SOPHROSYNE AND THE RHETORIC OF
SELF-RESTRAINT

MNEMOSYNE

BIBLIOTHECA CLASSICA BATAVA

ADRIAAN RADEMAKER

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POLYSEMY & PERSUASIVE USE OF AN ANCIENT GREEK VALUE TERM

BY

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To the memory of
Professor Dr C.M.J. Sicking
in gratitude for his teaching

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PREFACE

This book was originally a doctoral thesis prepared at Leiden University and defended there in the Spring of 2004. Accordingly, it owes much to the help and advice of many. My supervisor, Professor Ineke Sluiter, was an invaluable help and influence throughout the long period of its gestation. The members of my thesis committee, Dr Douglas Cairns, Professor Albert Rijksbaron, Dr Johannes van Ophuijsen, Professor Frans de Haas en Professor Henk Versnel, and Dr Marlein van Raalte all made valuable suggestions and corrected some major errors. Drs Susannah Herman did a very good job in correcting most of my obdurate sins against the rules of English syntax and style. The many remaining weaknesses and errors, both in style and content, are all mine.

Then, there are my teachers, friends and colleagues at Leiden. I feel a special word of thanks is due to Dr Marlein van Raalte, who was a great and beneficial influence on the choice of subject of my thesis, and Dr Peter Stork, for his teaching and support throughout a long education in Greek.

In its conception, however, this book owes perhaps most to the research interests of my original supervisor, the late Professor Sicking. His interest in literary texts that reflect the values of the ancient Greek πόλις, and, above all, his insistence on the vitality of a direct interaction between semantics, linguistics and the interpretation of texts, were a formative influence on my view of the classicist's profession. His deep interest in, and knowledge of classical music, was another great source of inspiration. I am aware that in many aspects the present text is different from what I would have envisaged in the years I have been studying and doing research under his supervision, but I hope he would still be in sympathy with its aims, and perhaps even with some of its results.

INTRODUCTION

1. *Aims of the Investigation:* ϲωφροϲύνη *in Plato and in non-philosophical Greek*

This study aims to address two related topics. First, it aims to give a synchronic semantic description of the uses of ϲώφρων, ϲωφροϲύνη, ϲωφρονεῖν and cognates in non-philosophical classical Greek up to the time of Plato, which is in the first half of the fourth century BC. Second, it investigates Plato's use of these terms from the viewpoint of ordinary, non-philosophical language usage.

To start with the second aim, ϲωφροϲύνη is unmistakably a central concept in Plato's ethical-political thought. But whatever its prominence, Plato's treatment of ϲωφροϲύνη is by no means straightforward, and indeed often positively puzzling. A brief comparison between *Gorgias* and *Charmides* would serve to illustrate this point. In *Charmides*, Socrates and his interlocutors discuss a wealth of what seem to be familiar and traditional notions associated with the concept of ϲωφροϲύνη, and dismiss most of them, without arriving at an acceptable alternative definition of the virtue. Strikingly, *Charmides* only hints at what may well be the most common use of ϲωφροϲύνη of all: 'self-control' or 'control of desires'. This notion, seemingly so central to the concept, is hinted at in the dramatic setting of the dialogue, but then completely ignored in the discussion proper. (For an overview of the treatment of ϲωφροϲύνη in *Chrm.*, see section 2 below; a fuller discussion follows in chapter 10.8.) In *Gorgias* (491D-E), by contrast, this notion of 'self-control' is introduced into the discussion by Socrates in just about the most emphatic way imaginable. Here, this other-regarding type of ϲωφροϲύνη is firmly rejected by Callicles, champion of self-assertive ἀνδρεία and detractor of other-regarding δικαιοϲύνη. Later on in the discussion, however, Callicles is forced to accept ϲωφροϲύνη after all, if in a rather different sense, that of a 'sensible' or 'rational' order of

the soul (τάξιϲ, 504A). This acceptance seems to be a crucial move, for Callicles is now made to concede that the 'ordered' soul has all the main virtues, including the δικαιοϲύνη rejected earlier on. Thus, Callicles' acceptance of ϲωφροϲύνη seems to be fatal to the consistency of his position in the dialectical discussion. (For ϲωφροϲύνη in *Gorgias*, see chapter 10.5.)

What are we to make of such proceedings? In the final chapter of this study, I will try to show that the two dialogues represent two characteristic but very different ways in which Plato deals with ϲωφροϲύνη. In *Gorgias*, it would seem that Plato *exploits* the polysemy of the term for persuasive effect. Callicles unsurprisingly rejects ϲωφροϲύνη in one of its typical uses, but Socrates forces him to accept it in another. Because the dialogue invokes these different uses of the term without in any way drawing attention to the fact that they are indeed different uses, it then seems that Callicles is caught in contradiction. By contrast, in *Charmides*, Plato apparently aims to *reduce* this polysemy. He gives an overview of a large number of traditional uses of ϲωφροϲύνη, dismisses virtually all of them, and leaves what remains (ϲωφροϲύνη in the sense of 'control of desire') to be ultimately incorporated in his own unified philosophical interpretation of ϲωφροϲύνη as given in *Republic*.

So if it would seem that Plato both *exploits* and *reduces* the polysemy of ϲωφροϲύνη in ordinary language use, this raises the question how contemporary readers would feel about Plato's treatment of the concept. Would they agree that he is giving a fair representation of what ϲωφροϲύνη 'really' means, or would they rather feel that Plato distorts the virtue to fit it into his own conception of ἀρετή? Might it be that in establishing his technical, 'philosophical' interpretation of the virtue in terms of a 'concord' or 'harmony' between the various parts of the soul, Plato has given a significant 'twist' to the ϲωφροϲύνη of ordinary language use? This idea was a working hypothesis for this study for some time, but one that, I think, has been falsified by my data. On the contrary, I think my study will show that Plato's technical conception of ϲωφροϲύνη as given in *Republic* sticks as closely as possible to what is *the* most central ('prototypical') interpretation of ϲωφροϲύνη for the most 'central' members of ancient Greek society, adult male citizens.

In order to get a clear view of whether Plato conforms to traditional ideas, however, we need to have an exact view of *which* traditional uses of ϲωφροϲύνη were available to him. Here we come to the first aim of this study mentioned above. What we need is a full synchronic description of the meaning of ϲώφρων and cognate terms in the early fourth century BC. As will be argued in section 3, a fully adequate synchronic description has not been given so far. Most of the existing descriptions provide a limited number of basic 'meanings' and standard translations, and thus fail to do full justice to the polysemy of the terms. Others, notably the study by North (1966), are sensitive to this polysemy but do not sufficiently account for the similarities and differences between the various uses of our terms, and thus fail to show, so to speak, whatever 'unity' there may be behind the surface variety. It is the preliminary aim of this study, then, to give this full synchronic semantic description of ϲώφρων and cognates in Plato's time. In sections 4-6, the requirements a semantic description has to meet will be investigated more fully, and I will argue that modern cognitive linguistics, in particular the network model developed in its fullest form by Ronald Langacker (1987, 1991), can provide us with adequate tools for the semantic description of lexical items in classical Greek, and that such a model helps to establish an adequate and illuminating description of ϲώφρων and cognates.

2. *The Meanings of* ϲωφροϲύνη: *An Overview provided by Plato's* Charmides

A quick glance at the treatment of ϲωφροϲύνη in *Chrm.* serves to suggest that its author is fully aware of the astounding variety of ways in which the word can be used. Here, it would seem, is a philosophical writer intent on giving a full account of the rich and complicated concept under consideration. It seems equally clear that Plato not only leaves no stone unturned, but also intends to take nothing for granted; *Charmides* seems to address virtually all traditional ideas concerning ϲωφροϲύνη, and to show that most of these are problematic.

Four definitions are offered by Socrates' interlocutors, and all
are rejected, two (offered by Charmides) almost immediately,
and two (attributed to, or offered by, Critias) after extensive dis-
cussion and modification. They are the following:

> 1. (Charmides) τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῆι, 'doing eve-
> rything in an orderly manner and quietly' (Pl. *Chrm.* 159B).
>
> 2. (Charmides) δοκεῖ ... αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ
> αἰσχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδὼς ἡ σωφροσύνη, 'it
> seems ... that σωφροσύνη causes a feeling of shame and makes a
> man liable to feel shame, and that it is in fact the same as αἰδώς.'
> (Pl. *Chrm.* 160E).
>
> 3. (attributed to Critias) τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 'doing one's own
> things' (Pl. *Chrm.* 161B).
> 3a. τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν, 'doing good things' (163E10).
>
> 4. (Critias) τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν, 'knowing oneself' (Pl. *Chrm.*
> 164D).
> 4a. ἐπιστήμη ... ἑαυτοῦ, 'knowledge of oneself' (165C5-7).
> 4b. τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ... καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς, 'knowl-
> edge of other fields of knowledge and of knowledge itself' (166C2-
> 3).
> 4c. τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, 'to know what one does and
> does not know' (167A6-7).
> 4d. εἰδέναι ... ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, 'to know that one does
> and does not know' (170D2-3).

The drift of the discussion would seem to suggest that the initial
definitions, and especially those proposed by Charmides, offer
superficial examples of σωφροσύνη, and that the movement of
the discussion is toward ever greater sophistication.[1]

Yet whatever their lack of sophistication, the initial definitions,
quite unlike some of their modifications in the sophisticated dis-
cussion between Socrates and Critias, are convincing enough at
first sight.[2] All seem to address notions commonly associated

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[1] Thus, e.g., North (1966) 155, writes: 'The serious search for a definition
now begins, following a symmetrical pattern which moves from the outer to the
inner and from a lower level of popular morality and instinctive response to a
higher one of intellectual analysis.'

[2] Cf. Heitsch (2000) 9 on Charmides' first definition: 'Als erster Versuch ist
das eigentlich gar nicht so schlecht.' Stalley (2000) 267 moreover notes that
'the first part of the dialogue provides all the materials for a Platonic account
of σωφροσύνη as a condition of order and harmony in the soul.'

with the concept of ϲωφροϲύνη. And those that are given rela-
tively short shrift, Charmides' definitions, even more obviously
reflect typical uses of the term than Critias'. The latter's defini-
tions rather seem to reflect his elitist political bias, and in some
of their modifications (4c and 4d in particular) define
ϲωφροϲύνη in terms of Socrates' own characteristic brand of self-
knowledge. Here, Greek readers may well be more likely to feel
surprise rather than agree instantaneously.

   The initial definitions, then, are, if anything, incomplete
rather than incorrect (or in any meaningful sense 'superficial')
and, in combination, they go some way towards a fuller under-
standing of the concept. (This is comparable to the procedure of
Laches, where the definitions of ἀνδρεία — 'remaining at one's
post', 'καρτερία' and some kind of 'wisdom' — are insufficient in
isolation, but are effective in suggesting the range of the concept
in combination.[3]) They do not by any means offer a *full* under-
standing of ϲωφροϲύνη: for instance, any so-called 'intellectual',
non-moral senses of the word ('soundness of mind', 'prudence')
are entirely ignored apart from some hints near the end of the
discussion that the benefit of ϲωφροϲύνη should consist of proper
management of the household and the state (171E). Even more
remarkable is the fact that 'control of desires and pleasures', or
'self-control' — perhaps *the* most common interpretation of
ϲωφροϲύνη, and prominent in other dialogues like *Gorgias* and
Republic — is likewise left out of the discussion. It is unmistakably
invoked, however, in the dramatic setting of the dialogue: Socra-
tes' hard-won mastery of his excitement caused by a glance in-
side Charmides' *himation* (155D3-4).[4] The dramatic setting offers
more glimpses of the non-verbal symptoms of ϲωφροϲύνη, most
notably Charmides' modesty, expressed when he blushes before
answering the question whether he himself is ϲώφρων (158C5).
This points to an important link between the theme of the dia-
logue and the characters of its protagonists: while Charmides
offers signs of youthful ϲωφροϲύνη, both Critias and he are asso-

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[3] See, e.g., O'Brien (1963) 131-47.
[4] See Tuckey (1951) 19, North (1966) 154, Santas (1973) 106, Irwin (1995)
39, Kahn (1997) 187-8, Stalley (2000) 265-6.

ciated with ϲωφροϲύνη in its political use as a slogan of the aristo-
cratic/oligarchic movement that culminated in what was later
seen as the 'tyranny of the Thirty'.[5] In retrospect, fourth century
readers of Plato of all persuasions are bound to agree that the
Thirty did not truly possess the virtue so important to them —
whether their *intention* to bring ϲωφροϲύνη into Athenian politics
is to be taken seriously or not. By contrast, the dialogue suggests,
as we will see, that Socrates is *truly* ϲώφρων, by virtue of his self-
control as well as in his characteristic activity of questioning the
experts.[6]

   So the dialogue points to at least five uses of ϲωφροϲύνη ('qui-
etness', 'shame', 'doing one's own things', 'self-knowledge' and
'control of desires') that are familiar from common Greek usage,
and these five uses are, at first sight, semantically quite unre-
lated. The definitions essentially consist of terms that are associ-
ated with ϲωφροϲύνη, but would seem to belong to quite differ-
ent contexts: thus, Charmides' κοϲμίωϲ πάντα πράττειν and
ἡϲυχία and αἰδώϲ characterise behaviour applauded in boys; it is
questionable in principle whether any of these terms are at all
relevant to the behaviour of adult males (though Socrates shows
himself to be κόϲμιοϲ in a quite different sense of the word when
he masters his excitement). 'Doing one's own things', and
'knowing oneself', on the other hand, evoke the domain of poli-
tics, and the ideals of citizenship in Critias' favoured aristo-
cratic/oligarchic society. ('Knowing oneself' is, in a quite differ-
ent way, also characteristic of Socratic self-knowledge, this is one
of the ways in which Socrates is established as the true ϲώφρων in
the course of the dialogue.)

