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New Parties in Old Party Systems

Persistence and Decline in Seventeen Democracies

Nicole Bolleyer

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

NEW PARTIES IN OLD PARTY SYSTEMS

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‘it is usually much more difficult to discover the right question than it is to find the answer. It is precisely at this point that the unexamined and unstated assumptions we make are most likely to defeat us, for the questions we ask grow out of the assumptions we make.’

E. E. Schattschneider, *The Struggle for Party Government*

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List of Abbreviations

ADR	Alternative Democratic Reform (Luxembourg)
ARP	Anti-Revolutionary Party (Netherlands)
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal (Netherlands)
DPP	Danish People's Party
DS70	Democratic Socialists 1970 (Netherlands)
EDU	Federal Democratic Union (Switzerland)
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FF	Fianna Fáil (Ireland)
FG	Fine Gael (Ireland)
FI	Forza Italia (Italy)
FPP	first past the post
GAP	Green Alternative Party (Luxembourg)
GLEI	Green List Ecological Initiative (Luxembourg)
LN	Liveable Netherlands
LPF	Pim Fortuyn List (Netherlands)
LRIV	Luxembourg Association of Retired and Invalid People
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MMP	mixed-member proportional electoral system
MNR	National Republican Movement (France)
MP	Member of Parliament
NA	Nationale Aktion (Switzerland)
ND	New Democracy (Sweden)
NDP	Nuclear Disarmament Party (Australia)
NF	National Front (Belgium/France)
NVA	New Flemish Alliance (Belgium)
ON	One Nation (Australia)
PD	Progressive Democrats (Ireland)
PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Germany)
PPR	Political Party of Radicals (Netherlands)

PR	proportional representation
RKNP	Roman Catholic Party of the Netherlands
RPF	Reformatory Political Federation (Netherlands)
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République (France)
STV	single transferable vote
TD	Teachta Dála
UDF	Union for French Democracy
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party (UK)
UUUP	United Ulster Unionist Party (UK)
VB	Vlaams Belang (Belgium)
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Netherlands)

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1

Introduction

The rise and sometimes enduring success of new political parties in established democracies has been one of the striking features of the past decades. In the 17 advanced democracies covered in this book,[1] 140 organizationally new parties have entered their national parliaments over the last four decades.[2] Only a minority of these parties have managed to consolidate their position on the national level and still form a part of the parliamentary party system today. About a third of them vanished from national parliament right after their breakthrough,[3] with comebacks having remained rare events. Programmatically, these new entries included Green and new right parties, but also new religious parties, new liberal or new left parties emulating mainstream ideologies, and a range of single-issue parties.[4] So far, only a minority of these new entries has been intensively studied, most notably the more successful Green parties and new right (or new anti-immigrant) parties.[5] Given the dominant focus on these two party families in the existing literature, we know surprisingly little about the variety of other parties that do not fall into these two groups.

In a similar vein, we know far more about the more successful new parties that attracted relatively high levels of electoral support or consolidated in the longer

[1] The democracies covered are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK (Italy was left out due to the disintegration of its party system in the 1990s, which prevents a clear-cut application of a distinction between organizationally old and organizationally new parties, and which is essential for this study).

[2] The period covered is 1968–2011 (for the justification of methodological choices, see Chapter 2).

[3] This figure does not include very recent entries that were not yet confronted with the challenge of re-election.

[4] New regional parties are often considered as an important group of newcomers. However, they tend not to qualify as organizationally new, given the conceptual starting-point of this study (such as the Scottish National Party formed in the 1930s) or do not win seats on the national level. Exceptions are the Walloon Rally or the *Bloc Québécois* though.

[5] Regarding terminology, I will refer to the group of 'new politics parties' (including parties such as the Australian Nuclear Disarmament Party or feminist parties) as 'Green parties' and to extreme/far/radical right as well as the populist right-wing parties simply as 'new right' (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the party family concept and how these group labels are understood in the context of this study). Prominent studies on these new party families which partially have adopted different labels are Kitschelt 1989; Burchell 2001; Poguntke 2002a; Ignazi 2003; Carter 2005; Mudde 2007; Art 2011.

term than about more marginal cases. This is partly rooted in pragmatic choices. To start out from a threshold for electoral significance—4 per cent or 2 per cent of the national vote for instance—to define one's sample of 'relevant cases' is not unusual in cross-national party research and facilitates data collection. However, less than half of the 140 new parties covered in this study—all of which made it into national parliament—ever won 4 per cent of the national vote at some point in their history, while only 91 climbed a 2 per cent threshold. Using either 4 per cent or 2 per cent as threshold for electoral significance, we would have lost 56 per cent or 35 per cent of the cases this study covers. A focus on long-lived cases has similar repercussions. Looking at party survival as an indicator for success rather than sustainability in national parliament or electoral performance, 65 of the 140 parties studied here had ceased to persist by the end of 2011. Suffice to say that the composition of such subsets excluded based on parties' supposedly marginal character is hardly random, which has major methodological implications. Most fundamentally, *systematically neglecting failure cases, we cannot know why parties fail, which leaves us with an only incomplete view as to why others succeed*. While we find excellent case study material on those new parties that tend to be neglected in cross-national work (including those that attracted marginal vote shares, vanished from the national stage quickly, or died), this knowledge has remained fragmented and has not been systematically compiled.

To pull existing insights together complemented by new research and to do so guided by an encompassing theoretical framework will not only help us to remedy some methodological problems (on these issues see Chapter 2). It will also allow us to address some theoretically important questions as detailed in the remainder of this introduction. To examine a wide variety of new entries will allow us to investigate the conditions for the medium- and long-term success or failure of those organizationally new political parties that managed to enter consolidated parliamentary party systems. More particularly, this study focuses on organizational characteristics that support or weaken the institutionalization of new parties, which, in turn, affects their performance both as societal organizations and as electoral vehicles. As developed in the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, whether a new party is likely to institutionalize is shaped by *the structural conditions in which it is formed*—a party's origin—and the capacity of its elites to overcome a core *tension inherent in the institutionalization process*, namely the tension between the self-interest of party founders to protect their own position of influence in the party and the need to invest in a viable party infrastructure autonomous of its current leadership. Undoubtedly, voter demands and new parties' programmatic offers are crucial factors to account for their medium- and long-term success. However, they leave unresolved the puzzle that *not all new parties are equally able to exploit their electoral potential and to consolidate a support base in the longer term*.

To address this puzzle, this study distinguishes new parties along type of origin, drawing on Panebianco's seminal book on the organizational evolution of parties

in advanced democracies (1988). A party's origin has long-term implications since it tends to shape the orientations of founding leaders, which, in turn, influence how strongly the tension between ensuring effective leadership and the formation of a lasting party infrastructure—inherent in the institutionalization process—will affect a party's evolution. This *interplay between structural dispositions and elite responses (i.e. party agency)* allows us to specify conditions that increase the likelihood that (a) a new party persists as an organization, including through times of crisis, and (b) it translates a breakthrough into national parliament into its sustainability in the national parliamentary party system (i.e. the capacity to defend its own niche against much longer established but also other new competitors). This change of perspective from emergence and entry to persistence and sustainability is important since it is only through the medium- and long-term presence of new parties at the national level that such parties have the potential to generate party system change, visible in the broadening of the programmatic offer available to citizens, in the dynamics of party competition, and in patterns of coalition formation (Mair 1997).

So far, it is the emergence of new parties that has received most attention in cross-national studies, often with a focus on the 'demand side' of the story: the spread of new values and issues in advanced industrialized societies and the rise of political distrust have been identified as important factors underlying new parties' success (e.g. Kitschelt 1989, 1990; Hug 2001; Dalton 2003; Krouwel and Bosch 2004; Dalton and Weldon 2005; Mair 2005; Mudde 2007). Furthermore, the institutional context (e.g. electoral thresholds) is crucial to explain why some political systems are more prone to new parties' breakthrough than others (e.g. Harmel and Robertson 1985; Rochon 1985; Willey 1998; Bischoff 2006). Finally, the (strategic and programmatic) responses of mainstream parties to their newly emerged competitors contribute to or undermine new parties' performance (Meguid 2008; van Spanje 2009). Instead of focusing on electoral demands, programmatic offers, or contextual constraints in terms of institutional context or party system dynamics (important dimensions which have been dealt with in earlier work), this study puts in the centre two supply-side factors that have received relatively little attention in cross-national studies, although their importance has been already highlighted in works that are by now considered 'classics': the structural conditions of party formation and the choices of party elites whose interplay affects new parties' long-term fate (Duverger 1959; Panebianco 1988).

This study takes the *dual nature of political parties* seriously and does not conceptualize them exclusively as electoral vehicles targeting voters by representing particular issues or ideologies. It also considers them as organizational actors that have to reconcile conflicting external and internal demands to persist in the longer run, demands of which vote-winning is only one. In one of the few cross-national studies of the persistence of political parties as such, defined as their ongoing capacity to run elections, Rose and Mackie stressed the 'importance of voluntarism', i.e. of the strategic choices of party leaders to reconcile

intra-organizational demands with those pressures generated by a party's environment. They found that contextual factors and levels of electoral support had a surprisingly weak effect on parties' persistence (Rose and Mackie 1988: 556–7). Such findings emphasize the need to shift attention towards the study of party properties, be they linked to conditions in which parties have been formed (structure) or to the organization that elites decide to build (agency), which will be echoed in this study. By shifting attention to the intra-organizational dimension, we gain a better understanding of why, despite similar potential in the electoral market, some parties are unable to exploit this potential and fail to develop a stable support base, while other parties become an established part of their party system.

On a fundamental level, a new party's evolution is affected by its organizational dispositions which reinforce or moderate the tensions that emerge when party elites attempt to maintain their leadership while making (or refusing to make) investments in an infrastructure that is able to stabilize support in the longer term. This balancing act is further complicated by a new (often inexperienced) party's national breakthrough, a critical phase in a newcomer's history that confronts the party with new demands and often requires considerable adaptation. As the literature on party change stresses, while environmental constraints might push party elites to adopt new strategies or reform party structures, whether and how they respond to these constraints is shaped by the initial nature of organizational structures and the goals considered as paramount in a party, two aspects closely linked to a party's origin (Panebianco 1988). Reflecting their focus on electoral performance, cross-national studies of party decline or failure in advanced democracies that attempt to pin down the relative importance of intra-organizational dispositions for (new) party performance are rare.[6] Similarly, we know little about how the choices of founding elites contribute to or undermine parties' organizational persistence and electoral performance.[7] The present study addresses this gap.

Whether and why some new parties persist organizationally and can electorally sustain their position in national parliament after breakthrough is important not only with regard to ongoing academic debates. Such an assessment helps us to evaluate concerns regarding the rise of new parties, particularly on the far right, that increasingly profit from the decline of mainstream parties and have become influential players on the national level, such as the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Danish People's Party in Denmark, or the National Front in

[6] See for exceptions Ware 2009; Mack 2010. Studies of party performance in new democracies or transition systems tend to have a more explicit interest in party decline or de-institutionalization, given higher levels of volatility (Randall and Svåsand 2002: 15; Mustillo 2009). For an insightful comparison of a success and failure case in the same institutional setting (the Pim Fortuyn List and the Party for Freedom), see de Lange and Art 2011.

[7] See for a notable exception Art's excellent cross-national study of the relative success of anti-immigrant parties in Western European countries (Art 2011).

France.[8] More generally, it helps us to put recent record lows in the electoral support of mainstream parties into perspective. It has been widely recognized that increasing volatility in Western democracies supports the rise of new parties, which can lead to party system change (Mair 1997). Yet if most new parties suffer as much as they profit from volatility, quickly vanish from the national stage and are replaced by other newcomers that themselves do not stay around long, the relative loss of vote support has fewer implications for the mainstream parties' position in their party systems than is often implied (Mair 1999: 220). In the latter scenario, mainstream parties stay in control. The overall support for new parties in a party system (often used as a measure of mainstream decline in cross-national studies) signals the discontent of voters with the mainstream. But it does not tell us a lot about the relative pressure put on the mainstream parties to adapt their programme, their strategies, or their structures. Significant changes in the behaviour of mainstream parties are likely to be triggered mainly by the rise of durable new parties rather than the rise of ephemeral ones. Thus, if only certain types of new parties manage to establish their own niche, it is essential to figure out which ones they are and why they do better than other newcomers. Only then will an informed discussion of the broader repercussions of the success of new parties in advanced democracies be possible.

These issues have not been fully resolved because, on a fundamental level, we lack an understanding about whether and how *organizational persistence* of parties outside public institutions (i.e. parliament and government) and *electoral sustainability* assuring regular access to these institutions—two interlinked but analytically separate dimensions of party performance—affect each other. 'Party success' and 'failure' as theoretical and operational concepts are inevitably multidimensional. They can be defined in electoral or organizational terms, two dimensions that mutually affect each other, without one being necessarily or always prior to the other. While distinguishing these two dimensions makes theoretical sense, it is difficult empirically to separate them out in advanced democracies, where the core parties have formed part of the parliamentary party system for decades. The simultaneous study of both dimensions in new parties, however, allows us to move towards a systematic specification of this so far underexplored relationship between organizational persistence and electoral sustainability. This, in turn, can lead us to a more nuanced understanding of party success.

To engage in such a study we need to examine more than election results and seat distributions and to consider party trajectories from their organizational foundation to their (potential) death. Following Pedersen, we need to start from an assumption 'which many political scientists forget, and very few politicians like

[8] Until recently, the Dutch Freedom Party functioned as formal support party in its respective national government. The Danish People's Party did so successfully for ten years (2001–11) with only minor losses at the 2011 elections (Bolleyer et al. 2012).

to ponder, namely that parties are mortal organizations' (1982: 6) and move beyond the study of parliamentary careers. More particularly, it demands a more systematic study of failure cases, which—leaving spectacular cases of disintegration such as the fate of the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*) aside—is rarely done. The in-depth analyses of spectacular cases direct our attention to basic organizational properties which a party needs to exploit its electoral potential in the longer term. Yet single case studies do not allow us to pin down whether these properties are important for the survival and success of new parties more generally. In essence, we need to address three sets of questions to specify theoretically those properties and the conditions under which a party is more or less likely to possess or develop them and, on that basis, to examine empirically their implications across a wider range of new parties and party systems:

1. In theoretical terms, how can we theorize the intra-organizational challenges different types of new party formations face in early periods of their existence as well as after their national breakthrough in order to specify those party properties that help account for why some of these formations manage to establish their own niche in the party system, while others decline and eventually vanish?
2. In conceptual terms, how can we distinguish both analytically and operationally the organizational and electoral dimensions of party success and failure to allow comparative cross-national research to analyse how these various dimensions relate to each other?
3. In empirical terms, how important in accounting for new parties' organizational persistence on the one hand and their electoral sustainability on the other are the conditions in which new parties are formed and the organization elites decide to build?

DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM SUCCESS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

This study looks at the full spectrum of organizationally new political parties in terms of programmatic profile and contrasts persistent and electorally sustainable new parties with those newcomers that failed to consolidate support after their national breakthrough. To do so is important since *new party entry* (into the electoral contest or into parliament) and *electoral sustainability on the national level* are not necessarily driven by the same set of factors. Indeed, both theoretical reasoning and empirical observation imply that the factors underpinning each diverge. This is important since it points to the need to develop an approach to

account for new party sustainability that is different from existing approaches to new party entry. Starting from a theoretical perspective the distinction between entry and sustainability reveals a paradox with regard to the impact of rising volatility levels on new party electoral performance. In essence, increasing electoral volatility (i.e. the growing willingness of voters to switch parties from one election to the other) is one of the fundamental changes affecting voting behaviour in advanced democracies over the last decades (Mair 2005). This development has different implications for new parties' initial success than it has for their long-term performance. In fact, the respective implications of volatility for new parties' short-term and long-term success are to some extent in tension with each other, stressing the importance of being explicit about the *time horizon* that underlies and thereby shapes a study of party performance.

The literature has argued convincingly that growing electoral volatility opened a window of opportunity for new parties in gathering votes, especially from those citizens who are frustrated with the mainstream parties (e.g. Dalton and Weldon 2005; Mair 2005). What usually receives little attention, however, is the fact that the core strength of new parties in the short run—to be appealing to detached voters more flexible in their choice than strong identifiers—can constitute a weakness in the medium and long term: at least in their formative periods new parties are forced to rely on a considerable number of voters who are, by definition, unpredictable and not (yet) attached to the party they currently choose to support. Otherwise they probably would not have been tempted by a new party in the first place. As argued later on, the challenge to stabilize initial support is more or less pronounced depending on whether a new party can rely on ties to societal groups that pre-existed its own formation, groups able to provide resources and lend support. Thus, the challenges to keep supporters loyal vary with the type of party formation. Nonetheless, compared to their long-established competitors, high rates of volatility make it harder for organizationally new parties to maintain and stabilize initial support at consecutive elections. They are organizationally less consolidated and have had less time to build up a pool of followers who might stay loyal, even when confronted with the party's weak performance, which—especially early on—is not an unlikely scenario. Suffice to say that mainstream parties or other new parties will highlight any weakness of rival parties in the parliamentary arena in order to reduce the appeal of the latter at consecutive elections. Consequently, high levels of volatility cannot necessarily be considered conducive to new parties' *repeated* electoral success. And yet in many cross-national studies, mirroring the focus on new party entry rather than sustainability, new parties tend to be portrayed as the beneficiaries of volatility, an interpretation that is more unambiguously convincing in the short run than in the long run.

This differentiation between short-term success and the sustainability of support gains further leverage once moving down to the micro level of the voters

themselves. It has been observed in numerous case studies that after a new party's breakthrough into national parliament, thanks to the salience of particular issues or a growing criticism of mainstream parties, voters usually start to expect the delivery of more substantive achievements than the articulation of protest. The frustration with mainstream politics, one important motivation to support a new party, might backfire once the newcomer has been re-elected a few times without having made any real difference in terms of policy. Newness as such—no matter with regard to which properties it is defined—is inevitably temporary and grants advantages only in the short term. Applying the often stressed difference between the reasons for joining a political party and for remaining a member (Conway and Feigert 1968: 1172) to the rationale underpinning vote choice, it is plausible to expect that the decision *initially to vote for a new party* is driven by partially different motivations and expectations than *to vote for it repeatedly*. Consequently, the same level of electoral support has different repercussions with regard to the nature of party support, depending on the point of a party's history we look at.

This insight not only reveals the difficulties in measuring party success (or failure) comparatively. It also leads us to the different relevance of organizational factors for party success in different stages of party evolution: while for the articulation of protest a popular leader might be sufficient, to work constructively in parliament presupposes competent representatives. Consequently, recruitment and intra-organizational procedures that socialize representatives into their new institutionally defined role might initially be of little importance but are likely to gain significance in the longer term (Mudde 2007: 264–5).

Furthermore, to maintain support by balancing conflicting intra-organizational and external pressures is a challenge for any party (Janda 1980; Panebianco 1988), yet it is particularly difficult for parties in their formative period, when they are still vulnerable. In the early stages of party life the need to respond to external pressures interferes with the set-up and internal consolidation of the party itself. To enter parliament—which many new parties do early in their history—multiplies such external pressures. Increased media attention following national breakthrough is as much an opportunity to showcase achievements as to expose incompetence. Given that new, inexperienced parties usually have difficulties in recruiting enough and, more importantly, capable candidates, the latter is fairly likely. A range of qualitative in-depth studies of new parties' evolution suggest that the level of organizational development shapes new parties' ability to cope with the challenges coming with breakthrough and, with that, the likelihood to suffer from this experience organizationally or electorally (e.g. Poguntke 2002a; Carter 2005; Deschouwer 2008; Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008; de Lange and Art 2011; Art 2011).

In other words, the initial electoral success of a new party does not necessarily tell us much about its capacity to achieve repeated re-election to national parliament, a claim that finds ample empirical illustration. Looking at the range of organizationally new parties that entered national parliaments with high initial

support, such as the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List, New Democracy in Sweden, or the Irish Progressive Democrats, we see that many of them are by now dissolved. By contrast, a number of tiny parties such as the French Greens or the Ticino League have been able to maintain a national presence until today, illustrating the discrepancy between levels of support and the continuity of support. Similarly, the number of new parties achieving representation in a country is a weak predictor for the number of parties that are electorally sustainable on the national level. Due to its highly proportional electoral system, and thus low entry barriers, the Netherlands has the highest 'entry rate' across the 17 democracies studied here: 17 organizationally new parties entered the Dutch first house between 1968 and 2011. Most of these parties are electoral vehicles formed by individual entrepreneurs, whose founders have little interest in forming a durable organization. Only Green Left (*Groen Links*), the Socialist Party, and the Christian Union, all parties with societal roots, managed to maintain a lasting national presence.[9] In Germany, where the electoral system is much less permissive,[10] we find only two new entries since 1968. Both the German Greens and the Left Party, again two rooted new parties, successfully carved out their niche on the national level. In other words, while the permissiveness of the institutional setting as defined by parliamentary thresholds is important for new party entry, it seems of little consequence for new parties' long-term success. Vice versa, while different formation types (i.e. entrepreneurial and socially rooted formations) get into parliament at about similar rates as we will see in the next chapter, to maintain support after breakthrough the nature of the formation and the organizational evolution it tends to induce are often decisive.

While the 'new parties literature' increasingly stresses the importance of party organization for party performance, the literature on established, long-lived parties has developed in a somewhat different, to some extent opposite, direction. Scholars leading the debate increasingly de-emphasize the importance of a traditional membership organization for parties' success in modern politics, building on notions of the catch-all or cartel party (Kirchheimer 1966; Katz and Mair 1995; see for an alternative perspective Yishai 2001). Others, rather than perceiving the nature of parties to change, consider parties defined as societal organizations and representatives of citizens' preferences to be in decline, threatened with replacement by more issue-specific or participatory organizations (Lawson and Merkl

[9] By the end of 2011 the Party for Freedom and the Animal Party had entered national parliament only once after breakthrough, thus have not (yet) met the minimum threshold for sustainability: two re-elections after breakthrough (on recent entries, see Chapter 9).

[10] The national threshold is 5 per cent of the national vote, a barrier which, however, can be circumvented if a party manages to win seats in three single-member constituencies, which helped the PDS (*Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus*), one of the predecessor parties of the Left Party, to enter parliament.

1988). Notions such as the ‘business firm model of party organization’ (Hopkins and Paolucci 1999) or conceptualizations of parties as networks (Koger et al. 2009) challenge the conventional assumptions that link the set-up of a traditional membership organization to a party’s capacity to achieve and reconcile its various goals (Epstein 1980: 233; see also Eldersveld 1964). These conceptualizations have various empirical starting-points: the traditionally weak US parties or specific new parties, most notably the former *Forza Italia* (FI).[11] Initially, FI had virtually no infrastructure and relied predominantly on the provision of selective, material incentives (McCarthy 1996) and seriously questioned the very need to invest resources in a traditional membership organization.

At the same time, research on party change in advanced democracies more generally points to the decreasing incentives and increasing costs for party leaders in modern democracies of recruiting and retaining members (e.g. Katz and Mair 1994; Mair 1997; Scarrow 1996). Party membership is in decline (Mair and Biezen 2000; Biezen et al. 2011), with parties being increasingly dependent on state resources to finance costly campaigns. This further devalues the contributions of members (Katz and Mair 1992, 1994, 1995, 2009; Biezen and Kopecký 2008), while party elites increasingly rely on professional advisers to attract short-term support (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Webb et al. 2002; Farrell 2006) rather than building long-term loyalties through organizational means. Indeed, the centrality of party organization for party success in the electoral and institutional arena might have become a thing of the past. Janda and Colman found—using data from the late 1950s and early 1960s—that party organizational features, such as organizational centralization or member involvement, support party performance in terms of electoral success, legislative cohesion, and the breadth of party activities (Janda and Colman 1998: 631–2; see also Harmel et al. 1995). However, the authors immediately concede that this might no longer be the case. Their concluding remarks echo the contested status of party organization in contemporary democracies:

> These findings on party organization and performance reflect arguments in Duverger’s *Political Parties*. This is with good reason since the data come from the ‘Golden Age’ of political parties—the time of his writing. . . . Whether or not such findings would hold today is questionable. Presumably if parties have moved more toward ‘electoral professional’ or ‘cartel party’ models, the more society-oriented variables of involvement and breadth of activities would diminish in significance while complexity[12] and electoral success might increase. (Janda and Colman 1998: 632)

[11] In 2009, FI merged with the *Alleanza Nazionale* and formed *Il Popolo della Libertà*.

[12] Complexity denotes ‘the complexity of regularized procedures for coordinating the efforts of party supporters in executing the party’s strategies and tactics’ (Janda and Colman 1998: 618).

Of course, even if the 'Golden Age' of political parties is over (in itself a contested claim), the observation that established parties care less about their membership organization than they used to and increasingly diverge from Duverger's (1959) classical mass party model does not mean that new parties can survive without putting any organizational structure in place able to generate a sense of belonging among followers altogether. New parties usually start out with few financial resources at their disposal and few material incentives to distribute to followers. This scarcity makes them particularly dependent on non-material benefits that can be provided, in the short run, by a charismatic leader, but which need to be generated organizationally once a less appealing leader is in charge (Wilson 1973).

It is telling that even the former *Forza Italia*—initially considered as the prototype of a 'virtual party' or 'business model or party organization' (McCarthy 1996; Hopkin and Paolucci 1999; Paolucci 1999)—built up local structures after having suffered various electoral defeats on the subnational level (Poli 2001; Pasquino 2003). When the party started out, it had little grass-roots presence and was heavily reliant on its leader, Silvio Berlusconi, and the resources provided by his corporation Fininvest. Back then, Fininvest formed FI's organizational core and was indistinguishable from the party itself. Later on, however, the party built up a membership organization and established itself as an 'organized' and 'entrenched' party (Pasquino 2003: 207).[13] This is particularly noticeable because it happened despite the new party's strong position in the restructured Italian party system, its superior financial resources, and its media access, privileges hardly any organizationally new party ever enjoys in advanced democracies. Such a development in a party, whose access to material resources has been vast, hints towards considerable pressure to complement the provision of selective inducements by an infrastructure able to provide (non-material) collective incentives to assure its viability in the long run. Even to this kind of party, an extra-parliamentary organization seems to provide something money can't buy, although campaigns have become increasingly professionalized and costly and the impact of short-term advertising on voting behaviour is growing (e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Webb et al. 2002; Dalton 2003; Farrell 2006). This example further suggests that the comparative study of new parties that emerged, consolidated, or died over the last decades sheds light on the broader debate around the decreasing importance of a 'traditional' party membership organization in contemporary democracies, as elaborated in the following.

[13] How far this is enough to keep the party going after it lost government, and its founding leader, remains to be seen.

ASSESSING THE RELEVANCE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION BY STUDYING NEW PARTIES

The comparative study of new parties' medium- and long-term performance allows us to explore the ways in which *party institutionalization* can help to assure the *organizational persistence* and *electoral sustainability* of a party and how failed or incomplete institutionalization makes parties vulnerable. Established parties' capacity to defend a niche in the national party system and, more fundamentally, their ability to institutionalize (and the difference this process makes) are only rarely perceived as a puzzle. Unlike the human life cycle, the longer a party is around, the less its death is expected. At the same time, studies tend to focus on parties that form part of the national parliamentary party system and often lose interest in cases once they leave the national stage, although these cases might persist on the regional or local level for longer periods (Pedersen 1982). This caveat, however, is considered of little consequence. Looking at parties that are around for decades, sometimes since or even before a democratic regime took hold, the discrepancy between short-term as compared to long-term success, between different dimensions of success (organizational and electoral), and the factors driving each are difficult to disentangle.

In consolidated party systems, the formation of core parties and their electoral breakthrough are distant moments in the history of a regime. As a consequence, organizational persistence can be implicitly taken as a given, although theoretical work stresses that these parties' origins have left their imprint on their nature in the long run (Duverger 1959; Panebianco 1988). Success is measured in relative electoral terms with complete collapse remaining a theoretical possibility lurking in the background, becoming a reality only in spectacular instances such as the breakdown of the Italian party system, instances that can easily be dismissed as exceptional (Ware 2009; Mack 2010).[14] Observing parties that have been elected to parliament for several decades, organizational persistence becomes visible *through* parties' electoral sustainability. Each party that wins seats at elections has logically participated in the elections and by definition qualifies as persistent, as far as persistence is captured by parties' ongoing participation in elections. In short, studying *old parties in consolidated party systems, organizational persistence and electoral sustainability tend to be inseparable* and parties as electoral vehicles and as societal organization can implicitly be considered as the same thing. This is acceptable since most established parties in advanced democracies have entered parliament many decades ago and have not lost representation since.

New parties do not share these features. Nonetheless, what we assume in the study of established parties tends to affect our thinking about new parties,

[14] For analyses of the Italian case, see Bardi 1996, 2006.

whether underlying assumptions travel well or not. Looking at the full range of new parties, persistence is indeed the exception, not the rule. And the younger a new party is, the more vulnerable it is considered to be. Still, as long as a party is young, we are tempted to consider it as ephemeral, whereas when a (formerly) new party has been around a few decades, we consider its presence as natural. This is why, similar to the study of old parties, we know a lot about the determinants of relative electoral success of new parties, but more fundamental questions about the sources of persistence and sustainability and how the two dimensions link remain unanswered. At the same time, the various fates of new parties in old party systems—the persistence of some and the decline of others—beg the question why some of them stay around and mature, while others do not. Put in more general terms, will a party—be it new or established for decades—continue to nominate candidates for elections if this activity is not rewarded by repeated parliamentary access?

One is tempted to answer yes, having the classical mass parties in mind—communist, socialist, and social democratic parties that grew and persisted outside public office for considerable periods of time before being rewarded by public office. These parties are the prototypes of institutionalized organizations that can generate support organizationally and do not rely exclusively on selective incentives available through public office. Panebianco argues that 'all parties must institutionalize to a certain extent to survive' since those which do not 'soon dissolve' (1988: 54) and thus claims that all long-lived parties by default must have institutionalized (since otherwise they would have died). However, one hesitates to follow this rationale in light of alternative party models. Take those parties whose 'organizational core' is the party in public office itself: Duverger's 'cadre parties' (1959). In these parties persistence as an organization seems to be more closely tied to the party's sustainability as an electoral machine than in a typical mass party with societal origins. But how can we really tell how persistence and sustainability relate and under which conditions the former might be little more than a function of the latter, except in those circumstances when electoral support collapses?

This book suggests the following: The study of *organizationally new parties that try to break into consolidated party systems* opens a window of opportunity to explore these issues and allows us to circumvent the limitations we face when studying old parties. The disentanglement of distinct dimensions of party success becomes feasible, since among these parties neither organizational persistence nor sustainability is a matter of course.

Core concepts: newness, persistence, sustainability, and institutionalization

Rather than focusing on a specific party family or defining new parties in terms of the issues they represent, this study focuses on all organizationally new parties that

entered national parliament in 17 advanced democracies with consolidated party systems from 1968 onwards. In contrast to older, mature parties, these parties resemble each other in that they faced the challenge to set up a working organizational infrastructure relatively recently, and most of them had to cope with the pressures of parliamentary (and sometimes governmental) office early in their lives.

This study distinguishes between a new party's *electoral sustainability* on the national level and its *organizational persistence*, a distinction that reflects the double nature of political parties as electoral vehicles and societal organizations. To capture *persistence*, in other words party survival, we need to address what a party is. According to Sartori (1976; see also Pedersen 1982), a party is an organization that nominates candidates for elections.[15] Consequently, any party functions by definition as an electoral vehicle, otherwise it would qualify as a pressure group or movement instead. The organizational life of a party, however, starts earlier, namely with its foundation: the constitution of a group with the explicit goal to participate in elections reflecting Pedersen's threshold of declaration (1982: 6).[16] This definition is preferable to using the first participation in elections as starting-point for two reasons: it keeps the organizational life of a party separate from its electoral activities, which is not only essential for the sake of conceptual clarity but also reduces endogeneity problems when trying to account for party persistence referring to measures of electoral success as an explanatory variable.

In line with Sartori's definition of what constitutes a party in the first place, a party can be considered dead when it ceases to run candidates for elections on any level of government. *Party death* can find expression in a party's *dissolution*, its *disintegration*, or its *merger* with another party. A party's formal dissolution is often a response to its electoral decline or other indications of malperformance

[15] While deregistration, if done with the intention to cease the organization's electoral activities, qualifies as one indication of 'party death', formal registration as a party is no necessary criterion to qualify as party in the context of this study insofar as a group is formed with the intention to run elections. Furthermore, individual candidates who explicitly run as independents (as individual personalities who are deliberately not part of any collective) do not qualify, but any new actor who joins parliament on a party label or as part of a 'group' does. This allows for the consideration of cases such as the 'Independent Unionists' represented in the Irish parliament 1922–60s (whose candidates were selected and deselected by Protestant associations), which—in practice—operated like a party but without carrying the name or applying for formal party status (Weeks 2008: 140–1). The rather inclusive criterion is further chosen because sometimes new parties, especially early in their career, structurally do not consist of much more than one MP and his or her personal following and simply might fail to develop into something more than that, even though they tried to. To draw a line between independent candidates and a organizationally new party based on organizational characteristics is therefore difficult since we cannot presuppose a party to start out with an 'organization' (for a detailed discussion, see Weeks 2008).

[16] Lowery et al. (2011: 8), by contrast, define party birth and death in terms of electoral participation on the national level.

(e.g. financial difficulties). However, it can also be a response to all major party goals being realized.[17] While this step is usually equivalent to the organization's dissolution, this is not necessarily the case. An organization can dissolve 'as a party' to dedicate itself fully to its activities in the extra-parliamentary sphere.[18] A party's organizational disintegration is often triggered by intense internal conflict or a shock such as the early exit of the party founder (usually before the party had a chance to develop working structures). Disintegration finds expression in a party's fundamental inability to operate as a collective actor as much as in the unwillingness of individuals capable of taking over leading roles to act on behalf of the remainder of the group. Finally, a party qualifies as dead if it merges with other parties to create a new formation. Again the type of death does not allow us to determine the underlying motivations leading to this outcome: a merger can occur out of a position of weakness (in effect being the only alternative to dissolution) or as a strategic move of an, in principle, self-sufficient party to increase its weight in the party system by merging with another party representing similar or the same issues (on different types of merger see Ware 2009). While party death through disintegration is clearly an expression of party failure, the same cannot necessarily be said about dissolution or merger. Due to this disconnect between type of party death and the motivations and pressures underpinning it, the case study chapters will have a closer look at which types of deaths are typical for different groups of new parties and under which circumstances they take place.

Moving to the second performance dimension explored in this study, *electoral sustainability* captures a party's capacity to maintain and consolidate a certain level of electoral support over time. How much support is enough to consider a party as electorally sustainable 'on the national level' depends on the institutional context. Maintaining 2 per cent of the national vote means in some democracies an ongoing presence in national parliament. In other democracies it is far too little to win even one seat. Votes as a 'currency' do not have the same value across advanced democracies. Being interested in a new party's capacity to establish a niche in the parliamentary party system after its national breakthrough, the *minimum threshold for electoral sustainability* in the context of this study—i.e. of a party that reached parliamentary representation at least once—is met when a party assures repeated re-election after breakthrough. Obviously a party can

[17] One example for this is *Enrolés de Force* (Luxembourg). This single-issue party entered national parliament once in 1979 with 4.5 per cent of the vote and claimed compensation from the West German government for people that had been conscripted into the Wehrmacht during the occupation of Luxembourg in the Second World War. After an agreement with Germany was achieved in 1981, the party dissolved and the party's one deputy joined the Christian Social People's Party (Graubart 2000).

[18] One example is *Frauen macht Politik*, a regionally based, feminist party founded in 1986 in Switzerland that decided to return to extra-parliamentary work after having been repeatedly elected to national parliament.

vanish from the national stage at any point of its life cycle. However, since organizationally new parties are particularly vulnerable in early stages of their development, the likelihood of this happening is higher during the first few elections than later on, which is why it is sensible to distinguish parties that reach a basic level of sustainability (in our case two re-elections to national parliament after breakthrough) from those that do not.

Depending on the basic conceptualization of parties we decide to adopt in terms of party elites' aims and motivations, we can expect sustainability and persistence to relate to each other differently. Starting from a rationalist conception in which party elites are instrumentally oriented and driven by immediate rewards (e.g. parliamentary seats), a new party is only formed when entrepreneurs anticipate sufficient electoral support to enter parliament (e.g. facing a low parliamentary threshold). Persistence remains a function of a party's electoral performance throughout a party's life. If such a party, once it is formed, against the expectations of its founders, hardly wins votes or initial electoral support declines dramatically without much hope for recovery, it most likely will cease to persist. Alternatively, we can start from a vision of party as societal organization in which elites are ideologically driven or consider themselves as the representatives of certain societal groups. In that case, the articulation of societal interests through the party's ongoing participation in elections might be a sufficient achievement for party elites to maintain their activities, irrespective of the party's electoral performance. While electoral success certainly is not irrelevant when choosing such a conception rather than a rationalist one, persistence—understood as the maintenance of basic organizational functions such as running elections—is, in principle, an end in itself, and less dependent on the level of electoral support or on rewards available to core personnel such as parliamentary seats.

That persistence might be an end in itself for party founders (due to their affiliation to pre-existing societal groups whose interests they feel they ought to represent in the political process) is of course only one thing. Whether followers who join the party later on (and have no prior attachment to an organization supporting the formation) share this orientation is another. According to Panebianco, for followers of a party to develop survival interests, meaning stable organizational loyalties, parties must institutionalize (1988: 54). The *institutionalization* of an organization becomes visible in routinization (a process by which internal rules and patterns of behaviour become habitual and entrenched) and in value infusion (a shift in followers' goals from the pursuit of a particular objective through an organization to the goal of perpetuating the organization itself) (Levitsky 1998: 79). It is institutionalization—especially in terms of value infusion—that can provide for an alternative underpinning for party persistence different from electoral success or other immediate rewards as main motivation. The later case studies will show that the formation of an extra-parliamentary membership organization is neither a necessary nor necessarily a sufficient condition for routinization or value infusion. However, value infusion through extra-parliamentary party building can help generate organizational loyalty among

future elites and followers, which makes a party less vulnerable not only to electoral decline but also to weak or the absence of leadership.

In essence, this study considers the two visions of party as social organization and as electoral vehicle as equally feasible possibilities rather than building an approach on the assumption that one tends to out-rule the other. On that basis it will be able to show that a party's origin systematically influences whether persistence is more or less likely to remain a mere product of the party's ongoing electoral support, instead of, over time, also becoming a product of successful institutionalization.

Core arguments: party formation and the leadership–structure dilemma—the interplay of structure and agency

To understand new parties' evolution we need to look at the *nature of these parties' origins and the way their origin can be expected to support or complicate institutionalization*. As will be developed in detail in the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, in the formative phase we can specify whether or not a 'party in the making' can draw on linkages to societal groups which predate the party's formation. If a party can rely on such linkages, it will be referred to as a *'rooted new party'*. If it is created by individuals who are not affiliated to any already organized societal groups, it will be referred to as an *'entrepreneurial new party'*.[19] This distinction captures basic structural preconditions which a newcomer starts out from, which are expected to shape a party's evolution in the long run.

Returning to the conceptualization of new parties as instrumentally driven, electoral vehicles on the one hand and parties as societal organizations on the other, while rooted newcomers more strongly correspond to the latter vision, entrepreneurs correspond to the former. The elites of entrepreneurial parties are likely to be more strongly driven by electoral rewards or institutional access to parliament and government. They are less likely to survive times of electoral decline, since elites are likely to defect if the party as electoral vehicle does not 'deliver'. Furthermore, given their short-term orientation they are unlikely to have invested in a lasting infrastructure. Rooted parties are more likely to be oriented towards representing particular interests in the longer term. They are more interested in and—due to the resources they can access thanks to their societal roots—more able to build an institutionalized infrastructure. This makes them more capable of outliving periods of decline. In essence, the type of party formation affects the motivations of party elites as well as the resources available to them. Both, in turn, are likely to affect new party elites' party-building strategies and thereby parties' medium- and long-term performance.

[19] The latter concept goes back to Harmel and Svåsand 1993; for a similar conception, see Krouwel and Lucardie 2008.

To give some first insights into the variety of new parties' trajectories after their entry into national parliament, Figures l.1–1.3 provide an overview of the long-term evolution of three of the programmatic groupings of new parties covered in depth in the later case study chapters.[20] They have been chosen because their performance trajectories are particularly distinct, both in terms of their long-term trends and the relative level of homogeneity of the individual party trajectories within each group. This first overview not only indicates that the short-term success of 'national entry' does not allow us draw conclusions regarding parties' long-term performance (not even if the vote share at the breakthrough election is considerable). A brief look at how parties in these three subgroups originated (either as rooted or as entrepreneurial formation) also provides a first illustration of why it is insightful to have a closer look at how new parties were formed, when trying to understand their longer-term development.

Figure 1.1 displays the electoral trajectories of new liberal parties from their breakthrough into national parliament onwards, a group that consists of over 80 per cent entrepreneurs mostly formed by defectors from established parties. Only a minority of this group was persistent and sustainable and nearly all parties in this group received most support at their parliamentary breakthrough and declined afterwards. Chapter 6 will show that party decline and eventual death in this group



FIGURE 1.1 National electoral trajectories of new liberal parties

Notes: x-axis displays percentage of vote. Figure does not display recent entries.

[20] Note regarding Figures 1.1–1.3 that the timing of breakthrough has been different for each party displayed. The figure is not chronological but serves the purpose to display the dominant development trends in each group. Also note that the three figures do not display emerging parties (that entered national parliament only recently), whose patterns of long-term performance are still unclear (this concerns 20 of the overall sample of 140 parties).



FIGURE 1.2 National electoral trajectories of new green parties

Note: Vertical axis displays % of national vote. Figure includes only electorally significant new parties (4% or more) and excludes recent entries.

are often caused by the strategic defection of core personnel. These defections are, in turn, often triggered by electoral losses or intra-organizational conflict, a pattern that is particularly typical for entrepreneurial parties formed and dominated by reward-driven, short-term oriented elites.

Moving to the more numerous Green and new right parties, Figures 1.2 and 1.3 focus—for the sake of clarity—only on the cases in these groups that were able to attract 4 per cent of the national vote at least once in their career.[21] Nineteen of 28 Green parties (67.9 per cent) won 4 per cent at least once, while 13 of 31 of the new right parties did the same (41.9 per cent). The difference in trajectories is telling, particularly because we only look at parties with significant electoral potential. In these cases the actions of the party as a strategic and organizational actor are more likely to have direct repercussions for whether a party fails or succeeds in the long term than in electorally very marginal cases, where chances for consolidation were meagre from the start.

As in the liberal group, we find a clear trend in the Green group, yet in the opposite direction. Parties in this group that is dominated by rooted formations

[21] The overall pattern of party trajectories to be illustrated here is not significantly altered by leaving out the electorally more marginal cases. The later case study chapters will cover the full range of cases respectively.



FIGURE 1.3 National electoral trajectories of new right parties

Note: Vertical axis displays % of national vote. Figure includes only electorally significant new parties (4% or more) and excludes recent entries.

tended to consolidate their support base after breakthrough. While 67.9 per cent of parties in this group managed to climb the 4 per cent threshold at least once, most Green parties initially started out with relatively small vote shares and slowly increased support over time. The contrast with Figure 1.3 is striking. The more successful cases in the new right grouping started out much more strongly than most Green parties, a clear indication of these parties' electoral potential. Unlike in the Green or the new liberal groups, however, the diversity of medium- and long-term trajectories is considerable, as is the discrepancy between short-term electoral success and the capacity to sustain support. Thus, in the new right group we lack a clear developmental trend.

Briefly looking at the two performance dimensions central to this study, 76 per cent of the 25 Green parties meet the minimum threshold for sustainability of two re-elections after national breakthrough, while 67.9 per cent persist, i.e. are still actively participating in elections today (end of 2011).[22] Of the new right group only 48 per cent meet the minimum threshold for national sustainability, while 61 per cent still participate in elections. We will see later that the majority of parties in

[22] Sustainability figures exclude emerging parties that have not had the chance to run two elections after breakthrough.

both groups have an ideological profile distinct from their competitors, which is why it is unlikely that the discrepancies between Green and new right trajectories as displayed in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 can be fully accounted for by their programmatic distinctiveness from rivalling parties. In contrast, the dominant type of party origin in each group seems to provide a more persuasive account. Twenty-five of 28 Green parties (89.3 per cent) are rooted, while only 11 of 31 new right parties (35.5 per cent) are.

While this study will show that coping with the challenges of institutionalization and the pressures of public office after breakthrough is easier for rooted newcomers, this does not mean that *party agency* is irrelevant to a party's fate. We will see that elite choices can help overcome unfavourable starting conditions. A brief look at the individual parties displayed in Figure 1.3 shows that the Danish People's Party and the Norwegian Progress Party have been very successful (even though the latter suffered from considerable ups and downs). Both are entrepreneurial formations and we will see later that both institutionalized as organizations and adapted to the demands of public office successfully. However, while such examples highlight the importance of party elites and their party-building strategies, these cases should not distract us from the challenges inherent in the institutionalization of new parties.

This brings us to the second core argument of this book that centres on the conflicting incentives that founding party elites face when confronted with the question of whether to invest resources in party building, i.e. whether to bother building an infrastructure able to operate effectively inside and outside public office. Taking the founders' viewpoint, the incentives to invest in party institutionalization appear less clear-cut than commonly assumed. Such a long-term investment needs to be weighted against its short-term costs for those in charge. An institutionalized party structure inevitably constrains the autonomy of founding leaders and eventually might lead to their replacement (Harmel and Svåsand 1993), a risk those in charge of a party might refuse to take. This *leadership–structure dilemma* confronting a new party on its way towards maturity is rooted in the tension between the *interest of the founding elites to protect their own position and pursue their immediate interests in the newly formed party structure and the anticipated (individual and collective) benefits and costs of future party institutionalization.* Funding elites face incentives to make choices problematic for the party's medium- and long-term evolution due to a tension between individual short-term and collective long-term interest. While particular types of newcomers such as entrepreneurial formations without societal roots are particularly prone to suffer from this, this study will show that these tensions also emerge in rooted formations whose founding elites tend to be more long-term oriented. To gain an encompassing understanding of party evolution, we therefore need to consider the structural conditions of party formation as well as party agency.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

Before developing the central theoretical arguments just alluded to in greater depth, the following chapter discusses the methodological choices this study rests upon. Most importantly, it introduces and defends an age-based conception of newness as the starting-point for this study and specifies the study's empirical scope. It further discusses the methodological implications that arise in the study of new party persistence and sustainability. In a concluding part, it presents a classification of the new parties covered along their type of origin, to systematically capture conditions of party formation, a factor that is central to the theoretical framework developed afterwards. On that basis, Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical framework and specifies sources of and challenges for new parties' organizational persistence and electoral sustainability, and how institutionalization links to both. Distinguishing different types of formations (most importantly entrepreneurial vs. rooted ones) and specifying the leadership configurations and elite orientations likely to be linked to them, this chapter stresses the need to study the interplay of structural and agential factors to understand different patterns of new party development and performance. From here, we move into the empirical analysis.

Chapter 4 presents statistical analyses which show that the core distinction between entrepreneurial and rooted formation not only systematically affects a new party's chance of survival (persistence) but also increases its chance to maintain a presence on the national level after its national breakthrough (sustainability). Having substantiated empirically the importance of structural features of party formation for party performance, its concluding section explains how the following in-depth case studies will complement the quantitative findings by bringing party agency into the picture. More specifically, it identifies systematic connections between party origins and programmatic profiles. The resulting 'clusters' provide the basic logic along which the qualitative case studies will be grouped.

Following this structure, Chapter 5 looks at intra-organizational dynamics in programmatic families mainly populated by rooted parties formed outside parliament (Green and new religious parties). Chapter 6 explores two families mainly populated by entrepreneurial parties formed with the support of national politicians, i.e. entrepreneurial insider formations (new liberal and new left parties). Chapters 7 and 8 look at the intra-organizational patterns among new right parties, structurally the most heterogeneous group as illustrated above. They present the different performance patterns of those new right parties that were rooted (Chapter 7) and entrepreneurs that were founded without group support (Chapter 8). Methodologically speaking, Chapters 5 and 6 will show that we find parallels in intra-organizational dynamics along party origin, elite choices, and patterns of institutionalization across programmatic groupings, i.e. *parallels that cross-cut ideological differences*. Chapters 7 and 8 follow an opposite logic. They will

show that performance differences *within the new right group* can be accounted for by differences in party origin, elite choices, and institutionalization patterns. The final Chapter 9 summarizes the basic findings and discusses their implications for new parties that entered their national parliaments only recently when this study was already finished.

2

Disentangling Dimensions and Sources of Party Success: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges

Analysing patterns of institutionalization allows us to distinguish those new parties that persist as electoral or leadership-dominated vehicles from those with the ability to persist as societal organizations when their electoral fortunes decline or their founding leaders leave. The story of the Irish Progressive Democrats, which will be explored in detail later, is a telling example of how the study of new parties allows us to disentangle different sources of persistence. The party was formed in the 1980s by *Fianna Fáil* dissidents and dissolved more than 25 years later when the last remaining member of its founding elite declared the party no longer viable. Despite considerable success (the party was in national government for most of its history), it never institutionalized beyond establishing and routinizing procedures for internal coordination which supported the party's activities inside public office (i.e. in parliament and government). Continuity was assured by its founding elite, not through organizationally generated value infusion. Once the party declined electorally, leading figures deserted it, leaving politics or continuing their political careers as independents or in competitor parties, while the Progressive Democrats dissolved.

This example suggests that sources for party persistence differ depending on the nature of the party we look at. If party loyalty (also) flows from collective benefits generated by an emotional affiliation cultivated within an institutionalized, extra-parliamentary organization, a party can be expected to persist despite electoral decline, at least for a while. Institutionalization as such does not presuppose an extra-parliamentary organization generating an emotional affiliation of followers to their party since values can be cultivated by a party leader, especially the creator of a party. But without an extra-parliamentary infrastructure it can be difficult to transfer leadership-oriented loyalty to a successor. At the same time, as long as a party can maintain electoral support, i.e. is sustainable, institutionalization through value infusion might be less essential for party persistence than usually assumed, as long as the functioning of the party in public office can be assured by the party leadership.

Consequently, persistence does not necessarily presuppose the sustainability of electoral success as implied by a rationalist vision of party elites (driven by

instrumental, careerist motivations), since an institutionalized party organization can provide non-material, collective benefits that help a party maintain its basic activities in times of crisis. Nor does persistence require institutionalization, since career-oriented elites might maintain a party because it helps them to pursue their individual goals such as gaining parliamentary seats. What this study argues, however, is that a party is unlikely to persist if none of these conditions, i.e. value infusion (generated by a leader or by means of party building) or ongoing electoral success, is met. At the same time, while electoral sustainability can be one major foundation for organizational persistence and can function as a substitute for fully-fledged institutionalization, party institutionalization can contribute to sustain electoral support by helping a party organization to operate when exposed to particular performance pressures. The period after a new party's national breakthrough is a phase in which organizational vulnerabilities are easily exposed. In such a situation, a party's organizational characteristics or the nature of its leadership are likely to become particularly important, since the party suddenly needs to cope with new and often conflicting pressures. While the examination of persistence logically refers to the overall lifespan of a new party, the analysis of sustainability will therefore be focused on the critical phase after a new party's parliamentary breakthrough. These theoretically grounded specifications have methodological implications, once they are translated into a cross-national research design. The following section discusses the challenges involved in doing so.

THE SUBSTANCE OF NEWNESS AND THE VIRTUES OF AN AGE-BASED CONCEPTION

Back in the 1970s and 1980s when new parties emerged in advanced democracies and entered national parliaments in growing numbers, it was still difficult to judge whether and which new parties would eventually become part of the established party systems rather than vanishing after a while. In fact, when Green parties initially emerged on the national stage in the late 1960s, some dismissed them as a temporary protest phenomenon. The same happened when parties of the new right started to flourish in the 1980s. Now 40 years later, not only have a number of long-lived new parties become part of the mainstream themselves, a number of (relatively) long-lived new parties have died. Consequently, it is 'late enough' to start studying new party trajectories cross-nationally (quantitatively and qualitatively) to assess whether and how the interplay between formative circumstances and elite choices shaped these newcomers' fate in the longer term. An encompassing assessment of new party long-term trajectories across advanced democracies is therefore particularly timely.

When doing so based on a theoretical approach that centres around party institutionalization, a concept to which the relative (im)maturity of parties is central, an age-based definition of 'newness' provides an appropriate starting-point to specify the relevant group of parties to study. When they were formed, *organizationally new parties*, as defined in this study, still faced the challenge to build a viable, self-sufficient infrastructure consolidated by a (relatively) stable support base, which makes these parties more vulnerable than and thus distinct from the group of established or 'organizationally mature' parties.[1] To operationalize 'organizational newness' according to this core feature, I follow Hug (2001) and classify parties as new if they are built from scratch ('newly born') or if they originate from minor splits of established parties. To assure a sufficiently homogeneous sample, successor parties are excluded (including those that grew out of major factions of established parties) (Arter 2010)[2] as well as mergers of old parties that start out from several established party organizations (for a more inclusive approach see Mair 1999).[3] I further exclude mergers between old and organizationally new parties, whenever old parties in effect 'swallowed' the remainders of organizationally new parties—so-called 'unbargained mergers' (Ware 2009: 106–7)—i.e. 'new' formations that in effect are an organizational continuation of established parties.[4] Reflecting the main definitional criterion, only those mergers are included in this study in which organizationally new parties actively participated and which at the time of formation still needed to build a viable infrastructure.[5]

New formations meeting this criterion were identified from 1968 onwards, a period when citizens' party affiliations underpinning formerly 'frozen party systems' in advanced democracies started to de-align (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini and Mair 2007).[6] The increasing flexibility of voters' choices created a 'window of opportunity' for new party entry as one first step towards sustainability, showing in higher numbers of newly formed parties participating in

[1] On conceptions of newness, see Barnea and Rahat 2011.

[2] Following this criterion for exclusion, Flemish Interest was considered as the successor party of the Flemish Block (itself a new party according to the above definition), i.e. they were counted as only one party. Similarly, the New Flemish Alliance (NVA) was excluded, being formed out of the major faction of the *Volksunie* (an older party from which also the Flemish Block originated as a smaller splinter). The NVA took the organizational resources of the mother party (e.g. personnel, real estate) with it (Govaert 2002: 32) and was considered as the successor party of the *Volksunie* rather than an organizationally new party.

[3] The Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal is one example for this configuration.

[4] An example for this constellation is the old Irish Labour Party that was joined by the remainders of the Democratic Left (new party) which was not counted as a new party.

[5] Using this operationalization, only nine new formations that involved established parties qualified as organizationally new.

[6] Consequently, the oldest, organizationally new formations in the dataset were formed in 1968 and at the earliest entered national parliament in the same year, as was the case for the Belgian Walloon Rally.

national elections, entering national parliaments, and defending a niche on the national level (e.g. Mair 1997; Hug 2001). Using 1968 as a cut-off point further allows us to cover new party life cycles over a period of more than 40 years, which is essential to explore sources of party medium- and long-term success. While these issues are relevant to parties operating in old and new democracies alike, we cannot look at similarly extensive party life cycles in new democracies, because the latter adopted democratic structures much more recently, leaving aside that parties in new democracies generated distinct patterns of party formation and evolution (Biezen 2003, 2005). Furthermore, in advanced democracies, new parties are confronted with long-established parties as main competitors, parties that have constituted the core of their respective party systems for decades and are in an advantaged position. This is a very different situation for a new party than operating in party systems in which most competitors are themselves new.

In short, to assure comparability of contextual conditions, this study is restricted to *advanced democracies with consolidated party systems*, where carving out an own niche is particularly difficult and the strategic position in which new parties find themselves is directly comparable. The 17 democracies covered accordingly are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.[7] In conjunction with the age-based conceptualization according to which new parties are identified, the country selection assures that the parties covered start out from similar conditions and face similar difficulties as organizations when competing for votes in increasingly volatile electoral markets and when trying to stabilize support. It further assures the coverage of a wide range of programmatic profiles and performance trajectories.

While the decision to define 'newness' in organizational terms builds on earlier works (e.g. Mair 1999; Hug 2001), a programmatic conception has been more prominent over the last decades, most visible in the by now vast literatures on Green parties and the new right parties. As a consequence of this, it is easily overlooked that both groups together form less than half of all organizationally new parties that entered the national stage in the 17 democracies studied here. Of the 140 new parties that entered national parliament in these countries, we only find 28 Green parties and 31 new right parties (including new far right and populist right parties). Certainly, they form an important minority, as Mudde (2007: 1), for instance, stresses. They are the only two 'new party families' that managed to get established across a wide range of Western (and in the case of the right also Eastern) democracies. As we will see later, for those new parties with less distinctive programmatic profiles it is more difficult to establish and defend a lasting niche in national party systems. Yet even if this is so, for cross-national

[7] Due to the transformation of the Italian party system in the 1990s after the collapse of the Christian Democrats (see Bardi 1996, 2006) this country was not included. While Malta fell into the initial country selection, no organizationally new party entered national parliament in the period under study.

studies to leave out from the start the majority of new entries that manage to break into national parliament is problematic,[8] considering that only very few new formations that compete in national elections ever enter national parliament in the first place (Krouwel and Lucardie 2008).[9]

The empirical focus on Green and new right parties can be traced back to the dominant theoretical lens through which party scholars assess long-lived, consolidated party systems and, with it, newcomers that manage to break into these systems. While these two families are themselves rarely discussed within the same comparative study (see for exceptions Ignazi 1996; Abedi 2004; Meguid 2008), new Green and new right parties have attracted particular attention since both groups were perceived as parties that represent genuinely new issues, issues that were systematically neglected or avoided by their mainstream competitors. As Sikk rightly stresses, most studies on new parties—at least in Western Europe—start out from the cleavage-based model of party system development introduced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) as a cornerstone, implicitly or explicitly (Sikk 2011: 1). Both Green and new right parties fit this bill, since their rise matches the dominant assumption that new parties only stand a chance to break into consolidated, 'frozen' party systems if they are sufficiently distinct from mainstream parties. Their rise, it has been argued, was only possible because old parties failed to absorb important issues and to integrate them in their programmes (Hug 2001; Meguid 2008; for a similar perspective on the success of minor parties, see Gerring 2005). Furthermore, there are few doubts that a range of Green parties and at least some of the new right parties (e.g. the Norwegian Progress Party) are by now established parts of their respective party systems, some of which were able to alter patterns of party competition and coalition formation.

Irrespective of the validity of this observation, the underlying theoretical assumptions about the rise of new parties might be problematic nonetheless. As Sikk points out in a study of new parties in new democracies, we find 'a number of highly relevant new parties with a broad set of policies similar to established parties' (2011: 3). New parties do not necessarily represent new issues, nor are they necessarily ideologically driven but might 'wilfully fight on an already-occupied ideological territory' (Sikk 2011: 3). Approaching the issue from the perspective of voters, it is plausible that voters are more willing to desert the party they have traditionally supported when they are disappointed about its capacity to

[8] Note that this evaluation does not apply to the various country literatures.

[9] Similarly, the rise of new regionalist parties has attracted considerable attention. Yet although a few of these parties such as the *Bloc Québécois* are new formations and have reached significant levels of support, they, yet again, tend to be discussed in a separate strand of the literature, either focusing on party politics in federal or devolved countries comparatively or on individual case studies (e.g. Cornellier 1995; de Winter and Türsan 1998; Webb 2005; van Haute and Pilet 2006; Mitchell et al. 2009; Swenden and Maddens 2009; Elias and Tronconi 2011).

pick up and represent new values or issues that are important to them. This is the flipside of saying that new parties only succeed if old parties fail.

At first glance, the literature stressing the growing alienation from and distrust towards political parties reinforces this reading (Dalton and Weldon 2005; Mair 2005), but only if alienation and distrust are direct responses to the actions of mainstream parties. The decline of group attachments might be a general societal trend instead, an expression of a growing individualization of the electorate that affects citizens' relationship not only to political parties but also to other societal organizations such as churches or unions (Biezen et al. 2011). This means that if more and more citizens are less reliable in their vote choice and less likely to stick with one particular party, they might be generally more open to alternative offers, irrespective of whether the alternative offer is genuinely new or different. Going back to the debate on new parties, under such conditions, a new party might simply repackage an old message and still be able to lure voters away without presenting anything genuinely 'new' in terms of policy content.

This might be a particularly persuasive argument in new democracies where voters' attachments to parties have never been strong. Yet looking at conceptual work on new parties in long-lived democracies that classifies different types of new party profiles and deliberately bypasses the usual party family distinctions, new parties that advocate a new ideology or new set of issues represent only one of several types. New parties might not be linked to ideologies at all but solely be vehicles of individual personalities. Alternatively, they can represent an existing ideology that is—in the view of the party founders—poorly represented by established parties (Lucardie 2000). The latter situation is particularly common when MPs or minor factions defect from established parties and form their own splinter party, often representing the ideology of the mother party in a supposedly 'purer' (usually more extreme but sometimes also more moderate) version. As we will see in detail in Chapter 4, only 51 of 140 newcomers present a programmatically distinctive offer not represented in their party system at the time of their entry, while a majority represents a mix of ideas and issues that already form part of the mainstream offer.[10]

Consequently, taking membership in particular party families with a new or distinctive profile as one's analytical starting-point creates methodological restrictions. They affect the choice of countries covered as much as the choice of the parties studied. It is only natural to focus on those countries where the type of parties targeted by a study emerged, if not on those where these parties enjoy a certain level of electoral success.[11] This is methodologically problematic, however, especially when the goal is to explain levels of electoral success, because

[10] See Chapter 4 for a detailed operationalization.

[11] Jackman and Volpert, for instance, studied the electoral success of the extreme right, yet left out a range of relevant cases that participated in elections during the relevant period including parties that won seats in their national parliaments, such as *Respect voor Arbeid en Democratie* (Belgium), the

settings unfavourable to the success of the respective party type are systematically underrepresented (Golder 2003). And while the currently very prominent literature on niche parties has the virtue of countering the fragmentation of the literature divided along 'new party families' and allows for broader conclusions, it still resembles this literature in some respects. These works examine patterns of electoral success of 'novel minor parties' whose policy offer is qualitatively distinct from the offers provided by mainstream parties,[12] which includes women's, peace, new right, Green, and ethno-territorial parties (Meguid 2008: 3–4; for a different operationalization, see Adams et al. 2006;[13] for a critique, see Wagner 2012). But even here the case selection remains relatively narrow. While explicitly recognizing that 'many of the new political organizations are variants of the existing socialist, liberal, and conservative parties' (Meguid 2008: 3), programmatic newness of a party's profile functions as the main criterion for case selection. Accordingly, Meguid identifies 110 niche parties that have *contested national elections* in 18 European countries 1960–2000, of which 55 are included in her empirical analysis (2008: 4–5, 17), as compared to the 140 organizationally new parties that *entered national parliaments* between 1968 and 2011 in a similar number of countries. Applying the niche party concept as operationalized in existing studies to the group of organizationally new parties with parliamentary representation would lead to the exclusion of more than half of the parties that managed to enter the national level.[14]

In essence, existing studies tend to raise the following question: restricting our analysis to cases that are programmatically distinctive, how can we examine whether distinctiveness as such is a necessary condition for (different types of) new party success, as many studies seem to assume? Building on an age-based conception of newness instead allows us to test the relative impact of programmatic distinctiveness as compared to other factors likely to shape party evolution and success, rather than taking its basic relevance as a given.

