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Racism and Discourse in Spain and Latin America

Teun A. van Dijk

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Racism and Discourse in Spain and Latin America

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Para Flavia, mi gran amor

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Preface

This book has been written as a complementary study for my earlier book *Elite Discourse and Racism* (1993), which unfortunately did not include data and analyses about racism and ethnicism in Spain and Latin America. I am therefore glad that Benjamins and the series editors accepted to publish the present book (of which an earlier version was published in Spanish with Gedisa, Barcelona, 2003), so that students and researchers have access to these new contributions in the field of the study of racism.

The studies in this book are very modest, and I refer to the many other investigations cited in the references for further information and research. For Spain, and especially for the many countries of Latin America, much more research of many teams would be necessary in order to begin to understand the complexity of ethnic and racial domination and inequality in the Ibero-Latin world.

Where I hope to have contributed something new in this brief study is to have examined, now also for Spain and Latin America, some of the relationships between ethnicism and racism on the one hand, and discourse, language use and communication on the other hand. Although racist prejudices and ideologies are largely acquired through public discourse, and although racist discourse itself is a form of discrimination and part of the system of ethnic and racial inequality, discourse has largely been ignored in most studies of racism in psychology and the social sciences.

I therefore hope that students and investigators, both in the humanities and social sciences, will feel stimulated by this limited investigation to undertake much more detailed research, in different countries, and on different forms of discourse and social institutions in Spain and Latin America. There are suggestions here for hundreds of monographs, doctoral theses and articles on, for instance, parliamentary debates, party programs, propaganda and other forms of political discourse; on news shows, talk shows, movies and advertising on television and on news and opinion articles in the press; on school textbooks and on scientific research; on novels, telenovelas and other forms of fiction or literature; on everyday conversations; on dialogues in organizations

and institutions, and on many other genres in which racism is daily expressed and reproduced in many countries, social situations and against many different ethnic groups.

Since especially the few observations in this book on Latin America are obviously insufficient to account for the many forms of ethnic and racial inequality in the many Latin American countries, I have in the meantime taken the initiative for an international project with teams in several Latin American countries, each reporting on discourse and racism in their own country. I hope that we will soon be able to publish the results of this collective research in a separate book.

Having widely traveled and lectured for nearly 30 years in all countries of Latin America, and now living in Spain for more than 5 years, I do not consider myself an external (let alone distant or 'objective') observer and critic of the ethnic and racial situation in the Ibero-Latin world. Rather, this is a critical study of "our own" society, that is, a society in which I feel more at home than in the country in which I was born. However, "our" society is also a society where unfortunately "white" (euro) racism has been prevalent for centuries, as is also the case for the rest of Europe and Northern America. In other words, we are dealing here with a very general and fundamental problem, a problem that is not limited to Spain and Latin America, but whose forms of course vary from country to country.

I hope that with this and further studies, I may be able to join and support those researchers – as well as all others, not least from the minority or immigrant communities themselves – who with their ideas, work and action explicitly struggle against ethnic domination and racism.

Those who have comments and suggestions about this book are invited to send me a message at the following e-mail address: vandijk@discourse-in-society.org.

For further information about my research, about my publications, and about other work in discourse analysis, please visit my web-site www.discourse-in-society.org.

Teun A. van Dijk
Barcelona, December 2004

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I also would like to thank my colleagues in discourse analysis at the University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, for their hospitality and cooperation during the years I have had the pleasure of working with them.

Finally, I owe more than gratitude to my partner Flavia Limone Reina for all I learned from her, every day, about Chile and Latin America, and about that other fundamental system of domination and inequality – machismo and sexism, and especially for her love and the years of happiness and passion that were the context of the writing of this book. This study is happily dedicated to her.

Chapter 1

Racism and discourse

Before I examine some contemporary forms of discursive racism in Spain and Latin America in the next chapters, this chapter will briefly present some more general reflections on racism and its reproduction in discourse.

It has become trivial to state that racism, like sexism, is a very complex social phenomenon, and hence cannot be described and reduced to some simple, monocausal explanation. Taking a discursive approach to the study of racism, therefore, should not be seen as an attempt to describe or explain racism only in terms of language use or communication. There are fundamental social, cultural, historical and economic dimensions to racism that have little to do with text or talk. Although my own earlier research – as well as much other work – have shown that racism, and especially racist prejudices, are also reproduced through many kinds of discourse, many of its manifestations are hardly discursive: Everyday discrimination, marginalization, exclusion, problematization and violence against non-European minorities and immigrants in Europe and the Americas are more general social practices, whose study goes far beyond the analysis of discourse. Of the many contemporary general studies of racism, we may refer to the following influential books and authors, as well as introductory studies, readers and handbooks: Back and Solomos (2000); Boxill (2001); Bulmer and Solomos (1999a, b, 2004); Cashmore (2003); Doane and Bonilla-Silva (2003); Essed (1991); Essed and Goldberg (2002); Feagin (2000); Feagin, Vera, and Batur (2001); García Martínez (2004); Goldberg (1997, 2002); Goldberg and Solomos (2002); Lauren (1996); Marable (2002); Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo (2000); Solomos and Back (1996); Solomos and Wrench (1993); Wieviorka (1994, 1998); for racism and discourse, see below; for racism in Spain and Latin America, see the next chapters.

Racism as domination

Within such a broader theoretical framework, I shall define racism first of all as a social system of *domination,* that is, of a specific kind of power of

one group over other groups, in our case of Europeans ('whites') over non-European peoples. Thus, whereas sexism is defined in terms of domination of women by men, and on the basis of constructed gender differences, racism is based on constructed differences of ethnicity, appearance, origin, culture and/or language. There are other forms of racism in the world, such as Japanese racism against Koreans, but since European racism has historically been most prevalent and consequential in the world, I shall focus on European racism, sometimes briefly called 'white racism'.

Since many forms of contemporary racism focus on cultural rather than on 'racial' differences, a more adequate term might be 'ethnicism'. However, I shall maintain the more common term 'racism', also because implicitly – and though often denied – appearance often remains part of the criteria by which the Others are defined as being 'different' from 'us'. In this sense, also ethnically based anti-Semitism is a form of racism. Domination only based on language, religion or origin, however, is not usually called 'racism', but more specifically identified as such, for instance as linguistic prejudice and discrimination or 'linguicism'.

I define domination as a form of *power abuse* (of the vast literature on power and domination, see Clegg 1975; Luke 1989; Miller 1987; Wartenberg 1990). Thus, if 'whites', as a group, have more economic, political, social or cultural power in society, and they abuse of such power by keeping non-whites 'down and out', out of the country, the city, the neighborhood, the company, the shop, the university, the job, the position, the newspaper or the scholarly journal, then we are dealing with manifestations of racism. Power means having preferential access to and control over scarce social resources.

Abuse of power, domination, is *illegitimate* use of power. Such illegitimacy consists in a systematic violation of fundamental human and social rights, whether or not these are enshrined in the constitution, the laws or the consensual norms of a country or community. Since the international consciousness and formulation of fundamental human rights is historically developing, also the definition of what 'counts as' racism may change. What was a 'normal' way of treating blacks in the Americas or Europe hundred or fifty years ago, may no longer be the dominant norm today (Barker 1978; Barkan 1992).

The result of racist domination is usually *social inequality*: minorities or immigrants have less access to, or less control over society's resources. As a group, they have a hard time entering and settling in a country, city or neighborhood; they generally have worse houses, worse jobs, worse health and worse schooling; they get more negative news coverage (if they are being portrayed at all), and receive less pay and less respect. On the other hand, they get more at-

tention from the police or shop owners, and longer prison sentences. This list is endless, and defines the everyday lives of non-European peoples in societies where Europeans are in power.

Racism as discrimination

The system of racist or 'ethnicist' domination consists of two major subsystems, a *social* (economic, political) and a *sociocognitive* one. The first of these subsystems has just been described and consists, at the microlevel, of the *discriminatory practices* that reproduce racism in everyday life, and that result in the problematization, marginalization and exclusion of non-Europeans by Europeans. Having less access to, or control over, scarce social resources than 'white' citizens is an abstract way of summarizing the endless inequities of which 'non-whites' are the targets, all day, every day in virtually all social situations and encounters in everyday life. This may show in a 'mere' impolite way of address, but also in not getting a job or promotion, not getting attention at school or university, by being stopped constantly by police or security agents, by being stereotyped in the media, by being 'forgotten' in textbooks, by being undervalued or ignored by the elites, by having difficulty renting an apartment or a house, and so on. As we shall see below, many of these discriminatory practices are discursive (for descriptions of these many forms of everyday discriminatory practices, see, e.g., Alvarez & Lutterman 1979; Banton 1994; Britton 2000; Cohn 2000; Dovidio & Gaertner 1986; Essed 1991; Flint 2004).

Many members of dominant groups have a hard time seeing these endless inequities as 'racism' – much in the same way as many men have no idea about the many ways women are being discriminated in everyday life, or do not accept to call them 'sexism'. This is quite typical for dominant groups and their members: power abuse is much more noted by those who suffer from it than by those who exercise it. Also, denial and negation are at the heart of racism as soon as the official norm no longer tolerates overt forms of discrimination (Van Dijk 1992). It is therefore usually a good idea to define power abuse in terms of the perspective of its victims or survivors rather than in terms of those who engage in such abuse. For those white people – among them also many scholars – who have difficulty with such a critical principle, it may be helpful to ask themselves whether a mugging, a hit-and-run accident or another crime of which they are victims, should be defined as *they* see it, or in terms of the perspective of the perpetrator. Indeed, discrimination is not just 'bad behav-

ior', but a crime. Denying or mitigating such crimes is part of the problem of racism.

In the general strategy of denying the impact of everyday racism in the lives of the Others, it is also sometimes argued that we *all* occasionally are being treated impolitely, undervalued, ignored or refused a job. This argument however is a well-known fallacy, because white people in white societies are not systematically discriminated against for being white. What happens to all of us occasionally, and for personal or ad hoc reasons, happens to black and other minority people in Europe and the Americas every day, systematically, and only for just one reason: for being black or otherwise different. Racism and discrimination are not *personal* problems, but *societal* problems: They are forms of domination of a whole group, and not merely individual cases of bad behavior against persons. And even if discriminatory practices do not actually occur each day, members of dominated groups may *expect* them any day. It needs no further argument that besides the consequences of the discriminatory practices themselves, such everyday expectancies of unequal treatment also have a profound influence on the minds and emotions of those who are the target of such discrimination.

Racism as institution

Racism in everyday life is exercised and reproduced by social practices of discrimination. Yet, there is another level or dimension of racism that at least needs to be mentioned, and that is traditionally associated with a more 'macro' approach to racism: *institutional* racism. That is, dominant groups usually do not exercise their power only at the level of personal interaction, but tend to *organize* their domination. One of the classical ways to institutionalize racism is by explicit racist laws, as we know them from the Jim Crow segregation laws in the USA or the apartheid laws in South Africa. Today, the State and its institutions have more subtle ways to differentiate, segregate and discriminate against immigrants or minorities. Contemporary legal restrictions to immigration are the more obvious forms of treating Others differently: by trying to keep them Out in the first place.

Politics

But there are many other ways in which discriminatory practices and beliefs are organized and institutionalized so as to more effectively maintain the balance

of power in favor of the white, dominant majority (and sometimes the white minority). One way is through political organization, for instance through racist parties. Even if these parties thus far do not constitute a majority in contemporary Europe, they sometimes form coalitions with other conservative parties, as was the case in Italy and Austria. Or they are able to influence mainstream parties to adopt racist ideas and policies, as was the case in the Netherlands, Denmark and France. That such parties are generally not prohibited, although their programs are racist and hence unconstitutional, is a further indication that somehow they are found politically useful, for instance as the target of negative comparison and ridicule by mainstream parties and organizations: *We* are not racist, because *They* are. Despite the sometimes virulent and explicit – and hence easily recognizable – racism of such extremist parties, their political influence is much less important than that of the somewhat more mitigated negative attitudes of mainstream parties about immigrants or minorities. The latter ones are at the basis of real policies and institutional practices and define the everyday lives of immigrants and minorities (for studies of political racism, see, e.g., Ansell 1997; Billig 1978, 1995; Fysh & Wolfreys 1998; Goldberg 2002; Lauren 1988; Miles 1978; Solomos 1993; Ter Wal 1997; Van der Valk 2002; Wodak, Nowak, Pelikan, Gruber, De Cillia, & Mitten 1990).

The media

The major and most influential forms of institutionalized racism today, however, are to be found in the mass media. Research in many countries has shown time and again that the mass media are the main source of racist beliefs. This does not mean that all articles of all newspapers are blatantly racist. Many tabloids, with millions of readers, are often openly racist and nationalist, as is the case for most tabloids in the UK and some in Germany. But the quality newspapers, and not only on the right, are also part of the problem. They barely hire minority journalists, so that the newsroom and hence the routines of news gathering and writing remain dominantly white. This means that the selection of topics, issues, sources and citations is seriously biased in favor of the dominant white (and male, and elite) group.

It should come as no surprise that stereotypes and prejudices repeatedly find their way in the media, sometimes more blatantly, sometimes more subtly. The everyday lives and concerns of minorities are seldom covered. Their negative acts, and especially crime and drugs, are enhanced, whereas their major contributions to culture and society – except in sports and entertainment – tend to be ignored or belittled. Research shows that white people's everyday

beliefs about immigrants or minorities are not usually based on daily experiences, but on the mass media. This also means that much 'popular' racism does not have a popular source at all, but is reproduced from various kinds of elite racism, e.g., as preformulated by politicians or commentators (see the following studies for detail: Chávez 2001; Cottle 2000; Hartmann & Husband 1974; Jäger & Link 1993; Ruhrmann 1995; Smitherman-Donaldson & Van Dijk 1987; Ter Wal 2002; Van Dijk 1991).

Education and research

Finally, institutional racism is implemented in schools and universities, in lessons and textbooks, in assignments and research projects. Although schools have much freedom to implement multicultural aims and values, and official curricula may have been formulated in such a way, the practice of everyday schooling is to impart not only the dominant social ideologies in general, but also the dominant ideologies of gender and race in particular. Besides the influence of parents, friends and TV, thus, white kids learn to be racist at school, through the myriads of biased children stories and textbooks (see, e.g., Blondin 1990; Klein 1985; Preiswerk 1980; Troyna 1993; Van Dijk 1987b). The upshot of most lessons in textbooks and of most children stories is that 'we' (whites, Europeans) are more advanced, modern, smart, etc. than the Others, that is, the minorities in 'our' own countries, as well as the peoples in the Third World. Although the old racist ideology of white superiority is no longer explicitly formulated, there are many implicit, indirect or mitigated ways in which such alleged supremacy is being conveyed to children. Besides this familiar form of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, we also find many stereotypes, by which countries, peoples or large social groups are characterized with a few standard lines.

At a more sophisticated level, similar remarks may be made for research and scholarship – areas that should be the first to critically analyze, to unlearn and to oppose racism. Nothing is less true, however. The very core notions of racism and white superiority have been 'invented' by the various sciences over the last centuries. Until today we find sometimes respected scholars engage in research that is more carried out to confirm racist prejudices about white supremacy, than to critically examine cultural group differences and similarities. Much research on racism has been vilified by mainstream scholars as being too 'political', and the denial of racism in science and scholarship is as prevalent as it is in politics and the media. Although today blatantly scientific racism has become rare after its heyday before the 2nd World War, we still have a long

way to go to arrive at a predominant and active form of antiracist scholarship (among the many studies of racism in science and scholarship, see, e.g., Barkan 1992; Chase 1975; Haghighat 1988; Hutton 1999).

Institutional racism does not imply that there is an official 'racist' policy in these institutions. On the contrary, officially antiracism might be the norm. Nor is there an elite conspiracy of dominant groups to maintain the major institutions under 'racial' control. It suffices that a 'reasonable' consensus about immigrants, minority or ethnic 'problems' be reached implicitly, and politicians, journalists and teachers will then basically say similar things. And what has been said of political, media or educational institutions, may also be formulated for business enterprises, the police, the courts, or other institutions.

Racism as racist beliefs

Besides the social dimension of racism as it manifests itself in everyday interaction and institutions, racism also has a 'sociocognitive' dimension. Prejudices, stereotypes and racist ideologies are the well-known forms beliefs may take when dominant groups mentally represent the Others in negative terms (among the vast amount of books on racist stereotypes, prejudices and ideologies, see, e.g., Apostle, Glock, Piazza, & Suelze 1983; Dovidio & Gaertner 1986; Hamilton 1981; Pettigrew 1982; Pickering 2001; Van Dijk 1984, 1987a, 1998).

Social practices and these socially shared beliefs are closely related. Depending on context, we tend to treat people more negatively when we think about them negatively: prejudices are at the root of discrimination.

These negative 'social representations' (Moscovici 2001) about non-European people have a long history. Many go back to the earliest 'images' Europeans had about what they saw as 'barbarians' or 'primitives' from other countries and continents. Racist philosophies and sciences (sometimes conveniently called 'pseudo-sciences' today, but quite respectable in their own times), developed especially in the 19th century. We find remnants of such ideas in psychology and social science until today. 'Scientifically' legitimated imaginary differences between 'Us' and 'Them' have been used to enslave, exploit, discriminate, marginalize and kill Other peoples for centuries (see, e.g., Allen 1994; Barker 1978; Barkan 1992; Carnes & Tauss 1996; Delacampagne 1983; Gates 1997; Geiss 1993; Gossett 1997; Mosse 1993).

Racism is unthinkable without this sociocognitive basis of racist beliefs. One of the classical propositions of these racist ideologies was the alleged superiority of white Europeans in a global color or 'race' hierarchy in which they

invariably came out on top, black Africans at the bottom, and 'yellow' Asians in the middle. Today, such ideological propositions might not focus so much on general superiority and supremacy, especially because such notions are blatantly used by right-wing extremists with whom 'we' do not want to identify ourselves either. Rather, mainstream racist ideologies today are framed in terms of cultural differences, or in terms of priorities. 'We' have priority in the country, city or company, because we were 'first' and this is 'our' country. This also suggests why racism often also has a nationalist dimension, as we also see in the slogan of the racist Front National in France: *Les français d'abord!* ('The French First!').

Although discriminatory practices are based on polarized racist beliefs about ingroups (Us) and outgroups (Them), this does not mean that such practices are *determined* by them. People have the freedom and the ability *not* to act upon their beliefs. If rules, conventions or the law require it, they have learned to refrain from hurting others, whatever their beliefs about others. This is also one of the reasons why the struggle against racism should also take place at the legal level: Groups may gradually change their (racist, sexist) ideologies when the law forces them to act in accordance with another (antiracist, antisexist) ideology.

It is important to stress that prejudices are 'nothing personal'. They are not some characteristic of people's 'personality'. Because racism is a social system of dominance of one group over other groups, also the beliefs that sustain such power abuse must be social, and shared among the members of dominant groups. That people often adopt the prejudices of the group of which they are members, does not mean that this is always the case for all group members. Thus, we have feminist men, and antiracist white people. In other words, it is not 'essential' or 'inherent' for white people to have racist beliefs. But it takes some effort to avoid accepting beliefs one has learned sinced one was a child, from children books, textbooks, television, newspapers or conversation with family members and friends.

We shall see below that racist beliefs are largely acquired through discourse. And since racist discrimination is based on racist beliefs, it is obvious that discourse is at the root of the reproduction of racism.

It is sometimes argued that racist (or sexist) prejudices are not (only) cognitive but also 'emotional'. This is one of the reasons why sometimes terms are used such as 'hate crimes' and 'hate speech' (Able 2000; Flint 2004; Whillock & Slayden 1995). However, there are several arguments against this 'emotional' analysis of prejudice. First of all, prejudices are socially shared and defined only for groups. If emotions are (also) defined in terms of physiological arousal,

groups *as such* cannot have emotions – only group *members* as individuals with a body. If many people in Europe are said to 'hate' immigrants, this means that they share a (very) negative *evaluation* about them, not that they are in a permanent state of emotional arousal. What *does* happen is that *in some situation* individual group members may get angry about immigration or about something an immigrant has done, and such an emotion may be based on (shared) social prejudices. In other words, racist emotions are subjective, personal, ad hoc and contextual. But they may be triggered by the application of socially shared racist prejudices – negative evaluations – in concrete situations. Reducing racist prejudice to emotions, or explaining them in terms of emotions, implies an individualist mitigation or excuse of prejudices – as something that is typical of 'bigoted' personalities or due to 'primitive' impulses we cannot repress. Most racist crimes in society, especially the institutional ones, are being committed as a matter of routine, and without any specific emotions. The practices of everyday racism are nothing personal, and seldom emotional.

We see that also in the theory of racism it makes sense to distinguish between a social or intersubjective level of analysis, and a personal or subjective level. The first is about groups, the second about individual group members. This allows us to make general statements about domination and prejudice for whole groups, but still allow for personal variation in the ways such domination and prejudice are being exercised *or challenged* by group members.

In this way we can also explain *changes* in the dominant systems of racist practices and beliefs: Influential individuals or subgroups may oppose the consensus of their group or community, and act in solidarity with dominated groups. Both the women's movement and the civil rights movement are well-known examples of succesful resistance that required the role of change agents among the political, media and other elites of the dominant group.

Racism as discourse

The brief account of racism provided above already shows how much discourse is involved in its reproduction. We all learn to be racist (or antiracist) through children's literature, movies, TV programs, textbooks, conversations with friends, news reports and opinion articles, and so on. The dominant white group's knowledge about minorities, immigrants, refugees and in general the Others is often quite limited, and seldom based on concrete everyday experiences, except in some countries of Latin America and in some regions and cities in the USA, Canada and Europe. What people know about other groups, other

peoples and the 'world', they largely know from the media. The same is true for their evaluative beliefs. It was already argued above that popular opinions are often preformulated by elites who have preferential access to the media. In sum, discourse plays a fundamental role in the formation of racist beliefs and in the discriminatory practices based on such beliefs. Not only is discourse the main source of our belief formation about Others, discriminatory discourse is itself a form of racist practice (for detail, see Blommaert & Verschueren 1998; Jäger 1992, 1998; Matouschek, Januschek, & Wodak 1995; Reisigl & Wodak 2000, 2001; Van Dijk 1984, 1987a, 1991, 1993; Wetherell & Potter 1992; Wodak 1996; Wodak & Matouschek 1993; Wodak & Reisigl 2000; Wodak & Van Dijk 2000).

In this book, as well as I my earlier work, I show *how* exactly discourse is involved in the reproduction of racism. I define racism as a form of domination, and domination as power abuse, for instance by unequal access to social resources. Access to public discourse is one of these resources. Thus, the elites who control the most important forms of public discourse, such as the politicians, journalists and professors, bear most responsibility for the ways the public discourses they control contribute to the reproduction of racist beliefs. Much popular discourse on race and immigration is based on or derived from such elite discourse, especially if such discourse is found consistent with own interests – such as priority on the job or in housing.

Systematic research on parliamentary debates, party programs, textbooks, lessons, news and opinion articles, and so on, has shown that the institutionally based public discourse of the elites indeed preformulates many of the prejudices we find in society at large. Explicitly antiracist politicians, journalists or professors are rather exceptional, and may be marginalized as well – as 'traitors' of their 'own' group.

Thus, at many levels of text and talk we find the familiar polarization between 'Us' and 'Them', where our good things tend to be emphasized, and our bad things (like racism) de-emphasized – and the converse for the Others, whose bad things are stressed, and whose good things ignored. This may happen in the contents and layout of headlines, in the choice of topics (often on crime, drugs, violence etc.), the lexicalization of concepts ('welfare mothers'), the selection of 'reliable' sources (mostly people like 'us'), the arguments, and the rhetorical enhancement of what is being reported. We find it in small things like pronouns; in active or passive sentences that emphasize of de-emphasize bad or good actions we or they are actively or passively engaged in; in metaphors (like 'invasion' for 'immigration') and so on. We see it in the predominant pictures of (good, brave, etc.) white people in textbooks, in the ways minority students are addressed or not in textbooks, and so on.

All these discourse properties of racist representation daily contribute to the formation of feelings and stereotypes among the dominant ingroup. It is in this way that our 'racial' attitudes and ideologies are formed and changed. Of course, again, this is not a process of passive inculcation, but part of a *construction* of shared social representations, in which also the readers or viewers take more or less active part.

In the same way as domination is not total, because power and power abuse are not, also racist discourses may be ambiguous, as we know from disclaimers such as "I am not a racist, but…". These standard formulas of racist discourse may show awareness of the antiracist norm but as a form of positive self-presentation, and combined with a negative statement about others. Similarly, at the level of the dominant group or its various elite groups, we may find more or less subtly racist discourse, but also antiracist text and talk. That is, if racism is reproduced by elite discourse, so is antiracism. We shall see in the rest of this book that also in Spain and Latin America discourses may have different functions and ambiguous forms and thus display contradictory social beliefs.

Conclusion

Much of what has been said about racism in Europe and North America also applies to racism in Spain and Latin America, as we shall see in the following chapters. However, we shall also find some differences, most clearly so in Latin America.

Thus, whereas Spain increasingly shows to be one of the countries of the European Union, unfortunately also when it comes to everyday racism, we also find that some forms of institutional racism as they exist elsewhere in Europe are as yet less developed, for instance in the form of explicitly racist parties and media.

The situation in Latin America generally exhibits what we have said about European ('white') racism, but also has a much more complex, ethnic and social basis. White Europeans settled on lands of indigenous people: they were the immigrants, but took not only the lands, but also the power – until today. Africans did not go to Latin America out of their own free will, as they are traveling to Europe and North America today (but pressed by miserable economic and political situations that are hardly only of their own making), but were forcefully brought there and sold as slaves. Thus, racism against indigenous and African peoples in Latin America has another social, economic and political history, in which whites for a long time where the dominant minority. Today,

racism in Latin America is also a system of domination and power abuse, in which 'racial', 'ethnic' and 'class' dimensions come together in many forms of inequality in which not only the direct white descendants of Europeans are involved, but also large parts of the mestizo population, both as agents and patients of discrimination and prejudice.

Whatever the more specific and diverse forms of racism in Latin American countries, the main principles of racism as sketched above also hold here, as we shall see in more detail in the following chapters. Also in Latin America, racism is a form of domination, of power abuse, largely by a dominant class of white(r) people, and against indigenous people or against people or African descent. Also in Latin America, such racism is manifest in the many forms of everyday discrimination sketched above, further exacerbated by poverty and class domination. And also in Latin America, prejudices and racist ideologies hold sway and are expressed in the many daily forms of public discourse. While emphasizing the specifics and particularities of each country, thus, our analysis of racism and discourse in Latin America will largely follow the outline of what we have found in Europe and North America, and basically for one major reason: that those who engage in it are of European origin, and those who are the main targets are of non-European origin. It is this form of European 'identity', even when redefined as 'Latin' identity, that is behind the racist ideologies and everyday beliefs and practices of ethnic inequality, marginalization and oppression in Latin America from the times of colonial empire until today.

Chapter 2

Elite discourse and racism in Spain

Historical contexts

Present-day racisms in Spain are not just new phenomena that should only be studied in the larger framework of European reactions against post-war immigration from the South. One of these racisms derives some of its properties from a historical consciousness of being the Southern rampart protecting Fortress Europe against Arab or Muslim 'invasions'. This makes anti-Arab racism in Spain different from more recent anti-African racism or the racism against immigrants from Latin America.

Yet, there are also historical structures and processes that explain the coherence of the various contemporary racisms in Spain and Europe. It is no coincidence that many of these processes go back to 16th century Spain, when intolerant Catholicism, colonial conquest, and Reconquista mutually influenced and reinforced each other in the incipient Spanish and European domination and marginalization of Arabs, Jews, Gitanos, American Indians, and sub-Saharan Africans, as well as their descendants in the Americas.

A fully fledged historical account of these various racisms in Spain is beyond the scope of this book. Let us recall however that only a few years ago Spain celebrated not only the 500th anniversary of Columbus's 'discovery' of the Americas – an event that at the same time formed the basis of racism in Latin America to be dealt in the next chapter – but also the 500th anniversary of the expulsion of the '*Moros*'[1] from Spain when the Reyes Católicos took Granada, the last Arab stronghold after seven centuries of occupation of the peninsula.

The crucial year 1492 thus at the same time constitutes the end and the beginning of an era of close encounters with ethnic or 'racial' Others that have a lasting influence on Spain's collective consciousness. Centuries of Spanish colonialism not only left their mark on the racist attitudes of settlers and their descendants towards the indigenous population and the enslaved Africans in the Americas, but also an indelible feeling of racial superiority in Spain itself. As we shall discover for many of the contemporary manifestations of elite

discourse and racism in Spain, it is also in this way that Spain is hardly different from the other colonial powers in Europe, that is, from England, the Netherlands, Portugal and France.

There is another historical dimension to contemporary racism in Spain that needs to be emphasized, namely that directed against the Romaní ('gypsies'), called *Gitanos* and *Gitanas* in Spain. Different from the other European colonial powers, the Spanish not only have a vivid collective memory of Arab conquest and cultural domination, whose influence are apparent in language, literature, the arts and architecture until today, a heritage that is rather extensively described in Spanish textbooks. At the same time, and especially in the same region last left by the Arabs, Andalusia, the Spanish exercised their dominance over the Romaní people arriving from Eastern Europe, the Middle East and India since the 15th century. Although current attention and public opinion is predominantly focused on contemporary immigrants from other continents, it should be stressed that, also since 1492 and through the centuries, prejudice and discrimination in Spain has mainly targeted the Gitanos and Gitanas (see, e.g., San Roman 1986; Calvo Buezas 1990). That such marginalization and discrimination continues until today is also shown in the last report of S.O.S. Racismo (2004: Ch. 2).

And finally, a third major historical event marks the history of ethnic relations in Spain, namely the marginalization, persecution and expulsion of the Jews. As is also obvious for the Spanish brand of colonialism and racism in the Americas, Catholicism would become not only the dominant religion both in the Peninsula as well as in Latin America, but also the basis for the judgment of the Others. Thus, the Amerindians were not just seen as 'racially' different, but primarily also defined as heathens, and hence as inferior. Similar religious criteria controlled the attitudes towards Arabs and Jews, whose different religions were seen to be inconsistent with dominant Catholicism, despite relatively peaceful co-existence during Arab domination.

Thus, as from the early 15th century, and especially since the establishment of the Inquisition in 1480 (Netanyahu 2001), the Sephardic Jews were forced to convert or to flee. Many went to Greece, Turkey, North Africa, Portugal and Northern Europe. Despite the initial prohibition to settle in the colonies, others went to the Americas. There they would join the Ashkenazim, the Jews coming from Eastern Europe, and with them they variously enjoyed the religious freedom and suffered the persecution that these other countries and continents would prepare them. Some Jews remained in Spain, usually living in a hostile environment of people afraid to be 'contaminated' by Jewish 'blood'. A well-

known example are what are called the '*Marranos*' or '*Chuetas*' in Mallorca (Porcel 1986).

Although contemporary anti-Semitism in Spain has become as politically incorrect as elsewhere in Western-Europe, it should be reminded that it is by no means extinct and historically related to religious intolerance and other forms of ethnic dominance in Spain (Álvarez Chillida 2002). The remaining forms of anti-Semitism in Latin America are the legacy of those hostile prejudices against the Jews in the colonial metropolis – and elsewhere in Europe – itself (Elkin 1998).

It is impossible to summarize 500 years of racism in a few paragraphs without simplification and leaving out important events. The few remarks made above therefore only serve to emphasize the important historical backdrop of many of the contemporary racisms in both Spain and Latin America.

Contemporary immigration and racism in Spain

In contemporary public discourse on the Others in Spain, Gitanos and Gitanas have largely been replaced by new immigrants from Latin America, Asia and especially Africa. Although the vast majority of immigrants arrive by airplane, no day passes without extensive media coverage of how many new immigrants (successfully or unsuccessfully) tried to enter the country in the dangerous little boats (*pateras*) that cross over from Morocco to the Southern tip of Spain or the Canary Islands – and about how many died in the process. Of course, no official statistics exist for the undocumented immigrants who managed to enter the country without being caught by the police, but it may safely be inferred from the numbers reported by the police and the press that thousands of these '*sin papeles*' (undocumented immigrants; literally: 'without papers') are able to enter the country each year, joining the tens of thousand of regular immigrants that annually arrive in Spain.

The official statistics show that at the end of June 2004 there were between 2.5 and 3 million foreigners in Spain, of which 1,776,953 had a residence permit (Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjería). The number of people '*sin papeles*' was probably more than one million in 2004. The largest groups are from Europe (36%), Latin America (32%) and Africa (25%). By nationality, most immigrants are from Morocco (more than 350,000), followed at some distance by Ecuadorians (some 190,000) and Colombians (more than 120,000). Also many tens of thousands EU nationals live in Spain, especially the British with more than 100,000, as well as Germans and Italians (some 70,000). About

90% of the immigrants live in Catalonia and Madrid (about 300,000 each), followed by Andalucia, Valencia and the Balear islands. Of the EU countries Spain receives by far the most immigrants. The majority (about 55%) of the immigrants are men, but from Latin America there are more women than men who come to live in Spain.

As is also the case for the other chapters of this book, it is not my aim to provide details on the rapidly changing numbers of immigrants, on the places where they reside, their motivations to leave their countries, or the kind of work they do; for these data we refer to specialized studies (e.g., Izquierdo 1996; Pajares 1998; Colectivo Ioé 2000; Ruiz Olabuénaga et al. 1999; López et al. 1993; as well as the annual foreigner statistics of the Ministry of the Interior). Compared to other Western European countries, the percentage of immigrants is still quite low (about 7% in the country as a whole, but reaching some 10% in cities such as Madrid and Barcelona).

Although as suggested (but often forgotten in Spain) most immigrants, especially from the Americas, arrive by air via Madrid-Barajas airport, the plight of irregular newcomers from Africa deserves special mention. Once they have survived the ordeal of their sometimes months-long voyage, and once they have managed to enter the country, their problems are far from over. Often they are broke, also because of the unscrupulous mafia that took advantage of them during their travel to Spain. If they want to survive they need to get a job immediately. Little imagination is needed to know that this invites large-scale exploitation by employers, from the hothouses and the fields in the South to construction, hotels and domestic service elsewhere in the country. With the worst possible housing (if any), without services, social security, sick leave or any other benefits, these undocumented immigrants barely survive. And on top of such social and economic misery they finally are often subjected to more or less blatant everyday racism by the original population, as well as police harassment. Those who get caught by the police and are not immediately expelled may be interned for months in centers that have been internationally criticized, e.g., by Amnesty, for their terrible conditions of detention (apart from personal testimonies of immigrants, see also the report by S.O.S. Racismo 2004: Chs. 5, 7 and 8).

It will become clear below that also in this respect Spain has become just like other countries in Europe. Until its demise in the 2004 elections, this development was further exacerbated by the conservative government presided by Aznar, who in 2002 took the European lead in the right-wing backlash against immigration. (For details about the experiences of immigrants in Spain, see,

e.g., Manzanos Bilbao 1999; see also the recent study on the integration of minorities by Garreta Bochaca 2003.)

Sometimes, racism in Spain may even take virulent popular forms, as was the case in early 2000 in the community of El Ejido (Almería),[2] where the local population engaged in a pogrom against the foreign workers after a local woman was murdered by a mentally deranged immigrant. With the support of its blatantly racist mayor, Juan Enciso, the original population of this fastly growing agricultural center destroyed the few shelters and belongings of the immigrants, chasing and beating them up, while the police did virtually nothing to protect them. And since anti-foreigner policies are as popular here as elsewhere in Europe, the Popular Party in power did nothing to disown the racist mayor who is a member of their party, and whose elite power contributed to and legitimated the outbreak of the vigilante attacks against the immigrants. Few recent events in Spain more explicitly illustrate one of the main theses of this book about the role of the elites in the reproduction of racism (for details about the events in El Ejido, see, e.g., Checa 2001; S.O.S. Racismo 2001, 2002; Martínez Veiga 1997).

Fortunately, ethnic relations in Spain are not usually that violent. But although everyday racism may often be less visible, its consequence for the lives of immigrants may be no less serious. This may especially show in bureaucratic hassles about papers, getting or keeping jobs, promotions, housing, welfare, treatment of children at school.

Especially notorious is the endless red tape of the process of the recognition of foreign diplomas (*homologación*). Such bureaucratic harassment in higher education specifically jeopardizes many students from Latin America. These may have to wait years before their diplomas are being recognized – or not – often with arbitrary arguments or with absurd requirements of irrelevant additional exams that must be done in Spain. This is not just a matter of bureaucracy but also of racism when (of course implicitly or unofficially) racist or eurocentric prejudices and arguments are used by professors who think that Spanish programs and diplomas are more valuable than Latin American ones, even when awarded by prominent research institutions such as the Caro y Cuervo linguistics institute in Bogotá. Without the recognition of their diplomas, foreign students and professionals (as well as Spanish students who received their diplomas abroad) cannot exercise their profession in Spain. Bureaucracy and racism thus effectively protect the Spanish elite labor market against foreign specialists.

Thus, in general we witness problematizing and marginalizing behavior both by the institutions, bureaucrats, the police, employers as well as ordinary

citizens (S.O.S. Racismo 2004: Ch. 8). Thus, as suggested above, there are few surprises when we compare Spain with other countries in Europe. Also the yearly Eurobarometer survey shows that Spain in many respects has become a EU member like the others. Although attitudes as expressed in these surveys may be somewhat less negative than elsewhere, they are still hardly friendly about immigrants (in autumn 2003 more than 20% of Spanish citizens – and more than 30% in Catalonia – listed immigration as a problem, comparable to the preoccupation about unemployment).

One of the differences with other EU countries might be that opinions as expressed in Spain may be more politically correct than in other European countries, where more and more people openly recognize that they are racists. As also the anti-immigration policies of the previous conservative Spanish government showed, attitudes and practices towards immigrants change rapidly, and popular racism closely follows its preformulation by the political elites.

Elite racism

After this very general historical and contemporary sketch of racism in Spain, the rest of this chapter will focus on various types of elite discourse and racism. I shall begin with a few general remarks on elite racism in Spain and then examine some examples from the few areas about which we have research results and discourse data, especially politics and the media.

When dealing with elite racism in Spain, the first observation that should be made is that, unlike in most other countries in Western Europe, Spain has no extremist right-wing, racist party represented in parliament. This means that within parliament there is no official legitimization of explicitly racist discourse or other social practices. It may be assumed that this has a decisive influence on popular attitudes. It is true, as it is in the United Kingdom, that Spain might not need a racist party when the Partido Popular (PP), the conservative party, offers enough ideological bandwidth to include a very broad range of anti-foreigner opinions. It should not be forgotten that the PP also houses at least some of the legacy of the Falangist party that for decades sustained the dictatorship of Franco.

There is a small party at the extreme right, Democracia Nacional, which on its homepage carries the racist slogan '*Los Españoles Primero*' ('Spanish First'), just like the slogan '*Les français d'abord*' of the Front National in France. They not only celebrate nationalist heroes (El Cid) and events, but also organize the presentation of racist books against immigration such as *The Black Book of Immigration* by León Klein (2003). As is the case for my other work on discourse

and racism, I shall however not deal with the extreme right. Its racism is loud and clear and for all to see, and as such has only marginal and indirect influence *as long as the mainstream parties do not adopt their ideologies and carry out its policy recommendations*. The problem is often that this right-wing racism is the 'official' racism in the country, and officially denounced as such, thereby implying that there is no racism elsewhere in society. Also for Spain, it is crucial to focus on the more indirect and subtle racisms of mainstream parties, organizations and groups. They set and execute policies and dominate elite discourse on immigration and minorities. Without ignoring right-wing propaganda and aggression, especially in local conflicts, it should be emphasized that it is especially from these official discourses, policies and practices that immigrants and minorities suffer most.

In 2001 this became especially clear in the new immigration law (*Ley de Extranjería*, 8/2000) of the Partido Popular. This law abolished the many positive elements of the broadly supported previous law (4/2000), adopted just a few months earlier, but never implemented. Thus, immigrants lost some essential rights, such as medical, legal or educational care or benefits. Disregarding the protests of the socialist and other opposition parties, immigrant organizations and others, the PP simply used its new parliamentary majority to impose the law – although its actual implementation (including expulsion of undocumented immigrants) is less harsh than feared. The Tribunal Supremo however annulled 11 provisions of the law, after which the PP compromised with the PSOE in a new foreigner law (14/03), thus making the socialist "accomplices of an antidemocratic and xenophobic law" as S.O.S. Racismo formulates it (S.O.S. Racismo 2004: 75; see also the commentary by Carlos Jiménez Villarejo, in the same report, pp. 93–100).

In other words, in the political realm of the elites, there is apparently a majority of people who favor immigration restrictions and curbing human rights of immigrants. Also, it should be recalled here that the earlier *Ley de Extranjería* of the socialist government, was not exactly friendly for immigrants either. The current socialist government led by Zapatero has taken some measures to regularize undocumented workers who can prove that they have been in the country for more then 6 months. It remains to be seen, however, whether all employers are willing to cooperate in getting papers for their foreign workers – especially since that would mean they have to pay social security. As was also the case in France and the UK, social democratic governments, when in power, do not usually have much more liberal immigration laws. Moreover, national immigration laws are increasingly coordinated with rather restrictive EU policies on immigration.

After the victories of the Right and the successes of the Extreme Right in the rest of Europe in 2002, most notably in Italy, France and the Netherlands, joining similar earlier developments in Denmark and Austria, former prime minister José María Aznar took the opportunity of Spain's chairmanship of the European Union to advocate increasingly more stringent policies against what he and his government consistently called 'illegal' immigration. At the same time, understanding the powerful influence of the theme of public safety on the population at large, Aznar and many other conservative politicians tried to gain more popular support by explicitly relating immigration with crime. A classic case of the preformulation of racism by the elites.

The fateful terrorist bomb attacks of March 11, 2004, in Madrid by Islamist extremists, killing 190 people on commuter trains, will undoubtedly contribute to the further association of Arab or Muslim immigration with terrorism. Before this event, which shocked the country, terrorism and insecurity was a major topic of preoccupation in Spain, but primarily associated with the Basque organization ETA, and not with immigration. It may be expected that the amalgamation of preoccupations about crime, security, terrorist violence and immigration will be furthered also in political discourse in Spain, as is already the case in other countries and at the international level. EU meetings and policies also usually combine the topics of crime and immigration.