   My claim will be that what we have here is a number of quite
distinct uses of the word that are connected by what is called, af-
ter Wittgenstein, family resemblance. In terms of cognitive se-
mantics, these uses are 'nodes', so to speak, of a network of re-
lated, if clearly distinct, uses. And, as the wealth of associated
terms that come up in the course of the dialogue shows, these

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   [5] For this use as a political slogan, see especially chapters 7.3 (Thucydides)
and 9.8 (Plato).
   [6] On the connections of Socrates with Critias and Charmides, see Stone
(1980), Krentz (1992), esp. 82-3, and Notomi (2000).

uses interact with other terms within the realm of what we may call the 'valuation of human behaviour'. The uses of ϲωφροϲύνη form a network in themselves, but within a larger network of terms used in the (positive or negative) evaluation of human behaviour. At some points within the smaller network, there are clear connections with other terms within the larger whole, not only with those just mentioned, but also with more cognitive terms like ϲοφία, and even, as any reader of Plato will be aware, with the concept of ἀνδρεία, different though this may seem at first sight.

A full description of the larger network would, in a sense, amount to a description in semantic terms of what Plato himself designed with ontological aims: a full account of the uses of virtue terms in classical Greek and the connection between them, a description, that is, of what Plato perceives as the 'unity' behind the proliferation of individual 'virtues'. That would go beyond the scope of this study. But a full semantic description of the use of ϲώφρων and cognates in non-philosophical Greek texts is a preliminary to an answer to the question to what extent Plato's treatment of ϲωφροϲύνη conforms to, or as the case may be, subtly differs from, common Greek usage: it is the aim of the present study to give such a description, and to assess on its basis how Plato deals with the term in *Charmides* and later dialogues.

3. *Problems with Traditional Semantic Descriptions of* ϲωφροϲύνη

The existing descriptions of the meaning of ϲώφρων and cognates all basically distinguish between two main senses of the words, commonly described as an 'intellectual' and a 'moral' sense. For the intellectual sense, the translations commonly given include 'of sound mind', 'discreet', 'prudent' and (when used of non-animate entities) 'reasonable'; the moral sense prompts translations like 'having control of the sensual desires', 'temperate', self-controlled', 'chaste' and (when used of non-animate entities) 'moderate'.[7]

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[7] These are the translations given by LSJ s.v. ϲώφρων. Apart from this, the

The description of this distinction in terms of a contrast between an 'intellectual', 'non-moral', sense and a moral one has to be challenged. When — to take just one of the early instances of the noun that easily translate as prudence — Eurycleia claims that Telemachus cαoφροcύνηιcι νοήματα πατρὸc ἔκευθε (*Od.* 23.30), 'out of cωφροcύνη kept his father's plans hidden' (as well as his father's presence), it is not the young man's intellectual acumen that she praises, but rather his sense of responsibility, responsibility for Odysseus' revenge and ultimately for the fate of his *oikos*. This 'prudence' is essentially the ability to take good care of the household, and thus, very probably, to live up to one of the main moral demands on the 'man about the house'. Eurycleia is in fact suggesting that Telemachus is successfully growing into his role of responsible adult male.[8] Therefore, it is mislead-

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lemma discusses the use of τὸ cῶφρον as a periphrasis for the quality of cωφροcύνη (sub II.3), and some instances of the adverb (sub III).

For cωφρονέω, LSJ give the following: 1. 'to be sound of mind', 2. 'to be temperate, moderate, show self-control', 3. 'come to one's senses', 'learn moderation', 4. τὰ cεcωφρονημένα ἐν τῶι βίωι μοι, 'things I had done with discretion' (Aeschin. 2.4). These last two are not separate meanings of the lexical item cωφρονεῖν as such, but concern (3) the use of the present and aorist stems in contexts where they require 'inchoative' or 'ingressive' interpretation, and (4) a rare use of the perfect participle of the middle voice.

For cωφροcύνη, LSJ give: 1. 'soundness of mind', 'prudence', 'discretion', 2. 'moderation in sensual desires', 'temperance', 'self-control', 3. (in a political sense) 'a moderate form of government'. This third sense, that from its translation would seem to be the application of the 'moral' sense of cωφροcύνη to the context of politics, reflects the adaptation of cωφροcύνη as a political slogan of the oligarchic movement in Athens, which is also ultimately behind the definition τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, as given by Critias in *Chrm.* The translation 'a moderate form of government' is rather too innocuous for the sarcastic use of the word at Th. 8.64 that LSJ cite. (See ch. 7.2.3).

The basic bi-partition that LSJ give turns up in all other descriptions. Thus, De Vries (1943) 99 states that 'cωφροcύνη est santé d'esprit, soit intellectuelle, soit éthique', before adding the significant modification: 'Bien que ces deux moments divergent, ils ne sont pas séparés dans la conscience grecque.'

North (1966) is generally more sensitive to the polysemy of the words, but starts from the same basic distinction. Thus, on p. 3, she notes that 'cωφροcύνη is basically 'soundness of mind' — that is, the state of having one's *intellect* unimpaired' [my italics], and suggests that at what she calls the earliest stage of its history [i.e. in the Homeric poems], cωφροcύνη is 'devoid of moral and religious implications' (*ibidem*).

[8] Unlike Penelope, Homer's public is probably aware that it was Odysseus himself who told Telemachus to keep quiet. Thus, they may also regard Telemachus as performing a different kind of moral behaviour associated with

ing to suggest that the use of caoφροcύνηιcι is here 'unencumbered by moral or religious accretions'.[9] Rather, the distinction between this 'prudential sense' and other more conspicuously moral senses would seem to be that in the first use, presence or absence of cωφροcύνη primarily affects the self-interest of the agent and his dependants, whereas in the second, cωφροcύνη primarily regards the agent's conduct vis-à-vis 'others'.

Things are rather similar with another allegedly non-moral sense of cωφροcύνη, 'soundness of mind'. When Herodotus relates how Cambyses, after protracted madness, ἐcωφρόνηcε, 'came to his senses', or 'was in a normal state of mind again' (Hdt. 3.64), the use of the verb does indeed focus on Cambyses' state of mind (though again, there is no hint of exceptional *intellectual* ability, rather of mental normality restored). But notions of morality are by no means absent, for it was clear throughout the preceding narrative that Cambyses' madness was the source of his many crimes, and Herodotus' public now knows that Cambyses can be expected to behave rather differently during the short remainder of his life. Again, this is not strictly speaking a non-moral use of the word; rather, the use of the word draws attention primarily to Cambyses' state of mind, and only indirectly to the moral behaviour that results from it. In the 'prudential' sense of the word, encountered in the example from *Od.* 23 above, this was the other way round: Penelope is hardly invited to reflect on the state of Telemachus' mind, rather she is to note that the young man acted responsibly, and then quickly to follow Eurycleia downstairs.

The distinction between 'soundness of mind', 'prudence' and the more conspicuously moral uses of the word, then, is not a clear-cut distinction between 'non-moral' and 'moral' uses of the word: rather, one should say that when cωφροcύνη translates as 'soundness of mind', the focus is *primarily* on a person's state of mind, and only *indirectly* on his behaviour versus others. When cωφροcύνη translates as 'prudence', the focus is primarily on a

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cωφροcύνη, that of the obedient son rather than the brave young man.
[9] North (1966), 4.

person's responsibility for his self-interest, rather than on his obligations with regard to others.

If so, there is *a priori* little to support the idea that the supposedly non-moral senses represent the 'original' meanings of the words, as etymology[10] might be taken to suggest, and that the 'moral' ones all result from later developments. The strongest adherent of this theory is North (1966), and the problems connected with such an approach are particularly conspicuous in the earlier chapters of her generally most valuable book. Even regarding the four instances in the Homeric poems, North suggests that there are two that are 'closest to its original significance' and two others that are 'more suggestive of later semantic developments'.[11] If so, one must simply conclude that the Homeric data do not warrant the isolation of 'soundness of mind' or 'prudence' as an 'original significance'. North is overemphasising the diachronic perspective here.

For similar reasons, North's contention that the quality of ϲωφροϲύνη is 'of minor importance to the heroic age' (p. 2) must at least be modified. The use of ϲαόφρων and ϲαοφροϲύνη in Homer is indeed remarkably limited when compared to later writers. However, as the chapter on the Homeric poems will show, many types of behaviour that are evaluated elsewhere in terms of ϲωφροϲύνη are valued highly indeed, even if the epics use different value terms. Here, the richness of epic diction is a part of the explanation. For some of the later senses of ϲώφρων/ϲωφροϲύνη, the epic poems have separate words that are not current in prose or other forms of poetry. North does not note this, which is surprising in view of the fact that she is usually always prepared 'to take into account the existence of the *concept* of sophrosyne, even when expressed in other terms'.[12]

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[10] There is no doubt that ϲώφρων is a compound of ϲάοϲ/ϲῶϲ ('safe, sound') and the lengthened o-grade of the root -φρεν- ('mind'). See Frisk, s.v., Chantraine s.v., and North (1966) 3n.10.

[11] North (1966) 3-4.

[12] North (1966), *ix*. This tendency is of course fully justified in principle (there is no doubt, for instance, that Socrates in *Chrm.* hints that he is ϲώφρων in the sense of 'in control of his desires' even without using the word, and that readers are expected to be fully aware of the point), but it involves some risks of its own.

Over-emphasis of the diachronic perspective is indeed a recurrent feature of North's study, which approaches the theme of ϲωφροϲύνη very much from the perspective of *Ideengeschichte*. And while North shows considerable sensitivity to the rich variety of ideas connected with the concept, a full synchronic conspectus of the uses of the words, and a systematic semantic account of the resemblance and differences between them, is not on her agenda. This is regrettable, for it seems useful with many authors, and perhaps never more so than in the case of Plato, to have a precise account of the uses of the word that were available to them, and to see which of these uses they exploited, or ignored. The central chapters of the present study aim to gather, period by period and genre by genre (in order not to lose sight of possible generic differences or even diachronic developments altogether), the building-blocks for a synchronic conspectus of the uses of ϲωφροϲύνη available to Plato. After taking stock of them, it will be possible to see how Plato uses them, to which extent he follows traditional ideas, and in which respects, as the

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In some contexts, it is not necessarily very significant that ϲωφροϲύνη is not mentioned. On Hesiod, North writes: 'Although Hesiod nowhere uses the word ϲώφρων, which may not yet be current in mainland Greece, his view of life and of the relations between god and man is thoroughly imbued with sophrosyne in one of its later aspects: as the spirit of *Mêden agan* ('Nothing in excess.').' (p. 9) Does this imply that Hesiod wished to express the concept of ϲωφροϲύνη but did not have the word available? Or did the poet did not feel the need to back up his appeal to δίκη in *Works and Days* with a subsidiary appeal to ϲωφροϲύνη, when it seems already sufficiently clear what he meant? In this case, I do not see how such matters can be decided.

Elsewhere, it may well be significant that ϲωφροϲύνη is *not* explicitly mentioned. Herodotus and Aeschylus' *Persians*, offer clear examples here: 'Although Herodotus is the most fertile source in Greek prose of stories illustrating traditional ideas of sophrosyne, he applies the word to none of the typical situations, and indeed he never uses the noun.' (p. 28). 'Among the antitheses of the *Persians* the fundamental contrast, and the one that includes all the others, is that between ὕβριϲ and ϲωφροϲύνη.' (p. 34). Indeed, Herodotus leaves no doubt that *some* oriental kings, notably the mad Cambyses and the rash Xerxes lack ϲωφροϲύνη at crucial stages of their careers, and Darius in Aeschylus' play confirms this for Xerxes. But both authors carefully avoid reducing the central conflicts of their works to a simplified clash between 'oriental' ὕβριϲ and 'Greek' ϲωφροϲύνη. In both authors, the characters who are portrayed as ϲώφρονεϲ are the king's counsellors (Otanes, Artabanus, Demaratus, the elders of the chorus) rather than his opponents.

case may be, he extends or reduces the concept to suit his own purposes.

Let us now return to our survey of the traditional descriptions of *cωφροcύνη*. When we turn from the so-called 'intellectual' uses (the uses that focus on the agent's mental state or sense of responsibility) to the second main category of so-called 'moral' uses (the uses that focus on the agent's conduct vis-à-vis others), a quick glance at the definitions in *Charmides* suffices to see that there is a greater variety of uses in this last group than the concise treatment of *cωφροcύνη* in lexica suggests. In fact, the standard translations that the dictionaries offer (such as 'temperance', 'self-control', 'chastity', 'moderation') do not quite fit any of the four basic definitions given in the dialogue. Charmides' first definition suggests that *cωφροcύνη* also applies to orderly behaviour and obedience; his second definition (*αἰδώc*) is probably best exemplified by his timid hesitation (visible by blushing, and described by Socrates the narrator as 'his liability to feel shame', *τὸ αἰcχυντηλὸν αὐτοῦ*, 158C5-6) to answer the question whether he is *cώφρων* himself. Charmides here shows two types of 'modesty' at the same time: he is ashamed to claim *cωφροcύνη* for himself, but also to contradict his uncle and others who are lavish in their praise of him on this particular point. Critias' *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν* on the other hand places *cωφροcύνη* in the political sphere and commends a line of non-interference and restraint, for which 'moderation' is a rather too general translation. By contrast, his second definition, *τὸ γιγνώcκειν ἑαυτόν*, aims less clearly at any specific type of behaviour. Rather, it would seem to suggest that *cωφροcύνη* is a type of self-awareness (including undoubtedly, in Critias' case, 'class awareness') and that this self-awareness is bound to prevent a man from doing things that do not accord with his class and status, and his general position in life.[13]

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[13] Socrates of course almost immediately diverts attention from the social implications of the definition to its 'epistemological' complications. But he also states that the benefit of *cωφροcύνη* should be that one is able to prevent oneself and others from doing things without the necessary expertise (171D-172A); this seems to imply a 'division of labour' between classes of citizens that implic-

So we are confronted here with a variety of uses that is considerably greater than a concise list of standard translations from the dictionaries would suggest. North's study (1966) is useful in identifying most of these as they turn up in her traversal of Greek literature. What has been less well established is, in which respects these uses resemble, and differ from, each other. One obvious but problematic resemblance between these other-regarding uses is that *cωφροcύνη* here always seems to be, in a way, negatively defined: it seems to provide, essentially, a check for socially unacceptable behaviour. This is not so obviously the case for the 'prudential' use of *cωφροcύνη*, where it would seem entirely conceivable that good care of the interests of oneself and one's dependants can on occasion function as a spur to action rather than a summons to caution. North indeed strongly argues that 'both in its essence and in its most typical manifestations [*cωφροcύνη*] is neither negative nor merely cautious. Rather it is the harmonious product of intense passion under perfect control...'.[14] But remarks like these regard the appreciation of *cωφροcύνη* rather than its semantics: even if *cωφροcύνη* itself is greatly valued (as it always seems to be throughout Greek culture), that does not at all preclude the possibility that in many cases it typically manifests itself in the repression of some types of behaviour, and that it is, in this sense, indeed negatively defined.