Belgian National Front, or the Freedom Party of Switzerland (Jackman and Volpert 1996: 519–21, appendix).

[12] Meguid refers this novelty back to these parties' rejection of the traditional class-based orientation of politics, the fact that the issues represented by these parties do not coincide with the existing, 'left–right' lines of political division, and the tendency of these parties to limit their issue appeal (Meguid 2008: 3–4).

[13] Unlike Meguid (2008), Adams et al. (2006) include communist parties and exclude regionalist parties. The authors share the assumption that members of some party families are intrinsically niche competitors, no matter what their ideological profile (Wagner 2012).

[14] 'Organizational age' is, in principle, irrelevant to the concept of the niche party. Meguid (2008), for instance, presents an in-depth study of the Scottish National Party as a 'new' niche party, though it was founded in 1934. However, unlike most works on the niche party that care little about the internal life of parties and do not consider party organization as a relevant factor of party success, Meguid explicitly considers this dimension in her study.

YARDSTICKS FOR NEW PARTY SUCCESS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CASE SELECTION

Reflecting my main interest in whether and how new parties get established in national politics in the medium and long term, this study looks at the subset of organizationally new parties that achieved representation in their national parliament at least once. A party achieves national representation when it enters into the first house of parliament, the chamber that most directly represents the citizens in a democracy and therefore tends to be superior in terms of formal competences and legitimacy. Taking this rationale seriously, one exception has to be made with regard to Australia, where entry into the Senate can be considered as similarly important for a new party as its entry into the House of Representatives. Not only can the Senate veto all legislation (which is true for other second chambers), it also has a more proportional electoral system than the House of Representatives. This makes it difficult to argue that the Senate is inferior in terms of democratic legitimacy and thus less relevant—from the viewpoint of other parties or citizens—as an 'access point' into national politics than the House of Representatives. This feature is distinct from other powerful second houses that are incongruent in composition and can veto legislation such as the Swiss Senate or the German *Bundesrat*. The 1975 constitutional crisis illustrated the Senate's special status: a government with majority support in the House of Representatives had to step down, being blocked by a partisan opposition that had a majority in the Senate, an incident unheard of in other federal systems.

Inevitably, one is interested in the success or failure of parties operating in a particular context and in relation to a particular goal. Choosing national representation as a cut-off point, all 140 parties studied here are by definition 'short-term successes' because they entered the most important democratic institution in their political system at least once. Furthermore, and this bring us back to the organizational vulnerability of new parties, all are exposed to intensive performance pressure when entering the national legislature. Parties that never experienced a national breakthrough—even if electorally significant—do not face equivalent pressures. When new parties enter the national arena, MPs who may be without prior parliamentary or even political experience are suddenly forced to behave in a competent and professional manner. Weak performance in office easily undermines party support in the medium and long run, and, by looking at the performance of parliamentary entries, this study can assess which ones suffer from national breakthrough rather than profiting from it and why.

One can legitimately query whether a party does not experience similar pressures in a *regional* or the *European Parliament* (EP) as in national parliament. However, in terms of the level of media and thus public attention a party receives, its national breakthrough is likely to be perceived as a qualitatively different event from its entry into regional parliaments, even in countries with powerful regional

tiers. Similarly, the extent to which the newcomer is perceived as a potential threat by mainstream parties is likely to be more pronounced after national breakthrough. It is true that national newcomers that operate in federal systems might have collected professional experience in parliamentary institutions on the regional level and therefore might find it easier to adapt to pressures they face in national parliament, a factor I will control for in the later statistical analyses (Chapter 4). Yet a focus on new parties entering national parliament does not introduce biases. EU elections are still widely perceived as second-order elections where voters are particularly open to vote for outsider parties to protest against the mainstream, which is why many new parties—at least initially—do better at EU than at national elections. Clearly, new parties with EU representation also learn how to operate in a legislature but adaptation pressure is still lower on the EU level. If the EU vote is indeed a protest vote, the articulation of opposition is likely to satisfy the voters of these parties longer than it would on the national level, where—in the perception of voters—policy-making power is concentrated. Voters pay less attention to decisions made in the EP than in their national parliament. This, in turn, implies that to assure repeated EU representation requires less of a reorientation on behalf of a party than the assurance of repeated national representation.[15]

All this suggests that a weak performance on the national level is likely to be more damaging for a newcomer than a weak performance in a regional or the EP, not the least for reasons of visibility, which is why a focus on new parties' 'national breakthroughs' is justified: it assures the comparability of the cases we look at in terms of the challenges these parties are confronted with. This substantive reason is further underpinned by the fact that this study also includes non-EU countries. Thus, considering new parties with representation (only) in the EP would generate problems of comparability of its own rather than solving them. Similarly, not all democracies covered have regional governments with significant legislative powers.

The discussion so far has already touched upon the fundamental question of which subset of new parties we need to study to avoid systematic biases in the findings, in other words: what are the 'relevance criteria' defining the sample? Even though the focus on new parties with national representation makes substantive sense, it is worthwhile to consider the link between the implications of this choice and the two dimensions of success to be examined in this study: *organizational persistence*, the ongoing capacity to nominate candidates for elections, and *electoral sustainability on the national level*, the capacity to maintain electoral support sufficient to *achieve repeated re-election after breakthrough*. Organizational persistence, which can be maintained by a party's participation in local or regional elections and does not require any ongoing activity on the national level,

[15] Numerically speaking, most new parties entering the EP also enter their national parliament at some point in their careers. Only nine organizationally new parties entered the EP without ever winning a national seat.

is analytically separate from national representation which each party in the sample has to have achieved. In other words, the constitutive criterion for persistence and criteria that constitute the sample composition are clearly separate.

National entry and electoral sustainability on the national level as a yardstick for success, in contrast, are linked, a link whose implications we need take a closer look at. To some extent it is inevitable that relevance criteria for case selection are linked to the yardstick for success along which new parties are evaluated, since the parties that are relevant for our examination encompass all those cases that are 'potentially successful' along the yardstick chosen (including those that fail). The problem is that the identification of success cases tends to be much easier than the identification of relevant failure cases. Drawing on Pedersen's life cycle model (1982) which defines different thresholds that parties might (or might not) overcome in the course of their lives, we can derive different yardsticks to assess party success. At this point, I will refer to the yardsticks of success as derived from Pedersen's seminal article to discuss issues of case selection. In the empirical chapters their application will reveal trade-offs between yardstick by showing how particular types of new parties can be very successful according to one yardstick, while performing weakly according to another.

Figure 2.1 presents the relevant yardsticks by distinguishing societal, electoral, and institutional (i.e. parliamentary and governmental) arenas in which new parties might operate. While early in its history a party might only be active in the societal and electoral arenas, in later stages it might simultaneously have to operate in all spheres, each of which imposes its own demands on a party as collective actor. Starting out with the societal arena, a group needs to form with the intention to compete in elections, a hurdle which Pedersen called the 'threshold of declaration' (1982: 6). Once a party seeks formal recognition through registration (the threshold of authorization) (Pedersen 1982: 7), it has moved into the electoral sphere. A higher level of success is achieved when a party enters the institutional arena and accesses parliament (the threshold of representation) or government (Pedersen 1982: 7–8).

The sequence of thresholds can be used chronologically to systematically characterize the life cycles of individual parties: this allows us to assess whether and when parties climb certain thresholds, whether they fall back below certain thresholds and whether they are likely to recover from it. However, its application to single case studies is more straightforward than its usage in cross-national analysis. In principle, the difficulty of overcoming each threshold intensifies from the initial declaration phase to government participation, and the level of success of an earlier stage should increase the likelihood of reaching a latter stage. But this is not necessarily the case and, more importantly, this relationship is not uniform across political systems (Pedersen 1982: 7). Due to parliamentary entry barriers that differ considerably in their relative permissiveness, minimal vote shares can suffice to win a seat in one system, while significant vote shares can be insufficient to enter parliament in another, a discrepancy we need to return to



FIGURE 2.1 Yardsticks of party success and their implications for case selection
Note: Based on Pedersen (1982: 6–8).

later. Similarly, parties with considerable seat shares might be systematically excluded from government power in one system, while parties with a minimal seat share might enter national government and even occupy a pivotal position thanks to the specific dynamics of coalition bargaining in another. These discrepancies have inevitable repercussions when studying party success cross-nationally.

Despite the discrepancies that emerge when looking at the relationships between these different yardsticks for measuring party success in different institutional contexts, the scheme can nonetheless help us to design cross-national studies of new party performance. Lower yardsticks tend to precede more demanding ones, which not only allows us to distinguish those parties (or proto-parties) that are successful from those that are not. It also helps us to specify the group of cases that are potentially successful, i.e. methodologically relevant. To specify this group we simply need to move down one threshold below the threshold that captures the type of success our research focuses on. To enter government, a party realistically needs parliamentary representation. To participate in elections, a party needs to be registered, etc. The more demanding the yardstick for party success is, which we are interested in, the fewer cases can be considered directly relevant for our analysis.

Most existing work naturally tends to focus on higher yardsticks of success and thus a more exclusive group of cases. This tendency is not only linked to the fact that more successful cases (e.g. parties that win significant vote shares) are considered more important. This choice is also related to problems of data collection. The latter would be insurmountable when, for instance, trying to collect cross-national data on newly registered parties that did not manage to actually participate in elections to compare them to those newly registered parties that entered the electoral contest. Systematizing existing cross-national studies along the yardsticks specified in Figure 2.1, we find a series of studies that try to account

for patterns of *new party emergence or entry.*[16] Hug's study (2001: 80–1), for instance, looked at those new parties across 22 democracies that entered the national electoral contest (i.e. presented candidates) for the first time at the second or consequent democratic elections after the Second World War (see also, based on Hug's work, Tavits 2006; for a detailed assessment of methodological issues in studies on new party entry, see Bischoff 2011). Such extensive data collection efforts are desirable since they provide us with a broad picture of a phenomenon. Yet as Hug himself concedes, 'to collect information on all new parties ever formed in Western Europe is an almost impossible task' (2001: 81). As far as the sample composition is predominantly driven by data availability, rather than representing a systematically selected subset of all relevant cases, questions of selection bias are difficult to address.

Less inclusive studies, in contrast, combine several criteria and focus on those *parties that newly contest national elections and win a minimum share of the national vote* or, alternatively, *achieve national representation* (e.g. Rose and Mackie 1988; Kitschelt 1989; Krouwel and Lucardie 2008). Yet again, to study party success based on a subsample of more successful cases explicitly or implicitly leaving weakly performing parties out, can—depending on how the dependent variable is specified—lead to an overestimation of the impact of those factors that favour the rise of new parties (Hug 2001: 70–7; Golder 2003). *Government participation* (usually embracing coalition partnership as well as support status), the most demanding yardstick for new party success, has long been a domain of small-N studies. These studies provide important insights not only into how a newcomer managed to become 'coalitionable' but also what impact government participation had on those parties that joined national governments for the first time in their history (e.g. Deschouwer 2008; Bale and Dunphy 2011; McDonnell and Newell 2011), aspects whose study tends to require qualitative, in-depth analyses. With the rising number of new parties joining national governments, however, cross-national studies started to apply conventional coalition theories to the new right (e.g. de Lange 2008) as well as to Green parties (e.g. Dumont and Bäck 2006) using quantitative methods to study patterns of coalition formation. While those cover the full range of 'relevant cases' in light of the yardstick of success applied (i.e. cover those parties that could assure parliamentary representation to account for patterns of government participation), their generalization potential to new parties more generally remains limited as long as they focus exclusively on one particular party family.[17]

How does *electoral sustainability* relate to the yardsticks specified in Figure 2.1? Sustainability is being defined as *a party's capacity to maintain*

[16] Entry is usually understood as the entry into the (national) electoral contest rather than parliamentary entry. If not otherwise specified, I use the term accordingly.

[17] See McDonnell and Newell (2011) for an attempt to bridge this gap by using the concept of outsider party.

sufficient electoral support to assure repeated parliamentary entry. It adds a temporal dimension to Pedersen's threshold of representation. To study sustainability, we have to compare those parliamentary entries that manage to *stay represented* (have the capacity to assure repeated re-election) with the group of potentially sustainable parties, i.e. the sample of relevant cases: those parties that *were represented* in national parliament but stayed there only briefly. Using parliamentary entry to specify the group of new parties relevant to account for patterns of party sustainability is not without its restrictions though. As discussed, the relationship between the various yardsticks is not uniform across systems (Pedersen 1982: 7), i.e. while Figure 2.1 suggests that winning significant vote shares is less demanding than entering parliament, this is not necessarily the case, depending on the system-specific threshold of inclusion as defined by the minimum share of votes necessary to win a parliamentary seat in a political system (Taagepera 2002). As we have seen, in some systems seats can be won with marginal vote shares, in others parties can remain shut out from parliamentary institutions despite winning significant vote shares.

How severe are these restrictions in practice? Using parliamentary entry as a selection criterion proves more inclusive than the usage of the thresholds of electoral significance that are more common. Only 61 of the 140 parties ever won 4 per cent of the national vote in their history, while 91 won 2 per cent at least once in their career. Using either 4 per cent or 2 per cent as threshold for electoral significance, we would lose 56 per cent or 35 per cent of the cases in the sample defined by parliamentary entry. In contrast, only eight new parties that won 2 per cent or more at national elections never won a national seat across the 17 democracies covered (Bolleyer and Bischoff 2012). Among them are parties that remain unconsidered because they operate in countries with a high formal threshold such as the German Republicans or parties with a territorially dispersed support base operating in first past the post systems, such as the United Kingdom Independence Party and the British National Party. Nonetheless, parliamentary entry tends to be a very inclusive yardstick that captures parties with a very diverse range of electoral support.

More importantly, looking only at new parties that reached national representation does not generate *selection bias* since the criteria that define the sample are not tied to explanatory factors supposed to affect the dependent variables, be it sustainability or persistence. Constraining settings with high parliamentary thresholds can be expected to prevent particularly marginal parties from entering. However, the idea that new parties that are confronted with high entry barriers face per se bigger challenges to gather the share of votes necessary to enter parliament than parties competing for votes in permissive environments can be questioned. It rests on the assumption that an equal number of competitors are formed in each setting, which is unlikely. As mentioned in earlier work (e.g. Hug 2000, 2001: 66; Selb and Pituctin 2010), whether new parties are formed is likely to be affected by the respective prospects of having success in the given institutional environment (e.g. such as the respective chances to enter the national arena). We therefore might expect a higher number of new formations to contest

elections in permissive systems than in constraining ones and so competition for these fewer votes necessary to enter parliament in the former context might be more intense. Interestingly, those parties operating in high threshold countries such as Sweden, Germany, or Austria did not—as one might intuitively expect—need longer to achieve breakthrough than parties operating in countries with a very low threshold of inclusions such as the Netherlands, the UK, or Switzerland. Irrespective of the threshold of inclusion, most parties persisted outside national institutions for only a few years before their efforts were rewarded with a parliamentary seat. Parties that are active for several decades before they won their first national seat form only a small minority including the Sweden Democrats (22 years), the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (40 years), the Green Party in the UK (37 years), and the Swiss Christian Social Party (20 years).

Whichever interpretation on determinants of party *entry* is the right one (a question that cannot be answered by this study), looking only at new parties that entered the national level does not bias the analysis since each party in the sample faces comparable challenges to sustain support *after* having entered. As the levels of support necessary to be a short-term success vary across democracies, so do levels of support necessary to assure re-election. Consequently, all parties face the same challenge to *maintain a sufficient level of support that allowed them—in their respective institutional contexts—to enter parliament earlier on* (the latter being the criterion to be considered a relevant case in the first place). As long as certain party properties favour similar patterns of medium- and long-term performance irrespective of (i.e. while controlling for) the constraints imposed by the institutional setting in which individual parties operate, any effect the former will generate is not likely to be biased by the sample composition.[18]

To illustrate this point, Table 2.1 gives an overview of the number of organizationally new parties that entered national parliament in each of the 17 democracies studied. It further displays how many national entries were still active at the end of 2011. It shows that the number of new parliamentary entries does not give us a good sense of the percentage of parties that persist. In essence, the higher the permissiveness of the electoral system (i.e. the higher the 'entry rate'), the lower the survival rate (the percentage of entries that persist). For instance, while all

[18] Another argument regarding qualitatively different conditions for sustainability in systems with different electoral institutions can be derived from the impact of voters' perceptions rather than the 'objective difficulties' of entry. The literature on strategic voting in disproportional electoral systems has emphasized the disadvantages smaller parties face. Voters desert them for parties they prefer less because the latter have a reasonable chance to enter parliament. Once a minor party enters national parliament despite these constraining conditions, supporters—some of whom so far voted strategically for their second or third preference—might see this breakthrough as a signal that it might in fact be worthwhile to cast a vote for their first preference in the future. In other words, as long as a new party has not yet gained national representation, its vote support is likely to be systematically suppressed, i.e. below its real potential, if electoral institutions invite strategic voting, a situation that might change after breakthrough (naturally, the party might still alienate supporters by weak performance in parliament).

TABLE 2.1 *New party performance in 17 democracies*[19]

Country	Parliamentary Entries (total)	Persistent Parties (% of total)	Parliamentary Entries (without recent entries[20])	Sustainable Parties (minimum two re-elections) (% excluding recent entries)
Australia	8	4 (50)	7	3 (42.9)
Austria	3	3 (100)	2	1 (50)
Belgium	9	7 (77.7)	7	6 (85.7)
Canada	5	3 (60)	4	2 (50)
Denmark	7	5 (71.4)	6	5 (83.3)
Finland	7	1 (14.3)	7	1 (14.3)
France	9	7 (77.7)	7	4 (57.1)
Germany	2	2 (100)	2	2 (100)
Iceland	10	4 (40)	9	4 (44.5)
Ireland	9	4 (44.4)	7	2 (28.6)
Luxembourg	7	3 (42.9)	7	2 (28.6)
Netherlands	17	5 (29.4)	15	6 (40)
New Zealand	10	7 (70)	9	7 (77.8)
Norway	7	4 (57.1)	7	2 (28.6)
Sweden	3	2 (66.6)	2	1 (50)
Switzerland	14	9 (64.3)	11	10 (90.9)
United Kingdom	13	5 (38.5)	11	3 (27.3)
Total	*140*	*75 (53.6)*	*120*	*61 (50.8)*

Note: The period covered is 1968–2011. The Norwegian Progress Party and the Swedish Environment Party have been coded as sustainable, although they have not assured two re-elections *directly* after breakthrough. However, they managed a comeback and consolidated their position on the national level in the longer run, i.e. unlike in the other cases, their performance at the first two elections after breakthrough was no appropriate reflection of the two parties' long-term fate. For the statistical analysis in Chapter 4 they have been coded non-sustainable instead, since the performance of parties was compared over the first two election cycles after breakthrough, which is why the number of sustainable parties referred to later is 59, not 61 (see also Appendix Table A2.2).

parties that entered national parliament in Germany—only two in over 40 years—were still active in 2011, only about a third of the 17 new Dutch entries were.[21]

[19] To identify the relevant sample of parties and to compile electoral data for the analysis accordingly I started out with cross-national datasets (<http://www.parties-and-elections.de>, the EJPR data yearbook and the Caramani dataset on elections in Western Europe (2000)) and identified all organizationally new parliamentary entries covered. I then identified the parties that were summed up in the 'others' category (and had remained unidentified) for all elections from 1968 onwards, using official election statistics or more detailed country-specific data bases (e.g. <http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/search.php?type=year>; <http://elections.uwa.edu.au>; <http://www.anneepolitique.ch/de/aps-online.php; http://www.electionresults.govt.nz>). I then identified, in a third step, which of those qualified as organizationally new. A significant minority of cases turned out to be so small in terms of vote support and/or so short-lived that they tended to 'vanish' in the 'others' category. Thus, not to identify them would have led to a systematic exclusion of weakly performing new parties which could have implied selection bias (Geddes 1990).

[20] Recent entries are excluded since they have not yet faced the challenge of re-election or had done so only once by the end of 2011. By definition, they cannot yet have met the minimum requirement of sustainability and therefore were not considered in the column capturing the rate of sustainable parties.

[21] While Table 2.1 is only supposed to give a first impression, the following limitation needs to be mentioned: it does not indicate when the parties were founded. However, it is not the case that in

The last column shows how many new entries per country reached the minimum threshold for national sustainability (two re-elections after breakthrough), which highlights the discrepancy between short-term success (entry) and a party's capacity to maintain a presence in national parliament in the medium term (see also Appendix Table A2.2). Again, the discrepancy between entry rates and longer-term performance is considerable. While both Finland and Belgium had seven entries (excluding recently emerging parties), the sustainability rate is 14.3 per cent in Finland and 85.7 per cent in Belgium.

Generally, Table 2.1 suggests that—unlike cross-national difference in entry rates—cross-national differences in the longer-term performance of new entries cannot easily be traced back to systemic variables such as the electoral system or the federal–unitary divide,[22] which pushes us to look at party-level factors instead.

THE VARIETY OF NEW PARTIES IN ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES

Having justified the conceptual and methodological choices underlying this study and having given a first illustration that new party performance patterns cannot be easily linked to country-level variables (see Table 2.1), this final section of Chapter 2 takes a look at the nature of new formations entering national parliament across the 17 democracies.

Distinguishing entrepreneurial from rooted formations

A distinction often referred to in cross-national party research is the one between newly born parties, splinter parties, and mergers (Mair 1999) which provides us with three types of party formation. While this differentiation might be a useful starting-point to identify the group of organizationally new parties as such, the

countries with a low 'survival rate', parties were systematically founded earlier than in countries in which the 'survival rate' is high. The one country where foundations and entries are systematically concentrated in the 1990s and 2000s is New Zealand which changed its electoral system from first past the post (FPP) to a PR (mixed member proportional) system in 1996. Its survival rate could therefore be slightly 'inflated' since parties had systematically less time to die.

[22] While in Switzerland 10 of 11 national entries proved sustainable, a system that might be favourable due to a low threshold, a highly decentralized federal system, and a heterogeneous society, the sustainability rate is also high in Denmark, which displays opposite features. In contrast, the sustainability rate is low in Finland, a Scandinavian neighbour with institutional features similar to Denmark but also in the UK, a plurinational country with a very low entry barrier, insofar as one uses Taagepera's minimum threshold of representation as a measure.

differentiation becomes problematic when studying new party persistence or sustainability, particularly when being used as an explanatory variable in this context. This is because the distinction between newly born and splinter party covers important structural differences that can be expected to be relevant for a newcomer's medium- and long-term evolution.

The category of 'newly borns'—new parties 'built from scratch'—encompasses two very distinct starting-points for new party development: *parties formed by individual entrepreneurs* and *party formations promoted by existing societal organizations*. In a comparative study of the Norwegian Progress Party and its Danish counterpart, Harmel and Svåsand (1993) introduced the concept of the *entrepreneurial party*, denoting new parties founded by individuals who are not affiliated to already organized groups. *Rooted new parties*—with ties to already existing organizations (which promote the formation of the newcomer in the first place and tend to provide support later on) constitute the counter-image to these entrepreneurial formations.[23] True, in both cases a party organization needs to be built 'from scratch' but party founders face this challenge from very different starting conditions. As Chapter 3 will elaborate in detail, party founders are likely to be driven by distinct motivations in each constellation and equipped with different resources and skills, which are crucial for a party's likelihood to persist as an organization and to sustain support electorally.

To give a first overview of the variety of new formations, each of the 140 new parties covered was coded regarding whether or not its foundation was supported by one or several identifiable promoter organizations or groups. Relevant groups were identified along criteria derived from the literature on voluntary associations (Knoke 1988: 312; van Deth 1997: 2–3) and organized interests (Pross 1992: 102–11; Halpin and Jordan 2012: 12). New formations qualified as rooted when their foundation was supported by a societal group that predated the actual formation[24] and at that time had in place an at least rudimentary organizational infrastructure[25] including voluntary members or affiliates relevant to the organization's maintenance.[26] These organizations ought to be directed towards some collective, societal need or interest, without seeking election themselves,[27] i.e.

[23] For a similar distinction between private initiatives or entrepreneurial parties and realignment parties as applied to the Dutch case, see Krouwel and Lucardie 2008.

[24] Leaders of newly formed parties might deliberately build linkages to societal groups and organizations *after* being formed to access resources important for organization building. While this might lead to the same outcome as 'being rooted' from the start, this would not correspond to the phenomenon captured here.

[25] Consequently, being formed as the vehicle of temporary, local protest is insufficient to qualify as rooted (e.g. Future for Finnmark).

[26] This is necessary for a promoter organization to provide a potential pool of supporters a party might be able to recruit from, as argued later.

[27] Consequently, a party that is created by recently formed local parties (that themselves have no identifiable ties to societal organizations) was coded as entrepreneur (e.g. Liveable Netherlands) (Beyens et al. 2013).

their *raison d'être* needed to be defined by extra-parliamentary activities (to function as a support base separate from the new party as such). While new parties might doubtlessly profit from other, more fluid sources of support (e.g. generated by the personality-oriented loyalty to local notables), a more narrow operationalization was more suitable to capture types of group support likely to be associated with the resources, skills, and member/elite orientations conducive to institutionalization as conceptualized in the following chapter.

A linkage between such a promoter group (once identified) and the new formation was considered sufficient, when sources indicated the expressed support of the former for the new party's formation suggesting an informal transfer of loyalty and resources from voluntary group to party.[28] To require formalized ties between groups and parties[29] would have been too restrictive, since ties between organized interests and new parties tend to be weaker than the types of linkages traditionally forged by established parties (Poguntke 2006: 397, 401). Each party that qualified as 'organizationally new' was coded according to these criteria independent of other formative circumstances. Minor splinter parties, for instance, were only coded as rooted (1) when indications of a support base separate from the mother party could be identified. Otherwise they were coded as entrepreneurs (0), to avoid conflating external support with resources brought in from the mother party as far as possible.[30] Parties were classified along these criteria on the basis of the case study literature, newspaper reports, and party publications. Following this, 74 of the 140 new parties qualified as rooted, 66 as entrepreneurs (see Appendix Table 2.1). Table 2.2 lists the 74 rooted parties according to the type of promoter organization that supported them. While Green parties supported by environmental movements are the most populated subtype of rooted formations, the variety of promoter organizations is considerable, ranging from fascist groups, nationalist movements, religious groups, unions, and employer organizations to far left movements.

Comparing entrepreneurs and rooted parties along various performance measures reveals a picture that suggests that party origin indeed affects party development as theoretically expected (for details see Chapter 3). Leaving aside the most recent entries (whose performance after breakthrough is difficult to evaluate at that

[28] In most cases the case study literature pointed out that the party profited from such linkages in terms of the ability to recruit loyal and skilled members and personnel. If a party solely declared itself to be the 'voice' of particular groups, this was insufficient to qualify as 'rooted'.

[29] An example for formalized ties would be collective membership of the group in the party (Allern and Bale 2011: 13).

[30] The Finnish Ecological Party Greens (a splinter of the Green Alliance), for instance, qualified as rooted, since it represented a separate strand of the environmental movement fighting for a different range of issues than the strand that supported its mother party (Linkola 1986; Lampinen 1988). The Danish People's Party that profited from resources coming from its mother party (Pedersen 2006) was coded as entrepreneur.

TABLE 2.2 *Rooted new formations by type of promoter organization (1968–2011)*

Type of promoter organization	Name of party (country) (year of foundation)
Leftist groups	Progressive Organization of Switzerland (Ch) (1969)
	Partito Socialista Autonomo (Autonomous Socialists) (Ch) (1969)
	SolidaritéS (Solidarity) (Ch) (1992)
	Radical Party of the Left (F) (1971)
	Socialist Party (NL) (1971)
	Red Electoral Alliance (Nor) (1973)
	Socialist Electoral League (Nor) (1973)
	Social Democratic and Labour Party (UK) (1970)
	Respect (UK) (2004)
	Democratic Alternative (Fin) (1986)
	Unity List (Den) (1989)
	Anti-H Bloc (UK/Ire) (1981)
	Socialist Labour Party (Ire) (1977)
	People before Profit (Ire) (2002)
	Workers and Unemployed Action Group (Ire) (2005)
	Left Party (Ger) (1989)
	Alliance (Nz) (1993)
	New Left (Déi Lénk) (Lux) (1999)
	Citizen Movement (Ice) (2009)
Environmental groups	Green Party (UK) (1973)
	Political Party of the Radicals (NL) (1968)
	Green Left (NL) (1989)
	Animal Party (NL) (2002)
	Green Party (Can) (1983)
	Value Party/Green Party (Nz) (1972)
	Green Party (Ch) (1975)
	Alternative Zug (Ch) (1986)
	Green/Agalev (B) (1976)
	Ecolo (B) (1980)
	Australian Democrats (Aul) (1977)
	Greens WA (Aul) (1990)
	Australian Greens (Aul) (1992)
	Greens (Ger) (1979)
	Green Alliance (Fin) (1980)
	The Ecological Party Green (Fin) (1988)
	Environment Party (S) (1981)
	Green Party (Ire) (1981)
	Green Alternative Party (Lux) (1983)
	The Greens (F) (1984)
	Alternative List (Aus) (1986)
	Nuclear Disarmament Party (Aul) (1984)
	Left-Green Movement (Ice) (1999)
Women's organizations	Women's Union (Ice) (1983)
	Frauen macht Politik (Women make politics) (Ch) (1986)

Religious groups	Christian Democrats (Den) (1970)
	Democratic Unionist Party (UK) (1971)
	Christian-Social Party (Ch) (1971)
	Federal Democratic Union (Ch) (1975)
	Reformatory Political Federation (NL) (1975)
	Christian Union (NL) (2000)
	United Future New Zealand (Nz) (2000)
	Family First (Aul) (2002)
Unions/employer organizations	Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour (B) (1978)
	Alternative Democratic Reform Party (Lux) (1987)
	ACT (Nz) (1994)
	Social Democratic Alliance (Ice) (1999)
Conservative/nationalist/far right groups	Republican Movement (Ch) (1971)
	Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz (Ch) (2008)
	National Front (F) (1972)
	Union for French Democracy (F) (1978)
	Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (UK) (1973)
	Flemish Block/Interest (B) (1978)
	National Front (B) (1985)
	Centre Party (NL) (1980)
	Centre Democrats (NL) (1984)
	Canadian Alliance (Can) (2000)
	Conservative Party of Canada (Can) (2003)
	Sweden Democrats (1988)
Regionalist/separatist groups	Walloon Rally (B) (1968)
	Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (UK) (1970)
	Bloc Québécois (Can) (1991)
Ethnic groups	Maori Party (Nz) (2004)

Note: While parties can be supported by different types of promoter organizations, the above classification is based on main support base.[31]

point[32]), of the 120 newcomers (that did or had the chance to participate in at least two elections *after* their parliamentary breakthrough), 59 managed to get re-elected twice, i.e. met the minimum threshold for electoral sustainability (see Appendix Table A2.2). Finally, of those 59 sustainable parties 47 (79.7 per cent) were rooted while only 12 were entrepreneurs (21.3 per cent). Seventy-five parties of the 140 entries were still active at the end of 2011, of which 50 were rooted (66.6 per cent) and 25 (33.3 per cent) were entrepreneurs. Vice versa, of the 65 parties that died, a majority (63 per cent) were entrepreneurs. Of the 54 parties that

[31] After group support was identified and parties qualified as rooted, parties were categorized along core group types as identified in the literature (Duverger 1959; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Poguntke 2006; Poguntke 2006; Meguid 2008; Allern and Bale 2011; Art 2011). While the main type of promoter organization suggests which programmatic family a party is likely to belong to, the overlap is not complete. For example, the Danish Unity List is classified as having the support of leftist groups. However, it is discussed as part of the 'Green family' later on.

[32] By the end of 2011, 14 newcomers had entered their national parliament only at the last national election and six that had been re-elected to parliament only once.

were still nationally represented at the end of 2011, 72.2 per cent were rooted. While the initial distribution of rooted parties and entrepreneurs in the sample is fairly even, the lower organizational persistence and electoral sustainability among entrepreneurs when compared to rooted new parties stress the importance of party origin. Suffice to say that these figures are no more than a first illustration. The impact of party origin will be tested against rival influences in Chapter 4.

Distinguishing insider from outsider formations

Similar to the problems implied by the concept of the 'newly born party' which embraces rooted formations and entrepreneurs, the concept of the 'splinter party' encompasses party formations that follow different rationales. Splinter parties can be formed inside or outside parliament. Inside formations are those in which (usually defecting) national parliamentarians are involved (be they from the same or from different parties), while outside formations are those that emerge without such insider support. This distinction refers to the location of a party's formation that has been stressed as important as early as in Duverger's seminal book on political parties (1959). Often splinters are initiated by defecting MPs dissatisfied with their mother party, formations that Duverger called 'personality parties', 'purely parliamentary groups having no real party organisation in the country . . . they are made up of deputies who chafe under the discipline imposed by major parties, or who consider that these are not capable of satisfying their ambitions' (Duverger 1959: 290–1). Leaving aside the ambiguity that emerges when dissidents from several distinct mainstream parties form a new party (is it a splinter or a merger of splinters?), splinter parties can equally originate from factionalism in the party organization, thus be initiated by party activists (rather than office holders) who disagree with the course of the mother party. The motivations of the main actors to initiate a defection and form a new party are comparable in *insider* and *outsider formations*: often they involve conflicts over policy or basic strategic decisions or, alternatively, are the outcome of leadership struggles. Similarly, in terms of the resources available to either type, neither insiders nor outsiders are—from a theoretical viewpoint—more likely to institutionalize, a theoretical link that will be developed in the following chapter regarding the entrepreneurial vs. rooted distinction.

Consequently, in the context of this study, the insider–outsider distinction will mainly serve heuristic purposes. Although Duverger (1959) argued that parties formed outside of public institutions are more likely to institutionalize than inside formations that have access to institutional resources right away, this is not applicable to new parties for the following reason. The cases he focused on, such as socialist parties, are core example for mass parties that built—unlike cadre parties formed in parliament—a highly institutionalized extra-parliamentary structure. Unlike new parties that emerged in the last few decades, those parties

were shut out of institutions for longer periods, which pushed them towards the formation of a strong organization and which, in turn, accounted for a distinct organizational evolution from internally created cadre parties. Most new parties studied here, be they insider or outsider formations, enter parliament rather quickly, usually not more than a few years after their formation and often at the first national election they participate in. The theoretical argument regarding patterns of party development that Duverger formulated—as derived from his distinction between internal and external formation—is therefore of limited applicability when analysing new parties that emerged and entered institutions over the last four decades. It is indicative that of 63 insider parties, 30 meet the minimum threshold for electorally sustainability, while 29 of 57 outsiders do so: 47.6 per cent compared to a 50.9 per cent,[33] a minor difference compared to the considerable discrepancy between the performance of rooted newcomers and of entrepreneurs.

That said, just because the distinction between insider and outsider formation does not play a major role in accounting for persistence or sustainability (the two main dimensions of success explored in this study), this does not mean it does not have implications for new party performance more generally. Once we switch our yardstick for measuring success, professional politicians with a national profile and experience in national politics can be expected to be more strongly directed towards and more effective in accessing prestigious positions, such as national government. Thus, insider formations can be expected to take over government responsibility on the national level more often than outsiders. Forty parties of the 140 new entries covered in this study took over government responsibility—either as coalition partner or as support party at some point in their career. Twenty-eight of these 40 parties (70 per cent) were insiders. While government participation is not the yardstick of success central to this study, it is certainly a relevant observation when trying to evaluate the careers of new parties.

Their moderate profile provides one possible explanation for this pattern. Seventy per cent of insiders emulate mainstream ideologies rather than having a profile distinctive from the offer of other parties already operating in the party system (on how to distinguish different types of programmatic profiles see Chapter 4). This, in turn, is linked to them being mainly formed by politicians who defected from a mainstream party. This familiarity helps party leaders to negotiate a mutually acceptable deal. Consequently, coalitions between splinter parties and their mother parties are not unusual in party families dominated by insider formations (see Chapter 5). Outsider formations do not have these advantages but can more credibly exploit an anti-establishment image to attract support, being untainted by any involvement in professional politics. Furthermore, outside formations form the majority of new parties with a distinctive profile (70 per cent).

[33] Note again, 20 of the 140 parties participated in less than two elections after breakthrough and are therefore not included.

While these features help to attract votes, they tend to complicate the joining of government coalitions, pointing to one trade-off between different yardsticks for new party success.

Note that the insider–outsider distinction is clearly separate from whether a new formation is rooted. The Maori Party (New Zealand), a rooted insider party, is a good example to illustrate the difference between the two distinctions. While a dissident Labour MP was one of the party founders, representatives of Maori tribes were present when the party was formed in 2004 and declared their active support. They also participated in the election of the party leader and indeed chose Tariana Turia, the dissident MP, who also won the party's first parliamentary seat. The party was an insider party profiting from an experienced politician taking over a leading role, but it was not an entrepreneurial party dominated by one single individual who systematically occupied core positions in his or her new party by means of 'self-selection', which—as we will see later—is a frequent pattern among entrepreneurial formations. To sum up, each formation type can be associated with a set of properties—a different set of resources and skills—when classified along these two dimensions, which are displayed in Table 2.3.

Based on Table 2.3, Table 2.4 displays the frequency of each formation type among the 140 organizationally new parties that entered their national parliament 1968–2011. We find a range of cases in each of the four categories, indicating that there is no particular 'structural formula' that is typical for newcomers achieving a parliamentary breakthrough. About the same number of entrepreneurs and of rooted parties entered national parliaments. At the same time, some configurations occurred less frequently. Rooted insiders and entrepreneurial outsiders constitute only 20 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. While sometimes national politicians pick up a cause promoted by a societal organization and take that as a starting-point for forming a new party leading to the foundation of a rooted insider party, rooted parties are more often formed by members of these organizations or people close to them that are not already established politicians. Vice versa, insider parties are often splinter parties formed by dissidents inside parliament without immediate linkages to groups outside.

TABLE 2.3 *Types of party formation and their resource/skill profile*

	Insider	Outsider
Entrepreneurial Party	Public Recognition/Professionalism Leader Preferences Dominant → Time horizon variable	Credible Anti-Establishment Image Leader Preferences Dominant → Time horizon variable
Rooted Party	Public Recognition/Professionalism Group Interest Dominant → Medium-/long-term orientation Organizational Resources/Recruitment Pool	Credible Anti-Establishment Image Group Interest Dominant → Medium-/long-term orientation Organizational Resources/Recruitment Pool

Table 2.4 *Types of party formation in 17 democracies*

	Insider	Outsider	
Entrepreneurial Party	45 (32.1%)	21 (15%)	66 entrepreneurs (47.1%)
Rooted Party	29 (20.7%)	45 (32.1%)	74 rooted parties (52.9%)
	74 insiders (52.9%)	66 outsiders (47.1%)	N = 140

Considering that all parties categorized in Table 2.1 achieved a first major success, namely national representation, at least once, it is noteworthy that rooted outsiders (parties that profited from the support of promoter organizations but not from the support of national politicians) and entrepreneurial insiders (parties without societal roots formed or supported by one or several national politicians) entered parliament with equal frequency. As discussed earlier, the higher percentages of rooted outsiders and entrepreneurial insiders cannot be read as an indication of their 'relative superiority' in entering national parliament. Since we lack data on how many and which parties entered the electoral contests in the 17 democracies in the first place, we do not know whether particular types have contested national elections more frequently than others, thereby accounting for their higher 'entry rate'. Nevertheless, and this is of central importance to this study, the categorization allows us to systematically compare groups of formations to explore whether parties formed in similar ways share similar performance profiles. More specifically, while the distinction between *rooted* and *entrepreneurial new formations* has a central explanatory function in this study, as will be detailed in the following chapter, the *insider* vs. *outsider* distinction is added for heuristic purposes to assess how different types of new parties operate in parliament and government as detailed in the later case studies (Chapters 5–8).

CONCLUSIONS

Many studies on new parties implicitly assume that electoral success is the main factor accounting for parties' ongoing organizational activities. Yet organizational persistence is not necessarily an appendix to electoral success, as those parties illustrate that continue running in elections despite little reward in terms of votes, institutional access, or prestige. The literature suggests that in institutionalized parties loyalty can equally flow from collective benefits generated by an extra-parliamentary party organization. Unlike the study of the core parties in consolidated party systems that are institutionalized for a long time already, the study of new parties allows us to disentangle these two sources of persistence—electoral success and organizational institutionalization. More specifically, it gives us the chance to consider the full life cycles of a wide range of parties, including periods after a party has lost national

representation (a shock established parties in consolidated party systems only rarely need to cope with), to see whether it dissolves or continues running elections. By definition, organizationally new parties are more vulnerable than established parties and are more likely to fail, be it electorally or organizationally. Consequently, this study covers parties with widely different performance trajectories ranging from steady consolidation to immediate disintegration.

In analytical terms, success and failure are multidimensional concepts and the earlier discussion of varying conceptions of success inevitably raises the question of how they compare to each other. It cannot be judged objectively whether a party that persisted only ten years but managed to enter national government is more successful than a party that persisted and regularly participated in elections for over 40 years but whose biggest achievement—in terms of climbing Pedersen's thresholds—was being represented in national parliament once. Such an evaluation again depends on our theoretical perspective, which is shaped by the kind of change we expect to be generated by the rise of new parties in advanced democracies, or put more broadly, by what we consider to be the nature of new parties, leading back to the two contrasting visions of parties presented earlier. For parties as societal organizations it might be more important to articulate neglected issues in election campaigns over a longer period to widen the scope of citizen interests represented at election time and the range of choices offered to citizens. Conceptualizing parties as electoral vehicles, in contrast, success is more likely to be measured in its capacity to attract sufficient votes to win seats and possibly to access government to exercise 'real' policy influence.

The more interesting question than which type of success has more weight when comparing parties—which is inevitably shaped by our theoretical preconceptions—seems to be whether particular party characteristics or systemic variables systematically improve performance on one dimension, while weakening performance on the other. As illustrated earlier, insider formations might have a harder time to maintain support in the longer term, since they are—usually splinters of mainstream parties—often insufficiently distinct from their much longer established competitors. This disadvantage that might affect a party in the long run, however, might account—next to the greater professional experience of party founders—for their greater capacity to join government coalitions early on in their career, since their profile is more compatible with the mainstream. Consequently, the explorations of trade-offs across performance dimensions and the specification of factors driving them respectively will form a central part of the in-depth case studies presented later.

Before we enter the empirical part, however, Chapter 3 will theorize the connection between party organizational evolution and performance by returning to seminal studies on party development. Building upon the crucial distinction between rooted and entrepreneurial formations introduced in this chapter, it details why and how the origin of new parties influences whether they are likely to institutionalize and in which way they are likely to do so and why this is likely to affect their chances to persist and to defend a niche on the national level.

APPENDIX

TABLE A2.1 *Entrepreneurial new formations per country (1968–2011)*

Country	Name of party (year of party foundation)
Australia	Liberal Movement (1972)
	Vallentine Peace Group (1987)
	One Nation Party (1997)
Austria	Liberal Forum (1993)
	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (2005)
Belgium	Rossem (1991)
	List Dedecker (2007)
	People's Party (2009)
Canada	Reform Party (1987)
Denmark	Progress Party (1972)
	Centre Democrats (1973)
	Common Course (1986)
	Danish People's Party (1995)
	Liberal Alliance (2007)
Finland	Finnish People's Unity Party (1972)
	Constitutional Right Party (1973)
	Young Finns (1994)
	Reform Group (1998)
France	Centre, Democracy, and Progress (1969)
	Citizen and Republican Movement (1993)
	Movement for France (1994)
	Modem (2007)
	New Centre (2007)
Iceland	Left Liberal Party (1969)
	Social Democratic Union (1983)
	Citizens' Party (1987)
	Association for Equality and Social Justice (1987)
	People's Movement (1994)
	Liberal Party (1998)
Ireland	Democratic Socialist Party (1972)
	Progressive Democrats (1985)
	Socialist Party (1989)
Luxembourg	Social Democratic Party (1971)
	Enrolés de Force (1979)
	Independent Socialist Party (1979)
	Green List Ecological Initiative (1985)
Netherlands	Democratic Socialists 1970 (1970)
	New Middle Party (1970)
	Roman Catholic Party of the Netherlands (1972)
	Evangelical People's Party (1981)
	Union 55 + (1992)
	General Association of Elderly People (1993)
	Liveable Netherlands (1999)
	Pim Fortuyn List (2002)
	Party for Freedom (2006)

(*Continued*)

TABLE A2.1 *Continued*

New Zealand	New Labour (1989)
	New Zealand First (1993)
	Progressive Coalition (2002)
	United Party (2004)
	Mana Party (2011)
Norway	Liberal People's Party (1972)
	Freedom Party against the EC-Union (1973)
	Progress Party (1973)
	Future for Finnmark (1989)
	Coastal Party (1997)
Sweden	New Democracy (1991)
Switzerland	Freedom Party of Switzerland (1984)
	Ticino League (1991)
	Greenliberal Party (2004)
	Citizen Movement Geneva (Mouvement Citoyens Genevois) (2005)
UK	Democratic Labour (1972)
	United Ulster Unionist Party (1975)
	Ulster Popular Unionist Party (1980)
	Social Democratic Party (1981)
	UK Unionist Party (1995)
	Independent Kidderminster Hospital and Health Concern (2000)

TABLE A2.2 *Sustainability patterns of new parties after their national breakthrough*

	Total number of new parties	Number of new parties with immediate failure	Number of new parties with one re-election	Number of new parties with two re-elections
Australia	7	2	2	3
Austria	2	0	1	1
Belgium	7	1	0	6
Canada	4	1	1	2
Denmark	6	1	0	5
Finland	7	5	1	1
France	7	1	2	4
Germany	2	0	0	2
Iceland	9	4	1	4
Ireland	7	2	3	2
Luxemburg	7	3	2	2
TheNetherlands	15	7	2	6
New Zealand	9	1	1	7
Norway	7	5	1	1
Sweden	2	1	1	0
Switzerland	11	0	1	10
UK	11	4	4	3
Total	120	38	23	59

Note: Recent new entries (less than two re-elections after breakthrough) not included.

3

Between Leadership and Structure Formation: The Challenges of Party Institutionalization

Institutionalization is a complex process that shapes the operations of a party and alters its internal distribution of power. The core argument made in this chapter is that party founders' attitudes towards investing into this process are likely to be ambivalent since, if successful, a fully institutionalized organization constrains their autonomy. Drawing on seminal theoretical studies on the organizational evolution of political parties this chapter develops a framework that specifies how structural preconditions—such as the type of party origin and the mode of party formation—on the one hand, and choices of party elites on the other affect whether and how a new party institutionalizes. It further specifies how institutionalization generally and the formation of an institutionalized membership organization more particularly can contribute to parties' persistence and sustainability.

At any stage of their lives political parties need to reconcile conflicting goals. This refers to conflicting goals that inevitably coexist inside a party as much as to conflicts between internal and external demands (e.g. Sartori 1976; Janda 1980; Panebianco 1988; Rose and Mackie 1988; Carty 2004; Ware 2009). A fully institutionalized party organization can be seen as a tool to cope with a changing environment as much as an obstacle in doing so; this point is apparent in the ongoing debate about whether institutionalization facilitates a party's capacity to adapt to new demands or, to the contrary, complicates these processes (Levitsky 1998: 77). This chapter takes a step back from this debate and begins by asking how a self-sufficient, institutionalized party organization emerges that is separate from and can survive without its present leadership (Janda 1980: 19).

Most fundamentally, it is argued that once a fully institutionalized organization is in place, it imposes constraints on the initial generation of leaders (who are often also the party founders). Party institutionalization, which tends to create new demands confronting the party leadership, might even support leadership turnover by inviting the recruitment of more suitable challengers. If this is the case, the decision to support party institutionalization is a contentious one from the perspective of initial leaders. Harmel and Svåsand (1993: 71) argue that in the early periods of a party's life the demands on leaders change quickly as the party moves from a fluid initial stage towards institutionalization. As a consequence, party

founders might be found 'obsolete' long before they consider their generation ready for replacement (or retirement)—a fact likely to create internal frictions since founders might be unwilling to step down. The authors are careful to stress that their arguments, which link questions of party building to the changing demands on the party leadership, might only apply to what they call 'entrepreneurial new parties' unconstrained by any ties to societal group. However, this chapter will argue that Harmel and Svåsand point out a core tension which all new parties (not only entrepreneurial ones) have to cope with in the process of institutionalization, albeit in different forms and intensities. Essentially, the process of institutionalization is characterized by *the need to balance and reconcile effective leadership and extra-parliamentary structure formation.* This is difficult because party founders face ambiguous incentives when trying to pursue their individual interests alongside organizational interests—a tension which constitutes a *leadership–structure dilemma* inherent in each new party's development as argued later. In which form and intensity this dilemma materializes depends on the *orientations of party founders*, which, in turn, are influenced (although not determined) by the *structural conditions* in which a party is formed.

Starting out from the distinction between bottom-up formations and top-down formations (Panebianco 1988: 50), we can imagine the following conflicts of interest to emerge in distinct formative configurations respectively. When a party grows bottom-up out of local groupings, founders face the question of whether to build an effective leadership structure at the national level; this implies a process of centralization, which is likely to take power out of their hands. When central elites build an organization top-down, they face the question of whether to invest in extra-parliamentary structures on the ground, which is likely to reduce the power of central actors. In both constellations, actors might shy away from such choices in order to protect their own position to the detriment of a party's long-term performance. In addition, since founding elites of a new party usually operate in a situation of scarcity,[1] any choice to invest resources in activities that pay off only in the medium and long run, such as extra-parliamentary party building, presupposes that elites take a long-term perspective, which can be as little assumed as their engagement in activities which might weaken their intra-organizational position.

To develop the arguments around the leadership–structure dilemma in detail, the following section discusses whether and how party institutionalization can function as one source of persistence, persistence that, in turn, is a necessary precondition for sustainability. It specifies why institutionalization is more likely to assure long-term survival than the mere reliance on electoral success and the rewards related to it, and looks at the ways it can be achieved (i.e. through

[1] Note that parties might face a level of scarcity that undermines any attempts to institutionalize. Given the focus of this study on parties that entered national parliament at least once, we can assume that all of them have access to some resources to engage in this process.

extra-parliamentary party building or through leadership). On that basis, a second major section focuses on the period after parliamentary breakthrough and specifies how institutionalization can help new entries to meet the functional and intra-organizational demands triggered or reinforced by public office (i.e. parliament and possibly government) and thereby can contribute to their sustainability.

PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION: STANDARD ROUTE TOWARDS PERSISTENCE?

Before systematizing the organizational evolution of different types of new formations and their implications for parties' long-term performance, we need to identify the roots of the tension between extra-parliamentary party building and assuring leadership inherent in the institutionalization process as such. To do so, Panebianco's seminal book on party development in advanced democracies (1988) serves as an appropriate starting-point. According to Panebianco, it is inevitable that those parties which are long-established parts of national party systems underwent a process of institutionalization (at least at a basic level). Otherwise these parties would have vanished in the meantime: 'all parties must institutionalize to a certain extent to survive' since those which do not 'soon dissolve' (Panebianco 1988: 54). Consequently, 'parties can be distinguished primarily according to the degree of institutionalization they attain, this degree being in its turn dependent upon the way the party forms' (Panebianco 1988: 55).

The limitations of this perspective for the study of new parties are obvious: parties that did not institutionalize fall out of the picture, as do the trade-offs between the costs and benefits of institutionalization from the point of view of founders and initial leaders. Panebianco considers an institutionalized party organization as a necessary tool for party leaders to maintain intra-organizational control (1988: 66–7). However, even if the creation of an institutionalized organization was the only way to centralize authority within a party (a claim that can be challenged), neither founders nor initial party leaders will necessarily aspire to build an institutionalized party. For one thing, a weak organization that lacks efficient recruitment mechanisms might prevent the rise of challengers, which might suit the current leadership just fine. Although deliberately undermining party formation from the top might make the party vulnerable in the medium and long term, depending on leaders' time horizon, this might be a minor concern. In essence, contradictory incentives towards investing in institutionalization fundamentally shape the process of party building and become visible once one takes a party founder's perspective and considers him or her to be an (at least partially) self-interested actor.

Only for one particular type of party, which Panebianco labels 'deviant', does he identify the tension between the leader's desire to maintain his power and his party's institutionalization—the charismatic party (see also Mudde 2007: 263).[2] With regard to this party type, he raises the following question:

> Under which conditions does the leader accept that partial *diminutio capitis*, that reduction in his personal power which is indispensable to organizational institutionalization? (Panebianco 1988: 161)

It is in the logic of his approach to leave the question unanswered: despite the emphasis on the nature of party formation and its importance for a party's long-term development, Panebianco developed his theory to offer a *re-reading* of the history of parties (1988: 163), most of which were in fact persistent for decades and (at least to some extent) institutionalized. Consequently, even though he builds on the assumption—going back to Weber—that charisma and the routinization of power tend to be incompatible, he indicates that even charismatic leaders will not necessarily undermine institutionalization (Panebianco 1988: 66–7).

To (implicitly) consider institutionalization as the standard route of party development has one unintended consequence: it brackets off from systematic attention the *puzzle concerning the motivation of those founding actors*, who are initially expected to push for (or at least to allow) the institutionalization of their party, although they might pay for it with a loss of individual influence. That *party founders face ambivalent incentive structures when it comes to party building* has remained—with the exception of the debate around charismatic leadership—unnoticed. How party founders respond to this tension depends on the initial structural configuration which influences but does not determine these founders' dominant orientations. We therefore need to conceptualize the interaction between structural constraints and party agency by way of distinct types of new party formations.

Before developing this line of argument, however, we first need to specify how institutionalization has been conceptualized so far, which clarifies why institutionalization has predominantly been perceived as beneficial to party leaders, while its costs have been little looked at. Furthermore, we need to discuss whether institutionalization as it is predominantly conceptualized in the literature is necessarily tied to extra-parliamentary party formation. This forces us to specify the structural mechanisms through which institutionalization—a theoretically fairly abstract concept—can be generated, which will provide a more solid foundation to formulate expectations regarding which new parties are likely to persist and why.

[2] For an alternative perspective on the reconciliation of charisma and institutionalization, see Pedahzur and Brichta 2002.

The benefits of party institutionalization

Institutionalization refers to the process that—if successful—leads to the eventual consolidation of a party; it is characterized by the transformation of the party from a *mere instrument of founders* for the pursuit of a set of goals in its formative phase into *'an end in itself' for the majority of supporters* later on. It follows an initial, structurally fluid stage, when the new-born organization is still forming, leading to a phase in which the organization has developed stable survival interests and stable organizational loyalties (Panebianco 1988: 18–20, 53–5).

Focusing on the internal life of a party, two distinct dimensions of institutionalization emerge as crucial: *value infusion* and *routinization* (Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svåsand 2002).[3]

Value infusion refers to the shift in actors' goals from the pursuit of a particular objective through an organization to the goal of perpetuating the organization itself (Levitsky 1998: 79). At the level of the individual, it refers to the presence of a generalized loyalty to the party as such, which Panebianco (1988) calls 'diffuse', because it cannot be reduced to the loyalty to a specific leader or programme. Value infusion is important to the party because it is not immediately withdrawn if the party performs badly. Levitsky interprets value infusion as a phenomenon which refers to the organization as a whole (1998: 79), in line with Panebianco's portrayal of its central element being the collective pursuit of fundamental organizational interests (1988). At the same time, however, value infusion inevitably becomes manifest in individual behaviour that is oriented towards the organization's survival. This is where routinization comes in, a process by which internal rules and patterns of behaviour become regularized and entrenched. The acceptance of organizational rules constrains individuals, makes their activities reliable and more predictable, and thereby stabilizes intra-organizational processes.

Both value infusion and routinization contribute to the newly formed organization's stability. This is not to refuse Levitsky's important insight that routinization and value infusion are not necessarily two sides of the same coin and can vary independently (1998: 81). Indeed, the later case studies will indicate that certain types of new parties tend to invest in mechanisms favouring routinization, while showing little interest in the kind of party building that supports value infusion. It is argued here solely that the two processes can be complementary, when looked at from the perspective of leaders in charge of managing an organization.

Value infusion allows leaders to profit from the greater inclination of members to follow initiatives for the 'good of the organization', even if these initiatives violate the individual interests or basic ideological principles of these individual party members; routinized behaviour increases leadership control by making

[3] A party's autonomy from its environment, another dimension Panebianco considered as important (which Randall and Svåsand (2002: 13) classified as the 'external dimension' of party institutionalization) is not considered here, in line with my focus on parties' internal dynamics.

processes, which become increasingly complex and difficult to monitor in the course of a party's life, more predictable and thereby easier to oversee. This also implies (and here value infusion and routinization intersect) that once rules are internalized, collective decisions are more readily implemented, *because* they have been approved by an accepted procedure, which in itself lends the decision additional legitimacy. In the structurally fluid context of the early years of party development, resistance is more likely: decisions are accepted when their actual content is in line with activists' goals or propagated by a charismatic leader, not because they are the outcome of an organizational process perceived as legitimate to make collective decisions. Thus, routinization is more than the mere repetition of behaviour (i.e. behavioural uniformity over time), since it often facilitates the tacit recognition of (unpopular) decisions because the latter were reached by meeting certain procedural requirements. Needless to say, the content of procedural requirements as such (the decisions on how to make internal decisions) has been one major source of conflict in the history of many new parties, as will be demonstrated in the later case studies. Finally, to the extent that an institutionalized party has procedures to voice dissent and feed preferences of different party units into the decision-making process as well as procedures to handle behaviour damaging to the organization, internal conflict becomes more manageable.

Building a membership organization: the only pathway towards institutionalization?

So far, the implications of the institutionalization process have been discussed in the abstract. Before we move to tensions inherent in this process, we need to explicitly address *what the structure of an institutionalized party looks like*, i.e. which types of structures are set up in a successful institutionalization process. This brings us to another crucial assumption in Panebianco's work that deserves to be treated as a puzzle. He refers to the classic mass party as the ideal type of an institutionalized party, although the concept of institutionalization as such does not demand such an assumption. More concretely, he associates the institutionalization process with the *building of an extra-parliamentary membership organization.* Without the consolidation of an incentive system, institutionalization does not take place, he argues; the formation of an extra-parliamentary organization is portrayed as a crucial part of this process (Panebianco 1988: 40, 54).[4]

[4] Later on, Panebianco (1988) introduces the distinction between parties that have immediate access to government institutions and those which have not. The former group is expected to develop weaker structures, since they can provide selective incentives due to their superior resource access, while parties in the latter group, dependent on the collective incentives they have to generate internally, show a higher degree of institutionalization. Despite these relative differences, however, institutionalization, in its operationalization, remains closely tied to the building of extra-parliamentary structures.

As a side-effect, the benefits of a membership organization and the benefits of institutionalization are equated. This, in turn, means that *the benefits of building a membership organization as such remain implicit*, and with it the question of whether there are alternative ways to stabilize a party. This caveat is problematic, since—as argued earlier—the importance of an extra-parliamentary membership organization as associated with the classical mass party model is increasingly questioned in party research since established party organizations seem in decline (e.g. Katz and Mair 1995; Scarrow 1996; Poguntke 2002b). The decreasing importance of extra-parliamentary structures in already consolidated parties requires us to address explicitly how these particular structures contribute to new party performance. This is all the more necessary once we query whether party institutionalization should be perceived as the 'standard route' towards party persistence in the first place.

Institutionalization as a theoretical concept does not presuppose any specific party organizational model.[5] A party can be institutionalized with respect to its parliamentary group only—whose members are socialized into a certain set of values and selected based on criteria set by the leadership—without an extra-parliamentary membership organization being in place. Neither the provision of selective nor collective incentives necessarily presuppose an extra-parliamentary structure: a skilful leader can control candidate selection and reward careerists through the provision of selective incentives. He or she can, at the same time, successfully embody and articulate the ideological convictions held by followers and create a shared identity (one important collective incentive), i.e. actively support value infusion, rather than relying solely on personal appeal. Even if, empirically speaking, only few party leaders are equally talented in managing internal party relations as in managing external relations (i.e. in communicating the party's message) (Mudde 2007: 263–4),[6] this line of argument challenges the view that forming a membership organization is the only way to fully institutionalize. The same holds for routinzation. A party can develop routinized decision-making structures to assure coordination and conflict resolution between the party leadership and its representatives without building an extra-parliamentary structure. Relying solely on structural routinization in public office, a party might not actively complement the provision of material incentives (e.g. rewards linked to electoral success) with mechanisms that generate organization-based loyalty (be the latter generated through an extra-parliamentary structure or a leader). However, while neither value infusion nor routinization presupposes a membership

[5] This is a point much stressed in the literature on Latin American party organization, which rather than building formalized party structures can be stabilized by patronage networks (see, for instance, Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006).

[6] Filip Dewinter, the leader of the Belgian VB, who is both a preacher and an organizer is an example (Mudde 2007: 264).

organization, their generation through alternative means is not necessarily equivalent or equally effective.

Leadership-oriented versus organization-based institutionalization: functional equivalents?

In functional terms, both leadership-oriented loyalty, i.e. loyalty generated through the attachment to a leader, and organizational loyalty to a party are mechanisms that generate the voluntary self-restraint of rank-and-file members, party officials, and office holders for the good of the organization. Both constitute a constraint that prevents them from prioritizing their individual over party interests. Drawing on Hirschman (1971), loyalty can be considered as an internalized barrier against exit. It increases the exit costs of the individual, when he or she is disappointed by the organization or when facing a conflict between individual preferences and organizational interests or activities. Whether a powerful leader embodies the party and defines the 'party interest' or the party organization as a collective actor does so does not change the nature of the underlying mechanism from the perspective of followers.

Still, institutionalization without the involvement of an extra-parliamentary structure leaves a party vulnerable in the medium and long term. It is easier to cope with a leadership vacuum for a party that does not solely rely on leadership-oriented loyalty. A leader can socialize the people who operate in public office into certain values. This process, if successful, will lead to a form of group attachment that transcends the personal attachment to a specific leader as an individual. Such attachment corresponds to the definition of value infusion as one core dimension of institutionalization. At the same time, however, the party as a collective body still remains dependent on *a leader*—albeit not on *the current one—who is a convincing 'carrier' or 'embodiment' of the party's core values*, which makes the search for a successor demanding. Without doubt, a popular leader, who convincingly embodies and represents core party values, can considerably reinforce organizational loyalty in a structurally institutionalized party as well. But this situation is different from party support being completely dependent on the leadership. If organizational structures are in place, the extra-parliamentary party embodies these core values and socializes incoming members into them as it socializes office aspirants into organizational practices; this is an ongoing process that is (at least temporarily) immune to malperformance at the top and can help to bridge periods of weak leadership.

