychological texts, along with several commentaries on them by Muslim thinkers in particular, had introduced Western Christian scholars to the Aristotelian view of the mechanics of cognition and of concept formation, a view on which, to quote the general empiricist principle, “nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses.” It is one of Thomas Aquinas’ major achievements that he combined the Aristotelian model of cognition with the Augustinian theory of the mental word. It was mentioned above (at n. 10) that Henry of Ghent’s development of the strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology was conditioned by the importance that Aquinas in his own trinitarian thought assigned to the psychological model; just as important, however, for Henry’s development of the strong use were Aquinas’ direct contributions to medieval cognitive theory. To understand these contributions one needs to become familiar with the general later-medieval understanding of the stages in human cognition as represented in Diagram F.

Medieval cognitive theorists looked at the cognitive process as composed of several relatively distinct stages or moments in the processing of the data we receive from the senses, culminating in intellectual cognition, that is, in the formation of a concept. They also postulated a basic divide between the material senses and the immaterial intellect. The senses, both the external senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, and the internal senses like the common sense and the imagination, deal with material aspects of the world around us, they deal with the here and now, and hence always




Diagram F: Very general depiction of the cognitive process as understood in the later Middle Ages (e.g., in Aquinas)

have some material conditions associated with them. The intellect, on the other hand, deals with necessary, universal, and immutable knowledge, and hence can have no aspect of materiality associated with it (since matter is a principle of change and particularity). The bridge between the material senses and the immaterial intellect is the agent intellect, which makes actual what is only potentially intelligible in our sense data. The agent intellect does this by producing an immaterial representation, called an intelligible species, which the agent intellect then impresses (or “stamps”) upon the potential or possible intellect. The intelligible species represents what is universal and unchanging about the object of intellection, that is to say, its essence or nature. According to the Aristotelian theory of intellectual cognition that Thomas Aquinas inherited, once the intelligible species is impressed upon the possible intellect, there is intellectual cognition. Aristotle’s theory explains how we arrive at original knowledge, i.e., knowledge based upon direct sensory acquaintance with extramental reality. The problem that Aquinas faced was that Augustine’s theory of the mental word explains how we call up or reactivate habitual knowledge, i.e., knowledge that we already possess. Since, for Augustine, the knowledge in the memory has been acquired in the various ways that we are able to acquire

knowledge (see Quotation 2b above), it is already at our disposal in our memory. So, from the Aristotelian tradition, Aquinas inherited an explanation for original knowledge, while from the Augustinian tradition he inherited a very different explanation for habitual, memory knowledge. Aquinas forged a theory of concept formation that smoothly melded these two legacies together. In Aquinas' synthesis, the Augustinian mental word becomes an element added on to the whole Aristotelian process of cognition. Whereas the Aristotelian process had ended with the intelligible species being impressed upon the possible intellect, Aquinas adds a step: he claims that the possible intellect informed by the intelligible species is Augustine's intellectual memory, and that the possible intellect itself, informed by the intelligible species, is capable of having its own act, from which issues a product that is distinct from the act itself. The product of the possible intellect's act is what Aquinas calls the *conceptio* or mental word, "because it is what is signified by the exterior," i.e., linguistic, "word." The concept or word, according to Aquinas, is not the same as the intelligible species abstracted by the agent intellect, because the intelligible species is the source of the possible intellect's further act. Moreover, the word is not identical to the act of the possible intellect, through which the word is formed, because the word is the term, the endpoint or product, of the act.²⁴ Summing up Aquinas' view, we can say that the act of the possible intellect, the mental

²⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1: "Differt <conceptio> a specie intelligibili, nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus, cum omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu; actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. Differt <conceptio> ab actione intellectus, quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis, et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum. Intellectus enim sua actione format rei definitionem, vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam . . . Haec autem conceptio intellectus in nobis proprie verbum dicitur, hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur: vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum, neque speciem intelligibilem neque actum intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem." Ed. Bazzi, p. 215a. Aquinas suggests that the possible intellect informed by the intelligible species is the intellectual memory in, e.g., *Summa theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 6, solutio and ad 1.

act, is productive of a term, it has a product, and this product is the mental word or concept. In modern-day terminology, we would say that Aquinas has an “act-object” theory of intellectual cognition: the intellectual or mental act (I use the terms interchangeably) produces a term or object, and the object produced is the concept. This is the way that Aquinas synthesized the Augustinian and the Aristotelian theories of intellectual cognition, and it was a remarkably influential synthesis, for it was to become the subject of intense debate for the next fifty years and more.

John Duns Scotus was one of many who responded to Aquinas’ view, and the psychological model of the Trinity has a large role to play in his response. Scotus’ reply to Aquinas is fundamentally a rejection of the act-object theory of concepts. Whereas for Aquinas the word is the product of the intellectual act, Scotus cannot see how this can be maintained, since – and here we see just how important trinitarian theology is to later-medieval psychology – it would contradict Augustine to claim that the word is the product of the act of understanding rather than the direct product of the intellectual memory. As we have seen, Augustine had explicitly stated that the word was begotten from the knowledge in the memory, but on Aquinas’ theory, according to Scotus, it would be the understanding (i.e., the intellectual act) and not the memory that brought about the word. Scotus claims:

(2i) This view is also disproved . . . because [if it were true], then the understanding and not the memory would give birth to the word, which runs contrary to Augustine, for the understanding would produce the term (*terminum*) of the action of understanding (if there were such a term).²⁵

²⁵ John Duns Scotus, I *Ord.*, d. 27, n. 57: “Improbatur etiam haec via . . . quia tunc intelligentia gigneret verbum et non memoria, quod est contra Augustinum; intelligentia enim produceret illum terminum actionis intelligendi, si quis esset.” VI, p. 87¹⁻⁵.

Thus, one of the major reasons that Scotus gives for not holding an act-object theory of concepts, like Aquinas' theory, is a theological one: the act-object theory is a misinterpretation of Augustine's fundamental texts. What Scotus seems to have in mind here is that, on Aquinas' theory, a mental act falls between the intellectual memory (the possible intellect infused with an intelligible species), on the one hand, and the word, the product of the mental act, on the other (see Diagram F above). Thus, Scotus read Aquinas' theory to say that the intellectual memory is the source of the intellectual act, which in turn is the source of the mental word or concept. Scotus appears to think that the very fact that the intellectual act on Aquinas' view mediates between the memory and the word is enough to violate Augustine's dictates on the mental word, and in particular the dictate that the word comes directly from the intellectual memory. Whereas for Augustine, the word was identical to the knowledge in the memory, differing only because the word was thought, Aquinas insisted on the word being the product of the mental act. For Scotus this rules out the immediacy between memory and word that he sees in Augustine's theory, an immediacy that, among other things, accounted for the identity and distinction of the divine persons. Accordingly, for Scotus, only a mental-act theory of concepts could possibly be reconciled with the characteristics that Augustine tells us mental words possess. Thus, Scotus would say that the element labeled "intellectual act" on Diagram F, above, is the concept; no product or term of the intellectual act is necessary. In fact, according to Scotus, a product or term would spell the ruin of the psychological model of the Trinity by conflicting with the Augustinian foundations of the model, and those foundations were laid precisely to clarify trinitarian theology. Today we might call a theory of concepts like the one Scotus is defending an "adverbial" theory of intellectual cognition, on which the mental act has no

term; the mental act itself is the concept. On an adverbial theory of intellectual cognition, the content of a concept is determined by modifications of the mental act itself, modifications best expressed by an adverb. Say that I am thinking the universal concept *bird* or *tree*. A proponent of an act-object theory of concepts, like Aquinas, would claim that I am understanding bird or tree in virtue of the fact that my intellectual act produces an intentional object, *bird* or *tree*, and this intentional object both is what my thought is about and is the concept, strictly speaking. In contrast, a proponent of an adverbial theory of intellectual cognition would say that the concept is the intellectual act itself, and that it is the way that I am understanding, as expressed through an adverb, that determines the content of my thought. Thus, it is because I am understanding “birdly” or “treely” that I think *bird* or *tree*, and “birdly” or “treely” expresses in each case the way that I am understanding, i.e., the modification of the mental act. On an adverbial theory, then, the production of an intentional object by the intellectual act is eliminated, and this is precisely Scotus’ point against Aquinas.

If the importance of trinitarian theology to the issue of concept formation is clear in Scotus’ reply to Thomas Aquinas, Scotus’ own theory of concepts emerges most clearly in contrast to the ideas of Henry of Ghent, and here too trinitarian theology plays a major role. In what follows, I will first briefly present Henry’s ideas on concepts and their formation, and then turn to Scotus’ reply to them, emphasizing the trinitarian elements in both.

Henry’s theory of concepts, mental words, can be seen largely as an attempt to explain how the word is *scientia de scientia* (“knowledge from knowledge”) or in Henry’s more usual rendition *notitia de notitia*. As we saw above, *scientia de scientia* was the important Augustinian phrase that indicated how the word and the knowledge from which it comes are identical except that the one comes from the

other, just as the Father and the Son are identical except that the Son comes from the Father. When Henry takes *scientia de scientia* as a major guideline in his theory of concepts, what he wants to specify is the nature of the knowledge, the *scientia*, that exists before, and the nature of the knowledge or *scientia* that comes after. Henry postulates a two-tiered or two-layered intellectual process in forming a word. First, we attain a vague or “confused” universal knowledge of the thing intellected. Then we process that confused knowledge through discursive reasoning, and we ultimately arrive at the essential characteristics of the thing intellected, what the medievals called its *quod quid est* or quiddity. When we arrive at the essential characteristics, we form a mental word or concept.

In detailing his theory of concepts, Henry maintains that first intellectual acquaintance with anything yields merely what he calls “simple knowledge.” As soon as an intelligible likeness of the object of intellection is impressed on the possible intellect by the agent intellect we have simple knowledge, and Henry, like Aquinas, calls the possible intellect infused like this the intellectual memory (compare Diagram F above). According to Henry, this simple knowledge is “confused,” it is all mixed up and fused together, it is unclear and vague knowledge. Since this confused knowledge is unsatisfactory to us, our will incites our intellect to clarify it by investigating it:

(2j) The intellect, moved by the command of the will and by its own active force, strengthens and sharpens its gaze on the thing cognized, and it strives to penetrate to the interior of the thing confusedly cognized, so that it knows clearly what it is in the parts making up its essence . . . Now a word comes about at that point when, through the possible intellect’s discursive reasoning, which has already been mentioned, along with the agent intellect’s illumination and irradiation over what was confusedly cognized, the essential parts . . . are made actually intelligible, and are proposed distinctly to the possible intellect . . . that is the way we have true and perfect knowledge of an incomplex thing, by finding as it were in the memory what was

hidden in it and then there is formed something having a complete likeness to it.²⁶

It is our will that commands the intellect to get to the bottom of what we have only confusedly understood, according to Henry. We desire to know the essence of the object of intellection. By using the power of the agent intellect, its “illumination and irradiation,” as well as using a process of discursive reasoning that takes place in the possible intellect itself, the intellect determines the essence of whatever it is attempting to understand. This process of determining the essence of the object of understanding, Henry normally calls “investigation” (*investigatio*). Only when the intellect has fully investigated the object of intellection is a concept or mental word produced. This word is, as we just saw Henry write, “true and perfect knowledge,” and he also calls it “declarative” knowledge, since it clearly expresses the essence or *quod quid est* of the thing understood.²⁷ As mentioned above, Henry’s main purpose in his theory of concepts is to explain precisely how the word can be *scientia de scientia* as

²⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 58, q. 2: “Intellectus autem motus imperio voluntatis et propria vi activa eius, aciem suam in rem cognitam fortius et acrius figit, et penetrare nititur interiora ipsius cogniti confuse, ut in partibus integrantibus eius essentiam ipsum limpide quid sit cognoscat . . . Et tunc fit verbum quando, per discursum iam dictum possibilis intellectus, et cum hoc illustratione et irradiatione agentis super confuse cognitum, partes eius essentielles . . . facta sunt actu intelligibilia, et distincte proponuntur intellectui possibili . . . hoc est quo veram et perfectam habemus de incompleto notitiam, quasi inveniendi in memoria quod in ea latebat atque inde formatur eius omnimodam similitudinem capiens.” Ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 130v1–K.

²⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 54, q. 9: “Cum enim noster intellectus per diversas differentias sub genere discurrit investigando de re scita simplici notitia quod quid est eius, quam investigationem <Augustinus> appellat volubilem cogitationem, investigatione eius completa habita ultima differentia quod appellat Augustinus pervenire ad id quod scimus, tunc primo interiora rei scitae deteguntur . . . et simplici notitia existens in memoria <noster intellectus> generat de se quasi subito collectis omnibus differentiis cum genere quod quid est, quod in ipsa intelligentia est quaedam notitia distinctiva et discretiva seu declarativa, quam ‘verbum’ appellamus, in quo res ipsa existens ut explicata per partes, movet ipsam intelligentiam ut intelligat cogitando, non cogitatione volubili, qualis erat ante verbi formationem, sed stabili qua res perfecte cognoscitur et scitur.” Ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 104vC.

Augustine tells us it is. In line with this, Henry claims that the first *scientia* is confused knowledge that is not a word, and then, after investigation of that confused knowledge, there is perfect knowledge that is a word. In Henry's theory, then, knowledge is very much fixed exclusively on two levels: simple confused knowledge, which is not a word, followed by investigation, and on the basis of the investigation comes declarative knowledge, that is to say, the mental word. Confused knowledge, then investigation, then declarative knowledge: this is the route that we follow in forming a concept. Henry captures the stages in this process of forming a word or concept by altering Augustine's phrase *scientia de scientia* into *notitia de notitia, declarativa de simplicibus*: knowledge from knowledge, declarative from simple.²⁸

John Duns Scotus has major problems with Henry's theory. Apart from several strictly philosophical objections that I will not go into here, Scotus also has objections that involve theological considerations. In particular, Scotus thinks that Henry deviates all too much from Augustine and the nature of a mental word into which Augustine's texts give us insight. As far as Scotus is concerned, Henry's word does not correspond to Augustine's, who had claimed that the word was *scientia de scientia, visio de visione* ("knowledge from knowledge, vision from vision"). Henry's significant alteration of this to *notitia de notitia, declarativa de simplicibus* reflects the fact that, for Henry, the knowledge in the intellectual memory is simple and confused, while the knowledge produced from it, the mental word, is perfect and declarative. In other words, for Henry, all mental words are complete or perfect: there is confused knowledge in the memory and that is not a word, and then there is perfect, fully investigated

²⁸ For the phrase, see Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 58, q. 2 (ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 131rK).

knowledge, and that is a word. There are no imperfect words – we either “get it” fully or we do not, and as long as we do not get it fully, we do not have a word or concept.²⁹ Knowledge, for Henry, is located exclusively on two levels.

For Scotus, this is entirely unacceptable, since Henry had made the mental word very different from the knowledge contained in the intellectual memory by too closely tying together the investigation of the knowledge contained in the memory with the formation of the word itself. Since, for Henry, a word is formed only when we have completely figured things out, on Henry’s theory investigation of the object of intellection is to all intents and purposes an integral part of the formation of a word. Henry’s pulling of investigation so tightly into the process of word formation itself, such that no word could be formed without a complete investigation, suggested to Scotus that Henry thought that the word was not merely the knowledge generated or born, but the knowledge *investigated*. But according to Augustine, the only difference between a word and the knowledge from which it is formed is precisely that the word is formed; this is all important, since this is the way that Augustine explains how concept formation mirrors the Trinity, in which the Father and the Son are completely identical except that the Son comes from the Father. So, Scotus thinks that Henry’s *notitia de notitia, declarativa de simpliciter* is a serious distortion of Augustine’s phrase *scientia de scientia*. In sum: Scotus thought that Henry had not sufficiently divorced investigation from concept formation *per se*. To be sure, Scotus thinks that investigation – or what he usually calls “inquisition” – is involved in some way in arriving at a perfect

²⁹ Interestingly, Thomas Aquinas also defended a two-step process of arriving at a concept (see, e.g., Aquinas’ *Commentary on John’s Gospel (Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura)*, c. I, lectio 1.26 [ed. Cai, p. 8b], and see *ibid.* [ed. Cai, pp. 7–8] for a concise presentation of Aquinas’ theory of the mental word).

word, that is to say, at “definitive knowledge” that fully analyzes and defines the very first confused knowledge of something we have at our disposal in our memory.³⁰ But, according to Scotus, the inquisition, on the one hand, and the word formation, on the other, must be two separate processes. And this is because, as we know from Augustine, the word must perfectly mirror that knowledge contained in the memory from which the word *immediately* comes. A word and the knowledge from which it immediately comes differ only because one is formed, while the other is not; it is not that they differ because the one is investigated and the other is not. This means that, in opposition to Henry, Scotus will maintain that not all words are perfect, since full inquisition is not an integral part of word formation. Thus, Scotus says:

(2k) All begotten knowledge – what Augustine calls an “offspring” – is a word . . . each and every actual intellection is born from the memory, imperfect [intellection] from imperfect [knowledge in the memory], just as perfect from perfect.³¹

According to Scotus, then, we can indeed have imperfect concepts, and he reaches this conclusion by drawing a sharp distinction between the process of inquisition (what Henry called “investigation”) and the process of forming or begetting a word: inquisition, according to Scotus, is no more than a type of prerequisite (*quasi praevia*) to concept formation. Accordingly, Scotus claims outright that “being formed after inquisition” is not an essential feature of a mental word,

³⁰ John Duns Scotus, I *Ord.*, d. 27, n. 75: “Sic ergo intelligendum est quod cognito aliquo obiecto confuse, sequitur inquisitio – per viam divisionis – differentiarum convenientium illi; et inventis omnibus illis differentiis, cognitio definitiva illius obiecti est actualis notitia perfecta et perfecte declarativa illius habitualis notitiae quae primo erat in memoria; et ista definitiva notitia, perfecte declarativa, est perfectum verbum.” VI, p. 92^{15–20}.

³¹ John Duns Scotus, I *Ord.*, d. 27, nn. 72–73: “Quaelibet autem notitia genita – quam Augustinus vocat prolem – est verbum . . . quaelibet intellectio actualis gignitur de memoria, imperfecta de imperfecta sicut perfecta de perfecta.” VI, p. 91^{10–16}.

although it is an essential feature of the gradual process whereby we finally reach a perfect mental word.³² In this way, Scotus takes inquisition out of the loop of concept formation proper, maintaining instead that our intellect must move gradually from confused knowledge of the intelligible object to more and more distinct knowledge.³³ For Scotus, in the process of going from an imperfect, uninvestigated word to a perfectly investigated word, a series of words are formed, each word accurately reflecting the dispositional or habitual knowledge in the intellectual memory from which the particular word is born. Scotus even gives us a relatively detailed picture of how this process works, represented in Diagram G.

As illustrated there, on Scotus' theory there is a dynamic interplay between habitual knowledge in the memory (i.e., the intelligible species), inquisition, and the formation of actual intellection, i.e., a mental word or concept. Thus, starting from confused habitual knowledge, we think that knowledge as a "confused" actual intellection or mental word; the habitual knowledge and the actual knowledge are identical in terms of their level of "confusion." Then, after inquisition, less confused knowledge is impressed into the intellectual memory as habitual knowledge (i.e., a new intelligible species that is more focused is formed and impressed in the possible intellect), and from this less confused habitual knowledge an equally

³² John Duns Scotus, I *Ord.*, d. 27, n. 77: "Non ergo est de ratione verbi gigni post inquisitionem, sed necessarium est intellectui imperfecto – qui non statim potest habere notitiam definitivam obiecti – habere notitiam talem post inquisitionem; et ideo verbum perfectum non est in nobis sine inquisitione. Et tamen quando verbum perfectum sequitur talem inquisitionem, illa inquisitio non est generatio ipsius verbi formaliter, sed quasi praevia ad hoc ut generetur verbum . . . ista iactatio (id est inquisitio) non est gignitio verbi formaliter, sed eam sequitur gignitio verbi de eo quod scimus, id est de obiecto in memoria habitualiter cognito." VI, p. 93⁷⁻¹⁹.

³³ John Duns Scotus, I *Ord.*, d. 27, n. 74: "Intellectus noster non statim habet notitiam perfectam obiecti . . . et ideo primo, ordine originis, imprimitur nobis notitia obiecti confusa, prius quam distincta, – et ideo est inquisitio necessaria ad hoc ut intellectus noster veniat ad distinctam notitiam; et ideo est necessaria inquisitio praevia verbo perfecto, quia non est verbum perfectum nisi sit notitia actualis perfecta." VI, p. 92⁷⁻¹⁴.