So it seems likely that these so-called moral senses show significant resemblance to one another on a certain level of abstraction, but one must never underestimate the fact that there are appreciable and very real differences between the particular uses on the surface level of language use. This is even the case with senses that seem strongly related. To give an obvious instance, it is not difficult to see that there is a correspondence between 'control of one's desires' in males, and the 'chastity' applauded in women. But in real life, they commend very different types of behaviour. When a Greek woman is called *cώφρων*, we are not so much invited to conclude that she can control her impulses, but simply that she is faithful and loyal to her husband.

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itly acknowledges Critias' class awareness.
    [14] North (1966), ix-x.

Again, this type of marital fidelity differs significantly from the total virginity required from unmarried girls. In the case of boys, cωφροcύνη in sexual matters manifests itself differently again, in a circumspect dealing with ἐραcταί for instance. Thus, age and gender roles and social setting provide for very different uses of the word even where, on a certain level of abstraction, these uses would seem closely related.

4. *Contrasting Theories of Language And Meaning: Structuralist Versus Cognitive Approaches*

In this study, I am going to use a model of semantic description taken from the field of cognitive grammar, the so-called 'network' model developed to its fullest degree by Langacker.[15] Cognitive grammar is designed to cover the description of more or less the whole range of linguistic phenomena, including phonology,[16] morphology,[17] lexical semantics,[18] and syntactic categories.[19] Some features of cognitive linguistics have typically been designed for the description of 'living' languages. Prototype effects, especially, are relatively easily identified if a control group of native speakers is at hand, and may not be always as readily identifiable in a corpus of texts from a dead language. In section 7 below, I will briefly deal with the identification of prototype effects in texts from a dead language.

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[15] The standard texts are Langacker (1987) and (1991), supplemented by Langacker (1990) and (1999). Accessible introductions to the field are offered by Langacker (1988), Taylor (1995), (1996). An excellent textbook on cognitive grammar is now offered by Taylor (2002).

[16] On phonology in cognitive grammar, see Langacker (1987), esp. 328-48 and 388-401. Introductory discussions in Taylor (1995) 222-38, Taylor (2002) 78-95 (references for further reading on p. 95).

[17] See many places in Langacker (1987), also (1999) 131-42, and Taylor (2002) 265-80.

[18] Arguably, cognitive grammar's successful treatment of polysemy in lexical semantics is its greatest source of popularity. A seminal study is Brugman (1988, 1981) on *over*, discussed in Lakoff (1987) and elsewhere. For an overview of recent approaches see Ravin and Leacock (2000).

[19] See, e.g., Langacker (1991) 240-81 on tense, ibid. 249-81 on modality.

In the field of classics, the model has proven its value in the description of a complex grammatical category, the middle voice of the Greek verb, by R.J. Allan (2003). This study hopes to show that it may also be applied successfully in the field of lexical semantics.

However, the theory may not yet be universally familiar to, and accepted by, classical philologists,. Studies of — culturally significant — words and concepts in the field of Ancient Greek, that naturally belong to the field of lexical semantics, are often remarkably reticent on the semantic models they use, and in practice work on the assumptions of 'classical' notions of categorisation that can ultimately be traced back to Aristotle. North (1966) is a good example, but in the case of many more recent studies, similar things can be said. Thus, Cairns (1993) on αἰδώς, offers an excellent introduction focusing in particular on αἰδώς as an emotion, and on the roles of 'shame' and 'guilt' with respect to αἰδώς (including a substantial reappraisal of the — in its original application — over-simplified opposition of 'shame cultures' versus 'guilt cultures'). On the level of semantics, he argues that αἰδώς-terms are used in different senses that native speakers would have recognised as such, but warns that his aim is to describe the concept of αἰδώς as a whole, and avoid 'the dangers of dividing the inseparable that are inherent in the 'separate meanings' approach'.[20] He then proceeds, in the main body of the work, to offer a very thorough and illuminating discussion of the material, mostly by means of solidly traditional 'close reading'.

So far, I have nothing to disagree with. On the contrary, as far as the manner of approaching the material by means of close reading is concerned, I can only hope that this study will not fall conspicuously short of the standards upheld by Cairns' study. But I do think that it is worth taking a further step, and describing the data from our texts in terms of the semantic model offered by cognitive linguistics. (I will mainly take this extra step in chapter 9, which gives a semantic description of ϲώφρων and cognates on the basis of the texts discussed in chapters 2-8.). The

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[20] Cairns (1993) 1.

asset of the semantic model offered by cognitive grammar is that
it is eminently sensitive to *both* the concept as a whole, *and* the
various typical and rather less typical individual uses of our terms
that invoke this concept, and that the model offers some good
tools to describe how the 'parts' relate to the 'whole' (notably by
means of the notions 'family resemblance' and 'prototypicality').
In the case of ϲωφροϲύνη, at any rate, the description helps us to
see at a higher level of abstraction which uses of ϲώφρων and
cognates Plato uses and which he ignores, and it will, I think,
show that this 'selection' is far from arbitrary. Thus, my claim is
that the application of this semantic model to my material in-
creases the explanatory force of my description, and to this ex-
tent it may be considered useful on a practical level, even to
those who are not naturally in sympathy with its theoretical as-
sumptions.

   Traditional theories of lexical semantics have often been ex-
plicitly or implicitly influenced by structuralism in its insistence
that meaning is a language-immanent phenomenon: the mean-
ing of a linguistic form is determined by the language system it-
self, rather than by any relation between the linguistic form and
the 'world' outside.[21] A natural concomitant of this language-
immanent approach is that the lexical meaning of an item in the
lexicon has been traditionally conceived as a fixed, isolated en-
tity, defined in terms of the so-called classical category (itself a
distant, and arguably somewhat simplified,[22] derivative of Aris-
totle's theory of categorisation).

   Now the classical category is remarkably successful as a tool for
finding similarities between its members, and thus for establish-
ing similarities between two uses of a lexical item. If, for in-
stance, all uses of ϲώφρων share the characteristic that someone
who is ϲώφρων is, somehow, 'of sound mind', a description of

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[21] For one example among many, see Lyons (1968). A telling remark is *ibid.*
427: 'Since sense is to be defined in terms of relationships which hold between
vocabulary-items, it carries with it no presuppositions about the existence of
objects and properties outside the vocabulary of the language in question.' For
a discussion, see Taylor (1995) 34-6. Lyons (1995) incorporates some recent
developments, notably prototype theory, without giving up the conception of
'sense' as a language-imminent phenomenon.
[22] Cf. Taylor (1995) 24n.1.

ϲώφρων in terms of a classical category will readily identify 'of sound mind' as a necessary feature of all members of the category ϲώφρων. The classical category is also useful for detecting sense relations between one item and a number of related terms (such as synonyms, hyponyms, antonyms etc.). For instance, for those uses of ϲώφρων that commend abstention from violence and are contrasted to terms from the lexeme ὕβριϲ, categorisation along classical lines will easily identify presence versus absence of 'violence' as the critical feature determining the sense relation of antonymy between the two terms.

The classical category has been less successful, however, in dealing with polysemy, that is in accounting for dissimilarities between various uses of a term. This we will see more fully in our discussion, in the next section, of the contrast between the 'classical' and the 'cognitive' conception of categories, here I will just mention some of the key issues.

Usually, there are many salient surface differences between various uses of a term. In the classical approach, there are basically two options for dealing with these surface differences. One is to relegate them from the realm of (language-immanent) linguistic meaning proper to the realm of 'reference', where linguistic terms are applied to certain entities and contextual situations in the world outside. The other is to break up the category, and to assume that a lexical item has two or more distinct lexical meanings.

Both procedures have their disadvantages when applied in isolation. If all surface differences in use are regarded as a matter of reference, the lexical meaning itself runs the risk of becoming highly abstract and under-descriptive. On the other hand, if one lexical item is assumed to have a very large number of lexical meanings, the difference between 'sense' and 'reference' ultimately breaks down.[23] Consider the case of ϲώφρων. Let us assume we are confronted with a man who 'prudently' manages his own affairs, a woman who is loyal to her husband, a boy who is

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[23] It is such an approach, not — as far as I can see — especially popular in the field of lexical semantics in classics that really runs the risk of 'dividing the inseparable' (Cairns (1993) 1, quoted above).

well-behaved, and a madman who has come to his senses. All four can reasonably be called ϲώφρονεϲ. How to deal with the phenomenon? Are we to suppose that ϲώφρων means something like 'of sound mind', and that the considerable differences between our four examples of ϲώφρονεϲ are the result of the application of this general term to four quite different individuals in quite different settings? Or are we to take it that 'sane', 'prudent', 'loyal' and 'orderly' are four separate, and in principle quite unrelated 'meanings' of the word? It would seem that the truth is somewhere in between. The language user will have a separate use of ϲώφρων as applied to loyal women available in his mind, and will be able to use the term this way without going through the laborious process of establishing again and again what exactly ϲώφρων in the case of married women may mean. On the other hand, he will at least be dimly aware that this use is not an entirely separate meaning of the term, but one that resembles other uses of ϲώφρων to commend types of 'decent' behaviour.

Most traditional semantic lexical descriptions are, in fact, a kind of compromise between the two approaches to polysemy. Entries in the lexicon, for example, will typically identify a relatively limited number of separate 'senses' of a term, which turn out to acquire a different flavour according to context. In a Greek-English lexicon, an entry will define a relatively limited number of 'meanings', but will often offer a considerably larger number of translations for each of these 'meanings'. In case of ϲώφρων, we have seen how the lexica distinguish between a non-moral and a moral sense of the word, but offer several translations for each of these main groups, see section 3 above. However, it is usually quite implicit by means of which criteria these distinctions are made, and much is to be gained if they can be made explicit.

There was every reason, then, to give up the definition of meaning as an abstract linguistic phenomenon, irrespective of its relation to human cognition and the world out there. The first general attempt to tie language more firmly to human cognition

was Chomsky's generative-transformational paradigm.[24] Chomsky took the step of regarding language as a product of the human mind, rather than an abstract system of its own. However, most of Chomsky's followers have focused on the mind as a faculty for generating grammatically correct sentences, and have tried to establish the rules which govern this generating of languages. The effect is a focus on 'grammar' to the detriment of 'semantics', which in fact all but dropped out of the field of linguistics proper.[25]

The second cognitive revolution occurred when linguists started to regard not only the grammar of language as a product of the human mind, but also its contents. Cognitive linguistics, of which the theory of cognitive grammar that I use here is a distinct branch, treats all linguistic meaning in terms of concepts within the human mind. They have abandoned the treatment of language as an autonomous system, and this has opened the way for a much more open, inclusive, and flexible approach to semantic 'categories'. For our purpose, the contrast between the 'classical' and the 'cognitive' conception of categories is the most relevant theoretical issue, and I will focus on this contrast in more detail in the next section.[26]

5. *Contrasting Conceptions of Categorisation: The 'Classical' Approach Versus Cognitive Linguistics*

(1) As we have seen in section 4 above, the 'classical' approach to categories defines a category as *a conjunction of necessary and sufficient binary features.* If, for example, 'man' (in its use of 'human being' rather than 'male human being') is defined as a 'TWO-FOOTED' and 'ANIMATE' being,[27] all two-footed (as opposed

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[24] See, for instance, Chomsky (1980).
[25] These remarks are entirely to be taken from a historical perspective; I am fully aware that I am ignoring later developments in generative grammar that try to do fuller justice to the level of semantics.
[26] A classic discussion of categorisation is Lakoff (1987); good remarks also in Taylor (1995).
[27] The example is taken from Arist. *Metaph.* 4.4.8.

to non-two-footed, e.g. four-footed or six-footed) animate beings
will classify as members of the category 'man', and all beings that
are not two-footed or inanimate will automatically be excluded.
As we have seen, the advantages of these binary features are ob-
vious: they will allow for easy classification of two-footed animates
as instances of the class of 'man', and for easy identification of
the sense relation between 'man' and 'dog' ('TWO-FOOTED' ver-
sus 'NON-TWO-FOOTED') or 'man' and 'thing' ('ANIMATE' versus
'INANIMATE'). Herein lies the appeal of the classical category to
theories treating meaning as an intra-lingual system of sense re-
lations.

   (2) Another thing to be noted about classical categories is that
categories have clear boundaries: membership of a classical catego-
ries is matter of 'yes' or 'no'; the theory does not allow for am-
biguous cases, for entities which 'up to a point' or 'in some way'
belong to the category, but which in other ways do not. Biologi-
cal kinds and species, like 'bird' and 'mammal' seem to offer ex-
amples of categories where such clear-cut divisions work per-
fectly well, yet one only has to think of a penguin, or an ostrich,
to realise that even in the field of biology, for the layman at least,
the boundaries may not be so clear after all.