In other words, while extra-parliamentary party building is not the *only* mechanism for generating value infusion, it has its advantages. A membership organization in the form of local branches that preselect a particular type of members (while shutting others out) increases a party's recruitment capacity; this is particularly important once a party has won its first seats in national parliament. It helps to

build up a pool of loyal office aspirants by increasing the party's reach and encourages committed and talented members to apply for positions. The national leadership might still unilaterally select the candidates. Yet if each person in the final pool of possible candidates (or at least most of them) had to work for the party and acquire some local support beforehand, e.g. went through a screening process on the ground, these people's behaviour is likely to be more predictable once they enter office. Local structures can provide valuable information about a wider range of people than a party that consists solely of its leadership and allows the leadership to make better-informed decisions. In principal-agent terms, a party organization of that kind helps to overcome problems of information asymmetry between the leader and office aspirants. This becomes more challenging the more successful the party (i.e. the more attractive it is for careerists, who are strongly interested in pursuing their individual goals even at the cost of organizational interests). It helps to assure that those allowed to rise to higher positions in the party or as party politicians are genuinely *attached to the party and the values it represents*. At the same time, the reliance on candidates who held low-key party offices over a certain period and are therefore used to following party rules in lower-level positions supports *routinization*. It is unlikely that such candidates completely disregard party rules once they move to higher echelons. The need to go through an 'apprenticeship' in the organization before being eligible for higher (party or public) office does not transform careerist office aspirants into loyal party followers. Yet those who are willing to make slow progress in their party career are more likely to be committed to the organizational interest in the first place.

While parties can be generally expected to profit from such an organizational 'back-up', this is particularly the case for those parties that concentrate power at the top. Strongly centralized new parties do not tend to attract followers that seek active participation and decision-making power for themselves. They expect the leadership to run the party. The more the followers of a party expect to be led, the bigger the risk caused by periods in which the leadership position is empty or occupied by someone who does not meet expectations (in terms of popularity or skills). Followers fixated on the party leadership are therefore particularly likely to defect in such situations. The 'diffuse' attachment of leadership aspirants and followers to the survival of the party as such—i.e. value infusion generated by their socialization in an extra-parliamentary structure—can be crucial for avoiding a vicious circle triggered by a weak leader or even a leadership vacuum that might otherwise systematically destabilize a party.

To sum up the major points, the set-up of a membership organization is in principle not a necessary condition for a successful institutionalization process. A skilful leader can initiate both routinization and value infusion without building an elaborate extra-parliamentary infrastructure; he or she functions as the creator of internal rules and as the main carrier of core values, which

members of the central elite are attached to, as far as they were preselected by the leader accordingly.[7] A party can be highly routinized in its internal relations—'internal' meaning the relations between national headquarters and parliamentary group (which often widely overlap) who can be bound together by shared values without an extra-parliamentary structure in place. In the long run, however, a complete reliance on leadership-oriented loyalty implies that a party remains dependent on a leader—albeit not necessarily the current one. Without any extra-parliamentary structures as a back-up, such a party has only a limited capacity to cope with a leadership vacuum, if a capable successor cannot be found. Similarly, a party might set up procedures that assure a decent performance in parliament and focus on the routinization of intra-parliamentary processes only, leading to a partial institutionalization. This might be sufficient to make the party persist as long as it attracts sufficient electoral support and gains institutional access to seats and possibly government to reward its elites (i.e. as long as it is sustainable). Yet routinization of intra-parliamentary processes is of little relevance once representation is lost, which is why the lack of an emotional affiliation generated by value infusion leaves the party vulnerable to electoral decline.

PUTTING AGENCY INTO CONTEXT: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE LEADERSHIP–STRUCTURE DILEMMA

While institutionalization can be beneficial from the party leadership's perspective, especially in the longer term, initially a party has to overcome a dilemma that emerges out of the discrepancy between the self-interests of founding actors (in preserving their status and influence) and the side-effects of the institutionalization process that can be undesirable to them. This dilemma becomes apparent when looking closely at what institutionalization as a process 'does'. When institutionalization begins, Panebianco argues, a qualitative leap occurs. The organization incorporates the ideological aims chosen by the initial leaders, and in the course of this incorporation the survival of the organization becomes *for a great number of its supporters* (Panebianco 1988: 53) an end in itself. But how does this process affect the *initial leaders*? Panebianco does not mention that leaders are 'infused by values' as followers are,[8] which is consistent insofar as their own values predate

[7] On this, see de Lange and Art's (2011) assessment of Geert Wilders, the founder and leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom.

[8] Unlike Panebianco, Levitsky (1998) considers value infusion as a process that captures both followers and leaders. This perspective, however, is more convincing with regard to leaders recruited after the party is fully institutionalized than with regard to party founders.

and drive the whole party-building process.[9] In other words, due to *the self-referential nature of party building from the perspective of those initial decision-makers, i.e. the party founders*, it is logically not possible to refer to the 'organizational interest' or 'organizational demands' as a constraint that shapes the activities of these elites. The behaviour of founding actors is inevitably self-centred, i.e. driven by their individual interests, not by the interests of an organization that does not yet exist. Party founders can be actively interested in the formation of a viable and lasting party organization but we cannot simply assume this to be the case. Similarly, in the early years, we cannot assume that leaders will emerge to meet the demands of the 'organizational imperative' (Wellhofer and Hennessey 1974: 139). Neither can we assume that those leaders will exit who can no longer meet these demands as Harmel and Svåsand suggest (1993: 69).[10]

At any stage of a party's life cycle, organizational reforms affect the distribution of power and might therefore provoke internal resistance. Yet within an already institutionalized and fully consolidated party an 'organizational imperative' can be expected to constrain all actors involved, including the leadership. In the analysis of long-lived parties, as Ware convincingly argues, party structures are often the product of decisions made decades earlier. They are largely fixed in the short term and can only be changed slowly. In analytical terms, party organization can be treated as an incentive structure 'external to' the decision-makers in a party, thus, constituting a constraint on party agency (Ware 2009: 20–1). Party structures are not an immediate product of these actors' own decisions, as is the case in a party in the making, which means that the environments in which party elites of new and old parties operate respectively are fundamentally different.[11]

Again, party founders might voluntarily constrain themselves (prioritize long-term goals over their individual aspirations, for instance). They might do so due to their affiliation to pre-existing groups which supported the party's creation. But this is a characteristic of the specific founder not an inherent feature in the process of party formation as such. Consequently, we find a range of empirical examples in which founders took over central positions in a new party and once they saw their internal influence vanishing helped to undermine their own creation and even provoked its disintegration (for examples on the right, see Carter 2005: chapter 3; Mudde 2007: 256–77). It is a reasonable assumption that a party founder is to some extent interested in maintaining his or her influence in the newly formed party. While they might not try to do so at any costs, we need

[9] In principle, the values of party leaders can also change. Still founding leaders set up an organization in line with their own values and before the organization is institutionalized this process is unlikely to feed back into the values of these leaders.

[10] Incidentally, in both parties that Harmel and Svåsand examined, the founding leader was forced to leave: the founder of the Norwegian Progress Party died, that of the Danish Progress Party went to prison.

[11] For a conceptual discussion of the difference between party formation and party change with a focus on parties in new democracies, see Biezen 2005.

to take the tensions between their short-term (individual) interest and long-term (organizational) interest seriously, which contributes to the difficulty of reconciling demands for leadership and structure formation as an essential part of the institutionalization process. As Panebianco points out, institutionalization designates a passage from a phase in which the leaders' freedom of choice is broad to a phase in which the leaders' freedom of choice is drastically reduced (1988: 19). If we assume the founder to be identical with the initial leadership, as Panebianco seems to, a working organization reduces the founding leader's leeway. If we further follow Panebianco in his conception of party leaders as 'entrepreneurs' who want to remain in control over their enterprise (1988: 40), the downsides of institutionalization become particularly evident.

To what degree these tensions between the founders' and their party's interest materialize, depends—in the first instance—on the type of party formation we look at. Instead of assuming one particular orientation that supposedly dominates initial decision-makers and using this assumption as a starting-point for advancing an approach to new party development, the following sections conceptualize which types of formative situation are more likely to generate one or the other orientation of party elites. This perspective allows us to put 'party agency' into context.[12] In other words, in order to understand the distinct trajectories of new parties, we need to assess how the consequences of institutionalization relate to the initial decision-makers' individual interests and ambitions by looking at their own characteristics as well as at the constraints they operate in. To do so, we need to recognize that depending on the mode of formation, the preferences of those taking over (national) leadership positions in the new party do not necessarily determine initial organizational choices. This very insight points to a simplification that is implicit in many works on party formation that build on Panebianco's account. He only speaks of party leaders and thereby implies that the *founder(s) and the (initial) leader(s) are the same person or the same group*, which necessarily shapes the given perspective on party development and institutionalization and tempts us to overlook the following: the initial party leadership, i.e. those people that take over core positions at the national level, might only be one group among party founders and not even an important one.

Once one takes seriously the distinction between leaders and founders as, in principle, two different sets of actors and imagines a formation dominated by activists with little ambition for taking over national leadership positions, the benefits of institutionalization for party leaders, as laid out above, might become secondary, if not immaterial.[13] That is to say the self-referential nature of party

[12] In a similar fashion, Ware, in his insightful study on the evolution of major parties in two-party systems (2009), integrates structural constraints as generated by this particular party system format (and the competitors in it) and agential factors in one theoretical framework.

[13] For the importance of considering party actors' main motivations in the party-building process when trying to account for levels of new party performance, see Kitschelt 1989.

formation is most pronounced in a situation in which the founder, who makes initial organizational choices, becomes the first leader (i.e. 'self-referential' meaning that the constraints that institutionalization is likely to impose on the leaders in charge matter most when the leaders in charge determine whether to invest in institutionalization or not). This is why the charismatic party or, more generally, leadership-dominated parties, which are usually created top-down by an individual or a small elite, are the ones for which the literature indeed identifies a tension between leadership and institutionalization through extra-parliamentary party building. By contrast, in configurations in which founders and initial leaders do not overlap or do so only partially, party building becomes subject to negotiation processes that need to reconcile a breadth of interests. This, however, does not mean that the leadership–structure dilemma is absent in such circumstances. It simply manifests itself in a different form. When party building is strongly shaped by activists who aim at protecting the power of the party base, the party's central steering capacities might be deliberately weakened (or remain underdeveloped). Lacking intra-organizational coordination, in turn, can have negative implications for a party's capacity to campaign and run elections professionally as well as for its operation in public office. Thus, the difference to parties created top-down by a few individuals lies in *the type of complications that emerge in the attempts to balance founding actors' own interests and the formation of a working party infrastructure* (able to provide leadership as well as a structural foundation for value infusion), not in the presence or absence of the basic tension as such.

To sum up, the respective manifestation of the leadership–structure dilemma depends, first, on whether party formation is driven by the choice of a powerful individual (or a small elite) taking over the newly formed party or by negotiations between pre-existing groups. Second, it depends on the orientations of the founders towards party building (a long-term investment); orientations which are—to mention one central aspect—shaped by their ties to already organized societal groups or the absence thereof. The link between these two dimensions is explored in the following.

Party origin, formation dynamics, and party development

As we saw in Chapter 2, of the 140 parties covered in this study, 74 are rooted formations (supported by societal organizations), and 66 are entrepreneurs (formed without such ties). Furthermore, a first overview suggested that rooted newcomers perform better in the longer term, both in terms of persistence and sustainability. There is a range of theoretical reasons why this difference can be expected to play an important role for party evolution, which are linked to the connection between party origin and the likelihood of successful party institutionalization. While Panebianco (1988), again reflecting his focus on long-established parties, considers the emancipation of parties from external group support as part

of a successful institutionalization process, the literature on (less developed) parties in new democracies indicates that external group support can help still fluid party organizations to stabilize a support base (Randall and Svåsand 2002; van Cott 2005). Similarly, Yishai (2001) points to the rise of new 'post-cartel parties' in advanced democracies that benefit from their ties to voluntary organizations and thereby provide linkages to society which old, established parties increasingly neglect (2001: 672).

Such group ties are beneficial because institutionalization is costly and the relative capacity of new formations to cope with these costs is likely to vary with the conditions in which they are formed. According to Wellhofer and Hennessey, the selection of a social base is a crucial phase in a party's development (1974: 138–9). Similar to Panebianco (1988), they portray this selection process as an open one. Quite often, however, a party's social base is, at least in parts, predefined by the party founders' backgrounds, their affiliation to some already existing groups and organizations. This naturally affects the social base which can be 'credibly' chosen. While this can be interpreted as a constraint on founders' leeway in the formation process, once one considers that new parties tend to operate (at least initially) in a context of scarcity, societal roots become a crucial resource exploitable for party institutionalization.

Numerous studies on Green parties have stressed the importance of those parties' roots in social movements (e.g. Kitschelt 1990; Burchell 2001; Poguntke 2002a; Frankland et al. 2008). Similarly, Art (2011) has convincingly argued that, in the case of radical right-wing parties, linkages to long-existing far right organizations provide these parties with important 'recruitment networks' that help them to sustain support in the longer term (see also Klandermans and Mayer 2006; Schwartz 2006). Irrespective of the ideological orientation of a new party, such networks provide a pool of committed activists able to fill positions inside the new party and to run for (and possibly perform in) public office. Due to these followers' pre-established affiliations to promoter groups, they are more inclined to identify with the newly formed party as well and a basic emotional attachment makes their behaviour more predictable. They are less likely to defect at early stages when the party organization is still fluid, an orientation among followers which institutionalization itself (in the form of value infusion) is supposed to generate once the organization matures. Put differently, ties to promoter groups function as a first 'natural pre-selection mechanism' for a party that initially has very little capacity to identify and weed out opportunists. Simultaneously, the ability to recruit people already used to operate in other organizations is advantageous since they are likely to know the necessity to follow certain procedures to keep an organization going and to possess basic managerial skills, which support the routinization of a newly formed party.

At the same time, ties to groups that predate party formation are likely to have implications for the orientation of the founders who are supposed to initiate an

institutionalization process in the first place. This is important since we cannot simply assume that 'leaders will emerge to meet the demands of the [party] organizational imperative' (Wellhofer and Hennessey 1974: 139 [insertion by author]), as highlighted earlier. Founding actors with leadership aspirations and simultaneous affiliations to societal organizations (which often represent broader collective interests that require political representation in the longer run) are less likely to be only interested in the newly formed party as far and as long as it promotes their individual careers, an orientation that is often dominant in entrepreneurial formations. They are less likely to be short-term oriented and therefore more likely to actively invest in their party's institutionalization, an investment that often only pays off in the medium and long term.

The two *types of party origin* (rooted and entrepreneurial parties) are closely tied to two basic *modes of party formation* that Panebianco distinguished and that he expected to influence party development in a fundamental way. More specifically, Panebianco argued that a party's 'genetic model', by shaping the party's leadership configuration, leaves its imprint on a party's organization in the longer term and is reflected in the organization's degree of institutionalization (1988: 50). If the formative situation shapes the degree of institutionalization, it is reasonable to expect that it also influences whether an institutionalization process is initiated at all and which difficulties parties are likely to face in early phases of development. Distinguishing two basic formation modes, new formations can take place through territorial penetration in a *top-down fashion*, driven by a central leader or a small elite, or through diffusion in a *bottom-up fashion* through the integration of local units. In the case of top-down formations, Panebianco presupposes the existence of a national leadership pushing for the creation of a local infrastructure. In the case of bottom-up formations, he assumes the presence of local groupings that aim at building a national party (1988: 50).

Following Panebianco's line of argument, for bottom-up formations to take place a collective base needs to exist from which the formation process evolves, which implies that bottom-up formations are 'rooted newcomers' (while top-down formations can be either rooted or entrepreneurial). Furthermore, the existence of such groups implies that party formation is the result of a negotiation process. Even if, for ideological reasons, the founding groups aim at establishing a centralized organization, they are unlikely to establish an all-powerful national leadership. They are bound to insist on the setting up of structural channels that give constituent units a say in the newly formed party. Thus, while bottom-up formations might result in hierarchical party organizations, reflecting elites' ideological orientations, party hierarchies are likely to be more 'controlled' or 'counterbalanced' when originating from such a configuration than from entrepreneurial top-down formations.

This expectation contradicts Panebianco's line of reasoning, though, since he assumes that the main decision-makers in a party are in favour of building an

institutionalized organization.[14] Consequently, he considers top-down formations as the more favourable starting-point for institutionalization, since the formation process is driven by a more cohesive national leadership (what he calls a strong 'dominant coalition') with fewer internal divisions. Bottom-up formations, in contrast, are more turbulent and prone to conflict, which complicates party building (Panebianco 1988: 63). The latter expectation is convincing insofar as bottom-up processes involve a variety of actors that want to see their interests realized, which is more likely to create sources of friction. Indeed, studies into the evolution of parties that originated as highly decentralized federative structures, such as some of the new Green parties, show that these parties' organizational development was often turbulent (e.g. Burchell 2001; Poguntke 2002a; Frankland et al. 2008; Bolleyer 2012a). At the same time, the assumption that top-down formations necessarily lead to stronger institutionalization than bottom-up processes (Panebianco 1988: 23) disregards potential tensions between the founders' individual short-term interests and the interest of the organization in the medium and long term as specified earlier. These tensions can lead to detrimental choices in terms of a party's long-term development, particularly when individual founders fully control the formation process.

Considering the interplay between party origin and formation mode, the development of a basic infrastructure appears to be less likely in top-down formations as a group than in bottom-up formations that are, by definition, rooted. Furthermore, in bottom-up formations, we tend to find group representatives involved in party building who are not interested in taking over leading positions in the new party themselves. Individual actors with strong career aspirations and little interest in the party's broader cause are less likely to completely dominate decisions. In other words, in rooted bottom-up formations decision-makers are more contextually constrained than in top-down formations (both rooted and entrepreneurial), since in the latter negotiations are less constitutive for the formation process. In bottom-up formations, organizational solutions are, on average, more likely to be compromises balancing various distinct interests, than when being dictated by an individual leader in a top-down fashion (who might or might not enjoy ties to societal groups).

Whether, more specifically, the involvement of group activists is beneficial for party institutionalization is difficult to establish in the abstract. Activists without leadership aspirations might consider the party solely as an instrument to highlight important issues and the party's long-term stability might be of little concern to them. They might foster the creation of a weak leadership structure, which protects activists' stakes in party decision-making but systematically weakens the party organization in the longer term. Yet even if this is the case, they have no interest in

[14] Note again, the charismatic leader is usually considered as an exception in this regard.

an organization completely dependent on a particular individual, since a leader might cease to meet important organizational demands. Thus, even if activists have a completely instrumental orientation towards the newly formed organization, it is in their interest to create a party organization that is able to exist *apart from* its present leadership (Janda 1980: 19) and possesses effective mechanisms of leadership recruitment and replacement. And this makes such a party less vulnerable to the defects of a particular leader.

We arrive at similar conclusions when taking into account organizational dispositions towards or against the centralization of decision-making power in a newly formed party structure, dispositions that are shaped by the two modes of formations respectively. Keeping ideological orientations that strongly shape elites' basic disposition towards creating a centralized or decentralized party structure constant for a moment, top-down formations can be expected to lead to more centralized infrastructures than bottom-up formations. They are more likely to lead to the set-up of effective mechanisms to establish discipline hierarchically (e.g. through the expulsion of dissident individuals or units) and to control candidate recruitment and selection top-down; this can be seen as an asset, especially once a party enters public office and internal discipline becomes an essential performance indicator. However, a strong dependency on individual decision-makers in the newly formed structure means that their impact on the fate of these parties is much larger than if they had to operate in a structure that disperses power more widely. Being formed bottom-up through inter-group negotiations and creating a decentralized party structure, multiplies the risk of internal conflict and reduces the capacity of national elites to solve it by imposing top-down decisions as implied by Panebianco (1988: 63). Simultaneously, the fate of a newly formed party is less likely to stand or fall due to the orientation and skill of a single individual as is often the case in entrepreneurial top-down formations.

Table 3.1 brings the three factors together and highlights the different possible configurations of party origin and formative dynamics, considering that in each category party founders—due to ideological dispositions—might have a basic preference for either a centralized or decentralized party structure.[15]

While all six configurations are possible and we will come across examples of each in the empirical part, entrepreneurs creating a decentralized structure are relatively rare (e.g. the Dutch Evangelical People's Party). While, in principle, entrepreneurs can aspire to the set-up of a decentralized party, at least in an initial phase decentralization is difficult to implement and remains limited, since the units to which power ought to be delegated by the founders do not yet exist. More often,

[15] Centralized party structures concentrate decision-making power on the national leadership with (relatively) little say left to lower-level units or the membership. Decentralized party structures either involve multiple actors in national decision-making (a horizontal division of power) or leave considerable spaces of autonomy to lower-level (regional or local) units (a vertical division of power) or both (for details on these distinctions, see Bolleyer 2012a).

TABLE 3.1 *A mapping of formative configurations and ideological dispositions*

Formative dynamics/ Nature of party origin	Bottom-up formation	Top-down formation
Rooted party	Ideological preference for decentralization: *Federation*	Ideological preference for decentralization: *Stratarchy/Constrained Decentralization*
	Ideological preference for centralization: *Constrained Hierarchy*	Ideological preference for centralization: *Leadership-centred Hierarchy*
Entrepreneurial party		Ideological preference for decentralization: *Limited Decentralization*
		Ideological preference for centralization: *Leadership-dominated Hierarchy*

entrepreneurial formations assign considerable steering power to the party leader or to the national executive around the leader, a structure that—due to the absence of an organizational counterweight in terms of societal groups involved in the formation—often implies the set-up of a 'leadership-dominated hierarchy' (e.g. New Democracy in Sweden). A more balanced hierarchical structure is likely to emerge if a party is formed through inter-group negotiations involving societal groups that aim at establishing a forceful, durable, centralized organization. Although they concentrate considerable power at the top, such structures still assure the consideration of group interests, leading to a 'constrained hierarchy', in which a powerful leader needs to reconcile the interests of constituent units with his or her own (or those of the national party that the leader embodies). Some of the most successful new right parties correspond to this model, such as the French National Front (see Chapter 7). Rooted top-down formations are located 'in between' the two configurations just described: while group linkages still exercise some influence in the organization, the constraints on the leader are likely to be weaker (e.g. Swiss Republican Movement). This is because the organization is formed top-down (presumably with a strong say from the founding leader), not as the result of inter-group negotiations.

Similarly, decentralization is more pronounced when a party is formed bottom-up than top-down, as indicated by the distinction between party federation and stratarchy. In both models power sharing is considerable. But in federations formed by several regional or local units the position of the subnational level is more pronounced, in terms of autonomy assigned to it as well as in its access to national decision-making, as the later analyses of Green parties will demonstrate. The German Greens are a telling example here. Stratarchies—in whose formation national elites have a bigger say—follow a functional rather than federal logic (e.g.

Irish Greens). While deliberately creating autonomous space for national and subnational decision-making, they separate these spheres more clearly and leave more room for central steering to assure intra-organizational coherence (Carty 2004; Bolleyer 2012a). The evolution of stratarchies and their adaptation to professional politics should therefore be less turbulent than in federative, bottom-up formations.

To sum up the most essential points, if pre-existing group ties facilitate party persistence by creating favourable conditions for institutionalization and bottom-up formations require these ties, parties created in such a fashion are—as a group—more likely to persist in the long run than are parties created top-down. The long-term performance of top-down formations should be affected by the absence or presence of group ties, as well as by individual founders' orientations (which themselves are likely to be affected by ties to societal groups) and their skills. In entrepreneurial, top-down formations leadership characteristics are likely to play the most dominant role due to the lack of contextual constraints these leaders operate in, suggesting that party performance will be most diverse in this category. The two distinct realizations of the leadership–structure dilemma—resistance against the creation of an effective national leadership and resistance against the formation of an extra-parliamentary organization (and their meaningful involvement in party decision-making)—should be most pronounced in the two 'purest configurations' displayed in Table 3.1 that maximize power sharing and power concentration respectively: the party federation and the leadership-dominated party hierarchy.

HOW INSTITUTIONALIZATION SUPPORTS SUSTAINABILITY AFTER BREAKTHROUGH

Electoral sustainability can be a source of organizational persistence for considerable periods. At the same time, party institutionalization can be expected to contribute to the consolidation of initial electoral support after breakthrough by helping a party organization to function effectively as a collective actor when exposed to the performance pressures that confront an inexperienced party in parliament and possibly government. Clearly, if led by a brilliant public speaker or a charismatic personality, a new party might get away with a lot in its first term in parliament, especially when voters are still ready to forgive mistakes attributed to the party's inexperience. However, this is unlikely to be a valid excuse for incompetent or unprofessional behaviour in the medium and long term. More fundamentally, an institutionalized party is unlikely to disintegrate under the pressure of public office right away, an event that inevitably ends a newcomer's career. Elaborating on these points, this section will specify in detail through

which mechanisms institutionalization improves party performance after breakthrough, which, in turn, is likely to support its sustainability in the national arena.

Once a new party has entered parliament, it is confronted with new demands that concern the working of the overall organization (intra-organizational demands), as well as new demands that concern the working of the party in public office (i.e. functional demands linked to party representatives' roles as legislators or governors). These two types of demands can be associated with two basic challenges: *coordination* and *recruitment* which both affect the working of the overall organization and the party's arm in public office. After breakthrough, coordination pressure increases due to the organization's increasing functional differentiation. Parliamentary entry forces the party simultaneously to operate in separate arenas with very different internal logics, generating conflicting demands. Coordination is crucial across party units inside and outside of public office but also within the parliamentary party itself. Simultaneously, recruitment gets more demanding, since office aspirants not only have to be effective campaigners but also need sufficient professional expertise to operate convincingly as legislators—two qualifications that do not necessarily go together. Similarly, core party offices need to be occupied by people able to reconcile various interests that are more likely to conflict within an increasingly functionally differentiated organization. If a party further joins government, recruitment and coordination demands yet again intensify, since a new group of actors (government representatives) emerges that is driven by other priorities than backbenchers or the external organization (e.g. Heinisch 2003; Bolleyer 2008).

The analytical separation between *intra-organizational and the functional demands of public office* is basic but still important, since it can be difficult for a new party to meet both types of demands simultaneously. On the one hand, the successful handling of recruitment and coordination within and across organizational layers can reinforce each other. For instance, after breakthrough, internal party management becomes more complex and party offices dealing with communication and coordination need to be taken over by increasingly skilled people. The effective recruitment of qualified personnel helps to assure such people's availability. Such a process is supported by communication and coordination between the local and national level, since local branches—in terms of capacity—can provide a broader and more thoroughly vetted recruitment pool than the reliance on the national leadership's personal network as argued earlier. On the other hand, once a local membership organization is established to support recruitment, this organizational layer might hold different preferences from the national party or its parliamentary arm. Consequently, this process of internal differentiation can simultaneously trigger conflicts between different party units for their share of decision-making power.

Most new parties tend to enter parliament early in their history, when the institutionalization process is still ongoing. Elites' handling of functional and intra-organizational demands (linked to coordination or recruitment) can function as indicators for

whether institutionalization is actively supported in terms of routinization and value infusion. Effective *intra-party coordination* between different party units inside and outside public office indicates the *routinization* of intra-party relations. *Recruitment*, if effective, reinforces *value infusion* and thereby strengthens and stabilizes the loyalty of party members and followers. The mechanisms that indicate that party elites actively foster institutionalization in order to meet intra-organizational and functional demands are the following.

If *coordination* demands grow when a party starts operating in different arena, so do sources of conflict. While the top-down expulsion of MPs might be an effective mechanism to silence dissent in the parliamentary group, it imposes heavy costs particularly on new (often smaller) parties, which are usually short of personnel. Furthermore, it makes infighting public, raising doubts regarding the functioning and reliability of the party. In the course of institutionalization, such drastic mechanisms should be complemented by mechanisms able to either respond to conflict in a less confrontational and visible manner or to reduce it ex ante. Further, we should observe an increasing formalization and rule-guidedness of processes. In short, to capture *structural mechanisms supporting routinization* operationally that help to cope with intensified coordination demands related to parliamentary representation or government participation, we can examine first whether a new party sets up effective and cost-efficient procedures to assure communication, coordination, and conflict resolution between party subunits inside and outside office, and second whether and how party statutes stabilize the functional differentiation of tasks in the organization.

Moving on to the growing demands towards *recruitment*, as discussed earlier, a membership organization can be an important instrument to support screening and selective recruitment to socialize members into the organization, reinforce shared ideological attachments, and discourage careerism. This, in turn, reduces internal conflict. As far as central elites establish effective linkage mechanisms across organizational layers (i.e. vertical integration), local and regional branches generate a bigger and better qualified recruitment pool of followers than the personal network of an individual leader could encompass. In short, to capture *structural mechanisms supporting value infusion* operationally that help to cope with intensified demands towards party personnel taking over public roles or core party offices, we look at the nature of extra-parliamentary party building: first, whether elites actively set up local and regional branches; second, whether they establish vertical linkages between central and lower-level elites; third, whether they establish selective screening and recruitment mechanisms; and finally, whether the party provides for training for activists, candidates, and incumbents.

Theoretically, it is desirable that a party responds to all demands immediately and effectively. However, failing to respond to intra-organizational demands does not necessarily create as severe problems as failing to respond to functional

demands from the party elites' point of view. This is because the consequences of neglecting intra-organizational demands do not necessarily become immediately visible or are less likely to be scrutinized publicly. The failure to recruit loyal and skilled members *might not affect the party for a relatively lengthy period.* For the party representatives in public office (who usually at least partially overlap with the central party elite) this is not an issue until the next election and it might not even be one then, insofar as the party leadership is confident of its ability to recruit a sufficient pool of qualified candidates ad hoc and the current parliamentarians can be controlled top-down and do a reasonable job. Intra-organizational demands are also less pressing due to the *limited visibility of what is happening in the organization as compared to the parliamentary party.* Once a party enters parliament, its performance in public office becomes essential for its sustainability because the activities of parliamentary (or government) representatives tend to be more visible to voters than the activities of extra-parliamentary actors. Inevitably, the party leader and leading representatives who take over public roles will receive most media attention. Voters who are not emotionally attached to a party's broader cause or its organization will be tempted to defect at the next election, when they are confronted with a party's outright failure to cope with its newly acquired responsibilities in public office.

From the voters' perspective, indicators for such failure are disarray in the parliamentary party (lacking party discipline) and the inability of the leadership to handle conflict in the parliamentary group. Similarly problematic is the inability of MPs to respond to salient issues in a qualified manner due to a lack of competence or communication skills, i.e. a lack of professionalization. While those challenges can be addressed by selective recruitment backed up by an organizational infrastructure on the ground that generates value infusion among office aspirants, this is a medium- to long-term process. Setting up coordination procedures to improve the interplay between core party actors (e.g. parliamentary group, party headquarters) or procedures that help the parliamentary group (and particularly its politically inexperienced members) to operate more effectively right away, i.e. strategies that support routinization, are more likely to have an immediate effect. Therefore, parliamentary entry is likely to push the party elites, especially its parliamentary representatives, more strongly towards *institutionalization via routinization rather than value infusion*.

How a party adapts to public office is naturally shaped by the structural features that a new party adopts initially (see Table 3.1). Leaving aside the advantages of having societal roots, which have been detailed earlier, the basic nature of the party organizational structure shapes the types of friction a new party is likely to suffer from, once entering national parliament. A *decentralized party* that was formed bottom-up and grants a strong position to regional or local branches is likely to be confronted with the need to overcome internal resistance against centralization to assure sufficient leeway for the national party to operate successfully in the political arena. Failure in this domain is particularly visible to the public (i.e. the

electorate), which is why (usually more pragmatic) party elites, particularly those taking over parliamentary seats, face strong incentives to address these demands, even though to achieve reform might be a turbulent process. In other words, entering public office creates strong incentives for those parties to moderate their 'in-built' leadership–structure dilemma. The implications of such reforms are clear: activists and lower-level leaders tend to lose out from a streamlining of decision-making procedures which increases the autonomy of national elites. Organizational streamlining might further imply the need to establish more coherent local or regional structures across the party as a whole in order to improve campaigning and recruitment, again implying a reduction of regional or local autonomy. At the same time, to operate professionally in parliament, the parliamentary party needs to function as a coherent, collective actor, which is likely to reduce the leeway of individual MPs to speak their own mind when their positions deviate from the party line.

Centralized formations, especially if their (founding) leader takes over a parliamentary seat (which is common) and the party lacks the societal roots, do not face similar incentives to remedy their initial structural imbalance: whether such a party invests in a working infrastructure on the ground is up to its leadership, a leadership which has no immediate incentives fostered by public office to engage in such activities as discussed earlier. Members of the core elite who take over parliamentary seats are likely to be distracted from dealing with extra-parliamentary matters and likely to prioritize their newly acquired responsibilities as public representatives. This, in turn, implies a focus on mechanisms supporting routinization within the parliamentary group, which also has the advantage of not shifting loyalty away from the current leadership as value infusion through party building might. Once electoral performance suffers as a consequence of the party's weak performance in office, it is often too late to invest in such structures that could have generated organizational loyalty through collective rather than selective incentives and could have increased the homogeneity of the parliamentary group by more selective recruitment. At that point, the defection of party elites is more likely than serious attempts to (re)build the party.

CONCLUSIONS

The structural conditions in which party formation takes place are important since ties to already organized groups that predate a party's formation can be expected to facilitate institutionalization in terms of extra-parliamentary party formation able to support value infusion. These ties facilitate institutionalization by making resources available to the party in the making and facilitating the recruitment of loyal followers. Furthermore, those actors who aspire to leading positions and are

attached to pre-existing groups are more likely to identify with a broader collective interest. Consequently, founding leaders of rooted new parties are less likely to consider the party as a mere instrument to pursue their careers (as is often the case with entrepreneurial parties). This, in turn, suggests a more balanced and long-term oriented approach to party building that is not solely focused on the immediate functioning of the party in public office—i.e. the routinization of coordination procedures in the parliamentary group. It is directed towards the formation of an infrastructure able to consolidate the party in the longer term, especially during those periods in which the party has only weak or no parliamentary representation.

On a fundamental level, the incentives for party founders to build a sustainable party organization are less clear-cut than often assumed in the literature. Decisions beneficial for the party's development in the long run can weaken the position of the founders of the newly created party, a tension usually associated with charismatic parties only. The theoretical framework, in contrast, suggests that this 'leadership–structure dilemma' is much more widespread. It exists not only in centralized formations in which the founding actors become the first leaders of the newly formed party but also in decentralized formations shaped by activists or local party units. The same basic tension between assuring leadership and structure formation manifests itself in different forms depending on the conditions in which a party is formed and dependent on the basic type of party organization party elites decide to create.

This implies that neither top-down nor bottom-up formations as such are superior when it comes to their prospects for surviving as organization or sustaining electoral support and thus maintaining a niche in the national party system (although bottom-up formations by definition are formed with the participation and support of some already organized groups, which is advantageous). Each formation type has its own, potentially dysfunctional, tendencies that can weaken an organization: parties with strong territorial subunits or an influential membership base tend to struggle with establishing effective leadership structures, since the former try to prevent centralization. Leaders of top-down formations might refuse to build an extra-parliamentary infrastructure as it could foster the recruitment of leadership contestants or they might neglect it because they are focused on their public responsibilities instead, weakening the party's recruitment capacity in the longer term. In each configuration, these structural dispositions can be overcome, which stresses the importance of party agency. An entrepreneurial top-down formation, for instance, can be highly successful and might build a strong organization if led by a skilful leader. What makes entrepreneurs—as a group—more vulnerable and more heterogeneous in their performance profiles is their stronger dependence on the particular skills and orientation of the particular individual on whom power tends to be concentrated.

The empirical analysis of such tensions is challenging. Institutionalization is a complex, dynamic process that is hard to measure directly, leaving the in-depth study of single cases aside (e.g. Harmel and Svåsand 1993; de Lange and Art

2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012). However, if it is the case that the prospects of successful institutionalization are increased or weakened by the structural conditions in which a new party is formed, the type of party origin—the distinction between entrepreneurial and rooted formations—should systematically shape new party performance patterns. Since this variable can be captured across a wide range of cases, the following chapter will examine quantitatively how party origin affects patterns of persistence and sustainability. It will assess whether rooted parties that are formed with the support of societal promoter organizations are indeed more likely to sustain support after parliamentary breakthrough than 'entrepreneurial parties' and whether they tend to live longer. The qualitative case studies in Chapters 5–8 will assess institutionalization processes directly, looking at the structural mechanisms as specified above through which its two core dimensions—value infusion and routinization—can be captured. They will also allow us to consider the implications of the mode of formation and the type of party organization a new formation decides to adopt.

4

Patterns of New Party Persistence and Sustainability in Seventeen Democracies

Following Pedersen's seminal article (1982) the examination of persistence patterns looks at new parties' overall lifespan starting with their organizational foundation and ending with their death.[1] Sustainability focuses on a critical phase in a new party's career instead. Electoral sustainability on the national level, defined as a party's capacity to gain repeated re-election after breakthrough, reflects the capacity of a new party to consolidate initial vote support: support that allowed the party to break into the national stage in the first place. If national representation can constitute a shock for a newcomer with little experience in politics, a party is bound to be most vulnerable right after breakthrough when being confronted with this experience for the first time. This perspective on sustainability as one important performance dimension reflects the conceptualization of new parties as 'organizationally new' (rather than programmatically new) that underpins this study. Simultaneously, in line with the specification of the parties relevant to this study, i.e. those with at least a chance to establish a niche in the national (parliamentary) party system as indicated by their initial national breakthrough, it makes sense to operationalize sustainability as the capacity to regain parliamentary representation. This is preferable to directly looking at the evolution of parties' electoral support at national elections since votes as a currency have a different value when it comes to their implications for party access to core institutions and resources in different political systems. While the period captured by the sustainability proxy used seems rather short, it will be demonstrated later that repeated re-election (in other words entering national parliament three election cycles in a row) is not as low a hurdle as it might seem.

In the broader context of this study, the parallel examination of sustainability and persistence patterns will not only indicate whether the distinction between rooted and entrepreneurial new formations is as crucial for new parties' national careers (sustainability) as for their survival as organizations (persistence). Introducing the same type of controls into the models—as far as appropriate in the light of the differences between the dependent variables—will also give us an indication

[1] As specified earlier, a party persists (or survives) as long as it nominates candidates for elections (e.g. local, regional, or national); for details on core definitions, see Chapter 1.

of which types of factors tend to affect only one of the two success dimensions, i.e. shape a party's career as electoral vehicle but not its life as a societal organization and vice versa. If, in fact, (partially) different sets of factors have significant effects on the various dependent variables, this fundamentally substantiates the basic conceptual distinctions this study rests upon.

The following section will present the core hypotheses that are tested and specifies which control variables will be included in the analyses respectively. This will be followed by the findings and, on this basis, a comparative assessment of how distinct factors affect the different dimensions of new party performance. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how qualitative research can enrich the large-N analyses on new party performance. It argues that qualitative case studies grouping parties along their programmatic profile and type of origin (the two factors the quantitative analyses will single out as relevant for persistence *and* sustainability) allow us to bring in the role of party agency and intra-organizational dynamics.

PARTY PROPERTIES SHAPING NEW PARTY PERFORMANCE: PARTY ORIGIN AND PROGRAMMATIC DISTINCTIVENESS

New parties are not exclusively subject to external constraints, be these constraints institutionally generated or generated by the strategic moves of their long-established competitors. Their own characteristics matter. Core 'supply-side factors' are the nature of a new party as an organizational actor and the programmatic offer based on which it competes for votes. While the latter dimension has been examined extensively, the former is only rarely captured in large-N analyses (see for exceptions Harmel et al. 1995; Janda and Colman 1998). Party institutionalization (as the product of the complex interplay between structural conditions of party formation and elite choices; see Chapter 3) is difficult to measure directly across 140 parties operating in 17 different countries. The type of party formation (rooted vs. entrepreneurial party), by contrast, can be captured across a wider range of cases as detailed in Chapter 2. While formative conditions do not determine a party's organizational development, Chapter 3 has specified why a new party's origin can be considered as crucial for its likelihood to persist as organization and sustain electoral support after breakthrough, a claim that can be examined quantitatively. The influence of party origin will be contrasted with the role of newcomers' programmatic profiles. Similar to a party formed with the support of promoter organizations (a rooted formation), a new party with a distinctive profile can be expected to find it easier to maintain a support base and prevent mainstream parties 'hijacking' its core issues. Thus, we can formulate two main hypotheses that will be tested in the following:

H1: A rooted new party is more likely to assure re-election after its parliamentary breakthrough and is less likely to die than an entrepreneurial new party.

H2: A new party with a distinctive programmatic profile is more likely to assure re-election after its parliamentary breakthrough and is less likely to die than a party that emulates issues or ideologies already 'owned' by other parties in their party system.

The following two sections justify the selection of control variables introduced into the analyses of persistence and sustainability respectively, followed by the operationalization of the relevant variables. As far as is conceptually suitable, the same variables have been introduced in each of the analyses to assure maximum comparability of the findings across the two performance dimensions.

Additional factors shaping persistence

Next to party origin and programmatic distinctiveness, a range of factors can be plausibly expected to shape new party persistence. Core factors highlighted in the literature are linked to the electoral system (e.g. parliamentary thresholds) and the regulation of institutional resource access (e.g. party funding regimes) (see, for instance, Willey 1998; Hug 2001; Bischoff 2006; Tavits 2006). They can be systematized along the two visions of new parties introduced earlier: new parties as electoral vehicle dominated by rational elites that are reward-driven and maintain a party as long as it is sufficiently successful (i.e. their investments pay off) as compared to new parties as societal organizations for which the maintenance of core activities such as the articulation of certain group interests or citizen demands through the participation in elections is an aim in itself. Naturally, both visions are closely tied since the basic activity that indicates a party's persistence is ongoing participation in elections. Any persistent party is therefore by definition an electoral vehicle.

As a consequence, one can argue that low access barriers to party funding reduce the costs of running elections, which provides rationalist incentives for strategic actors to maintain this activity. Yet starting from a reward-driven orientation of party elites as associated with the vision of parties as electoral vehicles, easy access to state funding is only a means to an end, to maximize votes, to achieve parliamentary access, or possibly to enter government. One would not expect this institutional factor to motivate the ongoing activity of a party if this party never wins more than marginal vote shares or never gets even close to winning a seat. When conceptualizing a new party as an organization mainly motivated by articulating certain societal interests instead, the easy availability of party funding can provide a good enough reason for going on. Thus, while these two visions are not mutually exclusive and some factors can be linked to both, they generate different expectations regarding the relative weight of individual factors in

explaining party persistence. In essence, while variables indicating resource access can be more directly associated with the organizational conception of party, variables capturing party success or immediately shaping elites' access to rewards in core institutional arenas can be more directly associated with the vision of parties as strategically driven, electoral vehicles.

Accordingly, when starting out from the vision of *new parties as societal organizations*, the *access to state funding* for political parties can be expected to be a major factor. The same rationale applies to indirect funding such as the *accessibility of free broadcasting* (Casas-Zamora 2005; Bischoff 2006; Nassmacher 2009). In essence, the higher the access barrier to receive party funding in a system and the higher the barrier to access free broadcasting, the more difficult new parties will find it to keep themselves going and the more likely they are to die prematurely. Similarly, the range of elected positions available in a system shapes the extent to which new parties can access resources. The presence of a powerful regional tier implies that there are subnational arenas through which new parties can enter valuable positions and thus resources that help to maintain their activities, also during periods when performance on the national level is weak. Therefore, parties operating in a system with a *strong regional tier* are less likely to die than are parties operating in a system without such a regional tier.

Moving to the vision of new *parties as electoral vehicles*, the level of success in the electoral and institutional arenas (parliament and government) should be of crucial importance to them, which brings us back to Pedersen's performance thresholds to assess the evolution of minor parties (1982; see also Chapter 2, Figure 2.1). The electoral performance over a party's life can be expected to be a crucial indication of whether it is worthwhile for a party to run elections. The higher the *average vote support at national elections* a party manages to attract throughout its history, the less likely it will die. Whether these votes lead to seats in parliament—a crucial reward for ambitious party elites—is a different question. Party access to parliament is heavily influenced by the threshold generated by the electoral system which defines how many votes are necessary to win a seat.[2] The higher the *parliamentary threshold*, the more likely rational party elites are to give up, if their party wins only marginal vote shares. The highest yardstick for success and the most prestigious reward for party elites is access to national government. Accordingly, a party that achieves *government participation* at some point in its history can be expected to be more persistent and less likely to die than a party that does not.

[2] The number of times a party entered national parliament throughout its history would be a more direct measure of the access to rewards but is not introduced in the analysis to avoid endogeneity problems.

Additional factors shaping sustainability

While it is desirable to compare the impact of the same set of variables on the persistence and sustainability of new parties, we need to partially adapt our hypotheses, given the different logics and time horizons underlying the two dimensions of party success to be explained. The impact of *barriers to party funding and free broadcasting* and the *presence of a strong regional tier* are directly comparable and should support sustainability as they should support persistence: the more difficult it is for a new party to access (direct or indirect) state funding, the less likely its re-entry to parliament should be after breakthrough. Similarly, the presence of a strong regional tier should facilitate sustainability.

The remaining factors require certain adaptation when used in the sustainability analysis. Clearly, electoral success should affect sustainability in a positive fashion. Yet unlike persistence, sustainability refers to the party's presence in national parliament, which means success is most appropriately defined in relation to the parliamentary threshold. Furthermore, the concept refers to the period right after breakthrough, which means we are interested in the impact of short-term electoral success. Rather than taking a vote average across the national elections a party participated in (as introduced in the persistence analysis), I use a measure of *breakthrough success* instead, which measures the share of the national vote that a new party won at its breakthrough election in relation to the minimum vote share necessary for parliamentary entry. The stronger a new party's breakthrough performance, the more likely it is to assure re-election after its parliamentary breakthrough. In terms of systemic constraints, we further need to consider the *permissiveness of the electoral system*. An electorally weak new party is more likely to have a chance to gain re-election to parliament if the entry barrier is low. Like breakthrough success, this variable—as it refers to entry into the parliamentary arena—is only introduced in the sustainability analysis. Moving to the expected impact of *government access* on sustainability, we need to consider that the analysis focuses on an early phase of a party's career, when the latter is still vulnerable, rather than its whole lifespan as in the persistence analysis. As the analytical focus of our analysis changes, so do the theoretical expectations regarding the type of impact we ought to expect from government access on new party performance. Case study work suggests that entering government can be damaging for parties that have not yet learned to operate professionally at the time they enter (e.g. Deschouwer 2008; McDonnell and Newell 2011). While achieving government access (at some point in party history) is an indication of success, too early participation can be expected to be damaging and should reduce a party's chances to assure re-election.

The operationalization of explanatory variables

Given a high number of parties of very small size or very short-lived character, the use of standard datasets on party positions (e.g. manifesto project data) to capture's

new parties' programmatic profiles would lead to a significant loss of cases, which, in turn, would make the meaningful application of statistical techniques impossible. It is therefore necessary to rely on a simpler but as we will see below still effective measure of *programmatic distinctiveness*. Lucardie, in an insightful conceptual piece on the classification of new parties (2000), distinguished new parties that emulate existing ideologies (purifiers) from those new parties with a distinctive or 'new' profile (prophets). Similar to the niche party concept discussed earlier (see Chapter 2), the distinction is not tied to a specific programmatic profile and thereby provides a helpful tool to categorize a wide range of new parties as covered in this study. Drawing on Lucardie's prophet concept, a new party has a distinctive profile if the ideology or issues it represents are not yet occupied or 'owned' by another competitor (be this competitor an old or itself a new party) at the time the party enters the national level.

To measure newcomers' *ideological distinctiveness*, I use a dummy variable based on Abedi's measurement of 'challenger' parties, parties that challenge the status quo in terms of major policy and political system issues (2004: 11–14). I followed his classification to identify those new parties with a distinctive profile. Exceptions were only made when parties had been classified as challengers because they used an anti-establishment rhetoric although they offered a version of an existing ideology already represented by another party in the party system. This was appropriate since unlike Abedi, the measure as it is used here—drawing on Lucardie's conception—aims at capturing distinctiveness *relative to* the offer of existing competitors at the time of breakthrough (rather than parties' protest character more broadly). The minority of parties in the dataset not covered by Abedi's study were classified based on the same logic. Of 140 parties 51 qualify as programmatically distinctive.

This specification considers that no programmatic orientation of a party is new in itself, i.e. new irrespective of the systemic context a party operates in. Instead, a party's distinctiveness depends on the already available programmatic offer in the party system at the time a newcomer enters parliament, i.e. whether some other (old or new) party has already occupied a similar niche for a certain period or not. Following this logic, the *List Dedecker* in Belgium does not qualify as distinctive. When entering parliament, it was confronted with the presence of Flemish Interest (*Vlaams Belang*), a party targeting an electorate on the far right that had been represented on the national level for a considerable period already. The Finnish Green Alliance, in contrast, is classified as distinctive, since at the time it entered parliament no other party in parliament represented similar ideological ground. Its splinter Ecological Party Greens formed and entered parliament years later and therefore does not qualify as distinctive because very similar territory had already been occupied by its mother party.[3] In other words, not all Green parties are by

[3] In contrast, the Greens Western Australia and the Australian Green Party entered the political stage around the same time and were therefore both coded as programmatically distinctive, since neither could claim to 'have owned' the issue area before the other.

definition programmatically distinctive parties in their respective party systems, although as a group they can be considered as a genuinely new party family (Mair and Mudde 1998: 224). Examples such as the *List Dedecker* further illustrate that 'purifier parties', although most of them emulate mainstream ideologies (i.e. ideologies of established parties), can also resemble another *new* party which entered the party system earlier on.[4]

The variables *state funding access* and *free broadcasting access* are measured through two ordinal indicators containing four scores each, as constructed by Bischoff (2006), updated for the period between 2000 and 2011 not covered by her study.[5] The highest scores indicate that no direct state funding and no free broadcasting are available. The lowest scores indicate that resources can be accessed by minor parties without parliamentary seats and only marginal vote shares. Both types of scores have been assigned for each party individually. For the 'persistence analysis' I specified the regime in place during the party's lifespan and for the 'sustainability analyses' I specified the regime in place in the period after its parliamentary breakthrough.[6] I coded a dummy variable *strength regional tier* distinguishing constitutionally federalized systems and devolved systems (with directly elected, powerful regional parliaments) from those unitary systems without such institutions.[7] The *electoral performance* variable for the 'persistence analysis' is measured as the average vote share the party won at national elections throughout its history, while the *parliamentary threshold* for each country is operationalized by calculating the 'threshold of inclusion' as proposed by Taagepera (2002). This measure captures the minimum percentage of the national vote a party needs—under the most favourable circumstances—to win one seat in the national legislature.[8] In the sustainability analyses, in contrast, I capture a party's individual short-term success in relation to the institutional entry barriers the party needs to cope with to assure re-election. The variable *breakthrough success* captures the share of the national vote that a new party won at its breakthrough election minus the minimum vote share necessary for parliamentary entry (the

[4] The discussion of the most recent wave of entries in Chapter 9 will show that this situation has become increasingly common.

[5] A main source to update Bischoff 's data was the IDEA database and related publications, detailed country reports on funding regimes and their reform published by GRECO, as well as the data provided by the Project on Party Law in Modern Europe, <http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/>.

[6] If a party operated under different regimes, the coding refers to the regime under which the party operated longest.

[7] Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK were coded as countries with strong regional tiers (1); Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden were coded as countries without strong regional tiers (0).

[8] The threshold is calculated on the party level for the particular election at which a party entered parliament for the first time, which can be expected to shape elites' perceptions on how easy or difficult it is for their party to access parliamentary seats.

latter is again measured through Taagepera's threshold of inclusion). To control for the *permissiveness of the electoral system*, party system fragmentation on the parliamentary level is used as a proxy, which is measured as the effective number of parties in parliament (see on this Lijphart 1994: 109, 68). This measure has the virtue of capturing variation in the impact of similar electoral systems as well as variation resulting from changes in the electoral system, both of which alter the level of permissiveness. Fragmentation is measured at each party's breakthrough election using the database provided by Gallagher and Mitchell.[9] Finally, to measure the variable *government participation* as introduced in the 'persistence analysis', a party is coded 1 if it took over government responsibility on the national level (as formal coalition partner or as a support party) at some point during its history and 0 if it did not. For the 'sustainability analyses' I coded whether a party took over government responsibility right after its parliamentary breakthrough or not. While all other variables are expected to affect persistence and sustainability in the same direction, government participation is expected to affect persistence positively, while early government participation is expected to affect sustainability negatively.

DETERMINANTS OF NEW PARTY PERSISTENCE

To estimate the impact of the range of variables on the probability of persistence (or death) of new parties, the proportional hazard model developed by Cox (1972) is most appropriate.[10] It provides estimates of the influence of covariates on the hazard rate of an event, in my case party persistence (or death). The hazard rate is the conditional probability of death occurring at a time t, i.e. the risk that a party 'dies' at a specific point in time.[11] The dependent variable in a Cox model

[9] The data are available at: <http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf>.

[10] The Cox model does not assume a specific probability distribution for the time until an event occurs (Garson 2010). This is advantageous since it is not necessary to parameterize time dependency, which would require an explicit theory on new party life cycles specifying a particular distribution a priori. The Cox proportional hazards model is semi-parametric and does not require the researcher to specify a baseline hazard rate or estimate absolute risk.

[11] The hazard rate predicted by the model is:

$$h(t) = h_0(t)e^{Xi\beta}$$

where $h_0(t)$ is the (unspecified) baseline hazard function and X_i are covariates for the individual i and β is the vector of estimated coefficients.

combines duration with an event variable. The persistence of parties is measured in whole years from the time of their foundation to the time of their death, which, in turn, is coded in a binary fashion (0 or 1).[12] The analysis below indicates the likelihood of death, i.e. factors supporting persistence show negative coefficients. The analysis of new party persistence and death draws on the complete dataset including all 140 organizationally new parties entering the first house of national parliaments in 17 advanced democracies in the period 1968–2011. The parties in the dataset have an average age of 17.4 years (std. dev. 12.1 years) and a median of 15. The lowest age observed is 1 year while the maximum is 43 years. Sixty-five parties have ceased to persist (died) during the period of observation.

Table 4.1 presents the findings. Most importantly, *party origin* (rooted formations were coded 1) is highly significant. The sign of the coefficient

TABLE 4.1 *Results of Cox proportional hazards regression: the risk of new party death*

DV = Party persistence in years	
Party origin (rooted formation)	*0.319 (7.66e-05)****
Programmatic distinctiveness	*0.496 (0.034)**
State funding access	*1.583 (0.013)**
Broadcasting access	0.932 *(0.663)*
Regional tier	0.825 *(0.643)*
Vote average	0.988 *(0.769)*
Threshold of inclusion	1.299 *(0.600)*
Government participation	0.483 *(0.032)**
N	140
Number of events (deaths)	65
Concordance	0.746
Likelihood ratio test	50.77***
Wald test	46.79***
Score (logrank) test	52.35***

Notes: Exponentiated coefficients. The coefficients estimate the predicted change to the baseline hazard rate for each independent variable: *p*-values in parentheses; levels of significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

[12] It is important to note that all covariates are treated as time invariant in the model, which is unproblematic for most of my variables capturing features that are naturally time invariant such as the nature of a new party's origin. This, however, does not mean that time is irrelevant to the model. A key assumption of the Cox model is that the ratio of hazards is constant over time, which should not imply that the risk of an event is constant, but rather that hazards are proportional over time (Garson 2010). The Shoenfeld residuals tests (variables and whole model) indicate no evidence against the null hypothesis. This shows that all variables have a proportional effect on the hazard of death, indicating the assumptions of the Cox PH model are justified.

(negative)[13] and the value of the exponent of the coefficient indicate that rooted new parties have one-third the hazard of instantaneous death compared to entrepreneurial parties. Or conversely, entrepreneurial parties have a three times higher instantaneous risk of death than new parties that profit from the support of promoter organizations.

Also *programmatic distinctiveness* has a statistically significant effect on party persistence. The hazard of death for programmatically distinctive new parties is half of the hazard for new parties that emulate the profiles of competitor parties. This complements existing findings that a profile distinctive from the one of competitor parties is an important determinant of electoral long-term success (e.g. Meguid 2008; Spoon 2009) by showing that distinctiveness also helps a new party to persist as an organization. Also the regulation of *state funding access* under which a new party has to operate throughout its life appears to have a significant effect on the survival of parties. Rising barriers in party funding significantly increase the likelihood of party death. Parties without access to party funding have a higher hazard of failure than parties where the funding regime also supports parties with very marginal vote shares, i.e. for every upward unit of change in the barriers to funding score, there is about a 60 per cent increase in the hazard of party death. Finally, parties which have been in government at some point in their career have a higher chance of survival, i.e. their hazard of failure is about half the hazard of failure for parties which are shut out of government in the long term. Interestingly, neither average vote share nor threshold of inclusion exercised significant effects.

Returning to the basic distinction between parties as electoral vehicles run by reward-driven elites and parties as societal organizations, it is interesting to note that only government participation seems to significantly affect party persistence of those variables that are closely associated with the first conceptualization (i.e. variables that capture a party's ability to access rewards in the national arena such as vote average, threshold of inclusion, and government). The significant effect of barriers to party funding echoes the vision of new parties as organizational actors that often struggle to maintain their basic functions facing a scarcity of resources. The importance of party origin follows the same rationale with promoter organizations providing access to organizational resources and a pool of loyal followers that are not solely driven by careerist motives and stick with the party also in periods of crisis. Finally, a similar argument can be made regarding the effect of programmatic distinctiveness. If a new party is genuinely different, defections are less likely. New parties lacking a distinctive profile are more likely to have difficulties preventing followers from leaving. This is because followers are tempted by a more established party that offers a similar programmatic package

[13] Exponentiated coefficients < 0 indicate a negative relationship, i.e. a lower hazard of instantaneous death; conversely, exponentiated coefficients > 0 indicate a positive relationship, i.e. a greater hazard of death.

but—compared to a newcomer—tends to be better resourced and is more likely to be able to put its programme into practice.

DETERMINANTS OF NEW PARTY SUSTAINABILITY AFTER BREAKTHROUGH

Rather than considering the whole lifespan of new parties, the study of sustainability is interested in how new parties perform once they succeed in entering national parliament, in a particularly critical phase. At the very least, *one re-election after breakthrough* indicates that a new party managed to compete at another national election and did so—to a certain extent—successfully. More fundamentally, it continued to persist as a party. The exposure to the pressures of public office did not have an immediately disintegrating effect. This threshold, however, is fairly low. Even if party performance in parliament is weak during the first term, voters—knowing of the party's inexperience—might still give the party a second chance, a tolerance that is likely to decrease the longer a new party is represented nationally.

Repeated re-election after breakthrough is less likely the result of the generosity of voters and more likely an indication that the party adapted to the challenges of operating in parliament and selling its achievements during campaigns reasonably well. Repeated re-election seems not a massive hurdle but, in fact, 31.6 per cent of new entries do fail immediately, 19.2 per cent manage to re-enter once, while only 49.2 per cent of new parties got re-elected to parliament at the two elections following their breakthrough.[14] Similarly, losing representation early on has long-term consequences. Only seven parties that did not achieve repeated re-election right after breakthrough managed a 'comeback', i.e. could re-enter national parliament later in their history.[15] If earlier discussions about the differences between electoral short-term and long-term success hold water, these two hurdles—one an expression of short-term success and the other the minimum threshold for sustainability—should be qualitatively different and be shaped by at least partially different factors.

To examine this, I run two models with different dependent variables: one dependent variable capturing whether newcomers failed immediately ('*reelect1*': grouping new parties that are *re-elected once or twice* against those that are not re-elected at all, i.e. failed immediately) and one capturing whether newcomers

[14] These figures refer to the sample of 120 parties included in the below analysis. See also Chapter 2, Appendix Table A2.2.

[15] These are the French National Front, the Norwegian Progress Party, the Swedish Environment Party, the Irish Democratic Socialist Party, the French Citizen and Republican Movement, the New Left (Luxembourg), and the Finnish Constitutional Right Party.

reached sustainability to the extent that they were re-elected twice (‘*reelect2*’: grouping new entries that are *re-elected twice* against those that are not).[16]

As a consequence of the construction of the two dependent variables, only those new parties can be included that participated or had the chance to participate in at least two elections after their national breakthrough which leaves us with a sample of 120 parties instead of the full sample of 140 parties. Leaving out the 20 most recent entries is unproblematic though since the factors producing the censoring of the data are unrelated to the factors shaping the dependent variables (Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford 1997: 1416).[17] The choice of measures allows for the estimation of logistic random-effect multilevel regression models to explain new party performance after breakthrough with *reelect1* (short-term performance) and *reelect2* (sustainability) as dependent variables. While this choice allows me to model effects of system level variables most adequately,[18] it has the further virtue of allowing for a direct comparison of factors that drive short-term performance (*reelect1*) and those that drive sustainability (*reelect2*) (see, for details, Chapter 2 and Appendix Tables A4.1 and A4.2 below).[19]

However, with a sample of 120 parties in 17 countries, the models might suffer from over-fitting, if too many variables are included. It is difficult to avoid a widespread trade-off of losing relevant controls, when deliberately leaving out independent variables to improve model fit. This issue is addressed by estimating bivariate logistic random-effect multilevel regression models for each independent variable and for the full models including all variables. Only those independent variables are included in the analysis that either show a significant effect in the bivariate or in one or both of the full models. This strategy minimizes the danger of missing important influences on the two dependent variables, while it provides a sound foundation to exclude two variables: *state funding access* and *government participation* do not have significant effects on *reelect1* or *reelect2*, neither in the bivariate nor in the full models. Leaving them out increases the model fit of the two final models (i.e. the BIC falls from 155.02 to 151.86 for *reelect1* and from 157.56 to 151.77 for *reelect2* respectively compared

[16] The findings of the sustainability analysis have been published in a revised version in the *European Journal of Political Research*, see Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013a.

[17] As far as the distributions of core party characteristics as considered in the model go, they are very similarly distributed in the subset of 20 parties left out as in the full sample of 140 parties. Splitting the sample in different time periods, there are no trends in patterns of party performance. Consequently, I can assume that recent entries follow the same patterns as earlier ones.

[18] On how this model choice addresses issues of hierarchical data structures, see Steenbergen and Jones 2002.

[19] Since some of the independent variables are not mapped on a dichotomous scale (i.e. breakthrough success, electoral system permissiveness, and state funding access), they were transformed to a scale with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1 before integrating them into the statistical models to ease coefficient comparison (see Appendix Tables A4.1 and A4.2 for descriptive statistics on explanatory and dependent variables).