Apart from the association of 'illegal' immigration and crime, the official political discourses that accompany immigration and integration policies are not generally explicitly racist. More in general, so far, dominant public discourse in Spain is fairly politically correct. When an occasional public figure makes a racist remark, many public figures and the media usually take critical distance. In other words, explicitly racist discourse in Spanish public life is (still) largely taboo, more so than for instance in France, Austria, Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands. Here explicitly racist parties are able to exercise much more influence, also on the media, especially when setting the terms of the public debate on immigration. This is a general tendency and, more indirectly and less publicly, there are many forms of the kind of elite racism we have found for other countries (Van Dijk 1993). Again, in this and many other respects, Spain has quickly developed and integrated within the EU, a development that in this respect has been very fast since 2000.

That elite racism and discourse in Spain still appear more mitigated than in some other countries in Europe might be explained by various factors. Probably the most influential of these factors is the very explicit democratization process that has taken place after the long period of authoritarian rule and oppression under Franco. More than in most other countries of the EU, right-

wing extremism is associated with that period, and hence definitely outside of the consensus. Where present, such extremism has been integrated into the conservative Popular Party. Since explicit racism is associated with the extreme right, for most of the political and other elites official racism is equally politically incorrect.

This is even more true for the main other societal areas of elite racism, such as the symbolic realms of the media, education, and research, where a strong leftist presence is usually incompatible with extremist racism. For instance, unlike in most other European countries, there are no right-wing, populist tabloids in Spain (note though that nearly all newspapers in Spain are of tabloid *format*). In the main elite newspapers one will not generally find explicitly racist articles, whereas more explicitly antiracist opinion articles are quite common. This does not mean, however, that the Spanish media play no role in the reproduction of racism, but only that they do not do so explicitly and systematically, as we shall examine in more detail below.

Let us now examine each of these elite domains and their discourses in some more detail.

Politics

It has already been suggested above that also because of the strong democratic reaction against the Franco regime and its heritage, the political landscape in Spain is not very polarized. Since there are no official racist parties at the national or the regional level, public slogans of right-wing parties (as with the Front National in France and other extremist parties in Europe) are virtually absent in Spain, except from small groups such as the Democracia Nacional, mentioned above.

But as suggested, this does not mean that more moderate forms of xenophobia or racism cannot be detected among (especially, but not exclusively) conservative politicians. The *Ley de Extranjería* and the government policies of the PP on irregular immigration are prime examples of this spirit of keeping Arab, Asian, African, and Latin-American foreigners out. As in other domains, also in the political domain we thus witness a principle of 'national preference' of which especially non-European immigrants are the victims. Another major aspect of political racism is the passive role of the State in the internationally mandated struggle against all forms of racism (for details of this and other aspects of political racism in Spain, see also Torrens 2002).

Although the most consequential forms of political racism are engaged in at the national level, that is, in Madrid, also some conservative politicians in the historic autonomous regions, such as Euskadi and Catalonia, may sometimes condone or flirt with xenophobic ideas. This is not only because these have wide currency in society and hence may attract votes, but also because for them they fit in a nationalist picture of autonomy in which assimilation of, if not resistance against, immigrants is a political tendency. Former Catalan leader Jordi Pujol, in his last major speech in Catalan Parliament, declared on October 2, 2002 immigration to be one of the most "problematic facts" of Catalonia of the last years. He insisted that it is a general problem for developed countries, but in Catalonia it has specific significance because immigration can affect 'our identity'. He then says:

(1) No podemos perder de vista que tiene que haber una cultura central de referencia, que es la que a través de los siglos hemos ido elaborando.
(*El País*, Oct. 3, 2002)

We cannot lose sight of the fact that a central culture of reference must exist, which is what we have been working on for centuries.

Two years later, in a lecture for the Catalan Summer School in August 2004, Pujol defended the integration of immigrants in Catalonia, but without "going as far as miscegenation", which would be the "end of Catalonia". Similar interventions of Pujol in 2004 basically repeated the same theme of the alien "threat" to Catalan language and culture. It appears from these interventions that maintaining national 'identity' is crucial for conservative Catalan nationalist leaders like Pujol. If an autonomous region or nation like Catalonia should have a 'central' or 'dominant' culture, this culture should be Catalan culture. Pujol and those who agree with such ideas conveniently forget that Catalan culture and identity are themselves shaped historically by many other cultures, as many critical commentators in the press also emphasized. In the future this undoubtedly will be the same, that is, Catalan culture will necessarily integrate the cultures of the many immigrants that will arrive in Catalonia, especially from Africa and Latin America, in the decades ahead. The new socialist government of Catalonia, led by Pasqual Maragall, insists on the Catalan identity of all those living in Catalonia, whatever their background, thus affirming the multicultural heritage of the nation.

Some 1990 statistics suggest that less than half of the people who vote for nationalist parties in Euskadi and Catalonia accept the thesis that foreigners should have the same rights as people from Spain, a thesis accepted by more

than two-thirds of those who vote for other parties (see also Colectivo Ioé 1995). Similarly, research suggests that voters of more radical autonomous-nationalist parties also tend to have less sympathy for Arabs, Blacks and Gitanos (see, e.g., Barbadillo Griñán 1997:60, 87ff.). This reaction against immigrants in the historic autonomous regions of Spain has a longer tradition, and also was directed against immigrants from other parts of Spain, especially from Andalusia (for details, for instance about Catalonia, see e.g., Solé 1981, 1982, 1988, 2001; see Aramburu Otazu 2002, and Bergalli 2001, for studies of the reactions to immigration by local residents in Barcelona). The same statistics suggest that these autonomous-nationalist tendencies are at the same time in line with voters of the conservative Partido Popular. Hence autonomous-nationalist and conservative attitudes about immigrants tend to be based on related ideologies, as they are both associated with nationalist values.

This resemblance may paradoxically be found in the two opposed forms of centralist and regional nationalisms in Spain, respectively. That is, we have on the one hand the official – and hence often tacit while presupposed – nationalism of the Spanish State, at present especially embodied by the conservative party, a nationalism that opposes any infringement on the unity of Spain. This centralist nationalism continues the Falangist tradition under Franco, who emphasized the unity of Spain, and who repressed any form of linguistic diversity and political autonomy of the nations of Euskadi or Catalonia. Given the current forms of regional autonomy, both the conservative and socialist parties at the national level oppose tendencies for more autonomy in Euskadi and Catalonia.

On the other hand we have the 'peripherical' nationalisms that may be found in the historic autonomous regions, especially those with their own language, such as Catalonia, Euskadi and Galicia. Especially the more radical conservative brands of both ideologies have the tendency to oppose multiculturalism, multilingualism, immigration or any other way 'national unity' or cultural or linguistic homogeneity are seen to be threatened.

Thus, for *some* conservative nationalists in the historic autonomous regions, too many immigrants might unbalance the delicate consensus of a system in which the autonomous project is dominant, for instance when it comes to teaching and using Catalan in Catalonia. Heribert Barrera, former president of the Catalan parliament, published a book with explicitly xenophobic remarks, declaring himself in agreement with right-wing Austrian politician Haider. In the same vein, Marta Ferrusola, wife of former Catalan president Jordi Pujol, in some public speeches expressed herself against immigrants, claiming to voice opinions that are widely shared – an intervention that was

only belatedly and weakly commented upon by her husband. We have just seen that Pujol himself is a proponent of the idea that Catalan culture and identity might be threatened by immigration.

That such ideas are not limited to regionalist nationalism, may be illustrated by the fact that Ana Botella, wife of former Prime Minister Aznar, in a speech in February 2003 in Medina del Campo, attributed the insecurity of citizens to the arrival of many immigrants – thus voicing a popular topic of the discourse of her husband (S.O.S. Racismo 2004: 251). It is not surprising that more than 58% of the Spanish thus link insecurity with immigration, as the 2003 barometer of the national sociological institute (CIS) reveals.

Despite these widely published explicit forms of what may be called 'regional ethnicism', it should be stressed that the peripherical nationalisms in Spain are not *inherently* racist. There are many nationalists in the autonomous regions, especially on the left, who are unconditionally multicultural and antiracist. For them, undoubtedly, exclusive racism and anti-multiculturalism are regarded as an abuse of the nationalist or autonomous projects.

But also for them, and as was the case on the occasion of earlier immigration from other parts of Spain, current immigration from other countries makes teaching and maintaining the own (minority) language and culture a permanent challenge. This is especially true because of the permanent competition with nationally dominant and internationally prominent Castilian Spanish (after English and Chinese, Spanish is the language most spoken in the world), reinforced especially by immigration from Spanish speaking immigrants from Latin America. The processes of globalization, in which the influence of English and Spanish will only grow, for instance in universities, research and teaching via the internet, of course are not forces that will favor the use of for instance Catalan beyond the local context.

In other words, the many kinds of nationalism in Spain have equally many ways of reacting to immigration, multiculturalism and integration, with subtle differences and variations that cannot be fully analyzed in this chapter.

That is, whereas superficially all seems quite well in Spain, one sometimes barely needs to scratch the surface in order to be confronted with forms of elite racism that are all too familiar in the rest of Europe, and that in some cases are also closely related to nationalist tendencies to 'be among one's own', and which therefore are barely in favor of multiculturalism.

By way of illustration of the political discourse on immigration, let us examine in some detail official Spanish political discourse as it is being manifested in parliament (see also Van Dijk 1993: Ch. 1). General background for this study of parliamentary discourse is provided by the "Racism at the Top"

study of an international team about the ways immigration and minorities are being discussed in the parliaments of seven EU countries (Wodak & van Dijk 2000). Part of that joint project is a contribution by Martín Rojo (2000) about Spanish parliamentary discourse. In this chapter, she analyses 4 parliamentary debates held in 1997, all about various immigration issues (interestingly, she did not find any debates on Gitanos/Gitanas).

In general, Martín Rojo observes, these debates are held in committees and not in the plenary sessions of the Cortes. Typically, the conservative perspective on these issues, represented by the then Minister of the Interior, Mayor Oreja, is predominantly one of policing and controlling the 'flow' of 'illegals', whereas the progressive view is rather a socio-political one, focusing especially on solidarity with immigrants and their miserable social status. The socialist party (PSOE) takes an intermediary position, also because they were responsible for the earlier *Ley de Extranjería*. Interestingly, and reminiscent of a similar topic used in earlier Italian parliamentary debates on immigration, one of the topics of these debates is the history of Spanish emigrants. This topic is used as an argument in favor of solidarity with the current immigrants, and hence should be analyzed as a typical example of an antiracist topos:

(2) (España) es un país que sabe perfectamente de lo que estamos hablando, una sociedad que ha sufrido en sus carnes la realidad de abrirse camino en países extranjeros. (Meyer-Pleite, IU, p. 5200, 24-9-1997).

(*Spain*) *is a country that knows perfectly well what we are talking about, a society that has felt for itself the reality of finding its own way in other countries.*

On the right, Mayor Oreja of the Partido Popular prefers to speak on the ways Spain and hence Europe should be protected against the 'invasion' from the South. This means that much conservative political discourse on immigration is in fact law and order discourse, in which immigrants are seen as a threat. Take for instance the following fragment of a speech of the then interior minister Mayor Oreja on the protection of the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa:

(3) La carretera denominada Melilla 300, que se construyó a lo largo de la frontera con el complemento de una pista de sensores y un complejo sistema de cámaras de televisión, alumbrado y megafonía, así como un puesto de control para todos los sistemas; supuso un gasto, ya realizado de 2.074 millones de pesetas (...). En la actualidad se están realizando obras en Ceuta para conseguir impermeabilizar la frontera e impedir el

paso de personas y mercancías de carácter ilegal.
(Mayor Oreja, PP, 10716-17; 18-12-97)

Melilla's Highway 300, which was constructed along the border with the added extras of a sensor track, a complex network of television cameras, lighting and sound systems and control posts for all, represents a cost of 2,074 million pesetas (*over 12 million Euros*) (. . .) *Work is currently being carried out in Ceuta to prevent illegal persons and merchandise from crossing the border by making the border impenetrable.*

Another topic that Martín Rojo finds in conservative political discourse is the issue of the smugglers of immigrants, a topic that easily lends itself to the association of immigration with illegal activities, thereby again blaming the victims, as in the following rather incoherent statement:

(4) Los responsables de estas muertes son los que trafican con la vida de esas personas, fundamentalmente, y los que están organizando ese tráfico ilegal de personas y, desde luego, el Gobierno de España hará todo lo que tenga que hacer. (Arenas Bocanegra, PP, p. 5203, 24-09-1997)

The responsible parties for these deaths are essentially those who do business with the lives of these people and who organize this illegal 'person trade' – And of course the Spanish Government will do everything it needs to do.

Martín Rojo concludes from her analysis that despite this focus on policing and associating immigration with illegality at that time also conservative discourse was not explicitly racist. The PP takes care not to formulate positions that could be associated with the Falangist past of some of its founders and members, so as to make sure that its positions cannot be associated with racism. Measures of immigration control are explicitly related to the immigration law adopted by the socialist party (PSOE) years ago. In political discourse even the otherwise usual metaphors of threatening water, such as 'avalanche' or 'wave' are hardly used, and the much less negative 'flow' (*flujo*) is used instead, both on the right as well as on the left. More generally, also the lexicalization of the Others is moderate, in the sense that the most frequent words used are 'immigrant', 'foreigners', 'persons', and even 'citizens', apart from designating de countries where the immigrants come from. In such cases the evaluation typically hides in the chosen adjectives, most notably in the widespread but controversial use of 'illegal'. And when immigrants are represented as involved in action, they are rather portrayed as passive actors or victims, as we have also seen for discourse on immigrants in other countries (for details, see Martín Rojo 2000).

As I make clear in other parts of this chapter, however, current developments of official political discourse in Spain on immigration, fortified by the increasing conservative backlash in Europe after 2000, might well mean a significant rupture with the moderate tendencies found by Martín Rojo for the 1990s (see also Grad & Martín Rojo 2003; Martín Rojo 2000a). As is also signaled by the media and other observers, the absolute majority of the Partido Popular between 2000 and 2004 has led to arrogant abuse of power in all political domains, also in the field of immigration policies.

In an earlier article, Martín Rojo and van Dijk (1997) examined in some detail a speech by interior minister Mayor Oreja in Spanish parliament in which he legitimizes the expulsion in July 1996 of 103 Africans by airplane, some of whom were administered a drug to keep them calm. The overall strategy of Mayor Oreja is to emphasize that the expulsion, as well as the methods used by the police, were all legal, and a natural consequence of the socialist immigration law. We showed that such discursive legitimization of expulsion has three basic dimensions: (a) a semantic strategy of 'truth': our representation of the 'facts' is the correct one, and that of our opponents is therefore 'false'; (b) a pragmatic one of justification: what we did was justified in terms of such and such norms or laws; and (c) a social-political one of power and authority: our discourse is legitimate and credible because of our position as minister and member of government. At the same time, this legitimization implies a confirmation of the moral order of Spanish society. Obviously, these aspects of legitimization at the same time imply a *de*-legitimization of the (socialist) opposition, the media, the NGO's and other critics of the expulsion.

It needs little argumentation and illustration that these three modes of legitimization are all biased in favor of the dominant position. Thus, the negative definition of immigrants as 'illegal' and 'violent' is not merely a subjective opinion, but presented as fact, and hence as part of the established regime of truth. A few characteristic examples of this typical kind of legitimization discourse may show in some more detail how such discourses are formulated.

Thus, the first legitimization move is of course the repeated claim that the actions were carried out in accordance with the law:

(5) (. . .) medidas estas que se adoptan con el carácter de medidas gubernativas y en cumplimiento estricto de lo dispuesto en la ley Orgánica Reguladora de los Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España, conocida habitualmente como Ley de extranjería. (p. 848)

These measures were implemented according to governmental procedure and in strict compliance with what is stipulated in the Fundamental Law Regu-

lating the Rights and Liberties of Immigrants in Spain, commonly known as 'Ley de Extranjería'.

The formal reference to the law is accomplished in quite a formal style as well, such as the use of the official name of the law, the use of *medidas gubernativas* (literally 'governmental measures' instead of the more current '*políticas del gobierno*', 'government policies'), the use of '*estricto*' to emphasize the nature of the compliance with the law, as well as the use of *lo dispuesto* ('what is stipulated') instead of for instance '*lo que dice la ley*' ('what the law says') or '*el contenido de la ley*' ('the content of the law'). Thus, more in general, his own actions, as well as those of the police are described, justified and in terms of laws and normal procedures. In other words, the formal style seems to symbolize and emphasize the formal, legal, and hence legitimate, nature of the expulsions. He also emphasizes that the actions were carried out with utmost carefulness.

In a another passage, Mayor Oreja emphasizes that the action is not just in accordance with the law, but also benefiting the country, as we see in the following passage, in which a stark picture of threat is being painted:

(6) El Ministro del Interior, ante estos graves acontecimientos que ponían en grave peligro el orden público y suponían una alteración grave de la seguridad ciudadana, tenía la inexcusable obligación de proceder, en nuestra opinión, a la expulsión o devolución de los inmigrantes ilegales. (p. 848)

The Minister of Interior, faced with these severe incidents that put public order in great danger and implicated a serious disturbance in citizen security, had, in our opinion, the unavoidable obligation to take action by expelling and sending back the illegal immigrants.

Only somewhat later, around 2000, also in Spain, a more 'positive' argument is used in favor of (well regulated) immigration, namely the dramatically low birthrate of autochthonous Spanish people, and the need for immigrants to take jobs that are not filled by 'us', and thus to pay for the pensions of older people. In most arguments on immigration only our rights and interests are discussed and not those of the immigrants.

Both the elite and the popular discourses of negative other-presentation focus on the various alleged 'threats' posed by increasing immigration. Therefore, in the overall strategy of negative other-presentation and positive self-presentation, one of the most powerful moves of anti-immigrant discourse is to claim or to show that anti-immigrant policies are good for 'Us' or 'our people'. This populist move is hard to defeat at first sight when immigration is espe-

cially presented as costing 'us' a lot of money, threatening 'our' jobs, housing, culture, and safety, among others.

Another important strategy is that of Consensus. Especially in parliamentary debates it is important not only to govern by the force of the majority, but to try to arrive at a consensus. This is especially true for typically controversial issues such as immigration. Thus, also in Spain, the conservative government wanted immigration policies to be bipartisan or consensual, and not object of political competition. After all, such policies pertain to Us vs. the Others, and thus require national solidarity against the 'invasion' from abroad. Apart from the nationalist argument, this move is obviously intended to placate the opposition. In Spain this should be particularly easy because the current law to which Mayor Oreja refers was adopted by the previous socialist government.

Negative other-presentation is the dominant strategy of racist discourse, controlling many forms of discourse at many levels of analysis. Also in the strategy of legitimization, such negative discourse is fundamental as a way to establish the 'facts' as the minister sees them. That is, in order to justify the expulsion and to get popular support for it, it is important that the minister describes the immigrants not only as 'illegals' (and hence as breaking the law, if not as criminals), but also as people who are violent. A minor demonstration of immigrants in Melilla is thus represented as particularly violent, and hence its participants intolerable in a peaceful country like Spain. At the same time, the own negative actions are denied (as is the case for the drugging of those being expelled), mitigated, or described as perfectly legal and moderate. Especially significant is the denial of racism, a form of dominant elite discourse we have encountered in many types of text and talk in many countries:

(7) (. . .) este Gobierno no quiere caracterizarse precisamente (. . .), por lo que viene a significar un discurso desde la intolerancia (. . .) (p. 868)

(. . .) *this government does not exactly want to characterize itself* (. . .)*, as something that could come to suggest discourse coming from intolerance.*

This awkwardly formulated denial is especially important because of the historical links of the PP with the legacy of the Franco regime. That is, it is very important for a PP government – which in 1996 had just come to power – to show its democratic credentials, and hence to deny any form of racism. Of course, the notion of 'racism' is not mentioned here, but a euphemism ('*discurso desde la intolerancia*': literally, 'a discourse from intolerance', or a 'discourse based on intolerance').

These few observations on a crucial political speech in Spanish parliament are intended to show first of all that explicitly racist formulations are rare in official Spanish political discourse in the 1990s. This does not mean, however, that more indirectly, immigrants are not associated with negative characteristics, such as illegal entry or illegal work, violence or other forms of breaking the law. This negative other-presentation is closely intertwined with positive representation of Us, our tolerance and solidarity, legal principles, as well as the denial of racism.

In her doctoral thesis on parliamentary debates, Montserrat Ribas (2000) investigated the social representations and the argumentation structures of questions on immigration formulated by delegates of the Catalonian parliament in so-called 'study committees'.

From her detailed analysis of global and local questions, she concludes that the representations of the MPs vary according to the party they belong to, as may be expected. Speakers of the nationalist party – in power until 2004 – CiU (Convergència i Unió), led by Catalonian former president Jordi Pujol, primarily define immigration and immigrants as a problem, and as a threat to the cultural and linguistic unity of Catalonia. Immigration for them is associated with undesirable changes of the social order, including different social and religious practices, increasing criminality, as well as problems of education and integration. Integration for CiU means catalanization and hence assimilation. It is not surprising therefore that among all the topics discussed in Catalonian parliament, that of integration is most frequent, as is obvious in the following fragment:

(8) si els immigrants també són sensibles a la cultura catalana (...) si ells es van integrant progressivament (...), als nostres costums, a la llengua, a la manera de fer d'aquí. (Ribas 2000: 147)

If the immigrants are also sensitive to Catalan culture (...) *if they will progressively integrate themselves* (...)*, into our customs, our language, the way things are done here.*

Ribas shows that for the Catalan socialist party (PSC), immigrants are first of all defined as foreign workers, and its concerns are thus focused on labor discrimination and exploitation. In that sense the PSC treats immigrants like any other group of Spanish workers, but on the other hand, such a definition also limits the problems of immigrants to the domain of labor. Also for the socialists integration means that the immigrants need to adapt themselves, namely to the norms and values of western culture, abandoning those of their

'backward' own cultures. The Republican Left (ERC) speaks of "immigrats" ('immigrated') instead of "immigrants" ('immigrants') and thus emphasizes their rights as established citizens in the country. However, by emphasizing the right to be different, and by focusing on social problems that follow from such difference, also the ERC presupposes that immigrants do not change culturally. On the other hand, the ERC uses the topic of immigration especially to attack the regional and national governments.

Ribas argues that only one group, the Iniciativa per Catalunya (IC, now called ICV after acquiring the V for '*Verds*', Greens), formulated an authentic counter-discourse against dominant racist discourse. Immigrants are defined as foreign workers, and their cultural differences valued as positive. If there is a problem, it is *they* who have problems with *us,* because we treat them as delinquents. It is quite telling that the topic of racism is the one that is least asked about in the commission. In other words, alleged problems for *Us* are focused on, and not on the problems of *Them.* On the other hand, Ribas also observes that the position of IC is not very combative, but rather paternalist.

The overall conclusion of her analysis is consistent with the one I have formulated above for national political debates, also in other countries, namely that there is seldom expression of overt, blatant racism, but a more moderate, often indirect expression of a number of familiar xenophobic stereotypes and prejudices. Montserrat Ribas summarizes the dominant political representation of immigration in Catalunya as follows (Ribas 2000: 404):

> Societies must be homogeneous, and immigration may threaten such homogeneity and is therefore a problem. The norms and behavior of the immigrants are not just different, but morally speaking wrong. Generalizations: Negative behavior of some member(s) of the out-group is generalized towards the whole group. Immigrants are not individuals, but only represented as stereotyped, homogenized group members. Cultural differences are essentialized: Immigrants are inherently (biologically) different from us. Voluntarism: If immigrants do not integrate, it is because they do not *want* to integrate. Positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. (Ribas 2000: 404)

In his doctoral thesis, a theoretical study on racism and politics in Spain, Xavier Torrens (2002) generally arrives at conclusions that are consistent with those found in earlier studies (e.g., Van Dijk 1993) as well as in this chapter. In particular, studying the literature and the current developments in Spain, he also concludes that the elites and their discourses play an important role in the reproduction of racism in the public sphere. Examining the politics of "*preferencia nacional*", Torrens significantly states that "*Los inmigrantes indocu-*

mentados creados por el Estado se traducen en los inmigrantes indeseables para la sociedad" ('the undocumented immigrants created by the State are translated into the undesirable immigrants of society'), a conclusion that confirms our thesis on the preformulation of racism by the elites. The "*preferencia nacional*" is not so much a means to guarantee social cohesion, but rather an institutionalized strategy of exclusion of the Others, thus violating the basic principles of the democratic state. This institutional exclusion may take various forms, such as the criminalization, expulsion, segregation and cultural assimilation of immigrants during various stages of their presence in the country. These official and unofficial (and hence denied) policies of the state finally act as powerful legitimization of everyday racism by the agents of state agencies (the police, etc.) as well as by the citizens at large.

Unfortunately, there is as yet no systematic study of the latest developments of political anti-immigration discourse in Spain. I already suggested that these closely follow xenophobic developments in other parts of Europe, such as the success of Le Pen in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections in France, that of a new anti-immigrant party founded by Pim Fortuyn (since then assassinated), now part of the government coalition, in the Netherlands or the anti-immigration measures propagated by quite explicitly racist politicians such as Berlusconi, Bossi and Fini in Italy.

These developments took place very fast in the spring of 2002, which in several respects may be considered a turning point, although it should not be forgotten that the deeper xenophobic tendencies in Europe are continuous. In several speeches former Prime Minister José Maria Aznar took advantage of these European developments by advocating even stricter European policies against 'illegal' immigration, and by repeatedly associating such immigration with crime. Former Interior Minister, Mariano Rajoy, who had followed Mayor Oreja on the job, declared in the same spirit that "an excess of immigrants causes marginalization and crime" (*La Verdad*, May 13, 2002). Mayor Oreja himself confirms this explicitly in an interview with *El Periódico* of May 26, 2002:

(9) Normalmente lo ilegal lleva al delito. Hay mayores índices de delincuencia cuando aumenta la inmigración. Tenemos que asociar lo irregular a la delincuencia, y la cultura de la legalidad es el mejor antídoto.

Illegality normally leads to delinquency. There are higher rates of crime when immigration grows. We have to associate the irregular with delinquency, and the culture of legality is the best antidote.

The socialist opposition of the PSOE explicitly accused Aznar of racist rhetoric. This does not mean, as we repeated above, that social democrats in power (as in the UK or until 2002 in France, as well as in Spain before the Partido Popular took power in 1996) are much more lenient when it comes to immigration policies. It is true that, thus far, the socialist-led government of Zapatero, has shown a considerably more humane approach to immigration, beginning with a generous measure of 'regularization' of many undocumented immigrants.

We see that also in Spain racist populist rhetoric is engaged in when politicians think they can win votes among those citizens who are (made) afraid of increasing immigration, or who are concerned about crime and everyday feelings of insecurity attributed to the 'foreigners'. Many concerns of citizens, such as unemployment, economic problems, or street crime, may thus be associated with immigration and by blaming the victims.

It should be stressed again that many of these public concerns are manipulated by the discourses of the politicians themselves (or by the media reproducing and legitimating them, if only by not criticizing them), for instance by using doubtful statistics on the incidence of crime. This is also the case in Spain, where government officials in the spring of 2002 emphasized that the percentage of provisional detainees is much higher (more than 75%) for immigrants than for other people in Spain – a contention energetically rejected even by the police unions, which critically comment that even 'illegal' entry is thus also counted as a crime (*El País*, 11-2-02).

Further analysis of Spanish contemporary political discourse is necessary to confirm (or disconfirm) and detail these scattered data based on recent media reports. For instance, we would need more analysis of the discourse of local politicians, like mayor Enciso of El Ejido, and their influence on the opinions, discourses and other social practices of the citizens.

The same is true at the highest level of government, state agencies and other elite bureaucracies. Thus, Mikel Azurmendi, president of the *Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes*, and therefore a major voice in the formulation of integration policies, declared in February 2002 that "*el multiculturalismo es una gangrena de la sociedad democrática*" ('multiculturalism is gangrene to democratic society') (*El País*, 20-2-2002). In a newspaper article, Azurmendi defines multiculturalism as follows:

(10) Se llama ahora multiculturalismo al hecho de que en el seno del mismo Estado de derecho coexistan una cultura democrática, por ejemplo en la nuestra actual, con otro u otras culturas no necesariamente democráticas. (*El País*, 23-2-2002)

> *What is now called multiculturalism is the fact that within the core of the same State of law, a democratic culture, like our current one for example, co-exists with another culture or cultures that are not necessarily democratic.*

It is of course quite significant when someone like him, in such a prominent and sensitive position, has such misconceptions and prejudices about multiculturalism. That is, he only can be in such a position when the politicians who appointed him basically agree with this 'monocultural' ideology and racist superiority feelings. On the occasion of the events in El Ejido, the same Azurmendi also wrote a book on the events, blaming all problems on the foreign workers and exonerating the local employers and politicians (Azurmendi 2001).

As expected Azurmendi is not alone in his ideas, and elite opinion on this case is quite widespread in Spain. Thus, also Hermann Tertsch of *El País* defends Azurmendi against his critics, in the usual style of fulminating against political correctness which we also have often observed in Dutch political discourse (e.g., in Van Dijk 1993) – that is, claiming the right to tell the "truth" about other cultures. Former Secretary of State for Foreigners and Immigration, Enrique Fernández Miranda shared the opinions of Azurmendi, and affirmed that some cultures are 'irreconcilable' (*El País*, 27-2-2002).

Apart from the surprising negativity of the opinions for men in their positions, these declarations especially show ignorance about what multiculturalism is, if not reluctance to modify one's own culture under the influence of others (García Castaño & Barragán Ruiz-Matas 2000). Multiculturalism is often interpreted as a relativist free-for-all, in which *any* cultural habit, even those who would conflict with basic tenets of democracy or human right principles, would become acceptable. For them, multiculturalism means 'ghettos'. Instead of pointing at the widely denounced negative aspects of 'our' own culture, such as the high incidence of domestic violence and male chauvinism, the focus in that case is especially on selected retrograde traditions attributed to the whole other culture, such as genital mutilation of women in some African cultures. Also, it is assumed that cultures never change – neither that of the Others nor Ours. In most of these political discourses the overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation is dominant.

On the basis of the studies reported here, we may conclude that official political discourse in Spain is not blatantly racist, but that there are many examples of stereotypes and prejudices about immigrants. Immigration is defined as a problem and not as a promise, as a threat rather than as an opportunity; cultural difference is not welcome, and integration often means adaptation if

not assimilation (see also Garreta Bochaca 2003). Whereas these stereotypes and these forms of problematization are stronger on the right, the left may be seen as less hostile to immigration, but on the other hand tends to take a more paternalistic position.

Genuine anti-racist policies and discourse are rare, both nationally and regionally. This does not mean that there are no antiracist organizations, NGOs, and prominent elites, in politics, the media, academia or other social domains. Similarly, some of the elites may take clear antiracist action, for instance José Chamizo, Defensor del Pueblo (ombudsman) of Andalusia, who spoke out against forms of racism in Andalusia (e.g., in El Ejido) and also played an important mediating role in an "*encierro*" (sit-in) of immigrants at the University of Almería in the spring of 2002 – although he was less successful during a similar '*encierro*' at Pablo de Olavide University in Seville in the summer of 2002. Unfortunately, also in Spain, such antiracist change agents are rare at the highest levels, and during the former conservative government and its influence of state agencies, explicit antiracist policies and practices were rare.

It remains to be seen how the social-democratic elites in power since March 2004 will engage in discourses and social practices that are essentially different. They have taken the lead in a significant change in the field of gender, first by appointing a government with many women in prominent minister positions, and secondly, by speedily formulating a promised major bill against violence against women, as well as bills facilitating divorce and enabling homosexual marriages. And, as suggested, also their immigration policies are less harsh than those of the previous government led by Aznar, for instance by promising '*papeles*' to many undocumented immigrants.

The mass media

In many ways the analysis of the mass media in Spain provides a picture that is similar to that of official politics. That is, there are no major, national or regional, newspapers in Spain that are blatantly racist, as is the case for instance for the major British tabloids.

Although hardly dominant or elite, however, it should not be forgotten that if we also include the internet among the media, Spain also has racist and neo-Nazi websites, such as Nuevo Orden, in which extensive anti-immigrant propaganda is made, e.g., trying to 'prove' with statistics how criminal or violent the immigrants are, and how 'we' white people are victims.

The large national newspapers represent ideas that run fairly parallel with those in politics, that is, from broadly conservative to centrist-left social-democratic positions, as is the case for the national newspapers *ABC, El Mundo,* and *El País,* respectively.

As elsewhere in most European countries, the more 'radical' left in politics does not have a major (national) voice in the Spanish media, although occasionally such leftist articles may be found in *El País*. The press in the autonomous regions, for instance in Catalonia, follows this pattern, although it may show a more or less regionalist-nationalist dimension that is absent in the newspapers at state level. The local press in Andalusia, geographically closer to the newcomers from Africa, voices opinions that are occasionally a more explicit expression of popular racism.

The vast majority of Spanish journalists are white and of Spanish nationality, a pattern that is similar to that in other EU countries. Ethnic minority journalists are few and far between. According to the statistics provided by the Collegi de Periodistes de Catalunya, there are 99 members who were born outside of Spain, the vast majority of them in other European countries (especially France) and the Americas (especially Argentina). There are 6 Moroccan journalists listed. We do not know how many of the foreign-born journalists actually have work and write for the more prominent newspapers, and how many of these are from Africa, Asia or Latin America, but these are probably only a handful. It is therefore safe to conclude that the newsroom and its policies and practices, also when it comes to the coverage of immigration and ethnic affairs, is virtually wholly dominated by white, Spanish journalists.

This does not mean that most Spanish journalists are blatantly racist. On the contrary, there is a strong tradition of leftist journalistic opposition in Spain. Thus, more than in many other countries in the EU, for instance Holland, there is also a strong anti-racist solidarity movement among journalists. Since 1995 the Catalan journalists have a special work group on mass media and minorities, advocating multiculturalism and sensitivity of style and portrayal of immigrants in the media (for detail, see www.periodistes.org).

After these general remarks on the role of the media and journalists in Spain, let us have a closer look at the facts of news coverage about immigration, immigrants and minorities.

Frequency

With the increase of immigrants, also the frequency of news and background articles on immigration has rapidly increased over the last years. The very use-

ful press data base of the CIPIE Observatory of Immigration and Racism shows how between 1995 and 2000 the number of items has tripled, from about 800 items per trimester for 8 selected regional and national newspapers in 1995, and about 1000 items per trimester in 1999 to about 2300 items per trimester in 2000. This means that in 2000 the newspapers published an average of about 2.5 articles *each day* on an immigration-related issue, and in the leading newspaper *El País* even more (between 3 and 4 articles daily). Coverage more than doubled between 1999 and 2000.

General tendency

The CIPIE data also show that the overall evaluative tendency of the articles is largely negative: About two-thirds of all articles have topics with negative implications, and only one-sixth of the articles can be classified as rather positive. Neutral or undefined tendencies can be found in another one-sixth of the articles, a proportion that increased somewhat between 1999 and 2000, at the expense of the more negative articles. There are (as yet) no data as to the variation of the national or regional press in this respect. However, one would expect that the more leftist national newspapers such as *El País* are generally less negative in their coverage. But that is only an extrapolation from data elsewhere in Europe, as well as from unsystematic observations of the coverage of *El País*.

Topics

A somewhat more qualitative description of the press coverage of immigration shows that some topics are both frequent and permanent, such as the events of immigration itself, primarily the tragic stories about immigrants arriving in little boats (*pateras*) from Morocco – a crossing that has cost about 3000 lives in the last five years, according to data of S.O.S. Racismo. Thus, whereas in the first trimester of 1999 there were 68 stories (6.4% of the coverage) about stowaways and *pateras*, in the third trimester of 2000 this number had risen to 409 (17.4%). One should add to these numbers the articles on immigrant trafficking, which rose from 55 to 169, as well as other articles related to border control. That is, on average about 25% of the articles are related to various forms of 'illegal' entry, border control, expulsions, and related topics. These articles are usually associated with police action and the very definition of undocumented entry as 'illegal' usually means that these articles are categorized as offering a negative picture of immigration.

Interesting, compared to the press in the rest of Western-Europe, is the fact that apart from 'illegal' entry, the Spanish press publishes comparatively little on *crime* attributed to immigrants: both in the first trimester of 1999 and the third trimester of 2000 about 3.5% of the articles. But there are also topics that might be associated with delinquency, such as prostitution and violence among immigrants, which may double the percentage of crime-related news.

More positively oriented news are the activities of government, officials and NGOs, including denouncements of various forms of racism and discrimination, which account for about 17% of the news in 1999 and 2000.

Superficially neutral (but possibly with negative effects on people's attitudes) are the articles on (usually restrictive) legislation, government immigration policies, official measures, questions of health care, and problems of reception, which together account for about 17% of the coverage. As may be expected, once the story of 'illegal' entry has been told and retold, and many immigrants have entered the country, the coverage turns more and more to the many themes related to immigrants as a minority: housing, health care, schooling of the children, and especially work. In the third trimester of 2000 the accumulative percentage of these topics is a mere 6%. Much of this news is still related to reception centers, housing, and slums.

Finally, as elsewhere, the Spanish press also pays attention to racism, discrimination, prejudice, violence against immigrants and related topics. But as is the case for the everyday lives of immigrants, this topic cluster is not very dominant, and accounts for about 7% of the items in 2000. Also many articles on Europe are related to the topic of racism (such as the coverage of the electoral success of Haider in Austria), and add a few more percentage points to the general topic of racism.

Each year, coverage adapts itself to major events. Thus, the new Ley de Extranjería alone accounts for 200 items (nearly 10%) of the coverage in the third trimester of 2000, whereas the racist attacks in El Ejido in February 2000, are covered in many hundreds of articles, letters and other items (about 20% of the whole coverage of the first trimester).

Despite this variation, however, a more global view of the coverage of immigration and minorities in the Spanish press, as represented in the CIPIE data-base, shows us that the overall topics related to immigration are limited (Table 1).

The percentages in Table 1 are approximate averages, with notable variation between trimesters and years, and depending also on new developments, such as major racist events (El Ejido), or major administrative actions (Ley de Extranjería, new policies, regularization of immigrants, and so on).

Table 1. Approximate percentages of coverage of the most important topic clusters

Topic cluster	% of coverage
1. Irregular entry	25
2. Administrative events	17
3. Solidarity	17
4. Europe	10
5. Racism and discrimination	7
6. Crime	7

If the (sometimes sad) record of the rest of the EU press serves as an example, we may expect in the coming years a decrease of 'Entry' stories, even when such entry will continue as before despite increasingly harsh immigration restrictions, and an increase of 'problems-caused-by-immigrants' stories of all kinds, from explicitly negative crime topics, to the typical "burden" topics that have to do with the role of immigrants in health care, schooling, housing and especially the labor market. Whereas the police and related agencies of control are the active agents and immigrants the passive participants of many of the Entry stories, the increasing stories about legislation and integration will probably shift the major agency role to the authorities. In the solidarity stories, the major agents are NGO's, political parties, and antiracist organizations, most of them white/Spanish. Immigrants or minorities are represented as main active agents only in crime stories, and as passive victims in discrimination and racist stories.

One recent contribution to this analysis of immigration topics in the Spanish press, and that combines qualitative and quantitative analysis of framing, is the study of Juan José Igartua and associates (Iguarta et al. 2004). On the basis of an analysis of 819 articles in arbitrarily selected issues of *El País, El Mundo, ABC* and *La Razón*, they identified 17 news frames, of which the following were the most important:

a. Government actions (Ley de Extranjería, etc.)
b. Irregular entry (pateras, etc.)
c. Treatment of (Moroccan) immigrant children
d. Immigrants as delinquents; mafias
e. Border and immigration control.

We see from this list derived from factorial analysis of news frames, that it largely confirms the less sophisticated CIPIE frequency data summarized above. The high frequency of governmental and bureaucratic topics in 2002 is related to the issues around the Ley de Extranjería, so that irregular entry

(pateras, etc.) appears as the most constant high frequency topic in the Spanish press. Delinquency is also high on the list, but in this case the immigrants may also be represented as victims of trafficking mafias. Surprising in this list is the special attention for young immigrants, usually from Morocco, and stories about their reception and sending them back home. Since this topic does not appear specifically in the other frequency counts, it may be specific for 2002. Also, it may appear as part of other topics, such as irregular entry. Quite frequent are also the articles on immigrants in conflict roles. Not very frequent are such topic clusters as the miserable living conditions of immigrants, their contributions to the economy, or bureaucratic hassles (papers), confirming my repeated critical comment in my own studies that in general the press does not tend to focus on problems of the immigrants themselves. Only a few articles deal with immigrants as the victims of aggression or racism. The authors also found differences between the papers. Thus, conservative *ABC* tends to focus on delinquency as a topic, whereas *El País* rather publishes on government policies. *El Mundo* focuses on more sensationalist issues such as the complaints of immigrants subjected to extorsion or theft. Further qualitative discourse analysis will be needed to provide the necessary details about *how* these topics or frames are treated in the respective newspapers.

Gitanos and Gitanas

There is one topic in the Spanish press, and within the analysis of racism in Spain, more generally, that sets it apart from other countries in the EU: the coverage of the Romaní people ('Gitanos' and 'Gitanas'). Since their arrival in 1425, and thus long before the current immigration of large groups from Africa, South America and Asia, the Gitanos have been the ethnic minority group that was most discriminated against in Spain. Despite the small size of the group (0.7% of the population), Gitanos and Gitanas have always been confronted with widespread stereotypes and prejudices, and only at present North Africans are judged in equally negative terms (San Román 1986). That such prejudices are not based on conclusions from negative personal experiences, but inculcated by parents and media from childhood is also suggested by extensive research on Paya (non Gitano) youth's attitudes about Gitanos and Gitanas (Calvo Buezas 1990).

Also the press has for a long time ignored, stereotyped or discriminated against Gitano people, who are typically associated with negative topics such as delinquency or violence, or with the failure to adapt themselves. As is the case for African Americans in the USA, Gitanos are usually only treated positively

in relationship to their culture, and especially to their music, the flamenco. A recent study on the press coverage of Gitanos (Instituto Romanò 1997), arrives at conclusions that are very similar to my own conclusions of racism in the press accounts of minorities and immigrants more generally (Van Dijk 1991):

– Even in stories about them, Gitanos are not used as reliable sources.
– Gitanos appear mostly in the 'social' sections of the press, and especially in the '*Sucesos*' category that usually reports about violent events or crimes; they hardly appear in the economic pages, and seldom on the cultural pages, despite their important cultural contributions. The Gitano thus is generally portrayed as a delinquent and as violent, and only sometimes as an artist.
– Most news reports derive from agencies or are signed by the editorial collective; this suggests that the newspapers do not use specialists (e.g., on minorities, or on racism) to report about Gitanos.
– News reports about Gitanos are small and superficial, and make little use of photos, and other visual information. If published at all, pictures about Gitana life portray poor, dirty kids in low-standard housing or neighborhoods.
– Gitanos hardly ever reach the front page, unless they are involved in sensational, very negative topics such as a drugs and/or a "*reyerta*" (brawl) with serious consequences (deaths).