   (3) Thirdly, and finally, in a classical category, there are no
differences of degree of membership: *all members of a category have
equal status.* A member of any category will only belong to the
category if it exhibits all the defining features of the category;
otherwise, it will be excluded. All animals are equal, so to speak,
and none are more equal than others.

   All three properties of classical categories have been chal-
lenged in the course of the past century, and with good reason.

   (1) It is more often than not impossible to define a set of suffi-
cient and necessary conditions that apply to *all* members of a
category. The classical example here is Wittgenstein's treatment
of the word *Spiel* ('game').[28] As Wittgenstein shows, there is an
immense range of things and activities that are rightly called
'games' (including Olympic games, card games, ball games,
mind games, and now — of course — computer games), yet

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   [28] Wittgenstein (1967) 48-9 = (1978) 31-3.

none of the attributes that seems characteristic of most games apply to all members of the category. 'Amusement' seems to be an important attribute of many games, but games that are practised on a professional level, such as football or chess, are not necessarily done for amusement; 'amusement' is certainly not an attribute of the German term 'Spiel' in expressions like 'auf dem Spiel stehen' (to be at stake) or 'laß mich aus dem Spiel' ('do not involve me in this'). Many games involve competition, but *solitaire* does not, and is still a game. Many games involve a playing field and instruments (even if very different ones), such as football and chess; but 'hints' or riddles do not.

Rather than sharing a complete set of essential features, then, games are connected to each other by sharing some attributes with some games, and others with others. There may even be games which have very little in common. (Think of football versus a mind game.) Wittgenstein describes these relations of similarity and dissimilarity in terms of the family resemblance between various individual members of a family.

Now 'game' is a word that in many of its typical explications describes a *genus* with many different *species*, and it might seem to represent a case where the classical approach is very likely to run into trouble ('man' as a *species*-term was not) and the Wittgensteinian approach might seem to be especially designed for such abstract, complex and inclusive categories. But let's turn from 'game' to one of the basic-level entities constituting a game, football. We have the game played according to the official rules, exercised on various levels of professionalism, but also more loosely organised games of football as played on the streets or in the park on a summer evening. The ball itself is also called football. And in the expression 'in football', the word often describes football as a professional trade. Does this use of 'football' have anything in common with the physical object?

Even with names, which would seem to represent clear-cut one-member-categories (in principle at least), things may turn out not to be so simple. The name Mahler is used to designate the man Mahler, but also to designate his music, as it may be played in Amsterdam or Vienna or wherever, or as it may be played back from compact discs in your living room. Do the man and his music have any attributes in common? Many people

would like to think so, but it may not be easy to say which charac-
teristics exactly. And in 'stored under Mahler', the name proba-
bly designates a specific area of a shop, where scores or discs of
Mahler's music may be found (or alternatively, a group of entries
in a database).

How would this turn out in the case of an abstract 'quality' like
ϲώφρων? It may still turn out to be the case that all uses of the
word do indeed share one or two characteristics, e.g. that they
imply a positive evaluation or that they have something to do
with a mind that functions properly. But how much does this say
about the individual uses? Let's consider the case of the Greek
male who calls his wife ϲώφρων (Lysias' Euphiletus, say, at a cer-
tain stage in his married life.) What such a man means, first and
foremost, is that his wife is loyal to him. Does this entail that she
must also be 'of sound mind'? Maybe it does, but that does not
seem to be what is on the speaker's mind. Is it conceivable that a
wife is called ϲώφρων who is eminently faithful, yet obviously de-
ranged? There does not seem to be a reason *a priori* why it
should *not* be conceivable. The problem with a dead language
here is that you cannot always check, but such a use of the term
may well be paradoxical rather than impossible.[29] (As we will see
in chapter 6, Euripides seems especially fond of formulating
paradoxes of this type.) The point is, probably, that 'soundness
of mind' is usually not a very marked, or relevant, characteristic
of the ϲώφρων wife. If asked, the Greek man would probably
have been likely to answer that a ϲώφρων wife will also be men-
tally sane, but sanity does not go far to explain what her fidelity is
all about.

That is to say, even if it turns out to be possible to identify a
single characteristic shared by all uses of ϲώφρων, overemphasis
of this characteristic is likely to give a distorted view of the actual
use of the word. Surface meanings like 'faithful', 'loyal' are

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[29] A similar paradox is formulated in Pl. *Prt.* 333B8-9, where it is said that
many people hold that it is possible to be ϲώφρων while committing injustice
(ἀδικῶν … ϲωφρονεῖν). Protagoras himself is reluctant to admit this possbility,
and in view of that the fact that there is often a close connexion between the
two virtues, his reluctance seems quite reasonable. See chapter 10.3.

much more salient than any context-independent abstract attributes shared by one use and its distant cousin.

(2) Categories have no clear boundaries. Seminal work in this field was done by the experiments of W. Labov.[30] Labov studied the categorisation of household utensils like cups, bowls and vases (which share the attribute of being receptacles). He found that drawings of receptacles with a maximum width equal to its depth and with a handle, were unanimously called 'cups'. As the objects' width increases as compared to their depth, more and more subjects called the objects 'bowls' rather than 'cups', but there was no clear boundary between the two categories. Similar, with increasing depth, the objects gradually came to be classified as 'vases' rather than 'cups'. Again there were no clear boundaries. Classifications were influenced by such factors as presence and prominence of a handle, and also by the imagined uses for the receptacles in question, but in all these cases, people did not agree on the categorisation of the objects in a 'borderline' area.

This means that in a category, there are clear examples as opposed to borderline cases where one can doubt if they qualify for inclusion in the category. A medium-sized receptacle with a handle will be a cup, but a shallow receptacle without a handle will arguably be more of a bowl, even if perhaps someone dislikes hot coffee and drinks his coffee from such a receptacle. One may compare the layman's response 'that is not music' to many types of twentieth-century music. Here, for many, too many attributes characteristic of most types of classical western music (major-minor tonality, thematic development, harmonic progression, expectations with regard to form) are missing or not readily discernible: as a result, the piece in question does not qualify for whole-hearted inclusion in the category of 'music'.

In dealing with cωφροcύνη, we may expect to encounter similar 'borderline cases' in the case of individual examples. Among women, Andromache and Penelope seem to be indubitably cώφρων, and Helena evidently is not. But Medea may well be only a borderline case at best, even though she may reasonably be said to exhibit some typical characteristics of the cώφρων wife,

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[30] Labov (1973).

notably — up to the start of Euripides' play, at least — undeni-
able loyalty to Jason. Alcestis is a cώφρων wife whose loyalty is
carried to the extreme of self-sacrifice. (Again, Euripides seems
especially fond of such 'extreme' examples.)

(3) It would seem, then, that not all members of a category
have equal status: 'borderline' cases are bad examples of a cate-
gory, and conversely, very 'central' cases are rather better ones.
Here, we come to a phenomenon that complements the fuzzi-
ness of the category at its boundaries: the so-called prototype ef-
fects, first described in detail by Eleanor Rosch. In one of her
classic studies,[31] Rosch asked her subjects to rate various objects
of household items, and say to what extent they constituted good
examples of furniture. It turned out that chairs, couches and ta-
bles were significantly better examples of furniture than pianos
or cushions; ashtrays, fans and telephones were among the worst
examples. In another experiment, Rosch found that for North-
ern Americans, a 'robin' is a better example of a bird than a
'duck'; consequently, the 'robin' was more often named as an
example of a bird, and it took less time for a robin to be cor-
rectly identified as a bird than it did for a duck.[32]

Categories are structured, then, around prototypes: central
cases that form 'normal' good examples of its category.[33] In the
examples given above, prototypicality will in part be an effect of
physical size and shape as well as of function. An ashtray is very
probably less of a piece of furniture than a couch because it does
not fill a room in the way that a couch may do, and because it
will also be used outside, in a way that a couch will normally not.
Cultural aspects may well play a role too: for some, a television
set may well be more of a piece of furniture than for others.

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[31] Rosch (1975a) 199-233.
[32] Rosch (1973) 111-44.
[33] A related phenomenon that I will not discuss extensively here is that of
stereotypicality. Stereotype effects occur when it is suggested that *all* members of
a certain group or category evince the typical characteristics. Thus, the notion
of stereotypicality is vital to the description of markers such as 'each', 'every',
'all' and *similia*. In our study of cωφροσύνη, we will meet some stereotype ef-
fects, in cases when it is suggested, e.g., that women are *generally* unfaithful, that
the young are *generally* rash and violent, etcetera. On stereotypes in cognitive
semantics, see, e.g., Verkuyl (2000).

(Rosch's subjects were college students.) And where for North Americans, a robin was a better bird than a duck, the same does not necessary hold for inhabitants of Amsterdam with its many canals (and with its Dam square crowded by pigeons). Significantly, the structure of the category depends on the minds of the language users, and this is one reason why a study of semantics will always also be a study of culture.

In the classical examples referred to above, prototype effects were identified in the use of generic nouns, where the various members of the categories are also designated by nouns. But it has been shown that prototype effects also show up in more abstract categories, e.g. 'telling a lie',[34] verbs such as 'look', 'kill', 'speak' and 'walk',[35] and a highly abstract category like 'tallness'.[36]

And prototype effects do not only occur between sub-groups of the larger class, but also of course between various members of one sub-group. Thus, if a television set is a less than typical piece of furniture, a laptop transmitting, via the internet, the programme of a television channel, is a far more unusual example of a television set than the piece of furniture in the corner of one's living room, and to that extent, probably, also an even more peripheral instance of a piece of furniture.

On the basis of cognitive grammar's view of categories, then, one would describe the meaning of lexical item in terms of an 'open' category in the following terms:

- The meaning of a lexical item is a cognitive concept that is structured as an open category, consisting of various groups of uses of the lexical item in question. These groups of uses are connected with each other in a network by family resemblance: some uses share some attributes with some other uses, and others with others. There may be uses of the term which have little or nothing in common at all. (E.g. the cώφρων loyal wife vs. the cώφρων sane person.)

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[34] Coleman & Kay (1981),
[35] Pulman (1983)
[36] Dirven & Talor (1988) 379-402.

- The category is centred around one or more prototypes: one or more central uses of the lexical items that exhibit a significant number of characteristic attributes and count as 'best' examples of the use of the item; more to the periphery are uses that exhibit fewer of the characteristic attributes. (For instance, it may well turn out that 'moral' uses of ϲώφρων such as 'in control of one's desires' or 'faithful' exhibit *more* of the characteristic attributes, and are *more* central uses of the word than ϲώφρων in the sense of 'sane'.)

- Since each group of uses consists of a (high) number of individual expressions in which the terms are used in roughly similar way, each use is a sub-category in itself and is likely to exhibit the phenomena of prototypicality and borderline cases. As we have seen, within the sub-category of loyal women, Penelope is a typical example, and Medea probably a borderline case. Alcestis is probably atypical in that she exhibits 'extreme values' for the required attributes.

6. *Requirements for a Semantic Description of* ϲώφρων *and Cognates*

On the basis of the theory of categorisation discussed above, we can now define the most important requirements that a semantic description of the lexical items ϲώφρων, ϲωφροϲύνη and ϲωφρονεῖν would have to meet.

(1) The description should be able to accommodate, without embarrassment, a large number of uses, always giving precedence to the peculiarities of particular uses as they occur, and resisting any tendency to reduce their number beforehand by abstracting generalisations from them. I regard polysemy as the normal case even in lexical items of limited complexity, let alone in the case of abstract value terms. A concept does not exist *independently* of the cognitive perception of the world outside, and shares its complexity with the perceived reality.

Above (section 3), it has been suggested that a translation like 'self-controlled' may well reflect an abstraction from at least four different particular senses, and that it is misleading to substitute the abstraction for the particulars without paying attention to what is lost in the process.

A very clear example of what happens in this type of abstraction is provided by the discussion of Laches' definition of ἀνδρεία in the dialogue of that name. Laches first gives the prototypical example of the hoplite, whose bravery can be analysed as (i) resisting (ii) dangerous enemies (iii) by fighting (iv) without fleeing from his post (190E5-6).[37] In reply, Socrates produces many very different examples of ἀνδρεία: he first cites fighting techniques that may include temporary retreat — such as fighting from horseback — so that condition (iv) no longer applies (191A-C). His next examples include dangerous and scary situations such as storms at sea, poverty, illness and politics (191D3-6), where resistance no longer even takes the form of fighting (iii); and finally he includes ἀνδρεία against pleasures and desires (touching on the one area where ϲωφροϲύνη and ἀνδρεία would seem to overlap), where resistance is not even against things that are really dangerous or scary (191D6-E2), except perhaps in a metaphorical way. When asked what all these have in common, Laches duly provides the answer καρτερία ('resistance' or 'endurance', 192B9-C1). This is indeed the only attribute that all these examples have in common, but misses three important characteristics of the 'good example' of ἀνδρεία provided by Laches at the start. (It will also turn out to be too inclusive: as the continuation of the discussion shows, not every instance of καρτερία qualifies as ἀνδρεία.)

Reduction of four or more senses of ϲωφροϲύνη to the more general sense of 'control of desires' would seem to constitute a similar type of reduction through abstraction, though this is not to preclude the possibility that 'control of desires' would be a fairly adequate description for one of these senses, the variety of ϲωφροϲύνη as 'self-control' in adult males. If so, this possibly explains why this definition is readily accepted by Socrates' male interlocutors in *Gorgias* and *Republic*.[38]

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[37] For an analysis of Laches definition in terms of prototype theory, see Sluiter & Rosen (2003), 5-8.