TABLE 4.2 *Results of random-effect multilevel models: factors shaping new party success after breakthrough*

	DV = *Reelect1*	DV = *Reelect2*
Party origin (rooted formation)	1.92 (0.50)***	2.50 (0.56)***
Breakthrough success	3.94 (2.07)*	1.31 (1.55)
Programmatic distinctiveness	0.50 (0.54)	1.06 (0.58)*
Electoral system permissiveness	0.11 (1.08)	2.43 (1.47)*
Broadcasting access	–0.79 (0.74)	–2.40 (1.28)*
Strength regional tier	1.30 (0.56)**	1.22 (0.79)
(State funding access)	–	–
(Government participation)	–	–
Constant	1.14 (0.74)	0.35 (0.98)
Country-level intercept variance	0.00 (1.32)	0.93 (0.43)
Log likelihood	–56.78	–56.73
BIC	151.86	151.77
N (countries)	17	17
N (parties)	120	120

Notes: Coefficients of logistic random-effect multilevel models, standard errors in brackets, levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. State funding access and government participation (in brackets) were excluded from the model based on findings from the bivariate and the full models.

to the full models), while minimizing the risk of over-fitting them.[20] Table 4.2 reports the results of the two final models.

Most importantly, *party origin* has a significant impact on both performance measures in the theoretically expected way (rooted formations perform better than entrepreneurs), findings that parallel the effect of party origin on organizational persistence. That the effects of party origin seem consistent across different performance dimensions and robust even when assessed with different types of statistical models (each of which inevitably has virtues and weaknesses) generates confidence in this basic finding. This is reinforced by the fact that several rival variables exercise significant effects in line with the theoretical expectations formulated earlier. Most notably, *programmatic distinctiveness* again has a positive effect as it had on persistence, although it does not exercise an effect on both measures. It only affects the sustainability measure (*reelect2*).

In line with the earlier claim that factors driving party short-term success do not necessarily shape sustainability, there are differences between the two stages as captured by the two dependent variables. *Breakthrough success* (percentage of national vote in relation to the institutional threshold of inclusion) of new parties and *strength of the regional tier* have significant effects in the expected direction on *reelect1* only. Hence, the better a party performs at its breakthrough election, the higher the probability that it is able to secure re-election. Even if a party performs badly during its first term, a large initial support base makes it more likely that it can climb the threshold a second time, even if it suffers

[20] For details on robustness checks, see Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013a.

considerable losses. This effect on the party level is strong. This 'buffer', however, does not have a lasting effect. Also the type of system in which parties operate helps to prevent immediate failure, i.e. the probability for new parties to assure re-election once is higher in systems with a strong regional tier. One reason for this effect on performance in the initial phase might be that parties' prior experiences of holding significant regional office decreases the time they need to get used to the demands of parliamentary office on the national level. Parties that did not have the chance to gain such experience suffer more strongly in the initial phase, while they tend to catch up once having survived the first election after breakthrough and having become used to parliamentary business.

Also *programmatic distinctiveness, electoral system permissiveness*, and *free broadcasting access* have only a significant effect on one of the two dependent variables. All three have a significant effect on *reelect2*, the sustainability measure. Again, the impact of distinctiveness on the sustainability measure is in line with recent work on niche parties that stresses the importance of maintaining a distinct profile for new party performance (e.g. Meguid 2008; Spoon 2009). More particularly, it substantiates Lucardie's expectation that new parties with a distinct profile might initially face problems in attracting support because they cannot appeal to existing identities, but might do better in the longer term (2000: 178). Moving on to the institutional variables that only affect *reelect2*, the more permissive an electoral system is, the higher the chance of a new party to sustain support. Since the support of vulnerable new parties is likely to gradually decrease, parties might still maintain sufficient support to regain parliamentary access once, irrespective of the electoral system. At the following election though, when support has declined further, the permissiveness of the electoral system becomes a significant influence. Also the significant negative impact of barriers to free broadcasting on party sustainability rather than short-term performance makes intuitive sense. New parties tend to receive considerable media attention when they win seats on the national level for the first time. This attention is likely to be short-lived and likely to decline once a party enters parliament for a second time. Then a party has to struggle for public attention and easy access to free broadcasting becomes more important for its capacity to mobilize support.

To assess the real-world meaning of these findings, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the predicted probabilities of *reelect1* (Table 4.3) and *reelect2* (Table 4.4) at different values of all significant explanatory variables.

Starting with variables shaping only *reelect1*, Table 4.3 indicates that an outstanding performance in terms of vote shares at the breakthrough election (*breakthrough success*) makes it nearly certain that a party is able to secure re-election, whereas parties with an initial vote share that only slightly exceeds the threshold of inclusion face only a 64 per cent chance to gain re-election. The chance to gain re-election in a political system without a *strong regional tier* is 65 per cent, which rises to a remarkable 87 per cent in systems with a strong regional tier. Looking at factors other than party origin on *reelect2*, parties with a distinctive policy profile

TABLE 4.3 *Predicted probabilities of new party short-term success* (Reelect1)

Variable	Score	Predicted probability	Confidence interval
Party origin (rooted formation)	0	0.53	0.38–0.69
	1	0.89	0.80–0.97
Breakthrough success	0 (Minimum)	0.64	0.50–0.79
	7.5	0.83	0.72–0.95
	15	0.93	0.82–1.04
	22.5	0.97	0.90–1.04
	29.5 (Maximum)	0.99	0.95–1.03
Strength regional tier	0	0.65	0.51–0.79
	1	0.87	0.77–0.98

TABLE 4.4 *Predicted probabilities of new party sustainability* (Reelect2)

Variable	Score	Predicted probability	Confidence interval
Party origin (rooted formation)	0	0.19	0.05–0.34
	1	0.74	0.59–0.90
Programmatic distinctiveness	0	0.38	0.18–0.57
	1	0.64	0.41–0.86
Electoral system permissiveness	1.74 (Minimum)	0.27	0.03–0.51
	3	0.37	0.17–0.56
	5	0.55	0.35–0.74
	7	0.72	0.43–1.00
	8.41 (Maximum)	0.81	0.50–1.11
Broadcasting access	1	0.77	0.50–1.03
	2	0.60	0.39–0.80
	3	0.40	0.22–0.58
	4	0.23	0.00–0.47

(*programmatic distinctiveness*) have a 63 per cent chance of repeated re-election, while parties which emulate mainstream ideologies have only a 38 per cent chance to sustain support. Moreover, in *constraining electoral systems* new parties face a remarkably lower chance to gain repeated re-election (e.g. about 30 per cent in systems with very low fragmentation such as New Zealand at the beginning of the 1990s) than in permissive systems (e.g. more than 81 per cent in systems with very high fragmentation, such as Belgium at the beginning of the 1990s). Also the range of *broadcasting access* granted to parties influences the chance of new parties to gain repeated re-election: Whereas in systems with no free broadcasting access for all parties (4) the chance to get re-elected twice is quite low (23 per cent), it is remarkably high (77 per cent) in systems with free broadcasting access open to minor parties (1).

Most importantly, party origin is not only the only variable that has significant effects in both models, it also makes the biggest difference: Whereas entrepreneurs

have about a fifty–fifty chance to avoid immediate failure (*reelect1*), for rooted parties it is 89 per cent. Moving to sustainability (*relect2*), it increases from 19 per cent for entrepreneurial to 74 per cent for rooted parties. Finally, the effect of *party origin* is steeper on *reelect2* than on *reelect1*, which substantiates Mudde's (2007: 264–5) expectation that structural factors are more relevant for a party's sustainability than for its short-term performance.

SUMMARY: DETERMINANTS OF NEW PARTY PERSISTENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY

Summing up the findings of the statistical analyses, Table 4.5 categorizes those variables that had a significant impact on one or several performance dimensions. Next to party origin, which turned out to be the only variable that affected all three performance measures, programmatic distinctiveness is the only other variable that had a positive impact on both organizational persistence and on one of the electoral performance measures (sustainability). The basic nature of a party's profile turned out to be relevant not only for a party's career as electoral vehicle but also for its life as an organization. Thus, the two main hypotheses were substantiated.

That several variables only affect organizational persistence, while others only had an impact on electoral performance substantiates the basic conceptual

TABLE 4.5 *Determinants of organizational persistence and electoral sustainability*

Dimensions of party performance	Probability of organizational death	Short-term electoral performance (*reelect1*)	Electoral sustainability (*reelect2*)
Statistically significant variables per model (direction of effect)	Party origin (–)	Party origin (+)	Party origin (+)
	Programmatic distinctiveness (–)	–	Programmatic distinctiveness (+)
	–	Regional tier (+)	–
	–	Breakthrough success (+)	–
	Government access (–)	–	–
	Access barriers to party funding (+)	–	–
			Electoral system permissiveness (+)
	–	–	Access barriers to free broadcasting (–)

distinctions this study rests upon and stresses the need to treat them as interconnected but still separate phenomena. The same goes for the distinction between short-term electoral performance and sustainability, which seem—leaving party origin aside—affected by different factors: short-term electoral performance by the presence of a strong regional tier and breakthrough success; electoral sustainability by programmatic distinctiveness, the permissiveness of the electoral system, and the regulation of free broadcasting access. While the two dependent variables are closely tied, the findings suggest that they capture qualitatively different phases after breakthrough which confront new parties with different challenges and expectations on behalf of voters respectively. In essence, not only does the analytical distinction between organizational persistence and electoral sustainability appear as empirically relevant. The same applies to the distinction between the capacity to prevent immediate collapse and decline after breakthrough in the short term (*reelect1*) and the capacity to function sufficiently well to stabilize support over two election cycles (*reelect2*).

BRINGING PARTY AGENCY BACK IN THROUGH QUALITATIVE CASE STUDIES

This chapter has underlined the importance of party origin for new party performance and thereby confirmed the theoretical framework's emphasis on the structural conditions from which party development starts out. Given the complexity of institutionalization processes, leadership dynamics, and elite choices (as theorized in Chapter 3), these processes themselves cannot be captured by simple proxies suitable to quantitative analyses. The 'agency dimension' of the story was therefore left out of the picture up to this point. It will be added in the remainder of the study by presenting a range of qualitative case studies. Before we can move to the qualitative findings, the concluding section of this chapter will address how the case studies will be grouped to allow for a focused comparison. The quantitative findings suggest that next to the distinction between types of party origin, programmatic distinctiveness plays a significant role both for sustainability and for persistence. Taking this into consideration, it is advisable to structure the case study chapters along these two dimensions. Keeping party origin and the basic programmatic profile *constant* to pin down the relative importance of party agency on party development is extremely difficult,[21] maybe impossible for

[21] This leaves aside the problem that a party's programmatic profile can be strategically changed by party elites, i.e. is itself subject to party agency. That said, usually a basic consistency in outlooks is maintained over time to avoid a loss of credibility, which means new parties do not tend to switch from one basic programmatic grouping to the other.

any study of this scope. However, the 'variance' introduced by these two factors can be systematically reduced. The following section shows how we can group new parties into relatively homogeneous subsets (in terms of origin and profile) facilitating the systematic in-depth study of intra-organizational dynamics and elite choices.

The link between type of party origin and new parties' programmatic profile

To categorize new parties according to their basic programmatic profiles presupposes that we can distinguish party types that are meaningful in different national contexts, in line with the party family concept long applied in the comparative analysis of established party systems. As Mair and Mudde highlight, the classification of newly emerging parties constitutes a major challenge for the party family literature:

> On the one hand, a number of new parties, such as the greens or even the extreme right, could be seen to constitute a new party family on the basis of shared origins or shared genetic identity. In other words, with time, we might anticipate the expansion in the number of identifiable party families. On the other hand, our intuition suggests that quite a few newly emerging parties might prove sui generis, with little or nothing in their genetic makeup to suggest an equivalence beyond the borders of their own respective polities. (Mair and Mudde 1998: 224)

Indeed, if vote choice in advanced democracies becomes less predictable and is increasingly structured by short-term factors such as candidate characteristics or (potentially idiosyncratic) events, party systems might be increasingly characterized by *sui generis parties* that undermine scholarly attempts to classify and systematically compare newcomers cross-nationally. However, while we will inevitably face some parties that are difficult to classify, next to the *rise of genuinely new party families*, such as the Green party family, we will also find a significant group of *organizationally new parties that represent a continuation of mainstream party families.* Drawing on the party family literature (e.g. von Beyme 1982; Mair and Mudde 1998) as well as on the literature on new parties already discussed, we can distinguish seven basic programmatic categories:

The first four categories displayed in Table 4.6 represent continuations of 'traditional' party families. The two groups in the middle (Green and new right) have so far received most attention in the literature: they are considered as genuinely new party families articulating new demands systematically neglected or avoided by the mainstream. Finally, the 'single-issue category' captures formations that stand out in the narrowness of their profile (Mudde 1999: 184), which makes it difficult to meaningfully subsume these parties under one of the broader, substantively defined categories and thus functions as a residual category. While

TABLE 4.6 *Families of organizationally new parties*

New (classical) leftist parties[22]
New liberal parties
New religious parties
New conservative parties
Green parties
New right parties[23]
New single-issue parties[24]

the new Green and the new right family can be expected to be populated by programmatically distinctive parties (see the operationalization above), the first group is likely to be populated by 'purifiers' which emulate mainstream ideologies (Lucardie 2000). Table 4.7 confirms this expectation.

Only 59 parties fall in the two 'new party families' (Green parties and new right parties make up 42.1 per cent), while a majority of 81 parties (57.9 per cent) do not. Of these 81 parties 62 (44.3 per cent) are continuations of 'traditional' party families (i.e. new left, new liberal, or new conservative), while 19 parties (13.6 per cent) fall in the single-issue category. Looking more closely at whether organizationally new parties add something 'new' to the existing offer in their respective party systems, Table 4.7 shows that only 51 parties of the 140 qualify as programmatically distinctive in the context of the party system they break into. Clearly, the lack of a genuinely new profile does not prevent parties entering the national stage

[22] This category includes communist, socialist, and social-democrat new formations. They are not to be confused with what many authors called left-libertarian parties, which are simply labelled as Green below.

[23] There is an ongoing debate about the 'correct' labelling of this party family which Mudde called a 'war of words' (1996), evolving around the central properties shared by its members in terms of ideology and about the level of internal homogeneity (or heterogeneity) of the overall group. Despite these disagreements, we find considerable overlap of cases in terms of which parties actually qualify as 'far right', 'radical right', 'new populist right', 'populist radical right', or 'new anti-immigrant parties' (for a comparison of classifications, see van Spanje 2011: 303–4; for a debate on the new right as a party family, see Ennser 2012; for major cross-national studies, see Ignazi 2003, Carter 2005, Mudde 2007, Art 2011). This overlap increases once considering only organizationally new parties as defined in this study. That said, this study does not claim to contribute to this debate. The 'new right' categorization (as the other categorization) serves solely the heuristic purpose to draw a rough distinction to other basic programmatic types. Thus, Table 4.6 does claim that—overall—the parties grouped in the same category are more programmatically similar to each other than to parties in other categories. It does not claim that parties in the same category are programmatically 'the same'.

[24] This category includes parties that focus on one narrow interest or group without necessarily having an ideological underpinning. Examples would be seniority parties representing the interests of the elderly, but also separatist or ethnic parties (see also Lucardie 2000).

TABLE 4.7 *Programmatic characteristics of organizationally new parties*

Programmatic profile	Number (% in total)	Number of programmatically distinctive parties per profile (%)	Number of rooted parties per group (%)
Green	28 (20)	20 (71.4)	25 (89.3)
New right	31 (22.1)	20 (64.5)	11 (35.5)
Single-issue	19 (13.6)	8 (42.1)	6 (31.6)
New religious	9 (6.4)	2 (22.2)	7 (77.7)
New (classical) left	36 (25.7)	1 (2.7)	19 (52.7)
New liberal	11 (7.9)	–	2 (18.2)
New conservative	6 (4.3)	–	4 (66.7)
	140	*51 (36.4)*	*74 (52.9)*

and becoming—at the very least—short-term successes. As expected, only three of the 51 programmatically distinctive parties fall in two of the four 'traditional new families' (5.9 per cent). In contrast, 78.4 per cent fall in the Green and the new right category. The category of single-issue parties is (with 42.1 per cent distinctive cases) most mixed. The only family that is dominated by parties with a distinctive profile that were also predominantly formed with the support of promoter organizations are the Green parties. While the majority of the new right parties enjoy the advantage of a distinctive profile, most of them were formed as entrepreneurs.

'Purifier parties' that try to 'reinvent' traditional ideologies are often formed as splinter parties that target (more moderate or extreme) supporters of their respective mother party (Lucardie 2000: 177). This suggests a systematic connection between the basic nature of a party's programmatic profile and its genetic origin, as stressed by Mair and Mudde who argue that:

> . . . it is likely that the most fruitful findings of all would derive from the combination—or, better still, the cross-tabulating—of both. (Mair and Mudde 1998: 226)

Starting out from this observation, a conception of 'genetic origin' following Lipset and Rokkan (1967) as conventionally associated with the distinction between traditional party families, however, is likely to be too narrow as a basis for classifying the dispositions of the wide variety of newcomers that entered national parliaments over the last decades. Their consolidation—if it took place—cannot simply be interpreted as being the result of a newly formed 'cleavage' (although it might be in some cases). It seems therefore more appropriate to define 'genetic origin' more broadly. To do so, we can return to Panebianco's conception of 'genetic imprint' or 'genetic model' discussed in Chapter 3, which can be used to refer to basic structural similarities in the way parties are formed (1988: 50). Doing so, in turn, suggests that the classification of party origins as introduced in

TABLE 4.8 *Clusters of party origin and programmatic profile*

Entrepreneurs	Rooted parties	
Entrepreneurial insiders	**Rooted insiders**	
3 Green	5 Green	8
11 new right (35.5%)	5 new right	16
5 single-issue	3 single-issue	8
0 religious	2 religious	2
16 left (44.4%)	9 left	25
8 liberal (72.7%)	1 liberal	9
2 conservative	*4 conservative (66.7%)*	6
N = 45	N = 29	74 *insiders*
Entrepreneurial outsider	**Rooted outsider**	
–	*20 Green (71.4%)*	20
9 new right	6 new right	15
8 single-issue (42.1%)	3 single-issue	11
2 religious	*5 religious (55.5%)*	7
1 left	10 left	11
1 liberal	1 liberal	2
–	–	
N = 21	N = 45	66 outsiders
66 entrepreneurs	74 rooted parties	*N = 140*

Note: % in brackets *behind* categories identifies frequency of dominant formation type *within* each programmatic grouping.

Chapter 2 might allow us to pin down whether new parties that share basic programmatic similarities are formed in a similar manner.

Furthermore, reflecting Mair and Mudde's argument (1998), if particular formative characteristics are 'typical' for certain programmatic groupings, i.e. these two types of properties are systematically linked, this might justify the treatment of parties sharing such similarities as members of the same (organizationally new) 'party family'. Table 4.8 shows which formation type is most frequent in each programmatic grouping. For the most dominant formation type in each group the table gives the relative proportion of its appearance in per cent (in italics). For instance, 72.7 per cent of the liberal parties are entrepreneurial insider formations, while 71.4 per cent of the Green parties are rooted outsiders.

While we find members of all programmatic groupings in nearly all formative categories, we also find a clear clustering of formative characteristics along programmatically defined groups. The clustering of particular types of party origin is not equally pronounced in each category though. In four programmatic groupings more than 50 per cent of the parties are formed in a similar manner: the new conservative, the new liberal, the new religious, and the Green group. In two further groups, the new left and the single-issue category, over 40 per cent

correspond to one formation type. Thus, in each of these groups we can identify one (relatively) dominant type of party origin. The new right stands out as the only group in which a dominant type of origin is difficult to pin down, since the most populated category of entrepreneurial insider constitutes just over a third of the cases.[25]

Using the pattern revealed by Table 4.8 as a 'heuristic map', the following qualitative part will analyse the developmental dynamics in Green and new religious parties, two groups mostly populated by 'rooted outsiders' (Chapter 5), and in new liberal and new left parties, mostly populated by 'entrepreneurial insiders' (Chapter 6). Parties of the new right, the second largest group of newcomers, whose cases spread relatively evenly across the four formative configurations, are discussed in two chapters (7 and 8), one focusing on rooted and the other on entrepreneurial parties. While the chapters that group two programmatic families together along a shared party origin allow us to examine whether similarities in formation induce similar internal dynamics despite programmatic differences, the two chapters on the new right help us to understand this programmatic group's remarkably diverse performance trajectories (reflecting these parties' structural heterogeneity).

Parties falling in the single-issue grouping and the conservative grouping are not considered in detail in the qualitative part of this study. New conservative parties not only form numerically the smallest group, half of them are merger parties formed with the participation of big, long-established parties. In terms of their starting conditions and their strong position in their party systems, the Union for French Democracy (UDF) and the Conservative Party of Canada, for instance, did not face challenges comparable to the vast majority of other new parties. Furthermore, the performance patterns of each of the six cases matches their structural preconditions and therefore do not allow us to separate out the role of party agency. We find a similar situation in the single-issue grouping. Long-lived cases are regionalist or ethnic parties rooted in pre-existing organizations.[26] The vast majority of entrepreneurial parties faded away relatively quickly. As a consequence, to pin down the role of party agency, it is sensible to focus on the new Green parties, new religious parties, new left, new liberal, and new right parties.

[25] This mapping reveals different patterns than existing classifications aim at capturing, such as the one proposed by Gunther and Diamond, who classify both left-libertarian (Green) parties and post-industrial extreme right parties as belonging to the same species of 'movement parties' defined as 'a type of partisan organization that straddles the conceptual space between "party" and "movement"' (2003: 188–9).

[26] Those include the *Bloc Québécois* (Canada), the Maori Party (NZ), and the Walloon Rally (Belgium).

CONCLUSIONS

Building on the findings of the large-N analyses that identified party origin as one main factor driving party development (for a summary of the findings see Table 4.5), the case study chapters will look at 'cases on the regression line' (Lieberman 2005) that show how favourable formative conditions support elites' party-building efforts and how unfavourable conditions can undermine them. However, to pin down the role of party agency as a driving force separate from structural conditions, the main focus rests on parties that show different patterns than suggested by their formative characteristics (i.e. parties that did well despite unfavourable formative conditions or badly despite favourable ones). This will reveal a differentiated picture of the interplay of party origin and party agency—particularly the role of founding leaders at the heart of the leadership–structure dilemma inherent in institutionalization as specified in Chapter 3. This strategy allows identifying functionally equivalent mechanisms that can assure persistence and sustainability despite disadvantageous formative conditions or without extra-parliamentary party building as well as identifying contextual factors such as inter-party competition that in certain circumstances can systematically undermine a new party's support base, irrespective of party characteristics both structure- and agency-based.

The core sources that underpin the case studies are country studies and news reports, party documents, and interviews, whose combination allowed for the triangulation of information. As with the coding of the 140 new parties' types of origin, the case studies rely on the various country literatures which provide excellent studies even on minor or very short-lived parties but are little referred to in cross-national studies. They were particularly essential for the study of all those parties that were dissolved long ago. News reports allowed for the reconstruction of intra-party conflicts that made it into the public sphere visible through defections or splits and which were particularly damaging for a party's image, as well as the reconstruction of core events in parties' evolution such as the replacement of party leaders or core reforms. Party publications and party constitutions were an important resource to assess the basic nature of party organizations and their evolution. These materials were enriched by 49 semi-structured interviews conducted with party officials, activists, and party experts covering eight countries,[27] complemented by the consultation of country experts.

[27] The interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2010. While confidentiality has been assured to the interviewees, with few exceptions interviews were taped. Fieldwork was conducted in the UK, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, France, and Switzerland. Interviews lasted on average 45 minutes.

In line with the specification of institutionalization as presented in Chapter 3, the case studies focus on organizational mechanisms and procedures created to cope with the demands of intra-organizational coordination and conflict resolution (within the parliamentary party as well as between party subunits in the organization as a whole), mechanisms that—if effective—support *routinization*, as the one core dimension of institutionalization. To capture the extent to which a party's structural development induces *value infusion*, the second core dimensions of institutionalization, I focus on strategies of extra-parliamentary party building and selective screening and recruitment strategies supported by and channelled through these extra-parliamentary structures (for individual indicators capturing each dimension, see Chapter 3). Structural mechanisms supporting routinization and value infusion respectively are expected to reduce the risk of defections of core personnel, members, or even whole party units. Similarly, they make it less likely that a party is unable to renew the initial party leadership and replace the 'founding generation' as one important indication that a party can at least partially rely on organizational (rather than leadership-oriented) loyalty. The distinction between routinization and value infusion is important since the leadership–structure dilemma predominantly materializes in relation to value infusion, which shifts loyalty from the party leadership in charge to the organization more generally and thereby creates a tension between the leadership's interests to stay in charge and the long-term viability of the organization as a whole.

Returning to the earlier distinction of different new party families, the next chapter will assess institutionalization patterns in the two programmatic groupings predominantly populated by rooted outsider formations: new Green and new religious parties. Chapter 6 explores two families mainly populated by entrepreneurial insider parties (new liberal and new left parties). Chapters 7 and 8 look at the organizational evolution of new right parties, structurally the most heterogeneous group. They present the differences between those new right parties that were rooted (Chapter 7) and those that were founded without group support (Chapter 8). While Chapters 5 and 6 will show that we find similar intra-organizational dynamics along types of party origin, elite choices, and patterns of institutionalization *cross-cutting* ideological differences, Chapters 8 and 9 follow an opposite logic. They will show that differences *within* the new right group can be accounted for by referring back to dynamics linked to differences in party origin, elite choices, and patterns of party institutionalization. While the grouping of families in the chapters is structured along dominant formation type to 'reduce variance', the chapters (except for Chapters 7 and 8) systematically cover both rooted formations and entrepreneurs—as a core explanatory factor.

APPENDIX

TABLE A4.1 *Party-level and mixed variables*

	Mean/% coded 1	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Breakthrough success	4.22	5.67	0	29.5
Ideological distinctiveness	38.33%	0.49	0	1
Electoral system Permissiveness	4.21	1.56	1.74	8.41
State funding access*	2.81	0.83	1	4
Broadcasting access**	2.62	1.08	1	4
Government participation	10.00%	0.30	0	1

Notes: * This variable ranges from a barrier of less than 1% of the vote is required to receive funding (1) to no funding provision at all (4) (for details see Bischoff 2006). ** This variable ranges from provision of free television time to all parties (1) to no free television time at all (4) (for details see Bischoff 2006).

TABLE A4.2 *Joint distribution of dependent and main explanatory variables*

	Total	*Reelect1*=1	*Reelect2*=1
Entrepreneurial parties	56 (46.7%)	26 (31.7%)	12 (20.3%)
Rooted parties	64 (53.3%)	56 (68.3%)	47 (79.7%)
Total	120 (100%)	82 (100%)	59 (100%)

5

The Leadership–Structure Dilemma in Green and Religious New Parties: Short-Term Trouble but Long-Term Endurance through Fully-Fledged Institutionalization

In terms of sustainability and persistence Green parties[1] and new religious parties can be considered the most successful subgroups of new parties that entered the national stage. Both are predominantly populated by rooted new parties, more specifically rooted outsiders. Chapter 2 has associated this formation type with various advantages: the capacity to credibly claim anti-elite positions due to their distance from established parties—at least in early phases of their development. Further, they tend to pursue group interests thanks to their organizational ties, which favour a long-term orientation of party elites as well as the availability of organizational resources for party building.

While by now 11 of the 28 Green parties have entered or supported national government, they tended to achieve access to higher office relatively late in their careers. Unlike insider parties, they first had to overcome their initial protest image and address the question whether such collaboration with established elites is acceptable to or really wanted by followers. They further had to prove their professionalism by working constructively in parliament in order to acquire coalition potential from the perspective of mainstream parties (e.g. Poguntke 2002a; Poguntke and Müller-Rommel 2002; Dumont and Bäck 2006). A small minority lost parliamentary representation as a punishment for entering government altogether, a move which triggered strife within the party and dissatisfaction among followers, as experienced by Belgian Agalev in 2003 and, more recently, the Irish Green Party in 2011. This event clearly constituted a shock for these two parties but did not undermine their activities (Buelens and Delwit 2008; Bolleyer 2012c). Most parties in these groups, however, coped relatively well with government responsibility, having overcome internal resistance against the party's

[1] As mentioned earlier, to keep the terminology as simple as possible, the label of 'Green parties' is broadly defined and includes also those 'new politics' parties that do not predominantly focus on environmental issues (e.g. feminist parties), although nearly all parties falling in this group have a strong focus on environmental issues.

involvement in 'normal politics' earlier on in their history and having had time to stabilize their structures.

Although most parties in these groups had to deal with serious crises on the way, so far none of them suffered from disintegration, be this disintegration triggered by parliamentary entry, government participation, or leader exit or a combination thereof. Instead, the few rooted parties that died, mostly did so as a consequence of a deliberate decision to merge with another or several other parties that shared similar ideological outlooks. This contrasts with the dominant picture in the new liberal, new left, or new right groupings analysed below, where mergers—especially when parties do relatively well as autonomous organizations—are comparatively rare.

Unsurprisingly, the entry of Green parties into national parliaments occurred more frequently than the entry of religious newcomers. In many advanced democracies we find long-established Christian democratic parties (Federer-Shtayer 2012). They made it hard for new religious parties to establish a niche as compared to the situation of Green parties that responded to the rise of new post-materialist values. Using the measure of distinctiveness introduced earlier, over 70 per cent of the Green parties are programmatically distinctive from the offer in their respective party systems. In contrast, only 22 per cent of the religious newcomers that managed to enter parliament have a distinctive profile, which makes them in programmatic terms similarly vulnerable as the new left and new liberal parties, as indicated by the statistical analyses in Chapter 4. At the same time, only a few new religious parties are entrepreneurial parties which is why—following the arguments developed in the theoretical chapter—their evolutionary dynamics should be nonetheless similar to the Green family.

The basic performance patterns of these two groups are easy to describe given their considerable homogeneity, which reflects the homogeneity of the conditions in which they were formed. Some 86.5 per cent of the parties across both groups are rooted, and 67.6 per cent are rooted outsiders. As Table 5.1 indicates, most of the parties that originated in this manner reached at least the minimum level of electoral sustainability and are still active party organizations today. Most of them have managed to establish and defend a niche in the national party system for considerable periods. In line with theoretical expectations, the few entrepreneurs tended to be neither sustainable nor persistent.

This does not mean we do not find differences between the two groups, once we consider trends in their electoral long-term trajectories. As Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1 already highlighted, most members of the Green and the religious group tended to enter their party systems with rather moderate vote and seat shares. Green parties slowly increased and consolidated their support base over time and nowadays regularly reach levels of electoral significance (using again 4 per cent of the national vote as a threshold). In contrast, some religious parties have experienced a downwards trend, while others maintained support on similar levels over numerous elections. Competing with long-established, well-resourced Christian

TABLE 5.1 *Party origin and performance of Green and new religious parties*

	Insiders	Outsiders	
Entrepreneurs	3 Green[2] (1 persistent, 0 sustainable) 0 religious	0 Green 2 religious (0 persistent; 0 sustainable)	5 entrepreneurs
Rooted parties	5 Green (4 persistent; all sustainable) 2 religious (all persistent; all sustainable)	20 Green[3] (14 persistent; 15 sustainable) 5 religious (4 persistent; 4 sustainable)	32 rooted parties
	10 insiders	27 outsiders	N = 37

Note: Figures include all parties falling into these two programmatic groups 1968–2011.

democratic parties, their support base tends to be restricted. This is reinforced by the increasing secularization of Western societies and the decline of organized Christian religions over the last decades (Girvin 2000: 23; Crouch 2008: 35), a trend paralleled by the rise of post-materialism from which Green parties profited. Still, Figure 5.1 indicates that when these parties could rely on ties to already organized groups, party-building efforts tended to be rewarded with a narrowly defined but reliable base of core support, often sufficient to assure repeated parliamentary access. The cases displayed in Figure 5.1 that show a rapid decline of support after their breakthrough are mostly entrepreneurs such as the Roman Catholic Party and the Evangelical People's Party (both NL). Against theoretical expectations, the most drastic decline of support, however, was experienced by United Future New Zealand, a party that could rely on ties to religious organizations before suffering from the split of its Christian faction. Its evolution will be assessed in a later case study.[4]

The evolution of most 'success cases' in the two groups that have been reasonably long-lived has been analysed in detail in earlier studies (e.g. Madeley 1977; Kitschelt 1989, 1990; Lucardie et al. 1999; Burchell 2001; Rihoux 2001; Poguntke 2002a; Freston 2004; Buelens and Delwit 2008; Frankland et al. 2008;

[2] The Greenliberal Party (Switzerland) is persistent yet has so far only participated in one election after its national breakthrough, i.e. by definition it could not reach the minimum of sustainability (for more information on recently emerging parties, see Chapter 9). The two other entrepreneurs in that category, however, the Australian Vallentine Peace Group and the Green List Ecological Initiative (Luxembourg), were neither sustainable nor persistent.

[3] Three parties in this category have not yet had the chance to participate in two elections after their national breakthrough, i.e. by definition they could not reach the minimum of sustainability. These are the Canadian Greens, the Greens in the UK, and the Dutch Animal Party.

[4] The entrepreneurs are Australian Family First (a recent entry), the Evangelical People's Party, and the Roman Catholic Party.



FIGURE 5.1 National electoral trajectories of new religious parties

Note: Vertical axis displays % of national vote. The figure does not include emerging parties.

Lucardie and Voerman 2008; Mitchell et al. 2009; Vromen and Gauja 2009; van Mulligen 2010; Bolleyer 2012a). The failure cases, in contrast, especially the short-lived ones, have received relatively little attention. This chapter focuses on them. Their study not only helps us to assess the interplay between party agency and organizational evolution but also allows the exploration of patterns of party death in greater detail. Patterns of party death, as we will see over the course of the following chapters, systematically vary across different 'new party families'. Finally, cases experiencing decline allow us to disentangle organizational persistence and (national) electoral sustainability as two separate performance dimensions.

Thus, after having provided a brief overview of how the leadership–structure dilemma displays itself in the two programmatic groups mainly populated by rooted outsiders, we take a closer look at rooted parties that were non-sustainable and/or non-persistent, followed by the fate of the entrepreneurs. A final section presents two cases studies in greater depth. It takes a closer look at two rooted parties, one belonging to the Green and one belonging to the religious group, which did less well than their formative dispositions would lead us to expect. The Australian Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) was a rooted newcomer with considerable electoral support that engaged in party building but failed to defend its niche. Also United Future New Zealand, a rooted religious party, managed to attract significant electoral support but still suffered drastic decline.

INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS IN ROOTED OUTSIDERS

In his seminal work on Green parties, Kitschelt has stressed the need to distinguish different types of actors involved in party formation, actors dominated by different goals and priorities,[5] to understand these parties' evolution as well as differences in these parties' success (Kitschelt 1989: 74). Their choices can generate unintended 'organizational pathologies', reflecting tensions between conflicting organizational goals and demands towards the organization (Kitschelt 1989: 68–73). The leadership–structure dilemma inherent in party institutionalization can be interpreted as such a 'pathology'.

In the vast majority of Green and religious new parties the nucleus of an extra-parliamentary base has existed from the start (i.e. the creation of an extra-parliamentary party building was facilitated). This, however, does not mean that institutionalization was a smooth process. The vast majority of parties in these two groups were decentralized and, at least initially, they required the involvement of multiple actors to approve any intra-organizational decision, while often lacking effective procedures to cope with internally destructive behaviour by representatives, members, and lower-level units. The latter problem was particularly intense in those parties that deliberately attempted to keep their organization and its decision-making processes 'open to society' and insisted on the protection of intra-organizational pluralism. This implied little selectivity in the recruitment of members or office holders and produced low levels of organizational commitment, intra-organizational coherence, or discipline.[6] Particularly highly educated activists—as Poguntke stressed in his work on the German Greens (1990: 253)—tended to feel stronger commitment to policy than to organization, and therefore often resisted the set-up of effective central leadership structures (see also Kitschelt 1990). Activists might have justified this opposition referring to norms of democratic participation and organizational openness but doing so also protected their own influence in the organization. That activists were driven by values rather than individual career interests (as prominent in entrepreneurial parties) does not change that they prioritized individual preferences over the functioning of the organization.

Such tensions did not only reflect the difficulties of balancing the demands for effective leadership and the formation of extra-parliamentary structures able to involve members and subnational units in central decision-making (Kitschelt 1989: 68–70, 1990; see also Poguntke 1990, 2002a; Burchell 2001; Delwit and van Haute 2008). They also echo the theoretical approach developed in Chapter 3 that

[5] Kitschelt distinguishes ideologues, lobbyists, and pragmatists (1989: 61).

[6] On the potentially destructive effects of limited selectivity in member recruitment, unconstrained member participation, and intra-organizational pluralism, see Katz 2001; Bolleyer 2009; Hazan and Rahat 2010.

stressed the *ambiguous incentives that founding actors face in the process of institutionalization*—in this case activists—which can motivate choices on their behalf detrimental to party performance. This concerns not only processes of organizational reform but also strategic choices. The party leadership, for instance, might want to tailor the party programme and campaign messages towards preferences of potential voters, but be unable to do so due to constraints by its accountability to the party base opposing such a move.[7] The general ambivalence of some activists as to whether involvement in normal electoral politics is the right path in the first place contributed to this, an attitude that was fairly pronounced in many Green parties[8] but could be also observed in some new religious parties such as the Dutch Reformatory Political Federation, which was divided between those in favour of committed evangelizing and those who favoured professional politics (van Mulligen 2010).[9] Alternatively, such ambivalence can find expression in the attempts of local or regional party elites (or of constituent parties in the case of mergers) to block the formation of a more centralized party infrastructure, a possible source of friction in any decentralized party irrespective of its programmatic profile.

In the majority of cases, these tensions could be reduced through organizational reform, reflecting the long-term orientation of founders and followers making them open to sacrifices to assure the persistence and sustainability of their party. Reforms were incentivized by the 'pull' of public office towards professionalization and the need for more autonomy of the central leadership, which moderated these parties' formative dispositions favourably in terms of their functioning in parliament and government. That said, given the power-sharing structures in these parties, reforms were the outcome of compromises and many Green parties are still the most decentralized party in their parliamentary party system today.[10] In many parties even limited reform was difficult to achieve due to considerable resistance. A couple of parties suffered from organizational splits of minor factions such as the German Greens (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) or the Dutch Green Left

[7] This discrepancy emerges if activists are more extreme than ordinary voters, a difference in orientation that has been theorized by 'May's Law' claiming that subleaders are likely to be the most extreme stratum in party organizations (May 1973), which is much debated in the literature (e.g. Norris 1995).

[8] Note that such divides did not occur in all Green parties. The Swedish Greens or the Swiss Greens, for instance, were fairly pragmatic from the start and therefore suffered relatively little from this type of division.

[9] The former wing aimed at finding concrete solutions to problems, thus focused on the craft of the (bureaucratic) politician. Evangelizing is less concerned with professional politics than with spreading the word, i.e. holding 'big speeches' on the word of the Bible in relation to broad policy aims rather then proposing concrete solutions, which their pragmatic counterparts wanted to focus on. Despite having only two parliamentarians, this divide affected the working of the parliamentary party (van Mulligen 2010).

[10] The French Greens (*Les Verts*) have engaged in expert consultations on how to make their infrastructures more efficient but could not agree to fully implement the recommendations made.

(*Groen Links*). Overall, tensions were particularly pronounced in highly decentralized bottom-up formations with a federative party structure and very weak central steering capacities ('federations'), a frequent configuration in the two groups. But this transformation also proved difficult in rooted, top-down formations such as the Irish Greens, which from the start adopted a less decentralized, more 'stratarchical' structure that gave relatively more steering power to the national party than other Green parties. Similar to party federations, it suffered from a split of a faction that refused to accept the 'normalization' of the party (Bolleyer 2012a, 2012b).

In essence, the study of rooted outsider parties reveals that the difficulties in overcoming an instrumental approach on behalf of party founders in favour of institutionalization are not unique to entrepreneurial top-down formation created and run by a career-oriented individual. It can equally be found among party activists who consider their party as an instrument to realize a set of values. As long as no attachment to the particular organization is formed, they might rather maintain dysfunctional party structures than see their values compromised in reform attempts directed towards enhancing efficiency. This is as much a sign of weak institutionalization as entrepreneurial leaders' attempts to keep the party organization weak, for instance, to avoid the recruitment of potential leadership competitors. The two constellations are mirror images of each other, reflecting the same leadership–structure dilemma in an opposite fashion, each expressing an imbalance between extra-parliamentary party building and central leadership capacities.

DEATH THROUGH STRATEGIC MERGER: NON-PERSISTENCE DESPITE INSTITUTIONALIZATION

While patterns of persistence and sustainability tend be linked (i.e. both tend to be weak or strong, depending on a party's origin), we find a number of cases among Green and new religious parties that are no longer active today, although they could—as theoretically expected—sustain electoral support and thereby a national presence for a considerable period of time after their parliamentary breakthrough. Those are the Icelandic Women's Union, the Dutch Political Party of Radicals, the Greens WA in Australia, the Swiss Women Make Politics (*Frauen macht Politik*) (all falling in the Green family) and the Dutch Reformatory Political Federation (a religious newcomer). These cases are insightful due to the way they died. All of them decided to merge with other minor parties, with the exception of the Swiss Women Make Politics, a party which had evolved out of extra-parliamentary feminist groups on the cantonal level and in 2009 decided to fully return to extra-parliamentary work (i.e. it persists as organization but not as

a party). In contrast, the Greens WA joined the federation of the Australian Greens (Jackson 2011), the Political Party of Radicals (PPR) joined three parties to form Green Left (Lucardie et al. 1999; Lucardie and Voerman 2008), and the Icelandic Women's Union joined three other parties to form the Social Democratic Alliance (Kristinsson 2007). Finally, the one religious party in this group, the Reformatory Political Federation (RPF), merged into the Christian Union (van Mulligen 2010).

Rootedness helps to stabilize support and maintain party organizational activity, particularly in times of crisis. Yet it does not provide a solution to the problem which the Icelandic Women's Union, the Dutch PPR, the Greens WA, and the Dutch RPF faced in their party systems, namely credible competitors in similar or the same issue areas (Meguid 2008; Wagner 2012). For these rooted outsider parties (that aspire to represent particular interests in the long run), the costs of merging (i.e. the loss of organizational autonomy) had less weight than the benefit of gaining influence in the party system through forming a new organization. This move allowed them to push more effectively for their core interests and it paid off in terms of consolidating a broader support base. Each of the new mergers is nowadays well established in its respective party system.

None of these cases was 'swallowed' by big long-established parties or made the decision to merge because its existence was under real threat. Although attracting a very narrow part of the electorate the PPR had been represented in parliament six times in a row with only a slight decline at the last election before its merger. Untypical for rooted outsiders, it entered government early on, only four years after its foundation. This move created a rift within the party organization and, after the radicalization of the party's programme (which made a renewal of the cooperation with the centre-left impossible), it led to electoral losses at the following election (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008: 72–3). Still, the experience did not seriously destabilize the party as its electoral performance at later elections indicates. The Women's Union was represented four times in a row still winning 4.9 per cent at the last election it contested as an autonomous party. Although still winning significant vote shares, during its 16 years in parliament more and more women had taken over important positions in other parties, both nationally and regionally, implying that one main mission of the Women's Union had been accomplished (Kristinsson 2007: 109). The Greens WA had repeatedly won Senate seats and increased their number of seats at the last election it competed as a separate party. Similarly, the RPF had its best electoral result ever before merging into the Christian Union in 2000, after having stressed already in 1987 that its differences to the old Reformatory Political Union (the party it would merge with) were merely of style, not of ideology or principle (van Mulligen 2010: 45). In short, in none of these cases was merging an emergency decision triggered by a crisis. Instead, it was a strategic choice that helped to consolidate or increase the parties' influence respectively. The newly formed Dutch Christian Union, for instance, could

successfully increase its support after its breakthrough in 2002. After doubling its seats in 2006, it joined the national government.

Returning to the core concept of institutionalization as specified in Chapter 3, this observation constitutes a puzzle. One wonders whether these parties were really institutionalized, since they gave up their organizational autonomy voluntarily, without being confronted with a severe crisis. Wouldn't those parties merge with least reluctance that see their organization solely as an instrument to pursue certain interests or values, i.e. parties that have not developed stable survival interests?

One simple but rather rough measure of whether these parties were institutionalized or not is organizational age, indicating how long a party could maintain itself as autonomous organization. The PPR had been active for 21 years before merging into Green Left. The RPF had been active 25 years when merging into the Christian Union, the Women's Union 16 years before it joined the Social Democratic Alliance and the Greens WA 13 years before they formally joined the Australian Greens. However, the RPR—with only six years between its foundation and its national breakthrough—persisted longest outside of national institutions without being rewarded with parliamentary seats. Consequently, organizational age does not allow us to pin down whether these parties simply continued thanks to their ongoing electoral success or thanks to their capacity to generate—as organizations—an emotional affiliation among their members and followers (i.e. value infusion). Similarly, none of the parties had to deal with a real electoral shock—e.g. failure to re-enter parliament, which happened to the Swedish Environment Party—an event that could have revealed the presence of a loyal support base in times of crisis.

Once looking at these parties' organizational development a bit more closely, however, it is difficult to argue that these parties did not possess a self-sufficient organization when they merged. The Greens WA had built a working grassroots organization in their state. Rather than merging they 'joined' the Australian Greens, a nation-wide federation. In the latter, the territorial parties active in the different states remain intact and have a strong position (Miragliotta 2006: 588, 2012). The price of merging in terms of organizational autonomy was very low for the Greens WA since the identity of the original party could be maintained. In other words, there was little conflict between the Green WA's own followers' attachment to the organization in their home state and them forming part of a nation-wide federation.[11] The PPR adopted a highly decentralized party structure and set up local branches—so-called action centres—as a constitutive part of its basic infrastructure. It allowed local activists direct representation in the national party congress as the main decision-making body, which later on, in

[11] Similarly, the Swiss 'Alternative Zug', the Greens of the canton Zug, joined the Swiss party federation after having entered national parliament twice as a separate party.

1979, was given the right to recall parliamentarians. '[A]t the same time, institutionalisation took place', as Lucardie and Ghillebaert point out, the party 'set up a youth organization, a women's organization and a research and training office' (2008: 78). And just before the merger into Green Left, the party actively modernized its organization[12] (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008: 78).

Similarly, the Icelandic Women's Movement grew out local movements—the Women's campaign in Reykjavik and Akureyri (Kristinsson 2007: 108)—and built an infrastructure typical for this party family stressing the equality between activists and office holders. It refused to have an individual leader and had a rotation system for public office holders, which only allowed taking over parliamentary seats for up to six years and participating on boards and committees for up to two years at a time. The position of chairman of the parliamentary party rotated annually (Jónsdóttir 2007: 162). The national congress (as all other meetings) was open to all party members and held once a year. In between these congresses the party was run by the party executive and the parliamentary party, where the former controlled the finances, the day-to-day administration, and internal coordination, while the latter shaped policies and offered advice to the party (Jónsdóttir 2007: 162–3). Finally, the RPF, a religious newcomer, was formed in 1975 as a federation of the *Nationaal Evangelisch Verbond*, a non-parliamentarian political organization of reformed Churches, the *Gespreksgroup ARP*,[13] and the *Reformatorisch Politiek jongerencontact*, which was a youth group of Protestants which later on became the RPF youth organization. Initially the groups stayed recognizable as units within the party (e.g. each could exclude members) implying a high degree of decentralization, which changed in 1976 when 19 local branches were formed. In 2000, the RPF youth organization, formally separate from the actual party, merged in the Christian Union's youth organization (*PerspectiveF*). The RPF itself only dissolved officially at the end of 2003, three years after the merger (van Mulligen 2010: 44).

These indications of party building match a final and maybe most clear-cut indication of these parties' organizational autonomy: none of them were founded by a particular individual dominating the party's evolution, who took over leading positions in the party throughout its history. All of them outlived their founding elite, which indicates that they were not predominantly stabilized by leadership continuity either.

All in all, none of the evidence suggests that these mergers took place because parties were insufficiently institutionalized, unable to survive independently or unable to sustain electoral support. Rather, in a constellation where several ideologically

[12] For instance, the party's executive committee was reduced in size and the party bureau modernized (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008: 78)

[13] The ARP was the Anti-Revolutionary Party, the oldest political party in the Netherlands that eventually merged into the CDA, the Christian Democrat Appeal.

similar parties competed for the same niche, the broader interest of the party was served best by giving up its organizational autonomy and transforming into a different organizational form. Taking this point of view, agreeing to a merger seems a very rational move. It is counterproductive for several minor parties with similar interests to weaken each other, which only can benefit the mainstream parties in the respective party system. However, this reading presupposes that elite choices are long-term oriented and pursue organizational interests. The pattern of 'death through merger' among rooted outsiders is noteworthy, once we compare this to the types of death we find among the new right parties, for instance, highly centralized parties, often dominated by their founding leader.

In theory, one might have suspected that mergers are more likely in centralized parties, since mergers can be more easily imposed top-down, especially when followers are not attached to the constituent organizations but solely to the leader. Instead, mergers of new right-wing parties that made it into parliament are relatively rare events, one example being the Canadian Reform Party, which merged with parts of the Progressive Conservatives, an old party in decline, to consolidate its position in the Canadian party system and reunite Canadian conservatism (Ellis 2005; Flanagan 2009; Ware 2009). Disintegration and dissolution are more common ways of dying. In leadership-dominated hierarchies, leaders often refuse to share power and power-sharing is an inevitable consequence of a merger. If the founding leader impersonates and 'owns' his party as in the case of entrepreneurial formations, a merger can be a direct threat to the leader and therefore be ruled out as a possibility, even in cases where such a move might be to the long-term benefit of the party or in fact the only realistic strategy to avoid disintegration and collapse. In the Green and in the new religious family, in contrast, numerous parties are themselves mergers of several extra-parliamentary groupings, i.e. they are the result of bottom-up formations characterized by decentralized decision-making structures. Elites are used to making decisions through negotiations. If there are no ideological objections against a merger, it is easier for them to accept the costs of mergers since they have relatively less power to lose.

By shaping the intra-organizational power distribution, patterns of party origin can help us to understand patterns of party death. Whether it is in the party's interest to merge and whether leaders consider it in their interest to merge are clearly distinct. Depending on the nature of the party, these two rationales can contradict each other. While parties' strategic position in their party system needs to be considered to understand patterns of (both voluntary and involuntary) party death fully, decisions to merge are not simple, strategic responses to systemic constraints. They need to be acceptable to the party leadership. This acceptability or the lack thereof is linked to parties' intra-organizational dispositions shaping the motivations of major decision-makers, dispositions which often dominate other strategic considerations.

THE LEADERSHIP–STRUCTURE DILEMMA IN GREEN AND RELIGIOUS ENTREPRENEURS

Entrepreneurial parties, a minority among Green and religious newcomers, have received very little attention in the literature due to their short-lived character. While their weak performance patterns match the unfavourable structural conditions they started out from, some of the cases illustrate tendencies associated with entrepreneurial parties in the theoretical chapter. This illustrates that these tendencies are not restricted to entrepreneurs of a particular ideological orientation. Among those features are the neglect of party building resulting from a short-term orientation of founding leaders, tensions between leadership autonomy and party building, and the difficulties in coping with the tensions triggered by parliamentary breakthrough, even if only very small seat shares are won.

The Australian Vallentine Peace Group, a party which we come back to in the later case study of its mother party, the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP), lasted only three years. It existed as long as its founding leader Jo Vallentine held her seat, who then (after having initially defected from the NDP to form her own vehicle) decided to continue her career in the Green party. The Luxembourgish Green List Ecological Initiative (GLEI) was formed by a split from the Green Alternative Party (GAP) in 1985 right after the latter had won its first two seats in national parliament. GLEI entered parliament in 1989, having run against its mother party, indeed the only election in which the two parties would compete against each other. Already for the next election in 1994, the two parties had decided to form a common list. After this successful election, GLEI rejoined its mother party. This decision was not uncontested and triggered defections such as that of Joseph Weber, an MEP, who had been a founding member of the original Greens and had joined the splinter party GLEI. Weber went on to found yet another new party, the Green and Liberal Alliance, which, however, disbanded after one unsuccessful national election (Dumont et al. 2006: 65–6). Neither the Australian nor the Luxembourgish Green splinter formed an autonomous organization, in the first case due to the instrumental drive behind the formation which was in effect a one-person vehicle, in the second case due to the temporary nature of the defection.

The Roman Catholic Party of the Netherlands (RKNP) highlights the tensions triggered by a founding leader who refuses to be constrained by the party organization. The party was founded by unsatisfied members of the Catholic People's Party, who perceived their party as too liberal. One of the founders, Klaas Beuker, had already been part of the New Roman Party. Having moved from one formation to the other after the New Roman Party had failed to win any parliamentary seats, the RKNP won a seat in the Dutch parliament in 1972 that Beuker occupied. Internal struggle between Beuker and the party board led to heavy infighting. Beuker, who was not only the only MP but also the party president, was not

transparent in his decision-making and tried to concentrate power in his own hands. The clash with the party board even led to legal action against Beuker, a conflict the latter eventually won. These intra-organizational conflicts caused lasting damage to the party's image, its organization, and its finances and triggered a decline in members. Beuker stayed the front man of the party and participated in several elections thereafter, but the party never managed to regain a seat.[14]

The Dutch Evangelical People's Party was formed in 1981 by dissident activists of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), who considered their parties too conservative. This new formation tried to build an infrastructure and, rather unusually for an entrepreneur, tried to set up a decentralized bottom-up structure with all positions to be chosen by the national congress (de Bas 1999: 275). It had its national breakthrough in 1982. Although the party only ever held one seat from 1982 to 1986, parliamentary representation still triggered conflict within the party due to a perceived lack of professionalism and 'lone wolf' behaviour of the party's MP Cathy Ubels (de Bas 1999: 178, 330). After breakthrough, the party itself became divided between a left and a centrist wing, each of which preferred different cooperation partners among the other parties. Attempts of the party's one representative to work with two dissidents from the CDA were short-lived (de Bas 1999: 178). The party lasted nine years and in November 1990 joined Green Left, a merger of three parties formed a year earlier, in which the Political Party of Radicals (PPR) had also participated. The PPR, however, actively participated in the merger process after having proved its ability to defend its national niche over a series of elections as we saw earlier. The Evangelical People's Party, in contrast, having suffered from internal strife and poor election results, joined out of a position of weakness only after the merger negotiations had been concluded.

PARTY FAILURE DESPITE SOCIETAL ROOTS: THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF PARTY AGENCY

This concluding section looks at two cases in greater depth. One belongs to the Green, one to the religious family. Their fates give insights into the challenges and obstacles that make institutionalization difficult even if a party can profit from linkages to societal groups at the time it is formed. More particularly, they stress the

[14] E. Tomassen, 'Beuker, Klaas', <http://www.protestant.nl/encyclopedie/themas/politiek-en-samenleving/beuker-klaas>; 'Rooms-Katholieke Partij Nederland (RKPN)', <http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/9353000/1/j9vvihlf299q0sr/vh8lnhrq0xzo>; 'Rooms-Katholieke Partij Nederland', <http://www.protestant.nl/encyclopedie/themas/politiek-en-samenleving/rooms-katholieke-partij-nederland>; 'Beuker, Klaas (1924–2000)', <http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/lemmata/bwn6/beuker>, all accessed 12 November 2011.

importance of party agency and elite choices, choices that can be (intentionally or unintentionally) detrimental irrespective of favourable formative conditions. The Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) is one of three rooted cases in the Green family[15] that were both non-sustainable and non-persistent and did not ‘die’ through merging with parties of a similar orientation, although it initially achieved significant electoral support.[16] United Future New Zealand has achieved higher levels of electoral support than any other religious newcomers (see Figure 5.1). Having tried to strategically construct a societal base by merging with other parties, it suffered from organizational splits, however. While still nationally represented today and even holding government ministries, the party as ‘organization’ has by now become an ‘appendix’ to its founding leader and only remaining MP.

The Nuclear Disarmament Party: failed party building despite movement ties

Like most parties in the Green family, the NDP was a party that formed out of a social movement (Turnbull and Vromen 2006: 457). Despite originating in favourable structural conditions and with considerable electoral potential it could not consolidate. That it engaged in active party building makes the case even more interesting from a theoretical point of view. However, as detailed below, decision-makers favoured a type of organization that generated internal conflict and thereby weakened the party ‘from within’.

The NDP won a remarkable 7.2 per cent at its breakthrough election (and more than 4 per cent in all but one territory) in 1984. It entered the Australian Senate in the year of its foundation, thus was very successful very rapidly. It lost representation after one re-election and never managed to return to the national level. It still participated in national elections until 2007 and only deregistered in 2009.[17]

[15] The other two cases are Women Make Politics, a Swiss feminist party that ceased its activity to return to exclusively extra-parliamentary work, and the Finnish Ecological Party Greens, a splinter of the Green Alliance, which dissolved after having been represented in parliament once. For details on the orientations of the groups underpinning the two Green formations, see Linkola 1986 and Lampinen 1988.

[16] Another rooted new politics party that underwent significant electoral decline is the Australian Democrats (see Figure 5.1). The party has regularly won Senate representation since 1977 but has failed to win any seats since the 2004 Senate election (on their evolution, see Warhust 1997; for an account of their success and eventual decline, see Gauja 2010). Although according to Gauja ‘it appears that the party’s role in Australian politics has come to an end’ (2010: 500), the party has the intention to maintain its activities despite current problems. C. Hockley, ‘Electoral Commission threatens Democrats with deregistration’, *The Advertiser*, 7 March 2012, <http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/national/electoral-commission-threatens-democrats-with-deregistration/story-e6frea8c-1226291165640>, accessed 2 June 2012.

[17] Nuclear Disarmament Party of Australia: Application for Voluntary Deregistration, Australian Electoral Commission, <http://www.aec.gov.au/Parties_and_Representatives/party_registration/Registration_Decisions/2009/ndp.pdf>, accessed 10 November 2011.

While being a clear failure case in terms of national sustainability after breakthrough, it showed considerable persistence. This potential to maintain party organizational activities with little electoral reward over a long period of time means the party does not qualify as a 'flash party', a pattern of party evolution associated with a rapid, electoral rise and a similarly rapid organizational disintegration (Pedersen 1982) (which, in fact, none of the parties discussed in this chapter corresponds to).

NDP branches started to form across the country a few months after its foundation in 1984, one source for organizational persistence in conjunction with its movement ties. Unlike other new parties it started out relatively well resourced. As reported in the diary of an NDP campaign manager, it held a fund of $30,000 in early 1985.[18] The organization was highly inclusive though and accommodated a very diverse membership, including not only peace activists but also defectors from the Labour Party, the Liberals, and the Australian Democrats. The question of whether or not new members had to cease their membership with other parties (a standard requirement in most parties) became a major controversy (Adamson 1999), which is indicative of the very fluid and open nature of the organization NDP activists attempted to build (see also Fisher 1995). This orientation also showed in the candidates the party recruited, who included not only former representatives from Australian Labour but also celebrities.

While reflecting the followers' democratic values, the downside of the party's openness haunted the new formation early on, when Jo Vallentine, a peace activist and the party's first elected senator defected from the party together with a range of NDP candidates and rank-and-file members as early as 1985, only one year after the party's foundation and breakthrough. The reasons she gave were the 'takeover' of the party by the Socialist Workers Party and her position in favour of multilateralism, which was in conflict with the party's policy platform (Mansell 1985: 19–20). She formed the Vallentine Peace Group, which entered the Senate only once and formally dissolved in 1990.[19] Vallentine returned to a unilateralist disarmament position and later became a Senator for the Greens WA (Adamson 1999). Having been a parliamentarian for three different parties indicates that she chose her organizational platform in an instrumental fashion, depending on which platform allowed her to pursue her current convictions most effectively and moved on when the organization started to constrain her activities, as did many leading figures in entrepreneurial parties analysed later.

[18] M. Gleeson (1997) 'The Short, Troubled Life of the NDP', <http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/15645>, accessed 19 May 2012.

[19] Vallentine Peace Group, <http://www.aec.gov.au/Parties_and_Representatives/Party_Registration/Deregistered_parties/vpg.htm>, accessed 12 November 2011.

The shock triggered by the early exit of a major leadership figure did not lead to the NDP's disintegration, however. The dependency on particular individuals was less pronounced than in typical entrepreneurs, which tend to be built around such individuals. In the latter the founder of the organization usually takes over one of the first seats a party wins, which makes such defections highly damaging both for the party as electoral vehicle and for the party organization in the making. This was not the case in the NDP which had been founded by Michael Denborough, a peace activist. Still, Vallentine's defection imposed heavy electoral costs. While the NDP won again a Senate seat in 1987, its vote share dropped to 1.1 per cent. And again problems that were heavily damaging for the party's image evolved around the party's one representative. The newly elected Senator Robert Wood, born in the UK, was disqualified from the Senate, not having been an Australian citizen at the time of his nomination. Irina Dunn, who replaced him as NDP representative until Wood was granted citizenship, refused to return the seat to Wood once he had become eligible. This led to her expulsion from the party[20] and (like Jo Vallentine before her) Dunn formed her own party, which, however, never entered national parliament.

The story of the NDP not only stresses the importance of the choices made in the party-building process but also the difficulty of assuring the party loyalty of leading elites in very early phases of party development as discussed in Chapter 3. The NDP suffered from a serious split in the first year of its career and lost both national seats it ever managed to win due to defections, displaying representatives' lack of loyalty to the party as an organization and their unwillingness to be constrained in the pursuit of their own interests to keep the party going (an orientation at the core of a successful institutionalization process). The organization's permeability allowed for high levels of individualism among its public representatives and its followers, who considered the party as an instrument that was valuable as long as it was the appropriate vehicle and effective in achieving their goals. More specifically, the NDP could not develop a party structure that integrated party elites operating in public institutions with its extra-parliamentary arm, be it in terms organizational loyalty of the former (value infusion), or in terms of effective procedures for conflict resolution between both arms (routinization).

It is true that too little time for party building might have contributed to this: the NDP entered parliament in the year it was founded. However, even if the party's breakthrough had come later, had the party continued to insist in its open recruitment strategy, this still would have constituted a major obstacle against institutionalization, especially value infusion. In a book on the NDP's history, Gillian Fisher (1995), a leading NDP member who formed part of the 1985 split,

[20] Chris Wallace, 'The Dunn-Wood war', *The Herald* (Melbourne), 17 August 1988; Kieth Scott, '"No Games" on NDP Seat: Greiner', *Canberra Times*, 9 June 1988.

identified the party's inclusiveness as one central reason for its collapse, since it made heavy intra-organizational conflict inevitable.[21] Competition from other minor parties such as the Australian Democrats, a new politics party founded in and with Senate representation since 1977 (Gauja 2010), and the decreasing salience of issues related to nuclear disarmament constituted further obstacles to the NDP's attempts to consolidate.

