POLITICAL VIOLENCE, ORGANIZED CRIMES, TERRORISM AND YOUTH

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Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth

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Preface

I am trained as a medical doctor and have been working as a surgeon for almost 30 years. However, as a person who is used to seeing blood and witnessed pain of people suffering from the loss of a part of their body, devastating mood switches of people who have been traumatized both psychologically and physically, I am still deeply affected by the children who are victims of war in Iraq, Palestine or Sudan or any other part of the world, as well as the ever increasing number of our children and teenagers who are involved in crime of all kinds and of which most are drug addicts, and every time I see them in the media or on the internet I cannot help questioning myself on these issues. We, those who live on this side of that world, have tried to provide the best health services for our own children, to send them to the best schools, have introduced them all state-of-the-art products of technology, and tried to equip them with the best skills and abilities for many years, in our quest to secure a better future for our children. We have allocated all the savings we could make, for their future. But, in this world of globalization, we closed our eyes to the other world that we have to live together whether we desire to do so or not. We may have provided our own children with many things and may have left them many valuable assets, however we cannot say that we are leaving them a safe environment or a secure future.

The twentieth century will be remembered as a century marked by violence. It burdens us with its legacy of mass destruction, of violence inflicted on a scale never seen and never possible before in human history. Violence pervades the lives of many people around the world and touches all of us in some away. No country, no city, no community is immune. And unfortunately, the young people are the most suffering victims either they are involved in as a victim or an offender. All over the world young people are witnessing, experiencing and participating in acts of violence perpetrated by one set on one people upon another.

More badly, the growing engagement of young people in organized crimes, political violence and terrorism is becoming more common in all around of the world. This engagement not only threatens the communities and destroys the infrastructures of the societies that may be exposed to the violence, but harms the young people, effects their development, well-being, and annihilates their future. Of course, as a consequence this means that the futures of societies are stolen.

Hence, we must address the root causes and consequences of violence. And then, we need to understand when, how and why young people are deciding to participate in organized violence.

Although, there have been many studies for a long time about the relationships between youth and violence, political violence phenomenon that is created and is legitimized by human beings and is involving its main dynamics in itself, is not paid attention very much until recent time. I hope this workshop makes a major contribution to our understanding of violence and its impact on societies and illuminates the different faces of violence, from the side of the most.

I would like to express my deep greetings and to thank to all our guests who have put all their efforts to participate in this workshop and gathered here for this purpose.

Prof. Dr. Tunçalp Özgen
Rector
Hacettepe University, ANKARA

Forward

So why does violence against children persist? Millions of children across the globe continue to be maltreated daily- often at the hands of the very people who are charged with their care.

The seeds of violence in society are planted during childhood. From the earliest years, children are liable to experience abusive behaviour within the family, from other children and adults at school and in the community and also as passive consumers of the media. Violence becomes such a pervasive fact of life that very few of us reach adulthood without having become insensitive to some degrees to the tragedy that violence against children represents.

The UN Secretary General's landmark *Study on Violence Against Children* published last year, has galvanised much needed debate on the issue and fuelled ambitious programmes such as Turkey's Strategy and Plan of Action to prevent end reduce violence in educational environments (2006–2011).

Whatever the cause or source of violent behaviour may be, children who are subjected or witnesses to violence can be physically or psychologically damaged. Denied their right to develop as a result of our failure to protect them from violence, such children are unlikely to realise their potential as mature adults. The toll of individual suffering is untenable for any modern society. The costs to the state in terms of wasted talent and human resources are immeasurable.

Violence against children can best be portrayed as a pyramid, with all but its tip buried in the deep sands of adult ignorance, self-deception and apathy. The tip represents the tiny proportion of violence which comes to official notice.

All States in this region have accepted legal obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The CRC requires States to protect the child "from all forms of physical or mental violence" while in the care of parents or others (article 19).

States also have the obligations to do all they can deter and prevent violence and to create the necessary conditions to protect children from violence wherever it occurs.

To fulfil these obligations, States are required to develop clear legislation which prohibits all forms of violence against children, including all corporal punishment; to ensure appropriate and effective enforcement of the law and to take all other necessary measures-educational, social and administrative – to prevent and eliminate violence.

Awareness-raising and public educations about children's right to protection from all forms of violence are among the necessary measures for the creation of a protective environment for children. In this context, I am confident that this event organized by Hacettepe University, and supported by NATO will be an important contribution towards creating a safer, more secure world for children and adults alike.

Edmond McLoughney
UNICEF Representative in Turkey

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V. Future Projection in the Era of Globalization

INTRODUCTION

M. Demet ULUSOY[1]
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 On October 3, 2002, The World Health Organization (WHO) released World Report on Violence and Health [1] as a most important issue for the millennium on October 3, 2002. This report examines what is known about the epidemiology and prevention of violence from research and programs throughout the world. It addresses several types of violence, including child abuse and neglect by caregivers, youth violence (violence by adolescents and young adults aged 10-29 years), intimate partner violence, sexual violence, elder abuse, self-inflicted violence, and collective violence (the use of violence by one group against another to achieve political, social, or economic objectives; for example, war or terrorism). In our study we will focus on collective violence which is planned to achieve or motivated by specific social, political or economic objectives of an organized social or political group [2]. In other words, the descriptive features of this type of violence are being sponsored by some power agents in societies or states.

Although most of the statistical values concerning causalities or results of these type sponsored violence are contradictory or deceptive because of their nature, they will be used to point out the warning circumstance inevitably.

Between 1995 and 2005, the global youth population, defined as persons between 15 and 24 years age, has grown from 1,025 million to 1,153 million. Young people currently comprise 18 per cent of the world population. In addition to the youth cohort, children below age 15 comprise another 30 per cent of the total global population. If these two groups are taken together, those below 24 years of age comprise almost half the world population [3] and which are also constitute the universe of these studies. Meanwhile, this global picture increases awareness of humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Although, the troublesome adolescent years have been a documented topic of societal concern for centuries. Plato characterized the adolescents of his era as argumentative and easily excitable, while Aristotle found them impulsive, prone to excess and exaggeration, and lacking self-restraint. For centuries, the decade of adolescence-from puberty to early adulthood-has been viewed as risky and problematic. This picture couldn't be explained by these developmental issues only. We, now face to a constructed unhumanistic world which is also procreated by human himself. In this era, they just had run away from home or school, fall in conflict with their parents, fought for love or their pride in the street or maximal they had involved in some small criminal activities to damage property. All of them had been acquaintance for us. But, now we face to different composition never seen before and we need to survey what is happing.

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Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Approximately, 191 million people lost their lives to collective violence in the 20th century and while more than half of who were civilians [4], since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, as contradictory to live before, the rate of diet civilians increased to 90%. This evidence had been warning the change of characters of war in itself. And in the recent years, most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states.

In 2006, there were 278 political conflicts. Six of these were wars, and 29 severe crises, amounting to a total of 35 conflicts carried out with a massive amount of violence and 83 conflicts were classified as crises, meaning violence was used only occasionally. Compared to last year, the number of conflicts carried out on the highest intensity level increased significantly from two to six wars. These six conflicts were Somalia (various rebel groups), Sudan (Darfur), Sri Lanka (LTTE), Afghanistan (Taleban), Iraq (insurgents), and Israel (Hezbollah) [5]. Most of the causalities in that countries have been caused of international terrorism which the only form of political violence. The most recent data suggest a dramatic increase in the number of high-casualty attacks since the September 11 attacks on the US in 2001. We also see youth, even children in terrorist organizations in the rol of pawn who sometimes charged to attack civilian target as suicide bomber or protester ahead of marching group, sometimes courier for illicit arm and drug.

Because of war, many generation of children grow up under bombs, broken homes, unhumanitarian violence without ever seeing the inside of a schoolroom, and without receiving proper nutrition or vaccination. According to United Nation's reports, 1990 to 2000, the number of children that lost their lives reached two million. More than six million children were severely injured, more than four million disabled and over one million orphaned. Landmines are being a particular threat to children; they are more than 50% of landmine victims [6]. And many children have been forced to abandon their homes because of conflict or persecution to seek safety elsewhere. Currently, there are an estimated 23.7 million of civilians with mostly children and women in at least 50 countries living amidst war and persecution. They have little legal or physical protection and a very uncertain future – outcasts in their own countries. These circumstances have been getting worsen their living condition. These have also result in serious health problems, including the spread of HIV/AIDS. Bureaucratically, they are described as IDPs – or 'internally displaced persons. UN2005.

According to the report released in 2002 by United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Save the Children [7] detailed evidence that even personnel employed by a range of agencies, responsible for the care and protection of these refugees and internally displaced persons, use their position to sexually exploit children. It was asserted that humanitarian aid workers bargain with food and aid, which is intended to benefit the community, to obtain sex from girls, primarily in the 13-18 years category. Both international and local staff was implicated, including workers of respected and established agencies, such as UNHCR.

 Many other children are recruited to be combatants and become witnesses to and forced perpetrators of extreme violence. One of sad realities is that underage soldiers are now an almost inherent feature of the modern battlefield. Children as young as six years old now comprise as much as 10% of the world's combatants [8]. Underage soldiers serve in 75% of the world's conflicts [9]. Recent statistics shows that more than 500.000 children have been recruited into state and non-state armed group in over

85 countries worldwide. The numbers of active child soldiers currently fighting is 300.000, in government armed forces or armed opposition group worldwide. Most child soldiers are between the ages of 15 and 18 years, but some are as young as seven years old [10]. Between 2001 and 2004, armed hostilities involving children less than 18 years old occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Cango (DRC), Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, India, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Indonesia, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

Who are these child soldiers? Child soldier, any person under the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government armed forces or any other regular or irregular armed force or armed group, whether or not an armed conflict exists. Child soldiers perform a range of tasks including: participation in combat, laying mines and explosives, scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards; training, drill or other preparations; logistics and support functions, portering, cooking and domestic labor; and sexual slavery or other recruitment for sexual purposes [11]. Most child soldiers enlist voluntarily. However, researches show that such adolescents see few alternatives to involvement in armed conflict. War, itself, lack of education or work, and desire to escape domestic servitude, violence or sexual exploitation are among the factors involved. Many also join to avenge violence inflicted on family members during armed conflict. Forcible recruitment and abductions continue unabated in some countries. Children as young as nine have been abducted. Despite growing recognition of girls' involvement in armed conflict, girls are often deliberately or inadvertently excluded from DDR programs. Girl soldiers are frequently subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence as well as being involved in combat and other roles. In some cases they are stigmatized by their home communities when they return. Some researches exhibited the dramatic reality that these children have been recruited by the warlords because of their specification of plentiful, cheap, malleable and expendable.

The widespread availability of small arms is directly correlated with the increase in the number of child soldiers as well as the dramatic rise in victimization of women and children. In 2000, the legal trade was estimated to be worth at least US$ 4-6 billion. Illegal trade has been estimated at up to US $ 1 billion. This illicit trade plays a disproportionate role in fuelling armed conflicts around the world. Over 600 companies worldwide legally produce small arms. Excluding privately and illegally owned weapons. It is estimated that there are more than 550 million small arms and light weapons in circulation around the world [12]. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, and contributes to the displacement of civilians. In fact, increasing incline to arming also threat the youth of developed countries. The carrying of weapons has become an important risk behavior among young people of school age. In Scotland, 34.1% of boys and 8.6% of girls aged 11-16 said that they had carried weapons at least once. In the Netherlands, 21% of secondary-school pupils admitted possessing a weapon, and 8% had brought one to school and around the world, 815.000 people, most of them belongs to developed western countries, were estimated to have killed themselves with mostly by firearms in the year 2000, which represents one death about every 40 seconds.

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons is directly correlated by organized crime groups and we can see youth again are taken place in a role to sacrifice themselves. As many studies put forward that increasing number of youth are becoming involved in gangs, particularly in the institutional setting. Youth gang member collaborating with organized crime groups is highest with respect to drug

trafficking, intimidation/extortion and theft. The World Report on Violence and Health, 2002, clearly also indicated that over the last decades, those youths are the most frequent victims of homicides. In only 2000, an estimated 199 000 homicides (9.2 per 100.000 population) occurred globally among young people.

Many research call attention to the conditions flourishing that violent environment; weak states, inequalities, poverty, racism, lack of democracy, economic deficiency, unemployment, social destruction, privatization etc. Which are getting lead us to concern the increasing unfavorable impact of globalization. Globalization is providing an enhanced opportunity for international trade, communication, travel, and intellectual enlightenment. In an ironic twist of fate, globalization also is furnishing opportunities for organized crime to expand and operate more efficiently and fluidly, and for terrorists to procure weapons, spread their intended messages (if any), and elude law enforcement authorities.

As former Secretary and Foreign Minister of State of United States of America Colin Powell had made a commitment to fight poverty, pointing out that "terrorism really flourishes in areas of poverty, despair, and hopelessness" [13]. Whereas, almost around 500 million young people, one by six of the world's population live on less than US$ 2 a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition and according to FAO estimation; 160 million young people are experiencing extreme hunger. 200 million youth living in poverty (less than US$ 1, and 515 million young people living on less than US$ 2 a day. Between 300 million and 420 million people are trapped in chronic or persistent poverty (Chronic Research Centre, 2004), global youth unemployment increased from 11.7 per cent in 1993 to an all-time high of 14.4 per cent (88 million) in 2003, 130 million youth illiterate, and 10 million young people living with HIV/AIDs [14].

In fact, the reality is worst than this evidence. For the last one or two decade, with the increasing unfavorable impact of the globalization, the collaborations with the political violent groups and organized criminal groups as black holes are going to threat the sociality, even the global security. And most of the recent works exhibit the realities about primarily children and youth are going to be sucked in these black holes by increasing incidence.

Contemporary insurgency groups and organized crime networks are not patterned in ways that can be mapped in tidy organizational charts or military-style chains of command. Rather, they operate within small, interconnected, flexible cells that easily move, transmute, and reconfigure [15]. They are difficult to trace. Traditional policing, military, and state structures and international legal structures developed during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. They do not suit twenty-first-century realities. International criminals and political insurgency movements do not operate neatly with the borders of states, nor within the boundaries of the rule of law. It is not possible to build military, political, or legal Maginot lines that will control the flow of information, environmental hazards, small arms, drugs, criminals, or political insurgents. There is considerable evidence that some terrorist groups are making money from organized crime activities. Recent studies found that "Many States indicated that terrorist groups were frequently involved in other crimes, in particular trafficking in illicit drugs, money-laundering and the falsification of travel and identity or other official documents. Several countries noted links between incidents of corruption of public officials and international terrorism, while others reported links with trafficking in firearms, the smuggling of illegal migrants and other forms of exploitation of illegal markets, inter alias, to support terrorist activities".

Michael Woodiwiss looks at the subject from various angles: organized crime as an element of the political economy, organized crime in terms of illegal markets as an outgrowth of a specific political culture, the term 'organized crime' as a politically and ideologically motivated construct, 'organized crime' as an instrument of furthering the economic and political interests of America's power elite, and, finally, organized criminal activity and the concept of 'organized crime' as two instruments of foreign policy [15]. Who had pointed out the increasing tendency in organized crime and political violence group like terrorism are going to coalesce in a large network which has never seen before.

Soon after the tragic events of September 11, the United National Security Council adopted resolution '1373' which also noted with concern the "(…) close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials (…)" [16]. Not long thereafter, the *G8 Recommendations on Transnational Crime,* for instance, drew attention to the problem of terrorist organizations supporting their activities through the commission of other crimes and recommended that states strengthen their response to the interaction between international terrorism and organized criminal activities, in particular money laundering, illegal drug trafficking, use of illegal migration networks and illegal trafficking in firearms [17].

All these activities, organized criminal or terrorist, undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organized crime can come to dominate the state. The corruption emerged as a global important problem, especially for transforming countries which are manipulated privatization progress. But it have been seen that any country although it is being developed haven't been avoided or excluded. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan-where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which bare also responsible for some 200.000 of the 700.000 women victims of the sex trade wide. According to the US State Department, Human trafficking is the third largest criminal enterprise worldwide, generating an estimated $9.5 billion in annual revenue [18]. Dysfunctional societies, severe and increasing poverty and unemployment, conflict and expectations of greater opportunities push children and young people into the hands of traffickers. Beyond it is being the cause of very serious humanity violation; human trafficking emerged as warning challenge the security of the western developed countries. Although there are examples in history of young workers being exploited by their masters, urbanization and industrialization increased the need for cheap labor. There has been an increase in demand for children for sexual exploitation because of the prevalence of HIV/AIDs and other sexually transmitted infections. The most widely acknowledged sector in which trafficked children are exploited is commercial sexual exploitation, through both prostitution and pornography. Children are also trafficked for a range of purposes including labor exploitation, domestic work and illegal adoption such as theft, pick-pocketing, selling-goods in the street and drug dealing. Some large amount of migrant peoples cause social strain as well as increase criminal activities by involving in the network and today, terrorism is found less in foxholes than it is in social systems.

Lloyd Axworthy, when he was minister of Foreign Affairs in Canadian Government had pointed out that today's security threats come increasingly from the international criminal, drug trafficker, political extremist, small arms vendor, warlord, or petty tyrant. These people are adept at using the modern tools of organization and

intelligence gathering and know how to exploit global communications technology [19].

A major concern, frequently expressed in the aftermath of prolonged armed conflict, is that long-lasting conflict will produce a 'lost generation' of young people, who will generally accept and use violence as a means of conflict resolution and strategy to satisfy their needs [20]. The reasoning behind such a proposition is that young people, who grow up during chronic conflict, will internalize violent behavior as normal and be seriously and permanently impaired in their moral development [21,22]. This psychological backgrounds provide the dynamics of perpetuation of a war carried through children and youth with in the order like rolling down snow ball and challenging future of humanity of all. So, the protection of children affected by armed conflict is essential for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security.

Therefore, there is a strong case for Governments or institutions to develop holistic and integrated youth policies. We know the all picture as the consequence and we have pieces of the puzzle. Now we need to band together to understand the picture. There is also a continued need to pay special attention to various disadvantaged groups of young people in follow-up action by different groups from different disciplines. This undertaking should be accepted as participation to the studies in that field and an enterprise to launch some concrete improvement projects.

For this purpose, the international workshop titled "**Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth**" was held as a **NATO** project on 13-14 September 2007 at Hacettepe Univertsity. The articles included in this book had been presented at the meeting.

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I. Human Beings and Violence

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YOUTH AND VIOLENCE

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Abstract. Youth violence, increasing all over the world, has become an important issue both socially and psychologically. The consequences of youth violence are much traumatic both for themselves and for the victims and their families. The involvement of youth in political violence especially requires special attention. It is crucial to identify the youth under risk of getting involved in violent acts and develop preventive programs. This paper presents the psychological characteristics of youth and risk factors which make them available for becoming involved in violent acts and discusses the protective and preventive measures to be taken for the prevention of youth violence

Keywords: youth, violence, development, risk factors, protective factors, prevention of violence

Defining Youth Violence

Youth and violence can be related in two ways; either it is youth violence or youth becoming victims of violence. The second is not the subject of this paper. The goal of this chapter is to discuss the factors predisposing youth to violent acts and to suggest ways to develop protective and preventive measures.

Youth violence may be defined as any intentional physical, sexual or psychological assault on another person (or persons) by one or more young people aged 12 to 24 years.

The most common perpetrators of youth violence are young, heterosexual males. Although a growing number of female youth are violent, the males dominate in frequency and severity. Youth violence can be perpetrated collectively by groups or gangs, or committed by individuals.

Similarly, the *victims* of youth violence can be groups or gangs of youth, or individual youth. The most common victims of youth violence are: peers, including girlfriends, boyfriends and other young people; family members, including siblings and parents; and members of ethnocultural groups or sexual minorities (homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals).

Violence increases dramatically in the second decade of life, peaking during late adolescence at 12 to 20 percent of all young people and dropping off again by the early twenties. Some of these cases are the childhood-onset, becoming violent before puberty and escalating their rate of offending during adolescence. But in over half of all violent youths, violent behavior begins in mid- to late adolescence. These youths gave little

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indication of problem behavior in childhood and did not have poor relations with their parents.

1.   Developmental Characteristics of Youth

There are numerous theories about why violence begins in adolescence [1, 2]. Developmentally, adolescence is accompanied by major physical and emotional changes that alter a young person's relationships and patterns of interaction with others.

Some of the developmental characteristics of adolescence are:
- Emotional instability,
- Weak impulse control,
- Difficulties in mood regulation,
- Need for role models for identification,
- Need to feel strong and powerful,
- Lack of experience,
- Challenges of self and identity development,
- Need to increase self-esteem,
- Need of ideals for commitment,

Although these characteristics are considered as normal features of adolescence, they also play role as the factors for becoming victim to violence or for being violent. Weak impulse control and emotional instability makes them attractive targets for external controlling agents, because these features avail them to be manipulated according to the aims of the agents easily. Difficulties in mood regulation, as well, avails them to be easily manipulated by others usually by inducing rage-provoking emotional states which are difficult to control from acting out.

The need to increase their self-esteem, frequently leads them to take risks, sometimes in the form of violent acts. Self –esteem increases as one feels oneself being successful and powerful. Any set purpose promising such gains will draw the interest of the youth. Research has revealed that both violent and suicidal individuals often exhibit lower self-esteem. Rubinetti (1996) investigated the relationship between exposure to aggression among urban youths and the following variables: empathy, hopelessness, self-esteem, and belief in the legitimacy of aggression [3]. He found combinations of these factors predicted a significant proportion of the variance in the other factors, supporting the relationship between self-esteem and violence. O'Keefe (1998) investigated protective and vulnerability factors for adolescents who had been exposed to inter-parental violence [4]. Results revealed low self-esteem differentiated those who experienced and/or inflicted dating violence from those who had not. The combination of low self-esteem and an inability to cope effectively has been found particularly important.

Young people need some adults who have close relations with them, with whom they can unite with for their growing identity. They will usually go after the people whom they see having some leadership role. These role models can be the leaders of the terrorist acts as well as the most popular singers in the country in connection with the inner tendencies of the young person.

The transition into adolescence begins with the move toward independence from parents and the need to establish one's own values, personal and sexual identity, and

skills and competencies needed to compete in adult society. Independence requires young people to renegotiate family rules and degree of supervision by parents, a process that can generate conflict and withdrawal from parents. At the same time, social networks expand, and relationships with peers and adults in new social contexts equal or exceed in importance the relationships with parents. The criteria for success and acceptance among peers and adults change. Adapting to all of these changes in relationships, social contexts, status, and performance criteria can generate great stress, feelings of rejection, and anger at perceived or real failure. Young people may be attracted to violent behavior as a way of asserting their independence of the adult world and its rules, as a way of gaining the attention and respect of peers, as a way of compensating for limited personal competencies, or as a response to restricted opportunities for success at school or in the community. Good relationships with parents during childhood will help in a successful transition to adolescence, but they do not guarantee it.

Adolescent world has no gray tones; it is always either black or white. When something is not good, it is considered as completely bad. When they see something not white about themselves, it is unacceptable, making them feel bad, weak and helpless. When they see the same characteristics in some other person they will start opposing the other person in a displacement for what they feel in themselves. Thus, this characteristic makes it easier for them to look out for enemies that they can fight against. This dynamic forms the basis for the youth to get involve in terrorist acts.

2. Risk Factors in Adolescence

There are three essential components of violent behavior among youth: Developmental factors related to aggression, sociocultural factors provoking violence, and reinforcers (rewards for violent behavior). The most aggressive behavior leading to violence, however, is acquired through observational learning.

Developmental factors related to aggression:
- Deficits in social cognitive or information-processing abilities,
- Low intellectual capacity,
- Low verbal IQ,
- Low frustration tolerance,
- Disorders of perception, mood regulation and impulse control,
- Low capacity of playing and imagination,

However, not all adolescents having these features are involved in violent acts. It is the risk factors which play triggering role.

Risk factors increase the likelihood that a young person will become violent. However, risk factors are not direct causes of youth violence; instead, risk factors contribute to youth violence [5, 6].

Biological factors can be predisposing, too. When there is a perceived danger, normally one feels fright, and comes with it loss of impulse control and loss of mood regulation. However, one needs to preserve self integration and this produces a reaction of fight or flight. In cases of violence, there is flight bluntness and emotional overstimulation with anger which results in the aggressive/violent behavior.

Research associates the following risk factors with perpetation of youth violence [6, 7, 8]:

2.1. Individual Risk Factors

- History of violent victimization
- History of early aggressive behavior
- Developmental disorders
  - Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
  - Severe learning disorders
  - Conduct disorder
  - Borderline personality organization
  - Intermittent disruptive disorder
  - Post-traumatic stress disorder
- Involvement with drugs, alcohol, or tobacco
- Deficiency in self development
- Difficulties in identity integration
- Poor behavioral control
- High emotional distress
- Antisocial beliefs and attitudes
- Novelty-seeking behavior
  - Getting bored quickly
  - Risk taking
  - Stimulation seeking
- Low self-esteem
- Prone to denial and projection
- Avoidance of mutual relations
- Problems of adaptation to new situations
- Lack of empathy
- Problems in social decision making
- Insufficiency in social relations
- Inefficient problem solving skills
- Overreaction to interpersonal stress.

Impulsivity was found to be one of the strongest predictors of aggression [9]. A study of 280 10-19 year olds revealed impulsivity to be significantly correlated with school-based violence [10]. Studies that have compared violent offenders with nonviolent offenders using both behavioral and psychometric measures of impulsivity have found impulsivity positively correlated with violent offenders in the behavioral measure [11, 12].

In early adolescence, involvement in general offenses—that is, illegal but not necessarily violent acts, including felonies—becomes a moderate risk factor for violence between the ages of 15 and 18. Its predictive power lessens from childhood, largely because teenagers are somewhat more likely than children to engage in illegal behavior.

Risk taking gains predictive power in early adolescence, particularly in combination with other factors. A reckless youth who sees violence as an acceptable means of expression, for example, is more likely to engage in violent behavior.

2.2. Family Risk Factors

- Genetic: There is evidence that criminal behavior is partly heritable. When the sum of all genetic traits is combined with environmental influences it can lead to the development of a particular trait. The existence of familial transmission of criminal convictions and related personality traits is now well established [13].
- Exposure to violence and conflict in the family: Parents who have a history of violence have a greater chance of raising violent children, because violence is learned by children by observing others, primarily parents and siblings
- Maternal deprivation in early childhood: causes the absence of secure attachment and lack of empathy
- Violent behavior in family: This is a factor which makes the child feel helpless in face of violence which in turn, unconsciously, leads to identification with the aggressor in order to be in control of his weakness.
- Family structure: Adolescents from broken homes are more prone to violent behavior,
- Number of siblings: the more the number of children that a mother has to take care of, the less the amount of involvement with individual children
- Poor family functioning: anger is more acted out in the form of violent behavior in dysfunctional families,
- Stressful parenting authority: this is one of the major causes of physical abuse
- Antisocial personality disorder in parent(s)
- Neglect and abuse: usually goes along with aggressive behavior towards the child
- Authoritarian childrearing attitudes: putting too much stress on the child, can lead to aggressive rebelliousness in adolescents
- Harsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practices
- Low parental involvement and low emotional attachment to parents or caregivers: creates a deficiency in empathizing with others which is an important risk for developing violent behavior easily
- Low parental education and income : violent behavior is seen more frequently in low SES and low sociocultural levels,
- Parental substance abuse or criminality: serves as a negative modeling for adolescents,
- Poor monitoring and supervision of children,
- Lack of social support,

Adolescents exposed to violence at home may experience some of the same emotions and difficulties as younger school-age children—for example, fear, guilt, anxiety, depression, and trouble concentrating in school. In addition, adolescents may feel more vulnerable to violence from peers at school or gangs in their neighborhood and hopeless about their lives and their odds of surviving to adulthood. These young people may not experience the growing feelings of competence that are important at their stage of development. Ultimately, their exposure to violence may lead them to become violent themselves. Studies have shown that adolescents exposed to violence are more likely to engage in violent acts in the face of a perceived threat [14, 15]. The expression 'Those abused become the abusers' usually proves itself.

The parent must supervise young children carefully. They must intercept the child when he is doing something wrong so they can explain why it is wrong and teach them

what is right. If children are not taught the right behaviors from their parents it is easier for other factors such as the programs on TV, and peer's choices to be the major influences in their lives. When this happens the child is more susceptible of learning the wrong ways to handle situations. Parents have to teach their children the right morals and behaviors and supervise their actions. Then the child will grow up being able to make the right and appropriate decisions in their own lives even when they are faced with possibly explosive situations.

In fact, very violent delinquents are more likely to have witnessed extreme violence in their homes. It is increasingly recognized that the witnessing of violence by youngsters is probably an important determinant in later violent behavior. Some of these children are over-controlled emotionally. They have few outlets to express their discontentment, and build up rage in a "pressure-cooker" effect which when it explodes can be in a fit of violence. This seems to happen most often in the instance where a child's fragile self-esteem has been injured. The act of murder is a way to restore the self, and it provides a sense of power [16].

2.3.   Sociocultural Factors Provoking Violence:

2.3.1.   Peer/School Risk Factors:

- Association with delinquent peers
- Involvement in gangs
- Social rejection by peers
- Lack of involvement in conventional activities
- Poor academic performance
- Low commitment to school and school failure

Not surprisingly, different risk factors for violence gain importance in adolescence. Family factors lose predictive value relative to peer-oriented risk factors such as weak social ties to conventional peers, antisocial or delinquent friends, and membership in a gang. Even involvement in general offenses, which had the largest effect size in childhood, has only a moderate effect size in adolescence.

Peers and feeling successful are very important for young people. It is like 'My peers are for me and I am for my peers'. The reactions of peers and the norms of the peer groups shape the developing identity of the adolescent. They feel obliged to behave according to the norms of their peer groups and most of the time they will chose such groups in relation with their needs. If an adolescent having school failure, feeling rejected by peers, having low self-esteem is met by a terrorist group promising high ideals and values, this will be an irresistible opportunity for him to raise his self-esteem.

2.3.2.   Effects of Media

Youngsters may be adversely influenced by the violence portrayed on the screen [16]. It is shown that prolonged exposure to violent images desensitizes violence and that watching violent programming may make a child accept violence as a way to solving problems. The television is a significant contributor to violence, because it is a powerful influence in developing value systems and shaping behavior (AACAP). Nine of the twelve follow-up studies with children show that children exposed to violent videos and computer games express violent behavior more in their late adolescence and

adulthood. However, the family may also have an impact on the effect of TV violence on kids. If the child's television habits are not monitored they will be watching programming that is not suitable for their ages. If there isn't a parent figure there to tell them the difference between what is real and what is imaginary the child accepts the behavior of the fictional characters and believes it to be the way to handle "real-life" situations. Today this is occurring more often as television is becoming a "baby-sitting" tool for many families.

2.3.3. Accessibility of Fire Guns

In fact, another factor for children committing violence at the rates they are today is the availability of guns, and development of the 'gun culture'. There is convincing evidence that the availability of guns can turn a violent situation to lethal [16].

2.3.4. Community Risk Factors

There is an ongoing rapid change in the communities especially in those at the bridging points of culture. Any change is a stress in itself regardless of the kind, whether it is positive or negative, in the sense that it motivates the ego's adaptive forces and capacities on individual level, and it presses the social flexibility on a wider level. The societies where there is not any tradition of change people are usually faced with chaotic and confusing conditions while going through this phase. When the change is negative in nature, as is the case with the risk factors, it forces the ego's capacity and causes to regress to more primitive defense levels which give way to violent behavior. Rapid changes increases the transiency in the community. Uncertainties created by the transient situations and transient people in their lives are a major source of confusion, anxiety and threat to their developing self and self-esteem.

2.3.5. Other Community Risk Factors

Some other community risk factors are listed below:
- Diminished economic opportunities,
- High concentrations of poor residents,
- High level of transiency,
- High level of family disruption,
- Low levels of community participation,
- Socially disorganized neighborhoods,

Increased involvement in the community is a healthy part of adolescent development, unless the community itself poses a threat to health and safety. Social disorganization and the presence of crime and drugs in the neighborhood pose a small risk of violence when measured on an individual level. However, both of these risk factors have a substantially greater effect on the neighborhood level.

Socially disorganized communities are characterized in part by economic and social flux, high turnover of residents, and a large proportion of disrupted or single-parent families, all of which lessen the likelihood that adults will be involved in informal networks of social control. As a result, there is generally little adult knowledge or supervision of the activities of teenagers and a high rate of crime. Moreover, in areas experiencing economic decline, there are likely to be few neighborhood businesses. In such an environment, it is hard for young people to avoid

being drawn into violence. Not only are they on their own after school, they are exposed to violent adults and youth gangs, they have few part-time job opportunities, and their neighborhood is not likely to offer many after-school activities such as sports or youth groups [17,18,19].

Social disorganization is also a risk factor for violence in rural areas. One study of rural communities found that poverty plays a less important role in predicting violence than residential instability, broken homes, and other indicators of social disorganization [20]. In fact, very poor areas were not characterized by high residential instability or a large proportion of broken homes. In cities, however, the combination of poverty with instability and family disruption is predictive of violence [17, 21].

Adolescents who are exposed to violence in their neighborhood feel vulnerable and unable to control their lives. These feelings can lead to helplessness and hopelessness. Such young people may turn to violence as a way of asserting control over their surroundings. They may arm themselves or even join a gang for protection. Studies have shown that adolescents exposed to violence are more likely to engage in violent acts, often as preemptive strikes in the face of a perceived threat.

Neighborhood adults who are involved in crime pose a risk because young people may identify with them. Easily available drugs add to the risk of violence. As noted earlier, drug use is associated with both a higher rate of offending and a longer criminal career [22]. More important, ready availability of drugs indicates that considerable drug trafficking is taking place in the neighborhood—and drug trafficking is dangerous for buyer and seller alike.

3.   Protective Factors

To prevent violence among young people we need to concentrate on the protective factors as well as the risk factors. Some children demonstrate a resiliency, almost from birth, that protects them from becoming violent or that makes them less vulnerable to the effects of violence. Psychological research suggests that resilience can also come from early experiences that counter the negative effects of violence. These experiences include:

- Positive role models; exposure to a greater number of positive than negative behaviors.
- Healthy development of self-esteem and self-efficacy.
- Supportive relationships, including those with teachers and friends.
- Sense of hope about the future.
- Belief in oneself.
- Strong social skills.
- Good peer relationships.
- A close, trusting bond with a nurturing adult outside the family.
- Great empathy and support from the mother or mother figure.
- The ability to find refuge and a sense of self-esteem in hobbies and creative pursuits, useful work, and assigned chores.
- The sense that one is in control of one's life and can cope with whatever happens.

Protective factors buffer young people from risks of becoming violent. These factors exist at various levels. To date, protective factors have not been studied as extensively or rigorously as risk factors. However, identifying and understanding protective factors are equally as important as researching risk factors. Most research is preliminary. Studies propose the following protective factors [6, 8]:

3.1. *Individual Protective Factors*

- Intolerant attitude toward deviance
- High IQ or high grade point average
- Positive social orientation
- Religiosity

3.2. *Family Protective Factors*

- Connectedness to family or adults outside of the family
- Ability to discuss problems with parents
- Perceived parental expectations about school performance are high
- Frequently shared activities with parents
- Consistent presence of parent during at least one of the following: when awakening, when arriving home from school, at evening mealtime, and when going to bed
- Involvement in social activities

3.3. *Peer/School Protective Factors*

- Commitment to school
- Involvement in social activities
- Supportive friends

4. Suggestions

Development of a tradition for change: The society needs a sophisticated social engineering to control the risk factors for violence and to lead the youth in healthy engagements which will decrease and prevent the violence created. One of the most important of all will be monitoring the change rate in the society. We need to develop policy programs to protect the individuals from confusions of rapid change.

Societies should have a responsibility for providing adequate role models and ideals for the young generation. This can be realized, on a large scale through media, by the messages given by the people who are popularized in the society and in other ways as well.

In a world becoming more and more computerized everyday and growing youth becoming more a part of computer culture evokes the risk of losing empathy and warm human relations in the future. Promoting the development of art in the societies may be a good way to defend against the 'computeralization' of the world.

About Parenting and Child Rearing: In parenting children and adolescents, it is very important to provide them with optimal levels of frustration availing *the reinforcement of their frustration tolerance*, the higher the frustration tolerance the more the psychological strength of the individual. Increasing the frustration tolerance of children when they are growing up is really a challenge of parenthood. Young people who have greater tolerance for frustration will be able to find healthier solutions to the problems they face, they will be able to control their anxiety levels and behavior rather than being impulsively reactive, which will prevent them expressing their anxieties in the form of aggression and violence. Another important developmental factor for psychological strength is the reality testing capacity, again learned mainly in the interactions within the family. So, the programs helping to enhance the quality of the intrafamilial relations and increasing the intrafamilial tolerance will have an important impact for preventing young people from getting involved in violent groups and acts. Society-wise it will be good to promote the intact families, too, to sustain the good-enough communication within the families.

Supporting adolescents for their adaptation to changes in the society: As stated above, young people are the group who is challenged the most by the rapid changes in the society. For their adaptation and psychological strength, social skills training, development of coping skills for stress, training for flexible problem solving skills for uncertain conditions, training for critical thinking will have important value. The young people should be taught how to learn rather than what to learn, how to think rather than what to think, the value of having attachments rather than what to attach to. Helping them for the maintenance of these skills in time will be very crucial, too.

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND YOUTH

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Abstract: This presentation will discuss the psychological origins of violent behavior among youth. Because youth are increasingly involved in and affected by violence it is thought that there may be some developmental characteristics which are contributing to this phenomemon. Violent behavior among human beings will be examined in terms basic human needs for power, dominance, and control as well as from a developmental perspective and and in terms of other enviromental realities which may contribute to increased risk of violent behavior. It is important to explore other contributing events including politics, economics, religion, and even love as factors which may contribute to violent behavior among young people. To begin to identify the contributing factors to this ever increasing and destructive pattern of behavior may provide clues to finding ways to intervene and reduce violence. Understanding these complex psycho-sociological reasons for violence is the foundation upon which future prevention policies can be successfully created.

Key words: political violence, youth, psycho-sociological factors

"Hassan Ben Sabbah conditioned and organized a band of fearless political killers such as had never been seen before. His method of indoctrination was unique. He constructed a secret garden and furnished it with all the delights promised in the Koran...to the faithful when they reached paradise. The chosen were drugged, one or two at a time, and taken to this garden by night. When they woke up in the morning they were surrounded by beautiful and scantily clad houris [in Muslim belief, women who live with the blessed in paradise] who would minister to their every need and desire. After being allowed to savor this false — but pleasant and sensual — paradise for a day or so, they were again drugged before being taken back to awaken in their own squalid hovel or cave dwelling. To them, it was as if it had been a vivid dream. Ben Sabbah then sent for them, told them Allah had given them a preview of paradise, and surprised them by telling them exactly what each had been up to while in the secret garden. So successful was he in this method of conditioning and indoctrination that it was said he once astounded a visiting emir whom he wanted to impress with his power by sending for one of his men and ordering him to kill himself — which he immediately did. When an Assassin was sent out by ibn-al-Sabbah to carry out some violent death, the Assassin was just as dedicated. So convinced were the Assassins that they would be rewarded in paradise that they never hesitated to fulfill their missions of murder, even though this often meant their victims' bodyguards would kill them immediately afterward. Popular Arabic name for hashish smokers is the root of our word, assassin" (geocities.com, 2007).

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Political violence/terrorism is behavior. Psychology is the study of behavior, so psychologists should be studying this subject. Historically, with few exceptions, academic and scientific psychologists have not been prominent in the study of terrorist behavior. Yet, there are also reflections on how psychology can help understand terrorism [1]. All kinds of violence effects children and youth in many ways. They can be the victims of violence or the purpetrators of violence. This chapter will present a discussion of how and why children and youth become involved as participants in political violence.

1. Basic Concepts

This section presents fundamental definitions and descriptions of basic concepts and ideas associated with the entire field of political violence.

1.1. Violence

Violence is defined as any act or situation in which a person injures another, including both direct attacks on a person's physical or psychological integrity and destructive actions that do not involve a direct relationship between the victims and the perpetrators [2]. This definition broadens traditional behavioral science perspectives about violence in four ways: (1) It emphasizes the consequences of violence from the victim's perspective; (2) it treats all types of violence equally, regardless of whether the perpetrators are individuals, groups, institutions, or society; (3) it permits examination of the manifestations of violence without excluding socially sanctioned violence, unintended violence, violence causing nonphysical harm, subtle or covert violence, and violence causing long-term consequences; and (4) it includes any avoidable action that violates a human right in the broadest sense or that prevents the fulfillment of a basic human need. As this definition indicates, violence comes in many forms, and its victims and survivors bear indelible scars that are often unrecognized or disregarded. [2].

1.2. Terror

The concept of terror as the systematic use of violence to attain political ends was first codified by Maximilien Robespierre during the French Revolution. He deemed it an "emanation of virtue" that delivers "prompt, severe, and inflexible" justice, as "a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country's most pressing needs." The Reign of Terror, during which the ruling Jacobin faction exterminated thousands of potential enemies, of whatever sex, age, or condition, lasted until Robespierre's fall. Similar justification for state-sponsored terror was common to 20th-century revolutions, as in Russia (Lenin), Cambodia (Pol Pot), and Iran (Khomeini) [3]. So make any headway investigating the determinants of terrorism, one must have a working definition of terrorism. This is a notoriously difficult task. More than one hundred diplomatic and scholarly definitions of the term exist. The types of activities by various groups that are considered terrorist acts differ substantially across the definitions. The term "terrorism" has also evolved over time. It was first used in a political context during the French Revolution, when it was reserved for accusations

against those who, like Robespierre, made use of violence in the name of the state. By the late nineteenth century, however, Russian and French anarchists proudly used the word "terrorism" to describe their violent endeavors against the state. A part of the difficulty in defining terrorism is that there are valid disputes as to which party is a legitimate government. During World War II, for example, the German occupation forces labeled members of the French Resistance terrorists. Since 1983, it has employed this definition for statistical and analytical purposes: "The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term 'international terrorism' means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country." The definitions of terrorism used by scholars, by contrast, tend to place more emphasis on the intention of terrorists to cause fear and terror among a targeted population that is considerably larger than the actual victims of their attacks, and to influence the views of that larger audience. The actual victim of the violence is thus not the main target of the terrorist act. Scholarly definitions often also include nation-states as potential perpetrators of terrorism [4]. In spite of its enduring presence and many forms, a comprehensive definition of terrorism has not yet been universally accepted [3,5]

1.3. Political violence

Some have recommended substituting the broader and less controversial term political violence for that of terrorism. In so doing, terrorism would become a special case of political violence, enacted against persons or property to achieve certain political ends [5]. Viewing terrorism as political violence creates several dilemmas. First, violence against economic and religious targets would qualify as terrorism only if politically motivated. Islamist terrorism has obvious religious underpinnings. Focusing solely on political violence also overlooks how integral organized crime has become to terrorism. Meaningful policies and strategies designed to anticipate and curtail terrorism must address multiple ideological objectives, not just political ones. What is most problematic about construing terrorism as political violence, revolution, guerilla warfare, or conventional warfare is that the act of terrorism and its outcomes are de-emphasized relative to the motives for terrorism, the organization of terrorist groups, and the methods that terrorists favor. These constitute the more debatable features of terrorism and have contributed to the impasse on establishing a universal definition [5]. Of course, one side's terrorists may well be another side's freedom fighters.

1.4. Suicide terrorism

Suicide terrorism is a complex individual, psycho-social and organizational phenomenon and it means killing yourself while killing your enemy [6]. Suicide terrorism can be characterized as follows: the targeted use of self-destructing humans against noncombatant--typically civilian--populations to effect political change. Although a suicide attack aims to physically destroy an initial target, its primary use is typically as a weapon of psychological warfare intended to affect a larger public audience. The primary target is not those actually killed or injured in the attack, but those made to witness it [3].

Killing oneself while killing the enemy is not a modern idea. It was practised against the Romans in 1st-century Judea by Jewish Zealots, and by the Islamic order of Assassins in the Middle East from the 11th to 14th centuries. Japanese kamikaze pilots changed the course of the Second World War (though not in the way they would have hoped) by flying their planes into enemy ships [7]. Whether subnational (e.g., Russian anarchists) or state-supported (e.g., Japanese kamikaze), suicide attack as a weapon of terror is usually chosen by weaker parties against materially stronger foes when fighting methods of lesser cost seem unlikely to succeed. Choice is often voluntary, but typically under conditions of group pressure and charismatic leadership. Thus, the kamikaze ("divine wind") first used in the battle of the Philippines were young, fairly well educated pilots who understood that pursuing conventional warfare would likely end in defeat [7].

Modern day suicide terrorism began in Lebanon in 1983, but it has not remained limited to the Middle East. Suicide terrorism as a tactic has migrated around the world: it is used in Sri Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (or LTTE, which perfected the suicide belt), the PKK in Turkey, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Al Asqa Martyrs Brigade in Israel, al- Qa'ida around the world, numerous groups in Iraq, and the Chechen rebels in Russia. The organizational goals of these groups are not necessarily linked to one another, yet across the entire spectrum, the use of human bombs has proven to be a powerful tactic in the hands of terrorists who are thus able to force concessions from occupying forces – even to the point of expelling them – to wreak havoc with peace processes, gain international recognition in the media for both the sponsoring group and its cause, disrupt daily lives and create widespread dread and horror [6].

1.5. Genocide

Genocide is defined as the deliberate and systematic destruction of a racial, political, or cultural group [8]. From 1900 to 1987, state, quasi-state, and stateless groups have killed in democide (genocide, massacres, extrajudicial executions, and the like) nearly 170 million people. Case studies and quantitative analysis show that ethnic, racial, and religious diversity, economic development, levels of education, and cultural differences do not account for this killing. Rather, democide is best explained by the degree to which a regime is empowered along a democratic to totalitarian dimension and, second, the extent to which it is characteristically involved in war or rebellion [9]. Genocide is foremost an international crime for which individuals, no matter how high in authority, may be indicted, tried, and punished by the International Criminal Court (ICC). According to Article 6 of the ICC Statute; this type of crimes involve, "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group, (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group". Genocide is also a subject of social science and scholarly study, but its legal definition does not easily allow for empirical and historical research. For this reason the definition of genocide for research purposes has, in essence, been of two types. One is the definition of genocide as the intention to murder people because of their group membership, even

if political or economic. A second definition, which may also be called democide, is any intentional government murder of unarmed and helpless people for whatever reason [9]. Most of this killing, perhaps around 110 million people, is due to communist governments, especially the USSR under Lenin and Stalin and their successors (62 million murdered), and China under Mao Tse-tung (35 million). Some other totalitarian or authoritarian governments are also largely responsible for this toll, particularly Hitler's Germany (21 million murdered) and Chiang Kai-chek's Nationalist government of China (about 10 million). Other governments that have murdered lesser millions include Khmer Rouge Cambodia, Japan, North Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Vietnam, and Tito's Yugoslavia. Regardless of type of government, the likelihood of genocide increases during their involvement in war, or when undergoing internal disruptions, as by revolution, rebellion, or foreign incursions [9].

2. Source of Violence

From different disciplines, researchers have attempted to explain why human beings act violently. In 2002 and interdiciplinary co-sponsored by the Institute for the Study of 'iolence at the Boston Graduate School of Psychoanalysis and the Department of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, sought to address the question of the origin of violence. Snyder (2003) summarized the findings of this conference [10]. One goal of the meeting was to begin an interdisciplinary dialogue including sociocultural, psychoanalytic, and neurobiological perspectives. The anthropologist Scheper-Hughes presented the argument that violence is a social-cultural phenomenon, rather than part of our biological heritage, and argued that we are fundamentally social creatures. A psychiactric viewpoint presented an explanation of violence rooted in Freud's dual drive theory, explicating the innate nature of destructiveness. Psychoanalysts see and experience this in their work with patients in the negative transference, negative therapeutic reaction, repetition compulsion, and the desire for revenge. There is pleasure in destructiveness. Violence may be tension relieving or sadistic in nature. Social psychological viewpoints portrayed violence as an expression of institutional rather than biological in nature. This view portrays human violence as being rooted in the tendency to dehumanize and adhere unthinkingly to ideology and in "humankind's aspiration for power, dominance and exploitation of others." Sociologists at the meeting made the point that violence is more pervasive in today's post-colonial, post-modern world and argue that the roots of social violence are found in the very act of analyzing, of dividing things up and differentiating. This process leads to relative evaluation, devaluation, economic exploitation, dehumanization. The meeting also included a biological or neuroscientific explanation for violence. This perspective described the "vicious circle" in the development of a predisposition to violence in the individual. Carefully defining violence as "a hostile response [that] is disproportionate to the severity of the threat, is directed toward an inappropriate target, or ceases to observe species specific norms and socially defined boundaries . . . . a maladaptive response to an interpersonal challenge," Niehoff describes a plastic neurochemical system, responsive to changes in the environment and to changes in behavior. Niehoff notes that biology offers a hopeful perspective, the brain is plastic, harm can be undone, but early intervention is most effective.

Sherlock reviewed Buss's (2005) book called, The Murderer Next Door: Why the Mind is Designed to Kill [11]. Whereas previous theories of murder propose that homicide is something outside of human nature —a pathology imposed from without by the distorting influences of culture, media images, poverty or child abuse. Buss argues that killing is fundamentally in our nature. Sometimes hate motivates murder; sometimes envy; sometimes greed; sometimes fear; sometimes jealousy; sometimes spite. And sometimes, a complex combination of emotions motivates murder. According to him murder is a product of the evolutionary pressures our species confronted and adapted to. Psychologist Milgram (1974) found that ordinary people readily obey destructive orders under the right circumstances. When told by a "teacher" to administer potentially life-threatening electric shocks to "learners" who fail to memorize word pairs, most comply [12]. Even when subjects stressfully protest as victims plead and scream, use of extreme violence continues--not because of murderous tendencies but from a sense of obligation in situations of authority, no matter how trite. A legitimate hypothesis is that apparently extreme behaviors may be elicited and rendered commonplace by particular historical, political, social, and ideological contexts. As a result it is hard to show just one or two reasons for violence.

3. Variables Which Effect Political Violence

Research studies have thus far failed to identify a definite or predictable profile for terrorists or suicide bombers. Personality dispositions, relationship considerations, social factors, and interpersonal or intergroup histories may combine to potentiate a coercive reaction from the target of influence [7]. The culture and political context clearly affect the socio-demographic characteristics of suicide bombers. The question of whether the culture and political context affect the psychological characteristics of the suicide bombers remains unanswered [13]. In the material which follow an attempt will be made to identify and discuss some of the relavent variables which conspire to influence political violence. Some of these variables, which have been identified in the research literature include: culture, collectivism/individulism, parental effect and family, honor, gender, psychological variables, social and contextual factors, sociodemographic characteristics, media and religion.

3.1. Culture

Culture could be defined psychologically as a shared system of beliefs (what is true), values (what is important), expectations, especially about scripted behavioral sequences, and behavior meanings (what is implied by engaging in a given action) developed by a group over time to provide the requirements of living (food and water, protection against the elements, security, social belonging, appreciation and respect from others, and the exercise of one's skills in realizing one's life purpose) in a particular geographical niche. This shared system enhances communication of meaning and coordination of actions among a culture's members by reducing uncertainty and anxiety through making its members' behavior predictable, understandable, and valued. This definition of culture borrows from recent approaches to culture developed by terror management and uncertainty reduction theorists [7].

Typically, aggressive behavior such as homicide and serious assault is linked to features of ambient national or cultural variation. Tedeschi and Felson (1994) proposed that the label "aggressive" be reserved for descriptions given by members of a culture to forms of coercive control considered illegitimate in that cultural context[30]. From this theoretical perspective, all forms of coercive control, from threats of sanctions to the administration of punishments are attempts to stop another from exercising influence and asserting control over a target or a social process. It is known, however, that certain role dyads are differently enacted, empowered, constrained, and legitimated for violence in different cultural systems. Consequently, one must be alert to probable differences in whether a given social behavior will be construed as aggressive from culture to culture, depending on what one role player is doing to another role player [7].

3.2.   *Collectivism/induvidalism and violence*

Beck (1992) argued that the individualization of society detaches persons from restraining social bonds, thereby releasing violence against others who frustrate one's goal attainment. However, individualization of society replaces traditional values of in-group loyalty, obligation, and exclusion with a "nomocentric" value orientation of universalistic civility, cooperation, and egalitarianism, thereby restraining violence[14]. Individualistic social systems tend to be wealthier, the strength of the correlation varying with the index of societal collectivism used. So, in examining the link between societal individualism and indexes of violence, it is important to partial out the effects of wealth, so the distinctive contribution of societal individualism can be assessed and theories developed about its link to violence. So, independent of economic development, certain types of violence may be sensitive to societal variations in individualism, namely, violence occurring as a result of the collectivist "logic" that maintaining family integrity is a paramount social agenda [7].

3.3.   *Honor*

Peristiany (1965) and other anthropologists identified a culture of honor syndrome whereby members of that culture are socialized to redress an insult to one's property, one's family, or one's self by violence. This counter attack is regarded as legitimate, and failure to respond to the affront is sanctioned by shaming and ostracism [15].

3.4.   *Parental effect and family*

The work of Ember and Ember (1994) has shown that low parental warmth was the strongest bivariate correlate of homicide in their cross-societal analysis [16]. Although socialization for aggression was the only predictor of homicide and serious assault in their subsequent multiple regressions, the overlap of social units had dropped, so that parental warmth seems a viable candidate for inclusion in any future cross-national study of developmental influences on homicide rates. This suggestion is reinforced by findings at the within-country level on parental use of physical punishment [7]. Familial devotion is a most important value in the cohesive paternalistic Islamic family. The sons and daughters feel committed and responsible for their parents, brothers, and sisters. The children usually stay at home until they get married. Strong family ties extend beyond the immediate family to close and even distant relatives. The suicide

bomber brings many benefits to his family and it is a well-known fact that these families are compensated financially. The families also gain a special status glorified with respect and honor. From the religious aspect, the shahid is granted by God the promise to secure a place in heaven for 70 people chosen by him, most of whom are, of course, family members. For the financial, social, and spiritual benefits, the shahid gains the love, idealization, and admiration of his mother, father, sisters, brothers, and extended family members [17].

3.5. *Gender and political violence*

Gender differences can certainly be observed between men and women suicide bombers, and these are important to understand. That being said, however, it is found that gender is rarely the central factor in the individual or organizational motivation for choosing to become or send a bomber. Certainly, Palestinian terror organizations began to open this option to women as it became more and more difficult to send male bombers across increasingly secure check points. Women could more easily hide explosives by feigning pregnancy, and respect for the cultural mores of modesty at first prevented vigorous searches of women and their use created a spectacular element of surprise (though with the increase in female bombers this has changed). There is limited evidence that some sending organizations view women as expendable and that they find it expedient to exploit the particular vulnerabilities of women in certain societies. There have been suggestions that the PKK used women as bombers more often than in other capacities because the terror cells needed to relocate fairly frequently, and the women were observed to be slower at hiking and less useful for carrying equipment over long distances. Blackmail is generally a more powerful tactic when used against women in conservative societies because women are often constrained to live with more numerous and rigid moral strictures than are men. Certainly, a woman who chooses to become a bomber briefly attains a sense of power inlife – and taking on the traditionally male role of warrior is a great equalizer. But both of these feelings are quite short-lived given the short career path that characterizes this role. Hence, these are likely only secondary motivations following traumatic stress. Likewise, in some societies a woman can attain "rock star status" only after death; a status that is very difficult for a woman to attain in life in most traditional societies [11].

3.6. *Psychological variables*

There is no psychological profile for terrorists, suicide bombers, or others who purpetrate political violence [3]. Forneris, (2006) reviewed a book called Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences[17]. According to book there is no such thing as a terrorist personality or a set of psychological or psychopathological factors that defines a terrorist, nor is there a specific formula for becoming a terrorist. In the book was assumed that "terrorism is meant to be traumatizing", and this can be accomplished in a variety of ways. These include threat or extraordinary use of violence, goal-directed, intentional behavior to harm, the intention to psychologically disorganize and horrify not only the immediate victims but also those around them, and choosing victims for their symbolic value, even their innocence. In most discussions as to whether a psychological profile

can be proposed for suicide bombers, the prevailing opinion is that there is no psychological profile and that psychological profiles would have little use, especially in preventing suicide bombings [13].

Stern (2003), also, argued that developing a single psychological profile for suicide bombers was impossible, yet she noted earlier that recruiters look for troubled youths, and she reported a checklist of traits that recruiters look for, including mental immaturity, pressure to work yet no job, no social safety net, without a girl friend, no means for him to enjoy life, and an absence of meaning in life. Stern also noted a leader of Hamas said that those who use knives have nervous personalities and get violent as a direct reaction to an incident, those who use guns are well trained, and those who use a bomb need to have just a moment of courage. These statements comprise the beginnings of a psychological profile (or profiles) of the suicide bombers [18] .

More than half the suicide bombers had entered further education, compared with just 15 per cent of the general population [7]. Similarly mentioned, contemporary suicide terrorists from the Middle East are publicly deemed crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in poverty and ignorance. Except for being young, unattached males, suicide bombers differ from members of violent racist organizations with whom they are often compared. Overall, suicide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunctional attributes (fatherless, friendless, or jobless) or suicidal symptoms. They do not vent fear of enemies or express "hopelessness" or a sense of "nothing to lose" for lack of life alternatives that would be consistent with economic rationality. Charismatic trainers then intensely cultivate mutual commitment to die within small cells of three to six members. The final step before a martyrdom operation is a formal social contract, usually in the form of a video testament. Recent research indicates they have no appreciable psychopathology and are as educated and economically well-off as surrounding populations. In general, suicide bombers have been found to be socio-economically better off, and at least as well educated (though often better educated) than their peers [6].

According to Tobeña, self-recruitment, for instance, is an individual factor that characterizes members of violent doctrinal groups, although it is not a distinctive feature among their members: fellow devotees, intermediate officers, and commanders typically share this attribute, which may be connected to biological proclivities [19]. But there are other constitutionally based traits (dominance, proneness to risk taking, fearlessness, aggressiveness, machiavellianism, narcissism, and obedience) that may make a contribution to the different roles played by self-recruited members, which in turn are crucial for the ties they establish within their micro societies as well as the tactics they employ. In addition to the aforementioned traits, altruistic punishment, messianism, and religiosity are factors that may lay important roles in the phenomenon of suicidal terrorism.

For suicide bombers, their primary motivations are often nationalistic and their personal motivations are trauma and revenge driven. They often rely on dissociation as a defense. These bombers generally see themselves as acting in defense of their communities, acting in an expressive manner and wishing to cause pain to their enemy "other" in order to make them feel "our pain". The second group of motivations or motivational set is entirely different from the first and emanates out of cultures in which immigration, migration and a clash of cultures is a primary issue. Alienation, Marginalization, Loss of Identity, Desire for Meaningfulness and Adventure, Secondary Traumatization and Desire for Redemption [6].

Very little of the analysis of suicide bombers has focused on the psychodynamics behind the acts. Salib (2003) noted that most discussions of the suicidal terrorist mention the charisma of the leader and the social structure of the group, the irrationality of their beliefs (especially in regard to what will happen to them in the afterlife), and the possibility that they have been brainwashed. A focus on situational theories and the role of the leader makes the suicide bomber appear to be a vulnerable person who is easily manipulated. In this case, the question may be asked what in this person's childhood, adolescence, and socialization experience led him to become so vulnerable [20].

Two assertions are common in essays on suicide bombers. The first is that suicide bombers do not appear to be characterized by the risk factors that predict suicidal behavior. The second is that psychological profiles of suicide bombers are not possible. Lester, Yang, &Lindsay, think that both assertions are certainly premature and probably incorrect. Both of these tasks (identifying suicide risk factors and constructing psychological profiles) require extensive biographies of the individuals involved[13]. For suicides, a detailed case history or information about the individual's life is necessary. Such data have not been collected for any suicide bomber as yet. Failing this, it is necessary to conduct a psychological autopsy. A psychological autopsy involves reconstructing the life of the suicide from birth on, with a particular focus on recent events, stressors, mood, statements, and behaviors, by means of interviews with all of the significant others, friends, and colleagues in the suicide's life. Again, a psychological autopsy has not yet been published on any suicide bomber.

3.7.   Social and contextual factors

During the past several decades, there have been numerous scholarly attempts to explain terrorism from a variety of social and behavioral science perspectives. A large portion of this extant literature utilizes the psychological approach, which typically views the motivations for militant extremist behavior as a product of the person's psyche. Consequently, while previous research has distinguished identity as an integral factor in comprehending terrorist behavior, relying purely upon psychological explanations appears wholly inadequate. Indeed, given much of this research to date, the identity construct remains a fundamental, but elusive, dimension to society's efforts to successfully understand this deeply disturbing phenomenon [21]. Although both personal and contextual factors affect action, studies of individual behavior in group contexts show situation to be a much better predictor than personality [10].

Israeli (1997) noted that suicide bombers do not appear to possess any of the risk factors commonly associated with suicide. They are instead the type of individuals who join cults or revolutionary groups—young with few life responsibilities, not particularly successful in life (work or interpersonal relationships), and with low self-esteem. The organization gives them recognition and acceptance, and they transform their frustration and failure into glory and victory. In the West, if they did not join such an organization (or cult), they might well become drug users and abusers [13].

It is common to assert that the suicide bombers are not typical suicides. In spite of the lack of knowledge and information about the shahid's psychological make up, Orbach, portrays a hypothetical profile that is based most on indirect evidence and the feel that one can get about these youngsters[22]. Of course, the hypothetical characteristics will not fit every single suicide terrorist, yet it seems to typify many of

them. Religiosity, tendency for identification, self-collectivistic perception, suggestibility, imagination, naivete, and magical thinking, aspirations for personal fame and the question of personal distress. One of the puzzling questions about suicide bombers is whether they also suffer from personal distress, personal hopelessness, life pressures, and any kind of pathology or physical illness - some of the better-known risk factors of people who commit suicide. From time to time, there are speculations and rumors that a particular shahid indeed suffered from personal maladies, such as depression, sexual frustrations, and illness. However, Merari, based on his investigations and interviews with terrorists, denies this categorically [22].