[38] I use the term 'self-control' in the limited sense of 'control of desires'; in modern usage it covers, of course, an astounding variety of uses. Klausner (1965), 15 lists four classes of objects of control: (i) performance (including posturing, sphincter and breath control and task performance); (ii) drive (diet

(2) The description should take into account relevant similarities between various uses. The search is not necessarily for one attribute that is shared by *all* uses of the words, though it is always conceivable that such an attribute can indeed be found. In the example from *Laches* above, 'resistance' or 'endurance' was an attribute shared by *all* given instances of 'courage'. From that example it is clear that identifying such an attribute — however useful for one's understanding of the inner structure of a network of related meanings — is unlikely to tell us very much about the characteristics of most particular uses. In the case of ϲωφροϲύνη, it may well turn out that some attribute like 'having a mind that functions properly' is shared by all uses of the word, but this attribute is likely to be highly descriptive of only one use of the words (the 'sanity' or 'soundness of mind' that was restored to Cambyses in Hdt.) but highly under-descriptive of many others.

Normally, however, many attributes will be shared by some uses but not by others: the concept of 'family resemblance' as introduced by Wittgenstein (see section 5 above) here provides a useful tool of description. Among the examples of *andreia* from *Laches*, 'remaining at one's post' was very important to the hoplite's courage as well as, probably, to that of the helmsman of a ship. But it is of course totally irrelevant to 'fighting' poverty or disease, or indeed to most other instances.

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and sex control); (iii) intellect (intellectual acumen under stress) and (iv) control of affects. Of these, classical ϲωφροϲύνη typically includes control of sexual drives, and also control of affects such as anger and fear, but probably less typically so: the ever-systematic Aristotle (*EN* 1103b19), for instance, contrasts ϲώφρονεϲ and πρᾶοι to ἀκόλαϲτοι and ὀργίλοι, qualifying the first members of these pairs as περὶ τὰϲ ἐπιθυμίαϲ and the second as περὶ τὰϲ ὀργάϲ. (Incidentally, the treatment of these types of affect in classical literature show strong stereotype effects. With men showing fear — Eteocles in *Septem*, for instance — or women showing anger — Sophocles' Electra — there is often an uncomfortable sense that they are somehow transgressing the boundaries of their gender roles.)

Classical ϲωφροϲύνη has little to do, in popular usage, with control of performance or intellect, nor with control of health and addictions, so important to modern understandings of self-control (see Stearns (1999) 253-320). Still, it can, perhaps, be argued that Plato's interpretation of ϲωφροϲύνη as τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, is an early attempt to define ϲωφροϲύνη as a type of control of performance.

Above, little has yet been said about how to account for similarities (family resemblance) between various uses of a word. For that, I refer to number (2) in section 7 below, on Langacker's abstract schema.

(3) Furthermore, the description should allow for the possibility that the category as a whole and its sub-categories within the network have no clear boundaries and allow for borderline cases. Some individual instances will be clear examples of a particular use, others will be highly peripheral. An example of peripheral use is Chremes in *Ecclesiazusae,* who claims ϲωφροϲύνη on account of his obedience to the law that prescribes the abolition of private property (Ar. *Ec.* 767); here, the law to which he conforms is so patently absurd, that his obedience turns him into a very peculiar example of a law-abiding citizen, one that is likely to be regarded as an incurable fool rather than as a man who is truly ϲώφρων.

And whereas some individual instances will be highly untypical examples of the group of uses, others may well activate more than one use at a time. A clear example is the lament (E. *Tr.* 645) in which Andromache claims that she used to do all the things that are ϲώφρονα for a woman to do: here the context makes it clear that the word covers female ϲωφροϲύνη in both its typical senses: fidelity and obedience.

(4) Finally, to complement the phenomenon of the borderline cases, the description should take into account gradations of membership, both between the various groups of uses within the category of the lexical item as a whole, as well as between individual instances of each type of use. To draw on our example from *Laches* once again, the hoplite fighting the enemy is probably a very typical general example of courage, and the man 'fighting' his desires is probably a rather less typical one. These effects are also discernible among individual manifestations of a single type: for instance, Laches may well be a better example of the martial variety of courage than Nicias. In the case of ϲωφροϲύνη too, there are some typical types of ϲωφροϲύνη, and mythological or real life persons who are very good examples of the quality at hand. Thus, for women, marital loyalty will probably be the central sense of ϲωφροϲύνη, and Penelope will be its most famous embodiment. Similarly, Charmides' prominence in

the dialogue of that name is a pointer that he is a very good ex-
ample of a ϲώφρων boy; the introduction to the dialogue makes
this clear. And one of the functions of the dialogue as a whole
would seem to be to suggest that Socrates is in fact an even better
(though at first sight atypical) example than either Charmides or
Critias, though contemporary readers may have needed some
help to recognise the typical ϲώφρων in *him*.

    These prototypical uses also on occasion give rise to stereotype
effects, when it is supposed that *all* members of a certain social
group share, or lack, as the case may be, the typical attributes. A
clear example of this is found in the *agôn* of Aristophanes'
Clouds, where it is suggested by the 'Stronger Argument' that in
the old days *all* boys were trained to be orderly, obedient and
liable to feel shame. Similar stereotype effects occur when it is
supposed that ϲωφροϲύνη is the distinguishing characteristic of
the old, or when it is feared that women are by nature more in-
clined to infidelity than to ϲωφροϲύνη.

7. *Theoretical Apparatus for Addressing these Requirements*

As I tried to show in section 5, modern cognitive linguistics offer
tools for meeting all of these requirements. These tools will be
described at somewhat greater length here.

    (1) The claim of pervasive *polysemy* translates into the assump-
tion that the meaning of a lexical item can be described as a
network of related uses. Ever since Wittgenstein's *Philosophical
Investigations* (cf. section 5 above), cognitive linguistics have
worked on the basis of the assumption that linguistic categories,
both on the level of the lexicon (single lexemes, clusters of se-
mantically related expressions) and on the level of grammatical
categories, are typically complex: a category 'is not defined by
any single unit, but comprises a constellation of units that may
be quite diverse despite an overall family resemblance'.[39] These
diverse units (in our case, the various 'senses' of lexical items)

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[39] Langacker (1991) 2. On categorisation, see also, among many others
Lakoff (1987) and Lucy (1992).

form a 'network' whose sub-units (conceptualised as 'vertices' or 'nodes') are 'semantic, phonological or symbolic units of any kind or size. Usually clustered around a prototype, these units are linked by categorising relationships of elaboration and extension, each unit and each relationship having some degree of cognitive salience'.[40]

In the description of lexical items, this means that precedence is given to the diversity of senses of a word as they occur, without the need *a priori* to reduce this plurality of uses to a single, or minimally complex 'lexical meaning', as in classical semantic theory.

(2) In accounting for family resemblance, a useful tool is offered by Langacker's *abstract schema*. The ability to account for similarity between related uses was always one of the strong points of the classical theory of classification. Langacker's schema is in fact a means to accommodate these successes with the gain of being more able to account for *differences* between uses.

In accounting for the inner structure of the semantic network, one tries to identify common attributes that any individual uses may have in common. This procedure of abstracting similarities from a plurality of foreground phenomena is what Langacker calls the construction of a schema.[41] What he means by this becomes clear from Langacker's account of how a language user may acquire the concept 'TREE'. Suppose a language learner learns the meaning of tree from large, leafed examples such as oaks and elms. On the basis of the similarities between these trees, he will form a schematic representation of what trees have in common. This schema, TREE[1] will now, according to Langacker, be the new prototype of a tree. Confrontation with a

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[40] Langacker (1991), *ibidem.*
[41] Langacker (1987) 371. A prototype is a typical instance of a category, and other elements are assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype; there are degrees of membership based on degrees of similarity. A schema, by contrast, is an abstract characterisation that is fully compatible with all the members of the category it defines (so membership is not a matter of degree); it is an integrated structure that embodies the commonality of its members, which are conceptions of greater specifity and detail that elaborate the schema in contrasting ways.

pine tree will then lead to the formation of a schema TREE^2 that represents what pines and TREE^1 have in common. Similarly, after a visit to warmer regions, the incorporation of palm trees into the concept of trees will lead to an even more inclusive schema TREE^3, and so one may ultimately arrive at a schema TREE^n that includes all the trees one knows.

On the level of lexical semantics, one will note, for instance, that cώφρων is used many times of women who are loyal to their husbands, and can be described as 'faithful'. This will then be a first schema for a group of uses of the adjective, and provide us with a prototypical use of cώφρων that normally requires no further detailed surface investigation. (They are the oaks among our trees, say.) When confronted with a very different group of uses (say cώφρων as used of self-controlled men) we can develop a second, more abstract schema that defines the similarities between the two uses. Ultimately, we may thus arrive at a schematic representation of what many, maybe even most, or all, uses of the word have in common.

This then is a way to account for a large variety of uses, without breaking up the indivisible, or losing sight of the 'concept' as a whole.

On the highest level of abstraction, the schema cώφρων^n closely resembles what classical theory would conceive of as the (or a) context-independent 'lexical meaning' of a word. Here one regains, so to speak, what was the main advantage of the classical concept of the abstract conception of the lexical meaning: its potential to explain what different uses of a term have in common, and why one term can be meaningfully applied to various entities or states of affairs. For Langacker, however, the priority remains with the surface phenomenon, and the schema very much remains a secondary phenomenon: a useful tool for analysis, but insufficient for the description of a concept at the level of its surface manifestations.

(3) By means of the network theory, one can easily accommodate borderline cases of category membership, or instances that belong to more than one group of uses. Here, two or more nodes of the network are activated by the context at the same time. Thus, after the stories connected with Cambyses' madness, Herodotus' public will draw at least *two* units of information

from the verb ἐcωφρόνηcε: (i) the king is now sane, and (ii) he will presumably change his brutal ways.

   (4) Otherwise, degrees of membership within one category can be described by means of the notion of *prototypicality*. Prototypicality[42] is a vital organisational principle of the structure of a semantic network. Clusters of uses of a word centre around prototypical uses, and individual instances will be closer to, or further removed from, the prototype. (Thus, if 'abiding the law' is a typical attribute of cωφροcύνη in one sense, Chremes' handing over his property in *Ec.* is an atypical example of this law-abiding conduct.) Prototypical examples do not only concern characteristic lines of behaviour (good examples of how one behaves when cώφρων) but frequently there is also a number of people or mythological figures who characteristically embody the typical ways of behaviour. Thus, Penelope's waiting for Odysseus' return is a very salient example of fidelity in women, and Penelope becomes one of the paragons of (female) cωφροcύνη (e.g. E. *Tr.* 422).

But prototype effects are also at work *between* various groups of senses. Some senses are more 'salient' (more easily activated) than others; they tend to jump to mind immediately, whereas others may come up only on reflection. This phenomenon can be observed particularly clearly in discussions of cωφροcύνη in Plato. In continuous discourse, the context usually activates the required sense (Cambyses' madness triggering the right interpretation of ἐcωφρόνηcε in Hdt. 3.64.5). But when Socrates asks 'what is cωφροcύνη?', strictly speaking there is no preceding context, and then it is no surprise to see Charmides coming up with what for him as a boy must indeed be a very salient use of the word. Here Charmides activates, so to speak, what is probably the prototypical sense of cωφροcύνη in the context of his own life. Similarly, the discussion of the virtue between adult males in *Gorgias* and *Republic* starts with another presumably salient sense of the word, 'control of desires'. These, then, are contexts that tell us something about the relative salience of individual groups

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[42] Apart from the works by Rosch noted above, see also Lakoff (1987) 39ff, Kleiber (1990).

of uses, and they provide us with a means to establish prototype effects even in the absence of living native speakers of ancient Greek.

A specific problem connected with prototypes is, indeed, that it is not always clear how prototypes arise in the mind of the language user, and, even more pertinently to our purposes, how they can be retrospectively detected by the student of language. Rosch considers a number of possible answers to this category.[43]

Some prototype effects seem to have a physiological basis. An example of this is the prototypicality of focal colours, for which there seems to be a clear neurological basis.[44] In our case, such a physiological basis is obviously irrelevant.

In other cases, some members of a category may have prototype status because they are more frequently encountered. But Rosch (*op. cit.*) warns that frequency of perception may well be a *symptom* of prototypicality rather than its cause. Even if mirrors and clocks are less typical pieces of furniture than tables and chairs, that does not necessarily mean that we encounter them less often. Rosch calls this the 'good old days' effect, by which people remember (some parts of) their past as invariably 'good', even if in reality it has been rather more mixed.[45] The consequence for our study is that it does not make much sense to try to start counting occurences of individual senses in order to establish the prototypicality of a use on the basis of its frequency (especially when we often would not be sure whether we were measuring characteristics of the lexical items themselves, or genre characteristics of the texts in our data base.)

Another possibility that has been suggested is the order of learning. As we have seen above, the order of learning played a role in Langacker's description of concept formation, and in his account of prototypes and schema's. In the case of a dead language, however, we have no means to see in which order various

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[43] Rosch (1975b) 177-206.
[44] See also Heider (1971) 447-55.
[45] Cf. Taylor (1995) 53n.6, who draws attention to the fact that children almost invariably draw green grass and blue skies, even in regions where for large parts of the year the grass is brown, and the sky grey.

uses of language items are acquired; therefore, this is no possible tool.

A fourth option that has been suggested, is that mean values of variable attributes are more typical than extreme ones. A gull, with its medium size may well be a more 'normal' bird than an eagle. Mean values may play some role in the distinction between the not-so-very ϲώφρων Medea, the fully ϲώφρων Penelope and the unusually ϲώφρων Alcestis.

And finally, it has been suggested that certain attributes may be particularly salient, because they are especially important in a society. This seems the most promising approach for our value terms.