"Confused" memory (= possible intellect infused with an intelligible species) → "confused" word (i.e., concept)



More perfected memory (= possible intellect infused with a more "focused" intelligible species) → new, more perfect word



Still more perfected memory (= possible intellect with an even more "focused" intelligible species) → new, still more perfect word



..... (= this iterative process of inquisition and word formation continues) → penultimate new word



Perfect memory (= possible intellect infused with most "focused" intelligible species) → perfect word (= the word most resembling the divine word, i.e., fully analyzed)

Diagram G: Scotus' theory of arriving at a perfect concept (i.e., mental word)

less confused actual intellection can be formed. This iterative process continues until distinct habitual knowledge is deposited in the memory, which is at this point called “perfect memory,” and then a perfect word – this is the human word that most resembles the divine Word – can be formed. Inquisition is no longer necessary at this point: we have “got it” or figured it out, having fully analyzed the confused knowledge that we started with in the memory. At all stages in the process, the actual knowledge formed is precisely like the habitual knowledge in the memory from which it was formed, except that the actual knowledge, the word, is formed, while the habitual knowledge is not. Inquisition is a separate process from concept formation *per se*. This is how Scotus formulates his theory:

(2) First there is habitual confused knowledge, second actual confused intellection, third inquisition (and in inquisition many words [are formed] about many pieces of habitual knowledge virtually contained in the memory), and, following the inquisition, distinct and actual knowledge [is formed] of the first object for the sake of which inquiry is being made – and this actual, distinct knowledge impresses perfect habitual knowledge in the memory, and then for the first time there is perfect memory, and this memory best resembles (*assimilatur*) the memory in the Father. Finally, a perfect word is born from the perfect memory without any inquisition mediating between the memory and the word, and this begetting best resembles (*assimilatur*) the begetting of the perfect divine Word from the perfect paternal memory.³⁴

I want to make two points about this passage. First, it is important to recognize that here Scotus is using Augustine’s psychological model of the Trinity to correct Henry of Ghent’s ideas on concept

³⁴ John Duns Scotus, I *Ord.*, d. 27, n. 78: “Primo est habitualis notitia confusa, secundo actualis intellectio confusa, tertio inquisitio (et in inquisitione multa verba de multis notitiis habitualibus virtualiter contentis in memoria), quam inquisitionem sequitur distincta et actualis notitia primi obiecti cuius cognitio inquiritur – quae notitia actualis distincta imprimit habitualementem perfectam in memoriam, et tunc primo est perfecta memoria, et assimilatur memoriae in Patre; ultimo, ex memoria perfecta gignitur verbum perfectum, sine inquisitione mediante inter ipsam et verbum – et ista gignitio assimilatur gignitioni Verbi divini perfecti ex memoria paterna perfecta.” VI, p. 94¹⁻¹⁵.

formation. Scotus' dynamic view, involving a multiplicity of knowledge leading up to the perfect word, replaces Henry's view that knowledge is at two levels only. In this way, Scotus thought he could best capture Augustine's dictum, *scientia de scientia, visio de visione*, thereby ensuring that the word and the knowledge from which it comes mirror each other totally, with the one exception that the word comes from the knowledge. Scotus' primary aim, then, is to safeguard that, when a word is formed on the basis of some knowledge in the memory, the word is in every way the same as the knowledge, except insofar as it has been formed or thought. Second, we should note that in Quotation 21 Scotus gets us back to the Trinity itself: our perfect word best resembles the absolutely perfect divine Word begotten by the memory in the Father. In fact, Scotus uses trinitarian theology directly against Henry and his theory of concept formation. For Henry, the knowledge in God corresponding to confused knowledge in us is God's essential knowledge, and hence the divine Word is declarative of that essential knowledge. This presents a problem for Henry, who himself admits that there cannot be any confused knowledge in God – all of God's knowledge, including his essential knowledge, is perfect – and yet Henry has to insist that the divine Word is “declarative” of the essential knowledge from which it comes, since otherwise the divine Word would not fit his own definition of ‘word’.³⁵ Scotus' question for Henry is: in what sense is the divine Word declarative? The essential knowledge from which the Word comes is just as perfect as the Word itself is, and thus, as far as Scotus can see, the divine Word cannot be “declarative” in any significant way. And, if the divine

³⁵ E.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1: “Quamvis notitia divina essentialis omnino sit perfecta, tamen habet tantum rationem simplicis manifestationis, Verbum autem habet rationem manifestativi et declarativi eius quod notitia essentiali manifestum est.” Ed. Wilson, p. 18^{69–72}. See the similar statement in *Summa quaestionum ordinatarum*, a. 58, q. 2 (ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 131vM–N).

Word is not declarative in any significant way, in what way is the divine Word a word at all, since in that case an essential feature of mental words is impossible to accommodate to the divine Word? Making “declarative” an essential feature of a mental word has the effect of setting the divine Word outside of the class of things that are words or concepts, since in a perfect God there can be neither any inquisition nor any confusion to clear up.³⁶ Thus, Scotus thought that Henry’s own definition and description of a word undermined any application of it in trinitarian theology, and hence undermined Henry’s own strong use of the psychological model; further, they did not meet Augustine’s own description of a word. For all of these trinitarian-related reasons, Scotus maintained that Henry of Ghent’s theory of concept formation should be rejected.

With his many criticisms of Henry’s theory recognized, however, it is clear that Scotus learned a great deal from Henry, and what he learned allowed him to come up with a theory that is radically different and, it might be argued, even superior to Henry’s as an interpretation of Augustine, as an explanation of concept formation, and as a clarification of trinitarian theology. Indeed, all of this thought that Scotus devotes to the nature of human mental words is prompted (in part) by the fact that he wants to apply his own concept theory directly to the divine Trinity. Hence, Scotus’ theory of concepts answers to both philosophical demands and theological demands. It is a crystal-clear example of what I have called a strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology.

In this chapter I have shown how the proper interpretation and use of Augustine’s psychological model of the Trinity was the object of intense debate between the Dominican trinitarian tradition with

³⁶ John Duns Scotus, *I Ord.*, d. 27, n. 70: “Contra istud arguo sic: si de ratione verbi sit ‘gigni inquisitive’, ergo Deus non habet Verbum.” VI, p. 90¹²⁻¹³.

its relation account of personal distinction, and the Franciscan trinitarian tradition with its emanation account of personal distinction. For the Dominicans, there was nothing particularly psychological about the psychological model: the Son's emanation was not "intellectual" because it had anything to do with the divine intellect. The Franciscans, on the other hand, following Henry of Ghent, used the psychological model in a "strong" way: the Son is a Word or Concept, and the reason the Son is distinct from both the Father and the Holy Spirit is precisely that the way in which he emanates, intellectually by way of the divine intellect, is irreducibly distinct from the ways in which they emanate (remembering that the Father's way of emanating is *not* emanating). John Duns Scotus' ideas illustrate well just how a strong use of philosophical psychology affected both philosophy of mind and trinitarian theology. But Scotus' strong use of the psychological model – like all strong uses of the model – is founded upon a tight link between, on the one hand, the emanations of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and, on the other, the divine attributes, intellect and will. And an important part of Scotus' theory on this topic is that the divine intellect and will are "formally" distinct – there is actually in God some kind of less than real distinction between the divine intellect and will – since there had to be a distinction in God between intellect and will in order to ground the distinction between the emanations and the persons. The question arises: what happens when a theologian rejects Scotus' formal distinction and goes on to deny that there are distinct intellect and will in God? What if a theologian were to maintain that, apart from the distinction between the divine persons and properties, God is absolutely simple? In Chapter 3, I will look at three Franciscans who took precisely this line: Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, and William Ockham. That will be the story of a significant change in the status of the psychological model as an element in Franciscan trinitarian theology.

CHAPTER THREE

The Trinity and metaphysics: the formal distinction, divine simplicity, and the psychological model

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES, THE SEARCH FOR SIMPLICITY, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF TRINITARIAN EXPLANATION

I want to begin this chapter by taking stock of where we are in our story. In Chapter 1, I sketched out two different ways in which later-medieval theologians tried to explain how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are personally distinct but essentially identical. Specifically, Dominican theologians, following Thomas Aquinas, turned to the very relations between the persons to explain how they were distinct, utilizing what I called the “relation account of personal distinction.” Franciscan theologians, on the other hand, following a tendency in Bonaventure’s thought, appealed to the different ways that the divine persons emanate, or receive being, to explain how they are distinct from one another. In Chapter 2, I showed how yet another major element in later-medieval trinitarian thought was brought into play: the psychological model of the Trinity. This model, descending from Augustine of Hippo, claims that human psychology – particularly the activities and architecture of the human mind – in some way reflects the Trinity, and hence can be used to illuminate or maybe even to explain the identity and distinction of the divine persons. In particular, the Son is a mental

Word or Concept, and Augustine described in some detail how the formation of a concept in our minds resembles the way that the Father and the Son are completely identical except for one minimal distinction. In the late thirteenth century, Franciscan authors, following Henry of Ghent, maintained that the Son is literally a Word, emanated by way of the divine intellect, and it is precisely because the Son's emanation is an intellectual emanation that he is distinct from both the Father and the Holy Spirit, each of whom emanates in a different way than the Son does, the Father being *unemanated*, the Holy Spirit being emanated by way of will. So, for the Franciscans, the way that the Son emanates, intellectually, is *the* property of the Son that makes him distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit. I called this a "strong" use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology. In contrast to these typical Franciscan views, Dominican theologians, holding a relation account of personal distinction, claimed that the Son's emanation is "intellectual" and the Holy Spirit's is "voluntary" because their emanations resemble in some way or another the emanation of a concept and the formation of a volition in human beings. Most Dominicans did insist that 'Word' is a proper name of the Son – it is not appropriated to him or metaphorically applied to him – but the fact that the Son is a Word has nothing to do with the divine intellect. Furthermore, one Dominican, Durand of St. Pourçain, said outright that the Son is a Word in a purely metaphorical way: we call the Son a Word because the emanation of the Son resembles the emanation of a word in us, but the Son is by no means literally a word (see Quotation 2f). For Durand, there is nothing properly intellectual about the Son or his emanation, and the psychological model says nothing properly about God's trinitarian reality. It is this aspect of the story – whether the psychological model is properly or merely metaphorically applicable to God – that I want to take further in the present chapter

by examining the views on the matter of three fourteenth-century Franciscan authors: Peter Auriol (†1322), Francis of Marchia († after 1344), and William Ockham (†1347).

The fact that I am choosing three *fourteenth-century* Franciscan authors requires some comment. In Chapters 1 and 2, I concentrated mostly on thirteenth-century developments, and most of the theologians I discussed in some detail – Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, John Peckham, and Henry of Ghent – were thirteenth-century authors. The one major exception to this is John Duns Scotus, who wrote most of his theological works during the first decade of the fourteenth century; but, as I will argue shortly, Scotus can be viewed as a part of the thirteenth-century Franciscan trinitarian tradition. In the present chapter and in Chapter 4, then, attention will be shifted to fourteenth-century trinitarian thought. Now, the history of medieval philosophy and theology, especially in more general secondary literature, is often presented as if around the year 1300 there is a rather sharp division in the character of the thought produced: there is thirteenth-century thought and that is something quite different from fourteenth-century thought. Just to give two specific examples: the thirteenth century is generally characterized as metaphysical and speculative, while the fourteenth century is characterized as logical and empirical; the thirteenth century is presented as realist when it comes to the question of universals, whereas the fourteenth century is presented as nominalist. In accordance with this division at around 1300, specialized secondary literature frequently confines itself *either* to thirteenth-century developments *or* to fourteenth-century developments. Now that the focus of this book is shifting to the fourteenth century, I want to address explicitly whether I think this historiographic pattern can be seen in the period's trinitarian thought: is it correct to say that there is a sharp change in the character of

trinitarian theology around the year 1300? My answer is: yes and no. Let us take the negative answer first.

Against there being any kind of sharp divide around year 1300 is the fact that from 1250 until at least 1350 there is a great deal of continuity in the trinitarian discussion. Consider the case of John Duns Scotus. As the material presented in Chapter 2 should make clear, Scotus' trinitarian theology is an integral part of the late thirteenth-century Franciscan trinitarian tradition: Scotus holds an emanation account of personal distinction, he makes use of the psychological model of the Trinity in a strong way, and his major discussion partner throughout his trinitarian theology is Henry of Ghent, another central figure in the Franciscan trinitarian tradition. It does not in any way detract from Scotus' immense creativity and tremendous intellectual achievement to claim that he fits very comfortably into the late thirteenth-century Franciscan trinitarian tradition. But Scotus is also the point of departure for a great deal of fourteenth-century Franciscan trinitarian theology: there were a large number of thinkers – men like Henry of Harclay (†1317), William of Alnwick (†1333), Landulph Caracciolo (†1351), and Francis of Meyronnes (†1328) – who in their trinitarian theology appear to see their goal as building on the foundations that Scotus had laid. These theologians were by no means necessarily slavish followers of Scotus: they often developed and updated Scotus' trinitarian ideas in interesting ways, especially in response to opponents of those ideas. Moreover, they sometimes openly rejected aspects of Scotus' trinitarian system. Nevertheless, Scotus' ideas played a central role in their individual trinitarian projects. In this way, John Duns Scotus acted as a conduit from the Franciscan trinitarian tradition in the thirteenth century to the Franciscan trinitarian tradition in the fourteenth century, and in this respect there is marked continuity in the entire period's

trinitarian discussion. The same can be said about Thomas Aquinas in relation to the Dominican trinitarian tradition: Aquinas served as the point of departure for quite a few theologians in the fourteenth century – in Chapter 2, I mentioned John of Naples, but throughout the fourteenth century there were many others strongly influenced by Aquinas – and this too gives a cohesiveness and coherence to the discussion of the Trinity across the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries. Finally, there are quite a number of thinkers from the later period whose trinitarian theologies more or less defy classification as “Scotistic” or “Thomistic,” but whose interests and techniques were clearly continuous with the earlier period.

With all that continuity acknowledged, however, there is also an important element of discontinuity in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century trinitarian discussion, and this element of discontinuity, as it is manifested by a small number of the period’s scholastic theologians, is what I personally find to be the most interesting and significant part of fourteenth-century trinitarian theology. When a fourteenth-century theologian develops or modifies the thought of Scotus or Aquinas, it is clearly important and definitely worthy of study; but when a fourteenth-century theologian rejects a position that had gone completely unquestioned in his order’s trinitarian tradition, or even argues for a view that was basically unheard of in the thirteenth century, that is, for me, still more interesting and significant. This is the reason why I am concentrating in the present chapter and in the next on the element of discontinuity.

I think that there is one main theological motivation that lies behind the discontinuous developments in the fourteenth-century trinitarian discussion, and I call that motivation “The Search for Simplicity.” A number of theologians from the early to the mid-fourteenth century take defending God’s absolute simplicity to be the most important goal in trinitarian theology, and their preoccupation

with this is reflected in their solutions to the traditional theological questions that we have been following in this book. One way to begin to think about the general impact that the search for simplicity was to have on trinitarian theology is by considering *explanation*. What is involved in coming up with an explanation for a certain state of affairs? It seems clear that we need to analyze the state of affairs itself. And as part of this analysis, we have to figure out what comes first and what comes second, and how various things are related to one another such that precisely *this* state of affairs obtains. In other words, as soon as we start explaining something, we proceed to break it up into parts, and give those parts some kind of order and mutual relationships. Succinctly put: in order to explain something we need to draw distinctions. That is what is most significant for our purposes here: explanation and analysis involve drawing distinctions. This is as true in trinitarian explanation as in any other type of explanation: if we claim, for example, that opposition of the divine relations is the explanation for why the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are essentially identical and personally distinct, then we have already implied that the divine relations are in some way or another distinct from the divine essence and persons: we are able to isolate the relations as one item in the complex of items that is the state of affairs that needs to be explained. Explanation requires distinction. Moreover, in the case of the Trinity we cannot say that the distinction is a merely rational or psychological distinction, drawn by the human intellect, because what we are trying to explain is something about God, something real: why the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are essentially identical and personally distinct. A rational distinction will not help in explaining something real like that.

Now, the theologians I have examined thus far in this book all thought that the types of distinctions that they were positing in order to explain certain facts about the Trinity were fully

compatible with divine simplicity. Medieval theologians were in general extremely sensitive to the fact that God is perfectly simple, and they often addressed explicitly and at length the issue of the compatibility between the distinctions that they were drawing, on the one hand, and divine simplicity, on the other. In short: no medieval university theologian thought that any distinction he posited to be in God compromised divine simplicity. Nevertheless, simplicity can be something of an elastic concept, admitting of degrees, and, as our consideration of explanation would indicate, the more strictly a medieval theologian takes divine simplicity to be, the less room he is going to have for any kind of explanation in trinitarian theology, since the distinctions upon which analysis and explanation are built up will be ruled out. This is what happens in the fourteenth century: a group of theologians to all intents and purposes claim that divine simplicity is more important than trinitarian explanation. These theologians say that, as soon as we appeal to the trinitarian explanations that had often been used in the thirteenth century – e.g., the relation account, the emanation account, and the psychological model – we compromise or destroy divine simplicity through the postulation of distinctions in God, and therefore we should not appeal to those explanations. This fourteenth-century tendency in trinitarian theology is what I am referring to by the phrase “the search for simplicity”: trinitarian explanation is, to one degree or another, ruled out by the attempt to preserve absolute divine simplicity. Ultimately, theologians who followed the search for simplicity judged that it was better to leave matters unexplained than to posit the distinction in God that would be required in order to explain them.

In this chapter and the next, I will present manifestations of the search for simplicity in the fourteenth century. In Chapter 4 I will illustrate how the search for simplicity affected the explanation for the distinction between the divine persons by examining thinkers like

Walter Chatton, Robert Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini. I will also discuss there how the rejection of explanation in trinitarian theology fits with the common description of fourteenth-century thought as “fideistic.” In the present chapter, however, I will look at how the search for simplicity manifests itself in the discussion of the psychological model of the Trinity. What links the search for simplicity with the psychological model is the sources of the emanations, the divine intellect and the divine will: how are these two sources distinct from each other, and does that distinction compromise divine simplicity? As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the two major characteristics of a strong use of the psychological model was the insistence upon a tight link between the emanation of the Son and the divine intellect, on the one hand, and the emanation of the Holy Spirit and the divine will, on the other hand. The Son’s emanation is an intellectual emanation as a Word by way of the divine intellect. The Holy Spirit’s emanation is a voluntary emanation as Love or a Gift by way of the divine will. In fact, Henry of Ghent claimed explicitly that the ultimate source of all plurality, not only in the Trinity but in the universe at large, is the distinction between the divine intellect and the divine will.¹ Thus, according to basically any form of the strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology, the distinction between the divine persons is based upon some type of distinction between the divine attributes. Now, in Chapter 2 (at n. 14), I mentioned that the Dominicans had a reply to this view, a reply they in fact got from Thomas Aquinas:

¹ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 54, q. 4: “Plurificatio enim creaturarum praesupponit ordine durationis plurificationem divinarum personarum, et illa <plurificatio divinarum personarum praesupponit> ordine quodam rationis plurificationem attributorum, de quorum numero sunt intellectus et voluntas, quae sunt duo principia operationum omnis intellectualis naturae, quae cum ceteris omnibus essentialibus ad divinam essentiam pertinent.” Ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 87vB.

(3a) Others [e.g., Franciscans] say that the difference [between generation and spiration] is taken from the fact that generation [the procession of the Son] is the procession of nature and the procession of the Holy Spirit is the procession of will. But this cannot be right, since will and nature in the divine are distinct by reason alone (*solum ratione distinguuntur*). Therefore, this kind of [rational] distinction cannot be the basis (*ratio*) for the real distinction [between the persons], because the source is not weaker than what comes from the source.²

Aquinas maintains that, because nature and will in God are merely rationally distinct, they cannot be the source of the real distinction between the persons: if that were the case the source would be weaker than that which comes from the source, and clearly Aquinas thinks that to be absurd. This argument by Aquinas is picked up and used by basically everyone holding a Dominican trinitarian theology based on opposition of relations. Thus, for Aquinas and the Dominican trinitarian tradition, the source of the emanations is not the distinct divine attributes of nature and will, but, as we saw in Chapter 2 (at n. 13), the divine essence. Two things ought to be noted about Aquinas' criticism. First, Aquinas is attacking here the distinction of the persons being based on *nature* and will, but later Dominicans employ this same criticism as a way of dismissing a strong use of the psychological model in trinitarian theology according to which the persons are distinct on the basis of their emanations by way of *intellect* and will. For Dominicans coming after Aquinas, then, this argument shows that the divine intellect and divine will cannot be the sources of the Son and the Holy Spirit, respectively; it is not because it comes from an intellect that the emanation of the Son

² Thomas Aquinas, I *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, solutio: "Et ideo alii dicunt quod differentia sumitur ex hoc quod generatio est processio naturae, et processio Spiritus Sancti est processio voluntatis. Sed hoc etiam non competit: quia voluntas et natura in divinis solum ratione distinguuntur. Unde talis distinctio realis distinctionis ratio esse non potest, quia principium non est debilius principiatio."

is intellectual: that is not possible, and hence the strong use of the psychological model is not possible. A second point should be made about Aquinas' statement in Quotation 3a: one result of the position he takes in this argument is that he can claim to countenance fewer distinctions in God than his opponents do, and hence he can claim to support a more robust notion of divine simplicity. For Aquinas and the Dominican trinitarian tradition, the divine attributes cannot be distinct enough to serve as the source of the real distinction between the divine persons, and this suggests that they thought that the explanation that the Franciscans favored for why the emanations are distinct from each other would have the effect of compromising divine simplicity.