3.8.   *Sociodemographic characteristics of suicide bombers as political violents*

The evidence that has been assembled and reviewed suggests that there is little direct connection between poverty, education, and participation in or support for terrorism [23]. In Sri Lanka, female suicide bombers are quite common, and Hoffman (2003) has noted in the Middle East the increasing participation of children and the middle-aged as well as the married in suicide bombings, including some who have children [24]. Merari, collected sociodemographic data on samples of suicide bombers. The mean age of the Lebanese suicide bombers was 21 (range 16–28), the early Palestinian suicide bombers 22 (range 18–38), and from the current Intifada (2000–present) 22 (range 17–53). The Sri Lankan suicide bombers tended to be much younger (as a matter of policy) [13].

The majority of the Lebanese sample was single, but Hizballah had trouble continuing to recruit single men because Lebanese Shi'ites prefer to marry young. Of the Lebanese sample, 38 were male and 7 female, but all of the early Palestinian suicide bombers were male. In the current Intifada, secular groups began to use women, as did the Kurdish suicide bombers in Turkey and the Tamil suicide bombers in Sri Lanka. Groups that are religiously Islamic, therefore, seem to avoid recruiting women. The social class of the early Palestinian suicide bombers matched that of the Palestinian general population, but their educational level was above average and they were more often refugees than the general population of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank [13]. Although Schbley argued that religious martyrs rarely come from the wealthy social classes, Kushner noted that the Palestinian bombers do not always come from poverty. Falsely connecting terrorism to poverty serves only to deflect attention from the real roots of terrorism. While economic deprivation may not be associated with participation in terrorism and political violence at the individual level, it may nonetheless matter at the national level [23].

4.   Being a suicide bomber

Some researchers think that the suicide attacker is being described as a victim, not an aggressor. "The perpetrator is the victim and the victims (sometimes women and children) are the perpetrators". The very aggressive act is often described as an act of love for God and not as an act of murder [22]. While the organizations that make use of human bombs often consciously and purposefully promulgate the ideologies supporting this tactic it is crucial to note that to be successful their messsage must find a resonance within both the individuals and the society that ultimately embraces these ideologies.

Without leadership promoting the utility and even morality of suicide terrorism as a tactic, widespread acceptance and use of it might never occur. Yet we must also acknowledge that this is not entirely a top-down phenomena. Social indoctrination into the ideologies in support of suicide terrorism need not always be an intentional mission driven on behalf of an organization or religion, but can simply be a social phenomena which is a result of community and individual responses to the circumstances in which they find themselves. On the individual level, motivations are multi-faceted and multi-leveled. They can include political/nationalistic, religious, ideological, economic, community, sociological, psychological, personal and familial motivations. Other factors that can potentially operate within the matrix of a suicide terrorist's motivations are:

• the individual's psycho-social history, including his or her indoctrination or embracing over time whatever religious and ideological justifications are given;
• the individual's personal and familial life experiences, including issues of personal and secondary traumatization (eg. history of incarceration, torture, trauma etc.);
• cultural identification with the concept of revenge and the need for it;
• community affiliations;
• identifications with the sponsoring group;
• notions of sacrifice for the group;
• and the use of psychological defenses, including the dissociative defense, which appears possibly necessary to carry out the act [6].

It is clear that the ideologies promoted by the organizations supporting suicide terrorism often resonate with the experiences and psychosocial needs of many young people within their societies. Witness Hamas' claims to have thousands of self-recruited individual bombers (most of whom it allegedly has to turn away) or the fact that Chechen suicide mterrorists also appear to be self-recruited. In both Palestine and Chechnya, experiences of deep personal traumatization and bereavement create in some a vulnerability, which leads them to seek out the ideological message of those promoting violent and jihadist methods. This message helps traumatized individuals to find a framework for dealing with their shattered world assumptions and to address their emotional suffering, survivor guilt and sense of a foreshortened future [6].

4.1. Committing suicide

The suicidal act often involves a variety of dissociative processes, such as narrowing of vision, altered states of attention, absorption in the act, detachment from feelings and the body, semi-hypnotic ecstasy, and sense of merging with a transcendental power, self-surrender. Some of these processes are actually manipulated and induced into the state of mind of the shahid-to-be. This description portrays an induction of a hypnotic, calm state of mind with visual images of flying like a bird in a peaceful atmosphere, floating easily into a dreamy world and into a total union with the light of the Creator. The countdown is almost an exact duplication of the hypnotic induction followed by a hypnotic state with alterations in self-perception, in self-experience, and with vivid imagery of a transcendental experience. When blowing himself/herself up, the shahid also believes that he/she is protected from the imminent physical pain. This is yet another aspect of bodily dissociation. The shahid apparently feels detached from his/her body. The shahid is also protected from other sufferings. He or she experiences

no anxiety and fear over death and dying. In other words, the fear and anxiety over death are displaced into a concrete fear of failure of his mission. This displacement frees the shahid from inner anxieties that can interfere with his holy mission [22].

4.2.   *Being trained as a suicide bombers*

Merari, an Israeli psychologist, who has studied this phenomenon for many years, outlines the common steps on the path to these explosive deaths. Senior members of an extremist group first identify particular young people who appear to have an intense patriotic fervor based on their declarations at a public rally against Israel, or supporting some Islamic cause or Palestinian action. These individuals are invited to discuss how serious they are in their love of their country and hatred of Israel. They are then ask to commit to being trained in how to put their curses into action. Those that do, are put into a small group of 3 to 5 similar youth who are at varying stages of progress toward becoming agents of death. They learn the tricks of the trade from elders, bomb making, disguise, selecting and timing targets. Then they make public their private commitment by making a video tape, declaring themselves to be "living martyrs" for Islam, and for the love of Allah. In one hand they hold the Koran, a rifle in the other, their head-band declares their new status. This video binds them to the final deed, since it is sent home to the family of the recruit before they execute the final plan. The recruits also realize that they will not only earn a place beside Allah, their relatives will also be entitled to a high place in heaven because of their martyrdom. Then there is a sizable financial incentive that goes to their family as a gift for their sacrifice. Their photo is emblazoned on posters that will be put on walls everywhere in the community the moment they succeed in their mission – to become inspirational models. To stifle concerns about the pain from wounds inflicted by exploding nails and other bomb parts, they are told that before the first drop of their blood touches the ground they will already be seated at the side of Allah, feeling no pain, and only pleasure. As an ultimate incentive for the young males is the promise of heavenly bliss with scores of virgins in the next life. They become heroes and heroines, modeling self-sacrifice to the next cadre of young suicide bombers [25].

4.3.   *Special preparetion for suicide bombers*

A suicide terror attack demands special preparation. Sure there is no direct access to this process, but clues can be detected from bits of information that leak to the media from various documents and investigations of the attackers who survived previous suicide attacks or of the officers in charge of the operation. On this basis, Orbach try to delineate the preparatory procedure. Indoctrination and intensifying motivation for terror attacks: The mobilization of a suicide attack state of mind started with years of indoctrination in the media, mosques, and the streets. The recruit: Each terror suicide brings in a new wave of volunteers, especially following the enthusiastic report of a "successful" attack, glorifying the attack and the attacker. One might choose to volunteer via actively seeking out a terrorist organization or be approached by a mediator after making a statement, sometimes quite innocently, that he/she, too, would like to become a shahid. The organization sometimes chooses to approach a family member of a shahid or a victim of Israeli action to avenge his/her relative's death. Usually at this point, in the recruitment procedure, a secret meeting is arranged with a high-ranking official or with a noted religious personality in which the volunteer is told

that he or she was chosen for the holy mission, promoting his/her beliefs in the exclusivity of being inducted as a shahid into the prestigious and holy fraternity. The volunteer is then tagged as Shahid Al Chai a (still) living martyr. From then on, the suicide attacker-to-be is required to keep things in total secrecy. Yet many of them do convey the secret to family members. There is repeated emphasis that the Shahid Al Chai is part of a selected group of an organization with a strong group affiliationand commitment, there is a total compartmentalization of information, and the volunteer gets to know only his operator [22].

After the initiation comes a period that lasts for about a month of seclusion (although not total isolation) in a training site or a mosque. The exact nature of the training that they go through is not clear. Part of the training includes sessions of direct religious and political indoctrination. The training and education culminate in a video ritual. It is staged as a scene of commitment, of no return. The Shahid Al Chai appears in uniform with arms and the Koran. In the back ground appear the canonized symbols. In a short speech he/she consecrates himself/herself to total self-sacrifice for God and the Palestinian people. This video is presented in the media after the suicide attack. On the day of the suicide, the Shahid Al Chai is instructed to bathe, to clean and purify himself/herself, to pray, and to dress in his/her best clothes and then he/she is accompanied to the site of the attack and given last instructions. Facing the moment of death is a must in every suicide. Indeed, it is evident that preparation for facing death is an important part of the entire process. The aim of part of this process is to give death a new meaning, to increase suggestibility, to install tranquility and peace of mind, to reduce fear, to increase the enthusiasm, to mobilize the anger and aggression toward the target, but at the same time to keep a clear mind to focus on the mission and pay attention to the smallest details [22].

4.4. Media and suicide terrorists

It is also clear that suicide terrorists make use of willingly manipulated mass media. Historically, terrorists have exploited the media to publicize and justify their cause, and with good reason: exposure to media coverage of terrorism enhances opinions about the status and motives of terrorists, particularly among those who are mildly opposed to terrorism. Through the media, terrorists widen their support, gain credibility and sympathy, convey their capacity for violence, and degrade governmental authority, all of which aid their cause. Terrorists have become sophisticated at marketing their message through radio and television (e.g., Al-Jazeera). Now, terrorists have even more powerful platforms from which to manipulate public opinion, as millions are connected via the Internet to alternative information sources [5]. The shahids are promised two kinds of rewards by the religious and political leaders - 72 black-eyed (beautiful) virgins and spiritual closeness to God. These rewards in the world to come constantly appear in the media, in religious ceremonies, and even in the schools as part of a continuous indoctrination process [22].

4.5. Religion and suicide bombing

Religion is mostly is a kind of cover of political violence. The link with religion is more complicated since most Islamic terrorist groups use religious propaganda, largely the promise of paradise, to prepare recruits for suicide missions. Yet suicide terrorism

is in no way exclusive either to religious groups or to Islamic culture. Pape, compiled a database of every suicide attack from 1980 to 2001. He found no direct connection between suicide attacks and religious fundamentalism [7]. Religion is not a cause of suicide terrorism but it can be a powerful mobilizer on behalf of his terror tactic. Jihadist Islamic ideologies promote the idea of self-sacrifice to benefit the larger community in exchange for otherworldly rewards – including forgiveness of sins, salvation and instant entry into "paradise". For a troubled, bereaved and guilt-ridden individual, the vision of these rewards can constitute strong motivation. The promise that, in paradise, one will be reunited with those who have gone before – especially other martyrs – is a particularly powerful draw to those caught in traumatic bereavement. Moreover, the promise that a martyr will be able to intercede on behalf of seventy relatives – securing, for them as well, entry into paradise – helps to assuage guilt and grief over leaving loved ones behind [6].

5.   Child Soldiers

Perhaps one of the most blatant examples of how youth are touched by political violence is the continued recruitment and use of child soldiers. There are as many as 300,000 child soldiers fighting in wars today [26]. Children and families are now in the front line of war, conflict and terrorism as a consequence of the paradigm shift in the nature of warfare and the growth of terror as a weapon. They are as vulnerable as are adults to the traumatizing effects of violence and mass violence. The child soldier problem became a more widely appreciated political and humanitarian crisis issue in 1996, with the publication of a United Nations Report, *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.* The report became the accepted template used by all UN agencies, humanitarian NGOs, and human rights NGOs that subsequently began work on the problem of child soldiers in post-colonial warfare. In fact it was a non-issue for these states when engaging in their anti-colonial wars, when they used child soldiers. Wars of national liberation are still exempt from the ban on child soldiers. Since humanitarian groups increasingly define themselves as political actors and UN agencies identify with humanitarian goals, the issue has become thoroughly politicized.

5.1.   *History of child soldiers*

The practice of recruiting children has waxed and waned over the past millennium, but it has never played so large a role in warfare as it does today. Under the feudal system of medieval Europe, only knights waged war. After a battle was lost and won, both sides disbanded and returned home. The chivalric code prohibited civilians from participating, and kings meted out drastic punishment to any nobleman who recruited peasants or children. The Catholic Church opposed the famous Children's Crusade in the 13th century, and the children never made it to Palestine, let alone engaged in battle. Outside the feudal system, wealthy burghers of the time, seeking private profit and territorial gains, recruited mercenaries, sometimes including boys. But the child soldier is really a product of the later era of standing armies. The Prussian General Frederick the Great's words at Zorndoff in 1758,"Come children, die with me for the fatherland," were apt, as many of his soldiers were boys in their early teens. In 18th-century France the preteenage sons of poor nobility had little choice but to become

career soldiers. The tide turned again at the end of the century during the French Revolution, when mass conscription became the norm and children were no longer needed as combatants. Even during the general mobilization of society near the end of the French Revolution, children worked exclusively with women and older men behind the scenes, tending to the wounded. Up until the 1930s, wars were fought on battlefields between competing armies. Civilians were not the main targets, even though they suffered from hunger, looting and violence. The nature of warfare, however, changed drastically during the Spanish Civil War, in which airplanes bombed towns and cities. The ruthless destruction that began at Durango and Guernica culminated when nuclear bombs killed 200,000 people at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.The unleashing of war on civilian populations rekindled the use of children as combatants. During World War II, several thousand children worked in resistance movements, valued for their resourceful ways and quick tempers. Children also took up arms in many of the colonial liberation wars of the 1950s and 1960s [27].

5.2.   Why Children soldiers

Children are small, inconspicuous, expendable and easily indoctrinated and terrorized into performing extreme acts [28]. In Sri Lanka, all children had to undergo classes of indoctrination which aimed to build a feeling of hatred against the enemy. It could be asked how it was that a majority had 'volunteered' to join the armed group. The public address system continuously broadcasts 'reasons' and 'justifications' to volunteers. A further example is seen in the seesaws in one children's playground, with model automatic weapons fixed and painted in camouflage paint. The dead are glorified as martyrs, monuments are built widely and posters of martyrs are placed on display. School children and school bands are used in parades at funerals of the dead 'martyrs'. The children mainly came from poorer socioeconomic classes, with no traditional professional persons such as doctors, lawyers or teachers. The poor have no voice and are not exposed in the same way to the arguments about the pros and cons of fighting in the armed forces. The children from more privileged backgrounds are less vulnerable to propaganda and live in a more protected environment. Many would have been removed from the conflict, perhaps to study in Colombo or out of the country. Children, especially adolescents, are vulnerable and 'give in' to ridicule. The Convention of the Rights of the Child (United Nations General Assembly, 1989) defines a child as a person below 18 years, and in situations of armed conflict the leaders of the armed groups, whether government or otherwise, should be considered the caregivers [28].

6. Dealing with Terrorism and Prevention

 Wagner, has some suggestions to deal with terrorism. They can be summarized as below:

• It is wise to understand the terrorists' perspective in the context of their culture. Understand their complaints, i.e., their allegations—they may have some validity and structural changes might remove some of the passion underlying the complaints. No part of this suggestion should be taken as condoning the terrorists' acts. Continue to condemn the terrorism, but do not, in the process, ignore the potentially valid complaints underlying their actions.

- Seeing terrorists as psychopathological, irrational, and evil maniacs is the fundamental attribution error. What may appear irrational to us may be perfectly logical in the context of the adversaries' culture and experience.

- Focus rather on "educating" both those who do not support terrorism as well as the critical next generation. But, in the process, do not assume that education alone will create a generation of "reasonable" people: the education takes place in a social context that includes structural factors (e.g., poverty, violence) that may be more educational than anything taught elsewhere.

- In order to move from quelling terrorism, to making agreements that remove the bases of valid complaints of those the terrorists claim to support, to building peace, clearly delineate short-term and long-term goals. People respond to hope, which short-term measures may provide. But it is the long-term peace building process that must be the ultimate goal. While it is probably impossible to build peace in the midst of terrorist violence, be prepared to build once the violence has stopped [1].

To prevent terrorism at its source, children must be socialized to become positive contributors to their community. Affection and guidance lower the chances that violent ideologies and charismatic leaders will seduce children. Furthermore, inclusive caring that extends beyond the immediate group humanizes others, reduces inter-group violence, and may prevent terrorism. The prevention of terrorism through positive socialization also involves teaching tolerance and civic education. Clearly, teaching tolerance and civic education are long-range investments that can succeed only where they arewelcomed, or at least seen as pursuant to a country's self-interest. To prevent the emergence of terrorism, educators teach children how to manage anger and resolve conflict peacefully, enhance metacognitive awareness and the critical thinking needed to disconfirm stereotypes and create inter-group understanding, provide exposure to models and mentors for socially constructive behavior, and offer cooperative learning experiences with diverse children. Democratization can forestall terrorism in the long run by supporting political pluralism and empowering citizens to address pressing social issues through legitimate political institutions. Democracies require citizens to tolerate the political participation of those who advocate unpopular views. Such tolerance is influenced by a commitment to democratic values [5].

Perhaps to stop the bombing we need research to understand which configurations of psychological and cultural relationships are luring and binding thousands, possibly millions, of mostly ordinary people into the terrorist organization's martyr-making web. Study is needed on how terrorist institutions form and on similarities and differences across organizational structures, recruiting practices, and populations recruited. Are there reliable differences between religious and secular groups, or between ideologically driven and grievance-driven terrorism? Interviews with surviving Hamas bombers and captured Al-Qaida operatives suggest that ideology and grievance are factors for both groups but relative weights and consequences may differ [3].

Wagner (2006) has a few suggestions for both peace psychologists and policymakers. First, for peace psychologists, in any attempt to inform policymakers, especially applying the concept of realistic empathy. It is essential that they believe that peace psychologists understand and respect their perspective. Second, we should dipsel the all-too-frequent equation of psychology and therapy. Peace psychology focuses primarily on interpersonal, social processes, and on relations between groups; it does not attempt to delve into the psyches of terrorists or their supporters [1].

Just as political terrorism is the product of generational forces, so too it is here for generations to come. When hatred is bred in the bone, and passed from generation to generation, it does not yield easily to peace talks. There is no shortrange solution to the problem of terrorism. Once an individual is in the pressure cooker of the terrorist group, it is extremely difficult to influence him. In the long run, the most effective antiterrorist policy is one that inhibits potential recruits from joining in the first place, for once an individual is in the grip of the terrorist group the power of the group and organizational psychology will increasingly dominate his psychology. dissemination of information and public education must be key elements of a pro-active program [29].

7. Conclusion

Political violence is now, and has been for milenia, part of the human condition. The pain and suffering caused is incalculable but among its most frequent victims are the children and the youth. This paper has attempted to discuss only a few of the many facets of this ongoing threat to peace and stability in an attempt to focus attention on some of the most recent research. It is clear that the complexity of the problems, the origins of political unrest, and cultural barriers are likely to make progress in reducing political violence difficult but with continued study and understanding may come greater insights in the real causes and future solutions. Because of the many variable interactions including developmental characteristics, psychological situations, social and contextual factors, sociodemographic characteristics, culture, parental effect and family, gender, media and religion, children and young people remain certain targets for exploitation and victimization. Although the solution to the problems of youth and political violence are neither simple not immediate, the search for understanding and change must certainly continue until an answer can be found.

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II. Political Violence and Effects

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COUNTERING POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN YOUNG PEOPLE THROUGH INTERGROUP CONTACTS

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Abstract: In this paper, we outline the significant progress that has been made by researchers using contact theory to combat the worst effects of prejudice and group based feelings amongst young people. We argue that the emergence of segregated areas in western societies, with members of religious or ethnic groups living largely in isolation from other groups, provides a breeding ground for group discontent and terrorist recruitment. We outline research suggesting that the group perceptions which underpin extreme group attitudes and terrorism in young people can be changed through contact with other group members. We discuss new evidence suggesting that young people's attitudes in segregated environments can be moderated through intergroup contacts. Using Moghaddam's conceptual exploration of steps toward terrorism as a framework, we discuss how cross group contacts may help to counter terrorism at different levels in his hypothetical staircase. Intergroup contacts we suggest can play an important role in both combating categorical "them versus us" thinking and when combined with new technology may help interrupt the circle of isolation that is central to terrorist recruitment via the internet.

Keywords: Northern Ireland, segregation, ethnic conflict, intergroup contact .

Introduction

Segregated social environments, associated with poor economic conditions, provide a basis for the development of extreme group attitudes amongst young people. It should be emphasized from the outset that the vast majority of individuals who live in deprived social conditions do not end up as terrorists despite natural feelings of injustice. Nevertheless, segregated ethnic or religious groups can be found across virtually every country in Europe and indeed the Western world. We argue that lack of cross group contacts may contribute to the development of extreme group attitudes

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making young people more likely to be attracted to terrorist groups or organized criminal gangs.

The idea that segregated living environments and poor economic conditions can lead to social problems generally and political extremism in particular is not new, however, the mechanisms through which these conditions can lead to terrorism are unclear. Comer and Kendall (2007) in their examination of the psychological impact of terrorism on youth usefully distinguish between children who have direct experiences of terrorism and the powerful media based portrayals of these events[1]. The relationship between perceived threat and the development of negative attitudes and prejudice toward other groups suggests that terrorist actions and their coverage may play a powerful role in young people's views of the out group members particularly in segregated environments [2, 3].

The psychological relationships found between threats to group identity, self esteem and intergroup discrimination Hunter, O'Brien and Stringer (2007) also suggest that group perceptions can lead to acts of intergroup discrimination in experimental studies[4].

We will utilize Fathali Moghaddam's (2005) "Staircase to Terrorism" metaphor as a useful psychological conceptualization of movement towards a terrorist act [5]. At each stage in Moghaddam's staircase, psychological factors are suggested to play a fundamental role in determining movement toward terrorism. He argues that the first step understands how people feel about the general levels of fairness and treatment of their group. The important aspect here is not the individual's environmental conditions but their perception of the general level of deprivation of members of their group (see also [6]). From a psychological perspective therefore, an individuals feelings about their group's position appear to be a more potent determinant of individual dissatisfaction than their personal circumstances. This helps to explain why as Mooghaddam points out many terrorists emerge from more advantaged economic circumstances (see [7,8, 9]). The second step is viewed as a search for solutions to this perceived injustice to group members. If ways cannot be found to address this need, the movement toward potential alignment with terrorist organizations is more likely. Actual alignment, according to Moghaddam, requires recruits to learn to view the world in a more rigid "them v us" way. He highlights the powerful role of the social categorization process in reinforcing this (for example Eastern /Western) view of the world.

Our focus in this chapter will be on the application of contact theory in countering the development of extreme group attitudes in young people from segregated group environments. In making this case, we will explore how intergroup contacts might help to counter progression from perceived group grievance to membership of terrorist groups at different steps in Moghaddam's staircase. Before doing this we will firstly review the experimental evidence that suggests that intergroup contacts can have powerful effects on group perceptions and attitudes among young people in Northern Ireland.

1. Conflict and Segregation in Northern Ireland

The conflict in Northern Ireland can be most simply described as a struggle between those who wish to see the Province remain part of the United Kingdom and those who

wish to see Ireland (North and South) reunited. The majority of Protestants are Unionist, and wish to remain within the United Kingdom, while the majority of Catholics are Nationalist and desire to see Ireland reunited. The advantage, from a research perspective, is that Northern Irish society divides starkly along religious lines. Individuals and locations are identified readily as either Catholic or Protestant [10, 11, 12] with very few social categories contravening this basic subdivides. Research into group effects is more easily designed and interpreted in this setting than in contexts (e.g. the United States) where multi-ethnic groupings make school interventions and evaluation of contact effects more complex.

A marked feature of Northern Irish society is the degree of segregation found between the two religious communities [13, 14]. Three types of segregation have been intensively studied: personal and marital, residential and educational [15]. Cairns and Hewstone (2002) in an overview of surveys from 1968 to 1998 found that both Protestants and Catholics consistently report having 'all or most' of their friends from their own religious group[13]. Mixed marriages are unusual, accounting for between four to ten per cent of marriages across surveys [16]. However, these relationships do little to alleviate entrenched segregation patterns as it is common for one partner to break all ties with their own group after marriage. Residential segregation in both urban and rural areas is common throughout Northern Ireland. Whyte (1990) estimated that 35 to 40 per cent of the population lives in completely segregated environments[14]. Despite the paramilitary ceasefires and lower levels of political violence, recent research suggests that residential segregation is increasing due to higher levels of local unrest between the communities at residential boundaries [17].

Educational segregation in primary and secondary education is almost complete, with Montgomery, Gallagher and Smith (2003) estimating that 96% of children attend single denominational schools and Cairns and Hewstone (2002) reporting that over 90% of individuals attend denominational schools at both primary and secondary levels. Despite this segregated educational system, an encouraging level of survey support is found for desegregated schooling [18, 19].

2. Intergroup Contact in Northern Ireland

The most influential approach to understanding the effects of intergroup contact is the 'contact hypothesis' [20, 21, 22, 23,24], which attempts to specify the conditions under which contact with members of a disliked out-group leads to decreased prejudice. This approach specifies four conditions that need to be present in order to ensure that contact between group members is successful: equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup co-operation and support from relevant authority figures.

Evidence in support of the hypothesis has been generally encouraging (see [23,24] for recent reviews). Equal status has been demonstrated to be particularly important in educational mixing, although differing conceptions of status make this difficult to assess. Brewer and Kramer (1985) stress the importance of equal status between groups as they come into the contact situation, while others (e.g. [25]) suggest that equality within the situation is more important [26]. In educational settings, as opposed to laboratory settings, equality within the contact situation appears to be more important than equality coming into the situation [27].

2.1 Group Membership Salience and Intergroup Contacts

Group membership salience, has been shown to be a key moderator variable in intergroup contact effects [28]. In a Northern Ireland context, group membership salience can be easily activated by a range of perceptual cues [11, 29]. In situations where group membership is made salient, contact between group members can lead to anxiety and fear [30, 31]. There is strong evidence that one of the most important aspects of intergroup contact is the anxiety that individuals feel when faced with members of the other group [32, 33, 34, 23, 24]. Paolini and his friends note that high levels of group anxiety ultimately discourage contact by making individuals defensive and even hostile towards other group members [34]. We suggest that intergroup contacts may both lessen the anxiety and fear toward other group members and also help to prevent young people from acting in group terms when their group membership is made salient.

2.2. Intergroup Contact Effects in Northern Ireland

It is beyond the scope of the current chapter to outline in detail the numerous studies that have been carried out (the reader should refer to [23, 15] for detailed accounts). Figure 1. summarizes the major effects found to date. It illustrates the range of beneficial effects that intergroup contact can have in terms of decreased intergroup anxiety; increased levels of intergroup forgiveness; perceptions of greater out-group variability; lower levels of prejudice and moderation of group based attitudes.

Figure 1: Changes Due to Intergroup Contact in Northern Irish Studies

2.3. Intergroup Contact and Attitude Moderation

The aim of the present study was to determine whether in school and out-of-school intergroup contacts moderate children's group attitudes and to assess how parental intergroup contacts and group attitudes influence children's group attitudes. In order to

assess the possible effects of contact, a LISREL modeling approach was used to explore the relationships between parental group attitudes, children's and parent's intergroup contacts and children's group attitudes.

The study was cross-sectional in design and involved a total sample of 1732 children together with 880 parents. The children came from three age cohorts aged 11-12, 12-13 and 14-15 years attending integrated schools, and Protestant and Catholic segregated schools. The integrated schools in the study were chosen specifically because they are the longest established of all the post-primary integrated schools in Northern Ireland (1981 and 1985). The segregated schools were selected to provide the closest match possible to the integrated schools, according to three criteria: the size of the school population; the academic performance of the schools based on achievement at GCSE /GNVQ; and the percentage of students taking free school meals, which was used as an indicator of socio-economic status. The analysis in this study used a subsample comprised of 824 matched parent and child pairs. The researchers informed the children that the study was investigating the attitudes and behavior of school children in post-primary schools in Northern Ireland. In this paper we will focus on a limited range of scales namely intergroup contact and group attitudes (see Stringer et al. for a full account of the different factors in this large scale study).

There are identifiable and highly specific issues on which the two communities in Northern Ireland take diametrically opposed views. We measured attitudes to five such issues: the Catholic religion, the Protestant religion, parades, the police, and the British government, which previous research, using adult samples, had show shown to be areas of group difference [35]. Children and parents responded to these items on a seven point scale ranging from strongly agree (7) to strongly disagree (1). Three separate scales were devised in order to measure in-school and out-of-school contact amongst children, together with a third scale to measure parental inter-group contact. The items were based on a measure designed to assess inter-group contacts across the religious divide amongst university students and piloted with younger children. The adult scale was derived directly from the Stringer and Vhattum (1990) scale [33]. They were rated on a four point scale: never (1), seldom (2), sometimes (3) and frequently (4).

The first stage of the analysis was to factor analyze the measures of cross-community contact and intergroup attitudes in order to examine their measurement properties. In order to verify the factor solution obtained in the exploratory factor analysis, all models were independently tested using LISREL 8.30. Our principal method of analysis comprised multiple-group mean and covariance structures (MACS). MACS models were chosen, because they provide an explicit test of measurement invariance, an essential condition for the validity of comparisons across different socio-cultural groups [36, 37]. A number of competing models were tested and our final model which showed excellent fit (RMSEA = .051, NNFI = .96, IFI = .97) is summarized in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Effects of Parental and School Intergroup Contacts on Children's Attitudes

The model reveals that parental attitudes influence choice of school type (Integrated or Segregated) with parents with moderate attitudes tending to choose integrated schools while parents with stronger group attitudes tend to send their children to segregated schools. Parental intergroup contacts also affect school choice with those reporting greater cross group contacts being more likely to choose integrated schools. Children's group attitudes are directly influenced by parent's attitudes. Children attending integrated schools reported higher levels of intergroup contact both in school and outside school and most importantly these intergroup contact (both in school and out of school) resulted in more moderate attitudes in both Protestant and Catholic young people.

3. Discussion

Intergroup contacts have been shown to have positive effects on both young people's attitudes and their perceptions of the other group. In this section, we outline briefly how these cross group contacts may help to counter a move toward terrorism. One of the advantages of contacts with other group members is that the individual is no longer likely to view members of other groups as being all the same (the assumed similarity effect, Holtz and Miller, 1985). At stage one in Moghaddam's staircase, subjective perceptions about perceived injustices may be countered by contact with individuals from other groups.

Social identity theory suggests that individuals act in terms of their personal identity or can act collectively as group members when their social identity is activated [38, 39]. This changeover from acting as an individual to acting in group terms is much easier to achieve in situations where groups are viewed in terms of "them versus us". For example westerners with little experience of oriental faces view all oriental faces as being very similar. Intergroup contacts arguably make this transition more difficult as the other group is no longer viewed as homogeneous but is increasingly viewed as being composed of individuals who are very different from each other. Intergroup contacts therefore bring home to the individual that members of the other group are not all alike, hold very different attitudes from each other and in many cases experience similar social disadvantages.

The second level where intergroup contacts may play an important part is in challenging the build-up of a categorical view of the social world which has been identified as one of the identifying features of both terrorist organizations and the individuals who are attracted to them [40, 5]. The process of building up this "them versus us" mindset is arguably crucial to terrorist recruitment and action with individuals being encouraged to develop private worlds separated from their normal lives and ultimately to view everyone bar their small terrorist cell as outsiders [41,42]. Intergroup contacts challenge this separation by reminding individuals of the complexity of the out-group and the individuals within it.

One of the main recruitment tools used by terrorists is the World Wide Web which enables individuals to isolate themselves from others for long periods of time and to be influenced by terrorist propaganda. Fortunately, modern technology also allows individual contacts via text messages and through computer contacts (e.g. Bebo and Face book) which can be used to build personal friendships and break this isolation. Early intergroup contact schemes in Northern Ireland between Protestants and

Catholics failed to work once participants returned to their largely segregated environments. The main reason for this failure was lack of follow-up contact opportunities [43]. The advent of new technology and its popularity particularly amongst young people means that these group contacts can now be maintained at a distance. An additional advantage of this approach is that it minimizes anxiety and threat from hostile group members found in actual encounters in segregated group environments. In this way intergroup contacts, which cannot be maintained through direct personal contacts, can be usefully maintained over time using these new technologies.

Summary

Intergroup contacts with other group members provide a powerful means of challenging the extreme group attitudes and group based perceptions that ultimately may lead young people toward terrorist groups. The process of group categorization, leading to a bipolar view of the world can be effectively countered through contacts with other group members. In addition, we suggest that greater attention should be paid to countering the isolation of young people through innovative web and phone based technologies to maintain a range of personal contacts with own and other group members to counter the development of extreme group positions.

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WHEN VIOLENCE, TERROR, AND DEATH VISIT YOUTH

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Abstract: Each day children are exposed to death and trauma as the result of war, terror, crime and disease resulting from political and social events over which they have no possible control. This presentation will review the various categories of psychological trauma and loss and the common responses to that trauma by children and youth at different developmental levels. Psychological trauma will be described and discussed as an understandable and very predictable reaction to a sudden, unexpected, and intense event that taxes individuals beyond their usual capacity to cope. These events will be discussed in terms of intensity and duration. Even for adults with years of life experience, a fine education, and well developed coping mechanisms trauma and the resulting loss, grief, and stress can be overwhelming at times but for children with much less power and control, it is no less real and full of pain.

Typical patterns of childhood response to violence will be described from both psychological and behavioral perspectives. Normal and abnormal responses to psychological trauma will be described as well as the typical patterns of recovery and the psychological and environmental components affecting that recovery. Specific problematic responses including post-traumatic stress syndrome, depression, phobias, substance abuse, etc. will be described. Specific recommendations will be made with regard to effective and age appropriate interventions to identify both normal and abnormal reactions to stress, grief and loss resulting from traumatic exposure to violence and terror as well as for assisting children and youth to recover and minimize the long term psychological effects of trauma.

Key words*:* terror, psychological trauma, children, risk factors, resilience

Introduction

Each day children are exposed to death and trauma as the result of war, terror, crime and disease resulting from political and social events over which they have no possible control. This presentation will review the various categories of psychological trauma and loss and the common responses to that trauma by children and youth at different developmental levels. Psychological trauma will be described and discussed as an understandable and very predictable reaction to a sudden, unexpected, and intense event that taxes individuals beyond their usual capacity to cope. These events will be discussed in terms of intensity and duration. Even for adults with years of life experience, a fine education, and well developed coping mechanisms trauma and the

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Typical patterns of childhood response to violence will be described from both psychological and behavioral perspectives. Normal and abnormal responses to psychological trauma will be described as well as the typical patterns of recovery and the psychological and environmental components affecting that recovery. Specific problematic responses including post-traumatic stress syndrome, depression, phobias, substance abuse, etc. will be described. Specific recommendations will be made with regard to effective and age appropriate interventions to identify both normal and abnormal reactions to stress, grief and loss resulting from traumatic exposure to violence and terror as well as for assisting children and youth to recover and minimize the long term psychological effects of trauma.

Despite an ever growing call for peace and the proliferation of peacekeeping initiatives the world continues to be a violent place in which children are born, struggle to survive amid death and destruction and often die. As this is written, in mid 2007, there are no fewer than 29 wars and 13 armed conflicts raging in Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. These wars arise from political and ethic hostility and are causing the death and destruction of millions of lives each year in addition to generating untold misery by creating millions of displaced refugees who attempt to flee from war. Perhaps one of the most tragic consequences of these wars is the fact that unlike the classic world wars of the 20th century in which huge national armies met along clearly defined battle fronts, modern political and ethic wars are often prosecuted as a long series of terrorist events by irregular forces and within civilian cities and communities. Consequently, the level of what is euphemistically called "collateral damage" is very high and the number of civilian casualties is growing as the battles are now fought in the streets, market places, and villages. It has been estimated that 19% of the casualties who died during WWI were civilians. That number rose to 48% during WWII, and onward to 80% during the 1980s [1, 2, 3]. As civilians are increasingly being caught up in the tide of battle, the numbers of civilian casualties grows and increasingly those victims of political and ethnic violence are the most vulnerable of us all: The children.

This troubling shift in the way wars are fought means that the horrors of war are still found on the battle field but that battlefield is now the cities and villages where the children live and so children are now more directly exposed to the result of ethnic and political violence and terrorism than ever before. Children now are frequently the victims as they are increasingly caught between warring factions [4] or even as the targets of military operations [5]. Children suffer most directly as the victims of violence when death comes knocking in for form of gunfire and artillery bombardment or from the sky as the result of an air strike. They suffer from the death and destruction that surrounds them in places where they once played. They suffer when their lives are disrupted by forced relocation to refugee camps where they struggle to survive, often separated from family and friends or as orphans. Perhaps the most troubling of all is the increasing use of children as combatants in war [6,7]. The international humanitarian organization Human Rights Watch (2007) currently estimates that between 200,000 and 300,000 children are serving as combatants [8]. In more than twenty countries around the world children are being subjected to horrific violence as they are recruited and used by both rebel groups and government forces in the prosecution of ethnic and political violence. These children are being used in all aspects of combat as they serve

in frontline combat units, act as human mine detectors, participate in suicide missions, and perform all other military responsibilities of combat soldiers.

There can be no doubt that children must be counted among the victims of war even if they are not active participants. There seems to be an ever growing body of research that suggests that exposure to the violence leaves indelible scars. Benjamin (1994) reported that more than 10 million children had been traumatized by the effects of war during the preceding decade and that more than 1,5 million had died in armed conflict. UNICEF estimates that between 8000 and 10,000 children die or are maimed by landmines alone each year. In but one brief conflict that occurred over the course of a few weeks an estimated quarter of a million children in Rwanda were slaughtered in 1994 in the genocide that took, by some accounts, a million lives. Many more thousands of children were tortured and hundreds of thousands more watched in agony and fear as their parents, families and friends were stalked and massacred by people they had known and trusted for years.

War, terrorism, political turmoil and unrest results in the death and injury of millions of children each year and for millions more these events bring life in refugee camps and other substandard living conditions which often bring the further horror of disease and starvation. The toll on the world's children is staggering. Ladd & Cairns (1996) describe the scope of the problem and the fact that millions of children are currently living in societies where ethnic and political violence are common facts of life[9]. There seems also to be growing evidence that children growing up under conditions of threat, chaos, and deprivation can be quite severe [10]. The list of specific impairments resulting from the exposure to ethnic and political violence is significant and growing as research continues to unlock many of the immediate and long-term effects. The list continues to grow but certainly includes mental health disorders including anxiety disorders, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), behavior problems, sleep disturbances, somatic complaints, and altered levels of cognitive functioning as well as impaired moral reasoning [11,4,12,7,13,14,15,16,17].

The indirect effects of war and political violence can extend far beyond the immediate "blast area" and children who may not have been directly affected may still experience the trauma in indirect ways. The most significant of these indirect effects is illustrated by the current refugee situation. The United States Committee for Refugees, a non-governmental organization based in Washington, says the global refugee population rose to almost 15 million people in 2001, the largest number in six years. The most recent estimates suggest that by 2006 the number of refugees had dropped to 12 million with an additional 22 million classified as internally displaced. This latter classification is reserved for those individuals so leave their homes and see refuge in safer and more secure locations within their own country. This classification of refugee is often the victim of internal political oppression and ethnic violence and has become so common that such individuals are now monitored by the United Nations. The combination of these two groups yields a total in excess of 30 million worldwide. Earlier estimates suggested that approximately 20% of this number would represent children under the age of 5 and that between 45%-50% would represent children and youth under the age of 15 [9].

What is further troubling is the suggestion that mortality for these refugee and displaced children appears to far in excess of what is observed in normal and undisturbed populations and appears to be highest for internally displaced children where the combination of exposure to violence and trauma and the stress of resettlement conspire to make normal life impossible (Committee on Labor and Human

Resources, U.S. Senate, 1990). While refugee camps may offer respite and some degree of protection from being caught up in armed conflict, they may create a host of other problems as huge numbers of displaced individuals are forced to live in close proximity and under typically primitive conditions. United Nations investigations of food shortages and nutritional problems in 42 refugee camps in Somalia (1980), Ethiopia (1988-89) and Kenya (1991), and among displaced persons in Ethiopia (1985), Sudan (1988) and Liberia (1990) suggest that malnutrition rates greater than 20% are quite common with dramatically increased mortality and morbidity rates [18]. The two principle factors responsible for this included the sudden and massive reduction of food availability and the impaired health environment of living in primitive and undeveloped conditions and in very close proximity to so many others. The higher rates of exposure to communicable diseases, lack of water and generally poor hygiene create a deadly recipe for death among the most vulnerable in populations, the children.

Clearly the fact that terrorism, war, and ethnic and political violence exist creates for children and youth an environment filled with physical and psychological trauma at developmentally critical periods in their lives. The real impact and lasting effects of these traumatic events are only now beginning to be researched adequately and the long term effects documented and understood but certainly the key to understanding what is happening is to begin to understand the idea of psychological trauma. Trauma can be defined as an understandable reaction to a sudden, unexpected, and intense event that taxes individuals beyond their usual capacity to cope. One of the most common elements of psychological trauma is perceived threat. The perception of a threatening situation typically triggers very adaptive responses in humans. The fight or flight response, first described by Cannon, prepares individuals to respond to threat [19]. In most situations the response is effective and the perceived threat level diminishes and the individual returns to a normal pre-stress level of activity. The scope and severity of terrorism and political violence make fighting or fleeing largely ineffective and this is particularly true for the children who are among the least powerful, least capable of coping and the least independent among us. The nature of childhood psychological trauma and the consequent effects on the child will be discussed now.

1. Childhood Trauma

The specific investigation of child and youth specific response to trauma is a field in which knowledge is growing slowly but there is clear evidence there are, indeed, specific individual factors that make such study important. Children appear to respond to traumatic events in very much different ways than do adults. There tend to be differences in the ways children perceive and interpret traumatic events as well as in the ways in which they cognitively process those events and respond to them. These differences appear to result from age and developmental level [20,21]. The differences in response to events appears to be a complex event for children who have yet to develop extensive and fully adequate schema for the interpretation of threatening events and who, by past experience, tend to rely on adults to provide protection. In the traumatic events associated with war and political violence the adults themselves may be quite overwhelmed and unable to provide the sense of security upon which children have come to rely. Furthermore, it has been suggested that these traumatic events may

disrupt normal development and lead to far more serious consequences at a later stage. The development of posttraumatic symptoms may present significant difficulties for parents and caregivers who are already stressed by the same events. These posttraumatic symptoms may persist for long periods of time and often present serious complications during both childhood and in later life [22,23]. Before proceeding it might be prudent to consider in a general sense the term childhood psychological trauma.

Childhood psychological trauma is a reaction to an overwhelming event that is a real or perceived threat to a child's life, or their physical or psychological well-being. There is often a sense of unremitting and intense fear and horror. There is a growing sense of helplessness and an awareness that the world is no longer a safe and secure place. Unlike a response to a simple and stressful situation, emotionally traumatic events typically are characterized by three elements. The first of these is that the event was unexpected. The second element is that the individual was unprepared for the triggering event and the third, and perhaps the most critical element, is that there was nothing the individual could do to control the event. This sense of having no control over events because of their size, duration, intensity or severity is what overwhelms individuals and leaves such deep scars.

It has been suggested that in some cases it is not the event per se that is stress provoking or even traumatic but the perception of the event. What has puzzled researchers for years is the fact not all children exposed to the same events demonstrate the same response. What is temporarily upsetting for one may be psychologically devastating for another. There must certainly be some additional variables that determine or influence the extent to which an event becomes traumatic in the life of a child and the following have been suggested as some of these variables.

2.   Risk Factors Associated with Traumatic Reaction

a.   *Level of exposure to the event:* The degree to which children can be exposed to terrorism or political violence can vary to a large degree. The three levels of exposure include participation in the event, being hurt during the event, or being present and observing harm done during an event. There is a small but significant percentage of traumatized children who where were actually participants in the events. The investigations done by Derluyn et al, suggest that, among the Ugandan child soldiers studied, the degree of post-traumatic stress experienced was directly related to the intimate nature of their involvement and participation in the horrific events [7]. These findings are supported by many studies conducted to investigate the effects of psychological trauma on children in the Middle East. Consistently, researchers have documented high levels of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among children and adolescents exposed to military violence in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and Occupied West Bank as well as Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan [24,11,25,26,27,28,29,30]. These studies strongly suggest that youth who were required to relocate, lost a family member, or who experienced physical threat were at the highest risk for developing significant stress reactions.

b. *Age and ability to understand the situation:* Another significant variable is the age of the child or adolescent. With increasing age and the associated developmental level children acquire a sense of control and an ability to acquire and use more complex coping mechanisms as part of their psychological defense against the threat and horror in their environment.

Garbarino further addresses the concept of childhood trauma by suggesting that it results when a child is unable to give meaning to or understand situations that are inherently dangerous [31]. For the child to experience overwhelming levels of fear without a clear understanding of the cause creates even greater fear and distrust. Two components of this include overwhelming arousal and overwhelming negative cognition. For children, especially those under the age of 8 when there is still immature brainstem development, the neurological systems that enable older individuals to modulate this arousal are not fully developed and this makes young children even more vulnerable to the effects of exposure to violence. High levels of arousal without effective systems for modulation can leave the child especially susceptible to later psychological insult [32]. The second component of trauma is overwhelming negative cognition the core of which was described by Herman and represented the coming face to face with personal vulnerability and the recognition of evil in human nature [33]. Once again the cognitive mechanisms to interpret and integrate these experiences are immature and limited in young children. Davidson & Smith in studying the effects of non-war trauma reported that among those children who were exposed to violent and traumatic events prior to age 10 they were three times more likely to exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than for children aged 12 and over [34]. The fact that children seem particularly sensitive to psychological trauma and the development of PTSD has been reported rather consistently. In a study of the effects of the "Anfal" military actions in Iraqi Kurdistan the results indicated that children were significantly more effected than their adult care-givers and reported significantly higher levels of PTSD and other psychological effects as the result of their exposure to this military action [35].

c. *Gender:* These findings also suggest that males and females demonstrate gender related differences in response to traumatic events. Females typically are prone to anxiety, depression, and other mood disorders and are far more likely to seek out opportunities to share feelings and fears. Males, on the other hand, are far more prone to more aggressive acting out behavior.

d. *Functioning prior to the event:* Perhaps one of the most significant indicators of how children respond to trauma lies in their level of functioning prior to the event. Children who present with a well developed constellation of coping skills and who were effective problem solvers will tend to cope more successfully than others who lack such a well developed pattern of effective daily functioning. Children who were emotionally dependent, insecure, anxious and in need of constant reassurance were prone to more severe and long lasting effects of stress and trauma.

e. *Personality style:* Evidence suggests that even young children less than 5 years of age have developed clear emotional and personality styles. These rudimentary patterns of behavior tend to become more clearly defined during times of stress

and trauma. A child's characteristic coping mechanisms will become exaggerated under stress. A child who would normally be prone to depression may become severely depressed while children with a strong need for power and control may set about trying to re-establish a normal routine of life for the family.

f.   *Family support patterns:* Healthy and effective family support patterns have been associated with more effective post-traumatic coping among children. Open patterns of family communication where a child is able to receive support, comfort and reasonable assurance seem to play a significant role in reducing the effects of traumatic situations. Poor family communication patterns marked by hostility, intolerance, and conflict seem to exacerbate the stress levels. What is particularly troublesome is the fact that during periods of political and ethnic violence the stability of basic family structures is one of the first casualties as families are fragmented and separated, removed from their homes, community and friends and individuals are forced to adopt an individual survival mentality. Children are particularly good at taking their cues from parents and other adults around them. Children who perceive their parents and other caregivers as being overwhelmed, fearful and anxious may themselves feel especially vulnerable and insecure. Children are also less likely to discuss their own emotional distress if they perceive that their caregivers are too upset to handle it.

g.   *Previous loss or trauma experience:* There appears to be considerable evidence that exposure to previous loss and trauma experience may result in increased strength and hardiness for some children but in most cases produces increased risk for psychological trauma [36].

3.   Common Stress Reactions in Children

Psychological trauma resulting from exposure to violence and terrorism typically produces a series of self-protective and adaptive reaction from victims. Essentially these are attempts to defend against the perceived threat. While some of these attempts are common to all individuals, children will demonstrate particular patterns of behavior in an attempt to regulate and control their feelings and fears. It should be emphasized that virtually all of these reactions can be considered normal and quite expected but should be regarded as temporary attempts to control and regulate an extraordinary situation. If these reactions persist over prolonged periods of time, generally more than 3 months, then there is reason for concern. In the material that follows, these reactions will be discussed first in a general sense and then in a more detailed fashion with age specific behavioral descriptions.

4.   General childhood responses to traumatic events and stress.

a.   *Avoidance:* This pattern of behavior is characterized by behavior that isolates and insulates children from events and memory triggers of traumatic events and can be identified by children as they try to avoid reminders, activities, thoughts and feelings related to the event. Commonly the use of avoidance is indicated by a withdrawal from usual forms of social interaction, play, and contact with family

and other children. There may be what appears to be flat emotions or a lack of emotional expression often expressed as the appearance of emotional detachment. This may be accompanied by cognitive blocking or what passes for memory loss but may in fact be an unwillingness to discuss or think about the traumatic event. Since the events that triggered the traumatic reaction may coexist with interruptions of normal activities of life including eating, sleeping, and even forced evacuation to locations other than the child's normal home, this psychological reaction may have a physical component resulting from intense fatigue and hunger.

b. *Re-experiencing:* This is a common reaction to trauma and is characterized by persistent and recurrent images the traumatic event. Examples of this may include repetitive play or repeating some behavior associated with the original event. Frequent nightmares of the event or an inability to concentrate because of obsessive thoughts and mental images of the event are also quite common among children and these may persist for several months. While this reaction would appear to be quite normal and expected, children are frequently in a position where there may be limited opportunities to discuss with others their feelings, fears, and recurrent thoughts and images.

c. *Heightened arousal:* As the result of exposure to a traumatic event many children become easily agitated and have elevated responsiveness to reminders of traumatic events. Fear of a reoccurrence may make a child hyper-vigilant and hyper-sensitive to events associated with a past traumatic event. Symptoms may include heightened sensitivity to light, sounds or other sensory stimuli associated with the event, nervousness, loss of appetite, poor concentration, irritability, worry and anxiety about others, and sleep disturbances. Essentially, the fears produced by the original traumatic event are fully expected to return and so the child is unable to relax and remain in a heightened state of readiness and anticipation. This heightened state of arousal consumes huge amounts of energy and typically generates very high levels of fatigue which further exacerbate the situation. While these three general categories of response to trauma provide a simple way of understanding child and adolescent's reactions a much more definitive list was developed by the New York University Child Study Center. This list delineates children's unique reactions to stress and trauma and their ability to understand and make sense of events which change as a function of their developmental age.

Below is the of childhood stress reactions characteristically found in specific age groups:

Toddlers and preschoolers: 2–5 year olds
- Repetitive play or talk about the event
- Tantrums, irritable outbursts
- Crying and tearfulness
- Increased fearfulness (e.g., the dark, monsters, being alone)
- "Magical thinking" (believing they caused the event, or that the event can be undone)
- Excessive clinging to caregivers and trouble separating
- Reemergence of earlier behaviors (e.g., bed-wetting, thumb-sucking)

Early school-aged children: 6–9 year olds
- Increased aggression, anger and irritability (e.g., bullying, fighting with peers)
- Blaming themselves for the event
- Moodiness
- Denying the occurrence of the event
- Academic problems or decline, refusing to attend school, trouble with memory and concentration
- Concern about physical health and physical complaints (e.g., stomachaches, headaches)
- Repeated asking of questions
- Fear of future injury or death of loved ones
- Crying and tearfulness
- Concerns about being taken care of
- Withdrawal from social interactions and pleasurable activities

Middle school-aged children: 9–12 year olds
- Crying
- Aggression, irritability, bullying
- Anger or resentment about the event
- Sadness, isolation, withdrawal
- Fears, anxiety, panic
- Denial of emotions, avoiding discussion of the event
- Self-blame, guilt
- Appetite and sleep changes
- Concern about physical health and physical complaints (e.g., stomachaches, headaches)
- Academic problems or decline, refusing to attend school
- Trouble with memory and concentration
- Repetitive thoughts and talk related to the event
- Exaggerated and intensified expressions of concern and the need to help
- Worry and anxiety about loved ones and the event or future events
- Desire to engage in altruistic behaviors, trying to help those most hurt

Early teens and adolescents: 13–18 year olds
- Avoidance of feelings, distancing self from friends and family
- Evidence of anger and resentment or loss of trust
- Depression, expression of suicidal thoughts
- Panic and anxiety, worrying about the future
- Mood swings and irritability
- Self-preoccupation
- Participation in high-risk and/or illegal behaviors
- Substance use and experimentation
- Academic problems or decline, refusing to attend school
- Trouble with memory and concentration
- Changes in appetite and/or sleep habits
- Rumination about the disaster
- Empathy for people directly affected by the disaster
- Desire to understand why the event occurred

While these reactions represent a considerable number of behaviors, the lists are far from complete. Each of these behaviors represents an attempt to protect, to forget, to soothe, and to calm a fearful mind and body. Each of them represents a predictable and normal response to an abnormal situation. Western cultures tend to portray childhood and youth as a joyous and carefree time to be filled with play, school, and freedom before the rigors of adult responsibility are confronted. For millions of children world wide, childhood has a very different meaning. Childhood for them is a struggle to live, to push from memory the images of death and destruction. War presents children with incredible challenges to normal development. The pace and technology of war have changed during the past century and now there is no way to hide war and conflict from the children. UNICEF estimates that whereas in 1900 the ratio of civilian to military casualties was about 1:9, in recent decades this pattern has reversed, and now stands at approximately 8:1, civilians to soldiers. Children constitute a significant proportion of these civilian casualties [31]. To gain an understanding of the impact of war on children and youth is increasingly important because of the very large numbers of children and societies affected.

Even countries that do not have armed conflicts or wars in the traditional sense are affected as the result of accepting large numbers of refugee coming from neighboring countries [10]. It also should be obvious that even developed western nations like the United States and those found in Western Europe are not immune to effects of violence on children [37]. The presence of chronically violent communities which have been called "urban war zones" gives rise to children growing up in ghettos where gang violence and drive-by shootings become a normal part of daily life. Garbarino argues that these urban war zones become the breeding grounds for future violent behavior because community violence creates threat and a lack of security and effected children become prime candidates for involvement in social groups that are used to augment or even replace families [10]. These groups provide a sense of affiliation, security and even revenge. Such groups in these war zones are gangs which become micro-cultures in themselves: Micro-cultures of violence. Withdrawal into depression, aggressive and antisocial behavior, or even gang membership are all expressions of an attempt to deal with a hostile and dangerous world on the part of children and youth. It is remarkable that in many instances the children facing a world of war, terrorism and political hostility must do so without the full care and support of adults who frequently are, themselves, engaged in their own attempts at survival or absent. Those who are most successful in coping with these traumatic events demonstrate psychological resilience the nature of which is remains an elusive research topic.

5. Childhood Resilience

The concept of resilience as a psychological construct has emerged within the past 20 years as a topic for research. Masten, Best, and Garmezy described it as the process of, capacity for, or the outcome of successful adaptation despite challenging or threatening circumstances [38]. A clear and predictable description of the antecedents to resilience has yet to be discovered for the many variables which conspire to allow a child to psychologically cope with weeks of artillery bombardment are likely to be very different from those which allow a child soldier to come to grips with his first combat "kill". Howard, Dryden, and Johnson suggested that the search for a meaningful

understanding of childhood resilience would rely largely upon a recognition of the complexity of social systems in which children exist and in understanding a child's or youth's perception of the world as fundamentally different from that of an adult [39].

Despite the complexity of the topic the study of resilience has produced some general indicators of resilience in children and these include the following.

Good relationships: Caring, supportive and strong relationships with family members and friends foster resilience in children. Resilient children accept help and support from others around them, provide help at a time of need and become involved in community-based activities.

Positive outlook: Children who have hope and a positive outlook about the future are more likely to effectively cope with adversity. At the time of a stressful event, these children consider how the situation could be better and believe that their lives and circumstances will be improved in the future.

Optimism: Children who are able to cope with adversity maintain an optimistic outlook. When faced with difficult situations, they try to visualize their future and their goals, and have hope that they will be able to accomplish their goals in the future/ They believe that "everything will work out" for them.

Self-confidence and positive self-view: Resilient children believe in themselves, their skills and their ability to take control of their lives and situations. They have confidence in their strengths and abilities and trust in their instincts. Resilient children develop confidence in their ability to solve current and future problems.

Decisive: Resilient children tend to be proactive and take control of situations. They actively make decisions and then take actions to carry them out.

Goal Oriented: Children with resilient traits actively develop realistic goals and take action to achieve them. They are consistently proactive in making progress toward reaching their goals.

Persistent: Resilient children demonstrate a capacity for consistent and hard work which contributes toward their ability to achieve goals even when there is difficulty or demanding effort involved.

Frustration tolerance: Resilient children are able to cope with frustrating circumstances and tolerate frustrating and upsetting situations. They possess the ability to manage strong feelings and impulses.

Acceptance of the past: Resilient children are able to accept that events in the past cannot be changed. They recognize and accept that event in the past may change their present and future goals and circumstances. These children focus on situations that they can change rather than dwelling on events which cannot be changed.

Realistic: Resilient children tend to confront stressful situations in a realistic and objective fashion and avoid blowing events out of proportion. They are capable of maintaining a sense of perspective even in difficult times.

Pay attention to needs and feelings: Resilient children are attentive to their feelings, beliefs, needs and behaviors. They ask for help and talk about their feelings and experiences. They also engage in activities that they enjoy and find relaxing [36].

Conclusion

There is a great need to find meaningful ways to respond to violence and harm resulting from political violence, terrorism and war. Despite our most fervent hopes wars and political violence are likely in continue and find expression in ever more destructive forms. As this is written in the late summer of 2007 a story being broadcast on BBC News concerns the fate of Youssif, a 5 year old boy in Iraq who, while playing in the street in front of his home, was attacked by hooded insurgents who doused the boy with gasoline and then set him aflame. His plight came to the attention of the major news organizations. Despite his horrific injuries he survived and as the result of news coverage he will receive the best medical and restorative care available in the world. His recovery is likely to be less than total because of the extent of his physical injuries and perhaps that is the point, for Youssif has been forever changed by the mindless and senseless horror of political violence.

Youssif will never be what he could have been and he is but one of uncounted numbers of children and youth who have been changed by the inhumanity of mankind. By any accounting, the response to traumatized children is likely to be too little and too late but still must be made. Perhaps the best way to begin is to recognize that children and youth still possess remarkable resilience and strength and a way must be found to foster and encourage the development of this natural strength in children. The integration of information about the causes and effects of war, terrorism and political violence into the education of all children everywhere would seem to be essential along with opportunities for treatment by trained and experienced health care professionals. The needs of child victims of political violence represent a challenge for discovery through continued research as well as for treatment.

The German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer once said that the test of the morality of a society is what it does for its children. In a global society where millions of children and youth are exposed to the trauma of war, terrorism and political violence, and where each day refugee children die, are injured, or face death from a hundred preventable sources there must be some reason for optimism. The research into the psychological impact of violence on children and youth has only just begun and in truth represents a branch of research that is relatively new. The accumulating body of knowledge, however, suggests that children and youth experience war and political violence in unique ways and are affected cognitively, behaviorally, and emotionally in ways that can have devastating and long-lasting developmental effects [25,40].

It would seem that a two pronged approach will be required if the harm is to be addressed. The first is to address the needs of the victims. The second is the need to begin the long and complex process of programmatic change as outlined by Garbarino [31].

Programmatic Efforts to Alter the "Legitimization of Aggression" among Children and Youth. These efforts should include programs that start early—in the early childhood classroom and in the elementary school—to simultaneously stimulate

cognitive restructuring and behavioral rehearsal of non-violence responses to conflict, anger, frustration, injustice, and threat [41] .

Respond to Trauma in Early Childhood. These efforts should help train and support early childhood educators recognize and respond to traumatic experiences in the lives of young children in their care—and perhaps serve as a focal point for mental health services aimed at the parents of these children [42].

Mobilize Pro-social Adult and Youth Members of the Community to "Take Charge." The greatest threat to young children comes when positive adults are defeated by the anti-social forces of community violence. Thus, efforts to mobilize adults and pro-social youth to have a visible presence and thus convey a clear message of strength and responsibility is crucial for redrawing the social maps of children living in violent communities [41].

Recognize the Critical Importance of "Moral" Rehabilitation. Our efforts to understand the impact of war-related violence on children and youth around the world highlights several concerns — unmet medical needs, the corrosive effects of the co-experiencing of poverty and violence on personality and on academic achievement, etc. But from our perspective, the most important of these is that the experience of trauma distorts the values of kids. Unless we reach them with healing experiences and offer them a moral and political framework within which to process their experiences, traumatized kids are likely to be drawn to groups and ideologies that legitimize and reward their rage, their fear, and their hateful cynicism. This is an environment in which gangs flourish and community institutions deteriorate, a "socially toxic" environment [43].

Focus on Issues of Trust. At the heart of this downward spiral is declining trust in adults on the part of children and youth in war zone communities. As one youth living in a small city experiencing a proliferation of gangs put it to us: "If I join a gang I will be 50% safe, but if I don't I will be 0% safe." He does not put his trust and faith in adults. That is what he is telling us if we are prepared to listen. There are self-serving, anti-social individuals and groups in any society prepared to mobilize and exploit the anger, fear, alienation, and hostility that many kids feel growing up in a war zone. They are the competition for programs designed to build peace in place of the cycle of violence.

Clearly there are no easy answers for the problem of violence is one that has plagued mankind since the beginning of time. The sources of fear, distrust, and violence are numerous. Major international conflicts, local or regional insurgencies and ethnic battles, the effects of inner-city crime all generate a continuing supply of victims who die, are injured, or are simply psychologically traumatized by direct or indirect observation of horror and death. The effects are devastating for all but most especially for the young among us. Likewise there seems no way to shelter those who are young and vulnerable, and so easily harmed from the effects of violence yet the search for a way to reduce the suffering must continue and in that search may come small answers and opportunities to intervene and make the pain less when violence, terror and death visit our youth.