Therefore, I will work on the assumption that a use of a word may well be prototypical if it is easily activated, without a great deal of contextual preparations (consider the first answers to the 'what is *x*?'-questions in Socratic dialogues, or the designation of Penelope as a ϲώφρων woman tout court in E. *Tr.* 422). A double-check for my findings would be that supposedly prototypical uses should be likely to reflect current and relevant norms of every-day life, rather than the constructs of high literature or philosophical discourse. For ordinary Athenian citizens, say, ϲωφροϲύνη in the use of 'control of desires' will probably more relevant to their daily lives than the special type of ϲωφροϲύνη ('submission') demanded from Ajax by Athena and the Atreids in Sophocles' play. If I found reason to assume that the former represents a prototypical use of ϲώφρων, I would happily do so; in the second case, I would hesitate rather longer.

8. *The Disposition of this Study: Theory Versus Practice*

Before turning to the main body of this study, it may be good to summarise which questions have to be addressed in the course of the investigation, and to indicate briefly how I will proceed in addressing them.

(1) As stated above, the peculiarities of the use of ϲώφρων and cognates in Plato raise the question how exactly the terms are traditionally used in non-philosophical texts. In order to answer this first question, the use of ϲώφρων and cognates in non-

philosophical Greek texts up to Plato's time will be investigated, resulting in a full synchronic description of the use of the words in the fourth century BC. It has been argued above (section 4) that the use of the so-called network model from cognitive linguistics developed by Langacker provides the most suitable tool of analysis of our data. The particular strength of this model is that, while it accommodates all the advantages of the classical semantic model, it is also able to deal with some residual problems of the classical models (as argued above in sections 4-7).

(2) After that, this study will turn to Plato, and will try to establish how exactly Plato's conception of *cωφροcύνη* relates to the traditional uses of the terms.

In the central chapters (2-8) of this study, I will investigate the material from the pre-Platonic texts. In these chapters, I will mainly be concerned with detailed analyses of individual text passages, and with identifying various groups of uses within the network. After the *theoretical* apparatus sketched above, my *method* of approaching the text will perhaps strike the reader as reassuringly, or — as the case may be — depressingly traditional: it will involve such familiar procedures as close reading and analysis of relevant text passages, listing and analysing of related and opposed terms, and seeing how and by what means the concept of *cωφροcύνη* is activated in contexts where the terms are not explicitly used.

The reason for this is that in these chapters, I am basically concerned with gathering and inspecting the material. I have deliberately delayed the attempt to synthesise my data in a full semantic description. (Any reader who is interested only in that can happily jump to chapter 9. Conversely, any reader interested in a specific author can either decide not to burden himself with theoretical issues and read only the relevant chapter, or in addition consult the relevant table for the use of the term in specific genres and authors in chapter 9.) After that, my theoretical model comes into full play in my attempt, in chapter 9, to give an integrated semantic description of the concept of *cωφροcύνη* as a whole. The test for my theoretical framework will be to see if it succeeds in integrating the data gathered in the central chapters into a description of some explanatory power.

In the central chapters (2-8), I have chosen to present the material genre by genre, and even, in the case of the tragedians, author by author, in a roughly chronological order.

This is not primarily in order to trace diachronic developments of the concept under investigation. It is of course quite true that from time to time, we will meet uses that are 'new' in the sense that we have not been confronted with them in previous chapters. But, especially for the earlier ages, our data are scattered, and it may not always be possible to decide whether we are dealing with the vagaries of our tradition, issues of genre, or with genuine diachronic developments. This is a question that does not fall within the scope of the present study.

My reasons for a quasi-chronological presentation of the material are, rather, one of convenience and one of content. First, this presentation seems convenient for readers who wish to consult the book for reference to a specific author. More importantly, however, we are confronted with considerable differences between genres and authors. The texts differ widely in subject matter and in their styles of presentation, and this is reflected in the fact that the use of our terms varies from genre to genre. Thus, each chapter brings its own particular contribution, so to speak, to the synopsis of uses available to Plato.

Chapter 2 will deal with the Homeric poems. The most significant use of ϲαόφρων there is connected with younger males vis-à-vis their elders, notably Telemachus, who in a sense offers the first literary model for the ϲώφρων youth in the manner of Plato's Charmides. This chapter will also investigate some related terms and expressions from epic diction. This is because epic diction uses other words for some of the typical uses of ϲώφρων found elsewhere.

The next chapter turns to archaic poetry. Here we meet the ϲωφροϲύνη of the male citizen in the archaic city-state. ϲωφροϲύνη is here most typically related to conduct that avoids injustice to others (and so, it is closely related to δικαιοϲύνη), and specifically with the orderly civic conduct that avoids internal conflicts. These are the first manifestations of ϲωφροϲύνη as a political virtue, and on that account obviously relevant to Plato's treatment of the concept.

In Aeschylus (chapter 4) we are confronted with the
cωφροсύνη of inferiors dealing with higher authorities, both that
of mortals versus the gods (*P., Th., Ag.*) and of subjects vis-à-vis
their superiors (*Ag., PV*). On account of its subject matter, *Sup-
plices* offers a lot of information on the cωφροсύνη of unmarried
girls.

In Sophocles (chapter 5), the main text is *Ajax*. Issues of
authority are important here again: the play exploits the tensions
that can arise between the heroic temperament of the strong in-
dividual, and the restraint demanded by the community. For
Plato, one of the issues of *his* conception of virtue seems to have
been the troublesome reconciliation of ἀνδρεία and cωφροсύνη,
and in *Ajax* we observe many of the tensions that give rise to such
a concern in the concentrated context of a dramatic setting.

Euripides (chapter 6) seems typically concerned with the psy-
chology of rather less-than-heroic mortals, and in his works we
see protagonists struggling with ἔρωc and various other affects.
Some of his plays thus offer a dramatisation of cωφροсύνη as con-
trol of the desires. Euripides is of course also notable for his fe-
male protagonists, thus providing us with the richest source of
information on female cωφροсύνη. Besides, Euripides is a rich
source on persuasive and manipulative uses of the terms with
which we concern ourselves. In the plays, we observe how charac-
ters use moral terminology to suit their own purposes, offering
examples of 'transvaluation' on a smaller scale, where some of
Socrates' interlocutors tend to do the same on a rather larger
scale.

With the historians (chapter 7), we return to a world entirely
dominated by male protagonists. Herodotus contrasts the mad-
ness of Cambyses and the rashness of Xerxes with the cωφροсύνη
of some counsellor figures, and thus provides some literary pen-
dants to Callicles' and Thrasymachus' strong men-without-
restraint. Thucydides by contrast focuses on the Greek πόλιс as a
collective. He is very informative on the use of cωφροсύνη as a
political value term, and especially as a slogan of the Spartans
and the elitist pro-Spartan Athenians. The use of evaluative ter-
minology in Thucydides is largely confined to the speeches, and
— like Euripides — the *Histories* are a rich source on persuasive

uses of our terms, and on the issues confronting Plato in his at-
tempt to construct a theory of political ἀρετή.

Chapter 8 finally deals with two genres that show rather more
of what cωφροcύνη means to the ordinary 'decent' citizen: Aris-
tophanic comedy and the speeches of the orators. Here we meet
the cώφρων πολίτηc, who refrains from injustice and violence,
avoids πράγματα, and is keen to be considered by his fellow-
citizens as generally 'decent'. The orators here offer compara-
tively straightforward uses of our terms that are likely to be ac-
cepted by the majority of their audience (though of course these
familiar notions are often employed for persuasive effect),
whereas Aristophanes is naturally prone to comic exaggeration
and inversion. Aristophanes' *Clouds* is important for its comic
caricature of traditional education, offering a ludicrous counter-
part to the serious portrayal of Charmides. And the orators are
important for featuring some fourth-century political uses of
cωφροcύνη that are markedly different from those from before
the turn of the century.

After this, I will take stock of my findings, and provide — as
an answer to my first research question, about the semantics of
cώφρων and cognates — a synchronic description, in terms of
the semantic model advocated above, of the uses of cώφρων and
cognates available to Plato (Chapter 9). This chapter discusses
the various uses encountered in our text corpora, and places
them in a network, centring around what I take to be *the* proto-
typical use of the word, the use to commend control of desire in
adult males.

When these preliminary conclusions have been reached, we
can turn to Plato (chapter 10). In that chapter, I will argue that
Plato uses traditional notions of cωφροcύνη in two rather differ-
ent ways. On the one hand, a dialogue as *Gorgias* exploits the
polysemy of the term for persuasive goals. In such texts, the
polysemy of cωφροcύνη is used to establish links between such
seemingly incompatible qualities as δικαιοcύνη and ἀνδρεία. On
the other hand, in *Charmides* the goal seems to be one of *reduc-
tion*: in the dialogue, a considerable number of traditional uses
of cωφροcύνη are discussed and dismissed. This procedure seems
to pave the way for Plato's attempt to get to the 'core' of the mat-
ter. At the final stage of this process of reduction, we will see that

the definition of *cωφροcύνη* in *Republic* ultimately rests on only two very central uses of our terms, and these include the proto-typical use of 'control of desire'.

HOMER

1. *Introduction*

This chapter will deal with the theme of ϲωφροϲύνη and some related expressions in the Homeric poems. Its section 2 will discuss the use of ϲαόφρων and ϲαοφροϲύνη in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey.* The terms are used only four times in Homer, three times of younger males dealing with men of superior status (Apollo versus Poseidon, Telemachus both versus Menelaus and with an eye on Odysseus' plans for revenge) and once of the servant woman Eurycleia vis-à-vis her mistress Penelope. In two out of the four instances, the concept of αἰδώϲ is directly present in, or unmistakably relevant to, the context, and section 3 will deal briefly with αἰδώϲ in order to establish in which types of context ϲωφροϲύνη and αἰδώϲ can be associated, and how the terms differ.

If instances of ϲαόφρων and ϲαοφροϲύνη are exceedingly rare in the Homeric poems, this is not to be taken to mean that the *behaviour* associated elsewhere with ϲωφροϲύνη is in any sense undervalued, and the remaining two sections of this chapter will deal briefly with some aspects of the description of the relevant types of behaviour.

First, the *Iliad*, especially, is full of heroic characters who momentarily lose their good sense and indulge in inexplicably irresponsible behaviour, often with disastrous consequences for both themselves and their subordinates. Epic diction describes such incidents as a momentary 'loss of φρένεϲ', and these situations provide a kind of 'negative' scenario, and show what happens if mental checks are lost temporarily. They will be briefly considered in section 4.

Even more importantly perhaps (section 5), the *Odyssey* features three protagonists, Odysseus, Penelope and Telemachus,

who are regarded by later authors as models of cωφροсύνη.[1] Of
the three, only Telemachus in his role of the 'decent young man'
and 'good son' is credited with caοφροсύνη in the Homeric
poem, but this seems due to the richness of the epic vocabulary
of the *Odyssey*. Each of the protagonists in fact has his or her own
specific set of epithets, and through their use in quite specific
contexts in the epics, these epithets invoke specific associations
relevant to the character at hand. Thus, the theme of the loyalty
of Penelope is invoked not by the adjective caόφρων, as one
might expect on the basis of later Greek usage, but rather by the
adjectives περίφρων and ἐχέφρων. Similarly, Telemachus in his
role of the 'responsible young man' rather than 'the obedient
son' is called πεπνυμένος rather than caόφρων. Odysseus is nota-
ble for his control of anger in some particularly insulting situa-
tions, but elsewhere, he is more typically wily and enduring, and
so perhaps a less typically cώφρων figure. He has his own epithets
that invoke these characteristic qualities.

2. caοφροсύνη *and the Rationalisation of Restraint in Homer*

In the Homeric poems, the adjective caόφρων and the noun
caοφροсύνη are each used twice (caόφρων *Il.* 21.462, *Od.* 4.158;
caοφροсύνη *Od.* 23.13, 23.30). In view of this small number of
occurrences, the range of uses we find here is inevitably limited
as compared to what one finds in later authors, yet the four uses
are by no means uniform, and it appears impossible even here to
identify a single 'original' sense of the words.[2]

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[1] Penelope is probably *the* paragon of the cώφρων woman: see E. *Tr.* 422, Ar.
Th. 547, *AP.* 9.166.4. Odysseus' renown for cωφροсύνη, on the other hand, rests
for a large part on Sophocles' *Ajax*, where Odysseus is generally regarded as a
'foil' to the eponymous hero (and most other characters in the play) in that he
is the only one able to heed Athena's summons to cωφροсύνη (*Aj.* 132), cf.
chapter 5 below. For Odysseus, see otherwise X. *Mem.* 1.3.7 (abstinence), Pl.
Phd. 94d (endurance). Elsewhere, Odysseus' talent for speech and deceit is
both admired and criticised (for the latter see S. *Phil.* passim and Aristotle's
comments on this play, *EN* 1146a21, 1150b20); he is also unequivocally blamed
for the death of Palamedes (X. *Ap.* 26).
[2] North (1966), 3, 4, suggests that *Od.* 23.13 and 23.30 are "closest to [the]
original significance", and that *Il.* 21.462 and *Od.* 4.158 are "more suggestive of

Three of the four relevant passages, *Il.* 21.462, *Od.* 4.158 and *Od.* 23.30, are connected in the sense that in all of them ϲωφροϲύνη is used to commend some kind of well-considered restraint on part of a younger man (Apollo, Telemachus) out of deference to a 'father' figure of higher status (Poseidon, Menelaus, Odysseus). Yet the three instances differ considerably in tone. In *Od.* 4.158, the reticence of Telemachus before Menelaus is commended by Pisistratus in a relatively straightforward manner in terms of modesty and respect for a grand old man. In *Od.* 23.30, on the other hand, Telemachus keeps silent again, this time about his father's return and in obedience to his father's explicit instructions, but here the ϲαοφροϲύνη ascribed to him is presented by Eurycleia to Penelope as a very 'adult' kind of prudence for the sake of the master plan of vengeance. Similarly, though Apollo in *Il.* 21.472 clearly shrinks from the idea of accepting his uncle's challenge to a fight, his reply ('You would not call me ϲαόφρων if I did') downplays his shyness and emphasises that it would not make sense for him to say yes. Thus, in these last two passages, two uses of ϲαόφρων are activated at the same time: in both passages, ϲαοφροϲύνη implies both careful consideration of what is at stake for the agent himself (prudential 'self-interest') and respect for others; no clear-cut distinction can here be made between these two types of motivation.