The Franciscan trinitarian tradition from an early date came up with an answer to Aquinas' criticism, and I will use John Pecham to illustrate it:

(3*b*) And what [Aquinas] argues, that nature and will [in God] are the same, is true as regards the way in which they exist (*in ratione essendi*), but not as regards the way in which they act as a source (*in ratione principiandi*). For, since there is truly nature and truly will in the Father, it is required that each has the operation that suits it, i.e., that each is the basis of an operation. Hence, the Father can elicit one operation from the property of nature and another from the property of will.³

For Pecham, it is true that the divine attributes are absolutely the same in terms of the way that they exist, but they are nevertheless distinct in terms of the way that they *act*, and, understood in this way, divine nature and will in the person of the Father are the bases

³ John Pecham, I *Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2: "Et quod <Aquinas> arguit, quia idem sunt natura et voluntas, verum est in ratione essendi, sed non in ratione principiandi, cum enim in Patre sit vere natura et vere voluntas, oportet utraque habere operationem sibi convenientem, id est esse rationem operandi. Unde Pater ex proprietate naturae potest unam operationem elicere et ex proprietate voluntatis aliam." Firenze, BNC, Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854, f. 41r; Napoli, BN, VII C 2, f. 38ra.

for the emanational distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. This type of response will by no means satisfy a Dominican critic of the Franciscan emanational trinitarian theology, but it is related to the way in which Henry of Ghent answers Aquinas' criticism. This is Henry of Ghent's justification, then, for his strong use of the psychological model:

(3c) The nature that is intellect, and the will, can be considered in two ways in the person who is not from another [i.e., in the Father]. In one way without qualification and absolutely; in this way they are nothing other than the sources of the essential actions that are understanding and willing. In another way [intellect and will can be considered] as being together with the relative properties; in this way they are the proximate sources of the notional actions that are saying and spirating [i.e., the productions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, respectively]. In the first way, it is true that they differ among themselves solely rationally, and in this way they cannot be the proximate sources of the diverse personal emanations . . . although they are the remote sources. But [considered] in the second way, it is not true that [intellect and will] differ solely rationally . . . For, although they are not relatively opposed, they are diverse disparate real relations insofar as they are in the person who is not from another person [i.e., in the Father].⁴

Henry offers a solution to the problem raised by Aquinas that is related to the solution that we saw in John Pecham, both solutions taking their point of departure in two ways of considering the divine attributes and both solutions focusing on the way the attributes exist in the person of the Father. Specifically, for Henry, when they

⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 54, q. 4: "Natura quae est intellectus et voluntas dupliciter possunt considerari in persona illa quae non est ab alia. Uno modo simpliciter et absolute; sic sunt principia praecisa actionum essentialium quae sunt intelligere et velle. Alio modo ut cum proprietatibus relativis; sic sunt principia proxima actionum notionalium, quae sunt dicere et spirare. Primo modo verum est quod sola ratione differunt inter se, nec sic possunt esse principia proxima diversarum emanationum personalium . . . licet sint principia remota. Secundo autem modo non est verum quod sola ratione differunt . . . Sunt enim diversae relationes reales disparatae, licet non relative oppositae, secundum quod sunt in persona quae non est ab alia." Ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 88rE.

are considered as essential attributes, the divine intellect and will are merely rationally distinct and serve exclusively as the remote sources of the divine emanations. But considered as they exist in the person who does not emanate from another, i.e. in the Father, these attributes are the proximate or immediate sources of the emanations, the intellect as it is in the Father being the proximate source of the emanation of the Son, and the will in the Father (and the Son) being the proximate source of the emanation of the Holy Spirit. As they exist in the Father alone, the otherwise merely rationally distinct divine essential attributes do have enough distinction from each other to act as the source of the distinct emanations and the really distinct persons. This is how Henry maintained the strong link between the sources of the emanations, the divine intellect and will, on the one hand, and the emanations themselves, on the other. Moreover, Henry used this strong link in a type of “proof” for there being three and only three divine persons: in God, as in any purely intellectual nature, there are only two productive sources, intellect and will. Since the productive power of each of these sources is fully exhausted in its unique divine operation, they each produce one and only one perfect divine person. Therefore there are three and only three persons: one unproduced, one produced by way of intellect, and one produced by way of will.⁵

I have my doubts as to the success of this type of response to Aquinas’ argument. If the divine attributes are merely rationally distinct, as both Pecham and Henry seem to admit, then it seems *ad hoc* to claim that, as those attributes exist in the Father, they have the kind of distinction required to serve as the basis for the real distinction between the persons. The Dominicans, to be sure,

⁵ This argument is presented in Henry’s *Quodlibet* VI, q. 1; see esp. ed. Wilson, p. 2³¹⁻⁴², and pp. 21²⁹⁻²²³⁰.

were always skeptical of this way of answering Aquinas' argument. That should come as no surprise, since the Dominicans rejected the strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology and the tight link between the emanations and the attributes upon which the strong use was predicated. Indeed, in general the Dominicans rejected the proof for the number of persons that Henry supported, claiming instead that we know the number of persons on the basis of revelation alone.⁶ Far more surprising, on the other hand, is the fact that John Duns Scotus was also highly skeptical about responses to Aquinas' argument like the one Henry of Ghent gave. We saw in Chapter 2 that Scotus held a strong use of the psychological model of the Trinity. Thus, Scotus rejected what he called the "metaphorical" Dominican use of the psychological model, and he claimed that the Son is truly produced by the divine intellect as a Word, while the Holy Spirit is truly produced by the divine will as Love (see Quotation 2h). Nevertheless, Scotus appears to have been impressed by the Dominican argument that a rational distinction cannot be the basis for a real distinction, and hence that merely rationally distinct divine attributes do not suffice to ground the real distinction between the persons. Scotus, in fact, uses just this kind of criticism against Henry of Ghent. In paraphrase, Scotus argues against Henry as follows. No real distinction necessarily requires for its existence a prior rational distinction (thus far Scotus agrees with the Dominicans); but Henry maintains that the distinction between the emanations necessarily requires for its existence the distinction between the sources of the emanations; therefore, since the distinction between the emanations is real, the distinction that is necessarily required between the sources of the emanations cannot

⁶ For examples of Dominican rejection of the proof of the number of persons, see, e.g., Durand of St. Pourçain, *I Sent.* (C), d. 10, q. 2 (ed. Venice 1571, f. 42rb); Hervaeus Natalis, *I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 4 (ed. Paris 1647, pp. 30–31).

be a merely rational distinction.⁷ Thus, Scotus here agrees with the Dominicans that merely rationally distinct attributes cannot be the source of the real distinction between the emanations and between the persons. Nevertheless, in this argument Scotus does not deny that the distinction between the emanations is necessarily based upon a prior distinction. And, in fact, he thinks that there *must* be a distinction prior to the distinction between the emanations in order for the emanations to have their different ways of proceeding. As just mentioned, Scotus rejected a metaphorical understanding of the psychological model of the Trinity, claiming explicitly (Quotation 2h) that the Son emanates through an act of the divine intellect, while the Holy Spirit emanates through an act of the divine will. According to Scotus, then, there must be a reason why the Son proceeds in one way, and the Holy Spirit in another. There would seem to be no such reason, however, if the completely undifferentiated divine essence were the immediate source of both productions, as the Dominicans maintained. The most basic difference, as Scotus sees it, between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, is that the generation of the Son is natural, while the procession of the Holy Spirit is free. Scotus concludes that a distinction between the sources of the emanations – one source being natural, like an intellect, and one free, like a will – is in fact necessary in order for the emanations themselves to be distinct.⁸ Again, one absolutely undifferentiated and indistinct divine essence, according to Scotus, could not produce in two irreducibly distinct ways, so there must

⁷ John Duns Scotus, I *Ord.*, d. 13, n. 31: “Distinctio realis non necessario praeexigit distinctionem rationis; sed distinctio istarum emanationum per te necessario praeexigit distinctionem principiorum elicitorum; ergo ista, si est realis, non est tantum per illam quae est tantum rationis.” V, p. 78⁹⁻¹².

⁸ John Duns Scotus, I *Ord.*, d. 13, n. 19: “Istae productiones distinguuntur quia altera est per modum naturae et altera per modum voluntatis; haec autem distinctio productionum . . . sumitur ex distinctione principiorum productivorum, quae habent oppositos modos principiandi <scil., naturaliter et libere>.” V, p. 73⁸⁻¹³.

be a distinction between the divine attributes of intellect and will prior to the distinction of the emanations, and it is from this prior distinction that the emanations take their irreducibly distinct ways of proceeding, i.e., naturally and freely. Because he thinks, however, that merely rationally distinct attributes could not be the basis for the real distinction between the emanations and the persons, Scotus maintains, against Henry of Ghent, that the divine attributes must be *more* than rationally distinct from each other; in fact, according to Scotus, they must be *formally* distinct from each other in order to explain how they can act as sources of fundamentally distinct emanations and really distinct persons.

For Scotus, then, the divine attributes must be distinct in order to be the sources of the distinct emanations, and yet they cannot be distinct merely rationally, and so Scotus insists that the attributes are distinct formally. It is not possible here to offer more than a brief description of Scotus' view on the formal distinction or formal non-identity (I use these terms equivalently). But, to put it succinctly, to posit a formal distinction in some thing is to claim that, prior to any act of the intellect, there is a distinction in the thing itself, yet that distinction is less than a fully real distinction. Thus, the formal distinction is extramental (or, to use Scotus' term, it is *ex natura rei*) – the formally distinct items, like intellect and will in God, are formally distinct in God himself prior to any mental activity – and yet the formal distinction is not as great as the distinction between two really differing things like two stones or a stone and a human being.⁹

⁹ Although Scotus himself does occasionally use the term 'formal distinction' (*distinctio formalis*), more usually he talks about a formal non-identity (*non-identitas formalis*) or about one item not being formally the same (*non formaliter eundem*) as another item. Scotus gives a pithy description of his basic understanding of formally non-identical attributes in, e.g., I *Ord.*, d. 8, pars 1, q. 4, nn. 191–92: "Ad quaestionem respondeo quod inter perfectiones essentielles non est tantum differentia rationis . . . Est ergo ibi distinctio praecedens intellectum omni modo, et est ista: quod sapientia est in re ex natura rei et bonitas in re ex natura rei; sapientia autem in re formaliter non est bonitas in re." IV, p. 260^{11–12}, p. 261³⁷ (and see further, *ibid.*, pp. 261–62).

Of highest significance for us here is that one of the major reasons that Scotus gives for the necessity of a formal distinction between the divine attributes is the fact that the attributes must be formally distinct in order to serve as the basis for the distinction between the emanations. And this is merely a manifestation of Scotus' strong use of the psychological model of the Trinity: while preserving the tight link between the emanations and the divine attributes, he is simultaneously answering Dominican criticism that a rational distinction between the attributes could not serve as the source of the distinction between the emanations. In this way, the formal distinction between the attributes has a key role to play in Scotus' trinitarian theology. In line with this it is no surprise that Scotus, just like Henry of Ghent, accepts the "proof" for the number of the divine persons (two productive sources, intellect and will = two produced persons + one unproduced person = Trinity).¹⁰

In fact, according to Scotus, not only is there a formal distinction between intellect and will in God, there is also a formal distinction between these attributes and the divine essence.¹¹ The formal distinctions between the attributes, and between the attributes and the essence, are the foundation of Scotus' strong use of the psychological model of the Trinity, since through them Scotus explains the nature of the sources of the divine emanations: both why these sources produce, and why they produce in two irreducibly distinct ways. To see this, consider Scotus' basic explanation for the intellectual emanation of the Son as a Word:

¹⁰ John Duns Scotus, *I Ord.*, d. 2, pars 2, q. 1–4, n. 353: "Tantum sunt tres personae in essentia divina. Quod probatur sic: tantum sunt duae productae, et tantum est una improducta; igitur tantum tres sunt." II, p. 335^{15–18}. Scotus' proof of this conclusion (among others) is extensive, occupying *ibid.*, pp. 305–49.

¹¹ E.g., John Duns Scotus, *I Ord.*, d. 13, n. 72: "Considerando aliqua quae *non sunt formaliter eadem*, potest aliquid accipi tamquam infinitum in se et omnino a se, sicut essentia divina . . . aliquid autem est infinitum per se et in se . . . sicut attributa divina." V, pp. 103¹⁵–104¹ (italics mine).

(3d) Take anything whatsoever that from its formal nature (*ratio*) is a productive source: wherever it exists without imperfection, there it is a productive source. But perfected memory – i.e., all of this ‘the intellect having an intelligible object present to it’ – from its formal nature (*ratio*) is the productive source of generated knowledge. Now, it is clear that memory of this type is in one of the divine persons on his own account (*a se*), because one [of the divine persons] is not produced. Therefore, that person could perfectly produce by means of such a perfect source.¹²

Perfected memory in God the Father is a perfect productive source, and this is precisely because the Father is unemanated, existing on his own account (*a se*). Due to the perfection of this productive source, the Father is able to produce perfectly, and what he produces is the Word or generated knowledge. One point to note about this passage is that here we see Scotus fitting very well into the thirteenth-century Franciscan trinitarian tradition that we have been examining: Scotus emphasizes that the Father’s innascibility, his existing on his own account (*a se*), is the ultimate reason that he generates. Despite the terminological and theoretical differences between Scotus’ theory and the earlier Franciscan tradition, the framework of his view is clearly related to that of, for example, John Pecham or Henry of Ghent (see, e.g., Quotations 3b and 3c). But notice too that Scotus claims that perfected memory is “the intellect having an intelligible object present to it.” He explains more fully in another passage just what this means, and there we see Scotus pulling the formal distinction between the attributes and the essence into the heart of his trinitarian theology:

¹² John Duns Scotus, *I Ord.*, d. 2, pars 2, q. 3, n. 221: “Quicquid de ratione sua formali est principium productivum, in quocumque est sine imperfectione, in eo est principium productivum; sed memoria perfecta, sive, quod idem est, istud totum ‘intellectus habens obiectum intelligibile sibi praesens’, ex ratione sua formali est principium productivum notitiae generatae, et patet quod memoria talis est in aliqua persona divina et a se, quia aliqua est improducta; ergo illa poterit per tale perfectum principium perfecte producere.” II, pp. 259⁷–260².

(3e) All of this ‘the intellect having an actually intelligible object present to it’ has the nature (*ratio*) of perfected memory in first actuality [i.e., immediate readiness to issue into act], and this [memory] is namely the immediate source of second actuality [i.e., operation or activity] and of begotten knowledge. But in this source that is the memory, two [items] concur that make up one total source, specifically the [divine] essence as the [intelligible] object and the intellect, and each of these on its own is a sort of partial source with respect to the adequate production by this entire source.¹³

Here is the framework of Scotus’ ideas on philosophical psychology in their trinitarian context: the perfected memory in God the Father, that is to say his intellect with the formally distinct divine essence present to it as its intelligible object, is a complete productive source of generated or begotten knowledge, i.e., of the Word. Scotus claims explicitly that the Father’s intellect and the divine essence are each a “sort of” (*quasi*) partial source with respect to the emanation of the Word. The significant point here is that the memory, the complete productive source of the Word, involves both the divine intellect and the divine essence, which are formally distinct from each other. This is Scotus’ description of the source perfectly productive of the Son. Scotus applies a parallel analysis to the production of the Holy Spirit: the divine essence, present as the loved object to the divine will as it is in the Father and the Son, is a complete productive source of subsistent Love, i.e., the Holy Spirit.¹⁴ And, of course, as we have seen, it is because the formally distinct divine intellect and will act in two irreducibly distinct ways, naturally and freely, that the emanations of the Son and the Holy Spirit are themselves distinct.

¹³ John Duns Scotus, *I Ord.*, d. 2, pars 2, q. 3, n. 310: “Hoc totum ‘intellectus habens obiectum actu intelligibile sibi praesens’ habet rationem memoriae perfectae in actu primo, quae scilicet est immediatum principium actus secundi et notitiae genitae; in hoc autem principio quod est memoria concurrunt duo, quae constituunt unum principium totale, videlicet essentia in ratione obiecti et intellectus, quorum utrumque per se est quasi partiale principium respectu productionis adaequatae huic totali principio.” II, p. 313¹⁻⁹.

¹⁴ Cf., e.g., John Duns Scotus, *I Ord.*, d. 10, q. un., n. 9 (IV, pp. 341²¹–342¹⁸).

This is what the psychological model of the Trinity looks like for Scotus. Most importantly, his strong use of the model in trinitarian theology is based upon the formal distinctions between the divine intellect, the divine will, and the divine essence. The fact that these items are formally distinct is a crucial element in Scotus' trinitarian thought. And this brings us back to divine simplicity and trinitarian explanation. What is extremely impressive about Scotus' theory is that it is an attempt to explain just about *everything*. Scotus' trinitarian theology is what I would call "explanatorily dense": he gives an answer to almost every conceivable question – we can disagree with him about his answers, but it seems hard to deny that he tries to cover as many issues and solve as many problems as possible. But this explanatory density comes at a cost to Scotus, for he has to postulate a great deal of distinction in God: most importantly, the formal distinctions between the attributes and between the attributes and the essence, and these formal distinction are in God before any act of the intellect. Explanation requires distinction, and no trinitarian theology shows this as clearly as does John Duns Scotus'. But what happens when theologians in the fourteenth century begin to maintain that preserving God's absolute simplicity is more important than being able to give detailed trinitarian explanations? Specifically, what happens when theologians influenced by the search for simplicity reject Scotus' use of the formal distinction? How do these later theologians evaluate Scotus' use of the psychological model of the Trinity? In order to try to answer this, in the remainder of this chapter, I want to look at the work of three of the best minds in the Franciscan order in the early fourteenth century, Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, and William Ockham, and see what they have to say on these issues. Although these three thinkers all embarked on the search for simplicity and all show signs of wanting to eliminate as much distinction as possible in God, nevertheless the

conclusions that they reach are astonishingly diverse: each approaches the psychological model in a very different and highly personal way.

PETER AURIOL

Although not well known among non-specialists, Peter Auriol is a major figure in the history of medieval theology and philosophy. He was born in France, in the area around Cahors; he read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1316–18 and served as regent master there from 1318 until 1320 or 1321. He died in 1322. Numerous manuscript copies of his work attest to the fact that Auriol was read throughout the later Middle Ages, and right into the seventeenth century one can trace his influence in terminology employed and in positions held and refuted.

One of Auriol's most important goals in trinitarian theology is to preserve the strong use of the psychological model of the Trinity. This becomes clear in Auriol's reply to Durand of St. Pourçain's view of the psychological model. As we have seen (Quotation 2f), Durand claimed explicitly that the psychological model is applicable to God on the basis of appropriation only. For Durand, the psychological model is fundamentally metaphorical and says nothing about God's trinitarian reality. Auriol rejects Durand's view categorically:

(3f) The Holy Spirit does not pertain to love metaphorically or transumptively, rather most properly. For an exemplar is not called such because of its likeness to the image – quite the opposite: the image is called such because of its likeness to the exemplar. The trinity, however, that pertains to the image in us consists in a word pertaining to the intellect and a spirit that pertains to love. Therefore, it is not because of their likeness to [the word and spirit] as they exist in us, that the Word and Spirit in the divine, whose image is in

our soul, will pertain to the nature (*ratio*) of intellect and of love, but rather vice versa.¹⁵

We know (from, among others, Scripture and Augustine) that our mind is an “image” of the divine Trinity. Does it make sense, asks Auriol, that the exemplar is only metaphorically like the image? The image takes its meaning from the exemplar; therefore, for there to be an image at all, it must share features with its exemplar. In us there is an image in which the mental word pertains to intellect and the spirit to love; in God, therefore, the exemplar of this image must likewise comprise a Word pertaining to the divine intellect and a Spirit pertaining to divine Love. This is not because God resembles us, but because we resemble (i.e., are an image of) God. Thus, Auriol rejects Durand’s metaphorical understanding of the psychological model, and Auriol uses the psychological model in a strong way. Indeed, Auriol claims, just as Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus had, that we can give a sort of “proof” of the Trinity demonstrating that God subsists in three and only three supposites, since God understands and loves himself.¹⁶

As we have seen, for both Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus the emanations took their distinction from the distinction between their sources, the divine intellect being the source of the Son’s

¹⁵ Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, d. 10, a. 3: “Spiritus Sanctus non metaphoricè aut transumptive pertinet ad amorem, immo maxime proprie. Exemplar enim non dicitur tale per similitudinem ad imaginem, sed magis e converso, imago talis dicitur per similitudinem ad exemplar. Sed trinitas, quae est in nobis pertinens ad imaginem, consistit in verbo pertinente ad intellectum et spiritu qui pertinet ad amorem. Ergo Verbum et Spiritus in divinis, quorum imago est in anima nostra, non pertinebunt ad rationem intellectus et amoris per similitudinem ad ista, ut sunt in nobis, immo magis e converso.” *Electronic Scriptum* (available at www.peterauriol.net), lines 335–41; ed. 1596, pp. 342b–343a.

¹⁶ Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, d. 3, q. 3 (= sect. 14), a. 3, n. 54: “Videtur esse verum quod . . . potest demonstrari quod primum principium subsistit in tribus suppositis . . . omne intelligens se et complacens vel amans se necessario in tribus subsistentibus triplicatur . . . cum Deus intelligens sit, quaevis pars <potest> eligi: quod illa supposita sint realia, vel quod sint intentionalia quoad duo, reale vero tantum unum.” Ed. Buytaert, vol. II, p. 712^{5–13}.

intellectual emanation, and the divine will being the source of the Holy Spirit's voluntary emanation. This is an expression of the fact that, for Henry and Scotus, there is a tight link between the emanations and the divine attributes, a hallmark of the strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology. Despite agreeing with Henry and Scotus on the need to maintain the strong use, Auriol nevertheless insists that the emanations do not have a source. Auriol's major reason for claiming this is that there is nothing in God that flows out of or into something else, nor does anything in God take being or give being. Everything in God is unchanging, necessary, and eternal, including the emanations. Thus, for Auriol, the emanations are simply not the kinds of realities that arise or take being, and therefore they have no source at all.¹⁷ Already here is a reason for Auriol to modify Henry's and Scotus' position on the tight link between the attributes and the emanations: the emanations have no source, so the attributes cannot be the sources of the emanations. In addition, however, Auriol rejects completely Scotus' formal distinction between the divine attributes.¹⁸

Thus, according to Auriol, the emanations have no source and there is no formal distinction between the divine attributes. But this would seem to create a problem for him. As just mentioned, Auriol uses the psychological model in a strong way, and hence he has an interest in defending some kind of connection or link between, on the one hand, the divine intellect and the Word, and, on the

¹⁷ Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, d. 13, a. 2: "Quod enim penes intellectum et voluntatem tamquam penes productiva principia processiones non distinguantur, ex supradictis apparet; ubi enim non est elicivum principium nec productiones elicite sunt, ibi processionum distinctio ex productivis principiis ortum habere non potest. Sed saepe extitit declaratum quod ista in divinis non sunt. Igitur ex ipsis non habet ortum distinctio processionum." *Electronic Scriptum*, lines 293–98; ed. 1596, p. 375aF.

¹⁸ For one of Auriol's detailed responses to Scotus' formal distinction, see Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, d. 8, q. 3 (= sect. 23), a. 5 (ed. Buytaert, vol. II, pp. 1009–22 [also found on the *Electronic Scriptum*]).

other, the divine will and the Holy Spirit. If there were no such connection, in what sense would the Son's emanation be intellectual and the Holy Spirit's voluntary? The question, then, is how Auriol maintains this link between the attributes and the emanations, when he claims that the attributes are *not* the sources of the emanations and that the attributes are not formally distinct. In fact, Auriol holds that, instead of the emanations taking their distinction from intellect and will, quite the opposite is the case: the intellect and will take their distinction in part from the distinction between the emanations. He writes: "The productions are not distinguished on account of intellect and will, but rather vice versa, intellect and will can be distinguished connotatively on account of the productions."¹⁹ For Auriol, the distinction between the divine attributes is a *connotative* distinction, which can in general terms be characterized as follows: one absolutely simple thing can nevertheless be assigned distinct features on account of the different ways that this one simple thing relates to or connotes various things that are, in one way or another, extrinsic to it.²⁰ This is how it works with the distinction between the divine attributes, according to Auriol. The divine essence is one absolutely simple thing, and yet it connotes various things and actions that are extrinsic to it, and on the basis of these different connotations we can assign to it different attributes that are then connotatively distinct. The divine intellect and will offer an example of this: the divine intellect is completely the same as the divine essence, but it is the divine essence as it connotes or stands in a special kind of relation to only certain types of actions and objects in some way or another extrinsic to the essence; the divine will is also

¹⁹ See the italicized text in n. 21 below.

²⁰ Auriol's most detailed treatment of the connotative distinction between the attributes can be found in his *Scriptum*, d. 8, q. 3 (= sect. 23), esp. aa. 2–3 (ed. Buytaert, vol. II, pp. 987–1000 [also found on the *Electronic Scriptum*]).

completely the same as the divine essence, but it is the essence as it connotes a different group of actions and objects extrinsic to the essence than does the divine intellect. Thus, the divine intellect and will are in every way the same (Auriol says they are *idem re et ratione*), they *are* the divine essence, but they are the essence as it connotes different realities that are in one way or another extrinsic to it. One of Auriol's most important examples of the extrinsic realities that the essence connotes and that contribute to the connotative distinction between the divine intellect and will is the saying of the Word (the intellect) and the emission of the Spirit (the will).²¹ Just to be clear: for Auriol, each of the divine properties (e.g., the saying of the Word, the emission of the Spirit) is a reality in its own right despite existing inseparably from the reality of the divine essence; thus, the properties are "extrinsic" to the essence to the extent that they are realities in their own right.