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TOMORROW'S PLAYERS UNDER POLITICAL VIOLENCE: THE PALESTINIAN ADOLESCENT CASE

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Abstract: The aim of the current study was to analyze the social and psychological consequences of ongoing political violence. We predicted an association between exposure to politically violent events with self-reporting psychological symptoms, domestic violence and school violence. We further hypothesized that adolescents reporting good economic status will have less psychological symptomathology and will report less domestic violence in comparison to those reporting moderate to very bad family status. Results also found associations between family violence, family economic status, and psychological symptomatology. Respondents reported low levels of family functioning.

Keywords: Palestinian Adolescent, political violence, domestic violence, school violence, SES, family fuctioning

Introduction

The long-enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict has escalated during the past three years into the Palestinian uprising termed El-Aqsa Intifada. As a result, both Palestinian and Israeli youths are exposed to traumatic events. Israeli youths who live in settlements in the disputed territories serve as a good example as they are exposed to attacks on these settlements and, as a result, they report a significantly higher percentage of moderate to very severe levels of posttraumatic symptoms in comparison to youth living in other places [1]. Regarding Palestinian youth, one study on Palestinian children exposed to war trauma found 72.8% with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) reactions of at least mild intensity, and 41 % reporting moderate/severe PTSD reactions [2]. More recent research associates direct exposure, and/or that moderated by the media, with children's sleep disturbance, somatic complaints, constricted affect, impulse control, and difficulties in concentration. Palestinian children living in war zones are also at high risk of suffering from depressive disorders [3].

Many studies have found a relationship between exposure to violence and family conflict levels. A 2005 investigation discovered the expected association between

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family environment, parental style of influence and PTSD symptomathology among school-age Palestinian children; but family ambiance (child's experience of anxiety in home environment) was the only predictor [4]. Youth who reported higher rates of exposure to violence also reported greater incidence of domestic violence [5]. Moreover, since the educational system is a part of the broader society, there is a reason to suspect a relationship between an environment of political violence and high rates of school violence. According to Laub & Lauristen, school violence is a reflection of violence in the broader social context [6].

The political situation in the West Bank and Gaza can be seen as one of the reasons for violence within Palestinian society. The West Bank is an area of land between Israel and Jordan, totaling 5860 square kilometers. With a population of over 3 million, and nearly half of the population under the age of 14, growth rates are high. The West Bank and Gaza together constitute Palestine, which is administered by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Most of the population is Muslim, and common Palestinian values include rootedness to the land, strong family bonds, social identity from family and community, and a holistic outlook to life [7,8]. The Palestinians have been an occupied people since 1967 and have had 60 years' experience of political unrest in the aftermath of the 1948 creation of the state of Israel. Palestinians refer to the 1948 creation of the state of Israel as a disaster (Al-Nakhba), creating a crisis in all aspects of Palestinian life, which persist to the present time [9]. The 1967 capture of the West Bank and Gaza initiated a period of political occupation that further restricted Palestinians' political autonomy. As a result of the ongoing conflict with Israel, Palestinians have been under military curfew and have experienced overwhelming economic loss. The First Intifada, an uprising from 1987 to the early 1990s, had deep consequences to all aspects of Palestinian life. The Second Intifada, from September 2000 to the present, has been equally intense. In 2005, more than sixty percent of Palestinian households lived below the national poverty line, compared to twenty percent in 1998. World Food Program estimates of 2004 indicate that 37 percent of the Palestinian population is food insecure and does not receive adequate food to meet minimum nutritional requirements [10].

In addition to political aspects, the economic status and level of education are also known as associated to the psychological well-being of families and individuals. According to Tolman & Wang, domestic violence is associated with various forms of material deprivation, as well as increased welfare dependence and decreased work reliance [11]. Other studies have linked job loss to domestic violence (e.g., Moore & Selkowe, cited in [11]). Low educational attainment was also found associated to domestic violence [12]. Domestic violence, in turn, has been linked to increased rates of mental health problems, including depression, suicidal ideation and posttraumatic disorder (Golding, 1999, cited in [11]).

Methodology

This study is based on a longitudinal national survey conducted in the West Bank in 2005. The sample was derived from major cities and refuges camps, and several villages which were randomly selected from a computer data base of the Palestinians Central Bureau of Statistics. The sample was restricted to male and female adolescents ages 12-18 attending high school. We also ensured that all geographic districts in West

Bank had the same probability of being included in the final sample. Schools and respondents within each were randomly selected. Permission to conduct the study was obtained from the Palestinian ministry of education. In addition, the research team contacted the parents of the adolescents, explained the aims of the study and asked their approval for the participation of their sons and daughters in the study. From the initial set of 2852 participants, the final sample consisted of 2328, of them 1202 (51.6%) were male and 1128 (48.4%) female; 98.5% of the sample were Muslims, only 1.4% were Christians. The average age was M= 15.39, SD=1.23. Most of the respondents' parents are married 89.2% and 167 (7.1%) reported that their fathers and/or mothers had died. The average number of children living at home is M=7.09, SD=3.06.

The research team trained male and female social workers and psychology students from universities in the West Bank who interviewed the youth. During the administration of the questionnaires, the interviewers were present to provide help completing the survey as required. Participants were informed about their right to quit the study at any time.

Research Instruments

The self-report questionnaire consisted of the following self-reported measures: demographic variables such as gender, religions, father's and mother's education, the socio-economic status of the adolescent's family, domestic violence, school violence and Political Violent Events (these three measures were developed by the research team based on focus groups adapted to cultural norms and specific situations), the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) that measures psychiatric symptomathology, and the McMaster Family Assessment Device measured the family functioning (Fad).

a. *Domestic Violence*, developed by the authors, measures two-dimensional verbal and physical violence within the family: violence between parents and children or between siblings (9 items) and spousal violent relationships (4 items). Respondents were asked to rate the level of occurrence ranging from "All the Time" (5) to "Never" (1). Example for an item in this questionnaire is: "My father beats me and my brothers and sisters". Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient was found to be 0.87 (.85, .92 respectively).

b. *School Violence:* We developed a tool that examines the presence of violence in the school environment. The tool consists of questions checking for active or verbal violence; for example, whether the student has witnessed any violent incidents during the last month, or whether students bring weapons to school, or whether the student has experienced verbal or physical violence. It also examines whether students threatened each other, whether students feel frightened to go to school and whether they witnessed or directly experienced violence at school. An example of such a question would be: "Does anyone of your friends bring weapons to school?" This instrument used a scale consisting of answers ranging between 1-4 levels: from "always" to "never". Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient was found to be .87.

c. *Political Violent Events* developed by the authors, measures the level of subjective severity of experiencing different political events activated by the Israeli army. Respondents were asked first to indicate (Yes or No) whether they experienced

any of the following events: physical or verbal abuse at a military checkpoint; the arrest of themselves or a family member; being subject to long curfew periods; injury by soldiers; death of a relative; property damage or loss during military house searching. If the answer was yes, they were asked to rate the level of severity ranged from "no impact" (1) to "serious impact" (5). An example for a question is: "Has the Israeli army ever searched your house?" Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient was found to be 0.92.

d.   *The Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI)* is a shortened version of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (H-SCL-90). It includes 53 items that elicit perceptions of symptoms during the last month. The nine dimensions of the BSI are: somatization, interpersonal sensitivity, obsession-compulsion, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation and psychotic symptoms. In addition, the scale provides a General Severity Index (GSI), a Positive Symptom Index (PSDI) and a Positive Symptoms Total (PST). The scale has been used to assess mental health of Soviet, American and Israeli adolescents in several studies [12,13]. The internal consistency of the nine sub-scales is adequate (Cronbach's alpha =.71-.81) and an adequate level of reliability has been found to exist by test-retest analysis ($\underline{r}$ = .60-.90). Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient in the current was found to be .94 (range between 0.6-0.78 on the different scales). The internal reliability of the current measure, in general, and of its sub-scales was measured in a Jewish research population [14] with reasonable results (Cronbach's alphas ranged from 0.62 to 0.90). The reliabilities of the subscales among respondents in this study were as follows. Somatization: alpha = 0.73, N = 2300; Obsessive-compulsive; alpha = 0.73, N = 2151; Interpersonal sensitivity: alpha = 0.59, N = 2120; Depression: alpha = 0.74, N = 2222, Depression: alpha = 0.74, N = 2320; Anxiety: alpha = 0.48, N = 2222; Hostility: alpha = 0.69, N = 2330; Panic (phobic anxiety): alpha = 0.65, N = 2315; Paranoid ideation: alpha = 0.64, N = 2320; Psychotism: alpha = 0.67, N = 2232; All items together: alpha = 0.94, N = 2321.

e.   *Family functioning- The McMaster Family Assessment Device (FAD)* was developed by Epstein and colleagues [15,16]. This questionnaire includes 60 items on seven dimensions of family functioning: problem solving, communication, roles in the family, emotional involvement, behavior control, emotional responses, and general functioning. All sub-scales range from 1- 4, with higher scores indicating more problems in a family's functioning. Cut-off points discriminating between "clinical" and "normal" families in American populations are available, though there are none for Palestinian families. The scale has satisfactory reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.72-0.92), good test-retest reliability (r = 0.66) and high validity, as indicated by comparing the scale's scores to other measures of the same matters [15,16]. Alpha reliability coefficient in the current study was found to be 0.60.

The BSI and FAD instruments were translated into Arabic, back translated by a professional translator, fluent in both Arabic and English, and then they were independently translated back into English to ensure the accuracy of translation. Both have been successfully utilized in previous research amongst Arab youth in the Middle East [17, 18].

Findings

Table 1: Socio - Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

		N	%
Gender	Male	1202	51.6%
	Female	1128	48.4%
	Total	2330	%100
Religion	Muslim	2296	98.5%
	Christian	32	1.4%
	Other	2	.1%
	Total	2330	%100
Place of living by District	Jinin	184	7.9%
	Kobatia	112	4.8%
	TolKarm	246	10.6%
	Kalkliah	119	5.1%
	Salfit	72	3.1%
	Naples	368	15.8%
	Ramallah	188	8.1%
	Jerusalem	175	7.5%
	Villages around Jerusalem	95	4.1%
	Jericho	39	1.7%
	Beit Leham	126	5.4%
	Hebron	434	18.6%
	South of Hebron	170	7.3%
	Total	2328	%100
Marital Status of your parent	Both alive/Married	2077	89.2%
	One (or both) of the parents died	167	7.1%
	Parents divorce (or father left home/live abroad)	62	2.6%
	One of the parents are in prison	4	.2%
	Non of the above fit	18	.8%
	Total	2328	%100
How do you evaluate your family socio-economic status	very good	182	8.0%
	Good	566	25.0%
	Moderate	826	36.4%
	Bad	626	27.6%
	very bad	67	3.0%
	Total	2267	%100
Is your father working (employee)	Yes	648	31.6%
	No	1402	68.4%
	Total	2050	%100

	Mean	**SD**
Number of children living In home	7.09	3.06
Fathers years of Education	5.61	13.62
Mothers years of Education	4.54	11.77

Table 1, provides basic demographic background of the sample. One third of respondents self-evaluated their family economic status as very good to good; the remaining two thirds evaluated as moderate to very bad. Over two thirds of respondents had fathers who were unemployed. An additional analysis revealed that those reporting good or very good economic status had less psychological symptomathology compared to those who reported moderate to very bad family economic status (Multivariate

Wilks' F (13,2058) = 6.97, p < .00). In addition, respondents from very good or good self-reporting family economic status claimed less domestic violence between parents and between family members, compared to their counterparts who self-reported moderate to very bad family economic status.

Table -2 Degree of exposure to Political Violence Events Low and High by Psychological Functioning and Domestic Violence

BSI		Degree of Exposure to Political Violence Events	
		High	Low
Somatization	Mean	1.08	.98
	S.d	*(.67)*	*(.65)*
Obsession-Compulsion	Mean	1.58	1.53
	S.d	*(.74)*	*(.74)*
Interpersonal sensitivity	Mean	1.36	1.30
	S.d	*(.87)*	*(.86)*
Depression	Mean	1.31	1.29
	S.d	*(.84)*	*(.86)*
Anxiety	Mean	1.26	1.16
	S.d	*(.73)*	*(.73)*
Hostility	Mean	1.35	1.29
	S.d	*(.81)*	*(.79)*
Panic (phobic anxiety)	Mean	1.24	1.13
	S.d	*(.80)*	*(.75)*
Paranoid ideation	Mean	1.37	1.35
	S.d	*(.80)*	*(.81)*
Psychotism	Mean	1.27	1.19
	S.d	*(.84)*	*(.82)*
PST (positive symptom total)	Mean	34.40	32.80
	S.d	*(10.31)*	*(10.42)*
Violence between parents and children	Mean	.91	.93
	S.d	*(.73)*	*(.69)*
Violence between parents	Mean	.31	.28
	S.d	*(.57)*	*(.52)*

Table two shows significant differences in mental health symptomathology between respondents with high degrees of exposures versus low degree of exposures to political violence events. Results of Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) suggest that subjects with high degree of exposure to political violence reported more somatization, anxiety, phobic anxiety and psychotism (Multivariate Wilks' F (13,2113) = 3.05, p < .00). There are no significant differences between low and high level respondents, vis a vis self-reported violence between parents, and self-reported violence between parents and children.

Table 3- Prediction of Mental Health Symptomathology by Political Violence Events, Violence Within the Family, Degree of Exposure to Political Violence, Family Functioning and Socio-economic Status: Standardized Beta Coefficients, R2 and p-Values.

	Psychiatric Symptomathology
Violence within family	.38**
Violence between parents	.04
Violent incident being witness in the last month	-.02
degree of exposure to political violence	-.08**
Family Functioning	-03
socio-economic status	-.10**
Political violence	.07**
Model summary	R^2=.1; $F_{(7,2020)}$=76.53, p<.001

Next, regression analysis was conducted in order to predict mental health symptomathology by political violence events, domestic violence, degree of exposure to political violence, family functioning and socio-economic status. Results indicate that 22% of the variance of mental health symptomathology is explained by five significant variables: politically violent events, violence within the family, degree of exposure to politically violent events, family functioning, and socio-economic status. Violence within the family is positively associated with higher mental health symptomathology *(β=.38, p< .00).*

Higher degree of exposure to political violence is associated with increased mental health symptomathology *(β=-.08, p< .00).*

Higher self evaluation of economic status is associated with reduced mental health symptomathology *(β=-.10, p< .00).*

Political violence is positively associated with mental health symptomathology *(β=.07, p< .00).*

Table 4 provides striking evidence of high scores in psychological symptoms, and problems in family functioning across all geographic districts. There are differences between one community to the next, as we will elaborate, but of all parameters examined, problems in family functioning were most similar across the geographic districts. The MANOVA results for Table 4 indicated significant differences of experiences of political violence by geographic district; as well as the interaction of political violence with mental health status, family functioning, violence within the family, violence between parents, and violence of youth (Multivariate Wilks' F (42, 13298) = 6.60, p < .01).

Univariate Anova tests showed that the source of differences was "Brief Symptom Inventory" *(F $_{(6, 2223)}$ = 6.03, p < .00)*; "Violence within the Family" *(F $_{(6, 2223)}$ = 4.20, p< .00)* "Violence between parents"*(F $_{(6, 2223)}$ = 7.56, p < .00)*; "Violent incident being witnessed in school in the last month" *(F $_{(6, 2223)}$ = 16.56, p < .00*; "Active violence in school" *(F $_{(6, 2223)}$ = 15.63, p < .00).*

Table 4- Level of Exposure to Political Violence Events by Geographic Region, and How This Interacts with Mental Health Status, Family Functioning, and Violence in School

Instruments		Jenin/ kabatia	Tulkarem	Kelkelia/Salfit	Nablus	Ramallah	Jerusalem /Jericho	Bethlehem /Hebron	
		Level of Exposure to Political Violence Events by Geographic District							
BSI	Mean	**34.27**	**30.50**	**31.73**	**31.69**	**30.06**	**33.01**	**34.76**	
	S.d.	(9.93)	(9.84)	(11.49)	(10.60)	(11.01)	(10.98)	(10.29)	9.95**
	N	282	238	183	364	178	283	703	
FAD	Mean	**2.87**	**2.82**	**2.89**	**2.81**	**2.81**	**2.78**	**2.77**	
	S.d.	(.55)	(.56)	(.49)	(.51)	(.50)	(.55)	(.53)	1.60
	N	282	238	183	364	178	283	703	
Violence within the family	Mean	**.96**	**.86**	**.79**	**.86**	**.73**	**.85**	**.98**	
	S.d.	(.72)	(.64)	(.63)	(.62)	(.67)	(.75)	(.73)	5.63**
	N	282	238	183	364	178	283	703	
Violence between parents	Mean	**.29**	**.29**	**.14**	**.20**	**.20**	**.27**	**.38**	
	S.d.	(.51)	(.52)	(.33)	(.37)	(.47)	(.58)	(.63)	7.07**
	N	282	238	183	364	178	283	703	
Violent incident being witness in school in the last month	Mean	**1.57**	**1.95**	**1.49**	**1.41**	**1.77**	**1.31**	**1.61**	
	S.d.	(.88)	(.96)	(.85)	(.98)	(.98)	(.77)	(.93)	16.78**
	N	282	238	183	364	178	283	703	
active violence in school	Mean	**.72**	**1.19**	**.83**	**.77**	**.95**	**.66**	**.92**	
	S.d.	(.65)	(.90)	(.82)	(.67)	(.79)	(.64)	(.79)	16.77**
	N	282	238	183	364	178	283	703	

$p < .05*$ **$p < 0.01$

Post hoc Bonfferoni revealed that exposure to political violence in Bethlehem/Hebron has a higher affect on mental health than in Tulkarem, Nablus and Ramallah. Post hoc Bonfferoni revealed that exposure to political violence in Bethlehem/Hebron has a higher affect on violence within the family than in Kelkilia, Nablus and Ramallah. Post hoc Bonfferoni revealed that exposure to political violence in Bethlehem/Hebron has a higher affect on violence between parents than in Kelkilia/Salfit, Nablus and Ramallah. Post hoc Bonfferoni revealed that exposure to political violence in Tulkarem has a higher affect on violent incidents being witnessed in school in the last month than in Jenin/Kabtia, Kelkilia/Salfit, Nablus, Jerusalem/Jericho and Bet Lehem/Hebron. Post hoc Bonfferoni revealed that exposure to political violence in Ramallah has a higher affect on violent incidents being witnessed in school in the last month than in Jenin/Kabtia, Kelkilia/Salfit, Nablus, and Jerusalem/Jericho. Post hoc Bonfferoni revealed that exposure to political violence in Tulkarem has a higher affect on the active violence in school than in Jenin/Kabtia, Kelkilia/Salfit, Nablus, Jerusalem/Jericho and Bet Lehem/Hebron.

Discussion

The Second Intifada has had a profound effect on the country's economic, political, and social systems. A concerning result in the present research is that self-reported family economic status and psychological symptomathology are positively associated. As a broad literature points out, psychological problems, in turn, can contribute to economic problems. Average educational levels of fathers (the gendered breadwinners) are low; and fathers' unemployment rates are correspondingly high. Previous scholarship correlates low levels of education and unemployment as especially high risk factors in poor mental health [19]. Indeed, chronic poverty has a deleterious impact on multiple life domains, including basic needs, family, social relations, leisure, and self-esteem [20]. Palestine's situation today suggests that current and future prospects for employment could be bleak. At the base of these troubling results is the ongoing political instabilities and political violence to which Palestinian peoples are subjected. Our research provides evidence that subjects with high degrees of exposure to political violence reported several psychological symptoms. These symptoms, in turn, are associated with economic problems. A perpetual cycle of political violence – psychological distress – economic problems – feed on each other in a downward manner that may appear to Palestinians as insurmountable.

Fathers' and mothers' average levels of education were low; their unemployment levels were high; and family poverty levels were also high. These phenomena are well understood in the literature, which correlates low education with low level of job placement success and with high poverty [21]. That mothers' education is low also provides further concerning evidence as research correlates lower maternal education with social problems like children's drug use [22], lower educational attainment among children [23], and with various indices that are associated with children's wellbeing, including nutrition [24]. These phenomena need to be understood in the context of large families. Respondents self-reported average family size as greater than seven children. The resources required for a family of that size are considerable, and the opportunities that children may have to forego because of economic need and limited resources, could include good nutrition, adequate education, and other things strongly associated with individual well being. More generally, the data provides evidence of high average scores for all families with respect to psychological problems, domestic violence, and active violence in schools.

Research on mental health risk factors and populations in developing countries such as Palestine, are limited. Recent findings in Columbia identify other at-risk factors for mental health problems to include being a woman, having limited schooling, working in the informal sector, and having a low level of trust in other people [19]. Our work – on low levels of education for fathers, on high levels of fathers' unemployment, on high levels of self-reported poverty - confirms some of these insights. In addition, service delivery in Palestine is constrained by limited resources and limited access to professional helping resources and this, in turn, relates to poverty. Canadian research confirms that not just material poverty but also service delivery poverty are high risk factors for the development of mental illness and as a determinant in mental health outcomes [25]. It is possible to understand poverty and psychological distress as a downward cycle of further poverty and psychological distress. Previous research confirms the positive association between poverty as an additional, high risk stressor on psychological health [26]. The present study provides a comprehensive assessment of

the situation of Palestinian youth. The findings regarding incidences of economic and psychological problems do not bode well for future capacities in such areas as individual, family, and community economic and political development. The commensurate damage to future prospects of peace making is also an area that requires further consideration.

One of the present study's most important findings involves the association between political violence and other examined parameters. Exposure to politically violent events is strongly associated with psychological symptomathology, lower family functioning, violence within family and between parents, and violence witnessed or active within school. These are concerning results, suggesting a strong association between the broader social context of occupation and other social problems.

Family members are regularly exposed to daily indignities of political checkpoints, constraints on movement, curfews, regular insults and long waits at checkpoints, inability to transgress checkpoints to get to school, school being cancelled because teachers cannot cross checkpoints, poor job prospects, continuous threats to personal safety, and commensurately impaired individual and social relations. They also experience arrests of family members, humiliations and/or abuse by soldiers and/or settlers, loss of close friends or family members, and the ongoing instability and generalized trauma that has become an established way of life. Tenure of property can be erased in a moment by Israeli mortar or bulldozers. The inability to move freely, to visit friends, family, to go to work or school, turns life upside down. The continued sense of impotence in the face of these broader forces can be profoundly destabilizing to individuals, families, and communities [27,28]. These have occurred for several generations, and have logically been understood to impede family and psychological well being (which are mutually enforcing). The responses to these phenomena, including strategies of active resistance that incorporate civil disobedience, may be empowering to individuals and communities. Other responses, such as violence, may be normalized even if they are ultimately self-defeating. Moreover, violence may also be displaced to domestic and school spheres.

Violence is estimated to have extreme sociopolitical impacts reaching, as an example, an estimated 3.3% of United States' Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and having a disproportionate effect on poorer countries [29]. Violence is a world-wide phenomenon that has a terrible impact on life quality, economic status, self-esteem [30,31]. Exposure to violence has profound psychological implications on respondents. Previous research correlates recent exposure to violence with predictable worsening of educational achievement and school-context violence [32]. The extent of exposure to violence amongst respondents can be likened to what has been described as "urban war zones", in which trauma is regularly witnessed, and those who directly experience it are joined by co-victims who witness it. On a psychological level, long term exposure to violence challenges a child's healthy context, in which a loving and sensitive environment provides the child with protection. This lack of control over one's environment and ongoing awareness of chronic danger can have long term psychological consequences. Representations of the world may be based on the premise that life is a succession of ongoing danger. Major traumas such as the destruction of one's parents' home may reinforce a sense of helplessness in the world. Negative beliefs towards the world, in turn, may make a person more susceptible to PTSD – to the extent that the trauma corroborates one's underlying worldviews [33]. Trauma may be passed inter-generationally. Parents' preoccupation with the state of

instability in which they constantly live makes it difficult for them to provide their children with any real sense of stability [34]. Weingarten states that children are witnesses to their parent's trauma[35]. Parents may be traumatized by political violence in a number of ways, including having lived through political conflicts, war genocide, and repressive regimes. Moreover, Angel, Hjern & Ingleby have found that even when a child is not exposed to violent events, growing up in a family subject to (ethnic) persecution and oppression could drastically undermine development of a sense of security [36]. Political violence may create in children of the Intifada the harmful lesson that violence is a valuable behaviour; and violence towards the Israeli army, perceived as an occupying force, may in turn be displaced to more generalized forms of violence that infiltrate the school and domestic spheres.

Srour, who has worked with Palestinian youth, found that children exposed to political violence may have symptoms, firstly, of losing control, such as urination, controlling parents through obstinacy, mutism, or separation anxiety, or not going to school for fear of separation from family [34]. Second, certain emotions may be transferred – particularly fear and rage. This may precipitate violence (domestically or in schools, as examples) in indirect aggression to show others "how it feels to be frightened", or it may cause increased depression and withdrawal.

These considerations lead us to the concept of social capital: the attitude, spirit and willingness of people to engage in collective, civic activities, which over time ultimately contribute to a community's social development and social infrastructures [37]. Initial research identifies social capital as a key ingredient in a community's capacity to respond to environmental challenges and promote change. The evidence we have suggests impairment in social capital, insofar as there is impeded family and individual functioning, and greater family and school violence. This is especially concerning given the high context nature of Palestinian society: the inextricable relationship between individual and community functioning, and the place of the collective in all aspects of self-conception. Research is emerging on the positive relationship between social capital and mental health wellness [38]. But recent findings suggest that social capital may not be a useful resource in high-poverty, high-minority, and high needs contexts in the United States [39]. In the present analysis, social capital seems to be a valuable concept that might warrant future scholarship.

The significant difference in the experience of political violence as a function of geographic district also indicates an important finding, as well as the interaction of political violence with mental health status, family functioning, violence within the family, violence between parents, and violence in school. Possible explanation for these apparent differences might be the instability and uncertainty faced by the Palestinians living in the West Bank. Different parts of the region might be affected differently by the current situation in different periods of time; for example, the Israeli army may impose a curfew on a specific Palestinian town. Keeping this in mind, the interaction between level of exposure to politically violent events by geographic region, mental health status, family functioning and violence in school seem rather reasonable.

Our research provides powerful, self-reported data of how youth evaluate a variety of phenomena: their psychological functioning, their family's economic status, their family functioning, and their experiences of domestic, political, and school violence. Future research could fruitfully examine any of these phenomena as stand-alone factors. We know little, for example, about family functioning in Palestinian society in

its own right. Moreover, previous studies [40] have found gender differences among Palestinian adolescents in relation to psychological symptomathology in the face of political violence. Future research would have to determine whether these differences exit in relation to all other variables outlined in the current study.

Implications for practice and policy

Our results, particularly their insight into the relationship between political violence and other social problems, do not provide great optimism for future prospects. The West Bank, we emphasize, is a young population, with nearly one half under the age of 14, and nearly two thirds under 19 [10]. That the present, large data set provides such ample evidence of psychological distress, high unemployment, and domestic and school violence does not establish a strong framework for future social development. It is reminiscent of sociologist Emile Durkheim's notion of anomie: where societal norms become unclear, confused, or not present, youth may become detached from their society's social structures [41]. The present study, like other research on Palestinian youth, could therefore provide policy makers with a rationale for considerable social and economic investment in the West Bank. In the absence of positive intervention, ongoing individual and community trauma may persist. These realities, in turn, could have a negative impact on future peace building prospects in the region. For the sake of justice and peace, the present research, and others like it [27,28], ought to be a clarion call for considerable investment and change.

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III. Political Violence and Its Patterns, Direct/Indirect Social Consequences

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THE ROAD TO INSURGENCY: DRAWING ORDINARY CIVILIANS INTO THE CYCLE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AND VIOLENT RESISTANCE

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Abstract: Northern Ireland has endured a turbulent violent history since its inception, with the last 40 years being characterised by ethnic conflict and a fledging peace process. This chapter explores the findings from a series of interviews with individuals who had used violence during the conflict to pursue political goals. The focus is on the processes involved in deciding to join Loyalist or Republican paramilitary groups and employ violence to bring about political change and also on how they view the current peace process in Northern Ireland. The interviewees' accounts echo features identified by other researchers as being antecedent to paramilitary membership, such as having the support of the immediate community, or the involvement of prior family members (see Crawford, 2003; Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003). However, the rational decisions revealed in these accounts demonstrate that the interviewees engaged in rational decision making as opposed to either being mindlessly stimulated into membership in response to an environmental stimulus, or joining an armed group due to some underlying personality characteristic. These results highlight the degree to which individuals bear, and accept, personal responsibility for joining a paramilitary group (as opposed to membership simply being stimulated by uncontrollable dispositional or situational forces).

Keywords: Insurgency, Northern Ireland, Terrorism, Decision Making

Introduction

For many people living in the West, the world has become a more fearful and less safe place since the terrorist attacks of the 11th September, 2001 and the resulting global 'war on terror'. The attacks on the twin towers of the World Tare Center killed over 2,800 with victims coming from 85 different nations, including Britain which lost 67 citizens, while many more of the casualties had close family ties to the United

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Kingdom. Since 2001 Britain and the city of London in particular has been the target of terrorist attacks linked to Islamic extremists, with the deadliest attack on the public transport network in London killing 52 people on the 7th July 2005. In addition, the British media, politicians and public find certain features of Islamic terrorism exceptionally frightening. In particular the Islamic theological concept of 'jihad' provoked fear and unease among the British public and has received a lot of media attention since 2001. These beliefs in jihad and martyrdom are of a particular concern within Britain as they indicate a readiness among Islamic fundamentalist's to use human-bomb attacks as weapons in their terror campaign.

This obsession with 'shahid', suicide bombers and the perception that they are particular to Islamic Fundamentalism is somewhat misplaced, as these tactics are used by other non-Muslim terror groups and were pioneered by the mainly Hindu, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, a.k.a. Tamil Tigers) even the Marxist and Atheist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) have employed suicide attacks. In reality suicide attacks have been used throughout history, even the Old Testament of the Bible recounts the story of how a blind Sampson purposely pushes down the pillars of the Temple causing it to collapse killing over 3000 people and him.

Hudson would argue that martyrdom is and always has been an ideal terrorist tactic and a great benefit to any terrorist organisation, because as the suicide bomber dies during the attack they cannot show remorse or guilt for their actions in the future, thus it reduces guilt and moral anxiety among remaining group members and their supporters [1]. While Speckhard adds that a suicide bombing is (a) inexpensive, (b) highly effective, (c) highly lethal, (d) extremely horrifying, (e) almost impossible to prevent, (f) difficult to trace and (g) if the organisation has a large pool of willing individuals who support this tactic, an almost endless supply of 'smart' weapons [2]. Thus while the suicide attack is a highly effective military strategy, it is not an innovative one.

Terror related bomb attacks on London or other British cities are not a new phenomenon, as republican groups have frequently bombed Britain. Indeed the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) caused two car-bomb explosions in London, the first was in Ealing, the second car-bomb exploded outside the BBC's Television Centre, while a third car-bomb failed to fully explode in Birmingham city centre as recently as 2001. In fact these are only the last in a series of numerous bomb attacks which have taken place in the UK since the Provisional IRA expanded their war in the early 1970's.

Even the use of human-bombs and suicide as weapons in a campaign of political violence are not new to the United Kingdom. In 1989-1990 the IRA used a particularly disturbing strategy called 'proxy bombing' in their armed struggle against Britain. During a proxy bomb attack the IRA would force their way into an innocent individual's home, take the family as hostage, then force the father with threats that they would kill his family into a van which was packed with explosives, strap him into it and force him to drive the vehicle to an army or police installation, once he arrive at the target they would detonate the explosives remotely, thus turning their hostage into a human-bomb. Irish Republicanism has also used suicide and martyrdom as a weapon to bring about political change. The most vivid illustration of this was the second wave of the 'Hunger Strikes' in 1981. During this period IRA prisoners starved themselves to death to demand changes to the status of political prisoners. Therefore the current experiences of terrorism and the fear it generates is not a new phenomenon, indeed the

UK has been dealing with sustained terrorist campaigns since the late 1960's, and the main focus of that violence has been in Northern Ireland.

The State of Northern Ireland was formed when the Anglo-Irish Treaty of the 6th December 1921 partitioned Ireland into two nations. Northern Ireland was formed from the predominantly Protestant six counties of the north, and remained an integral part of the United Kingdom. The majority of the island (the remaining 26 counties), which was predominantly Catholic split from the United Kingdom. Initially this was known as the Irish Free State and became the Republic of Ireland in 1949. Significant violence has occurred in almost every decade since the inception of Northern Ireland. However, the focus of this chapter will be the latest and most sustained period of violence that began in the late 1960s when claims by the Catholic population of Protestant discrimination in jobs, education, housing and local elections led to a civil rights campaign which quickly escalated into violence, resulting in the deployment of British troops to try to restore order in 1969 [3].

Over the last 39 years, this conflict in Northern Ireland has been responsible for over 3,700 deaths and over 40,000 injuries, with civilians bearing the brunt of all deaths (53%) and injuries (68%) [4,5]. The vast majority of deaths have been attributed to paramilitaries (87% of the total; 59% by republicans, 28% by loyalists), and a minority (about 11% of the total) attributed to the security forces [4].

Although the global focus on the conflict in Northern Ireland meant that Northern Ireland became the most researched conflict on the planet [3,6], the recent fears around Islamic extremism have generated a huge demand for information about terrorism and Islamic terrorism in particular. For example over 800 books published in English alone which written about the events of 9/11 before the first anniversary of the attacks [7]. This is a huge growth in an area of study which only had a handful of publications in total in the late 1960's [8]. A particular fascination has been with the psychology of the terrorist and the 'radicalisation' process that transforms normal young men into fanatics determined to kill for political reasons. However, as Horgan acknowledges, this deluge of journals, books and newspaper articles has not necessarily increased our knowledge of these processes to any great degree, as much of the analysis is misinformed, short-sighted and based unreliable data [7]. For example, 80% of terrorism studies relied on the secondary analysis of data from journals, books, or other media for their findings, while only 13% of data are derived from interviews with terrorists. Silke's review of the research on terrorism discovered that only about 20% of all published articles actually provide any new knowledge, while the other 80% simply reiterate and rework old data [9].

The main reason for the failure of the field of terrorism studies to provide good quality data is due to the lack of active researchers working in the area (see [10]) and the reason for the lack of researchers, is glaringly obvious, the activity is dangerous, with numerous physical and psychological hazards. However, Northern Ireland offers a relatively benign environment to research terrorism as it is a relatively open society and more accessible to the researcher than say Iraq, Chechnya, Afghanistan. It is located in an English-speaking part of Europe, and the communities have experience of dealing with researchers [6]. Nonetheless there has been a debate about the relevance of this 'old' terrorism to the 'new' terrorism we are now dealing with, and many have been keen ignore or dismiss analysis based on old terrorism (Horgan, in press). However, Horgan and other terrorism experts (e.g. [11,12]) have pointed out that the failure to explore pre-2001 terrorism means we lose the ability to appreciate the similarities

involved in the process of engagement in terrorism. In reality suicide attacks are predominately driven by nationalism, not Islam. Pape argues that every major suicide-terrorist campaign across the globe, whether it is in the Lebanon or Chechnya, aims to compel democratic states to withdraw military forces from the country [13]. Even a glimpse at complexities of the current conflict in Iraq illustrates that there is a need to understand nationalist-separatist related terrorism as much as terrorism originating among extremist Islamic groups.

This combination of the need to develop terrorism research grounded on quality data duelled with the accessibility of Northern Ireland and our experience of researching aspects of the Troubles prompted our recent research to explore the processes involved in joining a paramilitary group [14,15], the potential for future violence [16] and the impact violence can have on the victims and perpetrators of political violence [17]. This chapter will review research exploring how normal individuals can follow the road to insurgency and the impact this journey has on them and their attitudes towards the effectiveness of political violence in achieving political goals.

The Road to Insurgency

Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland are not the irregular militias who assist the regular military, as in the common definition of the term. The Northern Irish paramilitary groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) that are the focus of this article are armed insurgent groups, who are either viewed as resistance fights or reactionaries by their supporters or terrorists by their opponents.

Research focusing on the reasons why people join armed insurgent groups or commit acts of terrorism has generally explored intra-individual explanations, with terrorists being labelled or diagnosed as mad or sociopathic. They have been traditionally seen as possessing psychological disorders that make them capable of committing murderous atrocities [18,19]. Although this myth of the 'mad' terrorist still exists there is a growing awareness that this reductionist explanation based on individual abnormality is inadequate and probably no more than wishful thinking [14,15,18,20,21,19,22]

A recent review of the research suggests that an understanding of violent insurgency requires a more comprehensive analysis. This analysis needs to incorporate intra-individual factors, wider social factors and the dynamics of the conflict [22].

Despite the methodological shortcomings of terrorism research; studies involving individuals from insurgency groups from across the globe have consistently uncovered an inventory of factors that increase the likelihood of participation in a campaign of violence. Some of our own previous work has also supported the efficacy of these factors, which include:

(a) The existence of a grievance or perceived injustice by a sub-group of the population (see [15] for first hand accounts; [12]). Interestingly, Ferguson, Burgess and Hollywood's (under review) interviews with former Northern Irish paramilitaries have illustrated how some of the paramilitaries interviewed reflected back and remarked that this 'injustice' that they faced may not have been anything

more than myths that were circulating at the beginning of the troubles, myths that people were naïve enough to accept without question [17].

(b) Age and gender; terrorist acts are generally committed by young males aged 15 to 25 [23]. Research consistently demonstrates that Jihadist movements normally recruit and train unmarried males in the lat teens or early twenties [18]. Age and gender seem to be the only biological or genetic factors at play in distinguishing potential recruits to armed groups from those less inclined to join [23]. However, these biological factors are so vague as to be almost useless for anyone engaged in counterinsurgency.

(c) The individual's family may have a past involvement with, or show support to the movement, thus promoting membership within the family through historical connections [15,24]. Speckhard argues that this is one of the key aspects of the process of drawing in recruits from non-conflict zones [2] and Sageman believes that strong bonds to family and friends rather than behavioural disorders were the key motivating factor for young Muslims joining the jihad [25]. Brett and Specht have suggested that apart from actually being in the midst of a active conflict, having family who support an individual's membership is the most consistent factor in joining an armed group [26].

(d) The individual's community support the insurgent group, or membership of the group holds high status within the community [16,27]. Being a terrorist places immense physical, psychological and social burdens of the individual [17], they can be isolated; they face death or imprisonment, etc. Yet there are advantages of getting involved in violent resistance though gaining respect and esteem within your community; while membership may also bring financial or sexual rewards as well as increased status [23,7].

(e) Their eventual membership is the result of an incremental process of increasing acts of insurgence [14]. This process may start with relatively mundane behaviour such as spray painting before progressing to destroying property and finally becoming involved in injuring and killing opponents [21]. Many of the paramilitaries and ex-combatants we interviewed [16] discussed how they would begin on the fringes of the conflict, perhaps running with gangs and getting involved in riots, before being approached by, or approaching armed groups.

(f) The individual is motivated by vengeance and feels a need to hit back and right wrongs [14,15,16,28,23,2]. This is one of the most consistent findings from research dealing why people engage in political violence [23]. The personal histories of armed insurgents are frequently filled with stories about incidents in which they, their acquaintances or communities are victimized by 'them' and decide they need to take action, seek revenge and join an armed group.

(g) To join an armed group involves identifying with the people that group represents, so the prospective member needs to perceive themselves as categorically interchangeable with other ingroup members. This heighten identification allows themselves to become stereotypical ingroup members, taking on the group ideology, culture and values. Social Identity Theory [29,30] offers a detailed a robust theory from which to explore this process of identification and commitment to group goals and recent research from Northern Ireland has indicated that

Protestants or Catholics with high levels of in-group identification, feel, think and act differently from their counterparts with a weaker strength of identity [31,32,33].

(h) Witnessing violence against family, friends or the wider group an individual identifies with, either first hand or even via the television, as was the case for a member of the UVF we interviewed (see [15]) could easily be imagined as victimising. It could also be imagined that exposure to these events may cause trauma and possibly Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Speckhard also argues that these traumatic events can also cause dissociation (a feeling of separation from the body, thoughts, perceptions and/or emotions), which may cause the individual to become fixated on revenge and the defence of the group regardless of risk to ones life or well being [2]. Ferguson et al. [17] also concluded that Northern Irish paramilitaries did demonstrate moral disengagement, detachment and dissociation which are symptoms of perpetration-induced traumatic stress PITS [34,35] or indicative of PTSD[2].

(i) Research has revealed how in addition to the individual strongly identifying with his or her group, identification with role models who support the actions of the armed group is important in sustaining and committing the individual to political violence. Burgess et al. found that for some Northern Irish paramilitaries were moved to engage in political violence due to 'idols' in their community openly supporting armed confrontation [15]. After interviews with members of armed Palestinian groups, such as Hamas, Post et al. reflected how the interviewees had upheld religious figures who espoused violence or revolutionaries such as Ché Guevara as heroes [27].

(j) Finally, clearly to become a member of an armed group there must be an organisation that the individual has the opportunity to join, and that wants his or her membership [23].

Our research supports and adds to this inventory of terrorist induction. Burgess et al. interviewed eight members of the IRA and UVF and discovered that in addition to this list of risk factors, their interviewees had all instigated their violent activism after a *critical incident* [14,15]. For all the participants these critical incidents were attacks on themselves, their family or their wider community. For example a former member of the UVF decided to become involved in terrorism after he heard of a young man with the same name, age and background as him had been killed by one of the twenty-two bombs the IRA exploded on Bloody Friday in 1972. He explains the impact this had on him:

> *And I thought, "That's my fence sitting days over," and I joined the UVF. And there's so many stories like that where you talk to Republicans or Loyalists and you find out there was a moment. There was a moment when they crossed the Rubicon* [15].

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[2] However, it is unclear if their initial experiences of violence were a cause of these symptoms or whether the violence they had perpetrated as paramilitaries resulted in the trauma and symptoms.

This participant's experience is reflected by the actions of a young woman who decided to join an opposing paramilitary group, namely the IRA after witnessing police and security forces violently engaging a group of protestors:

> *...a lot of [peacefully protesting] women and children would have been beaten with batons and it was just messy. You begin to think, "this is not good"...I decided in '69 when the troubles really began and I'd watched a lot of people being hurt and a lot of friends die for standing up for what they believed in. I quickly, not through anger, but through sadness and fear, decided, "Ok, I'll take up this cause and I'll try and change"* [14].

The experience of critical incidents fuelling recruitment into Northern Irish paramilitary groups was also recognized by non-combatants. In one interview a peaceful civil rights activist remarked how violent confrontation provided people with a critical incident that increased IRA membership:

> *It's easy, after Bloody Sunday, for 10 or 20 young fellas to be so angry. They've seen their mates shot and they go down and see about joining the IRA* [14].

These quotes illustrate how the use of military force to tackle problems leads to more violence, creating the destructive spiral that Crenshaw [28, pp. 95] labels a "action-reaction syndrome" that fuels further conflict. It should also be remembered that in these cases the individual was not the target of the aggression, all that was needed was that s/he identified with the person or persons who were subjected to the violence and s/he perceived this assault as an injustice to them and their wider community.

Burgess et al. also demonstrate that it is not simple exposure to these events that results in taking up arms. Indeed, many of the participants who suffered from indirect and direct violent experiences did not join paramilitary groups [14,15]. Instead they became involved in peace work, civil protest or simply did nothing. For the interviewees that took action, either peaceful or violent all reported *periods of reflection* after these critical incidents during which the individual consciously considered how he or she would act to change the status quo, or hit back at those who were threatening their community. This act of reflection is an important consideration as many insurgents project a view that they had no choice, that the socio-political conditions forced them to use violence [28]. The fact that these individuals do make a conscious decision to engage in terrorism is further demonstrated by the fact that not everyone from an oppressed community engages in terrorism. Only a small section of the populace take up arms regardless of the brutally and oppression they collectively face [28,23].

Our data adds to a growing understanding of the complexity involved in attributing the causes for terrorism. As noted there are intra-individual causes based on the decision-making processes that combine with demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, employment status, level of education, family and social history. Another important ingredient that is added to this mix involves the dynamics of the violence, with our interviewees reporting that the use of violence on communities will be reciprocated with violence from some members of that community, while other members will offer support and succour. This indicates that terrorism is a likely result of war or violent oppression. Interestingly our findings and the previous findings exploring why people engage in terrorism are similar to research exploring why adolescents join legitimate and illegal armed groups across the globe. Brett and Specht

interviewed 53 adolescent boys and girls from 9 different conflict situations and junior British soldiers and the key factors involved in their interviewees deciding to join an armed group (ranging from the LTTE to the Mojahedin) map very clearly to the antecedent factors listed previously and also note the importance of *critical moments* in distinguishing those who decide to join an armed group from their peers who do not [26].

The Potential for Further Violence in Northern Ireland

Burgess et al. explored interviewees' views on the likelihood of the peace process succeeding, or Northern Ireland being drawn back into sustained ethno-political violence [16]. The five interviewees were either members or ex-members of the IRA (n=3) or peaceful civil rights demonstrators (n=2). The majority of the interviewee's felt that reactionary violence had brought about the Northern Ireland peace process and positively changed Northern Irish society with regard to the status of the Catholic minority. This belief that violence brings about positive gains for your group with regard to employment, housing, education, political power and status offers a challenge to the peace process and Northern Ireland's transition form a culture of violence to a culture of co-existence.

The participants did not view post-1998 Northern Ireland as a society at peace, they believed that the conflict was smouldering with the potential to reignite under the right, or should we say wrong circumstances. There was an acknowledgement that the Catholic and Protestant communities were more segregated now than in any previous decade and that this virtual apartheid keeps the potential for further conflict alive. Participants also felt that Northern Irish people liked the conflict, as it defined who they were and helped them understand the world, concisely summed up by an ex-paramilitary in that "there is an addiction to conflict here…I mean people need that in order to be safe and secure" [14].

However, many of the participants thought that political apathy and the growing drug culture in Northern Ireland would inhibit the ability of the community to organize, re-arm and defend itself effectively in the future. These opinions reflect how the protection offered by residential segregation may reduce conflict in the short-term, but only keep the conflict simmering in the long-term (see [36,37]). Recent unrest on the streets of Belfast in September 2005 or the recent find of 400lbs of explosives in August 2007 clearly demonstrate how little it takes to reignite the flames of conflict.

Terrorism, Trauma & Violence

As mentioned earlier, our paramilitary interviewees, particularly republican paramilitaries spoke about how having witnessed attacks, assaults, having their home searched and being brutalised by the State and the security forces caused them to join armed organizations. Speckhard has argued that these experience induced trauma and dissociation which made their membership of armed groups more likely. However, once they became members of these armed groups they then engaged in violence and killed, attempted to kill or trained others to kill, engaging in what they previously viewed as immoral acts caused them great feelings of guilt and revulsion at what they

had been forced to become to bring about political change. For example this ex-member of the IRA reflects on the impact joining an armed insurgent group had on him:

> *"I'm someone that's living that lived in the past, that went through it and is able to recount and tell them the horrors of it. And how much it can take lumps out of your head. Because it has taken lumps out of mine, there's no doubt about it. I have the rest of my life to live thinking on things that I've done and maybe hurt people. And I'm very, very, sorry for it. I never wanted to do it. I don't want any young people to go through that again. And I want them to appreciate life, you know, and get on and be happy and love one another no matter what religion they are."*

A number of the paramilitaries discussed their activities with a detachment or demonstrated dehumanisation, talking about 'only shooting at uniforms' or how any members of the other community were suitable targets, while a number of the other participants showed no remorse for members of the other side who were murdered. A republican paramilitary illustrates this detachment:

> *"I was after leaving the scene of an incident, where people were hurt, with a couple of friends. One of them is dead since, shot, uh, as we were going away it was night time and we were in a car and we had the lights out, but we knew where we were because we knew the area very well. And when we got a certain distance away from that incident – thank God, nobody was killed, but they were hurt – the fella that was driving the car switched on the lights, and this was in a country area. And a rabbit ran across the road, and what did the driver do? He braked and swerved to avoid the rabbit. But what did we leave behind us? That tells you a lot."*

It has been suggested that moral disengagement, detachment and dissociation are symptoms of perpetration-induced traumatic stress (PITS) commonly experienced by combat veterans [34,35] or indicative of PTSD. Although we never clinically interviewed the participants, there would seem to be some evidence that in addition to trauma being antecedent to engagement in politically motivated violence it is also a consequence of engaging in armed insurgency. Grossman's study of the taboo subject of humans killing humans sheds light on these findings, his research illustrated that human's have a powerful resistance to killing each other, which the military have spent centuries trying to overcome, so when individuals engage to armed actions and kill at close range, without combat training or being conditioned to kill fellow human beings they have a high propensity to suffer psychological harm, which usually manifests as PTSD symptoms [38].

Conclusion

These findings demonstrate how exposure to violence directed towards a particular individual, his or her family, or the wider community s/he identifies with, has the potential to push him or her into joining a paramilitary group and engaging in violence against the state or another armed or unarmed group. They illustrate that even after the peace has been negotiated and the photo call achieved the social problems or

conflicting identities bound to the conflict do not disappear, while also demonstrating that the conflict may well have caused the perpetrators of political violence to b come a victim of their own violent actions, leaving them psychologically harmed. These problems need to be addressed otherwise the conflict can still smoulder and reignite. Politicians and military leaders would do well to reflect on the lessons learned in Northern Ireland when deciding how to contain or react to terrorism across the globe, regardless of where it emanates from.

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ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEATH AND SOCIAL CONTEXT IN POST-WAR KOSOVA

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Abstract: It is our intention in this paper to discuss two major contentions: One concerns reasons for the precarious mental health of youth in post-war Kosova, and the second concerning what should have been done and should be done as an intervention strategy. We argue that the issues in adolescent mental health in Kosova have become steadily worse over the past twenty years due to a worrisome social, cultural and political context not solved by UN [predicament has been well-intentioned but seriously faulted intervention by the international humanitarian community, which continues to this day.

Keywords: Kosova, post-war, youth, mental health, intervention

"I've been all across this wide world and seen lots of funny men; some will rob you with a six-gun and some with a fountain pen".

Woodie Guthrie

Background

Kosova is a land-locked territory in ex-Yugoslavia lying between Serbia and Montenegro in the North and West, Macedonia to the East and South and Albania to the South and Southwest. For centuries it was populated mostly by Serbs and Albanians as a border territory between the two ethnic groups. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the territory became part of the new Yugoslav entity, where the Serbs

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were the most powerful ethnic group, even though Kosova itself remained populated almost completely by ethnic Albanians [1]. The Kosovar Albanians became the only major non-Slav group in Yugoslavia, and for the most part suffered discrimination, sometimes to the point of persecution. For Kosovar Albanians the Tito (communist dictator of Yugoslavia) period (1945-1980) was a lull in the storm before Milosovic his successor, who proceeded to systematically depopulate Kosova of Albanians, attempting to bring Serbs in their place. As the Yugoslav Republics left the federation, Kosova became the site of uprisings, reprisals, and general shedding of blood. The NATO bombings, then invasion, put an end to this policy and a UN protectorate was set up, secured by a multinational force [2].

Today there is a Parliament under tutelage of the United Nations (that has veto rights) and talks are being held about a separate future for Kosova, although nominally the territory is still part of Serbia-Montenegro. Albanians make up about 95% of the population, although the UN is trying to return the Serbs who left. Besides the Serbians, who live in tight and defended enclaves and to the North near Serbia, there is a smattering of other minorities, mostly Roma and Askali [3].

Most of the mental health personnel before the war were Serbs, as Albanians were not allowed to study in official Kosovar institutions during the later Milosovic period (Statistical Office of Kosovo [4]. The result was that in a war-torn and traumatized area of almost two million people, there were 19 local psychiatrists, less than ten psychologists, and less than a handful of professional social workers. During this period, there were over 700 international NGOs in Kosova, many of whom employed professional mental health workers of widely differing competencies, commitment and sensitivities [5]. These workers conducted most of the trauma work, along with a rather large body of local people who had been given some preliminary training. Furthermore, the average longevity of an international project in Kosova was between one and two years, often with human resources changing in less than six months. There is some evidence [6] that at times damage was done along with some amelioration of the situation. It became obvious that there was a compelling need for development of a sustainable local mental health infrastructure.

It is well-established [7] that political violence and related events influence the populations involved, especially young people. The influence can be direct or indirect [8].

The developments that transpired over the past ten years have had deep and widespread impact on social, political and economic changes in Kosova. Traumatic events of the war include murder, rape and other violations of physical and emotional integrity, such as threats to life and limb and vast destruction of property.

Poverty and unemployment have considerably increased. Personal and family income is very low and most of the time is insufficient for the very basic needs for living. In addition, establishment of new nationalities in the former Yugoslav countries has brought strong social transformations which have influenced both the individual and the society.

Mental Health in Post-War Kosova

Both international [9,10] and local studies [11] indicate that those who witness or are victims of traumatic events may experience a range of negative outcomes, including

symptoms of depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Aside from psychiatric symptoms, adolescents who have been victims or witnesses of violence are also likely to exhibit poor school performance and behavioral disorders which jeopardize their ability to function well later in life [10]. However, we believe that it is a mistake to refer continuously to PTSD as the main indicator of the influence of violence or to exposure to violence in youth; moreover, little information is offered of self-perception and values, which may be important intervening variables.

The relationship between violence and youth mental health is both complex and confusing. We believe that in the short-term, violence is not a major issue on a national scale. Most victims of short-term violence recover, at some times even using their experience as an opportunity for emotional growth. However, in the long term, violence may have insideous effects on society and on youth as one of the most sensitive parts of society. Moreover, violence can both be a cause of disintegration in society and an effect of it [12].

In the clinic we have witnessed increasing concern of parents for the violence they see in their children, wheras the media tells us of an alarming increse increase of serious violence in the schools, including knives and firearms.

The character of violence in Kosova is such that children seem to be dehumanised by the violence around them, and in the words of Chikane, "have been socialised to find violence completely acceptable and human life cheap" [13]. Martin-Baro has also mentioned the significant dehumanization accompanied by continued violence, especially violent oppression [8]. In our opinion, the rising violence in Kosovar youth today is a result of unraveling of the social fabric because of political disempowerment, radical annihilation of former values without building others in their place, and perhaps a fractal incarnation of violence from the regional level, seeping down to the individual level [14].

Although research on the consequences of the war for young people has been far from adequate, some modest surveys have been conducted that may serve as preliminary work on these questions.

Another serious indicator of this situation is the increasing suicide index for adolescents in Kosova (2.93/100.000), which is one third of the total suicides for 2007. From the year 2000 to 2006 there have been 356 registered suicides and, 417 suicide attempts, or 51 suicides and 60 suicide attempts per year. In first four months alone of 2007, 38 suicides and 58 suicide attempts were recorded (Police annual report 2006, unpublished).

According to a survey by Majd Kamalmaz, there has been a 300 per cent increase in the suicide rate in Kosovo's Drenica district over the past three years [15].

Kamalmaz's research revealed that, in the 40 years before the war, there had been only one case of suicide in the Drenica district. The three years since the end of the war, however, have seen over 30 such cases. The suicides in Drenica were all of Albanian nationality and were for the most part males between the ages of 17 and 28. While there were two cases of older suicides -- one a 56-year-old man, the other a 70-year-old woman -- the trend is overwhelmingly affecting the younger generation [15].

The State Children and Adolescent Mental Services have shown an apparent increase in the number of the children who asking for help in these institutions. It is difficult to tell whether this increase is due to increased services or because the problems have drastically increased. However, of one thing we are certain, that the

number of people who with complaints of depression, suicide ideation, and abuse is very disturbing.

To recapitulate, although Kosova should slowly recover from war, it seems that the opposite is occurring. We believe that war trauma is probably interacting with the following factors to cause the high suicide rate and other serious social problems in Post-War Kosova:

1. Kosova now faces a harsh political, economical and social transition, accompanied by drastic changes in beliefs and social values. Individual and collective values seem to be in a serious conflict with each other.

2. The family, as crucial factor in the education of and advancement of society as a whole, is in a deep crisis. Family support of individuals has begun to weaken.

3. The education system is far from meeting minimal standards for the needs of youth. The result has been a sharp increase in aggressive behavior and suicide among the school children. The school system, with no mental health services whatsoever, is helpless to prevent such destructive phenomena. Data registered by

4**.** Ethnic tensions are still very high, but have somewhat changed in focus. Both Serbian and Albanian Kosovars perceive themselves as victims. Since the War, the balance of power has changed, which has been difficult for many Serbians to accept. The United Nations, which administers Kosova through the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), has made demands from the Albanian population to fulfill obligations toward ethnic minorities (mostly Serbs) in order to achieve final national status. The result has been significant confusion of ethnic identity, ethnic relations, and the balance of power.

5. There are over 3500 people still missing in Kosova, whose families still have a glimmer of hope that one day at least remains of their loved ones will be returned to them. The tension and despair were made terribly clear when three Kosovar mothers committed suicide when their children's remains were returned. Programs applied at schools report significant difficulties working with children who continue waiting for eight years for someone from their family to return or for their remains to be returned. Interventions in these programs have endeavored to take a history for what has happened, and help the youth find meaning of their lives in the present.

6. The continued mobilization of emotional resources to cope with past terrors, along with present economic and political hardships and uncertainties, is taking its toll.

International initiatives for reconciliation have met with great frustration, first because the political climate, along with its uncertainties concerning final status, encourages emotional deadlock. Second, the widows of men who were killed in action were culturally unprepared to lead their families and to have some hope for fulfillment in the future. Reconciliation is near impossible unless hope for the future can be restored. Weaving a culturally sanctioned social fabric in the wake of the death of so many heads of families will take some time and the long-term consequences are difficult to predict.

The collectivist values of Kosovar society also can serve as an obstacle to individual initiatives for reconciliation. The first author remembers that in a city right after war, one could be punished for listening to music, or celebrating weddings or other celebrations with music. In this respect, it was premature to speak of empathy forgiveness, especially when no "culprit" has asked for forgiveness.

As mentioned above, Kosovar society is undergoing radical changes of both individual and collective values and beliefs. During and immediately after the war, the extended family functioned as an innate support for the youth and helped them

overcome various difficulties. Now, when the nuclear family is becoming the norm, this support is lacking and, in our opinion, bringing new problems to the forefront, such as a generation gap. The young people more quickly adapt to the new social, economical and political situation adopting new standards to guide their life, but at the same time they are cognizant of their parents who are not prepared to respond to the needs and demands created in the post-war years.

The values that individuals and families have are fundamentally influenced by the values and traditions of the broader society. A larger social order, favoring tolerance of others and a secular legal, political and socio-economic system based on respect for human rights, will serve to entrench such values in the workings of civil society. A social order favoring the rights of some groups in society over that of other groups, will entrench such values into the hearts and minds of our children [14,16]. A survey conducted with high school students revealed such conflicts as well as differences between values of parents and youth.

We also believe that emotional issues are related to the cumbersome political process, at times bordering on the absurd concerning the resolution of the status. International domination of the negotiations has caused people not to feel part of the decision process, not to feel active participants. This effectuates a feeling of worthlessness and futility in many individuals Kosovar society. Certainly, political violence has been studied in many countries that lived through forceful conflicts, but in our case the exclusionary policy of the negotiation process may be instrumental in creating widespread feelings of worthlessness.

This situation has been exacerbated by the dominance of the International Community - both governmental and non-governmental organizations - in the developing society of post-war Kosova. We are not saying that the International involvement is not needed; rather, that the intervention must be done in a culturally sensitive and empowering way. International personnel take times to understand the cultural context and the needs of the local population and by the time they do (if at all) they are replaced.

The result is disempowerment of the local population, including fatalism, resignation, and passivity. The first author has seen parents come to the clinic every day who have adolescent children with significant behavior problems. The parents seem powerless to make even small decisions concerning the upbringing of there children: Often there is no schedule in the household and young adolescents stay out until the early hours of the morning, weekends and school days. Parents are fearful of their children being influenced by internet cafes and losing interest in school but seem powerless to do something about it.

It seems to us that this issue is linked to several problems. Children who come to child and adolescent mental health centers are of course more likely to come from dysfunctional, chaotic families, where children learn to fend for themselves because their parents' lives are too chaotic to protect them [17] this is the population of children with difficult behavior in most empowered countries. However, in areas where the general population is disempowered, impact on youth through both the families and society is intensified. The process is both direct and indirect.

Directly, disempowerment influences the youth by limiting financial support for health, education and social services, severely limited job opportunities. The World Bank has demanded a balanced budget, significantly limiting economic development. Families are often dependent upon relatives working abroad. Indirectly, the atmosphere where both parents and peers are paralyzed by the political situation and do not possess

control over their future, creates despair, lack of, or faulty, planning behavior, fatalism and emphasizing cultural norms of putting one's fate in destiny [8].

Disempowerment is not only a post-war phenomenon. Ever since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the major powers (who created Yugoslavia in the first place) have had a significant stake in the fate of the Balkans in general, and Kosova in particular. When adults are disempowered, they have a tendency to neglect their children [18].

Services and Treatment Modalities

The Kosova experience has taught us as professionals several lessons that may be applicable in other areas under similar circumstances:

First, in a war or post-war situation services should be offered in a multi-level plan. Intervention must be delivered based on essential needs (security, house building, returning to one's own home, feeding) and simultaneously focused on installing intervention capacities of all levels (mobile groups, support groups, the construction of hospitals and nursing-homes, staff training, etc.). As mentioned above, the general disruption in life caused by the war crisis has created a wide range of psychosocial issues and all should be addressed in both primary and secondary prevention modes. We have seen that in a difficult post-war situation it is essential to find ways of resolving the survival problem and in parallel offer specific services based on the collective, more than individual needs. While there is little systematic data to support this policy, from our anecdotal clinical experience, it can be mentioned that the incidence of chronic ailments (psychiatric disorders, diabetes, gastritis, etc.) decreased to a minimum.