It is also against this background of the press coverage of Gitanos and Gitanas that we should understand the press portrayal of contemporary minorities.

Analysis of some examples

After this first, quantitative and global, description of the coverage of immigration and minorities in the Spanish press, let us have a closer look at some examples. We'll select some prominent themes covered in the third trimester of 2000, the last trimester on we have systematic data from the CIPIE database. The quotes below are from that database.

Immigrant trafficking

Let us begin with a few typical examples of one of the major negative topics related to immigration: the activity of networks of human traffickers.

(11) Liberan a ocho marroquíes secuestrados por no pagar a la mafia que los traía a Murcia. Los traficantes falsificaban papeles para los inmigrantes, que estaban hacinados y desnutridos en un cortijo de Málaga.
(*La Verdad de Murcia*, 07/07/00)

Eight Moroccans have been freed after being abducted for not paying the Mafia that brought them to Murcia. The traffickers falsified legal documents for the immigrants, who were undernourished and crowded onto a farm near Malaga.

(12) Desarticulada una red en Aranda de Duero que captaba a trabajadores sudamericanos con falsas ofertas de empleo. Los detenidos cobraban cantidades abusivas por sus servicios. (*El Correo-Bilbao*, 13/07/00)

An organization in Aranda de Duero that lured South American workers with false offers of employment has been dismantled. Those who were arrested were charging abusive amounts for their services.

(13) Red de prostitución en El Ejido. Los detenidos forman parte de una red de prostitución que captaba jóvenes en Rusia. Las mujeres eran obligadas a alternar con los clientes bajo amenazas y sanciones económicas.
(*Canarias* 7, 17/07/00)

Prostitution Ring in El Ejido. The detainees form part of a prostitution organization that recruited young women from Russia. The women were forced to consort with clients under threats and economic punishment.

(14) Desarticulada una red que arreglaba matrimonios de conveniencia para inmigrantes a un millón de pesetas. La Policía calcula que doscientos extranjeros han sido víctimas de esta banda ubicada en Madrid.
(ABC, 28/07/00)

An organization that arranged marriages of convenience for immigrants at one million pesetas has been dismantled. Police calculate that 200 foreigners have been victim to this gang working out of Madrid.

(15) Unas 400 extranjeras de tres continentes trabajan en los clubes de alterne de la Región. Buena parte de ellas carecen de papeles y han entrado en el país mediante redes de trata de blancas. (*La Verdad de Murcia*, 28/07/00)

Some 400 foreign women from three continents work in hostess bars in the region. A large part of them lack papers and entered the country through white slave networks.

These and other examples have a structure that is as stereotypical as the events described are routine, and may be summarized in the following format:

> Police arrests (group, network) of criminals in x who abuse of immigrants (who have to pay so much money; or are threatened in some way).

In these quotes, the police is often only referred to implicitly and by passive sentences, thus emphasizing the topical position of the criminals. The preferred verb chosen for the action of the police is "*desmantelar*" ('dismantle'). The immigrants virtually always have the role of victims in these stories, unless they are criminal immigrants who exploit other immigrants. When the criminals are Spanish, their nationality is not emphasized. Identification is usually categorical only, namely as shadowy 'Mafia'. As we see in example (1), the police may also be represented as the 'liberators' of the immigrants, thus contributing to the familiar positive presentation of Us (by one of Our main institutions). Although the traffickers are described negatively as abusing of immigrants, and the immigrants themselves as victims, these news items still have negative implications in the sense that they associate immigrants with crime or illegal practices. Because the ethnic or national origin of the traffickers is not always mentioned, there may well be a preferred reading that the traffickers are themselves immigrants or nationals of the countries the immigrants come from. In both cases, the obvious implication is a negative representation of Others, that is a xenophobic response.

Moreover, many of these messages refer to prostitution, thus adding an important gender dimension to the strategy of Negative Other-presentation. Thus, one preferred model may be that the others are not just foreigners, and illegal, but also morally inferior women, while engaging in prostitution. Preferred expressions that enhance this dimension may be "*esclavas del sexo*" ('sex slaves') or "*trata de blancas*" ('trade in – white – women'). An ethnic religious dimension may further enhance the "exotic" nature of such events:

(16) Sólo en Madrid 200 prostitutas nigerianas trabajan como esclavas para la "banda del vudú". Las prostitutas tardan entre dos y tres años en comprar su libertad. La deuda es de unos 40.000 dólares. (*El Mundo*, 18/08/00)

In Madrid alone, there are 200 Nigerian prostitutes working as slaves for the "Voodoo Gang". It takes the prostitutes 2–3 years to buy their freedom. Their debt is around 40,000 dollars.

There is one group totally left implicit in these passages on "exotic" prostitution: white (Spanish) men. Following the logic of the strategy of Positive Self-presentation and Negative Other-presentation, crime and deviance associated with foreigners or immigrants need to be represented free of the possible

participation of Us (white males), especially if these could be seen as the primary instigators of the crime. We shall see the same below for the topic of 'illegal' jobs, in which also the (white, Spanish, usually male) employers are seldom mentioned and *never* called 'illegal'.

Crime

Where immigrant trafficking is the dark and criminal side of illegal entry and residence, once the immigrants are in the country, they are not only represented as passive victims, as would be the case for discrimination, prejudice or racism. Although as yet the Spanish press is quite modest in its coverage of "ethnic crime", this does not mean that the recommendation not to mention the nationality or ethnic background of suspects is generally heeded. Let us examine a few of these examples in somewhat more detail.

(17) Un joven magrebí acusado de robar 7 millones a dos comerciantes chinos en la plaza de Tirso de Molina de Madrid. (*El País*, 07/07/00)

A young North African accused of stealing 7 million [*pesetas, 42,000 Euros*] *from two Chinese vendors in Tirso de Molina square in Madrid.*

(18) Hallan en El Ejido el cadáver de un joven magrebí con la cabeza destrozada a golpes tras una reyerta. Una llamada anónima comunicó que se había producido una pelea entre varios magrebíes.
(*La Verdad de Murcia*, 10/07/00)

A body of a young North African whose head was shattered from blows in a fight, has been found in El Ejido. An anonymous phone alerted police that a fight had broken out between several North Africans.

(19) Una mujer marroquí muere a causa de los golpes que le propinó su ex compañero sentimental. Los familiares de la víctima dicen que el agresor la maltrataba, aunque ella nunca quiso denunciarle. (ABC, 19/07/00)

A Moroccan woman dies after having been beaten to death by her ex-boyfriend. Family members of the victim say the aggressor had ill-treated her before but that she wouldn't press charges.

(20) La Guardia Civil ha detectado la presencia de más de 600 kosovares que integran las bandas de atracadores en España. Los robos y atracos les han reportado un botín estimado de 4.000 millones en los dos últimos años.
(*El Correo-Bilbao*, 21/08/00)

The Guardia Civil [*a national police force*] *have detected the presence of over 600 Kosovars within Spanish gangs that are committed to robberies.*

Stolen goods from robberies and hold-ups in the last two years have reached a reported estimate of 4 billion pesetas [*24 million Euros*].

(21) Carteristas y ladrones peinan Barcelona buscando turistas. Los latinoamericanos son los carteristas mejor preparados y los magrebíes dominan el arte de robar en coches con el dueño en su interior.

(*La Vanguardia*, 21/07/00)

Pick-pockets and thieves scout out Barcelona looking for tourists. Latin-Americans are the best prepared pick-pockets and North Africans dominate the art of robbing cars with the driver still inside.

(22) La quinta parte de los delitos registrados el año pasado en Murcia fueron cometidos por inmigrantes. El 15% de los reclusos internados en la cárcel de Sangonera son ya ciudadanos extranjeros.

(*La Verdad de Murcia*, 25/09/00)

One fifth of all registered crime in Murcia last year was committed by immigrants. Already, 15% of the inmates in Sangonera Prison are foreign citizens.

This brief selection is rather characteristic of crime reporting in general, and of 'ethnic crime' coverage in particular, in which also references such as those to '*magrebíes*' ('North Africans') may be quite confused. Alleged perpetrators, as well as their victims, are categorized by their ethnic group membership – as long as it is different from being Spanish – also when this information is irrelevant for the comprehension of the news story. The stories are usually about concrete events, and largely based on police reports, as is the case in (1–4). However, we also find generalizations that are based on social representations that may either be plain prejudices or be 'knowledge' derived from police statistics, as in example (5) and (6). Especially the statistics are problematic, because their numbers suggest factuality and objectivity. Also for that reason they are often used by newspaper readers to argue about the criminal tendencies of 'foreigners' (Van Dijk 1987a). Thus, in (6), the fact that 15% of prison inmates are foreigners, does not say very much if we do not know the percentage of foreigners in the region, or the percentage of poor people who have no alternative to survive but to steal, or the percentage of arrests, or the special activity and focus of the police on foreigners (resulting in many more selective detentions and arrests, and so on (see for detail *Boletín del Instituto de Estudios de Seguridad y Policía*, Observatorio de la Seguridad Pública, No. 10, May 2002). Thus, we seldom find a crime statistic in the press saying that (say) 95% of the inmates are men. In the same way, the generalizations of example (5) do not say how many Spanish criminals are involved in the street crime of Barcelona. Nor will we as easily read crime stories with statistics about the many forms of white

collar crime, most probably largely committed by Spanish men. Even more exceptional are stories with statistics about the percentage of Spanish people engaging in the many forms of discrimination, a type of crime many white people would not even define as a crime in the first place.

Many journalists defend ethnic crime stories of which we quoted fragments above as 'telling the truth'. However, our critical questions show that the 'truth' can be told in many ways, and that mentioning the ethnic background of suspects or convicts only serves to 'ethnicize' the definition of crime in such a way that readers, instead of gaining relevant knowledge, rather develop stereotypes and prejudices.

Undocumented entry

The stories about 'illegal' entry across the Straits of Gibraltar or between Morocco and the Canary Islands, represent the most frequent category of immigrant news in the Spanish press, even when the vast majority of immigrants initially arrive, for instance with tourist visa, by airline at Madrid Barajas airport. Daily police reports publish the sad statistics of how many Moroccans or Sub-Saharans have been arrested by the police, or how many have drowned during the risky crossing in *pateras*. Let us examine some fragments of these stories:

(23) Los 4.295 inmigrantes detenidos desde enero en Cádiz casi quintuplican los del mismo periodo de 1999. (*El País*, 01/07/00)

The 4,295 immigrants detained in Cadiz since January nearly quintuple the estimate for the same time period in 1999.

(24) La Guardia Civil detiene en sólo 24 horas a 141 inmigrantes en las costas españolas. Un subsahariano llega a Ceuta tras cruzar a nado la línea fronteriza desde Marruecos. (Levante EMV, 02/07/00)

The Guardia Civil detain 141 immigrants in a mere 24 hours along Spanish coasts. A Sub-Saharan arrived in Ceuta after having swum across the maritime border from Morocco.

(25) Un pesquero rescata en Lanzarote a los 16 pasajeros de una patera a la deriva. (*El País*, 08/07/00)

A fisherman has rescued 16 passengers from a small boat of immigrants that had been drifting off the coast of Lanzarote.

(26) Detenidos 193 subsaharianos en la costa de Tarifa en sólo una hora. Desembarcaron en cinco zodiac a lo largo de 10 kilómetros de litoral. Entre

los inmigrantes había 90 mujeres, ocho de ellas embarazadas, y dos niños de sólo seis meses y tres años. (*El Mundo*, 09/07/00)

In Tarifa, 193 Sub-Saharans were detained in only one hour, disembarking 5 rubber boats within a 10 km. coastal span. Among the immigrants were 90 women, 8 of whom were pregnant, and 2 children: a 6 month-old baby and a 3 year old.

(27) La policía detiene en Algeciras a 8 marroquíes que viajaban en los bajos de tres autobuses. (Levante EMV, 19/07/00)

Police have detained 8 Moroccans in Algeciras that had been traveling in the bottom compartments of 3 buses.

(28) Otros cuatro inmigrantes norteafricanos aparecen muertos en la costa de Almería. El Ayuntamiento de Algeciras ha comunicado que no puede hacerse cargo de más enterramientos de inmigrantes.
(*La Vanguardia*, 13/08/00)

Four more North African bodies have been found washed up on the coast of Almería. Almería's city government has made a statement that it cannot take responsibility for any more burials of immigrants.

Since these stories appear daily, their general structure and meanings have become virtually routine, both for the police that generally provides the information, as well as for the journalists and the readers. As is the case for the news about trafficking, the police are the main in-group protagonist of the news stories, either by simply doing their work (taking people in custody, etc.) or acting as heroes when they save the lives of the irregular immigrants. There are virtually no stories about police harassment or violence against the new immigrants. Obviously, if such exists, police spokespersons will hardly tell the journalists, and journalists seldom interview the new immigrants themselves. As is the case elsewhere in Europe and the Americas, white journalists prefer white elite sources. This means that large part of the daily story of police arrests never reaches the public at large.

Other in-group participants in the stories are either negatively represented as traffickers or others who abuse of the situation of the undocumented immigrants. We find positive presentations for instance of fishermen – as in example (25) – of members of agencies, municipalities or NGO's who try to help the newcomers.

Most prominent, however, are the out-group members, variously described as North-Africans, Moroccans, Sub-Saharans, or simply as 'illegal', 'irregular', or 'undocumented' immigrants. As we see in example (26) it is also

quite typical to add how many women and children were part of the groups that have been detected by the police, as well as the information whether one or more of the women were pregnant, so as to enhance the dramatic nature of these crossings. Finally, we find the tragic information about whether or not there were also dead people aboard, or dead people washed upon the shore.

As we see in virtually all examples, and as we have seen in immigration coverage in other countries of Western Europe in previous investigations, new arrivals are invariably associated with the *number game*. Although these numbers may not be correct, and would later need correction, the exact numbers as such are not relevant at all, only the semantic-rhetorical effect of apparent objectivity, precision and credibility. Also, these numbers are most likely a fixed element in the police reports that journalists use for their coverage. The numbers are often also generalized, summed up, extrapolated and compared to other periods, as is the case in example (23). Thus, as we see in example (24), the expression "so many X were arrested (found, etc.) in so few hours" also adds the further aspect of establishing 'records', as we would also find in sports commentary, or more generally in news about events that can be quantified.

Another element of these stories, especially when they are about stowaways, is information about how and where they hide themselves, especially when these places are remarkable or otherwise newsworthy (as in example (27)). Sometimes the stowaways die of lack of oxygen, or crushed between the walls and the cargo of ships or trucks.

Finally, once the immigrants have finally arrived in Spain, and have not been arrested, interned or sent back by the police, they are not only defined as having entered, and hence as being 'illegal', but also as a *burden* of agencies or municipalities, even, as in example (28), when they arrive dead.

Since many years these are the stories that are the staple of immigration coverage in Spain. Even now the immigrant population is steadily increasing, and hence many other topics become potentially relevant, the 'illegal entry' story remains the most prominent and most frequent report in the coverage of immigrants and immigration. This is even more clearly the case in the local press in Andalusia and the Canary Islands, where most immigrants land who come from Africa by boat.

The repeated emphasis on the irregularity of entry, on the 'huge' numbers, on the role of the police and on arrests, contribute to 'first definitions' that are very important in the development of attitudes about the newcomers. That many of the crossings result in death, may on the other hand contribute to the formation of social representations in which irregular immigrants are victims, which in turn may lead to paternalistic atitudes. Victimhood stresses passivity,

and obscures the fact, rarely stressed in the coverage on the crossings, that the immigrants are taking action, take their life in their own hands, often even risking it when struggling for a better future – that is, as active, brave people – characteristics that might positively contribute to their success in Spain.

Another element that is usually absent in these stories is an explanation of the *reasons* of the immigrants to thus risk their lives to arrive in Spain, as well as a description of the social and political situation of the countries they come from. Of course, such detailed information need not be given in each story about each crossing, but one would expect at least regular background stories on the motivations of immigration, and about the countries where the immigrants come from. This, however, is seldom the case – also because this would require much more work from the journalists: These are not stories that can simply be copied from the police reports.

Similarly lacking are news stories about the other side of the coin of migration: the need of Spain and Spanish employers for (typically cheap) labor. In other words, we get stories about dramatic forms of 'illegal' immigration, but hardly any explanatory context that is necessary for the comprehension of these stories.

Finally, rare also are the voices and the experiences of the immigrants themselves. This is not surprising if the routine stories come from the police, and coverage is 'distant'. But again, a local correspondent could easily talk with many recent immigrants and, even anonymously, ask them about the details of their arrival and experiences. Such stories sometimes appear, typically in the weekend supplements of the newspapers, but are rare in the daily press, for which strict deadlines usually do not allow reporters to go beyond the reformulation of police reports.

The lacking voice of the immigrants themselves is a rather general feature not only in politics, the media, education, science or other elite discourse, but also in scholarly studies on minorities and immigration. Although studies of racism obviously focus, and should focus, on the majority, it is important also to study antiracist discourse, not least of minority groups and their members (for recent documentation, see e.g., Manzanos Bilbao 1999). Antonio Bañon Hernández in a recent book does just that (Bañon Hernández 2002; see also Bañon Hernández 1996 – probably the first study of discursive racism in Spain). He examines the whole 'debate' about immigration, including many different voices, and provides a complex typology of the different discourses involved. He thus not only studies, with an impressive wealth of data, many forms of discriminatory discourse, but also the many various forms of polit-

ically committed text and talk, by politicians, members of NGOs, and many others, in articles, books, pamphlets, internet sites, and so on.

Racism on the job

Unfortunately, systematic discourse data about racism at work are rare (see, e.g., Colectivo Ioé 2001; Solé 1995a, b). Just as is the case for the rest of Europe, labor discrimination is common in Spain – either in the process to get a job, or while on the job. As elsewhere in the EU, most employers prefer white males, or women if these are cheaper. Similarly, for jobs that Spanish workers can't or won't do, especially in agriculture, construction or domestic service, and that can be filled by undocumented, and hence cheap, immigrants, there may be no problem as long as there is work. But as is typical of the general properties of elite racism discussed in this book and its companion study (Van Dijk 1993), the higher one gets, the tougher it becomes to get a job as an immigrant, and not only because of lacking education, knowledge of the language or cultural integration. As is the case in the Netherlands and the rest of the EU, jobs are preferably given to 'one's own', even in those organizations, institutions or companies where one would expect an explicit rejection of discriminatory practices. Of course, biased hiring is never seen or defined as discriminatory, but only as hiring of the best possible candidates – where being a foreigner or from another culture is seldom seen as an asset or as a contribution to the diversity and the competence of the workforce. In the autonomous regions, especially in Basque Country and Catalonia, further nationalist arguments may play a role in not hiring 'outsiders', especially when (possibly irrelevant) criteria of language play a role in hiring.

All this can be predicted from practices as we know them from elsewhere in the EU. The statistics confirm this prediction. The latest barometer of the Center for Sociological Studies (CIS), of May 2002, lists immigration as a problem that is mentioned by 23.5% of the people among the three most serious problems of Spanish society – far behind unemployment and terrorism (ETA), which is mentioned by more than 54.3%. Only one year earlier this preoccupation about immigration was more than 6 points lower. Personally affected by immigration are only 11.3% of citizens – again far behind unemployment (40.2%) or terrorism (13.3%) – but double that of one year earlier. But when people are asked about whether immigration is a (very) important problem in their own city or village, nearly 68% of the people respond affirmatively in 2001 – but these responses are more or less the same for such diverse issues as

housing, safety, traffic or the environment, and hence probably a reflection of what the citizens regularly read or hear about, rather than pressing personal concerns. Typical for these polls is that one hardly knows *why* people respond the way they do, so such statistics must thus be handled with care. The 2002 CIS statistics suggest a marked increase with respect to 5 years earlier, in 1996, when immigration was a relevant problem for only 4% of the population, and for 3% of the interviewed.

Worth noticing especially is the marked difference of these figures with people's worries about racism in society: Less than 1% of the people mention that as a problem. Similarly, the rise of the extreme right in Europe is generally attributed to immigration, and not to racism.

More directly relevant for the domain of work is the opinion of a majority of the population five years earlier (1991) about the influence of immigration on the economy, which only about a quarter of the population respond to positively, a third negatively and about half and a third say they don't know. More concretely – when asked about whether immigrant workers are necessarily in some areas of work – the large majority (more than two-thirds) of the people in 1991 respond negatively. It is therefore not surprising that also in 1996 there is still a majority of people that think that immigrants take away jobs from Spanish people (Gimeno Giménez 2001).

As is the case for many of these questions, answers that are less favorable about immigration are found especially among older people, with less education, lower incomes, living in mid-size towns, Catholics and people of the right, which are also the ones who tend to think that the increase of immigration favors the development of crime in Spain (for details, see Gimeno Giménez 2001).

Employers

These general xenophobic attitudes are obviously the same on the job, or worse as soon as someone sees her or his position threatened by the arrival of immigrants. As we have seen from the cynicism of the 'empresarios' of El Ejido, many business leaders ignore or exploit racism, and if they do not blatantly engage in it themselves, they will generally condone it on the shop floor, if only to avoid problems with white workers.

The discourse of the *empresarios* on immigrants and immigration, in Spain as elsewhere, often seems quite positive. Whereas most politicians, thinking of the majority of the population, whose attitudes they have prepared with their own biased policies and discourse, reject further immigration, employers in

general welcome it. Theirs is only one interest, and that is that of the companies they lead, and most companies welcome cheap, flexible labor, and that is what immigrants have to offer. And in social sectors such as agriculture, construction, hotels and restaurants, and domestic service, irregular women and men are even better, because they can be hired and fired at will.

Thus, the President of the Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE), José María Cuevas, during a talk he gave on March 9, 2001, urges the government to make sure that the rules of the new immigration law allow fast hiring of immigrant workers, "with the same rights" as Spanish workers. Many Spanish people who are out of a job, do not want to do the work immigrants are prepared to do. And since for many jobs employers first have to prove that there is no Spanish unemployed person who wants to do it, hiring immigrants may involve a lot of red tape – so that they often hire unofficially. In other words, at the highest level of the employers' organizations, interests match those of the immigrant workers, including the 'illegal' ones. It is not surprising that employment of 'illegals' is not exactly seen as a crime, nor prosecuted with vigor.

There is a world of difference though between the 'positive' official discourses of the employers and their actual talk and behavior in their companies and on the work-floor. As suggested above, illegal hiring and firing often also means exploitation and discrimination: An undocumented worker will usually not protest against this, call the police or get organized.

Unfortunately, we have very few data about how employers talk with and about their employees. Only in one of the very few sociological studies in Spain about how the Spanish speak about foreigners, do we also find some examples of talk by employers (Colectivo Ioé 2001; see also Cachón Rodríguez 1997, 1999).

Let us examine some fragments of a small rural employer (Colectivo Ioé 2001: 90ff.):

(29) Bueno, pues sabemos que hay de todo, no quiero decir que porque sea gente de fuera, si también los hay aquí, ¿no?, de aquí del mismo pueblo, ¿no?, pero el hecho de que vengan de fuera y, por ejemplo, los veas que no quieren integrarse porque. . .pues porque no *quieren trabajar,* o porque es mejor estar, pues no sé, con la droga, ¿no?, *traficando con la droga*. Eso es una realidad que los tenemos aquí en el pueblo, y eso hay que decirlo.

(p. 90)

Well, o.k., we know that there's all kinds of people everywhere. I don't want to say that because they aren't from here- I mean, there's also that here too,

right? From the same town, you know? But the fact that they do come here from abroad and you can see, for example, that they don't want to become integrated because. . . . Well, because they don't want to work *or because, oh I don't know, drugs are better. You know,* selling drugs*. This is a reality that we have here in the town and that just has to be said.*

(30) – ¿Cómo que no hay (ilegales)?, la mitad. ¿Todas las pateras que pasan, dónde están metidos?
– Todos escondidos, por los cortijos por los invernaderos y por todos los sitios están escondidos, y luego tienen que comer y no tienen contrato de trabajo ni nada, nada.
– Y eso es un problema a la hora de encontrar quién hizo un robo o una cosa, es muy difícil porque al no estar legalizados, no tener documentación aquí como Dios manda, pues es muy difícil para la policía o para quien quiera pillarlos, porque no se sabe ni el nombre; o sea que. . . (p. 91)

– What do you mean there aren't any (*illegal aliens*)*? Half. All the little boats that go by and where are they hiding?*
– They're all hiding: on the farms, in the greenhouses and everywhere they're hidden. And then they have to eat and they don't have contracts for work or anything. Nothing.
– And this is a problem when it comes to finding out who committed a robbery or something. It's very difficult because not being legal, they don't have any documentation like they should have, so it makes it really difficult for the police or for whoever wants to catch them, because you don't even know their names; it's like. . .

(31) – Yo tengo un concepto un poco personal, ¿no?, a lo mejor todos no. Yo pienso que *la raza blanca por si nos sentimos superiores a cualquier otra raza.* Y digo, voy a explicar un poco lo que yo entiendo: mira nos creemos. . .nosotros los españoles tenemos la raza gitana; en América los negros; en otros países, pues, los moros; es decir, siempre la raza blanca intenta, no sé,. . ., algo. . . *Quizás porque la postura que tenemos sea un poco más abierta o nos comunicamos más*, pero siempre hay ese. . ., los blancos, no sé por qué tenemos un poco superior a los demás, me creo, ¿eh? Y claro entonces viene que se enfrenta, *la cultura es muy enfrentá.*
– Sí, yo creo que sí; además me imagino, que yo no me ha pasado nunca ese caso, pero me imagino que casi todos los padres que tenemos hijos, *si a lo mejor viene un francés viviendo por esta zona, o un inglés o un alemán, y dice de casarse con él, no ponemos barreras;* en cambio si un padre dice que un moro se va a casar con su hija, hay atranque, hay atranque.
(GD2, p. 93)

> *– I guess I have a bit of a personal idea, maybe not everybody does. I think that the white race just because of how it is, we feel superior to whatever other race. And I mean, I'm going to explain a little bit about what I understand. Look, we think... Us, Spanish, have the Gypsies; in America there's Blacks; and in other countries there's 'Moros'. It's like, Whites always try, I don't know, something like... Maybe because the attitude we have is a little bit more open or we communicate more, but there's always this.... Whites, I don't know why we have it, a little superiority over the rest I guess, right? And so then of course comes confrontation; Cultures are very confronted.*
> *– Yeah, I think so. Also I can imagine that- this has never happened to me but I'm pretty sure that almost all parents with kids- if maybe somebody French moved to the area, or English or German, and our daughter says she's going to marry him we don't have a problem with it. But on the other hand, if a father says a 'Moro' is going to get married to his daughter, then there's trouble, big trouble.*

Although it would be premature to generalize over this or the other examples provided in this report, it would hardly be speculative to conclude that the opinions formulated in these fragments are quite typical of the everyday 'commonsense' racism that is widespread among the population in Spain and the rest of Europe. Thus, we encounter in (29) the familiar disclaimers, such as the vague concession that also 'here' we have 'all kinds of people' and the denial that such behavior is attributed to the others because they are foreigners. Then, we find the usual accusation that the others do not want to work, do not want to adapt and are dealing in drugs. Especially the first accusation is remarkable because rural employers are daily confronted with immigrants who desperately *do* want to work, as is also clear from other passages of the same speaker. We see how strong the racist stereotype of the lazy foreigner may influence what people say, even if it produces blatant contradictions. The same kind of contradiction exists for the familiar complaint 'that they do not want to adapt themselves', which I also repeatedly found in conversations in the Netherlands and the USA (Van Dijk 1984, 1987a). That is those who use this prejudiced topos at the same time do not actually want integration, or a kind of assimilation that makes the immigrants totally invisible, also culturally. Notice finally the familiar 'evidence' move at the end of this little story, namely when the speaker refers to the 'facts here in the village', showing that what he is telling is not mere personal opinion, but shared knowledge of the facts. Such a move not only has a function in the general strategy of positive self-presentation, namely as a claim to be consistent with general opinions of a community, but also function as a warrant of truth, and hence of credibility.

The same popular 'logic' is expressed in example (30) where the speaker denies the (implicit) denial that there are many 'illegals'. Explicitly referring to newspaper stories (not cited here), he concludes that if hundreds arrive in *pateras* each week, and few are sent back, the countryside must be full of 'illegals' – and that this is also a problem for the police, thereby explicitly assuming the easy association between illegal entry en illegal acts like robberies.

Example (31) is quite interesting, because such general popular discourses on 'race' are usually difficult to find or to tape today. Notice first a complex pattern of disclaimers and mitigations showing that the speaker is very much aware that he is talking about a very controversial and taboo topic: the superiority of the white race. He concedes that this is his personal opinion, and that others may not have it. His assertion that the white race is superior (compared to gitanos, negros and 'moros') is formulated with hesitation markers ('*quizá*', perhaps), mitigations of our superiority (we are a "little bit" more open than the others). It is this difference between the groups, he explains, that must be seen as the cause of the culture clashes. The final part of that example also shows that this is not against any foreigners, but especially against those coming from outside of Europe – a racist distinction that in this case is applied to the familiar 'daughter marries foreigner' topos.

That racist ideologies about the superiority of the white 'race' are hardly marginal in Spain, also shows the evidence collected among high school kids, about half of whom believe in 1993 that whites are superior (Calvo Buezas 1995: 678ff.) a percentage that however was decreasing to – a still disconcerting – 38% in 1997 (Calvo Buezas 2000: 120ff.).

The examples we have cited here are hardly spectacular and so common that they already have become part of the everyday life of racist societies. The only point that makes them worth mentioning here is to make the obvious claim that employers have quite similar racist feelings as many other people. We may expect that such opinions and discourses are not limited to the conversation with the interviewer, but also will have a direct impact on the way employers they treat immigrant workers.

The empirical problem for the researcher of everyday racism is that such 'private' discourses, especially for the elites, are usually not readily available, unless employees would copy or tape them. Unfortunately, as far as we know, no such data are available in Spain. We only have data from general reports, such as from the Comisiones Obreras, who find that immigrant workers have 25% to 30% less salaries (CCOO, p. 207), and a recent report by the Ioé collective for the UGT union (Colectivo Ioé 2001) about discrimination on the job. In its report over 2001 the well-known NGO S.O.S. Racismo summarizes the

situation of immigrant workers as follows, a passage we cite in full, because it provides indirect insight in both the practices and the discourses of employers:

(32) La mayoría de trabajadores extranjeros, unos 70%, se halla en situación irregular. Este hecho ocupa un lugar central en el sistema de producción de los invernaderos. El volumen de mano de obra que se necesita en las explotaciones es variable. En Almería, en la época de cosechas – tres por temporada – hay que cubrir 40.000 puestos de trabajo en un período comprendido entre una y tres semanas, mientras que sólo hay 11.854 puestos de trabajos fijos. Los irregulares son esta mano de obra flexible. Hay unos 28.000 puestos de trabajo dentro de la economía sumergida, con la connivencia de las patronales, las asociaciones agrarias y las administraciones. Es altamente significativo que, en los últimos años, no se haya realizado ninguna inspección laboral en El Ejido por parte del Ministerio de Trabajo.
Las jornadas de trabajo en los invernaderos son de unas diez horas. Dentro de las invernaderos se soportan temperaturas de hasta 45ºC, con una humedad próxima al 90% y el ambiente cargado de pesticidas. La mayoría de los contratos son verbales, con un sistema a la antigua contratación de jornaleros en los campos andaluces. (p. 106–107)
p. 167: Organización Internacional de Trabajo: "Un tercio de los inmigrantes que residen legalmente en España sufre rechazo xenófobo al buscar trabajo." Sobre todo los Marroquíes. Más grave en el sector servicios, hostelería incluida, que en actividades como la construcción.
p. 170: Barcelona: La policía detiene al dueño de un taller de confección clandestino que explotaba a cinco inmigrantes orientales. Los inmigrantes trabajaban 15 horas diarias sin ningún día de descanso.

The majority of foreign workers, approximately 70%, are found in irregular situations. This fact plays a central role in the system of greenhouse production. The amount of work force that is needed for cultivation varies. In Almería during harvest times (*three per season*) *there are 40,000 working positions to be covered in a period comprised of anywhere between one and three weeks, while there are only 1,854 steady positions. Irregular workers make up this flexible work force. There are around 28,000 positions within the underground economy that have been calculated with the cooperation of employers, agricultural associations and administrations. It is highly significant that in recent years there has been no labor inspection in the town of El Ejido on behalf of the Department of Labor.*
Working days in the greenhouses last around 10 hours. Inside greenhouses workers endure temperatures up to 45ºC with humidity near 90% and green-

house atmospheres full of pesticides. The majority of contracts are verbal, using an old-fashioned procedure of hiring laborers in the fields of Andalusia. (*p. 106–107*)

p. 167: International Employment Organization: "One third of immigrants that legally reside in Spain suffer xenophobic rejection when looking for work," and Moroccans in particular. It is worse in the service sectors, including the hotel and restaurant industries, than it is in construction.
p. 170: Barcelona: Police detain the owner of a clandestine clothes manufacturing workshop that had been exploiting 5 Asian immigrants. The immigrants were working 15 hour days and allowed no days off.

However, these are statistics and brief examples of concrete cases, but again do not show us how (especially prominent) employers speak about or with their employees. This is a fundamental research project that will need to stay on the agenda.

At the moment, thus, our only evidence about how employers speak and act comes through the stories of personal experiences of their victims. I shall therefore, quite appropriately, conclude this section with some testimonies of the immigrants themselves. These stories also show that although discursive elite racisms of politicians, media and employers play a fundamental role in the overall position of immigrants in the country, the everyday experiences of back-breaking and mind boggling exploitation are hardly only discursive. Again, we cite at length, because only those directly involved as victims of exploitation formulate their experiences most persuasively:

(33) Hace poco una sobrina mía estuvo en una casa, los baños no se los dejaban limpiar con una fregona, ¿y como quiere que le limpie los baños la señora? Viene a donde mí y me dice que arrodillada, y le dije: "mira, dígale que la esclavitud se acabó hace muchos años". Si llega una española, a esa chica no la hacen arrodillarse de esa manera; entonces, ¿qué es eso? Racismo, discriminación. (Manzanos Bilbao 1999: 144)

A little while ago, a niece of mine was working at a house and they wouldn't let her clean the bathroom with a mop. "And how do you suppose the lady wanted me to clean the bathrooms? She came over to me and she told me to do it on my knees." I told her, "Look , tell her that slavery ended a long time ago." If a Spanish girl had gone there, they wouldn't have made her get down on her knees that way. So, what is this? It's Racism, discrimination.

(34) Estudié enfermería y quería trabajar en el verano, empecé a llamar a anuncios del periódico y te ponen llama a tal hora, llamas y cuando dices, "soy negra", "ah, entonces te llamaré", y ya no llaman. (p. 144)

I studied Nursing and wanted to work for the Summer. I started to call job adds in the newspaper. They answer, call at such and such a time. You call and when you say, "I'm Black," it's "Ah, then I'll call you back," and then they don't call.

(35) Me han entrevistado para trabajo de profesor de inglés dos veces, y me entrevistaron ingleses y las dos veces me cogieron en las dos academias. Cuando me entrevistaron españoles no me cogieron porque el inglés, al hablar con los inglés, se da cuenta que sabes aunque no hayas estado en Londres, que es lo que te preguntan los españoles. Para ellos lo importante es que no has estado en Inglaterra y tienes una licenciatura marroquí, que se supone que es peor; eso para mí es mucho prejuicio: por qué no piden el programa de estudios para ver qué he estudiado. En el trabajo tienes que ser siempre peón, trabajar a destajo. Aquí el marroquí trabaja mucho y el de aquí no se deja explotar así, el marroquí siempre tiene el fantasma del permiso a final de año y como le hacen contrato de seis meses piensa se me acaba a los seis meses y si después no encuentro trabajo qué [...], tiene que aguantar muchas cosas. Tienes ahí una amenaza permanente. (p. 147)

I've had interviews for positions as an English teacher twice with English interviewers and on both occasions I got the job at the academies. When I was interviewed by Spanish people they never took me on because, when speaking English with native speakers, they can tell that you know the language although you haven't been to London, which is what the Spanish interviewers ask about. For them, the most important thing is that you haven't been to England and that you have a Moroccan degree, which they assume is worse; That means a great deal of prejudice to me: Why don't they ask about the curriculum and requisites of the degree to see what I've studied? At work, you always have to be a an unskilled worker for temporary jobs. Here the Moroccan works so much and a person from here isn't allowed to be exploited like that. Moroccans always have the false hope of the residency permit at the end of the year but as they're always given a 6 month contract, you think: O.k, my 6 months are up and what if I don't find work after that? You have to put up with so many things. You have this constant threat.

(36) Sabía que lo de dar clases de inglés, aparte de dar poco dinero es muy difícil de conseguir que cojan un moro para dar clases de inglés, te tienen que conocer o te tienen que dar una oportunidad y, normalmente, una academia seria ¿cómo va a dar a un moro trabajo? No te van a dar esa oportunidad, y yo quería trabajar en algo serio, y con seguro. (p. 153)

I knew that to teach English classes, apart from paying little money, it would be difficult to get them to hire a 'Moro' to teach English. They have to know you or they have to give you a chance and normally, at a serious academy, how can they give a 'Moro' a job? They're not going to give you that opportunity and I wanted to work in something serious with security.

(37) Aquí para trabajar como "moro" hay mucho trabajo: en el campo, en la construcción, lo que pasa es que hay gente que no aguanta que se les trata de "moro", tienes que estar dispuesto a olvidarte de tu dignidad totalmente y hacer todo lo que pidan, y hacerlo bien y cargarte con las culpas cuando a ellos les sale mal porque tú eres el "moro" que no entiende. Si no admites eso, yo conozco argelinos que tienen el sentido del orgullo más alto que nosotros, y no entienden ni pasan por eso. Un marroquí, normalmente, hace lo que le digan y lo aguanta, pero no se enfrenta a un jefe. Los que duran en los trabajos son los que aguantan todo. (p. 201)

There's a lot of work here, if you work like a 'Moro'- in the fields, in construction. But what happens is that there are people who can't take being treated like a 'Moro'. You have to be willing to completely forget your dignity and do everything they tell you to do, do it well and then take the blame when something has gone wrong for them because you're the 'Moro' who doesn't understand anything. If you don't accept this- I know Algerians who have a higher sense of pride and they don't understand this and wouldn't even attempt to go through this. A Moroccan normally does whatever he's told, puts up with it and wouldn't confront a boss. Those that last in their jobs are those who put up with everything.

These passages hardly need comment or analysis, and speak loudly and clearly for themselves, as class, gender and 'race' mix in the many well-known forms of labor exploitation, marginalization, exclusion, and other forms of discrimination. Notice also the various forms of resistance and critique by those who are discriminated: the Latin-American woman who does not let herself be treated as a slave (in example (33), the Moroccan academic who perfectly understands that his exclusion has nothing to do with his fluency in English (in example (35)), or the 'Moro' (in example (37)), who finely perceives the details of racist forms of address and command.

We hardly need to further detail the data on the everyday life of immigrants in Spain, and how it is shaped by multiple combinations of bureaucratic red tape and harassment from the moment they need a residence permit, to the many demeaning forms of exclusion and other forms of racism in the workplace, the barrio or the shop, among many other sites. We see that in all these

situations discursive racism accompanies the many other forms of derogation, e.g., when employers explain or legitimate what they do or expect the immigrant workers to do. For detail on these many forms of exploitation, such as long working hours and low salaries, see, e.g. Pajares (1998: 217ff.); Martínez Veiga (1997: Chapter 3); Ruíz Olabuénaga et al. (1999); (Colectivo Ioé 2001). For life histories of immigrants in which the lived experiences with everyday racism can be observed and felt, see Criado (2001).

Education

Politics, the media and the job are not the only contexts of elite racism, or indeed of racist (and antiracist) discourse in Spain. Let us therefore finally make some brief observations on other aspects of ethnic relations and elite racisms in Spain, obviously without pretending to present a complete picture, beginning with the important social field of education.

With the increased presence of immigrant children in schools (though nationwide still a small minority of some 4.5% in 2003), especially in big cities such as Madrid and Barcelona, there is increasing concern about multicultural education (García Martínez & Sáez Carreras 1998; Solé 1996; Terrén Lalana 2001).

As we know from other countries, this does not mean, that students are then automatically anti-racist, nor indeed that textbooks have become so (for details of students' opinions, see the series of voluminous studies by Calvo Buezas, e.g., Calvo Buezas 2000). That is, textbooks may condemn racism, but as is the case in the Dutch textbooks we studied (Van Dijk 1987b), also Spanish textbooks tend to search for racism mainly abroad (in the USA, South Africa or Germany) and not in Spain (Calvo Buezas 2000: 114ff.).

Similarly, it is precisely in education where cultural and linguistic conflicts and contradictions play an important role when children from other countries and cultures are being confronted with dominant cultures and languages. Current pedagogical and academic discourse in this domain focus on the kinds of integration that are actually taking place or that are most desirable, ranging from crude assimilation to various kinds of cultural and linguistic autonomy and pluralism. Liberal official policies and discourses of diversity may in the practice of the classroom imply various kinds of assimilation on the one hand or problematic segregation on the other hand (Martín Rojo 2003).

Thus, in February 2002, a Spanish version of the French conflict about Muslim girls wearing a scarf (*hijab*) hit the headlines. After a school did not

admit a 13-year old Moroccan girl because of her refusal to go without her hijab, the press made an enormous scandal out of this, and attributed the conflict primarily to an intransigent Muslim father who forced his daughter to wear a '*chador*'. Apart from mixing up the hijab with the chador – possibly one of the consequences of the S11 events and the war in Afghanistan and the generally criticized position of Afghan women – it later turned out that the father on the contrary was quite liberal and left the decision to wear or not the hijab to his daughter. Also the Minister of Education gave her opinion as saying that wearing a hijab was a symbol of the oppression of women. Other elites declared wearing a hijab unconstitutional, and the minister of Work and Social Affairs, Juan Carlos Aparicio, even associated it with ablation of women, thus amalgating all bad Muslim things as he saw them, and thus also testifying to the ignorance of leading politicians when it comes to immigrants and minorities. Also feminist groups declared themselves against wearing a hijab to school, also for symbolic reasons (*El País*, 20-2-2002). The girl was finally admitted, but the national debate had shown that many of the elites have problems with the multicultural society, whether because of ignorance, because of prejudiced attitudes, and in some cases because of well-intentioned but paternalistic concerns about the position of immigrant Muslim women.