Through this theory, Auriol attempts to reconcile two apparently contradictory tendencies in his own thought. On the one hand, he defends the strong use of the psychological model in trinitarian theology, including a tight link between the divine intellect and the Son's generation, and the divine will and the Holy Spirit's spiration. For Auriol, the Son is truly a Word and the Holy Spirit truly a Gift. On the other hand, he maintains that the intellect and the will cannot be the sources of the emanations of the Son and the Holy Spirit, respectively, for two reasons: because the emanations have no source

²¹ Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, d. 13, a. 2: "Praeterea, processionum distinctio ortum non habet ex iis quorum distinctio attenditur penes ipsasmet processiones. Sed dictum est supra quod intellectus et voluntas distinguuntur penes connotata, unum autem ex connotatis per intellectum potest esse dictio Verbi seu generatio, et ex connotatis per voluntatem emissio Spiritus sive spiratio flatus, saltem eo modo quo intellectus et voluntas activa sunt. Ergo productiones non distinguuntur penes intellectum et voluntatem, sed magis e converso, intellectus et voluntas penes productiones connotative distingui possunt." *Electronic Scriptum*, lines 302–8; ed. 1596, p. 375bB. There are other connotata that contribute to the connotative distinction between God's will and intellect; e.g., God knows but does not will evil.

at all, and because the divine essence is absolutely simple and hence the divine intellect and will are in no way distinct in God before some intellect actually draws the distinction between them. Auriol reconciles these two tendencies in his thought through the device of his connotative distinction between the attributes: far from the distinction between the divine intellect and will being the foundation for the distinction between the emanations, the distinction between the emanation of the Word and the emanation of the Holy Spirit is one of the factors involved in the connotative distinction between the divine intellect and will. This is the force of Auriol's connotative distinction between the attributes: when he argues that, e.g., the intellect is the absolutely simple divine essence as it connotes the emanation of the Son, he is maintaining God's ultimate simplicity while still upholding a tight link between the divine attributes and the divine emanations, which, as we have seen, is a critical element in the strong use of the psychological model. Auriol has, in effect, turned on its head the earlier Franciscan view of the relation between attributes and emanations. Whereas in the earlier Franciscan trinitarian tradition, the distinction between the attributes was prior to and the source of the distinction between the emanations, with Auriol the distinction between the emanations is a prior contributing factor to the connotative distinction between the divine attributes. The tight link between the divine attributes and the divine emanations is still there, but it is the attributes that take their distinction from the emanations. Significantly, an explicit partial motivation for this position is the preservation of divine simplicity: Auriol is clearly taking part in the search for simplicity.

Not everyone accepted Auriol's view with enthusiasm. Take, for example, the Carmelite friar John Baconthorpe († *ca.* 1348). The core of Baconthorpe's critique of Auriol's view is that, if the intellect took its distinction from the production of the Word, and not vice versa,

on what grounds would we call the emanation of the Word an intellectual emanation in the first place? What is voluntary about the emanation of the Holy Spirit, if the divine will is made distinct by the production of the Holy Spirit and not vice versa? As far as Baconthorpe is concerned, a connotative distinction between the attributes is a merely “metaphorical” distinction, and if the distinction between the attributes were indeed merely metaphorical, then the Son’s being a Word and the Holy Spirit’s being Love would also be merely metaphorical. In contrast to Auriol’s view, Baconthorpe holds that “from the fact that Word and Love are most truly there” in God, we know that distinct intellect and will must also be there truly in extramental reality.²² Baconthorpe rejects Auriol’s connotative distinction between the attributes on the grounds that it cannot safeguard the strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology that Auriol himself explicitly said (Quotation 3f) he was trying to defend. Thus, Baconthorpe says to Auriol that he cannot have his cake and eat it too: Auriol cannot insist on an absolutely simple God in whom there is no extramental distinction between intellect and will, and yet at the same time maintain that the Son’s emanation is intellectual and the Holy Spirit’s emanation is voluntary. If the Son’s emanation is intellectual, that is because it comes from an intellect. Baconthorpe clearly speaks for the superiority of the earlier Franciscan tradition’s insistence upon a distinction between intellect and will (like the formal distinction in Scotus) that in turn anchored the strong link between, respectively, intellect and Word, and will and Holy Spirit. In effect, Baconthorpe argues

²² John Baconthorpe, *I Sent.*, d. 10, q. unica, a. 2, §2: “Secundo, contra Aureolum, quod intellectus et voluntas non distinguuntur per connotata solum, ut ipse intelligit, scilicet quod non ex natura rei. . . Item, qua ratione in divinis est verissime Verbum et Amor, eadem ratione est ibi verissime intellectus et voluntas, quia qua ratione dicitur unum metaphoricè et non vere, eadem ratione et reliquum. Sed ex hoc quod verissime sunt ibi Verbum et Amor, ipsa ex natura rei distinguuntur. Ergo et hic.” Ed. 1618, p. 164aA and E.

that explanation, in the form of the strong use of the psychological model of the Trinity, is incompatible with the type of absolute simplicity that Auriol's connotative distinction between the attributes amounted to. In this sense, Baconthorpe can be seen as implicitly arguing that explanation requires distinction of some kind.

FRANCIS OF MARCHIA

If Peter Auriol is not very well known, Francis of Marchia is largely unknown outside of a small group of specialists. Marchia read the *Sentences* in Paris about two years after Auriol did, and much of Marchia's theology is a response either to Auriol or to John Duns Scotus. Marchia held several interesting views for which he has received some recognition in the history of science, and historians of political thought and of the Franciscan order know him because, together with Michael of Cesena (the Minister General of the Franciscan order) and William Ockham, Marchia fled Avignon and Pope John XXII on the night of May 26, 1328, taking refuge with Emperor Louis of Bavaria in Munich. In the period following his flight from Avignon, Marchia wrote tracts critical of Pope John and his view of Franciscan poverty, and Ockham's political thought bears signs of Marchia's influence. Eventually Marchia was captured by Church authorities, and in 1343 he recanted his criticisms of the Catholic Church. After 1344, we hear nothing more about him. Parts of his *Sentences* commentary are found in more than twenty-five manuscripts, so his works were widely read in the Middle Ages.

One of Marchia's major conversation partners was Scotus. This is certainly true when it comes to Marchia's discussion of the psychological model of the Trinity, a discussion based around the rejection of the formal distinction between intellect, will, and essence that we

saw Scotus held. Scotus had claimed (see at and around Quotations 3d and 3e above) that in the production of the Word, the divine intellect in the Father, along with the divine essence present to it as its intelligible object, is one complete productive source of the Word. This view involved the divine essence and the divine intellect being formally distinct from one another, and working together in some way in order to produce the Son. Scotus went so far as to claim that the divine intellect and essence were each a sort of (*quasi*) partial source of the Word. Marchia objects to Scotus' claim that the intellect and the essence (as it is the intellect's object) concur or act together in the production of the Word. Marchia argues, for example, that if the divine intellect and the essence (as the intellect's object) were formally distinct from each other and concurred in the production of the Word, then it would follow that each is in some way limited, unable to produce the Word on its own account.²³ Since this type of imperfection is impossible in God, Marchia maintains instead that the source that is productive of the Son is what we can call "formally indistinct": there is no formal distinction or non-identity in that source at all; it is absolutely simple.²⁴ Marchia argues in a similar manner that the divine will cannot be formally distinct from the divine essence in the production of the Holy Spirit. Scotus, of course, had claimed that one of the reasons why the divine attributes had to be formally distinct was that one undifferentiated source (i.e.,

²³ Francis of Marchia, I *Scriptum*, d. 27, pars 2, a. 3: "Item, quodcumque ad aliquem effectum communem concurrunt plura principia quo quorum neutrum sufficit sine alio, utrumque est limitatum in sua causalitate, et imperfectum. Patet quia principium simpliciter illimitatum continet omnem causalitatem sui generis. Sed essentia et intellectus concurrunt ad productionem Verbi sicut duo principia quo distincta, secundum istam opinionem, quorum neutrum continet causalitatem alterius. Igitur utrumque est imperfectum in suo ordine, quod est inconveniens. Igitur non distinguuntur." Ed. Friedman (1997), pp. 570⁷²⁴–571⁷³⁰.

²⁴ Francis of Marchia, I *Scriptum*, d. 27, pars 2, a. 3: "Intellectus et essentia sunt idem formaliter et voluntas et essentia sunt idem formaliter, et ita non concurrunt plus unum formaliter quam aliud." Ed. Friedman (1997), p. 570⁷⁰²⁻⁴.

the divine essence) could not produce in two mutually exclusive ways, naturally and freely. Marchia flatly disagrees: not only was Scotus wrong to maintain that the divine intellect, will, and essence are formally distinct, but both of the divine emanations come from one and the same absolutely simple and indistinct source. This is what Marchia says:

(3g) That which contains eminently the perfection of two sources as one (*unitive*) can bring about equally perfectly and in the same order all that it could bring about through those two sources if it had them distinct in itself. . . . But something having in itself a distinct intellect and will can bring about two actions. Therefore, something having eminently the perfection of each [i.e., of both intellect and will] can still bring about those actions in the same order. Therefore, for the Father to be able to bring about the two productions of persons it is not required to posit a distinction in the sources.²⁵

The formal distinction between the attributes and the essence will not work, argues Marchia, and we do not need to posit any kind of formal distinction in God anyway. The divine essence has in it *eminently*, not formally, the perfections or the functionalities of intellect and will. The opposition, then, that Marchia wants to draw between his own position and the position of Scotus is that the intellect and will do not remain in God *formally*, in the Scotistic sense of formally *ex natura rei*, but they remain in God *eminently*: their functional characteristics, i.e., what they can do, are contained in one indistinct divine essence.²⁶ Thus, there are no formally distinct

²⁵ Francis of Marchia, I *Scriptum*, d. 11: “Contra istam opinionem: illud quod continet eminenter perfectionem duorum principiorum unitive potest aequae perfecte et eodem ordine in omnia illa in quae posset per illa duo principia, si haberet ea in se distincta. . . . Sed habens in se distinctum intellectum et voluntatem potest in duas actiones. Ergo habens eminenter perfectionem utriusque adhuc potest in illas actiones eodem ordine. Igitur ad hoc quod Pater possit in duas productiones personarum non oportet ponere distinctionem in principiis.” Ed. Friedman (1999), p. 50, §23.

²⁶ Francis of Marchia, I *Scriptum*, d. 27, pars 2, a. 3: “Et ideo quia nullum istorum ponitur in Deo formaliter, sed eminenter, non enim intentio quod essentia sit aliquid in Deo quod

intellect, will, and essence in God: all of these are included eminently in the all-encompassing (and absolutely simple) divine essence. Like Auriol's, Marchia's criticism of Scotus' formal distinction is linked to a requirement for stricter divine simplicity than Scotus himself thought necessary, and hence this is without question a manifestation of the search for simplicity.

For our purposes, the most important thing about both Marchia's rejection of the formal distinction between the divine attributes and his further claim that the divine intellect and will are contained eminently in the indistinct divine essence is that they clearly have ramifications for his view of the psychological model of the Trinity:

(3*h*) From what has been said, I conclude as a corollary that the divine Word does not proceed through an act of the intellect, nor the Holy Spirit through an act of the will, since neither of these powers is formally in God, but both produced persons proceed through an act of that third characteristic (*ratio*) [i.e., the divine essence], eminently and utterly simply containing all these [intellect, will, and essence].²⁷

Here Marchia explicitly embraces a metaphorical understanding of the psychological model of the Trinity. In fact, on this issue Marchia is more in agreement with the Dominican trinitarian tradition than with the Franciscan. Although he does not say as much, one can surmise on the basis of Quotation 3*h* that Marchia would claim, as the Dominicans did (see, e.g., John of Naples in Quotation 2*e*), that

sit fundamentum intellectus et voluntatis nec alicuius talium, cum ista formaliter non sint ibi . . . Et ideo dico quod in Deo non est formaliter intellectus nec voluntas, sed est in eo unica ratio <i.e., essentiae> eminens continens supereminenter omnia ista." Ed. Friedman (1997), p. 571⁷⁵⁶⁻⁶⁵. On Marchia's own theory of the distinction between the divine attributes, see especially Marchia, I *Scriptum*, d. 22, q. 2 (ed. Mariani, pp. 398–413 [App. IV, 2.2]).

²⁷ Francis of Marchia, I *Scriptum*, d. 27, pars 2, a. 3: "Ex praedictis concludo correlative quod Verbum divinum non procedit per actum intellectus nec Spiritus Sanctus per actum voluntatis, cum neutra istarum potentiarum sit formaliter in Deo, sed ambae personae productae procedunt per actum illius rationis tertiae eminenter et simplicissime continens omnia ista." Ed. Friedman (1997), p. 571⁷⁷⁰⁻⁷³.

the emanation of the Word is “intellectual” because it is the first emanation in God, not because of any special connection with the divine intellect. Scotus – and for that matter the rest of the Franciscan trinitarian tradition of which Scotus was an important part – would have rejected this aspect of Marchia’s trinitarian theology on the grounds that it was a purely “metaphorical” understanding of the psychological model (see, e.g., Quotation 2h). In this way, at least in part on the basis of his rather strict understanding of divine simplicity, Francis of Marchia has given up a key element of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Franciscan trinitarian theology: that the productions of the divine persons are literally productions by way of nature (or intellect) and by way of will, that is to say, he has dropped the strong use of the psychological model in trinitarian theology. And again, what lies behind this development is the search for simplicity that at least partially motivated Marchia’s rejection of the formal distinction between the attributes.

WILLIAM OCKHAM

William Ockham hardly needs an introduction, since he is commonly recognized to be, along with Aquinas and Scotus, one of the three giants of later-medieval theology and philosophy. His very productive university writing career began at the time of his *Sentences* lectures in Oxford (ca. 1317–19) but was interrupted by charges of heresy that ultimately led him to Avignon. There, through study of some of Pope John XXII’s theological pronouncements, Ockham came to the conclusion that the Pope was a heretic, and in 1328 he, in the company of Francis of Marchia, fled to the Munich of Louis of Bavaria. Ockham spent the rest of his life writing polemical treatises concerning Church politics and apostolic poverty, dying impenitent in 1347.

Despite his fame and despite his recognized intellectual prowess, Ockham's trinitarian theology is rarely mentioned outside of two specific contexts: his ideas on the relation between faith and reason, and his total rejection of the formal distinction except for the formal distinction between the divine essence and the personal properties. With regard to the latter issue, what is important in our context is that Ockham rejected the formal distinction both between the divine attributes and between the attributes and the essence:

(3i) I say that divine wisdom is the same as the divine essence in all the ways in which the divine essence is the same as the divine essence, and this is also the case for divine goodness and justice; nor is there any extramental (*ex natura rei*) distinction there at all, nor even any non-identity . . . such a formal distinction or non-identity . . . ought only to be posited where it evidently (*evidenter*) follows from the things believed (*credita*), handed down in Sacred Scripture or in the determinations of the Church (on account of whose authority all reason ought to be held captive). And thus, since all the things handed down in Sacred Scripture and the determinations of the Church and the assertions of the saints can be saved without positing [a formal distinction or non-identity] between essence and wisdom, so *I deny without qualification that such a distinction is possible there, and I deny it everywhere in creatures.*²⁸

Ockham flatly denies that there can be a formal distinction between the attributes: for him God's essence is absolutely simple and indistinct. (Ockham will admit that the essence relates to or connotes things extrinsic to it in various ways, offering the possibility of

²⁸ William Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 2, q. 1: "Dico quod sapientia divina omnibus modis est eadem essentiae divinae quibus essentia divina est eadem essentiae divinae, et sic de bonitate divina et iustitia; nec est ibi penitus aliqua distinctio ex natura rei vel etiam non-identitas . . . talis distinctio vel non-identitas formalis . . . non debet poni nisi ubi evidenter sequitur ex creditis traditis in Scriptura Sacra vel determinatione Ecclesiae, propter cuius auctoritatem debet omnis ratio captivari. Et ideo cum omnia tradita in Scriptura Sacra et determinatione Ecclesiae et dictis Sanctorum possunt salvari non ponendo eam inter essentiam et sapientiam, ideo simpliciter nego talem distinctionem ibi possibilem, et eam universaliter nego in creaturis." *OTh* II, pp. 17⁹–18⁵.

a very weak connotative distinction between at least some of the attributes, a connotative distinction in some ways resembling Peter Auriol's).²⁹ Here we see Ockham's emphasis on divine simplicity at work.

A key to Scotus' arguments in favor of a formal distinction between the attributes was the following inference: the indistinct divine essence cannot produce in diverse ways, like naturally and freely; therefore the divine intellect and will must be formally distinct from the essence and from each other in order for the Son and the Holy Spirit to be produced in these different ways. Ockham (like Francis of Marchia) rejects in particular the antecedent of the inference, claiming explicitly that one indistinct source can indeed produce in opposite ways, like naturally and freely:

(3j) It is not required on account of the diversity [between the Son's natural production and the Holy Spirit's free production] to posit a distinction of this kind [i.e., a formal distinction] between the elicitive sources, because . . . what is the same, totally indistinct in every way (*re et ratione*), can be a natural source with respect to one and a free source with respect to another, and the same source can relate in different ways to the one and to the other. And so all such otherness (*alietas*) or diversity can be explained just as well through one elicitive source as through many.³⁰

Ockham argues that Scotus was wrong to think that the totally indistinct divine essence could not produce in two irreducibly distinct ways, like naturally and freely.³¹ Indeed, as his rejection of the formal

²⁹ See William Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 2, q. 2 (*OTh* II, pp. 50–74), which is Ockham's detailed treatment of the distinction between the attributes.

³⁰ William Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 2, q. 1: "Dico quod non oportet propter istam diversitatem <inter naturalem productionem Filii et liberam productionem Spiritus Sancti> ponere talem distinctionem inter principia elicitiva, quia . . . idem totaliter indistinctum re et ratione potest esse principium naturale respectu unius et principium liberum respectu alterius, et idem principium potest aliter se habere ad unum et ad aliud. Et ita omnis talis alietas vel diversitas ita potest salvari per unum principium elicitivum sicut per plura." *OTh* II, pp. 35²⁰–36⁷. Compare this to Francis of Marchia in Quotation 3g (= n. 25) above.

³¹ In *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 6 (*OTh* I, pp. 491–92), Ockham attempts to prove this point against Scotus.

distinction between the attributes would indicate, Ockham claims as a point of fact that the indistinct divine essence is the one source of both emanations.³² On this same basis, Ockham rejects any type of tight link between the attributes and the emanations. This rejection, in turn, leads Ockham to two conclusions that run counter to the Franciscan tradition as it was presented in Chapters 1 and 2, two conclusions with ramifications for Ockham's use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology.

The first of these conclusions has to do with our ability to deduce or "prove" the number of the divine persons. As we have seen, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and Peter Auriol all supported a type of "proof" that there are and can be three and only three persons in God: the only two productive sources are nature (or intellect) and will, therefore there are three persons, one unproduced, and one produced by each of the productive sources. Ockham, on the other hand, denies that distinct intellect and will are the sources of the persons, and correspondingly he denies that the Trinity is amenable to this or any other kind of proof: we accept on faith alone (*sola fide*) that there are three and only three persons.³³ According to Ockham, the number of persons is a mystery revealed to us through sacred writings, and believed on that basis; no attempt to "prove" that there is a Trinity of persons could possibly succeed.

³² E.g., William Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 7, q. 2: "Dico quod essentia sub ratione essentiae est principium elicativum generationis Verbi." *OTh* III, p. 141¹¹⁻¹²; Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 10, q. 1: "Oportet quod principium elicativum <Spiritus Sancti> sit aliquod absolutum. Sed ostensum est prius quod nihil est absolutum in divinis nisi essentia divina." *OTh* III, p. 326¹³⁻¹⁵.

³³ William Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 10, q. 1: "Ex dualitate principiorum productivorum – si poneretur – non potest probari trinitas personarum, quia non potest probari dualitas personarum productarum . . . dico quod ex pluralitate productionum in divinis non potest inferri evidenter tantum dualitas, quia non potest sufficienter probari quin unum principium productivum possit esse respectu plurium productorum quam duorum . . . <dico> quod sola fide tenetur quod tantum sunt duae personae productae et una non-producta, et ideo trinitas personarum sola fide tenetur." *OTh* III, p. 325¹⁶⁻¹⁹ and p. 328⁹⁻¹⁵.

The second conclusion has to do with the Son's intellectual emanation as a Word. Ockham's summary of his position is categorical: "the essence as such (*essentia sub ratione essentiae*) is the elicitive source of the generation of the Word."³⁴ Ockham, as we have seen, denies that there is any distinct intellect in God, and argues further that the indistinct essence is the source of both emanations. But given that the essence, and not the intellect, is the source of the Word's emanation, is the Son a Word in any strict or literal sense? Ockham might at this juncture have taken the path that Durand of St. Pourçain took, that is to say, he might have claimed that the name 'Word' is merely appropriated to the Son. But Ockham does not take that route, instead appealing to Scripture: John the Evangelist in his first letter tells us that "three there are who give testimony in heaven, Father, Word, and Holy Spirit,"³⁵ therefore the Son, and only the Son, is the Word. But, according to Ockham, *that* the Son is a Word is held on faith alone – *sola fide* – on account of the many authoritative passages in which we can read that it is so. This identification is not amenable to proof.³⁶ The question that arises for Ockham, then, concerns the way in which the Son's emanation can be an intellectual emanation, when the indistinct essence and not a distinct divine

³⁴ For the Latin text, see the first quotation in n. 32 above.

³⁵ For the passage in Ockham, see n. 36 below. The Ockham critical edition refers to I Io. 5:7, which in the Vulgate version reads: "quia tres sunt qui testimonium dant Spiritus et aqua et sanguis et tres unum sunt," so the version Ockham used deviated considerably from the text we now recognize. Nevertheless, the same wording given by Ockham for this passage was also given by many other theologians from the period, and thus this appears to be a common reading of the biblical text in Ockham's day.