Yet the most immediate source of vulnerability that damaged the party's chances to exploit the wave of support that it initially received—'estimated in the thousands'[22]—was located inside the party. Voters defected when confronted with the consecutive departure of three of the party's best-known faces (Vallentine, Wood, and Dunn), after a public display of the party's incapacity to sort out internal quarrels as visible in the defection of parliamentarians and members, the incapacity to operate professionally as demonstrated by the nomination of a Senatorial candidate who won a seat but who had not been eligible to run in the first place, and the incapacity to control its representatives, visible in Dunn's refusal to step back from her seat. Rather than being a platform to boost its popularity, parliamentary breakthrough led to a public display of the NDP's internal disarray and lack of professionalism, both of which jeopardized its chances of stabilizing initial support.

Rooted parties with 'entrepreneurial' founders: the transformation of United Future

United Future New Zealand stands out among other religious newcomers in several respects. Most notably, at its breakthrough election, it attracted more electoral support than any of the other religious newcomers ever did (6.7 per cent of the national vote leading to eight seats). This support, however, drastically declined over the course of the next elections, to 2.7 per cent and finally below 1 per cent, with founding leader Peter Dunne currently holding its only seat. Nonetheless, the party has been influential in terms of policy-making. It repeatedly functioned as support party for national governments with Dunne holding prestigious posts such as minister of revenue located outside cabinet (Bale and Blomgren 2008: 88) and was able, yet again, to negotiate a support agreement with the National Party after the 2011 elections. Also, United Future New Zealand illustrates the challenges of party institutionalization. But in some ways, it constitutes a mirror image to the NDP that failed to sustain national support after breakthrough due to major splits and various defections but persisted a longer period after having lost national

[21] Others stress the disagreement over the role of members as another important divide, with some insisting in active member involvement in decision-making, while others preferred a more constrained involvement of the membership. Gleeson, 'The Short, Troubled Life of the NDP'.

[22] Gleeson, 'The Short, Troubled Life of the NDP'.

representation without much electoral reward. The initially rooted United Future has managed to sustain a national presence and access to national government until today, while transforming—as a consequence of organizational splits—into a pure entrepreneur that now persists as a mere appendix to its founding leader and is unlikely to outlive Dunne's career.

United Future formed in 2000 as a merger of the centrist United Party and the Christian party Future New Zealand (Geddis 2004: 153), two parties with different origins and orientations. The United Party was a classical entrepreneur formed in parliament in 1994 by moderate National and Labour MPs, including Peter Dunne (formerly Labour), who has been its only ever party leader. Dunne further won the only seat United ever held and managed to defend it in 1999 due to an electoral pact with the National Party, which did not run its own candidate in Dunne's constituency (Vowles 2002: 137). Future New Zealand (formerly the Christian Democrats), in contrast, had initially formed part of the Christian Coalition together with the Christian Heritage Party—an evangelical Christian party with strong linkages to Christian organizations (not dissimilar to Family First in Australia). When the merger with the Christian Heritage Party dissolved in 1997, Future took a range of senior people and members from the Christian Heritage Party with it. Consequently, Future New Zealand was at the time of the merger a highly organized, albeit small, party that provided the newly formed United Future New Zealand with links to civil society, an element of national organization, and a fresh supply of candidates (Bale and Blomgren 2008: 87, 92–3).

The merger provided United led by Dunne with a societal recruitment pool United itself did not have at its disposal. In the merger's early years this fuelled debates about whether the new United Future might transform into a self-consciously Christian party able to consolidate a religious cleavage in the New Zealand party system (Miller 2005: 58, 63). Such a transformation, however, did not take place although initially the merger seemed advantageous for both partners: United expanded its support base, while Future NZ acquired—through Dunne's direct mandate which allowed United to circumvent the 5 per cent entry barrier—access to parliament and the resources attached to parliamentary seats and government. While Dunne took over the leadership of the new party, the party as an organization had to reconcile the moderate, centrist pragmatism of United with the strong convictions of a Christian faction brought in by Future NZ, which inevitably affected the merger's internal dynamics.

Following the remarkable breakthrough success of the new party in 2002, the party ended up with eight parliamentary seats. This is widely attributed to Dunne's stunning performance in a pre-election television debate among party leaders, which he won. This success found much resonance in the media, triggering a rise of the party in the polls from below 3 per cent to 8 per cent a few days before the 2002 election (Geddis 2004: 152; Miller 2005: 186). It is difficult to say to what extent this considerable electoral breakthrough was the product of a 'leader effect'

and to what extent the party's newly acquired ties of members and parliamentary candidates to churches and Christian organizations played a role. Looking at the composition and internal operation of United Future's parliamentary party, however, the distinct natures of the two constituent parties clearly created tensions that Dunne, as he indicated a few years later, did not foresee when negotiating the merger, tensions which intensified during the party's first term.[23]

Unlike Dunne, who has not only plenty of parliamentary but also governmental experience, the party's other seven MPs were newcomers to politics (Miller 2005: 222). Dunne was aware of the problem and did not want to expose his inexperienced colleagues to a formal participation in government, especially knowing the considerable costs government participation had imposed on the other minor parties such as the Alliance and NZ First. This concern was further reinforced by the profile of a centre-left government at odds with the conservatism of his party. Still, he struck a support agreement with Labour, giving the party policy responsibility in clearly specified areas, while allowing it to criticize government in other areas (Miller 2005: 222–3). Yet even 'limited' government participation required the parliamentary group to operate as a coherent unit, which proved problematic for the following reason: a significant number of evangelical Christians had ended up in the few top positions on the party list (Miller 2005: 58). The merger had been informally agreed between Dunne and Anthony Walton, the leader of Future NZ without any involvement of their parties (Miller 2005: 130–1). Dunne took over the party leadership yet made concessions regarding the composition of the party list, which seemed unproblematic since he could have hardly anticipated that the party would win eight seats. Due to the merger's stunning success, former Future people ended up shaping the public face of the newly created party, which in the former United Party had been personified by the founding leader Dunne alone.

This division in the parliamentary group and the unwillingness of both sides to compromise for the good of the organization became clear in a number of parliamentary defections. In 2005, United Future MP Paul Adams defected and ran as independent at the following election. In 2007, after the party had already lost five seats in the 2005 election, another MP left, an event that was triggered by policy disagreements. Gordon Copeland left to found the Christian Kiwi party (also joined by the earlier defector Paul Adams) and took a wider range of members with him. Of the eight United Future MPs who entered parliament in 2004, four were involved in the foundation or eventually joined the explicitly Christian Kiwi Party,[24] mirroring the line of conflict that ran through United

[23] 'Dunne Rebrands United Future after Christian Faction Split', *The New Zealand Herald*, 3 September 2007.

[24] Former United Future list MP Bernie Ogilvy, who lost his seat in 2005, became party secretary of the Kiwi Party.

Future.[25] Despite the damage imposed on the party by the split, party leader Dunne publicly welcomed the move: 'I think it's taken a bit of a monkey off our back, frankly, and made us able to talk about who we really are . . . We're a political party, not a church.'[26]

In the 2008 election that followed the split, the party lost another two of its three seats, leaving Dunne as the only MP of United Future. It is difficult to quantify how many members the party lost or whether Copeland—when founding the Kiwi Party—took the whole Christian base with him or just the 'core of the Christian moralist camp'.[27] At any rate, the United Future post-2007 more strongly resembles the 'old' United Party as founded by Dunne in 1994, a personal vehicle created by a professional politician to boost his own career, rather than a self-consciously Christian party and potential carrier of a religious cleavage. In line with his initial position in the United Party, Dunne is now not only the founding leader of United Future but again the party's sole representative open to support governments of the centre-left and centre-right (Bale and Blomgren 2008: 86), an orientation that requires considerable ideological flexibility and pragmatism.

It is noteworthy that the merger between the United Party with Future NZ was not the only failed attempt to broaden the party's support base initiated by Dunne. In late 2003, United Future announced an election pact with Outdoor Recreation New Zealand, a party supported by hunting and fishing lobbies;[28] a bit later he struck an agreement with the WIN party (a party opposing the smoking ban), whose leader ran as a United Future candidate. The partnership with Outdoor had already ended in 2006, with Outdoor explaining its decision in terms of United Future's Christian evangelism.[29] All these attempts failed which highlights the difficulty of manufacturing a societal base in a top-down fashion through strategic pacts or mergers negotiated by party leaders that are not based on existing common ground between the constituent units. Dunne claimed in 2008 that he wants to build a 'sustainable party' able to outlive his own career, i.e. to overcome his party's status as a 'personality party'.[30] This could have been

[25] Marc Alexander, another MP run for National in 2008. Judy Kirk, 'National's List Promotes Strength and Diversity', 17 August 2008, <http://www.national.org.nz/Article.aspx?articleId=28388>, accessed 16 November 2011.

[26] 'Dunne Rebrands United Future after Christian Faction Split', *The New Zealand Herald*, 3 September 2007.

[27] 'Dunne Rebrands United Future after Christian Faction Split', *The New Zealand Herald*, 3 September 2007.

[28] 'United Future and Outdoor Recreation Sign MOU', 24 November 2003, 9:42, Press Release: United Future NZ Party, <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0311/S00463.htm>, accessed 17 November 2011.

[29] 'Outdoor Recreation Splits from United Future', *The New Zealand Herald*, 27 March 2006, <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10374646>, accessed 16 November 2011.

[30] 'I'm only speaking from United Future's perspective, but that is a key challenge for us—to make this party sustainable in the longer term. That's the big test, and I'm not planning on moving on any

achieved through the 2002 merger, providing access to a loyal Christian support base.[31] These roots, however, decreased the manoeuvrability of the party leadership and despite his 'self-portrayal' as a party builder Dunne did not show any inclination to accept such constraints when intra-organizational conflicts arose whose settlement would have required the negotiation of compromises. Instead, he was determined to maintain the pivotal position of his party as the majority provider for national government, being located between the two big parties Labour and National. At the same time, the followers coming from United Future and, more importantly, its representatives who entered parliament were ideologically driven and unwilling to compromise convictions to achieve pragmatic goals such as government access at any cost.

Serious attempts to manufacture a lasting social base and thereby strengthen United Future as an organization would have required procedures able to assure a meaningful involvement of different parts of the newly formed party to take decisions collectively. This would have constrained the flexibility of the leadership procedurally but also in terms of substance, since certain policies would be inevitably ruled out by the involvement of the Christian base in central decisions. While such involvement could have provided the basis for an identification of followers with the newly formed merger, the constraints implied by an effective institutionalization process were clearly unacceptable to the party's leader.

While the departures of constituent parties with their own agendas made the internal life of United Future less complex, the electoral fortunes of the remnants of the party now fully depend on the personal appeal of its leader. There are no societal roots left that would maintain support for United Future in times when the party lacks access to parliament and the resources attached to it. Direct state funding does not exist in New Zealand, which puts particular emphasis on resources linked to parties' parliamentary and governmental activities.[32] Dunne's parliamentary office and his two constituency offices are the main organizational units.[33] This mirrors the centralization of this party built around its leader (Miller 2005: 82), best characterized as a leadership-dominated hierarchy. The organization of this 'centrist party' whose main asset is its access to government and thus

time soon—but clearly I want to make sure that when I do, the party has some vitality. And some future.' Dunne in 'Gordon Campbell Talks to Peter Dunne', <http://gordoncampbell.scoop.co.nz/2008/06/16/gordon-campbell-talks-to-peter-dunne/>, accessed 17 November 2011.

[31] The Christian Coalition, of which Future New Zealand had formed part at the 1996 election, won 4.3 per cent of the national vote (although no seats) indicating considerable electoral potential despite a lack of parliamentary access.

[32] To give an illustration of the importance of these resources, ahead of the 2002 elections, Dunne used his parliamentary budget on full-page advertisements in all daily newspapers, praising the achievements of United Future (Miller 2005: 98).

[33] United Future, 'Ohariu Contacts', <http://www.unitedfuture.org.nz/ohariu-contacts/>, accessed 20 November 2011.

policy-making power[34] makes little effort to cultivate a particular type of membership, which anyway plays a subordinate role in the party. As the party constitution indicates, ‘final authority on all matters pertaining to the Party’ is assigned to the board of management, i.e. the party executive which naturally includes the party leader (Art. 8.2.1).[35]

Organizational efforts, so far as they exist, are solely directed towards keeping the party in parliament and thus, on Dunne’s constituency, as he highlighted in the run-up to the 2011 elections: ‘In the absence of crossing the 5 per cent threshold, I am the threshold. Because we’re focused in that area, you could argue that it does diminish attention from elsewhere.’[36] Ahead of the 2011 general election, United Future ruled out a coalition with Labour, while the National Party advised its followers to support Dunne’s party in his constituency to assure the latter’s re-election.[37] After the election, National re-entered government with United Future support, with Dunne again holding the revenue portfolio.[38] As long as Dunne is able to negotiate access to government and assure parliamentary access through pre-electoral deals, national electoral sustainability of United Future NZ can be assured without a self-sufficient organization. As Bale and Blomgren (2008: 93) put it a few years ago: ‘Being in or near government has not encouraged United Future to institutionalize’, a statement that seems today more valid than ever.

Unlike in most rooted parties discussed in this chapter the founding leader of United Future was never tied to any societal group that would induce a long-term orientation essential for party building. As an individual he operated like an entrepreneur, a configuration we will come across again in later chapters. United Future was a rooted merger that was solely formed for strategic reasons, without a sufficiently broad, shared value basis or orientation between the merging parties. Neither was conducive to generate any willingness of the founding leader to accept the constraints on his actions to make a merger work. As a consequence, this initially rooted party has transformed into a classical entrepreneurial party

[34] United Future, ‘Why Join Us?’ <http://www.unitedfuture.org.nz/why-become-a-member>, accessed 20 November 2011.

[35] Next to an age requirement that assures eligibility at elections, the payment of a joining fee and the annual subscription seem the only criteria for entering the party. United Future, ‘Get Involved with United Future’, <http://www.unitedfuture.org.nz/get-involved-with-united-future-membership/>, accessed 20 November 2011; United Future constitution, <http://www.elections.org.nz/files/UnitedFuture_Constitution.pdf>, accessed 20 November 2011.

[36] Amelia Romanos, ‘Election 2011: The State of United Future’, *The New Zealand Herald*, 5 November 2011, <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10763952>, accessed 20 November 2011.

[37] Danya Levy, ‘Key Gives Dunne Run at Ohariu’, *The Dominion Post*, 22 August 2011, <http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/politics/5482389/Key-gives-Dunne-clear-run-at-Ohariu>, accessed 13 May 2012.

[38] Andrea Vance and Danya Levy, ‘Dunne Does Deal to Fight RNZ Sale’, *The Dominion Post*, 5 December 2011, <http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/politics/6088106/Dunne-does-deal-to-fight-RNZ-sale>, accessed 13 May 2012.

similar to United, Dunne's first creation. Its persistence and sustainability hinge on Dunne's career and are likely to end with it.

CONCLUSIONS

Green parties and new religious parties can usually profit from linkages to already organized societal groups. Compared to other 'new party families' discussed later, they are the most successful in terms of persistence and sustainability and nowadays many can be considered as established parts of their national party systems. Only a few of them are no longer active. Some parties lost parliamentary representation along the way, such as the Swedish Environment Party or Belgian Greens (*Groen/Agalev*), yet managed a return to national parliament. This is a rare achievement among new parties covered in this study and highlights these parties' considerable capacity to cope with external shocks and outlive periods in which access to institutional resources is scarce. In addition to the distinctive profile a majority of these parties can profit from, their outsider status tended to help them to build up a support base separate from mainstream parties. But this came at a price. To enter government often took them considerable time, if it could be achieved at all. Unlike insider formations emulating mainstream ideologies, they have more differences to overcome before workable coalitions with established parties are feasible. They often needed to transform themselves first, having started their careers as protest parties with strong anti-establishment orientations, i.e. they needed to develop the aspiration to get into government first and to develop into reasonably professionalized parties after to be taken seriously as potential coalition partners. Despite these hurdles, after several decades in national politics, a considerable number of Green and religious newcomers have achieved this and successfully participated in or supported national governments. The few entrepreneurs in these two groups show similar weaknesses to entrepreneurs in other new party families, which indicates that structural dispositions cross-cut programmatic differences.

Yet also in rooted parties institutionalization was often a difficult process. Most rooted parties suffered from tensions between maintaining membership influence and trying to establish effective leadership structures that allowed the party's arm in public office to operate professionally. This usually happened against considerable resistance from ideologically driven activists who saw their influence diminishing and their values compromised, when their parties became increasingly successful in the national arena and national elites gained power in the party organization as a consequence of this. However, the shared interests between core activists and often more pragmatic party elites in keeping the party going usually allowed them to settle for a compromise and

overcome the risk of disintegration, even if splits of those groups that considered the 'normalization' of their party as unacceptable could not be avoided.

While parties in other families often simply dissolve or sometimes disintegrate, in the Green and new religious party family 'death through voluntary merger' is particularly common. That electorally sustainable and organizationally institutionalized parties decide to form a new organizational unit to more effectively push for their core issues reflects the long-term orientation of these parties' leading elites. Even though these mergers with ideologically similar, minor parties at first glance make sense to avoid the fragmentation of their support base, it cannot be assumed that party leaders are willing to make this choice. Mergers often threaten the position or diminish the power of the elites of constituent parties. This is why in some party families discussed below (especially those that concentrate power on their party leaders), death through merger is a rare event, even if the context of party competition or the vulnerable state of the party makes it a rational move. At the same time, instances of death through merger remind us that a party's end cannot be simply equated with 'party failure' but can be a strategic move to increase a party's weight in the overall party system. Consequently, we not only need to carefully differentiate between types of death when evaluating the fate of new parties but—especially in the case of mergers—also need to consider the strategic position a party is in when the decision to dissolve into a new formation is made.

Finally, the failure of rooted formations to institutionalize—although a relatively rare event—revealed the importance of party agency. The NDP's decline—triggered by numerous defections at an early phase of party development—stresses the difficulties in generating emotional attachment to a new formation in the early years, despite shared movement ties. The case of the NDP also indicates the importance of the nature of the party organization which elites attempt to build. In particular, it illustrates the problems invited by the rejection of selective recruitment mechanisms (both for members and office aspirants) to incentivize organizational commitment in terms of value infusion. In contrast, the case study of United Future NZ shows the difficulties of manufacturing a societal base through strategic mergers with rooted parties, if these mergers are driven by 'entrepreneurial' leaders, who themselves are not interested in the representation of any societal interest. Tensions emerge when such leaders refuse any involvement in decision-making of those constituent groups brought together in the merger, which, in turn, prevents these groups from identifying with the party. Going back to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3, the meaningful involvement of constituent groups seems to constitute an important condition to generate value infusion at least in those constellations where leadership-oriented loyalty of all constituent parties to the same leader cannot be a unifying factor.

6

The Leadership–Structure Dilemma in Liberal and Leftist New Parties: Short-Term Success but Long-Term Decline through Partial Institutionalization

New liberal and new left parties are mainly populated by entrepreneurial insiders: parties formed without linkages to societal groups pre-existing their formation, yet created with the support of established politicians who were already active in the national arena before their parties' foundation. While the ideological orientations of parties in these two groups differ considerably, their founders are often defectors from established parties, which explains in both groups the dominance of parties that emulate ideologies already represented. Although party founders sometimes take a personal following with them, these splinter parties usually cannot rely on the support of promoter organizations separate from their mother parties. This also means that they are mostly formed top-down, usually adopting a centralized infrastructure. The dominance of entrepreneurial insiders is more pronounced in the liberal group, in which 73 per cent originated in this way. In the leftist group, in contrast, we find a certain number of rooted insiders (9 of 36) as well as rooted outsiders (10 of 36). Yet among the new left entrepreneurial insiders are most numerous (16 of 36; 44 per cent), which allows us to explore whether similarities in origin lead to similar intra-organizational dynamics across these ideologically very different groups of new parties.

Again I will focus on those cases that show different patterns of persistence and sustainability than theoretically expected in terms of their formative conditions to specify the role of party agency. Furthermore, cases of particular interest are those that failed to consolidate despite high levels of electoral success, seat share, and/or repeated government participation, i.e. cases where the discrepancy between short- and long-term success is particularly pronounced.[1] The first section starts

[1] Two left parties that were non-sustainable on the national level despite the support of societal roots were the Red Electoral Alliance (Norway) and the Socialist Labour Party (Ireland). They always remained electorally marginal, never winning more than 1 per cent of the vote, which ex ante delimits the extent to which elite choices can shape a party's capacity to defend a niche on the national level. It is noteworthy though that the Red Electoral Alliance persisted over 30 years and waited 20 years for its national breakthrough (Furre 1991).

out with an overview of the intra-organizational dynamics in these two groupings as shaped by the dominant formation type, entrepreneurial insiders. A second section discusses the implications of government participation which mainly concerns those new parties formed with the help of politicians formerly belonging to mainstream parties since they entered national government particularly frequently. The chapter concludes with two case studies, in which the choices of party elites generated or reinforced intra-organizational sources of vulnerability rather than counteracting them. The leftist Alliance Party (New Zealand) failed to consolidate support despite its initial ties to promoter groups, while the liberal Progressive Democrats (Ireland) eventually declined despite the party's outstanding and repeated success in entering parliament and assuring government access for most of its history.

INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL INSIDERS

In the majority of parties covered in this chapter, the main motivation of professional politicians to found and maintain 'their' party was or still is the pursuit of individual goals. The decision to leave the mother party is often the outcome of conflicts over policies, major strategic decisions, or the distribution of core posts. Obviously, exit from the mother party is not necessarily voluntary and can be the result of expulsion. In practice, however, the distinction between exit and expulsion is often not very clear-cut since MPs often actively provoke such a drastic response by their party, for instance, by refusing to comply with the party line in a crucial parliamentary vote. As stressed in Chapter 3, the motivations and the time horizon driving the choices of party founders are crucial. They are essential to understanding patterns of party evolution, more particularly, the decision (not) to set up the mechanisms that support the institutionalization of extra-parliamentary party structures, whose benefits show predominantly in the medium or long run.

While active opposition of party founders against party building is rare in the parties covered in this chapter (unlike in some new right parties studied later on), party building driven by insiders still takes a particular form that mirrors the tensions inherent in the leadership–structure dilemma. Elites tend to favour partial institutionalization. Entering parliament and government quickly, founding leaders are busy with their parliamentary or governmental roles. They are usually interested in developing coordination procedures within the parliamentary party, thus, in achieving a certain level of routinization able to assure the party's effective operation in public office. Simultaneously, they tend to neglect extra-parliamentary party building directed towards value infusion that would allow the party as organization to outlive its leaders and survive periods without parliamentary

representation. Party elites' interest in the extra-parliamentary organization usually does not transcend the purpose of voter mobilization at election time.

Also, founding leaders of insider parties—usually strongly driven by making a career in politics—tend to favour infrastructures that consolidate their own position. They show a limited willingness to be constrained by an extra-parliamentary membership organization, especially if such constraints hamper the party's operations in public office or its leadership's room for manoeuvre. In that sense, a lack of value infusion (as defined by an interest of followers in the survival of the party as such irrespective of the current leadership) protects the position of current leaders by maintaining the party's dependence on the particular people in charge. This also means, once the leadership deserts the party, the party suffers considerably,[2] sometimes triggering party followers' return to the formation's mother party. In some instances, the party founders, who initially left an established party to have their own vehicle to run elections, return to their mother party or join another mainstream party. One striking example is the founding leader of the newcomer Icelandic People's Movement/Awakening of the Nation (*hreyfingfólksins/Þjóðvaki*). After her return to the party she initially defected from, the high-profile politician Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir became the leader of the Social Democratic Alliance and is Iceland's current prime minister.[3] Similarly, the Irish Democratic Socialist Party was created by Labour dissident Jim Kemmy. After Kemmy's repeated re-election to parliament running on this new label, he led his party back into Labour in 1990, was re-elected as Labour MP and became party chairman. Finally, the Austrian Liberal Forum (*Liberales Forum*), a splinter formed by moderate defectors of the Swiss Freedom Party, still exists as a separate organization today. Yet once the party's electoral fortunes declined and the party decided not to participate in the 2006 national elections, Liberal Forum representatives decided to run on a common list with the Social Democrats instead (Kratky 2009: 126–7; see also Gröger 2000).

[2] The Icelandic Liberals suffered from internal turmoil after it was joined by members of the New Force in 2006/7, a small, extra-parliamentary anti-immigration party, indicating the fluidity and organizational weakness of this new formation. The entry of the New Force, which was considered by some as an infiltration, caused the defection of a prominent member, Margrét Sverrisdóttir, the former party manager, a conflict that brought the party close to a split, see 'Liberal Party to Split?', *Icelandic Review*, 29 January 2007, <http://www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/Dáily_news/?cat_id=16567 &ew_0_a_id=260125>, accessed 15 December 2011. 'Margrét Sverrisdóttir Leaves Liberal Party', *Icelandic Review*, 30 January 2007, <http://www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/Dáily_news/?cat_id=16567&ew_0_a_id=260428>, accessed 15 December 2011.

[3] The Social Democrats, the party which Sigurðardóttir defected from after she lost a struggle over the party leadership, later on merged with a number of new parties into what is now the Social Democratic Alliance. The People's Movement already re-merged into the mother party during its first legislative term, i.e. well before this later merger. For an overview of new Icelandic parties, see Faber 2000 as well as Kristinsson 2007.

Given a predominantly instrumental approach, the incentive to maintain one's own party vanishes once founders realize that their vehicle is unsuccessful in electoral terms, organizationally non-viable, or if they are sufficiently successful to induce the mother party to make an attractive offer in exchange for the founder's return. Alternatively, some leaders move from founding one splinter party to the next. Once they start facing internal opposition that restricts their freedom of action, they defect, as they defected from the mainstream party they belonged to in the first place. This also implies that founding leaders of insider parties, who decide to leave their creation, tend to move on to another party (old or new) to continue their political career. Founders of outsider parties, in contrast, more often exit politics altogether, if their party fails electorally or descends into internal quarrels. That said, we also find examples of party founders who founded a second party, after having been unable to maintain a dominant position in their first creation among entrepreneurial outsider formations (e.g. the founders of New Democracy (Sweden) and the Danish Progress Party, see Chapter 8).

The fates of new left and new liberal parties echo the fate of entrepreneurial parties in other party families, whose careers tend to end when the founding generation leaves, even in cases when they were electorally successful over a long period of time. The Centre Democrats (Denmark), an entrepreneurial insider, was a party that persisted for an extensive period due to its ongoing electoral success without institutionalizing as an organization. It was represented in national parliament for nearly three decades without interruption and repeatedly participated in government, once in a centre-left, once in a centre-right coalition. It dissolved in 2008 having failed to enter parliament twice. For the first twenty years it was led by Erhard Jakobsen, a defector from the Social Democrats. He founded the party in 1973 as a 'corrective' of the Social Democrats, which had moved too far to the left according to some party members. The new party won parliamentary representation at every national election under Jakobsen's leadership. Once he stepped down in 1989 and passed on the leadership to his own daughter Mimi (an event that mirrored how closely the party was tied to Jakobsen as a person), electoral support for the party started to decline, eventually losing representation in 2001. Mimi Jakobsen stepped down as chairman in 2005, after the party had failed to enter parliament two elections in a row. Two years later, she joined the Social Democrats, the party her father had deserted in the early 1970s to found his party. Her successor stayed in office for only two years before he defected to the New Alliance, a newly created party formed only in 2007.[4] Similarly, numerous members deserted the party, many of them to join the New Alliance. In 2008, the year of its dissolution, the Centre Democrats had barely 320 members left. The number of defections reflects the failure of the party to build up a sufficiently stable support base. The New Alliance effectively 'displaced' the Centre Democrats even before the latter had formally dissolved. As a leading

[4] Note the party later moved to the right and renamed itself the Liberal Alliance.

Centre Democrat explained in 2008, 'there are too many parties in the centre'.[5] Thus, the party's decline was not triggered by a change in electoral demand but by the perceived incapacity of the Centre Democrats as an electoral vehicle to attract support and to do so more successfully than a party that had only experienced its parliamentary breakthrough one year before. Despite being active over 30 years in national politics, the Centre Democrats were not able to organize and create a membership base similar to the older parties. Co-optation into leadership positions was common practice in the earlier years. While local activists formed committees that financed and carried out campaigns (Pedersen 1987: 39), the party's lack of local penetration was visible throughout its history. In the 1981 local election the party only gained eight seats, even though the support in national elections was 8.3 per cent. In comparison, the Christian Democrats (a rooted new party) gained 27 local seats, having only 2.3 per cent of the votes at the national level. This pattern was confirmed later on: the Centre Democrats won only two, four, and three seats at the local elections of 1993, 1997, and 2001, respectively. Despite regular access to parliament and participation in national government (both founder Jakobsen and his daughter were government ministers during their time as party leaders), the party's life remained tied to its founding leader and while the take-over by the founder's daughter prolonged the career of the Centre Democrats, it could not prevent its eventual decline and death.

Typically, throughout their history, the persistence of entrepreneurial insiders is driven by their ongoing success in the parliamentary and governmental arena. Continuity is more often than not provided by the following around the founding leader. Rather than support being increasingly underpinned by the institutionalization of the party as an extra-parliamentary organization (able to generate the emotional attachment of followers to the party as such), these parties tend to remain dependent on a particular leader. In line with the leadership–structure dilemma, the failure to institutionalize is often a side-effect of and nourished by the founding elites' attempts to maintain control on the one hand and their focus on the party's functioning in public office on the other.

Table 6.1 groups the two new 'party families' along their type of origin. To engage in a systematic examination of the role of party agency, it lists separately those cases that show performance patterns that are not in line with parties' formative dispositions (i.e. entrepreneurs that showed considerable sustainability and rooted parties that declined prematurely). The distribution shows that there are more parties that did better than their structural conditions would lead us to expect than parties originating in favourable structural dispositions which were unable to reach the minimum threshold for sustainability. The first constellation particularly

[5] *Politiken*, 27 January 2008.

TABLE 6.1 *The origins of new left and new liberal parties*

	Entrepreneurial new parties[6]	Rooted new parties
	New left parties	**New left parties**
	People's Movement/Awakening of the Nation (Ice)	Left Party (Ger, bottom-up merger)
	Social Democratic Union (Ice)	Radical Party of the Left (Fr, top-down)
	Socialist Party (Ire)	Respect (UK, top-down)
	Social Democratic Party (Lux)	Workers and Unemployed Action Group (Ire, top-down)
	Independent Socialist Party (Lux)	*Socialist Electoral League/Socialist Left Party (Nor, bottom-up)*
	New Labour (Nz)	*Social Democratic Alliance (Ice, bottom-up)*
	Democratic Labour (UK)	*Alliance Party (NZ, bottom-up)*
	Social Democratic Party (UK)	
	Modem (Fr)	
	LeftLiberal Party (Ice)	
	Association of Equality and Justice (Ice)	
Insider formations	*Sustainable despite unfavourable formative conditions:*	*Non-sustainable despite favourable formative conditions:*
	Democratic Socialist Party (Ire)	
	Citizen and Republican Movement (Fr)	Socialist Labour Party (Ire, bottom-up)
	Progressive Coalition (NZ)	*Democratic Left (Ire, top-down)*
	Centre Democrats (Den)	
	Democratic Socialists 1970 (NL)	
	New Liberal Parties	**New Liberal Parties**
	Liberal People's Party (Nor)	*ACT (NZ, top-down)*
	Liberal Movement (Aus)	
	Liberal Forum (Aul)	
	Young Finns (Finland)	
	Liberal Alliance (Den)	
	United Party (NZ)	
	New Centre (Fr)	
	Sustainable despite unfavourable formative conditions:	
	Liberal Party (Ice)[7]	
	Progressive Democrats (Ire)	
	New left parties	**New left parties**
	Common Course (Den)	Progressive Organization (Ch, bottom-up)
		Socialist Party (NL, top-down)

[6] Entrepreneurs cannot be formed by inter-group negotiations in a bottom-up fashion, which by default would imply societal rootedness. Consequently, the formation mode is only specified for rooted parties.

[7] This party managed to get re-elected twice, i.e. met the minimum threshold for national sustainability. However, it drastically declined and lost all its seats right afterwards.

Outsider formations		Social Democratic and Labour Party (UK, top-down) SolidaritéS (Ch, bottom-up) Partito Socialista Autonomo/Unitario (Ch, top-down) People before Profit (Ire, bottom-up) Citizen Movement (Ice, bottom-up) New Left (Lux, bottom-up)[8] *Non-sustainable despite favourable formative conditions:* Red Electoral Alliance (Nor, bottom-up) Democratic Alternative (Fin, bottom-up)
	New liberal parties	**New liberal parties** Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (UK, top-down)

Notes: Parties in italics have been in national government (coalition partner or support party); note that recently emerging parties cannot violate the sustainability criterion since they have not yet participated in two re-elections after breakthrough.[9]

highlights that the fates of new parties are not determined by their formative conditions but that party agency matters. The success of the entrepreneurial parties, however, is usually not underpinned by extra-parliamentary party building. As indicated earlier, in the case of the Irish Democratic Socialist Party as well as the Danish Centre Democrats, two entrepreneurial insiders that are by now dissolved, leadership continuity—more particularly the ongoing reign of the party founder—was the crucial stabilizing element that underpinned these parties' sustainability. The same is the case in the French Citizen and Republican Movement, still run by its founder Jean-Pierre Chevènement (a former Socialist) and the Progressive Coalition (NZ) which has recently become moribund when its founder, a former Labour MP, retired.

Table 6.1 underlines the strong career orientation of insider parties by showing the high rate of insiders that manage to enter national government either as formal coalition partner or support party (in italics). Before selecting one left and one liberal party for closer scrutiny, the next section explores which implications the take-over of government responsibility had for new liberal and new left parties.

[8] The New Left failed to assure two repeated re-elections directly after breakthrough but won seats at three national elections.

[9] These are People before Profit, Modem, New Centre, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, the Workers and Unemployed Action Group, the Danish Liberal Alliance, and the Icelandic Citizen Movement.

THE DOMINANCE OF CAREERISM: LIBERAL AND LEFT INSIDERS IN GOVERNMENT

We have already seen in Chapter 2 that insider formations enter national government more often than outsider formations. Twenty-eight of 40 new parties that achieved access to government on the national level were insiders, a tendency that shows in an even more pronounced fashion in the new liberal and new left groups. In these two groups, we find no outsider party that achieved access to national government. In contrast, ten left insiders (six of which are entrepreneurs) and four liberal insiders (three of which are entrepreneurs) took over government responsibility at some point in their career. Entrepreneurial insiders are not only highly successful in taking over government responsibility, they often do so relatively quickly after their parliamentary entry. This contrasts with other new party families whose members have entered government in increasing numbers, such as Green parties, but are populated by outsider formations. They were active on the national level for considerable periods before being considered as possible coalition partners. Similarly, left and liberal entrepreneurial insiders usually enter parliament when they first participate in national elections. Their potential to access institutional resources tends to be confirmed right away, a crucial incentive for party elites to stick with the party. Consequently, entrepreneurial insiders widely conform to the conception of a new party as electoral vehicle.

At the same time, these parties tend to emulate mainstream ideologies, which increases their compatibility with mainstream parties naturally and thereby their coalition potential. Especially when insider formations coalesce with their mother parties, which we find among both new liberal and new left parties, ideological compatibility is assured, which facilitates cooperation. Such a move usually serves the immediate career interests of a party's (founding) leadership, as did the formation of the new party in the first place. At first glance such a move seems surprising, since the formation of these splinter parties is often a consequence of an internal struggle between high-profile figures in the mother party, which should complicate cooperation between party leaders. However, if a new party is successful and ends up in a pivotal position (i.e. can deliver the necessary seats to form a parliamentary majority), its (founding) leader can negotiate with his or her former rivals eye-to-eye over the distribution of government spoils, which unlike a fight for the leadership of the mother party is not a zero-sum game.

Given careerist motivations and instrumental attitudes towards the party among leading elites, entering government is a rational move, even though government participation can be damaging for a newcomer by making it difficult to maintain its profile and destabilizing organizationally as case studies have suggested (e.g. Heinisch 2003; Deschouwer 2008; O'Malley 2010). It is indicative that four of five entrepreneurial insiders that were, against theoretical expectations, sustainable (i.e. managed to get re-elected after breakthrough at least twice) took over

government responsibility, yet none of these parties—except for the Citizen and Republican Movement[10]—is still active today. Thus, we find a discrepancy between short-term success as visible in a party's government participation (as aspired to by elites) and its long-term persistence as an organization. While left and liberal entrepreneurial insiders enter government more often and quicker than parties in the other categories, they tend to be less long-lived in terms of their overall lifespans, leaving aside two notable exceptions, the Danish Centre Party and the Irish Progressive Democrats (which, however, are both no longer active as well). In other words, government access might help parties without the support of promoter organizations to sustain electoral support through the provision of selective incentives in the short run, without supporting their persistence as organizations once the access to such incentives is lost. At the same time, we find only one case of organizational disintegration when being in government, which suggests that parties led by professional politicians know what they get into and adapt to the pressures of government reasonably well.

These mixed observations raise the question of what the implications of government participation are for entrepreneurial and rooted insiders respectively. Is rootedness also an advantage in the realm of government as it is with regard to persistence and sustainability? More fundamentally, is the take-over of government responsibility really as damaging for new parties as the literature suggests (e.g. Heinisch 2003; Deschouwer 2008; O'Malley 2010)? Although the picture is mixed, a closer look suggests that the last two questions can be answered with a tentative 'no', stressing the importance of elite choices that shape how well a party can cope with government (de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012).

In the entrepreneurial formations covered in this chapter, government tended to reinforce fundamental vulnerabilities but these did not lie at the heart of parties' decline and eventual death. The Democratic Socialists 1970 (DS70) displays this pattern nicely. This entrepreneurial inside was a classical purifier, founded as a 'less left-wing corrective' of the Dutch Labour Party. While conservative Labour members took the initiative and started the party in 1970, they were soon joined by Labour MPs, after which the DS70 announced it would run at the next general election in 1971 (Vingerling and Schouten 2003: 119–20). It entered parliament with 5.3 per cent of the vote and eight seats, thanks also to the capacity of its political leader—Wim Drees, a former civil servant at the treasury and son of a very popular former prime minister—to sell the party's programme very effectively (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008: 74). The party joined a centre-right government together with the Liberals and Christian Democrats right away. However, the party left the coalition already one year later based on Drees's initiative, as he failed to convince his coalition partners of his financial policies, which led to the collapse

[10] Note that the party changed name several times. It started as Citizens Movement. Before the 2002 presidential elections Chevènement created the *Pôle Républicain*, which eventually became the Citizen and Republican Movement.

of the coalition and triggered new elections in 1972 (Schikhof 2002).While the party lost votes, it still returned to parliament with six seats. It did not return to government though (Vingerling and Schouten 2003: 193), which upset many members, who had left the Labour Party to participate in government rather than join the opposition (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008: 74), indicating an instrumental underpinning of at least some followers' support.

Government participation triggered tensions in the party but what brought it down were internal struggles between a conservative and a progressive wing and criticism of Drees's leadership and strategy. These struggles hit the party two years after the party had left government and provoked the defection of four of their six MPs in 1974 (Vingerling and Schouten 2003: 221–2; see also Drees 1991). The incapacity to cope with intra-organizational conflict and to work effectively as a party in parliament was considered as one major reason for the electoral disaster in 1977, which left the party with only one parliamentary seat. Confronted with this result, Drees decided to leave and at the following election the party lost parliamentary representation altogether. The party dissolved in January 1983 with 50 of only 63 remaining members in favour (Vingerling and Schouten 2003: 263–4). The defection of the majority of the parliamentary party in 1974 already indicated the limited attachment of office holders to the party, as did the leader's departure as his response to the party's electoral decline.

Rather than illustrating the costs of governing, DS70 mirrors intra-organizational dynamics already observed in other entrepreneurial insiders such as the Danish Centre Democrats. This will be echoed in the later case study of the Progressive Democrats, who were in government for most of their history. While they dissolved while still holding ministries, repeated government access kept the party going rather than undermining it. While government responsibility might reinforce existing tensions by putting additional pressures on the party and its leadership, the vulnerability of these parties has roots in their structural dispositions and the orientation of their leaders.

Among rooted insider formations, responses to government are more mixed. The Icelandic Social Democratic Alliance is a merger that included several new parties but also an old, experienced party, the Social Democrats.[11] The Norwegian Socialist Electoral League took over a support party role only after more than 30 years of parliamentary experience. Both did well and repeated the experience. In the liberal ACT party (NZ), in contrast, government status created dissatisfaction among members and MPs with the party's policy achievements. These tensions culminated in an attempt to replace the leader, Rodney Hide (who had also been the first party president). While this attempt was unsuccessful, Hide

[11] The Icelandic Social Democratic Alliance managed to consolidate its vote share after having been in charge of government. However, in addition to the political experience the Social Democrats (an old party that formed part of the merger) brought to the table, the Alliance was the dominant coalition party and not a junior partner struggling to realize its policy preferences (a difficulty that is often an important source of conflict in the membership organization when new (small) parties enter government).

stepped back ahead of the 2011 elections, an election at which the party won only one seat, the worst result in party history. In the left Alliance Party (NZ), intra-organizational opposition against the leader's operation in government led to the leader's defection and his founding of another party, the Progressive Coalition (Miller 2005). The Alliance declined drastically after this shock as we will see in a later case study, while its splinter was sustainable and maintained a national presence until its founder retired. Like the Alliance (NZ), the Democratic Left (Ireland) was also destabilized by its participation in government, which it joined directly after its parliamentary breakthrough in 1992. Electoral support dropped slightly after the party had left government, which led to the party losing two of its six seats. More importantly, however, between 1994 and 1997 the majority of its parliamentarians took over ministerial posts, while the party headquarters lost its resources to engage in party building because its most experienced workers were reallocated after 1994 to jobs defending and servicing the party in government. As a consequence, the party 'had insufficient time to carve out an effective extra-parliamentary identity and infrastructure' (Dunphy and Bale 2011: 498). Having further accrued significant financial debt, the party merged with the Labour Party a few years later (O'Malley 2010; Bale and Dunphy 2011; Dunphy and Bale 2011). It was the insufficient capacity of this party as a collective actor to cope with government, rather than additional lines of conflict caused by government participation, that seem to have caused lasting damage.

What conclusions can we draw from the experiences of these two types of insider parties? For one thing, not all new parties suffer from government. Furthermore, entrepreneurs do not necessarily cope with government less well than rooted parties, to the contrary. The picture starts making more sense when making a distinction between *electoral costs* and *organizational costs*.

Some entrepreneurial formations suffered strongly electorally after having been in government (such as the French Citizen and Republican Movement), indicating a particularly volatile support base. A quantitative study exploring the electoral losses that the new parties covered in this book suffered from at the first election after their breakthrough echoes this. It indicates that entrepreneurs systematically lose more votes than rooted new parties, while whether new parties (including rooted parties and entrepreneurs) entered national government right away or whether they stayed in opposition did not have a significant effect (Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013b).[12] While the support base of entrepreneurs is less reliable, electoral vehicles that are centred around (or mainly consist of) a strong leadership are less likely to suffer from intra-organizational strains triggered by government. If the core elites are unified in their goal to access core positions in parliament and, if

[12] Similarly, Akkerman and de Lange (2012) show that the electoral costs of governing for radical right parties in Western Europe are shaped by the capacity of the party to cope with office organizationally.

possible, government, the compromises necessary to stay in office will trigger relatively little internal conflict (conflict which can be repressed more easily than in parties that have a well-organized, extra-parliamentary membership base).

Rooted formations, in contrast, are more difficult to manage when tensions emerge. The case study of United Future NZ examined in Chapter 5 illustrated this. Rootedness implies a ready support base that tends to hold certain policy preferences rather than blindly following a leader. The presence of such a base is an advantage only as long as the leadership—to some extent—is willing to act in line with followers' preferences. Once conflicts materialize, the potential to impose decisions hierarchically is much more restricted. To handle tensions in such an organizational context requires more managerial skills from the leadership. If a rooted party has a capable leader who can reconcile intra-organizational divides, government can trigger reforms favouring party institutionalization which, in turn, can help to assure the persistence of a rooted newcomer in the longer run (Bolleyer et al. 2012). However, as stressed by earlier studies (e.g. Mudde 2007), such managerial skills are not necessarily a given, which is why the organizational tensions triggered by government can be particularly intense in rooted parties and their consequences for the party as an organization particularly severe.

LONG-TERM TRAJECTORIES OF NEW LIBERAL AND NEW LEFT PARTIES: IDENTIFYING 'DEVIANT' PERFORMANCE PATTERNS

Having summed up the basic intra-organizational tendencies predominant in left and liberal insider parties and the implication of government participation more particularly, a brief look at the long-term trajectories of new liberal and new left parties allows us to identify cases that contradict our theoretical expectations and whose analyses are therefore particularly insightful. We already observed in Chapter 1 the decline in electoral support prevalent in the liberal group (see Figure 1.1).[13] Mirroring the dominance of entrepreneurial insiders, performance is weak in terms of both persistence and sustainability (see Table 6.1 for the full list of parties). While the fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s made far-leftist positions difficult to 'sell' on the electoral market, the European financial

[13] One exception among liberal parties in terms of origin and performance pattern is the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, a rooted outsider party, which persisted thanks to a stable regional base and its capacity to win seats in the Northern Irish parliament and to enter government regionally. The party participated in national elections for decades without entering the House of Commons, winning its first national seat in 2010. Initially it represented a liberal Unionism (Walker 2004: 171) and then moved towards wider liberal concerns.

crisis in the late 2000s made neoliberal policies highly unpopular, which, in turn, has opened a window of opportunity for the rise of new left-wing parties: for example, the Icelandic Liberal Party, an inside entrepreneur, formed by a dissident from the Independent Party in 1998, managed to win seats at three elections in a row and at its peak, in 2003, won 7.4 per cent of the vote. While it won four seats at the elections in May 2007, it lost all of them only two years later. Incidentally, this election saw the entry of the Citizen Movement winning four seats (7.2 per cent), a new left-wing party formed as a response to the financial crisis that hit Iceland in 2008. Despite the importance of the recent financial crisis, however, most new liberal parties had already dissolved before the economy started to decline. And in the cases where liberal parties suffered directly from this development, the latter functioned as an accelerator of vulnerabilities which characterized these parties since their foundation, namely their lack of institutionalization, particularly in terms of value infusion. While mirroring the overall downwards trend, the Irish Progressive Democrats (PD) still stands out as a liberal party that was highly successful for more than two decades. It was more persistent than its origin as splinter party without organized societal support would suggest and won 11.8 per cent at its breakthrough election in 1987. It dissolved in 2008 after Ireland had been hit by the financial crisis, making the party's policies extremely unpopular, which, in turn, led to the last member of the founding elite leaving the party. This party seemed to have all advantages on its side (in terms of electoral success and regular access to institutional resources) to consolidate support and build a lasting organization able to outlive periods of crisis. However, the case study below will illustrate how the party's success in government never made it necessary to decouple followers' support from the provision of selective incentives. Consequently, there was little incentive to form a lasting extra-parliamentary organization able to provide any non-material incentives. The PD's success inside parliament and government and its failure to institutionalize outside public institutions are mirror images of each other, both being underpinned by the dominant strategic orientation of its founding elite.

Reflecting the more mixed origins of new left parties, trajectories after breakthrough are more diverse in this group. Figure 6.1 shows the trajectories of all new left parties after breakthrough that managed to win 4 per cent of the national vote at least once during their career. Showing this level of electoral potential, their elites are likely to have had some room to shape the fortune of their party. Fourteen new left parties (excluding recent entries) won that level of support, which highlights that a majority of new left parties had a rather marginal (although sometimes very loyal) support base. The Icelandic Social Democratic Alliance—with electoral support up to 30 per cent of the national vote—represents the other extreme. Among the 140 cases included in this study, there are only two new formations that resemble that configuration structurally and in their electoral strength. Both are conservative mergers composed of old and new parties: the Union for French Democracy (at its peak 23.9 per cent) and the



FIGURE 6.1 National electoral trajectories of new left parties

Note: Vertical axis displays % of national vote. Figure includes only electorally significant new parties (4% or more) and excludes recent entries.

Conservative Party of Canada (at its peak 39.6 per cent). Although each of these parties is certainly interesting for its own sake, they are unrepresentative regarding the difficulties that new—usually minor—parties tend to face when entering the national stage.

Rooted parties did, on average, better than entrepreneurial formations in terms of sustainability. Examples of such rooted new left parties that could establish their own niche are the German Left Party, the Dutch Socialist Party, and the Socialist Left Party, Norway. Although the figure echoes the importance of party origin, we find two entrepreneurs that do not conform to our expectations. The Centre Democrats, an entrepreneurial insider, maintained a parliamentary presence for nearly three decades with continuity mainly provided by its founding leader, as described earlier. This leaves us with the Alliance Party (NZ), a rooted party that suffered from a spectacular decline.

Based on these two overviews we can identify two cases deserving a closer look. Due to their extremeness in the context of their respective families, they are likely to show with particular clarity the differences between the sources of electoral success and the sources of organizational persistence. The Alliance Party (NZ) captured 18.2 per cent at its breakthrough election, only 'beaten' in the left grouping by the Icelandic Social Democratic Alliance (currently the main

government party in Iceland). Similarly, the Progressive Democrats (PD) won 11.8 per cent at its breakthrough election, more than any other party in the liberal group ever did. Both entered parliament quickly after their foundation and participated in national governments. The exploration of elite choices shows why the Alliance Party, a rooted merger party, did not manage to consolidate a support base and constitutes the only case of an insider formation that showed openly disintegrative tendencies while being in national government. It also shows why the PD, a classical entrepreneurial insider formation, despite plenty of resources, failed to build a self-standing organization and throughout its career remained dependent on a small founding elite.

Rooted parties with 'entrepreneurial' founders: the decline of the Alliance Party

The Alliance Party (NZ) was formed in 1992 by a merger of five parties. One of the merging parties was New Labour, an entrepreneurial insider, founded in 1989 by a national politician who also initiated the formation of the Alliance a few years later. Jim Anderton, a former backbencher of the Labour Party and former Labour president, was expelled from the caucus in 1988 after having refused to support the government's privatization legislation. He became a catalyst for a growing opposition against free market reforms in Labour's extra-parliamentary party and when he founded New Labour in 1989, he was joined by a range of former Labour activists (although none of his parliamentary colleagues). The rationale of the party was the shared belief of its followers that Labour had moved too far towards the right and that New Labour was in fact the 'true Labour party'. Thus, New Labour was a classical 'purifier party', populated and run by former Labour people: all members of the government body of the newly formed party came from Labour as did the majority of delegates at the party's 1990 conference (Miller 2005: 40). Yet although there were considerable frustrations among voters with old Labour at the time, the newcomer still competed with its mother party for the same type of voters. It targeted low-income workers and beneficiaries and indeed had modest support in these groups. Most of them, however, remained loyal to Labour (Miller 2005: 55). Furthermore, Anderton's party had no ties to societal groups that could have provided a separate support base from those attached to the mother party, while it competed for the 'anti-Labour vote' with other minor parties that were genuinely distinctive and not affiliated with the two big parties, such as the Greens. Consequently, at the general election in 1990, New Labour won only 5.2 per cent of the national vote.

To consolidate a broader and more distinct support base, in late 1991, Anderton convinced three other minor parties—the Greens, Social Credit (renamed the Democratic Party in 1985), and Mana Motuhake, a Maori party founded in 1980, to pool their resources and merge into one party organization. They were

later joined by the Liberal Party, a National Party splinter. Although the constituent parties initially retained some autonomy, they spent the next two years harmonizing their resources (Miller 2005: 40) and eventually built one party infrastructure which new members could join directly rather than entering through the constituent parties. Yet despite these party-building efforts that led to shared procedures, the merger did not lead to a shared, organizational identity able to keep the party together in times of crisis. Despite being embedded in one overall party structure, an orientation of the constituent parts towards assuring the survival of the party as a whole (i.e. institutionalization in terms of value infusion) remained underdeveloped. The Democrats (the old, renamed Social Credit Party) and Mana Motuhake (a rooted party with ties to Maori organizations) tried to retain their distinct identities within the new formation. And only in the late 1990s did the New Labour Party and the Liberal Party (both entrepreneurial splinter parties from the major parties Labour and National respectively) fully dissolve into the new formation, with their members becoming members of the Alliance.[14] The Greens, which left as early as 1999, never fully dissolved into the party. The Democrats and Mana Motuhake split from the Alliance a few years later. The Democrats joined the new party of the defecting leader, Jim Anderton, and Mana Motuhake—similar to the Greens in 1999—split in 2002 to compete in elections on their own.

Winning 18.2 per cent at the 1993 general elections (which under FPP led to only two seats), the party's support had already more than halved (7.7 per cent) when it joined government in 1999, two legislative terms later—incidentally the last term the Alliance would be represented in national parliament. The party became irrevocably divided in late 2001/early 2002, when in government with Anderton's former party, Labour. Already ahead of the election the policy differences between Labour and Alliance blurred. The coalition agreement was negotiated quickly, was only one and a half pages long and virtually policy-free (the NZ First and National agreement, in contrast, had been 72 pages long), which reflected Anderton's strategy to rebuild trust between Labour and the Alliance (Bale and Blomgren 2008: 95). Although Anderton took over the important position of deputy prime minister, doubts about the Alliance's capacity to influence policy arose quickly and opinion polls indicated that the party would lose most of its list seats at the next election. Alliance's subservience to Labour was identified as one of the main reasons for this development (Miller 2005: 221–2).

In late 2001 a fight arose over who in the party should control major policy decisions[15] leading to a fall-out between Anderton and party leader Matt McCarten. Anderton was accused of being too compliant towards the big coalition partner Labour and insufficiently forceful in the implementation of the party's own

[14] See <http://www.elections.org.nz/files/Alliance_rules_0.pdf>, accessed 28 November 2011. See also <http://www.ourcampaigns.com/PartyDetail.html?PartyID=1022>, accessed 20 November 2011.

[15] One was triggered by the government's decision to send military assistance for the invasion of Afghanistan (Bale and Blomgren 2008: 95).

agenda, a position that was not only shared by activists but also by some members of the parliamentary group and some cabinet ministers (Bale and Blomgren 2008: 95). Consequently, activists demanded the involvement of the party council when major policy decisions were made. Anderton and his supporters in the parliamentary party wanted the caucus to be in full control and dismissed other solutions as impractical. Operating at that point under a mixed-member proportional system (MMP), Anderton held a safe constituency seat, which given the nature of the newly adopted electoral system assured him parliamentary access even if his party won less than the formal threshold of 5 per cent[16] of the national vote. Being confronted with the demand of the organization for a say in party decisions, rather than negotiating a compromise, Anderton decided, together with three MPs, to defect and to found another new party.[17] Anderton's and his followers' defection is particularly striking given the strong institutional incentives to maintain the integrity of the parliamentary group of the Alliance, which effectively split into two halves. Existing parliamentary rules regarding changes of party allegiance meant that Anderton and his allies could not officially resign from the Alliance without also resigning from parliament. To avoid the latter, Anderton and his allies technically remained part of the party, while practically operating outside of it, which caused the disintegration of the Alliance's parliamentary group and was one reason for the early election in 2002.[18]

Anderton's response to the conflict by simply deserting his party and founding another one points to fundamental sources of vulnerability inherent in the Alliance from the start. Mechanisms of conflict resolution able to coordinate and reconcile diverging positions taken by the different party units were underdeveloped, which was particularly problematic for a party like the Alliance that was formed bottom-up. Leaders of many hierarchical new formations—at least initially—tend to solve internal problems by expelling dissenting voices or forcing them to defect by refusing them sufficient say, be these voices those of individuals, groups, or subnational units. Yet unlike in many entrepreneurial formations that are created top-down, the Alliance was composed of several parties that constituted a shared infrastructure which provided a platform for collectively organized intra-party opposition. This opposition was led by the leader of the extra-parliamentary organization and could not be bypassed by top-down decisions of the party leadership in parliament. Thus, Anderton left and founded a new entrepreneurial party (initially 'Anderton's Progressives') to pursue his career

[16] Under MMP as adopted in New Zealand in 1996, a 5 per cent parliamentary threshold applies only to those parties that do not win any direct mandates.

[17] Audrey Young, 'Feud Leaves Alliance Caucus a Lame Duck', *The New Zealand Herald*, 27 March 2002, <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=1291897>, accessed 20 November 2011.

[18] 'New Zealand's Prime Minister Calls For Early Elections', 11 June 2002, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2002-06-11-22-New-67428547.html>, accessed 12 November 2011.

ambitions, a 'mode of conflict resolution' that refuses negotiation and compromise, similar to the top-down suppression of dissent, which given the Alliance's nature was not an option.

Yet while Anderton's exit severely damaged the party, the Alliance had already suffered from defections before his departure, both on the level of the parliamentary group and in terms of its extra-parliamentary base, which indicate the party's vulnerability. Two MPs had defected and the Greens already departed, after internal relations had deteriorated due to Anderton's domineering style (Miller 2005: 216). These events stress the tension between the very nature of this bottom-up formation composed of several, formerly autonomous parties and the hierarchical style of a founding party leader. When Anderton left, the Democrats, one of the constituent parties, joined him and his 'Progressive Coalition' for the 2002 election.[19] Furthermore, several Alliance MPs who stayed with the party eventually decided not to run again, which meant the Alliance had to compete in the 2002 election having lost most of its better-known people. While Anderton's Progressive Party won two seats in 2002 (with 1.8 per cent of the vote), its mother party Alliance won only 1.2 per cent and, more importantly, no seats since it lacked parliamentary access through a constituency mandate. After this electoral disaster, another of the constituent parties, Mana Motuhake, left[20] and the Alliance's parliamentary career was effectively over.

In terms of institutionalization or, more precisely, the lack thereof, the range of defections of individuals and constituent parties reflect a weak attachment to the newly formed party as such. Value infusion could hardly develop given the lack of influence of the party base on internal decisions and the lack of identification with its new leader who dominated those decisions. The escalation of the conflict around Anderton—as Bale and Blomgren put it (2008: 95)—shows that 'the party had never really resolved the institutional relationship between the party in public and in central office', a sign of weak routinization. In terms of leadership, the refusal of the Alliance founder to be constrained by any responsibility towards his own party (and its various constituent units), the parliamentary group, or his cabinet colleagues could not have been displayed with greater clarity. While the Alliance as a party initially had ties to societal groups through some of its constituent parties, Anderton himself did not share such affiliation—similar to United Future's founder Dunne. He chose the path best serving his career as political entrepreneur, unconcerned by any considerations for the survival of the party. Just as the Alliance's career (initially a rooted merger) ended with Anderton's defection, so the career of the Progressive Party—Anderton's third creation

[19] This strategic coalition also did not last. The Democrats' candidates did not win either of the Progressives' two seats, since they only occupied the third and fourth position on the list. They left after the election.

[20] See < http://www.ourcampaigns.com/PartyDetail.html?PartyID=1022>, accessed 20 November 2011.

and (as New Labour) a prototypical entrepreneur—ended with his retirement several years later.

Sustainability through leadership continuity: the Irish Progressive Democrats

The Progressive Democrats (PD) is the most successful new liberal party that entered the parliamentary stage in the 17 democracies covered in this study, especially when measured in terms of government participation in relation to the party's lifespan (see Table 6.2). That the PD achieved this is all the more remarkable since Fianna Fáil (FF) (from the foundation of the Irish Republic the dominant and natural government party in the Irish party system; see Mair 1987) had long refused to share government power altogether (until 1989—when FF formed its first coalition with the PD). Before then, policy influence for minor parties or Independents was mostly exercised by providing support for minority governments[21] as did the PD after its parliamentary breakthrough, when it selectively supported the FF minority government formed after the 1987 election (Collins 2005: 78). The willingness to share government power from 1989 onwards indicated a fundamental change from a Westminster-style democracy dominated by single-party government to coalition government, a shift the PD had initiated and that it used in its favour later on: the party effectively framed elections as a choice between one party and coalition government, such as in 2002, an election at which the PD doubled its share of seats from four to eight.

The PD, an entrepreneurial insider, was formed in 1985 by defectors from FF, most prominently Teachta Dála (TD) Desmond O'Malley. He was expelled by the party for refusing to support the party in a crucial vote, which triggered the defection of further TDs, such as Mary Harney (O'Malley's later successor as party leader). Like O'Malley, she opposed the FF leader at the time, Charles Haughey. Yet, the creation of the PD was supported not only by FF affiliates but also by some Fine Gael (FG) and Labour followers. The country was in deep crisis and citizens' frustration with the two mainstream parties was considerable. More specifically, the foundation of the PD was driven by the perceived need to develop an alternative approach to economic policy (Collins 2005). To influence policy in the Irish political system, however, in which the parliamentary opposition is in effect powerless, government access is a necessary precondition to shape policies. Throughout their history the PD was oriented towards exploiting its parliamentary position to achieve such access, even at high costs. One might even say it was the party's main survival strategy.

[21] For an overview of minor party participation in Irish government 1948–2009, see O'Malley 2010: 546.

TABLE 6.2 *The performance of the Irish Progressive Democrats at national elections*

Year of general election	Votes (%)	Seats	Government participation after election
1987	11.8	14	No[22]
1989	5.5	6	Yes
1992	4.7	10	No
1997	4.7	4	Yes
2002	4.0	8	Yes
2007	2.7	2	Yes

Sources: O'Malley 2010; Bolleyer 2012c.

As Table 6.2 indicates, the PD held core ministerial posts in government (such as justice, economic development, or health) for 15 years during a lifespan of 23 years, and spent more than the last decade of its existence in government, despite experiencing ongoing electoral decline. Two of its representatives still held ministerial posts in 2009, after the party had already decided to dissolve (November 2008),[23] echoing that it always had been the party in public office that kept the party going, rather than its extra-parliamentary base. The figures show that losing seats did not necessarily mean that the PD could not enter government. After the election disaster of 1989, when it lost eight of its initial 14 seats, the party still managed to negotiate its first formal coalition agreement with FF. Similarly, the PD was reduced to four TDs after the 1997 election. Yet again, the party joined a coalition with FF. Throughout its history, the party profited from the geometry of coalition formation with a big partner eager to form a 'minimal winning coalition' to minimize the share of power it had to give up in exchange for the formation of a working government majority.

As compared to other minor parties in Ireland, the PD was a highly successful electoral machine but, unlike the Irish Green Party or the Labour Party, the party was never underpinned by a fully institutionalized, extra-parliamentary organization. Organizational continuity was provided by a core of highly talented politicians, ambitious, office-seeking individuals most of whom occupied parliamentary office throughout their careers. This structural dependence on specific individuals becomes most visible when looking at the powerful position of party leader in this leadership-dominated party. While most Irish parties tend towards the cadre rather than the mass party model (Mair 1987), the PD still stands out since for nearly all of its history the party was run by a member of its generation of founders.[24] Main founder Desmond O'Malley was leader from

[22] After the 1987 elections, the PD occasionally supported the government but did not function as a formal support party.

[23] It officially deregistered in 2009.