The irony of the case was that the girl was not admitted to a religious school, and that religious schools are usually run by nuns. However, the way 'our' nuns are dressed is apparently not perceived as strange and as a symbol for the oppression of women. We thus witness another case of double standards and perception, namely of the in-group and the out-group.

Incidentally, this event with the Moroccan girl is not unique when we think of the Gitano minority, whose kids often encounter discrimination and rejection at schools. There are examples of joint action by payo (non-gitano) parents when their children are in the same class as gitano children. We have no general data about the treatment of immigrant and other minority children in the classroom, but there is evidence of racist insults by teachers (S.O.S. Racismo 2004; as is also shown in ongoing research by Adriana Patiño on taped multicultural classroom talk).

Relevant for our discussion and this book are however especially the attitudes, behavior and public discourse of the responsible elites, such as cabinet ministers, heads of schools, administrators and the journalists who by their one-sided and dramatic reporting blew up the case to gigantic proportions (see Bañon 2002b, about this case and the confused uses in the press of 'veils', 'handkerchiefs', 'chadors', etc.; for the relations between gender and multiculturalism, see also Nash & Marre 2001).

The profound changes taking place in the schools are not always met by corresponding changes in the attitudes of the educational elites about the necessary and positive integration of immigrants from the time they are children. Thus, difficulties of language learning are often only seen as a problem or as a handicap of the young newcomers, instead as of a valuable contribution to cultural and linguistic diversity in Spain.

Textbooks

Together with media discourse, school textbooks are the most widely read discourse types in society. They are the only obligatory discourses in society, and their daily readers – and intensive users – are millions of school children. Since these books also are supposed to be studied, and often memorized literally, we hardly need to speculate about their tremendous influence in society. Children's basic knowledge about the world – outside of their daily experiences and apart from what they learn from television and their parents and peers – they acquire though textbooks and other learning materials. This is especially also true for their knowledge and other beliefs about the Others, both those in 'our own' country, as well as those abroad, and especially in the Third World (Blondin 1990; Gill 1992; Giustinelli 1991; Klein 1986; Mangan 1993; Preiswerk 1980; Troyna 1993). Earlier research on the textbook representation of minorities and immigrants, may be summarized as follows:

- **Exclusion**: immigrants and minorities do not or barely appear as groups represented in textbooks. Even when significant groups of immigrants are present in the country, many textbooks still represent society as homogeneous, monocultural and 'white'. Diversity is not celebrated as a positive value.
- **Difference:** if represented at all, immigrants, minorities and in general non-European peoples tend to be described as essentially different from us; differences are emphasized and similarities are de-emphasized.
- **Exotism:** The 'positive' side of the emphasis on difference is the enhancement of the exotic, strange or otherwise distant nature of the Others. This is especially the case for peoples living far away, or for the first small groups of immigrants from such peoples.
- **Stereotyping:** Representations of the Others tend to be stereotypical, schematic and fixed. Textbooks often repeat each other in the reproduction of such stereotypes about poverty, lacking modernity, backwardness, and so on.

- **Positive self-presentation of Us:** Our own group (Europeans, nationals, etc.) are attributed many positive characteristics: Technologically advanced, democratic, well-organized, knowledgeable, and so on. Typically, We are being represented as actively helping or assisting (passive) Them.
- **Negative representation of Them:** Besides the usual stereotypes, Others may also be attributed many negative characteristics, such as being violent, criminal, illegal, using drugs, authoritarian, undemocratic, backward, passive, lazy or lacking intelligence.
- **The denial of racism:** The positive representation of Us also implies the absence, denial or mitigation of the negative representation of Us. Thus, our history of colonialism, aggression or racism tends to be ignored or mitigated. Racism is typically represented as of the past (slavery, segregation in the USA) or elsewhere (e.g. in the USA or South-Africa), and seldom as being here, now, among us, and in our institution.
- **Lacking voice:** The Others are not only represented stereotypically and negatively, but also passively and as lacking voice. We talk and write about Them, but they are seldom heard or represented as speaking and giving their own opinion, and even less when saying critical things about Us.
- **Text and Images:** Many of the characteristics mentioned above not only are exhibited in text, but also in images, which typically exhibit the exotic, negative or problematic dimensions of Others or other countries. Thus, we will typically see a picture of 'huts' in Africa or igloos in Canada, rather than of a traffic jam among skyscrapers of many cities in Africa, Asia or Latin America.
- **Assignments:** The didactic dimensions of textbooks often presuppose the exclusive presence of 'white' students in class, addressing them specifically and inviting them to reflect about the Others as if these were not also present in class.

Many of these characteristics are not explicitly racist, but contribute to an overall stereotypical image of a homogeneous monocultural society, and of Them as being distant, different, absent or more or less subtly inferior to Us Europeans. Once immigrants and minorities are being represented, such representations may remain more or less stereotypical or negative – as *Them*, rather than as part of *Us*. Problems of multicultural societies tend to be emphasized, whereas the many positive aspects of diversity are ignored or played down. Immigrants tend to be portrayed as creating problems for us, rather than as contributing to our economic prosperity or cultural diversity.

These general characteristics of textbooks are more pronounced in countries where immigrants or minority groups are recent. Thus, in the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia, debates about racism and textbooks have been going on for a longer time than in (other) countries of Europe and the Americas, and textbooks there have followed the tendencies of a more general debate about multicultural education.

In Spain, this debate is more recent, and barely integrated in the curriculum. The international debate in other countries is of course known to education specialists in Spain, so that they did not need to begin from scratch (for discussion, see Aparicio Gervás 2002; Calvo Buezas 1989, 2003; Colectivo Amani 2002; García Martínez & Sáez Carreras 1998; Jordán Sierra 2001; Martín Rojo 2003; Ruíz Román 2003; Sabariego Puig 2002; Sierra Illán 2001).

Calvo Buezas (1989) found that in 48 Spanish textbooks (representing 9694 pages), there are only 7 references to Gitanos in primary school textbooks, and 6 in secondary school textbooks. When dealt with at all, the culture of Gitanos is represented as exotic but stereotypical, and rather in terms of the past than the present, for instance in terms of the Gitana fortune-teller. Consistent with the familiar macrostrategy of mitigating Our bad things, the marginalization, let alone the racism, experienced by Gitanos is not dealt with. Similarly, the converse of that strategy, namely mitigating Their good things, also is true: No reference is made to famous Gitanos.

The Grupo Eleuterio Quintanilla (1998) in a later research project confirmed these findings in a study of 64 contemporary schoolbooks. Gitanos are totally absent in textbooks of the first two grades of primary school; in the higher primary school grades only 6 textbooks indirectly refer to Gitanos when speaking about language. In secondary school textbooks there are some references in social studies textbooks. What textbooks do *not* offer though is information about the origins of Gitanos, the representation of Gitanos y Gitanas is rather a thing of the past, and stereotypically portrays them as the Gitana fortune teller, Gitano clowns, or Gitanas in traditional dress. Worse, but quite typical of textbooks and all elite discourse, is the absence of information about the marginalization and discrimination of Gitanos by the Spanish majority population.

Castiello (2003), in what is probably the first PhD dissertation in Spain on the textbook portrayal of immigrants, arrives at the same conclusions other authors have found for textbooks elsewhere (see also Van Dijk 1987b):

– Emphasis on *illegal* immigration, rather than on regular immigration.

- Emphasis on *different* immigrants, so rather on those from Africa than those from Latin America.
- Emphasis on dramatic, negative aspects of immigration: waves, invasion.
- Hardly an explanation of the socio-economic causes of migration, such as the need for (cheap) labor in Europe: In other words: we need them as bad as they need to leave their country.
- Exclusive association with stereotypical, low-paid jobs – ignoring for instance highly qualified foreigners doing research, etc.
- Racism attributed to others: USA, South Africa, Nazi Germany.
- Emphasis on 'rejection' (rechazo) by Spanish population, because of fear of the unknown, cultural differences, job competition.
- Multiculturalism and similar notions mentioned as general principles, but not illustrated with concrete examples.
- Emphasis on cultural differences, not on similarities.
- Earlier European (Spanish) emigration, e.g. to the Americas, is positively evaluated.

Analysis of two textbooks

Against the background of this debate and these earlier findings in Spain, I examined a Catalan and a Castillian textbook of social science in order to obtain first hand recent data about the portrayal of immigrants in Spanish textbooks (for details, see Van Dijk 2004).

The Catalan textbook (*Marca,* Barcelona, Vicens Vives 2003), in use by the second grade of secondary school, combines social sciences, history and geography. The second volume continues the Ancient History of Volume 1 with a section on the Middle Ages, and especially about the period of the Arabic occupation of Spain between 711 and 1492: El Andalus. This section focuses on the many positive cultural aspects of Arabic domination, for instance in architecture, and literary and agricultural renewal. As is often the case in textbooks, ethnically different Others may be positively portrayed in the past, as we shall also see for indigenous groups in the Americas. Since Arabic architecture is part of contemporary Spain, it has become the object of historical pride (and contemporary income from tourism).

In the section on the geography of contemporary Spain, the textbook is characterized by several well-known stereotypes. Thus underdeveloped countries are poor, and the developed countries are rich – no mention is made of poverty in the latter, nor of rich people in the former. Poor countries have high

birth rates, because of different attitudes about having children, e.g., religious beliefs and a different role of women. Religious beliefs in Spain or the USA are not mentioned, and it is implied that women in developing countries do not work and hence have many children. The stereotypical text is accompanied by a similarly stereotypical picture of a well-to-do middle class family in a developed country, seated at a table with all kinds of food, and a barefoot poor family in the South, standing in front of their dilapidated wooden house. Migration is explained in terms of the needs of people in poor countries, and not as a consequence of the needs of rich countries for cheap labor:

(38) Sembla clar que els corrents migratoris els generen més aviat les condicions adverses dels països d'origen i no pas tant els factors d'atracció dels llocs de destinació. Així doncs, és la desesperació dels habitants de molts països del sud la que origina, actualment, els fluxos migratoris cap a països del nord. (p. 176)

It is clear that migration flows are generated by the adverse conditions in the countries of origin rather than by the attraction factors in the places of destination. Thus it is the desperation of the inhabitants of many countries in the South which presently give rise to the migration flows toward the countries of the North.

The authors of the textbook are of the opinion that measures need to be taken against the "explosion" of migration. Thus, there will be less migration from poor countries if the following actions are taken (p. 176):

– Growing investments in technology, education, health care and infrastructure in the poor countries.
– Import barriers in underdeveloped countries need to be lowered so that imported goods can generate wealth.
– Social and political changes (more democracy) will favor progress.

First of all, this passage implies that migration is a problem ('explosion') that need to be solved. Secondly, the solution is sought in the poor countries and not in the rich countries. Thirdly, lowering import barriers in poor countries first of all benefits the rich exporting countries. No mention is made of the necessity to lower import barriers in the rich countries so that poor countries can export their products. And finally, the poor countries are stereotypically associated with social inequality and lacking democracy. That many of the undemocratic regimes in the South have been created and supported by the 'democratic' regimes of the North is another fact that is not fit to be read about by school kids. Thus, the textbook gradually construes a polarized picture of

the rich, democratic North and the poor undemocratic South, and immigrants are associated with the latter.

After a brief description of the consequences of migration for the sending and the receiving countries (in rich countries immigrants do work others do not want to do), the focus of the next section is on migration control, described as one of the major worries of the receiving countries. In other words, after suggesting that migrants may contribute positively to the demography and economy of the rich countries, immigration is more emphatically defined as a problem, as is also the case in politics and the media. These problems are described as follows:

(39) Els països receptors d'immigrants consideren que el nombre de treballadors estrangers que poden acollir està en relació amb el nombre de llocs de treball que necessiten cobrir. La superació d'aquests límits pot generar fluxos il·legals de persones, que es didiquen a **feines clandestines i d'economia submergida.**
El fet que els immigrants no trobin feina pot provocar problemes de tipus social.
Tot això facilita que una gran quantitat **d'immigrants clandestins** puguin arribar als països de destinació a través d'uns iteneraris controlats per les màfies , que comercien amb el tràfic de persones i posen en perill fins I tot la vida dels immigrants. (p. 178)

The countries that receive immigrants consider that the number of foreign workers they can take in is related to the number of vacancies they need to fill. If these limits are exceeded, illegal flows may result of persons involved in clandestine jobs and the hidden economy.
The fact that immigrants do not find work may cause social problems (. . .)
All this favors the arrival (. . .) *of a large number of clandestine immigrants through itineraries controlled by mafias who make money by smuggling people and who even endanger the lives of the immigrants.*

The problem with such passages is not that they are totally wrong or misguided, but rather that the selection of negative aspects of immigration and immigrants creates a biased social representation. The passage rather reads like the offical government point of view than a passage from a textbook. If only a handful of such biased opinions are being given about immigrants, and these are the same kind of things the children hear from parents or friends or see on TV, then this can only confirm established stereotypes. It would in that case be much more important to take advantage of the materials of formal education to emphasize those aspects of immigration that are less known, or that tend to be denied or

forgotten. Thus, in the cited passage, immigrants are associated with such negative concepts as 'illegal', 'clandestine' as 'creating social problems', 'smuggling' and 'mafias', even when they are victims of the latter. That immigrants often contribute positively to the demography, the economy, the diversity, renewal and cultural richness of their new homeland, would have been an alternative and less stereotypical way of formulating the consequences of immigration. And among the social problems one should not only mention or vaguely suggest those *caused* by *them*, but also those caused by the receiving population, as is the case for prejudice, discrimination and racism.

Racism is typically ignored or mitigated in the textbook, as is obvious from the next fragment:

(40) La **marginació** o el **conflicte** es presenta quan la societat receptora I els nouvinguts no s'accepten I no respecten els valors, les normes I les conductes propis. Es poden denencadenar problemes de **racisme** o **xenofòbia.** Les **polítiques migratòries** són essentials per evitar els conflictes I afavorir la integració I la multiculturalitat. (p. 179)

Marginalization or conflict arise when the receiving society and the newcomers do not accept each other and do not respect the values, norms and behavior of the others. Problems of racism and xenophobia may thus be unleashed. Migration policies are essential to avoid conflicts and to favor integration and multiculturalism.

Again, in this passage immigration and immigrants are presupposed to be related to problems – which are said *not* to occur when the immigrants integrate and do not need to occur when the receiving society recognizes and accepts the immigrants. The latter passage mentions racism and xenophobia as some kind of natural phenomenon, or as a problem that spontaneously arises, and mutually between groups, and not as something engaged in by people of the receiving society, that is of *Us* in the Northern countries. No more is said about racism and its consequences than this one vague sentence. Moreover, the way integration is defined it rather stands for assimilation, because there is no mention of possibly changing norms, values and habits of the receiving society. Finally, the textbook unambiguously seems to support "migration policies", thus implicitly favoring a limitation of immigration, and defining the problems and conflicts in terms of the immigrants and not in those of the receiving society.

The same book for the third grade (*Marca 3*) confirms the analysis we have made of the book for the second grade, for instance in Chapter 3, dealing with the populations in the world and the section on migrations today. A picture of a

'patera' and of police arresting 'illegals' at the beach, again confirms the stereotype that most immigrants are illegal and come by pateras, instead of through the airport of Madrid. In this volume it is mentioned that also the rich countries need cheap labor, and that this also attracts immigrants. Also in this book the high birthrate among immigrants is emphasized – and no mention is made of the fact that such birthrates usually decrease drastically after one generation. In other words, all dimensions that can be represented as a problem or even as a threat are being magnified. It is not even added that such higher birthrates may be beneficial for Spain with its very low birthrate, and hence its possible problem of lacking funds in the future to pay pensions. After a quote of an interview by well-known French MP Sami Naïr, questions for the students only pertain to 'problems' and to 'illegal' immigration, which are only two of the many points raised in the interview. Naïr also talks about xenophobia, racism and exclusion – topics the authors of the textbook apparently find less interesting to ask questions about. A fragment about immigration to Australia similarly mitigates racism as follows: "anti-immigration sentiments have emerged", that is, as some kind of emotion or sickness that spontaneously 'emerge'. In sum, in a textbook of some 300 pages, we get just one page of stereotypical, negative impressions about immigration and immigrants, largely confirming prevalent prejudices. No attempt is made to critically examine such stereotypes and prejudices, as may be expected from a textbook that should provide the ideological instruments that prepare students for the multicultural society in which they are living. Similarly, the textbooks and their assignments do not take advantage of the fact that many classrooms already have immigrant children – Indeed, as elsewhere these are largely ignored.

A Castillian textbook

The Castillian textbook we analyzed, *Geografía e Historia. Ciencias Sociales* (Madrid, Anaya 2002), used in Madrid, is very similar to the Catalan one, probably as a consequence of the unifying national curriculum on which it is based. Migration is dealt with in the second volume, as part of the lesson on population. Again, we find the same series of stereotypes and a polarized distinction between the "underdeveloped" and "developed" world, the latter associated with high birthrates, due to "the incorporation of women in the world of work", which again seems to imply that the women in poor countries do not work – or are mainly housewives. High birthrates in underdeveloped countries are vaguely explained as a consequence of "lack of control over births", as well as religious beliefs and traditional customs. No mention is made of the Catholic

church in this case and its influence on, for instance, the situation in Italy and Spain until not very long ago.

A typology of human societies associates Third World countries with hunter-gatherer societies and European countries with industrialized societies, as also a stereotypical picture shows (an African woman working the land, and a European in front of a computer). The strong implication throughout such passages is not only that developing countries are poor, but especially also that they are backward. No attempt is made to educate the students with non-stereotypical images or text, e.g., by showing modern cities and computers in developing countries, and poverty and agriculture in the North.

As in the Catalan textbook, racism is defined as something that spontaneously arises ('takes place'), and as a consequence of what the Others do: "when the number of immigrants is high, racism and xenophobia may take place, or feelings of rejection towards those who arrive from abroad" (pp. 17, 64). The Spanish text typically uses '*brotes*' here, that is literally 'shoots', that is as a natural 'outbreak' of feelings. Unlike the Catalan textbook, this textbook does not associate immigrants with illegality. In the description of the world economy and its history, information is missing on colonialism and exploitation of developing countries or about the contributions of immigrants to the economy of the USA and Europe. Mention is made of ethnic minorities in the USA, but not a word about the history of slavery, segregation and contemporary racisms. The few passages about Latin America briefly and incorrectly mention indigenous people and the "mestizo race", but do not mention the people of African descent. The diminishing numbers of indigenous people are largely attributed to themselves (alcohol, illnesses) and not to white massacres, exploitation and other consequences of domination. We at most find the following general and vague statement:

(41) La colonización hispana y portuguesa también dio lugar en **Iberoamérica** a una alarmante disminución del número de nativos indios. (p. 114)

The Hispanic and Portuguese colonization also gave rise to an alarming decrease to the number of native Indians in ***Iberoamerica****.*

In the same way, poverty in Latin America is wholly attributed to 'their' backwardness ("scarce technical preparation of the farmers"), but not to the practices and policies of rich countries. We find a similar treatment of Africa, said to be populated by the "black race". Of apartheid in South Africa we read the following:

(42) (. . .) que ha logrado superar el régimen del apartheid y los enfrentamientos entre la mayoría negra y la minoría blanca. (p. 121)

(. . .) *managed to overcome the apartheid regime and the confrontation between the black majority and the white minority.*

But we do not read any details about what apartheid really meant, how it is related to white (European) racism, and that it is not some kind of "confrontation" or conflict of which two parties are equally responsible, but rather a form of domination. Nor do we read about the black *struggle* against apartheid – and instead the students are presented with the bland and vague term "overcome", as one overcomes an illness. Here as elsewhere in textbooks, "rudimentary" agriculture is said to be modernized by "modern" methods brought by Europeans.

Volume 3 of the same book follows the same pattern as the corresponding Catalan book. It is proposed that immigration can be categorized by its legality or illegality (p. 64). Racism, as we have seen before, is not attributed to white European or Spaniards, but simply emerges as a natural phenomenon: : "(. . .) the last years has seen the emergence of xenophobia and racism" (p. 76). Immigrants are exclusively portrayed in stereotypical jobs, as a picture of an immigrant collecting garbage suggests. No mention is made or pictures shown of one of the many thousands of doctoral students from Latin America and that in many PhD programs they form a majority, such that without them the PhD program would not even exist – such would not be consistent with stereotypes. Immigrants are said to have frequent problems of integration, and only occasionally (p. 96) it is also said that Spanish people have fequent problems with the integration of immigrants – a mitigated reference to discrimination, prejudice and racism.

The evidence presented in this section is limited to the analysis of textbooks. Obviously, to arrive at a complete picture of the role of educational discourse in the reproduction of racism and antiracism, we would need to investigate what happens in the classroom. There are as yet no publicly available data about the educational practices and lesson contents of teachers – situations that are usually not accessible to researchers. There is however some evidence that even in multicultural schools some teachers treat immigrant children in a racist way (Patiño 2004). We have no way of knowing how widespread this problem is.

Conclusions

The textbooks show the stereotypical polarization between *Us* and *Them*, between Us in the North, in Europe or in Spain, on the one hand, and Them in the South or in the Third World, on the other hand. Very little variation or diversity is observed among Us or Them. For instance, in the South there are no rich people, and in the North there are no poor people. Immigration is represented as motivated and caused only by the needs of immigrants, not by the needs or benefits of the receiving countries. The information about the immigrants is scarce, and largely limited to some simple statistics about how many there are, where they come from, and where they settle. Their work is stereotypically described as what Spanish people do not want to do. There is no diversity of information about motivation of immigration or type of work the immigrants do. Even if little information is given about immigrants, one of the standard items is virtually always that many of them are illegal. No information is given about 'illegal' employers who give work to immigrants without papers. Also, it is emphasized that immigrants have problems to "integrate themselves". Little information is given about the causes of lacking integration, and such causes hardly have to do with the receiving population. Racism, prejudice and discrimination are sometimes mentioned, but in general, abstract terms, and not as a major problem of *Us* in Spain or Europe, and of which we are the active agents. It is never described what the consequences are in the everyday lives of immigrants. No details are given about the kinds of daily discrimination. More generally, negative aspects of *Us* in the North are ignored, toned down or described in very vague and general terms. This is also true for the (lacking) account about colonization and its consequences, as well as contemporary globalization.

These are not just incidental problems of a single textbook. Given the similarity of the Catalan and Castillian textbooks, we surmise that these features characterize the curriculum and hence many textbooks. The new education law proposed by the PP, but suspended by the PSOE government confirms the eurocentric perspective of education in Spain (Tomassini Vilariño & Lecina 2004).

The consequence for the learning process of autochthonous adolescents in Spain is serious: They are not prepared for active and adequate participation in an increasingly multicultural society. This should hardly come as a surprise, because their teachers have not been trained in multicultural programs either. Thus, teachers and students alike lack knowledge and insight into one of the most important social issues of our time, immigration and racism, and have

not been prepared for daily interaction with fellow citizens from other countries and cultures. Ignorant about what racism means they will not be able to recognize it when they see it, nor be able to take into account the serious difficulties immigrants may experience who are victims of everyday racism. In sum, on the basis of our analysis we must conclude that current textbooks and curricula in Spain need serious revision if they want to contribute to the necessary knowledge and abilities of the citizens in a multicultural society. And since textbooks play such a fundamental role in education, and because of lack of time and adequate education teachers hardly will be able to provide alternative materials, and students in their everyday lives are rather confronted with the same stereotypes and prejudices, we may also conclude that our findings, confirming those of other scholars, more generally imply a serious problem and challenge of education in Spain that urgently needs to be addressed.

Racism and the Law

Of the courts, also in Spain, one would expect principled respect for the law, including the provisions against discrimination and racist behavior. Article 22.4 of the new (1996) Penal Code imposes harsher punishment for crimes with racist intent (see also Pajares 1998: 305ff.).

In the report of S.O.S. Racismo of 2000, there is a section that summarizes some 14 cases of racist crimes, such as police officers that beat up immigrants, racist insults, and skinheads who attack immigrants. The 2004 S.O.S. report list further examples of harassment and aggression of police officers against immigrants (S.O.S. Racismo 2004: 269ff.). Of course these lists are merely the top of the iceberg, since the police force is not exactly keen on broadcasting in press conferences the racist harassments by its officers. There is no general information about convictions for racist crimes, or crimes against immigrants more in general. If the S.O.S. Racismo reports are complete, legal action against racist crimes would of course cover only a fragment of the thousands of cases each year in which immigrants are discriminated against in all sectors of society, or in which they are attacked or insulted. After the violent events in El Ejido, 693 accusations were filed, but none of them led to a conviction. In this case the courts were apparently just as passive as the police who did not intervene in the attacks. In an unusual case in 1998 a judge declared a man non guilty for having contracted and treated an Algerian man as a slave (*El País,* Nov. 8, 1998, p. 38).

Despite the general lack of data of racism and the law, we do have a recent study on discriminatory treatment in the courtroom. The Law School of the University of Zaragoza examined 8.182 cases in the courts throughout Spain, and found that when immigrants are suspects they are mostly (60%) convicted. But when they are plaintiffs, there are only 25% convictions, much lower than the average (S.O.S. Racismo 2004: 252).

Another communicative event that sheds some light on the ethnic attitudes of the elites in the realm of the Law was the speech the President of the Supreme Court, Francisco Hernando, delivered at the opening of the Judicial Year on September 16, 2002. In this speech he comments extensively on 'illegal' immigrants who pressure the authorities to be legalized "*al margen de las cauces del Derecho*" ("outside the normal channels of the law"). He argues against international solidarity and fraternity of all human beings when these lead to permissivity in the area of illegal immigration. He warns that illegal immigration may threaten the economy, public order and the level of public services (*El País,* September 17, 2002).

With his conservative speech, Hernando appears to confirm the policies and attitudes of the (former) Aznar government. For the argument of this book, this event is another confirmation of the thesis that xenophobic policies and ideologies are formulated and developed by the elites, whose discourse in barely more politically correct style preformulates the sometimes cruder racism of the street.

We also see that elite attitudes on immigration are not isolated, but tend to be formulated and implemented coherently across the various elite groups of society, in this case between politics and the judiciary. In Spain, this means in particular how anti-foreigner attitudes are widespread in the conservative Partido Popular (supported by the majority of the top legal magistrates of the country), and that explicit formulation of such attitudes apparently is no longer politically incorrect.

Again, this does not mean that there is some kind of conspiracy, but only that right-wing conservatism happens to be thinking in the same way on matters of immigration and minority policy. And if the President of the Supreme Court thinks and openly speaks the way he does, we may safely assume that many judges and state attorneys in the country will hardly be more lenient when it comes to 'illegals' on trial, to decisions about residency or the struggle against racism and discrimination in society.

Our evidence on elite racism in the judiciary is however anecdotal and speculative, and obviously needs to be complemented by systematic research on actual cases and arguments. This is another task for future research in Spain.

The Church

There are many areas in which the Spanish Catholic church, during but also after Franco's dictatorship, hardly played a positive role. In most moral matters, especially those related to sexuality, gay marriages, the role of women, and so on, the church hierarchy continues to apply socially retrograde rules. The opposition of the church hierarchy against the progressive measures of the Zapatero government is ferocious.

As is usual elsewhere, this does not mean that all Catholics or even all priests are reactionaries, and there are many who are at the forefront of social change. This is also true for the struggle against racism and for the protection of undocumented immigrants against expulsion, probably one of the most positive areas of church activities, both in Spain as elsewhere in Europe. Those threatened by expulsion sometimes find shelter in a church. Of all the official institutions, thus, the churches today perhaps are most explicitly antiracist, and frequent official statements are made in favor of immigrants.

We have no contemporary data of racist official discourse of Church officials in Spain. As in any institution also in the Church there are many forms of positive self-presentation. Thus in a document by the well-known Pontificia Committee "*Iusticia et Pax*", "*La Iglesia ante el Racismo. Para una Sociedad más Fraterna*" (The Church confronting racism. For a more fraternal society). (www.mercaba.org/consejos/pax/racismo_01.htm), we find a strong position against racism, with a brief history of racism, from Antiquity until today. In this history, the (Catholic) Church plays an exemplary role. Racism, claims this report, from the start has been condemned by various Popes, whatever the behavior of the worldly powers, beginning with Paul III's Bull Sublimus Deus of 1537, which explicitly says that the Indians may not be deprived of their freedom or goods. In this series of positive voices, we also find, of course, that of Bartolomé de Las Casas, as the priest who defended the Indians and denounced (Spanish) cruelty against them.

Of course a brief history can hardly be complete, but it is at least biased when no word is found about the activities of the '*Reyes Católicos*', the role of the Church in the expulsion of Jews from Spain, and of countless priests and popes that *did* practice or tolerate racist behavior towards the indigenous peoples of the Americas, and later towards the African slaves, throughout the Americas.

That is, also the Church has historically been profoundly related to the forms of colonialist and racist domination of Spain and other colonial powers. Whether they treated and discriminated the Others first of all as non-

Christians, and not as members of another 'race', merely shows that 'racial' racism and 'cultural' racism have been a unified phenomenon from the start.

However, in the current situation in Spain, one of the few documents we have, an article on the Church organization Caritas (Herrera 2000), emphasizes the good work of Caritas for immigrant workers in Spain. We lack the data to present a different angle on such religious institutional activities in contemporary Spain. However, the general impression about Caritas, also among other NGOs and (other) immigrant organizations, is rather positive, and hence an example of an elite organization that does give a good example. Unfortunately, they are a minority and have no power.

Increased immigration, especially from North Africa, also has led to an increased presence of Muslims in Spain. One of the many consequences of such religious diversity is that this also means that mosques are appearing here and there in this traditionally predominantly catholic country – not always without frictions caused by intolerant citizens, as we also have seen elsewhere in Western Europe. Multiculturalism thus not only becomes a challenge in the schools, but also in the realm of religion.

Academia

Also for the universities, research institutes, and hence for academic discourse, we as yet lack the empirical data to make reliable generalized statements on academic racism in Spain. As is the case for the Church, explicitly racist or xenophobic voices are seldom heard in academia – and if they occur they are not reported in the press. As is also the case in the Netherlands and elsewhere, the reverse is also true: There is no broad antiracist movement in academia either, at least not among professors. Students are generally more openly critical of racism and restrictions on immigration, as is also clear from the '*encierros*' in Almería and Sevilla mentioned above, in which the students were quite active. Such sit-ins usually generate much local and national debate about the situation of undocumented immigrants.

Critical studies on racism in Spain are hitherto rare and have been referred to above. Major interest is in immigration topics more generally, not in detailed investigation of racist practices or discourses. Most publications on racism are anecdotal. Few academic study programs explicitly deal with racism, although an increasing number deal with immigration, interculturalism, and so on.

The only recent data we have about 'academic' racism is a quantitative study of student attitudes about immigration carried out by Calvo Buezas

(2001), the last of a series of similar studies undertaken by the same author among youths. Although we hardly need to emphasize the limitations of surveys when it comes to studying complex social attitudes, e.g., because of the widespread tendency to give politically correct answers about a sensitive topic such as immigration, this study at least provides some results on what students explicitly say in such a survey. The main results of Calvo Buezas's study may be summarized as follows:

- Nearly 90% of the students, and especially the female students, feel antipathy against skinheads and neo-Nazis.
- The ethnic group that still receives most antipathy from (especially the male) students are the Gitanos, who are rejected by 36.5% of the students, followed by the 'Moros' (26.5%) and the Catalans (23.5%). Other groups and peoples receive rejection rates of less than 10%. Thus Blacks are negatively judged by only 3.7% of the students. Feminists are rejected by 27.1% of the students, expectedly rather by the men (39.4%) rather than by the women (17.8%).
- These negative attitudes are even more pronounced when the students are asked whether they would mind marrying members of different groups. Now, Gitanos and 'Moros' are rejected as marriage partners by nearly half of the students, whereas (African or Latin American) Blacks are rejected as partners by nearly 20% of the students. Virtually no one has problems marrying white/European people.
- More radical attitudes, such as wanting to throw people out of the country, are shared by some 15% of the students, both for Gitanos and 'Moros'. The same attitude about Blacks is shared by 5% of the students. Only about 4% of the students would vote for a party, such as Le Pen's *Front National* in France, which would advocate such policies.
- About 77.4% of the students disagree with the thesis that the white race has historically been the most developed, cultivated and superior of all races. More significant perhaps is the fact that nearly 20% of the students agree with this thesis.
- The large majority of the students (78%) finds Spanish society racist, and half of them finds themselves a bit racist, and the other half that they are not racist.
- The majority of the students (56.8%) finds that there are now enough foreigners and that we need to prevent others from coming. Less than a third of the students (30.9%) does not agree with that and thinks that there are relatively few immigrants and that Spain can have more of them.

- A large majority of the students (71.1%) does not agree with the claim that the immigrants take away jobs from Spanish workers, but a large minority (27.6%) does accept this thesis.
- The well-known association of immigrants, drugs and crime is explicitly accepted by a large minority (41.7%) of the students, and only a small majority (56.4%) rejects blaming the immigrants. Also a majority (52.2%) thinks that immigration has more drawbacks than advantages.
- Most students (85.4%) prefer a multicultural, mestizo society, and nearly the same amount also would let the immigrants preserve their own cultures (whereas 13.6%) advocates cultural assimilation.
- Most students (57.7%) think that Spain has more or the same amount of immigrant workers than the rest of the European countries. Only 9.1% knows that there are much less immigrants in Spain than in other European countries.
- For a host of other opinions on immigration, it is usually about 70–80% of the students that give the 'politically correct' answer, whereas about 20–30% of the students reject such opinions, for instance whether immigrants have the same rights as Spanish people, may bring their family, will eventually be accepted, and those without papers need not be sent back to their countries.
- Women are on many opinions more tolerant than the men (except for instance about 'Moros').
- Generally the upper (middle) class students are more against immigrants than the lower class students. For instance 35.4% of upper class students and 18.9% of lower class students is against 'Moros'. On the other hand, when it comes to the option to throw out Gitanos or immigrants, such attitudes are more frequent among the upper as well as the lower class. The differences with middle class students are sometimes dramatic in this case.
- The university students compared with adolescents are in general less prejudiced.

Although survey data about students do not tell the whole story about their attitudes, and students do not represent all academics, these data provide at least a glimpse of the attitudes of the future elites. Generally, students are politically more to the left, and ethnically more tolerant of diversity and immigration than older elites, so that many of the attitudes reported here will probably become less tolerant when they grow older. We have seen that the general tendency is that the large majority of the students welcome the multicultural, mestizo society, and do not profess anti-foreigner attitudes.

On the other hand there are still significant minorities that feel antipathy against Gitanos and 'Moros', the two emblematic groups of Spanish prejudice and racism through the ages. In comparison to these attitudes, those about Blacks are generally much less negative. When the relationships are – imagined to be – closer (such as marrying someone from the other group) the attitudes become much less positive. Even in these survey questions the majority of the respondents think that there are enough immigrants, and others should be prevented from coming (an opinion also related to the wrong perception among most students that Spain has the same amount of immigrants as other countries in Europe). Similarly, also nearly half of the respondents tend to associate immigrants with crime. It should also be stressed that the racist tendencies among the upper class and the lower class are stronger, obviously for opposed reasons, such as social and cultural distance for the upper class and social competition for the lower class. If some sections of the elites are drawn from the upper classes, and upper class students often share the social attitudes of their parents, this also provides us some further insight into the ethnic attitudes among the conservative, upper class elites in Spain.

If we also take into account that in surveys responses to explicit questions will tend to be more positive than when the same people talk spontaneously, especially among their own group, it is very likely that the attitudes will generally be less positive. On the other hand, we also see that the xenophobic attitudes tend to be moderate, in the sense that the more radical racist ones (exemplified by the opinion that the Others must be thrown out of the country) are definitely a small minority. More generally, violence is rejected, and violent groups among Us (skin-heads, neo-Nazis) generally not accepted.

Concluding remarks

Considering the ethnic situation in Spain as a whole, and racism and elite discourse in particular, the preliminary overall conclusion from the limited number of research reports and data available is that Spain in this respect has become a Western European country like the others. Racist attitudes, ideologies and discriminatory practices can be found in any domain of society, also in elite discourses. With the conservative Partido Popular and given the development of right-wing and racist policies in the rest of Europe, this tendency has been exacerbated over the last few years this party was in power. Like elsewhere, this tendency is usually attributed to increased immigration, of which especially undocumented immigration is focused upon.

Historically most important to understand racism in Spain has been Arab occupation of the peninsula and the following reconquista and the expulsion of the Jews by the Reyes Católicos more than 500 years ago, followed by centuries of racist colonization of the Americas. This historical background is necessary to account for at least part of the current racism. The other major historical dimension and continuity has been the presence and age-old discrimination of Gitanos and Gitanas, and their problematization and marginalization until today.

One of the most significant differences between Spain and most of Western Europe, is that Spain has no right-wing, racist party represented in parliament. Many of the attitudes and ideologies elsewhere defended by such parties find their natural home in the Partido Popular. The association of the leading elites, beginning with former Prime Minister Aznar, of 'illegal' immigration with crime, as well as other ideas and policies, are not fundamentally different from racist right-wing parties elsewhere. In the autonomous regions such as Basque Country and Catalonia, some more conservative forces in regional or linguistic nationalism may further exacerbate the state nationalism of the central government and the conservative party in Madrid.

Current reports as well as my own observations and analyses suggest that, again in comparison to for instance tabloid racism in the UK or Germany, discursive racism in the Spanish media is generally moderate, especially in the more progressive newspapers. Explicit racist views seldom have access to the media, whereas antiracist voices, for instance about national or European policies on immigration are quite common. Dominant is reporting on irregular immigration and on the various political and legal debates on immigration. Crime and violence by immigrants are reported but is not a dominant topic in the national elite press. On the other hand, racism is not a frequent theme either, and it is generally limited to reports on racist violence and blatant discrimination. Everyday elite racism in the many institutions and organizations is not a prominent media topic. The general conclusion for most of the Spanish press is that it is neither explicitly racist nor explicitly antiracist, but tends to write in terms of stereotypes about immigrants and the events that are most spectacular, such as the arrival of the Spanish version of 'boat people' across the Straits of Gibraltar. This also means that in the more liberal major newspaper we may occasionally find more explicitly antiracist opinion articles, and in the more conservative press a more explicitly xenophobic article, and more generally support for the anti-immigration policies of the current government.

About the other elite forces in Spain we have very little (discourse) data. The few discourses examples we have about the business elites is that in general

they welcome immigration if that means cheap labor. At the daily, interactional level on the work floor between Spanish employers and foreign workers, there is evidence of widespread discrimination and prejudice, including frequent racist slurs and other discriminatory discourse about immigrants. Such opinions and practices may be found throughout the population, and hence also among the rank and file of the police force, with the much more serious effect of cases of police harassment against immigrants.

For the other elite realms, such as education, research, the judiciary, the church, the police, the army, and the state bureaucracies, among others, we still have insufficient data to make general conclusions.

There is some (survey) evidence that young academics generally favor a multicultural society, and have little prejudice against black people, but also that there are still significant minorities with strong prejudices against Gitanos/Gitanas and 'moros', especially when it comes to closer, personal contacts. Also, as among the rest of the population, most young academics are opposed to further immigration.

Education is struggling with the increased arrival of children from many countries and cultures, and current attempts at multicultural policies and practices often remain limited to seeing linguistic and cultural differences as a problem rather than as a valuable contribution to the diversity in the schools and in society. We have presented some data that suggest very stereotypical, eurocentric textbooks in which racism is largely ignored or mitigated.

We also have some data that suggest that especially at the top of the traditional institutions of the church and the judiciary there remain powerful elite attitudes against immigration, integration and a multicultural society.

For all these domains, much further research will be needed to obtain more reliable and extensive data that will allow us to assess the forms of elite discourse and racism in Spain.

The data also have shown that ethnic attitudes change as fast as the ethnic situation. In just a few years, opinions in politics, the media and among the population at large have undergone sometimes dramatic transformations towards more intolerant and sometimes explicitly racist positions. Immigration, integration and the increasingly visible presence of people from other countries, cultures or continents have become prominent topics of text and talk, both in everyday conversation as well as in elite discourse, and have become a major challenge for Spanish society. Such everyday discourses are not primarily based on personal experiences though. Rather they are (also) inspired by the prevalence of many kinds of elite discourse, especially as reported and published in the media. Thus, whereas immigration has become a topic of de-

bate as well as a matter of rather general concern, and generally defined as a problem if not as a threat, the same is not true for racism.

Although it is probably true to say that as yet the forms of racism in Spain are more moderate than elsewhere in Europe, there is enough evidence that suggests that prejudices and discrimination are on the rise. That is, there is reason for serious concern, especially among the political, media, academic and judicial elites who should give the good example, and who should be on the forefront of the official struggle against racism. If no such concerted action is taken soon, Spanish multicultural society in the making will show the same fundamental problems that result from 'white' racism elsewhere in Europe and the Americas.

Chapter 3

Elite discourse and racism in Latin America

Introduction

Racism in Latin America has many properties in common with racism in Europe, not least because also in the Americas it is especially engaged in by people of European descent and with similar ideologies about non-Europeans we have found in the previous chapter. Yet, there are important historical, economic, social and cultural particularities, as well as differences among various Latin-American countries, that need to be stressed from the start:

- Latin-American racisms are systems of ethnic-racial dominance historically rooted in European colonialism and its legitimization, that is, in conquest, the exploitation and genocide of the indigenous Amerindian peoples and the enslavement of Africans by European settlers and their descendants.
- Racism in Europe is generally directed against "foreigners" who are "different", whereas in Latin America it is the foreign immigrants from Europe and their descendants who discriminated against the indigenous peoples, as well as against the descendants of "different foreigners" from Africa.
- More recently, patterns of economic migration within Latin America itself have been accompanied by xenophobic reactions against more indigenous looking migrants, e.g., against people from Bolivia and Paraguay in Argentina, against people from Peru and Ecuador in Chile or against people from Guatemala in Mexico.
- Because of complex patterns of miscegenation, these structures of ethnic-racial dominance do not just involve "whites" (Europeans) and "non-whites" (non-Europeans), but mestizos and mulattos of very diverse appearance, status or power, who variously may be agents, collaborators or victims of racism, depending on context.
- Besides European settlers and their descendants, also many people from other countries and cultures migrated to Latin America, such as Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Lebanese and other Arabs, South Asian Indians, and so on. With Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews who migrated to Latin Amer-

ica at various moments, these immigrants may also be variously involved in ethnic inequality, whether as victims of 'euroracism' (racism perpetrated by 'white' Europeans and their descendants) or actively as agents of discrimination against indigenous peoples and afrolatinos.