Od. 23.13 stands somewhat apart in that the noun is used there simply to indicate a 'sensible state of mind' without focusing on the restraint characteristic of such a state. Yet here as well, the context centres on the theme of respect for persons of superior status: Penelope rebukes the servant woman Eurycleia for waking her up, but in mitigation of her rebuke states that her servant's uncharacteristically inconsiderate behaviour must be due to the gods, who can suddenly and completely change a person's state of mind.

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later semantic developments". She generally assumes that the ostensibly 'intellectual' uses of the word precede the more unequivocally 'moral' ones. The Homeric data do not confirm this assumption: as we shall see, even in those Homeric passages where the terms are used in a primarily 'prudential' sense (*Il.* 21.462, *Od.* 23.30), moral considerations are relevant to the context as well.

Relatively speaking, the most straightforward case is *Od.* 4.158. Telemachus has been received by Menelaus in Sparta. His host guesses the young man's identity, and Helen openly notes the resemblance to Odysseus. Nestor's son Pisistratus explains Telemachus' hesitation to speak up and make himself known:

Ἀτρεΐδη Μενέλαε διοτρεφές, ὄρχαμε λαῶν,
κείνου μέν τοι ὅδ' υἱὸς ἐτήτυμον, ὡς ἀγορεύεις·
ἀλλὰ caόφρων ἐcτί, νεμεccᾶται δ' ἐνὶ θυμῶι
ὧδ' ἐλθὼν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεcβολίαc ἀναφαίνειν
ἄντα cέθεν, τοῦ νῶϊ θεοῦ ὣc τερπόμεθ' αὐδῆι."
(*Od.* 4.156-160)

> Son of Atreus, Menelaus protected by Zeus, lord of hosts, this is really a son of his, just as you say. But he is *caόφρων*, and heartily disapproves, having only just arrived for the first time, of exhibiting rash speech in front of you, in whose voice we take delight as in that of a god.

Telemachus refrains from speaking up, even when Odysseus is mentioned by both Menelaus and Helen (107, 143). Pisistratus explains that there is a good reason for the young man's remarkable reticence: it is due to the fact that he has the 'good sense' to refrain from rash speech in front of a host of considerably higher status, 'for he considers it wrong' (*νεμεccᾶται*, 158[3]) for a newly arrived young guest to speak rashly in front of a grand old, even god-like, man such as Menelaus. Peisitratos thus suggests that Telemachus' reticence is well-considered and suits his position.

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[3] *νέμεcιc* and *νεμεcάω/νεμεcίζομαι* typically point to 'disapproval', 'indignation' or 'anger' at transgressions of social norms by others (Hesych. v 287 *νεμεcῶ· μέμφομαι*). See, for instance, *Il.* 3.156-7 οὐ νέμεcιc Τρῶαc καὶ ἐϋκνήμιδαc Ἀχαιοὺc | τοιῆιδ' ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἄλγεα πάcχειν, 'it's no cause for disapproval (i.e. quite understandable) that the Trojans and the Achaioi suffer pains on behalf of such a woman for a very long time.'; *Od.* 1.128 νεμεccήcαιτό κεν ἀνὴρ | αἴcχεα πόλλ' ὁρόων, ὅc τιc πινυτόc γε μετέλθοι, 'A man would feel indignation at the sight of so many disgraces [the suitors feasting], if a sensible man came along.' But one can also experience *νέμεcιc* at the thought of doing wrong oneself: see, for instance, the use of the *adj. verbale* νεμεccητόν, 'it is liable to *νέμεcιc* (to do *x*)', *Il.* 3.410, 9.523, 14.336, 19.182, 24.463, *Od.* 22.59, 22.489. *νέμεcιc* then becomes an inhibitory force similar *in effect* to αἰδώc. Cf. Von Erffa (1933) 30-35, Scott (1980) 13-35, Cairns (1993), 51-4.

   That Telemachus' commendable quietness might well be con-
sidered over-inhibited for his age and situation, is suggested,
however, by the conversation between Athene/Mentor and
Telemachus at the start of book three. There, Athene tells him
that he should no longer feel αἰδώς now, not even a little, but go
and confront Nestor in order to ask after his father.[4] The young
man's reply shows that, though he was presented from *Od.* 1.230
onwards as a πεπνυμένος speaker, he himself has no confidence
in his own eloquence, and does indeed feel αἰδώς at the thought
of interrogating Nestor.[5] So there is no doubt that Telemachus
also feels αἰδώς here, but by attributing this to his being cαόφρων
and explicitly stating the norm that one should not speak rashly
in front of a host like Menelaus, Pisistratus suggests that there is
a very good reason for this feeling of inhibition.[6]

   Telemachus is credited with cαοφροcύνη in *Od.* 23.30 as well,
and here, too, the term is used to suggest that there is a reason-
able explanation for surprising reticence on his part; this time, it
is his silence about his father's homecoming. Eurycleia has an-
nounced Odysseus' return to Penelope, who is angry to have
been woken up, and disinclined to believe the good news. Eury-
cleia insists that it is really true:

> οὔ τί cε λωβεύω, τέκνον φίλον, ἀλλ' ἔτυμόν τοι
> ἦλθ' Ὀδυcεὺc καὶ οἶκον ἱκάνεται, ὡc ἀγορεύω,
> ὁ ξεῖνοc, τὸν πάντεc ἀτίμων ἐν μεγάροιcι.
> Τηλέμαχοc δ' ἄρα μιν πάλαι ἤιδεεν ἔνδον ἐόντα,
> ἀλλὰ cαοφροcύνηιcι νοήματα πατρὸc ἔκευθεν,
> ὄφρ' ἀνδρῶν τείcαιτο βίην ὑπερηνορεόντων.
> (*Od.* 23.26-31)

"I do not at all mock you, my dear child. No, it is *really* true that
Odysseus has come and returned to his home, as I tell you: he is
the stranger, whom all men did insult in the *megaron*. Telemachus

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   [4] *Od.* 3.14 Τηλέμαχ', οὐ μέν cε χρὴ ἔτ' αἰδοῦc οὐδ' ἠβαιόν.
   [5] 3.22-4 Μέντορ, πῶc τ' ἄρ' ἴω, πῶc τ' ἄρ προcπτύξομαι αὐτόν; | οὐδέ τί πω
μύθοιcι πεπείρημαι πυκινοῖcιν· | αἰδὼc δ' αὖ νέον ἄνδρα γεραίτερον ἐξερέεcθαι.
'Mentor, how shall I go to him; how shall I greet him? I am not yet experienced
in well-crafted words. And besides, it is a cause for αἰδώc for a young man to
address an older man.'
   [6] This implies that αἰδώc, unlike cαοφροcύνη, is more like a 'feeling' or
'emotion' than like a 'deliberation' in that it occurs spontaneously. See section
3 below.

seems to have known for quite some time that he was in the house, but he prudently concealed his father's plans, until he might take revenge for the forcible deeds of overbearing men.'

To corroborate her assertion that the beggar who has been mocked by all is indeed Odysseus, Eurycleia says that Telemachus seems to have known for quite some time that his father was back;[7] she then adds that in view of Odysseus' plans for revenge, it was quite sensible that he did not tell the good news, apparently to counter the suggestion that the boy's silence does not exactly confirm her account. Telemachus' silence is thus explained as prudent restraint for the sake of the revenge — very appropriate and responsible behaviour in view of the need to save Odysseus' *oikos*.[8]

But the hearer may well remember that at *Od.* 16.299-307, Odysseus has explicitly ordered his son to keep silent about his return even to Penelope (and Eurycleia may be well aware of this because at *Od.* 19.482-90, he has given her the same instruction in quite forcible terms). So the hearer is likely to take Telemachus' silence as a sign of obedience to his father's commands, and this hints at a use of the noun ϲαοφροϲύνη not explicitly activated in the context.

There is another passage in which the 'prudent' restraint of a younger male has a great deal to do with respect for an older

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[7] At *Od.* 21.381-5, it is Telemachus who, in preparation of the murder of the suitors, tells Eurycleia to shut the doors of the *megaron* and pay no attention to the noises inside. Then, at *Od.* 22.395-7, immediately before the killing of the disloyal servant women, Telemachus tells her that his father wants to have a word with her.

[8] The — exceptional — *plural* ϲαοφροϲύνηιϲι might simply be due to metrical considerations, but more probably it may be taken to imply that Telemachus' discretion was tested for a prolonged period and on several occasions. As we know from the context, Telemachus held his position of 'keeping quiet until/for the sake of the revenge' for two whole densely packed days of narrated time. Cf. *Il.* 1.205 ἧιϲ ὑπεροπλίηιϲι τάχ' ἄν ποτε θυμὸν ὀλέϲϲηι, where it is certainly implied that Agamemnon's 'arrogance' has been evident many times before, and ἀταϲθαλίηιϲιν in *Od.* 1.7 (the almost proverbial 'stupidity' of Odysseus' crew). North (1966), 4 translates ϲαοφροϲύνηιϲι as 'acts of prudence', and comments: 'The use of the substantive in the plural, almost unparalleled in later Greek, suggests that the focus is here on the behaviour characteristic of ϲωφροϲύνη rather than on the mentality that produces it.' Focus on behaviour, however, is entirely common for the singular as well. Besides, 'acts of prudence' is puzzling rendition for what was in fact a remarkable suppression of action.

relative. This is the battle of the gods in the Iliad, in which Apollo declines his uncle Poseidon's challenge to a fight:

ἐννοςίγαι᾽, οὐκ ἄν με ϲαόφρονα μυθήϲαιο
ἔμμεναι, εἰ δὴ ϲοί γε βροτῶν ἕνεκα πτολεμίξω
δειλῶν, οἳ φύλλοιϲιν ἐοικότεϲ ἄλλοτε μέν τε
ζαφλεγέεϲ τελέθουϲιν ἀρούρηϲ καρπὸν ἔδοντεϲ,
ἄλλοτε δὲ φθινύθουϲιν ἀκήριοι. ἀλλὰ τάχιϲτα
παυώμεϲθα μάχηϲ· οἱ δ᾽ αὐτοὶ δηριαάϲθων.
ὣϲ ἄρα φωνήϲαϲ πάλιν ἐτράπετ᾽· αἴδετο γάρ ῥα
πατροκαϲιγνήτοιο μιγήμεναι ἐν παλάμηιϲι.
  (*Il.* 21.462-9)

'Earth-shaker, you cannot maintain that I am ϲαόφρων, if I really am to wage war with you on behalf of mortals, the wretched ones, who, like leaves, now flourish fierily, feeding themselves on the fruits of the land, but then lose their lives and whither away. No, let us immediately stop this battle. Let them fight for themselves.' Thus he spoke, and turned away. For he had αἰδώϲ to engage in a battle of fists with his uncle.

Apollo motivates his refusal to accept his uncle's challenge by pointing out that it would not make sense for him to fight with his uncle (ϲοί γε) on behalf of mere mortals. His emphasis on man's mortality explains why their claims to his loyalty do not outweigh those of his uncle: it would make no sense to let these — necessarily temporary — claims prevail. The expla-natory comment of the narrator in 468-9 (αἴδετο γάρ …),[9] however, while by no means contradicting Apollo's own words, make explicit what Apollo's own words ϲοί γε seem to imply: it is not so much the good sense to avoid engaging in a senseless enterprise, but αἰδώϲ in front of an elderly relative, that inhibits his accep-tance of his uncle's challenge, and triggers his subsequent sud-den departure (462 πάλιν ἐτράπετο).[10] This suggests that Apollo feels that he could not possibly accept his uncle's challenge, but

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[9] For the verb αἰδέομαι in combination with an infinitive expressing a line of action from which the subject is deterred, see Cairns (1993), 48-9. For αἰδώϲ in connection with inhibition amongst relatives, see especially *ibid.,* 90-2.

[10] De Jong (1987), 113-4, 269n.38, compares this passage to four others in which the narrator expresses a motive that is not voiced by the character itself: *Il.* 1.536-8, 2.3-4, 5.563-4, 15.728. Of these, our passage is the only one where the words of the narrator state the implications of the motivation given by the character itself.

comes up with a rationalisation of this feeling that allows him (as well as his uncle) to save face. Again, this inhibition of a younger male versus an older one who, except for his age, is not intrinsically of a higher status, is a somewhat ambiguous affair. Indeed, the following lines show that Apollo's behaviour is not uniformly appreciated among the gods: Artemis rebukes her brother's 'desertion' (φεύγεις, 472) and tells him never again to boast that he can compete with Poseidon (475-7).

Thus, αἰδώς and σωφροσύνη are clearly related in this passage, if in a somewhat oblique manner. If αἰδώς inhibits the 'shameful' act of fighting with an older relative, the phrase 'You will certainly not say that I am σαόφρων if I did ...' offers the rationalisation that it would indeed not make sense to accept the challenge, presenting the involuntary inhibition in terms of a well-considered and purposeful rejection.[11] Again, a second use of σαόφρων is activated in retrospect: while Apollo suggests that he is 'sensible' or 'prudent' enough not to engage in a useless enterprise, the hearer is bound to reinterpret this 'prudence' in terms of youthful reluctance to offend his uncle.