³⁶ William Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 27, q. 3: "Tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo: Pater, Verbum, et Spiritus Sanctus. Igitur Pater, Verbum, et Spiritus Sanctus sunt tres; igitur Pater non est Verbum nec Spiritus Sanctus. Et certum est quod Filius est Verbum; igitur etc. Circa istam quaestionem primo supponendum est unum concessum ab omnibus, scilicet quod Verbum est genitum. Ideo primo videndum est quid est genitum in divinis; secundo quod illud genitum est Verbum . . . dico quod illud genitum est persona relativa. Sed hoc non potest probari per rationem, sed est sola fide tenendum. Et quod hoc sit tenendum patet multis auctoritatibus tam Bibliae quam Sanctorum." *OTH* IV, pp. 228¹⁵–229²; p. 229^{21–24}.

intellect is the source of the Son's generation. Ockham claims that we can be certain on the basis of authoritative texts that the Son is truly a Word; given this fact, how, if at all, does Ockham hold that the divine intellect is involved in the Son's generation? In short, does Ockham use the psychological model of the Trinity in a "strong" way, or does he deny that the Son's generation has anything at all to do with an intellect, as Francis of Marchia and John of Naples had done? Interestingly, Ockham attempts to preserve the strong use of the psychological model in a highly attenuated form. In a long and complex text, he sets out to determine whether there is any way of understanding the term 'divine intellect', according to which it is true to say that the divine intellect is the source of the Son's emanation. His conclusion is that there is one and only one way: if we define 'intellect' in God as "source of producing the Word," then we end up with an identity statement, and this is the only way we can talk about the divine intellect as being the one and only productive source of the Word and only the Word, without saying something false. Ockham's clearest expression of this position is in an analogy with the way the sun is the productive source of both insects and plants: just as you can define *a* to be the sun as productive of insects and *b* to be the sun as productive of plants, so you can define the divine intellect to be the divine essence as productive of the Son.³⁷ The important point here is that Ockham goes out of his way to draw a special link between the divine intellect and the Son's generation, and he does this precisely because we know on the basis of revelation that the Son is a Word. Nevertheless, the link

³⁷ William Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 7, q. 2: "Si primo modo <scil., dicendi per se>, tunc est haec falsa 'intellectus est principium producendi Spiritum Sanctum', et haec est vera 'intellectus est principium producendi Verbum' . . . Et isto modo accipiunt omnes tales propositiones quae aliquid negant de voluntate respectu Verbi et concedunt de intellectu respectu Verbi, et e converso de voluntate, si bene loquuntur, quia aliter dicerent simpliciter falsum." *OTh* III, pp. 143¹⁷–144⁸. For the parallel with the sun, see *OTh* III, pp. 144¹⁷–145⁸.

between intellect and generation becomes very tenuous in Ockham – it becomes basically a question of semantics, of defining ‘intellect’ in just the right way. This is an application of the psychological model to trinitarian theology by fiat.

With regard to the voluntary emanation of the Holy Spirit, Ockham gives an analysis and conclusion precisely parallel to those concerning the Son and his intellectual emanation. We know that the will is the source of the spiration of the Holy Spirit. It cannot be otherwise, because the saints – Ockham mentions Augustine in particular – tell us that the Holy Spirit is Love, and we know that Love is produced by the will.³⁸ But, as we have seen, Ockham holds that the indistinct essence is the source of both of the emanations. Nevertheless, the saints spoke truly, and Ockham claims, just as he did with the Son’s emanation and the divine intellect, that only if we define the divine will to be the productive source of the Holy Spirit are we justified in maintaining that the will is linked in a special way to spiration, however tenuous that link may be.³⁹

In Ockham, the psychological model met the search for simplicity in the form of the dismissal of any kind of distinct intellect and will in God that could serve as sources for the emanations. On this basis, although he does not reject the strong use of the psychological model outright, as Francis of Marchia did, Ockham does heavily attenuate its use, developing a type of “psychological model lite.” What we know, based on John’s Gospel and his first letter as well as on Church Fathers like Augustine, is that the Son is a Word, and just on this basis Ockham does not want to completely dismiss the

³⁸ William Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 10, q. 1: “Quod voluntas sit principium spirandi patet ex auctoritatibus Sanctorum, quia secundum Sanctos Spiritus Sanctus est amor et caritas; sed talis persona producitur a voluntate tamquam a principio elicitivo; ergo, etc.” *OTh* III, p. 327³⁻⁶. For the appeal to Augustine, see *OTh* III, p. 318¹¹⁻¹³.

³⁹ William Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 10, q. 1 (*OTh* III, pp. 326¹⁶–327²).

strong use of the psychological model: a connection to the divine intellect there must be, since the Son is a Word. But for us human beings to say much more than “the Son is a Word” would be pure speculation. We do not know why the Son is a Word; on account of our faith in revelation and authoritative statements we are simply certain that this is the fact of the matter. The Holy Spirit’s procession has something to do with the will; we know that from Augustine. But to explain why and how this is the case is beyond us; we accept this on faith alone (*sola fide*). And behind these views, I suggest, is the search for simplicity, and particularly the rejection of Scotus’ formal distinction between the attributes. This is the root source of many of Ockham’s appeals to faith when it comes to the psychological model. In Ockham, as was also the case with Peter Auriol and Francis of Marchia, divine simplicity has become a major factor in the shaping of trinitarian theology.

In this chapter, I have wanted to give a flavor of what I think is most original and important about early fourteenth-century trinitarian theology, and particularly a flavor of the search for simplicity. Certain fourteenth-century thinkers began to stress divine simplicity to such an extent that various trinitarian explanations that were rather common in the thirteenth century were rejected outright. For these thinkers, preserving absolute divine simplicity became more important than drawing the distinctions that would have been required for any type of detailed explanation, and as a result explanation in trinitarian theology became more and more marginalized. To illustrate this development, I have presented three reactions to John Duns Scotus’ use of the formal distinction between the divine attributes as a part of his defense of the strong use of philosophical psychology in trinitarian theology. What happens to the use of the psychological model when a fourteenth-century Franciscan theologian rejects

the formal distinction? A variety of views arises. Peter Auriol uses his connotative distinction between the attributes to hold on to the strong use of the psychological model – but, as John Baconthorpe’s reply to Auriol shows, this has problems of its own, since it seems to make the psychological model metaphorical, which is precisely what Auriol wanted to avoid. Francis of Marchia takes the route of the Dominican trinitarian tradition and maintains explicitly and without apology that the psychological model is appropriated or metaphorical. William Ockham claims that the psychological model is correct and proper, but that we have no idea why it is correct and proper. Auriol, Marchia, and Ockham all exhibit manifestations of the new search for simplicity that arises in fourteenth-century trinitarian theology. In Chapter 4, I am going to look at a far more radical manifestation of the search for simplicity: Praepositinianism, the categorical denial that we can explain why the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are personally distinct but essentially identical.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Trinity, divine simplicity, and fideism – or: was Gilson right about the fourteenth century after all?

FIDEISM, PRAEPOSITINIANISM, AND THE DEBATE OVER PERSONAL CONSTITUTION

In the previous chapter I began to discuss a trend in fourteenth-century trinitarian theology that I labeled “The Search for Simplicity.” I argued there that an overwhelming emphasis on divine simplicity led William Ockham to appeal to the faith as the sole reason for holding a strong use of the psychological model, using the phrase *sola fide* (“on faith alone”) on several occasions. I called Ockham’s use of the psychological model “the psychological model lite” because Ockham said that the Son is literally a Word emanated intellectually, while also basically admitting that he did not know why or how this was the case, since there is no distinct intellect in God. We *believe* in the strong use of the psychological model – it is held *sola fide*, its truth assured by revelation and the Catholic Church – and we believe that the Son is a Word having something to do with intellectual emanation; but we can neither explain it nor use reason to support it by making it more plausible or even comprehensible. For Ockham, when it comes to the strong use of the psychological model of the Trinity, reason is fundamentally impotent.

This insistence upon the fundamental impotence of human reason in the face of various theological truths has in fact been seen as a defining characteristic of fourteenth-century thought as a whole. In particular, a number of important early twentieth-century historians of philosophy like Maurice de Wulf (†1947), Konstanty Michalski (†1947), and Étienne Gilson (†1978) associated the label ‘fideism’ or ‘fideistic’ with (especially) fourteenth-century theologians. These historians were interested in documenting the gradual reduction in the number of metaphysical and theological truths that later-medieval theologians thought were able to be demonstrated – strictly proven – using natural reason alone; moreover, they considered the questioning of reason’s abilities to have been detrimental to scholasticism and to European thought more generally. Indeed, for them, skepticism concerning the power of human reason was simply the flip side of fideism, since if reason on its own could not penetrate or illuminate the metaphysical and theological mysteries, then the faith, i.e., revelation and official Church pronouncements, would necessarily fill the void as the final arbiter. Thus, fideism, the appeal to faith, and skepticism, the view that human reason is insufficient to attain certain types of truths, were intimately related and defining characteristics of fourteenth-century thought for historians like de Wulf, Michalski, and Gilson. In more detail, the picture of later-medieval thought that emerged from their point of view went something like this: fourteenth-century thinkers, William Ockham prominent among them, claimed that human reason is not up to the task of demonstrating the truths of the faith, and, on account of this skepticism they turned to fideism, the appeal to revelation or religious decrees; these religious truths, then, could not be known in any strict sense, they could only be believed. This skepticism about the reach of human reason was, on this view of the history of medieval thought, destructive of metaphysics, of philosophy, and

of the scholastic project as a whole. The subtext to all this was that in thirteenth-century philosophy, and especially in Thomas Aquinas, there was to be found a sounder, healthier harmony of philosophy and theology, in which metaphysics and human reason could do what they were meant to do: support the scholastic theological enterprise.

The greatest champion of this type of historiographic scheme has been Étienne Gilson – indeed, to such an extent that I want to label the scheme the “Gilsonian paradigm.” When Gilson accused Ockham of fideism, he was specifically criticizing the fact that Ockham “considerably increased the list of those revealed truths which a Christian should believe, but cannot prove.” In Gilson’s works, Thomas Aquinas is often explicitly contrasted to Ockham. Aquinas maintained that many revealed truths could be proven by purely natural means, and hence that doctrines essential to the Christian faith, like God’s existence and the soul’s immortality, enjoyed two distinct forms of support, demonstrative proof as well as revelation. Ockham, in contrast, denied the demonstrativeness of rational proofs of God’s unique existence and the immortality of the soul; for Ockham, probable proofs could be offered, but nothing more. If one wanted certainty, according to Ockham, one could find it in revelation. Gilson, at least, was in no doubt as to the superiority of Aquinas’ view of the relation between reason and revelation, finding in Aquinas’ view the only justification for a believer to take philosophy seriously, and finding in it a cure for “the intellectual and moral crisis” that confronted the later Middle Ages. Gilson was correspondingly negative about Ockham: taking his point of departure in Ockham’s rejection of the broad harmony between reason and revelation that Aquinas had subscribed to, Gilson proceeded to talk about Ockham’s influence “invading” the fourteenth-century universities, resulting ultimately in “the total wreck of both scholastic philosophy

and scholastic theology as the necessary upshot of the final divorce of reason and Revelation.”¹ These quotations should suffice to show that the Gilsonian paradigm involves strong and wide-reaching characterizations that aim to express the very essences of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholastic thought.

The Gilsonian paradigm concerns demonstrative knowledge, that is to say, scientific knowledge in the strict Aristotelian sense. Specifically it has to do with, as mentioned, truths of the faith that Aquinas thought could be demonstratively proven but that Ockham and other fourteenth-century thinkers denied could be demonstratively proven – truths like the immortality of the soul, God’s existence and unity, and God’s knowledge of things other than himself. Our topic, trinitarian theology, would not fit neatly into the Gilsonian paradigm, since, for example, Aquinas would never claim that we could demonstrate the Trinity on the basis of human reason alone: for Aquinas, we always need revelation to start our investigation of the triune God, and even with that help our intellects are hardly up to the task.² Nevertheless, I think that Gilson would feel rather comfortable with the picture that I have been painting of the differences between thirteenth- and fourteenth-century trinitarian theology, and

¹ The quotations are taken from Étienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950), esp. pp. 84–89 *passim*. For some context, here is a complete quotation (pp. 87–88): “The influence of Ockham is everywhere present in the fourteenth century; it progressively invaded Oxford, Paris, and practically all the European universities . . . The late Middle Ages were then called upon to witness the total wreck of both scholastic philosophy and scholastic theology as the necessary upshot of the final divorce of reason and Revelation. Granted that not a single one of the revealed truths could possibly be justified by natural reason, why should pious souls have paid the slightest attention to philosophy?”

² For a particularly strong statement by Aquinas about the insufficiency of the human intellect to tackle trinitarian questions, see *De potentia*, q. 9, a. 5, solutio: “Dicendum quod pluralitas personarum in divinis est de his quae fidei subiacent, et naturali ratione humana nec investigari nec sufficienter intelligi potest.” Aquinas goes on, however, to say that the saints had been forced to investigate the Trinity on account of the enemies of the faith and “nec talis inquisitio est inutilis, cum per eam elevetur animus ad aliquid veritatis capiendum quod sufficiat ad excludendos errores.” Ed. Bazzi, p. 235b.

he probably would have considered it added evidence for his view. An example is Ockham's appeals to faith in connection with the strong use of the psychological model: according to Ockham, we are certain that the Son is a Word produced by intellectual emanation, but we cannot prove it and our reason will not even help us to explain it. We take it on faith alone: *sola fide*. This limiting of the reach of reason is precisely what the Gilsonian paradigm is all about. Skepticism about the powers of reason led fourteenth-century theologians to appeal to the faith as our only grounds for holding truths of the faith. Skepticism led to fideism. Now, my claim in Chapter 3 was that fourteenth-century theologians on the search for simplicity emphasized divine simplicity to such an extent that distinction in God was ruled out, and as a result analysis and genuine explanation became impossible. For those theologians, reason is impotent in the face of divine simplicity, and this is manifested in their appeals to faith where other theologians attempted rational explanations. In this sense, when, in connection with the strong use of the psychological model, Ockham appeals to our accepting or holding some truths *sola fide*, on faith alone, he is fitting beautifully into the Gilsonian paradigm, and the characterization of fourteenth-century thought as fideistic.

I will return to Gilson and the Gilsonian paradigm toward the end of this chapter, where I address the issue of whether Gilson was right about the fourteenth century and its fideism after all. Before that, however, I want to present several more examples of the impact that the search for simplicity had on fourteenth-century trinitarian theology. In the present chapter I leave the psychological model behind, although I think it worthwhile to point out that all three of the theologians I will discuss here as representatives of the fourteenth-century search for simplicity – Walter Chatton OFM (†1343), Robert Holcot OP (†1349), and Gregory of Rimini OESA

(†1358) – either rejected outright or neglected even to mention the strong use of the psychological model. This in itself is a manifestation of the search for simplicity. But Chatton, Holcot, and Rimini exhibit a still more radical manifestation of the search, and this is the reason that they are the focus of this chapter. I call this manifestation “Praepositinianism,” and in order to understand it we need to go back to the issues dealt with in Chapter 1.

A basic divide laid out in Chapter 1 was that the Dominicans held to a relation account of personal distinction whereas the Franciscans held to an emanation account of personal distinction. The Dominicans said that the persons are distinct because of the opposition of relations between them, whereas the Franciscans claimed that the persons are distinct because they emanate, i.e., take their being, in three irreducibly distinct ways. These are very different ways of conceptualizing the Trinity, and most of the trinitarian debate of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is an expression of the deep differences that exist between a relational and an emanational approach to trinitarian theology. We see these deep differences best in the “flashpoints” discussed in Chapters 1 and 2: on these issues in the trinitarian debate the two trinitarian accounts were fundamentally in disagreement with each other (see the Appendix for the flashpoints that have been mentioned in this book). And yet, for all of their disagreement, the two approaches to the Trinity share the fact that they maintain that what makes one person distinct from the other two is a *personal property*, a minimally distinguishing characteristic that is unique to one person and makes this person different from the other two persons. To be sure, the Dominicans thought about the personal property as relational and the Franciscans thought about it as emanational; nevertheless, on both the relation and the emanation accounts of personal distinction it was the personal property that made one divine person really distinct from the other two.

Moreover, these two different ways of looking at the Trinity, relationally and emanationally, shared the claim that the persons are essentially identical because they all are the very same divine essence. Now, in medieval terms, the way that one divine person comes about as distinct from the other two is called the person's "constitution." In both the Dominican relation account and the Franciscan emanation account, personal constitution became an explanation for how each divine person is essentially identical with and personally distinct from the other two. The explanation went something like this. The divine essence is what accounts for the fact that all the persons are essentially identical. The personal property is what accounts for the fact that each person is really distinct from the other two persons. It is the divine personal property and the essence "working together" (metaphorically speaking) that accounts for the fact that each divine person is essentially identical with the other two persons but personally distinct from them, essentially identical in virtue of the shared divine essence and personally distinct in virtue of the unique personal property. The person, moreover, just *is* essence and personal property. Personal constitution is, therefore, an explanation of essential identity and personal distinction, and as such it lies at the heart of later-medieval trinitarian theology.

It should be noted that medieval theologians in fact supported many different models of personal constitution – the dual nature of the divine relations mentioned in Chapter 1 was one of those models, John Duns Scotus had a different model, and interestingly Peter Auriol and William Ockham shared yet another model. But nowhere is the central issue that I want to point out as clearly presented as it is in Henry of Ghent and in Godfrey of Fontaines (†1307?). Let us look first at what Henry says: "Since the entirety (*integritas*) of a person involves two [items], namely the essence and the personal property . . . in the same [person] the essence is quasi-material and

the property is quasi-formal.”³ Henry of Ghent has a *hylomorphic* model of divine constitution:⁴ a divine person for Henry is made up of essence and personal property, the essence acting as a type of material principle, the personal property acting like a formal principle that makes the quasi-material essence be that particular divine person. The divine person, then, is the mixture of the two, essence and property – that is to say, of the quasi-material principle and the quasi-formal principle. This model of personal constitution is nothing more than Aristotelian hylomorphism applied to the divine persons: the persons are essence and property in a way analogous to the way individual trees and rocks and all primary substances are made up of matter and form as two inseparable principles. Godfrey of Fontaines holds precisely the same view: “In the constitution of a person the common essence must be included as quasi-material, and the relative property as quasi-formal, just as genus and difference concur in the constitution of a species.”⁵ We see again a hylomorphic model of divine personal constitution, and this is a good example of the way a theory of personal constitution explains how essence and property work together to constitute a divine person as *this* person distinct from but essentially identical with the other two persons. There is one extremely significant point that needs to be stressed here:

³ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 53, q. 3: “Cum duo sint de integritate personae, scilicet essentia et personalis proprietas . . . ipsa essentia est quasi materiale in eadem et proprietas quasi formale.” Ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 63vZ. Clearly the force of the ‘quasi’ here is to lessen the impact of the use of the term ‘material’ in connection with God’s essence, since God is as immaterial as can be. Despite this caveat, Henry’s use of the term ‘material’ in this context was duly noted and attacked by, among others, John Duns Scotus.

⁴ Hylomorphism is the view, common to Aristotle and his medieval followers, that all material objects are composed of two principles, matter (Greek: *hyle*) and form (Greek: *morphe*), the matter being what takes on the characteristics that the form has the capacity to give or actualize.

⁵ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* VII, q. 2: “Unde in constitutione personae oportet includi essentiam communem quasi materiale et proprietatem relativam quasi formale, sicut in constitutione speciei concurrunt genus et differentia.” *Les Philosophes Belges*, vol. III, p. 284.

Henry of Ghent, as we have seen many times, was a central figure in the Franciscan trinitarian tradition, while Godfrey of Fontaines generally supported positions that Dominicans would hold. Thus, the fact that Henry and Godfrey shared a model of personal constitution shows that both the Dominican and the Franciscan trinitarian traditions relied upon personal constitution. In fact, basically everybody appealed to constitution in their trinitarian theologies. The particular model of constitution was a source of disagreement and debate, but the fact that personal constitution explained essential identity and personal distinction was broadly accepted.

And with that we have returned to the main topic of this chapter, since, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, explanation requires distinction, and the use of personal constitution as an explanation for why the persons are essentially identical but personally distinct appears to require a distinction within one and the same divine person between divine essence and divine personal property. If the explanation for the way each divine person comes about is that the person is constituted, then it seems that the person is somehow “put together” from essence and personal property, the essence explaining why the person is essentially identical with the other two persons, the unique personal property explaining why the person is personally distinct from the other two. This can be seen very clearly in John Duns Scotus, who maintains explicitly that each personal property is formally non-identical with or formally distinct from the divine essence. For Scotus, there is in God, prior to an act of any intellect, created or divine, a distinction or difference between the divine personal properties and the divine essence: these two entities are not formally the same.⁶ This was, for Scotus, the only way to account for

⁶ E.g., John Duns Scotus, I *Ord.*, d. 2, pars 2, qq. 1–4, n. 389: “Ratio qua formaliter suppositum est incommunicabile (sit *a*) et ratio essentiae ut essentia (sit *b*) habent aliquam distinctionem praecedentem omnem actum intellectus creati et increati.” IV, p. 349^{20–22}. It

the distinction of the persons in an ontologically tenable manner: he thought that without there being both common divine essence and unique personal property in each one of the three persons, the divine persons would be either completely the same or completely distinct. Scotus clearly believed that this formal distinction or non-identity “within” the divine person posed no problem for the simplicity of the person; in his view, the formal distinction left God’s absolute simplicity intact. But what would be the reaction to personal constitution from a theologian holding that the preservation of absolute divine simplicity is the most important goal in trinitarian theology, that is to say, from a theologian on the search for simplicity? One might suspect that such a theologian would have severe reservations about personal constitution as a way of explaining why the persons are essentially identical but personally distinct. Personal constitution posits some kind of minimal distinction between essence and property: that is the basis of its explanatory value. This could be seen as incompatible with divine simplicity. One might suspect this, but what actually happened when personal constitution met the search for simplicity?

In fact, we do not have to wait until the fourteenth century to find out. The theologian who appears to have first made a major issue of this was the Italian scholar Praepositinus, who taught theology in Paris at the end of the twelfth century, was the Chancellor of the University of Paris from 1206 until 1209, and died after 1210. Praepositinus’ most important work of theology is his *Summa* “*Qui producit ventos*,” written in the last decade of the twelfth century (perhaps 1190–94). The first book of this *Summa* contains a treatment of trinitarian theology in which Praepositinus denies that the persons

is clear from the context (*ibid.*, pp. 349–78) that the incommunicable *ratio* is the personal property, and that this *ratio* and that of the essence are not formally identical.

are constituted by personal properties. Instead, in a presentation that would become notorious in the thirteenth century, Praepositinus maintains that the properties *are* the persons, and when we talk about the properties as though they are different from the persons, this is merely a manner of speaking. Specifically, Praepositinus claims that the word ‘paternity’, in statements like “The Father is distinct from the Son by paternity” or “Paternity is in the Father,” functions in a way parallel to the way the word ‘majesty’ functions when addressing a king or queen, for example in the entreaty “I beseech Your Majesty”: just as ‘majesty’ in this case means “you who are majestic,” so ‘paternity’ means “you who are the Father,” and just as ‘majesty’ is simply another name for the king or queen in question, so ‘paternity’ is simply another name for the Father. In sum, for Praepositinus, the difference between person and property is a merely grammatical difference with nothing corresponding to it in divine reality: in reality, person and property are absolutely identical. In accordance with this, since the persons are not made distinct by anything more basic (like personal properties), Praepositinus insists that the persons are distinct in and of themselves (*se ipsis*). Thus, the divine persons just *are* distinct from each other, and no mechanism need be given to explain their distinction – the Father is distinct from the Son, and both the Father and the Son are distinct from the Holy Spirit in and of themselves. And yet, they are all one God.⁷ Praepositinus’ theory of the persons, then, can be boiled down

⁷ Praepositinus, *Summa “Qui producit ventos,”* I, q. 17: “Dicimus ergo quod cum dicitur ‘paternitas est in Patre’ vel ‘Pater paternitate distinguitur a Filio’, modi loquendi sunt, et est sensus: ‘paternitas est in Patre’, id est Pater est Pater, sicut cum dico ‘rogo dilectionem tuam’, id est te dilectum, et in similibus similiter. . . Quaeritur autem a nobis: si personae non distinguuntur proprietatibus, quibus distinguuntur? . . . dicimus quod se ipsis distinguuntur. . . Ergo Pater se ipso distinguitur a Filio et Spiritu Sancto, et ita de aliis personis.” The text is quoted from Giuseppe Angelini, *L’ortodossia e la grammatica: Analisi di struttura e deduzione storica della Teologia Trinitaria di Prepositino* (Rome: Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1972), p. 277⁷⁻¹⁰, p. 279¹⁻⁶ (slightly modified).

to two main claims: first, there is no distinction between person and property; second, the persons are distinct in and of themselves (*se ipsis*).