In a war-affected society, the development of a sustainable, community-based child and adolescent mental health service that attempts to address the full range of mental health problems may be a more appropriate humanitarian intervention than a psychotrauma service focusing on a single diagnosis.

Second, emergency services offered by NGO or other international organizations, proved unsuccessful. A considerable number of social workers instituted services for traumatized persons which led to a myth that one must be traumatized in order to receive mental health services. The first author has personally dealt with cases during her clinical work - children with enuresis, nightmares, speech problems, intellectually challenged, etc. the cause of which was attributed to the war. The children bearing these disorders were described by their parents as "traumatized". This intervention, as reported by WHO and UNICEF, led to the blossoming of the so-called "PTSD epidemic". On the other hand, many of those receiving services were exposed to trauma but were not unwell. Psychiatric services working in this context may have a significant role in depathologizing normal reactions.

In the first years, there were many children referred to child mental health centers with no formal psychiatric diagnosis. Many families wanted advice about simple psychological problems such as a behavior change, poor sleep, tearfulness or minor physical illness. Or they wished for reassurance that the child, although exposed to stressful events such as a death, had not developed a mental illness. In such instances it is important to give meaning of different reactions to the stress situation and not label the problem traumatization.

Third; many NGOs tried to implement their strategies without taking the historical context into consideration. Many international psychotrauma programs folded when the funding dried up. Banatvala & Zwi [19] have argued that mental health interventions in complex emergencies should be affordable, effective and culturally valid; they should be based at the community level, and not bypass or undermine established health services; and they should be audited and reviewed to improve the standard of care. It is interesting to note that other post-conflict countries experienced similar flawed intervention [20,21].

Fourth**,** empowerment of individual and family capacities has proved to be an excellent indicator for positive mental health of the young population. Intervention programs based on the family have proved more effective than those based on the individual alone. In this respect, Kosovar experts have built up an extensive cooperation with The American Family Therapy Academy, which highlights a resilience-based family approach that draws on the strengths and culture of the Kosovar family.

As a result of these lessons, we would like to propose a modest model of intervention in the wake of violence at the national level, especially a post-war situation, where one side must recover from enduring oppression. The model is based upon three approaches in Mental Health: Action research, community development and liberation psychology. Each approach contributes to the various dimensions of a wounded society that must recover from an extended period of violence and oppression. The action research approach addresses the need to gather data while simultaneously conducting intervention. The community development approach addresses the building, rebuilding and empowering of social and cultural institutions, as well as of mental health institutions and strategies. Liberation Psychology contributes a dimension of establishing a free people whose vocation is humanization. We divide the model into three stages: the emergency stage, the short-term stage and the medium-range stage.

Emergency Stage

This is the stage when the systems are unstable. According to the community model, once the external threat has been removed, the society begins a healing process which occurs with every organism after experiencing trauma. The intervention at this stage requires stabilizing the systems, locating malfunctioning and beginning to repair them. The systems are often all important institutions of society: Security, local governance, economic, health, education and welfare. The malfunctioning parts are individuals with a pathological reaction to the past trauma, candidates for developing PTSD.

It is highly important that the empowerment and liberation process begin early at this stage. Therefore, resources must be invested in developing and utilizing the local leadership in all systems. However, the use of the local leadership must not be *lese faire.* Internationals must be closely involved in the stabilization/empowerment process, which should be monitored and tweaked when needed.

Significant attention must be paid to gathering data. Very often international organizations, with the best of intentions, swoop down upon the hapless victims of the conflict without a clue to what the real needs are and how to meet them within the social context of the victim. Often gathering data is considered a luxury and thus neglected or ignored. However, the emergency situation requires that the data collection be tied closely to the intervention process, opening and maintaining channels

for dialogue and communication. The action research approach is thus recommended, where intervention is conducted and evaluated simultaneously.

Part of the data gathering is the discovery of cultural and class memories that can be used in the liberation process. New leadership may also be discovered and utilized, as well as unnoticed needs.

The emergency stage is characterized by the height of resources pouring into the recently redeemed territory. It is paramount to establish immediately institutions for utilizing these resources, as well as monitoring them and advising the process of decision-making as to utilization of these funds. A delicate balance must be established between flexibility and accountability. It is our experience that in the wild tide of funds some will inevitably be lost or skimmed off and this will continue to be a source of frustration, but this can be minimized by proper coordination and decision making.

To recapitulate, in the emergency stage agencies concentrate their energies to stabilizing the social systems, dealing with malfunctions, establishing preliminary services that will grow with time, and setting up the empowerment and liberation process. All they while, the agencies collect, analyze and share data, feeding the intervention process. Local structures are set up immediately to coordinate the resources and agencies conducting the intervention process, in turn monitored and fine-tuned by the international community.

Short-term

The second stage is usually characterized by preliminary system stabilization, along with intensive development of social and economic services and continuing intervention with malfunctioning individuals. It is important to emphasize here that these malfunctioning people may not be directly connected with trauma or the traumatic situation, but instead may have the trauma as an indirect cause, or may malfunction because of social or personal reasons not related unidimensionally with the traumatic environment. Training locals for future professional and decision-making work becomes critical here, as the resources usually begin to dwindle and the empowerment process must be in full swing in order to utilize resources for future stability. The empowerment process must be intensified and the liberation process including recovery of collective memory, class praxis [8] and *conciazion* [22] must be dominant and create a fertile dialogue with the other recovery processes. Evaluation of the data collected during the emergency stage and early short-term stage must be constantly fed to the intervention process. A quick debriefing and orientation module must be developed for internationals constantly being replaced. Corruption created by unfortunate use of funding and the malfunctioning parts of society must be discovered early and eliminated before it hardens.

Medium-Range

The third stage begins when funds begin to dwindle and most of the international organizations have already left. In an ideal situation interventions will cease when criteria are met, but what normally happens is that an organization enters a post-conflict area, stays a fixed amount of time, and then leaves when the donors become interested in other hot spots. If the local leadership has properly developed during the first two stages, then the leadership should be able to envision and plan for the inevitable desertion of the international community. Usually there is at least six months to plan

for interruption of services. During this time the local leadership must plan for alternative use of the human resources, first trained, then left high and dry. Often the informal training can be converted to formal training by local standards so those trained can find a niche in the local economy.

The local leadership must also evaluate what has been done and how to salvage the remains of international intervention and continue to advance in services. The leadership will plan alternatives and attempt to generate alternative sources that can be developed while the original NGO is still in town. It is vital that the local leadership be clear and assertive as to the needs of the local system and make every effort to have the transition criterion-driven and not only driven by financial resources.

The medium-range stage is a transition stage to normal long-range operation and therefore the local leadership must pay attention to the social needs and build the national institutions to meet them.

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ILLEGAL, TRAFFICKED, ENSLAVED? IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN RUSSIA

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Abstract. In the era of the globalization, undesired human trafficking emerged as the one of global problem although it facilitate to becoming the nations closer each other. In 2006 the Bureau of the International Organization for Migration in the Russian Federation (RF), with the support of the European Commission, began a large-scale comprehensive research on migration and human trafficking in Russia. The research which will be argued was part of the bigger project carried out in three pilot regions: Moscow, Astrakhan region, and the Republic of Karelia. The overall goal of the research – analysis of the causes and risks of human trafficking, especially within the main "at-risk" groups, and developing a set of recommendations for all parties involved for countering the spread of human trafficking.

Keywords. Migration, Russia, human trafficking, risky groups, transnational crimes

1. Background

Research objectives

- Evaluate the scope and spread of human trafficking, the degree of risk for falling prey to human trafficking for various population groups in the pilot regions;
- Identify a wide range of factors, contributing to the vulnerability of various population groups in terms of ending up in a situation involving human trafficking, including spheres of the economy, labor market, education, economic and household situations, family relationships, etc.;
- Identify possible ways to counter the existing risk factors and the needs of society in terms of the development of counter-trafficking measures and combating the development of exploitive infrastructures;

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- Analyzing the awareness and knowledge at-risk and regular people have in terms of understanding the problem of human trafficking, as well as the ability of the government and the population to counteract the spread of human trafficking;
- Development of a set of recommendations for the improvement of the legislative base and policy in the realm of human trafficking, including proposals for the joint work of various structures, including government and NGO structures, in the development of a National action plan, creation of coordinating structures, etc..;
- Suggesting a methodology model for the evaluation and analysis of the human trafficking problem and the subsequent use of this model in other regions of the RF; Evaluation of the capacity of different local structures to conduct research of a general and specific character on the given subject; basic linear and applied research
- Develop suggestions for the continuation of counter-trafficking work within the project framework as a whole, as well as within its separate components.[i]

Main approaches and research concepts

The main concept of the whole project and the research, in particular, is the priority of human rights and a comprehensive approach towards the trafficking problem, based on the "3Ps", including preventative work, aid for victims and effective punishment of criminals.

   The research approach is based on an extensive understanding of the importance of paying attention to the causes and factors, contributing to the spread of the trafficking risk among the general population and the more vulnerable population groups.

   Researchers went off of the fact that it's not just the scale and scope of trafficking that is of critical importance. In order to evaluate the negative consequences of trafficking for society, it is necessary to open up and look at the branched out network of connotations through which this problem manifests itself and influences key spheres of society: quality of the population and human potential (standards of living, health, education, etc.); state of the economy, safety of the people and the government, development of democracy and human rights, the moral environment, etc. The real and potential danger of human trafficking and similar practices lies not only in the scale of these phenomena, but rather in fact that they are built into the basic social, political, and cultural structures and institutions. In essence, this legitimizes many elements of human trafficking, turning them from extreme human rights violations into something quasi-normal, moving the border of social norms into a sphere of direct human rights violations.

   Although the scale of trafficking itself (the relative number of people who were or are subjected to exploitation in connection with human trafficking) which can be found by using sound research methods, is usually not that big, the prevalence of risk factors for many groups of the population is usually quite a bit larger. This is why one of the basic categories of research is the concept of risk, connected with human trafficking.

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[i] The whole research report "Combating trafficking in human beings and slave labour in the Russian Federation" will be published by IOM Moscow Bureau in early 2006. This paper is part of the report representing situation with spread of risks associated with human trafficking and slave labour among labour migrants from CIS as one of the most vulnerable groups.

The risk of trafficking does not only pertain to those in the vulnerable or deviant groups of the population (unemployed, disabled, children without parental supervision, drug addicts, workers in the entertainment industry or in sex service industry, etc.). As a result of the spread of various deep-lying causes and factors of vulnerability (poverty, limited economic opportunities, weakening of family ties and inter-generational exchange of experience), many other groups of the population fall into the risk category (the poor, young people entering the work force, migrants, and many other socially disintegrated groups. The weakness of the law and legal relations, an under-developed civil society, a weak system of social protection, wide prevalence of shady economic practices, and informal labor also serve as factors, which contribute to the spread of risks for human trafficking among the wider population.

In order to effectively counter the spread of exploitation, it is necessary to find out not only what factors make people vulnerable in terms of bringing them into the cycle of trafficking, but also the "gaps" that exist in the modern economic and migration regimes, which create a fertile social field for it. While the method of looking at risk factors and groups at-risk has been widely used, the second category has been studied much less.

Aside from the main research groups, the focus of this research falls upon public relations and socio-economic mechanisms, which create the "field for human exploitation", sucking in large groups of the population, forming, re-creating, and legitimizing the practice of exploitation, of which the most severe is human trafficking and slave labor.

The socio-economic nature of human trafficking and the exploitation connected to this is analyzed in the context of the spread of poverty, segregation of the labor market, unlawful economic practices, unfair competition, "dumping" rates for labor, social isolation and criminalization of the social field, weakening of social responsibility among private businesses and the government. Special attention is paid to the access to resources for effective employment and education, to accurate information. Upon analysis of the causes and results of human trafficking, the limited access to such resources is construed as a risk factor – as a heightened risk for the person involved to get become involved in a cycle of exploitation and coercion. In this case, the risk is the probability of the fact that a person (or a whole social group), as a result of limited access to resources, will be either forced into an exploitive situation, or coerced into agreeing to conditions which are exploitive in order to survive or achieve success. The report gives several quantitative appraisals of such risks; an analysis of specific cases for in-depth research with regard to mechanisms of vulnerability in the face of exploitation are also given; finally, socio-economic relationships contributing to the increase of risks factors and range of at-risk groups are analyzed.

Methodology and data

A wide spectrum of research questions calls for a variety of strategies for data collection: analyses of legislation and normative documents, statistics and analytical materials, sample survey of at-risk groups, in-depth interviewing of victims, expert estimations, etc.

For the purpose of this paper mainly the results of sample survey of labour migrants from CIS countries working in Russia is used. The poll was done in summer 2006 in three pilot regions. Sample size is 1153 migrants. Structured interview technique was used. For sample design we used official labour migration statistics,

involving however some possible biases that needs to be taken into account when interpreting data.

2. Current counter trafficking legislation in the RF

Russia ratified the Palermo Conventions against trafficking and thus, the definition of trafficking from the Conventions also went into national law.

However, with regard to criminal law, the Convention norms do not have a direct effect. On the national level there exists the definition, which is outlined in the Criminal law code of the RF. The definitions of trafficking and exploitation are generally similar to the definitions outlined in the Palermo Conventions.

Article 127.1. Criminal Code of the RF- Human Trafficking

1. Trafficking, or the purchase and sale of a person or his recruitment, transportation, transferring, hiding or receiving, committed with the objective of exploitation – is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years.

2. The same committed:
a) with regard to two or more people,
b) with regard to a minor,
c) by a person using their professional position,
d) with transportation of the victim across RF boundaries and unlawfully holding the victim on foreign lands,
e) with the use of fake documentation whether through confiscating, hiding or destroying the documents proving the victim's identity,
f) with the threat or actual use of force,
g) with the objective of taking the victim's organs or tissue, is punishable by prison sentences from three to ten years.

3. Acts outlined in parts 1 and 2 of this article:
a) which led, due to lack of care, to death, dire health consequences, or other consequences,
b) committed in a way dangerous to the lives and wellbeing of many people,
c) or committed by an organized group, - are punishable by prison sentences from eight to fifteen years.

Notes.
1. A person who has committed the act for the first time. Under part 1 or "a" of part 2, a person who freed the victim of his own accord and who helped uncover the crime, is freed from criminal charges if there is no other contingencies in his actions.
2. Exploitation in this article is defined as the use of prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, as well as slave labor (services) or a dependent state for exploitive purposes.

Article 127.2. The use of slave labor

1. The use of the labor of a person who is held in the position of property, in the case that the person, due to factors out of his control, is unable to say no to doing the work,-
is punishable by a prison sentence of up to five years, -

2. The same act committed:
a) with regard to two or more people;
b) with regard to a minor;
c) by a person using his professional position;
d) with the use of blackmail, threat or use of force;
e) with the use of fake documentation whether through confiscating, hiding or destroying the documents proving the victim's identity, -

> *Is punishable by a prison sentence of three to ten years.*
>
> *3. Acts listed under the first and second parts of this section, which through a lack of care led to death, dire health or other consequences, or acts committed by an organized group,- are punishable by a prison sentence from eight to fifteen years.*

Trafficking of persons or the use of slave labor under the defined international definitions is classified by Russian law as a gross crime.

Many difficulties in law applicability are connected to the haziness of definitions of trafficking, slave labor, exploitation, including sexual exploitation, and a dependent state. Thus, the definitions of the criminal code need further elaborations and commentary.

Further interpretation and breakdown of the definitions outlined in the criminal code (whether as a separate normative act or commentary within the existing law) is necessary. First of all, it is important to determine in the criminal code (or in the accompanying commentary) the more specific forms of trafficking, which are quite common in real life and should go under the category of trafficking or crimes connected to trafficking. For instance, until it is recognized that a dependent state can include exploitation of people, for instance, as beggars, these kinds of crimes, which really pertain to trafficking will not be classified as such. Three years of application of this criminal code article has proved this to be true. With regard to formulating the necessary commentary: the words of the Palermo Conventions could be used as a guideline to characterize the means, through which a person is placed in a position of dependence and exploitation (threat or use of force, kidnapping, lies, etc. – sec. 3 of the Palermo Conventions). Decoding the definition of exploitation, it is also important to note specific forms of control over a person, use of force, and human rights abuse, which can be classified as exploitive (indebtedness, forcing hard or dangerous labor, forcing "dangerous" sexual acts, blackmail, the use of labor without remuneration, etc.). The effective use of the criminal code article is also difficult because of a lack of key definitions in the Russian legislation such as recruitment, blackmail, pornography, indebtedness, dependent state.

A serious gap is the fact that the Russian law lacks a definition for a "victim of trafficking", which can be found in other international documents (Brussels Declaration, European anti-trafficking convention, etc). This omission creates serious problems for law-enforcement practices, connected to the identification of victims.

As a result of the big disparity in economic development and living standards between the different regions of Russia, a comprehensive and integrated outlook on trafficking, including domestic trafficking, is necessary. Even though according to the Criminal Code of the RF the definition of trafficking can be applied to instances of domestic trafficking, there are no special remarks in the law with regard to it, and it is often ignored, because there exists a stereotype that trafficking is an international crime.

When speaking about trafficking, it is also necessary to make clear its difference from illegal migration and smuggling of people across borders, which is, again, clearly defined in international documents, but in practice it often turns out that, for the government, measures against illegal immigrants are more of a priority than finding

and protecting victims of trafficking. [i] This impedes effective identification of trafficking victims in the lines of illegal immigrants. The specifics of Russia's migration situation – when the larger part of migration occurs from CIS countries without visas – takes a toll on the relationship between smuggling and trafficking. Both the transparency of borders within the CIS and absence of visa regime lead to the fact that most trafficking within the CIS occurs by way of lawful border-crossing and with legitimate documentation. In this case, only a very small part of trafficking cases can be stopped at the border with the help of border control.

Generalizing the former statements, the conclusion can be drawn that, on the whole, the definitions of trafficking and exploitation of the Criminal Code of the RF are congruent with the Palermo Convention. On a number of issues, Russia has even adopted the Convention as a minimal standard, while taking a more hard-line stance. However, the main system of classifications, upon which the legal field of counter-trafficking is based, needs more analysis, systematization, additions, and specification, especially as to the means and ways through which trafficking is carried out and specific forms of exploitation. The specification of such forms in the legislation – aside from making it easier to identify trafficking cases and victims – will also serve to counter the stereotype that trafficking mostly happens to women and children for the purposes of sexual exploitation. This is quite important, since trafficking (including of women and children) for the purposes of labor exploitation is often overlooked and not seen as a crime.

The following paragraph makes an attempt to classify the forms exploitation, which can be associated with trafficking and should have more specific definitions in the criminal code:

3. Criminal statistics – "the top of the iceberg"

Out of the 17 registered trafficking crimes in 2004: 2 – in Moscow, 2 – in the Moscow region, 1 – in the Chechen Republic (re-qualified according to article 156 of the Criminal Code of the RF); all criminal charges in the Northwest federal district were put on hold; in Rostov – 1 charge, Saratov region – 2 charges; criminal charges were raised and investigated in Udmutria, Khabarovsk, and Makhachkala.

According to the article 127.2, charges were raised in Omsk, Murmansk, Tula region, Chelyabinsk, Kemerovo, Tomsk, and Primorsky region.

Table bellow presents the statistics of the Ministry of Interior on articles 127.1 and 127.2 - Criminal Code of the RF for 2004-2006.[ii]

Statistics of the Ministry of Interior on articles 127.1 and 127.2

	2004	2005	2006
Article 127.1 Trafficking			
Registered crimes	17	60	106
Criminal charges initiated	14	7	

[i] Unlike smuggling of people and organization of illegal immigration, which are crimes against the government, trafficking is a crime against the individual. In practice, trafficking is much lower on the priority list for the government than illegal immigration and smuggling.
[ii] Data of the Investigating Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RF (presented by A.V. Krasnov and M.V. Klimova)

Criminals identified	39	24	45
Victims	67	21	
Article 127.2 Use of slave labor			
Registered crimes	17	19	19
Criminal charges initiated	14	3	
Criminals identified	39	10	15
Victims	67	5	

In sum, starting from 2004 to present, 14 criminal cases were investigated, 11 of which were sent to court on grounds of article 127.1. Eight sentences were given to a total of twenty-nine traffickers. The victims numbered sixty-seven, including nineteen minors.

Table bellow presents a short list of characteristics of the crimes committed, of the accused and the complainants. According to article 127.1, criminal charges were raised only when sexual exploitation with transportation of the victims to another region of Russia or another country was involved; No cases where the victims were brought into Russia (i.e. from CIS countries) were investigated on the grounds of this article. In addition, no cases where there was exploitation other than sexual were investigated – even though article 127.1 deals with other types. According to the statistics, the victims are young women, mainly under 25 years of age. The perpetrators are of both sexes, citizens of the RF, usually with no prior criminal history.

Essentially, there are very few cases investigated and charged according to article 127.2 and most of them are connected to the use of a vulnerable or dependent person with the goal of exploiting his or her labor. Most of the time, these are homeless and unemployed people, seriously addicted to alcohol or drugs. There is no history of cases in terms of migrant labor exploitation, even though according to expert testimonies and estimates this form of exploitation is quite prevalent in Russia and the Moscow region. Criminal charges connected with the exploitation of the disabled and children for begging purposes are also very rare and usually are brought up in light of other articles of the criminal code (fraudulent activities, anti-social actions) and thus, the victims are never identified as victims of trafficking.

Usually, the cases investigated have victims in several categories in both articles, which is a factor that carries with it a more severe sentence – from 3 to 10 years in prison.

Characteristics of the victims and criminals[i]

Article 127.1. of the RF Criminal Code. Trafficking in human beings.

Characteristics of the criminals (39 in the database of Ministry of Interior)	Characteristics of the victims (58 in the database of Ministry of Interior)
■ men-59%; women -41% ■ 100% RF citizens ■ Prior convictions – 10% (4 people) ■ Age: less than 25 – 15 people; 25-30 – 9 people; 31-40 – 10 people; older than 40 – 5 people. ■ Accompanying crimes – art. 240 (involvement in prostitution), 241 (organizing prostitution activity).	■ All women ■ age: from 13 to 27 ■ 33% - minors
Article 127.2. of the RF Criminal Code. Use of slave labor	

[i] According to the Investigating Committee of the RF Ministry of Interior.

Characteristics of the criminals (13 in the database of Ministry of Interior)	Characteristics of the victims (24 in database of Ministry of Interior)
■ men-12; women -1 ■ 100% RF citizens ■ Prior convictions – 3 (for rape, burglary, inflicting physical harm, etc.). ■ Average age - 35	■ homeless – 10 ■ unemployed - 10 ■ drug addicts - 1 ■ age - > 30

Characteristics of criminals according to article 127.1. People criminally charged according to art. 127.1 are mostly young or middle-aged people – under 40, with no previous criminal history. The crimes committed are of a very commercial nature – at their root lies a criminal type of business. Analytical experts tested a hypothesis to do with whether there is a connection between these crimes and drug trafficking, but with the given information could find no relevant connection. Some experts see a pattern in the fact that people who are involved in human trafficking do not get involved in drug trafficking, explaining this with the fact that human trafficking in a very profitable and much less dangerous business than drug trafficking, so the criminals try not to get themselves caught up in "risky business". Also characteristic, according to the experts, is the fact that the criminals had not engaged in prior criminal activities, be it drug trafficking or violent crimes (which is characteristic for those accused under article 127.2), and thus were never criminally charged. This type of people could be termed "new businessmen" – young people with lots of energy, who decided to take advantage of the legal chaos and the difficult economic situation in order to get rich through the criminal business of human trafficking. In some cases, we can even say that they distance themselves from traditional criminal avenues (fights, killing) when it can have an adverse effect on their business and, on the contrary, they can do whatever it takes, using the most inhuman methods, to maximize their profits [1]. Other experts explain the lack of a criminal background, especially to do with drug trafficking, for criminals accused according to art. 127.1 by the small lack of experience and organization on the part of law enforcement agencies (at this early stage of development for these laws, it was easier to accuse and convict a "newbie")

Characteristics of the criminals according to article 127.2. As opposed to those accused of human trafficking, every third person convicted of slave labor exploitation has been previously charged with a crime (rape, burglary, inflicting physical harm, etc.). Two thirds of the criminals are younger than forty years old.

Characteristics of the victims under article 127.1. All the complainants are young women, 80% under the age of twenty.

Characteristics of the victims under the article 127.2. All the complainants are older than thirty. The majority are homeless and unemployed.

Statistics on "tangent" crimes, 2006

	Number of crimes	Number of people accused
Art. 240. Involving in prostitution	548	262
Art. 241. Organizing prostitution	1376	967
Art. 242. Illegal distribution of pornographic materials	2876	1198
Art.242.1.Production and distribution of pornographic materials with minors	359	40
Art. 322.1. Organizing illegal immigration	1008	664

The former statistics are only the tip of the iceberg and do not give a real picture of the scale of the problem. The reasons for the high latency of these crimes are: 1) the complexity of the crimes, 2) lack of necessary knowledge, proven methods for uncovering and investigating of these crimes, along with a lack of practice, analytical and methodical materials for uncovering and investigating these crimes; 3) Low priority (which is especially important given the limited staff and material resources for investigation); 4) institutional problems (these crimes are mostly investigated by the Department of Internal Affairs, which aside from these crimes also deals with murder and other serious convictions, the priority of which is much higher for the department due to earlier-set methods, reporting structures, better skills at proving "old" crimes, etc.)

Thus, today the goal is to activate the exposure and investigation of these crimes according to the aforementioned articles.

But the task is not to solely raise the number of crimes uncovered, but also to widen the spheres where the articles are actually applied. Today these spheres are still quite limited. As stated previously, article 127.1 was applied only in cases of trafficking of women in Russia for sexual exploitation. It was not applied in cases of people coming from other countries to Russia (i.e. from CIS countries) and it was applied only in a very limited way to trafficking cases inside of Russia. Finally, there were no investigations connected with forms of exploitation that were of a non-sexual nature, even though the article expressly identifies such forms.

Article 127.2 has been mainly applied to cases where the slave labor of homeless and unemployed people was used. No cases to do with exploitation of migrant labor were investigated, despite the fact that this type of exploitation is quite common in Russia (see above). Thus, according to article 127.2 the Murmansk Department of Interior Affairs (City Prosecutor) raised and investigated a case of exploitation of labor of 6 homeless people at a factory. Similarly, in Omsk there were 4 unemployed victims of slave labor exploitation, 3 of which were deemed mentally ill.[i]

And although the Criminal Code of the RF looks at these crimes as especially severe, the court often gives the accused very lenient sentences.

The goal is to create in society and in professional circles, including judicial authorities, intolerance towards these crimes, an attitude that would portray trafficking as a serious crime against humanity.

The law-enforcement experience of other countries and Russia as well, shows that crimes connected with trafficking in most cases are also connected with a number of other crimes. In the case of trafficking they include faking documents, organizing assignation houses, involving people in prostitution, rape, the creation of organized criminal gangs, etc. For crimes connected with slave labor use, these include inflicting serious physical harm, beatings, limitation of freedom of movement, demeaning actions, threats, etc.

In investigations, the classification of these crimes should be done with the whole criminal make-up considered, but with trafficking looked at as the main part. In

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[i] Interview with B.Y. Gavrilov, PhD, assistant director for the Investigating commission of the Ministry of Interior, Justice General.

practice, though, the classification is done according to tangent articles, which are easier to prove, while the main crime is left out. As an example, in Chechnya criminal charges were raised with regard to the sale of 2 minors, but it was subsequently re-classified according to art. 156 of the Criminal Code (Failure to take care of a minor). See also illustrations for case 2 in appendix 3.

Investigative jurisdiction of criminal cases. At this point, almost all cases under article 127.2 are investigated by the Public Prosecutor (as a result of the fact that accompanying crimes in these cases are often severe – including murder). Cases under art. 127.1 are investigated by the Ministry of Interior. The implementation of alternative, multiple investigative jurisdictions (Ministry of Interior, Prosecutor, and Federal Security Service) for cases connected with human trafficking would lead to an expeditious investigation.

Key issues for criminal proceedings in the realm of human trafficking include the following:

- identifying situations where trafficking is involved and exposing the crime (with the help of an optimal combination of a proactive and reactive strategy)

- launching a criminal investigation and classifying the crime

- collecting evidence, investigation

- questions of cooperation of the victims with law-enforcement for purposes of the investigation (either victim-witness status or denial of cooperation) and their behavior

- The verdict and final classification of crimes connected with human trafficking

- Protection of victims and witnesses, cooperation of law-enforcement agencies with NGOs

- Preventive work

Experts in Human rights protection note the importance of implementing into the work of law-enforcement agencies an approach based on the absolute priority status of human rights and primary attention to the interests of victims of human trafficking. This only becomes possible via cooperation and partnership of law-enforcement agencies and the civil society (NGOs) as specific stages in terms of operations management, investigation and other components of the process of investigating crimes connected with trafficking.

Trafficking is a composite, complex crime with a large latency rate and therein lies the special task of developing strategies and methods for telling situations that might involve trafficking and being able to expose the crimes. Exposing and investigating these crimes is often connected with difficulties in terms of establishing relationships with victims who often refuse to aid in the investigation. This requires special knowledge, experience, and skills of staff, criminal investigators, prosecutors, lawyers, and judges. It is also for this reason that it is necessary to develop a system of education, information, and consulting for the staff of various law-enforcement agencies – first of all, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, because it is the staff of this department that are responsible for exposure and investigation of trafficking crimes and they are the ones who are the first to be in contact with the participants in the crime and the crime itself.

Some additional data on victims of human trafficking drawn from IOM CTM Global Database can be seen in the Annex 1.

4.   Description of the sample and the target group: factors of vulnerability

4.1. Gender: According to official statistics labor immigration on CIS space remains primarily a man's strategy: 82% of the immigrants are men. Sample surveys give a slightly lower but also high percentage - 70%. The dominance of men among labour migrants is partly rooted in structure of their employment: 39% of labour migrants (mostly men) work on construction sites. However, there are grounds to suppose that women are not fully represented in research samples as well as the official statistics; and that their real proportion is much higher. This might be a result of certain characteristics of their work (informal, "hidden" in private households, etc.), which make them invisible for both researchers and governmental authorities. This means that special research needed; and migrant women need to be looked at as distinct target group in research pertaining to illegal immigration, human trafficking, and forced labor. That is why we will try to present some gender breakdown of data where relevant.

4.2. Age: 75% of migrants are younger than 40; the average age for immigrants is 32. Young age of the immigrants can be considered itself as a risk factor because it often signals a lack of experience and necessary knowledge, including inability to integrate socially. All these coupled with a strong motivation to make money plays into increasing risk as well.

4.3. Country of origin and place or living. The structure of labor immigration by the countries of origin varies across regions of Russia. However, there is a clear tendency towards an increase in share of immigration from Central Asia. In Moscow sample this share was 40% while in Astrakhan – 60%. Majority of immigrants (70%) come from small towns or villages (in Moscow this proportion is 60%, in Astrakhan – 80%). While in Moscow 20% of the immigrants "don't speak Russian well" and 3% have a "very poor" knowledge of the language, in Astrakhan these figures are 42% and 17%, respectively. That means that the cultural "distance" between immigrants and the local population is growing.

4.4. Education and occupations. Educational level of immigrants is gradually lowering: about 40% of immigrant in Moscow and 55% in Astrakhan don't have any professional education.

Higher Education	13
Unfinished higher education	7
Specialized secondary education	31
Secondary school	34
Unfinished secondary education	12
Primary school or no education	3
Total	100

Immigrants with a low educational level and not having any professional education can only work at low positions and preferably in so called "3D" jobs (dangerous, dirty, difficult). Often such employment is informal; conditions of labour are very bad; and such migrants highly depend on employer or mediator. In addition, they are less adaptable to a new environment and, thus, the risk of getting into a situation involving trafficking is much higher.

We have yet to see how the growth of cultural distance and low education levels will increase the vulnerability of immigrants in terms of trafficking and labor exploitation risks.

About a half of the respondents didn't have stable employment in their home country (they were unemployed or had occasional, one-off or temporary employment).

Immigrant occupations in their home country before moving to the RF, %	Total
1 Worked a permanent job	25
2 Worked a temporary/seasonal job	18
3 Had occasional/one-off employment	16
4 Ran a business or was involved in farming	4
5 Was self-employed	6
6 Attended school or university	6
7 Unemployed	17
8 Homemaker	5
9 Other	3

Before moving to the RF, 40-50% of the immigrants could be considered "very poor", because their earnings were not enough to cover essential needs such as food, minimal clothing, etc.

4.5. Family/dependants. More than half of the respondents have 2 children per immigrant as an average. Another risk factor is the essential need of the immigrants to support their families. It is precisely the despair of being out of money, hungry and without any means of supporting a family that lead immigrants to agree to slave labor conditions. This creates the "consent effect". More than half of migrants are only breadwinners in their families. At the same time about 40% of migrants have 3 or more dependants and only a quarter of the respondents don't have dependants at all.

The majority of immigrants (over 70%) regularly send money to their home country in order to support their families.

To what extent does the money that you send home support your relatives? (%)	Of general migrant population	Of those who send remittances home
Full support (remittances are only family income)	26	34
Supports them for half of their income	33	41
Supports them for a quarter of their income	13	16
Smaller support	6	8
No answer/ Not applicable	22	1

Only less than a quarter of immigrants do not send money; in Moscow this figure is even lower – 10%.

5. The infrastructure of migration: shadow services as grounds for human trafficking

The majority of labor immigrants started coming to Russia after 2000; about half came after 2004 and in subsequent years for the first time. In the years following the first massive wave of labor immigration, immigrants have built a spread-out and developed network of channels for employment that are being used by the next generations of immigrants for the organization of their trips and for settling in Russia. Unlike traditional diasporas, these networks are not institutionalized, informal, often shadow and even close to criminal; they grew out of the vacuum of official immigrant services. However often they work better than existing official structures.

As many prior studies have shown, there exist certain informal channels of labor immigration in the RF. More than 70% of immigrants find employment through relatives or acquaintances – that is classical informal immigrant networks. Relatively new institute of professional mediators providing every kind of services for migrants and employers is also continuously developing and currently serves 10-15% of the whole immigrant flow (from 8% in Moscow to 22% in Astrakhan). 40% of immigrants in Moscow and 60% in Astrakhan know how they can find an unofficial middleman who can help in organizing labor immigration. The majority of such middlemen currently act as shadow service providers – with all of the consequences.

Channels of immigrant employment in the RF	Total
With the help of relatives, friends or acquaintances	74
Offered by a middleman or recruiter	14
Government structures (employment services, immigration centers)	2
Private employment agency, company, employment office, etc.)	2
Tourist agency	-
Media advertising – newspaper, radio, TV, etc.	5
Internet advertising	1
Other	5

Informal connections as well as commercial third-party services form the shadow infrastructure often involved in labor immigration, encompassing up to 90% of the immigrant flow. Government channels for labor immigration form from 1 to 3% of the flow. If we also put in legitimate private structures, we get a sum total of no more than 5%.

Immigrants know full well that going to shady intermediaries is connected with various risks. Only 9% don't see the risks involved or think they are minute. Around 55% think that there is a high risk of being deceived. However, only 13% perceive the risk of falling prey to exploitive labor conditions and recognize this risk as real. In Astrakhan region the proportion of such immigrants turned out to be three times higher than in Moscow (20% and 6% respectively).

About 9% of migrants think that they were deceived during organization of migration and employment in Russia, 14% of migrants report that their real working conditions turned out to be absolutely different compared to what was promised; and about ¼ - partly different.

Did the real job turn out to be what was promised and what you expected? (migrants' answers), %	Total
No answer	6
Yes	45
No	14
More or less	24
Hesitate to answer	11

6. Immigrant labor in Russia: spread of exploitation and risk factors

6.1. Fields of migrants' work and structuring the labour market

The majority of labor immigrants are employed in the RF on a temporary basis. However, more than a quarter of the respondents noted that they work on a full-time, permanent basis, and feel confident on the Russian labor market. This data corresponds to the data on the proportion of immigrants who plan to stay in Russia for an extended period of time, get a residence permit or be naturalized and become a citizen.

Type of immigrant employment in Russia, %	Total
No answer	3
Hired on a permanent basis	27
Hired on a seasonal or temporary basis	53
Occasional employment	7
Self-employed	10

Immigrants who don't have a regular, full-time occupation and work "occasional" jobs are at-risk group. These are usually low-qualified workers who often have to use "black market" services to find occasional employment.

The main sectors of employment of migrant workers, according to the official statistics of the Russian Federal Migration Service, are presented in the table.

Type of immigrant employment in Russia, %	Total
Construction	40
Trade	30
Manufacturing	10
Agriculture	7
Transportation	5
Other	8

The majority of immigrants are employed by privately-owned companies. Only 1/10 of the respondents work for government/municipal structures in the RF.

Our survey confirmed the conclusion that prior research came to: in many regions of Russia the distinct immigrant sectors of the labor market have been allocated, that means sectors which can not develop without attracting migrant labour. Only 8% of immigrants reported that they work mostly among local people. On the other hand,

60% of immigrants said that they work in an immigrant dominated environment and another 28% said they work in a mixed environment.

Who works with you at your enterprise (migrants' answers)? %

	No answer	Mostly immigrants	Immigrants and local workers	Mostly locals	Total
No answer	6	44	31	19	100
Construction	1	77	17	5	100
Trade	7	47	41	5	100
Service	9	36	35	20	100
Manufacturing		31	25	44	100
Agriculture		81	17	2	100
Other	1	51	25	23	100
Total	4	60	28	8	**100**

Only a quarter or the respondents reported that they feel there is competition with local people for their jobs. On the other hand, half of the respondents say that local people do not compete with them for their job place; another 22% hesitate to answer. It is notable, though, that in Moscow, where the immigrant labor market has been developing for a fairly long time and is the most structured and steady, the proportion of those migrants who reported competition with local workers is the lowest (13% compared to 32% in Astrakhan).

Do you feel that there is competition with local workers? (migrants' answers), %

	No answer	No, there is not competition with locals	Yes, there is competition	Hesitate to answer	Total
No answer	9	59	25	6	100
Construction	1	58	23	18	100
Trade	7	37%	30	26	100
Service	5	39	16	40	100
Manufacturing		38	25	37	100
Agriculture		67	27	6	100
Other	2	65	18	15	100
Total	3	50	25	22	**100**

The majority of immigrants (65%) were hired by an RF citizen. However, there are actually less ethnic Russians among employers – only 45%. In terms of other nationalities, the most prevalent are Azerbaijanis – 7% and Armenians – 6%.

6.2. Contracts and remuneration

Only 23% of immigrants work on the basis of a formal written contract with the employer. That means that at least ¾ of labour migration contributes to the informal and shadow economy which produces minimum about 25% of Russian GDP, and reaches up to 60-70% in some sectors of economy [2]. Among most "shadow" sectors are trade, services, agriculture, construction – that are sectors where share of migrant labour is especially high.

Do you have a contract with your employer? %	
No answer	8
Written contract	23
Oral agreement	69
Total	**100**

It goes without saying that work without written contract (besides all this is a violation of Russian Labour Code) is serious factor of risk for migrant workers in terms of both "softer" infringement of their labour rights and more serious abuses up to trafficking in human beings and forced labour.

With the recent change of migration legislation in 2007 towards liberalization and introducing more simple legalization procedures for migrants and especially employers, labor immigration will hopefully enter a new phase. With this phase, we can expect a growth in the proportion of official ("white") employment of immigrants and correspondingly the lowering the shady and informal employment on the labor market. However, the further success of these new provisions, most likely, be dependent upon economic policy (control, taxes, etc.) as migration policy itself is not any longer a serious barrier for legalization of stay and employment.

Usually (in 60% of cases) the contract (whether written or oral) is for one year. About 20% of immigrants have short-term agreements (usually for 3 or 6 months) and about the same amount have longer term agreements.

Those migrants who work without contract usually are paid informally ("in the envelope").

How do you get your salary? %

No answer	2
Officially - according to official records, with signature	19
Unofficially - cash without record ("in an envelope")	73
The employer withholds my salary off of my debt	1
I do not receive a monetary salary	1
Other	4

About 30 % of migrants are not paid on the regular basis. Those who should cause alarm are the ones who said that they are paid "when the employer feels like it" (2%) as well as the ones who said the "employer pays upon completion of work or services" (12%). Pay "after the work is complete" is a typical form of shady employment practices. As the poll showed, less than a third of these immigrants got any sort of an advance from the employer. Thus, without any means to support themselves, these immigrants are at the mercy of the employer. Moreover, only a half of these immigrants are sure that they will be paid upon completion of the work. Practice shows that finally such workers often don't get paid. In this case immigrants (considering the fact that most of them work informally, without a contract) have almost no chance of legally standing behind their right to receive their salary. Since this kind of deception (actually these cases can be classified as forced labour) is fairly common, there are already certain typical models of immigrant behavior in such cases:

- o   Not doing anything – just find other employer or go home.
- o   Going to an NGO for help in getting paid by the employer/ (This solution is common among those immigrants who have strong national (or diasporal) NGO as Center for "Immigration and Justice" and Tajikistan Fund for the Tajik immigrants.).
- o   Going to a trade union for help in getting the salary payable. (This avenue is usually used by immigrants in sectors which have a strong trade union as construction.).
- o   Seeking help from criminal structures, compatriots, friends.

> *The trade union of Russian construction workers has a special branch that deals with the rights of immigrant laborers. However, the trade union only offers protection to its members (irrespective of their legal status) and has access only to those work sites where at least one member of the union works. According to the chairman of the union, Boris Soshenko, more and more immigrant laborers want to join the trade union. In 2006, the organization counted around three thousand illegal immigrants, mostly from Tajikistan. This year, according to union projections, another twenty five thousand people will become members. Soshenko tells of how the union was able to negotiate salary pay-outs of five million rubles as well as a new way of communication between illegal immigrants and law-enforcement. This is the trade union member ticket. According to Soshenko, when the illegal immigrant shows the ticket to the officer, he is usually released* [3].*
>
> *Research shows that immigrants know next to nothing about the existence of trade unions or other organizations which are there to protect their rights. Thus, there are very few immigrants seeking help from these organizations.[i]*

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[i] Labor immigration into Russia in the context of new immigration policy and the growth of terrorism (according to the examples of Saratov, Chelyabinsk, and Rostov-na-Donu), research conducted by IOM/OSCE, 2004-2005.; Informational support of the development of programming for the legalization (immigration amnesty) of labor immigrants in the RF", IOM/ODIHR OSCE joint project 2005-2006

> *"Employers are usually just as afraid of contact with government officials as the immigrants themselves and so cases do not usually go to court when there is any issue with immigrant rights. A well-placed call is usually enough. It is with the help of this "telephone justice" that issues to do with unfair firing, salary payable, etc. are solved" (from an interview with a worker of the trade union, research conducted by ODIHR/OSCE)"* [i]

> *Gavhar Dzhuraeva is the director of the organization "Immigration and Justice/Tajikistan Fund", which helps immigrants from Tajikistan - one of the most vulnerable groups of immigrants on the Russian labor market (but doesn't deny aid to other immigrants). "Going to court is one of the most ineffective ways of helping and protecting the rights of immigrants, whose rights were violated. The reason for this is the fact that most of these immigrants are illegal and have practically no rights (no contract or agreement which would show the person as working for a specific employer), which makes it very difficult to protect their rights, including getting employers to pay salaries, through official law-enforcement avenues. It is difficult to even prove any sort of labor agreement between the immigrant and the employer in court.*
>
> *The main reasons immigrants have for going to the organization "Immigration and justice/Tajikistan Fund" include: employer's failure to pay; unfair discharge; arrest or being placed in an immigrant camp; work-related injuries (mostly at construction sites). We can only speculate that many of the immigrants are or were in situations involving trafficking. Gavhar Dzhuraeva describes their methods of helping immigrants:*
>
> *The immigrant comes to us, for instance, because he hasn't been paid for a long time. He describes the situation. Usually there isn't just one person, but a whole brigade involved. The last call was from 80 construction workers who were working for a Turkish company. Our lawyer made a call to the company and talked to the director of the company, trying to convince him to pay the workers the salaries owed. This is the first step. If he refuses, then we write up a written testimony, signed by the immigrants and send the employer an official notification letter that our organization has received such a "signal" from the workers and will take further action to protect their rights. At the same time, we try to find out the nationality of the director so as to attempt to influence him through his national diasporal community. If all of these actions achieve no results, the next step is to go to the trade union of construction workers. Their lawyer goes to the workplace and uses his own methods to influence the employer. Recently, we have also started working with the network of FMS lawyers, who also help in regulating conflict situations to do with immigrant labor. Employers are afraid of them because the fine for hiring illegal immigrants is quite high (up to 800 thousand Rubles). Only if none of these actions bear any effect upon the employer's actions do we go to court on behalf of the immigrants or support their lawsuit. This is the last resort, the most ineffective method. Usually, the company changes its name and director or just denies the fact that they hired any immigrant laborers – so there is no way of proving there were labor relations.*
>
> *When there is a work-related injury, the situation is different. Usually, the employer pays the minimal amount for treatment and sends the ailing person to his home country. Right now we are working on a case where a construction worker fell into a pit and broke his back; right now he is in the hospital.*
>
> *From this interview we can see once more that the informal avenues of getting the salary payable out of the employer is often the most effective. However, informal relations bring the whole process into a realm completely outside of official justice channels and law-enforcement with all the ensuing consequences. For instance, there is the risk that the employer will take action against the immigrants who complained – in order to retaliate. Considering the prevalence of criminal relations in the spheres of shady business, this could potentially include not just dismissal from the job, but real danger in terms of health and wellbeing.* [ii]

Overtime work without any pay is another typical shady employment practice. Half of the polled immigrants who work overtime (more than 40 hours per week) don't get any pay for overtime hours.

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[i] Interview with Boris Soshenko, chairman of the trade union of construction and industrial workers. Research materials from ODIHR/OSCE "Evaluation of structures aiding victims of trafficking in the RF (on the basis of Moscow and Perm regions)." 2006.
[ii] Interview with Gavhar Kandolovna Dzhuraeva (NGO "Immigration and Justice/Tajikistan Fund", president). Materials from research conducted by ODIHR/OSCE "Evaluation of structures aiding victims of human trafficking in the RF (according to Moscow and Perm regions)." 2006.

How do you get your salary? %	
Yes	27
No	53
Hesitate to answer	20
Total	**100**

20% of immigrants are fed by their employer; 37% are housed; 12% are provided medical services; almost 5% are provided with alcohol and cigarettes. These types of practices contribute to a situation where the immigrant is isolated and completely dependent upon the employer.

On average, immigrants receive a salary of around 11 thousand roubles per month, which is about 420 USD and is equivalent to the average salary across Russia (10.9 thousand roubles according to the data of Rosstat as of September 2006 when a poll was done). The salary of immigrants in Moscow region is 1.6 times higher than the salary of immigrants in Astrakhan region.

Working hours and salary of migrants

Region	Hours worked per week (hours)	Salary per month		Salary per moth that migrant can earn in home country (US $)
		RUB	US $	
Moscow	63	13337	513	111
Astrakhan oblast	57	8238	317	98
Karelia	56	8513	327	104
Total	**60**	**10948**	**421**	**106**

At first glance these earnings can seem like quite a lot. However, we need to consider a few things before jumping to conclusions. First of all, salaries of Russian citizens turn out to be much more stratified according to region than immigrants' salaries: thus, in Moscow, according to Mosgorstat statistics, the average salary for the same period was 27898 rubles per person ($1063), which is twice the immigrant salary. Second, immigrants have to work a lot more than Russians for the salary they get. Their week is about 60 hours and over a third of the immigrants had a 70-hour (or larger) work week. This means they work 10 hours every day, with no weekends.

These results show that the widespread stereotype of "dirt-cheap labor" is not so simple and need to be reconceptualized. Many immigrants get paid money that is quite suitable to them. Their salary in Russia is, on average, 3-5 times higher than in their home country (not taking into consideration the fact that even getting a job at home is difficult). (In any event, 77% of immigrants consider their trip for work purposes profitable.) Moreover, the consent of migrants to work for relatively low pay is their "trump-card" in competition for jobs with local and other immigrant workers.

Considering cheap labour phenomenon from the employer's perspective we need to explain the demand side of the problem. For the employer informal hiring of immigrants is very profitable, because it means not only lower salaries as such (see table bellow), but also saving on taxes (which, in sum, make up more than 50% of the salary including 30% of income tax for those migrants who work less than ½ year in the country, VAT, social tax, etc.), as well as on social expenses.

In some cases, immigrants are denies the liberty to spend their salary as they see fit. Around 10% of immigrants have to give a portion of their salary to an intermediary or the employer or the latter subtracts a portion of the salary automatically.

6.3. Forms of control and labor exploitation

Only half of the respondents think that their conditions of labor are normal, although even these "normal" conditions involve some breach of the legal standards and regulations.

Only 53% of polled migrants reported normal labour conditions. The most common breaches of the law in terms of labor conditions include increasing work hours (about 30%) and labor intensity (24%); poor working conditions (cold, unequipped working place, etc.), criminal danger (racket, etc.).

Only 17% of immigrants have the opportunity to get paid holidays and 15% are able to get sick leave. Majority of the immigrants don't have any assurance of employment continuity: the employer can fire them at any time. From other point of view, an average 20% of respondents are not free to leave their workplace or employer by different reasons (see table bellow). This type of labor cannot be considered free and lawful according to International regulations.

If you can not freely leave the employer what is the reason for it? %	
The employer keeps your passport	9
You can not leave as you have to pay the debt to the intermediary	2
Your labor permit is valid only for this employer	5
They threaten to take revenge on you in case you leave	1
You were said that you will face arrest or deportation in case you leave	5
You have no other job to leave for	19

Confiscation of ID documents is the prevailing form of control over an employee and a method of establishing dependence. On the whole, employers take away the ID of about 10% of immigrants. ID documents removed from CIS migrants in Russia are used by criminal groups for trafficking of women abroad to be put into prostitution.

The following table gives the different forms of the slavery and ways immigrant employees are manipulated.

Forms of slavery and control over migrant workers, %	
Have you ever been forced to:	
work over time without appropriate payment (longer working hours, working without days off est.)	29
hard labor ("drudgery")	24
work in unhealthy conditions (cold, insalubrities)	19
work partly without payment	17
work fully without payment	6
do the work you did not agree to	15
What violations of your dignity and freedom you experienced:	
Can not freely move around the city/town where work in Russia because of irregular state	18
Restrained freedom of movement by employer (control over movements, locked up, est.)	8
Complete isolation	6
Sexual harassment on behalf of your employer, boss, intermediate	3
Physical violence, beating est.	6
Physiological violence: threats, blackmail, fraud	11
They passed you from one employer to another without your concern	4
There was no violence or human rights violations	59

About 60% of migrants did not report any serious form of human rights violations. 15% of polled migrants think that their human rights are violated in rude form, and almost half recognize some softer violations.

7. Awareness of the problem of slavery and human trafficking

Quite a surprising results were got concerning migrants' awareness of the human trafficking and slave labour issues. The vast majority of polled migrants know at least some cases associated with trafficking or of slavery. Only about 20% are not aware of such cases, being it labor or sexual slavery, human trafficking, manipulations with migrant workers, exploitation of women and children.

Migrants' awareness of cases of slavery and trafficking, %

Are you aware of :				
cases of migrant labor slavery	cases when an employer gave up migrant-workers to police not to pay them for their work	cases of human trafficking of migrants and using them as slaves	cases of trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitations	cases of using children for begging and other labor
No answer — 1	39	2	2	3
I know many cases — 25	13	18	20	21
I know some cases — 28	17	26	25	28
I do not know such cases — 25	21	35	33	30
Hesitate to answer — 21	10	19	20	18
Total — 100	100	100	100	100

A half of polled migrants think that many migrants work in slavery like conditions; many of them consider migrants themselves are responsible for their situation because they generally "agree" on proposed bad conditions.

Are you agree that:

	many migrants work in slavery conditions	many migrants become fraud victims	migrants themselves are to blame to agree to slave labor	employers are to blame in migrants' slavery conditions	Russia is to blame in migrants' slavery conditions	countries of origin are to blame in migrants' slavery conditions
Yes	39	52	37	30	23	23
No	61	48	63	70	77	61
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

8. Legalization and labour/human rights violations

According to poll results more that 1/3 of migrants do not have migration card (this document is to be given at the border and necessary for further legalization) and registration (all migrants have to register in migration service).

Stages of migrants' legalization, %

	Do you have:		
	migration card	registration	labor permit
Yes	56	55	28
No	34	37	48
No answer/Hesitate to answer	10	7	24
Total	100	100	100

About 30% of migrants reported that they would prefer informal (without contract) and even illegal (without work permit) employment, not to pay taxes and therefore have higher salary. That means that low sense of justice that is typical for the former soviet states contribute to higher risk for people to be involved into slavery like conditions

Depending on three main criteria of irregularity (absence of migration card, registration and work permit) surveyed migrants were divided into two «polar» groups of "fully regular" and "fully irregular"; and some relevant characteristics of these groups were compared. We found out that migrants belonging to each of groups differ both by the migrants' behavior during the organization of migration and by the characteristics of migrants' labor activity in Russia as well as by spread of risks and abusive practices. Although there are no doubts that irregular situation fuels every kind of abuse and exploitation, the problem is not so simple and clear. Regular migrants are also not secured enough in terms of exploitation and human rights violations; they also experience the lack of safe avenues for migration and sufficient legal and institutional infrastructure for assistance and protection of their rights.

Main forms of labor rights violations, discriminations and violence are wider spread among the irregular migrants: incomplete salary, document confiscation, physical and psychological abuse, isolation, etc. Their working time is longer, and average salary is smaller. We conclude that 6 to 10% of irregular migrants experience situations of severe exploitation that can be identified as slavery like conditions; and 20 to 40% experience softer forms of human and labour rights violations. (Annex 2)

The data of IOM survey shows that many illegal migrants experience hard forms of exploitation and could be victims of THB. Brief research in so called "deportation camp" in Moscow (special place where illegal migrants are kept waiting for the court decision to be deported) confirmed these data.

Illegal, trafficked, deported (interviews with illegal migrants in "deportation camp" in Moscow

- Age: 14-18; 19-25; 25+
- The majority of illegal migrants were caught at Moscow streets because of lack of ID documents, registration and permission to stay or to work in Russia and put to the "camp". Many of them are actually victims of THB. After some time (up to one month) they are deported as illegal migrants.
- Many of them were recruited by members of small organized criminal groups (recruiter-employer, police officer), severely exploited, and then "pass on" to police and put in the camp.
- Some migrants are drag addicted and authorities suspect they were also drag   couriers (actually used/exploited as drag couriers by drag traffickers).

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9. Help yourself…?

Only 13% of polled migrants know any organization that they would address in case of trouble; and 7% have really addressed them.

If you turn out in slavery would you address to: (%)		
	Yes	No
Police	26	74
friends or family members	51	49
embassy or your country in Russia	12	88
NGO	6	94
Do nothing, just suffer	5	95
Try to free and go into hiding	16	84

Data show that only ¼ of migrants trust police. Other state organizations even are not mentioned.

If you have to address for help to defend your rights where would you go first? (%)	
Police	27
friends or family members	63
Employer	12
embassy or your country in Russia	16
NGO	13

Conclusions

Russia is the main country of destination in CIS space. In 2006 according to FMS statistics about 1 million labour migrants work in Russia. In 2007 this amount was increased almost 3 times as a result of new liberalization of migration legislation introduced from January 15 2007. Irregular migration is much higher. According to estimations about 5-7 million labour migrants worked in Russia in 2006-2007. Irregular migrants form one of the main at-risk groups in terms of trafficking and slave labour.

Following characteristic features of labour migration into Russia contribute to higher risks for migrants to be involved in trafficking and slave labour situation. (1) Young age and low educational level of migrants. (2) Very strong push factors influencing migration and migrant's behavior, contributing to stressful nature of migration (lack of employment opportunities, low earnings, relatively big number of dependants and urgent need to support family, etc.). (3) About half of migrants have not professional educational and can only work at low-level positions and so called 3D jobs. (4) The majority of migrants arrived from small towns and rural areas that make their social and cultural adaptation especially difficult. (5) Year by year more migrants report poor knowledge of Russian language: cultural distance is increasing.

While migration of young and active people represents valuable resource for economic development, at the same time it produces some serious challenges to migration management and policy making, especially for institutional structures, informational and other services. Such migrants (young, poorly educated, arrived from small towns and rural arias, etc.), as a rule, are less adaptive, have poor legal knowledge and weak sense of justice (greater readiness to solve problems in informal way out of legal system); they are more vulnerable for different kind of exploitation and violation of their rights, including basic human rights. This features need to be carefully considered in policy design and its implication on practice, including organization of easy access to information, legal consultations, justice and other services including social and cultural assistance.

The responsibility for family's survival explains many motivations and features of behavior of migrants. Being strongly money-motivated and oriented on fast earnings, they prefer to limit contacts to official institutes, rely on more simple and "fast"

informal links with compatriots, accept very bad and insecure labor conditions with weak social guaranties, leading to exploitation and human rights violations down to slavery like conditions.

Use of foreign labor has become already a part of business strategy for many entrepreneurs of different spheres of activity. Migrants have occupied particular sectoral niches in the labor market that are left vacant by local workers. Such niches are currently in the process of development. Advanced shadowy infrastructure is developing to serve the needs of migrants and employers in this niches.

Large amounts of irregular migration present a serious problem for Russia and whole CIS region. The liberalization of migration legislation and practice has greatly reduced the amount of irregular labor migrants but did not solve the problem completely. Further measures of economic policy (tax regulations, insurance and loan programs, etc.) needed to provide avenues for migrants to get out of the shadow economic space. Formerly employers were full responsible for legalization of migrants' employment. Now migrants themselves have got possibility to control their own legal situation. But migrants sometimes also are interested in keeping irregular status, because legalization often leads to new problems for them due to both gaps in economic legislation and poor knowledge of migrants and sense of justice.

Concept of irregular labor migration includes three main components: illegal border crossing; violated residence regulations; illegal work or entrepreneurship. Those migrants who are lacking legal status in all these three stages experience most cruel forms of human rights violation coming close to real slavery and forced labour. Many of those who work illegally feel comfortable with this illegality. That means that illegal space of migrants activity are already quite developed and good "equipped" with all necessary infrastructure, including shadowy services for migrants to support their "comfortable" stay in Russia.

Irregularity is directly connected to the shadow economy. The shadow schemes of employment (lack of contract, "black cash") are much wider spread among irregular migrants than among the regular ones.

For the majority of migrants the migration bears the informal character from the very beginning. They find job in Russia through informal networks and shadowy mediators. The institute of private (individual) mediation in the organization of migration has already been formed and continues to develop in Russia; it is to the greater extent oriented on the potential irregular migrants. It has a shadow character, use sometimes schemes similar to trafficking and promotes the development of shadow migration, i.e. helps migrants to find a job and settle in the recipient country staying in the illegal situation. Migrants use informal shadow private mediators because they can not find more reliable official (state or private) services providing help in the organization of migration. Creating sufficient infrastructure of labor migration (job searching services, renting apartment, legal counseling, etc.) can reduce considerably informal and unsafe channels.

Although there is clear evidence that irregular situation fuels many forms of abuse and exploitation, the problem is not so simple and clear as one can assume. In some cases characteristics, opinions and models of behavior of regular and irregular migrants are similar as well as spread of risks and abusive practices. This means that regular migrants are also not being secure enough in terms of exploitation and human rights violations; they also experience the lack of safe avenues for migration and sufficient legal and institutional infrastructure for assistance and protection of their rights. Therefore only legalization as such would not solve the problem; development of

secure economic mechanisms and migration services can plays a key role in establishing safe migration avenues.

The nature of the irregular migration phenomenon is complicated and to the larger extent may be related to the sphere of state responsibility but is also defined by private economic agents and business relations, strength of the civil society, the level of legal consciousness in the society, and other factors. The complex legislation and policy needed in all these spheres to tackle the irregular migration, human trafficking and labour slavery problems.

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Annex 1

IOM CTM Database (2002-2006)

Russia as a country of destination	Russia as a country of origin
1331 victims of human trafficking were identified in the RF	**170 victims of human trafficking in the RF were identified abroad**
Of them:	Of them:
65% - women, 35% - men	99% - women
95% from Belarus or Ukraine	46% in Turkey; 23% - Bosnia, Herzogovina, Yugoslavia
45% from 18 to 25 years old	70% from 18 to 25 years old
10% - minors	8% - minors
90% considered themselves poor or very poor	56% considered themselves poor or very poor
43% have completed secondary education	8% have secondary education
10% have higher education	12% have higher education имеют высшее образование
50% sexual exploitation	50% sexual exploitation
50% - labor exploitation	50% - labor exploitation

Annex 2

Regular versus Irregular Migrants – Attitudes and Behaviour

A. Before migration	Group 1 Fully Regular	Group 4 Fully Irregular
Come from small towns and villages, %	64	84
Have no professional education, %	49	62
Were unemployed of have just occasional job, %	30	47
Were poor/extremely poor in the country of origin (earnings were just enough/not enough to cover essential needs such as food, minimal clothing, etc.) , %	33/47	32/56
Now are poor and extremely poor, %	23/2	47/4
Average monthly income in home country (USD)	71	102
Used services of private mediator, %	27	9
Do not know official channels to find a job in Russia, %	36	56
Was cheated or misinformed while organizing migration, %	9	13

B. Work in Russia	Group 1 Fully Regular	Group 4 Fully Irregular
Occasional and one-off work, %	3	9
Work in migrant-dominated enterprises/organizations, %	60	73
Does not feel competition with local workers, %	51	60
Has written contract (% of those who have employer), %	51	3
Gets salary without payroll ("cash in envelope"), %	52	90
Working hours per week (hours)	61	64
Remuneration per month (USD)	499	336
Have medical insurance	50	6

C. Human Rights Violations & Abuse	Group 1 Fully Regular	Group 4 Fully Irregular
Employer can fire anyone at any moment	40	76
Cannot leave employer freely	31	22
Passport is kept by employer / and used for keeping migrant from leaving	8 / 8	27 / 19
Has a debt to employer (% of those having an employer)	1.8	1.6
Compulsion to work overtime without appropriate remuneration	24	43
Compulsion to do part of the work without remuneration	13	17
Compulsion to do all the work without remuneration	6	4
Compulsion to work really hard - too intensive	24	29
Compulsion to work in inhuman conditions (cold, dirty, unhealthy) (% of those having an employer)	22	14
Restraints on movement (no possibility to move freely within the city or district)	7	19
Full Isolation	9	9
Physical violence (beating etc.)	6	11
Compulsion to sexual service (% of women)	21	3
Psychological violence, threats, blackmail, deception, etc.	10	23
Were passed from one employer to another without person's concern	4	3
I experienced heavy/some human rights' violations in Russia	19/49	21/37
Know many/some cases of slave labour among migrants	35/20	32/15
Know many/some cases of trafficking in migrants with the purpose of labour exploitation	33/22	35/24
Know many/some cases when employer gave up migrants to police in order not to pay wage	16/10	14/20
Know many/some cases of trafficking in migrant women with the purpose of sexual exploitation	32/21	31/21
Know many/some cases of use of children for beggary	32/25	34/24
Know organizations to address for assistance	15	8
Addressed any organization for assistance	9	6
Would address police in case of getting into slave conditions	38	9
Better not to have legal status but earn more	7	36
Bad attitude of local population	10	5
Last migration to Russia was profitable for you	82	72

IV. Youth in the Web Trap of the Sponsored Violence

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YOUTH, CRIME AND TERRORISM

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Abstract. The phenomenon of youth involvement in crime and terrorism is understudied. Youth commit crimes many facilitating activities for terrorism because juvenile arouse less suspicion and have diminished responsibility if arrested. Youth under 25 are involved in many of the criminal activities that facilitate terrorism including participating in the drug trade, acting as couriers and developing the websites that facilitate youth recruitment to terrorism. The links between youth criminal involvement and terrorism deserves more attention that presently exists. This paper which provides an introduction to this subject focuses on the recruitment of youth and the activities they commit for terrorist organizations.