[24] In line with their constitution, the party leader had to be a Dáil member, a rule that did not change until after the 2007 election when the party had only two TDs left (from then on, the post was opened to Senead members as well), a year before the party dissolved. Three years earlier the PD had

1985 to 1993, then Mary Harney took over from 1993 to 2007. After stepping down, O'Malley stayed on as parliamentarian and party whip until his retirement in 2001 and Bobby Molloy, another former FF TD joining the PD right at the beginning, retired in 2002 after he was forced to resign as junior minister just ahead of the 2002 election (Collins 2005: 208).

While the party's demise had been repeatedly predicted by political observers over the years,[25] Harney's decision to give up the leadership after the 2007 national election was the moment when the party's organizational autonomy from its founding fathers was finally put to the test. At this point the party was electorally weaker than ever before in its history and a recovery highly questionable. Harney had considered stepping down already in 2004 but had been convinced to stay on by other members of the party executive.[26] Finally, in 2008 Harney gave up altogether the party which she helped to maintain for more than two decades. Before the crucial party meeting in November 2008 to decide about the party's future, she indicated that 'the party does not have the capacity to elect people to the *Dáil*',[27] a capacity which had always remained the dominant *raison d'être* for the party's persistence. Together with the new party leader Ciarán Cannon and the other MPs she argued in favour of the party's dissolution. The representatives in public office—the arm of the party that formed its very core—did not see any point in maintaining the party (although quite a few of them intended to continue their political careers). Other core figures in the party had already quit politics, such as the former president of the PD, Tom Parlon, who left to take up a job in industry.[28] The result of the vote was 201 votes to 161 against a motion to continue with the party.[29] A majority of members followed the party elite to call it off.

adopted the 'electoral college form' of leadership selection; prior to this the selection was made by the parliamentary party. The formula adopted in 2004 provided parliamentarians with 40 per cent of the vote, party members received 30 per cent, and locally elected officials and members of the national executive accounted for the remaining 30 per cent. The initial push to change the selection method seems to have been in the form of a conference motion offered by the Dublin South East constituency, the home constituency of TD and leadership aspirant Michael McDowell, calling for the adoption of a pure membership vote method (Cross and Blais 2011).

[25] See also Progressive Democrats, *The PDs: From Boom to Bust*, Episode One: Party On/Episode Two: Party Over, <http://www.rte.ie/tv/programmes/the_pds_from_boom_to_bust.html>, accessed 5 November 2011.

[26] Interview with Mary Harney, Progressive Democrats: *The PDs: From Boom to Bust*. 'Harney to Remain as Leader of the PDs', 18 July 2007, <http://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0718/pds.html>, accessed 9 January 2012.

[27] 'Harney Pessimistic on Future of PDs', 7 November 2008, <http://www.rte.ie/news/2008/1107/pds.html>, accessed 9 January 2012.

[28] 'Parlon Quits PDs for Construction Industry Job', 11 November 2007, <http://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0710/pds.html>, accessed 15 May 2012.

[29] 'PD Vote to Bring Party to an End', 10 November 2008, <http://www.rte.ie/news/2008/1108/pd.html>, accessed 9 January 2012.

While the PD died as a party, a range of PD politicians continued their careers nonetheless. Harney returned to the *Dáil* as an Independent candidate being able to rely on her personal following in her constituency, as she could during her time with the PD. At the 2011 election, several former PD politicians returned to parliament, such as Noel Grealish (next to Harney one of the two last PD parliamentarians) who had joined FG, as well as Ciarán Cannon, its former leader. Some did better in this election than they had when still running on the PD label.[30] With the Irish economy still suffering under the financial crisis and the PD heavily criticized for its economic policies, to leave the party was the rational move for any politician who wanted to protect his or her own career prospects. In effect, the PD died when Mary Harney, the last founding member, and who had led the party for nearly 15 years, decided that the PD as electoral vehicle had become incapable of fulfilling its main function, namely helping to get people into parliament and, hence, into government.

Yet the instrumental attachment of PD followers to the party was not just visible in the final phase of decline, it was visible throughout the party's history and, to some extent, was in-built in the party from the start. The specification of disciplinary procedures in Article 12 of the party statutes mirrors the self-perception of this party as an electoral vehicle rather than as a societal organization representing certain values: while running without an official nomination or supporting a candidate from another party leads to immediate expulsion, violating the principles of the party was considered as less severe.[31] Members of the party elite withdrew from the party when the party's demise seemed inevitable or when they were not able to realize their career ambitions within it. One telling example is Michael McDowell, a former FG follower and later PD party secretary, who had been involved in setting up the party organization. He left the party after the 1997 election, having lost his seat a second time in a row. The party was reduced to four seats and McDowell anticipated the party's death and decided to leave.[32] He long refused to rejoin the party, but did so eventually to run the 2002 election on a PD ticket, after which he became Minister of Justice. Losing his seat in 2007, he withdrew from political life a second time. Further defections of high-profile TDs followed after O'Malley—in effect—passed on the party leadership to Harney, another member of the founding elite, which was not an uncontested decision (O'Malley 2010: 555).[33]

[30] 'The PDs Return: Former Party Fares Better in 2011 than 2007', 27 February 2011, <http://www.thejournal.ie/the-pds-return-former-party-fares-better-in-2011-than-2007-2011-02/>, accessed 9 January 2012.

[31] Progressive Democrats, Party Constitution, adopted 28 February 2004.

[32] Interview with Michael McDowell, *The PDs: From Boom to Bust*, Episode One: Party On, <http://www.rte.ie/tv/programmes/the_pds_from_boom_to_bust.html>, accessed 5 November 2011.

[33] When O'Malley decided to step down from the leadership, he informed Harney about his decision earlier than other people in the party including Cox, who was interested in the party leadership himself. In effect, he put Harney in an advantaged position to gather support compared to other contestants,

Similar indications of the instrumental underpinning of PD support were the recurrent discussions about joining one of the major parties, whenever the effectiveness of the PD as 'political label' was seriously questioned. Possible mergers were discussed over the years with varying partners. In 1998 some in the party contemplated a return to FF, an idea which Harney publicly rejected after a successful General Council meeting (Collins 2005: 198). A few years later, informal talks took place with FG over a potential merger after poor results at the 2004 local election, which failed since PD members would not have accepted a simple absorption of their party by the bigger FG.[34] Again, in autumn 2008, rumours had to be denied that the PD leadership had made a deal that would see their party 'being subsumed into Fianna Fáil'.[35]

Exploring the sources of the party's sustainability (and consequently persistence), one important factor was the seats of the four initial FF defectors who founded the party. These were the seats the party could rely on, even in times of electoral decline and intra-organizational turmoil. This was the case because the four politicians brought a constituency organization with them (such as O'Malley's base in Limerick). Of the 14 seats the party won in 1987, the six who still remained in the *Dáil* after the next election all came from Fianna Fáil and only one of them had been newly elected in 1987 in the first place (Collins 2005: 95). This extra-parliamentary base that FF parliamentarians brought into the party shrank over time with the latter's departure, since it was based on loyalty to individuals, not predominantly to the party these individuals had created. After the 2007 general election little of this base was left, while the party had failed to establish an organizational underpinning of its own able to generate loyalty through organizational means in the meantime.

The absence of consistent attempts to build an extra-parliamentary base able to socialize followers in the organization mirrored the time-horizon of party elites who were driven by the electoral cycle. This does not mean the party founders were opposed to party building as such or did not make efforts to build an infrastructure. From the start the formation of an electoral machine able to run campaigns across a wider range of constituencies was supported. Similarly, the creation of local branches was considered important to mobilize support at

especially since the leader was elected by the parliamentary party, which consisted, next to the two contestants—Harney and Cox—and O'Malley himself, of only seven other people. This event triggered tensions, culminating in Cox's defection and his consecutive electoral victory over O'Malley at the European election. A few months later, Martin Cullen decided to return to FF, the party he had initially defected from, which contributed to the existing sense of turmoil (see for details Collins 2005).

[34] *The PDs: From Boom to Bust*, Episode One: Party Over, <http://www.rte.ie/tv/programmes/the_pds_from_boom_to_bust.html>, accessed 5 November 2011.

[35] 'PD Leader Denies "Deal" with Fianna Fáil', 14 September 2008, <http://www.rte.ie/news/2008/0914/pds.html>, accessed 17 May 2012.

election time, particularly in Ireland, where localism is pronouncedly reinforced by its electoral system. However, in between elections the focus of the leadership was on performing convincingly in parliament, the arm of the party most recognized by the media and thus by voters. The party founders were mostly experienced TDs (O'Malley, for instance, had been not only a national parliamentarian but also a government minister during his time in FF). They formed the leadership of the party as well as the core of the parliamentary group and new MPs received active guidance on how to adapt to professional routines and procedures. The leadership was strongly focused on the party's operation in parliament and party elites put much energy to recruit talented people. From the start, party leader O'Malley aimed at preventing the party from becoming the resort of disgruntled politicians from other parties. Consequently, the performance of the PD as parliamentary group right after its breakthrough was evaluated very positively.[36]

However, this convincing performance did not lead to electoral success. Most new MPs failed to retain their seats in the 1989 election, which revealed the weakness of their constituency organization. As O'Malley pointed out in a later interview, 'Some thought the *Dáil* chamber was all that mattered and didn't work their constituencies' (Collins 2005: 96). Thus, they neglected what matters a lot, potentially more, for being re-elected under the Irish single transferable vote (STV) system than being a good parliamentarian: the cultivation of a local support base. In other words, while the PD successfully routinized internal processes, especially those that assured coordination and conflict resolution in parliament and government, party elites neglected the establishment and consolidation of organizational mechanisms able to support value infusion among the followers outside, whose support could have enabled the party to survive periods during which its representation in parliament was weak or absent. To be fair, that party building in between elections was no priority after the initial formative phase might have been as much a response to the range of pressures party elites were confronted with in their newly acquired public functions as a deliberate choice. After all the PD was a small party and leading figures in the PD took over high-profile positions in government only three years after having entered parliament and four years after the party had been launched. Their attention quickly shifted to other matters than the building of the extra-parliamentary organization and only returned to it when they had to start campaigning for an upcoming election.

The neglect of institutionalization in terms of value infusion found particular reflection in the party's strategy of candidate recruitment. It relied on personal linkages, focused on short-term electoral appeal, and, most importantly, was not

[36] Mark Brannock wrote in *The Irish Times* after the 1989 election: 'the average intelligence of Dáil deputies will fall with their [the PD parliamentarians] departure. Almost without exception the party's fourteen deputies in the last Dáil were very capable performers, working very hard in their designated areas of policy and making intelligent contributions to Dáil debates and at committee level' [insertion by author], 17 June 1989.

complemented by any strategies that incentivized organizational loyalty (e.g. through the prioritization of those candidates also willing to work in low-profile positions first). The process was driven from the national headquarters, which nominated candidates based on their vote-winning potential. Local branches were not set up to build up a loyal pool of supporters or to train potential candidates for public office. While candidates who occupied local positions might be considered to run for national office later on, working for the party was not a prerequisite to get nominated and outside recruitments were nothing unusual. In particular, party leader Harney developed an approach to recruitment that was directed towards the identification of celebrity candidates and spent lots of her time finding good (i.e. electorally appealing) candidates. While this strategy favoured the recruitment of people loyal to the leader, their decision to join the party and to run was 'instantaneous', as McDowell put it, instead of being rooted in 'in long-term loyalties'.[37]

The recruitment capacity of the party leader, in turn, was closely linked to the (expected) capacity of the party label to assure access to parliamentary and government posts for these ambitious, career-oriented candidates. Once the effectiveness of the label was in serious doubt, such a recruitment strategy was unlikely to be effective. That the party, despite having been in national government for so many years, did not manage to run candidates for the 2004 European election is indicative of its weak recruitment capacity at the time. Similarly, the losses at the 2004 local election emphasized the PD label's declining capacity to attract votes. In an organization whose followers are driven by the expected level of success rather than by any ideological motivation or solidary incentives, problems in recruitment and electoral decline feed into each other. Lacking roots in the community led to a struggle to assure a 'critical mass' of candidates and financial resources, as Mary Harney put it.[38]

To sum up, by choosing a very short-term oriented recruitment strategy, the elites reinforced tendencies inherent in this entrepreneurial insider party from the start: politicians would stay with the party only as long it served their careers (i.e. the party label delivered) and followers stayed with the party only as long it was successful in recruiting good candidates and thereby gained access to core positions in parliament and government. Once the party label no longer delivered, recruitment problems and electoral decline would quickly reinforce each other and thereby undermine the party's very foundation. In an insightful study on the party's history completed not long before the PD's collapse in 2008, Collins identifies the failure to build and retain 'tribal loyalties' as the PD's main source

[37] *The PDs: From Boom to Bust*, Episode One: Party On, <http://www.rte.ie/tv/programmes/the_pds_from_boom_to_bust.html>, accessed 5 November 2011.

[38] *The PDs: From Boom to Bust*, Episode One: Party On, <http://www.rte.ie/tv/programmes/the_pds_from_boom_to_bust.html>, accessed 5 November 2011.

of vulnerability (2005: 238).[39] This judgement echoes the earlier distinction between new parties that survive solely as a consequence of their electoral sustainability—such as the PD—and parties that can survive periods of crisis because they can rely 'on a staunch loyalty from its members during the dark days' (Collins 2005: 238). They persist as societal organizations even if they suffer as electoral vehicles, while the PD persisted only as long as it was sufficiently successful as electoral vehicle. The party remained an entrepreneurial insider, composed of professional politicians who were loyal to the party as long as its label was effective in helping them to enter positions which they could not have achieved more easily had they been members of one of the major parties or Independents.[40] As a consequence, although the party was successful over two decades, it remained dependent on its founding generation as a main stabilizing factor. That the party never built an institutionalized, extra-parliamentary infrastructure able to generate value infusion was not the result of scarce resources but a consequence of choices of party elites who prioritized their party's performance at elections and their own performance in public office. This does not mean that no institutionalization took place, yet it did so in a 'partial' fashion. Routinization of internal processes was valuable to party elites to assure the party's functioning in parliament and government. The generation of lasting loyalties to its extra-parliamentary organization, in contrast, was—from the strategic point of view of party elites—of relatively little importance.

CONCLUSIONS

Most new liberal and new left parties formed as entrepreneurial insider formations. As we could see, although their ideological orientations are very different, their shared origin shapes intra-organizational dynamics in a similar fashion. Their elites are strongly office-oriented, which shows in a high rate of insider parties that enter national government. National politicians who form or help to form a new party usually also hope to advance their career prospects, rather than being solely driven by representing a specific set of values or feeding certain issues into the political debate for its own sake. While these parties enter government more quickly than parties in other families, they remain vulnerable as organizations in the longer term. Once they fail to 'deliver' electorally, there are few incentives that prevent party elites from exiting, either in order to continue their careers in a

[39] Collins cites Stephen O'Byrnes, who had actively worked for the party throughout its history, declaring himself 'puzzled at the inability of the party to establish deeper roots in the community' (2005: 238).

[40] In Ireland, given its electoral system, this is common among defectors (Weeks 2008).

mainstream party or as Independents. Alternatively, they might form yet another new party or in some cases retire or leave politics for a career elsewhere. In short, performance at elections and the rewards of public office are paramount for these parties' persistence.

This implies an approach towards party building that is strongly focused on creating an infrastructure that helps to mobilize voters at election time rather than an infrastructure building up a recruitment pool of loyal followers and office-aspirants. Recruitment tends to be organized top-down and candidates selected based on their electoral appeal, which can include people without a prior affiliation to the party. Loyal party work such as taking over lower-level party office is not systematically incentivized. As a consequence, these parties tend to do well in public office, being managed and led by often experienced politicians, and institutionalize in terms of routinization assuring intra-organizational coordination and conflict resolution. While conflict can intensify by taking over parliamentary and particularly governmental responsibilities, outright disintegration as a response to these is rather unusual as compared to dissolution triggered by a party's lack of electoral success. Since the *raison d'être* of many of these parties is strongly shaped by individual career ambitions, members of the founding elite have often little interest in building an autonomous infrastructure 'with stable survival interests'. A membership base with own preferences able to act collectively might even be perceived as an unwelcome constraint to leaders' autonomy, as the case study of the Alliance (NZ) illustrated. This does not mean that these parties cannot be long-lived or very successful. The Danish Centre Democrats or the Irish Progressive Democrats were not only in national parliament several decades. They also repeatedly entered national government as formal coalition partners. Yet throughout their lives, they remained dependent on continuity at the leadership level and on the capacity to sustain sufficient electoral support to assure regular access to parliament and, with it, institutional resources and rewards. Both of these factors tend to be closely linked: leaders often exit when support declines and support declines when leaders, the face of the party, leave. This means that in case of a sudden leadership vacuum or a drastic decline of support, the party is easily under threat, lacking an institutionalized, extra-parliamentary infrastructure that could provide the foundation for a recovery.

7

The Leadership–Structure Dilemma in Rooted New Right Parties: Reinforcing or Undermining Advantageous Formative Conditions?

Unlike the new party families discussed so far, it is difficult to associate the group of new right parties with one ‘dominant’ type of origin. While we find more entrepreneurs than rooted parties in this group, as Table 7.1 indicates, a discussion focusing on entrepreneurial insiders as the most numerous formation type would lead us to bypass a range of new right parties that not only succeeded in establishing a niche in their national party systems but have attracted significant vote shares over longer periods of time. To do justice to this level of diversity, which shapes these parties’ performance profiles accordingly, the later part of this chapter concentrates on rooted parties, while the more numerous entrepreneurial parties are discussed in a separate chapter.

Both chapters will indicate that formative conditions influence but do not determine elite strategies and that leadership motivations and skills are important, particularly in entrepreneurial new parties which tend to fully concentrate power on the national leadership. A closer look at the orientation of founding leaders reveals that resistance against extra-parliamentary structure formation—the manifestation of the leadership–structure dilemma—is widespread and crucially affects how well these parties (which in their majority enter national parliament immediately after their formation) cope with the pressures related to national breakthrough. While we find tensions associated with the leadership–structure dilemma not only in entrepreneurs but also in rooted parties, entrepreneurs are particularly vulnerable, which means that public office more often becomes a liability for a party’s further development, and in extreme cases, triggers disintegration. Before analysing rooted new right parties in greater detail, the following section will provide an overview of both rooted and entrepreneurial formations and their respective performance profiles.

Table 7.1 *The origins of new right parties*

	Insider formation	Outsider formation	
Entrepreneurial party	11 (35.5%)	9 (29%)	20 entrepreneurs
Rooted party	5 (16.1%)	6 (19.4%)	11 rooted parties
	16 insiders	15 outsiders	N = 31

THE DIVERSE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW RIGHT: AN OVERVIEW

Table 7.2 categorizes 25 new right parties (leaving out emerging parties[1]) according to whether they persisted up to 2011 and whether they met the minimum threshold for sustainability after their national breakthrough. It distinguishes entrepreneurs from rooted parties and specifies the mode of formation (bottom-up or top-down). It further indicates whether active and systematic attempts to build an extra-parliamentary party organization were made when the party was founded and whether a party outlived its founding leader(s) as a central indication of organizational autonomy. Finally it shows how quickly after its formation a party entered parliament and in the case of non-persistent parties it indicates the type of death.

Table 7.2 suggests that active and skilful party building can assure a party's capacity to consolidate a support base despite originating in unfavourable structural conditions, while elite choices can undermine a party originating in favourable conditions. The cases most challenging in light of the theoretical expectations formulated earlier are highlighted in italics. They encompass entrepreneurial parties whose leadership refuses party building but that still are persistent and sustainable and parties that built an organization (especially when formed in favourable conditions) but failed nonetheless.

The theoretical approach has argued that support for a party can be maintained in the longer term solely on the basis of leadership-oriented loyalty, which, in principle, can be considered as functionally equivalent to organizationally generated value infusion. Furthermore, persistence can be assured for extensive periods as a product of electoral sustainability without an elaborate infrastructure, as we have already observed in other case study chapters. However, it also has been argued that both constellations leave parties vulnerable. Their capacity to deal with

[1] In addition to these 25 cases, we find six cases which only relatively recently emerged on the national level: the Austrian Alliance for Austria's Future (*Bündnis Zukunft Österreich*), the Sweden Democrats, the Dutch Party for Freedom, the Dedecker List and People's Party (both Belgium), and Citizen Movement Geneva (*Mouvement Citoyens Genevois*). With the exception of the Sweden Democrats, all of them are entrepreneurs and only the Sweden Democrats and the Dutch Freedom Party qualify as programmatically distinct in the context of their party system (for details on the operationalization of 'distinctiveness', see Chapter 4).

TABLE 7.2 *Core characteristics and performance profiles of new right parties*

Performance profile	Party name (country)	Entrepreneur	Party building	Mode of formation	Age at breakthrough in years	Outlived founder	Type of death
Non-persistent/ Non-sustainable	New Democracy (Sweden)	Yes	No	Top-down	0	No	Disintegration
	Pim Fortuyn List (Netherlands)	Yes	No	Top-down	0	No	Disintegration
	Citizens' Party (Iceland)	Yes	No	Top-down	0	No	Disintegration
	Reform Party (Canada)	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Top-down*	*0*	*No*	*Merger*
	Centre Party (Netherlands)	No	No	Top-down	6	No	Dissolution
	Centre Democrats (Netherlands)	No	No	Top-down	2	Yes	Dissolution
	Constitutional Right Party (Finland)[2]	Yes	n/a	Top-down	5	No	Dissolution
	Liveable Netherlands (Netherlands)	Yes	No	Top-down	2	Yes	Dissolution
	Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (UK)	*No*	*Yes*	*Top-down*	*3*	*No*	*Rejoins mother party*
	United Ulster Unionist Party	Yes	n/a	Top-down	1	No	Dissolution
Non-persistent/ Sustainable	Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour (Belgium)	No	No	Top-down	0	No	Dissolution
	Republican Movement (Switzerland)	*No*	*Yes*	Top-down	*0*	*Yes*	*Rejoins mother party*
Persistent/ Non-sustainable	One Nation Party (Australia)	Yes	Yes	Top-down	1	Yes	
Persistent/Sustainable	Progress Party (Denmark)	Yes	Yes	Top-down	0	Yes	
	Freedom Party (Switzerland)	Yes	Yes	Top-down	3	Yes	
	Danish People's Party (Denmark)	Yes	Yes	Top-down	0 (3)[3]	No	

[2] Due to the lack of detailed information on its organization's evolution, the Constitutional Right Party (Finland) is not discussed later on.

[3] The Danish People's Party was an internal splinter from the Progress Party exposed to the pressures of public office from its foundation onwards. Formed in 1995 in the Danish parliament, in 1998 it competed as a separate party at its first general election, which is why 3—the number of years before its first national election—is added in brackets.

Progress Party (Norway)	Yes	Yes	Top-down	0	Yes
NZ First (New Zealand)	Yes	Yes	Top-down	0	No
Flemish Interest (Belgium)	No	Yes	Bottom-up	3	Yes
National Front (France)	No	Yes	Bottom-up	14	Yes
Federal Democratic Union (Switzerland)	No	Yes	Bottom-up	16	Yes
Alternative Democratic Reform Party (Luxembourg)[4]	No	Yes	n/a	2	Yes
Ticino League (Switzerland)	*Yes*	*No*	*Top-down*	*0*	*No*
National Front (Belgium)	No	No	Top-down	6	Yes
Movement for France (France)	Yes	Yes	Top-down	0 (3)[5]	No

Notes: Contradictory cases are highlighted in italics. Table does not include recent entries.

[4] Information on the Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR) is relatively scarce, which is why it is not discussed in depth in the following. However, existing work suggests that the party qualifies as a rooted formation and built a conventional extra-parliamentary party structure (Dumont et al. 2006). It was promoted by the Neutral Union of Luxembourg Workers (NGL), the third-largest general trade union in Luxembourg (Immergut et al. 2007: 815). The ADR has been further close to the Luxembourg Association of Retired and Invalid People (LRIV) (Immergut et al. 2007: 849). It was founded as a single-issue party with the aim to introduce equality between private and public sector pensions as its dominant focus for the first ten years after its formation (Immergut et al. 2007: 36). By 1998—before its second term in parliament had ended—most of its initial demands had already been realized. Thanks to the broadening of its programme, this did not lower the party's attraction (Dumont et al. 2006). Being the only Eurosceptic party in parliament, it puts an emphasis on the Luxembourgish language. ADR's success in the 1999 election, for instance, pushed the government to make knowledge of the language a criterion for naturalization (Moyse et al. 2004: 380).

[5] De Villier, the party founder, was already represented in parliament when he defected and founded the party (for a detailed study, see Mitchell 1998), which is why 3—the number of years before its first national election—is added in brackets.

a leadership vacuum or with sudden electoral decline tends to be limited. Thus, if we find entrepreneurs being sustainable without an extra-parliamentary base supporting value infusion, it is unlikely they have undergone leadership turn-over or overcome periods of electoral crises.

Before looking at individual cases in greater detail, the following patterns are worth mentioning in light of the findings presented in earlier chapters. Twelve of the 25 parties have entered parliament in the year of their foundation and only very few waited more than a few years for their national breakthrough. This, in effect, means that most parties won seats at the first national election they participated in. The party that had to persist longest before entering national parliament is the Swiss Federal Democratic Union (*Eidgenössische Demokratische Union*) (16 years), followed by the French National Front (14 years). Having been able to maintain their activities before breakthrough over a long period without access to the selective incentives attached to national office, their breakthrough did not destabilize those parties. Neither did the later loss of national representation. Vice versa, immediate parliamentary breakthrough can but does not necessarily damage a party. Most of the parties in the persistent/sustainable category have entered parliament right away, which again highlights that parties are not passive subjects to the contextual constraints they are exposed to.

Only three cases suffered from disintegration after parliamentary breakthrough and can be classified as 'flash parties', parties that initially attract significant electoral support but disintegrate relatively quickly (Converse and Dupeux 1966; Pedersen 1982). Those are New Democracy (Sweden), the Pim Fortuyn List (Netherlands), and the Citizens' Party (Iceland), parties that did not only enter parliament right after their foundation but also took over government responsibility right away.[6] NZ First, entering government a bit later in its career, also suffered considerable electoral losses but managed to recover and is still active. As already indicated, while governing tends to have some electoral and organizational costs for new, inexperienced parties, the experience usually does not trigger disintegration. Early government participation seems to be particularly problematic for new right parties, particularly if they are entrepreneurs that attracted support by exploiting an anti-elite rhetoric.

However, early government participation (rather than remaining in opposition) cannot account for the family's overall performance profile. Only eight new right parties in this group entered government or have functioned as a support party so far.[7] And some of them coped well or even profited in terms of increased institutionalization such as the Danish People's Party (see details below). Furthermore, while we find cases of spectacular collapse among parties that entered government, some parties that remained in opposition suffered from similarly disintegrative

[6] The Pim Fortuyn List and the Citizens' Party were formal coalition partners. New Democracy functioned as a support party.

[7] This figure includes the Alliance for Austria's Future and the Dutch Party for Freedom.

tendencies, simply after entering parliament, such as the Australian One Nation Party. In line with earlier findings, how well or badly new right parties coped with government responsibility or, more fundamentally, with parliamentary office depends on party organizational properties and on how elites respond to their new responsibilities (de Lange and Art 2011; Akkerman and de Lange 2012; Bolleyer et al. 2012).

It is further interesting to note that there is no clear pattern that insider parties take over government responsibility more often than outsiders, a pattern that could be observed in the new left and new liberal groups. The reason for the difference lies in the type of politicians that create new parties respectively. New left and new liberal parties are often splinters from mainstream parties founded by defecting politicians who are willing, sometimes eager, to enter government with the bigger mainstream parties, possibly with the new formation's mother party. Cases corresponding to this pattern are the Citizens' Party and NZ First, both of which were formed by mainstream defectors and joined government. However, this is not typical for insiders in the new right group that tend to be formed by defectors from other, longer established far-right parties such as the Swiss Republican Movement (*Republikanische Bewegung*, a splinter of *Nationale Aktion*), the United Ulster Unionist Party (a splinter of the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party), or the Dutch Centre Democrats (a splinter of the Centre Party). Thus, due to their specific origin they are unlikely to get an offer by mainstream parties to join government with them, one reason being their ideological extremeness, which might make them incompatible with the mainstream in policy terms (de Lange 2008) or they may be ostracized by mainstream parties, which consider forming a government with them as generally inacceptable (van Spanje 2009; Art 2011). Consequently, the insider–outsider distinction does not play the same role in the new right family as it does in the groups of new left and new liberal parties.

In all entrepreneurial parties listed in Table 7.2 the party founder took over the party leadership. Since these founders were not constrained by any broader organizational interests or groups in the formation process, they were free to access a core position in the newly formed party, reflecting their special status in the formation process, making it easy for them to insist on their prior claims against leadership contestants. This leads us back to a fundamental assumption underlying the leadership–structure dilemma: that the individual self-interests of party founders can be in tension with their organization's long-term interest. In fact, only a minority of entrepreneurs managed to outlive their founding party leader. If they did, they tended to decline after the leader's departure. Linking these patterns to parties' performance profiles, nearly all non-persistent/non-sustainable parties have been dominated by one or a quick succession of powerful leaders, actively opposed to or with little interest in party building. Most of these parties suffered from intra-organizational frictions, reinforced by their parliamentary breakthrough.

At the same time, the overview shows that a party's origin does not determine leader orientations towards or against party building. The group of organizationally persistent and electorally sustainable parties is fairly mixed, i.e. parties in this category do not consistently combine structural and agential characteristics expected to be conducive to persistence and sustainability. Favourable formative conditions can prolong a party's life despite little interest of elites in party building. The Belgian National Front is one example of this. Although it never overcame its marginal status, it profited from its ties to extremist groupings. These ties supported the party's persistence and the sustainability of its electoral support, despite its founding leader's active attempts to undermine the set-up of a party structure (Art 2011).[8] 'Counter-images' to this constellation are the Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People's Party, two entrepreneurs, which sustained support through the long-term oriented strategy of their particular leaders who built an institutionalized party structure that is operative inside and outside public office.

While covering the different formative configurations and institutionalization patterns we find in the new right, the case studies in the remainder of this and in the following chapter will pay particular attention to the dynamics underlying failed and successful party institutionalization, which originated in different formative conditions than those theoretically expected. This allows us to specify the role that party agency played in these processes. At the same time, the case studies help to specify the limitations of such accounts. The Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (UK) and the Republican Movement (Ch) were rooted parties whose elites made party-building efforts but were neither electorally sustainable nor persistent due to the constraints imposed by competitor parties.

The remainder of this chapter will explore the interplay of structural and agential factors in new right parties that could profit from ties to societal groups, discussing first bottom-up and then top-down formations. I conclude with an examination of the two contradictory cases—the Vanguard Unionists and the Republican Movement.

THE LEADERSHIP–STRUCTURE DILEMMA IN ROOTED NEW RIGHT PARTIES

There is no natural orientation of party founders or early leaders towards building an institutionalized party organization due to the costs successful institutionalization can impose on them in the longer term. The conflict of interest inherent in

[8] Daniel Féret dominated the party from 1985 to 2007.

this decision is particularly problematic in the new right family since founders usually take over leadership positions for long periods, positions on which decision-making rights tend to be concentrated. We will see in the following that we find the disinclination of founders to engage in extra-parliamentary party building in rooted top-down configurations ('leadership-centred hierarchies'), while in rooted bottom-up formations ('constrained hierarchies') demands for leadership and structure formation could be reconciled more easily.

Balancing leadership and structure formation in bottom-up formations

Only a few new right parties were created bottom-up through inter-group negotiation: the French National Front (NF), Flemish Interest (*Vlaams Belang* VB, formerly *Vlaams Blok*), and the Swiss Federal Democratic Union (*Eidgenössische Demokratische Union*, EDU). In terms of their formative conditions, they started out most favourably. The presence of organizational resources facilitated extra-parliamentary structure-formation, while leaders were constrained by organizational (long-term) interests. The combination of these factors implied a moderation of the tensions between leadership and structure formation as it has been associated with 'constrained hierarchies' in Chapter 3. Before proceeding with the analysis, it is further noteworthy that the NF and the VB managed to carve out a niche in their respective party systems, although both parties were confronted with a *cordon sanitaire* for considerable periods, i.e. a principled refusal of mainstream parties to engage in any form of cooperation with them (Art 2011; van Spanje 2009). Unlike parties that declined in more permissive settings, they managed to consolidate in hostile environments.

The French NF has been founded out of a federation of extreme right groups (Kestel and Godmer 2004: 138): the *Ordre Nouveau*,[9] the major extreme right group in the 1970s, and the right-wing anti-Gaullists. The ex-*Poujadist* MP, Jean-Marie Le Pen (a long-term affiliate of the French right) was called to its presidency (Ignazi 2003: 90) but was not a member of the founding organizations. Consequently, he was 'in no position to dictate the pattern of national party formation' (Hainsworth 1992: 35).[10] The leadership of the new party was a collective one including, among others, two *Ordre Nouveau* representatives and the president Le Pen. Le Pen's strong position—long considered as a 'typical characteristic' of this party (and often of the new right more generally, see, for instance, Carter 2005)—was only established a few years later (Hainsworth 1992: 36). Similarly, the VB was created through a merger of two factions, the *Vlaams-Nationale Partij* and the

[9] The *Ordre Nouveau* was well organized with more than 5,000 activists (Ignazi 2003: 90) and acted to some extent as an umbrella organization of the extreme right (Hainsworth 1992: 34).

[10] In fact, Le Pen had a difficult position, since militants were troubled by his status as ex-parliamentarian (Hainsworth 1992: 36).

Vlaamse Volkspartji, which had left the *Volksunie* in 1977. In autumn 1978 their leaders, Karel Dillen and Lode Claes, decided to put forward a common list for the general elections in the same year and in 1979 the groups merged into the *Vlaams Blok* (Husbands 1992: 135–6; Ignazi 2003: 131). While power was concentrated in the party executive, all important national rank-and-file organizations were represented in it (Swyngedouw 1998: 61).

Different from bottom-up formations in the Green family for instance, both parties chose a strongly centralized structure, in line with their ideological orientations. Still, the presence of already organized groupings had important implications for the dynamics in these organizations: it prevented the detachment of the leader from extra-parliamentary activities as well as his exclusive focus on electoral considerations. As already mentioned, Le Pen had not been a member of the groupings which founded the NF. Yet due to his long-lasting political and organizational activities in the French right, he possessed the skills of effective internal party management and was generally interested in uniting the fragmented French extreme right party family with the NF's help (Hainsworth 1992: 33). This implies an ideological outlook and long-term orientation which goes beyond a purely instrumental attitude towards his party, which he led from the 1970s up to 2010.

The leaderships of the NF and the VB paid attention to organizational needs and deliberately strengthened their extra-parliamentary infrastructure to improve recruitment capacities (e.g. the creation of local branches in charge of training activists). They effectively exploited their parties' growing electoral success to consolidate their position inside and outside public office[11] (Mayer 1998: 15; Swyngedouw 1998: 61; Reuter 2009: 195). This strongly contrasts with other new right parties studied later, where increasing success and the inflow of resources triggered or accelerated internal conflict. This does not mean completely peaceful internal relations: both parties suffered from infighting and factionalism. The NF, for instance, suffered from a major split in 1998. Bruno Mégret along with other leading members quit the party, and founded, in 1999, the National Republican Movement (MNR) (Monzat and Camus 2004: 235–6), a split that affected all levels of the internal organization of the NF (Hainsworth 2000: 30). Yet being able to rely on institutionalized party organizational structures, the party could cope with this backlash despite heavy electoral and organizational costs.

Taking a closer look at these parties' performance after national breakthrough, in the early years the VB did not win more than one or two seats. Consequently it could get used to operating in public office without being confronted with the challenge to manage a big parliamentary group right away. The NF, in contrast, entered the National Assembly in 1986 with 35 MPs. Measured in seat share, it

[11] This parallel orientation towards the VB's societal position and its professional function in public office shows in the range of national organizations: they include a research service, an Association of VB Representatives, a legal service, a press service, the Nationalist Broadcast Foundation, and a youth wing (Swyngedouw 1998: 61).

was one of the biggest short-term successes in the new right family. To take a closer look at the circumstances and the repercussions of its breakthrough is therefore particularly telling: although the NF did not manage to maintain national representation in the longer term, which brings the 'flash party' concept to mind, this label proves misleading in this particular instance.

While the 1988 presidential election (Le Pen won 14.4 per cent of the vote) is considered as a crucial turning-point in the party's development from a marginal player into a broader movement (Hainsworth 1992: 43), it is important to recognize that already in 1986, the year of the party's big national breakthrough, the NF had been active on the ground for 14 years. For a long period, it had struggled to overcome its marginal status starting in the 1970s, strengthening the awareness in the party that to assure survival, it needed to surpass its image of a narrow and extreme '*groupuscule*' (Hainsworth 1992: 39). More concretely, the party had made organizational efforts visible in the creation of a youth organization, of the weekly *Le National*, and of an embryonic extra-parliamentary structure (Ignazi 2003: 92–3). These first attempts to strengthen its organization paid off later on. Electoral breakthroughs on various governmental levels taking place during the 1980s provided the party with the opportunity to strengthen its organization further. Its fate turned with the 1984 European election (the party won 11 per cent of the vote and 10 MEPs) and the regional election of 1985, in which the party managed to field candidates in three-quarters of the constituencies securing 10.4 per cent therein and 8.8 per cent of the vote in total (Hainsworth 1992: 42). Running candidates so widely was an achievement that would have been impossible if the party had not been able to recruit a wide range of candidates, one indication of its organizational capacities at a time when the party was still considered a marginal player.

Coming back to its success at the 1986 parliamentary election, the party's national entry was clearly facilitated by the Socialists' decision to switch from the double ballot system to proportional representation, which allowed the NF to win 35 seats on the basis of 9.7 per cent of the vote. Unlike other parties' parliamentary groups that fell into disarray such as those of New Democracy (S) and Pim Fortuyn List (NL) discussed in Chapter 8, the party used its newly gained national prominence in its favour. Indeed, the 35 NF parliamentarians were quite heterogeneous and inexperienced and, not surprisingly, the group found it hard at times to maintain internal discipline and suffered from defections (Ignazi 2003: 96).[12] Overall, however, NF representatives took up the role of constructive opposition to Chirac's right-wing government, while mostly voting against the left. Leaving a few instances aside, they successfully played the parliamentary game and enhanced the movement's appeal, which showed in the maintenance of its electoral support base at the next

[12] They were provoked when the party changed its strategy away from the politics of accommodation towards the RPR-UDF government.

election. Due to the switch back to the double ballot system initiated by Chirac in 1988, the party lost all but one MP two years after its big breakthrough. Thus, while the party received 35 MPs for 9.7 per cent of the national vote in 1986, it won the same vote share but nonetheless received only one MP in 1988. In 1993 it increased its vote share to 13.8 per cent but did not receive any seats. On the regional level the NF continued to play the role of a constructive opposition and could maintain its performance at consecutive regional and local elections (Hainsworth 1992: 43–4; Mayer 1998; Ignazi 2003; Monzat and Camus 2004).

Instead of becoming a victim of its own success, the party had the resources to develop a sizeable party organization and since the 1980s systematically started to build and to institutionalize a nation-wide infrastructure (on similar developments in the VB, see Reuter 2009: 194–6). Most notably the party has a general secretariat in charge of the federations and of 'party implantation'. The position was shaped by Jean-Pierre Stirbois (in charge 1982–8), who transformed the party into a disciplined and centralized party machine (Mayer 1998: 14). Consequently, its membership rose from a few thousand to about 15,000, which became visible, for instance, at the eighth party congress in Nice in 1990: for the first time the congress was composed of locally elected delegates, surrounded by a large number of activists (around 1,600 people attended), mirroring a complex nation-wide party organization (Ignazi 2003: 97). Again we find a link between party institutionalization and the meaningful involvement of members, even in a strongly hierarchical party structure such as the NF. The territorial penetration and consolidation of the niche occupied by the NF had been attained through the formation of a party organization similar to the French Communist Party (Mayer 1998: 14), the party in the French party system coming closest to a classical mass party (Haegel 2009; Knapp 2004). Thus, grassroots militants, who are trained in party schools and summer universities in how to be a perfect party activist (including canvassing, leafleting, and newspaper editing), contribute to value infusion and form an essential part of the consolidation of the NF's electoral support (Mayer 1998: 15). As a consequence, the party can now rely on a well-defined and stable electorate, which reiterates its support for the NF, election after election.

The vote for Le Pen has become a vote for the NF, indicating the party's successful shift from reliance on loyalty to its specific leader to organizational loyalty to the party as such (Ignazi 2003: 98–9, 100–2). Recent events confirm this interpretation, in particular, the take-over of the NF leadership by Marine Le Pen in January 2011, pointing to the organizational emancipation of the party from the personality of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Although clearly profiting from the ties to her father, Marine Le Pen actively tries to broaden the appeal of the party further than would have been possible under her father.[13] This strategy seems to have worked,

[13] On 16 January 2011 it was announced that Marine Le Pen had received the two-thirds vote needed to become the new head of the National Front. 'Marine Le Pen Chosen to Lead France's National Front',

as demonstrated by her considerable success at the 2012 presidential election—she won 17.9 per cent—and by the return of the NF into national parliament at the following legislative election.

The Swiss Federal Democratic Union has received much less attention in the literature than the NF or the VB, yet is noteworthy since it shows very similar developmental patterns but on a much smaller scale. This Swiss far-right party[14] was founded in 1975 by nationalist and republican groupings located in the cantons Waadt, Zurich, and Berne and a few dissidents from the Evangelical People's Party, who through this new formation attempted a fusion of patriotic and Christian beliefs. Similar to the NF, the EDU entered national parliament only late in its history, 16 years after its foundation. The party started to compete on the cantonal level in an attempt to build up regional strongholds. In 1981 it started to run a party newspaper and over the next 20 years, the party consistently expanded the territorial scope of its organization. By 1988 it had set up regional branches and was active in seven cantons and in 1991 ran candidates in five cantons at the national election.[15] By 1995 it had 21 regional branches in total. These included cantons in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, indicating that this party with its main support base in German-speaking Switzerland aspired to cross the language divide and to develop an organization stretching across the country's main regions. At the same time, it tried to strengthen its national profile by nation-wide activities such as gathering support for its referendum initiatives.[16]

In 1991 the EDU won its first seat in national parliament and while the party never won more than 1.3 per cent of the national vote, it could maintain national representation until 2011. While the party targets a very narrow part of the Swiss electorate when measured in national vote shares, it effectively exploited small-scale successes in individual cantons to expand and gather support in other regions to eventually succeed in national elections. The party's first national seat was taken over by one of the party founders, Werner Scherrer, who had become party president in 1989. He was replaced as party president by Christian Waber, a member of the cantonal parliament in Berne, in 1995. In 1997 he also stepped down from national office to leave his seat to the new president. Waber, in turn, stepped down in 2009, while announcing that he wants to continue to work for the party and help strengthen the party organization after having left public office.

BBC News Europe, 15 January 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12198370>, accessed 25 January 2011.

[14] For a detailed specification of the party's 'extremeness', see van Spanje 2011.

[15] Under Swiss electoral law it is sufficient to run candidates in one canton only to be able to participate in national elections.

[16] 'Political Initiatives and Actions of the EDU', <http://www.edu-schweiz.ch/cms/index.php?id=244>, accessed 11 October 2011.

Both the party-building process and the party's capacity to renew leading personnel without causing major disruptions and leading people's willingness to continue their activities in less high-profile positions suggest a successful institutionalization process. This process took place despite the party's limited electoral potential and despite the fact that resources for party building in the form of direct state funding are particularly scarce in the Swiss context (Nassmacher 2009). The party experienced its national breakthrough 16 years after its foundation and hired its first full-time party secretary only in 1993, nearly 20 years after its foundation, and has only slowly started to hire part-time staff working in regional offices.[17] While a certain level of electoral success was clearly necessary to motivate the ongoing support of activists, candidates, and office holders, the party managed to persist as organization although rewards in terms of selective incentives were scarce. This is striking particularly when considering that in the Swiss party system several parties compete for the far-right vote. The Swiss Freedom Party, for instance, won much bigger shares of the national vote much earlier in its history but has undergone considerable decline (Husbands 2000). Unlike the Freedom Party, the EDU has slowly built and cultivated a narrow but by now reliable support base. While the party lost its national seat in the 2011 election (despite defending the same vote share of 1.3 per cent as at the previous election), it still holds various seats in cantonal parliaments[18] and is organizationally consolidated across a range of cantons.[19] Even if it does not achieve a national comeback in the near future, the party's long-term survival is unlikely to depend on it.

All three rooted bottom-up formations (or 'constrained hierarchies') have consolidated a support base through organizational means showing indications not only of routinization but also of value infusion, which allowed them to outlive their founding leadership. They profited from electoral success without being destabilized by it or becoming overly dependent on the selective incentives coming with it. Due to the presence of several already organized groups and of founders attached to the broader interests these groups represent, the leeway for or the likelihood of leading figures to monopolize decision-making power in the organization and to compromise the party's long-term development was clearly limited. Leaders of rooted top-down formations, as we will see in the following, are neither subject to the same constraints nor are they driven by similar motivations. This, in turn, leads to very different patterns of party evolution and performance.

[17] 'Political Initiatives and Actions of the EDU', <http://www.edu-schweiz.ch/cms/index.php?id=244>, accessed 11 October 2011.

[18] The party holds one parliamentary seat in Aargau, five seats in Berne, one seat in Schaffhausen, three seats in Thurgau, one seat in Waadt, and five seats in Zurich (cantonal parliaments are unicameral).

[19] The main source for this section are the annual reports of the Année Politique Suisse (2010a), detailed reports that trace the evolution of Swiss parties on an annual basis 1975–2009.

How leaders can damage rooted top-down formations

The Belgian National Front (NF), the Belgian Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour (*Respect voor Arbeid en Democratie*), and the two Dutch Centre parties were formed top-down and despite the presence of promoter organizations were dominated by strong personalities. They were weakened by intra-organizational conflict on the elite level as well as leaders' opposition to or neglect of systematic party building. While these parties' societal roots slowed down decline, elite choices prevented them from exploiting their full potential.

The Belgian NF displays the conflict between individual and organizational interest underlying the leadership–structure dilemma with particular clarity. Although the party had linkages to long-existing extremist groupings that supported the newly formed party,[20] Daniel Féret, its founder and 'leader for life', was not well established in the far right. Before he founded the NF, he had not only been a member of several far-right groups but also of the Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour discussed below. He led the NF for most of its history from 1985 to 2007 and systematically undermined the consolidation of its organization to protect his own position (Art 2011: 64, 68). The organizational vulnerability of the party showed with particular clarity once the party entered national parliament. It is often assumed that starting out with a big parliamentary group creates particular challenges and easily destabilizes a new party. This, however, does not mean that winning only few seats makes parliamentary entry unproblematic. Throughout its history, the Belgian NF never won more than two national seats. It had its national breakthrough in 1991, six years after its foundation. Instead of profiting from this major breakthrough, the access to new resources intensified the internal disarray and the heavy factionalism that had characterized the party earlier on, conflicts that led to a number of defections (none of the splinter parties that were created took off electorally though). In line with Féret's tendency to expel those upcoming, more talented activists who could have questioned his hegemony, the party organization did not develop any mechanisms to recruit loyal followers and capable candidates: local structures remained virtually non-existent. As a consequence, the party was not capable of keeping extremists out, which made it unattractive to moderate candidates who could have broadened the party's electoral appeal (Art 2011: 64–5). While the long-standing ties to small extremist groupings slowed down the party's decline in the long run by profiting from already established group affiliations of followers, there were no attempts by the founding leader to use them as a resource to build a viable party infrastructure. On the contrary, Féret weakened such attempts. In 2006 he was found guilty of publishing racist pamphlets and

[20] These groups are *Mouvement Social Nationaliste*, the *Union pour une Nouvelle Démocratie*, and the *Groupe Delta.*

banned from standing in elections for ten years.[21] Nowadays, his party is no longer represented on the national level.

There is only limited information about the organizational development of the Belgian Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour. While the party's formation was supported by the General Federation of Self-employed Workers (Ignazi 2003) and therefore qualifies as rooted, it was dominated by its leader, Robert Hendrick, throughout its career (Beyens et al. 2013), who seemed to be interested in the party as long as it assured him parliamentary access. The party entered the Belgian parliament with one seat in 1978 and managed to re-enter another two times, each time with its leader taking over a seat (or, more precisely, in two of three cases, the party's only seat). The party lost representation at the 1987 general election with 0.1 per cent of the vote, after its Flemish arm had left earlier in the year to join the *Vlaams Blok* and after moderate followers had defected to more liberal parties, reflecting the party's incapacity to maintain the support of ideologically driven followers. With the party severely weakened after numerous defections, Robert Hendrick participated in the 1987 election as an Independent on a list of the Christian-Democrats (*Centre Démocrate Humaniste*). While the Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour dissolved as a party and re-formed as a pressure group (Beyens et al. 2013), Hendrick gained representation in the Belgian parliament and stayed there as an Independent until 1991.

Similar to the other rooted, top-down formations, the Dutch Centre Party could profit from its affiliation to right-wing groups (Lucardie 1998: 111). It was founded by Henry Brookman in 1980, who—unlike in many other new right parties—did not take over a leadership position himself. He was a professor of social science at the Free University of Amsterdam and faced pressure from his employer because of his political activities and decided against adopting a prominent role in the newly formed party (Art 2011: 79). Similar to the French NF, the party founder and initial leader were different people. In the case of the Centre Party, however, this did not work in favour of the party's organizational development. The person recruited as a party leader was not attached to the groups involved in the party's formation, nor did he pursue any collective interests linked to broader societal movements as had been the case with Le Pen. Hans Janmaat, who took over the leadership, had been a member of both left-wing and right-wing organizations in the past, including several political parties, implying a lack of attachment to the party he ended up leading. The newly formed party did not possess any mechanisms to constrain its new leader, whose position was further strengthened when the party won its first parliamentary seat at the 1982 Dutch general election, which Janmaat took over.

[21] 'Far-Right Boss to Help Immigrants', <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4919888.stm>, accessed 29 May 2012.

The Centre Party started with only 50 members but had grown to an estimated 3,000 by 1983. In 1984 internal tensions started to mount between a more moderate centrist wing around Janmaat and a more extremist wing. After the extremist wing had taken over the party executive, Janmaat—whose rather inconsistent voting behaviour in parliament generated considerable criticism—was expelled two years later after internal conflicts had escalated, which imposed heavy costs on the party: as a consequence, the party could not use the state subsidies it had received thanks to its national breakthrough. Having lost Janmaat, the party's membership declined rapidly and the party did not win a seat at the 1986 national election. It went bankrupt in the same year, which triggered its dissolution (Lucardie 1998: 112–13).

After his expulsion from the Centre Party, Janmaat quickly became the leader of another new party, the Centre Democrats founded by his former aides (Mudde and van Holsteyn 2000: 147), again a party linked to right-wing groups (Lucardie 1998: 111). Although the Centre Democrats did not manage to enter parliament in 1986, Janmaat won a seat in 1989 and the party could increase its seat share to three at the election thereafter. Although the Centre Democrats persisted longer than the Centre Party, the leader's short-term oriented, instrumental approach towards the new party soon became visible. Janmaat focused on controlling core positions in the party rather than building an organization able to recruit loyal members and capable candidates (Carter 2005). The 1994 municipal elections provide an illustration of the consequences: the party managed to raise its seats from 11 to 77 (in Rotterdam it received over 10 per cent of the vote). Yet given its lack of a party cadre, it did not manage to fill all positions and many of those it could fill it lost again, because local officials either defected or were expelled (Lucardie 1998: 115). Party building was no priority, although public subsidies created direct incentives to do so: the party would have been entitled to subsidies from the Department of Culture, Health, and Welfare for emancipation of women and political education of young people. This, however, would have required the party to set up corresponding ancillary organizations (Lucardie 1998: 117). While experts have stressed the considerable electoral potential of both Dutch Centre parties, they were structurally unable to exploit this potential (Mudde and Holsteyn 2000; Mudde 2007: 265; Art 2011). Despite having entered national parliament twice, the Centre Democrats lost all its seats in 1998 and dissolved in 2002, shortly before Janmaat's passing.

In sum, the Belgian National Front, the Belgian Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour, and the two Dutch Centre parties had the advantage of being affiliated to already organized groups. However, they were also top-down formations controlled by one or a few individuals and those who took over leadership positions lacked the interest and the skill to exploit the available organizational resources to pursue their party's long-term consolidation. Leaders deliberately weakened the recruitment capacity of their party to protect their own

position or, alternatively, left the party when it became strategically advantageous. Lacking an organizational structure able to control member recruitment made the parties unable to keep extremists out, to keep internal conflict at bay, and to prevent defections. Thus, different from the VB, the French NF, or the EDU, these top-down formations were damaged by the instrumental orientation of their leaders for whom the party was only valuable as long as it served their own interests. Unsurprisingly, none of the top-down formations could sustain sufficient levels of support to go on after they had lost their initial leaders, while the three bottom-up formations could renew their founding leadership and coped with this process reasonably well. The Belgian National Front, the Belgian Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour, and the two Dutch Centre parties did not suffer predominantly from unfavourable structural preconditions or a lack of voters. Neither do systemic constraints provide a convincing explanation for their inferior performance. Indeed, the Belgian NF and the Centre Democrats were confronted with a *cordon sanitaire*, but so were the Belgian VB and the French NF.

In essence, the contrast between the two groups suggests that favourable formative conditions slow down party decline, since followers attached to affiliated groupings are more likely to remain loyal to a party despite high levels of internal conflict, the destructive behaviour of party elites, or an unconvincing performance of the party's public representatives. However, favourable formative conditions cannot replace the active support of party elites for extra-parliamentary institutionalization and the meaningful integration of the membership organization in the overall party structure, which is essential to transform external group support into a stable party support base.

EXPLORING 'DEVIANT' PERFORMANCE PATTERNS: FAILING TOP-DOWN FORMATIONS DESPITE PARTY BUILDING

Both the Swiss Republican Movement and the Northern Irish Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party were top-down formations with ties to promoter organizations. Neither of them persisted as organization or maintained a niche on the national level in the longer term as the three rooted bottom-up formations did. Yet different from the four rooted top-down formations just discussed, they were not predominantly vulnerable because their leaders refrained from party building. Instead, they highlight how intense inter-party competition for the same niche can systematically undermine attempts to create followers' affiliation to a newly formed party.

The Swiss Republican Movement and the Northern Irish Vanguard Unionists: the challenge of intra-party conflict and inter-party competition

The Swiss Republican Movement (*Republikanische Bewegung*) was founded in 1971 by James Schwarzenbach, the chair of the *Nationale Aktion* (NA) (Skenderovic 2009: 59). In the 1960s Schwarzenbach had become the 'personification' of the emerging 'Movement against Overforeignization', had founded the NA in 1961, and got elected to parliament in 1967 (Husbands 2000: 506). Four years later, he split from his party that suffered from internal power struggles and doctrinal quarrels and built the Republican Movement instead. The newly formed party won seven seats at its breakthrough election in the same year (its direct competitor on the migration issue, the NA, won only four). Being a core figure in the far right movement, Schwarzenbach tried to build up a hierarchical party organization drawing on his societal support base. He also provided for the official party paper *Der Republikaner*, which according to his own figures had 3,500 subscribers in 1971 (Skenderovic 2009: 59). Despite a strong start, the newly founded party suffered from internal tensions. In 1974, the election after its breakthrough, the party had already lost four of its seven seats. Although Schwarzenbach's authoritarian style was criticized by leading party members, he stayed in charge until 1978, when he retreated from politics for health reasons.

In the 1979 election, a year later, the party lost national representation altogether. The NA, in contrast, could hold on to two MPs, which triggered the defection of some leading members of the Republican Movement (Skenderovic 2009: 59–60), indicating the limited attachment of leading figures to the party as an organization. One important figure in the 'Movement against Overforeignization' was its leading ideologist, Jean-Jacques Hegg, who had published widely on related issues and had run for the Republican Movement in 1971 without success. Later on he managed to win a seat on an NA ticket instead (Skenderovic 2009: 74–5). Ulrich Schueler, party secretary under Schwarzenbach, won a parliamentary seat for the Swiss People's Party in 1995, a mainstream party that in the 1990s strongly shifted towards the right. The Republican Movement did not recover from the 1979 electoral disaster. In 1983 it run with the NA, its mother party, on a joint ticket and won 3.5 per cent of the national vote (Husbands 2000: 506). The two parties targeted the same issues, had grown out of the same movement, and had even been founded by the same leader. After Schwarzenbach's departure (who might have boycotted a return), there was no reason to weaken their shared cause any longer by competing with each other.

As indicated earlier, no matter on which types of values a new party mobilizes support, the attachment of policy-driven followers to a new, not yet institutionalized party is initially based on what their party stands for and how effectively it can defend core positions. In such a situation, organizational loyalty is difficult to generate when a party faces strong competition for the same niche and the same

groups of followers and is therefore unable to monopolize a particular issue area. In the Swiss political system several right-wing parties have successfully won national seats over the last decades and more than one have failed despite attempts to build an organization. The Swiss Freedom Party, an entrepreneur, provides another example. This far-right party became the victim of the 'reinvention' of the Swiss People's Party (a long established party) that strongly moved to the right in the 1990s and thereby undermined the newcomer's effort to consolidate initial levels of support. As for the Republican Movement, organization-based value infusion among followers was difficult to achieve for the Freedom Party, in face of a longer established rival capitalizing on the same issues.[22]

Similar to the Republican Movement, also the Northern Irish Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party was built by a high-profile politician. The Vanguard Unionists, a Northern Irish Party, was initially a political pressure group within the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) which was transformed into a party in 1972 led by William Craig, former Minister of Home Affairs at Stormont (1966–8) and head of the Ulster Loyalist Association (1969–72). This party, which took a range of prominent UUP members with it, was considered as right-wing, being formed to counter the more liberal streams in the UUP. Vanguard had been intended to provide an umbrella organization for various loyalist groups and not only had close links with paramilitary groupings but had its own paramilitary group called the Vanguard Service Corps[23] (Barberis et al. 2000: 263; Walker 2004: 216, 294; Weinberg et al. 2008). It was strongly involved in extra-parliamentary activities, holding rallies such as in Belfast on 18 March 1972 which was attended by an estimated 60,000 people (Boyd 1972: 100). The party won three seats in the House of Commons in the two 1974 elections but split in 1976 over the issue of

[22] The Freedom Party entered the Swiss parliament in 1987 with 2.6 per cent. It increased this level of support at the following two elections (5.1 per cent and 4 per cent respectively) but lost all its seats at the consecutive election, and has since then declined steadily. Under the leadership of Christoph Blocher, the long-established Swiss People's Party moved to the right and adopted a hard line on immigration, a central issue of the Freedom Party, around the time of the latter's breakthrough. Tempted by the Swiss People's Party, numerous representatives of the much weaker Freedom Party defected, systematically eroding its support base (Husbands 2000: 507). That the party under such conditions could persist until today—despite suffering from considerable internal turmoil—can be attributed to the attempts of core elites to build up structures on the cantonal and local level (Année Politique Suisse 2010c) and a considerable continuity on the level of the party leadership. Party founder Michael E. Dreher represented the party 1987–99 in national parliament but joined the Swiss People's Party shortly after. He was followed as party president by Jürg Scherrer, who held the position (with interruption) for over ten years. Thanks to the latter's local base, the party had local representation up to spring 2012. 'Die Auto-Partei verliert ihren letzten Amtsträger', <http://www.derbund.ch/bern/region/Die-AutoPartei-verliert-ihren-letzten-Amtstraeger/story/25838844>, accessed June 6 2012.

[23] The party soon dropped the 'progressive' from its name. Due to Craig's rhetoric and the presence of stewards of the Vanguard Service Corps at party meetings, observers assign the party a 'Mosleyite' quality (Oswald Ernald Mosley was an English politician who founded the British Union of Fascists) (Barberis et al. 2000: 263).

power-sharing with the Social Democratic and Labour Party, which Craig supported, in contrast to other members of the party leadership. This conflict led to the formation of the United Ulster Unionist Party (UUUP).[24] In 1977 the two parties competed at the Northern Irish council election. The UUUP won 12, the Vanguard Unionists only five councillors, although the latter had 13 councillors running that had been elected in 1973. This poor performance signalled the party's limited potential to survive as a separate organization. Consequently, in February 1978 Craig led his party back into the Ulster Unionist Party (Barberis et al. 2000: 262–3; Walker 2004: 294). While this is a rather rare move among founding leaders of new right parties, Craig did not return for long. In 1982 (having lost his seat in Westminster in 1979), Craig tried to revive the Vanguard label and run as a Vanguard Unionist at the Irish Assembly elections, but he failed to win a seat and faded out of politics thereafter (Barberis et al. 2000: 263). For founding leader Craig his party remained an instrument to assure the effective representation of particular positions, as visible in his return to the UUP when the Vanguard Unionists' electoral fortunes vanished and his renewed departure once new conflicts arose.

Both the Republican Movement and the Vanguard Unionists failed to persist and sustain electoral support as autonomous party organizations in the longer term, although they had ties to organized groups and attempts were made to build an extra-parliamentary structure. Neither of the two parties was a careerist vehicle. Elites and followers were ideologically motivated. Both formed as splinter parties and after having tried to go their own way, their lack of success pushed them to return to their respective mother parties, in one case initiated by the founder, in the other probably facilitated by the founder's departure. Both parties suffered from heavy infighting, which in Vanguard's case triggered a major split, calling into question their capacity to represent core policies effectively. The formation of a self-standing party able to generate an organizationally motivated attachment of followers was particularly difficult to achieve, facing the direct competition of better established parties targeting the same niche.

[24] Relatively little is known about the internal life of the United Ulster Unionist Party. It was formed by Ernest Baird, dissident of the Vanguard Unionists (Walker 2004: 224). It won 12 councillor seats in 1977 and did much better than its mother party that disbanded one year later. It further retained the Mid Ulster seat in Westminster at the 1979 general election. At the 1982 Assembly elections all its 12 candidates were defeated and the party effectively disappeared afterwards. In 1983 their national MP John Dunlop did not stand again, a time by which most members had already joined the Democratic Unionist Party (Barberis et al. 2000: 262). 'Going alone' was no aim in itself from the leader's point of view and the survival of the organization did not become a goal in itself for followers. To keep the party going needed justification in terms of its electoral support from the viewpoint of policy-driven supporters, since otherwise it was more sensible to fight for one's convictions in another party. Consequently, members left when other organizations seemed a more effective vehicle to promote the relevant cause than the UUUP. That the UUUP's one national MP decided not to run at the follow-up election certainly contributed to the party's eventual dissolution and reinforced a process of desertion that was already ongoing at that point.

CONCLUSIONS

Group ties facilitate party institutionalization in the new right family when elites are interested in the viability of their party and are willing to invest resources in it. Such an orientation could be mainly observed in bottom-up formations initiated by several already organized groupings. Unlike the top-down formations, all three bottom-up formations outlived their founding leadership. Their founding elites systematically invested in a party infrastructure to consolidate the party in the longer term, especially visible in mechanisms favouring value infusion among members as well as office holders. These parties tended to adapt to the pressures of public office reasonably well. They used the resources they were able to access thanks to their national breakthrough to further consolidate their support base, even if they had to assure coordination in a rather large parliamentary group.