What drives Praepositinus' view is a complete emphasis on simplicity "in" the divine persons, rejecting any type of constitution of the persons out of essence and property. For Praepositinus, the persons are absolutely simple, and the complete simplicity of the persons rules out the possibility that a property could "bring about" their distinction or constitute them in any way: person and property are totally identical, because if they were not, then there would be something distinct "in" the person, and the persons would not be simple. So, divine simplicity is the motivating factor behind Praepositinus' view. What is sacrificed in Praepositinus' scheme, however, is explanatory comprehensibility. Praepositinus offers no explanation for the distinction between the divine persons, but merely asserts that the persons are distinct in and of themselves. Nor does he offer any explanation for why and how the persons are essentially one. There is, in fact, no explanation on Praepositinus' view whatsoever.

Although Praepositinus had at least one high-profile supporter in the early thirteenth-century theologian William of Auxerre (†1231),⁸ basically everyone else in the thirteenth century rejected his view. In a paraphrase of the way in which Henry of Ghent puts it, the most important argument for the rejection of Praepositinus' view goes like this: if simple things differ in and of themselves (*se ipsis*), then they differ totally and in no way are united; but we know that the divine persons are simple things and that they differ personally and are essentially united; therefore the persons are not distinct in and of

⁸ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* I, 7, 6 (ed. Ribaillier, pp. 125–27), where William (p. 126^o) calls Praepositinus' theory "multum probabilis."

themselves.⁹ In effect, Henry and others said to Praepositinus: if you do not postulate personal properties, then you cannot explain how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are personally distinct and yet essentially identical. And to this Praepositinus would have replied, first, that personal properties would destroy the very simplicity of the divine persons upon which this argument rests, and, second, that there is no explanation for why the persons are both identical and distinct: they just are that way. Here is the search for simplicity in action: in Praepositinus, the concern to preserve divine simplicity eradicated trinitarian explanation. In the thirteenth century and into the fourteenth century, when explanatory “density” (I used this term in Chapter 3 to describe Scotus’ trinitarian thought) was the driving motivation in theological speculation, Praepositinianism was very unattractive. Thirteenth-century (and many fourteenth-century) theologians wanted to explain things about God’s trinitarian reality – they considered this to be a *sine qua non* for a minimally satisfying treatment of the Trinity – and Praepositinus’ theory did not allow them to do that. But in the fourteenth century, with the rise of the search for simplicity, it was only a matter of time before Praepositinianism became an attractive theory. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, some fourteenth-century theologians did in fact insist that preserving absolute divine simplicity is more important than giving detailed trinitarian explanations. In what follows, before returning to Étienne Gilson and the topic of fideism, I want to examine the three theologians I mentioned above, all of whom accepted Praepositinus’

⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 55, q. 1: “Quaecumque simplicia se ipsis differunt, differunt eo quod est sui, aliter enim differunt aliquo quod est sui et aliquo non differrent. Quaecumque autem sic differunt omnino differunt, et in nullo conveniunt, quemadmodum differunt genera praedicamentorum substantiae et accidentis. Si ergo sic differrent divinae personae, omnino differrent et in nullo convenirent. Consequens falsum est, ergo et antecedens.” Ed. Badius, vol. II, f. 106vT.

view: Walter Chatton, Robert Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini. In short: I want to examine fourteenth-century Praepositinianism.

WALTER CHATTON

The Franciscan theologian Walter Chatton was born around 1285 or 1290, and it seems likely that he was pursuing theological studies at Oxford when William Ockham was reading the *Sentences* there. Moreover, Chatton, Ockham, and the young Adam Wodeham (on whom see below) appear to have been teaching and studying at one and the same Franciscan convent (perhaps in London) around 1321–24, and the fact that they were debating together in the same place is often reflected in their works. Chatton was Franciscan regent master at Oxford from 1330 until 1333. Thereafter, he served at the Papal court in Avignon, and died in 1343.

Walter Chatton shows as well as any other medieval theologian just how important divine simplicity could be in crafting a trinitarian theology. We can begin to see this through examining what amounts to his guiding principle in trinitarian theology: the three really distinct persons are one God and there is no fourth thing.¹⁰ Chatton repeats variations of this principle frequently throughout his treatment of the Trinity, consistently using the principle for one purpose only: to guard against the postulation of any distinct items in God except for the three divine persons. In other words, Chatton uses it to guarantee that the only distinction in God is between the three really distinct persons. For Chatton, God is three persons, really distinct and essentially identical, and to make into a distinct item any other term that we use about God, whether that term be

¹⁰ E.g., Walter Chatton, *I Rep.*, d. 33–34, q. un., n. 17: “Asserendum est primo quod tres personae divinae sunt realiter distinctae; secundo, quod est unus Deus; et tertio, quod in divinis non est quarta res.” Ed. Wey and Etzkorn, vol. II, p. 290^{17–19}.

‘essence’, ‘will’, ‘active generation’, or ‘paternity’, etc., would be to posit a “fourth thing” (*quarta res*) in God, and that, as Chatton frequently tells us, is expressly forbidden by the Canons of the Fourth Lateran Council, according to which there is Trinity in God, not quaternity.¹¹ All of those terms that we use about God, then, are merely terms – nothing corresponds to them “in” God, for God is three really distinct persons and there is no fourth thing.

One can imagine several ways of responding to Chatton’s principle and the use to which he puts it. One could ask Chatton, for example, whether the existence in God of an item with some kind of distinction of its own necessarily entails that that item is a “thing” (*res*). Chatton’s view assumes that there is no distinction partway between a purely psychological distinction and a real distinction, but why should we accept this? Further, one could ask whether the text from the Fourth Lateran Council is not open to other, less categorical interpretations than the one that Chatton here gives it. But, setting aside these possible rejoinders to Chatton’s view, what needs to be noted here is that in his principle we are seeing the first sign of Chatton’s overwhelming interest in divine simplicity. God is, for Chatton, absolutely simple. Of course, all of the theologians discussed in this book would have agreed with Chatton on this point, although how exactly to understand the term ‘simple’ would have been a topic for discussion. But Chatton takes simplicity to be *the* central issue in trinitarian theology – he explicitly calls simplicity

¹¹ The Fourth Lateran Council was held in 1215 during the papacy of Innocent III. Especially the first two chapters of the “Canons,” or official decisions, that emerged from the Council and were later codified in Canon Law, were fundamental dogmatic texts for later-medieval trinitarian theology, setting the boundaries within which later discussion could take place. At several junctures (e.g., I *Rep.*, d. 5, q. 1, n. 31 [ed. Wey and Etzkorn, vol. I, p. 394⁶⁻⁹] and I *Rep.*, d. 33–34, q. un., nn. 12, 23 [ed. Wey and Etzkorn, vol. II, pp. 289¹⁵ and 291³²]), Chatton refers to the following text from the Canons: “In God there is a Trinity only, not a quaternity” = “et ideo in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas.” Ed. Denzinger, no. 432.

“the general attribute,”¹² and from start to finish in his treatment of the Trinity all other explanations and arguments are subordinated to divine simplicity. For Chatton, three really distinct persons are one God, and no other distinctions or distinct items are necessary. In fact, so simple is God that positing any other distinction whatsoever would entail there being a fourth thing in God, and that is strictly prohibited. For Walter Chatton, then, God’s simplicity demands that there are no distinctions except for the real distinction between the persons. And, of course, the sole reason we postulate the real distinction between the persons is on account of the faith and revelation.

This radical understanding of divine simplicity – that the only distinction in God is the real personal distinctions between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit – seems clearly incompatible with the postulation of personal properties and personal constitution. A Praepositinian view of the identity and distinction of the divine persons would seem to be Chatton’s only possible recourse, and, indeed, according to Chatton, the persons are really distinct in and of themselves and they are essentially identical in and of themselves:

(4a) If it is inquired as to how it is really [in God], we ought to imagine that each person is absolutely simple (*simplicissima*), having no duality, large or small, but the persons are totally distinct in and of themselves by personal distinction, and they are totally united (*conveniunt*) in and of themselves by essential unity (*convenientia*); I say that extramentally (*extra animam*) they are united (*conveniunt*) in their every totality in being one God, but they differ in being distinct persons in and of themselves in all ways (*utrobique*) and not only by a part of them (*aliquo sui*).¹³

¹² Walter Chatton, *I Rep.*, d. 6, q. un., n. 5: “Simplicitas est generale attributum, igitur aequaliter convenit essentiae et cuilibet personae et simul omnibus aequaliter.” Ed. Wey and Etzkorn, vol. I, p. 418⁵⁻⁷.

¹³ Walter Chatton, *I Rep.*, d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, n. 29: “Si igitur inquiratur quomodo est in re, debemus imaginari quod quaelibet persona est simplicissima, nullam habens dualitatem nec parvam nec magnam, sed personae se ipsis totaliter distinguuntur distinctione personali, et se ipsis

Here Chatton neatly presents the two main points in the Prae-positinian position: there is no distinction between person and personal property, and the persons are distinct in and of themselves. The motivation behind the first of these points is, as is evident in Quotation 4a, the persons' absolute simplicity: each person is absolutely simple (*simplicissima*). For Chatton, the person's absolute simplicity is fundamentally incompatible with the postulation of a personal property: if the personal property were an entity in any way distinct within a person, if within a person there were *any* distinction whatsoever between essence and property, composition from distinct things would result, and the simplicity of the person would be shattered.¹⁴ Chatton, then, rejects any type of distinction between essence and property "in" any of the divine persons. Take the person of the Father: Chatton claims that "to posit in the person of the Father anything in whatever way distinct in reality, would not be to preserve the highest simplicity."¹⁵ As Chatton says in Quotation 4a, there can be no "duality" in the person, and hence there must be total identity between person and personal property, and between person and essence, and between property and essence. Thus, we end up with Chatton's own Prae-positinian view: person and personal property are absolutely identical, that is to say, person is personal property in the strictest sense. Moreover, person and essence are absolutely identical, as are personal property and essence. For Chatton, God is three persons and there is no fourth thing; thus, there are

totaliter conveniunt convenientia essentiali; totalitate omni extra animam conveniunt, inquam, in essendo unus Deus, sed differunt in essendo distinctae personae, se totis utrobique et non aliquo sui tantum." Ed. Wey and Etzkorn, vol. I, p. 393¹⁴⁻²¹.

¹⁴ E.g., Walter Chatton, *I Rep.*, d. 33-34, q. un., n. 3: "<Si proprietates personalis in divinis non sit idem cum essentia et cum persona>, in persona esset compositio ex distinctis, scilicet ex proprietate et essentia." Ed. Wey and Etzkorn, vol. II, p. 287¹⁷⁻¹⁸.

¹⁵ Walter Chatton, *I Rep.*, d. 26, q. un., n. 9: "Ponere enim in persona Patris aliqua distincta quomodocumque in re, non esset salvare summam simplicitatem." Ed. Wey and Etzkorn, vol. II, p. 178²⁸⁻²⁹.

no distinct personal properties and there is also no distinct essence. No matter what we call them, relations or emanations: if we posit in God personal properties that are distinct in any way from the persons, or if we posit a divine essence distinct from the persons, then we have posited a fourth thing, and that is prohibited by the Church and, moreover, would compromise God's total simplicity.

The second point in Chatton's Praepositinian position – that the persons are distinct in and of themselves – follows directly from his view that person and property and essence are absolutely identical: the persons are not in any way *made* distinct, they just are distinct. With this second point, Chatton is rejecting any form of personal constitution. This is a radical move: as mentioned above, from Praepositinus himself up until Chatton's day there had been a variety of explanations for personal constitution, but there appears to have been near total agreement not only that the distinction and identity of the divine persons needed to be explained, but also that personal constitution was the way to explain it. This is what Chatton rejects: for him, explanations for personal distinction and essential identity are a mirage; the persons are distinct and identical in and of themselves and nothing more basic can be appealed to in order to explain this most fundamental fact (see Quotation 4a). Chatton offers an interesting argument for this view. He indicates that on any form of personal constitution, there is going to have to be some item in God that is in and of itself identical with and distinct from some other item in God. This argument appears as part of Chatton's discussion of the formal non-identity that Scotus had claimed to exist between the divine essence and the personal property:

(4b) For just as, according to those positing a non-identity between essence and paternity, essence and paternity are the same in and of themselves (*semetipsis*) essentially and really, and not the same in and of themselves (*semetipsis*) formally, so the persons in and of themselves and on

their own account (*se ipsis totis*) are the same essentially and are distinct personally.¹⁶

According to Chatton, theologians (like Scotus) who posit a formal non-identity between essence and property must say that, e.g., essence and paternity are really identical on their own account and formally distinct on their own account. There is nothing that *makes* the properties at once both identical with the essence and (formally) distinct from it – the properties just are that way.¹⁷ Chatton saw, then, that earlier theologians had argued for a type of native, irreducible identity and distinction between essence and property. This unmediated, unconstituted, and simultaneous identity and distinction, Chatton merely transferred to the real distinction between the persons, thereby eliminating the need for the properties altogether. The persons just are in and of themselves really distinct and essentially identical, nothing makes them be that way.

We could generalize Chatton's argument in the following way: on any theory postulating divine personal properties, those properties are God (they clearly cannot be something external to God), and hence each of them must be identical to the divine essence; nevertheless, these same properties explain why the persons are really distinct from one another and hence the properties themselves must be in some way distinct from one another (otherwise, they would not explain what proponents of personal constitution say that they

¹⁶ Walter Chatton, *I Rep.*, d. 2, q. 5, a. 3, nn. 99–100: "Sicut enim secundum ponentes non-identitatem inter essentiam et paternitatem, essentia et paternitas sunt semetipsis idem essentialiter et realiter, et semetipsis non idem formaliter, ita personae se ipsis totis sunt idem essentialiter et distinguuntur personaliter." Ed. Wey and Etkorn, vol. I, p. 202^{15–19}.

¹⁷ Of course, for Scotus, it was the very fact that the properties are *really* identical with the essence and merely *formally* distinct from it that preserved God's absolute simplicity: the formal distinction was a less than real distinction, and hence, for Scotus, it did not compromise God's simplicity. Chatton clearly did not concur.

explain). Chatton is simply pointing out that the personal properties must be essentially identical with one another (insofar as each is identical to the same divine essence) and yet in some way distinct from one another. Chatton's argument seems to imply further that the properties must be both essentially identical and in some way distinct from one another in and of themselves, since nothing more basic can be appealed to in order to explain these facts (we cannot claim that something else makes the properties be distinct from one another but essentially identical, because in that case an infinite regress would ensue: what makes those other somethings distinct but essentially identical?). Thus, on any theory of personal constitution, the divine personal properties will be by definition, i.e., in and of themselves, essentially identical and yet distinct from one another. Chatton concludes that, when we discuss the Trinity, something in God will always have to be in some way or another in and of itself distinct from and identical with something else. Whereas, however, earlier theologians had thought that personal properties not only explained something highly significant about identity and distinction in God but also left divine simplicity uncompromised, Chatton thought that the sole way to safeguard divine simplicity was to eliminate all properties and maintain that exclusively the persons are distinct in and of themselves.

Two things should be noticed about Chatton's Praepositinian view. First, simplicity stands at the heart of Chatton's trinitarian project. There can be no distinction whatsoever "within" a person, for, as we saw Chatton say above, that would compromise God's total simplicity. This led him to reject any form of personal constitution, since all models of constitution posit some (minimal) distinction between essence and property in God. So, Chatton claims that there is personal distinction without personal constitution: the persons are distinct in and of themselves. Second, we should notice that

Chatton's theory explains nothing. Absolutely nothing. To give a paraphrase of the bottom line for Chatton, we could say that he holds that the three divine persons are really personally distinct by personal distinction and essentially one by essential oneness – end of story (see Quotation 4a). God's reality is so simple that explanation as such is impossible concerning it; and this is because explanation requires analysis, which in turn requires distinction, and, for Chatton, there are no distinctions to which we can appeal when talking about God. In short, Chatton's trinitarian theory involves little more than repeating or restating what the articles of faith tell us about the triune God: God is three really distinct persons, all essentially identical.¹⁸ Saying that the Son just *is* personally distinct from the Father and essentially the same as the Father does not explain anything, but it is where Chatton's overwhelming interest in preserving divine simplicity has led him. Explanatory density has been jettisoned in order to make room for absolute simplicity. To put it another way: on account of absolute divine simplicity, reason is unable to penetrate the mystery of the Trinity, so we fall back on what the faith tells us is the case, i.e., that God is three really distinct but essentially identical persons. Chatton's trinitarian theology offers an excellent example of a rather robust form of fideism: reason is impotent when confronted with God's total simplicity.

Praepositinianism was always a minority view, and most later-medieval theologians rejected it explicitly. Let us look at a direct attack on Chatton's version of Praepositinianism by his slightly younger Franciscan colleague, Adam Wodeham (†1358). Wodeham rejects Chatton's position forcefully, saying that it will lead particularly to the Arian heresy, i.e., that "the three persons are really distinct among themselves, so that none of them is the other,

¹⁸ See n. 10, above, on what Chatton claims we know about God's triune nature.

neither essentially nor personally . . . instead [they will be] absolutely [distinct].”¹⁹ In his criticism of Chatton’s view, Wodeham concentrates on what he considers to be Chatton’s all too weak understanding of the divine essence. For Wodeham, Chatton’s claim that “three persons are one God and there is no fourth thing” erased the essential identity of the persons by erasing the divine essence itself. In particular, Wodeham takes Chatton’s view to boil down to “the three persons only are the three persons, so that they are not one essence or one God except by taking one essence or one God for the three persons at once.”²⁰ In effect, Wodeham maintains that Chatton’s efforts to eliminate any parts within the persons resulted in the elimination of the divine essence itself. And Wodeham thinks that this is completely unacceptable. The divine essence for Wodeham is precisely the mark of the *unity* of the three persons, and Chatton’s tendency to eradicate from his theology any mention of essence (and property) leads Wodeham to liken the divine persons on Chatton’s view to “a collective unity . . . and then there is true distinction without any essential identity, [agreeing in this] with Arius.”²¹ Thus, in Wodeham’s eyes, Chatton’s version of Praepositinianism led inevitably to heresy: three persons who were essentially distinct, forming a unity only as some sort of aggregate or collection. Adam Wodeham, then, rejected Chatton’s Praepositinianism, and he tried to explain how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are essentially identical but

¹⁹ Adam Wodeham, *Lectura secunda*, d. 5, q. un., §2: “Istam responsionem [scil., Gualteri Chatton] tenere non audeo, quia nescio cavere quin incurram in sententiam Arianam . . . Nam tres personae sunt inter se realiter distinctae, ita quod nulla istarum est alia, nec essentialiter nec personaliter . . . immo absolute.” Ed. Wood and Gál, vol. II, p. 260^{18–22}.

²⁰ Adam Wodeham, *Lectura secunda*, d. 5, q. un., §2: “Si tres personae tantum sint tres personae, ita quod non sint una essentia vel unus Deus nisi sumendo unam essentiam vel unum Deum pro tribus personis simul, tunc non video quod esset in divinis nisi unitas collectiva . . . et tunc vera distinctio absque omni identitate essentiali cum Ariano.” Ed. Wood and Gál, vol. II, p. 260^{43–47}.

²¹ See the text in n. 20 above. Compare Wodeham’s criticism of Praepositinianism with Henry of Ghent’s at n. 9 above.

personally distinct and to show how his explanation is compatible with divine simplicity.

ROBERT HOLCOT

The Dominican Robert Holcot read the *Sentences* at Oxford beginning in 1331, lectured on the Bible there in 1334, and was Dominican regent master there probably between 1336 and 1338. Holcot died of the plague in 1349. He is known for his works of speculative theology, but even more for his biblical commentaries and for being one of the “classicizing friars” of the early fourteenth century whom the historian Beryl Smalley famously discussed in her book *English Friars and Antiquity*.²²

Holcot’s trinitarian work exemplifies a trend in Oxford theology of the second quarter of the fourteenth century: the metaphysical issues in trinitarian theology that have been the focus of this book become less and less prominent. For example, Holcot, as far as I can tell, does not discuss the psychological model of the Trinity at all in his work. From some brief and passing statements, however, it is possible to excavate some of Holcot’s views on divine simplicity, the constitution of the divine persons, and the relation between essence and property, thereby giving some indication of where he stands on the search for simplicity.