- Despite these complex varieties of prejudice, discrimination, ethnicism or racism, the overall tendency is that virtually everywhere in the Americas more European looking groups discriminate against less European looking groups. In that sense, Latin-American racism is a variant of European racism.
- Despite the official celebration of '*mestizaje*' in several countries, and despite the pride of a unique 'Latin' identity in an international context, the ideology of Euro-American racism tends to associate being white or more (North) European looking with more positive qualities and values, such as intelligence, ability, education, beauty, honesty, kindness, etc. The opposite is the case for less European-looking people who may variably be associated with ugliness, laziness, delinquency, irresponsibility, backwardness, lack of intelligence, and so on.
- Latin-American racism is closely associated, and hence often confounded (and excused) with classism. The general tendency is that class hierarchies often correspond with 'color hierarchies': The more African or Amerindian looking peoples are often also the poorest and more generally have less access to and control over scarce social resources. However, although this is the general tendency, 'race'/ethnicity and class do not always run parallel, and there are many discontinuities and contradictions in a very complex system of social forces that may vary from country to country and from region to region in each country.
- This complex association with class inequality also means that class, status or other forms of material or symbolic power may partly compensate for 'race', in the sense that for instance rich or famous black people may be seen, at least in some contexts, as 'less black', and be treated accordingly. This is a especially the case if these famous black people are from another country, e.g., from the USA.
- In the same way as people may rise in the racial hierarchy by rising in the class hierarchy, there have been other processes of 'whitening', including the promotion of immigration from Europe, interracial marriages, and so on.
- This system of classism-racism is structurally also combined with sexism and male dominance, and most patterns of dominance mentioned here usually affect women most.

- As is the case with racism in Europe, also Latin-American racisms are often mitigated or denied, e.g., by attributing differences of power, position or status to class.
- It is still widely believed, especially by the elites of the 'whiter' dominant groups (and not only in Brazil), that their country is a 'racial democracy' or that race relations in their country are more benevolent and cordial than in the USA or Europe.
- Latin-American racism is a variable mixture of 'racial' and 'ethnic' racisms, the first typically targeted at people of African descent, the second at indigenous people who are perceived to be socioculturally (and even geographically) most distant and most different from the dominant (white, mestizo or mulatto) groups, and hence most often defined as the real Others. Yet, in the patterns of dominance of everyday Latin-American racism, appearance ('race') and culture are often fused in one form of being 'different' from 'Us'.
- The social, economic and cultural reality of racism in Latin America is based on forms of discrimination – such as inferiorization, marginalization or exclusion – that manage the unequal distribution of material and symbolic power resources as they are most relevant in each country and context. Thus, the more African and indigenous looking people generally are more limited in their access to (more or better) capital, land, jobs, income, housing, neighborhoods, education, knowledge, information, status, fame, respect, and so on.
- This system of discrimination or everyday racism is based on and legitimated by an ideology of Latin-American racism involving many of the concepts, norms, values and attitudes about racial-color-ethnic hierarchies mentioned above.
- Where there is racism, there is generally also antiracism, also in Latin America. That is, historically, the victims of racism have often taken an active role, by escaping from or resisting slavery and other forms of racist domination and exploitation. At present, black and indigenous peoples are increasingly forming organizations that oppose racism, strengthen their own power and identity and in general advocate the protection of human rights, equality and democracy. Similarly, also among the dominant white(r) elites, there are people and organizations that have actively resisted racism and shown solidarity with discriminated minorities or majorities. Also the Nation States themselves, together with the Organization of American States, UN organizations, the International Labor Organi-

zation, the World Bank and various NGOs, have participated in various programs and declarations to eradicate racism.

– As a consequence of these forms of resistance, ethnic-racial diversity, growing antiracism and some forms of power sharing have recently become established in several countries in Latin America, and even enshrined in laws and constitutions, as is the case in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil. Although in politics much of this is still limited to official rhetoric, and changes 'on the ground' have been slow or virtually non-existent, it should be recognized that there is an overall tendency of changing attitudes, of consciousness raising and of more sensitive everyday practices, making racism often more indirect and more subtle – and hence harder to combat, as is the case in Europe and the United States.

These are, obviously, very general principles, with many local variations and exceptions. For each region and each country they need to be translated for the specific groups, forms of dominance, and sociocultural contexts that have historically developed there (although there are few general studies of racism in Latin America, see, e.g., Almeida 1999; Bello & Rangel 2002; Domínguez 1994; Hopenhayn & Bello 2001; Klich & Rapoport 1997; Knight 1996; Minority Rights Group 1995; Sagrera 1998; Wade 1997; Whitten & Torres 1998, as well as the references for specific countries given later in this chapter).

Some (approximate) statistics

To give an impression of the numbers and percentages of indigenous peoples in Latin America, see Table 2 (borrowed from the www.gtz.de website about indigenous peoples in Latin America). Most indigenous people live in Mexico, Peru and Ecuador, and we shall deal with racism in these countries below. In the other countries we deal with, such as Argentina, Chile and Brazil the number of indigenous peoples is very low.

We find Latin Americans of African descent especially in the Caribbean countries, as well as in Brazil, Perú, and Ecuador. The approximate statistics are given in Table 3.

Both for the indigenous and the afrolatin population in Latin America, these statistics are of course only approximations – which vitally depend on self- or other-definitions of membership in these two communities. If one would apply the 'one-drop' criterion that traditionally defined being African American in the USA, then many more people in Latin America would be classified as indigenous or afrolatin. If we take local definitions and self-

Table 2. Estimated percentage of indigenous peoples of the total population of Latin America

Country	Indigenous population		Part of the total population in %	
	Inst. Indigenist	*World Bank*	*Inst. Indigenista*	*World Bank*
Argentina	350,000	360,000	1.00	1.10
Belize	30,000	27,000	19.00	14.70
Bolivia	4,500,000	4,150,000	63.00	56.80
Brazil	300,000	225,000	0.20	0.20
Caribbean Islands	3,000	x	0.01	x
Colombia	600,000	300,000	2.00	0.90
Costa Rica	30,000	26,000	1.00	0.90
Chile	800,000	550,000	6.00	4.20
Ecuador	4,100,000	3,100,000	40.00	29.50
El Salvador	400,000	1,000	7.00	0.02
Guatemala	5,800,000	3,900,000	66.00	43.80
Guyana	15,000	x	6.00	x
Honduras	600,000	110,000	12.04	2.10
Mexico	7,800,000	12,000,000	9.00	14.20
Nicaragua	160,000	48,000	5.00	14.25
Panama	140,000	99,000	5.05	4.10
Paraguay	100,000	80,000	3.00	1.90
Peru	8,400,000	9,100,000	40.00	40.80
Suriname	30,000	x	6.00	x
Venezuela	400,000	150,000	2.00	0.80
Total of LA LA & Caribbean	**34,225,000**	**34,426,000**	**7.72**	**12.76**

–: no indigenous population
x: no estimated data available
Sources:
World Bank, Regional & Sectorial Studies:
Indigenous Peoples & Poverty in Latin America, Washington D.C., Sept. 1994
Instituto Indigenista Interamericano (III), *América Indígena*, Vol. LV, No. 3, Mexico 1995

categorization there are also many differences between countries, groups and even individuals within groups – such that generally people in Latin America will tend to categorize themselves as 'white' even when they for others may be seen and defined as mestizos. With growing political selfconsciousness and critical attitudes, such forms of ethnic denial is of course less prominent. We see this difference especially dramatically in the case of Brazil, where the estimates of 'afrodescentes' vary between 57 million and 129 million.

Table 3. Afro-descendant population in Latin America

	Minimum and maximum estimates (1)				Other Source (2)	
Countries	**Minimum**	**%**	**Maximum**	**%**	**%**	**Total**
Brazil	57 million	33	129 million	75	44	75.6 million
Colombia	6.5 million	15	18 million	43	21	9.1 million
Venezuela	2.2 million	9	17 million	70		
Dominican Rep.	946,000	11	7.7 million	90	84	7.2 million
Peru	1.6 million	6	2.6 million	10		
Panama	406,000	14	2.2 million	77		
Ecuador	645,000	5	1.3 million	10		
Nicaragua	468,000	9	676,000	13	9	468,000
Honduras	134,000	2	335,000	5		
Bolivia	170,000	2				
Uruguay	38,000	1			5	170,000
Cuba					62	7 million
French Guyana					66	132,000
Guyana					44	396,000
Suriname					41	164,000
Haiti					99	7.7 million
Jamaica					98	2.6 million
Puerto Rico					19	741,000

(1) Source: *No Longer Invisible: Afro-Latin Americans Today*, edited by Minority Rigths Group (London, 1995); Actualized with population for 2001
(2) Source: The CIA World Factbook 2001

Regional and contextual differences

Racism against indigenous peoples in Mexico is different from the racism experienced by mulattos in Brazil, or the racism against Peruvian or Bolivian immigrant workers in Argentina. Black people in Colombia have different everyday experiences with racism than those in Brazil, Nicaragua or Cuba. And racism against blacks in Brazil, Venezuela or Colombia is different from racism against the indigenous peoples in the same country.

Also, much of what has been said above applies differently in the South-Caribbean, where several countries or islands have virtually no white-European domination, but other forms of combined ethnic-racial dominance. This is for instance the case in Suriname, Guyana, or Trinidad and Tobago, where besides African, Amerindian and European also South-Asian groups are part of the complex ethnic-racial structure (Premdas 1995). Since this chapter only deals with some of the bigger countries of Latin America, we shall have to say very little on these Caribbean countries.

In some countries, such as Argentina, Chile and Brazil, indigenous groups are small minorities, whereas in others they are sizable or major parts of the population, as is the case in much of Central America, Ecuador and Peru. The same is true for people of African descent, which are small minorities in Mexico and the 'Cono Sur' (the Southern tip of South America), but large minorities or majorities in Brazil and the Caribbean, depending who is defined as being an African Latin American.

Jews

This chapter shall not deal with anti-Semitism in Latin America, about which there are already many studies, both in English and in Spanish (see, e.g., Elkin 1987; and for a bibliography, Elkin & Sater 1990). As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, the presence of Sephardic Jews in Latin America dates back to the earliest years of Spanish conquest, when Jews were banned from Spain. Through the centuries they were joined by Ashkenazi Jews from other parts of Europe, especially as a result of Nazi persecution since the early 1930s. The fate of Jews in various Latin American countries has been as variable as the different countries and regimes, from Cuba and Mexico to Brazil and Argentina, would allow (see, among many other studies, e.g., Lesser 1995; Levine 1993; Loker 1991). Although many Jewish communities, most of which are quite small, are now more or less integrated in the countries where they live, there often remains a sense in which they are seen and treated as different, and may still be discriminated against (Elkin 1987).

In the eyes of the indigenous and African American minorities, Jews will usually be seen as 'white', and – where prosperous – also as part of the elites by which they may be discriminated. On the other hand, as is the case in Europe and the United States, Jews in Latin America may also be prominently involved in antiracist movements.

The large majority of Latin American Jews (about 200,000) now live in Argentina, where their cultural Center (AMIA) suffered a terrorist bomb attack on July 18, 1994, in which 86 people where killed and more than 300 wounded – two years after a bomb attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, in which 29 people were killed and 242 injured. For years the investigations of the bombings were frustrated, also because of the alleged involvement of Argentine police officers in a complex conspiracy, now believed to be associated with Syrian nationals, in order to persuade former president Menem to change his pro-Israel policies. Besides these terrorist attacks, Jews in Argentina

may also be the victim of many forms of everyday anti-Semitism by ordinary Argentines (Avni 1986; Gardosky 1988; Kleiner 1984; Mirelman 1990).

Other immigrant communities

There are many other immigrant communities in Latin America that may be discriminated against by 'Eurolatins', such as Koreans in Argentina, Japanese in Brazil, South-Asians (Indians) in the Caribbean, or Lebanese, other Arabs and Chinese throughout Latin America. As is the case for mestizos, mulattos and Jews in several countries, they may occupy or be assigned "intermediate" positions, in which they variously may have the role of victims of European racism or perpetrators of discrimination against blacks or indigenous peoples, especially also depending on their class, status and economic power. Unfortunately, we are unable to detail here these complex forms of ethnicism or racism in Latin America (see, among many other studies, e.g., Baltazar Rodríguez 1997; Cazorla 1995; Gómez Izquierdo 1991; Greiber, Maluf, & Mattar 1998; Lone 2001; Look Lai 1998).

Finally, also within Latin America, there is migration between countries, generally from poor to less poor countries. This means that many people from Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay moved to Argentina looking for work, at least until the recent economic problems in that country. The same is now true for Peruvians and Bolivians who are moving to Chile. As we shall see in more detail for Argentina below, these poor – and often more indigenous looking – immigrants maybe treated in the same discriminatory way as immigrants in Europe.

The agents of racism

Besides the differences between the victims of racism in Latin America, there are considerable differences between those who actively engage in the many forms of this kind of everyday dominance. Thus, for instance in Mexico or Brazil, there is a notable difference between the possibly subtle and symbolic racism of the elites in the capital, and the forms of sometimes violent racism of local landlords, for instance in Chiapas or the Amazon region, respectively. The racism of the Argentine elites against poor immigrant workers from neighboring countries is exercised and legitimated in a different way from that of poor Argentines who live in the same poor neighborhoods ('villas miseria'). as the immigrants. And the racism of the white upper-class '*paulista*' (citizen of São Paulo) in Brazil against blacks and mulattos within São Paulo itself, or when

on vacation in Bahia, is quite different from that of a poor white Nordestino (citizen in the North-East of Brazil) against an indigenous neighbor. There are significant differences of racism among the white elites of São Paulo themselves, for instance between a leftist university professor and a conservative business manager.

These local, regional and social differences of participants, class, profession, education, political ideology, as well as the differences of interaction context, define an infinite variety of forms of racism. Hence our frequent use of the plural 'racisms' when we speak about the situation in Latin America. For the same reasons we speak of 'racism(s)' rather than of 'ethnicism', because the racisms in Latin America are seldom only cultural, but usually blended with difference of 'racial' appearance, even when for instance the cultural and hence 'ethnic' differences with the indigenous population tend to be focussed on more than their different appearance.

As suggested before, this large variety of forms of dominance and exclusion in concrete contexts are often indistinguishable from those of class or gender. This does not mean that Latin-American racism therefore does not exist, or that no generalizations can be made. On the contrary, the general principles of racism formulated above apply in most situations in most countries, and allow us to speak of racism in all these situations in the first place. Of course, the interesting details are to be found in the unique contexts, experiences, and forms of enactment of racism in each country, region, and social situation, as we also shall see in the ways such racism (or antiracism) is expressed in discourse.

Elite racism

It is against this general background that this chapter will investigate some properties of elite discourse and racism in some countries in Latin America. Because of space limitations, and as indicated before, I shall only deal with racism and ethnicism in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and only briefly mention some other countries. As assumed above, we may expect similarities with elite discourse and racism in Europe and North America, but probably also particularities and differences among different countries in Latin America.

Given the general patterns of Latin American racism summarized above, we expect the Latin American elites and their discourses to be part of the problem – and, we may hope, to be part of the solution as well. If also in Latin America racism is generally 'white' racism, and if the dominant elites are gen-

erally 'white(r)' that non-dominant groups in society, there is little reason to assume that dominant discourse should be inconsistent with this tendency. It would be hard to understand how political, economic, social and cultural racisms could be reproduced only non-verbally, that is, without the discursive and ideological conditions that are necessary for the legitimization of these racisms and the formation and change of racist ideologies.

Yet, elite racism *might* be different from that in Europe. For instance, one could imagine that some of the 'symbolic' elites, for instance in the press or in scholarship, tend to be more anti-racist than in Europe, and thus form a dissident group with respect to the politicians or the business managers. If this should be the case, such a special role of journalists and scholars might be explained by their different socio-political and cultural position in Latin America, e.g., if they have political or moral credibility where politicians, judges or business people do not.

Thus, in Argentina, it is rather generally accepted that journalists of the quality press have acquired a prestige and credibility among the population – for instance by denouncing political corruption and social inequality – that politicians no longer have. Such a position might in principle extend to denouncing forms of political and other racism. But the opposite is equally true. If journalists see themselves as the voice of the people, and if they have the impression that popular resentment against immigration or against minority groups is widespread among large segments of the population, they might lose their credibility and ethical prestige if they should distance themselves too far from such popular feelings.

One of the main theses of this book and my earlier work (Van Dijk 1993) is that the general tendency of racism is top-down. That is, racism is preformulated, perhaps in rather moderate forms, by the symbolic elites in general, and by politicians and the media in particular. That is, it is hard to imagine popular racism, also in Latin America, without a preformulation of such racism in at least part of the media or other public discourses – as was earlier the case for literature read by some of the elites. Racism has to be learned, and hence taught, and does not arise spontaneously from everyday experiences: People need social categories of difference, criteria of superiority, examples, and in general a legitimization for their racism. The mass media, political discourse and didactic discourse are the main sources for such processes of communicating and reproducing racism.

This means that if elite racism in Latin America is generally less prominent than in Western Europe, or limited to only some elite segments of the population (for instance politicians), we still need to explain how racism can become

reproduced and widespread among the population at large. One explanation may be formulated in terms of historical change: Popular ('commonsense') racism may be more widespread in Latin America than in the USA or Europe not only by more intensive everyday 'interracial' experiences, but also because the underlying popular ideologies might be derived from *earlier* racist elite discourses, for instance in politics, the media or science. That is, the elites, or at least some of the elites, may have changed their ideologies in the last decades, on the one hand because of their own sociopolitical developments after the demise of the various dictatorships, or on the other hand under the influence of the civil rights movement in the USA, or because of a critical, external view of growing racist developments in Europe. Current popular ethnic attitudes may not yet have followed these changes.

Enrique Luengo (1998) in an article examining the 'indigenous otherness' in the (elite) discourses on Latin American identity, shows that on the one hand elite discourse in Latin America was historically quite explicitly racist – as also the racist immigration laws suggest – despite occasional celebrations of mestizo roots or indigenous histories. On the other hand, and more recently we find more 'modern' discourses celebrating *mestizaje* and ethnic diversity, though not without ambiguity and contradictions (such as celebrating indigenous peoples and derogating blacks, as is the case for peruvian writer José Carlos Mariátegui and his celebration of the '*raza cósmica*').

I shall however no longer speculate about whether or how elite discourse and racism are fundamentally different from that in Europe or North America, but rather look at some of the evidence we have been able to find in some studies on elite discourse and racism in Latin America.

It is important to recall though that Latin American racism is historically rooted in European colonialism and its racist beliefs and practices. Together with other ills and injustices it was massively 'imported' by the Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese and other European conquerors and settlers, and perpetuated by their descendants as well as by all those who thus learned to wield and legitimate power abuse on the basis of ethnic and 'racial' difference (Lewis 1995).

At the same time it is crucial to emphasize that the current racisms in Latin America are not merely a marginal legacy of colonialism or neocolonialist domination. It is ubiquitous in all countries of the Caribbean and South America, with variations merely in terms of its virulence, its manifestations and its victims. Its everyday practices affect the everyday lives of many millions of indigenous peoples and afrolatins and give shape to the social and political order of many of the countries on the continent. Together with other causes, it is at the root of poverty and exclusion from Mexico to the Cono Sur.

Thus, we have stressed that racism provides the basic explanatory structure of the undeniable everyday experience and observation in virtually all Latin American countries that whiter means better, and blacker (or more indigenous looking) means worse, in any domain of society and in any type of experience. This is not a superficial esthetic evaluation, but a simple rule of thumb summarizing a profound generalization about social hierarchy and dominance, according to which the more European looking people are virtually everywhere on top – in politics, business, the media, education and research, the judiciary, and so on – and the Others lower down or at the bottom of the hierarchy.

Of course, 'race', ethnicity or color are not the only organizing social force in Latin America, and we have emphasized that it is inextricably combined with caste, class or gender in the reproduction of the complex socioeconomic, political and cultural structures of each country and region. Moreover, it functions differently in the Caribbean or in Brazil, where many people are from African descent, in Peru where most people are indígenas or mestizos, or in Argentina, where the large majority of the people are of European descent.

One of the many properties, besides its common roots, that Latin American racism shares with that in Europe is that it is often denied by the white or mestizo elites, both in scholarly or political discourse, as well as in everyday conversation (Dulitzky 2000). We have seen that the common (and commonsense) explanation of the relatively greater poverty and marginalization of indigenous and black people is that this is not because of color or race, but because of class. The fact that some black people can be rich and famous, for instance in Brazil, or that indigenous people can become presidents as used to be the case in Mexico or as is now the case in Peru, is still taken by many as evidence that color or 'race' do not matter.

Consistent with the everyday experiences of indigenous and black people in Latin America, as well as on the basis of much specialized research, I shall however assume in the rest of this chapter that the particular regional variants of racism remain a powerful dimension of everyday life and social structure in Latin America.

It may well be that this racism is not rooted in differently constructed 'races', but rather in social perceptions of color or appearance, combined with ethnic differences such as language, religion or customs. Yet, even when many Latin Americans claim and feel they are all mestizos, and that thus a concept such as racism – based on racial difference and dominance – does not make sense, I shall interpret such denials as part of the very problem of racism.

In this respect this chapter is also written to support the increasing protests, social movements and critical academic investigations that aim to challenge

such denials and to counter the pervasive myths of racial equality and democracy as they are expressed in the constitutions and much other dominant political, media and scholarly discourses in Latin America (for a detailed account of official denials of racism and discrimination in Latin America until this day, see the excellent report by Dulitzky 2000).

Discursive racism

The concrete objective of this chapter is to make explicit some of these properties of Latin American racism by an analysis of examples of elite discourse in politics, the media and other domains of dominant discourse. If denial is one of the characteristics of such racism, this will also show up in many ways in discourse, for instance in explicit negations, in mitigation, euphemisms, alternative explanations of inequality, and other forms of denial. Similarly, the analysis should help us make explicit the underlying beliefs that form the socio-cognitive basis of Latin American racism, and the criteria that are being used by dominant group members and institutions to exclude, marginalize or problematize dominated groups.

It need not be recalled that discourse is not the only, the most important or the most incisive manifestation of racism in society. It is most definitely *not* my intention to reduce racism to its discursive practices, or to find most of its explanations in text or talk. Everywhere, and especially so in Latin America, racism first of all shows in the many everyday social practices of discrimination, exclusion, and problematization resulting in the overall social inequality defined in terms of lack of decent housing, health care, education, jobs or income. In Latin America, racism in everyday life first of all means poverty, rather than discursive marginalization. Much of the official discourse, e.g. in politics and the media, may appear surprisingly antiracist.

On the other hand, as we also have shown for Europe and North America (Van Dijk 1993), elite racism is often based on, legitimated by, or acquired by discourse. It is through this discourse that dominant group members learn the dominant ideologies of their group, as well as the norms, values and attitudes that organize the daily social practices of everyday discrimination and exclusion. Daily discrimination has reasons, and these reasons need to be acquired, reproduced and legitimated within the dominant groups. Prevalent social representations about indigenous or black people thus not only explain the reasons of unequal treatment but also need to show up in the many elite discourses of the dominant groups. That is, although as such discourse may

not be the major manifestation of racism in the everyday experiences of dominated peoples, its analysis does yield vital insights into the ideological and other mechanisms that are crucial in the reproduction of racism.

The prevalent denial of racism in Latin America not only means that systematic studies of such racism are few and far between, but especially that also its discursive forms have so far hardly been studied. Thus, we do not have a systematic body of research in each country of Latin America, in which the dominant political, media, educational, scientific, corporate or legal discourses about indigenous or black people are being studied. There are only a few of such studies, and many still limited to local MA or PhD theses that are hard to come by, or about which there is little international bibliographical information. Many of our data have been gleaned from very heterogeneous internet publications, of which those of minority organizations are often more than revealing about the forms of everyday racism in Latin America.

Another reason for the lack of books on discursive racism in Latin America is the fact that the vast majority of relevant studies on race relations have been carried out by local or foreign sociologists and anthropologists whose main focus is the ethnic groups themselves, rather than the patterns of power abuse by the dominant elites. Racism and other forms of marginalization may be a major dimension of the position of indigenous or black people, but it need not always be experienced as such in everyday interactions with dominant group members, and hence not be verbalized in such terms by the very members of ethnic minority groups. Many social scientists may be more interested in social dimensions of poverty and inequality (whether or not conceptualized in the framework of racism), or in cultural dimensions such as language, literature, art, or religion of ethnic minority groups, rather than in dominant elite discourses in politics, the media or education. In other words, my focus is on dominant white groups and their discourse rather than on blacks or indigenous peoples.

Conversely, despite broad Latin American interest in discourse and discourse analysis (it is the only region in the world that has its own association of discourse analysis, ALED), most linguists and discourse analysts have so far focused on other aspects of discourse, such as communication in the classroom or perhaps political discourse. Fortunately, during the ALED congress in Puebla, Mexico, 2003, several papers dealt with racist discourse, and we may expect increasing attention for this issue also in the study of language, discourse and communication in Latin America.

Racism is not part and parcel of the everyday life experiences of white academic elites, whether in Europe or in Latin America, so that there is seldom

direct personal interest, let alone motivating experience, in studying racist text and talk of their own group – a potential form of threatening self-criticism that is hardly popular anywhere.

We shall organize the rest of this chapter on a country by country basis, especially in order to describe and explain the historical and local differences in the types of racism and groups of people involved. Yet, since we do not have systematic data of even the most prominent countries of the region, and do not want to repeat the same questions for each country, I shall select some studies on various types of discourse in various countries for our account of discursive racism in Latin America. Where necessary, I shall add information about how and where such discourse types are different in different countries or regions of the continent.

It hardly needs emphasized that a single chapter cannot give but a very brief and superficial impression of discursive racism in Latin America. Each country would deserve at least a full monograph to begin to understand the complexities of the many types of elite text and talk that contribute to the reproduction of (and resistance against) racism and ethnicism in that country. This means that we can only study a few countries and only a few discourse types, and hardly beyond a first analysis of a few examples. Future research will need to provide the necessary details about discursive racism in the various countries of Latin America.

Political discourse

As is the case in Europe, political discourse in Latin America is usually public and for the record. Whether or not because they might lose important votes, or because of official ideologies of racial democracy, pluralism, and tolerance or just because of other types of political correctness, politicians in Latin America at present seldom explicitly derogate minority groups. Moreover, unlike in Europe, and perhaps with the exception of Argentina (Margulis & Urresti 1998), in Latin America immigration of "foreigners" is seldom experienced as threatening by large segments of the population, and hence also hardly a major political concern, nor a populist topic that can be used for political gain. Historically immigration of Europeans was often welcomed as a way to 'whiten' the country. That is, if political discourse is about ethnic groups, it is generally about indigenous groups or about people from African descent.

Today, from Mexico to Brazil, most official political discourse is full of respect for the indigenous roots of officially defined mestizo nations (see also

Urban & Sherzer 1991), as well as for the rights of people of African descent. Nor can the basic social and economic ills of the Latin American states be credibly attributed to indigenous or black minorities (or majorities in some countries, as in Brazil or Peru) as would typically be the case with immigration in Western Europe.

In other words, there does not seem to be an obvious *political* reason why public political discourse in Latin America would be explicitly racist, or disparage minority groups. On the contrary, even among the dominant white elites, formal recognition of the indigenous roots of the nation may inspire feelings of national pride, as would be the case in Mexico, Peru or Brazil (but not for instance in Chile or Argentina). That is, if such political discourse is racist, this is rather because politicians are usually recruited from the classes that for *social* rather than *political* reasons feel superior to poor – and hence in general indigenous or black – people. Thus, political racism in Latin America finds one of its rationales in class clientelism, engaged in by politicians who protect other (white) elites, such as landowners, against the consequences of ethnic or racial equality.

It is also important to stress that the indigenous, African or mestizo heritage of Latin American nations may be an official, ideological reason for collective nationalist pride, but the same feeling may not be shared at all at the individual level. Few white politicians in Latin America would feel flattered if one would compliment them on some 'indigenous' or 'African' trait of appearance. Nor is their officially positive political discourse on ethnic minorities a guarantee that the same politicians would not treat their indigenous or black servants in a racist or at least paternalist or authoritarian way, even without being aware of it. In that respect, politicians are no different from the other (white, mestizo) elites in Latin America.

Obviously, public political discourse is quite different from everyday informal discourses with family members or close friends – discourses that may be as blatantly racist as of any racist politician in Western Europe. In other words, the properties of public political discourse, including its racist or antiracist overtones, are not just an expression of personal prejudices but also a function of context, that is, of the social context of dominant class membership, on the one hand, and of the political conditions and implications of party politics, power play, national ideologies, and the maintenance of privilege and domination of the dominant groups and their elites, on the other hand.

Let us examine some fragments of political discourse as an example of this kind of official discourse on ethnic minorities and do so first for the most northern of Latin American countries, Mexico.

Mexico

Anti-indigenous racism in Mexico

The group of people of African descent in Mexico is small, so racism in Mexico is primarily directed against the indigenous peoples, estimated to be between 8 and 12 million (9% and 14% of the population). Since the literature on the indigenous peoples in Mexico is vast – more than 5000 titles in the Library of Congress – we only cite the following for further information: Argueta and Warman (1991); Barlow et al. (1994); Lartigue and Quenvel (2003); Scheffler (1992); Warman and Argueta (1993).

Racism directed against the indigenous peoples of Mexico has been a fact of their everyday lives since the conquista by Hernán Cortés nearly 500 years ago. Despite the numerous studies of indigenous peoples, however, systematic studies of racism remain rare, also because, here as elsewhere, racism is often denied or confounded with classism, or associated only with racism against black people.

A recent collection of studies, edited by Alicia Castellanos (2003a), provides details. In her own extensive contribution to this collection (Castellanos 2003b), based on field work in the South East of Mexico, she sketches a vivid 'picture' (as also the name of the book suggests) of everyday racism against the 'Indios', together with a detailed sociopolitical analysis (see also Castellanos & Sandoval 1998). Relevant for this study are the elite discourses that sustain and legitimate the oppression of the indigenous population. Thus, in the historical sketch of racism in the South East of Mexico, Castellanos also reports about resistance of the indigenous peoples, and the ways such resistance is being described by the governor of Chiapas, José Pantaleón Domínguez who in 1888 speaks of "savage fury" that attacks white people, and he calls for the struggle so that "barbarity will succumb to civilization" (Castellanos 2003b: 50). These characterizations of indigenous peoples in terms of 'savages' was of course hardly new, and continued a long tradition of European imagery. The local media were the main public voices that expressed and distributed these racist descriptions in Mexico. Castellanos concludes that the "bestialization and criminalization of the Other is a recurrent fact in history", often as a reaction against a perceived threat of economic, political or cultural interests (p. 54). Such an explicit racist discourse is not incompatible with paternalistic discourse that calls for the the education and "civilization" of the "Indians", as we shall see in more detail below. Castellanos emphasizes that today the ethnocentric mentality of the local elites, who pride themselves of their Spanish

heritage, has not fundamentally changed, as one of them shows in an interview "[we] are of blue blood, of noble birth, superior to all those who have indigenous blood; we are proud of this lineage, of this superiority and this tradition" (p. 69). Although on the one hand it may be recognized that, of old, there is indigenous blood in their veins, on the other hand being white is celebrated as an important value in a color hierarchy that has many words for many tones of skin color, and that dominates perceptions, discourses and social interaction anywhere in Mexico and Latin America. In interviews with upper middle class women speaking about mestizos, we find such descriptions as "superstitious", "people who do not to work", "lazy", "savages", "uncivilized people" and "backward" (p. 87), that is, the usual racist descriptions of white europeans of the no-european Others. The designation 'indio' is generally being used in a very contemptuous way (pp. 87, 104), as is the paternalist use of diminutives to refer to indigenous peoples or adults. Half of the news reports in the local press about indigenous people associates them with some form of criminal conduct. Similarly, also politicians express disgust for indigenous peoples, while at the same time they are able to state that in 'their' state, Chiapas, there is no racial hatred or conflict. Indigenous local politicians complain about exclusion from committees and that the plight of the indigenous people seldom is on the agenda (p. 109).

Also the other contributions in this collection document the widespread racism and oppression of the indigenous peoples, such as labor discrimination and segregation in the South East (París Pombo 2003) and the usual prejudices ('ignorant', 'lazy', 'backward', etc.) in the discourses about the rarámuri in the city of Chihuahua in the North, which may well combine with a recognition of a historic civilization (Servín Herrera & Isela González 2003).

Parliamentary discourse

One of the most extensive studies to date that has been done in Latin America on the discourse on minorities, is Teresa Carbó's monumental thesis on parliamentary debates in Mexico on indigenous peoples (Carbó 1995). As key events, she chose three moments in Mexican history, namely the creation of the respective departments for indigenous affairs, the DECRI in 1921, the DAI in 1935 and the INI in 1948, respectively. After a detailed account of her discourse analytical approach, large part of her study deals with the details of the political contexts of these debates.

Such an approach is crucial, because political discourse and its properties are ultimately well understood only because its practices take significance in

the social and political context. Thus, what Mexican MPs say is not just plainly to be understood as transparent discourse about indígenas, and not even only as expressions or enactment of ethnic bias by dominant group members, but should always be primarily interpreted in terms of the many conditions and implications of the political power play between the respective presidents, governments and political parties.

Most parliamentary discourse, as Carbó also shows, deals with the political ritual and argumentation for these departments, and barely talks about indigenous peoples at all – let alone that these have a major voice in the deliberations. The major theme of the first debate is that of 'bettering' of the indigenous population, the difficulty of their integration and the prevailing prejudices against them. This paternalistic and racist idea of improving or 'bettering' the indigenous (or black) population can be found in several Latin American countries, e.g. under the influence of similar social policies and eugenics in the USA and Europe in the first half of the 20th century (Stepan 1991).

As in virtually all political debates on minorities, one major stereotypical argument (*topos*) is also here that the indigenous peoples represent a 'problem.' Carbó observes ironically that in the same passages about prejudices, the lexical choices of the delegates themselves are not exactly free of bias when they speak about 'the Indian' (p. 460). Decades later, in 1948, the well-known paternalistic topic of 'bettering the Indians' remains dominant in the discourse of the PRI, whereas the oppositional PAN (the party that finally defeated the PRI and won the presidency in 2000), spoke of "incorporation". The only difference with 1921 was that "bettering the Indians" was now being proposed in terms of the results of anthropological research.

Against the background of Carbó's research, I examined several passages of parliamentary speeches in Mexican parliament, starting 80 years ago, in 1921. It is interesting to note in such discourse that already at the beginning of the twentieth century at least some delegates, such as Pedro de Alba, acknowledged the importance of the issue of the relations with Mexican's indigenous peoples, much in the vein of the famous African American sociologist W.E.B. Dubois:

(43) (...) el problema fundamental de nuestro país, [es] el problema del indio, el problema de la raza. (Aplausos.) El problema, hace años, en la XXVI Legislatura, casi tengo la seguridad de que fue en ella, uno de los diputados, cuando hablaba de la lucha con los zapatistas, tan escarnecida, tan caótica, que nadie sabía por qué era aquello, que todos se preguntaban por qué no se sometían, por qué si Zapata era amigo de Madero no venía a someterse, a acompañarlo a protestar en la Cámara, entonces hubo un

> diputado que aquí dijo: "Señores, la guerra de Morelos es la guerra de razas, la lucha de castas, la lucha de clases." Aquel diputado produjo estupor en la Asamblea; en la prensa apareció con letras rojas como si fuera un sarcasmo aquello, pero siempre con cierto recelo, con cierto temor porque en el fondo había una enorme profecía, a la que de seguro estamos avocados. (Pedro de Alba, 6-5-1921, Diario 41)
>
> (. . .) *The fundamental conflict in our nation,* (*is*) *the problem of the Indian, the problem of race.* (*Applause.*) *This problem was addressed by one Representative many years back- I'm almost sure it was during the 26th Legislature- when speaking of the Zapatista struggle that was incomprehensively chaotic and mocked. Everyone wondered why Zapata didn't come himself- Why, if Zapata was Madero's friend, why he wouldn't step up, join him to protest in the House. This Delegate then exclaimed: "Gentlemen, The War of the state of Morelos is the war of race, the struggle of castes, the struggle of classes." That delegate stunned the Assembly; In the press, the quote was printed in red satirizing it, but always with a certain mistrust, with a certain fear in the background, because in it, there was a great prophecy, one that we are certainly condemned to*.

Quite striking in this debate is that – as is the case in the debate about the march of the EZLN on Mexico eighty years later (see below) – also in this passage, the issue of the indígenas is related to the Zapatistas, and whether they may come and speak in parliament. And in the same way as the words of the earlier diputado referred to here by Pedro de Alba were described to be prophetic, so were the words of De Alba himself, as we shall see below. Apart from the common use of the term 'Indio' in parliamentary debates of those times, we also find repeated reference in this debate to the '*problema de la raza*', and to the '*Día de la Raza*', during which the unique mestizo heritage of Mexico is celebrated, until today.

In order to get an impression of the kind of background ideologies presupposed in these debates, we may again cite Pedro de Alba when in an early anti-racist passage he denounces these prejudices and their pseudo-scientific legitimization:

(44) Quiero hacer hincapié en un asunto que se ha ventilado en la práctica y que es oportuno traer a esta tribuna: el que se refiere a la falta de regeneración posible en el indio; a que es una raza inferior, a que es una raza irredenta, a que es una raza que no puede nivelarse con la corriente civilizadora de nuestro tiempo. En fin, todas estas zarandajas, como dije, que no tienen en el fondo sino un convencionalismo perfectamente in-

> humano, perfectamente inconsecuente con los postulados mismos de la ciencia que ellos invocan. (Voces: ¡Muy bien!) A propósito de estas cuestiones de raza, se cita a Lebón, se cita a Lombroso, se cita a los antropologistas de aquí y de allá, y, señores, estas teorías, estas ideas, son ideas en desuso, descalificadas y, tanto en serio como en broma, ya se han dicho una infinidad de cosas a propósito de estos prejuicios de raza.
>
> (Pedro de Alba, 6-5-1921, Diario 41, p. 11)

> *I want to stress the importance of one subject that has been aired in practice and which is appropriate to bring to this forum at this time: That topic which refers to the impossibility of Indian redemption; That it's an inferior race; That it's an irredentist race; That it's a race which can not catch up with the civilized currents of our times. Ultimately, all of this nonsense and like the aforementioned, has nothing to back it up except for a completely inhuman conventionalism, utterly inconsistent with the very premises of the Science that it attempts to invoke.* (*Voices: Here! Here!*) *Speaking of these racial matters, Lebon is cited, Lombroso is quoted, Anthropologists from all over are mentioned, but Gentlemen, these theories, those ideas are ones which are now obsolete, discredited, and as much as in seriousness as in jest, are racial prejudices that have already been referred to enough.*

The relevant aspect of these descriptions is that the dominant argument in parliament is precisely premised on the "backwardness" of the 'Indian'. Mexican diputados throughout the 20th century repeatedly formulate their beautiful discourses in the paternalistic terms of "helping" the 'Indians' to become people like 'us'. On the other hand, it should be stressed that this speech was held in 1921, that is, in a period when in the USA and Europe racism and colonialism were still widely and openly practiced and legitimated, not only by politicians but also by scholars. This speech may also be understood against the background of the ideas of Mexican writers such as José Vasconcelos, at the beginning of the 20th century, celebrating a new, mestizo race he called the 'cosmic race' – ideas which however hardly could hide the special, dominant role of european culture, and the usual presuppositions on the inferiority of indigenous cultures (Luengo 1998).

Rejection of explicit racism may well be combined with various forms of paternalism that also imply the inferiority of the Others. For instance, a bit further in his speech, the same speaker describes the development of the indígenas when they met the conquerors as being easily impressed 'adolescents':

(45) Pues las razas aborígenes de América que encontrándose en la adolescencia tomaron contacto con los conquistadores en esa forma a que vengo

refiriéndome y seguramente que ese hecho por sí solo bastaría si los procedimientos posteriores no lo explicaran para darnos la llave, por decirlo así, de todo aquello que hemos observado posteriormente.

(Pedro de Alba, 6-5-1921, Diario 41, p. 12)

It is because the American Aboriginal races were found in their adolescence and first had contact with the conquistadors in this form that I mention. And surely this fact by itself would suffice if later events didn't explain even more, giving us the key, so to speak, to everything that we have subsequently observed about them.

It is this double-faced discourse that characterizes much of the official political speeches on indígenas, both in Mexico as well as in other Latin American countries. On the one hand, we find the recognition of the indigenous heritage of the country, of the richness of indigenous languages and cultures and the necessity to protect these. On the other hand these discourses barely hide the dominance and ethnocentrism of European culture and the paternalism of redeeming "our Indian". That is, the pervasive presupposition in all discourse on the indigenous population is that they are in all respects "backward" or in other ways inferior to 'us'. And although there may be repeated pleas to "help" the poor "Indios," throughout the history they hardly ever are given any serious rights, lands, political power or other important resources (Valdez 1998). It is mainly for this reason that on January 1, 1994, the Zapatistas in Chiapas revolted against the Mexican state.

To get a particularly relevant impression of the pervasive positive rhetoric in Mexican political discourse, we studied one of the most recent debates on the indigenous population, namely that on March 15, 2001. Discussed in that – internationally reported – debate is the wish of the EZLN (the National Zapatista Liberation Army) to address parliament on the occasion of the new *Ley Indígena* promised by current president Fox. This address would culminate the famous Zapatista march on the city of Mexico. Many MPs, especially of Fox's own Party, the PAN, rejected such an unprecedented and 'illegal' presence of what they saw as rebels in parliament, but they hid their outright refusal behind the usual pro-indígena rhetoric, which we shall cite in full:

(46) Históricamente los grupos parlamentarios del Partido Acción Nacional hemos concebido a la persona humana con inminente dignidad y un destino espiritual y material que cumplir, por lo que la colectividad y sus órganos deben asegurar el conjunto de todas las libertades y medios necesarios para cumplir cabalmente con su destino.
Estamos convencidos que en la organización política nacional es preciso

que las comunidades naturales sean reconocidas, respetadas y en cuanto se encuentren dentro de la jurisdicción del Estado, ordenadas y puntualmente jerarquizadas, dándoles el lugar y la participación debida en la estructura y el funcionamiento del Estado mismo, a fin de que éste coincida verdaderamente con la realidad nacional y el gobierno y el Estado en su conjunto sea siempre una expresión genuina de la nación.

Son nuestras convicciones, nuestros ideales, por lo que las diputadas y los diputados del Partido Acción Nacional hacemos nuestras las legítimas aspiraciones de los indígenas de México. Sabemos bien del orgullo de cada indígena por su cultura, por sus raíces, por sus tradiciones, por su historia; sabemos bien del orgullo de la lengua que habla cada una de las etnias de nuestro país, del clamor indígena por ser tratados no sólo con dignidad, sino por asegurar que el Gobierno haga presentes las oportunidades para su desarrollo.