In most rooted top-down formations, neglect or opposition among party founders or initial leaders to build an extra-parliamentary organization could be observed instead. The fact that parties were affiliated to societal groups did not necessarily imply the leadership's long-term orientation or the willingness to prioritize organizational over individual interests. This was especially the case when the leader was not attached to these groups personally but an 'outside recruit' whose activities—once occupying a powerful position in the new formation—were difficult to influence by promoter organizations. While the presence of group ties slowed down parties' decline as compared to entrepreneurial parties we will look at in the following chapter, tendencies associated with the leadership–structure dilemma still materialized. Finally, the concluding two case studies showed that societal roots and party building are not necessarily sufficient to assure long-term success and survival. They suggest that party building can fail to establish effective mechanisms of internal conflict resolution, especially when party founders strongly aim at protecting their own position in the newly formed party. At the same time, fierce competition from other parties focusing on the same or very similar issues—especially if they are better established—can undermine a new party's efforts to consolidate by providing a more attractive platform for members and office aspirants to realize their ideological or careerist goals.

8

The Leadership–Structure Dilemma in Entrepreneurial New Right Parties: From Disintegration to Fully-Fledged Institutionalization

This chapter moves on to the more dominant type of origin among new right parties: entrepreneurs, a configuration usually leading to the creation of leadership-dominated party organizations. In terms of their long-term trajectory, lacking group ties and being formed top-down, these entrepreneurial parties fall roughly into three groups: those with party elites who invest in an extra-parliamentary organization to support routinization and value infusion; those with elites who do not invest in an infrastructure or oppose it; and those who create an infrastructure exclusively to protect their own position and assure the party's functioning in public office. We start out with an overview of new right entrepreneurs, which allows us to group them according to whether their leading elites engaged in party-building activities or not, and how. This, in turn, allows us to identify cases that contradict one of two main theoretical expectations, namely that parties that do not institutionalize should be short-lived, while parties that institutionalize should not dissolve prematurely.

Table 8.1 categorizes parties according to their performance profiles and provides basic information on these parties, especially the role their initial (usually founding) leader. All founder(s) of entrepreneurial parties took over leadership positions, at least initially, and in most cases also one of the first parliamentary seats the newly formed party was able to win (and in a few cases government ministries). In a range of cases the founders have not been replaced until today, such as Pia Kjærsgaard, one of the founders and the leader of the Danish People's Party, in office for the last 16 years (a persistent and sustainable party). Table 8.1 further shows that—with only one exception—parties which were deserted by their initial leader early on suffered from decline as a consequence. The identity or strong overlap of party founders and the initial party leadership that is typical in these parties is important. It increases the likelihood that party development is strongly shaped by attempts of the founder to maintain his or her position of power in the newly formed organization. This brings us back to the self-referential nature of party formation that is particularly pronounced in

TABLE 8.1 *Party building and performance patterns of new right entrepreneurs*

Performance profile	Party name (country)	Founders' support for party building	Early leader exit	Performance trajectory after leader exit	Type of death
Non-persistent/ Non-sustainable	New Democracy (Sweden)	No	Yes	Decline	Disintegration
	Pim Fortuyn List (Netherlands)	No	Yes	Decline	Disintegration
	Citizens' Party (Iceland)	No	Yes	Decline	Disintegration
	Constitutional Right Party (Finland)	n/a	n/a	n/a	Dissolution
	United Ulster Unionist Party (UK)	n/a	Yes	Decline	Dissolution
	Liveable Netherlands	n/a	Yes	Decline	Dissolution
	Reform Party (Canada)	*Yes*	*No*	–	*Merger*
Persistent/ Non-sustainable	One Nation Party (Australia)	Yes	Yes	Decline	–
Persistent/ Sustainable	Freedom Party (Switzerland)	Yes	No	–	–
	Danish People's Party (Denmark)*	Yes	No	–	–
	Movement for France (France)*	Yes	No	–	–
	Progress Party (Denmark)	No	Yes	Decline	–
	Progress Party (Norway) *	No	Yes	Consolidation	–
	NZ First (New Zealand) *	Yes	No	–	–
	*Ticino League (Switzerland)**	*No*	*No*	–	–

Notes: n/a information unavailable; contradictory cases in italic. Parties with * currently (2011) represented in national parliament. The table does not include emerging cases.

this constellation, as discussed in the theoretical framework. Later leaders, in contrast to party founders, are more likely to be recruited in line with basic organizational priorities and are therefore more likely to be attached to the party as an organization. Compared to other formative situations, when founders create a party top-down detached from any societal groupings, they are particularly likely to consider the party as an instrument to achieve their personal goals. Vice versa, they are less likely to consider the party as a 'collective enterprise' which they form part of, which has considerable consequences for these parties' long-term evolution.

The founders of most parties in the persistent/sustainable group have supported the formation of an infrastructure from the start, which stresses that entrepreneurial

origin does not predetermine the orientation of founders. In the cases where the founding leader is still in charge today, a closer look at the party's development is necessary to see whether the structures created mainly serve the consolidation of control of the founding leader or whether they also help to constitute a self-sufficient infrastructure able to outlive the founder.

The Movement for France (*Mouvement pour la France*) is a case that suggests the former rather than the latter. This minor party forms part of the Eurosceptic right and was founded in 1994 by the Viscount Philippe de Villiers, a former UDF minister, rooted in the Catholic department of the *Vendée*. There, de Villiers rules the *Vendée* General Council—of which he has been the president since 1988—through cronyism, alleged political intimidation of opponents, and control of the purse strings. Electorally, the party strongly depends on its leader's local base, where the party's representatives receive most of their votes. Organizationally, the party has adopted a conventional party structure, e.g. the party has fee-paying members, a party congress which elects the party leader every four years, and branches on the constituency level (Mitchell 1998). While this infrastructure consolidates de Villiers's position and provides communication channels and coordination mechanisms, the systematic involvement of members in internal processes is unheard of and core decisions are dominated by the founding leader.[1] Accordingly, experts consider the party as not more than a vehicle for de Villiers's personal ambitions that will disband once he decides to finish his career. As we will see in detail below, the evolution of the Danish People's Party, another party that has not yet undergone the critical test of replacing its founding leader, evolved very differently. It systematically developed structural mechanisms that favour value infusion and routinization and can be considered an institutionalized organization both inside and outside public office.

Looking at the parties with weak performance profiles, Table 8.1 indicates that initial (usually founding) leaders have frequently left their parties early, when they were still in the formative phase. In two cases—the murder of Pim Fortuyn (the founder of the LPF) and the death of Anders Lange (the founder of the Progress Party)—this event was an 'external shock' rather than a result of internal turmoil. More often, however, the party becomes an obstacle to the founder's individual goals which triggers irresolvable conflict. The exit of the founder, either voluntarily (after having lost control over the party) or imposed by the party (responding to the latter's destructive behaviour), is one indication of the fundamental tension between individual and organizational interest stressed by the leadership–structure

[1] The short-lived alliance with Charles Pasqua, a Gaullist renegade, in 1999 (dissolved in 2000) is telling. From the start, the two leaders of the new *Rassemblement pour la France* fought over jobs for their respective protégés (Knapp and Wright 2006: 238), pointing to a materialist underpinning of the party.

dilemma. Whether the founder's exit triggers the disintegration of a party depends on whether an alternative leader is available, who is willing and sufficiently able to keep the party together. This is crucial because these parties tend to lack an institutionalized infrastructure able to maintain support through organizational means. Naturally, the likelihood that a successor is available (reflecting the recruitment capacity of the party) and the organizational ability of the party at the point of the founder's departure to cope with a leadership vacuum are closely related, which is why many weakly developed entrepreneurial parties indeed cannot cope with this event and dissolve quickly afterwards.[2]

In only one case could the founder's opposition against the formation of a conventional party structure be overcome relatively quickly: Anders Lange, the founding leader of the Norwegian Progress Party opposed the formation of a conventional party structure but died two years after creating the party in 1973. He was followed by a successor, Carl I. Hagen, already a national politician, who was an active party builder. While Hagen led the party a long time, his departure in 2006 has not visibly destabilized the party, indicating its successful institutionalization. The Danish Progress Party, in contrast, is a remarkable example of a founding leader's return into the party ten years after his expulsion, with disastrous consequences for the party. Mogens Gilstrup founded the party in 1972 and opposed the formation of a conventional party structure, yet lost control over his party during a prison sentence. Being unable to regain his initially dominant position after his return, he had to leave. In 1999, after the party had already suffered a major split running through the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary party in the mid-1990s, Gilstrup was allowed to return. Unwilling to accept his extreme positions, the complete parliamentary group defected (Widfeldt 2000: 490), leaving the party with no MPs after nearly 30 years in national politics.

The following section looks at a range of failure and success cases in greater depth to examine the role of agential factors such as leadership orientations, leadership continuity, and elite strategies for party building that shape entrepreneurs' capacity to exploit their electoral potential. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the two cases that most directly contradict the theoretical expectations (see Table 8.1 in italic): the Canadian Reform Party did not lose its leader and institutionalized but was still short-lived, and the persistent and sustainable Ticino League (*Lega dei Ticinesi*) whose founding leader (who died suddenly in March 2013) opposed the formation of an extra-parliamentary membership organization but—so far—was able to sustain considerable levels of support.

[2] Failure to cultivate member loyalty (e.g. through the careful selection of members and candidates) can severely backfire as well and the example of ex-members suing their parties for undemocratic practices is one striking example of this (it happened to the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List and the Australian One Nation Party; in both instances the parties lost the case).

DEATH THROUGH DISINTEGRATION: ELECTORAL BREAKTHROUGH AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE

The Dutch Pim Fortuyn List (*Lijjst Pim Fortuyn*, LPF) and Swedish New Democracy (*Ny Demokrati*, ND) were the most spectacular cases in terms of the discrepancy between initial support and the incapacity to sustain it after breakthrough: the LPF entered the Dutch parliament in 2002 with 17 per cent of the national vote, winning 26 seats at its initial election. ND won 6.7 per cent of the national vote at the 1991 general elections, for which it received 25 seats. Given their considerable size, the disintegrative tendencies following their breakthrough showed with particular clarity. Iceland's Citizens' Party (*Borgaraflokkurinn*)—although much smaller in terms of its parliamentary group—showed a similarly rapid decline after having entered national parliament in the late 1980s. All three had taken over government responsibility right away. While Australia's One Nation (ON) remained an opposition party during its parliamentary career, it mirrors many disintegrative features.

Thus, the parties discussed in the following subsection vary considerably in the size of their parliamentary groups and the pressure they were exposed to within institutions (i.e. two being formal coalition partners, one functioning as support party, and one remaining in opposition). Nonetheless, the sources of vulnerability in these 'flash parties' are remarkably similar: the incapacity to regulate internal conflict that often intensified with their national breakthrough, defection of leading personnel and followers early on; and the incapacity of the newly formed organizations to fill the void created by those defections, especially when triggered by the exit of the founding leader.

Starting with probably the least-known case, the Icelandic Citizens' Party was founded by Albert Guomundsson, a former minister of the Independence Party. He defected in 1987 after he was considered unsuitable to stay in office any longer, due to his involvement in a large financial lawsuit. To continue his political career on his own terms, he founded the Citizens' Party with the support of a few Independent members. The party participated in the 1987 general election and managed a remarkable entry with 10.9 per cent of the national vote and seven seats in parliament (Kristinsson 2007: 109). Only two years later the founder resigned to become Iceland's ambassador in France, which led to a split in the parliamentary party, an event that stresses the dependency of the party on its founding leader. Two MPs defected to found their own party (later they returned to the Independence Party). The rest of the group joined a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party, the People's Alliance, and the Progressive Party, in which it received two ministries (Kristinsson 2007: 109). The government lasted just over one and a half years until April 1991. By that time, the party's internal fragmentation had increased to such an extent that the party was unable to run in the following general election.

The LPF suffered from similar weaknesses, although its rise and, consequently, decline were far more spectacular. Before becoming the founding leader of the LPF, Pim Fortuyn had already unsuccessfully tried to enter top positions in several of the established parties (Peper 2007: 4).[3] Having little luck, he became affiliated with the local *Leefbar* movement, a movement that was mainly united by a disdain for the established political elites and led to the foundation of a new party, Liveable Netherlands (LN), in 1999. In 2001 the party congress of Liveable Netherlands chose Fortuyn as the LN's leading candidate for the upcoming election (Praag 2002). Yet since Fortuyn treated Liveable Netherlands as a vehicle to pursue his career, he showed little consideration for the actual goals of the new formation. He radicalized the party programme to an extent unacceptable to the party's followers, which provoked his expulsion from the party just one year later.[4]

After this experience, he founded his own vehicle, the Pim Fortuyn List, to participate in the upcoming national election (Reuter 2009: 187). After Fortuyn's assassination in May 2002, the LPF entered parliament with 26 seats. At that point, the party had no formal organization in place—with the exception of an executive committee of three of Pim Fortuyn's friends and a few volunteers who managed to collect sufficient signatures to allow the party's participation in the election. After Fortuyn had been assassinated the group fell apart and leading figures resigned within a few days (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008: 78), lacking any organizational affiliation beyond their attachments to the party founder.

Already during the coalition negotiations the problems resulting from the party's lack of organizational structures became visible and some attempts to set up local branches and organize a party congress were made to gain approval for the party's government participation after its 2002 success (Chorus and De Galan 2002: 214–15). In June 2002 (two months after the LPF's national

[3] Fortuyn had been a member of the PvdA, the Labour Party, from 1973 to 1989 where he tried to rise into high positions. Later on, he made similar attempts in the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberals (VVD) (Oosthoek 2005: 16; Peper 2007: 4).

[4] Similar to the LPF after Fortuyn's assassination, Liveable Netherlands (*Leefbaar Nederland*) could not cope with discontinuity on the leadership level. The national party, a typical outsider party, was founded in 1999 by the founders of *Leefbar* Hilversum and *Leefbar* Utrecht: Jan Nagel, who would become the party's first chairman, singer Henk Westbroek, radio presenter Willem van Kooten, business man Broos Schnetz, and journalist Ton Luiting. While the structure that was adopted was decentralized, the process was dominated by a small group of self-selected individuals. Pim Fortuyn was chosen as the frontman of the new formation. After Fortuyn's expulsion, Liveable Netherlands only managed to win two seats at the 2002 elections, in striking contrast to the 26 won by Fortuyn's LPF. When in January 2003 the party executive proposed Emile Ratelband as the leading candidate on the party list, Fred Treven (who had led the party into the 2002 elections and had taken over one of the two seats) defected. He later became a junior minister for security for Wilders's far-right Freedom Party, the party that filled the gap left after the collapse of the LPF. While the LPF drastically declined after its big breakthrough in 2002, Liveable Netherlands, in turn, lost all its seats at the election following its breakthrough and did not participate at the 2006 general election.

breakthrough) a committee was established to build a party organization. Yet instead of addressing existing problems, conflicts around the distribution of decision-making power within the party accelerated, which split the party leadership and even led to a temporary interruption of the coalition negotiations. Frustrations among the members were similarly pronounced since the party organization in the making was, theoretically, supposed to be democratic but decisions were not made accordingly. Two critics even went to court to challenge undemocratic party practices in the LPF and won their case (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008: 79).

The consequences of the lack of any systematic recruitment or screening of candidates became fully visible in the working of the parliamentary group. Many people on the list had been friends of Fortuyn or signed up after having heard him speak and identified with his message and persona (de Lange and Art 2011: 1236). Organizational loyalty did not play a role in this process and could not do so, for the simple reason that the organization had been non-existent when the list for the 2002 election was put together. In its 2002 annual report the party itself recognizes the lack of experience of its MPs. Only a few of them had engaged in prior political activities and the MPs hardly knew each other, which inevitably affected the internal working of the group negatively and provoked intense infighting (de Lange and Art 2011: 1239, 1242). On top of that, some MPs were confronted with criminal charges, and another one turned out to be a former member of the right-wing extremist Centre Democrats. Two members of the group were expelled to maintain a certain level of internal discipline, a move that was heavily criticized by the extra-parliamentary party and fostered conflict between the arms of the party that operated inside and outside public office. Mat Herben, the leader of the parliamentary group, had been severely criticized for lacking the capacity to discipline the group as early as August 2002; even group members—lacking any consideration for the party's public image—openly speculated about his political future (Reuter 2009: 199–200). Herben was replaced in the same month, a move that did little to stabilize the party.

The next elections followed quickly in 2003. Aware of the poor performance of its parliamentary group the party asked the voters 'for another chance'. The party returned less than a third of its MPs, which reduced its parliamentary group to eight members. Although coordination should have been easier within the smaller group, the party still suffered from prominent defections, such as that of Hilbrand Nawijn, the former Minister of Integration, who became an Independent (Reuter 2009: 199). In the meantime, heavy conflicts within the extra-parliamentary party had led to the expulsion of various members, which triggered the resignation of Maas, the party leader. Unsurprisingly, Maas's several successors also did not stay in office for long. The ongoing conflict between the parliamentary group and extra-parliamentary party finally escalated with the whole parliamentary group leaving the party, another indication of the lack of organizational loyalty of the

LPF representatives. In 2005 former LPF members tried to found a new party, without any significant electoral success (Reuter 2009: 202). By 2006, the LPF's membership had declined considerably. Its official dissolution followed a year later (Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008: 79).

Another case of spectacular rise followed by rapid disintegration is that of the Swedish party New Democracy (ND). ND won 25 seats in the Riksdag at the 1991 general election, nine months after it was formed by the director of a record company and a count (Bale and Blomgren 2008: 90). Like the LPF, it was a classical entrepreneurial outsider formation which started out without political experience and with virtually no organization. From the start, two camps rallied around the two founders, Ian Wachtmeister and Bert Karlsson. This divide created severe internal tensions and triggered Wachtmeister's exit just over three years after the party's foundation, an event that destabilized the party considerably[5] (Widfeldt 2000: 494). The ND disintegrated after its failure to re-enter parliament at the next election.

Similar to the LPF, the ND was after its breakthrough in a strategically very strong position. It occupied a pivotal position in the Swedish parliament and became a supporter of the non-socialist minority government (Svåsand 1998: 90). The two founders Wachtmeister and Karlsson initially tried to pressure the government into concessions to exploit this advantageous position. Yet while the centre-right minority government was willing to cooperate with ND, such attempts were undermined by the unreliability of its parliamentary group. The latter not only suffered from defections but lacked internal coordination mechanisms which became most visible when ND representatives agreed on supporting bills with other parties, which were defeated afterwards because ND could not provide the necessary votes (Widfeldt 2000: 495). The party had no proper recruitment mechanisms in place when putting together the list for the 1991 election. Consequently, the people entering parliament on an ND ticket turned out to be a burden for the party and its image rather than a resource (Bale and Blomgren 2008: 98).

The lack of parliamentary discipline was paralleled by the incapacity of the party to cope with the void after Wachtmeister had left the party, which was followed by a state of anarchy (Svåsand 1998: 90). Leading figures such as co-founder Karlsson presented alternative candidates for the party leadership. As Widfeldt put it, the 'process to select a new leader was chaotic, involving disputed choices and a legal battle' (2000: 494). Wachtmeister's successor was replaced after only a few months. She resigned from the party and, when doing so, even urged her supporters to vote for the Moderate Party instead (Widfeldt 2000: 494–6). Similar to Wachtmeister who tried to continue his political career by founding another party, these actions indicate leading personnel's lack of

[5] Wachtmeister tried a comeback at the 1998 general election with a newly founded party, but won less than 1 per cent of the vote.

attachment to the only recently formed party. After it had become clear that the party as a collective actor was unable to operate in parliament, there was little to motivate individual representatives to stay.

Looking at the ND's arm outside public office, it is indicative that initially the ND statutes were similar to those of most other Swedish parties. But to avoid the influence of radical local activists on national decisions, the statutes were amended in 1993: this amendment decoupled the national party from the local level. As a consequence, the 'party' only functioned at national elections leading to a complete centralization of decision-making (Svåsand 1998: 82). While such a structure was unlikely to generate or consolidate the attachment of local followers and party branches to the national party, it also meant that the turmoil in the national party after Wachtmeister's departure completely undermined the party's campaign preparations for the 1994 election. After a disastrous performance, both in parliament and during the campaign, it won only 1.2 per cent of the national vote and, with it, no seats (Aylott 1995), which triggered further defections, including that of co-founder Karlsson. The party went bankrupt a few years later.

Although still being formally active, the Australian One Nation Party shares a range of features with the group of non-sustainable and non-persistent 'flash parties' in terms of the destabilizing conflicts that evolved within and between the different arms of the party. Like the LPF and ND, the party received a wave of popular support in its initial years and had thereby a major impact on the political landscape. Unlike LPF and ND, it profited to some extent from the systematic attempts of its founders to build—in a top-down fashion—a party infrastructure that in parts persists until today. One major line of conflict evolved between the national party, on which the party founders tried to concentrate all decision-making power, and the state organizations that, once operating, demanded a say. Mirroring the Australian federal system with its strong state governments, party building led to competing centres of power. The party founders, relying solely on top-down sanctions to assure internal discipline, refused any constraints on their own activities and therefore failed to create mechanisms of conflict resolution through which divides could have been managed, a failure that triggered disintegrative tendencies in the party.

One Nation was found by Independent MP Pauline Hanson, who until 2003 was the voice and president of One Nation, David Oldfield, a local councillor, and David Ettridge, a business man. Having been deprived of her pre-selection as Liberal Party candidate, Hanson entered the House of Representatives as an Independent in 1996—profiting from a 21 per cent anti-Labour swing, the largest in the country (Denemark and Bowler 2002: 50). While ON is formally an insider party created by a national politician, Hanson's rejection of the mainstream parties, their political correctness, and their lack of responsiveness to 'ordinary Australians' clearly places her in the populist camp trying to profit from an outsider image (Johnson 1998; McDonnell and Newell 2011).

The 'Hanson movement' started with the MP's provocative maiden speech in the House of Representatives, which triggered sufficient societal support across the country to constitute the nucleus of an enduring party organization. These processes of self-motivated grassroots mobilization led to the formation of Hanson support groups and, later on, to the formation of, according to party reports, 250 One Nation branches comprising 25,000 members only 14 months after the party's foundation (Ward 2000: 91). Yet what could have been a crucial resource for a successful institutionalization process clashed with the founders' vision of the party machine they wanted to put in place. In essence, the three founders tried to channel this wave of support into an organization that assured complete top-down control (Ward 2000: 99). Ward sums up the reason for this failed institutionalization attempt in the following way, a description that echoes the tensions as captured by the leadership–structure dilemma:

> Its unique corporate structure was purpose-built to prevent its rank-and-file from disturbing the complete control which its founders wished to preserve for themselves. For these reasons One Nation eventually failed its many supporters—and failed to take root. (Ward 2000: 89)

The party experienced its national breakthrough at the 1998 Senate election, only one year after its foundation. At that point, the formation of Hanson support groups had already started and the party had already had its most crucial and so far biggest success at the Queensland state election in 1998, a success that would haunt the national party later on: One Nation managed to field 79 candidates, and won 22.7 per cent of the Queensland vote and 11 of 89 seats. This was followed by 9 per cent of the national vote at the Senate election, a result that due to the disproportionality of the electoral system only translated into one seat. Electoral success had its price: after gaining parliamentary representation, ON was plagued by intense internal turmoil and splits. The Queensland contingent of parliamentarians fought with each other, with Hanson, and with the party leadership, leading to the defection of the first Queensland representatives only four months after being elected. Another five deserted early in 1999, when Hanson refused the demands of the Queensland branch for more independence. At the time Hanson's position was already weakened, having failed to regain her seat at the 1998 House of Representative election. And while initially the Queensland MPs acknowledged their political debts to Hanson for the support she had generated, the lack of a vertical structure for interest mediation across party units and organizational levels meant that the Queensland representatives soon identified more strongly with their state and had little incentive to follow national orders (Reynolds 2000: 186). This controversy forced the three ON founders to expand the national executive from the initial five to 11 members, thereby assuring the representation of state party presidents.

But this was not the end of the tensions that evolved along territorial lines between national and state parties. The defection of the remaining five Queensland MPs followed in late 1999, after they had proposed to register One Nation

Queensland as a separate entity,[6] which the national party leadership considered as a revolt. They left to found their own party, the City Country Alliance, to which many members, seeing One Nation in serious trouble, deserted (Gibson et al. 2002: 826). Leaving aside the lack of experience of ON parliamentarians and the lack of skill and capacity to operate as professional politicians (Reynolds 2000: 183–4), the unwillingness of the party's founding leaders to compromise and reconcile the interests of party units operating on different levels was evident. While other case studies have already indicated that institutionalization—particularly value infusion—requires a meaningful (even if limited) involvement of members, constitutive parties, or lower-level units in decision-making, in a federal system like the Australian one where state governments have a powerful position (and with that the regional representatives), a completely power-concentrating party structure was particularly difficult to maintain.

The failure of One Nation could not be prevented although Ettridge and Oldfield were fully aware that in order to make a lasting effect Hanson needed a durable party structure (Ward 2000: 99–100). Yet party building made matters worse. The supporters of the initial movements should be either tightly controlled or, in case of resistance, expelled. The ON founders were aware that recruitment mechanisms were essential to stabilize support given the heterogeneous support base Hanson had mobilized. Consequently, they were determined to create a structure that protected the core of the party from infiltration, the core being the founders themselves. The national 'management committee' (i.e. the national executive), in which the three founders had a majority, had decision-making authority in all essential areas (membership, terminations, finance, policy). Ettridge justified this, in effect, authoritarian structure by the overriding importance of assuring the survival of the party and 'to keep trouble makers out'. Similarly, the three founders established a range of mechanisms to effectively punish those who ignored the chain of command. Branch and other party officials, for instance, had to sign undated letters of resignation which the party leadership could use to remove whoever proved to be troublesome later on. On the level of rank-and-file members, a by-law prohibited branch members gaining access to the membership register to prevent them finding out about other members (Ward 2000: 103). As a consequence, there were no intermediate structures that mediated policy, communications, or financial information between the party elite and its members (Reynolds 2000: 185). As one vivid expression of resentment and disappointment among ordinary followers, the One Nation Party was sued by ex-members. Found guilty of electoral fraud, the party had to repay Aus$500,000 of public funding it received at the 1998 Queensland elections. The lawsuits had

[6] Early on the party ran into legal trouble. Among other things, it had bungled its application for registration at the Queensland Electoral Commission. In late 1999, the Supreme Court delayed its decision on the ON's appeal against its deregistration in Queensland, which triggered the proposal of the regional parliamentarians (Ward 2000: 108).

alleged that the party was undemocratically constituted, which was incompatible with the receipt of public funding.

Eventually, when it became clear through a range of high-profile defections and heavy internal turmoil in 1999 that internal control could not be maintained, Ettridge left the party to pursue an alternative business career (Ward 2000: 94, 107–8). David Oldfield, in contrast, was expelled by Pauline Hanson, the leader and co-founder, in 2000, leaving the party without those members of the founding elites who supported party building. In 2002, Hanson herself resigned as party president.[7] While she still ran for One Nation on the state level in 2003, a year later she entered the 2004 federal election as an Independent and in 2007 founded a new party.[8]

The lesson told by the fate of the ONP is that the formation of a formal party structure does not necessarily support party institutionalization. All the mechanisms set up in ON assured the control of the leadership by potentially excluding those damaging to the organization and preventing them from collaborating with each other, which undermined the party from within. No 'positive' recruitment mechanisms were established that could have generated activists' and officials' positive identification with the newly created party structure. On the contrary, the mechanisms the founders set up prevented the followers from transferring their identification with and attachment to Hanson as a charismatic leader to the newly formed organization. Clearly, a sense of belonging to an organization is difficult if members are not allowed to know each other. These particular organizational choices prevented the newly formed organization from providing 'solidary benefits' rather than supporting the latter's provision. Furthermore, those taking over responsibility in the new party had to explicitly accept that the leadership could get rid of them at any point, which also does not favour any affective affiliation of the core personnel to the organization. Routinization of processes might have been possible in One Nation, had the party suffered less from internal disruptions and had the founders shown some basic willingness to coordinate positions with other party units—most notably the state parties (especially the Queensland branch) on whose support they depended. In essence, the particular organizational choices made by founders rather prevented than helped to translate the wave of public support into organizational loyalty.

Irrespective of varying sizes and ideological orientations, none of the four entrepreneurial parties could cope with the exit of their founding leaders, one basic indication of a failed institutionalization process. Party building was either not effectively initiated or exclusively focused on protecting the power of the founding elite, both of which provided a poor foundation for value infusion. By definition, a non-existing or not yet existing party infrastructure cannot constrain

[7] S. Murphy (2002) 'Pauline Hanson Pulls the Plug as One Nation President', <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2002/s458299.htm>, accessed 2 June 2012.

[8] 'Now Pauline's for a United Australia', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 May 2007, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2007/05/24/1179601573572.html>, accessed 2 June 2012.

or socialize founding leaders into prioritizing organizational over individual interests. Consequently, the leaders of entrepreneurial parties (who, as individuals, are less likely to be long-term oriented) have little incentive to remain loyal to a party, once it runs into trouble, once it does not serve the leaders' interests anymore, or once more attractive career opportunities come up. Leaving top-down sanctions aside, they lacked mechanisms for conflict resolution. Confronted with a group of extremely heterogeneous and inexperienced MPs, these parties found it hard to assure the internal functioning of the parliamentary group (or, more severely, to prevent it from falling apart), especially once the founding leaders as a central unifying force had left.

Taking over government responsibility certainly reinforced the pressures coming with public office in the case of the LPF, the ND, and the Citizens' Party. But the departure of founding leaders and their inability to reconcile intra-organizational conflict most likely would have been destabilizing factors even if the parties had remained in opposition, as the comparison with the Australian ON suggests. National breakthrough multiplies lines and sources of conflict by forcing a new party to operate simultaneously in different arenas (each with their own distinct requirements on the party representatives in charge), whether a party also takes over government responsibility or not. Most fundamentally, all four cases that showed disintegrative tendencies were represented by individuals with little in common except for their lack of experience with professional politics, which again emphasizes the fundamental role of selective recruitment.

This is all the more telling when mainstream parties were actually willing to cooperate with the newcomers (as in the Dutch and Icelandic cases) in terms of formal government participation. Had these parties been able to function as collective actors and to respond to the functional demands of governmental and parliamentary business, established parties would have allowed them to exploit their strategically favourable position and profit from their breakthrough, as for instance the Danish People's Party did successfully, rather than falling into disarray. In a sense, the leadership-dominated top-down formations constitute a mirror image to parties such as the French NF or the Belgian VB—more constrained party hierarchies—discussed in Chapter 7, which succeeded due to their capacity to operate as organizational actors although they were ostracized by mainstream parties.

PARTY AGENCY, MODES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION, AND PARTY PERFORMANCE

Among the entrepreneurial parties that fall in the persistent/sustainable category, only two are currently represented in their national parliaments, have won

significant vote shares, and have, according to expert opinions, successfully carved out a niche in their respective party systems: the Danish People's Party (DPP) and the Norwegian Progress Party (e.g. Andersen and Bjørklund 2000; Art 2011; Pedersen 2006; Svåsand 1998; Widfeldt 2000).[9] NZ First is a third example of an entrepreneur that won significant vote shares and repeatedly took over government responsibility on the national level. However, while both the Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People's Party are characterized by a successive strengthening of their support base and a consolidation of the latter, the trajectory of NZ First has been marked by dramatic ups and downs from one general election to another. At the 2008 general election, the party even lost access to national parliament altogether and although it made it back into national parliament in 2011, there are doubts as to whether the party will be able to outlive its founding leader. In the following we will see that although party building took place in all three cases, the rationale underlying this process in the cases of the DPP and the Norwegian Progress Party differ remarkably from what we find in NZ First.

Sustainability through fully-fledged institutionalization: the Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People's Party

The Norwegian Progress Party stands out among entrepreneurs, since it has not only outlived its founding leader but also his successor, a rare case of consolidation that occurred despite the early departure of the party founder. In fact, it is a case in which this exit was beneficial rather than destructive for the party's long-term evolution. Today the Norwegian Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*) is the second largest party in the Norwegian parliament. While the mainstream parties have so far refused to form a formal government coalition with the party, minority governments have depended on its support. While the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*)—an insider formation by the pragmatic wing of the Danish Progress Party—was led by a party builder right from the start, the initial years of the Norwegian Progress Party were dominated by the anti-organizational attitudes of its founder. Unlike in other entrepreneurial parties, however, the course of events prevented the founder from shaping the Norwegian Progress Party's evolution beyond an initial period.

The founder of what would later become the Progress Party was Anders Lange, an outsider to politics who built his 'Anders Lange's Party for greatly reduced taxes, fees, and public intervention' from scratch. Although the formation started pretty much as a one-man party, it gained over 5 per cent of the vote in the 1973 general election and won four seats. A year later, the party's current leader and one of its MPs, Carl I. Hagen, defected and founded the Reform Party, a party that

[9] Movement for France, as discussed earlier, has only ever won very marginal vote shares.

never won seats in the national parliament. Lange died two years after founding the party, which allowed Hagen to return to the party in 1975. Two years later the party changed its name to Progress Party (Widfeldt 2000: 488). Hagen led the party until 2006. This did not only mean stability on the level of the party leadership for over two decades. Hagen's reign (although at times turbulent[10]) was accompanied by the creation of a traditional membership organization autonomous of its current leadership. Anders Lange had had strong anti-establishment credentials and had opposed the formation of a conventional party organization, while Hagen, a former member of the Conservative Party, was a party builder who tried to emulate the organizational strategies of long-lived parties to consolidate the newcomer's position. Just as the French Communists served as an organizational template for the French NF (Mayer 1998), the Norwegian Labour Party, a mass party with a fundamentally different ideology, served as organizational template for the Progress Party. While in the early years the party avoided expelling local branches that violated the party line due to the organizational costs this imposed on the new formation, later on the exclusion of disruptive activists became a tool to assure that members and office holders remained loyal to the party and did not damage it. This was accompanied by selective recruitment strategies and the active training of members, candidates, and office holders (Art 2011: 160–6) which positively incentivized party loyalty and helped the party to successively build up and consolidate its membership (Mjelde 2009). That after the tremendous electoral success of the party in 1989 (it won 13 per cent and 22 seats) the balance of power in the party changed in favour of the extra-parliamentary party, fits the mass party template and highlights the strength the organization had acquired outside public institutions at this point. The parliamentary party was subordinated to the organization in terms of policy, organization, and finance. According to Svåsand, no other party in Norway had ever reduced the autonomy of its parliamentary group that much (1998: 81).

That the anti-organizational tendencies displayed by the party founder Lange could not damage the party in the longer term was the result of an external shock. This 'solved' the problem of replacing a founder who might otherwise have been unwilling to give up his position, a problem the Danish Progress Party struggled with throughout its history. It is indicative of the powerful position founder Lange had in the party that Lange's opponent Hagen was forced to leave the party in the early years—although the latter was considered a charismatic figure similar to the late Jörg Haider (the former leader of the Austrian Freedom party) (Widfeldt 2000: 490). Lange's involuntary, early, and final departure allowed for Hagen's return, which facilitated a shift towards a more pro-organizational

[10] At the 1993 election the party's support more than halved to 6.3 per cent at a time when the party suffered from heavy infighting between the extreme libertarian minority and Hagen's more moderate majority, which triggered a range of defections, most notably the breakaway of four MPs belonging to the libertarian wing in 1994 (Skjørestad 2008).

approach that contributed to the party's long-term success. This does not mean that Lange's death was a necessary condition for a pro-organizational attitude to take hold in the party. Pro-organizational factions in the party might have constrained or got rid of Lange at some point in any case. That said, the experiences of other entrepreneurial parties suggest that parties rarely manage to 'get rid of' a founder who is unwilling to leave, even when he or she has become a liability to the party.

The essential point is that the Norwegian Progress Party started as an entrepreneurial party without the nucleus of a loyal supporter pool provided by affiliated groups and with a founder who actively opposed party building. Considering the importance of the national party leadership in highly hierarchical, centralized new parties, the take-over of a leader who actively invested in extra-parliamentary structures to improve recruitment capacities and socialize supporters in the organization was an event that helped to stabilize the party's position in the Norwegian party system in the longer run. It further allowed the party to outlive Hagen's leadership, which is a relatively rare event as far as entrepreneurial parties go. After the leadership turnover in 2006—Hagen had been the party leader for over two decades—the party could consolidate its electoral support and increase its seat share at the 2009 election.

The Danish People's Party (DPP) has not yet undergone this critical test of replacing its founding leadership. Yet a closer look at the party's organizational evolution reveals its consolidation as similar to that of the Norwegian People's Party. The newly formed party entered the *Folketing*, the Danish parliament, in 1998 with 7.4 per cent of the national vote, at the first election it participated in. Six years after its foundation, in 2001 (after having increased support to 12 per cent of the national vote and 22 seats), it took over government responsibility, by becoming the support party of a Conservative–Liberal minority government.[11] It did so successfully for ten years and in 2011 returned into opposition with only minor losses: it won 12.3 per cent of the national vote and 22 seats as compared to 13.8 per cent and 25 seats at the previous election.[12] While the party's formative conditions were not favourable—it was an entrepreneurial insider formed by defectors from the Progress Party—it took over parliamentary and government responsibilities quickly and coped with them remarkably well. The consolidation of DPP support was accompanied by a process of organizational institutionalization that contributed to the party's capacity to use public office (both parliamentary and governmental) as an asset, instead of being destabilized by responsibilities related to it.

[11] In the 2005 and 2007 general elections the party increased its electoral support to 24 and 25 seats respectively.

[12] At the 2009 European election, the DPP more than doubled its vote share to 15.3 per cent and won a second seat with its main candidate attracting more votes than any single candidate of any other party.

Methodologically speaking, the DPP is a particularly telling case because its mother party, the Progress Party, targeted the same electoral niche and was initially—when the DPP entered parliament—clearly in the stronger position in terms of resources, both organizationally and electorally. Although the Progress Party's vote shares had declined over the two past decades the party had been active before the DPP was formed, it managed to re-enter parliament more often than most parties covered in this study. Thus, unlike the Norwegian Progress Party, the DPP could not profit from presenting a profile distinct from what was already on offer in the parliamentary party system. That the DPP still could conquer its niche illustrates the Progress Party's organizational vulnerability that still characterized the party more than 20 years after its foundation, which, in turn, highlights the importance of elites' party-building strategies.

The Progress Party had been characterized by repeated internal clashes and was considered as ungovernable as an organization and therefore considered unfit for government by potential coalition partners on the centre-right. This was the case although the party had considerable electoral potential—it started with 15.9 per cent at its breakthrough election in 1973, a level of support it was unable to ever reach again. Mogens Gilstrup, the founder of the Danish Progress Party (who in 1974 had been elected to the National Executive of the Progress Party for life), had never had much interest in party politics and considered himself as the leader of a spiritual movement. He consequently refused the formation of a conventional party organization that could have stabilized the considerable support the party managed to attract. As a result, the party became divided into two camps: Gilstrup's loyal followers and a more pragmatist grouping. The formation of basic party structures was only initiated after considerable pressure from the grassroots level. Yet while Gilstrup finally gave in to this demand for a 'regular organization', he simultaneously made sure that the organization had minimal impact on his own role in the party (Svåsand 1998: 80), again exemplifying the tension between the interest of the founder to protect his or her power and extra-parliamentary party building. Eventually, Gilstrup lost control over the party during a three-year period in prison (1984–7).[13] Pia Kjærsgaard took over as the leader and the 'Gilstrup clause' (assuring the founder a life-long membership in the party executive) was removed. After his return, Gilstrup could not re-establish his position in the party and had to leave. He entered the 1990 elections with his own new party, the Wellbeing Party, with very little electoral success (Svåsand 1998: 80).

Unlike in the Norwegian Progress Party, however, Gilstrup's departure did not mean that the pragmatist faction had won the battle. Conflicts between the rivalling factions continued and, in 1995, escalated with the party leader Pia Kjærsgaard and a minority of officials and members leaving the party and

[13] He was sentenced for tax fraud in 1983.

founding the DPP, after Kjærsgaard's candidate for parliamentary chair lost against one of the ultra-libertarians (Svåsand 1998: 81). From then onwards, the anarchic faction had its way, which found its most vivid expression in Gilstrup's return. Having been expelled in 1991, Gilstrup was readmitted to his party in September 1999, after the party's leader had resigned to leave politics and the party lacked leading personnel. Articulating extreme positions, Gilstrup provoked the defection of the last four Progress Party MPs remaining in the *Folketing* one month later (Widfeldt 2000: 489–90), leaving the party without national representation for the first time since 1973.

Taking a closer look at the DPP, the party was founded in October 1995 by four Progress Party MPs—one of them the present party leader Pia Kjærsgaard. As with Hagen, who initially had to leave the Norwegian Progress Party, in this case too it was the pro-organizational forces that had to exit. The initiative was supported by about a third of Progress Party members including both prominent party bureaucrats and rank-and-file belonging to the more moderate arm of the party (Andersen and Bjørklund 2000: 197; Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004: 4, 6; Pedersen 2006). Still, at the time of the split, the DPP lacked a working organization or established ties to already organized groups able to lend external support. While personal ambitions of the leading figures of the revolt were one driving force behind the split, overcoming the 'anarchic party structure' of the mother party was another. The Progress Party's further decline was accompanied by the DPP's take-off. While the 2001 election led the DPP into government, it in effect ended the Progress Party's national career. After nearly 40 years in national politics, the party failed to enter parliament, and has not participated in national elections since. Figure 8.1 displays both parties' electoral trajectories at national elections from 1973 to 2011.

Overall, the DDP has been characterized by relatively peaceful internal relations assured by the strong position of the party leader: until today, Kjærsgaard has dominated the party with the help of a few trusted politicians and party bureaucrats, thus assuring the tight integration of the party elites in central and in public office. To achieve this, the party executive skilfully used organizational processes and structures as tools to respond to the challenges they faced in public office. This strategy was accompanied by the overall organizational strengthening of the party (including its extra-parliamentary structures), a process that cannot be reduced to mere centralization and top-down steering. That said, there was a lot of the latter, especially in the early phase.

Starting with the functional pressures the party was exposed to in parliament, in the years between 1996 and 2001 parliamentary discipline was considered essential to signal to potential coalition partners that the party could reliably 'deliver votes' if necessary. While the Progress Party had occasionally lent support for government bills, given intense infighting in the party, it was never considered a reliable partner. Right from the start, Kjærsgaard's leadership has been hierarchical and strictly sanctioned any public critique by followers. Procedurally, a two-thirds



FIGURE 8.1 National electoral trajectories of the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party
Note: Vertical axis shows % of national vote.

majority of the national leadership is sufficient to expel individuals, groups, and local branches without any formal need for justification and without those being expelled having any right to appeal (2006 Constitution, Art. 8). An internal rebellion in 2000, a year before the party took over its supporter role, provides a telling example of how the leadership used heavy (and for the new party costly) sanctions to impose discipline. Complaints in the parliamentary group regarding the leadership's hierarchical decision-making style were answered by the expulsion of three MPs and the announcement that publicly articulated critique by any other MP or party member would have the same consequences in the future (Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004). A Danish newspaper provided estimates that between 1996 and 2006 the DPP expelled 30–40 members who spoke out against the party line.[14]

Drastic measures such as expulsion—especially of MPs—are, however, only part of the story since the party simultaneously developed organizational procedures to regulate conflict more silently. In the initial phase hierarchical control and

[14] This contrasts with the Liberals with 3–4 expulsions, the Conservatives with 3–4, the Social Democrats with 2–3, and the Unity List with 2. See <http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik/2006/10/06/0941.33.htm>, accessed 2 June 2010.

sanctions were the main instruments available to the leadership since the development of organizational routines and procedures to resolve dissent in a quiet and less costly manner inevitably takes time. Facing a minority government, the usual government constellation in Denmark, the DPP already participated in a few legislative accommodations before 2001 under the Socialist minority government (Christiansen 2003: 17). However, once the party had achieved support status in 2001, the need to develop less costly and less visible ways to accommodate internal differences than the use of outright sanctions intensified. Not only was there more to argue about substantively, the party's activities simultaneously received more media attention which reinforced the pressure to stick to a common line. The DPP had received the chairmanship of five parliamentary committees—including finance, agriculture, and health—which increased its visibility (that was already high given its provocative stands on immigration issues) (Karpantschof 2002: 26) and, with it, the pressure to assure intra-organizational coherence and effective cooperation with the government. This was accompanied by the party's commitment to a negotiation agreement, which it struck with the government, and which covered a range of policy areas. This agreement obliged the party to stick to the agreed policies, except where changes were approved unanimously (Christiansen and Darmgaard 2006). Based on such agreements, the party effectively functioned as the government's main majority provider in day-to-day decision-making from 2001 (Meret 2010: 143) until it returned to opposition after the 2011 election.

This brings us to the coordination strategies in the parliamentary group other than top-down sanctions which were core to the routinization of the party's operations in public office. To maintain the morale in the parliamentary group, Kjærsgaard meets up with the individual MPs from time to time (independent of particular issues) to discuss how things are going and thereby maintains a direct link between leadership and backbenchers. Furthermore, each new or younger member of the group is assigned a more senior and experienced contact person, who is consulted in case of conflict to provide advice. Clearly, in case of acute conflict in the group Kjærsgaard can still impose a common line hierarchically. Yet both mechanisms help to maintain channels of communication and to anticipate problems before they become virulent. They help to prevent unnecessary escalations and the use of drastic and costly measures as a response to those. Particularly effective are the mechanisms of assigning incoming MPs with more senior 'contact people' to help them to socialize into the group, and to familiarize them with what is expected as a member of the parliamentary group. They further learn about how to engage in 'legislative business' as such, which is essential for the group to function effectively and to present itself professionally towards colleagues, the media, and, in the end, the voter. Intra-parliamentary coordination mechanisms are thus closely tied to the demand for professionalization and expertise, although not so much in terms of policy substance as in terms of generic skills expected from a parliamentarian.

In terms of substantial expertise, these intra-parliamentary mechanisms are further complemented by three to four seminars per year run by the national party that each MP has to attend. Right after its foundation the party started to provide political education for its candidates before elections (a strategy that paid off given that the party more than tripled in size) and organizational education afterwards (Pedersen 2006). Office aspirants, after having been screened, have to take courses run by the national party, i.e. the DPP systematically links selective recruitment and educational measures. It is indicative that although since 2001 the parliamentary group has grown and its involvement in policy-making intensified thanks to its support party status, only one MP has ever split from the party (Art 2011: 155).

Moving to the mechanisms supporting value infusion outside public institutions rather than routinization inside, the developments in public office were paralleled by the set-up of an extra-parliamentary membership organization including recruitment structures able to attract capable candidates and offering training to talented party members early on, members who might be future candidates. Right after its foundation the DPP stressed its goal to have a local organization with more than a few members in each of the municipalities (Pedersen 2006). Accordingly, the DPP made active attempts to expand its support base. In 1997, the DPP had about 1,500 members, in 1998 2,500 and in 2000 over 5,000. In 2009 the party membership was reported at about 10,000 (Meret 2010: 98). The party arranged social get-togethers directed towards generating 'solidary benefits' which helped to prevent the alienation of core supporters. Especially after taking over support status, the latter were confronted with their party's increased cooperation with the established elites from which the party had distanced itself since its foundation. As another countermeasure, the party tried to link MPs to the party base by making them attend an annual seminar with local activists.

In an interview in 2002, Steen Thomsen, the organizational leader of the party in the national headquarters, indicated that the main benefit of having a membership base was having people to take over public office.[15] Thus, recruitment was a major incentive to invest in a membership organization, especially since the DPP in 1998 had still experienced a shortage of candidates (as is often the case with new parties). It is noteworthy that despite these problems, the party still pursued a selective approach. In 1999, it distanced itself from the right-wing Dansk Forum, a student union that was perceived as too right wing and extreme to provide a pool of potential DPP activists and representatives (Karpantschof 2002: 32–3). Being aware of the need to build linkages to existing organizations to address recruitment difficulties, it was the Danish Association, a right-wing intellectual movement, that provided human capital to the party. Several of the movement's leading figures became MPs. More generally, the party's recruitment strategies proved effective in attracting not only enough but also talented people.

[15] Conducted by Pedersen (2006).

In 2005, of 86 candidates for national elections 39 had a university degree (Art 2006: 23–4, 28),[16] which is clearly not representative of the party's electoral base consisting predominantly of workers (Meret 2010).

Looking at the process of member recruitment and candidate nomination more closely, from the start the leadership directly controlled the inflow of members to assure a basic homogeneity of the party on the ground, establishing—in 1999—a national membership record of all fee-paying members (Zalewski 2005; Pedersen 2006). This was during its first years as support party, when internal processes were increasingly guided by organizational procedures—a core indication of growing party institutionalization (Panebianco 1988: 49, 53). Candidate selection was, in practice, less centralized in 2004 than in 1998. Basic oversight of the leadership over selection had been formally acknowledged in the party statutes only in 2003. Initially, the regional and local levels were in charge, formally speaking, yet the leadership interfered in selection processes irrespective of formal rules (Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004). Nowadays, the centre's involvement is formally recognized. Every potential candidate has to apply to the national leadership and undergoes a strict screening process and the actual lists are put together by the leaders of local branches and one member of the national party executive.

A complete centralization of decision-making has become less essential, since the membership organization is able to filter the pool of possible office aspirants more effectively nowadays compared to 1998 when structures were still rudimentary.[17] People's activities on the ground serve as a first 'check' on them and the presence of an infrastructure across the country reduces the pressure to recruit 'outsiders', which, as a consequence, facilitates internal coordination once such people enter public office.[18] The involvement of the local organization in recruitment is a controlled process and the national executive still has the last word, as in other top-down entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, it constitutes a form of routinized participation, if only in terms of 'being heard', which not only stabilizes intra-party relations vertically but signals that local activity is valued in terms of the information on potential candidates that can be provided (e.g. on their local activities

[16] Of the 16 candidates born after 1970 12 had a such a degree implying that the education level of DPP candidates is likely to increase (Art 2006: 23–4, 28).

[17] In a similar vein, in 2003 the time to acquire suffrage and eligibility as a party member was prolonged from two to four months (Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004). Although this statute change which regulates member privileges more tightly seems minor, it reflects the more general trend to increase the screening capacity of the party both on the elite level and on the ground with regard to newly incoming members.

[18] Even spectacular examples of political success such as Morton Messerschmidt, who became a DPP MP at the age of 24, had worked eight years for the party before that. He became a member in 1997 and built up a youth organization in his home constituency before he ran for office and was elected in 2005 (Art 2011: 158). While this rise might have been quicker than in other more established parties, it still required a considerable period of activism.

for the branch). This development not only has consequences for the party's operations on the national level: similar to national MPs, council members (themselves a pool of candidates for higher office) are also well trained and defections on the local level are rare (Art 2011: 155).

While it is difficult to predict what will happen after Kjærsgaard's departure, the organizational infrastructure in place reduces the party's dependency on the personal appeal of Pia Kjærsgaard's successor. Unlike Hagen, the leader of the Norwegian Progress Party, who was a party builder as well, Kjærsgaard herself is usually not considered as a charismatic leadership figure (Mudde 2007: 261). Thus, to stabilize her position structurally might be another reason—next to her negative experiences of infighting in the Progress Party—that made an investment in organizational structures able to consolidate party loyalty so important. Unlike in other entrepreneurial parties, the protection of the founder's own position of power did not completely dominate the party-building process. This shows in concessions in terms of the involvement of local actors in internal decisions and the granting of restricted levels of autonomy regarding purely local activities, as long as the national party hierarchy remained unquestioned. Future leaders are likely to profit from the set-up of mechanisms that support both routinization and value infusion, inasmuch as the party as an organizational actor itself is likely to profit, once it enters a period of weak leadership. So far, the institutionalization of the DPP has played an important role in maintaining the party's appeal. It allowed the party to communicate its ideology in a coherent fashion and to be a credible and effective representative of its followers' interests inside and outside public institutions. Even more importantly, its increasing institutionalization helped the party to use its status as parliamentary party and as support party to realize policies in line with its ideology.

Sustainability through leadership continuity and routinization: New Zealand First

After having looked at cases of fully-fledged institutionalization, the NZ First is in many ways more typical for the group of entrepreneurial formations as a whole: a party underpinned by leadership-oriented loyalty and routinized structures, stabilized by leadership continuity. NZ First was founded in 1992 by Winston Peters, a former National Party minister, right after he resigned from his party. Although Peters is part-Maori and the party could attract significant support from voters registered in Maori electorates over the years, it did not support the retention of the Maori electorates. Neither was it formed with the active involvement of Maori organizations or the Maori Tribes, as has been the case with the Maori Party founded 12 years later. With Peters sticking to the party over the years, NZ First has shown considerable resilience to overcome both internal strain and electoral decline, while maintaining national representation up to 2008 and again from 2011

onwards. While having to cope with considerable ups and downs in its support base, the party particularly suffered after having been in government, which did not prevent its leader, an ambitious politician and former National minister, from using his chance to take over a ministry more than once.

In 1996, after the party had won 17 seats in parliament and four years after the party's foundation, Peters decided for the first time to enter government with Peters's former party, the National Party. This decision considerably compromised his party's populist image and revealed the volatility of its support base. It also put considerable strain on the party as collective actor operating inside public office. Apart from Peters, none of the ministers had executive (and some not even parliamentary) experience, which exposed the party's personnel to public ridicule (Miller 2005: 220). Furthermore, five of the seats were Maori seats, while (leaving Peters's direct mandate aside) the remaining MPs were elected from the party list. This boiled down to a divide between Maori and socially conservative non-Maori supporters, which created considerable tensions in the parliamentary group (Miller 1998: 208). Rumours arose that the deputy leader Tau Henare together with the other Maori MPs planned to defect and to launch their own party, which triggered a dispute with Peters who removed Henare from the deputy leadership. This, in turn, provoked a split in the party and, with it, the collapse of the government (Miller 2005: 220). As a consequence, the party's support collapsed at the following election and it lost 12 of 17 seats. This event inevitably affected the party organization. Woolerton, party president at the time, estimates that after the collapse of the coalition in 1998 the party lost a third to half of its 18,000 members, a loss it could not recover from (Joiner 2009: 20).

So far, this story resembles the tales of the LPF and ND told earlier. It also resembles entrepreneurial top-down formations more generally, characterized by a leadership unwilling to be constrained in its actions or to engage in negotiations to regulate internal conflict rather than exercising top-down sanctions. Finally, the willingness of the founding leader to enter government at very high costs mirrors a pattern we find in other insider parties run by career-oriented politicians. However, unlike a proto-typical 'flash party', the party was capable of recovering from the shock of seeing its parliamentary base diminished, winning over 10 per cent (and with it 13 seats) at the following election.

Support collapsed again later on, after NZ First had supported a Labour government (2005–8), in which Peters held the Foreign Affairs portfolio. Peters had to step down from his ministerial role ahead of the election, having been accused of receiving illegal donations. While no wrong-doings were found in the end, Peters did not regain his seat and the party's vote declined to 4 per cent of the national vote and lost parliamentary representation altogether (Vowles 2009). Yet even the failure to enter parliament triggered neither the leader's resignation, nor the party's disintegration. Peters remained determined to compete at the 2011 election and made an astonishing comeback, winning eight seats. He effectively exploited the Tea Tape Scandal, a scandal which involved Prime Minister John

Key (National) and the ACT Party candidate for Epsom,[19] John Banks, over a recording of a (supposedly private) conversation on 11 November 2011, in which disparaging remarks about elderly NZ First supporters were made. This incident gave Peters extensive media attention towards the end of the campaign. He convincingly won the TVNZ minor parties leaders' debate, which generated an additional boost. The party won 6.8 per cent of the vote, a sufficient share to climb the entry barrier of 5 per cent.

Clearly, the scandal constituted a window of opportunity for Peters but the party also had to run an efficient campaign beforehand, which can be seen as a necessary condition to exploit such a chance effectively.[20] Like other minor parties in Australia, NZ First heavily depends on resources attached to holding parliamentary and governmental office, which is so important because New Zealand has no direct state funding that would allow a party without parliamentary seats to receive funds. This makes it all the more remarkable that NZ First did not collapse after the 2008 disaster, when parliamentary representation was lost, but was in the position to stage a comeback. One reason for this was that by that time the party as organizational actor consisted of more than a personalist movement around its charismatic leader. Similar to other electorally successful entrepreneurial formations, party building took place, but without encouraging value infusion. Instead, it was directed to consolidate the position of the founder, which proved sufficient to keep the party together, since Peters stayed with the party. Initially, the party had been a one-man show with skeletal and informal structures, yet between 1993 and 1996 it developed a tiered organization and established channels of communication and coordination between its parliamentary and extra-parliamentary arm. On the national level the party is managed by a council, while the local level is divided into 65 electorates, each of which is managed by a committee in charge of recruiting members, raising funds and assisting candidates during campaigns. This process was supported by considerable managerial experience and continuity of core personnel. One core figure was Doug Woolerton, a NZ First MP for nine years and party president from 1994 to 2005, who before his career in NZ First had been, together with Peters, active in the National Party. He was instrumental in establishing the party's first constitution that aimed at stabilizing the party by facilitating communication and coordination across levels. At the same time, major decisions on campaigning, policy, or government participation are still made by Peters. For instance, untypical for parties in New Zealand, the ranking of the 1996 party list was the domain of Peters and his advisers alone (Joiner 2009: 19). Despite the set-up of a conventional party organization, the party has remained highly centralized (Joiner 2009; Miller 1998: 207, 2005) with people

[19] Peters had previously criticized the arrangement between National and ACT in which National encouraged its supporters to vote for the ACT candidate in the Epson constituency.

[20] 'Late Entry for Winston's Cup of Tea', 27 November 2011, <http://www.webcitation.org/63UvNXnlr>, accessed 20 December 2011.

critical of Peters being pushed to resign from office or to leave the party altogether (Bale and Blomgren 2008: 93).

Again we find an instance of 'partial' institutionalization as we did in other entrepreneurial parties. While party institutionalization was structurally supported in terms of the routinization of intra-party relations, it was not directed towards generating loyalty to the organization as such. Organizationally induced (in contrast to leadership oriented) value infusion is difficult to achieve as long as power is concentrated on the founding leader, without the systematic involvement of subnational party units or members in intra-party decisions, something the DPP established, despite its high level of centralization. The party's evolution did not reduce Peters's power in the organization; he has remained the central focus of followers' attachment. Accordingly, Bale and Blomgren doubt that the party can rely on a solid membership likely to persist in the longer term, visible in its inability to build up lasting ties to civil society (2008: 93–4). If this is so, the long-term survival of the party is dependent on Peters's willingness and ability to embrace a successor with similar professional skills as well as with the capacity to maintain Peters's following beyond the latter's departure. That the party could survive a longer period without such a leader seems unlikely.

EXPLORING 'DEVIANT' PERFORMANCE PATTERNS

The evolution and performance profiles of most entrepreneurial parties mirror the party-building activities of their leadership or the absence thereof. However, two parties that least fit the theoretical expectations deserve a closer look (see Chapter 7, Table 7.2): the Canadian Reform Party dissolved despite the formation of an institutionalized infrastructure and despite attracting nearly 20 per cent of the national vote two general elections in a row; the Swiss Ticino League (*Lega dei Ticinesi*), in contrast, persisted and sustained electoral support over 20 years. It did so despite its founding leader's ongoing attempts to undermine the formation of conventional extra-parliamentary structures, which maintained the party's movement quality outside public institutions until today.

The death of the Canadian Reform Party: long-term oriented leadership and the dangers of institutionalization

The Canadian Reform Party, an entrepreneurial outsider, has its roots in the Canadian west, more precisely in a protest movement against the neglect of western interests in the Canadian federation. The foundation of the party in 1987 was initiated by individuals outside politics, mainly members of the western

Canadian business elite. Preston Manning, its founder and leader throughout the party's short career, was an economic consultant and son of a former Social Credit premier of the province of Alberta. The party's activists were mainly refugees from established parties and its electorate consisted mainly of former Progressive Conservatives voters (Nevitte et al. 1998: 195).

The process of party development was strictly controlled in a top-down fashion by the party founder and directed towards the formation of a strong organizational base (Carty et al. 2000: 38–40). Starting out as a plebiscitarian movement, the party systematically built up an organizational presence in the west as early as 1988 and started to expand towards the more eastern provinces such as Ontario (Carty et al. 2000: 42), which reflected its leader's aspiration to become a major player on the national level and not to remain a regional force. It is interesting to note that there is little indication that the Reform Party's appeal was tied to Manning's particular charisma or personal appeal (Nevitte et al. 1998: 178). Instead, the Reform Party's party-building strategy followed a mass party template similar to the Norwegian People's Party, the Danish People's Party, and the French NF, at odds with the tendency of Canadian parties towards stratarchical structures (Carty and Cross 2006). As Ellis stresses in his excellent study of the Reform Party's organizational development:

> Much of what we will observe in examining Reform's organizational structure will conform to what is expected of a mass-based party with extra-parliamentary origins in the last twentieth century. Reform was highly centralized and strongly articulated, exclusively through vertical links. Its primary organizational units were the national party and the local branch, both of which focused on mass membership recruitment and the development of candidates and leaders within their own ranks. Its financial health was dependent on members' subscriptions and voluntary contributions. It was also dedicated to the training and education of its members and candidates. (Ellis 2005: xxi)

Still, Reform as an autonomous organization existed only six years. What does this tell us about the link between institutionalization on the one hand and party persistence and sustainability on the other? Does it confirm the claim that the mass party is an outdated model as some party scholars argue? Again we encounter a party whose actual death is, in itself, less crucial to answer questions of party success and failure than the particular circumstances of this event. These circumstances will reveal Reform to be unusual among the centralized, new right parties as well as among entrepreneurial, top-down formations more generally, but they do not call into question the importance of organizational institutionalization for party performance. At the same time, this case study will show how institutionalization, at first a helpful instrument to pursue the founding leader's interest, can lead to the latter's removal, stressing the contradictory implications inherent in institutionalization from the perspective of party founders (as theorized in Chapter 3) with particular clarity.

Looking at Reform's organizational development more closely, while the new formation successively set up constituency associations from its foundation onwards, the national party office simultaneously established a national membership register that allowed for direct contact with members and was an efficient means to solicit financial contributions (Ellis 2005: 31). This does not mean the process was without difficulties, especially because the party gained considerable prominence very quickly. From the start the party leadership was concerned about the party being hijacked by extremist groups in the process of the organization's territorial expansion. In fact, the party struggled with keeping out extremist members, who had started infiltrating the party already before its spectacular breakthrough in 1993, when it won 18.4 per cent of the national vote. Next to the use of disciplinary measures against extreme members, the national leadership quickly established a very detailed screening process for potential candidates prior to the nomination process for the 1993 election. The leadership further ruled out that new members could join the party through groups associated with the party or subgroups within the party (Ellis 2005: 31), which could undermine the coherence of the organization. Instead, it tied membership recruitment to the successful set-up of constituency associations (Ellis 2005: 31) and—in conjunction with the national party register—made the process of expanding the membership base more controllable. When constituency associations ignored Manning's advice and nominated undesirable candidates, the leader refused to sign the nomination papers, a right the leader has under the Canada Elections Act, a behaviour that was criticized but in the end accepted by activists for the good of the organization as a whole (Carty et al. 2000: 42). More generally, when members were deemed to engage in damaging behaviour, Manning would simply expel them or, in a few cases, would invoke plebiscitary techniques to do so (Ellis 2005: 33).