That Holcot is indeed influenced by the search for simplicity is clear in his denial that the essence and the personal properties are in any way distinct from each other, “not really nor modally nor formally nor by reason (*ratione*) nor convertibly nor in any other way.” According to Holcot, essence and property are identical to such a degree that you cannot even claim that they *are* the same,

²² Beryl Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960).

because just the use of the plural verb ‘are’ would imply some sort of distinction.²³ Of course, maintaining that there is no distinction between essence and property directly affects Holcot’s view of the constitution of the persons. In particular, he considers “the fantasy of some” (*imaginatio quorundum*) that the common essence and paternity concur in the constitution of the Father, so that the essence is that by which the Father is God and paternity is that by which he is the Father.²⁴ This is quite clearly Holcot’s presentation of a generic theory of personal constitution related to those we saw above in Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. Holcot unequivocally rejects this kind of view:

(4c) This way of speaking is not suitable, both because it necessarily posits in a person an aggregation of several things, and this is in any case not true, and because everything that is constituted through something, is constituted through it through some genus of cause, for example of efficient, formal, or material [cause], but none of these ought to be posited internally to God. Thus, I say that neither God nor any person is constituted through something, but without any internal constitution or causality God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.²⁵

Not only would personal constitution entail there being in each divine person a complex of several things; it would inevitably involve some

²³ Robert Holcot, *Quaestio* “*Utrum cum unitate essentiae divinae stet pluralitas personarum*”: “Essentia et relatio in divinis non distinguuntur realiter nec modaliter nec formaliter nec ratione nec convertibiliter nec aliquo alio modo . . . haec non est concedenda: essentia et relatio sunt idem, proprie loquendo de virtute sermonis, quia sequitur: sunt idem, ergo sunt una res, et ultra: sunt una res, ergo sunt, et ultra: sunt, ergo sunt aliqua, et ita non sunt una res. Consequentia patet quia illud verbum ‘sunt’ est pluralis numeri, et ideo consignificat multas res.” Ed. Gelber, p. 102^{1001–3}, p. 103^{1007–11}.

²⁴ Robert Holcot, *Quaestio* “*Utrum cum unitate essentiae . . .*” (ed. Gelber, p. 104^{1030–37}).

²⁵ Robert Holcot, *Quaestio* “*Utrum cum unitate essentiae . . .*”: “Sed iste modus loquendi non est conveniens, tum quia in persona ponit plurium rerum aggregationem necessario, quod tamen non est verum, tum quia omne quod constituitur per aliquid, constituitur per illud per aliquod genus causae, ut puta efficientis, formalis, vel materialis, sed in Deo nulla istarum debet poni ad intra. Unde dico quod Deus non constituitur nec aliqua persona per aliquid, sed sine quacumque constitutione vel causalitate ad intra Deus est Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus.” Ed. Gelber, p. 104^{1038–45}.

type of causality internal to God, which is certainly untrue. For Holcot, constitution is flat out wrong. If this were to leave us in any doubt about the Praepositinian tendency in Holcot's trinitarian thought, he makes it unmistakably clear when he says that "speaking properly, the Father is distinguished in and of himself (*se ipso*) from the Son, and nothing makes the Father distinct from the Son," although Holcot does concede that the Father can be said to make the Son a distinct person inasmuch as the Father generates the Son.²⁶ The Father and the Son are indeed distinct from each other and the Father does indeed give being to the Son, but neither of these facts can be explained by appeal to personal properties, since there neither are nor can be personal properties in God. The only distinction in God is the real distinction between the three divine persons, who are distinct in and of themselves and nevertheless simply are one God. This is Holcot's Praepositinianism.

For Robert Holcot, the essence and personal property are in no way distinct from each other "within" a divine person, and there is no personal constitution. Moreover, we cannot explain why the persons are distinct from one another and identical essentially: they just are that way. In line with this emphasis upon divine simplicity to the near exclusion of any type of trinitarian explanation, Holcot makes a blanket appeal to revelation to justify any seemingly contradictory claims in our statements about the Trinity. Reason, he says, cannot penetrate these types of mysteries, and hence trinitarian statements cannot be known but must be believed strictly on faith.²⁷ In sum,

²⁶ Robert Holcot, *Quaestio "Utrum cum unitate essentiae . . ."*: "Quando accipitur quod idem constituit Patrem in esse Patris et distinguit, dico etiam quod haec est metaphorica et impropria locutio 'aliquid distinguit Patrem a Filio', quia proprie loquendo Pater distinguitur se ipso a Filio, et nihil distinguit Patrem a Filio. Sed bene potest dici quod aliquid distinguit Filium a Patre, quia Pater qui generat distinguit Filium qui generatur." Ed. Gelber, p. 107¹¹⁷⁻²².

²⁷ E.g., Robert Holcot, *Quaestio "Utrum haec sit concedenda: Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus"*: "Nescimus scientifice defendere quod articuli quos credimus non includunt

then, Robert Holcot appears to have been fully engaged in what I have called the search for simplicity, valuing divine simplicity more highly in trinitarian theology than explanation. This, I would suggest, is the source of the fideistic character of Holcot's trinitarian theology.

GREGORY OF RIMINI

Born around 1300, the Augustinian Hermit Gregory of Rimini was educated at Paris in the late 1320s. After teaching in a number of his order's educational institutions, in 1343–44 it was his turn to read the *Sentences* at Paris, and the written *Sentences* commentary that we have is clearly based on those lectures. In 1357, Rimini became the head of his religious order. He held that post for just a year, dying at the end of 1358. Through his *Sentences* commentary, he had widespread influence in the scholastic discussion into the Reformation period and beyond. On our topic, Rimini advocates what can best be described as a trinitarian theology of radical minimalism. Driven by the search for simplicity, Rimini rejects completely and explicitly the strong use of the psychological model and embraces Praepositinianism.

The presentation of the Praepositinian view in Rimini's *Sentences* commentary is, typically for him, a model of clear and well-organized theological exposition. After a detailed preliminary discussion by Rimini, clarifying the possible meanings of crucial terms, in particular various ways in which the terms 'property' and 'personal distinction' can be taken, Rimini encapsulates his own view in four "conclusions," of which I will discuss the first three in order to give an idea of Rimini's position and his theological method:

contradictionem, quaelibet enim via adhuc inventa magis intricat quam declarat, et ideo dicendum est quod credimus eos fore possibles veros et compossibiles quia sanctis patribus sunt revelati, et per miracula facta ad monitionem eorum qui talia docuerunt sunt facti nobis credibiles, et non per rationem naturalem." Ed. Gelber, pp. 49⁴²³–50⁴²⁸.

(4d) Having made these points, I posit four conclusions with regard to the question, nevertheless [I do this] without assertion and without excluding any better view. The first [conclusion] is that the divine persons are constituted by no properties, no matter how ‘property’ is taken. Second, that the divine persons are made personally distinct through their properties, with ‘property’ accepted in the first way [i.e., as identical with the person], that is [they are made personally distinct] in and of themselves. Third, that the divine persons are not made personally distinct by any properties, [with ‘property’] accepted in the second way [i.e., as a really existing entity proper to but in some sense distinct from the person].²⁸

At work in the first two conclusions is a distinction between personal constitution and personal distinction: the persons are not constituted, yet they are distinct, albeit they are distinct in and of themselves. This, of course, is one of the two main points of Praepositinianism: the persons just *are* distinct. The second main point of Praepositinianism – that there are no properties distinct from the persons – is confirmed in Rimini’s third conclusion: the properties are not entities distinct in any way from the persons themselves.

A look at Rimini’s arguments for his conclusions shows quite clearly that the motivation behind his view is to uphold what he considers to be the strictest divine simplicity possible. Thus, in his proof of the first conclusion – that the persons are in no way constituted – Rimini’s argument takes its point of departure in divine simplicity: “Each and every divine person is utterly simple; therefore no divine

²⁸ Gregory of Rimini, *I Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2: “His praemissis pono ad quaestionem, absque assertione tamen et sine praeiudicio melioris sententiae, quatuor conclusiones. Prima est quod nullis proprietatibus, qualitercumque sumantur proprietates, personae divinae constituuntur. Secunda, quod personae divinae distinguuntur personaliter suis proprietatibus primo modo acceptis proprietatibus, id est se ipsis. Tertia, quod divinae personae non distinguuntur personaliter aliquibus proprietatibus secundo modo acceptis.” Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, p. 61^{29–35}. For Rimini’s discussion of the various meanings of the term ‘property’, see *ibid.*, pp. 59²⁶–61¹³.

person is constituted in his being through something.”²⁹ The more detailed argument is that either the property that supposedly constitutes the person is merely a concept or mental construct of some kind, in which case it can have no bearing on the actual constitution of the eternal divine person, or the property is extramental, and in that case, call it “a thing or a formality or a modality or by whatever name you like,” the property will not be the person but rather something belonging to the person, i.e., a mere part of the person, and in that case the person will not be absolutely simple but put together as a whole is put together out of its parts.³⁰ Moreover, if the property constitutes the person, then the essence constitutes the person as well; but we know that the essence does not *constitute* the person, since the essence *is* the person, and thus, according to Rimini, the theories of personal constitution that he is attacking compromise the identity between essence and person, because essence would not be the person but merely constitute the person.³¹ Clearly, for Rimini, any form of constitution whatsoever is incompatible with strict identity between essence and person. Rimini concludes his discussion of constitution using the terminology of formal and material “constitutives,” or factors bringing about personal constitution, that we saw

²⁹ Gregory of Rimini, I *Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2: “Quaelibet persona divina est simplex omnino; igitur nulla persona divina per aliquid in suo esse constituitur.” Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, p. 62^{5–6}.

³⁰ Gregory of Rimini, I *Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2: “Si autem illud constituens non est ipsa persona constituta, sed aliquid eius, aut illud habet esse per operationem animae tantum, et tunc constat quod non constituit personam aeternam, quae summa res est, aut est aliquid extra animam, et quicquid ipsum sit, sive res sive formalitas vel modalitas, aut quovis alio nomine appellare velis, ex quo ipsum non est persona, sed aliquid eius, et non possit intelligi quod sit eius extrinsece sicut forma materiae, sed intrinsece sicut pars est aliquid totius, sequitur quod persona non sit omnino simplex.” Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, p. 62^{14–21}.

³¹ Gregory of Rimini, I *Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2: “Tertio, et sequitur ex eo quod iam tactum est, si persona constitueretur per proprietatem aliquam, constitueretur etiam per essentiam, et essentia constitueret personam, verbi gratia Patrem, et per consequens essentia non esset Pater, quod est contra determinationem ecclesiae in capitulo Damnamus.” Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, p. 62^{30–33}. The reference to “Damnamus” is to the second chapter of the Canons of the Fourth Lateran Council, on which see n. 11 above.

above in Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, and appealing to the figure of greatest authority short of the Bible itself, Augustine:

(4e) It is in no way to be thought that there is in God something really constituted through some formal or material constitutive, but all that is there, in and of itself formally and not through something belonging to it (*aliquid sui*) . . . is all that there is, although a producer and someone who is produced truly are there, and the one produced has being from the one producing. On account of this, terms like ‘constitutive’, ‘constitution’, and ‘constituted’ . . . are not suitably applied to the divine, and it would be better not to use them in these matters, and certainly I find nowhere that Augustine or any other of the saints of that time made use of such terms when they spoke about the distinction between the divine persons.³²

In God, one person truly produces another, producer giving being to produced, but there is no personal constitution, since in order to get that off the ground the absolute simplicity of the persons would have to be shattered by positing some type of distinction between essence and property. Thus, in this first conclusion, the search for simplicity has led Rimini to break the link between constitution and distinction that many medieval theologians had held more or less explicitly. For Rimini, the persons are in no way constituted, and we should not even use the term ‘constitution’.

Although they are not constituted, the three persons are distinct, distinct in and of themselves. Rimini proves this second conclusion appealing once again to divine simplicity. The persons are just as

³² Gregory of Rimini, *I Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2: “Nullatenus aestimandum est esse in Deo aliquid realiter constitutum per aliquod formale vel materiale constitutivum, sed omne, quod ibi est, se ipso formaliter et non per aliquid sui . . . est omne quod est, quamvis ibi sit vere producens et qui producitur, et productus a producente habeat esse. Propter quod huiusmodi vocabula ‘constitutivum’, ‘constitutio’, et ‘constitutum’, et similia, in sensu praemisso non convenienter, ut videtur, assumuntur ad divina, et melius esset non uti eis in materia ista, et pro certo nullibi invenio Augustinum aut alium aliquem illius temporis sanctorum, ubi locuti sunt de distinctione divinarum personarum, talibus usum fuisse vocabulis.” Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, p. 63^{3–12}.

simple as the divine essence or any conceivable property; therefore, just as essence or property (if there were any properties) do not include components that are distinct in any way, neither do the persons. Thus, the persons are not made distinct through or by anything, but are distinct in and of themselves.³³ According to Rimini, there cannot be a more basic source of distinction between the persons than the persons themselves. A potential objection to his view is that the Father refers to the Son by one relation or property, paternity, and to the Holy Spirit by a different relation or property, active spiration, and therefore these properties must be in some way distinct. Arguments of this kind – pointing out that, on the common understanding of the Trinity, persons and properties do not neatly coincide, since both the Father and the Son have more than one property and they even share a property (active spiration), and hence person and property could not be strictly identical in the way Praepositinus maintained – had been deployed against the Praepositinian position at least since the time of Bonaventure and Aquinas. Rimini raises the objection but flatly denies the problem, responding that “the same absolutely simple entity, which is the Father, *is* spiration and paternity, and corresponds to filiation in the Son and to the co-opposite spiration in the Holy Spirit.”³⁴ In other words, there are no relations or properties through which or by which the Father refers to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, the Father does that in and of

³³ Gregory of Rimini, *I Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2: “Personae sunt summe et omnino simplices, ita quod nec essentia simplicior est personis, nec aliqua proprietates est cogitabilis in persona nec est simplicior quam ipsa persona, et per consequens nulla aliquo modo inter se distincta includit ipsa persona. Igitur qualibet persona a quocumque distinguitur, se ipsa et non aliquo sui primo transitive loquendo distinguitur.” Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, pp. 63²⁵–64².

³⁴ Gregory of Rimini, *I Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2: “Eadem entitas simplicissima, quae est Pater, est spiratio et paternitas, et correspondet filiationi in Filio et spirationi cooppositae in Spiritu Sancto.” Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, p. 66^{15–17}; for the statement of the objection itself, see *ibid.*, p. 64^{10–20}. For Bonaventure’s use of this type of argument, see his *I Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, solutio (*Opera Omnia*, vol. I, p. 452b); for Aquinas, see *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 32, a. 2, solutio, to which Gregory himself appears to refer.

himself. And, of course, Rimini is leaving unstated here his view that filiation just *is* the Son and passive spiration just *is* the Holy Spirit, and that these two persons are distinct from the Father and from each other in and of themselves and not in virtue of any properties. Another obvious objection to Rimini's Praepositinianism is, given that all the persons are identical to the divine essence they share, if there were not something unique to each person (i.e., the properties) bringing about their distinction, then the persons would be merely identical. There must be some basis for the distinction between the persons or else the fact that they share the essence would entail their complete sameness; therefore the persons cannot be distinct in and of themselves. For someone raising this objection, then, the person must be both common essence (to ensure essential unity) and unique personal property (to ensure personal distinction). Rimini blocks the objection by appealing to simplicity: "Nothing constituted from common and proper is simple."³⁵ With that said, however, Rimini does allow that "something is the Father that is not distinct from the Son, namely the divine essence."³⁶ This last claim in particular shows very clearly that Rimini, like Walter Chatton and Robert Holcot, does not explain the trinitarian mystery, but merely restates it: the Father and the Son are essentially the same and personally distinct.

Rimini's third conclusion is that there can be no properties that are entities belonging to the persons and making them distinct. One of Rimini's arguments for this position is that, if the Father had some entity that was proper to him and him alone, then it would

³⁵ Gregory of Rimini, I *Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2: "Nullum constitutum ex communi et proprio est simplex." Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, p. 69¹⁸. Rimini himself identifies the objection to which this is a response as being from William Ockham (see *ibid.*, p. 65^{1–12}).

³⁶ Gregory of Rimini, I *Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2: "Aliquid tamen est Pater quod non distinguitur a Filio, scilicet essentia divina." Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, p. 67^{24–25}.

not be the case that the Son through his generation would accept the Father's entire substance with nothing left out, as the Church tells us is the case: at least this personal property would not be communicated to the Son. In addition, Rimini offers as proof for this third conclusion a battery of arguments similar to the ones we have already seen presented as proof for the first and second conclusions. Thus, here again Rimini focuses on his most basic point: that if there were properties like this in God, the simplicity of the divine persons would be compromised.³⁷

Gregory of Rimini's trinitarian theology is radically minimalist. The search for simplicity is clearly central to his trinitarian enterprise, and it leads him to deny any distinction whatsoever in God, except for the real distinction between the divine persons. Noteworthy about Rimini is the large number of arguments that he gives for his position: he was interested in showing why he thought that all explanation for trinitarian identity and distinction failed. Ultimately he did not think that we could explain anything about the Trinity, and his few positive trinitarian assertions are basically restatements of what we know from revelation and the Church. I would venture to call this a thoroughly fideistic position.

Walter Chatton, Robert Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini: in their trinitarian theologies we see the highpoint of the search for simplicity. For these three thinkers, God is so simple that we are in fact unable to give any explanation at all for how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are essentially identical and personally distinct.

³⁷ For Gregory's entire discussion of the third conclusion, see his *I Sent.*, d. 26–27, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, pp. 69–74). Specifically for the argument on the communication of substance, see *ibid.*: “Cum ergo, ut profitetur ecclesia, Filius totam substantiam Patris sine diminutione acceperit, manifeste patet quod nullam entitatem in se habet sibi propriam Pater quam Filio generando non dederit.” Ed. Trapp *et al.*, vol. III, p. 70^{7–10}.

There are not, and cannot be, any personal properties, since this would compromise God's simplicity, and accordingly the persons are essentially identical and personally distinct *se ipsis*, in and of themselves. Instead of explaining it, for these three thinkers all that we are able to do is to repeat a fact that we know through revelation: one and the same God is three really distinct persons. The search for simplicity in these thinkers has ruled out any distinction, any analysis, and any explanation. Human reason is totally impotent in the face of divine simplicity. We are left with the faith.

This is where Étienne Gilson and the Gilsonian paradigm cross paths with fourteenth-century trinitarian theology. What can we conclude on the basis of the material presented in this chapter concerning Gilson's view that (1) the fourteenth century was on the whole more fideistic than the thirteenth and (2) that this fideism and skepticism about the power of reason were the ruin of the scholastic project? What does fourteenth-century Praepositinianism as it is found in Chatton, Holcot, and Rimini say about the Gilsonian paradigm? I have four points to make about this, and this is by way of conclusion to the present book as a whole.

The first point is that Gilson's global historiographic scheme emphasizes just one part of fourteenth-century theology, and just one group of fourteenth-century thinkers. Confining myself to the later-medieval trinitarian discussion, in Chapter 3 I noted that there was indeed discontinuity between the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries – and I claimed that the source of this discontinuity was the search for simplicity – but I also indicated that there was a great deal of continuity between the two centuries. Thus, there were a large number of important thinkers in the fourteenth century who were no more fideistic than John Duns Scotus or Thomas Aquinas – these thinkers were building on Scotus' and Aquinas' trinitarian thought. To give another striking example of continuity and of a

fourteenth-century rejection of fideism, a relatively unknown Franciscan theologian named Nicholas Bonet (†1343) produced a work that went under the title *Natural Theology* (*Theologia naturalis*), in which, largely following Peter Auriol, he tried to demonstrate the existence of the Trinity on the basis of the psychological model. Moreover, we saw earlier in the present chapter that Adam Wodeham rejected Praepositinianism, and in fact tried to explain how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit were essentially identical but personally distinct and to show how this explanation was compatible with divine simplicity. Finally, I can mention that very soon after Gregory of Rimini presented his Praepositinian view in Paris, his confrère, Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo (†1366), gave a blunt rebuttal of Rimini's view in the very same place, and Vargas's rebuttal was by no means the last of its kind in the fourteenth century. If one were to choose to emphasize this other part of fourteenth-century trinitarian theology, and this other group of thinkers, then the fourteenth century would not appear to be so fideistic and skeptical. In other words, the Gilsonian paradigm almost inevitably makes selective use of evidence.

But with that stated – and this is my second point – Gilson was by no means wrong concerning the existence of fourteenth-century fideism. Ockham appealed to the faith in places where earlier Franciscans, like John Duns Scotus, would not have done so. Chatton, Holcot, and Rimini basically gave up on explanation in trinitarian theology and thought that the best we can do is restate what we know from revelation. This is fideism, and it is a fideism that is more or less alien to thirteenth-century trinitarian theology. To be sure, Thomas Aquinas also held that understanding the Trinity is beyond the natural powers of human reason; for Aquinas we depend on revelation to know that God is triune, and on that basis he claimed that ultimately we know very little when it comes to the Trinity.

But after making claims like these, Aquinas went on to say quite a bit concerning those things that we do not know much about, giving fully fledged explanations, like the relation account of personal distinction, for all sorts of trinitarian facts known from revelation. Aquinas was in fact rather confident in the power of reason to clarify and explain trinitarian theology, as well as to defend the basic rationality of the Trinity. He certainly thought that we humans need significant help in order to get started upon rational investigation of the Trinity; but in the final analysis he also held that many features of the Trinity are amenable to some sort of rational investigation. Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus agreed with Aquinas on this matter. Praepositinianism stands in stark contrast to that sort of optimism. In fact, so different is the Praepositinian view when compared with the traditional view that it seems hard to escape the conclusion that genuine discussion between proponents of the two views was basically impossible. When Gregory of Rimini says that we do not know, he means that we really do not know and, further, that explanations for the trinitarian facts are in principle impossible. For our Praepositinian thinkers, one God is three really distinct persons: end of story, because there is no further story for us to tell. This is a different world from Aquinas. And to this extent, Gilson's observation that fideism is a more marked characteristic of fourteenth-century thought than of thirteenth-century thought is without question true for trinitarian theology.

But how do we evaluate that point of historical fact? I think it is fair to say that if Gilson had had the opportunity to reflect on the fideism that we have seen in Chatton, Holcot, and Rimini, he would have considered it a sign of the bankruptcy of fourteenth-century scholastic thought. Gilson maintained, after all, that fourteenth-century affirmations of the inability of human reason to explain facts about the world and about God led to skepticism about the power of

reason itself and about the scholastic enterprise as a whole. Now, it is probably not possible to “refute” anything as global as Gilson’s view of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century philosophy and theology. But I can certainly indicate why I see things differently. In my view, it is in fact very difficult to make an historical case genuinely linking fideistic views among some fourteenth-century thinkers with the ultimate decline of scholastic philosophy and theology – there are many other historical factors at work that would need to be taken into account, and it is worth bearing in mind that the scholastic project flourished well into the seventeenth century. But even more importantly, and this is my third point, the fideism that we see in Ockham, and in Chatton, Holcot, and Rimini, is an expression of the search for simplicity. That is what is different here: these theologians stress divine simplicity to such a degree that trinitarian explanation becomes impossible. Moreover, they did not simply assert this view, but using reason they argued for it and against other competing views, such as personal constitution. The use of reason in trinitarian theology is not dismissed completely by Chatton or Holcot or Rimini – there is no real divorce of reason and revelation here, since all three of our thinkers believed that they could use reason to disprove complex explanations in trinitarian theology – but the reach of reason is very limited. Through the use of reason, basically nothing positive can be said about the Trinity, although reason can be very useful to show why other positive views do not work. What would undoubtedly strike Gilson about our fourteenth-century Praepositinians is the fact that they all insisted that reason is severely limited and that on this basis they turned instead to fideism: this was highly unsatisfactory to Gilson, and, as mentioned, a sign for him of the bankruptcy of fourteenth-century scholasticism. What is most striking to me, on the other hand, is the reason *why* these thinkers maintained that reason was so very limited. For theologians

like Chatton, Holcot, and Rimini, where there is explanation and analysis, there is distinction, and where there is distinction, there is no simplicity. Better, then, to appeal to faith rather than postulate distinctions that we have no actual grounds to postulate and that would compromise divine simplicity in any case. This is the root of the very different and more fideistic character of the trinitarian theology of the search for simplicity compared to more “traditional” treatments. This may be unsatisfactory to a Gilson, but it is certainly worthwhile making the attempt to understand the roots of and the motivation behind the fideism found in fourteenth-century trinitarian theology.