(Armando Salinas Torre, *Diario de los Debates*, 15 de marzo, 2001)

We, the Parliamentary groups of the National Action Party (PAN), have historically regarded the human beings as having imminent dignity with a spiritual and physical destiny to fulfill. Because of this, the collectivity and its organizations are obligated to ensure the entirety of all freedoms and necessary means to respectably carry out the destiny of an individual.

We believe that in the National political organization it is essential that natural communities are recognized, respected and as soon as they are duly organized within the jurisdiction of the state, given a place and due participation within the structure and function of the State itself, with the objective that this truly coincides with the reality of the nation, the Government and the State as a whole, and forever be a genuine expression of the nation.

These are our convictions, our ideals and the reasons why we, the men and women of Parliament representing the National Action Party, make the legitimate aspirations of the Indigenous peoples of Mexico our own. We understand the pride that each Indigenous person has for his or her culture, roots, traditions and history; We understand the pride for their language that every individual of the ethnic groups of our country speaks; the Indigenous outcry to be treated not only with dignity but to ensure that the Government bring forth opportunities for their development.

We recognize the same kind of nationalist, self-serving rhetoric that is used at the beginning of debates in Western Europe on immigration, which we analyzed in Van Dijk (1993) and Wodak and Van Dijk (2000). Our nation, and in particular our party, celebrates the highest ideals of humanity and the human rights and equality of all people. In the first paragraph of this fragment, the

speaker nevertheless inserts some keywords of the PAN's liberal-conservative ideology, namely its individualism and the reference to 'freedoms'. Against this background also the indigenous peoples (which he calls "natural communities") should be recognized, respected and given their place and participation in the government of the nation. But he adds the disclaimer that such only can be the case when they are within the jurisdiction of the State.

Much of these seemingly positive formulations of the recognition of the indigenous peoples can only be fully understood when the many implicit propositions are being spelled out. Thus, if the Zapatistas do not recognize the jurisdiction of the State over indigenous lands, if they want autonomy, then they can no longer aspire to be recognized and respected. The last paragraph is the classical topos of pro-indigenous rhetoric and argumentation summarized above: We share the legitimate aspirations of the indigenous people and recognize their pride in their own language and culture. All the keywords of indigenous claims are summarized here in a repetitive format, including on the one hand the symbolic claim of 'dignity' and on the other the material claim of 'development'. This topos is not merely presented as an opinion, but introduced by the repeated use of the notion of 'conviction' and in the last paragraph also that of 'ideals', a move we could call the 'ideological sincerity' move. That is, sharing aspirations of the other group is not merely a superficial opinion, but rhetorically presented and emphasized as deeply felt, honest and the basis of our beliefs.

In order to soften the US-THEM polarization that necessarily organizes all political talk about the Others, the speaker uses the well-known lexical ingroup-outgroup bridge of the expression "to make ours, their …", emphasizing sharing and hence national unity. Within this general framework of pro-indigenous rhetoric, also the current attitude towards dialogue with the EZLN is being formulated in positive terms:

(47) Los diputados del PAN hemos estado dispuestos a recibir a los interlocutores del Ejército Zapatista en el marco del respeto y la legalidad. El grupo parlamentario del Partido Acción Nacional seguimos insistiendo, insistimos e insistiremos, pedimos dialogar y conciliar los contenidos inscritos en la iniciativa de Ley de Derechos y Cultura Indígena. En el marco de la ley, el respeto al Congreso y en el respeto a la representación indígena.

The delegates of PAN, have been willing to receive the spokesmen of the Zapatist Military within the framework of respect and legality. Our Parliamentary group of The National Action Party has continued to insist, does insist and will keep insisting on asking for dialogue and conciliating on the written

content in the initiative for the Law of Rights and Indigenous Culture- within the context of the law, in respect to Congress and in respect to Indigenous Representation.

Again, the keywords of positive self-presentation are abundant in these paragraphs, which in fact can be interpreted as a long disclaimer, after which we expect a major But. Thus, the PAN is, of course, officially in favor of dialogue and reconciliation. But, again, even in the 'positive' part of the disclaimer, the restrictions are already made explicit: Not only with respect but also within the law. Indirectly it will be made clear in a moment that receiving the EZLN in parliament is against the law, and hence a dialogue within Congress itself is rejected. On the other hand, those who are in favor of receiving the EZLN in parliament think that there is nothing illegal about inviting people to address parliament, as often also visiting heads of states are being invited to do so; for them, parliament has the power to make and break its own rules or make new or ad hoc rules to do so. The real problem is that inviting the EZLN is an important symbolic recognition, and a way to dialogue as equals, and the PAN is not prepared to go that far. Apart from the symbolism, most crucial of course is that the PAN represents powerful interests (e.g., of landowners) that are inconsistent with indigenous claims. Thus a blunt denial, which can be interpreted as being against indigenous peoples (a position that is politically indefensible), needs to be hidden behind a series of legalistic arguments and various disclaimers that enumerate the positive ideals of the party, one of which is respect for the law – probably the first value legislators need to subscribe to by definition. It is therefore in similar rhetoric that the denial is formulated, namely in the positive terms of the obligations of these legislators:

(48) Los diputados del PAN estamos conscientes de la altísima responsabilidad de nuestra representación política y función como miembros del Congreso de la Unión. Sabemos que la soberanía nacional reside esencial y originalmente en el pueblo y que todo poder público dimana de éste para su beneficio. La naturaleza de la república representativa se inscribe en la idea de que todo el pueblo no puede, a la vez, ejercer su soberanía y que en consecuencia necesita nombrar representantes que decidan por él y para él. La república representativa significa que la colectividad dueña de su propio destino transmite a sus representantes, que pueden serlo por distintos títulos, la capacidad de decidir. ¡Ese es nuestro origen y destino en la función como congresistas mexicanos! (. . .) Aquel legislador que cede su espacio de representación política renuncia a su máxima obligación en el mandato concebido por la voluntad democrática del pueblo. . .

> *We, the Delegates of PAN are conscious of the utterly important responsibility of our political representation and function as members of the Congress of the Union. We know that national sovereignty resides essentially and originally in the people and that all public power derives from them and for their benefit. The nature of this Representative Republic is based upon the conception that the entire population cannot, at the same time, exercise their sovereignty and that in consequence they need to nominate representatives that decide on behalf of the people and for the people. A Representative Republic means that collective owners of their own destiny transfer the capacity to decide to their representatives, who may go by a number of titles. This is our origin and our destiny serving as Mexican Congressmen and Congresswomen!* (. . .) *Legislators who yield their position of Political Representation, renounce their maximum obligation to carry out the command of the democratic will of the people. . .*

The refusal to let the EZLN speak is never explicit, but only formulated in the extremely positive terms of the obligations of members of parliament, the recognition of the basic values of democracy, namely power by the people – but only through representation. In that sense, positive self-presentation is at the same time a form of self-defense, namely of the MPs' rights to be the only representatives of the people. And hence, letting others speak in their place for them means breaking the fundamental rules of the democratic game. Of course, no one in parliament denies these principles, in the same way that no one in parliament fails to understand why this delegate uses these arguments as self-serving rhetoric to deny a parliamentary dialogue with the representatives of the EZLN.

This rhetoric is a representative example of the double-sided nature of much official Latin American political discourse on indigenous peoples: formal recognition of rights, culture and aspirations, but in practice the indigenous peoples are kept outside of the power structure, and are socially marginalized. There is a world of difference between the beautiful pro-indigenous rhetoric in parliament, also of conservative parties, on the one hand, and the discourse about and living conditions of indigenous people outside of parliament, on the other hand. Of course, changing these conditions means changing the power relations, and hence 'we' cannot be made responsible for the miserable state of 'our Indians'. Instead, as another speaker later says, the "common enemy" is poverty, a personification that attributes to poverty itself the blame that could be directed at those in power. Thus, speaker after speaker recognizes that the "*comunidades indígenas han sufrido marginación, olvido, durante muchos,*

muchos años" (the indigenous communities have suffered from marginalization, and have been ignored for many many years) and deserve admiration and respect, but few of them are willing to share power, and even less to share their wealth.

We thus find, in a concrete case of political conflict, namely the uprising of the indigenous people in Chiapas on January 1, 1994, how political discourse formulates the dominant ideology on the indigenous minorities, a discourse that is replete with many forms of positive self-presentation and laudatory but paternalistic rhetoric about 'our Indians'.

In order to examine in somewhat more detail in which contexts the notions of 'indio' and 'indígena' occur, we examined all passages in the debates between 1994–1997, that is the last debates of Mexican parliament that can be searched by key-words. We also chose this period because it coincides with the Zapatista uprising in 1994, and hence with a period of enhanced prominence of indigenous people on the Mexican (and the world) stage.

As we have found before, the stereotypical discursive contexts in which indigenous peoples appear in Mexican political discourse are the following, often as part of complex expressions such as "*comunidad*(*es*) *indígenas*", "*población indígena*", "*zonas indígenas*" or "*pueblos indígenas*", and sometimes especially when the MP is herself or himself an *indígena*, "*hermanos/hermanas indígenas*":

- They are poor and hungry and already for centuries they live in miserable conditions.
- They are often illiterate and speak their own languages.
- They are marginalized, oppressed and discriminated against.
- We need to help, assist, and "uplift" them.
- They have (now, in Chiapas) risen up against these conditions.
- Their claims are justified.
- Any reform should take into account the indigenous population.
- We can only have peace when the legitimate claims of the indigenous peoples are honored.
- They need land, health care, education.
- They live on the land, like the campesinos.
- They need their own organization and governance.

This topic summary covers about 1000 uses of the term 'indigenous'. Analysis of the word 'Indio(s)' , much less frequent in the 1990s, does not alter this summary of the typical contexts of use. It is especially used, also by indigenous peoples themselves, in the compound "pueblos indios", which refers to the indigenous 'population' rather than to indigenous 'villages.'

As repeatedly observed above, official political discourse about indígenas in México (or anywhere else in Latin America) is generally very much politically correct, but premised on a stereotypical image that has not changed for a long time. Apart from the usual paternalistic rhetoric, I have not found openly or blatantly racist expressions in parliamentary debates, but that does not mean either that all laws and policies necessarily favor the indigenous population. On the contrary, their continuous state of poverty, and finally the Zapatista uprising, prove that also politically the cards are usually stacked against them. One needs no openly racist discourse to simply ignore the indigenous population. Rhetorically positive discourse, except when used in the political speeches of indigenous delegates, apparently does not imply policies that are equally favorable for 'our Indians'. In the examples above, we have seen how positively formulated is the denial of PAN politicians to admit the Zapatistas into parliament. This denial is metonymical for the more general denial of rights to the indigenous population.

We have seen in Western Europe that beautiful words on hospitality and tolerance are often the standard introduction of restrictive immigration policies (Van Dijk 1993; Wodak & Van Dijk 2000). We have no idea as yet how Mexican politicians speak about indigenous people in less formal contexts. We have seen some evidence in the research by Castellanos (2003) that informal political discourse in the regions may be quite racist, but more detailed analysis of such text and talk will be necessary. Of course, not *all* positive discourse in parliament is just rhetoric, and not all politically correct expressions of concern and goodwill are hypocritical. There undoubtedly are politicians, also in Mexico, who have strongly engaged themselves in improving the situation of minorities. There are governments, especially more recently, who have acted in favor of the indigenous population, also in Chiapas. Critics, also in Mexican parliament, however, insist that it is not enough, by far, and that the situation of the indigenous population continues to be miserable, also as a consequence of racist marginalization. Therefore, only discourse data from other political contexts, closer to everyday decision making, in the Mexican states, cities and villages, will be able to reveal how politicians really think and act in relation to the indigenous population. Geographically and socially there is a huge distance between parliament in Mexico City, and the indigenous villages of Chiapas or Yucatan, or the indigenous people who have come to live in Mexico City and other towns.

One of the conclusions of our comments of political discourse on indigenous people in Mexico confirms the main tenet of this book, namely that also here various kinds of racist exclusion, marginalization and problematization of

the Others are practiced by the elites at the top. It should however be added that everyday racism against indígenas in Mexico involves more than elite opinions, discourse and legislation at the top. On the one hand there is the daily racism and violence by white or mestizo landowners, or the prejudices and discrimination by shop owners or civil servants, among others. But on the other hand, precisely such forms of dominance also favor forms of collaboration and selective protection of local caciques responsible for violence within the indigenous community. And conversely, also among the political, media or academic elites we may find dominant group members that are actively engaged in antiracist action. EZLN leader subcomandante Marcos is merely a prominent example of such intellectual elites. We see that both in Mexico and elsewhere racism is never a simple picture of bad white people and innocent minorities, but a complex structure of dominance in which different groups and interests each may be involved in sometimes contradictory ways.

Argentina

After a first encounter with official discourse on 'race' and 'ethnicity' in Latin America, as expressed in parliamentary discourse in Mexico, let us jump to the other end of the continent, to Argentina.

Racism in Argentina has five main dimensions:

- the historical genocide and current racism against the indigenous population, e.g., of the Mapuche people
- the current prejudices and discrimination against the poor mestizo population, called "cabecitas negras"
- anti-semitism
- the current prejudice and racism against labor immigrants, especially from Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay
- prejudice and discrimination against Koreans.

I shall deal only with the latter forms of racism, and deal with racism against the indigenous Mapuche population in the next section on Chile (for Argentina, see, e.g., Briones 1998; Hernández 1985, 1992; Radovich & Balazote 1992; for a study of argentine political discourse on indigenous peoples, see Briones & Lenton 1997; Lenton 1999).

The press

I already suggested above that the press in Argentina, facing the current crisis and the widespread and popular disenchantment with politics, has acquired a position of prestige and influence that at the same time gives it powers that few media have. The press in Argentina is increasingly seen as the only bulwark against political corruption and the mafia, as the only recourse against state violence, for instance by the police, and in general as the defender and the voice of the people. Journalists are all but safe from such violence themselves, as became clear with the torture and assassination on January 25, 1997, of José Luis Cabezas, photographer of *Noticias*, an important political magazine of the country. This event had a profound effect on the media and on public opinion, the more so because of the involvement of the police of the province of Buenos Aires and of a notorious businessman, Yabrán, allegedly associated with the Mafia, who later committed suicide under mysterious circumstances. Especially the quality press, such as *Página 12, El Clarín* and even conservative *La Nación*, thus regularly denounce cases of corruption, police violence and other forms of power abuse, and ordinary people would rather tell stories of crimes and power abuse to journalists than to the police.

My concern, however, is how the Argentine press deals with immigrants and ethnic minorities. Progressive or committed journalism in politics does not generally mean that male journalists also oppose sexism in the media. The same is true for the antiracist coverage of ethnic affairs or race relations by 'white' journalists.

Thus we need to ask whether Argentine journalists can also be seen as the voice and the defender of the small indigenous communities, for instance of the Mapuche, of the poor mestizo population, and of the immigrants from Korea and the mestizo immigrants from countries such as Peru, Paraguay and Bolivia. What is the role of the press in the formation and propagation of stereotypes and prejudices about these and other ethnic minorities in the country? Does it try to correct widespread prejudices against the Others in Argentina? Does it ignore such minorities or represent them in a balanced way?

In his book *Racismo y discriminación en Argentina* (1999), Víctor Ramos, former journalist and current director of the INADI (Instituto Nacional contra la Discriminación, la Xenofobía y el Racismo), also pays attention to the role of the media. In a chapter that is headed with a quote from my own earlier translated work on racism in the press (Van Dijk 1997), he first summarizes some of the findings about racism and the press in Europe and the USA, and then concludes:

(49) Justo es reconocer que no es común que la prensa argentina adopte actitudes discriminatorias de esta gravedad. Por lo general, los medios de comunicación locales juegan un papel positivo en materia de integración de los inmigrantes. Aunque no faltan excepciones, en particular en las zonas de la frontera, donde los periódicos, la radio y la televisión expresan sentimientos de xenofobia hacía los habitantes de determinados países vecinos. Eso pasa en el sur con los chilenos y en el norte con los bolivianos, paraguayos y brasileños. (p. 129)

It is only just to recognize that the Argentine press does not usually adopt discriminatory attitudes to this extent. In general, local media play a positive role on the subject of immigrant integration, although not without exceptions, specifically in border zones where the newspapers, radio and television express xenophobic sentiments towards the inhabitants of certain neighboring countries. This happens in the South with the Chileans and in the North with Bolivians, Paraguayans and Brazilians.

This is all he has to say about racism and the press in Argentina. The rest of the chapter is about youths and other topics, but does not deal with the way the press writes about (or simply ignores) minorities, despite the title and topic of the book. The fact that Ramos describes the press as generally being non-discriminatory, and that where discrimination occurs it is typically found 'elsewhere' (the media at the border), that is, far from the national prestige media in Buenos Aires, are tell-tale signs of elite denial of racism as I found them in my earlier research. That the author was himself a journalist may explain some of this extraordinarily positive presentation of the media, given our experience, not only in the Netherlands, with the difficulty many journalists have in recognizing own shortcomings especially in the area of race relations. When do newspapers report about racism in the press? That Ramos is director of INADI makes his conclusions even more authoritative and therefore, if they should be too rosy about journalism, a kind of 'cover-up' that requires at least concern, if not further investigation.

Unfortunately, despite the broad interest in critical discourse and media analysis in Argentina, there is as yet little discourse analytical work on the way the Argentine press reports on immigration, minorities and racism.

One book-length study is that by anthropologist Corina Courtis on everyday discourses on Korean immigrants, which also deals with the media (Courtis 2000). Koreans in Argentina are about 32,000 and especially run small businesses such as neighborhood shops. They are targets of similar prejudice and resentment as Korean shopkeepers in for instance Los Angeles, as became

most clear in the Los Angeles uprising in 1992. Courtis bases her observations on a corpus of articles of 1988–2000 from the most prestigious Buenos Aires newspapers: *El Clarín, La Nación,* and *Página 12*. One of her findings is that the media tend to represent Korean businesses as exploiting poor immigrants and evading taxes, a stereotypical story that of course reads well in any context: it is progressive because it takes the perspective of poor immigrants, and it is at the same time consistent with xenophobic anti-Korean feelings among other Argentines. Courtis reports (p. 66) that she and a colleague of hers, Eugenia Contarini, wrote a letter to conservative newspaper *La Nación*, in which they emphasize that it is quite remarkable that of all the forms of exploitation of immigrants, the newspaper should precisely pick out and blame the Koreans and Chinese. They conclude that this only hides other forms of exploitation, exacerbated by public policies of the state.

In another study, Diego Casaravilla (2000) focuses on media reports on labor migrants from neighboring countries, who generally live in miserable circumstances and are widely discriminated against, and sometimes even attacked and killed (see also Casaravilla 1999, as well as many human rights reports, e.g., at www.derechos.org). Not surprising, but still remarkably similar to European results on anti-immigrant prejudices and racism, are his findings about the strategies of media and other discourse to construct a stigma about labor immigrants. He focuses especially on the public discourse on the occasion of the (failed) attempt of the Legislative to pass a negative migration bill. He identifies 16 of such strategies, such as the direct association of immigrants and crime, the manipulation of arbitrary statistics (so many crimes are committed by immigrants), the identification of suspects or those detained (e.g., to check their papers) with criminals, the myth that immigrants commit crimes in order to avoid deportation, interpreting carrying false papers as proof of criminal intent, the association of undocumented immigration with mafias, the association of immigrants with danger, aggression, disorder, etc., and the menace of a massive invasion of immigrants, among other strategies. Reading these strategies and the examples, one could find examples of each of them in Spanish (and other European) political and media discourse studied in the previous chapters (for press discourse in Argentina on immigrants, see also Courtis & Longo 2000; Margulis 1998).

As I have observed many times before, everyday discourse of common citizens will often reflect these media images of immigrants (for studies of everyday discourse on immigrants in Argentina, see Caggiano 2000, 2001; Margulis 1998).

Since we lack further systematic, quantitative or discourse analytical data about media discourse in Argentina about immigrants, we may form a more qualitative impression from a letter, sent to (and published by) *La Nación*, by Amilcar E. Argüelles, former minister of Health in the military government of dictator Roberto Viola, and vice-president of the Academy of Science. This letter is so revealing about the racist attitudes and ideologies of the Argentine right, that it deserves to be quoted in full:

(50) Recientes estudios sobre la población argentina demuestran que la salud ha empeorado por aumento de la enfermedad de Chagas, meningitis, tuberculosis, parasitosis y, particularmente, el cólera, hasta hace poco desconocido en nuestro país. Este alarmante aumento de la morbilidad se relaciona con el ingreso de la inmigración ilegal sudamericana que, en aumento, se hacina promiscuamente en la periferia de Buenos Aires y en otras zonas rurales de Misiones, Chaco, Formosa, Salta, Jujuy y toda La Patagonia, con lo que introduce enfermos chagasticos, parasitados y casos de cólera de Bolivia, Perú, Paraguay y Brasil. En el Gran Buenos Aires, la contaminación es ya gravísima. Los últimos exámenes médicos para conscriptos registraron déficit de estatura de diez a doce centímetros en los adolescentes de zonas de frontera y Gran Buenos Aires en relación con los del resto del país. *Dos tercios del presupuesto de los hospitales públicos argentinos se gasta en pacientes inmigrantes sudamericanos.* Pero más grave aún que el empeoramiento de la salud de nuestra población es *el descenso de los niveles intelectuales y de escolaridad que se está observando, debido fundamentalmente a la incorporación creciente de familias indocumentadas de pulses cordilleranos y limítrofes.* Desgraciadamente esa corriente entre legales e indocumentados ya es de millones de inmigrantes, *gran número de ellos con capacidad mental limitada por siglos de desnutrición,* de sus antepasados e infancias, por carencias vitamínicas y de aminoácidos esenciales para el desarrollo cerebral, necesario para su educación. Ante el bajo índice demográfico de las familias argentinas, *el notable número de nacimientos entre los inmigrantes sudamericanos de menor nivel intelectual llevará a una reducción apreciable del promedio intelectivo* de los habitantes de nuestro país. Ya Estados Unidos, con grandes recursos naturales y amplia disponibilidad de capital y gran fuerza laboral, *retrocedió ante los países que basaron su desarrollo en las producciones "cerebrointensivas", condición que sólo es posible si existe una población con capacidad intelectual destacada.* Los países adelantados requieren ya poseer la mitad de su población menos educada con capacidad para controles de equipos y manejos computadorizados, como ya ocurre en Japón y Alemania. *Por ello*

un descenso del nivel de capacidad cerebral de nuestros pobladores por migraciones subdotadas condenaría al país a un desarrollo parcial y detenido. Ya no es posible soslayar que la subcultura de *una inmigración aluvional de bajo nivel intelectual en nuestro país nos impide lo que debe ser una existencia civilizada y está en pugna con los valores fundamentales sobre los que basar un proyecto nacional.* (. . .) Postergar la realización de estas acciones arriesgará nuestra soberanía territorial y mas grave aún, *traerá un monstruoso crecimiento de arrabales contaminados tercermundistas, poblados por subdotados, en detrimento del nivel intelectual y cultural nacional* y del desarrollo y la competitividad de la Argentina del Siglo XXI.

(*La Nación*, April 21, 1994; italics in the original)

Recent studies on the Argentine population demonstrate that health has worsened due to a rise in diseases such as Chagas disease, meningitis, tuberculosis, parasitoids and particularly cholera, which was non-existent in our country until now. This alarming rise in the mortality rate is related to the influx of illegal South American immigrants that, on the rise, are confoundingly crowded into the outskirts of Buenos Aires and other rural zones around Misiones, Chaco, Formosa, Salta, Jujuy and all of Patagonia. This type of migration brings immigrants who have Chagas desease, parasitoids and cases of cholera from Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay and Brazil. In greater Buenos Aires, contagion is already very serious. The latest medical exams of those eligible for military service registered a heightened deficiency of 10–12 cm. in adolescents from border zones and greater Buenos Aires when compared to the rest of the country. *Two Thirds of the budget for public hospitals are spent on patients that are South American immigrants*. However even more frightening than the worsening of our population's health, *is the decline in intellectual and scholarly levels that is currently being witnessed, owing fundamentally to the growing incorporation of undocumented families from the mountain ranges and neighboring border areas.* Unfortunately this trend, between legal aliens and unregistered aliens, is already calculated at millions of immigrants, *a large part of them with limited mental capacity due to centuries of malnutrition*, from their ancestors, their infancies, from lack of vitamins and amino acids that are necessary for cerebral development and essential for their education. Faced with the low demographic rate of Argentine families, *the noticeable number of birth rates among South American immigrants of lesser intellectual levels will lead to a serious reduction in the intellectual average* of the inhabitants of our country. Already the United States, with their immense natural resources, extensive availability of capital and a vast work force, *has fallen behind countries that base their development on "brain-intensive"*

> *productions, circumstances which are only possible if there is a population with an outstanding intellectual capacity*. Advanced countries now require having half of their population less educated but with the capacity to control and check equipment and handle computerized operations, like that which is already happening in Japan and Germany. *For that reason, a decline in the level of cerebral capacity of our citizens due to an under-endowed migration population* would condemn our country to an interrupted and partial development. It is no longer possible to avoid that we are impeded by the sub-culture of *low intellectual immigration bombarding our country from what should be a civilized existence and this is opposed to the fundamental values on which we base our National aspirations.* (. . .) Postponing the fulfillment of these actions will risk our territorial sovereignty and even worse, *will bring on a monstrous growth of third-world contaminated ghettos, populated by the obtuse and against the interests of national intellectual levels and culture,* and the development of Argentina overall in the 21st century. (*La Nación*, April 21, 1994; italics in original)

As the scholar who cites this letter (Margulis 1998) suggested, we should perhaps not comment. The letter speaks for itself. However, in the framework of the critical analysis of elite racism in this book, I need to make at least some analytical comments.

First, in line with the topic of this book, it should be recalled that this is a characteristic example of elite discourse: The author is ex minister of health, a medical specialist, and a vice-president of the academy of science. Secondly, his political leanings may be inferred from his participation in the military regime under Viola, and what he writes in this letter is quite consistent with a fascist ideology. Thirdly, to show how the military and media elites may be closely related, the fact that Argüelles has access to a major national newspaper such as *La Nación* is perhaps most remarkable. One might simply mitigate the relevance of the letter by pointing out that this is the isolated letter of an elderly racist or fascist person. But the fact that this major newspaper publishes it, automatically provides it (together with the writers credentials: minister, etc.) both authority and access to the public domain. The newspaper is completely co-responsible for this letter and the publication of its ideas. We have no way of knowing, at the moment, how many people in Argentina share the ideas in this letter. But we do surmise that they are not just a marginal few, otherwise the letter would not have been published.

As to the content and the style of the letter, we may simply say that it is the unadulterated expression of a racist ideology, even without the usual dis-

claimers or indirectness. Because a detailed analysis of this letter would require the rest of this chapter, we merely summarize its main properties:

- Pseudoscientific legitimization of racist beliefs.
- Fallacy of abuse of scientific jargon as authoritative argument.
- Inferiorization of ethnically or racially different Others.
- Abuse of hyperboles and alarm words (*alarmante, gravísima, monstruoso,* etc.).
- Number game: Abuse of statistics (e.g., two thirds of budget of public hospitals used for immigrants, etc.).
- Racist presupposition of own intellectual superiority (level of intelligence goes down because of immigration), and false presuppositions about the alleged lack of intelligence of immigrants.
- Pseudoscientific and racist arguments about genetic conditions of intelligence and behavior of ethnically different Others.
- The usual racist argument of the high birthrate of immigrants (opposed to "our" low birthrate), without explaining that immigrant birthrate usually goes down and adapts to that of the receiving society.
- Blaming economic decline of the country to the immigrants.
- Immigrants represented as threat to our civilization, health care, welfare, etc.
- Polarization between Us (developed, civilized, intelligent, healthy, etc.) and Them (underdeveloped, unintelligent, sick, etc.).

The rest and the details of the text, and all its presuppositions and implications need not further be commented upon. I do no know whether this letter caused a scandal in the country. I suppose it did not, and was at most frowned upon as maybe a bit too extreme and too 'honest' in its formulation. Unfortunately, its racist beliefs are quite consistent with those of many conservative elites in Europe and Latin America, although their formulation is perhaps no longer politically correct. Many of the arguments used here can also be read in parliamentary debates on immigration in Europe (Wodak & Van Dijk 2000). Quite extreme but typical of this letter is the openly racist belief of 'our' intellectual superiority, and the 'contamination' of our race by the immigration of 'inferior' people. Such ideas in the USA and Europe virtually only appear in extremist racist circles. Further research should show whether or not these ideas are widespread in Argentina. For our discussion it is however most important to conclude that they do exist, and that they do have access to a major newspaper and thus to public debate.

Politics

One could argue that the text by Argüelles is an aberration, an exception, and that most Argentine politicians have eminent democratic and antiracist credentials. Unfortunately, there are too many arguments that plead against such a wholesale exculpation of Argentine's political elites, as also the recent anti-immigrant legislation – and the political debate about it – show.

To provide another example, let us cite a few fragments of the parliamentary debate held on March 14, 2001, about the abrogation of a law on changing jail terms.[3] When the issue of security comes up, it is argued that insecurity in Argentina must diminish, and an MP then says the following:

(51) Sr. Pichetto: Es imprescindible debatir fuertemente una ley inmigratoria en la Argentina y avanzar en esta materia. De ninguna manera hago un planteo xenófobo ni creo que los autores de los delitos que se cometen sean solamente inmigrantes clandestinos o ilegales. Simplemente señalo un dato de esta sociedad y creo que es importante analizar esta temática.
Debemos contar con una ley de inmigración seria y responsable como la que tiene cualquier Estado moderno. No puede haber ilegales en el país que cometan ilícitos, y si los hay, inmediatamente debemos deportarlos. No nos tenemos que hacer cargo de este tema.

Mr. Pichetto: It is imperative that we powerfully argue for an Immigration Law in Argentina and advance on this topic. In no way am I making a xenophobic suggestion, nor do I believe that those who commit crime are only clandestine or illegal immigrants. I am simply pointing out a fact of this society and believe it's important to analyze this matter.
We must come up with a serious and responsible Immigration Law, like any modern State has. Illegal aliens that commit unlawful acts can not be in one's country and if they are, we must deport them immediately. We do not have to take responsibility for this issue.

One of the most frequent associations, both in Europe as well as in Latin America, is that between immigration (or resident minorities) and crime. Thus, also in Argentina poor immigrants from Peru and Bolivia are routinely attributed a prominent contribution to the country's crime rate. Mr. Pichetto does so in his speech with the usual disclaimers ("*De ninguna manera hago un planteo xenófobo*, etc.", 'No way I am indulging in xenophobic explanations'). As right-wing parties in Europe have always proposed: those immigrants that are guilty of crimes, should be deported. His colleague Mr. Scioli supports this view and further emphasizes it:

(52) Sr. Scioli. – Señor presidente: quiero poner mucho énfasis en este punto que está describiendo el señor diputado Pichetto, porque nada tienen que ver las características de los inmigrantes que hoy están llegando a nuestro país, especialmente a nuestras grandes ciudades, con las de aquellos inmigrantes italianos y españoles que han hecho grande a nuestra patria, cuando vinieron a trabajar y a poner industrias.
Esto se ve claramente reflejado en el caso concreto de muchos delitos que están azotando la ciudad de Buenos Aires con tours de delincuentes que vienen de otros países, con tours sanitarios que vienen a ocupar nuestros hospitales, con delincuentes que vienen a usurpar casas y a ejercer la prostitución.
Argentina hoy vive al revés: estamos exportando ingenieros y científicos, y estamos importando delincuentes. Esto no significa ir contra la inmigración. Tenemos que tomar los ejemplos de otros países, como España, que ha producido un sinceramiento en la situación y protegido a los suyos. Por eso tenemos que empezar a proteger a nuestra gente, sancionando una ley migratoria que contribuya a erradicar gran parte de la delincuencia (. . .)

Mr. Scioli. – Mr. President: I would like to strongly emphasize the point that Senator Pichetto is describing, because the immigrants that are coming to our country today, especially to the larger cities, have nothing in common with those earlier Spanish and Italian immigrants that have made our country great, when they came to work and establish industries.
This is clearly reflected in specific cases of many crimes that are flogging the city of Buenos Aires with 'tours of delinquents' that arrive from other countries, with 'sanitary tours' that come to occupy our hospitals and with lawbreakers that come to take over houses and exert prostitution.
Today, Argentina is living backwards: We're exporting engineers and scientists and importing criminals. This is not meant to go against immigration. We have to follow the examples of other countries, like Spain, that have come to terms with the situation and protected their own.
Because of this, we have to start protecting our own people, sanctioning a Migratory Law that contributes to eradicating a major part of crime (. . .).

Interesting in this example is not only the blunt but familiar association of immigrants with crime, or with the exploitation of welfare and health care, but also the distinction Mr. Scioli makes between 'old' (European, white) immigrants and 'new' immigrants, the first obviously being very good for Argentina, and the last hardly contributing anything. From Mr. Scioli's name, one might infer that he is from Italian descent, and hence needed to make such a distinc-

tion. Part of this polarization may be explained in terms of the well-known categories of the established and the outsiders (Elias & Scotson 1965). Yet, more is at stake here, because such a negative reaction does not apply to any newcomer, but selectively against those who can be seen as 'racially' different, such as the more "indigenous looking" and poor immigrants from Peru or Bolivia. Again, this is similar to the racism against immigrants in Western Europe, which also is selectively focusing on those who look more or less 'different', such as most immigrants from Africa, Asia or Latin America, or who may be attributed a more or less different culture, such as the Turks in Germany and the Netherlands. The well-known strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation that characterizes the blatantly racist speech of Mr. Scioli is supported by a contrastive rhetoric that not only opposes old (good) and new (bad) immigrants, but also by the mirror image of exporting highly qualified people and importing delinquents. But even such forms of explicit and hyperbolic generalizations may be routinely followed by a disclaimer, for instance when he says that he is not against immigration. Note finally how in his positive reference to Spain and Spanish immigration law, he again introduces the ingroup-outgroup polarization when claiming that Spain protects '*los suyos*' ('its own').

Also in Argentina, however, such forms of blatant racism are at present outside of the consensus, at least in public discourse. Thus, Mr. Scioli is being interrupted by another member of his own party, Mr. Galland, who accuses him of bringing "us back to the worst of Argentine xenophobia", a remark that draws the applause from the other representatives. Mr. Galland recalls that there are laws in Argentina against crime, and that these should apply equally to Argentines and foreigners.

These remarks are followed however by the same initial speaker, Mr. Pichetto, who emphasizes that he and Mr. Scioli are not "*sosteniendo la bandera de la xenophobia*" ('carrying the banner of xenophobia'). Yet, this disclaimer again serves as an introduction to an example of a recent crime (murder) committed by 'illegal' immigrants, a crime he qualifies as having "*características transnacionales*" and attributed to "*quienes vienen a la Argentina a robar automotores*" ('those who come to Argentina to steal cars'). Thus, murder and car theft are thus described as 'foreign' crimes, as if they are never committed (or not even mostly committed) by Argentines.

Again, without extensive further research, we have no way of knowing how many politicians share such xenophobic views in Argentina. The applause following the critique of these views suggests that there are many in parliament for whom such views are too extreme, as would also be the case in Western Europe.

This does not mean however that more moderate forms of racism or xenophobia are not shared by many, as also the Argentine anti-immigration legislation suggests (for further references and details about racism in Argentina, also for further references, see, e.g., Margulis & Urresti 1998; Noufouri et al. 1999; for studies of racism in textbooks, which we are unfortunately unable to review here, see, e.g., Gvirtz, Valerani, & Cornejo 2000).

Finally, it should be recalled that whatever de various forms of contemporary racism in Argentine politics, it is hardly new. A century earlier, president Domingo Faustino Sarmiento formulated explicitly racist opinions that were hardly exceptional in the heyday of scientific and political racism in Europe and the Americas, but that had long-lasting influence in Argentina itself. As elsewhere, the indigenous population was seen as a impediment to 'progress' and 'civilization', and as a means of the 'struggle against barbarity' he sees hardly a problem in extermination:

(53) Puede ser muy injusto exterminar salvajes, sofocar civilizaciones nacientes, conquistar pueblos que están en un terreno privilegiado; pero gracias a esta injusticia la América, en lugar de permanecer abandonada a los salvajes, incapaces de progreso, está ocupada hoy por la raza caucásica, la más perfecta, la más inteligente, la más bella y la más progresiva de las que pueblan la tierra... Así pues, la población del mundo está sujeta a revoluciones que reconocen la leyes inmutables; las razas fuertes exterminan a las débiles, los pueblos civilizados suplantan en la posesión de la tierra a los salvajes. (Sarmiento, *Conflictos y armonías de las razas en América*, p. 38; cited in Luengo 1998)

It may seem very unjust to exterminate savages, to smother the birth of civilizations, to conquer peoples who are in a privileged terrain; but thanks to this injustice, America is now occupied by the Caucasian race, the most perfect, the most intelligent, the most beautiful and the most progressive of all the races of the earth, instead of being left to the savages, incapable of progress... Thus, the population of the world is dominated by immutable laws; the strong races exterminate the weaker ones, the civilized people replace the the savages as the owners of the earth.

We see that the supremacist, eugenetic and neodarwinist discourse features that would later express and legitimate the ideology of the Third Reich were hardly an invention of the Nazis. They had their roots in the positivist concepts of modernity, progress and the superiority of the European 'race', as they were developed in the 19th century, and shared by many politicians, also in Latin America. Note the familiar disclaimer, an Apparent Concession betray-

ing some idea of justice, at the beginning of this gruesome passage. The overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation finds its most extreme, macabre and racist expression in passages of this kind.

Chile

Let us now move west, across the Andes, to neighboring Chile. Ethnic relations in Chile are largely defined in terms of the relations between a large European majority of descendants of immigrants from Spain, Italy, Germany and other countries, on the one hand, and Mapuche, on the other hand, which form about 94% of the indigenous minorities (Aymara in the North only form 4% and Rapanui on 'Easter Island' 2%).

With the current immigration of workers from Peru and Bolivia, there is also increasing racism against these minorities. There are more than 700 internet sites that document Chilean racism against the Peruvian and Bolivian minorities. A survey of newspaper *La Tercera* in 2000 shows that three quarters of the Chilean population is against further immigration (Hopenhayn & Bello 2001: 46). In this section I shall however focus on the racism against the largest indigenous group in Chile, the Mapuche.

The Mapuche are historically known (that is, stereotypically constructed as) as valiant warriors who resisted Spanish occupation for nearly 300 years until their lands south of the Bio Bio river, also known as Araucanía, were gradually colonized by the Spanish and other immigrants in the course of the 19th century after Chilean independence in 1810. Throughout the centuries, from this genocide of the Mapuche, euphemistically called "*la pacificación de la Araucanía*", until today, the major conflict between the Mapuche and the Spanish and then the Chilean State, centered on Mapuche lands and their resources (Barra González 2000; Barrera 1999; Bengoa 1999, 2000; Millamán Reinao 2001; Vitale 2000).

Also current public discourse, both in politics and the press, centers on land claims of the Mapuche, mostly in the Southern part of Chile, where powerful logging and hydro-electric companies, such as Ralco, have important interests that clash with those of the Mapuche (Johnston & Turner 1999; Namuncura 1999). Thus, the usual newspaper headlines of the last years are about these and related conflicts, e.g., when Mapuche 'occupy' (or rather: reclaim their own) lands, obstruct logging or undertake other actions against the business companies. These stories usually are about intervention by the '*carabineros*' (the Chilean national police), the resistance and arrests of Ma-

puche activists, and about international solidarity with the Mapuche indigenas. Such coverage also suggests that all Mapuches are left-wing activists, whereas in reality all political parties are represented among the Mapuches.

The press

To understand reporting of ethnic affairs in the Chilean press, however, one not only needs to understand the history of the Mapuche and the current claims that derive from it, but also the Chilean press (Human Rights Watch 1998). As is the case also in other domains, such as the official church, the military and business, the media in Chile are largely very conservative. This is especially true of the leading newspaper *El Mercurio*, which supported dictator Pinochet and its military government (Sunkel 1983; Dermota 2002). The company and family that owns *El Mercurio* also controls many other media, and was closely associated with the fascist coup against socialist president Allende on September 11, 1973 (for many details, see the excellent study and documentation of Dermota 2002). The fascist regime was particularly cruel against the Mapuche, and jailed, tortured and killed many of their leaders (Declaration in London, 1978, of Mapuches in exile, see also Millamán Reinao 2001).

Other newspapers are sometimes less conservative, such as *El Sur,* and *La Tercera* (which however was also pro-Pinochet during the military regime). Others, such as *La Segunda* and *La Cuarta* are tabloids. In Chile an influential, critical and independent quality press, as in other countries of Latin America, hardly exists: The dominant conservative forces that also did not tolerate divorce and abortion in the country (as one of the few in the world – a modest divorce law has only recently been adopted) do not allow a critical, independent newspaper. The only more critical newspaper (*La Época*) that briefly existed was soon put out of business – because it failed to attract advertising. It should also be noted that within this broader perspective there is considerable variation when it comes to press attitudes during the dictatorship, the transition and the current democratic government. There is unfortunately no space here to describe these attitudes and their development in detail for all Chilean newspapers.

Maybe also because of this situation of the press, few people read the press in Chile anyway. Most people depend on TV for their news, and fortunately there is slightly more variation in opinion on television – although for instance catholic Canal 13 is not exactly a bulwark of progressive forces, as was also clear in its refusal to air a state campaign against AIDS that recommended the use of condoms.

Against these backgrounds, one does not expect a very positive press about the Mapuche. *El Mercurio* represents the interests of the political right, business and the military, and none of these groups is known to be fervently pro-Mapuche and its land-claims. This attitude is hardly new. In 1859, *El Mercurio* wrote the following about the Mapuches:

(54) Los hombres no nacieron para vivir inútilmente y como los animales selváticos, sin provecho del género humano; y una asociación de bárbaros, tan bárbaros como los pampas o como los araucanos, no es más que una horda de fieras, que es urgente encadenar o destruir en el interés de la humanidad y en el bien de la civilización.

(*El Mercurio*, 24 de mayo de 1859)

Men were not born to live uselessly nor to live like wild animals without taking advantage of being one of the human species; And an association of barbarians as barbaric as those in the Pampas or the Araucanians is no more than a horde of wild animals gathered together that must be chained or destroyed in the interest of humanity and for the good of all civilization.