Keywords. Youth, crime, terrorism, recruitment.

Introduction

There is much written on youth involvement in criminal activity. There is also an increasing literature on the recruitment of youth for terrorist activity, particularly as suicide bombers. There is very little discussion of the involvement of youth in both crime and terrorism. This is part of a larger analytical problem that views terrorism and crime as distinct phenomena that rarely have a relationship. Therefore, the purpose of this analysis is to examine youth and juvenile involvement in both crime and terrorism and where these two phenomena may intersect. The analysis in this paper will include juveniles, teenagers and youths up to 25. This is using the UN definition of youth that defines it as the period from 18 through 24.

The link between youth involvement in crime and terrorism is not confined to one region of the world or to one form of terrorism. Neither is it a new phenomenon. Historians of terrorism such as Walter Laqueur point to such earlier terrorist groups as anarchists and Bolsheviks engaging in both criminal and terrorist acts [1]. Many of the participants in these two movements were youths. Therefore, the phenomenon we are observing today is not new, is not confined to Islamic terrorism or to one geographic region. Rather, it is a historical phenomenon that has existed in the past and more recently youth involvement in both crime and terrorism has been observed in Latin America, North Africa, the Middle East, Western Europe and Asia. North America has

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provided more limited examples as the observed crime-terror connection has generally been observed in those over 25[2].

Prior to 9/11, there was a commonly held belief that suicide bombers and others engaged in terrorist acts were single unemployed men, particularly vulnerable were youth with limited hopes for the future. After the events of September 11th in which there were older perpetrators, much of the literature on terrorism has focused on the fact that many terrorists are older [2]. There is not much current literature that focuses on the involvement of youth in terrorism and also there is limited literature on the intersection of crime and terrorism. In the absence of much analytical work on these subjects, this piece is necessarily an exploratory one that examines where the links are and where more research should be undertaken. Its focus is on the recruitment of youth to crime and terrorism and the forms of their subsequent participation in these two activities.

The vulnerability and malleability of youth make them especially susceptible to exploitation by both criminals and terrorists. The differentiation in most legal systems in the world between juvenile and adult offenders means that there is a readiness to use minors to commit crimes or terrorist acts because they are subject to much shorter sentences and if very young may actually not be subjected to criminal penalties. Furthermore, they are less likely to arouse suspicion because of their youth. As Yoram Schweitzer has noted there is the growing use of 10 to 14 year olds as suicide bombers because others would assume them to be harmless [3].

The youth who are discussed in this paper are not just juveniles but those under 25. The youth involvement in crime and terrorism are primarily male although there are some limited examples of female participation. Youth are involved in terrorism in many different organizations. Research conducted over two decades ago reviewing reports of terrorists in Latin America, Asia, Middle East and Europe found that the average urban terrorist was between 22 and 25 based on analyses of 350 terrorists of different organizations [4]. The involvement of youth in both terrorism and crime remains a persistent problem in many societies. The problem has achieved increasing currency as youth are a target of recruitment by many Islamic terrorist organizations.

1. Recruitment

One of the central problems of a terrorist organization is the recruitment of new members. Members are needed to finance, plan, provide logistical support and execute terrorist activities. Behind every terrorist act are many people who help recruit and prepare the person who will carry out the terrorist act. Facilitation of this act often requires the commission of many criminal activities including transport of weapons or explosives, illegal financing and money laundering, and illegal movement of people.

Often the individuals recruited know they are serving the organization. But on many occasions, the individuals who are recruited may only be connected with the criminal side of the activities and will therefore not be aware that they are working with a terrorist organization. While this situation applies to all members of a terrorist

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[2] For example, Zacarias Moussaoui known to have committed crimes and was convicted for supporting the 9/11 terrorists was over 30. The cigarette smugglers supporting the Hezbollah through their activities were also older.

organization, it is particularly true for the recruitment of juveniles and youth who may often have less political understanding of the environment in which they operate. In contrast, politicized youth in colleges and high schools may be more willing to commit criminal acts if they do this to support a political cause they believe in.

1.1. Who is Recruited into Terrorism?

There is significant diversity in those recruited into terrorism. Studies that have been done show that some who are recruited for terrorist groups are more affluent and educated. As previously mentioned, some who joined the Sendero Luminoso were university students, as the access to higher education is limited in the highly stratified society of Peru [5]. Research conducted among Middle Eastern groups such as the militants of Hezbollah and Palestinian suicide bombers shows that their members are as likely to come from educated and relatively advantaged families as from economically disadvantaged and uneducated [6]. This means that there are many educated individuals involved, not the picture usually painted by the mass media that often feature the extensive role of the less educated. This is true but it is only part of the picture.

Marc Sageman's analysis of 400 terrorists based on court documents found that contrary to the situation of Palestinians recruiting 14 year olds, members of Al Qaeda "join the jihad at the average age of 26. Three-quarters were professionals or semi-professionals. They are engineers, architects, and civil engineers, mostly scientists." [7]. In this respects, there is some resemblance to the previously discussed movements that also recruit from educated elites.

The countries from which the terrorists are recruited often have severe problems of social inequality and little possibility of participation in the process of governance. In these countries, levels of frustration may be as great for those who are more affluent than less. Affluent individuals may perceive their world position as acutely if not more than those with more limited financial resources and educational opportunities.

However, these terrorists are different from many who have been identified in terrorist training camps in Afghanistan who are often young and uneducated men who have come from North Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East. There are also some disaffected youth from Western Europe as well. This is because Islamist terrorist organizations often recruit from troubled population, feeding on the vulnerabilities of the young. But these recruits often mature in the organization after having fought in locales like Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan.

Examples of confused youthful terrorists are available from many diverse situations around the world. For example, Amrozi, the young Jamaat Islamiyah terrorist responsible for the Bali bombings was observed to smile inappropriately after his act. The young American jihadi, Johnny Walker Lindh was a confused young man, and the youths of Pakistani origin involved in the London subway bombings of 2005 came from seemingly integrated families until they were recruited to commit these violent acts. All are examples of how Islamic extremists exploit and brainwash young people [8].

Examining the phenomenon of terrorism not as a distinct phenomenon but one linked to a broader range of political phenomena, one can see a much larger representation of disadvantaged youth than in specific terrorist acts or in terrorist training camps. European security experts report that the typical age of radical

recruitment in Diaspora communities in now 13 or 14 [9]. The vast majority of recruits not just for terrorism but for ethnic conflict and insurgency are young men who are unemployed and have dropped out of school or do not have the financial possibility to attend school. This was true in Peru, is the case in North Africa, Pakistan and in many other countries.

> *Recent studies have shown that a large "youth bulge"—usually defined as a high proportion of 15-to-29 year olds relative to the adult population—is associated with a high risk of outbreak of civil conflict. This youthful demographic is found principally in countries in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, but also in parts of the South American Andes, Central Asia, and the Pacific Islands. In these regions, where average family size tends to be large, boys grow up in youth-packed neighborhoods where parental authority in the home can take a back seat to the power of adolescent males on the streets.* [10]

The current growth in the youth population in the developing world is leaving many young people, including those with access to education, unemployed or underemployed. Economic growth is not keeping pace with the growth of the youth population in the Middle East, Africa and throughout parts of Asia. With limits on international migration, [11] the youth that are left behind are frustrated and often angry at the absence of opportunity. Furthermore, they are often "resentful of those who enjoy the opportunities they lack… While not the overt cause of armed conflict, these demographic factors can facilitate recruitment into insurgent organizations and extremist networks or into militias and political gangs— now among the major employers of young men and the main avenues of political mobility in weaker countries." [10].

Unfortunately, this susceptibility of youth is not unique to just weaker countries. In immigrant communities in many of the affluent countries of Western Europe, youth of minority groups can be subject to discrimination, often live in residentially isolated communities, receive inferior educations, and have high rates of unemployment. Therefore, the previously described sense of frustration is not unique to the youth in poor countries with high rates of population growth and lack of employment. That sense of frustration is also experienced in Moslem communities in Great Britain, Spain and France where recent immigrants and especially the children of immigrants do not see much of a future for themselves. They are susceptible to recruitment by both terrorist and criminal groups. While the youthful British bombers apprehended in 2005 appeared to come from families that were integrated into British society, there was a sense of frustration among these children of immigrants. This is consistent with broader research in Europe that shows the propensity for involvement in terrorist and criminal organizations by second generation immigrants.

A multi- year research study analyzed the recruitment of Muslim youth in European suburbs into jihad groups. It concluded that apart from the previously identified frustrations, social and personal grievances were also important motivating factors for recruitment. For discontented Muslim youths, terrorist groups;

> *Offer the social gains of friendship and companionship, a newfound cultural identity, spirituality, and a consistent ideology that clearly defines the 'evil forces' of world politics. For the individual, the newfound identity resolves the problem of a division between the modern West, and the traditional Islamic culture. The activist suddenly has a new independent platform, allowing him to be in opposition against both Western modernity and Islamic traditionalism* [12].

In some societies, youth are recruited into crime and terrorism because of the financial compensation. The financial rewards can include profiting for participation in a drug trafficking organization, or financial rewards provided by some Islamic terrorist groups to the family members whose children have become suicide bombers. In some cases the criminals are hanger on to the terrorist cell [13].

For others, recruitment is facilitated by the glamour of association with the criminal and terrorist world. There is the sense of breaking social norms and living outside the confines of society. Furthermore, there is the glamour of living dangerously and the adrenalin flow that is associated with living precariously. For the criminal actors that are involved in terrorist groups, there is also the attraction of being attached to a larger or more ideological cause as opposed to profit.

1.2. When and How the Recruitment Takes Place

Youth recruitment to a terrorist or supporting criminal organization that supports the terrorist group often takes place during a transitional period of a young person's life when they are most vulnerable. The kinds of transitions that make individuals susceptible can be those such as death, loss of employment, depression, familial divorce or a dramatic change in financial status [14]. Unemployment motivated a number of Gulf States detainees, particularly young unskilled and semi-skilled laborers to join the jihad. For them, going on jihad was alternative employment [15]. It is at these times of vulnerability that individuals can be won over through the support of the crime and terrorist network that substitutes for the family, work or other support structures that help individuals survive in different environments. Recruitment is facilitated by proximity to other criminals and terrorists. As the great criminologist explained in his theory of differential association, involvement is determined by the intensity and duration of association[3]. Therefore, individuals who reside in a crime ridden neighborhood or are sent to prison may be recruited in either of these environments.

Youth are particularly vulnerable in prison where they are cut off from their families and their support networks. For youth who have not had previous exposure to prisons or jails, the experience can be both overwhelming and disorienting. Youth in this environment are especially susceptible to recruiters who try to exploit their vulnerability and win them over to their ideological views or to get them to support their criminal activities. Because many terrorists travel on false documents and are incarcerated in prisons for petty crimes, their true identity as terrorists is known neither to the prison authorities nor to the youth that they seek to recruit. Therefore, it is possible for them to recruit either for the criminal activities that support their terrorism or even for the terrorist organization itself. This phenomenon has been observed in many countries in Western Europe.

Those with street smart skills and physical fitness but low levels of education are targeted for recruitment at a young age into the criminal side of the terrorist world. "He might be a friend or acquaintance of the cell leader or one of the other cell members, and they may propose to straighten him out and get him back on the right path by joining the jihad. Some misfits have violent tendencies and some have been convicted for acts of violence in the past. Physically fit, inclined to show violent tendencies, and

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[3] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential_association, accessed March 19, 2008.

used to the adrenalin rush often associated with crime, the misfit is suitable for being entrusted with important tasks at the preparatory and operational level, such as being in charge of acquiring weapons and bomb making materials [16]." Examples of this include the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, or the criminals recruited by Jamal Ahmidan in the Spanish prisons.

The recruitment of youth can occur in many different locales besides the prison. In several British cases recruitment has been associated with mosques. Research among young men confined in Guantanamo revealed that "many of the young men had been motivated by Imams and recruiters in their local mosques to leave their countries of origin for Afghanistan, Chechnya, or Palestine. Visual displays of persecuted Muslims were well-used by the recruiters, and recruits were routinely exposed to films that featured suffering women and children in refugee camps in Chechnya, Palestine or Afghanistan [17]." Radio advertisements were also found to be a powerful tool for recruitment [18]. Recruitment can occur in colleges and universities as was seen twenty years ago in Peru for the Sendero Luminoso and more recently in Turkey. Given the rise in globalization and the technology boom, youth today are recruited by websites and chat rooms on the internet [19]. It is unsurprising that strong affiliations can be established with youth who spend so many hours of their available time on the internet. Youth of all social backgrounds are particularly vulnerable to recruitment if they do not have strong identities or feel the need from reinforcement from group engagement.

2.   The Activities of Youth in Crime and Terrorism

Youth are most visible when they act as suicide bombers. Even though this attracts the most attention, it is the rarest form of youth participation in crime and terrorism. Their most frequent involvement of youth is in the criminal acts that help facilitate and support terrorism. Youth can facilitate both crime and terrorism by acting as couriers of money and false documents as well as moving arms and drugs without arousing the suspicions of law enforcement or intelligence bodies. They can acts as facilitators of internet communications. Youths can also commit fraud to penetrate a terrorists act such as was the case of the London subway bombers in 2005 [20]. Therefore, juveniles and youths can participate in crime and terrorism in a diversity of ways. They are often given tasks that are especially dangerous because they will receive a much lesser penalty than an older member of the organization. Furthermore, through their involvement in these essential tasks, they are reducing the likelihood of arrest of the more seasoned and useful operatives of the terrorist organization.

The roles of youths and juveniles are often distinct in different regions of the world. Juveniles in Africa can be recruited as child soldiers. Often they are kidnapped or sold into this role and are armed to participate in violent conflicts. In North Africa, significant recruitment in poor neighborhoods is conducted to attract youth who will act as drug couriers that help fund the terrorist organizations, help move the supplies for terrorists or provide other logistical support for the terrorist organization. In the case of the Sendero Luminoso, youths were also on the frontline of visible operations as well as engaging in the support activity. In contrast, in Europe youths are much more likely to participate in the support activities that enable the terrorists to operate. This is particularly the case in sub-Saharan Africa. They can be couriers of drugs and false

documents needed by terrorists to hide their identities and facilitate their movements. As previously mentioned, the criminal liability of juveniles is significantly reduced.

Terrorist activity is facilitated often by a wide range of petty acts because the funds needed for the perpetration of terrorism are often limited. In different environments in western Europe and North Africa, child pickpockets are not only working for criminal gangs but are doing these small scale crimes to support terrorist organizations.

One of the key needs of a terrorist organization is communications whether it be by computers, cell or satellite phones. Al Qaeda and to a lesser extent other Islamic terrorist groups have shown an ability to recruit engineers and those with high levels of technical education. Such individuals are useful not only because they have the capacity to assemble bombs but because they can facilitate the communications of the terrorists. Their knowledge of encryption, their ability to facilitate communications from prison and to establish appealing websites to recruit new members is tasks often assumed by the young.

Conclusion

The recruitment of youth into terrorism is a phenomenon mentioned by many analysts of terrorism but the role of youth in the crimes that facilitate terrorism or in the terrorist organizations has not been the subject of sufficient analysis. The vulnerability of youth in many different situations has been an important facilitator of this phenomenon. This recruitment can occur in conflict and post-conflict environments, refugee camps, Diaspora communities where children of immigrants are poorly integrated, in poor neighborhoods and in prisons. Youth can also be recruited from affluent and educated communities where levels of frustration at the existing political or economic situation are high.

Youth are particularly susceptible to involvement because they, especially in vulnerable situations, will agree to commit the acts necessary to facilitate terrorism because they will find the sense of group belonging satisfies many of their psychological needs. Once in a group, they will not challenge requests to act as couriers, smugglers or drugs or arms. Their loyalty to the demands of the group combined with the diminished responsibility under the law make juveniles particularly desirable targets of terrorist organizations.

In addition, youths bring technical skills that may not be available to more senior members of a terrorist organization. Due to recruitment and communications of a terrorist organization are so heavily dependent on modern information technology, the importance of youthful members who have the technical skills to mount and maintain websites, communicate through chat rooms and other inherent facilitated communications are particularly important.

The phenomenon of youth involvement in terrorism and its supporting criminal activities is not a temporary or transitional phenomenon. It has been the case since the mid-19th century and is not likely to change in the future. Despite this fact, there is little attention in the larger terrorism discussion of the particular characteristics of youth involvement in terrorism or the diverse criminal acts that facilitate it. Therefore, it is essential that much more attention be paid to this aspect of the phenomenon in the future as it deserves more analysis. Because youth are the future lifeblood of terrorism, efforts to minimize the impact of its youth facilitators will have long term benefits.

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ISLAMIST TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO EUROPE: THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE CHALLENGE

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Abstract: While in the last decade the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe was very small, post-9/11, small violent Islamist cells caused and aim at mass casualties. While autonomous and self-generating, they pursue transnational agenda, blurring the distinction between internal and external security, and are viewed by European states and agencies as the most serious terrorist threat, in terms of its destabilizing political effects. Terrorism, however, is hardly the main manifestation of Muslim radicalization in Europe—a process that takes many forms and may be more likely to transform to peaceful protest and forms of violence other than terrorism, ranging from delinquency, vandalism and hate crimes in "failed suburbs" to public disorders and riots. Any links between religious awakening and socio-political radicalization of Muslim youth in Europe and the rise of Islamist terrorism should be treated with caution and are mostly indirect and non-binding: while the main age category for Islamist terrorism suspects is young adults, Muslims are generally younger in Europe than the rest of the population; younger people are deeper affected by moral outrage at the "injustices" against Muslims at levels from local to global and more likely to seek glory through direct violent action.

Keywords. Youth, Islamist terrorism, Europe security, radicalization,

1. Introduction

In terms of the impact on global security, some landmark international events since 11 September 2001 seem to point the global actors in two different directions.

The first direction, or trend, is catalyzed by the US post-9/11 'war on terrorism' that has conflated anti-terrorism with the need to 'win the war' on terrorism. It may employ different instruments, but still heavily, or even primarily, relies on the use of overwhelming military force.

The second trend is highlighted by the dramatic situation in a number of conflict and post-conflict areas (such as Afghanistan and Iraq) aggravated by some adverse consequences of the 'war on terrorism' itself, such as the military involvement in those

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areas under the banner of anti-terrorism or a combination of anti-terrorism and WMD non-proliferation. The second trend emphasizes the ever-growing need to 'win the peace' and a greater demand for actors capable of building sustainable and lasting peace while integrating security concerns. The demand is so great that a state's international security status is likely to be measured not just by its ability to 'win the war', its traditional military and security potential, but increasingly by its ability to 'win the peace' through non-military means.

As applied to anti-terrorism, the 'winning-the-war' approach championed by the US is based on the view of Islamist terrorism as not only the main terrorist challenge, but also a primarily *external*, exogenous threat to US homeland. This threat has also been seen as either primarily military nature or, more recently, as the one that at least has a clear military dimension. In contrast, for Europe, there's a significant *internal dimension* to terrorist challenge, which may be no less if not more important than its external dimension. That also partly explains the prevailing European perception of this threat as largely non-military in nature and the primary reliance on non-military tools to counter it.

How do these different trends play up for Europe through its part in the global anti-terrorism campaign? Whether and how do they reflect the nature of main terrorist threats to Europe and prevailing anti-terrorism approaches in Europe? To answer these questions, we need to start with three basic questions: (*a*) what is Europe? (*b*) what is terrorism? and (*c*) how serious is the terrorist threat in general and Islamist terrorism in particular to Europe at present and in both foreseeable and more distant future?

What is Europe?

Europe is a rather loose concept. Do we mean EU Europe, plus such non-EU states of 'Western/Central Europe' as Norway and Switzerland? Or do we imply a much broader 'Council of Europe' Europe? (including Russia, Ukraine and several non-European post-Soviet states)? While there's a temptation to view the region in the broadest possible terms, for the purposes of this paper, the notion of Europe in the EU/EU-plus format should be employed. This notion excludes the so-called 'new Eastern Europe', particularly Russia where not just the dynamics of terrorism/antiterrorism, but the very nature of the state and society is specific enough to justify a separate analysis. For the same reason, it also excludes such an EU candidate country as Turkey. It should be noted that some terrorism data collection and research methodologies are even more conservative in their definitions of geo-political regions: the US-based MIPT database, for instance, still keeps the regional divisions between Western and Eastern Europe (dating back to the Cold War times) for the purpose of data collection on terrorism [1]. Likewise, the only dataset available on internal, or domestic, terrorism in Europe since 1950 focuses on 18 Western European countries exclusively [2].

As the main responsibility for anti-terrorism—in Europe and elsewhere—still rests primarily at the national level, it is also important to address 'Europe' both as individual states and—to the extent it is applicable—as a common entity, with attention paid to the EU dimension.

What is terrorism?

There is still no internationally agreed definition of terrorism, although some progress has been made on this at the UN. While definitional issues can hardly be addressed in

detail in this paper, [3] it focuses on at least three key characteristics a combination of which helps distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence and security threats.

First, what distinguishes terrorism from plain, economically-motivated crime is its political motivation. An act of terrorism is always more than just profit-oriented crime, and what turns it into something more than crime is its *political goal* (that may also be formulated in ideological or religious categories and may range from a specific to a very abstract one). Terrorism is a tactics to achieve a political goal, which is an end in itself and not just a secondary instrument or a 'cover' for advancement of other interests, for instance, for illegal economic gains in the case of organized crime groups.

Second, the main victims and targets of terrorism are *civilians and non-combatants*—either by design (on purpose), or by its indiscriminate nature. This criterion distinguishes terrorism from classic guerrilla tactics that implies the use of force by the rebels mainly against regular government security forces, even as both these different tactics may be used by the same group.

The third characteristic is the *asymmetric nature* of terrorism as 'the weapon of the weak vs. the strong'. It best explains the specifics of this mode of operation. Terrorists are too weak to challenge their main opponent—the state—conventionally and choose an asymmetrical response—attacking 'soft targets', mainly unprotected civilians and civil infrastructure, in order to exert pressure on a qualitatively stronger opponent. Asymmetry here implies not merely a gap in capabilities, but also a status asymmetry of the main protagonists (an asymmetrical confrontation between a sub-national or transnational non-state actor and the state, or a groups of states). Asymmetrical nature distinguishes terrorism from other forms of politically motivated violence against civilians, such as repressive actions by the state itself or 'symmetric' inter-communal and sectarian violence [1].

To sum-up, *terrorism is the use or threat to use force by non-state actors against civilians or non-combatants to achieve political goals in asymmetrical confrontation against the state or international system.*

2. How big is the threat?

Europe did not wake up to terrorism as a security challenge on 11 September 2001. Some European countries have faced more traditional types of terrorism for a long time—more recently, for decades and, historically, since terrorism emerged as a systematic and conceptualized tactics of political violence in the second half of the 19th century. Ethno-separatist terrorist in Spain and the UK or left-wing terrorists in Germany, Italy and elsewhere in Europe provided examples of some of the world's most dangerous terrorist groups. But the events of 9/11 and subsequent attacks, both worldwide and in Europe, by a new kind of Islamist terrorist cells with a transnational agenda highlighted the emergence of a new type of terrorism. It is to be distinguished from the use of terrorist means, often in the context of ongoing broader armed conflicts, by locally-based armed non-state groups and movements combining radical nationalism with Islamism. This type of terrorism is associated with the post-al-Qaeda networks of semi- or fully autonomous cells in different parts of the world that may not even be operationally linked, but pursue similar or common quasi-religious politicized goals and agenda with a global outreach, not confined to any single local/regional context.

As certain skepticism has been voiced regarding the scale or the imminence of terrorist threats, especially as long-term security challenges, both for Europe and more generally, the issue needs to be further explored.

Terrorism as a threat to international security

To assess the relative weight and gravity of terrorism as a threat to international security in general, it needs to be placed in context of other modern forms, dynamics, and trends in violence and armed conflicts. In conflict and peace studies, there's been much discussion recently, based on analysis of some newly available and more complete data, about the gradual, but quite significant decrease both in the number of wars and conflicts and in battle-related deaths over the last 15 years. Still, data points to some worrying trends too some of which are one way or another related to terrorism.

While the number of armed conflicts, particularly of classic major state-based ones, and of battle-related deaths is declining, there's no comparable, major decrease in violence not initiated by the state (non-state violence). The good new is that non-state violence is generally less lethal than major wars; the bad news is that it is increasingly and primarily directed against civilians. Non-state violence, whether ultimately directed against the state or against other non-state actors, becomes increasingly intertwined and integrated with one-sided violence against civilians. Of all forms of violence, terrorism most tightly integrates one-sided violence against civilians that are its immediate targets with anti-state violence against its ultimate and stronger opponent—the state or the state-based international system.

In the age of information and mass communications, of critical importance is not just the real level and scale of conflict potential, but its destabilizing effect for state, public and international security and the extent to which it is perceived as destabilizing. While the number of armed conflicts may have decreased after the end of the Cold War, it does not yet mean that their destabilizing potential has also decreased. It is not the mere number of conflicts and battle-related deaths that matters. As evidently demonstrated by effects and consequences of high-profile terrorist attacks, today it no longer takes several millions of battle-related deaths to seriously affect or destabilize international security and significantly alter security agenda. While the number of civilian deaths caused by 9/11 attacks (about 3000) was hardly comparable to the huge battle-related or civilian death-toll from major post WWII wars such as those in Korea or Vietnam, its impact and repercussions for the global security are comparable with those events. This is what asymmetry is all about. Violence takes and will continue to take increasingly asymmetrical forms and terrorism perhaps is the most asymmetrical of all forms of violence.

Thus, of critical importance is not just and not so much the real scale of armed violence in the form of terrorism, its direct human costs, but its destabilizing effect on national, international and human/public security that is usually not commensurate with and goes far beyond its actual damage. What matters is its ability to seriously affect politics or, as in the case of 9/11, even significantly alter global security agenda. This is why sheer numbers and quantitative indicators hardly suffice for terrorism: some terrorist acts may reach their purpose and have the intended destabilizing effect even if they do not result in direct fatalities, while very few, comparatively rare high-profile, mass-casualty attacks can have an enormous impact.

Still, of all forms of armed political violence, terrorism is clearly on the rise *even in terms of sheer numbers*, most dramatically—since the 9/11 attacks that did not mark

a peak of global terrorist activity. In 2006, the number of terrorist incidents was the largest ever recorded (over 6600), a 30% increase from the previous year and a 3.7 times increase from the total for 2001. The 2006 terrorism death toll has exceeded 12000 (a *46%* increase from the previous year) and exceeds the 2001 fatalities total by *2,6 times* [1] Even as indicators of global terrorist activity in 2007 declined from the peak of 2006, they were still considerably higher than annual total for the rest of the previous decade. If one of the main goals of the global anti-terrorism campaign were to curb or diminish terrorist threat worldwide, five years on, the situation has gravely deteriorated. Overall, since 9/11 terrorist activity worldwide has increased three-fold. The sharpest rise has been observed in large-scale attacks (eight-fold since the early 1980s).

Terrorism as a threat to Europe compared to other regions

How serious are terrorist threats to Europe, compared to other parts of the world? Both over the last 50 years and over the last decade, Europe had relatively high levels of terrorist activity on its soil. According to MIPT data, since the late 1960s (1968-2007), Western Europe ranked only sixth in terms of fatality rates of international terrorist attacks. However, in terms of international incident rates (2746) in the same period, Western Europe was second only to the world's top region—the Middle East.

The level of internal, or domestic, terrorism in Europe throughout the second half of the 20th century—early 21st century has also been relatively high. Out of 18 Western European countries the only two unaffected by internal terrorism over the 1950-2004 period were Finland and Iceland. Based on both terrorist incident and death count, the UK remained the most severely affected country, followed by France, Spain, Italy, Germany and Greece [4].[i]

In the last decade—1998–2007—Western Europe has shown the second lowest domestic and international terrorism fatality rate in the world, but a very high incident rate: with 3087 domestic and international attacks, it was second only to the Middle East and South Asia. Furthermore, for three years in a row prior to 9/11 (1999–2001), Western Europe had the highest numbers of terrorist attacks and, for the three following years (2003-2005) made it to the world's top three regions on this count [1]. For broader, 'geographical' Europe, the indicators of terrorist activity have of course been much higher. The data given above does not, for instance, include data on 'Eastern Europe' dominated by terrorism of the Chechen/Russian origin. Eastern Europe had the highest number of terrorist attacks in the world in 1998 and the highest number of fatalities in 1999. On the latter count, it also made it to the world's top three regions from 2002 to 2004 (from Dubrovka to Beslan).

Terrorism indicators and dynamics for Europe come in contrast to the data on terrorism in the US homeland. With the striking and very untypical exception of 9/11 in 2001—which immediately brought the US to the first place in terms of terrorism-related deaths for that year—for the rest of the last decade, both prior and following

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[i] In total, 9730 'domestic' terrorist incidents and 2956 terrorism-related deaths caused by internal terrorism have been recorded for Western Europe for the period since 1950 until 2005 in the TWEED dataset (see note 2 and Engene, J.O., 'Five decades of terrorism in Europe: the TWEED dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 115-116). TWEED defines 'internal terrorism' as the one that originates and takes place within the political systems of Western European countries. Engene, J.O., 'Five decades of terrorism in Europe: the TWEED dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 115-116.

9/11, the US has not even made it to the top three either by the no of attacks or by the number of victims. The US homeland and North America in general demonstrated the lowest levels of terrorist activity in the world (with annual number of attacks ranging from 6 to 18 and numbers of deaths from 0 to 3) [1].

While these low homeland levels are to a large extent balanced by the very high level of terrorist threats to American soft targets abroad, overall, contrary to some public perceptions, terrorist threat to European states and their citizens on European soil is much higher at the moment than terrorist threats to the US homeland. The latter, with the strange exception of 9/11, had been and remains one of the most secure places in the world.

Terrorism as compared to other security threats to Europe

The final question is how big is terrorist threat to Europe compared to other security threats: (*a*) to the so-called traditional (military) threats; and (*b*) to other urgent nonmilitary threats? This is a crucial question that has to be answered, for instance, in order to select an adequate critical infrastructure protection strategy—an all-hazards one or a primarily terrorism-oriented one.

It is hardly surprising that, in the radically changed security environment when the Cold War type threat of large-scale military aggression in Europe highly improbable, other, essentially non-military security threats have moved to the forefront. In this context, there are two extreme ways terrorist threat to Europe may be perceived in comparative perspective. One extreme would be to depoliticize this threat by putting it on par with more typical and regular law enforcement challenges such as economic (organized) crime, human and drug trafficking and thus to underestimate the essentially political nature and risks of terrorism. An opposite extreme would be to view terrorism as an existential threat for Europe, giving it a much higher priority over a range of all other pressing security challenges.

European states, both individually and collectively, to their credit, have by and large managed to avoid both extremes, swaying somewhere in between. Even with higher probability of terrorist attacks on European soil (as compared to the US homeland), overall, European terrorism threat assessment has been more balanced than that of the US. Terrorism was already seen as an important or even the main non-military threat in European states such as the UK, Spain or France well before 9/11. In post-9/11, but pre-Madrid European Security Strategy of 2003, terrorism was listed as one—and as the first one—of the five main interrelated security threats to Europe, along with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); regional conflicts in neighboring states or in regions that may affect European security; state failure; and organized crime.

The only area where terrorism threat assessment by Europe's leading states increasingly mirrors the super-alarmist approach of the US is an interface of the two main 'strategic' threats to the West: (*a*) terrorism and (*b*) proliferation of WMD and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials. The case in point is the important, but significantly hyped, threat of WMD/CBRN-terrorism (notwithstanding the fact that most catastrophic, mass-casualty attacks have been carried out by limited, conventional means and did not require WMD/CBRN to produce the intended effect).

3. Types of terrorist threats to Europe

The question about the scope and scale of the terrorist threats to Europe is closely linked to the nature and typology of these threats. There are several typologies of terrorism.

(a) Domestic or international? While this traditional way to categorize terrorism has never been too strict, the demarcation between domestic and international terrorism has become increasingly blurred over the recent years, both in Europe and elsewhere. On the one hand, even groups with localized agenda that does not go beyond national borders or a certain region may internationalize their funding, logistics, planning and other activities, often to a significant extent (a classic example is ETA and IRA terrorism). On the other hand, as demonstrated by terrorist attacks of 2004 and 2005 in Madrid and London, respectively, even Islamist cells pursuing transnational quasi-religious globalized agenda may not necessarily be 'outsiders' and a purely 'imported' phenomenon originating outside Europe, but grow within Europe and involve and be led by second- and third-generation European citizens. Against this background, it is not surprising that Europol in its analytical assessments of the terrorist threat has even decided to no longer use the distinction between domestic and international terrorism [5].

(b) According to *motivational typology*, terrorism is usually categorized as either secular ideological/socio-polical (left-wing, right-wing, ecological etc.), or nationalist (anti-colonial, national liberation, ethno-separatist etc.), or religious. While this typology is hardly accurate when applied to many groups that are driven by more ideology than one and combine socio-political and nationalist or religious and nationalist motivations, it is still broadly used. With all possible reservations about its adequacy, it can still be said that while secular ideological/socio-political terrorism has stabilized, it has been overshadowed by separatist terrorism that persists in Europe and by religious (quasi-religious)—primarily Islamist—terrorism that is on the rise.

Most of the total of 498 attacks carried out in Europe in 2006 resulted in little material damage and *were not intended to kill*. The vast majority of these attacks (424) were carried out by ethno-separatist groups (60 per cent of attacks of this type took place in France, to be closely followed by Basque separatists' activity in Spain). This also conforms to the general historical pattern in internal terrorism in Western Europe: more than 80% of internal terrorism incidents initiated by terrorists in this region over the 1950-2004 periods were perpetrated by ethnic-nationalist groups [4].

The second largest category, in terms of the number of incidents committed, were left-wing and anarchist terrorists responsible for 55 attacks in the EU, mainly in Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany [5]. In contrast, the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe in the mid-2000s—as well as through the entire period from 2001 until 2007—has been relatively small. Nevertheless, it is this type of terrorism that poses the gravest terrorist threat to Europe in the early 21st century, as it is the one responsible for the bulk of terrorism-related deaths. *Islamist terrorism aims at mass casualties.* As demonstrated by Madrid and London attacks, this 'new' Islamist terrorism also effectively results in mass casualties, if it is not preemptively disrupted, prevented or, which is often the case in Europe, fails to achieve the intended result due

to technical deficiencies of the explosive devices and lack of technical experience of the part of the perpetrators. While there were only 309 terrorism-related fatalities in Europe since January 2001 until July 2007 (as of the time of writing this paper), the vast majority—at least 250 deaths in Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK—were caused by Islamist terrorists.[i]

4. Islamist terrorism in Europe

Whatever typology of terrorism is used, there's no dispute among all the anti-terrorism actors ranging from MI5 to Europol and among experts that the threat posed by the new type of Islamist terrorism for Europe has grown substantially. There is a clear trend to emphasize this new type of Islamist terrorism that may grow up on European soil, but pursues transnational agenda, over other types of terrorist threats to Europe. Investigations against Islamist terrorists are clearly a priority in the EU: they comprised half of 706 people arrested on terrorism grounds in the EU in 2006 (mostly in France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands) [5]. The rate of arrest on Islamist terrorism-related charges per Muslim capita in Europe is almost five times that of the United States [6].

Europe did not wake up to Islamist terrorism as a security challenge on 9/11. While the Islamist terrorist presence in Europe was first introduced decades ago, Algerian and Egyptian Islamists tended to confine their agenda to political struggle in their home countries. Until mid-1990s, when the first Islamist attacks with a broader agenda and of the more endogenous type can be traced, the *direct* threat from Islamist terrorists to Europe was insignificant. But 9/11 and a number of subsequent high-profile Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere highlighted the emergence of a new type of terrorist activity by a network of semi- or fully autonomous cells in different parts of the world that may not even be operationally linked, but pursue similar or common quasi-religious politicized goals and agenda with a global outreach, not confined to any single local or regional context.

At the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, the Islamist terrorist threat in Europe has also gradually, but steadily shifted from infiltration by outsiders to the domestic production of perpetrators that pursue transnational agenda. By the mid-2000s, over 80 per cent of arrested Islamist terrorists in Europe (as well as in the United States) were part of the Muslim Diaspora, most in second and third generation [6], rather than pure outsiders, visitors or recent migrants.

So far, the most lethal Islamist terrorists that have ever been based in Europe remain those of the Hamburg cell which served as a European component in preparation of the 9/11 attacks. While there has not been a major terrorist attack in Europe since the July 2005 bombings in London—that marked the first case of Islamist suicide bombings in Europe—dozens of attempts were disrupted since then. There have been far more suspected radicals under surveillance in Europe in the mid-2000s than at any point since 9/11. Europol vaguely describes Islamist terrorism as a threat for foreseeable future, while MI5 warns that the *current* Islamist threat would 'last a generation'. It is also suggested that Europe may see increased participation in the global jihad.

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[i] Assessment based on MIPT data (note 1). Over a longer period—since the late 1960s—ETA still holds the first place in the EU in terms of terrorism-related deaths (about 850).

Migration, radicalization and Islamist terrorism

The recent rise of Islamist terrorism in Europe has often been directly and sometimes even primarily linked to the growing Muslim migration and Muslim minorities in Europe and the problems of their marginalization, socialization and integration. This link is questionable at best and extremely complex and indirect, at most.

On the one hand, migration is an objective process driven by fundamental socio-economic dynamics. These include demographic decline in Europe where immigration is already responsible for 70 per cent of population growth and development difficulties (traumatic modernization) in the North Africa, other parts of the Middle East, South Asia etc., with rather pessimistic mid-term projections of the development of these regions.

Terrorism, on the other hand—including terrorism of Islamist bent—is a heterogeneous phenomenon that cannot be reduced to any single set of explanations, such as socio-psychological behavioral patterns alone. Negative socio-cultural experiences of European Muslims, including migrants, in their immediate social environment may of course help explain why some of them become more susceptible to quasi-religious/political radicalization, but hardly explain why this radicalization leads to violence in the form of mass-casualty terrorism. Nor is this link necessarily a binding one: radicalization of Muslim migrants or minorities does not even necessarily lead to *violence*: a number of professedly radical movements do not resort to violence or promote it. Even if radicalization does lead to violence, the latter does not necessarily take the form of terrorism. In fact, of all forms of migrant and anti-migrant violence in Europe terrorism is not the most common one, even as it remains the most high-profile and the most deadly one.

There is also a risk here of underestimating the role of other driving factors behind Islamist terrorist behavior that may have little to do with problems of socialization or lack of social integration. This is particularly true for those Islamist terrorists who, unlike some of the poorly integrated recent immigrants, may be very well integrated second generation citizens of European countries (one can hardly be integrated better than the leader of the Leeds group) or even European converts (who are a small minority among terrorists of this type, but show that not Islamist terrorists in Europe are even migrants or their descendants). In contrast, the radicalization process of recent migrants involves social isolation and identity crisis resulting directly from transplantation into an alien culture of people most of whom were not Islamists, let alone militants, at home. Apparently, for different categories of European Muslims and Muslim migrants, the impact of socio-psychological factors in the process of radicalization may vary.

An excessive focus on the impact of immediate social circumstances of Muslim migrant and citizens may have an effect of de-politicizing terrorism—perhaps, the most politicized of all forms of political violence, of downgrading the importance of broader international political agenda, re-interpreted in quasi-religious way, for both 'outsider' and 'insider' jihadists in Europe. There is no single social profile of Islamist terrorists and the profound nature of their resentment is not always and not necessarily a product of their poor social integration. So while their formative socio-cultural experiences in Europe may have prepared them to champion what they believe is the cause of fellow-Muslims suffering around the world, they frame their actions in quasi-religious, political neo-anti-imperialist discourse of global confrontation with the West, stimulated by what they see happening in *Iraq*, *Afghanistan* and elsewhere (as noted in

a London bomber's Al-Jazeera videotape: 'our attacks will intensify and continue until you pull your forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq')[i]. In sum, the focus should be on the mix of certain home-grown negative socio-psychological conditions, experiences or perceptions with the impact of broader, international political realities re-interpreted in line with a powerful and universalist quasi-religious ideology.

Muslim youth and terrorism in Europe

Much have been said and written about the 'youth' factor and aspect in Muslim radicalization in Europe, including the way it is commonly seen as related to the rise of Islamist terrorism. Furthermore, it is often stressed that Islamist terrorism in Europe is 'young' and is becoming even younger, especially since 11 September 2001. It has been argued that if previously 'security services faced terrorist structures mostly made up of experienced jihadists, often with Afghan experience in common, between 25 and 40 years old, more and more we now find very young people, who by definition have no 'past' in Islamist circles'[7]. Attempts to explain away the entire phenomenon as impulsive violent behavior by idealistic young people who seek glory as a way out of their individual and social problems are not uncommon either.

   Against this background, some words of caution are needed and some questions need to be asked. How young are these people? Is there a direct link between the revival of religious identity or socio-political radicalization of young Muslims in Europe and Islamist terrorism? More generally, is the age factor one of the decisive ones in turning to terrorism or is it just a reflection of a generally higher predisposal of younger people to all forms of violent behavior? Is it a prime driver or just one of the many secondary, facilitating conditions—and hardly a binding one—for Islamist terrorism in Europe?

   To start with, a tendency to depict Islamist terrorist in Europe as an almost exclusively 'youth' activity may not be fully accurate and is contradicted by the more systematic and more recent data. For instance, according to Europol's analysis, despite the high number of people arrested in Europe on terrorism grounds in 2006 (with suspected Islamist terrorists comprising half of 706 arrested) there were *a relatively small number of young suspects*. More than two thirds of the arrested suspects were in fact aged between 26 and 41 [5]. In some European countries, though—notably Britain—Islamist terrorists and terrorist suspects do seem to be younger: e.g. most of the 19 people arrested in the UK on 10 August 2006 in connection to the alleged airplane plot were aged between 22 and 25, with one of the arrested as young as 17. Overall, however, it seems that the main age category for Islamist terrorists in Europe is young adults and, less so, adults, rather than teenagers.

   However, this fact does not yet in itself provide sufficient grounds for attempts to directly link the broad religious revival among European Muslims, especially among the younger generation, and a political dimension to that revival—to violent behavior in general and to such a specific form of violence as terrorism, in particular. That religion is playing a progressively higher role in self-identification of European

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[i] An attacker Shehzad Tanweer quoted in the transcript of the video released on 8 July 2006 at the Middle East Media Research Institute's TV Monitor project's web site, URL <http://www.memritv.org/Transcript.asp?P1=1186>.

Muslims from various citizenship, ethnic background and social status is a plain fact. That this trend is most evident in the younger generation of Muslims is hardly disputable either. One of the many manifestations of this trend is, for instance, by the popularity of youth associations acting as front organizations for the Muslim Brotherhood in many European countries. A single Hizb-ut-Tahrir conference in Britain (March 2004) alone brought together about 10.000 Muslims, many of them young people

Fig. 1. Terrorist activity in Europe per age group (%), 2006.

Source: Europol.

In the UK in particular, faith identity among young Muslims has become stronger than ever. As revealed by the 2001 Home Office Citizenship Survey data, faith ranked second on identity after family among Muslims. This trend was particularly strong amongst young people aged 16-24. However, their high level of religious identification (74%) was not unique for their faith group. It was, for instance, paralleled by high indicators for young Sikhs and Hindus (63%), in contrast to just 18% of Christians of the same age for whom religion ranked only 7th out of 15 factors [8]. According to a January 2007 survey by a conservative British think-tank, 74 per cent of young British Muslims (age 16 to 24) would prefer Muslim women to wear a veil or hijab (as opposed to only 28 per cent of those over 55). 37 per cent of the younger set would also prefer to live under Shariah law (as compared to just 19 per cent of Muslims over 55 years old). While this points to a growing religiosity, it is interesting to note that in the 16-24 age group the same proportion (37 per cent) said they would also like to see Shariah to reflect 'modern ideas about human rights… and tolerance of religious conversion'.[i]

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[i] It can also be mentioned that, for instance, more Muslims supported free speech than members of the general population. Zeller, T., 'Survey: young Muslims in Britain are more politicized. Blame multiculturalism?', *The New York Times* (30 Jan. 2007).

However, there is still a tendency to confuse two processes or to view the one as a logical and binding progression of the other while it is not. On the one hand, religious self-identification among Muslims in Europe is growing. Significant minorities among them express profound anger at the Western policies, including those of their own governments, towards 'the Muslim world'. But while, for instance, in the early 2000s between 64-80% of British Muslims have strongly opposed the intervention in Afghanistan and about 80% opposed the intervention in Iraq, an ever greater proportion (67-85%) did not think that further terrorist attacks would be justified. A minority of Muslims (7-13%) may even sympathize with some of the groups that employ terrorist means or think that some terrorist attacks, on balance, 'can be justified'.[i] All this, however, does not, in and of itself, make these people terrorists and an overwhelming majority of them would not even think about resorting to violence themselves. On the other hand, few self-starter Islamist cells choose to resort to violence in the form of mass-casualty terrorism against civilians. While in the first case, it is broad, if not necessarily mainstream, social trend and popular sentiment, in the second case, small, exclusive, fanatical 'vanguard-type' violent cells. The problem is that the former by no means automatically leads to the latter—rather, these are different manifestations—the broader and more common one and the violent extremist one—of the same set of problems.

How much can the 'youth' factor be helpful in explaining the disjunction between these two processes, i. e. where the general socio-political dissatisfaction and moral outrage interpreted in quasi-religious form transforms into violent action in the form of terrorism? In the end, the links between age and Islamist violence and terrorism in Europe seem to boil down to at least four main aspects, none of which is a binding or decisive one in itself.

First, the significant number of young Muslims among Islamist terrorists may partly reflect a much broader demographic reality: Muslims are generally considerably younger in Europe than much of the rest of the population. For instance, over half of Muslims in Britain are under 25, compared with a third of the population as a whole [8].

Second, in taking a decision to start a terrorist cell and mount a terrorist attack, the younger generation is generally more susceptible to—and is more likely to be struck by—a deep feeling of moral outrage at the actual and perceived political and social injustices against Muslims both on a local and on a global scale. Young adults are also more likely to interpret their moral outrage as a recipe for more radical 'direct action', including violence. Coupled with the generally higher susceptibility of youth to radical ideologies and to 'differential-aggressive bonding' long noted by social psychologists,[ii] this anger becomes part of their identity through ideological discourse and extremist group membership. The youth factor may also be relevant to some extent to explaining the next step—the resort to violence and particularly the choice of terrorism as a violent mode of operation. Terrorist means may particularly appeal to younger extremists as they generally tend to have less tolerance for delay and are more impatient to express their anger through violent action.

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[i] E. g., according to the Policy Exchange survey (January 2007) in the UK, 13 per cent of the younger age group (16-24) said they admired organizations like al-Qaeda. See Zeller (note 20).
[ii] See, e. g., Flaherty, L. T., 'Youth, ideology, and terrorism', *Adolescent Psychiatry*, vol. 27, 2003, pp. 29–58; Pinderhughes, C.A., 'Differential bonding from infancy to international conflict', *Psychoanalytical Inquiry*, vol. 6,1986, pp. 155-173

Still, this anger is not only a 'generational' phenomenon that results in 'mindless violence' driven by immediate social grievances or 'purely' religious zeal—it is interpreted and formulated in highly politicized—quasi-religious, rather than purely religious—almost anti-neo-imperialist categories and has an explicit political focus and goals, however abstract. As noted by a young moderate Muslim leader in Britain, 'what is needed is a debate about the root cause of terrorism, which is our country's foreign policy'.[i]

Third, the youth, including European Muslim youth, are generally much better familiar with, and more prone to use, modern forms and means of information and communication, particularly the Internet. This is especially important in view of the structures of the contemporary post-al-Qaeda transnational violent Islamist movement. Its multiple cells are often autonomous and self-generated and formed on a voluntary basis, but are inter-connected by collective radical quasi-religious ideological discourse and manage to act as parts of the same movement for the sake of the same final goal. The recent replacement of face-to-face radicalization with on-line one and the switch from static extremist web-sites calling to violence to interactive Islamist for as key instruments in radicalization certainly have their bearing primarily on younger people.

Fourth, while no single social pattern of Islamist terrorists in Europe can be traced and the latter, including young radicals, may come from very different social background, including the well-educated middle class, the younger people may still have 'less to loose' in socio-psychological sense and in social and socio-economic terms when taking a decision to turn to terrorist activity.

In sum, it is true that socio-political-religious radicalization of Muslims in Europe mostly affects relatively young people. This radicalization of young Muslims of different ethnic and social background takes place in Europe on a growing scale. But to link this radicalization directly and primarily to Islamist terrorism is an overstretch. It also reflects a dangerous tendency to degrade Islamist terrorism to an extreme, abhorrent 'excesses' of typical 'youth radicalism'.

5. Anti-terrorism in Europe

This account would not have been complete without at least mentioning some of the specifics of European approaches to anti-terrorism. While normally compared to the US counterterrorism policy and practice, the EU where primary responsibility for anti-terrorism lies with the member-states is not exactly comparable with the United States. For instance, the UK and Spain historically practiced much stricter antiterrorist measures shaped by decades of fighting the IRA and ETA, respectively. With frequent intra-EU discussions and disagreements, any EU-wide approach to anti-terrorism can only be the very minimal common denominator at least and an added-value framework at best.

Still, there are some common features in European states' anti-terrorism policies and a developing EU dimension to anti-terrorism. Even if limited and slow to develop, this dimension is essential for effective anti-terrorism in Europe, given the unique characteristics of the European space that terrorists are have been able to take

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[i] Osama Sayeed of the Muslim Association of Britain, quoted in Alam, F., 'Vision of a new Islam', *Observer* (4 Apr. 2004).

advantage of: a combination of freedom of movement and permeability of borders inside the Schengen area with multiplicity of judicial and police systems. To this some would add relative reluctance of Europeans to enhance the powers of security agencies for the sake of preserving civil liberties.

The post-9/11 anti-terrorism campaign helped booster European states' national capacities on anti-terrorism that increased its general effectiveness and produced some positive results even in countering more traditional types of terrorism (for instance, it was only in the aftermath of 9/11 that Greece, after 25 years of fruitless efforts, was able to finish off its left-wing Revolutionary Organization 17 November).

The 9/11 events and their aftermath also helped booster European cooperation on anti-terrorism, especially in the realm of Home and Justice Affairs. In 2001, the EU established its own common definition of terrorism and agreed to common penalties on terrorism crimes; pursuant to the UNSC Res. 1390 the EU agreed on Common Position on enacting its own list of terrorist groups and individuals. At the end of 2005, under UK Presidency, the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy (with four priority goals – prevent, protect, pursue and respond) was finally agreed on by EU Justice and Interior Ministers and approved by the Council. The European Council has designated a Coordinator for counter-terrorism, Gijs de Vries (who established a peer review process to evaluate domestic competencies of member-states and coordinate counter-terrorism mechanisms), succeeded by Gilles de Kerchove d'Ousselghem. Finally, the EU has even set up the solidarity clause in favor of countries struck by terrorism (Articles I-42 and III-231 of the draft European Constitution).

The main specifics of European anti-terrorism approaches (as compared to the United States) are the following.

First, anti-terrorism is mainly viewed as a task for law enforcement and intelligence rather than the military. Center of gravity is not a military option, but *intelligence, law enforcement and judicial activities and cooperation.* ESDP is not at the core of EU anti-terrorism efforts (there was very limited increase in defense spending after 9/11, and only in the UK and France). It may be argued that this non-military focus is partly balanced and facilitated by Europe's other, NATO 'hat' and by the Alliance's attempts to get a 'counter-terrorist' profile for itself. Still, European non-military focus in the area of anti-terrorism is not just a matter of convenience or division of labour, but reflects some genuine European preferences and the way Europe grasps the specifics of this threat.

With operational *intelligence* best done at national level, the most valuable and sensitive information needed to dismantle networks and prevent attacks may be shared, but on a task-specific basis, rather than at 25 (it may for instance lead to simultaneous arrests in several European countries in a joint operation). It remains to be seen whether there should be more formal EU-wide mechanisms for sharing operational intelligence. Overall, Europe's intelligence cooperation with the United States, both prior to and after 9/11 (exemplified by arrest of Ahmed Resam on Canadian border even before 9/11), has been more balanced that in the military sphere.

In the area of *Justice and Home Affairs*, the European Arrest Warrant has been enacted; European Evidence Warrant is in progress; despite all the difficulties, information exchange has been enhanced; cooperation between members and Europol/Eurojust is growing (the two support 20 cross-border terrorism investigations). In terms of border protection, the European Border Agency was established and the Council agreed to include biometric features into national passports and to improved security standards in ports and airports; Visa Information System is under discussion.

Second, most European approaches to anti-terrorism put a far greater emphasis on prevention (the first pillar of the EU anti-terrorism strategy is 'Prevent' which illustrates a strategic difference with the US-style 'war on terrorism'). Also, greater attention is paid to political, socio-economic, ideological and other causes of terrorism; and to the processes of radicalization and recruitment. Initiatives here range from analyzing how extremists use Internet, trying to limit radicalization in prisons to attempts to draw a direct link between Islamist terrorism and the issues of immigration, Muslim diasporas and integration, even if there are serious problems with the way this link is often drawn.

In sum, while Europeans suffer more attacks on their soil than the US, anti-terrorism in Europe is more balanced and more specifically tailored to anti-terrorism needs than the US approach. Anti-terrorism in Europe is also generally more oriented towards prevention and addressing the various types and combinations of causes of terrorism, primarily non-military in nature, and more measured, nuanced, and multi-sided. Most problems with the EU approach and antiterrorism cooperation within Europe are less related to antiterrorism than they are to general problems of the functioning of the European institutional bureaucracy. Still, Europe can make more, especially of its analytical and especially human intelligence capabilities (quite significant on terrorism), better information sharing (including better access to national/EU databases by competent authorities, with appropriate data protection rules, and of its more comprehensive conception of security.

While, as noted above, US citizens are much more at threat from terrorists abroad than they are at home (where they are, in fact, very secure, almost terrorism-prone), Europeans are no less, if not more, at threat at home than they are abroad. Against this background, critics, especially in the US, often argue that European states are slow to bolster domestic protection beyond law enforcement efforts (in areas such as transport security, emergency preparedness and response, critical infrastructure protection, protection against chemical or biological incidents). In contrast to law enforcement and intelligence, funding for these purposes is less visible and more scattered. But that may also partly reflect Europe's strategic choice that seems to be different from the US approach. While in terms of homeland security, the United States has launched wholesale reorganization of its domestic security and border protection institutions, the European states opted to work within existing institutional framework integrating anti-terrorism into it and making it more flexible to respond to wider range of security challenges and disasters, both natural and mad-made, with more limited personnel and funds (which is also a more economic system).

Over the last couple of years, there may have been some rapprochement between European and US approaches to certain aspects of anti-terrorism (such as the growing attention to prevention and preventive disruption as compared to post hoc coercion and enforcement, to the radicalization processes that may lead to terrorism etc.). On the one hand, limited reassessment of the US approach in favor of a slightly more nuanced one, at least on the part of the US intelligence community, came about, primarily as a result of US failures in the war on terrorism anywhere with the exception of the US homeland. On the other hand, high-profile jihadi terrorist attack in Europe in Madrid (March 2004) and in London (July 2005) have produced a tougher European approach on terrorism. Examples may range from introduction of tougher legislation and stepping up the powers of executive at the expense of judiciary to the inclusion of entire Hamas rather than just its militant wing into the EU terrorist list.

Anti-terrorism and human rights

Still, on some issues, any further rapprochement between the US and its European allies on anti-terrorism is impeded by remaining differences. The area where the nuances are the greatest not just in terms of governmental policies and legal practices, but in term of broad public attitudes is the need for adequate protection of fundamental human rights in the fight against terrorism. These include the absolute prohibition of torture—a right that cannot be derogated from, even with diplomatic assurances—and the right to fair trial, both of which were violated by the US which is one of the main reasons for declining public support in Europe for the US war on terrorism (according to the Pew Center data, it fell below 50 per cent in Britain and France and reached the low of 16 per cent in Spain).

But in Europe itself, the erosion of human rights by government counterterrorism policies has been a well-developed tendency long before 9/11—e. g. over decades in relation to *Northern Ireland* (where violations in the name of security included torture, ill-treatment and unfair trials). Majority of people detained under anti-terrorism/emergency regulations in Europe over the previous decades have been subsequently released without charge (which is often the case with the Islamist terrorist suspects today).

Much of the current public debates on terrorism and human rights in Europe is about the discriminatory nature of certain measures undertaken in the name of anti-terrorism, in law and/or practice (even as there is little credible data available on the extent of this discrimination, as official collection of statistics and records on this issue is prohibited for the most part). The main problem with these debates is that many of the measures perceived as associated with antiterrorism and most commonly heavily—and fairly—criticized on human rights grounds in fact have little to do with counterterrorism as such.

Most heavily criticized security measures justified by authorities in the name of antiterrorism, in practice, may not be particularly well-tailored to the specific needs and priorities of counterterrorism in the genuine sense, let alone effective in meeting them. It is as true for discriminatory use of stop-and-search powers, privacy concerns over enhanced data retention and other vastly enhanced law enforcement and executive powers as for most kinds of profiling, computer-generated screening of the populations (*Rastefahndung*) etc. Massive violations of human rights, particularly during a large-scale public emergency following a terrorist attack, have more to do with the need for authorities to quell the population and preserve their public image, with crisis management rather than anti-terrorism as such. 'Core' activities most specific for anti-terrorism—scrupulous human and technical intelligence-gathering and analysis and preventive disruption or terrorist acts and networks—are carried out on a permanent basis, even in absence of any emergencies, and primarily not by police, but by counterintelligence/security services (which in most countries have the powers they need). They do involve serious legal and human rights problems and implications, but those are of a somewhat different nature than those that have received the bulk of public attention.

A more informed and subtle way to address these issues and a more relevant question to ask would, for instance, be: How to achieve a balance between counterintelligence capabilities and the judiciary? How to make counterterrorism both functional and legal, how to balance the need, specific for counterterrorism, to conduct much of the intelligence-collection, analysis, targeted surveillance, preventive and

preemptive activities on a permanent basis, even in absence of a terrorist incident itself and before (!) it occurs—and the need to conduct these activities in due process of law? A related problem is a barrier between intelligence and its use for judicial purposes involving the problem of secrecy of evidence.

Conclusions

Even as on September 12, 2001 European allies readily invoked NATO Article 5, by now it is clear that Europe—both individually and collectively—is not waging a 'war on terrorism'. Rather, it tries to improve its capacity to prevent and counter terrorist threats of different types and at different levels, sometimes interrelated, with a growing emphasis on Islamist terrorism.

The rise of Islamist terrorism in Europe results from a combination of political impulses to react to international and domestic 'injustices' committed against the Muslims with socio-psychological factors of radicalization, re-interpreted through the prism of relatively simplified, quasi-religious ideology. This further underscores the erosion of a distinction between interior and exterior in terrorism/anti-terrorism, between homeland and external security – a trend that will continue and will be one of the new century's security characteristics. In this context, broadening Europe's strategic vision and especially European states' individual or collective involvement in armed conflicts beyond its immediate environment (particularly in Muslim-populated Middle East, South or Southeast Asia) may somewhat increase the risk of terrorism for Europe, but not necessarily in the form of externally-driven attacks – it may give domestic, self-starter Islamist terrorists new motivations and justifications for their attacks.

While Islamist terrorism poses a considerable threat to Europe, this paper cautions against super-alarmist approach. It also questions whether, of all forms of violent threats, it is terrorism that will necessarily be the main manifestation of Muslim radicalization in Europe or, indeed, the main long-term security challenge for Europe in the 21st century. Terrorism—politically motivated asymmetrical attacks or threats to use force indiscriminately or specifically against civilians—is an extreme, highly politicized and very specific tactics which cannot be easily applied by each and every radicalized group and which is only effective under certain circumstances and conditions. While socio-political, quasi-religious radicalization, in combination with other factors, may provide grounds for such extremely asymmetrical form of political violence as terrorism, the link is not necessarily a binding one.