To assure the internal working of the rather large parliamentary party proved difficult after breakthrough, since—in line with its populist principles—the party declared solidarity within the parliamentary group as less important than the authentic representation of constituency preferences. Conflict had to be resolved by the expulsion of several MPs, reflecting a growing rift between members who wanted to remain true to the party's founding principles and its more pragmatic leadership who wanted to expand the party's reach and improve its position in national politics (Ellis 2005: 152–3). Despite a rather mixed initial performance within parliament, the party's efforts to broaden and consolidate its support base outside institutions paid off. After having won 18.7 per cent in 1993 and initially being dismissed as a one-election phenomenon destined to decline, the party won 19.4 per cent at the following federal election in 1997 and increased its seat share from 52 to 60 seats (Carty 2006: 826).

In 2000, following Manning's initiative, the party dissolved through merging with some provincial Tory parties into a new formation, the Canadian Alliance. It was Manning's explicit goal to unite the fragmented centre-right to achieve a permanent realignment of partisanship with him leading one of the two main

parties in the Canadian party system. And this goal could only be achieved through a merger. Yet the building of a working party organization, in which—despite the founding leader's considerable powers—members had a say in basic matters, with which members identified and which members wanted to see maintained, suddenly constituted a problem. Due to the organization's increasing institutionalization, Manning did not 'own' the party anymore, most visible in an increasing value infusion of members (which the recruitment strategy set up by party elites had actively supported). This nicely exemplifies the costs institutionalization can have for party leaders, captured by Ellis in the following manner:

> Knowing the opinion structure of the members he had recruited into his party, and understanding the practical power members had built up over the years within the party's organization, he now viewed Reform, the vehicle he used to begin his quest, as one of the greatest obstacles to his grand plans. (Ellis 2005: 166)

Manning eventually succeeded in folding his Reform Party into a new, larger Canadian Alliance, yet only in a second internal referendum. The support that Manning's initiative received in a first referendum proved insufficient to approve the merger, an event after which he declared in an open letter to members that he would no longer be interested in the party, should his initiative fail again (Ellis 2005: 170–1). While resistance against the merger collapsed and he got his way at the second attempt, the standing of Manning among members suffered heavily as a consequence. At the leadership race following the merger, in which every party member had a vote, he lost against Stockwell Day, whose 'greatest asset could be found in the fact that he was not Manning', as most observers agreed (Ellis 2005: 172). Being brought down by the party which he had built, Manning became the victim of his own success in creating an institutionalized organization autonomous of its leadership that through its own procedures could get rid of its own founder.

Not long after, in 2003, the Canadian Alliance finally merged with the Progressive Conservatives into the Conservative Party of Canada, which is nowadays the biggest parliament party and since 2006 in government on the federal level (Flanagan 2009). As Ware stresses, through the decision to merge, Reform could consolidate—although in a different organizational form—its position as second major party in the Canadian system at relatively little cost by effectively expanding its base that was still relatively weak in eastern parts of the country (2009: 116). The Reform Party's death was a strategic step to strengthen the position of the right in the Canadian party system which in its fragmented state could not have countered its Liberal opposition. It was not an expression of the party's weakness or decline, i.e. an 'unbargained merger' (Ware 2009: 106–7), but a profitable bargain.

As we saw earlier, to voluntarily dissolve in a new formation without strong external pressure is unusual among new right parties, whose deaths tend to be the result of organizational disintegration or dissolution. Powerful founders

of top-down formations, like Manning, usually do not want to risk their position through merging. In that sense, considering Manning's fate after having pushed his party into a merger, the case of the Reform Party not only illustrates the risk that party leaders face when merging but even more so the costs that founders face when investing in their parties' fully-fledged institutionalization.

Charismatic leadership outside—routinization inside public office: the balancing act of the Ticino League

The Swiss Ticino League (*Lega dei Ticinesi*) is a challenging case because it successfully sustained support although its founder, Giuliano Bignasca (who ran the party until his recent death in March 2013) systematically undermined the formation of a conventional, extra-parliamentary infrastructure. Reflecting the party's movement character outside institutions and its founder's populist strategies, Albertazzi called the League the embodiment of populism (2006), while Mazzoleni (2010) called it an extreme case of a personalist party. Taking a closer look, the striking feature of the League, distinct from other parties that are strongly dependent on leadership-oriented loyalty, are the 'two souls' that coexist in this party: a revolutionary, extra-parliamentary one and an institutional one operating in parliament and government (Mazzoleni 1999; Albertazzi 2008).

Over the course of its life, the party has struggled with considerable levels of volatility from one election to the other (Mazzoleni 2010: 9), which mirrors its heavy reliance on the personal appeal of its founder. Until his recent death, the public image of the party had been dominated by Giulio Bignasca, a highly controversial figure, not only due to his provocative rhetoric but also for being convicted in more than ten lawsuits.[21] The questionable reputation of its founder, however, did not prevent the party from becoming an established player on the cantonal level. At the federal election in 1991, the party won 23.5 per cent of the cantonal vote and, with it, two seats in the Swiss federal parliament and became the third strongest force in the canton (Année Politique Suisse 2010b: 1). In 1995, it won over 18 per cent of the vote at the election in Ticino and even joined the cantonal government.

Such a move tends to pose considerable risks for populist outsider parties, making it hard for them to credibly maintain their anti-establishment image (McDonnell and Newell 2011). The League, however, coped remarkably well

[21] Twelve convictions are publicly known including forgery, drug abuse, and defamation, <http://www.drs.ch/www/de/drs/nachrichten/wahlen-2011/280733.ldt-lega-dei-ticinesi.html>, accessed 17 May 2012. In 1994 he spent 25 days in prison for drug abuse. In 1998 he caused a heavy controversy with anti-Semitic statements and had to pay 70,000 Swiss Francs for violating anti-racism laws (Année Politique Suisse 2010b: 3–4). In 2002 Flavio Maspoli (who occupied one of the two seats in the national parliament) was given 11 months in prison (Année Politique Suisse 2010b: 6).

and, if anything, was able to increase its appeal. In 2011 the party successfully defended its seats in the national parliament and conquered a second seat in the cantonal executive, which further consolidated its position.[22] The party clearly profits from its regionalist ideology (it defends the interests of the Italian-speaking majority in its canton) and its regionally focused activities (it only runs elections in Ticino, whose population only constitutes 4.3 per cent of the Swiss population) (Albertazzi 2009: 5). This very specific profile protects the party from being undermined by other parties targeting an anti-immigrant vote in the Swiss system.[23] However, it does not explain why—considering the party's fluid character outside public institutions—the League did not suffer from the same defects as other parties built around a charismatic leader, once they entered parliament and government. Answers to this puzzle are that the League's organization is maybe not as fluid as it seems or that the organization of the extra-parliamentary party says little about the party's organization in public office.

The Ticino League was founded in 1991 by the businessman Guiliano Bignasca and the journalist Flavio Maspoli, the publisher of *Il Mattino della Domenica*, a weekly tabloid owned by Bignasca which de facto functions as the major communication organ of the party with the regional population. It propagates party policies and condemns the political elites or, if necessary, disloyal followers and party critics. The canton is characterized by a very dense media system that is used by the Ticino League in a skilful manner to propagate its status as the defender of the interests of the people of Ticino (Mazzoleni 2010: 5, 12–13). In the League as an extra-parliamentary movement power was until recently concentrated on its life-long president Guiliano Bignasca. Expulsion (naturally without any possibility of appeal) was a core mechanism of conflict resolution. While the constitution formally assigns core powers to the general assembly composed of members, the document is purely symbolic and has not been put into practice. Since its foundation in 1991 the party has maintained a very low degree of institutionalization. Bignasca systematically opposed the formation of conventional party structures in terms of formal membership and local branches, although by now some of the activists of the Ticino League are eager to build up such structures to be able to operate more efficiently. However, since the founder insisted on directly controlling all (extra-institutional) party functions such as fundraising, campaigning, and recruitment,[24] attempts towards organizational emancipation could not go very far

[22] 'Wahlen im Tessin. Lega schnappt sich Sitz auf Kosten der FDP', *SF Schweizer Fernsehen*, 7 April 2011, <http://www.tagesschau.sf.tv/Nachrichten/Archiv/2011/04/07/Schweiz/Kantonale-Wahlen/Wahlen-im-Tessin-Lega-schnappt-sich-Sitz-auf-Kosten-der-FDP>, accessed 17 May 2012.

[23] Most notably and unlike other minor parties such as the Freedom Party, the Lega managed to maintain its niche despite the fierce competition from the Swiss People's Party that in the 1990s adopted a harsh line on immigration, a core issue of the Lega.

[24] 'Der Lega sterben die Anführer weg', *Der Tagesanzeiger*, 8 March 3013, <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Der-Lega-sterben-die-Anfuehrer-weg/story/29721455>, accessed 23 April 2013.

(Mazzoleni 1999: 87–8, 2010). Still today the party has no clear organizational structures in place, which raises concerns about the party's possible disintegration, in face of the leadership vacuum that Bignasca's recent death has created.[25]

Before evaluating the current concerns around Bignasca's succession and its possible implications, it is helpful to take a closer look at the party's long-term evolution and Bignasca's specific role in it. While the extra-parliamentary party lacks a conventional membership organization and there are no formal criteria for member recruitment, for instance, the party is not free from an organizational underpinning per se. The same goes for the personal support Bignasca as founder was able to generate, which is only partially explained by 'charisma'. Not without reason the Ticino is called 'the land of clans' (Allenbach 2001): the party was stabilized by a clientelistic network around its president who provided not only the money to run campaigns but also generated personal support through providing economic and social favours. In other words, he played the role of a classical 'political boss' in a canton that is economically less developed than the other cantons and heavily dependent on federal subsidies. That he was in the position to maintain such a network was facilitated by the local scope of his operations—Ticino has only about 320,000 inhabitants (Mazzoleni 2010: 5, 12–13).

A clientelist network that stabilizes leadership-oriented loyalty is a rather unusual extra-parliamentary base for parties that operate in advanced democracies. Yet once we take a closer look at the party's arm in public office, institutionalization took place in a relatively conventional way. While we have seen 'partial institutionalization' focused on routinization in a range of entrepreneurial parties already, their founding leaders (usually the focus on leadership-oriented loyalty) tended to become MPs themselves and often engaged less in extra-parliamentary activities as a consequence. In the League, extra-parliamentary activities have remained a constitutive part of the party's identity with Bignasca—who did not take over any prestigious public functions—in the centre. This was supported by the fact that Bignasca remained relatively distant from conventional politics compared to many other populist leaders who tend to take over the most prestigious institutional roles their parties are able to access.[26] Although he undermined conventional party building outside public institutions, the sphere he dominated, he did not prevent League representatives from routinizing procedures and thereby professionalizing their operations in cantonal parliament or in government. While none of its parliamentarians after the breakthrough election in 1991 had prior political experience, in 1995 13 of 16 representatives had held political offices prior to entering the Ticino legislature (11 were re-elected in 1999) (Mazzoleni 1999: 89–90).

[25] 'Tessin sagt Bignasca caoi', *20 Minuten Online*, 9 March 2013, <http://www.20min.ch/schweiz/tessin/story/18976061>, accessed 23 April 2013.

[26] Bignasca only took over positions in local government and was represented in Lugano city council.

A dualism of mutual tolerance and a division of labour evolved between the more moderate and increasingly professionalized office holders and the party leader Bignasca who gathered support by condemning the elites—the elites of which also the party's own representatives form part (Mazzoleni 1999, 2010). While Bignasca was the uncontested core figure in the League as a populist movement, he allowed the party's arm in public office to adapt to functional demands. This becomes particularly visible in the prominent role of Lega minister Marco Borradori, a professional politician very different from Bignasca who is willing to engage in the compromises necessary to make decisions in the context of multi-party governments and who successfully represents the League's institutional face in Ticino.[27]

This suggests that unlike a prototypical charismatic leader, Bignasca allowed for the development of a second centre of power in the party, a concession which secured the party's electoral sustainability. The maintenance of this dualism was facilitated by a specificity of cantonal executives that are (unlike the members of the federal executive) directly elected and thus particularly independent from both parliament and their parties (Vatter 2002), which reduces the need for intra-party coherence and coordination. Nonetheless, conflicts between the two spheres have occurred, given the inevitable tension between the party's populist electoral strategy and its institutional strategy to participate in law-making and inter-party negotiations over cantonal policies,[28] yet an escalation has so far been prevented. Each arm has clearly profited from the other arm being able to respond to the demands of the sphere it operates in.

In the past, close ties between the spheres were maintained by members of the Bignasca family who held public office, sometimes simultaneously on the national and cantonal level. Most notably, from 2003 to 2009 Bignasca's brother Attilio was one of the national League parliamentarians. He stepped down in 2009 to focus fully on his position as leader of the parliamentary group on the cantonal level.[29] Similarly, Bignasca's son Boris sat in the cantonal parliament from 2007 to 2010. In some sense, Boris has been following his father's footsteps: in his time as representative he received media attention for his aggressive behaviour towards colleagues[30] and after leaving office became chief editor of the online version of

[27] Borradori, the League's institutional leader, has not only been re-elected to every executive since he joined government in 1995 but at times was the most popular candidate of all (receiving higher vote shares than mainstream candidates), which considerably raised his profile in the extra-parliamentary movement (Albertazzi 2009: 6).

[28] Usually, these executives are oversized governments that include the main parties in each canton, one expression of the Swiss consociational system (Vatter 2002), and have been attacked by outsiders such as the Lega as 'elite cartels' detached from and unresponsive to the normal citizen.

[29] 'Lega-Nationalrat Bignasca bringt nicht alles unter einen Hut', *Der Tagesanzeiger*, 26 May 2009, <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/LegaNationalrat-Bignasca-bringt-nicht-alles-unter-einen-Hut/story/16926399>, accessed 17 May 2012.

[30] 'Verbaler Amoklauf von Bignascas Sohn', *Der Tagesanzeiger*, 2 December 2008, <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Verbaler-Amoklauf-von-Bignascas-Sohn/story/13469278>, accessed 17 May 2012.

the *Mattino* and the weekly *10 Minuti* (both financed by his father), attacking the League's political enemies.[31] Since his departure from parliament, Boris Bignasca clearly belongs to the extra-parliamentary, 'revolutionary' sphere previously dominated by his father, where he reproduces the latter's populist strategies.

While current concerns about how to cope with the leadership vacuum that Bignasca left behind are justified, the greater source of vulnerability than finding a new leader seems to be the maintenance of the party's separation into two spheres—the institutional and extra-parliamentary one. The delicate balance between the movement and the professional party which the League has so far managed to reconcile could be easily destabilized if leading figures in either sphere show insufficient self-constraint in their activities or insufficient tolerance towards the activities of the other. An event last year indicated the difficulties in maintaining this balance, inherent in the League's structural set-up. Boris Bignasca was forced to resign from the post of party secretary and had to leave the party after publishing a death wish addressed to an 85-year-old writer who had been critical of the League.[32] Borradori, as a member of government, together with his colleague in the cantonal executive distanced themselves publicly from their leader's son, a 'novum' according to the Swiss press. That Bignasca, the founder's son, had to give up a central party office and leave the party shows the constraints imposed on the League as populist movement by the presence of the League in public office, a constraint which the founding leader was willing to accept. At the same time, the repercussions for the party's representatives were not without difficulty as well: once the 'double face' of the League, as referred to in the media, yet again revealed itself, Borradori was under heavy pressure to defend how he—as part of the professional establishment—could seriously belong to a party presenting itself as a populist protest movement.[33]

Now, after Bignasca's death, Borradori seems to be a natural candidate for the succession,[34] although there are doubts whether he—as core representative of

[31] 'Boris Bignasca, Haudegen der Lega', *Der Tagesanzeiger*, 6 May 2012, <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Boris-Bignasca-Haudegen-der-Lega/story/29470554>, accessed 17 May 2012.

[32] 'Boris Bignasca wehrt sich gegen diffamierenden Artikel', <http://www.wirtschaft.ch/Boris+Bignasca+wehrt+sich+gegen+diffamierenden+Artikel/541046/detail.htm>, accessed 5 June 2012.

[33] The *Tagesanzeiger* phrased it the following way: 'Einmal mehr wurde so das doppelte Gesicht der Lega deutlich. Hier die hemdsärmelige Lega mit ihrem Stammtisch-Slang, dort die "braven" Regierungsvertreter. Die Tageszeitung "La Regione" forderte Borradori denn auch auf, endlich Farbe zu bekennen und nicht auf zwei Hochzeiten zu tanzen.' 'Boris Bignasca, Haudegen der Lega', *Der Tagesanzeiger*, 6 May 2012, <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Boris-Bignasca-Haudegen-der-Lega/story/29470554>, accessed 17 May 2012.

[34] 'Das Luganer Duell', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 11 April 2013, <http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/schweiz/das-luganer-duell-1.18061784>, accessed 23 April 2013.

the party's institutional arm—can effectively play Bignasca's role.[35] Even though Borradori is very popular with voters, as a consequence of his takeover the party's 'populist pillar' (a core source of value infusion among followers) would lose its independent foundation. This, in turn, would be likely to alter the internal dynamics of the party and its very character fundamentally. So far, Bignasca's death has led to a boost of the party. Despite his death in March, the League's leader was included on the electoral list for the Lugano municipal elections in mid-April and won 9,001 personal preference votes. For the first time, the Ticino League was the most-voted party with 35.5 per cent of the poll, a jump of seven percentage points. Borradori, who won more preference votes than any other politician, is now the town's new mayor.[36] The leadership question, at the time this book was completed, was still unresolved.

Returning to the question of whether the Ticino League constitutes an 'outlier', a closer look indicates that we find processes of both value infusion and routinization, although neither of them in conjunction with the formation of a conventional membership organization. This echoes the earlier conceptual discussion that institutionalization—usually associated with the mass party model—can be generated through other means than a membership organization. Ticino as a cultural and socio-economic setting facilitates the stabilization of support through clientelist networks supported by family ties. The small scale of the canton and the extreme media concentration further facilitate a heavy reliance on leadership-oriented loyalty that can function (as long as no leadership vacuum emerges) as efficient carrier for value infusion among followers. At the same time, we can observe a routinization of the internal working of the cantonal parliamentary party and of intra-party relations of the League. The latter was possible since leading figures in the extra-parliamentary arm and the institutional arm of the party refrain from mutual interference, which highlights how party agency can stabilize a structural configuration that strikingly contrasts with developmental patterns in other parties. Whether under Bignasca's successor the intra-organizational division of labour between a populist and an institutional arm central to the party's success can be maintained or whether the party will be taken over by its institutional arm (and what the latter would imply in the longer term) remains to be seen. Clearly, Bignasca's replacement will be critical, not only for the party's electoral sustainability but more fundamentally for its persistence.

[35] 'Der Lega sterben die Anführer weg', *Der Tagesanzeiger*, 8 March 2013, <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Der-Lega-sterben-die-Anfuehrer-weg/story/29721455>, accessed 23 April 2013.

[36] 'Recently Deceased Tichino League Leader Elected in Lugano', *Corriere della Sera*, 15 April 2013, <http://www.corriere.it/International/english/articoli/2013/04/15/bignasca.shtml>, accessed 23 April 2013; 'Lega-Politiker wird Bürgermeister von Lugano', *Der Tagesanzeiger*, 22 April 2013, <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/LegaPolitiker-wird-Buergermeister-von-Lugano/story/11899807>, accessed 23 April 2013.

CONCLUSIONS

Neglect of party building and the frequent exit of founding personnel constitute main sources of vulnerability that easily trigger the dissolution of new right parties, particularly the entrepreneurs discussed in this chapter. In some cases party building took place, such as the Australian One Nation Party, but with the sole purpose to centralize power in the national party leadership. This proved conducive neither to value infusion, nor to routinization in terms of intra-party coordination or conflict resolution. When the leadership of an entrepreneurial party actively engaged in the creation of a membership organization involved in the selective recruitment of members and candidates, incentivizing party work and training activists and office holders, institutionalization took place and supported parties' persistence and sustainability, as in the cases of the Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People's Party. Entrepreneurs' performance in public office—whether breakthrough had a destabilizing effect or could be exploited to the party's advantage—tended to mirror party-building strategies with those parties investing in mechanisms supporting institutionalization doing better.

A closer look at the Reform Party, at first glance a contradictory case, allowed for a more nuanced perspective on motives for and the eventual evaluation of party death. As already discussed in the chapter on Green and new religious parties, so in the case of the Reform Party 'death through merger' was no expression of weakness and vulnerability but constituted the strategic decision of a consolidated organization, which is why it does not undermine the link between institutionalization and performance. Furthermore, the case study showed how institutionalization—initially a tool of the founding leader—can become a liability and turn against him or her, mirroring the ambiguous nature of institutionalization from a founder's perspective. A closer look at the Ticino League, a second seemingly contradictory case, revealed that routinization can take place within the party in public office, while value infusion is generated outside institutions through loyalty to a leader who systematically undermines the formation of an extra-parliamentary structure. Clearly, entrepreneurial formations are not predestined to be short-lived and the extreme discrepancies of performance patterns among new right entrepreneurs stress the importance of elite choices.

9

Conclusions

The literature on new parties in advanced democracies has convincingly shown that voter demands and the programmes new parties offer to them are crucial factors to account for new parties' success, both in the short and in the long run. Nonetheless, one important puzzle has remained unresolved: the puzzle that new parties as collective actors that enter national parliament are not equally able to exploit their electoral potential in the longer term and to establish themselves in their national party systems. Whether they can do so, I have argued, is shaped by parties' capacity to operate as organizational actors, their capacity to provide leadership, and their readiness to invest in an institutionalized infrastructure that helps them to consolidate initial support. More particularly, these factors help to assure an acceptable performance in parliament and sometimes in government, new institutional roles that confront a party with new demands and responsibilities after they successfully entered the national arena, for the vast majority of new formations an already insurmountable hurdle. The change of perspective proposed in this study from new party emergence and entry (that most cross-national studies have focused on so far) to questions of organizational persistence and electoral sustainability is important since only the medium- and long-term presence of new parties on the national level indicates that their entry has the potential to generate party system change, visible in the broadening of the programmatic offers available to citizens, in the dynamics of party competition, and in patterns of coalition formation (Mair 1997).

A considerable range of case study literature and small-N comparisons have stressed the role of party organization in accounting for new parties' medium- and long-term performance. However, no encompassing framework has been formulated that could have been systematically tested across a wide range of democracies, separating out organizational and electoral dimensions of party performance in order to examine the factors driving them as well as the connections between them. To address this gap, the theoretical perspective presented in Chapter 3 linked structure-based and agency-based approaches on party development and provided a set of analytical tools to examine how the structural conditions in which parties are formed and how the choices of party elites are likely to shape party performance. Theorizing the interplay between structural dispositions and elite choices allowed for the specification of conditions that increase the likelihood that a new party as organization persists, even through times of crisis, and, furthermore, that it

translates its breakthrough into national parliament into its sustainability in the national parliamentary party system.

Once we redirect our attention towards the conditions of parties' medium- and long-term performance, we discover that our thinking about new parties in old party systems is shaped by our thinking about old parties in these settings. As long as a party is very young, we are tempted to consider it as ephemeral; when a (formerly) new party has been around a few decades, we consider its lasting presence as normal. This may be why, as with the study of old parties, we know a great deal about determinants of relative electoral success of new parties but more fundamental questions about the sources of organizational persistence and of electoral sustainability are rarely even asked. This implies that the existing literature on new parties implicitly mirrors the constraints we face in the study of established parties. There, fundamental questions regarding sources of persistence and sustainability are difficult to examine, since most parties have not only persisted for many decades but have entered parliament decades ago and have not lost representation ever since. Organizational persistence and electoral sustainability become practically inseparable. Similarly, the relative impact of institutionalization on these two dimensions is hard to explore where most parties have institutionalized decades ago.

New parties breaking into these old party systems do not share these fundamental characteristics. A majority of the parties studied here stayed in national parliament for relatively brief periods and over 40 per cent of them are by now inactive. Furthermore, the case studies have shown that fully-fledged institutionalization helps parties to cope with and reconcile conflicting internal and external demands that tend to intensify the more successful a party gets—some of the electorally and institutionally most successful new parties formed post-1968 were never fully institutionalized. Thus, methodologically speaking, the study of new parties that entered the national stage over the last 40 years has opened a window of opportunity to exploring fundamental issues around the survival and performance of political parties generally. It does so by circumventing the limitations that confront us when studying organizational persistence and electoral sustainability and the link between the two dimensions in already consolidated parties and party systems.

NEW PARTY SUCCESS WITH AND WITHOUT INSTITUTIONALIZATION

This study has covered full party life cycles from foundation to death comparatively across a wide range of democracies, not only to explore how institutionalization can support persistence and sustainability but also identify the conditions that allow new parties to maintain their activities and be successful for several

decades without fully institutionalizing. Distinguishing organizational persistence from electoral sustainability and examining the former as a separate dimension of performance further allowed for the exploration of patterns of party death which we—for the reasons just mentioned—still know surprisingly little about. These insights are crucial to understand the sources of viability of long-established parties, parties that are considered in transformation or even decline over the last decades, being forced to operate in increasingly individualizing societies. While the formation of a traditional membership organization might have become less important as compared to the role of professional full-time staff, for instance, this study suggests that the mass party model as an organizational template is not as outdated as sometimes claimed in the debate. This is the case even though we have seen that a considerable range of new parties are run by ambitious individuals whose time horizons do not transcend their own political careers and who see little reason to invest in a lasting extra-parliamentary structure. Institutionalization through building a membership organization able to generate organizational loyalty is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for persistence or sustainability. However, this does not mean that the formation of an institutionalized membership organization does not pay off for those leaders who want their parties to outlive their own careers and to form a lasting part of the national party system. Ironically, some of the (along several yardsticks) most successful new right parties—a party family that has long had the reputation of being run by charismatic leaders with little infrastructure around them[1]—such as the Norwegian Progress Party or the French National Front have deliberately emulated organizational strategies of mass parties located at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. And unlike those parties that relied on leadership-oriented loyalty throughout their careers, they could outlive their founding leaders. Similarly, while the frequent replacement of party elites through rotation rules was an inbuilt element in many Green party organizations and prevented them from strongly relying on leadership-oriented loyalty ex ante, they were pushed to reform their often very permeable organizational boundaries and adopt more selective recruitment strategies both on the level of membership and of office aspirants to increase followers' commitment to the organization as such. They also moved—although often unwillingly—towards a more 'conventional', institutionalized membership organization.

Returning to the core arguments proposed by the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, this study started out from the following claims: whether a new party is likely to persist as organization and to electorally defend a niche in its national parliamentary party system is fundamentally shaped by *the structural conditions in which it is formed* (the nature of its origin) and the capacity of its elites to overcome a *core tension inherent in the institutionalization process*, namely the

[1] Art's (2011) excellent study on new anti-immigrant parties has convincingly corrected this view.

tension between the self-interest of party founders to protect their own position of influence in the newly formed party and the need to invest in a viable party infrastructure independent of its current leadership. Leaving aside work on 'charismatic parties', this basic tension—introduced as the *leadership–structure dilemma*—has been so far overlooked. Unlike 'normal' party leaders, charismatic leaders are expected to refuse a reduction of their personal power by an institutionalized party organization and to undermine the latter's formation. While this constellation has been usually considered as deviant, this study has argued that the process of institutionalization in general carries an implicit threat for those who are in charge of a party. Their power might be reduced or they might be replaced altogether for the benefit of the organization, once followers have transferred their loyalty from the current leadership to the organization as such, a transfer which lies at the heart of value infusion as one core dimension of institutionalization as specified by Panebianco (1988).

This leadership–structure dilemma (see Chapter 3) creates incentives against party founders' investment in party building, an argument linked to a crucial distinction that party scholars have so far paid little attention to: that between party founder and party leader. This distinction is important when we conceptualize the initiation of institutionalization processes early on in a party's life: founding leaders cannot be already socialized into an organization that has not yet been formed. They are in a different situation than party leaders of long-established parties who made their career within an already institutionalized organization. There is no 'organizational imperative' to guide or constrain founders, at least not generated by the new formation itself. They might be guided or constrained by intrinsic motives of their own or by the imperative of a promoter organization they are affiliated to that supports the formation of the new party. This is why the distinction between rooted and entrepreneurial party is so important. But these arguments have already contextualized party formation by distinguishing between different types of founders or party origins.

We cannot take a pro-organizational attitude or a long-term orientation of party founders as our starting assumptions when trying to account for the evolution of new formations as such. More concretely, we cannot assume that a founding leader will leave just because his or her party enters a new phase of its development which requires different leadership skills. Neither can we assume that a founding leader invests in a structure that generates value infusion among followers, if the latter might weaken the founder's position in the newly formed party in the medium and long term. This very tension at the heart of the leadership–structure dilemma can induce choices of founding elites that are problematic for the party's medium- and long-term evolution in a phase during which the new formation as organizational actor is still very vulnerable. This is not only the case when founding elites are powerful leaders of strongly hierarchical organizations who created their party top-down and do not want to see their power diminished. They also can be activists on the ground opposing a centralization of their party which could improve the party's parliamentary performance but would reduce their own

influence in intra-party decisions. While founding actors might be substantively driven by very different goals (e.g. to maximize personal power or to defend decentralized, democratic decision-making in a party), we have to consider that they are not necessarily happy or willing to see their own influence diminished.

To get a sense of how strongly such tensions will materialize, we need to ask in which formative constellation actors are more able to push through their own interests without being counterbalanced and moderated by the need to consider the interest of others. Formative constellations tell us whether the new formation is likely to be shaped by actors with a stake in the party's long-term survival, i.e. interests that transcend individual ambitions. As detailed in Chapter 3 and echoed by the empirical findings, rooted formations, especially when formed bottom-up through inter-group negotiations, are more likely to prevent the self-interested choices of one individual or a small elite from determining the future development of a party. At the same time, the time horizon of a leadership that (also) aims at representing certain group interests is likely to be longer, which is bound to be beneficial for institutionalization since investments into an infrastructure—especially in those mechanisms supporting value infusion—tend to pay off only in the medium and long term.

To explore the importance of a new party's origin empirically, this book classified the 140 parties that entered their national parliaments across 17 democracies as rooted new parties formed with group support or as free-standing entrepreneurial parties. The quantitative analyses in Chapter 4 showed that the way in which a new party is formed influences its long-term persistence as social organization as well as its sustainability on the national level after its parliamentary breakthrough. As theoretically expected, rooted parties performed better with regard to both performance dimensions, while most significant variables only had significant effects on one dimension, stressing the qualitative difference between the two and the importance of keeping them analytically separate. Clearly, the analyses do not reject the importance of other variables such as new parties' programmatic profile or the importance of institutional variables—prominent dimensions covered in existing work. Indeed, a distinctive programmatic profile contributes to a new party's persistence and sustainability—as the only factor next to party origin significantly shaping both dimensions. The findings further show significant effects of free broadcasting access on a new party's sustainability after breakthrough as well as of party funding on organizational persistence. These two institutional factors have long been identified as factors likely to be important for 'new party success' but their systematic effects could rarely be pinned down (for an overview, see Bischoff 2011).[2] This might be the result of measurement problems. Alternatively, these factors

[2] Neither Hug (2001) nor Tavits (2006), for instance, find an effect of party finance on new party success.

might not influence the rate of new parties entering electoral contests as much as helping individual parties to do better once they have entered, again stressing the importance of the time horizon underlying the conception of party success targeted by a study.

Returning to the main finding of the quantitative analyses presented in Chapter 4, introducing party origin as an explanatory variable aims at redressing an imbalance in the literature that tends to bypass other party characteristics than those linked to their programmatic profile and electoral demand or tend to focus on institutions directly shaping electoral results (e.g. electoral systems). Despite a long tradition of theoretical work that stresses the importance of party formation and party building, these factors have remained the domain of 'qualitative researchers'.[3] This is to some extent appropriate given the very complex nature of intra-organizational dynamics that are shaped by sometimes idiosyncratic elite choices, which finds reflection in the decision to dedicate the second part of this study to the in-depth analysis of individual party trajectories. However, the findings of the large-N analyses in Chapter 4 still suggests that starting out from existing theoretical work, basic operational concepts can be developed and proxies be found that allow us to distinguish the basic nature of new formations. Doing so is important (even though it might involve the measure of complex phenomena by means of relatively simple proxies), not the least to assure the robustness of findings generated by those studies on patterns of new party emergence or success, which so far have not controlled for such characteristics.

On a broader level, the return to parties' origins pushes us to consider the different rationales underlying party activity, activity that can be predominantly maintained by reward-driven elites or by groups for which the representation of interests is an aim in itself. Both visions—the one of new parties as electoral vehicles and the one of new parties as societal organizations—are simplistic and incomplete, as they need to be in order to help us to cut through the complexities and messiness of empirical observations. But because they are simplistic it is crucial not to start out from one vision only, while rejecting the other ex ante. Depending on their origin some parties correspond more to one vision (e.g. new liberal parties to the vision of new parties as electoral vehicles), some more to the other (e.g. new Green parties to the vision of new parties as societal organizations). These dispositions matter, as substantiated throughout this study.

At the same time, we saw that formative conditions could be overcome transforming an initially skeletal entrepreneurial formation into a fully institutionalized, self-standing organization, which brings us to the second major argument of this study that stresses the importance of party agency. Elite choices can help to overcome or accelerate the conflicts inherent in the institutionalization process, conflicts which, depending on structural conditions in which a party is formed,

[3] Carter's (2005) and Meguid's studies (2008) form notable exceptions here.

tend to materialize more or less forcefully. As already mentioned, *fully-fledged institutionalization encompassing routinization* and *value infusion* is no necessary condition for a party's medium- and long-term success. A range of parties, predominantly entrepreneurs, had a successful career in parliament and government over the course of several decades. In fact, parties such as the Irish Progressive Democrats (PD) that are by now dissolved were more successful in accessing core positions in the institutional sphere—most notably government—during their lifetime than rooted new parties that have institutionalized and are still active today but never even got close to entering national government. While this observation stresses the discrepancies we run into when applying different yardsticks of 'party success' simultaneously, the fate of this party also illustrates that irrespective of its success in the institutional arena the PD as a societal organization remained vulnerable because it never formed an extra-parliamentary organization able to generate organizational loyalty. Its sustainability and more fundamentally its persistence remained tied to its founding elite, a dependency the party as an organization did not overcome in over 20 years, despite plenty of access to material resources that could have been used for party building. The founding elites remained focused on their careers driven by intra-institutional demands, and this was reflected in the rather short-term oriented party-building strategies they initiated, which supported 'partial institutionalization' in terms of routinization to assure the functioning of the party in public office without providing value infusion.

Similar tendencies could be observed in many entrepreneurs. Throughout their careers they were stabilized by leadership continuity, often by the party's initial founder staying in charge with the party declining once the founder left the organization. Their persistence remained linked to the lifespans of political careers, individuals who stayed with the party as long as the party supported their goals. Put differently, persistence remained a function of electoral sustainability, rather than getting detached from it through growing institutionalization able to keep a party going through the generation of organizational loyalty, i.e. value infusion. These parties might come to a natural end only after several decades, once leading figures retire. Yet as a range of case studies indicated, more often the end comes prematurely, triggered by internal conflict arising around the leader's dominant position, leading to exit or expulsion, which, in turn, creates a leadership vacuum, a challenge these parties find difficult to cope with. The hurdle of leadership renewal is often insurmountable, as long as there is no organization in place to which followers are attached irrespective of who runs it, an organization which can recruit a leader from its midst, who is genuinely interested in the organization's survival, and is accepted by followers even if he or she lacks particular leadership skills or charisma. In other words, these parties have never overcome the leadership–structure dilemma.

Routinization, as the one major dimension of institutionalization, is compatible with any form of power distribution in the organization and does not have

potentially problematic long-term consequences for the leader in charge as does value infusion, which transfers loyalty from the particular leader to the organization. While routinization helps the party in public office (the party unit most visible to voters and followers) to operate through facilitating internal coordination and conflict resolution, it implies only few costs for the leaders beyond the willingness to stick to basic procedures and handle conflict in other ways than through repression or the exercise of top-down sanctions. This is why it would be wrong to say that entrepreneurial parties did not institutionalize at all: the more successful ones did but in many cases only partially.

Case studies of party failure and decline indicated that value infusion is difficult to generate top-down as long as the leadership initiating this process is fundamentally unwilling to be constrained by the newly formed organization. The case studies of rooted mergers—the Alliance Party (NZ) and the United Future New Zealand—were telling. Although they were constituted by several parties some of which were tied to societal organizations, they were formed for strategic reasons by leaders who themselves were detached from any promoter groups and driven by their own career interests instead. While they were happy to consolidate their support base by merging with rooted parties that were better organized and provided a pool of loyal followers, they were unwilling to pay the price to make these mergers work. To generate an attachment of those constituent parties could have been possible by their meaningful involvement in intra-party decision-making. This, however, was incompatible with the founding leaders' refusal to accept organizational constraints on their own activities that aimed at maximizing the party's access to core institutional positions, most notably government. A similar rationale was visible in a range of rooted top-down formations, where the loyalty of promoter groups helped parties to persist. Founders or initial leaders (themselves not directly associated with these promoter organizations), in contrast, did not exploit these favourable conditions to institutionalize their party and in some cases actively opposed such a process, since it constituted a threat to their dominant position in the party. While ties to promoter organizations tended to slow down decline, elite choices—particularly those of party founders—undermined these parties' potential to consolidate their support base.

While the case studies stressed the importance of leadership orientations (especially those of founding leaders), they did not suggest that founding leaders who are not associated with already organized societal groups are necessarily short-sighted and refrain from party building. Formative conditions do not determine the orientations of founders or the time horizons that dominate their decisions. They only increase the likelihood that a leader with certain orientations is in charge. Neither are entrepreneurial parties necessarily unable to institutionalize and build up a support base. The case study of the Canadian Reform Party illustrated the importance of party agency by showing a founding leader of an entrepreneurial formation who built, in a top-down fashion, an institutionalized membership organization to consolidate the position of his party in the Canadian party system. At the

same time, this case also highlighted with particular clarity the risk to the founding leader inherent in institutionalization as specified in the theoretical approach. After having pushed for his party's merger (meaning the end of the party as autonomous organization), the founding leader lost his standing among many activists and provoked his own replacement at the next leadership contest. This would have been less likely, had he not actively incentivized his followers to shift their loyalty away from the leadership to the party as organization in the first place.

Also the case study of the Danish People's Party (DPP), another entrepreneurial party formed top-down, warns us not to overemphasize the role of formative conditions. It showed that links to already organized groups can be systematically forged by the founding party leadership after a party is formed, while connections with others—that might be too extreme—can be deliberately avoided by selective recruitment strategies. As we saw in Chapter 8, the party-building strategy of the DPP is in many ways a counter-image of the organizational approach of its mother party, the Progress Party, a party plagued by infighting throughout its history. Similarly, interviews with representatives of the Greenliberal Party, a splinter of the Swiss Green Party formed in 2004, revealed as a major goal to be better organized and more professional than the mother party, while offering a fairly similar policy package to voters, a strategy the party has so far been quite successful with. Both examples echo an observation recently made by de Lange and Art (2011). They argued that the organizational strategy of the Dutch Freedom Party for Freedom—most notably the decision to have no membership organization and to fully centralize power on the founding leader Geert Wilders—can be read as a reaction to the spectacular disintegration of the Pim Fortuyn List, i.e. the result of a learning process. This suggests that we need to consider that elite choices might be deliberate responses to the failure of other parties, especially those that targeted a similar niche, which is why agency-based approaches should not be bypassed in favour of simple structure-based arguments, although the latter form an important part of the picture. While this study tried to show that entrepreneurs often shy away from fully-fledged institutionalization, the question which organizational templates entrepreneurs choose in those cases where party leaders aim at building a functioning organization (e.g. whether splinter parties try to emulate their mother party if successful and deliberately choose a counter-model if the mother party struggled) clearly constitutes an important issue that needs to be addressed in greater detail in future research.

This brings us back to the main theoretical claim driving this study. Rather than making a choice between structure-based and agency-based approaches, we should attempt to further theorize the link between party elites' orientations and the conditions in which a party is formed, a link which cross-cuts new parties' programmatic orientations. Case studies revealed that rooted bottom-up formations—such as the French National Front or the Belgian Flemish Interest (*Vlaams Belang*)—overcame the tensions between leadership and structure formation inherent in institutionalization. This was the case although they are very

centralized parties with powerful leaders, which again shows that to associate the presence of supposedly charismatic leaders with anti-organizational tendencies is not particularly helpful. The basic rationale underlying party building that led to fully-fledged institutionalization in these cases was more similar to other rooted bottom-up formations that originated in inter-group negotiations (such as a range of new Green and new religious parties)[4] than to programmatically more similar entrepreneurial formations. This also suggests that while the fate of some parties can only be fully comprehended when considering the exceptional character of a party's founder or long-term leader, the role that leading personnel are likely to play in a new formation and the basic orientation of these personnel are likely to be systematically shaped by a party's origin and mode of formation. In other words, while a history of the French National Front, for instance, is hardly possible without a special recognition of the character of its long-term leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, an account of why his party could outlive his leadership should not start with his personal characteristics but with the initial position of this important figure in the formation process and how this position evolved in conjunction with the institutionalization of the National Front as a social organization.

In a similar vein, the case study chapters suggest that patterns of party death are systematically linked to the way parties form. 'Bargained mergers', as Ware (2009) called them, between institutionalized and reasonably successful new parties were relatively frequent among rooted parties populating the Green and new religious groups. We found far fewer among entrepreneurial top-down formations whose (founding) leaders preferred to jump ship and let their party dissolve or disintegrate rather than share power with the elite of another party. Whether a new party, when facing a programmatically very similar competitor in its party system, seriously considered a merger, appeared to be directly linked to whether the leadership really cared about the representation of the issues their party stood for and to the extent to which a merger would imply a considerable reduction of the leadership's power. While an interest in social representation cannot be taken as a given, especially not in the case of entrepreneurial parties, the anticipated loss of power is likely to constitute much more of a barrier in highly centralized entrepreneurial parties 'owned' by their founders than in rooted bottom-up formations. This suggests that a party's origin not only affects whether founders are likely to pay the price of fully-fledged institutionalization, it also influences whether leaders are willing to potentially risk their own

[4] That said, the issues around which intra-organizational conflict evolved were naturally very different. Splits in centralized organizations such as the French National Front, for instance, often evolve between factions competing for the party leadership, while splits in Green bottom-up formations that started out from a highly decentralized model are often triggered by more radical groups opposing attempts to centralize and 'normalize' the party organization. Although these configurations are not the same, there are parallels in that groups leave because they see their influence in the organization as too limited or diminished (for a distinction between different forms of factionalism, see Boucek 2009).

position for the sake of strengthening the party's core interests by merging with a rival organization.

In general terms, parallels in organizational dynamics—including party building, decline, and death—are not confined to new parties of a particular profile. While this study would have been impossible without the vast 'party family literatures' and even less so without the many excellent case studies, it suggests that it is fruitful to specify parallels in patterns of persistence and decline and the factors driving them across party families and across democracies. These parallels ought to exist because all new parties, once they become more successful, have to maintain themselves as organizations, while responding to similar challenges in the electoral and, after breakthrough, the institutional arena.

PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE AND NEWLY EMERGING PARTIES IN ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES

Considering the long-term implications of the findings, it is interesting to note that the rate of new entries tended to go up rather than down over the 43 years covered in this study. Using 1989 as cut-off point, which splits the period of examination in two phases of roughly similar length, we find that 66 parties entered the national stage in the earlier and 74 in the later period. Even considering the slight increase in new entries generated by the change from 'first past the post' to a 'mixed member proportional' electoral system in New Zealand in 1996, the higher number of entries post-1989 is remarkable. It is remarkable because in most democracies some newcomers entering in the earlier period managed to get established, i.e. the programmatic offer to voters had already expanded and diversified. It further suggests that confronted with increasingly individualized and complex societies, new generations of new parties are likely to enter in the future. They will successfully 'reinvent' the initial strategies of by-then 'established newcomers' (e.g. offering a more participatory form of politics or using an anti-establishment rhetoric), strategies the latter were pressed to tone down or give up altogether in the course of their consolidation. Even if only a small minority of newcomers establishes a lasting niche, long-lived party systems slowly change towards greater fragmentation, with the mainstream parties being the main losers.[5] Not all new parties entering old party systems (with or without a new profile)

[5] An interesting development in this context is the internal democratization of political parties (e.g. through the introduction of primaries for the selection of candidates or direct leadership elections) through which more and more established parties try to expand their appeal. Whether such reforms lead to a real empowerment of rank-and-file members is an ongoing controversy (e.g. Katz and Mair 1995; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Cross and Blais 2011; Cross and Katz 2013).

remain 'temporary vehicles' for protest that attract the support of detached voters for a while and are later replaced by another newcomer, a party that seems more appealing, at least in the short run. No doubt, such cycles exist. The Party for Freedom tends to be considered as the successor of the Pim Fortuyn List, whose niche opened after the latter disintegrated. A similar story can be told about the Progress Party and its splinter, the Danish People's Party, with the latter conquering the former's niche, and about the Danish Centre Democrats that after several decades was replaced by the newer Liberal Alliance. But these cases do not tell us something about organizationally new parties as such. They tell us something about the vulnerability of entrepreneurial formations.

Over the last four decades, a range of new parties, not always but mostly rooted formations, fully institutionalized and are unlikely to vanish from the national stage, even if challenged by newer entries. The rise of the German Pirate Party that recently managed to break into several regional parliaments is a telling example. Using strategies that for many political commentators compare with the Greens in their early years, the party mobilizes the 'internet generation' on a vague policy platform, claiming—as organization—to engage in a more inclusive, transparent, and participatory form of politics (e.g. through the use of e-democracy). Whether the 'digital revolution', a theme which the 'Pirates' currently capitalize on, provides a similar foundation for the rise of a 'new party family' able to defend its own niche in national party systems, as did the 'silent revolution' of post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977) a few decades earlier, is an open question. What seems clear is that the German Greens are unlikely to be replaced by this particular or other challengers—and not just because the formal parliamentary threshold to national parliament of 5 per cent of the vote is high and the Pirates themselves might not necessarily be capable of handling the new responsibilities linked to regional parliamentary representation as recent media reports suggest.[6] The Greens managed—despite considerable intra-organizational strains—to build a loyal support base similar to old parties. And while the Pirates could draw significant support from Green voters (after 30 years in German politics the Greens have lost the appeal of being really new or anti-establishment), the Pirates also won significant support from the two biggest parties (the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats), the Liberals, and from non-voters.[7]

This example suggests that when formerly new parties have 'consolidated' and 'normalized', other newcomers are likely to come in and capture those voters who genuinely aspire to inclusive and participatory forms of decision-making, which

[6] After an initially very positive response in the German media, the party's image suffered strongly, not the least because it struggled with intense intra-organizational turmoil, triggering the defections of prominent 'Pirates'.

[7] 'Upstarts Continue to Hijack in Germany', *New York Times*, 8 May 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/world/europe/the-pirate-party-continues-to-hijack-votes-in-germany.html?pagewanted=all>, accessed 2 December 2012.

even Green parties, as the most 'participatory' group of new parties covered in this study, found difficult to maintain in the longer term, once operating in parliament and in government and reforming their internal structures accordingly. Alternatively, these 'new newcomers' attract those disaffected voters that can be only mobilized through protest and are likely to defect from any party sooner or later. The group of voters that do not strongly identify with any of the established parties increases in advanced democracies and old parties find it particularly hard to mobilize young people who are more likely to be weak identifiers (i.e. particularly flexible in their vote choice, if they vote at all). Consequently, we are likely to observe some new parties coming and going, while a minority of new entries with ties to organized societal interests, which invest in lasting infrastructures, are most likely to stay around.

The most immediate test for this study proposing a party-centred framework lies in the—still undecided—fates of those new parties that entered their national parliaments just recently. While the survival analysis in Chapter 4 included all 140 entries from 1968 to 2011, the case study chapters concentrated on those new parties that—as the minimum test for sustainability—already faced the challenge or had theoretically the opportunity to participate in two national elections after their national breakthrough (obviously some might have dissolved beforehand). Consequently, 20 recent entries were not analysed (or only mentioned in passing), since the implications of their national breakthrough on their internal dynamics and thus on their medium- and long-term performance are difficult to evaluate at this point.[8] While predictions are always risky, it is still worthwhile to ask what the findings of this study suggest with regard to these parties' future developments focusing on the nature of their programmatic profile and the way they are formed, as the two core factors that affected both persistence and sustainability in the large-N analyses.

Many of the recent national entries are right wing, followed by Green parties and new left parties. Only five of the 20 parties[9] offer a programmatic profile that can be considered as clearly distinct from those of their competitors already established in their respective party system. Since most of them were formed relatively recently, they as often emulate other new parties' profiles (that entered parliament earlier on) as traditional ideologies, reflecting the observation that through the consolidation of early entries the programmatic offer on the party

[8] The respective parties that had not yet faced their second re-election after breakthrough before the end of 2011 are: Alliance for Austria's Future, Family First (Aul), Dedecker List (B), People's Party (B), New Centre (F), Modem (F), Mana Party (Nz), Liberal Alliance (Den), Citizen Movement Geneva (*Mouvement Citoyens Genevois*) (Ch), Civic Democratic Party (*Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei*) (Ch), Greenliberal Party (Ch), Green Party (UK), Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (UK), Green Party (Can), Animal Party (NL), Party for Freedom (NL), People before Profit (Ire), Workers and Unemployed Action Group (Ire), Citizens Movement (Ice), Sweden Democrats (S).

[9] They are the Dutch Party for Freedom, the Sweden Democrats, the UK Greens, the Canadian Greens, and Family First.

system level has become more diverse, which, in turn, makes it increasingly difficult for recent entries to offer something genuinely new in the context of their party systems. If an increasing number of new parties that enter national parliaments nowadays are 'purifiers', the way they were formed will increase in importance to explain which ones will survive, also because a well-organized party can claim to represent important issues more effectively than programmatically similar rivals. Looking at the profiles of recently emerging newcomers, a range of new right-wing insiders entered national parliaments such as the Citizen Movement Geneva and the Civic Democratic Party (both Switzerland), the Dedecker List in Belgium, or the Alliance for Austria's Future. An example for a 'second generation' environmental party would be the Greenliberal Party, a splinter of the Swiss Greens, while the Workers and Unemployed Action Group and People before Profit, two new left-wing parties in Ireland, and the Icelandic Citizen Movement, also left-wing, entered their national parliaments after the two countries were hit by the financial crisis.[10]

While the findings of Chapter 4 suggest that parties that lack a distinctive profile have more difficulties in carving out their own niche in the longer term, the way they are formed and whether their elites (through skilful leadership, party building, or both) can keep their party together should be of considerable importance as well. Half of 20 newcomers are rooted, half are entrepreneurs, while nine of ten entrepreneurs are insiders and nine of ten rooted parties are outsiders. Looking at the connection between substantive profile and formative configurations, most rooted outsiders are Green, while most entrepreneurial insiders belong to the right. This implies that—everything else being equal—most of the recent new right-wing entries are vulnerable, not only lacking a distinct profile but also lacking societal roots such as the Belgian Dedecker List, while most of the recent Green entries such as in the UK or Canada start out from more favourable conditions to maintain their current level of electoral support and, more generally, to persist as organizations.

I cannot explore each of these 20 parties in detail at this point. However, it is useful to briefly look at some recent entrepreneurial entries and some recent rooted entries in turn. The study suggested that whether entrepreneurial formations are likely to last (and, more specifically, outlive their founders) is influenced by the party-building strategies of their elites. Thus, the comparison between two successful entrepreneurial insiders that gained prominence only relatively recently might be insightful. Both operate under permissive electoral systems (the Netherlands and Switzerland respectively), one belongs to the new right, the other to the Green family. While the new right party—the Dutch Party for Freedom—has

[10] People before Profit and the Workers and Unemployed Action Group had their national breakthrough at the 2011 Irish election that led to an unprecedented decline of support for the long dominant party of government Fianna Fáil, as well as wiping the Green Party—its coalition partner—out of parliament (Bolleyer 2012c).

attracted far more electoral support so far and qualifies as programmatically distinct, this study implies that the Swiss Greenliberal Party is more likely to establish a lasting niche in the longer term despite having attracted fewer votes and lacking a distinct profile.

The rise of the Dutch Party for Freedom has been spectacular since it was founded by Geert Wilders, a defector from the Liberal Party, in 2006. Running in its first national election in the same year, it won 5.9 per cent of the vote and nine seats right away, a victory that was consolidated in 2010 when the party not only won 15.5 per cent and 24 seats but also agreed to function as support party for the centre-right minority government. The party's rise and its strategy to lend support to a minority government have been compared to the Danish People's Party, another entrepreneurial insider formation that achieved support party status early after its foundation. Yet the organizational approach of the Party for Freedom is fundamentally different from the (by now well-established) Danish People's Party we looked at in Chapter 8. Organizationally, the Party for Freedom consists of its founding leader Wilders and his personal circle of followers. Since Wilders refuses to have party members, the party did not set up a conventional membership organization, which also means that his party is not eligible for state funding and has to live on private donations. And while this skeletal structure did not prevent its electoral rise on the national level (it might even have been beneficial in some respects), it limits the party's recruitment capacity, as visible on the local level.[11]

De Lange and Art (2011) have argued in an insightful, in-depth analysis that the Party for Freedom nevertheless has institutionalized both in terms of value infusion and in routinization, which, in turn, accounts for its so far much better performance than its predecessor, the Pim Fortuyn List. While the contrast between the Party for Freedom and the LPF is striking, lacking an organizational infrastructure, the loyalty that unifies Freedom Party MPs can only be leadership-oriented. While this can be enough to stabilize a party as long as the founder stays in charge, the bigger the parliamentary group of a new party becomes, the more difficult it is for an individual leader to recruit enough personal affiliates who will take over positions and are willing to accept the founder's dominance without question. Unsurprisingly, it proved much more difficult for Wilders to maintain a similar level of control over the much larger parliamentary group that came into office after the 2010 election (it grew from 9 to 24 MPs), particularly since the party, as government support party, had to participate in a much wider range of substantive decisions. During its term as support party, the party suffered from defections, including several national MPs. In spring 2012, Hero Brinkman, a popular Freedom Party MP defected. As the party pulled out of government a bit

[11] At the local election in 2010, it only ran candidates in The Hague and Almere. 'PVV Picks Second MP for Local Elections', *DutchNews.nl*, 21 December 2009, <http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2009/12/pvv_picks_second_mp_for_local.php>, accessed 3 April 2013.

later (due to differences over budget cuts), two further defections followed in summer ahead of the upcoming election. All three defectors referred to the party's undemocratic structures and Wilders's authoritarian leadership style as one major reason for their exit.[12] Yet although the party suffered somewhat (its vote share went down from 15.5 to 10.1 per cent) in the 2012 election, it managed to defend ten parliamentary seats. As long as Wilders remains in control, it is likely that his party will be able to profit from its tough positions on immigration and to its exploitation of anti-Islamic sentiments. However, the findings of this study suggest that once Wilders decides to exit (which he might once internal resistance against his dominance intensifies or the party's support declines below a certain level) there is little left to keep the organization together, since representatives have been recruited based on their personal loyalty to its founder. That the Party for Freedom (like its predecessor the LPF) has the advantage of a distinct profile in the context of the Dutch party system does not change this basic vulnerability of the party as an organization. Like other (possibly long-lived) entrepreneurial insider parties that died after they were deserted by their founders, usually well-known politicians, the persistence of the Party for Freedom is likely to depend on Wilders's on-going presence.

Moving on to the Greenliberal Party as contrasting case, we find a more centrist version of the Swiss Greens, which originated as a splinter of the Greens in the canton Zurich (Milic 2008: 1148) in 2004 and entered national parliament in 2007. While the party could draw some support from the Greens' regional branch in Zurich, the home canton of the (formerly Green) MP who initiated the party's foundation, the party as an organization—like the Dutch Party for Freedom—had to be built from scratch. Greenliberal party officials, staff, and activists interviewed in 2009 indicated that they consider their party as a 'more pragmatic' and 'more professional' version of the Swiss Greens (a highly decentralized party federation) placing less focus on their party's distinctiveness in terms of policy than in terms of its operations. Accordingly, to catch up with its much better resourced mother party that has existed since 1975, the Greenliberals immediately made active attempts to build regional branches across the country. Although under the Swiss electoral system a party can achieve national representation by only running elections in specific cantons (the Ticino League analysed in Chapter 8 is a fitting example), the establishment of regional branches across the country was considered an important activity. Looking at the party's current

[12] 'Hero Brinkman Quits the PVV, Opposition Call for New Elections', *DutchNews.nl*, 20 March 2012 <http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2012/03/hero_brinkman_quits_the_pvv_op.php>, accessed 3 April 2013; 'Setback for Wilders as Double Defection Torpedoes Launch of "Referendum on Europe" Campaign', *The Amsterdam Herald*, 3 July 2012, <http://www.amsterdamherald.com/index.php/news-specials/tweede-kamer-election-september-12/15-election-2012-untagged/387-20120703-setback-wilders-double-defection-torpedoes-eurosceptic-eu-election-campaign-manifesto-netherlands-pvv-politics>, accessed 2 April 2013.

national constitution, it adopted a decentralized infrastructure composed of regional branches resembling its mother party. The steering capacity of the national elites, however, is more pronounced than in the Swiss Greens (a capacity reinforced by the fact that in a number of cantons the regional branches were created only recently), which reflects the party's stronger focus on decision-making efficiency. Whether the repackaging and presentation of Green issues in a more moderate and more professionalized form will be sufficient to sustain support in the longer term remains to be seen. Similar to the Party for Freedom, the party increased its vote share after its national breakthrough. While it won 1.4 per cent of the national vote (4 seats) in 2007, it more than doubled its share to 5.4 per cent (12 seats) in 2011. Clearly, the Greenliberals' success seems moderate compared to the Party for Freedom's 15.5 per cent and its former status of government support party. However, the findings of this study suggest that—given this party's systematic attempts to consolidate its support base outside institutions—the latter is more likely to outlive its generation of founders and to be resilient in times of crisis than the Party for Freedom.

While most new parties, especially entrepreneurial ones, enter parliament—if they do—early in their life cycle, we still find a range of rooted formations that had to wait for their national breakthroughs for an extensive period. In 2010 and 2011, we saw the national breakthrough of three, already long-lived Green parties, into their first houses of parliament in Canada, the UK, and Australia.[13] While the Australian Greens have repeatedly held the balance of power in the powerful (and more representative) Australian Senate before (i.e. the party is already experienced in national politics), the Greens in the UK and Canada had to persist outside national institutions for several decades. Confronted with high electoral thresholds, they 'caught up' with most of their Western European counterparts operating under PR systems more than one decade late. All three parties only conquered one seat in the first house (with the Australian Greens since 2010 lending support to the current Labor minority government), which might be temporary victories, given the mechanics of the electoral systems they are confronted with. However, it will be interesting to see whether national representation will change the internal dynamics especially of the UK and Canadian Greens—two newcomers to national politics—by altering the resource distribution in favour of national office holders and pushing them towards centralization as was the case in other Green parties before them.[14]

[13] The British Greens were founded 1973, the Canadian Greens in 1983, and the Australian Greens in 1992.

[14] The UK Greens still have an extremely decentralized infrastructure and stick closely to Green ideals, which became visible when party leader Caroline Lucas took over her seat in the House of Commons and, as a consequence, had to step down from her position as party leader. The key elements of the party structure as introduced in 1975 have remained the same, despite many incremental changes. The main weight of the party's activities lies in the extra-parliamentary sphere, despite the

Yet while (especially ongoing) representation in national parliament is likely to change these parties' organizations at least somewhat, it is unlikely to be decisive for these three parties' persistence. This is even more the case for the entry that waited for its national breakthrough even longer: the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, also a rooted outsider formation, persisted outside national institutions for 40 years thanks to a regional support base, its capacity to win seats in the Northern Irish parliament and to enter government on the regional level. The party participated in national elections for decades without entering the UK House of Commons until the 2010 election when it finally won one seat.[15] Unlike in many entrepreneurs whose trajectories were studied in earlier chapters, these rooted parties' persistence is no function of sustainability. While success on the national level can boost them, its decline is unlikely to bring them down.

FINAL REMARKS

The brief look at a number of recent entries yet again echoes the importance of distinguishing organizational persistence and electoral sustainability as separate performance dimensions and demonstrates how useful it is to consider systematically how new parties were formed and which structures their elites decide to build. At the same time, the last few examples shed critical light on one assumption defended in the methodological part of this study, namely that a focus on 'national careers' is appropriate to assess new party performance. A focus on national sustainability is appropriate when coupled with a conception of organizational persistence (also) defined by a party's ongoing activities in general (on the national or on other governmental levels)—assuring that these two performance dimensions can be separated out.

Yet while the quantitative analyses in Chapter 4 showed that operating in a system with a strong regional tier supports new party performance on the national level, at least in the short run, the actual presence of individual new parties in regional or local institutions was not analysed directly. This caveat points to the implicit assumption made in this study that it is success on the national level that

winning of EP seats in the late 1990s (Faucher 1999; Rüdig 2008: 220–1). The Canadian Greens abandoned core features such as consensus decision-making, rotation of leadership, and gender parity rather early in their history. This might have been triggered by the (so far failed) prospects of adopting a PR system as recommended by the Law Commission of Canada in 2004 or by observing the evolution of successful Green parties in other countries. Nonetheless, their party organization still assures considerable member involvement (Sharp and Krajnc 2008: 240) and thus leeway for further reform.

[15] In 1970 an Ulster Unionist MP defected and joined the Alliance Party but the latter has never won a seat at an election before 2010.

matters most—or at least to a considerable extent—to party elites. This assumption is reasonable since all parties in this study made an active effort to and succeeded in entering national parliament. Yet even if only studying electoral performance on the *national* level, it remains a simplification, once we move into systems with strong regional identities and powerful regional governments as some of the case studies of Swiss or Northern Irish parties indicated. Inevitably, by trying to overcome certain assumptions in the existing literature, this study had to adopt some assumptions of its own, if only to facilitate systematic, cross-national comparison. That said, further research will hopefully build on the concepts and analytical tools presented earlier and the findings they helped to generate to explore more directly than done in this study how new parties' simultaneous operations on multiple tiers shape patterns of persistence and decline.

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