Of course, this does not mean that the press today can print explicitly racist stories against ethnic minorities, because also in Chile this is no longer politically correct (for an analysis of an example from *El Mercurio* about the subtle and indirect representation of Mapuche 'menaces', see Merino 2001, 2003). What happens is that the selection, topics, and style of the newspaper stories about the conflicts are such that Mapuche are generally associated with problems, protests, land occupations, if not with violence. Thus, whereas in the old days they were represented as barbarians or drunks, today they are rather portrayed as extremists, if not as terrorists. The other Mapuche stories in the press are largely folklore – attention for language, customs, etc. – and seemingly politically innocent, but, as María Eugenia Merino has shown, not devoid of stereotypes (Merino 2000a, b, 2003).

In her doctoral thesis on the press coverage of the Mapuche, Berta San Martín concludes that although there are few explicitly racist statements on the Mapuche, the newspapers use many indirect strategies to represent Mapuche in a stereotypical and prejudiced way, namely as poor and backward, irrational, irresponsible, violent, criminal and opposed to progress (San Martín 2002). The few positive stories about Mapuche are about brave warriors in the past, or about folkloristic events. As is the case for minorities in the press anywhere, San Martín also found that the dominant group and culture (the non-Mapuche or 'winkas') is represented as superior, that few Mapuche sources are cited or used, that no stories ever have a Mapuche perspective, and that no mention

is made of Mapuche in non-stereotypical roles, e.g., as teachers, scholars or business people. Besides this general strategy of negative other-presentation, San Martín found a marked tendency of the well-known ideological strategy of deemphasizing our bad things: the historical and contemporary forms of 'winka' aggression and exploitation directed against Mapuche are mitigated, denied or ignored.

In another study, Cristian Gallegos Díaz (2004) provides a detailed and theoretically very explicit study of the editorials in the *Austral*, newspaper of the city of Temuco, the capital of Araucanía, the main territory of the Mapuche. Of the 850 editorials published between 2000 and 2003, 42 (4.9%) are directly about the conflict and 257 indirectly. A global analysis of topics yields the usual pattern of negative other presentation: *They* are violent, extremists, terrorists and do not respect the law. More specific about the conflict between Mapuche and the logging companies, the editorials emphasize the artificiality of the conflict, and affirm that the major problem is the poverty of the Mapuche. The conflict is especially described as being exacerbated by radicals among *them*. The ethnicity and autonomy of the Mapuche is denied: we are all mestizos and chileans. Mapuches must be economically integrated, and private enterprise protected, within a framework of globalization. In sum, as may be expected from a mainstream, conservative newspaper, the position taken is that of the dominant Chilean state, but against the too permissive current (central-left, '*concertacionist*'), government, with special concerns about the freedom of enterprise and other neoliberal values, as well as a nationalist ideology about the unity of the nation and its territory.

An example

To illustrate these conclusions of earlier and ongoing studies in Chile (which in turn often use, confirm, illustrate and extend my own earlier work on racism and the press), let me give an impression of a characteristic example in the press of this kind of reporting by making some observations on an article that appeared in *El Mercurio* on an action by Mapuche in the southern city of Temuco. We cite nearly the whole article in order to get a good impression of this kind of typical coverage (see the original Spanish text in the Appendix):

(55) Temuco:
500 Mapuches Attack City Hall
Iván Fredes, *El Mercurio*, Thursday, July 26, 2001

14 injured police officers, one wounded pedestrian and 120 detainees, plus millions in damages after enraged crowd attacks buildings, businesses and public property.
Governor of Araucania announces possible legal actions against the demonstrators.
In parallel action, other groups put up barricades and rob gas stations for fuel to make fire bombs.

TEMUCO (Iván Fredes). – The coordinated action of several Mapuche groups created a genuine chaos in the urban center and adjacent streets of this city, with a total of nearly 800 indigenous people attacking police officers, buildings, public and private property, putting up barricades and robbing gas stations for fuel to make ignitable weaponry with no provocation whatsoever.
(. . .)
The aggressive and violent behavior of the demonstrators against central offices of the Regional Government at times endangered the lives of the civil servants' working there.
The building ended up with some 20 large windows broken, the same as the nearby offices of National Tourism for the Region, whose 3 civil servants had to crawl on the floor to avoid being hit by the hail of rocks being thrown in.
These disturbances are the most severe that have ever happened in this city to date. They left 14 of the police force injured, one pedestrian wounded and 120 detained, on top of millions in damages to buildings, businesses and public works.
The disturbances developed towards the end of a peaceful march where the Mapuche organization *Consejo de Todas las Tierras* (All Lands Council) had come together, with support from 10 other Indigenous organizations to protest against the reform in the penal process, effective in the region since last December.
This is a result of at least a dozen investigations that public prosecutors are carrying out for various criminal actions protagonized by Indigenous people who claim the rights to land. Illegal activity, usurpation, injuries, damages, robberies are the charges causing the detention of the presumed offenders.
Also included in the process of investigation and seizure was the headquarters of the organization *Consejo de Todas las* Tierras, led by Aucán Huilcamán, who according to the government, unites between 10 and 20 communities. He was inspected last Friday in compliance with a judicial

order which instigated the massive and violent demonstration.
Organizations as well as groups of Mapuche cohorts who have been investigated for repeated occupations of properties of woodland businesses and private owners, have adopted the decision to resist and face the consequences of juridical warrants. They have been charged with assault, ambushes, sabotage, arson, kidnapping and theft of wood and other materials.
In the early morning of last Tuesday, Indigenous persons from the town of Ercilla in the zone of Cherquenco, wounded 4 Investigative Police Officers, when they tried to rescue an associate, detained by a judicial order that also posed the possibility of arrest for 5 other Indigenous people, charged with criminal activity, kidnapping, robbery, damages and possession of illegal arms.
(. . .)
Similar actions, which included the destruction of road signs and the placement of giant rocks, as well as tire burning, was repeated in at least four other intersections of the most traveled highway in the city, causing chaos in traffic.
Police authorities prepared the dispatch of 300 special force agents, backed up by two tanks of water-pressure cannons and smoke bombs and at least 3 buses deployed to adjacent streets, to avoid any chance of further turmoil.
(. . .)
Without having been provoked, security forces were attacked by a downpour of rocks shot with slings and other launching devices, while other Mapuches got within one meter of the police to hit their legs with *chuecas* [Mapuche hockeysticks].
The squad, virtually cornered against the attack of extraordinary violence, used tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. At this point, the rest of police forces intervened, using all of their resources to detain and control the Indigenous people.
However they still continued the confrontation, employing any makeshift weaponry, including sling-shots, firebombs and even hand-to-hand combat. Simultaneously, other Mapuche groups provoked disorder in the neighboring streets and on Caupolicán Avenue.
Yet another group looted and intimidated employees of a nearby gas station on the corner of Caupolicán and Rodríguez, where they demanded the handover of fuel to fabricate firebombs.
The Demonstrators also concentrated their actions in and around the Plaza of Aníbal Pinto, where the pedestrians in the streets, including

> mothers with little children, had to frantically look for refuge in shopping centers, to take shelter from the flying rocks and the effects of the tear gas and water cannons.
> During the battle, a passer-by who was simply trying to make a transaction in a nearby bank was wounded.
> (. . .)
> Governor Belmar, who had at first minimized the acts of violence committed by the Indigenous compatriots and blamed the press for exaggerating them, later admitted that the Indigenous people had acted with unusual aggression and violence.
> "The majority of marches are without permission, peaceful and are limited to the delivery of a letter," she pointed out. She specified that between 380 and 400 Mapuches participated in the march, according to police authorities.
> The Governor said that damages would be evaluated to impose legal action against the *Consejo de Todas las Tierras*.

There is little doubt in this news article about who are defined as the bad guys, and who as the victims. The Mapuche demonstrators are represented as aggressive, violent and irrational. The overall perspective is that of the police, who are said to have been attacked "without any provocation", so that the attack is seen as irrational. That barely a paragraph later it is said that a building of a Mapuche organization was confiscated by the police, is apparently not sufficient as a legitimate reason for the demonstrators (see also the analysis of Merino 2001, 2003).

In the main headline, we find the usual number game ('500 Mapuches') the negative active verb 'to attack' and the Mapuche in the responsible, topical agent role. The sub-headline topicalizes the role of the other main participants, namely the police, in subject position but not in agent-role but in patient/victim role, again in a number-game framework that emphasizes the bad role of the Mapuche.

Throughout the article, this macro-strategy of presenting the Mapuche only in a negative role is carried out systematically. They are thus presented not only as aggressive, demonstrating, making barricades, as engaging in violence, attacking the police, destroying property, or throwing stones, but even as having committed the unspeakable crime of having stolen some gasoline for petrol bombs. Even the number of windows broken is being specified, apart from the (vague) calculation of the damages inflicted in 'millions' of pesos (which in dollar value may be as low as a few thousand dollars). Later in the article, also the earlier crimes of Mapuche activists are repeatedly enumerated.

As usual in this kind of accounts, as we already know from the classic book on such events, *Demonstrations and communications* (Halloran, Elliott, & Murdock 1970), the fact that the events concluded a peaceful protest, is only mentioned briefly and without emphasis. And as usual, those involved are described as youths – even as 'under age', which combines crime and violence with the theme of unruly adolescents. In other words, the account follows a very stereotypical pattern of news about social protest, including the mention of an incendiary speech of the leader as political agitator. Perhaps most interesting for our analysis is the familiar use of 'alleged' when speaking about the repression and discrimination exercised by the State, thereby explicitly formulating doubts about such State action against the Mapuche, or by treating this as a spurious accusation of the Mapuche.

Note further that whereas the negative actions of the Mapuche are described in great detail throughout the article, the actions of the police are not merely described as passively defending themselves. When the police finally take action, it is merely said that they "used all their resources to detain and control the indígenas", leaving to the fantasy of the reader what these resources may have been. Since 120 people were arrested, it is hardly likely that these arrests took place without any violence, but about that the newspaper does not provide any information. There is ample evidence, not only from Mapuche sources, that police brutality is standard procedure in such cases.[4]

And if passing mothers with children have to seek refuge against the demonstration, it is again the Mapuche action that is named and topicalized, and the actions of the police (water canons, smoke bombs) are only mentioned as if they were self-propelling, without naming the police. We see that also the classical moves of grammatical transitivity structures and agency (de)emphasis are standard procedure in this article.

And finally, the semantic figure of contrast concludes the article when the very governor who is said to have "minimized" the actions and to have accused the press of exaggerating, is now said to recognize that the current actions of the indígenas were in fact violent. The function of including this affirmation in the press story is to confirm and legitimatize the correctness of the press account of this event with the authority of a government official, and of course denying, as usual, any exaggeration and hence malpractice of the journalists.

Further analysis of the details of this news item would take many pages, but the upshot of our critical observations may be clear: We here have a classical case of the global strategy of negative other presentation of an ethnic minority group, combined with the form of positive self-presentation of assuming a victim role, and mitigating, denying or simply ignoring any negative action of the

police. Typical also is the absence and minimization of the possible causes or reasons of the demonstration, so that the violence appears wholly arbitrary and irrational. And finally, this is a very detailed account of the violent conclusion of a peaceful demonstration about which however we do not read anything. Thus we find all the usual moves of emphasizing Their bad things and de-emphasizing Our (the police's, the press') bad things are being applied here to execute these overall strategies.

Textbooks

Educational discourse in Chile about the Mapuche people is mainly historical. Carmona (2001) in one of the few systematic studies of the textbook representation of Mapuche in history textbooks used in primary school confirms what has been found also in previous studies, namely a largely stereotypical account of indigenous peoples. The representation of the rebellious nature of the Mapuche in the press accounts of Mapuche protest actions against the occupation of their lands has a long history in traditional accounts of the indigenous population and its struggle against the Spanish invaders. Also the history textbooks emphasize the definition of 'Araucanos', as they are called, in terms of valiant 'guerreros' (warriors), with special attention for one of them, Lautaro, and his resistance against the Spaniards, who finally assassinated him. This historical account is just that: historical, and about 'dead Indians', and certainly not in the current descriptions of contemporary Mapuche resisting logging or building of dams. Rather, the valiant history of the Mapuche people is integrated as a part of Chile's past, and as a characteristic of Chileans generally:

(56) Heroismo, patrimonio de todos los Chilenos: el espiritu heroismo heradado de Españoles e indígenas continuó vivo en los líderes de la Independencia, es otro rasgo del chileno, en las guerras se han dado grandes muestras de él. (History book published by Santillana, 8th grade, 1993:120; cited by Carmona 2001:33)

Heroism, the cultural heritage of all Chileans: The heroic spirit of Chileans inherited from the Spanish and Indigenous peoples continues to live on in the leaders of the Independence. It is another characteristic of the Chilean and throughout wars, great demonstrations of it have been displayed.

We see from this passage not only that national histories celebrate military valiance, but also tend to 'nationalize' the history of indigenous resistance into a general trait of the population. Such a strategy is consistent with the 'unifi-

cation' strategy also apparent in much political discourse, namely that there is just one kind of Chileans.

Unlike similar discourses elsewhere in Latin America, for instance in Mexico, such a unification strategy does not usually imply the claim that 'we are all mestizos', because being Mapuche or having indigenous traits is not at all something most Chileans would be proud of.

The rest of the textbook description of the Mapuche focused on everyday life, cultivating land, the tasks of women and men, food, customs and music, with occasional racist remarks about laziness of the indigenous people. The dominant topic, however, is the resistance against the Spanish and the belligerent and valiant nature of 'Araucanos' as warriors. Obviously, we hardly read about Spanish – let alone later Chilean – oppression and violence against the Mapuche. Obviously, we need further systematic research on the portrayal of Mapuche and other indigenous peoples of Chile in other textbooks, e.g., of geography, social science and language, and especially also an analysis of the representation of the Mapuche people today.

A study by Almonacid, Merino and Quilaqueo (2003) of the didactic supplement of *La Tercera* confirms many of these findings on stereotypes on Mapuche as they are being told to children. First of all, historically, the Mapuche people is represented as less advanced than other indigenous peoples in Latin America, such as the Incas and Mayas. Secondly, as we have seen above, also these newspaper tutorials do not fail to emphasize the alleged violent nature of the Mapuche – historically represented not only in terms of valiant warriors, but also as a people that was always fighting, also among themselves.

Although further systematic studies of the way textbooks represent the Mapuche people today are still on the agenda, these few observations suggest strongly that such representations are fundamentally stereotypical and occasionally racist. Whereas on the one hand Mapuche identity is often denied – and overall Chilean identity emphasized – it also clear that the dominant elites and their discourses in Chile undoubtedly feel superior.

Political discourse

Press discourse usually does not stand alone, and much political discourse reflects more or less the same attitudes, although there is more political diversity than media diversity in Chile. Although more explicit on the conservative right, e.g. among UDI supporters, also centrist and left-wing parties, both nationally and regionally are known to have engaged in various forms of prejudice and paternalism towards de Mapuches (for details, see Merino 2003). The

marginalization of Mapuche is also reflected in their very exclusion from political debate, in such a way that many conservative politicians simply avoid the topic altogether. In some parliamentary speeches we also encounter the usual denial of racism we have found before, namely when it is stressed that all Chileans have Mapuche blood (see, e.g., the speech by Eduardo Diáz on May 20, 1998). In that same speech Mapuche resistance is described as an attack on private property, as foreign inspired and as non-representative of the Mapuche people, that is, with the familiar moves of the strategy of delegitimation.

Van Bebber Ríos (2002) provides a more abstract, political scientific account of the discourse of political parties in Chile about the "Mapuche conflict". He distinguishes three major political discourse orders about the Mapuche: On the left, we find the value of 'reason' as the link among communities and a recognition of (Mapuche) Otherness, as we also find it in class solidarity. The political Center (in Chile especially Christian Democrats) takes a more traditional view, based on general values and culture, in which we are all 'children of God'.This principle also means that ethnic identity and difference are denied, and Mapuche seen as Chileans. The political Right defines the conflict especially in negative terms, and accuses the Left of having exacerbated it. For them, the unity of the State and the Nation is fundamental, and Mapuche land and other demands hence seen as preposterous.

More than other public discourses about the Mapuche in Chile, a detailed study of all kinds of political discourse (parliamentary debates, propaganda, speeches, campaigns, etc.) is urgently needed.

Brazil

A study of discursive racism in Brazil, even more than for the other countries we deal with in this chapter, deserves a book, or several books on its own. Race relations in this huge country are the epitome of those in the rest of the continent, with (officially, according to census figures) some 44% people of African descent[5] (in reality there may be more than 50%), and more than 200 different indigenous peoples, besides the many different groups of European or Asian descent and the infinite variety of appearances that result from centuries of miscegenation. Yet, because the indigenous people form only some 0.2% of the current population of 160 million Brazilians (Ramos 1998), the major dimension of Brazilian race relations in everyday life is between white and black – and its many intermediary shades (D'Adesky 2001; Reichmann 1999; Silva & Hasenbalg 1992).

Despite the vast complexity of Brazilian race relations, the fundamental tendencies of ethnic power relations are not much different from elsewhere on the continent. The general rule of ethnic relations, dominance and racism also applies here: White (European) people in many ways dominate all other groups. This is directly observable in the middle and upper classes, among the elites and in the centers of power or wealth, where the large majority of the people are of European descent: in politics, the media, universities, research, the corporate boardrooms, the courts, and so on. It shows in the history of 'whitening' (embranquecimento or branqueamento) through selective immigration policies and the general preference for white(r) marriage partners (Piza 2000; Twine 1998), or white children for adoption (see, *Correio da Bahia,* July 1, 2002) among many other manifestations in everyday life. It is obvious in the complex color hierarchies and their associated denominations and values, where whiter is nearly always better, and blacker nearly always worse. (Piza 2000; Telles 2004). Racist ads explicitly search personnel "*de boa aparência*", in other words white men or women (Damasceno 2000).

Switch on television in Brazil, watch one of the many telenovelas, or open a newspaper or a magazine, and you'll see mostly white faces, and much blonde hair. Thus, being white is not only generally seen as esthetically preferable for many people (even by many black people[6]), but also represents social, economic, intellectual or cultural power in the country (D'Adesky 2001; Guimarães 1999, 2002; Guimarães & Huntley 2000; Reichmann 1999; Telles 2004).

There is another major feature of racism in Brazil that it shares with the rest of Latin America and Europe: Its denial. Even more than in other countries, Brazil has been able to maintain this denial within the framework of a complex ideology of 'racial democracy', promoted by influential social scientists such as Gilberto Freyre (Azevedo 1975; Guimarães 2002; Twine 1998). According to this ideology, race relations in Brazil are more 'cordial' than for instance in the United States (Degler 1986), with less interpersonal distance and polarization between black and white people (Folha de São Paulo/Datafolha 1995).

Many forms of everyday racism were thus made invisible, and until today many white (and even black) Brazilians will emphasize that social problems and conflicts are based on class, and not on race. That Brazil is socially and economically one of the most unequal societies in Latin America and in the world, with vast differences in wealth and power between the very rich and the very poor, is therefore also rooted in its racial inequality (Hasenbalg & Silva 1988; Silva 2000).

Thus, to cite just one figure, according to IBGE (the Brazilian office of statistics), white men had an average salary in 1999 that was double (R$ 670, in 1999 about US$ 300) that of "pardos" (R$ 320) or "negros" (about R$ 314). This also shows that if we go by income, "pardos" (mulattos) are in the same bracket and class as "negros", and not some intermediary class between white and black (see also Silva 1999).

In 2002, UNESCO sub-director Pierre Sané, from Senegal, former director general of Amnesty International, on a visit to Brazil, declared that Brazil was 40 years behind other countries in its fight against racism, e.g., because until recently it did not take adequate measures of affirmative action (*Jornal do Brasil* – and other newspapers, June 13, 2002).

The last few decades racial democracy in Brazil has often been shown what it is: a myth (Azevedo 1975; Munanga 1996). Various studies sponsored by Unesco in the 1950s and 1960s document the fundamental socio-economic aspects of racial inequality, though still ignoring the many other dimensions of racism (Guimarães 2002). Secondly, in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement in the USA and throughout the 1970s and 1980s an increasing number of critical social scientists produced the hard figures that prove discrimination against indigenous and black people in Brazil (D'Adesky 2001; Hasenbalg 1979; Lovell 1991; Munanga 1996; Reichmann 1999).

Although these studies, as well as the other research summarized in this book for Latin America in general and Brazil in particular, point to a basic social polarization between 'whites' and 'non-whites', this should not be interpreted as implying a reduction of complex social structures to a simple dichotomy. Costa (2002) points out that using 'race' as a conceptual instrument does not suffice to understand social relations and identities in Brazil, and that work on polarized race relations in the USA cannot simply be projected on the Brazilian case.

In the process of conscientization of racial inequality, African Brazilians themselves finally got organized and founded many black organizations or publications that celebrate black culture and pride (Fernandes 1989; Guimarães 1999, 2002; Hanchard 1994; Nascimento & Larkin Nascimento 2000; Santos 2000).

On the occasion of the centenary of the abolition of slavery in 1989, a law was adopted that severely punishes 'racial' discrimination and racist acts and discourse, even with stiff prison terms. As a consequence, both in the media and with the police authorities there are many more charges of racism in the last decade. In other words, resistance against racism among the black population, and at least in theory also among some elite groups, or state agencies, is

growing. These developments, however, do not always imply many changes in the everyday practices and discourses of dominant group members, but at least there is debate and thus the beginning of change.

Given the sheer size of the country, the many universities and the seriousness of the problem of racism and other forms of social exclusion, one would expect a vast amount of studies about racism in Brazil. Nothing is less true, however. Many studies are on black culture or on historical topics, especially in the wake of the celebration of 100 years of the abolition of slavery in 1988 (see e.g., the many important historical studies of Lilia Moritz Schwarcz, e.g., Schwarcz 1987). Also there are many anthropological and linguistic studies of indigenous cultures and languages. Studies that deal with racism proper generally focus on socio-economic inequalities, highlighting the many domains of society where black people experience various forms of discrimination: less access to the labor market, less access to higher position, lower wages, worse housing, urban segregation, less access to good education, and so on.

Forms of symbolic racism are studied especially for the mass media, in particular television, and for education, but there are still few detailed monographs (see below for references). There are as yet hardly systematic studies of racism in political discourse, news discourse, scientific discourse, or legal discourse, among other forms of elite text and talk. Hence, what we report here is culled from a handful of shorter studies, chapters, theses, papers, internet publications and other less ambitious studies. Most of the work on discursive racism in Brazil is still on the agenda.

Everyday conversation

Generally, white researchers can only speculate about how other white people speak to black people in everyday conversations. We usually lack reliable data about such spontaneous talk based on tape recordings. The myth of cordial race relations, and more in general of social relations in Brazil, would suggest that interracial communication is generally equally cordial. This may be so in many situations and maybe even for most people, but some unique data from police precincts registering complaints of citizens about racist insults collected by Antônio Guimarães (2002), show that discursive everyday race relations in Brazil can be very blunt and explicit. On the job, in shops, in the bus or in encounters with neighbors, whites often treat blacks in very crude racist terms, such as *macaco* (monkey), *besta* (animal), *vagabundo* (bum), *filho da puta* (son of a whore), *safado* (insolent person), *ladrão* (thief), and so on. Some examples, as cited by the police records are:

– *Eu quebro a sua cara seu nego safado, ladrão sem vergonha* (*on the job*)
  I break your face, you impertinent nigger, shameless thief
– *Suas negrinhas filhas da puta, negas fedorentas* (*among neighbors*)
  You daughters of a whore, stinking niggers
– *Estou cheia dessa raça; Essa raça não presta* (*among neighbors*)
  I have enough of this race: this race is good for nothing

In other words, blacks tend to be associated with animals, with laziness, dirtiness and impertinence and tend to be addressed or represented as delinquents, as amoral, as lacking intelligence, and as of lower origin. Interestingly, there are more complaints about women, whereas white men tend to racially insult black men more often than black women. We have no way of knowing how representative these complaints are of interracial communication in Brazil,[7] but we may safely assume that the complaints made at the police precincts are merely a very small tip of the iceberg. We also saw above that it is due to the antiracism law of 1989 that such discursive racism has become an offense in the first place, and in principle people can go to jail for them. Convictions are rare though, if any. We also see that at least for some whites and some contexts, unprovoked racist insults are common, and that the restrictions of the political correctness of public, elite discourse are not operating there.

Another idea about everyday talk about race can be obtained from a study conducted by Pedro de Oliveira Filho (2002). He interviewed white people about the different social position of black people in Brazil. Asking for explanations or 'accounts' is always in an interesting way to obtain data about a socal phenomenon, and the data cited here are revealing. Hesitatingly or reluctantly, people may mention discrimination or racism as a cause of the current situation of blacks, although – as in the USA – such explanations tend to be put in a historical framework, in the perspective of slavery, and hence as a thing of the past. More often than not the position of Brazilian blacks tend to be described in terms of their own lack of self-esteem, that is, attributed to themselves, thus blaming the victim – a well-known strategy of racist or sexist discourse.

Politics

Unfortunately, we have virtually no data or studies about racism in contemporary political discourse in Brazil. Most historical studies will of course emphasize the role of the State and politicians in the institution and maintenance of slavery: Brazil was the last country in which slavery was abolished, in 1888. And also after abolition, politicians, the vast majority of which were and are

also white, showed little interest in the black or indigenous populations. It was only in the 1930s, and especially with the Estado Novo (1937–1945) and the Segunda República (1945–1964) that the State discovered its 'people' (*povo*) but reducing its diversity to one Brazilian 'race', thus trying to avoid a ethnic time bomb going off (Guimarães 2002: 117ff.). These attempts were academically supported by scholars such as Gilberto Freyre, and by the propagation of the idea of the well-known notion of 'racial democracy' inspired by Freyre and other scholars. Similarly, it is only when in the 1970s the Black movements begin to acquire increased influence that both the academics and the politicians slowly wake up and begin to accept that Brazil never was and is not now a racial democracy.

In the year of the Centenary of the Abolition of Slavery, in 1988, racism was declared a "*crime inafiançável e imprescriptível*" in Article XLII of the new Constitution. A year later various laws were enacted to combat racism and discrimination.

In line with other elite discourse in Brazil of the last decades, also official political discourse today on blacks and indigenous people tends to be politically correct in the sense of rhetorically emphasizing the highest ideals of equality. We have no data, however, on how politicians speak to or about blacks and indigenous people in everyday life, or in less formal, and more local political contexts. These data will have to come from testimonies of the targets, which need to be collected and analyzed in future research on discursive racism in Brazil (for comparable research in the Netherlands and the USA, see, e.g., Essed 1991).

Also due to the initiative of black members of parliament, a special parliamentary committee was appointed in 2001 in order to discuss the "*Estatuto da igualdade racial*", a bill proposed by deputado Paulo Paim. Interestingly, in the committee debates in the fall of 2001, one of the first points of debate was whether or not such a Statute would apply to all ethnic groups, or whether it would specifically apply to the community that in Brazil was most affected by discrimination, that is, the afro-brasileiros, as Paim and other black representatives emphasized: "*O negro é o grande discriminado*" (Commission debate of 20-9-2001, p. 17). Another point of debate, brought up by representative Tânia Soares, was whether black women in this case would be given special attention because of the specific ways they suffer from double discrimination (see also Roland 2000). This point of view, however, is energetically rejected by Paim, for whom the unity of the black community is crucial: "*É importante deixar bem claro que, para nós, negro é negro, seja mulher, seja homem*" (p. 26). We'll have to see whether this and other political initiatives will provide

an official framework that allows for serious improvement of the position of blacks in Brazilian society, such as the reduction of poverty, less discrimination and police harassment, and easier access to the university, as well as a more positive representation in school textbooks, among many other claims of the afrobrazilian community.

The media

Not only scholars of racism, but also the casual observer or the tourist watching television in Brazil, are usually impressed by the predominance of 'white' faces on the screen compared to the number of people of color seen in the street. In that respect, television of course reflects a social reality in which few people of color have positions of political, social, economic or cultural power (Araújo 1996, 2000a, 2000b; Lima 1984, 1996, 2000, 2001).

Because the elites control the media anywhere, this means that in Brazil people of African descent, and especially also indigenous people, are rare as program directors, anchor women and men, commentators, reporters, talk show hosts, telenovela characters, sources, or prominent actors in the news. And *if* blacks sometimes occupy positions of leadership they will be more discriminated the higher they climb – which is one of the major corollaries of the main thesis of this book – whether in the media or the university (see, e.g., Silva Bento 1999: 115–117).

For the same reasons, also the opposite is true: If brown or black people *do* appear on television, this will usually be as servants or secondary characters in telenovelas, as perpetrators or victims of crime, as unidentified citizens in news programs, as slaves in historical programs, and of course as musicians, dancers, sensual mulatas, Macumba mamas, etc., and especially in carnival scenes. Occasionally they appear as victims of discrimination or "*preconceito*" (prejudice). Typical exceptions are famous soccer players such as Pélé, or musicians such as Milton Nascimento or Gilberto Gil, now minister of Culture in the government of Lula. They are the exceptions that prove the rule. Blacks hardly ever appear as "normal" families and their everyday lives are seldom shown. It is not surprising that with this kind of negative public representation on the omnipresent tube (74% of households have TV), and with the special value of images and esthetic norms in Brasil even many black people associate their color with ugliness and white with beauty. Research shows that even less black people (34%) than white people (56%) find that the image of blacks on TV is negative.

Araújo (1996: 248, 2000a, 2000b) lists the following properties of the representation of African Brazilians on TV: (a) Blacks are represented in terms of

negative stereotypes that go back to times of slavery, and play subservient roles in telenovelas and comical programs; (b) more positive images are absent, such as the representation of blacks as leaders when speaking both about national issues as well as about questions of the African Brazilian population; (c) Black culture is merely represented as folklore, and not as part of a living culture – and blacks thus only appear as sambistas and 'paes-de-santo' etc. and other roles related to carnival, and similar festivities, (d) and wherever blacks appear routinely, they tend to be associated to drugs, poverty, ignorance, homicide, and other negative issues (see also Lima 1984, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2001).

As is usually the case, the marginal appearance of blacks on TV has nothing to do with lacking qualification of actors, but everything with discrimination by (usually white) personnel chiefs, as the following piece of evidence shows, cited in a study on job discrimination in Brazil (Silva Bento 1999: 114):

(57) Two women, both of whom had more than five years experience in television production, applied for a job. I routed their forms to Mr. Pires, the manager. His assistant came back and said there was one job opening. I called Mr. Pires and asked him if he was losing his mind. He had just told there were two positions open for production work. He said, "Ah dona Rosane, you didn't tell me one was a *crioula*, you didn't tell me that." I said, "Mr. Pires, it's too bad that you don't have a video screen on your phone so you could see me." Then I hang up.

The more progressive newspapers, such as *Folha de São Paulo*, generally join those voices who in the last decades have challenged the myth of racial democracy (Reid Andrews 1991: 226ff.; see also Conceição 2001; Guimarães 1996). Yet, other newspapers may still reflect how much this myth is still alive and kicking among many Brazilians, especially on the right. Thus, the Centennial (of the Abolition of Slavery) of May 13, 1988, was greeted by Rio de Janeiro newspaper *O Globo* with an editorial that denied racism in the usual terms, namely by attributing social inequality in Brazil to class, and by warning black people not to be manipulated into thinking something else, thereby referring to the violence of the Civil Rights movement in the United States.

If we examine the recent press clippings of the unique and excellent data base of the Fundação Cultural Palmares of the Ministry of Culture (www.palmares.gov.br), we see first of all that articles on racism, even when conceptualized in terms of "preconceito" or "discriminação", are quite common in the media. Also the official measures against racism receive frequent press attention. Thirdly, many articles are about cultural aspects of the afro-brazilian community, such as candomblé, theatre, literature, or dance. Judging

by these clippings, which presumably do not cover most articles in which blacks only appear as any other citizen (or elite member), one might provisionally conclude that blacks mostly occur as victims of racism, as antiracist activists, or as agents in afrobrazilian cultural events, that is in stereotypical roles. That is, black participation in the economy, science or related prestige areas does not seem to prominent in the media. Of course, detailed content and discourse analyses will be necessary to confirm this first impression of the Brazilian media.

D'Adesky (2001) in his Ph.D. thesis on racism and anti-racism in Brazil also dedicates a chapter to the role of the media, based on several other studies (p. 89). He begins by providing some evidence of what everybody knows about one of the major cultural phenomena in Brazil: the prominent telenovelas. In comparison to their percentage in society African Brazilian actors seldom appear in these influential series. In the 25 telenovelas showing between 1993 and 1997, less than 8% of the actors were black. Moreover, they tend to be light colored and play minor or subservient roles (pp. 91–92). A study of advertising shows that similar percentages apply to the presence of blacks in ads: about 6.5% in 1995 in *Veja* (comparable to *Newsweek*), and even less than 4% in a magazine such as *Cosmopolitan* (p. 106) (for the representation of blacks in advertising, see also Hasenbalg 1988).

As for the presence of blacks in the news, D'Adesky refers to a study by Fernando de Sá, in which it is shown that television news about Brazil seems to be about a white, first world country, in which the largest black population outside of Africa is practically invisible.

D'Adesky recalls that the exclusion of black people from television in Brazil also holds for the print media and for motion pictures (for the position of blacks in Brazilian movies, see Rodrigues 1988). There are no African Brazilian newspapers and also magazines generally address the (upper) white middle class, in a country of which only about 26 million of 160 million people are readers. There are only a handful of small specialized magazines for the black population, and made by black people, and the ones that are widely sold, such as *Raça Brasil*, and *Black People*, are specifically addressing blacks of higher incomes (see also Pereira 2001, on black journalists and their access to the radio in São Paulo).

D'Adesky shows that the same is true for the contents of the press, which systematically ignores black people (except during carnival), and which does not reflect the cultural diversity of the country, even when there is a slight increase of articles on racism.

Similar remarks hold for the marginal and stereotypical media portrayal of the (very small) indigenous population as backward, primitive and only associated with specific cultural customs, dress, and so on (Warren 2001). Warren reports the case of former Army Minister Leônidas Pires Gonçalves, who on the national day of the Indian in 1989 said that "Indians" need not be protected because "Indian cultures are very lowly and therefore not respectable" (Warren 2001:175). Obviously the opinion of one politician at the top cannot stand for those of all others, but if such things can be said in public, there is reason to believe that there are more high ranking military and politicians who have similar ideas.

Education

Also in Brazil discursive racism is so pervasive that it appears in virtually all genres and contexts, not only in the mass media, but also in the other major domain of public discourse: education. Historically, minorities have had less access to school, and generally only could afford (worse) public schools (Rosemberg 1991, 2000), so that their illiteracy rates are more than twice as high (about 36% in 1980) as those for whites and only 0.6% of blacks had a college diploma (Hasenbalg & Silva 1990).

Also as represented social actors blacks have less access to educational discourse (for a survey of the literature on this topic, see Rosemberg, Bazilli, & Baptista da Silva 2003). As is the case for the mass media, black people in textbooks are marginal, and the same is true for the indigenous population, except in historical or cultural topics, for instance about slavery or about the 'interesting' cultural habits of indigenous peoples. As elsewhere in the textbooks in Latin America, blacks and indigenous people are interesting for educational discourse especially in the past – that is, when they are dead (Donisete Benzi Grupioni 1995).

Blacks and indígenas of today, and their everyday lives, are seldom interesting for textbooks. That nearly half of the Brazilians are people of color does not seem to be a very prominent theme in educational materials (Silva 1995). This is hardly surprising when one notes that the topic seldom appears in pedagogical discourse until the late 1980s, and that teachers are not educated to teach on this topic (Fernandes de Souza 2001).

Again as in the media, the last decade has seen some change, in the sense that there is increasing (though still modest) interest in multicultural education and racism, both in the curricula as well as in lessons and textbooks (Cunha Jr. 1996). More than in the real highbrow boroughs of elite discourse (those of

elite politics, media and academia), the sheer pressure of the presence of many children of color in the schools forces teachers, planners and researchers in this area to be more sensitive to the needs of the black population (Cavalleiro 2000, 2001).

In a follow up-study of her earlier book just mentioned on mother tongue textbooks for primary school, Ana Célia da Silva found some significant advances in the 1990s: In the 15 textbooks she analyzed, published in São Paulo between 1994 and 1998, blacks are still represented as a minority, but no longer are they often appearing (in text or image) as caricatures; black kids are also represented in school, and as playing and not merely as street kids or serving as cheap labor; there is interaction between white and black kids; and blacks are also engaged in positive actions (Silva 2000; see also Bittencourt 1997; Carmo 1991; Oliveira 2000).

Oliveira (2000), in a study on 20 years of history teaching (curricula, textbooks, etc.) between 1978–1998 also concludes that there have been changes. There is increasing attention for the everyday life of people, including of people of color and their culture. Yet, textbooks may still feature stereotypes, including a representation of the black community only as victims, both during slavery and today, and not as actively resisting and taking action against oppression or marginalization. Thus, the diversity of blacks today in their many contexts and functions is hardly reflected in the textbooks. The author stresses that it is one thing to recognize that until today blacks are often marginalized, and another thing to portray blacks only in passive victim roles. In interviews with teachers, the author also found that there is student resistance against teaching about prejudice and racism – which are considered as relevant only for blacks.

Sônia Irene Silva do Carmo, in one of the few discourse analytical studies of textbook representations of indigenous peoples in Brazil (and in Latin America for that matter) concludes first of all that much of this representation is related to their 'discovery' by white Europeans, namely the Portuguese, 500 years ago (Carmo 1991). In history books indigenous peoples often only appear in later chapters, after presentation of the Europeans. Many of their properties are not described in independent terms but in explicit or implicit comparison to white Europeans – compared to whom they lived in a 'Neolithic' past, and used 'primitive' instruments. As suggested above, more generally the representation of indigenous peoples is associated with the past and seldom with the present. This past is at the same time often characterized in positive terms, much like a lost Arcadia of harmonious and egalitarian village life. Interestingly, it is also only the village that is attributed as being their own – not the whole territory occupied by the colonizers. This colonization is critically dis-

cussed in contemporary textbooks, but especially because of the physical and cultural annihilation of the indigenous peoples, not because of the invasion of their lands. Instead of words such as '*invasão*' or '*conquista*' euphemisms tend to be used, as is also the case for the ways the indigenous people have been massacred. The author also concludes that the textbooks are not homogeneous. Although the 'Indios' are generally represented in rather generalized and distant terms, and always as the Other, they may sometimes be characterized in the well-known terms of traditional prejudices, that is, as exotic, wild Others, but also as "*bons sauvages*" who are the victim of white domination and needs our support. That is, even the more positive, empathic portrayals of the indigenous peoples represent them in passive terms. In the textbooks studied the 'Indio' does not speak and does not resist. On the other hand, the positive 'civilizing' actions of the Jesuits are emphasized – confirming our general ideological square according to which 'our' good things are being highlighted – although not always without a critical note.

Summarizing these various properties of the textbook portrayal of the indigenous people, eurocentrism is of course the appropriate but hardly surprising term to describe the dominant ideology. But there are also voices that try to formulate a different perspective, critical of white Europeans and in solidarity with the Indigenous population.

Brazilian elites, just like elites everywhere, are reluctant to lose their privileges, and generally reject any kind of affirmative action or quota. This is also the case for the broad opposition to a bill (289/99) that guarantees that 50% of university places are reserved for students coming from public schools, that is, the schools to which most black people have access (Guimarães 2002:70). In the meantime, one sees few black faces in the universities, and this academic selection is thus one of the core elements of the reproduction of the elite classes, which are more than 80% white (Oliveira et al. 1982). To get an idea of the kind of elite discourse – and arguments – that are being used to reject university (or any other) quotas, see the following opinion article in *A Jornal da Tarde* (the newspaper of Salvador de Bahia)*:*

(58) Cotas de Discriminação
O sistema de cotas segundo a raça para ingresso na universidade está fadado a produzir no Brasil os problemas que provoca na África do Sul, onde a lei de ação afirmativa determinou a substituição dos brancos por negros nas empresas e no serviço público. Não há professores negros suficientes para ocupar as vagas abertas com o afastamento dos brancos que deixaram de dar sua colaboração à unidade do país com a democratização,

arrumaram as malas e foram para outros países. No Brasil, uma legislação que promove em lugar de reduzir o racismo troca o critério de entrada nas universidades, baseado na competência, pela raça dos vestibulandos. Difícil está sendo, para início de conversa, identificar quem é ou não é negro. Moreno é negro ou branco? Engenheiros, médicos, advogados e executivos de grandes multinacionais se transformaram, desesperadamente, em carregadores de malas ou responsáveis por outras atividades braçais até que encontrassem emprego no exterior, depois que foram alijados dos cargos que ocupavam após a democratização da África do Sul. Os partidos não conseguiram cumprir no Brasil a lei que os obriga a inscreverem um mínimo de candidatos mulheres. Ora, a opção de se candidatar ou não é individual. Não pode ser determinada por lei a exemplo das cotas de afro-descendentes para universidades, um sistema racista que também vai prejudicar a qualidade de ensino no Brasil. O exemplo da África do Sul não deixa dúvidas sobre tal assertiva.

(*Jornal A Tarde – Opinião*, 2 August 2002)

The race-based quota system to enter the university is doomed to produce in Brazil the problems it has caused in South Africa, where the affirmative action law ordered the replacement of whites by blacks in business and civil service. There are not enough black professors to fill the vacancies that were left open by the whites who refrained from joint collaboration with the democratization of the country, packed their bags and went to other countries. In Brazil, legislation that exacerbates racism instead of reducing it, replaces the university entry criteria based on competence, for the race of those doing their university entry exam. To start with, it is difficult to identify who is black and who isn't. Is moreno [*dark-skinned*] *black or white? Engineers, doctors, lawyers and executives of big multinationals fear to be become luggage carriers or have to do other manual labor until they find a job abroad, after they were removed from the positions they occupied after the democratization of South Africa. The political parties in Brazil were unable to respect the law that obliged us to register a minimum of women candidates. The option to present oneself as a candidate or not is an individual choice. It cannot be established by law as are the university quota for African Brazilians, a racist system that also will harm the quality of education in Brazil. The example of South Africa does not leave any doubts about that statement.*

This text shows some of the familiar strategies of elite denial and a rejection of antiracist measures to combat discrimination, such as 'reversing the charges' (proposals to combat discrimination are themselves called discriminatory and racist), irrelevant comparison with other countries, misrepresentation

(whites are being substituted by blacks), erroneous or alarmist counterfactuals (if the measure were implemented, there would not be enough black experts; we would not even be able to tell who would be black or not, white specialists would leave the country, etc.), and of course the strategy of positive self-presentation in most elite discourse on the Others (we care for good education). Most importantly, the typically neoliberal fallacy of this argument is that the law (the State) should not interfere in academia by imposing quotas: It is the individual who decides. It needs no further commentary that a similar, and more relevant comparison with the United States would have shown that quota have been vastly influential in recruiting African American experts who otherwise would not have been able to get a university degree. We also should note how obviously the Brazilian elites in the press and in the universities share the same negative attitude, and hence a common ideology, about affirmative action.