Socio-political radicalization of young Muslims in Europe may take many forms, does not necessarily lead to terrorism and may in fact be more likely to transform into other, more widespread and more mass-based forms of violence and protest actions than terrorism. They may range from further consolidation of 'grey areas' not controlled by authorities and a mix of delinquency, hate crime and vandalism to public disorders, revolts, riots, violent breakthroughs by migrants etc. Urban unrest in France in the Fall of 2005 that did not involve violent Islamists may be no less or more indicative of the type of threats to Europe from Muslim radicalization than even high-profile terrorist attacks on European capitals by self-generating Islamist cells with a transnational agenda.

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YOUTH AND TERRORISM: EXAMPLE OF PKK

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Abstract: This study constitutes of four main headings. First the "Profiles of the Militants Active in PKK" is addressed and then the "Correlation between the Youth and Terrorism" is discussed. This is followed by some attempts to explain the "Youth Organisations of PKK" and "The Methods PKK uses to Recruit the Youth". In the conclusion, some suggestions and solutions are given on the precautions that should be taken to prevent the recruitment of terrorists groups are given.

Keywords: terror, terrorism, youth, profile of the the militants, recruitment

1. Introduction

One of the most important problems that confront many countries in the 21st century is terrorism. Indeed in the recent years debates and researches on this problem as well as the search for an international co-operation to tackle have considerably increased. Particularly after the 9/11 the search for solution has further increased.

In Turkey, terrorism has been one of the biggest problems that threaten the general security for long years. Since years Turkey has been trying to tackle terrorism as a security problem and thus provide a solution. However, the recent researches indicate that terrorism is not only a security problem but a fact that is based on economic, social, cultural, political and psychological problems [1].

There are certain elements that keep terrorist organisations alive: ideology, internal and external support, funding and human. The last element, the human resources, is the most important element therefore, a terrorist group may have a very strong ideology, unlimited funding and domestic-foreign support but unless it has the human resource that will keep it going it is not possible for the group to continue existing.

In that context, one of the most significant topics that need to be addressed when examining terrorism is "the identity of the terrorist". When the terrorist groups in Turkey which are separatists and disruptive and which exploit religious beliefs are analysed, it is observed that the main source of recruitment is the youth [2,3].

This study constitutes of four main headings. First the "Profiles of the Militants Active in PKK" is addressed and then the "Correlation between the Youth and Terrorism" is discussed. This is followed by some attempts to explain the "Youth Organisations of PKK" and "The Methods PKK uses to Recruit the Youth". In the

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conclusion, some suggestions and solutions are given on the precautions that should be taken to prevent the recruitment of terrorists groups are given.

2. Age, Education, Marital Status and Occupational Profile of the Militants that are Active in PKK".

When Alkan and Yücel searched the Internet website of the terrorist organisation PKK www.serixwebun.com/martyrs [4], they found that the organisation was publicising information, such as the date of birth, recruitment date and date of death, pertaining to their so-called martyrs who lose their lives in armed conflicts with the law enforcement agencies.

By means of random sampling of the so-called martyrs album published on this website, the dates of birth, dates of recruitment and death of 216 militants were put through statistical analyses through SPSS program. This resulted in the production of the following profiles which indicates the ages these militants join the group and how many years they survive in average.

Table 1. The Age Distribution of the Militants in the Terrorist Organisation PKK

Age Distribution	#	%
Unanswered	3	1,3
Under 14	2	0,6
Between 14-25	167	77,4
Between 26-35	39	18,2
Between 36-40	3	1,9
Over 40	2	0,6
Total	216	100

When the average age of the 216 PKK convicts who were killed in an armed conflict with the law enforcement agencies while they were involved in PKK is analysed it is found that 77,4% of them joined the group when they were between 14 – 25, and 18,1% between 26-35. These facts are also supported by the findings in the survey of *Cantekin* [5] made on the statements of the 97 PKK convicts who either surrendered to or were arrested by law enforcement agencies. Indeed, as per that research 77.2% of the PKK militants are between 14 – 25 years old.

The average time these militants who were assigned to the armed wing of the terrorist organisation PKK spend in the group is demonstrated in the table below.

Table 2. The Survival Time Period of the Militants within the Terrorist Group PKK

How long they stay alive within the group	#	%
Unanswered	4	1,9
Those who die within 0-2 years	100	46,5
Those who die within 2-4 years	46	21,3
Those who die 4-8 years	46	21,3
Those who live more than 8 years	20	9,0
Total	216	100

As it can be seen in Table:2, 46,5% of the militants who join the armed wing of PKK either die in an armed conlifct with the security forces or killed by the organisation within 0-2 years. Meanwhile 21.3% die in 2-4 years, and 21,3% in 4-8 years. These

results indicate that 90% of the militants in the armed wing of PKK die within 8 years of their recruitment.

A survey carried out by the Counter Terrorism Command of the Turkish National Police created the following table which demonstrate the distribution of the PKK militants as per their education level [6].

Table 3. The Distribution of PKK Militants as per their Education Level

Education Level	#	%
University Graduate or Student	29	11,06
High-school Graduate or Student	43	16,41
Secondary School Graduate	35	13,35
Primary School Graduate	104	39,69
Literate	51	19,46
Total	262	100

As per this table, 11% of the PKK militants are university graduates or students; 16% are high-school graduates or students; 13% are secondary school graduates and 39% are primary school graduates. The KÖK Social and Strategic Researches Foundation's study on 1003 PKK members between 1994 – 1996 shows that 4,6% of the PKK members are university graduates; 14,4% are high-school graduates; 12,3% are secondary school graduates and 47,2% are primary school graduates [7]. Meanwhile Cantekin's research observes that as the education level decreases, the number of people who join the terrorist group increases [8].

Cantekin's research also indicates that 90,7% of the active militants in PKK are bachelors [9].

Table 4. Distribution of PKK Militants as per their Marital Status

Marital Status	#	%
Bachelor	88	90.7
Married	9	9.3
Total	97	100.0

3. The Correlation between the Youth and Terrorism

As the researches prove, the terrorist organisation PKK recruits young, single and unemployed people who have little knowledge and almost no life experience with a low level of education. That is because the youth constitute the most dynamic, active, sensitive and self-sacrificing – when guided well - group of the society.

As well known, the human being develops recesses and collapses at certain ages of his/her life. These ages known as the childhood, youth, adulthood and old age are not distinguished from one and other by means of precise borders. The preceding age has an influence on the succeeding age. That is why the childhood creates the youth and the youth creates the adulthood [10].

The youth is the period where the human being biologically, psychologically, intellectually and socially matures and thus moves into the realm of adulthood [11]. Many academicians, philosophers and researchers studied the youth. While the famous

philosopher Plato called the youth "a spiritual drunkenness", Aristotle defined it as "impervious creatures" [12].

As per UNESCO's definition, youth is "a person between the ages of 15 and 25 who still studies, who does not work for a living and does not live in a separate address" [13]. Meanwhile, Yörükoğlu described the youth as "the period of development, spiritual maturity and preparation for life between the childhood and adulthood". The rapid development that starts with puberty ends with the physical, sexual and spiritual maturity at the end of the age of youth. The age of youth which generally starts with the first signs of puberty continues till the development ceases and includes the ages between 12 – 21 [14].

Within the framework of these definitions, the youth is a social category which consists of individuals who are generally studying, who do not work for a living, who are sensitive to the problems of the society they live in and who are demographically between the ages of 14 and 25 [12]. In this statement, the individuals between the ages of 14 – 25 are considered the youth.

While the psychologists describe adolescence as the most beautiful, happiest and strongest time of the human life, they also talk about it as a period of "crises" and "depression" [15].

During this period, the young consider themselves worthless and felt insecure. Their emotions tend to shift quickly therefore they feel happy, sad and angry all at once and make problems out of the simplest of things. This is why their reactions cannot be predicted. Since they constantly have ups and downs and an exultant spirit, most of the time they are capricious. There are many things they want to do but they are indecisive and impatient and since they are impatient they want to immediately see the results otherwise they give up on whatever they were involved in. They become selfish and more demanding and consider the rules set for them nonsense and the rights given to them insufficient. They are ardent; they are daydreamers and idealists. They faithfully defend their emotions and opinions; adopt a relentless stance against injustice; without paying much attention to the existing facts and realities they want that the current social order be instantly changed and the inequalities be eliminated [14,16].

Along with these inconsistent behaviours, the youth have some positive characteristics as well: "being energetic and lively; having a high sense of perception and sensitivity; being fair and tolerant; being flexible, bold, honest, optimistic and charitable; feeling sincere concern for the future of the country and the world and exerting a sincere effort for development" are among those characteristics [17]. The most important emotion in this age of learning and dynamism when the courage overcomes timidity; desire for adventure overcomes comfort and feelings overcome logic is the feeling of wanting to be freed from authority. Therefore, at this age the young tend to upraise against everybody who is an authority figure – from the parents to the state.

We can say that the terrorist organisations and the organised criminal groups exploit these characteristics the most. Indeed the terrorist group PKK has been using the youth as its human resource since 1984, the year it launched its attacks.

4. PKK's Youth Organisations

The terrorist group PKK was established by Abdullah Öcalan, as a student at the Faculty of Political Sciences, and his friends as a youth organisation. Öcalan describes the reasons for this structuring as follows [18]:

> *"...the activities were mostly carried out among the intellectual youth. The intellectual youth has a character of its own. For one thing, as a social category the youth is open to revolutionary ideas; it can easily absorb them. Secondly, since they are the intellectual youth, they constitute a group that is most open to science, that touches base with science the most and that is most prone to adopt the revolutionary ideas. Thirdly, the youth has characteristics that is dashing, ardent and that does not recognise any barriers or obstacles. With respect to these, it was natural and obligatory to conduct activities among the youth."*

On the other hand, PKK which states that the youth has the strength and the energy it requires for its fight considers the youth as the vanguard of the fight. Claiming that the labour, tradesmen, etc fight for their own interests, PKK asserts that a fight mainstreamed on economy would be narrow-minded and limited [19]. On the other side the youth is considered a force that will fight without any personal or economical interests.

In this context, PKK that wants to organise and use the youth, established and launched the Youth Council of Kurdistan (YCK) in abroad on 25 October 1987, during its 3rd Congress, with a view to organising and recruiting the youth more systematically. After this date, YCK began to organise de facto. It mostly focussed on recruiting members for PKK. Furthermore, around this time they also began to issue their first magazine for the youth in Turkey; "The Revolutionary Patriot Youth" [19].

The youth organisation which increased the level of its activities after the 90's intensified its activities mostly at high schools and universities. Indeed, the organisation experienced the highest number of recruitment after the 90's from the high schools and universities in abroad and in Turkey. Many young people who lived their first revolution experience under YCK later joined the organisation's mountain cadres.

The organisation held the Youth Congress between 03-15 August 2003 at its camps in the Northern Iraq during which it terminated YCK and established the Free Youth Movement of Kurdistan (TECAK). It was decided that TECAK would operate in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Europe under the following structures [20] ;

- The Independent Youth Movement in Turkey (BAGEH),

- Democratic Youth Movement in Iran,

- Independent Youth Movement in Iraq (TCM),

- Free Youth Movement in Syria (TCA),

- The Free Youth Movement (ÖGH) in Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

TECAK was restructured as the Democratic Youth Confederation (DEM-GENÇ) within the framework of a new organisation model established on 20 March 2005, "Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan". It was stated that as a cultural, flexible and

federal organisation this re-structuring should embrace the youth in all layers of the society [21].

Between 26 July and 06 August 2005, TECAK held its 2nd Usual Congress and changed the name of its branches operating in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria to the "Democratic Youth Confederalism of Kurdistan / Komalen-Ciwan). In December 2005, as the conclusion of the meeting that was held under the name "BAGEH Turkey Conference" with the purpose of restructuring BAGEH and DEM-GENÇ, the organisation terminated BAGEH and replaced it with "the Free, Patriot Youth Movement" (YÖGEH) [22].

In this context, we observe that recently the terrorist organisation PKK has been conducting its attacks against the city-buses in the Metropolitans and its recruitment and propaganda activities in the universities and faculties through YÖGEH.

5.   The Methods PKK uses in Recruiting the Youth

In a research on the "police statements" of the arrested PKK members, it was identified that a majority of the young people who operated in PKK had not joined this terrorist group willfully on their own accord. Even if a young individual wants to join PKK, since the group operates covertly it does not very likely that he/she will find them [23].

Equally, Özönder's research on 1003 PKK convicts verifies this finding. According to this research, 71% of the convicts stated that the members of the organisation have found them and they joined the group though those members [24] .

So, being a terrorist is not an inherited trait but a "process of construction". PKK implements this process of construction by using one-to-one propaganda techniques. The following diagram depicts this process:


Figure: Militant Raising Process

The terrorist organisation PKK communicates with a young individual that it wants to recruit, by using friendship, kinsmen, townsmen, social and cultural activities, religious values and ethnic roots. Once it communicates to the individual by using one or more of these values, it gathers rough information on that individual. This information includes the individual's family structure, vulnerabilities, current friends, economic

standards, religion, ethnic and cultural roots, physiological, psychological and social needs [25].

After collecting this information, PKK withdraws the individual it wants to recruit into a group dynamism the scenario, actors and stage of which have been pre-set up. Because, in order to make a terrorist organisation or an extremist tendency successful, it must have the power to establish a covert (closed) network right from the start and dissolve and integrate all of its supporters in this network so that they become an indispensable part of the organisation [26].

We can briefly summarise the structure and the functioning of the "group dynamism" in PKK as follows:

a.   PKK is a covert organisation that operates in "cell" system. Therefore, PKK builds a wall between its members and the outer world by means of group dynamism. So, not every body is included in the terrorist group at any time he/she wants: because PKK has covert operations and they approach any willing individual suspiciously. However, they trust those they recruit through their existing members.

b.   PKK meets all sorts of physiological, social and psychological needs of its militants in its network. In that context, it finds employment for the unemployed members, it meets their need for affection, respect and belonging, and it provides them an opportunity to live him/herself. Along these, it gives an identity and personality to its members.

c.   An individual recruited by the PKK cannot leave the organisation as he wishes; when he wants to leave, the group never lets him go. Therefore, apart from physical torture he/she is subjected to psychological torture as well. At this point, PKK uses two major emotions of the human being; hope and fear. Until it recruits an individual it appeals to the hope but then, once the person has become a member it appeals to the fear in order to keep him/her in the network. Additionally, it marks those who want to leave the organisation with humiliating adjectives such as "fluke" or "traitor" [27].

d.   PKK has its own system of norms and values. Although these norms and values are not generally in writing, there are a few on paper as well. By means of this system of norms and values the organisation assimilates its members to each other just like in an organic solidarity. In other words, it transforms human beings into a fabricated product.

e.   PKK has its own organisation functioning, stereotyped values, purposes and an order of relation. In that respect, it has a solidarity, unison and job sharing in the group and separate expectations from its members.

f.   An organisational group has a collective mind, approach, stance and behaviour [28]. Therefore individuals in the PKK network cannot act as they wish; cannot read the books they like; cannot meet with the people they choose, and; cannot marry the people they want [29]. Because the mechanism that directs the lives of the individuals, that thinks and makes decisions on behalf of them, is the collective mind, stance and behaviour of the organisation.

g.   There is no place for individualism in PKK, which is an organisational group. Individualism is constantly humiliated while collective organisation is praised /

blessed. Rather than the "I" "we" is used. The organisation is everything. Therefore, individuals can always be sacrificed for the higher good of the organisation [29].

h.   Organisational groups have a very strict hierarchical structure. This structure is built on a cell type group structure and each militant of the organisation can only know the militants in his/her group. The instructions of the organisation's leader are conveyed to the subordinates through the group coordinators. The information sent to the seniors by the subordinates is again transferred in the form of a report through the group leaders [30].

i.   With respect to its hierarchical structure PKK is under the complete control of its leader Öcalan and managed by a monopoly. Öcalan is everything the group has and he has immunity in the organisation: he cannot be criticized and he has absolute domination over the organisation [31].

These conditions which PKK systematically construct remove the individuality of the members as a psychological person and cause them lose their personal identities and characters. In this context, an individual withdrawn towards the group by PKK can no longer think and act on his/her own will. Because the system of common norms and values has already been activated.

Therefore, the sole patron and director of the thoughts, emotions and actions of the individual is the group he/she belongs. From now on the individual whose world of thoughts, heart and spirit are trapped/stereotyped acts with a "collective logic".

By means of using the group dynamism the terrorist organisation PKK changes the stances and perception systems of its recruits and brainwashes and conditions them in line with its ideology. The main purpose in all of this is to erase the identity and the personality the individual has gained from his family and social environment then to replace it with the identity and personality of a militant. The most important purpose of PKK in providing a new identity and personality to its militants is its desire and wish to ensure that all individuals will become a part of the collective organisational identity and personality [32]. In other words, it is to ensure that the young people will become the threads of an organisational gear.

In his book "True Believer" Eric Hoffer states the following [33] :

> *"To develop a person in the path of self-sacrifice, it is necessary to seperate the individual from his own identity and differences unique to his personality. He must be dissuaded from being a Hussain, an Edvar, an Ali, a Richar as an individual that is stuck between birth and death. The most effective means to achieve this is to fully adapt the individual to a collective community. A fully adapted individual will no longer consider himself and others individual persons. When he is asked who he is, his automatic answer will be that he is a Christian, a Jew, a German, a Russian, a Japanese (a DHKP/C member, a Hizbollah member, a PKK member). He does not have any objective, value or destiny other than that of the collective community he belongs in. As long as this community lives, there will never be a real death for him."*

That is to say in order to prepare the PKK militants to kill and to die; they must be turned into "a true believer" by being given a new identity and personality.

Additionally, organisational identity and personality provide a legitimate ground for the committed murders. For instance, when an ordinary citizen kills someone even by mistake, his/her life is completely devastated with remorse and grief and in some cases they cannot even continue with their normal lives. However, when the brainwashing of the PKK members is fully completed, a militant will feel no remorse for the murders he/she will have committed. Indeed, after a while, the individuals who are brainwashed and whose spirits are conditioned will not be any different from a robot.

Conclusion and Suggestions

As mentioned before, there are certain elements that keep the terrorist organisations alive. These are ideology, domestic and foreign support, funding and members. The terrorist organisations may have an ideology, foreign support and even funding but despite all these without human resources it is not possible for that terrorist organisation to continue to exist.

When the 30 years of combat against the terrorist organisation PKK is analysed, it is observed that there is the misunderstanding which suggests that the problem can be solved only by operational activities. In such operations, the militants of the terrorist group who have been through the above explained phases are either arrested and sent to prisons or killed in an armed conflict. But has this prevented the entire scope of the organisation's activities? It has not. Because the terrorist organisation PKK recruits a new militant who would fill in the empty place left behind every militant it has lost in the armed conflict. This is why its activities still continues today.

To have absolute control over and terminate the activities of PKK, social projects focussing on human should be developed and implemented. In other words, just like the practice in "Preventive Medicine in Healthcare Services", the sections of the society which PKK uses as a resource for recruiting new members, particularly the youth, must be well informed about the activities of the organisation, and they must be taught of the methods and ways to avoid catching the "terrorism disease". We may summarize what can be done to that extent as follows:

1. The most important human resource for the PKK is the youth at high schools and universities. So, each year conferences, training seminars, radio and T.V. shows can be organised for the students, their families and teachers to inform them about the activities and recruitment methods of PKK.

2. OSYM (The Higher Education Council) may attach to the university admission letters of the students pamphlets about recruitment activities of this terrorist organisation.

3. In coordination with the Provincial Departments of National Education, knowledge contests, football matches etc can be organised. These events can be celebrated in the form of a festival where the roles of the Turkish youth in the bright future can be stressed.

4. In coordination with the Provincial Departments of National Education, visits to sites of the Independence War and the War Cemetery of Canakkale can be organised. Because the National Independence War and Canakkale are an epic that was created by the whole Turkish society in unison and solidarity, from east to

west, north to south. What holds the Turkish society together is in fact the brewing of this epic?

5. The young people who are known to have withdrawn the attention of the terrorist organisation must be identified by the intelligence services and their joining with the organisation must be prevented by means of contacting their families and schools if they are students. Similarly, by using these methods it can be ensured that the young people who are known to have joined the terrorist organisation and who continue to have contact with their families will surrender to the law enforcement agencies.

Briefly, we must not forget that counter terrorism is a whole. While trying to produce a solution to the economical, social, cultural, political and psychological problems that lay underneath the problem of terrorism, we must continue to take preventive security measures. Additionally, the domestic efforts in counter terrorism must be supported by measures that will be taken in abroad.

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CRIMINAL NETWORKS IN GEORGIA AND KYRGYZSTAN AND YOUNG MALE SPORTSMEN

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Abstract: The paper analyzes criminal networks in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the structure and activities of these networks trying to explain the involvement of young male sportsmen in organized crime groups. It is argued that lack of opportunities during post-Soviet transition, instability on the political scene, importance of physical force for crime groups, social role of criminals and cultural factors, among other variables contribute to the engagement of sportsmen in criminal groups.

Keywords: Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, sportsmen, thieves in law, organized crime group

1. Introduction

In Soviet Union the sport was the state priority, receiving much funding and support from the government. However, soon after the breakup of USSR and consequent economic collapse in many successor republics (such as Georgia and Kyrgyzstan), the state funding of sports has been dramatically reduced and many sportsmen were obliged to flee to more developed countries in order to continue their careers. Those who stayed in former Soviet republics found themselves in adverse economic conditions and many, especially wrestlers and boxers, have joined organized crime groups.

The paper discusses organized crime in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the structure of these groups and their activities trying to explain the involvement of young male sportsmen in criminal networks. First the development of crime-sport relationship is observed, commonalities and differences between Georgian and Kyrgyz organized crime groups are outlined and specific cases involving sportsmen/criminal are

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discussed. It is argued that lack of opportunities during post-Soviet transition, instability on the political scene, importance of physical force for crime groups, social role of criminals and cultural factors, among other variables contribute to the engagement of young male sportsmen in criminal groups.

2. The development of crime-sport relationship

Sports was highly valued and therefore extensively funded by Soviet state. Apart from professional training, the concept of Soviet 'mass sports' implied the involvement of every Soviet citizen in physical exercise. Athletics on any level was viewed by the Soviets as most important for their extrinsic functions for Soviet productivity, health, national price, foreign policy advantages and military preparedness [1]. The development of sports was especially closely linked with military goals of Soviet Union. Stalin once remarked to Eisenhower that physical culture and sports enhanced the fighting spirit.[2] Riordan correctly argues that there has been a close relationship between sport and the military throughout Soviet history, which "has helped to ensure that as many citizens as possible are physically fit, mentally alert, trained in military skills and equipped with the patriotism, will power, stamina and ingenuity [2]. Interestingly, USSR was most successful in the combat sports (wrestling, weightlifting, judo, etc)[3] and quasi-military sports (fencing, shooting, archery, etc) [3].

Since the late years of Stalin, USSR has appeared full-scale on the international sport scene, has outdistanced all other countries in medal counts at the Olympics and has won more international meets and championships than any other nation [4]. The commentators of Soviet sports observed that "the sportsmen are held in high esteem for the skill, grace and strength by which they inspire young and old alike to be active and to join in at all levels of sport" [5]. Certainly highly qualified sportsmen had strong influence over their trainees, - younger sportsmen. As Volkov argues "champions were role models for the young and symbols of success" [6]. Unfortunately the involvement of high-class sportsmen in crime coined their new image of 'social bandits'[4]: as Marat puts it, towards the end of the 1980s, "the physically strong criminal figure became a cult image among younger people" [7]. The feeling of impunity among the criminals that was entrenched during Soviet Union survived in post-Soviet times as well. The evident lack of punishment for powerful criminal groups further "corrupted young generation by showing that crime pays and it signifies real power" [8]. Thus during *Perestroika* and the break-up of Soviet Union many young sportsmen, hoping to improve and reinforce their social standing joined 'status communities' revolving around athlete/criminals. Unfortunately, often joining crime groups is the only option for young people.

In this period first groups of racketeers/sportsmen appeared in post-Soviet republics. The funding for sports have been dramatically cut down and many sportsmen

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[2] See for instance Riordan J., 1977 and Shneidman N., The Soviet Road to Olympus: theory and practice of Soviet physical culture and sport, The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1978
[3] South Caucasian republics produced most of these sportsmen
[4] For the comprehensive analysis on social bandits see Hobsbawn E.J., Bandits, The Trinity Press, Worcester, and London, 1969

trained in the use of violence have been left without legitimate income. As Volkov argues, "the withdrawal of state sponsorship and the relaxation of the constraints that had once turned the art of warfare into a rule-governed nonviolent competition were sufficient to launch a dangerous process whereby sportsmen started to look for alternative employment… the shared experience of being one sport team, which involves regular training and competition as well as shared victories and defeats is likely to create strong trust and group coherence… what provides social basis for the conversion of teammates into members of a racketeering gang" [6]. The emergence of sportsmen-criminal groups was particularly evident in Russia, although other newly emerged states also experienced the same problem. For instance the first organised criminal association formed and acting in Estonia was a group of sportsmen operating a protection racket [9]. In Bulgaria first mafia-type structures were the groups connected to the former security police and the intelligence services who used sportsmen trained in special schools [10].

On the other hand, another part of Soviet sportsmen, especially very successful and experienced ones, made sure that post-Soviet transition benefits them. The 'star treatment' of some performers and their inclusion in country's 'honor list' expressed by awarding the supreme award 'the Order of Lenin' to Soviet champions [11] made most successful sportsmen the part of Soviet elites. Consequently some of the sportsmen successfully gained their shares in shadowy privatization deals during post-Soviet transition; others went to politics and have been elected in the legislative bodies, while the others became criminal leaders capitalizing on their vast connections in political and business elites.

Hence, the involvement of sportsmen in organized crime can be divided in three stages that overlap in time although vary according to the degree of sophistication. First, engagement in protection racket in late 80s and early 90s: the respect for discipline and physical force of sportsmen [12] was of paramount importance, especially in the conditions of limited availability of arms in this period. The major weapons were fists and baseball bats in the first violent conflicts between gangs and sportsmen quickly proved their superiority [6]. The situation with weaponry changed soon, however the field of racketeering was already penetrated by criminal-sportsmen. Second, engagement in more sophisticated criminal activities, such as debt recovery, dispute settlement and contract enforcement: as market economy was establishing itself while the state capacity did not develop and remained limited, law enforcement inefficient and courts corrupt, businesspeople started using the services of sportsmen for collecting debts and enforcing contracts. Third, the engagement in political-criminal clans and penetration of state structures: some sportsmen turned into leaders of political-criminal clans, co-opted and recruited representatives of government institutions, especially law enforcement structures and legalized themselves through becoming politically active and winning seats in legislative bodies. The notorious examples are wrestler of Georgian origin Otari Kvantrishvili in Russia and boxer Rysbek Akmatbaev and another wrestler Bayman Erkinbaev in Kyrgyzstan. The latter has moved into highly lucrative drugs business from racketeering and played a crucial role in political and economic life of South Kyrgyzstan before he was assassinated in 2005.

3. Criminal networks and sportsmen in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan

Sportsmen are playing a key role in organized crime in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Successful wrestlers and/or boxers can frequently be found in criminal groups.

The crucial distinction between Georgia and Kyrgyzstan is that sportsmen occupy leading positions in criminal groups in Kyrgyzstan while in Georgia they are mainly subordinated to thieves-in-law and act as operational/field leaders. Thus in Georgia, infamous with its large contribution to the world of Soviet professional criminals (around 33 percent), *vory v zakone* (thieves in law, professional criminal) took the lead, while in Kyrgyzstan known as '*krasnaia respublika*' (red republic)[5] in Soviet times with no significant presence of professional criminals, sportsmen became the main actors in criminal networks. Hence *vory* were already established and their influence was significant in Georgia what also means that thieves' code was widely followed and accepted in the criminal world. The thieves' code denounces '*bespredel'* (in literal translation 'without borders') that can be basically everything, from the point of view of *vory*, what is not regulated by the code of *vory* and limits the influence of professional criminals. For instance, *mentovskyi bespredel* meaning the supremacy of police or *sportivnyi bespredel* implying the "out-of-limit" influence of sportsmen/criminals are familiar terms in *vory*'s code.

Conversely, *vory*'s code was weakly enforced in Kyrgyzstan, what allowed sportsmen to take initiative building on their physical strength. There are no more than 2 thieves in law in Kyrgyzstan.[6] First is Chechen criminal leader Aziz Batukaev, although his title of *vor* is contested since according to some sources he is self-named and never was 'officially' endorsed by professional criminals, what is an essential procedure to obtain the status. Second is Komchy Kolbaev, nominated as thief in law by professional criminals in Moscow in 2006. Interestingly enough Murat Sutalinov, then Minister of Internal Affairs commented that "first Kyrgyz thief in law will bring stability to criminal world to a significant extent and will decrease the number of *bespredelshiks*" [13].

This leads to second point: Georgian thieves in law mainly were trying to infiltrate 'upperworld' i.e. politics and legal business from the very beginning i.e. since the break-up of Soviet Union, for instance *vor* Jaba Ioseliani became President Shevardnadze's deputy in early 90s. However initially Kyrgyz criminals mostly relied on physical intimidation since their main activity was racketeering and they gradually developed into crime groups with political connections.

Third, in Georgia most of the sportsmen have been co-opted by government being rewarded jobs mainly in law enforcement structures. In Kyrgyzstan sportsmen mainly work as bodyguards of politicians or entrepreneurs, however they are not represented in Kyrgyz law enforcement structures to the same extent as in Georgia.

The factor having an important influence on organized crime that is peculiar to Kyrgyzstan, unlike Georgia, is tribalism. Tribalism has had a significant impact on the formation of the political, business and criminal networks in Kyrgyzstan. However the role of tribalism in Kyrgyz organized crime should not be overestimated. The tribes and clans are only providing context for constructing crime groups and sometimes serve as initiating factor in relationships between criminals and politicians. For instance

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[5] Implying the reign of law enforcement structures
[6] as opposed to roughly 400 thieves in law of Georgian origin

famous racketeer Rysbek Akmatbaev's *krysha* was his relative from the same village and tribe - former Minister of Internal Affairs of Kyrgyzstan. Also, family and tribal allegiance play a key role in recruiting, especially key players in criminal networks, but ultimately it is money that keeps these networks intact. Empirical evidence shows that the crime groups are mainly "pragmatic coalitions of convenience" [14] based on material interest. For instance, many member of Jogorku Kenesh have the group of sportsmen in case they need them to advance their political goals. However, all these sportsmen are chiefly on the payroll of deputies regardless presence or absence of relative links [15]. The significance of material interest is also illustrated by several incidents of split between close relatives - collaborators in crime groups, due to the disagreement over division of spoils.

Other divisions affecting the structure of crime groups are also present such as ethnicity and regionalism for instance. In Georgia, mainly ethnic and sub-ethnic differences prevail, for instance Abkhazian, Ossetian and Svanetian crime groups. Likewise in Kyrgyzstan there are Chechen criminal group in North and Uzbek in South. However the importance of North-South divide in Kyrgyz organized crime groups is not clear, mainly because many criminal relationships are initiated in the prison and certainly, the inmates are not divided according to regional belongness in the prisons.

Blood kinship, such as family and relatives are important in both countries. In addition, friendship plays crucial role in the formation of Georgian criminal networks. For instance the infamous paramilitary criminal group "Mkhedrioni" (horsemen) operating in early 90s was formed on the basis of various district *brotherhoods*, that on its side were comprised of the friends living in the same districts/suburbs and brought-up together, for instance *Borotebi* brotherhoods of Vera district. Other criminal gangs were also based on the same principle such as infamous rivals groups *Kulinarielebi* and *Iosebidzelebi* in Saburtalo district of Tbilisi.

Criminals play social role in both societies. They are frequently regarded as protectors of social justice. Leaders of organized crime groups participate in charity activities, especially in constructing religious buildings (mosques in Kyrgyzstan and churches in Georgia) and sport centers. Moreover, they are frequently called local "Robin hoods" since many poor people in their neighborhoods get help from them. The popularity and influence of criminals is reinforced by several cultural factors. For instance there is particular attachment to arms in Georgian case. Like the rest of the Caucasus "a traditional affinity with guns and a romantic attachment to weapons as objects of great symbolic value is an inherent feature". The existence of such a 'gun culture' is confirmed by the fact that guns are often fired into the air in celebration at weddings or births [16]. Additionally in Georgia a male "macho subculture" can be observed predicated on habits of drinking large quantities of alcohol and rough displays of manhood, such as fighting. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan "local culture is accepting male aggression" [17].

The two following sections point out the particularities of Georgian and Kyrgyz organized crime and discuss case studies involving sportsmen/criminals.

3.1. Georgia

Georgia was one of the richest republics of Soviet Union, mainly at the expense of its well-developed shadow economy. The political-business-criminal nexus has already

emerged during the Soviet times, when powerful thieves in law established the relationships with *nomenclatura*-protected 'red directors' of Soviet factories. The world of *vory* was very influential in Georgia and this tiny republic with the population of 5 million (around 2 percent of Soviet population) contributed almost one third to the community of *vory*.[7] After the break-up of Soviet Union, professional criminals got even stronger. The high level of collusion before the "Rose Revolution" allowed them to participate in decision-making processes on government level. They were linked with high-level officials of government and law enforcement structures while official delegations abroad were frequently hosted and assisted by Georgian professional criminals operating out of the country. For instance Tariel Oniani enjoyed extensive links with bureaucrats in Shevardnadze's government, among them the representatives and leaders of local and regional governments, Members of Parliament and high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Interior. He had the shares in private businesses, among them "Airzena", one of the leading Avia companies in Georgia. Oniani even has helped Georgian government in solving internal and external problems. Thus thieves in law owned legitimate companies, were offering protection to private businesses and controlled significant part of underground economy of the country. For the purposes of criminal networks, especially its enforcement goals, *vory* recruited sportsmen and policemen.

However as already mentioned in Georgia most of the sportsmen have been co-opted by government being rewarded jobs mainly in law enforcement structures, especially in Ministry of Interior. For instance, Mikheil Saladze, world champion in wrestling occupied various high-ranking positions in Tbilisi police in late 90s and early 2000. The head of Presidential guard under Shevardnadze was also former wrestler. He owned several businesses and reportedly many of his sports friends were working there. The head of investigation unit of Ministry of State Security in early 2000s was also a wrestler (former champion of Europe). Arguably this was one of the most lucrative positions in the Ministry in terms of vast rent-seeking opportunities. This individual has retired before the 'rose revolution' and reportedly together with other former officials of law enforcement structures has invested good capital earned on bribery in construction and trade sectors [18]. In general all these individuals were helping their fellow sportsmen by recruiting them in law enforcement structures or giving jobs in various businesses they owned. Thus sportsmen can be found in lower rings of police as well: at least 6 policemen are the practicing sportsmen and the world champions in Athletics and Weight Lifting [19].

Interestingly several former officers reported that one sportsman law enforcer used his sport contacts to successfully investigate transnational human kidnapping case. The official of anti-terrorism unit of Ministry of State Security, former junior champion of Europe in wrestling managed to locate kidnapped person in Dagestan through his acquaintances in sport cycles there [20]. On the other hand, some sportsmen working in law enforcement structures were forming criminal ties with other sportsmen, for instance organized crime group of former wrestlers involved in human kidnapping case in 2003. The group comprising, four former wrestlers, among them official of penitentiary department of Ministry of Justice and trainer of sport complex "Martve" kidnapped a child and extorted 70 thousand USD from his parents. The group members

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[7] See for instance Shelley L.I., Georgian organized crime in Shelley et al., Organized crime and corruption in Georgia, Routledge, 2007.

were arrested and convicted in human kidnapping and illegal keeping of weaponry [21].

In general the groups found complicit in sophisticated organized criminal activities in Georgia are mixed groups comprising thieves in law who are usually at the top of hierarchy, sportsmen, acting and former police and security officers and ordinary criminals. These groups are frequently based on blood kinship (family, relatives) and close friendship that makes them difficult to penetrate. The example of this kind of sophisticated organized crime group was detected in Summer of 2005, thanks to increased anti-criminal efforts of the new government brought to power by so-called 'rose revolution'. Three Georgian sportsmen, Aleko Davitashvili, President of the Georgian Wrestling Federation his brother Davit and judo champion Giorgi Revazishvili, has been arrested and convicted on the charges of extortion of USD 8,000 from Greek businessman in Tbilisi [22]. After the court passed decision to imprison the perpetrators their friends, mainly wrestlers and relatives destroyed the court hall and blocked the central Rustaveli Avenue of Tbilisi. Riot police was deployed to the streets first time since the 'rose revolution' and soon police dispersed the demonstration [23]. The arrest of the wrestlers resulted into the protest of other sportsmen. Some of them even refused to take part in preparatory training for the World Championship in wrestling. Nestron Khergiani, two times champion of Europe in judo, stated: "we are not going to wrestle! Let the government officials wrestle instead of us"[24]. Later on, Zviad Zviadauri, Olympic champion in Judo and Dilar Khabuliani, former Minister of Interior and president of Judo Federation apologized to the President Saakashvili for the riots [25].

The wrestlers arrested are a part of organized crime group with international connections. The group is headed by influential thieves in law, including Tariel Oniani having ties with former policemen, such as Davit Kachkachishvili, former head of the Anti-corruption Unit of the Ministry of Interior dismissed after the Rose Revolution [26]. According to Georgian press and government officials, the riots were managed from the prison by Davit Karseladze alias Kalatoza, relative of Tariel Oniani's wife, former wrestler and wrestling trainer, operational leader of the crime group [27]. Kalatoza does not have a status of thief-in-law, although enjoys great authority in the criminal world. Significant part of the money that was mobilized through racketeering and extortion activities of his crime group, was diverted to him in the prison. Part of the money was going to *obshiak*,[8] also through Kalatoza. The group was also engaged in kidnapping, robberies and selling illegally trafficked cars from Europe in Georgia. For instance, Kalatoza used the sportsmen to extort the money from the drivers of *marshutka* (micro-buses) and to force entrepreneurs to give up their shares in companies and officially transmit them to him. One entrepreneur running a factory producing construction materials was paying 15 percent of his incomes to Kalatoza's group [28]. The same group was involved in the attack on Post Bank in Tbilisi in 2004 and seizing 80 thousand laris (roughly 40 thousand USD) [29].

Despite significant anti-crime efforts of Saakashvili government Kalatoza remains influential up to these days. For instance, the candidate supported by him has won the local elections in Gamarjveba, his home village near Tbilisi in 2006. He is still popular

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[8] Criminal cash desk. The funds gathered in Obshiak are used for several purposes: they are sent to prisons for the care of incarcerated fellow professional criminals; used for bribing officials in and outside of the prison; or used for planning and implementing new criminal activities.

among the population of this village [30]. In general organized crime groups, especially thieves in law became much weaker since the 'rose revolution' of 2003, however they remain powerful elsewhere, especially in Russia.

3.1.1. Georgian sportsmen and organized crime in Russia

The decade of Georgia's independence brought increased internalization of organized crime, Georgian crime groups being active in Russia, Europe[9] and beyond. Georgian organized crime has been particularly strong in Russia.

Georgian thieves in law, known as *lavrushniki* (bay leaves, which are grown in the Caucasus) in Russian, first established a presence in Russia in the 1970s, initially through contacts made in Soviet prisons with other criminals, underground entrepreneurs and even Soviet dissidents. The Georgian criminals, very able at networking, quickly established themselves in Russia and soon became one of the most powerful organised crime groups in that republic [31].

The development of Russian-based Georgian organised crime along this path is perhaps well illustrated by the career of Otari Kvantrishvili. Kvantrishvili, who was born in Western Georgia, was probably the most renowned and influential Georgian criminal authority operating in Russia in the 1980s and 1990s. A successful athlete in his youth, in the early 1980s he worked as a wrestling trainer, making contacts with other athletes that he would later recruit for criminal activities. Kvantrishvili first worked as a pimp, collecting fees from prostitutes working in several hotels around Moscow. Soon, he managed to establish contacts and gain influence and control over some of the major criminal groups in Moscow at the time, such as the *liubertskaia*, *solntsevskaia*, *baumanskaia*, *balashkhinskaia* and *dolgoprudnenskaia*. His criminal empire grew in the late 1980s and early 1990s to include eight joint ventures, 12 cooperatives, four banks and five casinos in Moscow and beyond. Capitalising on his extensive contacts among Russia's political and economic elites, Kvantrishvili even considered establishing a political party – Sportsmen of Russia [31]. He was shot by a professional killer in April 1994.

Another notorious sportsman, close ally of Kvantrishvili, and still influential in Russia is Mikheil Mamiashvili. He is three-times a World and a Europe champion in wrestling, president of All-Russia Wrestling Federation since 1998 vice-president of the Russian Olympic Committee.[10] Mamiashvili was accused of links with various criminal groups in Russia as well as in Japan [32]. However allegations have never been confirmed. Despite of absence of any formal charges against him, Mamiashvili is considered as one of the 20 or so most influential godfather figures in the Russian mafia and is repeatedly denied entrance in Western countries, including US and Finland [33] .

In general, some Georgian criminal groups have actively penetrated Russian economic and political circles in order to facilitate operations and avoid prosecution. Kyrgyz organized crime has been more confined to national borders until chaotic trade in illicit drugs with no white collar involvement in early 90s has been substituted with organized trade by sophisticated criminal groups with political connections. These

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[9] On Georgian crime groups in Europe see Kupatadze A., Georgian organised crime groups spread in Europe, Janes Intelligence Review, April 2006

[10]   For   his   profile   see   official   site   of   Federation   of   Martial   Sports, http://2003.wrestrus.ru/xml/t/fila.xml?lang=en&pid=42

groups have also shown signs of increasing transnationalization. The following section discusses criminal networks in Kyrgyzstan and demonstrates the greater role for sportsmen as opposed to Georgian case.

3.2. Kyrgyzstan

As already mentioned criminal networks in Kyrgyzstan share some characteristics with Georgian counterparts, although they are somehow different due to the country specifics. According to Osmanaliev, the groups of criminal-sportsmen consist of former and acting sportsmen, mainly fighters, wrestlers and boxers that are engaged in racketeering and fraud. On the other hand, leaders of criminal groups use sportsmen as *boeviks* (fighters) for committing crimes and for negotiations between criminal groupings [34]. Thus there are the groups composed of only sportsmen as well as mixed groups. For instance, the group of Almaz Bokushev discussed below is mainly composed of sportsmen, while the group of Aibek Mirsidikov, alias Chornyi Aibek in Jalalabad comprises former sportsmen as well as former inmates [35]. Certainly some of these links between sportsmen and inmates have been established in the prisons.

After the breakup of Soviet Union, sportsmen got involved in currency exchange business. They did not recognize any authority and basically challenged anybody who would try to oppose them [36]. First detected case of sport-crime relationship in Kyrgyzstan that got extensive media coverage was the arrest of Andrei Kurniavki, champion of Europe in boxing, in the airport of Hanover, Germany in 1998, with 3 kg of Afghan heroine. He was sentenced to 7.5 years of imprisonment [37].

Another case in mid 90s concerns the Karabalta group, self-named the "Karabalta sports community", in North of Kyrgyzstan that is still powerful up to nowadays. Head of the group is Almaz Bokushev, a graduate from the Kyrgyz State Institute of Psychical Culture and former wrestler and his group members are qualified sport trainers, acting and former sportsmen [38].

In 1996 the members of the group were arrested on the charges of robbery, assaults and rackets of large scale enterprises. The group was racketeering several enterprises that were engaged in wholesale trade of wheat flour, sugar and spirits. In case of JSC "Bakai", sportsmen were also extorting money from the clients, sometimes even chasing them on the highways and taking away part of the goods as their 'share'. The court admitted the presence of organized crime group and sentenced the convicts for the racketeering. However several charges have been dropped since some of the witnesses refused to uphold previous arguments and the evidence, such as arms, were not found. The court sentenced 7 members of the group to imprisonment (ranging from 1.5 to 3 years) [39], however having spent several days in a police isolation cell, the members of the group were freed, and criminal cases were presumably closed on unknown grounds [40]. According to several analysts, Almaz Bokushev is linked and protected by his relatives - former Minister of Internal Affairs, and his brother, currently member of Jogorku Kenesh [41]. He enjoys significant prestige within the sports community, youth environment and in Kara-Balta city [42]. Nowadays the group numbers 25 individuals, although if needed Bokushev can allegedly gather 200 armed fighters [43]. They control smuggling of wheat, alcoholic beverages and fuel from Kazakhstan [44].

The Karabalta group was a rival of another very influential criminal in North, Rysbek Akmatbaev. Rysbek, also a graduate of the Kyrgyz State Institute of Psychical

Culture and former boxer and boxing trainer [45], became the most influential criminal authority in the North of the country until he was assassinated in 2006. Rysbek managed to garner support of the majority of sportsmen in early 90s and recruited many boxers, wrestlers and other sportsmen trained in martial sports. The relatives of famous sportsmen were also members of his crime group, such as son of Satimkul Jumanazarov, silver medallist in Olympic marathon [46].

Initially Rysbek started by racketeering the businessmen in Issyk kul region in North and afterwards gradually expanded his influence to Bishkek and parts of South Kyrgyzstan. Some of his regional representatives were also former sportsmen, such as Abdumalik Jumabai, known as burr walnut [11] smuggler in Jalalabad [47]. Rysbek became very influential in late 90s and early 2000s and contributed to the ouster of President Akaev, what is now called 'tulip revolution'. After the "revolution", Rysbek's brother Tynychbek Akmatbaev, MP and chairman of the legislature's committee on defense and security was killed during a visit to a penal colony outside Bishkek. Rysbek accused Prime Minister Feliks Kulov of complicity in the killing and subsequently organized demonstrations in the capital demanding the premier's removal. High ranking officials, including President Bakiev were obliged to negotiate with the criminal boss. Importantly, on these demonstrations many young men wearing sport outfits could be seen, who mainly arrived from Issyk-kul oblast as well as from sports center "Hermes" [48], controlled by Rysbek. Soon Rysbek openly declared about his political ambitions, ran for the seat in Jogorku Kenesh and won elections, although was assassinated in May 2006.

The sportsmen are continuously used by politicians in power as well as in opposition for advancing their goals. One can observe their presence on nearly every political demonstration. This is exacerbated by the continuing instability of the political scene. Numerous anti-government demonstrations have created the conditions when many politicians are still in need of the services of sportsmen and criminal groups. Marat argues "today, most parliamentarians are able to gather the instant support of 100 to 400 sportsmen to organize mass demonstrations to secure their own political positions" [17]. For instance, during the elections in one of the districts in Osh region for a seat in Jogorku Kenesh, the skirmish was reported between two groups of sportsmen supporting the rival candidates [49].

A local observer noticed several criminal/sportsmen, allegedly practitioners of sambo (Russian freestyle wrestling and mixed martial arts, aka sombo, cambo), participating in the April 2007 demonstrations organized by opponents of President Bakiev [50]. On the other side, according to foundation for tolerance international, about 1500 supporters of Bakiev, mainly youth, sportsmen and women [51] were mobilized in Jalalabad and sent to Bishkek for counter-demonstrations.

The sportsmen communities were also actively used during 'tulip revolution' in March 2005. After the rigged elections, Bayman Erkinbaev, sportsman, member of Jogorku Kenesh and drug baron of South (he will be discussed in next section) has gathered 2,000 young people from martial arts sport clubs - Alysh (traditional wrestling) clubs. They stormed state offices in Jalal-Abad and Osh [52]. Rysbek Akmatbaev also participated in anti-government demonstrations together with his

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[11] According to gazeta.kg, burr walnut (*kap* in Russian) is mainly available in South Kyrgyzstan and represents most valuable material for making furniture (http://www.gazeta.kg/week/2006/06/29/wood/).

supporter sportsmen. Also other individuals linked to sports and loyal to opposition recruited sportsmen in North.[12]

The sportsmen were mobilized by incumbents as well. So-called '*belokepochniki'* (men in white caps) were used for two purposes: first, for instigating fights with the purpose of using force against "violent" revolutionaries and disperse them. Ironically, the very provocation resulted in outrageous response from the demonstrators and consequent storming of White House one day prior to the planned date [53]. Second, these groups of sportsmen were used by ousted authorities to discredit 'revolutionaries': after Akaev's government was ousted *belokepochniki* allegedly engaged in marauding supermarkets and trading centers in Bishkek.

Reportedly *belokepochniki* were organized by some military official in Bishkek, former sportsman [54] together with another former sportsman, businessman and member of Jogorku Kenesh Jirgalbek Surabaldiev [55]. Roza Otunbaeva, one of the opposition leaders directly accused the latter in organizing disorders. Surabaldiev was the first member of Jogorku Kenesh in the history of Kyrgyzstan to be assassinated.

Surabaldiev graduated from state institute of physical culture and since 1980 he was a trainer and later director of boarding school for Olympic reserve. In 1998 he went to business and being an ally of President Akaev, eventually was elected in the parliament in 2005 with the support of "Alga Kyrgyzstan", political party headed by President's daughter.[13] In the elections Surabaldiev was also supported by the same military official mentioned above. Around 800 militaries were transported to Bishkek in order to vote for him [56]. At the same time Surabladiev was the chairman of judo association in Bishkek [57] as well as president of "Union of Entrepreneurs" [58], that was created by initiative of President Akaev. Besides, several allegations suggest that he was linked with organized crime, being criminal authority himself [59]. Several MPs have left the legislative body in protest against Surabaldiev when he was swearing in as parliamentarian. MP Sherniazov stated that he was not able "to work in bandits' parliament" [60].

Surabaldiev was shot in June 2005 in downtown Bishkek, just 200 meters from the Ministry of Interior. Two main versions appeared about the possible causes of his assassination. First, redivision of spoils in 'post-revolutionary' period: Surabaldiev was considered as one of the most successful entrepreneurs in Kyrgyzstan and owned two large automobile markets and ceramic factory. After his death, Elvira Surabaldieva his daughter alleged that the new authorities have applied pressure on him to give up the business [61]. Elvira continuously reported about the pressure after she took over some of his father's businesses [62]. Second, political motives were behind the assassination since Surabaldiev was insider for previous regime and main organizer of '*belokepochniki'*. The first version sounded more credible for everyone, including law enforcement; however investigation had no real outcomes. In March of 2007, close associate of Rysbek Akmatbaev was accused in Surabaldiev's assassination, however the charges could not be confirmed [63]. Arguably, several high-ranking officials heavily involved in redistribution of spoils after 'tulip revolution' used criminals to get rid of Surabaldiev.

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[12] For instance see the diaries of activist of 'tulip revolution' - Iskander Sharsheev: kak I bil revolutsionerom, July 28, 2005, available at http://www.kg-ordo.net/system/article/printarticle.php?sid=586 .

[13] For his profile see http://karakg.net/hu/?per=surabaldievzhyrgalbek .

Another notorious case of assassination in 'post-revolutionary' Kyrgyzstan involved famous sportsman Raatbek Sanatbaev. Sanatbaev, famous Greco-roman wrestler, master of sports and deputy director of the State Center for Olympic training, was killed in Bishkek in January 2006. Sanatbaev owned some businesses in Bishkek and Jalalbad in South although had no criminal record and according to numerous sources was not linked to any organized crime group. However he was one of the candidates for the position of the chairman of National Olympic Committee (NOC). Other candidates included several MPs, officials of executive government and Rysbek Akmatbaev. Interestingly the later took over the chairmanship of fencing federation, even though he had no relations with this sport discipline, in order to have a right of running for NOC chairmanship [64]. Kyrgyz press and friends and relatives of Sanatbaev has immediately linked Sanatbaev's assassination with the struggle over this position [65] as opposed to official version of law enforcement structures that Santbaev could be killed as a result of criminal negotiations [66].

In late January police has arrested Aldoiar Ismankulov, head of unit fighting organized crime of SNB, security service of Kyrgyzstan (successor of KGB). Police found weaponry and drugs in his car. The additional search of his house recovered an arm that can be used in assassination of Sanatbaev [67] what was unofficially confirmed later. Under pressure of SNB, the police was not allowed to search Ismankulov's working place and his case was soon taken away from Ministry of Interior and sent to Military Prosecutor's office. The latter released Ismankulov under suspicious circumstances. [14] Later the Bishkek court dropped all charges against Ismankulov, including illegal keeping of arms and drugs. Several members of Jogorku Kenesh and other officials have officially addressed the court demanding his release [69]. Moreover the policemen who arrested Ismankulov were later sued for abuse of power and falsification of evidence against Ismankulov [70].

It appears that Ismankulov had a fake name and in fact he was Aleksei Kim, son of rector of State Academy for Physical Culture and Sport and relative of deputy chair of Security Council of Kyrgyzstan [71]. Interestingly Kim/Ismankulov had criminal record: in 1996 he was arrested on the charges of robbery together with M. Konoev, [15] close associate and relative of Rysbek Akmatbaev. Also importantly, Ismankulov/Kim became the head of organized crime fighting unit under Tashtimir Aitbaev, then Minister of Security Service, *krysha* of Rysbek Akmatbaev [72]. After the incident, President Bakiev was obliged to dismiss the latter as well as the deputy chair of the country's Security Council, Vyacheslav Khan [73].

The last case illustrates several interesting points: first, the members of organized crime groups were working on leading position in law enforcement structures; second, organized crime groups used them in eliminating their rivals and third most relevant for the subject of this paper, the official structures of national sports have become highly corrupt involving the interests of organized crime.

The chairmanship of National Olympic Committee of Kyrgyzstan was always highly contested and attracted the attention of various political-criminal clans. Aidar Akaev, son of ousted President, became the chairman in 2004 forcefully obliging

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[14] Akipress, February 3, 3006. [68]
[15] MVD obvnilo SNB v sviazakh s kriminalom, Fergana.ru., January 25, 2006; Konoev was assassinated in April 2007.

Eshmin Kutmanaliev previous president to step down [73]. The board formed under him comprised 58 members, among them only 19 were actual sportsmen – participants of Olympic games [74]. After 'tulip revolution' Bayman Erkinbaev, notorious criminal and drugs trafficker took over and headed the committee until he was assassinated in September of the same year.

The question can be asked why NOC attracts the high-profile people, among them criminals when the chairman's salary is 800 USD [73] and its annual budget is only 205 thousand US dollars, moreover the chairman has no personal access to the bank account of the organization [74]. Arguably some of the money can be stolen, like it happened in 2004-5 when 59 thousand US dollars went unaccounted; [75] however the sum is not significant enough to attract very affluent individuals, like Aidar Akaev or Bayman Erkinabev. It can be argued that firstly the chairmanship of NOC is considered to be highly prestigious position and is an outlet to good publicity, secondly criminals and politicians consolidate their control over sportsmen that proved to be valuable asset in advancing one's own agenda and most importantly NOC serves as very convenient way of money laundering. Means of embezzlement may include false invoices, fictional purchases of trainers and players, hidden honoraria and intermediate payments regarding transfers, transfer of funds to tax havens and etc. Most importantly sport lends itself particularly well to trafficking in different currencies in cash form to launder the money for criminal activities. In its 1996-7 report the GAFI (Financial Group for Action on laundering Capital) indicated that illegal gaming including sport betting and criminal financing were clearly expanding.[16] Money laundering through sports has been a particular problem in Kyrgyzstan, since criminal leaders involved in drugs trade have been linked with national sports and national Olympic committee.

3.2.1.   Sport clubs and drugs trafficking in South Kyrgyzstan

The development of crime-sport relationship and illegal trade in drugs in Southern Kyrgyzstan is largely associated with the name of Bayman Erkinbaev. Erkinbaev was a wrestler and started his criminal career as a racketeer, although soon managed to get control over lucrative drugs business as well as sectors of legal economy in the region. Thus he controlled several markets/bazaars including Karasuu market in Ferghana Valley, one of the largest in Central Asia. Bayman became a Member of Parliament in 2005 despite close to 40 criminal cases [76] raised against him since 1991, although neither of them had any follow-up. Interestingly Bayman received highest number of votes (95,45 %) than any other candidate in Kyrgyzstan [77]. Supposedly major election fraud would greatly contribute to this number, although this still speaks about the public endorsement of Bayman in Osh.

Erkinbaev played a major role in public uprising in South that resulted in 'tulip revolution' of March 2005. He provided logistics for the demonstrations and contributed financially as well. Reportedly Bayman was trying to defend and expand his business in this way. Interestingly, unlike Bishkek no looting has occurred in Osh after 'tulip revolution" due to Bayman's efforts and his ability to control the situation, according to local residents [78].

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[16] Some of the money laundering practices in European sports is discussed in Andreff W., Financing Modern Sport in the Face of a Sporting Ethic, European Journal for Sport Management, vol. 7, N 1, November 2000, pp. 5-30.

Bayman's popularity reached its peak during the March events and afterwards before he was assassinated in September 2005 when Erkinbaev became actual governor of the region. In this period the slogans like "Bayman is our *batir* (hero)" and "Bayman is the hero of Kyrgyz nation" were common in Osh and Batken [79], his home district. He controlled the personnel policy of regional and city administrations as well as law enforcement structures in "post-revolutionary" phase. Some of his former appointees still hold on power despite their increasing animosities with central government in Bishkek, for instance Kushbak Tezekbaev, former school teacher of physical culture and an activist of 'tulip revolution' allegedly having links with organized crime and being involved in smuggling [80].

 Main pillar of Bayman's power were sportsmen, the practitioners of Alysh, national wrestling. The wrestling club and his members hold one of the leading position in Central Asian wrestling. They frequently win the competitions in various types of wrestling on national, regional as well as international level. Bayman was he President of International Federation of Wrestling on Belts Alysh headquartered in Osh and also active in Bishkek. There is no exact statistics of Alysh practitioners, although it was estimated that Bayman could gather more than 2000 sportsmen in case of need and he had 400 strong sportsmen group always mobilized, just in case[81]. More recent estimations include 500 members of Osh club and 300 in Bishkek [82]. Some of these sportsmen were found to be involved in various criminal activities, for instance Sapar Akanov, golden medalist of first Asian Alysh championship was involved in the shootout in front of the hotel belonging to Bayman in August 2005 [83]. Reportedly after Bayman's assassination many sportsmen from his group were sent to jail and others found refuge in neighboring countries, yet others were mobilized by Bayman's wife and his several other associates [84].

Reportedly Bayman's main source of income was drugs trafficking and he had extensive cooperative relationships with Tajik and Uzbek criminal authorities in transnational drugs trafficking business [85]. Arguably the money derived from drugs trade was laundered through Alysh federation. For instance, Bayman organized World Alysh Championship in 2002 in Osh where he brought mainly students from Bishkek who had nothing to do with wrestling [86]. Interestingly enough Alysh federation was mostly active in the countries that lie on major drugs trafficking routes such as Russia and Lithuania. These two countries, together with Turkey and Iran have hosted Alysh world championships.[17] Interestingly, heroin is smuggled into Lithuania by the Silk Road from Central Asia via Russia [87]. Hence it can be argued that Alysh federation was used for facilitation of drugs trafficking as well as for laundering money deriving from illicit drugs trade.

Bayman was assassinated by professional killers in September 2005. Much of his business was taken over by Sanjar Kadiraliev, who was a long-standing competitor of Bayman. Kadiraliev, now a youngest member of Jogorku Kenesh, is former sportsman-boxer and racketeer. He has been legalized through the support of his protectors on the highest level of Kyrgyz bureaucracy. The local police official mentioned that when Sanjar became an MP, his group was taken out off the police watch list [88]. Before being elected to Jogorku Kenesh, Kadiraliev was a manager of sport complex "Turbaza" and head of the crime group "Sanjar and Kanjar" based on the territory of

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[17] For more details see the website of Alysh federation http://www.wrestling-belts.org/index2.php

this sport complex [89]. Interestingly, in 2005 Sanjar and Kanjar group, together with another criminal group in Osh, was conducting 'educative work' with youth, involving teenagers and training them in fight tactics and strategy [90].

In general, there is a trend of opening sports complexes intended for training young men (mainly of high school age) in martial arts skills. The trend was initiated by Erkinbaev who built first such sport complex. In summer 2005, another parliamentarian with alleged links to organized crime opened a sports complex in Osh city [90]. Another MP, allegedly leader of Uzbek organized crime group in South, was running a "sport and health enhancement center" comprising 300 sportsmen in 2000-2005 [92]. Certainly these schools and training centers are used for recruiting younger members to criminal groups.

4. Conclusions

First crime groups of sportsmen emerged during *Perestroika* and after the break up of USSR. The sportsmen first filled in the niche of racketeering and then gradually developed to more sophisticated criminals and even the leaders of political-criminal clans. The degree of sportsmen' representation in criminal networks of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan is different. Three main factors, first the extent of presence and influence of thieves in law, second, the extent of reliance on physical intimidation and third, the extent of sportsmen' recruitment in state structures determined the degree of sportsmen' representation in criminal networks. In Georgia sportsmen were mainly recruited by law enforcement structures and few joined crime groups that were led by professional criminals. In Kyrgyzstan sportsmen took the initiative and became the leaders of crime groups.

The following variables delineate the engagement of young male sportsmen in organized crime:

- Lack of opportunities during post-Soviet transition of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan;

- The importance of physical force for organized crime groups. Organized crime groups frequently use violence or threat of violence. The young male sportsmen are particularly needed for aggression and intimidation;

- Chaos and instability on political scene. Instability on political scene and extensive links between politicians and criminals increase the chances of young male sportsmen to be recruited in criminal groups. The groups of sportsmen are widely used by politicians for securing their political position in Kyrgyzstan.

- Penetration of official structures of national sports. These structures are largely corrupted and used for money laundering, involving illicit money from drugs business. The leaders of crime groups consolidate their power over sportsmen through penetration of various sports federations.

- Social role of criminals. In Georgia and Kyrgyzstan criminals frequently participate in charity activities, including building sport centers, financing various sport activities what eventually leads to the recruitment of young male sportsmen in criminal networks;

Popularity among population. Criminals are frequently considered as local 'Robin Hoods' in the two countries being the guards of social justice. This image makes the criminal groups under their leadership attractive for young male sportsmen; This is reinforced by local cultural factors. First, local cultures are accepting of male aggression. Second, there is particular attachment to the weapons, especially in the Caucasus.