A fourth and final point: I do not think that I am being unfair to Gilson when I say that, if he had considered the fourteenth-century Praepositinians, Chatton, Holcot, and Rimini, what would have struck him was how different, and in his opinion how inferior, their trinitarian theories are in comparison with thirteenth-century theories, and especially with Aquinas’ ideas. When I look at the development of trinitarian theology from Aquinas to Rimini, I too am struck by how different the theories are from one another. Just think about the diversity! – from Scotus’ explanatory *tour de force* to Gregory of Rimini’s radical minimalism; from Aquinas’ very strict relation account of personal distinction to Henry of Ghent’s emanation account combined with a strong use of the psychological model. In the hundred years stretching from 1250 until 1350 there were literally dozens of very distinctive trinitarian theories, each elaborated with perhaps hundreds of arguments and counterarguments, and each finely balancing such theoretical concerns as the words of revelation and authority, divine simplicity, and explanatory completeness. Each one of these theories is an impressive achievement in its own right. Considered in this light, the fideistic views examined in the present book are not an indication of the bankruptcy of

fourteenth-century scholasticism; rather they are yet another manifestation of the immense vitality and creativity of later-medieval theologians. This is where I really differ from Étienne Gilson: to me what all of this material reveals is the incredible richness of later-medieval trinitarian theology and later-medieval scholasticism as a whole.

Major elements in Franciscan and Dominican trinitarian theologies

ELEMENTS IN FRANCISCAN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

- (a) The Father is the Father because he generates, and the ground of generation is that the first person is God innascible, i.e., primity gives the “proto-Father” the ability to generate and hence become the Father (= flashpoint 1).
- (b) Nested distinctions: two sources of distinction in God, emanational distinction (disparate relations) and relational distinction (opposed relations), where the indispensable emanational distinction is nested inside the (counterfactually) dispensable relational distinction. Thus: the persons could be (but in fact are not) constituted without opposed relations.
- (c) The Holy Spirit would be distinct from the Son, even if the Holy Spirit did not come from the Son (= flashpoint 2; see at and around Diagram D).
- (d) Flashpoint 3: the distinction between the emanations generation and spiration is the most basic distinction in God – the emanations are intrinsically and irreducibly distinct on the basis of the different ways in which they originate, by way of nature (or intellect) in the case of generation and by way of will in the case of spiration.

- (e) “Strong” use of the psychological model of the Trinity. The Son’s generation really is intellectual in character and on this basis the Son really is a Word; the Holy Spirit’s spiration really is by way of will and on this basis the Holy Spirit really is Love or a Gift. The two major characteristics of a strong use are: (1) a tight link between the divine intellect and the emanation of the Son, on the one hand, and the divine will and the emanation of the Holy Spirit, on the other; and (2) the attempt to consistently make psychological positions answer trinitarian questions – since the Son is a Word or a concept, concept theory should in some way be directly applicable in the study of the Son in the Trinity, and since the Holy Spirit is a willed Gift, a theory of willing and volitions should be directly applicable in the study of the Holy Spirit.

ELEMENTS IN DOMINICAN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

- (~a) The Father generates because he is the Father, and the Father is established in being on account of opposition of relations. Innascibility as such does not contribute to the constitution of the Father (= flashpoint 1).
- (~b) Only opposed relations bring about personal distinction in God – opposition of relations is both necessary and sufficient for the constitution of the persons, and disparate relations or emanations are neither necessary nor sufficient for that.
- (~c) The Holy Spirit would not be distinct from the Son if the Holy Spirit did not come from the Son (= flashpoint 2) – the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct only on the basis of opposition of relations, and this requires that the Holy Spirit come from the Son.

- (~d) Flashpoint 3: the distinction between the emanations is logically or definitionally posterior to the distinction between the persons: generation is generation because in it one person comes from one person; spiration is spiration because in it one person comes from two persons.
- (~e) Highly attenuated use of the psychological model of the Trinity. The Son's emanation is intellectual not because it has anything to do with the divine intellect, and the Holy Spirit's emanation is voluntary not because it has anything to do with the divine will, but for other reasons (they resemble our psychological productions).

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Annotated bibliography of selected secondary literature

The following annotated bibliography is highly selective. The literature on trinitarian theology in the medieval Latin West is vast, and I can only give indications here of the best places to start when approaching topics touched on in the present book. For more detailed treatment of the issues dealt with above, and especially for further references to secondary literature with discussion, see Russell L. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350* (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). One issue that I deal with in much greater detail in *Intellectual Traditions* is “authority” and the means employed by later-medieval theologians to circumvent authoritative texts that did not square with the view they were advocating.

Modern research on medieval trinitarian theology is usually traced back to Théodore de Régnon’s *Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité*, 4 vols. (Paris: Victor Retaux et Fils, 1892–98). De Régnon argued that there were fundamental differences between the Greek model of the Trinity, in which God’s unity is ultimately guaranteed by the Father as the source of the Trinity, and the Latin model of the Trinity, in which the divine essence is the principle of unity and the distinction of the persons becomes something of an afterthought. De Régnon was not particularly sympathetic to Latin trinitarian thought, and his analysis of Western medieval trinitarian theology ends with Bonaventure and Aquinas. He considered the differences between Bonaventure’s and Aquinas’ models of the Trinity to issue from, respectively, a dynamic conception and a static conception of the Trinity. Well into the

twentieth century, de Régnon's views had a huge influence on the study of medieval trinitarian thought. Recently there has been a critical reaction to what are presented as de Régnon's anachronistic and inaccurate characterizations of Latin trinitarian thought; see, e.g., Michel René Barnes, "De Régnon Reconsidered," *Augustinian Studies* 26 (1995), pp. 51–79. For my part, I can say that de Régnon's scheme does not begin to do justice to the diversity of trinitarian views in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century discussion in the Latin West, as I hope the present book demonstrates.

Throughout the twentieth century, a dynamic group of German scholars studied intensively the trinitarian theology of the later-medieval period. A good early summary is found in Albert Stohr's "Die Hauptrichtungen der spekulativen Trinitätslehre in der Theologie des 13. Jahrhunderts," *Theologische Quartalschrift* 106 (1925), pp. 113–35. But the master work on later-medieval trinitarian theology in any language is without question Michael Schmaus's *Der "Liber propugnatorius" des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, II Teil: Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1930). In this immense work (xxvii pp. + 666 pp. of main text + 333 pp. of Latin text editions and indexes!), Schmaus examined basically all trinitarian texts then known from the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and situated them in a grand narrative about the basic doctrinal differences between Thomas Aquinas, on the one hand, and John Duns Scotus, on the other. Eighty years after it appeared, Schmaus's work is still a basic starting point. If I were to formulate one piece of criticism regarding Schmaus's study (and this is a criticism that applies to much of the twentieth-century German-language literature on medieval trinitarian theology), it would be that it compartmentalizes the medieval thought very rigidly along the lines of a modern systematic theology – so rigidly that one is often at risk of missing the important interconnection between topics and views found in the medieval texts themselves. Perhaps the product of the German school that best avoids this compartmentalization is Bruno Decker's brilliant *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz: Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1967), which (among other things) traces the late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century development of what I have been calling the Dominican trinitarian tradition.

One topic that I have not dealt with in the present book is the logical conundrums that the doctrine of the Trinity raised and the many extremely

creative methods later-medieval theologians came up with to deal with those conundrums. Known as the “trinitarian paralogisms,” the conundrums focus on problems the Trinity creates for the expository syllogism, e.g.: ‘This essence is the Father; The Son is this essence; Therefore the Son is the Father’. This formally valid syllogism is clearly unsound, since the Son is not the same person as the Father. Especially from the time of Scotus on, these trinitarian paralogisms became a burning issue, as theologians worked to save the formality of Aristotelian logic even when it came to the Trinity. Happily, Hester Goodenough Gelber wrote her 1974 doctoral dissertation on just this topic, and it must be one of the most successful dissertations ever to have appeared in the field of medieval intellectual history: “Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison (1974; UMI number 74–24,720). Gelber traces the medieval debate from Aquinas and Bonaventure up to Adam Wodeham and Robert Holcot, and includes a thoughtful discussion of what I have been calling in the present book the “Gilsonian paradigm.” Some of Gelber’s conclusions have been corrected on the basis of further research (on Scotus’ formal distinction, for example, see the articles by Cross and Dumont mentioned below), but this dissertation is obligatory reading for those interested in later-medieval trinitarian theology. Gelber’s work on logic and the Trinity has been followed up more recently in numerous studies from (among others) Olli Hallamaa, Simo Knuutila, Alfonso Maierù, and Christopher J. Martin.

For information about the individual figures discussed in this book, situating their works and their thought in the intellectual history of the later Middle Ages, one can see the entries in the online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://plato.stanford.edu>), or in Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), or Robert Pasnau (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

BONAVENTURE’S trinitarian theology has been well studied in Luc Mathieu, *La Trinité créatrice d’après saint Bonaventure* (Paris: Éditions Franciscaines, 1992), and in Zachery Hayes’s “Introduction” in Bonaventure, *Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1979 [rpt. 2000]). Two points are worthy of mention with regard to Bonaventure and these two books. The first point is that the way in which the relation and the emanation accounts of personal distinction fit together

in Bonaventure's thought is not entirely clear; in the present book, I have given my interpretation, which I argue for at some length in Chapter 1 of *Intellectual Traditions*, but for other perspectives see especially Hayes's work and the literature referred to there (Hayes, p. 38, tentatively supports the view that Bonaventure holds the emanations to be constitutive of the persons). Second, Mathieu (pp. 28–34) gives a useful summary of the background to the distinction between *per modum naturae* and *per modum voluntatis* and what appears to be its first application to the distinction between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, respectively, in the thought of Bonaventure's teacher, Alexander of Hales (†1245); Harry A. Wolfson, in *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, vol. I: *Faith, Trinity, Incarnation*, 3rd revised edn. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 217–32, deals in more detail with the late-antique background to the distinction.

The literature on THOMAS AQUINAS' trinitarian thought is vast. An excellent starting point is to be found in the work of Gilles Emery; e.g., *La théologie trinitaire de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2004), translated into English by Francesca Aran Murphy as *The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). For a recent study relating Aquinas' trinitarian theology to our contemporary trinitarian discussion, see Anselm K. Min, *Paths to the Triune God* (Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005). A good deal of serious scholarship has been devoted to the Dominican trinitarian tradition that (to one degree or another) takes its point of departure in Aquinas' thought. Besides the books by Schmaus and Decker mentioned above, one should see for JOHN OF NAPLES: Richard Schneider, *Die Trinitätslehre in den Quodlibeta und Quaestiones disputatae des Johannes von Neapel OP* (†1336) (Munich, Paderborn, and Vienna: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1972). For the debate between DURAND OF ST. POURÇAIN and HERVAEUS NATALIS, see Isabel Iribarren's *Durandus of St Pourçain: A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). One of Durand's great critics was the Dominican who goes under the name DURANDELLUS; on the trinitarian theology found in Durandellus' mammoth critique of Durand, known as the *Evidentiae contra Durandum* (ed. Stella), see Gilles Emery, "La théologie trinitaire des *Evidentiae contra Durandum* de Durandellus," *Revue Thomiste* 97 (1997), pp. 173–218. A study of Hervaeus Natalis' acerbic attack on Henry of Ghent's view that the Holy Spirit's emanation is voluntary is found in

Russell L. Friedman, "The Voluntary Emanation of the Holy Spirit: Views of Natural Necessity and Voluntary Freedom at the Turn of the Thirteenth Century," in Pekka Kärkkäinen (ed.), *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 2007), pp. 124–48. On Hervaeus' trinitarian theology, see also the article by Lauge O. Nielsen mentioned below in the section on Peter Auriol. Finally, significant aspects of the trinitarian thought of GILES OF ROME are studied in Concetta Luna's "Essenza divina e relazioni trinitarie nella critica di Egidio Romano a Tommaso d'Aquino," *Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 14 (1988), pp. 3–69.

The study of JOHN PECHAM's trinitarian thought has been hampered by the fact that the work in which he deals most extensively with the Trinity, his *Sentences* commentary, is unedited. Schmaus studied Pecham's thought at some length in *Der "Liber propugnatorius,"* and in *Intellectual Traditions I* both study Pecham's own trinitarian theology and show how great an influence he had on later thinkers in the Franciscan trinitarian tradition. The most recent full-length study of Pecham, placing him in his institutional and theological context, is Alain Boureau's lively *Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle: Le cas de Jean Peckham* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1999).

A recent study has been dedicated to HENRY OF GHENT's trinitarian theology: Juan Carlos Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006). On Henry's distinctive theory of relation, which was a major motivation behind his repudiation of the relation account of personal distinction, see, e.g., Mark Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories, 1250–1325* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 40–58 (see Henninger's book also for studies of the theories of relation by [among others] Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and Peter Auriol), as well as several articles by Jos Decorte, e.g., "Modus or Res: Scotus' Criticism of Henry of Ghent's Conception of the Reality of a Real Relation," in Leonardo Sileo (ed.), *Via scoti: Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti, Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, Roma 9–11 marzo 1993* (Rome: Edizioni Antonianum, 1995), pp. 407–29; and "Relation and Substance in Henry of Ghent's Metaphysics," in Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel (eds.), *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought: Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), pp. 3–14. For a nuanced comparison of Henry of Ghent's and Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of the divine Word, see Giorgio Pini's "Henry of Ghent's Doctrine

of *Verbum* in its Theological Context”, in Guldentops and Steel (eds.), *Henry of Ghent*, pp. 307–26. Finally, the aspects of Henry’s trinitarian theology that I have dealt with here are at present being studied in detail by Scott Williams, whose forthcoming Oxford D.Phil. dissertation will be entitled “Henry of Ghent on the Trinity: Metaphysics and Philosophical Psychology.”

With regard to AUGUSTINE’s place in the development of the psychological model of the Trinity and especially the interpretation of the text from John’s Gospel found in Quotation 2a above, see H. Paissac, *Théologie du verbe: saint Augustin et saint Thomas* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1951), esp. pp. 61–100: “L’originalité de saint Augustin,” and compare this to Harry A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, vol. I: *Faith, Trinity, Incarnation*, 3rd revised edn. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 177–286, which approaches from a somewhat different angle much of the same material as found in Paissac. My broad view of the development of medieval cognitive theory as presented in Chapter 2 above, and especially of Thomas Aquinas’ synthesis of the Aristotelian and Augustinian legacies available to him, is indebted to several of Claude Panaccio’s studies. See in particular, Panaccio’s “From Mental Word to Mental Language,” *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992), pp. 125–47, and *Le discours intérieur de Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham* (Paris: Seuil, 1999), esp. ch. 6, pp. 177–201: “L’acte contre l’idole.”

Much of Michael Schmaus’s *Der “Liber propugnatorius”* was dedicated to JOHN DUNS SCOTUS and his place in later-medieval trinitarian theology. One of Schmaus’s students, Friedrich Wetter, took up where his master left off and laboriously went through Scotus’ trinitarian writings, at times coming close to paraphrasing them: *Die Trinitätslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1967). A recent, very high-quality addition to the literature is Richard Cross’s *Duns Scotus on God* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), much of which is devoted to Scotus’ trinitarian ideas. Two important publications have recently advanced our knowledge of Scotus and the formal distinction: Richard Cross, “Scotus’s Parisian Teaching on Divine Simplicity,” in Olivier Boulnois *et al.* (eds.), *Duns Scot à Paris 1302–2002: Actes du colloque de Paris, 2–4 septembre 2002* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 519–62; and Stephen D. Dumont, “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction,” *Vivarium* 43 (2005), pp. 7–62. One significant aspect of Scotus’ trinitarian theory that I have not addressed in this book is his suggestion that the divine persons are absolutes, constituted not by relations but by absolute

origin. This view had important advocates from the period before Scotus (e.g., Robert Grosseteste and William of Auvergne) and a very small number of proponents in the fourteenth century (e.g., Michael of Massa and John of Ripa). For Scotus' own views, see esp. Wetter's or Cross's books; for the later-medieval history of absolute persons, see Chapter 6 of my *Intellectual Traditions*.

PETER AURIOL receives a substantial treatment in my *Intellectual Traditions*, and Lauge O. Nielsen has been publishing for the past decade on aspects of Auriol's trinitarian thought and his controversies with his contemporaries: see most recently Nielsen's "Logic and the Trinity: The Clash between Hervaeus Natalis and Peter Auriol at Paris," in Pekka Kärkkäinen (ed.), *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 2007), pp. 149–87. An up-to-date bibliography of research into Auriol's thought is found on Russell L. Friedman (ed.), *The Peter Auriol Homepage* (www.peterauriol.net). A part of the Auriol Homepage is the *Electronic Scriptum*, which includes texts from Auriol's *Scriptum in I Sent.* edited from Vat. Borgh. lat. 329 (the copy of the *Scriptum* presented by Auriol as a gift to Pope John XXII).

Besides the discussion found in my *Intellectual Traditions*, see, on FRANCIS OF MARCHIA's trinitarian thought, Russell L. Friedman, "Francis of Marchia and John Duns Scotus on the Psychological Model of the Trinity," *Picenum Seraphicum: Rivista di studi storici e francescani*, n.s. 18 (1999), pp. 11–56.

As mentioned in the text of the present book, WILLIAM OCKHAM's trinitarian theology has not received much attention in the secondary literature. It has sometimes been touched upon in the context of treatments of Ockham's ideas on the relation between faith and reason (e.g., Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, 2 vols. [Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987], esp. pp. 961–1010; and Alfred J. Freddoso, "Ockham on Faith and Reason," in Paul Vincent Spade [ed.], *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham* [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999], pp. 326–49), and sometimes in treatments of Ockham's view of Scotus' formal distinction (e.g., Marilyn McCord Adams, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction," *Franciscan Studies* 36 [1976], pp. 5–74, esp. pp. 59–74), but rarely in its own right. One recent exception to this trend is Bruce D. Marshall, "*Utrum essentia generet*: Semantics and Metaphysics in Later Medieval Trinitarian Theology," in Pekka Kärkkäinen (ed.), *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 2007), pp. 88–123.

(Besides those mentioned here, Kärkkäinen's volume contains several other very fine studies on later-medieval trinitarian thought.) A chapter is devoted to Ockham's trinitarian theology in my *Intellectual Traditions*. For a discussion of one late fifteenth-century theologian's use of Ockham's trinitarian thought, see my "Gabriel Biel and Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology," in Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielsen (eds.), *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), pp. 99–120.

On PRAEPOSITINUS' trinitarian ideas, see Giuseppe Angelini, *L'ortodossia e la grammatica: Analisi di struttura e deduzione storica della Teologia Trinitaria di Prepositino* (Rome: Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1972). More recently, Luisa Valente, in *Logique et théologie: Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220* (Paris: Vrin, 2008), places many aspects of Praepositinus' grammatical and logical teachings into their historical and theological contexts. There is, as far as I am aware, no study dedicated to the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century reception of Praepositinus' trinitarian views. Indeed, as far as I know, the study that I devote to WALTER CHATTON in *Intellectual Traditions* is the first that deals in any depth with Chatton's Praepositinianism. In her "Logic and the Trinity," Hester Gelber has investigated Chatton's attempts to defuse the logical conundrums associated with the Trinity, as well as aspects of ADAM WODEHAM's trinitarian theology.

Gelber's "Logic and the Trinity" also studies at great length ROBERT HOLCOT and the "Logic of Faith" that he developed to deal with the logical issues trinitarian theology raises. Beryl Smalley discusses Holcot as a classicizing friar in *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960).

A book-length study of the trinitarian theology of GREGORY OF RIMINI can be found in Eliseo García Lescún, *La teología trinitaria de Gregorio de Rimini (Contribución a la Historia de la Escolástica Tardía)* (Burgos: Ediciones Aldecoa, 1970). Rimini is treated more briefly and as part of an exciting piece of intellectual history by Michael H. Shank, "*Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand*": *Logic, University, and Society in Late Medieval Vienna* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Shank argues that theologians in late-medieval Vienna became convinced that the Jews living in the town would never convert to Christianity precisely because they could see the logical problems raised by the Trinity. As a part of his study, Shank presents a sketch of the development of logical methods devised by

mid- and late fourteenth-century theologians to deal with the trinitarian paralogisms.

For a very compact presentation of what I have called here the “Gilsonian paradigm,” see Étienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950), esp. ch. 3, “The Harmony of Reason and Revelation.” An interesting extension of Gilson’s view can be found in Roland H. Bainton, “Michael Servetus and the Trinitarian Speculation of the Middle Ages,” in B. Becker (ed.), *Autour de Michel Servet et de Sebastien Castellion* (Haarlem: Tjenk Willink, 1953), pp. 29–46. Bainton argues that the “fideistic” and “skeptical” views of, e.g., William Ockham, Robert Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini may have convinced Michael Servetus, one of the very first Christian anti-trinitarians of the sixteenth century, that the problems associated with holding the Trinity were insurmountable, and hence that the doctrine itself should be dropped. Servetus does actually mention some of the arguments of the earlier thinkers, but, as Bainton himself admits, it is extremely difficult to know what role these arguments had in the evolution of Servetus’ ideas. Servetus himself appears to say that he reached his anti-trinitarianism on the basis of reading Scripture.

On the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century background out of which the Gilsonian paradigm evolved, see John Inglis’s fascinating *Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), as well as the articles collected in Ruedi Imbach and Alfonso Maierù (eds.), *Gli studi di filosofia medievale fra otto e novecento* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1991). For a superb analysis of and reply to the Gilsonian paradigm, by a pioneer in the study of fourteenth-century thought, see Ernest A. Moody, “Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy,” in his *Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Theology: Collected Papers, 1933–1969* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 287–304 (article originally published in 1958). Finally, a recent appraisal of the fourteenth-century scholastic endeavor, and modern approaches to it, is found in William J. Courtenay, *Changing Approaches to Fourteenth-Century Thought* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2007).

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