Another revealing letter against affirmative action for blacks in the universities was published on February 7, 2002, under the title *Preto e Branco* ('Black and White') in prominent newspaper *Jornal do Brasil*. The letter was signed by José Carlos Azevedo. From the content and style of that letter, one not only can infer that the writer is a profoundly conservative and racist person. Significant is that he signs the letter as having a PhD in Physics, and being former Rector of UnB, the University of Brasilia, thus emphasizing his status and competence. What Azevedo did *not* write however, but what a quick search for his name on the Internet revealed, was that he was rector of UnB during the military dictatorship, and responsable for the repression of students. As in the case of the Argentine example of a former member of the military regime there, in a letter analyzed above, we again see that the old authoritarian voices have not disappeared, and that they still have access to major newspapers. It is quite unlikely that *Jornal do Brasil* did not know who Azevedo is. Representatives of the old fascist regimes are thus able to express and spread racist opinions. In his letter Azevedo ridicules the criterion of self-categorization of blacks, by supposing that any Chinese or Swede in need of a scholarship can now declare himself to be 'black'. He also uses other absurd examples, such as a black couple having an albino kid, etc. Similarly, he denounces the usefulness of the term 'race', which he (correctly) recalls not to have any scientific basis – an argument that conveniently fits his current purpose. He 'forgets', however, that also in Brazil, the social function of 'race' or color is fundamental. There is no doubt whatsoever that Azevedo is able to make the distinction between white and black people in everyday life and will treat them accordingly.

Of course not all academics accept these ideologically based arguments against quotas, and among other counterarguments stress that the Vestibular (the university entrance exam in Brazil) does not measure individual merit, but the quality of the school, that identification of who is black will take place as it is always being done, also by the census, namely by asking people, and that instead of lowering the quality of the universities, the universities will have the advantage of having more bright students who earlier could not enter because of the schools they came from (see, e.g., Edna Roland, *Folha on line,* May 23, 2002).

Other countries

Space limitations unfortunately do not allow me to examine the prominent forms of discursive racism in all other countries in Latin America. But we should at least pay brief attention to ethnic relations in some major countries such as Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Peru. For most of these countries a more or less prominent presence of both indigenous and black people, generally dominated by a white elite or majority defines the overall ethnic relations. Here are only a few observations on these countries.

Cuba

In Cuba, the dominant socialist ideology and its official discourses both prohibit and deny prejudices and discrimination by white(r) people against black(er) people, and emphasize racism especially as occurring before the revolution (Dzidzienyo 1971; Morales Fundora 2001; Serviat 1986). Official discourse is egalitarian and hence antiracist. As elsewhere in Latin America, however, the current Cuban leadership is overwhelmingly white, more so than in the 1960s and 1970s. Everyday racism against black people continues a long tradition of white supremacy of the Cuban oligarchy, race relations that have been eloquently described by the famous Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz (Ortiz 1943), though with the usual biases of the time. Black protest has often been repressed, and the U.S. Civil Rights movement had barely any influence in Cuba. In other words, there is very little space for fundamentally different, opposition discourse and analysis of the position of blacks. On the other hand, for the same reasons of political control, there is barely explicitly racist public discourse (Fuente 2001; McGarrity & Cárdenas 1995; Pérez Sarduy & Stubbs 2000).

Colombia

In Colombia, after a long history of colonialism and slavery (Mosquera, Pardo, & Hoffmann 2002), followed by other forms of marginalization and domination of afrocolombians and indígenas, the 1980s saw the emergence of an increasingly conscious and critical black movement (Mosquera Mosquera 1985). Also as a consequence of this opposition, an interesting debate took place on the territorial and other rights of black and indigenous peoples, for instance in the multi-ethnic assembly preparing the new Constitution of 1991. Striking in this debate were the differences made between indigenous and black people. The first were already defined in ethnic terms and their own territories recognized, as elsewhere in Latin America, for instance in Brazil and Venezuela (Borrero García 2003). Blacks, however, especially at the Pacific coast (the Choco), had much more difficulty having their collective claims accepted, e.g., because they were not defined as a different 'ethnic' group in the first place, and because their claims clashed with indigenous interests in the same region (Arocha 2001).

Despite the relevance of these debates on official minority rights (and as an object for further discourse analytical study), ordinary blacks and indígenas in Colombia continue to be poor, have less power and less access to scarce resources than white people and everyday white racism is as prevalent as anywhere in Latin America (for detail, see, e.g., Friedemann 1993; Friedemann & Arocha 1986; Wade 1993). Most discourses of black organizations and resistance groups continue to refer to the 'invisibility' of afrocolombians in most elite positions and much of public life. A brief glance at Colombian textbooks shows that these pay extensive attention to the history of indigenous groups and cultures, but have nothing to say about contemporary indígenas.

By way of example of the kind of discourse that could be pronounced in Colombia before the war (and published in 1970!), and that exhibits profound racist ideologies, we merely cite the following, quite ordinary talk by someone called Laureano Gómez held in 1929 in the Teatro Municipal in Bogotá.

(59) Nuestra raza proviene de la mezcla de españoles, de indios y de negros. Los dos últimos caudales de herencia son estigmas de completa inferioridad (...).

Otros primitivos pobladores de nuestro territorio fueron los africanos, que los españoles trajeron para dominar con ellos la naturaleza áspera y huraña. El espíritu del negro, rudimentario e informe, como que permanece en una perpetua infantilidad. La bruma de una eterna ilusión lo envuelve y el prodigioso don de mentir es la manifestación de esa

falsa imagen de las cosas, de la ofuscación que le produce el espectáculo del mundo, del terror de hallarse abandonado y disminuido en el concierto humano.
La otra raza salvaje, la raza indígena de la tierra americana, segundo de los elementos bárbaros de nuestra civilización, ha transmitido a sus descendientes el pavor de su vencimiento. En el rencor de la derrota, parece haberse refugiado en el disimulo taciturno y la cazurrería insincera y maliciosa. Afecta una completa indiferencia por las palpitaciones de la vida nacional, parece resignada a la miseria y a la insignificancia. Está narcotizada por la tristeza del desierto, embriagada con la melancolía de sus páramos y sus bosques. (*Editorial Revista Colombiana*, Colección Populibro, No 29, Bogotá 1970: 44–47; cited in Saúl Franco (Ed.), *Colombia contemporanea*. Bogota: ECOE/IEPRI, 1996: 237–266)

Our race descends from a mix of Spaniards, Indians and Negroes. The latter two lines of heritage are stigmas of complete inferiority (. . .).
Other primitive inhabitants of our land were the Africans, which Spaniards had brought here to help them dominate their unruly and antisocial nature. The Black spirit was rudimentary and deficient, like what would remain in a perpetual infancy. The mist of an eternal illusion enwraps him and the marvelous art of lying is the manifestation of his false image of things, of the bewilderment that the spectacle of the world produces, and of the terror in finding himself abandoned and handicapped in the function of humanity.
The other savage race, the Indigenous race of American soil, the second of the barbarian elements of our civilization, has passed down to its descendents the rage of its revenge. Out of resentment for defeat, they seem to have taken refuge in quiet cunningness and malicious and insincere discretion. They have a complete indifference for the life-blood of national livelihood and appear to be resigned to misery and insignificance. The race is drugged by the sadness of the dessert and inebriated with the melancholy of their moors and their forests.

Similarly, in the 1940s, ex-minister of education and founder of Colombian sociology Luis Lopéz de Mesa has the following to say about the indigenous population:

(60) (. . .) un pueblo ignorante y deprimido durante los siglos de la colonia, y tal vez no preparado nunca antes para las reacciones de una ética espiritual. . . . De ahí que sea notable todavía un comportamiento indeseable, tal el poco respeto por la propiedad ajena, la crueldad fría, casi torpe, de sus castigos y venganzas, la incuria en sus relaciones sexuales, que va hasta el incesto, la mentira y la falsedad en todas sus formas, la em-

> briaguez que busca para alejarse de la realidad y como única expansión de ánimo o lenitivo a su alcance (p. 75) (. . .) Sobre estas materias de la civilización de los aborígenes americanos la historia y la sociología tienen una palabra que añadir: y es que sólo el cruzamiento con las razas superiores saca al indígena de su postración cultural y fisiológica. De ahí que el esfuerzo catequista de varios siglos en nuestras selvas del sur y en las estepas del oriente, con un gasto que ya monta a muchos millones desde el tiempo de la colonia hasta nuestros días, no está representado por nada, por absolutamente nada que no sea el relato anual de los inmensos sacrificios que hacen los misioneros en meterse en esas desoladas regiones de cuando en cuando para bautizar por la décima vez a los mismos salvajes que eternamente permanecen salvajes. Son cincuenta mil indios que allá viven, que allá han vivido, y cuya educación total en Oxford habría costado a la República menos tal vez que la secular tarea de evangelizarlos cada año nuevamente. (*De cómo se ha formado la nación colombiana*. Bedout, Colección Bolsilibros, Medellín, p. 113)
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> (. . .) *An ignorant people, depraved during the centuries of colonization and most likely never before prepared for the reactions of a spiritual ethic. . .. Hence their detestable behavior is still notable in their little respect for private property, cold cruelty, nearly thoughtlessness, their punishments and revenges, disregard in their sexual relations that even stretches to incest, deceit and falsity in all forms and the intoxication they look for to distance themselves from reality and as the only way to uplift their spirits or calm them that is attainable* (*p. 75*). (. . .) *On these matters of the American Aboriginal civilization, History and Sociology have a word to add to this: And it is that crossing the Indigenous race with superior races is the only way to pull them out of their cultural and physiological prostration. Thus, the centuries of catechist effort in our Southern jungles and Eastern steppes with a cost that now surmounts many a million from the time of colonization to our day is represented by nothing- by absolutely nothing that is not the annual account of the immense sacrifices that out missionaries make in penetrating these desolate regions from time to time to baptize the same savages for the tenth time that eternally remain savage. There are 50,000 Indians that have lived there, still live there, and whose total education at Oxford would have probably cost the Republic less than the secular task of evangelizing them ever year over and over again.*

Obviously, today, no official, public talk like this could be given in Bogotá, nor an academic book be written in this style, not only because also in Colombia public discourse has become much more politically correct, but also because

underlying attitudes and ideologies have changed in the last decades, also among the elites. Yet, on the other hand, if we would have access to the discourse blacks and indígenas are confronted with in their everyday lives, also by the elites, much of this old discourse might still be alive today – and not only in Colombia, as future research will have to show.

Venezuela

Probably many (white) people in Venezuela in 2004 are less worried about racism – if they were ever worried about it – than about the mounting conflict between controversial President Hugo Chávez and his followers on the one hand, and the opposition – especially also of the media – on the other hand. The discursive polarization of this conflict has spawned various discourse analytical studies, which however cannot be reviewed here (see, e.g., Bolivar 2002, 2003).

And yet also this conflict has many connections with racism, poverty and ethnic relations in the country. Chávez, a mulatto, whose presidency was vindicated in the unique national referendum of 2004, is generally seen as the president of the poor, including the black and indigenous peoples. And the leaders of the opposition are generally identified as the representatives of the largely white bourgeoisie that controls the economy, the press and until Chávez' landslide election also the state and its agencies. We thus witness under the political conflict a combined class struggle and racial dispute, pitching poor blacks and mulattos against middle and upper class whites in an increasingly polarized struggle for power (Blanco 2003; Ellner & Hellinger 2003). Although as anywhere in Latin America the picture is more complex, and cannot be wholly reduced to an opposition between white and black, rich and poor, recent events in Venezuela – including racist taunts of the president in the media and everyday conversations – remind us that racism is alive and kicking also in this Caribbean country.

The history of racism in Venezuela is much like that of other countries in the Caribbean and Latin America, and can be summarized by a few words: Enslavement of Africans, black rebellions, oppression of the indigenous peoples, and after independence and separation from Colombia in 1830 and the abolition of slavery in 1854 continued exploitation and inferiorization of afrovenezolan@s and marginalization of the indígenas, in many forms of everyday racism and dominance by the elites of European origin (Charier 2000; García & Camacho 2002; Montánez 1993; Wright 1990).

As is the case in Colombia, the revolutionary Constitution of 1999 of the new 'República Bolivariana' recognizes the indigenous peoples, their territories and rights, after ethnic equality was formally enshrined in the Constitution of 1961.

Despite the beautiful political rhetoric, the participation of Afro-Venezuelan leaders in the Acción Democrática party since 1959, and the often relaxed Caribbean-style intergroup relations, daily discrimination of blacks and indígenas continues as before: Few black faces (and even less indigenous ones) in the media, at the universities, in the courts, or in the corporate boardrooms (Wright 1990). Television anchor persons are invariably white or off white, and so is Miss Venezuela, among many other celebrities, except a handful of black people who confirm the rule.

In a study by Ishibashi (2003) of the (lack of) access of black people to the media, analysis of a vast corpus of texts and images of the last decade showed that invariably blacks only appeared in at most 10% percent of billboards, TV programs, movies, or telenovelas, and next to zero percent as main protagonists. Miss Venezuela is *never* black, and black models generally have serious difficulties to get assignments, and if so in quite stereotypical roles (ads with representations of beach and party, sensual bodies, music or sports, etc,). Interviews with the relevant gate keepers, such as 'bookers' for modeling or casting agencies, show that the esthetic criteria are generally eurocentric, with blonde women scoring highest – and as representing 'class'. Morenas (dark-haired women with somewhat darker skin) may stand for 'Latin' stereotypes in the media or fashion, and may model for some specific products that require a national or Latin association. Black, African features were generally considered to be ugly, and would only be used for country style scenes with poor people. Formulations of such discourses not seldom were very explicitly racist, thereby belying the myth of Venezuelan's lack of racism. Here as elsewhere in the countries studied in this book, as well as more generally in the Americas and Europa, informal everyday discourse of white people – even in interviews – is replete with more or less explicit forms of racism. In interviews with black people about their reactions to this kind of absence in the public images, this inference from the interviews with white people was generally confirmed.

Ramírez (2002) similarly studied decades of images and drawings in Venezuelan school textbooks. As is the case elsewhere, also here we observe a semiotic marginalization of black and indigenous people, who each appear in hardly more than 4% of the 10,000 images analyzed in this research, compared to 13.6% Mestizos and 77.5% white people. Moreover, of the relatively

few pictures of minorities, more than two-third represent men, thus combining racism and sexism.

Despite the general lack of investigation into racism in Venezuela, even in contemporary scholarly discourse Venezuela is still being described as a "racial democracy" just like Brazil, in which "white upper class infants had black nurses, and white people retained fondness for, and trust in, the black people who had helped raised them", and in which the marginal position of people of color is being explained in terms of class (Bermúdez & Suárez 1995: 243, 248, 264). In other words, also in Venezuela the elite denial of racism is part of the problem (see also Mijares 2001, 2003).

As elsewhere, current official discourse in Venezuela is formulated in terms of the positive values of a mestizo, multicultural society, e.g., as follows in the words of Foreign Secretary Luis Alfonso Dávila in his address to the international antiracism congress in Durban, South Africa, in 2001:

(61) Venezuela es una sociedad multi étnica y plus cultural, resultado de la fusión de etno culturas e idiosincrasias muy diversas, en cuya formación tomaron parte y se amalgamaron las tres razas primigenias de América, como lo fueron la india, la negra y la blanca, y de la inmigración proveniente de todas las naciones del mundo entero durante varios siglos.
Los venezolanos estamos orgullosos de este mestizaje.
Hemos creado una cultura de respeto a las diferencias, lo cual nos ha permitido un mejor manejo de la diversidad.
Este proceso de mestizaje ha operado de manera decisiva.
Sra. Presidenta, acudimos a esta Conferencia porque Venezuela quiere hacer oír su voz ratificando su tradicional e histórica posición y compromiso de luchar contra el racismo, la discriminación racial, la xenofobia y cualquier otra forma de intolerancia que se pueda dar en el mundo.
(Durban, 2 Sept. 2001)

Venezuela is a diverse ethnic and multi-cultural society as a result of the fusion of very diverse ethnic cultures and idiosyncrasies that were formed by the 3 primary races of America the Indian, Black and White races, as well as an immigration that stemmed from all nations in the world over for many centuries. These all took part in and added to this mutli-ethnic combination.
The Venezuelans are proud of this mixture.
We have created a culture of respect for differences, which has allowed us to better handle diversity.
This amalgamation process has worked in a crucial way.
Mrs. President, we turn to this Conference because Venezuela wants to make its voice heard in ratifying its traditional and historical position and promise

> *to fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and all other forms of intolerance that exist in the world.*

Although there can be little doubt that these and other solemn declarations are well-intentioned, as are the government policies on which they are based, it should be emphasized that also in Venezuela there remains an abyss between official rhetoric and the prejudiced discourses and discriminatory practices of everyday life. Hundreds of pages of internet filled with declarations and experiences of black and indigenous organizations are testimony to the fact that racism continues to be a prominent dimension of the everyday lives of people of color in Venezuela. Not only public discourse, such as the leading newspapers and television stations, as well as political discourse and textbooks should show more explicit awareness of this situation of everyday racism. If the media could harass racism as they could undesirable president Chávez, racism might finally begin to be tackled as a national problem. The same is true for academic research in virtually all fields of the humanities and social sciences, which also has generally ignored (or condoned) racism. No surprisingly, of course, because virtually all scholars are white, and racism was and is hardly their everyday problem. Again, this is not a specific problem of Venezuela, but for most countries studied in this book.

Bolivia

Bolivia is usually described as the Latin American country with the largest percentage of indigenous people and mestizos (about 70%). In a democracy this would mean that these are in power, and that prejudice, discrimination and racism would be limited to everyday informal discourse and practices of the white minority living in the cities. Government, parliament, the courts, universities, the media and schools would in that case not only formally celebrate but actually implement full ethnic and racial equality, also for the indigenous and Afro-Bolivian minorities. Nothing is less true, however, and as elsewhere in Latin America, the elite institutions, and hence their discourses are controlled by people of European descent (called "*k'aras*" or "*carai*" by the different indigenous groups).

There is a long history of Hispanic domination and marginalization of the indígenas, and a prevalent urban discourse in which indigenous people, urban indígenas (insultingly called '*cholos*') and mestizos, are traditionally associated with laziness, lying, drunkenness, backwardness, or sometimes romantically in

more exotic terms when referring to their cultural differences (Abercrombie 1991; Zavaleta 1986).

In a study of press editorials about the well-known 700 km long march of indigenous people in 1990 because of a land dispute and the blockade of the road to La Paz in 2000, Gonzales (2002) argues that current public discourse may be less blatantly racist, but that the portrayal of indígenas remains generally negative, as we have seen above in the media representation of protesting Mapuche in Chile:

– Indígenas are a menace and subversive extremists
– Their actions are irrational
– Indígenas do not know what to do with their lands
– Indígenas must be educated
– Indígenas must be integrated in the national production process and education
– The problem of Indígenas is not lands but (lacking) culture.

In other words, until today dominant media discourse constructs the 'Indians' as the uncivilized and backward Others who need to be civilized by Us. The recent Constitution, however, as we have seen in Colombia and Venezuela, defined Bolivia as a multicultural society where all groups have equal rights. Scholars, while recognizing that this is a first step, also remain cautious and emphasize that the social and political order of Bolivia remains racist:

(62) El racismo en Bolivia es una institución que está enraizada en nuestro orden social desde la colonia. Es más, incluso es aceptado por quienes son sojuzgados, excluidos y marginados por esta actitud. Los indígenas y los mestizos se sienten obligados a aceptar que a los ojos de la minoría blanca no son iguales sino también inferiores. (Mauricio Imaña de la Barra, Aula Libre, www.bolivia.com; see also the other contributions to this site)

Racism in Bolivia is an institution that has been rooted in our social order since colonial times. Moreover, it is even accepted by those who are subjugated, excluded and marginalized by this attitude. Indigenous and multiracial people feel obligated to accept that in the eyes of the white minority, they are not only unequal but inferior.

Biased dominant discourse is merely a moderate front for the violent racism and oppression of indígenas on the ground, as documented in many indigenous publications and internet sites (e.g., www.aymaranet.org). Here is a fragment of this kind of counterdiscourse, which I shall cite at length, and which

needs no further commentary as a response to those who minimize or deny racism in Bolivia.

(63) Los indios, campesinos y urbanos (que ahora somos más) somos originarios de esta patria, la colonización nos despojó de nuestro dominio como nación y de nuestras propiedades familiares y, junto con ella nuestra libertad se trocó en servidumbre y esclavitud. Hasta cuando podrá durar esta situación, cuál la seguridad física y jurídica que sirven de resguardo a los privilegios de una minoría que usurpando acapara tierras y territorio? Hasta donde llega la incomprensión de esa gente en continuar empecinándose en creer que los indios les seguirán sirviendo, trabajando con salarios de hambre, y teniendo la conciencia de que estas tierras son suyas? Bajo este marco el conflicto por la tierra muestra su brutalidad colonialista. Los latifundistas, aparte de contar con bandas paramilitares, gozan de la protección estatal, de sus aparatos de represión con cuyo respaldo buscan sentar propiedad en tierras comunales indigenas, siendo que estas se encuentran poseídas por sus legítimos propietarios.
Esta innegable situación colonial se ha traducido en el asesinato genocida de 10 campesinos indígenas agrupados en la organización Movimiento Sin Tierra en el paraje de Parantí, jurisdicción de Yacuiba. Los autores de este crimen fueron latifundistas y asesinos a sueldo que dejaron además a 20 heridos entre mujeres y niños. La defensora del pueblo Ana María Campero declaró "todos los campesinos fueron muertos con un tiro en el corazón", quiere decir, fueron cazados por veteranos como si fueran enemigos o simplemente animales, a quienes hay que despejar del latifundio. Esta violencia colonial no pude quedar impune así como la masacre de Amayapampa y Capacirca que fue encubierto por un indio que presidía el Congreso de la República, es obligación moral denunciarlo y pedir el castigo de los criminales. Las personas, instituciones y organizaciones indígenas tenemos el deber ineludible de poner fin al colonialismo, para que nunca más haya víctimas de nuestro pueblo, para que nunca más el llanto de sus viudas desgarren el corazón del Qullasuyu.

(*Qullasuyu*, November 2001)

Indians, poor country-folk, and urban dwellers- there are even more of us now- are the origins of this nation. Colonization stripped us of our national control and our family properties, and with that, our liberty turned into servitude and slavery. Until what point will this situation be allowed to go on? From physical safety to judicial security that is saved only for the privileges of a minority that by usurpation hoarded land and territories? To what extent will the incomprehension of these people go? These people who keep

fishing for beliefs that Indians will keep on serving them, working for starvation wages and maintain the idea that these lands are theirs? Seen in this light, the fight for land proves their colonialist brutality. The large estate owners, besides counting on paramilitary groups, bask in the protection of the state and their entities of repression whose support allows them to aim for setting up more property on communal Indigenous lands, feeling that they are within the possession of their legitimate owners.

This undeniable colonial situation has transformed itself into the genocidal assassination of 10 Indigenous peasants who were part of the organization Movimiento Sin Tierra (*Movement without Land*) *in Parantí, under the jurisdiction of Yacuiba. The authors of this crime were large estate owners and paid assassins that besdes that, left 20 wounded with women and children among them. The ombudswoman, Ana María Campero, stated that "all of the peasants were killed with a shot to the heart," meaning they were hunted down by veterans as if they were enemies or simply animals who have to be cleared out for the Ranchers.*

This colonial violence can not go unpunished like the massacre of Amayapampa and Capacirca, that was covered up by an Indian who presided over the Congress of the Republic- It is a moral obligation to denounce this, press charges and demand the punishment of these criminals. Indigenous people, institutions and organizations have the unavoidable obligation to put an end to colonialism, so that never more will there be victims amongst our people- So that never more do the wailing of widows shatter the heart of Qullasuyu.

Peru

Finally, let us go west again, to Perú, and say a few words about a nation of 25 million in which indigenous peoples (36%) and mestizos (49%), together with a sizable group of afroperuvians (between 6 and 10% of the population), form the majority from whose midst a mestizo president (Alejandro Toledo) was recently elected – but soon fallen out of grace again among the poor majority of the country.

In many ways, ethnic relations in Perú recall those in Bolivia, in the sense that the Quechua and Aymara peoples of the mountains and the indigenous groups of Amazon jungle are dominated by a minority of whites and middle class mestizos living in the coastal region and the cities (Mendoza Arroyo 1993). A study by Federico Dejo of the Agrarian university shows that 81% of city indígenas say they have been the victim of discrimination, especially on the job. León, in a study of student attitudes about race and ethnicity, argues that

racism in Perú is ethnic-social, a combination of race (appearance) and culture, but in general, a darker or more indigenous appearance means a lower status, also in Perú (León 1998; see also Callirgos 1993; Manrique 1999; Pontecarrero 1993). Wilfredo Ardito formulates it this way (Ardito 2002):

(64) En el Perú, arrastramos desde la Colonia, la creencia de que la capacidad intelectual, la belleza física y el status son propios de la raza blanca. Es verdad que actualmente el dinero, la posición social, el nivel educativo, el cargo que se ocupa, pueden hacer que muchas personas olviden el aspecto racial. Sin embargo, es cierto también que, cuando estos factores no son evidentes o visibles, las personas pueden padecer maltratos o discriminación. De hecho, muchas personas cuyos rasgos físicos los harían discriminables, enfatizan siempre dónde viven, qué cargo ocupan y en dónde han estudiado, con la finalidad de ser respetados.

(www.lainsignia.org, Sociedad, March 2002)

In Peru, we have been dragging along with us since colonial times the belief that intellectual capacity, physical beauty and status are only things of the white race. It is true that nowadays money, social position, educational levels, job titles, may make many people forget the racial aspect. However, it is also true that when these factors are not evident or visible, people can and do suffer from mistreatment and prejudice. In fact, many people whose physical characteristics could make them discriminated against, always emphasize where they live, what job they have, and where they have studied, with the objective of being respected.

Unlike in other Latin American countries, even the official discourse and policies became harsher for the indigenous population. Thus, the 1993 Constitution adopted during the regime of former president Fujimori limited indigenous rights (given to them in the 1930 Constitution), with the argument that their problems need to be resolved in the framework of a liberal economic model (Chirapaq 2003; Manrique 2002).

The same is true for the historic domination of the urban Afro-Peruvians who share their poverty and second class position with the '*cholos*' (Luciano Huapaya 2002). But as we have witnessed in Brazil, also in Peru blacks in the 1980s began to organize to resist racism and spread a conscious discourse of dissent, continuing a long tradition of resistance to slavery and '*cimarronaje*' (Couche 1975). Here is how one of the organizations of black people ASONEDH (Asociación Negra de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos; Black Association for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights) formulates on its webpage how blacks – and indigenous people – are being

treated in Perú today, another passage that I prefer to cite at length, because it formulates the incidence of racism much better than I can do so:

(65) En el Perú contemporáneo la mayoría de los grupos étnicos padecen graves problemas económicos, culturales y represivos, además de estas dificultades son víctimas de prejuicios raciales. Los hombre y las mujeres son considerados como ciudadanos de segunda y última categoría, y sospechosos de haber cometido algún delito, o presuntos delincuentes en contra de la Sociedad Civil, existiendo marginación y discriminación racial encubierta con un máscara de igualdad legal, siendo muchas veces los entes políticos, militares y policiales los que contribuyen con su racismo a colocar dolosamente pruebas o indicios para acusar a miembros de las comunidades peruanas con el fin que se les recluyan en las cárceles, lo que contribuye a que el 80% de la población penitenciaria en el Perú sean de raza negra e indígena entre inculpados y sentenciados. Generalmente, estas víctimas del racismo permanecen en un período de tiempo que oscila entre 8 y 24 meses.
En el factor educacional las oportunidades son mínimas, pues existe escasez de colegios, por lo que nuestros jóvenes tienen que emigrar la capital en busca de una educación digna, siendo objetos de una serie de maltratos por parte de la sociedad, negándoles de esta manera espacios merecidos.
Cabe mencionar que muchos de nuestros jóvenes llegan a cursar estudios superiores con mucho esfuerzo, pero igualmente siguen siendo relegados pues cuando tratan de obtener algún trabajo digno, siempre está supeditado a la buena presencia, lo cual está determinado por el color de la piel y las características físicas, no tomando en cuenta su capacidad profesional e intelectual.
Por ejemplo y a manera de ilustración y resumen diremos que en el caso del poblador de raza negra esto significa ser delincuente, vivir en los lugares más pobres, tener los empleos más bajos (chofer, mayordomo, albañil, pescador, agricultor, técnico, portero de hotel, etc.).
Hay una serie de mitos y prejuicios en torno a los ciudadanos de raza negra como son:
– Que sólo piensan o razonan hasta el medio día.
– Que las mujeres negras son prostitutas.
– Que las personas negras son delincuentes y gente de mal vivir.
– Que son una raza ociosa.

In contemporary Peru, the majority of ethnic groups suffer serious repressive economic and cultural problems. Besides these difficulties, they are victims of racial prejudices. Both men and women are considered second and bottom

class citizens, suspected of having committed some crime or are presumed criminals against Civil Society. They are living under marginalization and racial discrimination hidden by a mask of legal equality. Many times these acts are carried out by political entities, soldiers and police that all contribute their racism by providing false proof or evidence to accuse members of Peruvian communities with the objective that they will be locked away in jails. 80% of the penitentiary population in Peru is of a Black or Indigineous race, between those that are sentenced and those not yet found guilty. Generally, these victims of racism remain in jail from a time ranging between 8 and 24 months.

On the topic of education, opportunities are sparse, existing only a limited number of schools, which force our youth to emigrate to the capital in search of a good education. They are then objects of a series of mistreatment and in this way denying them deserved space in society.

It must be mentioned that many of our youngsters do achieve a higher education with great efforts, but they still remain degraded- When it comes to obtaining a good job, they are always subordinated to the requisite of 'a nice appearance', which is determined by the color of skin and physical characteristics, not taking into account their professional or intellectual capacity.

For example and as a matter of illustration and summary, let us look at the case of a person of the Black race: This means to society that they are criminal, live in the poorest of places, have the lowliest jobs (chauffer, butler, construction worker, fisherman, farmer, machine operator, hotel porter, etc.).

There is a series of myths and prejudices about people of the Black race which are:

– They only think or rationalize until midday.
– Black women are prostitutes.
– Black people are delinquents and people living badly.
– It's a leisurely race.

Lacking further data of elite discourse in Perú, this testimony will have to do to have a first impression of the kinds of elite racism, for instance on the job, afroperuanos and indígenas have to face in everyday life. Future research will have to examine in detail how politicians, also in less formal contexts, as well as the media, scholars, teachers, judges, bureaucrats and other elites write and speak about blacks, mestizos en indígenas in Perú.

Conclusions

We may draw the following overall conclusions from our brief study of contemporary discursive racism in Latin America:

- Discursive racism on the one hand enacts, expresses, reproduces and legitimatizes the other forms of racism, and on the other hand denies, mitigates, hides or excuses them.
- Just like racism in general, also discursive racism has its historical roots in European colonization, enslavement, and domination and its basis in an ideology of European superiority over non-European peoples, ethnic groups or 'races'.
- Through a sophisticated ethnic, somatic and chromatic vocabulary ('negros', 'pardos', 'pretos', 'morenos', 'mulatos', 'indios', 'cholos', etc. etc.) discourse expresses and daily reproduces the perceptual and evaluative categories of the ideologies of white domination.
- 'Positive denial' is the overall strategy of discursive elite racism, e.g., through the self-attribution of a "racial democracy" to the own nation state.
- Another strategy of denial is that of 'alternative explanation': racist inequality and discrimination are explained away in terms of class.
- A third strategy is to deny or minimize ethnic or racial differences and hence inequality by describing all citizens or our country as being 'mestizos' or 'mulattos' and to rhetorically celebrate the indigenous and/or African roots and culture of the nation.
- Due to these strategies of denial and their underlying ideologies, official and public discourse today is seldom explicitly and directly racist, and in that respect it may be very different from everyday, informal text and talk that is 'off the record'.
- Often as part of paternalistic disclaimers, it is recognized that the indigenous population is poor and needs help and protection.
- On the other hand, and especially directed at lower class people of African descent, poor mestizo minorities or immigrants, less official political and media discourse as well as everyday conversation may clearly mark the difference between Us and Them by associating the Others with negative values and negative attributes, such as criminality, violence, laziness, backwardness, primitiveness, stupidity, amorality, impertinence, and so on, and 'proving' these by frequent negative media reports and personal stories about the Others.

- Television discourse, images, films, and telenovelas generally tend to ignore indigenous people, marginally celebrate them as being exotic when they are peaceful or as violent when they resist, whereas blacks tend to be invisible and *if* they are represented at all they are portrayed in negative or subordinate roles, or as being associated with problems, such as poverty of discrimination, as if these were forces of nature.
- There are clear changes in racist discourse, namely between the explicitly racist, white-supremacist or at most paternalist discourse of before the Second World War, and the more conscious, politically correct, and sometimes even antiracist official discourses of the last decade. We have no way of knowing however how much everyday discourse in informal situations have changed, although the few data we do have point to the continued presence of explicitly racist everyday talk, especially against lower class blacks.
- Overall, after a transition period following dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s have generally witnessed on the one hand increasing discourses of antiracist resistance, and on the other hand modest positive developments of official discourse recognizing the autonomy, values, grievances and claims of indigenous and black groups, for instance in political, media and educational discourse. The new constitutions in several countries explicitly recognize the rights of indigenous or afrolatin minorities or majorities. However, such improvements are themselves interpreted as sufficient proof of the correctness of the ideology of racial democracy and of the denial of racism which continue to define the main parameters of official state discourse.

It need not be repeated here that these general conclusions may vary for different countries and contexts. On the whole, dominant discourse on ethnic affairs of course reproduces the profound social inequality based on 'race' (color, appearance) and ethnicity in all Latin American countries. This is more subtly and indirectly so in official public discourse, for instance in politics and education, and more crudely and openly so in everyday conversation and in much of the media. On the other hand, some contemporary elite discourse also manifests and provokes social change, largely brought about by increasing indigenous and black self-consciousness and resistance and the formulation of an alternative, egalitarian and multi-ethnic discourse of diversity.

What to do?

Finally, nearly all sections of this book have been concluded by saying that more research in necessary. For Latin America in general, and for its respective countries, there are as yet few detailed studies of racism, and virtually none on discursive racism. Because the elites have been defined as those who give both the good and the bad examples of ethnic relations, it is important to have a detailed insight in the way the ethnic Others are written and talked about in the discourses of politics, the media, education, research, the law, administration and business. The many strategies of denying or avoiding the problem of racism in many areas of society should be denounced. Politicians should implement the lofty principles of the constitution, legislate against all forms of racism, and make sure that such laws are respected and enforced by State agencies. The news media should presuppose and promote ethnic equality and respect and explicitly denounce all forms of discrimination, prejudice and racism. Textbooks at all levels of education should explicitly deal with ethnic relations, not avoid to talk of racism, and promote the values of equality – and deal in much more detail and less stereotypically with the non-dominant ethnic groups in society. University programs and research should develop theoretical frameworks and engage in empirical research on the many – often subtle – forms of racism. Linguists, discourse and communication analysts, more specifically should study the ways racism is expressed, enacted, legitimated and reproduced by the many forms and meanings of text and talk. It is only through such a joint effort that also in Latin America racism can be combated.

Notes

1. 'Moros' (Moors) is today used as a racist slur to refer to Moroccans, and more generally to people from North África.

2. The village of El Ejido is one of the centers of intensive agriculture in Southern Spain where many immigrants work in de plastic greenhouses, where temperatures may rise to more than 40 degrees centigrade. The village has become a symbol of racist violence against immigrants.

3. I am indebted to Corina Courtis for pointing out this example to me.

4. We consulted e.g. the following internet sites for details about police brutality against Mapuche:

– www.rebelion.org/ddhh/mapuches110601.htm and –150301;
– www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/doc/endesa/denuncia.html;
– www.soc.uu.se/mapuche/docs/CAPMa001127.html);
– www.xs4all.nl/~rehue/act/act259.html

5. However, it should be noted that not only most whites, but also many blacks in Brazil in everyday conversation continue to use the terms "*pardos*", "*morenos*" or "*mulatos*" to refer to blacks of lighter skin color who are not seen or categorized as "*pretos*". According to the census of 2000, only 6.2% of the respondents declared themselves "*pretos*", whereas 39.1% categorized themselves as "*pardos*". Compared to the 1991 census however, there is a tendency for more black people to declare themselves "*pretos*" instead of "*pardos*", or to use euphemisms, such as "*morenos*", "*morenos claros*", "*mulatos*", etc. For discussion, see, e.g., Piza and Rosemberg (1999).

6. Following the practice of contemporary afrobrazilian organizations and leaders, the rest of this section on Brazil will use the term 'black' or 'afrobrazilian' to refer to all Brazilians who are of African origin. In Brazil another term used to denote the same community is 'Afro-descendentes'.

7. An antiracist organization in Bahia, Disque-Racismo (Dial-Racism), which received complaints about racism by phone, received 300 complaints in 18 months (*Correio da Bahia*, May 14, 2002).

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Appendix

500 Mapuches Atacan Sede de La Intendencia
Iván Fredes, *El Mercurio,* Jueves 26 de Julio de 2001

Catorce carabineros lesionados, un transeúnte herido y 120 detenidos, más millonarios daños luego que enfurecida turba se lanzó contra edificios, locales comerciales y bienes públicos.
Intendenta de la Araucanía anunció posibles acciones legales contra los manifestantes.
En acción paralela, otros grupos levantaron barricadas y saquearon gasolinera, para robar combustible y confeccionar artefactos incendiarios.

TEMUCO (Iván Fredes). – Un verdadero caos en el sector céntrico y calles aledañas de esta ciudad provocó la acción coordinada de varios grupos mapuches – con un total cercano a 800 indígenas –, que atacaron sin provocación alguna a efectivos de Carabineros, edificios y bienes públicos y privados, levantaron barricadas y robaron combustible desde una gasolinera, para confeccionar artefactos incendiarios.
(. . .)
El agresivo y violento proceder de los manifestantes contra la sede del gobierno regional puso por momentos en peligro la integridad física de los funcionarios que trabajaban allí.
El inmueble resultó con una veintena de ventanales rotos, al igual que las oficinas aledañas de la dirección regional del Sernatur, cuyos tres funcionarios debieron arrastrarse por el piso para evitar ser alcanzados por una lluvia de piedras lanzadas al interior.
Los disturbios fueron los más graves que han ocurrido en la ciudad hasta la fecha. Dejaron a 14 efectivos policiales lesionados, un transeúnte herido y 120 detenidos, además de millonarios daños en edificios, locales comerciales y bienes públicos.
Se desarrollaron al concluir una marcha pacífica a la que había convocado la agrupación mapuche Consejo de Todas las Tierras, con apoyo de otras diez organizaciones indígenas, para protestar contra la reforma procesal

penal, en vigencia en la región desde diciembre último.
Ello a raíz de al menos una docena de investigaciones que instruyen los fiscales del Ministerio Público por diversas acciones delictivas protagonizadas por indígenas que reivindican tierras – asociación ilícita, usurpación, lesiones, daños, robos –, las que han derivado en la detención de sus presuntos responsables.
También en la incautación y registro de la sede de la agrupación Consejo de Todas las Tierras, liderada por el dirigente Aucán Huilcamán – que según la intendenta reúne entre 10 y 20 comunidades –, registrada el viernes último en cumplimiento de una orden judicial, y que dio origen a una masiva y violenta manifestación.
Tanto organizaciones como grupos de comuneros mapuches investigados por reiteradas ocupaciones a predios de empresas forestales y particulares han adoptado la decisión de resistir y enfrentar el cumplimiento de las órdenes judiciales. Estas han sido dictadas por casos de ataque a personas, emboscadas, sabotajes, incendios, secuestro, robos de madera y especies.
En la madrugada del martes último indígenas de la comunidad de Cherquenco, comuna de Ercilla, ocasionaron heridas a cuatro funcionarios de la Policía de Investigaciones, cuando éstos intentaron rescatar a un comunero detenido por orden judicial, la que contemplaba también el arresto de otros cinco indígenas, imputados de asociación ilícita, secuestro, robo, daños y tenencia ilegal de armas.
(. . .)
Acciones similares, a las que agregaron la destrucción de señales de tránsito, instalación de grandes piedras y neumáticos encendidos, se repitieron en al menos otras cuatro intersecciones de la vía, la más transitada de la ciudad, generando un caos en el tránsito vehicular.
La autoridad policial dispuso el despliegue de 300 efectivos de fuerzas especiales, apoyados por dos carros lanzaguas, dos lanzagases y al menos tres buses, desplegados en calles aledañas, para evitar cualquier asomo de provocación.
(. . .)
Sin mediar provocación, el contingente de seguridad fue atacado con una lluvia de piedras lanzadas con boleadoras y hondas, en tanto que otros mapuches se aproximaron a menos de un metro de los policías para asestar golpes de chueca en sus piernas.
El piquete, virtualmente acorralado bajo el ataque de inusitada agresividad, lanzó un artefacto lacrimógeno para dispersar a los manifestantes. A partir de ese momento intervino el resto de la policía, que empleó todos los recursos para detener y controlar a los indígenas.

Estos continuaron los enfrentamientos empleando chuecas, boleadoras, hondas y bombas incendiarias, e incluso en peleas cuerpo a cuerpo. Simultáneamente, otros grupos mapuches provocaban desórdenes en calles aledañas y la avenida Caupolicán.
También otro grupo saqueó e intimidó a los empleados de una gasolinera en Caupolicán con Rodríguez, donde exigieron la entrega de combustible para confeccionar bombas incendiarias.
Los manifestantes concentraron también su acción al interior y alrededores de la Plaza Aníbal Pinto, donde los transeúntes, incluso madres con sus hijos pequeños, debieron buscar apresurado refugio en galerías comerciales, para así protegerse de las piedras y los efectos de la acción del carro lanzaguas y los gases lacrimógenos.
En la refriega resultó herido un transeúnte que realizaba trámites bancarios en una sucursal de las inmediaciones.
(. . .)
La intendenta Belmar, que en un comienzo había minimizado las acciones de violencia perpetradas por comuneros indígenas y culpado a la prensa de magnificar los hechos, admitió ahora que los indigenas habían actuado con una agresividad y violencia inusitada.
"La mayoría de las marchas son sin autorización, pacíficas, y se limitan a entregar una carta", subrayó. Puntualizó que en la marcha participaron entre 380 y 400 mapuches, según Carabineros.
La intendenta dijo que se evalúan los daños para interponer acciones legales contra el Consejo de Todas las Tierras.

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