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DRUGS, DRUG RELATED CRIMES, YOUTH AND PREVENTION IN TURKEY

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TUBIM

Abstract. This paper demonstrates the institutional approach to drugs and drug related problems as well as drug prevention methods in Turkey. Drug related problems have many dimensions and each could affect and trigger each other. From production to trafficking, street level drug selling to drug usage, and narco-terror, drugs pose a significant threat to societies. Institutions play an important role to cope with those problems; however, different dimensions could be related to the responsibilities of different institutions. Institutional cooperation at the national and international level is an important way to overcome those problems. In the second part, this paper presents an example of national and international cooperation to reduce the problem of drugs in the society.

Keywords. Drug, prevention, Turkey, trafficking, terrorism

1. Introduction

Drugs and drug usage have become an problem for Turkey in recent years. A recent report indicates a 37.3% increase in the number of people who are treated in the treatment centers in 2006 comparing with the previous year [1]. The same report also indicates significant increases in the number of drug seizures in Turkey. In terms of the trends in drug use several studies report increases, however comparing with the European average and several EU countries, the drug use in Turkey is still at the lowest level [2]. Because of the relevant increase in drug use Turkey, a transit country for many addictive substances, started to be also a target country mainly because of her geographical location. There are also increases in drug-related crimes and in the number of suspects taken into custody.

Drug related problems are not one dimensional. There are so many reasons for people to use, for other people to sell, and so many others to involve in trafficking. Since the problem is multi-dimensional, the fight against drugs must also involve different institutions at the national as well as international level. Inter-organizational cooperation must be ensured and the fight against drugs must be conducted in coordination. A policy and a strategy covering all dimensions of the problem is the most essential element in an efficient fight against drugs. Another important issue to combat

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drug trafficking and drug abuse is international level cooperation among law enforcement agencies and cross country comparisons of best practices to decrease the drug usage problem.

Drugs are also related to different types of crimes, and became a main financial resource for illegal activities including activities of terrorist groups. McBride and McCoy [3] indicate that despite the fact that in the public mind, the relationship between drugs and crime is often seen as fairly straightforward- with drug use being viewed as directly causing criminal behavior- critical research analysis has indicated that the relationship is conceptually and empirically quite complex.

This paper demonstrates the problem of drugs and drug usage in Turkey and explores the institutional responses to the problem at the national and international level. In the second part, this study demonstrates the connection between drug trafficking and other crimes specifically terrorism and lastly presents an example of international cooperation in the field drugs. Focusing on the drugs terrorism nexus this paper also presents a theoretical model to study drug crime relationship.

2. Drug Trafficking and Drug Use in Turkey

UNODC 2007 world Drug Report [4] states that around 92 percent of the world's heroin comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan. Europe is the primary target for the trafficking of heroin and other opium derivates. EMCDDA 2007 report [5] also indicates that heroin consumed in Europe is predominantly manufactured in Afghanistan, which remains the world leader in illicit opium supply. Several opiate (heroin, morphine and opium in heroin equivalents) trafficking routes have been identified from Afghanistan to Europe in recent UNODC report. EMCDDA 2007 report also indicates that heroin enters Europe by two major trafficking routes.

"The historically important, and shortest, Balkan route continues to play a crucial role in heroin smuggling. Following transit through Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, the route then diverges into a southern branch through Greece, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, Italy, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina and a northern branch through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands; the latter operating as a secondary distribution centre to other western European countries." [6].

Table-1 Amount of Heroin Seized in Countries Situated on the Balkan Route.

Country	Amount of Heroin (Grams)		
	2003	**2004**	**2005**
Albania	114.475	138.000	40.945
Austria	42.876	235.032	-
Bosnia-Herzegovina	-	-	68.627
Bulgaria	778.637	828.931	436.867
Croatia	85.727	114.431	27.680
Iran	3.327.000	4.715.000	5.553.000
Hungary	256.334	84.925	287.047
Romania	320.700	65.406	285.070
Serbia Montenegro	278.760	474.430	359.579
Turkey	**4.704.736**	**8.847.170**	**8.212.000**
Greece	246.719	-	331.342
Total	**10.155.964**	**15.503.325**	**15.602.157**

Source: Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime 2006 Annual report.

As it is also stated above Turkey is located as a transit country on the Balkan route which is mainly used for heroin trafficking. Overall there is an increase in the amount of heroin seized by the countries situated on the Balkan route by 52,6% when compared with the total amount seized in the year 2003. Among the countries which are located in the same route, Turkey made the most of the seizures between 2003 and 2005 (see Table– 1).

Turkey made the 14% of the world's heroin and 7% of opiate seizures in 2005 (UNODC, 2007). The total amount of drug seizures in Turkey is equivalent nearly to the half of all seizures in Europe (see Graph-1).

Graph-1 Heroin Seizers Turkey and EU countries compared.

	2002	2003	2004	2005
Turkey	2535	4704	8844	8195
EU	9209	8057	9297	8979

Source: Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime 2006 Annual report.

 In terms of drug use, Turkey still considers itself as a low prevalence country. However, there are indicators showing a relative increase in young population drug use, nonetheless those indicators cannot be proven statistically since there is a lack of research and a comprehensive survey on this matter. There is a unique data set collected by the Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM) which provides an estimation on drug use in the general population. However this data only reflects the people who are arrested by police because of drug related crimes, where the participation to the survey is voluntary. Despite its weaknesses this data set provides the best available data to identify the nature of drug use in Turkey.

According to the most recent KOM Drug Arrestees data (N=911 in 2007) the mean age of people who are arrested by the police because of drug related crimes is 30.87 and the mode is 24 (6% of all cases). Graph-2 shows the age groups of all drugs arrestees (arrests made by the police) in 2007. Almost 64% of all drug arrestees are between the ages of 23 and 39. Among the same age group (23-39) 52% currently smokes cigarette and 27% drinks alcohol regularly, and at the same time 51% of them smoked marijuana recently. Heroin usage in the same age group (23-39) is 10%, which corresponds to the 71% of all heroin usage.[†]

[†] Total Heroin usage for all ages is 14% and heroin usage of ages 23-39 is 10%. 10/14x100=71.42 gives the percentage of herion usage for ages 23-39.

Graph-2 Age Groups of Drug Arrestees in 2007

Most ecstasy users (92%) and marijuana smokers also smoke cigarette (73.3%), but cigarette smoking among heroin users (13.2%) is lower than both ecstasy and marihuana users. Almost 49% of users started using marijuana because of curiosity and 20.1% of them with peer pressure, 13% as a result of family problems. On the other hand 38% of heroin users state that they started using heroin because of curiosity, 33% because of their peers and 16% because of family problems. Forty seven percent of ecstasy users started because of curiosity, 17% of them because of their friends, 13.3% because of their personal problems and 11% family problems. Table-2 shows the reasons to start marihuana, heroin and ecstasy use.

	Types of Drugs		
Reasons to Start	**Marijuana**	**Ecstasy**	**Heroin**
Curiosity	48.5%	47%	40%
Family Problems	13.1%	11%	16%
Personal Problems	11%	13.3%	2.6%
Boy/GirlFriend	1%	1.2%	3.4%
Friends	20.1%	17%	33.6%
Recreational (Entertainment)	3%	6%	1.7%
Trapped	0%	1.2%	0.9%
Easy to Access	0.1%	0%	0%
Cheap	0.1%	0.1%	0%
Other	1.2%	1.2%	30%
Don't Know	2.1%	2.4%	12%

Table-2 Reasons to start using Marijuana, Ecstasy and Heroin

Most people, especially heroin users consume drugs at their own houses or in abandoned buildings. There is also significant number of people stated that they use drugs at other places which are not listed in the questionnaire. Table-3 shows where people prefer to use drugs.

	Types of Drugs		
Places to Use Drugs	**Marijuana**	**Ecstasy**	**Heroin**
School	0.4%	0%	0%
Disco-Bars	4.1%	17%	2.6%
My House	33.2%	31.1%	50%
Friends House	6%	7.2%	2.6%
House of a Relative	0.6%	0%	0%
Abandoned Places	39%	30.1%	35.3%
Other	16.3%	13.3%	9.5%
Don't Know	1%	1.2%	0%

Table-3 Places to Use Marijuana, Ecstasy and Heroin

2.1. Other Studies on Drugs Use

In 2002 Turkish Psychological Association conducted a survey (n=7681) in order to understand the prevalence in the general population. In this study the sample was drawn in stratified multistage method. Point prevalence of substance use other than alcohol and nicotine in cigarette form was 0.3% (n=25); prevalence of substance use at least once in life-time was 1.2% (n=97). Mean age of first drug use was 16.6 ± 3.0. Cannabis (marijuana) was the most frequently used substance (60%); oral nicotine use (20%), antidepressant abuse (12%) and unidentified drug use (8%) followed cannabis.

The above mentioned survey had been carried on a contract basis between MoH and Turkish Association of Psychologists (a non-governmental organization) and realized on home basis. This survey is also the first one covering the country.

Another study – "National Study on Assessment of the Nature and Extent of Drug Abuse in Turkey" – in this field has been completed in 2003 under the coordination of UNODC and with the cooperation of related public institutions in 6 large provinces of Turkey, namely, Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, İzmir, İstanbul and Samsun. The aim of the Study in question is to provide complete information on drug use in Turkey through a comprehensive analysis of different geographical regions of the country. The sub studies conducted in line with the National Study are as follows: (a) Key Person Survey (b) Drug User Survey (c) Alcohol, Tobacco and Substance Use Student Survey (d) Ecstasy and Other Rave Party Substances Focus Groups (e) Information Need and Resource Analysis.

According to the date and information collected during the assessments the ratio of the opiates users among the Turkish population between the ages 15 and 64 varies between 0.03 % and 0.07 % (average 0.05%); and the ratio of the volatile substance users among the same section of the population varies between 0.03% and 0.09% (average 0.06%). It is estimated that more than two thirds of the opiates addicts use heroin. Besides the notified illicit substances, there are data showing that other types of substances are also used in the different regions of Turkey. Furthermore the figures mentioned are not exact figures, but estimates and do not reflect the general situation in Turkey, but mirror the drug use in large provinces of Turkey.

3. Institutional Strategies and Policies

Institutional level strategies to combat drugs require a multi-agency cooperation and multi-dimensional approach; therefore it is necessary for the institutions and agencies to work closely and in collaboration. In Turkey several institutions work together both in the fields of reducing drug supply, rehabilitation and prevention. The National Drugs Strategy Document grants TUBIM (Turkish Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug addiction) the authority of coordination to perform the fight against drugs in Turkey among several agencies. The national structure of coordination among agencies in Turkey presented in Figure-1.

Figure-1 National Structure of Coordination

4.   Institutions in the Field of Supply Reduction

In Turkey, several institutions are responsible to combat drug trafficking and other crimes related to drugs. Those agencies are; the Turkish National Police under the Ministry of Interior, General Command of the Gendarmerie, Coast Guard Command and the Undersecretary for Customs under the Office of the Prime Ministry. Furthermore, Department for Anti-Trafficking Intelligence and Data Gathering (KİHBİ) working under the Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the Foreign Ministry continuously support the counter efforts.

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the Directorate General for Turkish Grain Board are in charge of legal production of opium; Directorate General for Medical Drugs and Pharmaceutics, Ministry of Health is in charge of the supervision of controlled chemicals and psychotropic substances; Tobacco and Alcohol Market Supervisory Board (TAPDK) is in charge of the production and control of tobacco and alcohol products; Directorate General for Treatment Services, Ministry of Health, Department of Probation and Health Services, Directorate General for Prisons and Detention Houses, Ministry of Justice and the University Hospitals are in charge of the treatment services; and Ministry of National Education, Directorate General for Youth and Sports, Directorate General for Social Services and Child Protection Agency, Directorate General for Primary Health Care Services, Ministry of Health, security agencies under the Interior Ministry, Turkish Radio and Television Broadcasting Authority (TRT), Supreme Radio and Television Board (RTÜK) are in charge of the preventive measures. In addition to those, non-governmental organizations, municipalities and universities also conduct preventive activities in the field of drug use.

4.1. National Strategies, Planning and Implementation

The reasons and consequences of drug use and addiction relates to many disciplines and agencies. It is necessary to act in a systematic, integrated and multi-discipline approach for the constitution of policies, strategy and action plans to direct preventive, protective, treatment and rehabilitating studies in this field. This approach has been reinforced with the foundation of TUBIM in the year 2004. TUBIM became the national focal point of the EMCDDA and also national coordination center of all works relevant to drugs. One of the important document developed by TUBIM is the "National Policy and Strategy Document for Addictive Drugs and Fighting Against Drugs" covering the years 2006-2012. This document has been signed by the office of Prime Minister and became the national strategy document which provides a framework to work against drugs in all fields. TUBIM, later on, produced a national action plan in order to realize the objectives of strategy document.

4.2. TUBIM Provincial Focal Points

Fight against drug use gained a great velocity after the foundation of TUBIM, and the activities in different fields, prevention, law enforcement, and treatment are increasingly continue. TUBIM provincial focal points those performing effective works for demand reduction in the recent periods provides vital amount of support for Ministry of National Education units. Those people who are also the members of narcotic divisions in their cities provide preventive training programs, and carry out projects to focus the on the drug problem in their regions.

4.3. International Cooperation

Turkey believes in the fact that drug-related crimes are the concern of all nations and that no country in the world can turn face against this problem and thus shapes her policies with this underlying approach. In this respect, despite of not being a target country in terms of drug use, Turkey plays a significant role in the fight against illicit drugs trafficking and contributes to regional and international cooperation. Turkey has active cooperation with the following International Organizations in the field of illicit drugs trafficking.

Turkey has ongoing effective relations with the organizations under the United Nations such as the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Customs Organization (WCO) Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) and Regional Intelligence Liason Office (RILO), Center for International Crime Prevention, Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East (OYUTAK), Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA) and Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) and the Council of Europe, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSCE), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), South East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), Interpol, International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), POMPIDOU Group, International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) and EUROPOL as well.

Besides these international organizations, Turkey has concluded Security and Cooperation Agreements with a total of 68 countries. Turkey has been hosting various

international meetings in the field of combating against drugs and attending several meetings for contributions and share of information and experiences. For instance, Turkey has been supporting international cooperation by attending to several international meetings such as Heads of National Focal Points by EMCDDA, Reitox Board Members meeting, UNODC meetings, Paris Pact and CND meetings.

5.   Drugs Terrorism Nexus

Terrorist organization, like many other type of organizations, need financial resources to survive. However, they cannot provide financial support from legal resources and business activities for two reasons. One of them is that their ideology usually keeps them out of the legal system and their ignorance about the current system prevents them to operate within the system. Second reason is related to their illegality. Since they are usually under the surveillance of law enforcement agencies and whether they do a legal business or not, as soon as their money involves in to illegal activities, they are aware of that, they would not be able to use this money for their purpose. In addition to those reasons terrorist organizations need huge sums of money (usually in cash) either to buy weapons or for the daily needs of their human resources. Drug trafficking becomes an attractive way of providing financial resources for those organizations. Drugs are easy to store and carry for those types of organizations, it is easy to convert them in to cash, and the profit ratio of drugs is higher than many other things.

Terrorist organizations with their international connections usually traffic drugs easily, therefore already established international connections made their job easier. For larger organizations, they can also use the gaps of the international financial system and take advantage of the weakness of international combating strategies. Nation states are still the unit of analysis in the international system therefore, international cooperation among states might be influenced by different policies of states, and organizations can use those weaknesses on their behalf.

Official documents in Turkey provide strong evidences about the connection of PKK terrorist organization and drug trafficking both in the borders of Turkey and in Europe by using its connections and network. Systematic scientific studies are not enough in this field to show how much effect drugs have on the terrorist organizations activities. In other words, how the drugs turn in to terrorist events and how much the instability that is created by terrorism also creates additional drug problems. A theoretical approach to this nexus could be presented in the following figure.

This simple diagram covers a very complex relationship. Simplicity is preferred by social scientist to understand the complex phenomenon; however in some cases the nature of the problem puts us in a situation that causation is not as simple as it is hypothesized. In this example, for example, the question whether drugs create terror or terror creates drugs cannot be concluded with straightforward answers. What we need here is multi-level and cross country data, as well as detailed information about the terrorist organizations and their drug related illegal activities.

Another way of approaching the problem is dividing the previous model in to two equal pieces and considering it as a non-recursive system that has no feed back effect to each other. In this case we have two models independent from each other (Figure-3) and could be tested without any concern of feedback loop. This technical difference is important to highlight because of the theoretical connection we present in this study, therefore if we argue a strong connection then we have the follow the first model,

Figure-2 Recursive Causal Approach to Drug and Terror Nexus


Model 1

otherwise we can use Model-2 and Model -3 which are independent from each other. One of the most important differences between Figure- 2 and Figure- 3 is the type of variables we need to test our hypothesis. In the first model we would need instrumental variables to reduce the relationship between our dependent variable and error term (unexplained variance.) Instrumental variables should only be related with our one of the dependent variable and the relationship must be strong, such as ideology (here the question is how you can quantify the ideology) which might cause terrorism but not drug trafficking.

Figure 3- One way Causal Approach to Drug and Terror Nexus

TERROR → DRUGS

MODEL 2

TERROR ← DRUGS

MODEL 3

The third way of looking at the phenomenon is the looking for an intervening variable and creating a path model. Figure-4 presents the path model that could be used in understanding the relationship between terrorism and drugs. In this model there is at least one variable which intervenes in the relation between drugs and terror. Those two models again should be considered independently from each other. In Model – 4, for example, terror effects variable X, and in combination with that effect X affects Drugs. The cumulative effect of Terror and X, as well as their individual effects are calculated to measure the total effect.

Figure-4 Non-recursive Causal Approach to Drug and Terror Nexus

TERROR → (X Intervening Variable) → DRUGS

MODEL 4

DRUGS → (X Intervening Variable) → TERROR

MODEL 5

6. Conclusion

Drug use in Turkey is not high as it is in many European countries. Statistics show that drug use in Turkey is at the lowest rate comparing the countries in the region. However, drug seizers are almost higher than total amount of seizures in all EU countries. This fact proves that Turkey, as a transit country in drug trafficking has been minimally effected by those drugs. Law enforcement in Turkey also shows great success in their fight against drugs both in the field of trafficking and street level dealers. Nonetheless, many other transit countries report significant increases in drug use in the last decade which should make Turkey to pay more attention on understanding level of drug use in the general population and among youth. Despite the current statistics which show lower levels of drug use, officials should be more careful and conduct more studies to understand the nature of the problem. Drugs are also connected to many other crimes and a source for terrorist financing. However, the connection between drugs and terrorism should be, first identified with the intelligence and operational information, and then also examined systematically with relevant data. This paper offered a methodological framework to identify this relationship.

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[6]   Ibid, p. 63.

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V. Future Projection in the Era of Globalization

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GLOBALIZATION AND THE NEXUS BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORISM AND YOUTH: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Tamara MAKARENKO[*]

1. Introduction

Apart for the relatively slow development of academic interest in the phenomenon of child soldiers, literature searches on the relationship between organized crime, terrorism and youth produce rather scant results. In fact, the role of youth within the crime-terror nexus has not been treated as a central phenomenon; however, there are several factors associated with understanding the dynamics of the nexus between globalization, crime and terrorism that shed light on the role of youth. As such, the focus of this paper is to highlight four inter-related points:

1. To provide an overview of the 'relevant' aspects of globalization which have shaped the transformation of both organized crime and terrorism this decade; and which have subsequently had an impact on the role of youth in illicit environments.

2. To introduce the nature of the nexus between organized crime and terrorism within the context of globalization (taking the view that since globalization is a process, the crime-terror nexus continues to evolve)

3. To highlight trends which affect the nexus and the role of youth within the framework of globalization. Providing reflections across the globe, a spectrum can be identified to mark the situations in which youths are engaged: from ideological support / forming a recruitment pool, to conducting petty crimes on behalf of the 'organization' (often as part of an initiation process), through to the full fledged use of violence as a functioning *member*.

4. To conclude by providing an assessment of the future trajectory – what is the threat facing the youth of today by the nexus of organized crime and terrorism within an environment impacted by the process of globalization?

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2. Globalisation: key aspects shaping the nexus

Although the concept of 'globalisation' emerged in the 1980s, it was not until the 1990s that it became a term widely-utilised by policy-makers, academics and the popular media to describe the spread of ideas, culture, and commercial products throughout the world. Regardless of whether the process of globalisation began at "the dawn of history" [1] or more recently as a phenomenon "unprecedented in history", [2] its significance for the purposes of this paper is in its contemporary impact. A general overview of both globalisation and more specifically, globalisation in the context of the post-Cold War period will reveal that the environment in which people and states operate has fundamentally changed. For example, these historical processes have directly challenged the primacy of the state, and they have given rise to a host of new justifications for the emergence of inter-state and intra-state conflict.

The term 'globalisation' has been used in numerous contexts, and has been defined in several ways. Although a universally-accepted definition of the term does not exist, Jan Aart Scholte has perceptively argued that most existing definitions of globalisation can be divided into five broad categories [3]. The first category includes the most straightforward definitions that describe globalisation simply as cross-border relations that emerge from the growth in international exchange and interdependence [4]. Second, globalisation has been used synonymously with liberalisation, or the "process of removing government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an 'open', 'borderless' world economy" [5]. Extending this idea that globalisation is solely about economic integration, the third category equates globalisation with universalisation, or the process by which the same objects (i.e. automobiles, fashion) and experiences (i.e. decolonisation) are spread throughout the world. Fourth, globalisation has often been defined as westernisation or modernisation [6]. This definition of globalisation focuses on the universal spread of predominantly Western ideas such as capitalism, democratisation, rationalism, and industrialism [7]. Finally, globalisation is often regarded as deterritorialisation, or the "reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances, and territorial borders"[8]. Initially attributed to advances in communications and transportation technology, this interpretation of globalisation as the process of breaking down territorial boundaries through integration also presumes that the shrinking of social and political space has subsequently threatened the primacy of the Westphalian [9] nation-state.

Regardless of the focus taken in defining globalisation, it may be concluded that, although globalisation has often resulted in "presenting opportunities and benefits to many, it has also brought new risks and costs" [10]. Among the most serious consequences of globalisation for international security is the resulting diminution of state legitimacy and the state's capacity to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence where a sovereign state is granted the sole authority over the use of force within its borders, and externally to protect the territorial integrity of the state [11]. In an international system which continues to place priority on states and the maintenance of state control by state actors, globalisation has introduced an environment characterised by competition for control over the state by non-state actors. Historically state control was challenged by external states and groups of legitimate internal actors (i.e. the military), as exemplified in coup d'états and the creation of empires. Increasingly, however, states are being challenged by non-state actors, including

terrorist and criminal groups, which have taken advantage of the benefits and opportunities presented to them through globalisation.

On a primarily political level, phenomena such as terrorism and organised crime have developed to such an extent that they are beyond the capacity of states to deal with through traditional diplomacy. Furthermore international society is witnessing the spill-over of problems across state borders (i.e. the cross-border movement of refugees and illicit smuggling networks); the interrelationship of political-economic phenomena (i.e. the linkage between hunger, overpopulation, deforestation, the greenhouse effect, and regional conflict); and, the growing number and importance of transnational movements and institutions that have emerged in response to globalisation [12]. Some of these non-state actors have played an important role in bringing non-traditional security threats, such as environmental degradation, onto the political agenda of state actors [13]. However, there are also non-state actors which, by embracing the various dynamics of globalisation specifically referred to below, now pose one of the most serious challenges to international security.

Since the 1960s technological breakthroughs have accelerated the growth of international transfers of money, labour and information. As a result of this 'shrinking financial world', regional actors (such as the Association of South East Asian Nations, the North American Free Trade Association, and the European Union) emerged to consolidate the integration of economic activities, thus building entities with varied sources of political strength and economic vitality [14]. Despite growing trends towards international economic integration, it was not until the 1980s that structural changes emerged to produce what is commonly referred to as the period of economic globalisation. In essence, the free movement of capital deepened what Mittleman labels "commodified forms of political and social integrations" [15]. Thus not only could production be transferred globally in order to reduce costs and thereby to drive out competitors, but the frequent relocation of production simultaneously globalised the distribution of commodities and raised consumption patterns in many parts of the world.

The globalisation of trade and investment was initially welcomed as a phenomenon that could redistribute wealth globally, however it was not long before the effects of globalisation revealed an inherent contradiction. Many academics have argued that globalisation has produced a social polarisation both among and within countries. According to Robert Cox, the world has a three-part hierarchy: the upper echelon consists of people integrated in the world economy (i.e. those involved in the production process and those who buy commodities); the middle consists of people who serve the economy in more 'precarious employment' (i.e. prostitutes, criminals); and at the bottom are those who are excluded from the global economy because of a lack of opportunities (i.e. most of Africa and many parts of the former Soviet Union) [16]. For the most part, the last two groups are potentially destabilising forces because, as 'losers' in the globalisation process, they have been forced to locate ways to redefine their roles in an emerging order. This is already evident in the realm of organised crime which has taken advantage of global financial services (i.e. electronic transfer of credit and info-technology [17]) to such an extent that crime is being transformed to something "beyond people, places and even identifiable victims [18]." Criminal organisations have recognised opportunities presented by open borders and modern communications and transportation technologies to increase their operations and to enter new areas of activity, such as the illegal traffic in human beings. Furthermore, globalisation has

opened access to a largely unregulated international financial system to such an extent that actors previously excluded for political reasons have been able to obtain unimpeded access. For example, Abdullah Ocalan – leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) – noted that the market economy was "very useful for us. If you have money you can find anything on the market [19]." In the current international financial environment, ease of money laundering coupled with rising numbers of tax havens and the abuse of more traditional bank secrecy, has made it "very difficult for public authorities to trace illegal activities and it makes it relatively easy for movements to organise their financing far from public authorities [20]."

In addition to ushering in new opportunities in the legal market economy for criminal and terrorist groups, globalisation has also expanded the operations of parallel economies in regions where "new forms of legal and illegal ways of making a living have sprung up among the excluded parts of society" [21], and have thus legitimised new forms of criminal activity. Kaldor argues that these parallel economies are produced from the neo-liberal economic policies pursued by international organisations, forcing states within the former Soviet Union (FSU), Africa and Latin America to undertake macro-economic stabilisation, deregulation and privatisation. These forced economic programmes have also increased unemployment, depleted natural resources, and generated greater income disparities – creating conditions conducive for terrorist and criminal recruitment. In this context it may not be concluded that the victory for capitalism and free markets in the 1990s implies peace as "free enterprise can easily dovetail into economic violence, and self-help into helping oneself [22]."

Although the expanding market economy has given non-state actors, such as terrorist and criminal groups, many new opportunities, it has also been used as a focus of and incentive for political backlash. For example, militant organisations have gained support in some regions because of globalisation and the perceived spread of a 'global community' based on western liberal democratic values that threaten their cultural and/or religious existence. In this context the inherent dichotomies of globalisation (creating integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and diversification, globalisation and localisation) have mobilised non-state actors to react to what is commonly perceived as the "growing incompetence and declining legitimacy of established political classes [23]." In many cases this mobilisation is executed in various forms of public demonstrations; however weak states run the risk that this mobilisation will take on a violent form – such as terrorism. Partly because extremist organisations do not have the membership base or resources required to launch a full-scale military attack on their enemies, some of these groups have utilised terror tactics to defend their beliefs. As one Islamic scholar asserted, "The world as it is today is how others shaped it ... We have two choices: either to accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so that we can construct the world as Islam requires" [24]. This political aspect, combined with technological developments, has enabled terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda to conduct mass-casualty terrorist acts globally [25].

In conjunction with using globalisation as a mobilising force to recruit a membership base, terrorist have also successfully used another by-product of globalisation: the spread of the mass media. However, the reliance on the media in the 1980/90's has been replaced by more overt attempts by terrorist and criminal organisations to develop their own media and related technical capabilities (i.e. the use of the internet, chat rooms, video games and music videos, and social network sites to

spread ideology and other communications). Combined with feelings of alienation and 'non-belonging' produced through globalisation and skewed socio-economic realities in many parts of the world, first, second and third generation Muslim youth have become prime targets for recruitment strategies. This is true for terrorism, but it is also becoming increasingly true for organised crime as the same fundamental issues are driving the growth of 'gang cultures' in Europe (i.e. London and Paris).

The success of non-state actors in taking advantage of the various dynamics of globalisation, as briefly described above, has also directly challenged the state's monopoly over the use of violence in the Westphalian state system. In the post-Cold War era, non-state actors compete for state control by establishing their own monopoly on violence – an action facilitated by the expansion of the international market in arms since 1990 [26]. Although establishing a monopoly is difficult to attain throughout a country, there are examples of non-state actors having success in this respect in isolated regions or provinces, as has historically been the case in Colombia with the FARC, and in Turkey with the PKK. In both cases, a central component of the groups' activities – in addition to directing violence against the state – is symbolically to attack the state. As a result, they regularly seek to:

> *impose their own taxes, issue their own passports/identification documents and often require foreigners to obtain visas with them. They provide alternative social structures (schools, hospitals, credit systems). They also impose alternative controls over organised violence. They have alternative "police" forces and alternative "drafts" for their own armies* [27].

In situations where the state is successfully challenged, the "efficiency, attractiveness and legitimacy" of the state is subsequently undermined [28]. In extreme cases, such as Afghanistan, an environment emerges in which it is difficult to hold any one actor accountable in the political process – thus subsequently producing a state of anarchy, ruled by tyranny. This directly complicates security because if tyranny is identified as "government that is not held to give account of itself," the absence of a ruler in an anarchic state "is clearly the most tyrannical of all since there is no one left who could even be asked to answer for what is being done [29]." The environment that this breeds is one wherein violence necessarily begets more violence.

The cycle of violence that ensues in states threatened in their authority and legitimacy occurs for two reasons, according to Leander. First, in order to defend their position within the state, governments attempt to hold onto their authority – referring to a "person or institution which legitimizes acts or commands; as such it must be differentiated from power which indicates capacity rather than right" [30] - by reverting to violence and repression. This situation has been the most obvious reason for the escalation of intra-state violence, and has thus been well documented throughout most of modern history. Second, violence is prevalent in an environment characterised by competition for state control for economic gain. For example, economic processes that emerged from globalisation have transformed violence into an "important means of social control and an economic resource in and by itself [31]." Furthermore, through the expansion of information, technology, finance and manufacturing, globalisation has given rise to "warlords, mafias and mercenary groups, many of which have an interest in the perpetuation of conflicts [32]." Especially in the context of weak states (described in further detail below), the dynamics caused by the spread of information technology and market liberalisation have helped create a "situation where the structure,

authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart", thus creating conditions where the hold on power is increasingly divided between "what is left of the formal institutions of the state (which are invariably corrupt), local warlords and gang or mafia leaders [33]."

Paradoxically, the very fact that there are numerous examples of non-state actors challenging the state demonstrates that control over state functions remains an important feature in the current security environment. The state, for example, is the only organised institution that can symbolically assert legitimacy and authority. Most importantly, however, within the current international system, states have the right to make a claim of 'sovereignty'. State sovereignty is generally understood as a concept that encompasses two components: first, it incorporates the ability of a state to enforce rules within its borders and to monitor and control what happens within its territory. This concept is often incorporated in definitions of state sovereignty that focus on control over violence, such as that employed by Charles Tilly when he defined sovereignty as "controlling the principal means of coercion within a given territory [34]." Morgenthau defined the concept a decade earlier in reference to "the appearance of a centralised power that exercised its lawmaking and law-enforcing authority within a certain territory [35]." Second, state sovereignty commonly refers to state relations with external actors [36]. The governments of sovereign states can subsequently claim ultimate control over how their territory interacts with the world and how it should be internally regulated. This claim allows states to decide what activities they should focus their resources on: be it economic development, or illegally selling arms. Instead of making the state a defunct actor, globalisation has thus merely intensified the competition for control over state functions by creating a host of non-state actors seeking to assert territorial authority and monopoly over the use of violence.

3.   The Nature of the Nexus Within a World Driven by Globalisation

The connection between crime and terrorism is identified and measured along two lines of interaction: the first is focused on *crime* and *terrorism* as concepts defined within specific definitional parameters; whereas the second concentrates on crime and terrorism as distinctly identifiable non-state actors which challenge security on all levels of analysis through their actions. Although these two lines of interaction can be separated to ease enquiry and provide explanatory clarity, the relationship between crime and terrorism exists along a dynamic continuum which plots the organisational and operational interaction between both phenomena. Thus crime and terrorism as concept and entities cross-over on several analytical planes: first, through the creation of alliances between distinct entities; second, through the operational use of terror tactics by a criminal group or criminal tactics by a terrorist group; and third, through the convergence of criminal and terrorist tactics within a single group, thus creating a hybrid entity. The notion that crime and terrorism exist along a continuum is used to illustrate the fact that, in addition to situations of cooperation between a criminal and terrorist group, a single group can slide across a definitional scale between what is traditionally referred to as *organised crime* and *terrorism* depending on the environment in which it operates [37].

In assessing the interaction between criminal and terrorist groups, the available evidence indicates that the depth of collaboration is most often dependant on the nature

of the geographic region in which these relations are established. The nexus in Western democracies are often based on sympathetic feelings which can emerge from loyalties to specific ethnic or religious community, or it can be established through converts. Relations in transitional states are most accurately described as ad hoc because they are predominantly based on fulfilling immediate operational needs; and, relations which emerge within (post) conflict societies tend to be the ones that are most developed and interactive. In conflict-ridden and conflict-prone environments, the maintenance of instability is in the interest of terrorists because it diminishes the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of the mass populations – the very people terrorists seek to gain support from; and it is in the interest of criminal groups who have learned how to maximise profits within this context. For this reason, the relationship between organised crime and terrorism are most developed and prevalent in South America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Eurasia; however, they are potentially most dangerous in North America and Western Europe precisely because these ties are less transparent and more adaptive.

3.1. Interaction in Unstable Environments

Criminal and terrorist networks which have emerged from a state of perpetual conflict and instability blatantly reveal the ultimate danger of the crime-terror connection to international security. Operating within de facto 'safe havens' for illicit operations, weak and failed states foster nefarious collaboration, which subsequently seeks to perpetuate a condition of civil (or regional) war to secure economic and political power. At an extreme end, this is reflected in the conditions of Afghanistan, Angola, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and confined territories in Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand where government control is extremely weak, if existent at all. Although unstable, but not necessarily classified as failed states, conditions in many South American and African states also fall within this category when assessments of relations between criminal and terrorist networks are concerned. In most of these situations conflict/war has provided "legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions of power and for access to resources [38]."

Conflict that besets the interaction between criminal and terrorist networks share several common characteristics. To begin with, these conflicts usually have no clear military objective and lack political order. Instead, military units constitute "little more than marauding bands acting quite independently" and "showing no discipline whatsoever in the actions they were committing [39]." Furthermore, it is evident that the perpetuation of conflict, as opposed to victory, becomes a priority in order to create ideal conditions for criminal activities to flourish [40] amongst groups equally motivated by the "accumulation of wealth, control of territory and people, freedom of movement and action, and legitimacy. Together, these elements represent usable power – power to allocate values and resources in society [41]." Unlike traditional organised crime, epitomised by the established hierarchical groups such as the Japanese Yakuza, which is dependent on the international financial system and state stability, criminal networks which grew from within unstable environments have no innate loyalty to the state. As a result, the risk calculations which are made prior to engaging with known terrorist networks are extremely open, based more on fulfilling immediate benefits

rather than assessing long-term repercussions.

When looking at the role of youth in this context, it is evident that the interaction between crime and terrorism in unstable environments provides the foundation for the emergence of child soldiers, sexual violence against children, and the exploitation of natural resources through child labour. The histories of Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, although as extreme case studies, reflect this reality. Recruitment strategies in this context do not need to be cleverly framed as it is the perpetual nature of instability that, in and of itself, is a determining factor literally driving youth out of need, fear and/or coercion to repeat the cycle of violence while securing financial and/or social benefits.

3.2. Interaction in Transitional States

Transitional states, generally incorporating the former Soviet Union, parts of Eastern Europe, the Americas and the Middle East, provide a different context in which criminal and terrorist networks engage with one another. Unlike criminal and terrorist groups engaged in conflict and post-conflict societies the nexus in transitional states is not necessarily about perpetuating instability, but about maximising the chances of success for immediate operations and for fundamental political change. In this environment, illicit actors – regardless if they are characterised as criminals, terrorists or insurgents – have a driving interest in profit maximisation as the route to ensure their survival and feed their ability to operationalise their long-term interests. This is a motivation that is facilitated by poor border security, weak law enforcement, corrupt public officials, and established smuggling networks. As such, transitional states are most often used to provide exchanges of goods, access to established smuggling routes and/or expertise. Interaction thus predominantly follows the trade in high value illicit commodities, such as narcotics and arms.

When adding the youth element, transitional societies are predominantly about recruitment; providing youths purpose either through the promise of monetary gain or the provision of an identity and associated belief system to fill the social void which currently dominates many transitional societies. In this environment, crime and terrorism have often been equally regarded as a social engagement, rather than an illicit enterprise (i.e. Brazil, Colombia, Gaza/West Bank, Albania, Serbia, Uzbekistan).

3.3. Interaction in Western Democracies

Aspects of the nexus are most readily identifiable in environments characterised by some degree of instability – be it in a state of outright conflict, or suffering from entrenched corruption which fuels the rise of criminal enterprise. In these environments not only is the existence of criminal and terrorist networks expected, but there interaction seems natural – even if only ad hoc in nature. Identifying the connection between criminal and terrorist networks in Western democracies, however, is significantly more complex. To begin with, these societies pose a host of obstacles to illicit operations, making internal group trust and loyalty more sensitive issues. Furthermore, there is a natural ideological divide between criminal and terrorist networks; highlighted by the fact that criminal groups successfully operating in the West have no interest in destroying the fabric of the society from which they prosper. As such, of all types of societies, the crime-terror nexus seems most unwelcome, and thus most unlikely, in Western democracies.

The driver behind the cases of crime-terror interaction noted above is not believed to be profit-maximisation or a desire to secure an unstable operating environment. These connections appear to be based on a more complex equation, combining factors such as loyalties to a specific ethnic or religious community, or the emergence of sympathetic feelings by the criminal/criminal network – feelings often reflected in converts. These trends appear to be consistent throughout North America and Western Europe, and are most relevant in the context of radicalisation and conversion of criminals within prison systems, as was the case with John Jose Padilla, Walker Lindh and Richard Reid. In fact, France, the U.S. and the U.K. have all admitted that their prisons systems are vulnerable to charismatic radical Islamist leaders inspiring prisons to join the *global jihad*.

The problem of radicalisation in respect to the U.S. was succinctly established in a study by George Washington University [42] which identified four main radicalisation processes: individual, organised, gang and para-radicalisation. Potentially the most problematic in terms of the crime-terror nexus are gang radicalisation and para-radicalisation. In the former pre-existing prison gangs are exploited to attract converts (thus taking advantage of an established system of trust and loyalty), and para-radicalisation referring to a situation when non-radicalised individuals aid radicalised networks. Thus in addition to creating an inherent 'home-grown' terrorist threat, the interaction within prison systems also provides terrorist cells in Western democracies with access to the know-how required to conduct criminal activities which remain below the radar of law enforcement because they are naturally high volume and low cost (i.e. various types of fraud and petty crimes). In this context, young inmates lacking a social support network may begin as gang converts, but may be inspired to convert and operate for more 'meaning'.

4. Conclusion

Globalisation has transformed crime and terrorism significantly, especially since the demise of the Soviet Union. More specifically, globalisation has increased the value of illicit operations, both financially and politically; it has extended the scope of 'products and activities' by increasing the range of tactics employed and avenues to recruitment; and, it has brought together various illicit trade specialities with groups well versed (or with the potential to become well adapted) to the entire slew of criminal activities associated with acquiring financial and political gain.

Within this environment of expanding criminal and terrorist activity, youths have been impacted. In addition to being forced into illicit activities through fear and coercion, youths have voluntarily sought participation in criminal and/or terrorist circles because:

1. It is seen to provide an identity and social network lost within a globalised world that has exaggerated the division between haves and have-nots. This can be compared to the early industrialisation years when young workers migrated to the cities and subsequently lost their social support network.

2. It fulfils personal needs, especially in transitional societies, to address short term needs (i.e. financial support) versus worrying about long term repercussions.

3. Both criminal and terrorist circles have provided youths with arenas to show their

discontent and disillusionment with the current economic and political system. This is especially the case in Western democracies where the contradictions between political ideals and economic realities have become highlighted for youths already made to feel as though they are peripheral to society (i.e. minorities, first generation immigrants).

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GLOBALIZATION, YOUTH AND SECURITY

A Multidimensional Approach to Security Concept in The Globalizing World Regarding Youth

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Abstract: Undoubtly, globalization has been one of the most hotly-debated topics over the past few decay. Globalization broadly refers to the expansion of global linkages, the organization of social life on a global scale, and the growth of a global consciousness, hence to the consolidation of world society. Such an ecumenical definition captures much of what the term commonly means, but its meaning is disputed. It encompasses several large processes; hence,definitions differ in what they emphasize. Globalization is historically complex; definitions vary in the particular driving force they identify. The meaning of the term is itself a topic in global discussion. The current article tries to study on a subject that was not searched very much previously in terms of its severity. This study on the basis of the theories of basic human needs,social construction and human development, scrutinizes globalization as a process through which Money has become a deity on the throne of technology and as a consequence human beeings are becoming isolated by means of destroying ecology of human development. The result of this is violence and historical collapse. And unfortunately, the front victims of this process are the children and the young people.

Keywords: Globalization, money, human ecology, security, identity construction.

Introduction

Most of the major theories of our popular concept "globalization" are derived from studies in the field of political sciences and especially economy. It can be safely said that economy and political science pretty much had a monopoly over the leading theories of globalization, followed perhaps curiously even by the disciplines of religion. Sociological, psychological and criminological, ecological theories have also certainly had a role to play with some relevance. In our study, we will try to offer different dimensions of the concept from different perspectives.

Nowadays, globalization process was being debates on the range from who accept it as a unique unprecedented success to pessimists who see it creating a wild inequality by a world market and contracted sphere for democratic decision-making. Founded in 1971 by a Swiss economics professor Klaus Schwab, the WEF-which called as "Davos Meeting" –by the late 1990s had become the meetings in which the elites of the world begun to discuss the globalization process with an optimist manner for future considering the collapse of Soviet Union.

However, in 1999 at the world Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle – popular known as the "Battle for Seattle" the defenders/allies of anti-globalization

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established contrary movement and latter in 2001 in Porte Allegre, the anti-globalization activist from all around the world joined their power and the imperialist policies of the Bush administration reinforced this unity. After the attacks of September11th, 2001, the Iraq policies of USA were reflected to the Davos meeting in 2003 and the former optimist mood left his place to confusion and embarrassment.

Commentators on globalization range from triumphalists hailing it as an irreversible process leading to unprecedented prosperity and peace to dystopians who see it creating a world marked by cruel inequality and an ever-dwindling sphere for democratic decision-making. The roles of the traditional state and neoliberal economics are central to the contemporary debate on globalization. The more fervid supporters of globalization, rather like doctrinaire Marxists of an earlier generation, see it leading to the inevitable "withering away" of the state as decisions are transferred from parochial and inefficient governments to free markets where consumers reign sovereign; alarmed opponents fear that globalization will replace democratic governance at the state level with decision-making by multinational corporations and international financial institutions. Finally, these debates are driven under the shadow of the recent ideologies.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians and more than 18 million people compelled to migrate as a result of conflict. Almost 3 billion people, half the word's population, live on less than 2 dollars a day, 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict. Unfortunately, most of the victims of such violent conflict had been child as most vulnerable partition of society. So, conflict encourages criminality, deters investments, destroys infrastructures, and principally, destroys the generations as the infrastructure of future. In the recent one or two decades, the major concept of globalizing world was security and impact on it.

We will begin to discuss with theories of social psychology and sociology and none of these ideologies, or any ideology for that matter, are being advocated. The purpose is to provide an objective assessment of impact of globalization on the global security regarding youth and prediction for future. If some one ask that is this study of globalization or youth, or security?, answer will be "**both of them**".

It has been a general rule that every analysis to be made on globalization starts at least with one definition inescapably. Globalization is, definitely, not a special expression: most of its meaning and, depending on the speaker, its content changes in the sense of general usage of the term. Generally, it is used as a hollow but impressive cliché we manipulate and express according to our individual opinions. Its context and viewpoint determines its discourse and stand. A businessman may focus on high-level of taxes or competition created by merciless foreign capital for some or other reason; likewise, an environment-friendly company may be held responsible for many environmental destructions even it has not been involved, etc. Globalization today, however, seems to have been placed at the heart of the traditional disputes about state and neo-liberalist economies due to the appeal of political and economic issues. This, at the same time, reflects the extraordinary complexity of globalization. One of the definitions expressing these extensive and complex aspects of globalization was put forward by David Held.

"(Globalization is) a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power" [1].

One of the most important emphases in this extensive definition is that globalization is a historical process. It did not begin yesterday, nor will it end tomorrow. It expresses just the trend in the transformation. Another emphasis is made, in a covert fashion, on technology. In this context, it is an irresistible and undeniable phenomenon. Nevertheless, it does not present a trend in the relationship between transformation and man.

  Could the effect of today's globalization process on mankind and social structure give us some clues about our current and future security structures? If social phenomena are a constructed form of the mutual interaction which is shaped by our own individual actions and also through which we are shaped by these social phenomena [2] and if the "structure" is not "external" to individuals but a setting which individuals exist within and re-create [3], then it presents two components: the first one is related with the ontological character of social structure and places man in the center of social phenomenon. The other one, on the other hand, is about methodology and implies the necessity of a holistic approach in order to analyze a social phenomenon; and it is this approach which would determine the viewpoint of our analysis.

  In this respect, as a base of our discussion about effects of globalization and future security problems, it would be beneficial to present this theoretical framework under very brief topics for it would make our discussion more comprehensible.

Human Being: Construction of SELF[II]

Basic Human Needs

It would be appropriate to begin with basic human needs which are known by almost everybody for the sake of understanding what we discuss. As put forward by so many researchers starting from McDougall [4] and Freud [5], continuing with Muray [6] and Maslow [7] and Burton [8], Baumeister and Leary [9]; Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscou, Ryan [10] and Rosenberg [11] up till today, basic motivation of human behavior is determined by these basic needs. Maslow, Burton and Rosenberg lists these basic needs as follows:

Table 1 Basic Human Needs

Maslow	Burton	Rosenberg
Food, water, shelter (1)	Justice,	Physical nutrition,
Safety, security (2)	Safety and security,	Solidarity,
Belongingness and Love (3)	Belongingness, Love,	Integration,
Self-esteem (4)	Self-esteem,	Autonomy,
Self-fulfillment (5)	Self-fulfillment,	Play,
	Identity,	Celebration, mourning
	Cultural security	Spiritual sharing,
	Freedom,	
	Participation,	

Unlike others, Maslow defines these needs in a hierarchical structure. However, in our opinion all beings are born with a single basic motivation: self and lineage security.

[II]Some parts of the conceptual framework were presented in Turkish at Globalization and Changing Values symposium which was held at Hacettepe University 8th of May 2007.

Construction process commences dialectically with the creation of this 'SELF' by this motivation. For this reason, the progress from this basic motivation is important so that components to be constructed later will not be ignored. Other needs are human being's own creation in the process of being a human. From this perspective, Maslow's hierarchical approach seems more explanatory and consistent considering the time factor.

Figure 1 The Ecology of Human Development

Urie Bronfenbrenner, The Ecology of Human Development, Harward University Press, 1979.

As known, ecological approach constitutes a sound framework in studying human behavior. As expressed by Bandura [12], human behavior effects the social environment as social environment effects human behavior. This concept of mutual determination emphasizes the bi-directional effect suggested by Giddens before. Bronfenbrenner [13] defines this as human development ecology and states that human development exists within the social system surrounding it in a hierarchical fashion, the details of which we will not describe here, that is microsystem, mesosystem, ecosystem and macrosystem. All these sub-systems assume functions in parallel with their dialectical interaction with the individual and constitute a large system by organizing themselves to meet the basic needs of the individual.

Family is the most important sub-system even today without any doubt; in that it bears great importance beyond meeting physiological needs, especially during the first two years of child development in cognitive and social fields. The top layer is, on the other hand, is defined as the socio-cultural layer including ideology and attitudes.

Interaction of Social Construction and Individual: Construction of Realities

In this context, individual and society are the reflections of each other and serve as a mirror to each other. As defined by Peter Berger and Thomas Luchman [14], who are among the founders of the social construction theory, social order is a creation of man

himself in order to meet their own needs; or to put in a more accurate way, it is a manufacture, a product of continuous extroversion of man. That a human being could ever exist without creating his/her social environment is as impossible as that a human being could ever develop as isolated from his/her environment. Being just a human means a kind of existence in the form of an animal. Being a social existence, nevertheless, is an indispensable part of his/her presence. That is why *Homo sapiens* are at the same time *homo socius* always. To put in other words, social reality has no ontological area which has been separated from man. In this context, in its own ecological environment, the entire human culture, including social order, is nothing but just the totality of creations of humans it has made monotonous –by taking the easy way out- to meet their needs; and most importantly, it creates a feeling of security.

Giddens suggests the concept of ontological security, taking Laing's [15] assumption that a human being has demands in the sense of psychological safety levels based on the perception of a secured relationship among fixed identity, physical existence and larger environment of his/her own. Giddens defines the concept of ontological security as

> *"confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity"* [16]

whereas Turner has extended this definition later as

> *"A motivating and one of the widespread forces underneath actions; a feeling of trust arisen from the desire for continuous ontological security or possibility of diminishing anxiety under social circumstances."* [17].

The key notion here is that both self and world are stable, predictable and consistent with past experience, beliefs and knowledge. Threats to ontological security emerge from any perception of threat, and challenges to the belief that one's assessment of the nature of the world and its content are sound.

This view reflects a Freudian opinion in the sense that erasing the elements associating anxiety of ever-existed chaos, as threat against integration of identity. Giddens focuses on defense, denial and exclusion in questioning daily routines. By this way, individual builds a cocoon at a practical level to block against possible cases which may threaten his/her physical or psychological integrity [18]. This security cocoon is a defense mechanism we have formed at cognitive level against uncertainty, inconsistency and transformation, which pose threat against us and create anxiety. This mechanism does not have a universal reality in its content and it is so, in general.

Turner [19], bearing ontological security claim of man in mind, takes Giddens' *'structuration'* theory [16] and suggests a plan consisting of 11 phases for construction process of any social structure.

Emerging Social Life

Social construction arises from this basic ontologic claim for security. Unconscious motives take place in meeting this claim, which have been organized unconsciously, totally being included in our intellectual capacity without interpreting them, and which notify us of how we should behave under certain circumstances. Sometimes we evaluate these motives as practical gains and transfer them to our practical consciousness without any need for further questioning or explanation. This practical cognitive knowledge of us is moved to (verbal) logical plane through interpreting and expressing them (*rationalization- discursive consciousness*). Social systems unlike physical or biological systems do not display internal unity and could be expressed through various variables

Figure 2

| Unconscious Motives 2	Discursive Consciousness 4	Regionalization/ Routinization 6	Structural Sets 8	Rules and Resources 10

Needs for Ontological Security 1	Practical Consciousness 3	Social systems of interaction 5	Structural properties/ institutions 7	Structural Principles 9	Structure 11

Turner (1991:536)

which may be considered as the level of development of the system. For this reason, our practices need to be regenerated within our social relations in the context of time and place (*social systems of interaction*). Practices regenerated in the system of different social relations are routinized by actors in order to meet ontological security claims (regionalisation/ routinisation) and settle as structural properties -extending the dimensions of time and place- of social systems, especially of social institutions. All of these structural properties constitute structural sets which are generalized (extended over time and place) for methods and resources of social structure. These structural sets are the basis of structural principles of the organization of all social institutions and their interactions. These general principles transform into general rules in order to be better understood by society. Every institution or social organization has peculiar rules and resources at actors'disposal when required. Now, social organization has created its own space and aims to meet the same basic needs as a reflection of individual and usually seek its own ontological security versus man. Hence, basic rules and resources (structured) have been formed which ensures cyclical regeneration and dynamism of social system.

Social Map and Identity

A rough plan regarding individual's externalizing his/her internal world was given above. Then, how does an individual internalize the external world? A baby is born with the capacity to both perceive and construct, develop his/her own world, within symbiotic relationships with structural developments taking place in his/her brain. [20] Our initial feelings are simple forms revealed as reactions to our experiences. [21] However, as babies grow up and develop dependency upon their caretakers, these forms are adapted as to guide baby's emotional state in order to react to clues –may be sounds or mimics- received from the parental figures, or to stimulants. In this way, parenthood figure effects the way of interpreting the external world and becomes conciliator of activated internal states of the baby. These experiences recorded in emotional memory which keeps recollection of parenthood attitudes, which may possibly be retrieved under similar conditions; start with the process of socialization (Social Learning Theory). Through this process, the child commences to develop cognitive and emotional map of his/her own environment. Objects are classified in this map according to their differences noticed and values recorded. As Mead [22] and Cooley [23] state, these information provided by caretakers and other figures who are important to the child in his/her early childhood constitute the resource for construction of the child's concept of identity. Identity, therefore, is based on elements of differentiation: Differentiation between Me and Not-Me (the other), which is followed by all other

classifications. The main point here is that personal identity (or symbols attributed thereto) which gained in the early years of life is the most static and resistant part to further revisions, as stated by Richard Jenkins [24]. Human consciousness is quite narrow. It is known that active memory is limited with the capacity to hold only limited-range comprehensions at any time. Therefore, it is compulsory to make classification and generalization (stereotypes) given our limited capacity to keep huge and varied information at the same time [25]. The mental models approach suggested by Spears and Johnson-Laird tends to support this case. Thus, rational models appear on the one hand for our personal identities and for our social projections on the other hand during the development process, each providing us with means of categorizing, organizing and interpreting our experiences. As products of collective experience of society, these symbols are gained from the society, and family basically, and personal experiences. This co-development of individual and social structure ensures a natural harmony to a certain level.

Figure 3

Social Map[26]

These symbols constitute basic building blocks of identity formation, and ensure that individuals adopt and regenerate stereotype social identities, through determining and scripting personal attitudes, actions, emotions and language and introducing such scripts as natural in-born characteristics. These symbols, the family in the first instance, are provided by ecology of human development and are filled with collective values. As reflections of external social structure, they take place in a totality which is harmonious both categorical and hierarchical levels. Identity actually desires a balance to be sought in the whole social structure as well: similarity as much as to feel oneself secure, and differentiation as much as to ensure self-awareness.

People manage their daily activities to a large extent through the most superficial symbols. These are the symbols which we have gained recently in our lives and to which we feel the least faithful. As moving towards the center, emotional responsibilities of the symbols increase, get deeper and they are transmitted to a large extend from the family during early childhood, during the process from infancy to adolescence. From this perspective, they have historical roots and do not change almost all through our lives. Obligation to change them is a psychological destruction for an individual. For example, the belongingness we feel towards the workplace we work at

and its symbols exist as long as we work there. Nevertheless, ethnical or cultural symbols are widespread at almost all levels and are deep. This structure ensures on the one hand affinity between individual and society and brings differentiation on the other hand, hence it renders individuals Ayşe, Mehmet, Salomon, Maria and John; and it constitutes basic engine power for transformation in the interaction between individual and society as we expressed before.

Figure 4

Prof. ULUSOY

However, this collective nature of identity; that is, considering it as a process shaped, regenerated and activated under the sovereignty of cultural scenarios and power centers, have resulted in questioning the generating of manipulated identities and reorganization of social structure through this way.

Now that we have explained the socio-psychological interaction in order to examine globalization and its effects on values, we can discuss what "globalization" is.

Globalization: *Money as God, Digitizing of the Values*

Money is generally seen as the subject of economists. Nevertheless, given the status it has reached today, it has a content which goes far beyond that. As the most abstract thing created by man, money attains reality with its tremendous effect on social structure. For this reason, even we do not mention it here, it is necessary to review history of money in order to perceive this process. Actually, debates going on about "money" have deep roots in history. Below are given some historical statements regarding money.

We can summarize the interaction of money with social structure under the following headings:

Realization of Self Subjectiveness;

In his book "Philosophy of Money" [27], Simmel deals with "money" as the main subject and discusses the relationship between money and individual and, thus, relationships in the field of modern society. According to Simmel, money is a subjective value. This subjective value, however, is made objective by affiliating it to an object through the need felt by humans in obtaining it, and *money*, as a subjective value only, suggests a totally objective definition and its own manifesto, creating its own independent space [28].

> *"The love of money is the root of all evil"*
> **THE HOLY BIBLE**
> *(The New Testament)*
>
> *"Let those who hoard the wealth which God has bestowed on them out of His bounty never think it good for them: it is nothing but evil"*
> **THE KORAN**
> *(The Imrans 3:181)*
>
> *"....... Money, according to the Philosopher, was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange, and consequently, the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation, whereby it is sunk in exchange"*
> **SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS**
> *(On Law, Morality, and Politics)*
>
> *"Money.... not only affords you no protection, but makes you the sooner fall a prey.... it is not gold, as is acclaimed by common opinion, that constitutes the sinews of war, but good soldiers; for gold does not find good soldiers, but good soldiers are quite capable of finding gold"*
> **NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI**
> *(The Discourses)*

Weber discusses in the *Protestant Ethic* the principle of Protestant ethic including **"***sunmum bonum", 'making more and more money' and 'aversion from pleasures of life' intertwined with it* [29]. In his view, access to wealth means at the same time the end to it, and Protestants are addictively indulged in money-making. Irrational accumulation of wealth (it is irrational, because money avoids the change constituting its reason to exist), accelerates the rationalization of money economies of capitalism, and he states that money acquired its status in the legal sense before long even if money-making is controversial from the points of conscience, justice and avoiding hypocrisy [30]. Weber, for example in his article "*Religious Rejection of the World and Their Direction*" [31] makes a detailed review on the Protestant ethic and discuss the characteristics of rational economy of capitalism as a calculable method of living: he puts forward that money is the most abstract and impersonal element of human life [32]. Weber [33] relates the reason why money makes rational calculability possible to the fact that money is applicable to all goods and services, these creating in turn the principle of impersonal change, as an expression of accepting exchange of money, among the participants of market.

Expression of Values;

Simmel, first of all, analyses the relation between money and value. Value is not determined by value of use or material money but by demands (desire) of people trying to acquire money. According to Simmel, trade has vital importance in formation of the value of money and it is through this way objects are made exchangeable with a value expressed in a terminology within monetary system. The price of a product in this exchange, by Simmel's definition, is a measure of exchangeability among and totality of other products [34]: *"money expresses the general element contained in all exchangeable objects, it is incapable of expressing the individual element in them"* [35].

> *"...... those who know the true use of money set the limit of their wealth solely according to their needs, and live content with little"*
> **SPINOZA**
> *(The Ethics)*
>
> *"The trite objects of human efforts- possessions, outward success, luxury-have always seemed to be contemptible."*
> *"Money only appeals to selfishness and irresistibly invites abuse"*
> **ALBERT EINSTEIN**
> *(Ideas and Opinions)*
>
> *"In the form of democracy, money has won."*
> *"Through money, democracy becomes its own destroyer, after money has destroyed intellect"*
> *"In reality, money, like number and low, is a category of thought."*
> *"Thinking in money generates money- that is the secret of the world economy."*
> **OSWALD SPENGLER**
> *(The Decline of the West)*
>
> *"...... the importance of money essentially flows from its being a link between the present and the future"*
> **JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES**
> *(The General Theory)*

Power of Transformation;

Money constitutes the objective starting point of exchange relations. Because it is a transformator which commoditizes objects separate from other goods. When possessing material value, money (gold or silver) has later become an exact symbol which expresses the quality in quantitative means and an absolute aim of itself, in a way. Simmel's approach defines this as commoditizing the interaction, or the process through which quality is reduced to quantity. Money, by this way, commoditizes economy and the whole social life at the same time, including culture, and transforms qualitative values into quantitative functions (obligatory by its content). This rational intellectualization process has become widespread with the capacity of money to transform objects into exchangeable goods. The most extreme examples to this case could be seen in metropolises with this principle: "*the seat of the money economy, (where) in rational relations man is reckoned with like a number*" [36]. Through this way, individuals in society are valued externally in money, and this makes it possible to measure objectively and accurately people as monetary values who interacts with money.

"...... money is one of the greatest instruments of freedom ever invented by man"
(The Road to Selfdom)
".. monetary policy and its effects should be as predictable as possible."
(*The Constitution of Liberty*)
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK

"Money .... becomes dangerous only if it can buy power, either directly, or by enslaving the economically weak who must sell themselves in order to live."
KARL R. POPPER
(The Open Society and its Enemies)

"To paraphrase Clemenceau, money is much too serious a matter to be left to the Central Bankers."
MILTON FRIEDMAN
(Capitalism and Freedom)

"...... using Hobbesian logic, I revealed Capitalism as a Religion of Money (banks as churches, bankers as clergy, loan applications as auricular confessions, bankruptcies as excommunications, credit bureaus as index librorum prohibitorum, etc.)
EDWARD E. AYOUB
(The Essence of Capitalism)

Bindingness;

Money especially in modern societies establishes relationships through flow of cash and services, and ties people together. Money could put aside the physical and social differences between individuals. For Simmel, money is the central building and symbol around which historical structuring of modern societies have been realized and indicates mutual dependency within social life. These relations are made concrete in impersonal cost-benefit relationship and this enables money to exceed social and physical boundaries. Nevertheless, with expansion of monetary economy, intellectualization process contributes to break down the tie between impersonal bonds and the material. Likewise, while Marx initially exalts money in structuring social relationships, he expresses that money gradually breaks its ties with social relationships paradoxically through this process. The opinion of - autonomous- Market and "invisible hand" manipulated by Adam Smith himself in the 18th century, Ricardo's "comparative advantages theory" and Richard Cobden's articles in 1840s described that free trade promoted international ties of friendship. Kant in his article titled *Towards Perpetual Peace*, which was published in the early 19th century and which occupies a large place even today in liberal theory, discussed that the possibility of republics to wage war was less due to their nature. These ideas later would be defended by Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman who are representatives of Post World War II Anglo-American School. From this perspective it would not be wrong to mention the "globalizing" effect of money.

Endowment of Liberty

Simmel analyzes the relationship of money with personal freedom in chapter two of his book titled **"***The Philosophy of Money***".** He discusses that money frees individual due to obligation to use money in labor production or buyer/seller relations in market; however, he states that this is not true for all people. He at the same time draws attention to its effect on differentiation of individual. In his view, "*Money has carried to its extreme the separation ... between man as a personality and man as the instrument of a special performance or significance*" [37]. He paves the way for establishing more intensive and complex relationships through references made to freedom, and later property and money. According to Simmel, money has the effect of release. Because it frees individual from majority effects of all social categories and from all limits presented by being a member of collective structures of groups. Money, in this way, creates freedom within which there is no restriction, limitation, which also means lack of feeling of taste and quality in dialectical sense. In Simmel's view, money in the first instance produces impersonality unknown within the whole economic possession, and equally developed independency and autonomy of identity [38].

A neoliberal sociologist, F. Fukuyama who is one of the most prominent advocates of globalization, has created reactions with his book *"The End of History and the Last Man"* printed in 1992 which is basically a continuation of this idea. Fukuyama repeated Kant's and Hegel's idea that history has an aim, a last target which is already included in human potentials and which attributes a meaning to the whole history, i.e., human freedom; and claimed that this aim has been attained through capitalist liberal democratic system of which foundation was laid by Adam Smith. Globalization was a concept which exalts this aim.

> *"Both (money and goods), in excess, produce enmity and feuds in private and public life, while a deficiency almost invariably leads to slavery"*
> ***PLATO***
> *(The Laws)*
>
> *"Those who follow illiberal occupations, like ..... moneylenders who make small loans at a high rate of interest; for all these receive more than is right, and not from the right source. Their common characteristic is obviously their sordid avarice....... "*
> ***ARISTOTLE***
> *(Ethics)*
>
> *"....... Money answereth all things." (Ecclesiastes 10:19)*
> *"The rich ruleth over poor, and the borrower is servant to the lender" (Proverbs 22:7)*
> ***THE HOLY BIBLE***
> *(The Old Testament)*

Unlimited Power to Exchange

Simmel suggests that money could render all objects exchangeable and hence reason and money are exchangeable and humans and culture could be purchased; that is, everything could be bought with money. However, for Marx, in parallel with theory of value, money has strong relationships with labor and, the concept of value, based on labor, has with labor production; and money is itself a commodity. Nonetheless, as an abstract form it expresses other commodities, as well. Money therefore is not a medium of exchange but at the same time expresses sovereignty. Money is the last commodity as long as it could purchase all other goods, but it transforms the true manpower into an alien nature which is a summary of materialization in exchange relations. Marx reviews the power of money to alienate, especially (Jewish) culture of materialism in his book "*On the Jewish Question*": in his interpretation, money is the jealous, envious god of Israel, and Israel probably has no other god at all [39]. (Karl Marx was born of a German-Jewish family).

Alienating and Fragmentation

While money creates a bond between members among which it is used, it also alienates and differentiates between them. Marx, in his book *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*-1844 [40] allocates a chapter on the topic *The Power of Money in Bourgeoisie Society*. Marx discusses that money, which is separated from human relations of exchange, expresses a summary of special property relationships. Money is an example of human alienation; "*It is me who could afford whatever provided by money is the owner of money*" [41]. Marx in his book "*On the Jewish Question*" examines the alienating power of money and also in his most important study Grundrisse [42] claims that money reflects and commoditizes social relationships and that it has become externalized and independent of people included in these relationships.

Power of Determination of Social Construction

We have already said that money applies its own manifesto over the members among whom it is used. Weber makes the definition of class in the framework of opportunities especially in property possessed and revenue earned [43]. While drawing to attention the importance of monetary economy in development of almost all aspects of modernity in all his works, Weber emphasizes the relationship with rationalization in modern society to cultural, religious, political, technological and legal processes. Weber suggests the difficulty in earning revenue for existence of bureaucratic structures (taxation system) [44] and according to Weber monetary economy is at the same time determinant of the bureaucratic structure. The most remarkable characteristic of Simmel's discussion on money is relatedness of money with other social phenomena. As Bryan Turner points out, in Simmel's study "*every issue related with the whole ……… is not unimportant. Because everything is interrelated.*" [45] This relatedness expresses itself in Simmel's dissertation on money; and is a comprehensible formation within social structure as existed again within this social structure, such as social institutions. Money suggests the mutual dependency within social life, and all occurrences, things and individuals are interrelated somehow. Nevertheless money is capable of expressing the whole system itself alone and the core symbols of this system.

Accumulation of Social Energy

Money is probably the greatest invention of humanity. Its characteristic of accumulating social energy and transferring it to future renders it unique. It connects the past to the future by this way. However, it deepens the breakdown and disparity within society through this process. It is this accumulation characteristic of money –which is in contrast to its own manifesto, anyway- that enhances its rationalization and power of rationalization, and causes it to separate away further from society.

Technological Advancement and Social Structure

It is important for ensuring integrity of presentation of the topic to describe briefly the transformations experienced in four different spheres as a result of extensive developments in the last two decades of information technologies which are explained in detailed in especially Manual Castells' studies [46]. Castells, when analyzing the transformations caused by these technological advancements in the spheres of economy,

nature of business and work life, mass communication and political system, claims that this creates a new structure he describes as 'network society'. Internet, mobile phones and means of satellite communication have prepared the infrastructure of this network and therefore, there is a continuous, real-time feedback process which is also able to do actions on itself. This infrastructure presents the possibility to real-time transmission, even monitoring, of information to the entire production and distribution system. Harvey, conceptualized globalization principally as compression of time and space: one can only speculate about the impact of such a compression on an individual's psyche and social functioning [47].

This infrastructure has responded excellently the globalization demand of capital and allowed economic activities to settle in the foundation of this network. Today multinational corporations represent one-third of global GDP and two-thirds of international commerce although they employ only 120 million people. According to Castells, local small and middle-sized economic structures could have the means of competition only by establishing similar networks. This small and middle-sized networks are affiliated as sub-contractors to the networks by which responsibilities of big, global corporations are spread out and therefore, they constitute a structure within which the internal responsibility is dispersed, they being connected to external networks at the level of whole universe. [III]

Figure-5. Space of Technology and Social Structure

Prof. Ulusoy

Another issue to be underlined is that there is a dramatic increase in strategic merges between companies within which the responsibility is dispersed during the last one or two decades. Such merges have become widespread especially in the fields of communication, media, finance and possession of certain strategic natural resources.

As a result, money has been included in the relations of almost the entire social structure in the sense of digital money applications and flow of all financial movements through electronic media. Money, by this way, proposes an opportunity to monitor not only economic structure but social structure and its dynamics, as well: it makes possible to control the totality of individual behavior and requires the concept of freedom to be reviewed considering this aspect.

A new cultural era has been introduced, which is called by Castells not virtual reality but real virtuality. Now many cultural expressions –related to entertainment or politics- enter circulation as electronic hypertexts with social influence, going far beyond communication among people. What is new is not coding reality but placing much of such coding in a virtual network. By this way television, Internet and electronic hypertexts have become parts of our reality and the media has turned to be the most strategic apparatus in transformation of social structure. This issue will be reviewed in detail later in this study. Interaction between technology and society is surely not a new phenomenon; hot debates about the influence of technology on social structure, especially in the process of industrialization, have continued almost a hundred years. However, the fact we should underline in the process we have been through is that the

---

[III] From the presentation by Manual Castells at the Center of Science, Technology and Society, University of Santa Clara, 4 May 2000.

space of technology has covered the space of social structure and that we entered a unique era we have never experienced before. Arguments for space of social life have not expanded while those for technological life have, and are continuing to do so incredibly (see Figure 5).

It is possible to give an example for this case: while a technological element belonging to 2000-3000 years ago bears no surplus value other than its anthropological value, or while we witness that a technological product of today has become obsolete in short notice, the statements of Confucius or Aristotle, or Orkhon scripts maintain their meanings even today. Opinions on money we have quoted before are also good examples for that. We have been discussing liberation and welfare of humanity nearly for 3000 years. It is certain that this new era will bring about a future difficult to foresee.

Becoming Deity on the Throne of Technology

Money, on the throne of technology, has been a perfect medium for accumulation of social energy and transferring it to future which was impossible before. Nevertheless, its gaining power and coming into existence during this historical process has placed itself in the center of social structure by means of changing it fundamentally and pushing man away from the center as put forward by Giddens; and it transforms the whole social structure in this context.

Globalization is a process through which money has become a deity on the throne of technology and quantified all social values as required by its very nature. Leaving its mark upon its time, globalization process has turned out to be the process in which all values are measured with money and thus an alienation from all previous values appears. Whether this era provides liberation for people or not is controversial; but what is certain is that it points out a historical period during which money has liberated and enhanced its area of influence as far as it could push. In today's world, money is capable of suggesting and practicing its own manifesto. Baudrillard also bases the hierarchy in capitalist societies on distribution and use of wealth and he mentions "money" as the prime criterion of power leading to hierarchical priorities as well as power and cultural priorities [48]. Possession of money today expresses high-paid, top-level representatives of money. In the system, all elites including "possessors" of money serve only to the application of this self-defined manifesto. This is in fact a large-scale transformation realized within last decades. Possessing money has lost its meaning in this context. There is a system consisting of intertwined and highly sophisticated networks managed by elites, and this system is monitored perfectly because it is structured so. For the purpose of explaining this structure, the structure of boards of executives of international Halliburton Company and Citigroup, and the connection between them was given in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Networking of The Companies Through Elites (2004)

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Rise of elites is clearly expressed by the graphic below without requiring any further explanation. It's even more revealing to compare the actual rates of increase of the salaries of CEOs and ordinary workers; from 1990 to 2005, CEOs' pay increased almost 300% (adjusted for inflation), while production workers gained a scant 4,3%. The purchasing power of the federal minimum wage actually *declined* by 9,3% when inflation is taken into account.

CEOs' average pay, production workers' average pay, the S&P 500 Index, corporate profits, and the federal minimum wage, 1990-2005 (all figures adjusted for inflation)

Source: *Executive Excess 2006*, the 13th Annual CEO Compensation Survey from the Institute for Policy Studies and United for a Fair Economy.

Has Hegel's universal spirit come into existence with the object of "money? Does the fact that rationalization process introduced with enlightenment has moved to an abstract, even a theological era remind us of dialectical components of existence in Hegel's views? Has Marx's comparison become a reality?

In the center of the above-mentioned social system we put forward in the beginning of our study, the system emphasized by Giddens as well, stands not man but 'MONEY', which has become deity. This new deity has no mercy, because it refers only to itself.

Globalization, thus, in this context, means a restructuring process of a new model of mankind and social structure by means of destroying ecology of human development, i.e., changing parameters thereof.

Figure-6. Changing Ecology of Human Development in the Global World

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"New Deity" of the global imposes its own values and order on social system which are totally isolated from individual and outside of joint production of individual and society (Baudrillard calls it hyper-reality [49]) (The second phase, creation of anti-thesis - Hegel). For this reason;

- It is away from the motive for meeting the needs of individuals, (Remember the explanation above; money exists not through production or meeting of needs but through consumption demands of people).

- The top layer of this ecologic system, in comparison to man, has been created as a copy, i.e. simulacrum which refers only to itself, as expressed by Baudrillard, and which is superficial, having not ontological connections with sub-systems any more, by the system of 'money' which is itself an isolation. (Simulacrum is defined as an identical copy which has no original).[IV] It is 'Simulacrum' because it does not reflect the origin, i.e. man.

- In this new global order, money imposes these new values on the whole system from outside to inside of the system by means of the power of media it possesses largely. Culture of modern society is characterized by weakening emotions and influence. Influence of cultural products is both open-ended and weak due to continuous reproduction. Now all alienation and anomy has been replaced by segregation and disintegration. All values have been commoditized and have lost their value. Individuals with their values they categorized and internalized during their process of development are now incapable of defining these continuously changing symbols of the new order. This uncertainty brings about anxiety for individuals trying to minimize crisis between internal and external worlds and to create more secure and stable environment.[V]

- Historicity has lost in this context. There is nothing certain about the past any longer. What is being done under the name of History is to reproduce the 'glorious' history of 'money's' own, in new texts with new scenarios. Therefore, a kind of schizophrenic culture has appeared due to that the past, now and future is all mixed up and segregated and discontinuous. Everything has now become incomprehensible, indefinable; and unreliable even it could be defined.[VI]

Man, once in the center of the system, has fallen outside of this new order and constitutes the masses defined by Baudrillard (2003: 12) as *"a black hole within which the societal has been lost, which possesses current powers, with no history to be written neither in the past, nor in the future; no robust energy to be freed and a desire they want to realize, neither"* [50]. Individual has to be a part of this mass being shaped as long as he/she consumes – which is inevitable. And the mission to manipulate masses, make them suitable for the system and 'create a new model of man' has been assigned to the media.

[IV] Social structure is a copy of man. Money is, on the other hand, is a copy of the copy, i.e. 'simulacrum', as a product of this social structure.

[V] As mentioned before, man weaves a cocoon; even it is not real as defined by Giddens, to eradicate this anxiety. Giddens conceptualizes this as ontological security. The best example of this could be given as the phenomenon of "religion". Man has found out answers to every question which he did not know. Could we consider that religion, which has become a rising value recently throughout the world, is a consequence of globalization in this context? Re-staging a theological period as adorned with technology...making Money a deity and hence birth of new religions... is a social 'regression'. It should be remembered that Protestantism was born to promote Money in the process of its becoming a deity, as well.

[VI] For this subject please see also the section titled "'living in the world': dilemmas of the self" in pages 187-201 of Anthony Giddens' book "Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age.

As the main manipulating argument (*schools*) of the Simulacrum (*money*): MEDIA

The most important element of the media today is television. This is because of its huge influence in social structuring and formation of identity. The TV, in phenomenological terms, is an instrument which presents a means to communicate through images as talking pictures. We spend a large amount of our daily life in front of the TV and it transforms the daily images, presents them to us as much more colorful, musical, dramatic, fast, exciting and appealing illusions. However, in contrast to what is known, this is not a reflection of the real world any more but a symbolic metamorphosis in which the reality has been transformed and attributed different perspectives and importance. It provides the myths and rituals regarding social institutions, values and lifestyles and creates a sense of social contribution and integration [51]. Nonetheless, while people experience this feeling on the one hand, new norms created by TV lead to more alienation and isolation from the society, on the other hand [52]. This is due to the natural characteristics of TV which is independent from the media manipulation we will discuss later. Television takes photographic images from the reality and turns them into symbols of social life and experiences. These symbols, unlike photographic images, do not perceive the whole and gives only the moral characters, values which are related to these symbols in a limited fashion. Nevertheless the watcher tends to see the TV as an apparatus to present social realities when sitting in front of the TV.

The clear result of all the critiques and studies performed in this field is that it is not a window opening to outside world, not a picture of reality, nor a section from life, but a fictional, organized new world manufactured through technical and cultural arguments [53]. Its capability to produce and transfer a symbol and to largely enter private lives of individuals assigns a great power to it in that formation of social norms, identities and social restructuring, consequently.

Ericson defines such attachment to remote figures as secondary relationships and discusses whether they play role in transition from adolescence to adulthood [54]. As well as being occupational roles or identity role models, these secondary relationships undertake social and emotional functions. This attachment to media-friendly figures is defined as a parasocial relationship in which all interaction is one-way and individuals feel themselves as friends or colleagues [55]. This relationship, no matter how visual it is, is experienced as if it was real; and parasocial relationships bear many similarities with the real social relationships [56] [57].

The importance of television in shaping to a large extent attitudes, behavior and values of the youth is academically indisputable [58]. Bandura's social learning theory states that new behavior observed is watched and repeated as a role model [59]. As a basic source for the youth for receiving information, TV has an influence serving as a teacher [60].

According to a research conducted with 1400 parents in the USA, parents believe that television is the second most influential resource over the youth, coming after themselves. What is interesting is that only 13 % of these parents believe that TV informs the youth correctly [61].

The thing to which is drawn attention is that global powers have noticed the power of media to reshape the history experienced as well, going beyond reshaping today and future, as expressed by Vidal: "…the ones who reflect the history on the screen make the history, and not the reflected on the screen but who reflects the history on the screen holds the control. The most important factor coming after capital is the media in globalization process. It is quite remarkable in this context that media institutions, the number of which was more than 50 in the USA in 1980s, only started to be monopolized through the end of 1990s and gathered under 6 international media giants

with the total revenue above 100 billion dollars and approximately 350 thousand employees [62].

The media has turned to be a propaganda apparatus –aiming at a media culture - which pumps its values increasingly doubling their influence and intensity like an amplifier; the values of consumer society of capitalism which we cannot follow and understand; the values consisting of symbols based on nation-less, constantly changing, surreal illusions.[VII]

Now modern society is managed by industries of cybernetic models, media, entertainment and information. New identities are formed by changing the symbols which are basic values of society. There are two basic principles to do this. First, to create characters, role models who bear the symbols you want to transfer and then to use stages equipped with advanced technology to enhance the effect of illusion. Heroes must be created. The most important ones among the basic arguments used for this purpose are popular art (music, in particular), sexuality and violence.

Information Society which is frequently mentioned today is being constructed on the dynamic media culture created by this very media. One of the most important target groups of the media culture is the youth. According to the United Nations, the youngsters between the ages 15-24, amounting 1.1 billion, who are defined as post-adolescent, constitute the prime engine power of this growing global media culture and main target of a large market estimated at approximately 2 trillion dollars (UN, 2003) [63].

Monopolization of US Media[VIII]

Globalization: Destruction of Human Development Ecology

Giddens emphasizes that nations are faced with risks and dangers rather than enemies today; and he continues that content of the concepts such as nation, family, work, tradition and nature –called as "shell institutions"- have changed even if their shell remains the same; that these institutions have become incompetent in meeting the functions they were established to perform and that most of us feel surrounded by powers on which we have no effect in such an environment; and he questions whether we could impose ourselves on these powers again [64]. In this context, examining some changes emerging in human development ecology destroyed by globalization (free market monetary system) to enforce its own values would contribute to understand this anxiety.

Fragmentation of Family and Confusion of Roles

It is widely known that family is important in child development. It is necessary to reevaluate the situation we are faced with today in this respect. Family has lost most of its functions during this process. With the introduction of working women, especially in developed societies, the function of raising children has shifted to other institutions in which emotional ties are rather weak, or institutions which lack emotional ties. Moreover, this generation spends much more time in front of the TV than they spend with their parents. From this perspective, parents could not go beyond meeting just economic needs of their children and being their biological reason for existence and they have been pushed far away from their children's space. Emotional ties have been weakened. Love has been commoditized, made worthless and reduced to sex. This is an irreplaceable void in identity of individual. Thus, families have entered the process of disintegration. Today, the rate of single-parent families has risen to 60 % in the USA. The same situation is observed with the rate of 40% in similar, developed countries such as the UK and France. Although still well under these levels, the same trend is witnessed in developing countries including Turkey, as well.

Discharging Roles and Rising Masculinity Crisis

One social change that is now in place is that men and masculinities can at least be talked about as problematic. Today there is several ways to studying men and masculinities ranging from examinations of 'masculine psychology' and psychodynamics [65] to broad societal, structural analyses of men [66]; which have interrogated the operation of different masculinities- hegemonic, complicit, subordinated, marginalized, resistant [67][68] - and the interrelations of unities and differences between men. Some detailed ethnographic descriptions of men's activity as

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[VIII] An important part of the news media was controlled by 50 companies in the USA in 1983. Ben Bagdikian mentioned this case as alarming in his book titled, **The Media Monopoly**. He wrote in the fourth edition of his book in 1992 that 90% of the whole mass communication including newspapers, magazines, TV and radio stations, books, cinema, video, cabled broadcasting services, photo agencies was controlled by just a few companies less than two dozens and foresaw that this number would decrease to half dozen in a very short time.   This estimation was met by a serious doubt, but when the sixth edition of his book was published, this figure was decreased to 6 actually. Since then, the new media has greatly expanded including the Internet market. Today, one fourth of the Internet users in the USA is affiliated to AOL Time-Warner, which is the biggest media institution of the world. Bagdikian revised and enhanced his book in 2004 with the title of **The New Media Monopoly** and stated that a great majority of the media industry in the USA was being managed by just five companies, - namely Time Warner, Disney, Murdoch's News Corporation, Bertelsmann of Germany, and Viacom (formerly CBS)- and by General Electric's NBC as the sixth one.

well as investigation of the constructions of specific masculinities in specific discourses several influences have brought this renewed focus on men and masculinities [69]. One of them feminist movement as we will discuss below while the others are related to the economic, social and cultural changes. What is perhaps most interesting is that while men's general power as a dominant social category remains virtually unchanged and may even have become intensified in some respects, men's power is constantly being challenged, fragmented and even transformed. But it is being adequate cause to escalate the tension in the crisis and more victimization of women.

However, women, since the 18th century, have joined work life to provide cheap labor demanded by the system especially with the expansion of industrialization, and while the rate of unemployed men, particularly of youngsters, is increasing with the expansion of service sector, the rate of women labor tends to grow rapidly although management is still dominated by men.

Although patriarchy has certainly changed over the last century through the growth of the state, men's power still resides at least in part in the family and the institution of fatherhood [70]. Historically, fatherhood is both a means of possession of and care for young people, and an arrangement between men. As a result of fragmentation of family and illegitimate parturition, the problems of both father absence and father distance are now recognized more than ever and men become to face so many ethical questions corresponding fatherhood; what is responsibilities and rights of fatherhood for natural or biological father and step father. Albeit men resist changing of their roles, there is a clear need for a 'post-marriage' ethics for men. In addition there are long term changes in the number of men living alone as well as women.

Dominant forms of normal male sexuality are characterized as power, aggression, penis-orientation, separation of sex from loving emotion, objectification, fetishism, and supposed 'uncontrollability' [71]. These features can be criticized as highly problematic. But, in the recent decades, more broadly the pressures on the construction of men's sexualities and roles seem to be diverging more and more the forces of reaction, of the glorification of violence. This would include child abuse, child sexual abuse, domestic violence, rioting, crime, policing, soldiering, wars, as well as football hooliganism, public disorder. Men's violence needs not just patching up the problem, but the changing of men and 'normal masculinity' [72].

In traditional beliefs, men is being representative of states in micro-level societies (family) and as we will discuss further below, states face similar crisis like men have; deprivation of powers for authority. Liberal thought have been supporting the activities of feminizing the social institution ever. But, because of its internal dynamics, the problem is more complex. However the masculinity crises are neglected concept in debates of global social problems. It seems to be more problematic area as, at least environmental destruction and security.

Changing Women and Sexuality

The first feminist movement which had advocated also by the famous philosophers like John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Harriet Tatlor (1807-1858) begun to concern with a number of egalitarian issues including equal rights for women, educational and legal reform, abolition of slavery and the rights to vote. Scarcely, in the early twentieth century, during and after World War I (1914-1918), most women, in the western world and Turkey also granted the rights to vote. After World War II, a new generation of massive baby boom (1946-1964) grown up during the period of economic prosperity leaded a new feminist movement while the other had forced back into traditional roles which idealized women as "full-time wives and mothers". That new generation had the

opportunity to assure more education and attendance to social life. The new movement which was the precursor of coming "sex wars" and addressed political and cultural battles over sexuality in the 1980's was characterized by their concerns about reproduction and sexual liberation of women [73]. When arrived to 1990's, a kind of insurgent feminism arose and examined the intersections between races, class, culture, sexuality. Which has been called the "politics of hybridity" later and so many contemporary concepts like "multiple identities", "multiple cultures", and "multiple ethnicities" have been based upon the policies of this new insurgent movement. Beyond these, many contemporary issues related also to immigration, class conflicts, multiculturalism, globalization, environmental matters, global human rights underlie much of their feminist theory and practice. But, the notion after incorporation and advancement of "queer theory" has become more radical. After excessive impassioned dispute, post-feminism emerged.

Susan Faludi heavily rejects the people calling themselves third-generation or post-feminists, and calls these neo-feminists as "media-made pseudo-feminist" or "pod feminist"[IX], and defines this new wave as the following:

> *"..... it would be more accurate to describe this drama as a media-assisted invasion of the body of the women's movement......".* [74]

Anti-man, far from being attractive and meeting the needs of young women actually, defending free and unlimited sex and holding rather leftist ideology probably due to its method of questioning, a false feminist stereotype has been created which is supported extremely by the media. Popular media has not been late to adopt and commoditize this new lifestyle established upon sex and shopping, in order to pump up the values of ultra-capitalist consumption society. Michelle Goldberg defines this neo-feminism as "shopping-and-fucking feminism":

> *"This new shopping-and-fucking is so ubiquitous right now in part because it jibes precisely with the message of consumer society that freedom means more-hot sex, better food, ever-multiplying pairs of Manolo Blahnik shoes, drawers full of Betsey Johnson skirts, Kate Spade bags and MAC lipsticks."* [75]

In addition, it would be beneficial to remember the disputes among genders focused on the feminist reproduction included in this feminist movement, pornography and S&M (Sadism & Masochism) trends and idea of Eros, as well.

Erosion of the Understanding of Nation-State

The transnational businesses and non-state dynamics such as internationally-effective private banks have covertly destroyed the nation-state sovereignty, which is formally adopted. The power appears to be shifting from the state to multinational corporations, some of which have a market value exceeding the gross domestic product of many countries. Even the governments of economically most powerful countries today are aware of the dilemma between areas of action within the boundaries of nation-state and mandates of globally-organized production relations. Sovereign states could benefit from their economies as far as there exist 'national economies' they could influence through political means. However, with the economy being taken out of national realm,

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[IX] *The metaphor "Pod" is an adaptation from a science-fiction movie called "Invasion of The Body Snatchers" made in 1956. Dwellers in a small town were replaced mysteriously with their look-alikes who were nothing but like a plant in a pot and their souls were stolen.*

and especially monetary markets and industrial production being organized throughout the world, national policy has lost its sovereignty over general conditions of production and thus, its impetus to maintain the social standard attained. [76]

Money defended nationalism before it became 'deity', going through national obstacles instead of class obstacles and creating homogenous, central units in language during this process. But now, as the 'deity', it claims to remove national barriers to the benefit of a single, integrated world market [77].

As times goes on, international economic system in collaboration with globalization market is being a transition to a transnational system. The raising important features of this transition are rapid flow of capital with increasing volume, dependency of national economy to a global market connected to the global monetary system, and assessment of national economies according to the global economic manifesto and countable with obedience to the system. Anymore, global relations are being to constitute the main connections between states and nations. Recently, national economies had been prevailing in the states, today, the states is embedded in the market [78].

Pressures on the national markets, sectors are going to be connected to global economy by privatization process by increasing trends.

Proceeds from privatization transactions per year (US$ millions)

Region	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total (all regions)	38 020	13 55	15 451	24 976	33 125	56 873
East Asia & Pacific	10,727	1,298	1,782	7,698	7,903	14,370
Europe & Central Asia	10,480	7,926	10,577	8,909	14,800	32,886
Latin America & Caribbean	12,321	3,141	303	410	2,189	922
Middle East & North Africa	3,748	227	112	6,484	3,338	4,155
South Asia	53	367	2,209	947	4,739	3,722
Sub-Saharan Africa	691	599	470	527	156	818

http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/

Politics, consequently, has become a politics of image. If you cannot use the media effectively, then you could not exist in politics. Politics is determined by the machines required to be and remain powerful. There are two important instruments: image (to access advocates) and money (to create that image), and these two go hand in hand. Since the whole democratic political system was established on the basis that you may not need money, this paradox paved the way for relying on illegal finance. For this reason, politics has been corrupted systematically.[X] Consequently; politics of states, to a large extent, have been included in the global monetary network and societies have lost their faith and trust in their states and democracy, as a result of this corruption.

Therefore, under the sovereignty of globalization, or global sovereignty of 'money', "…..state, stuck within the mutual dependency relations of world economics and world community, has started to lose its autonomy, capability to act and democratic core element. Here, these three points should be specified which depict loss of potency of nation states: (a) state's loss of capability to control and loss of power, (b) emergence of lack of legitimacy in decision-making mechanism, and (c) incompetence of state in providing administrative and regulative services which ensure legitimacy [79].

[X] From the presentation by Manual Castells at the Center of Science, Technology and Society, The University of Santa Clara on 4 May 2000.

One of the main disputes of origin is about the culture. Although there have been concerns that globalization will eventually lead to the homogenization of culture and identity, there is evidence that this process is being opposed by the tendency for communities to retain or assert their ethnic identity- in its extreme form leading to the rise of neo-nationalist and fundamentalist movements [80].

Weakening of state and all other social institutions, erosion emerged in the moral values of society, loss of ideologies and thus ideals and state authority foreshadow the social disintegration and thus, increase in social tensions.

Inequalities- Bureaucracies of Money: **ELITS**

According to estimation of UN (World Youth Report 2005), currently almost 209 million young people, or 18 per cent of all youth, live on less than $1 a day, and 515million young people, or nearly 45 per cent, live on less than $2 a day and 45 million people die every year of hunger and malnutrition. In fact, poverty can't be explain just "Poverty" which is the worst form of violence as stated by Ghandi considering the consequences of it; malnutrition, limited access to public services, such as a safe water supply, roads, health care and education and deprivation of shelter.

To measure the poverty there are several indicators and any one of them is insufficient to base of poverty only on household income, expenditure, consumption profiles or deprivation of basic human needs. All of them are point out the absolute physical or biological needs and they neglect the feelings of perception of deprivation or satisfaction of self which addresses the identities and feelings mostly related to culture, education, and further more to religion. Hence, most social scientists contributed social capital, pro-poor growth, empowerment, and voicelessness and there is now more focus on the deeper issue of equity.

While providing a relative economic growth, the phenomenon of globalization presents a different trend as well; income differences are gradually growing among regions, countries and within countries themselves. A similar trend is observed concerning cultures, religions or ethnical structures. In this context this phenomena is not the problem of developing or underdeveloped countries only, but also the problem of developed industrial countries as well. This is due to the non-egalitarian structure of the new global system. As we mentioned above, the system works on and by elites, through a well-developed network structure, and creates its own elites in every field. As point out by Castels, this comprises network structures within which risks, responsibilities and authority are shared and a very strict internal control is exercised in this sense. Therefore, it is impossible for us to explain the system exactly by means of our old ideological intellectual infrastructure. For example, there is no possession of money left in this context. Now, no one is possessor of money, but money is the possessor of everything.

This developing structure has divided society into two groups in general. Elites who are hierarchically structured and integrated in a network system within which rules of operation are based on the manifesto of money, and the mass, that is, aristocrats and slaves…

Actually this structure was foreseen by Weber to some extent. He said "In the modern state, real authority...... rests necessarily and unavoidably in the hand of the bureaucracy". He suggested increased specialization as the main reason for that. However, his theory of "bureaucratization" has developed in different direction because technology has tremendously advanced and specialization has gone up to unanticipated, extreme levels and gained an international aspect, and national state structures have weakened. For example, Deflem's study is remarkable which questions the loyalty of

police to international organizations rather than political structures of national state today [81].

The system is gradually closing upon itself excluding the outside world as required by its internal dynamics, and this separation is being marked with more and more precise and permanent lines day by day. This election starts with education in early years of life and continues with membership to exclusive groups in following years: graduation from certain universities; proficiency in economics, international relations and politics; membership to certain sports, business, think-tank clubs etc.; and finally, high ability of mobilization.

The closed structure of the system creates a distinct culture including also exclusion and violence in society and gains permanency with its characteristics of "intergenerational transmission". In this respect, poverty should be understood as an ontological security structure, a culture which is founded on inequalities, and the victims of this development who suffer most, unfortunately, are children and youngsters by their very nature.

Risk Society: **CHRONIC ANOMIE**

It suggests a social structure which has been dissolved, fragmented which is pictured rather in an exaggerated – but important in that it reveals the trend in the development-fashion. This phenomenon is a case of anomie. It was for the first time used by Durkheim in his book "The Division of Labor in Society" and thus entered the terminology of sociology, and later theorized by Morton as;

> *".....normative breakdown and some forms of deviant behavior derive largely from a disjunction between "culturally prescribed aspiration" of a society and "socially structured avenues for realizing those aspirations."* [82]

Merton, pointing out that the source of crime should be searched in the social structure which creates pathologic individuals, suggests two basic arguments: 1. Cultural goals and values expressed in American society and passed on from generation to generation 2. Social structure in which stratification (in US) is a source of both social and income inequality.

Later on, Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld proposed their own variant of Merton's anomic theory (which is commonly known as "Strain Theory" in criminology)- institutional anomic theory (IAT). Although they accept Merton's argument that motivation for crime stem from unequal access to legitimate means for success, they argue that the problem is the American Dream itself. The nature of the American Dream – fetishism of money, success by any means necessary- is a prime example of culture setting up a structure where "at all social levels, America is organized for crime" [83]. They claim that non economic institutions in the United States are subjugated by the economy and the roles of institutional balance of power. This subjugation occurs through 1. the devaluation of noneconomic institutional functions and roles, 2. accommodation to economic requirements by other institutions, 3. penetration of economic norms into other institutional domains [84]. Actually what Durkheim emphasized most was the rapid social and economic changes. He argued that anomic conditions take place when normative regulation are absent or when abrupt transition in society lead to loss in the effectiveness of norms to regulate the behavior (acute anomic). Durkheim's this approach was neglected for long years in comparison to others in academic discussions. However, it has been brought to agenda once more and has begun to be discussed widely with globalization and the collapse of communism in Eastern European countries.

Nevertheless, the problem we face today is much deeper and complex. In fact dialectical structuring in social systems is in search of some balance. Each individual, in order to establish a balanced individuality, must experience both the presence of their autonomous existence and the sense of belongingness to a social world. Thus, complete integration, or full isolation, is a threat to the effect of losing identity. This new formation renders integration of individual impossible in this sense. In a human-oriented system ("original", in Boudrillard's terms), individuals may be expected to regenerate the social system as a reflection of each other, and hence to restructure a balance. Nevertheless, the new world order which is not human-oriented, and which is thus lacking in its original, is far from ensuring such balance, and because the social system excludes human being as its reference point, it is on the edge of losing its all ties with reality. Individual's reference points in society, - which rely on consumption only, i.e. on the objects changing constantly by their nature - are losing their reliability, too. Now, individual is far from ensuring his/her ontological security.

In a human-oriented system, mobility would be motivated by the clash between the individual demanding reconciliation naturally and the social structures which are reflections of the individual and which try to delineate their own area. Then, how does the global value making reference to anything but itself, i.e. simulacrum, that is, money, ensure such mobility to human's advantage? This is the prime question for our future… Now, balance, "institutional balance of power" in Merton's terms, has gained continuity to human's disadvantage. This is the situation of chronic anomie.

A liberal theoretician, Fukuyama himself accepts this development as well, and defines this phenomenon as a "great disruption" in his book "The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order" and put forwards extreme individualization as the main reason for this [85]. Moreover, he defines fragmented, decomposed structure emerged as a result of enhancing such individualization as miniaturization of the society [86].

Likewise, Nassar relates adverse effects of globalization with terrorism in his theory of globalization. Globalization contributes to dreams, fantasies, and rising expectations, but at the same time, it leads to dashed hopes, broken dreams, and unfulfilled achievement. Terrorism breeds in the gap between expectation and achievements. Nassar, gives place to rich-poor dichotomy. Rich people (or nations) are seen as wanting power and wealth, and poor people (or nations) are seen as wanting justice [87].

Youth of our time have to be faced with extreme obscurities of this new and ever unique post-modern world, a dark and unforeseeable future and all risks of an asymmetrical and non-predefined war. They are the first generation of a new transformation fed by unrealistic symbols which are formed by money through technology (computers, communication technologies, and genetic engineering) and this transformation aims at basic identity structure of the youth. In addition, they have to struggle with poverty, famine, immigrations, ascending violence and crime brought along by this asymmetric war. Another world is being established now.

At this point, it would be beneficial to look back and mention this topic once again: All our deities have had a gender up today; and god is male in all monotheist religions and defined with a father figure; the protector, deliverer of justice, bestower, punisher and source of authority. However, with the rise of the new god, a war is declared against all source of masculinity of social life. Unisex approach of post-modernism has begun to dominate all over social life. Some philosophers have clung to the assumption that this development would elevate the status of women in society and also eradicate violence which is identified with masculinity. However, as revealed over time, women still do not occupy the desired status in social life at all and discrimination remains; they

are subjected to much more violence than ever. Tendency to violence in youngsters, in males especially, is increasing proceedingly. From this perspective, the loss of father figure causes aggression to emerge.

Future Security Prospect in Globalizing World

If we turn back to the issue in the beginning and repeat our question, then: What is globalization? Or, more precisely, what distinguishes it from the other processes?

If we define it as a process through which tremendous steps are taken in technology including informatics and cybernetics especially as more decisive fields, which humans all over the world communicate much more intensely than ever before by means of such technologies, and which developments towards the single world society have appeared, removing all boundaries, then it could be possible to say some thousand-year ideals of humanity have been attained and we could mention the end of history actually. On the other hand, the biggest mistake to be made in evaluating the phenomenon of globalization is to reach conclusions thinking from the perspective supplied to us by our historical ideologies. To what extent is it realistic to define globalization as the colonialism or imperialism of the USA, or new order of exploitation put forward by the Western world? The west has already been dominating over almost more than half of the world, exploiting their resources and selling goods to them for more than 200 years. The invasion of Iraq - and this was the breaking point of the optimistic perception of globalization - by the USA, the single super-power of the single-pole world especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, could not be attached a meaningful explanation by this way of thinking only. The news prepared by Katty Kay in the BBC on 29 January 2001 gave the clues of future developments:

> *"A majority of President Bush's new cabinet are millionaires and several are multimillionaires........ It is not unusual for American politicians to be rich. For the last two decades more than half of all cabinet members have been millionaires... The president, vice president (Dick Cheney- Haliburton oil company), commerce secretary (Donald Evans – Tom Brown Inc, the oil and gas exploration company) and national security adviser (Condoleeza Rice- Chevron) all have strong ties to the oil industry ......Now a Washington based think tank is questioning whether some of the cabinet members could face a possible conflict of interest."* [88]

All deities drained their powers from the realities of nature: the sun, thunder, fire and disasters; and they did not need anything other than faithfullness of their believers. The new god, however, takes its power from its influence over the relationships among humans; and nature, in this sense, is a rival to it; and continuity of its existence depends on its ability to hang onto strategic resources; and it is aggressive to secure this.

When launching the operations for Iraq on 4 March 2003, the prime target of the American forces was not alleged chemical weapon depots, but oil wells lying above the second largest oil reserve of the world. Nevertheless, these oil wells and other American logistics facilities were going to be protected by a special military force called PMF (privatized military firms – soldiers of money). These firms presently operate in over 50 countries and in a number of conflicts, have been taking key roles from Bosnia, Angola, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Sierra Leone to Iraq. In Iraq war, PMFs employees handled from feeding and housing coalition troops to maintaining the US's most sophisticated weapon systems. Over 15,000 private military contractors play even wider roles in the current occupation period, guarding key facilities and staff from terrorist and guerilla strikes and training the post- Saddam army, paramilitary, and police. During the period

of 1994-2002, the US Defence Department entered into over 3,000 contracts with US – based firms, estimated at a contract value of more than $300bn. Today, beyond the US Defence Department, so many clients have ranged from rebel groups, warlords and drug cartels to humanitarian NGOs and unfortunately the UN have been working with PMFs [89].

Privatization of all economic activities and services in society is regarded as the main reason for weakening authority agents and corruption in society. Shifting global management from national states to global transnational corporations comprises the main driving force of this transformation. The cooperation between the above-mentioned legal structures and crime organizations cause these organizations to be legalized in the eyes of society. Even provision of security, which is among the main functions of national state, has entered the area of activity of private corporations, as we mentioned above, in the process of the developments witnessed in recent years. Although many crimes against humanity in which the employees of such corporations have been involved, including arms trade, sex trade, human trafficking or crimes of rape and torture, have not been mentioned in the media adequately, they have brought along many crucial discussions to the agenda: the fundamental problems could still not be handled; such as monitoring these activities, legitimacy problems, contradiction between existence and aim, commoditization of the issue of security, establishing of legitimate justice, and potential cooperation with illegal structures.

The consequence that classical authority agencies, especially the status of state and family, have been corroded by this process lies in the heart of the discussions about globalization. Almost all researches carried out have shown that violence and crime emerges in the regions where the state authority has weakened and could not meet basic needs of society sufficiently (lack of security, basically). The Soviet Union countries separated after 1990 are the best example of this case. It is observed that social and economic structures have disrupted and poverty and violence has ascended in these countries where organized crimes, political violence and migrations have broken out, which is a vicious circle.

System structuring has been formed by effective, intertwined and hierarchically-structured communication networks established by agencies of power in every field. Crime organizations are becoming a part of such networks as well, and we should expect that they would integrate more and more into the panorama by the very nature of their structuring. Instead of ideology-manipulated, large hierarchical structures of pre-1990, complex structures which are small but interrelated with each other and with other networks have emerged. Within the framework of drug trafficking, for example, sex trade-oriented immigration allover Europe, the PKK terror in Turkey, Islamic terror activities in Afghanistan and street gangs in the USA and South America are all interrelated through organized crime and being integrated into the system by banking sector and legal product providers.

These developments we touch upon, that is, over-privatization of services, legal corporations' and political structures' contacts with organized crime and political crime organizations such as terrorist groups, increase the possibility for these crime organizations to possess non-conventional, highly-developed mass-destruction nuclear and chemical weapons, including all technological advances; and the system does not have any applicable tool to monitor this. While tons of C-4 explosives are seized and found out that they were used during terrorist activities in southeastern Turkey, weapons carried by suspects charged over political murders are found out to be the same as the ones used by the armies of the USA [90].

Global Salafi Jihad Operational Network

Marc Sageman

However, maybe the most important effect of globalization, which is as hard to foresee as important, is about the identity changes. It could be expected that, as a consequence of increasing effect of globalization, multi-identity structures would appear through overlapping of these different structures in time and, by this way, illegal activities would be legalized. A similar development should be expected to appear for individuals, as well. For example, organ trafficking in conflict areas in east and south-east Asia foreshadows such developments. While a physician, who has made a Hippocratic Oath to save human life, could participate in exposing a human being, generally youngsters and children, to violence, even could participate in murdering them, for taking their organs, and another colleague could participate in marketing an organ supplied through illegal means to a western country and transplanting it, they could be at the same time a nice father for their kids, a church-goer and a voluntary activist for social assistance activities. According to a research made by Luke Dowdney on street gangs in South America countries, the members of such gangs, while conducting illegal activities in ghettos of metropolises, not hesitating to apply violence when required, they, as opposed to what is believed, could be a very nice father and husband, and are known as utterly respective to their families, including parents, as farmers working on land, and as nice, benevolent people, when they return and visit their hometown from which they migrated. What is interesting is that this case is regarded as normal by these men themselves, their family and family circle [91].

At this point, it is necessary to emphasize the changed profile of criminal, as well. Leaders are needed to mobilize masses whose identities are revealed as a result of emptying those identities. However, it could not be expected that classical leaders will emerge and create wide-base mass movements, because this new structure does not allow ideologies to emerge and be adopted. Moreover, members of the mass are far from possessing the ability to conduct individual actions. Marc Sageman's studies clearly reveal this case [92]. Contrary to what is believed, terrorists of recent epoch are well-educated, married persons having a profession, even most of them are well-respected by their social circle. The terrorists made the September-11 attacks, or the terrorists made the recent bombings in England were all well-educated persons having popular professions and coming from medium- and upper-class families. The terrorist in England was a doctor working in British hospitals and a respected man.

It is more difficult to foresee which behavior the masses will develop. Here, although the methods to manipulate and protect the masses gain importance, these masses develop two attitudes in the framework of what is known: While one of them reveals itself as silent protest of the masses, as defined by Baudrillard [93], the other is anarchy. Anarchy on the one hand disseminates violence throughout society; it becomes a medium of expressing the reaction of the masses by contributing heavily the erosion and corruption in society through their increased birth rates, intensive immigrations, and emphasized personal benefits, on the other hand. This reaction may well be more effective than terrorism from the perspective of protecting sociality. Today, what underlies the intensive anxiety of European countries or America is this development. While immigrants in such countries are not assimilating into the society within which they live, they are changing the demographic structure of the society with their extremely rapid birth rate; and adverse effects of certain regions are being globalized. The most concrete example of this case is sex trafficking in Europe. It is estimated that in Europe 300 thousand women, most of whom are under 18, and 700 thousand women and young girls in all over the world, are being translocated for this purpose [94].

These adverse effects of globalization bring along discussions within the framework of democratic life and basic human rights. The changes in political structures we have mentioned before have created hesitations regarding participation of society in political life. Society seems much more involuntary than before for this. For example, today 100 million USA citizens even do not go cast vote and the majority of them is black or Hispanic people who are undereducated and poor. Societal violence increased tremendously in the USA especially in 1990s has diminished by certain extent largely by means of new techniques, but has revealed a profile which has never been witnessed in almost any country before; there are much more ratio among people in prisons versus the number of cases. Or, to put in other words, while the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the wall which was regarded as a disgrace to humanity once upon a time, is celebrated all over the world, higher and higher walls stretching far away, equipped with state-of-the-art technology, are being constructed on the border between the USA and Mexico, and on the border of Israel, and thus giant prisons are being formed. Now, thousands of electronic eyes are monitoring our life, and our whole life could be controlled by banks with digital monetary applications and by huge information systems with extensive communication means we possess. While the issue of provision of wide range of mobility facilities to people by globalization is under discussion, the fact that western countries have imposed restrictions on passing over borders reinforces the assertions put forward by the people advocating the assumption that globalism is a new imperial strategy. When regarded from this perspective, whether globalization could suggest a positive development towards democratic freedoms is an issue of hot debates.

Another point is the effect of globalization, which could be regarded as a political coercion itself, on the developed societies. Generally, it is very seldom to come across a research conducted in this context. How does the change in the structure of our identity affect the youngsters in western welfare societies? These youngsters do adopt the global values to a much greater extent (the survey on global values conducted recently, including 60,000 people, provides sufficient information on this issue). While our classical identity structuring includes deepness, the post-modern identity structuring offers a wider but superficial structure. The deepness in identity structuring allows individuals to develop defence mechanisms for rehabilitating themselves against the traumas they have been exposed to, and receives the support of group dynamics. In contrast, the structuring of post-modern identity renders obligatory to manage multi-identity in compliance and has more elasticity in respect of experiencing traumas.

Nevertheless, it is insufficient regarding provision of defence mechanisms. The consequence is suicide. According to a research conducted without ignoring the cultural values concerned, the balance between the losses as a result of suicide in developed western countries (or regions or groups), excluding the regions where intensive conflict or extremely serious social anomie exists, and the losses as a result of other violent activities in underdeveloped countries (or regions or groups) is quite remarkable. For example, the data regarding white and black youngsters of the ages 13-17 in the USA is given the table below. As could be seen, white youngsters seem much more vulnerable. But this issue requires a more extensive research.

♦ Between 1981 and 1998, more white male juveniles ages 7–17 committed suicide (14,080) than were murdered (8,785), while black male juveniles were far more likely to be murdered (11,017) than to commit suicide (1,561).

♦ The number of white female juveniles ages 7–17 who were murdered between 1981 and 1998 (3,708) was slightly less than the number who committed suicide (3,874), while more than 6 times as many black female juveniles ages 7–17 were murdered (2,554) as committed suicide (397).

Data source: NVSS, compiled by CDC's National Center for Health Statistics. [See Data source notes on page 7 for detail.]

Executive Director of UN office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) Mr. Costa was explaining that peace cannot be guaranteed, development cannot be sustained and justice cannot be reign;

- if a country's economy is based on illicit activities;
- if trade is contaminated by narcotics, arms and worse of all, people;
- if the wealth of nation is stolen by corrupt leaders;
- if laws are decided from the chamber of a gun, rather than of deputies,
- if, public officials pursue private interests;
- if, otherwise respectable business people bribe their way to success,
- if the banking sector is used to launder illegal proceeds;
- if a country's youth is robbed of their identity, and even of their bodies;
- if, terrorist violence is allowed to influence a country's political course [95].

Conclusion: THE LAST HUMAN

It should be accepted that globalization has the ability to make people closer to each other, to prevent large-scale warfare, to balance distribution of revenue to some extent and to form a global culture. However, by moving the human component away from the centre in social structuring, these positive aspects are disgraced and degenerated.

Globalization, with its current stand, creates a world in which no sympathy could be established, everything is mixed up, and everything has lost its meaning, as pointed out by Boudrillard. Contemporary society establishes a new culture hosting all exclusions and discriminations and consuming everything, within which asymmetric violence exists as well, and a new model of human.

"New 'god', demands from people, first of all from youngsters, dedication to itself, it demands their souls. It erases their identities and replaces them with easily manipulated symbols which are superficial and open to constant changes. It is the enemy of the symbols attaching deepness to our identities – it presents them as barriers in front of liberation of individual- and thus, Freud's floating iceberg transforms into a small raft and individuals into masses as stereotypes, an ear of grain in the wheat field. Our identities are superficial. They are for arranging our daily activities. They have no historicity and ties. They bear no emotion for this reason. Now, everything, including human, is a digital number. There is no love, no affection, hate or faithfulness, either. There is no hope. No human any more. There is a mass, a collection of slaves in an electronic prison, performing the duties defined, stupefied by virtual pleasures and manipulated by visual images and it is undesirable by the new order for them to think; and there are also high-rank officials serving to their 'new' god, elites of the order and intellectuals exalting it. This is a collapse in history, an existence at the level of animal."

Giddens says that this atmosphere is similar to a global plunder rather than to global village [96]. Again in Giddens' expression, the world which we live in today is proceedingly cutting loose from our control and transforming into "a world slipping through our fingers" [97]

Day by day, our natural space is diminishing, which threats physical existence of the whole humanity. Money-oriented values of globalization excludes natural environment in the way it excludes human. The violence arising from unlimited demand on our natural resources, and destruction brought by this violence has been ascending rapidly through encouraging consumption and deepening the imbalance in resource-sharing in society. Global warming, diminishing of arable lands – desertification-, diminishing of forests and pollution and diminishing of air and water resources are portents of disasters which would cause not only to the destruction of humanity, but to the total extinction of human being, as well.

Globalization, in this respect, is a source of threat posing the same danger to all nations, all classes and all groups, that is, all societies in the world; and discussions in the context of politics would not serve anything other than to terrify or degenerate scientific approaches. Prevention of such negative impacts would be possible through elites of the world's societies possessing such capability and, in this context, through international organizations with concerns for issues of humanity, such as the United Nations. By this way, this negative structure could be changed into a chance for the humanity in the world.

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CONCLUSION
Looking Forward through Youth Scope in Future and Calling Peace

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Gladly speaking, the workshop titled "Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth" which was executed as a NATO Project, despite its limited scope, has attained its desired goals. It must be stated that our colleagues, each of whom are the experts in their respective fields, have greatly contributed to this. Certainly, it needs to conduct many more studies in the field in order to perceive such a complex, multi-dimensional and far-reaching problem.

I will try to assess the outcomes of the meeting executed in below section, adding my contributions as well. It would be appropriate to discuss the basic issues aimed to be handled at the beginning of the project under two main topics, which were mentioned also by participants during their presentations and the meeting and discussions. The first one could be defined as assessment and the other as the required activities.

The period of youth is the one which is most tumultuous, most sensitive and most aggressive by its very nature, of a human life and has been always like this throughout the history. Committing crime and violence for gaining power or benefit is unfortunately a phenomenon as old as the history of humanity. This process is at the same time a history of struggle which, as a requirement of being a human, includes efforts made in the way to eradicate such negative phenomena which have brought nothing but greatest threat to life, pain, unhappiness and destruction to humanity and to social life. In this sense these phenomena are not new at all. There are many studies conducted by psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, social scientists, political scientists and criminologists from their own perspectives in these fields, and also a highly rich literature.

However, the phenomena of crime and violence reveal a different profile not seen before, as a consequence of developments especially in information and communication technologies, together with globalization movements. Today, even when looked at the phenomena at micro-level, this profile change could be clearly seen. It is widely known that children or youngsters have a tendency toward crime. In the past, attachment problems would appear generally in the first stage as a result of social and/or family problems and individual used to move away from these groups, go out to the streets to commits simple crimes there and form simple violent and crime gangs, gathering their friends alike. Such groups could be easily identified, their area of action was known and their already primitive structure and group identity could be defined at first glance. Now children go out to the streets due to the same reasons, but find themselves in the gangs which are a part of serious crime structures (Networks) which are not identified as easily as before.

"Network society" as defined by Castels, which has been suggested as one of the most distinctive social changes of globalization, is a collection of structures in which global capital holders in specific and groups in general interacts with each other on-line through strong organic ties. A similar structure is seen among crime organizations, as well. This development has brought about the consequence that political, terrorist and organized crime organizations have intertwined with each other. Changing the dynamics, structures and modus operandi of the organizations, this new formation reveals itself as more flexible, highly complex, and dynamic and hybrid transnational structure which is extremely hard to define and monitor.

"Corruption" operates as a transformer in integrating this new structure into the current system, and legality and illegality is increasingly mixing up, making society got used to illegality and legalizing illegality. It deeply influences individual identities, basic architecture of social structure and socialization process. There appear multi-identities and multi-structures.

One can look at this problem outlined in very general terms from many different angles; it would constitute the subject field of psychiatrists in the respect of individual psychological health, of sociologists in the respect of newly emerged social structures and their effects, of criminologists in the respect of crimes, and so on. However, there is a need for a multi-dimensional and multi-category approach in order to depict the real dimensions of the phenomenon. This change, inevitably, has to be regarded as a threat to the humanity in terms of security and general public health. This is an asymmetrical war being executed through youth by means of a furtive, wide-spread and paradoxical fiction which creates its own dynamics.

Today, it is possible to say that, with their gradually weakening functions neither nation-states facing the effects of globalization nor international organizations such as UN, NATO and OSCE could perceive this new threat, or have a fighting strategy against this phenomenon. In fact the studies conducted and our knowledge on this subject is quite limited. The concepts and definitions which we use and which have remained controversial for a long time are rather insufficient in describing this newly-emerged picture. For example, as a primary contributor to the arrangement of this event, NATO, expected to be mentioned broadly in the discussions during the meeting, has to re-consider and re-locate its security strategies, with the necessity of re-defining itself, as well. Otherwise, as mentioned during the discussions, interventions made with the aim of establishing peace would be far from producing the desired results, and also could bring very different problems alongside.

First point deduced from the meeting is to draw attention of official, civilian and academic institutions, whether national or international, to this phenomenon in order to enable enhanced studies on this subject. To this end, the participants expressed their common wish to provide continuity of this event and arrangement of subsequent meetings with larger participation.

Another point suggested is the necessity of establishing an international center to handle the phenomenon in a holistic approach to lead the researches, studies and efforts on the topic which have been long delayed already, and to guide information exchange and social attempts, assessing every development in the world in this sense. Also, there is a vital necessity for realizing the projects aiming at securing participation of children and youth especially in the areas of conflict, in parallel with such studies. We could specify the basic components of such a n attempt aiming at youth, as put forward in the presentations and discussions during the meeting as follows, bearing in mind that they need certainly studying and filling in on an individual basis:

- **A Holistic Approach:** The most important feature that such attempts should bear is to have an approach embracing the social, economic and political status of children and youth, starting from their psychological traits, and all of the preventive and remedial components altogether. It is a fact proven by former studies that they provide no benefit in the long term, and could even produce negative outcomes.

- **Ideology:** There is a strong need for re-defined discourses which are acceptable by every society in the international arena; discourses which are solidarity-enhancing; formed in the framework of basic universal ideals such as democracy, human rights and freedoms; and responsive to youth idealism. It is certain there are virtues for adults to learn from youth in this respect.

- **Training:** A training program must be implemented which aims at educating necessary personnel for organizations' own management and providing the ones lacking of general means of education with special skills through the projects teaching skills, responsibility and participation; as well as ensuring that children have internalized the main discourse of the project, such as: Providing the youth who are successful but are lacking in necessary means for education with scholarship from international platforms established with this purpose, and founding the infrastructure required for such activities, for example, employing internet facilities to provide non-formal training.

- **Opportunity of self-expression:** Provision the means for youth to express their own problems at national and international platforms. This includes sharing ideas with both local or national-level policy makers and public through the visual media and press institutions mentioned below.

- **The Media:** Broadcasting news and providing opportunities of self-expression for youth through national or international media institutions by ensuring their active participation in internet or printed media publishing in order to make their voice heard.

- **Leadership (Role Models):** Integrating nationally or internationally well-known scientists, social activists, artists, journalists and businessmen and businesswomen in the project who work for improving the status and protecting the rights of children and youth and for establishing peace or who support and encourage the activities to this end or who make pioneering efforts to raise public awareness; and supporting them as role models and also awarding prizes to them for their activities regarding the issue (for example, the International Youth Awards to be awarded by youth).

- **Responsibility and Participation:** It is a widely-known fact that the children and youth who are involved in criminal activities and working in extremely adverse work environments like a slave in many parts of the world possess the skills beyond our imagination and that they could improve those skills when given opportunity. Hence it is important for them to assume responsibility in many fields to ensure their positive development. To this end, especially social assistance, development and environmental organizations could play an active role in public domain, for example they could assume responsibility in orphanages or nursing homes for senior citizens. This could provide them with a certain social status, as well as an income as an economic gain of the project. Also important is to ensure contact among the youth of different countries and cultures and to construct new positive groups and leaderships within the framework of the project.

- **Means of Dialog:** As one of the main aims of the project, providing the youth with a means to establish a dialog among themselves in a positive atmosphere who

come from different nations, cultures, religions or ethnic groups, especially who live in the areas of conflict hence are the victims,.

- **Rehabilitation:** Providing treatment for the youth who are psychologically or physically traumatized as the victims or offenders of violence in the areas of conflict, and normalizing their future life.

- **Strengthening Identities:** Preserving and supporting national or ethnic or religious identities, as well as transnational identities.

- **Research:** Establishing a center to conduct researches on youth and gather data on the subject at international level, and supporting the efforts in this framework and producing & disseminating universal knowledge.

- **Gaining Status:** The Project should provide the participating youngsters with a positive social status and a positive reference for their future life. Also vital is to support youngsters who have formed solidarity and positive support groups.

- **Monitoring:** Establishing and operating the systems which actively monitor both the children & youth under risk and activities of the organization.

- **Publishing:** Publishing journals including academic studies as well as periodicals which enable youth express themselves.

- **Cooperation at National and International Level:** Establishing networks for effective communication and cooperation with official or civilian local and international organizations which perform activities for children and youth.

- **Dialog with Families:** It is certain that positive relationships with families are very important for the project to be successful. It should be aimed at creating different channels ensuring connection with families for the purpose of dialog. Presentations and educational activities especially for the families of targeted youth groups should be included in the scope of the project.

- **Flexibility:** The project structure should be design in a way to provide flexibility in responding both different formations and features at both general and local levels.

- **Youth Camps:** Contact with more youngsters from different societies by means of establishing camps with rotation system which perform activities in the scope of the project for youth in many parts of the world. In addition, special-purpose provisional camps should be established in different regions (such as regional development or areas of conflict).

- **Artistic and Sports Activities:** Implementing artistic and sports training programs for enhancing the dialog among youth and developing their skills, and also for establishment of positive leadership; in addition, creating revenue by means of the shows to be performed by such groups.

Consequently, it is important to mention the UN's approach briefly in this sense for the purpose of depicting differences. Although children's rights have been put on the agenda of world public opinion since Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 and Convention on the Rights of the Child has been signed by all except two countries, and despite all bona fide efforts of the UN and non-governmental public organizations perform activities in this field, the violence targeting children has become wide-spread. The figures suggested by Mr. McLoughney reveals this fact clearly. The strategies being followed in this context need re-evaluating and re-questioning. For example, that 90% of children are exposed to violence by their families is an abnormal, pathological situation and to regard this fact as just a consequence of cultural values is not in congruence with the reality in our hands. We could see that non-holistic

approaches, even regarded successful in the short term, feed the phenomenon as a catalyst most of the time. In context of in-family violence, how influential is suggesting the parents as the accused and alienation of children from their parents on their perception towards their parents? Or what are the long-term effects of the food aid provided to African children on the verge of death due to hunger without any form of contribution from their families and society on that society? Or what is the impact of the violence phenomenon applied by political activities, organized crime and terrorism by their very nature, on the general phenomenon of violence? As depicted by the presentations made during the workshop, it is impossible to foresee and measure the exact cost of such violence phenomena due to the fact that they are hidden in social effects. In order to prevent such violence phenomena, there is an urgent need for the change of mentality in our all social institutions. The psychologists and psychiatrists in the firs session have suggested that children are aggressive because they are away from the reality, they are idealists and they want to change their world for their ideals. Aren't those realities our own structures? And what do youth want? They want affection, love, and justice, and they don't want to be humiliated, neither do they want to live in hunger or poverty and to be exposed to violence; and they strongly demand that their claims be heard and that they be accepted by the world. Who could ever reject such claims? I believe that there are many lessons we are to learn from them in order to recall some values we, parents, have forgot in this respect. What could be the chance of success of the strategies which ignore their just claims, which fails to clearly announce its genuine will to realize those claims, and which neglects the fact that these children will be parents one day and we were children and youngsters once upon a time?

I would like to conclude my assessment with an analogy. Pardon the crude expression, but the situation we are in resembles that we are being crushed under a heavy weight of an ill and hostile elephant. We could breathe when it moves occasionally. We will choke if it dies but we will be killed by him if he gets well, and

we suffer in the present situation. The solution? Perhaps, to cure and to convince him to live friendly to gether.

The participants have expressed their views that universities would be the most appropriate facilities for such an international activity to be conducted with their infrastructure, and that Turkey also has a favorable location with her geographical, cultural and political structure regarding such an attempt, and they have expressed their wishes that local and international agencies including NATO will cooperate in realizing and implementing such a project. Below is the diagram of a draft structure prepared for this purpose.

YOUTH PROJECT COUNTRY NODE
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

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