The last Homeric passage to be considered here is *Od.* 23.13, again from the passage in which Odysseus' return is announced to Penelope. Penelope is irritated to have been disturbed by Eurycleia with patently false messages:

μαῖα φίλη, μάργην σε θεοὶ θέσαν, οἵ τε δύνανται
ἄφρονα ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐπίφρονά περ μάλ᾽ ἐόντα,
καί τε χαλιφρονέοντα σαοφροσύνης ἐπέβησαν·
οἵ σέ περ ἔβλαψαν· πρὶν δὲ φρένας αἰσίμη ἦσθα.
(*Od.* 23.11-4)

My dear woman, the gods have made you raging mad, the gods who are both able to make mindless even someone who is very attentive, and bring someone whose φρένες are weak to σαοφροσύνη. As for you, they have harmed you; before, you were quite right-minded.

Penelope is very angry indeed, and she rebukes the good old woman in the strongest of terms: she must be 'raging mad',

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[11] For the emotion-like nature of αἰδώς, cf. section 4 below.

μάργην.[12] In mitigation of this fierce criticism, she suggests that this behaviour is so much 'out of character' that it can only have been caused by gods, who are able to make 'mindless' someone who normally is very attentive.[13] Besides, they also bring someone who is normally 'weak-minded'[14] to caoφροcύνη.

The noun caoφροcύνη, then, is used here to describe a 'sensible' state of mind rather than the behaviour characteristic of it. But again there are unmistakably 'moral' implications in the background. Eurycleia fails in her usual obedience and loyalty to her mistress, and it seems implied that if she were caόφρων, she would act otherwise. Here again, then, a secondary use of

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[12] Penelope also uses the word μάργε when she strongly rebukes Antinous for plotting to kill Telemachus (*Od.* 16.421). Otherwise, the adjective is used at *Od.* 18.2 to describe the insatiably raging stomach of the beggar Iros. In *Il.* 5.882, the indignant Ares uses the verb μαργαίνειν to describe the fighting of Diomedes, who with the help of Pallas Athene has wounded the war-god.

[13] ἐπίφρονα is not to be taken as an equivalent of caόφρονα. In *Od.* 5.347, it is said that Odysseus would have died in the storm before his time if Athene had not paid attention and saved him (εἰ μὴ ἐπιφροcύνην δῶκε γλαυκῶπιc Ἀθήνη). Similarly, in *Od.* 19.22, Eurycleia prays that Telemachus will take on the attentiveness which is necessary for taking care of his house and belongings (αἲ γὰρ δή ποτε, τέκνον, ἐπιφροcύναc ἀνέλοιο | οἴκου κήδεcθαι καὶ κτήματα πάντα φυλάccειν). At *Od.* 19.385, Odysseus-the-beggar praises Eurycleia for attentively commenting (ἐπιφρονέουc' ἀγορεύειc) on the resemblance between himself and Odysseus. Accordingly, the adjective is otherwise used in combination with nouns such as βουλῇ (*Od.* 3.128, 16.242) or μῆτιc (*Od.* 19.326), and may then as well be taken to mean *attentive* or *clever*. In the *LfrE*, H.W. Nordheider translates ἐπίφρων as *umsichtig*; ἐπιφροcύνη as *Umsicht* or *Geistesgegenwart*. The point of the association of the two terms here seems to be that Eurycleia's behaviour is both inconsiderate and offensive to her mistress.

[14] χαλίφρων seems to mean *weak of* φρένεc (*Schol.* Q. in *Od.* 23.13 χαλιφρονέοντα· κεχαλαcμέναc καὶ παρειμέναc ἔχοντα τὰc φρέναc). The adjective χαλίφρων twice occurs in connection with νήπιοc to describe either the supposed 'weak-mindedness' of Menelaus who lingers on the isle of Pharus in apparent oblivion of his homeland (*Od.* 4. 371-2) or the 'weak-mindedness' of Telemachus as a little child not yet able to take care of the deserted *oikos* of his father (*Od.* 19.530). At *Od.* 16.310, Telemachus encourages his father to be prudent in dealing with the suitors, and goes on to make the apology that his warning is not the result of 'weak-mindedness', but rather of a concern for the best strategy, κέρδοc: ὦ πάτερ, ἦ τοι ἐμὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἔπειτά γ', ὀΐω, | γνώcεαι· οὐ μὲν γάρ τι χαλιφροcύναι γέ μ' ἔχουcιν. | ἀλλ' οὔ τοι τόδε κέρδοc ἐγὼν ἔccεcθαι ὀΐω | ἡμῖν ἀμφοτέροιcι· cὲ δὲ φράζεcθαι ἄνωγα. (*Od.* 16.309-12). All three passages imply a contrast to Odysseus, whose mind is set on returning home and taking charge of the affairs in his *oikos*. Thus, the use of χαλίφρων in other contexts suggest that it is not an exact antonym of caoφροcύνη: it points to 'slackness' and even 'cowardice' rather than 'imprudent' (or 'impudent') behaviour.

cαοφροϲύνη is activated, and again this has to do with the reluc-
tance to offend a social superior, but this time it is the 'quiet
obedience' of a servant woman versus her mistress.

Thus, the noun ϲαοφροϲύνη is used twice in the *Odyssey*, once
to indicate soundness of mind (*Od.* 23.13), but with a hint at an-
other use, 'obedience' to one's masters, and once to indicate
'prudence' (*Od.* 23.30), but again, a second use is here hinted at:
that of youthful obedience to an older relative. The adjective
ϲαόφρων is used in the Homeric poems in two ways: it is used to
commend 'prudence' (*Il.* 21.462), and youthful 'quietness' (*Od.*
4.158).

So if we assume that the adjective and the substantive belong
to a single lexeme, which is to say that their use invokes the same
concept (and so far, I do not see anything that speaks against
this assumption), we have four basic uses in all: soundness of
mind, 'prudence' in one's own self-interest, and quiet-
ness/obedience of young men versus adults, and of servants ver-
sus their masters. On the basis of these four passages, not much
can be said yet about the inner structure of the network that
connects these senses, though it may well be significant that no-
tions relating to the two 'other-regarding' uses are activated in
all four passages. This may well be a pointer to their greater cen-
trality. (For a diagram that tries to visualise our results, see Fig. 3
in Chapter 9.3.)

It is noteworthy that, on the level of behaviour, ϲωφροϲύνη in
all these cases invariably acts as a kind of restraint: it inhibits be-
haviour that either harms oneself (fighting with a god, giving
away the plot of revenge) or infringes on social decorum.

3. *Restraint and Concern for Others:* Αἰδώϲ

In two of the four passages considered above, αἰδώϲ was seen to
be actually present in the context (*Il.* 21.468), or directly rele-
vant to the situation (Telemachus in *Od.* 4). In Homer, indeed,
restraint is frequently appraised in terms of αἰδώϲ; and the claim

that αἰδώϲ is the 'cement of Homeric society' is no exaggeration.[15]

Αἰδώϲ has been extensively treated by Cairns (1993); for this reason, there is no need to discuss the subject extensively here, but I will briefly indicate (i) in which type of context αἰδώϲ can be expected to figure as an associated term with ϲωφροϲύνη, and (ii) how these terms differ essentially in meaning.

The first thing to note is that αἰδώϲ is quite exclusively concerned with the regulation of proper conduct vis-à-vis others. It has been rightly described by Cairns as connected with the 'inclusive concept of honour as a concern for one's own honour ... and for that of others';[16] as such, αἰδώϲ typically inhibits[17] actions that (i) bring disgrace on the agent himself and (ii) detract from the status of the persons affected by them.[18] Αἰδώϲ thus charac-

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[15] Cairns (1993), 87.

[16] Cairns (1993), 140.

[17] That αἰδώϲ typically inhibits improper action is uncontroversial, but of course it may also take the form of 'apprehension' when some impropriety has already been committed and then preclude the continuation of this behaviour. A typical example is the battle cry αἰδώϲ, Ἀργεῖοι (Il. 5.787, 8.228, 13.95, 15.502, cf. 16.422), which precludes the continuation of the army's present inertia in battle (δειλία) and spurs the combatants on. Here, then, αἰδώϲ is not just an inhibition, but a performative incentive to a better performance at the same time. Αἰδώϲ is likewise invoked as a stimulus to better fighting at Il. 4.402, 5.530-1, 13.122, 15.561-4, 15.661, and Hector's αἰδώϲ for the Trojans at Il. 22.105 prepares the ground for his decision to stand up and confront Achilles. Outside the context of war, αἰδώϲ forbids Hephaistos to refuse Thetis' requests and induces him to make new weapons for Achilles (Il. 18.425). For very similar reasons, it seems potentially misleading to say that αἰδώϲ is 'exclusively prospective' (Cairns (1993), 145) in Homer. While the cry αἰδώϲ will definitely raise the prospect of the charge of cowardice, especially if the appeal is reinforced by a reference to what others will say about the present performance, it also constitutes such a charge in itself: the 'shame' connected with αἰδώϲ will be 'acute' as much as 'prospective' in such instances. It is important here to note that in Homer, αἰδώϲ exhibits a far wider range of uses than in later Greek, cf. n. 42 below.

[18] The two usually go together. If, for instance, in Il. 1.23 most of the Greek heroes are in favour of αἰδεῖϲθαι ἱερῆα, it is implied that refusing Chryses' supplication is disgraceful to the Greeks just because it ignores Chryses' status as a priest and a suppliant. Similarly, when the heralds in Il. 1.331 do not immediately address Achilles αἰδομένω βαϲιλῆα, it is implied that speaking out immediately is disgraceful because it ignores Achilles' higher status. Of course, this is not always the case. When Hector in Il. 22.105 feels αἰδώϲ for the Trojans who will criticise him, this is primarily because he has failed to fulfil his responsibilities as a chief commander. Conversely, if a defeated warrior supplicates his en-

teristically involves two parties: a subject who experiences αἰδώς as well as some 'other' whose claims on the subject are the main source of this experience.[19] As such, it is invariably rooted in social interaction, and this means that αἰδώς, like cωφροcύνη, encourages behaviour that observes social decorum, but not prudence in one's own interest. In other words, αἰδώς is close to two of our basic uses of cαόφρων/cαοφροcύνη, but not to the other two.

The second important thing to be noted about αἰδώς is that, unlike cωφροcύνη, it can be conceived as a more or less spontaneous occurrence; in this respect it is more like a 'feeling' or 'emotion' than a 'rational' response.[20] For this reason, αἰδώς can be a part of a dilemma rather than a means to its solution: at *Il.* 7.93, when Hector has challenged the Greek leaders to single combat, they do not know how to react because of two opposite feelings: 'for they had αἰδώς to say no, but feared to accept' (αἴδεcθεν μὲν ἀνήναcθαι, δεῖcαν δ' ὑποδέχθαι). The 'spontaneous', emotion-like character of αἰδώς is brought out even more clearly by the fact that it occasionally occurs in a situation where it is regarded as inappropriate, or fails to occur when it is called for. The Iliadic battle-cry αἰδώς, indicating that warriors should feel 'ashamed' at their present performance and attempt to do better

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emy and appeals to αἰδώς, the victor may ignore this appeal without disgrace (*Il.* 21.74, 22.124); he is then free to ignore the supplication and treat the defeated simply as an enemy (cf. *Il.* 22.419 and 24.208, where Achilles is expected not to have αἰδώς for the suppliant Priam).

[19] The distinction between the two roles seems important, for there is no suggestion in Homer that one may have αἰδώς for oneself in the way one has αἰδώς for others; indeed, Democritus' injunction to 'have αἰδώς for oneself above all' (B 264, ἑωυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖcθαι) is a deliberate *oxymoron,* stressing the importance of internal rather than external checks on wrong-doing (cf. Cairns, *op. cit.* 363-70). This is not to say, of course, that αἰδώς may not spring from one's own consciousness as well: a good example is *Il.* 22.104-107 (νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ὤλεcα λαὸν ἀταcθαλίηιcιν ἐμῆιcιν | αἰδέομαι Τρῶαc καὶ Τρωιάδαc ἑλκεcιπέπλουc, | μή ποτέ τιc εἴπηιcι κακώτεροc ἄλλοc ἐμεῖο· | Ἕκτωρ ἧφι βίηφι πιθήcαc ὤλεcε λαόν.), where Hector's reluctance to face the Trojans who will rightly criticise him for endangering the army is triggered by his *own* conscience on the *prospect* of facing popular disapproval. On the 'internalisation' of external standards, see Cairns (1993) 27-47.

[20] For the classification of αἰδώς as an emotion, see Cairns (1993), 5-14, who does *not* use the term 'emotion' in strict opposition to 'rational' cognition: 'No approach to emotion can ignore [its] cognitive aspect'.

(see n. 17 above), is an example of the latter, as is of course the charge of ἀναιδείη levelled at both Agamemnon (*Il.* 1.149 etc.) and at the suitors (*Od.* 1.254 etc.); by contrast, αἰδώς is seen to occur at the wrong occasion when Athena tells Telemachus that he should not have αἰδώς for Nestor (*Od.* 3.14) in view of his need for information, or when Telemachus remarks that αἰδώς is 'not good' for a beggar in need of food (*Od.* 17.347, cf. 17.352, αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένωι ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι,[21] cf. 17.578 (Penelope:) κακὸς δ' αἰδοῖος ἀλήτης). Similarly, though Odysseus' need has forced him to appear naked before Nausicaa and her companions,[22] he still asks them to get out of the way while he washes himself, 'for I have αἰδώς to appear naked among young girls' (*Od.* 6.221-2, αἰδέομαι γὰρ γυμνοῦσθαι | κούρηισιν ἐϋπλοκάμοιςι μετελθών). A strong personal need, then, may over-rule αἰδώς and one's sense of decorum, but it is a testimony to the strength of the feeling of αἰδώς that it is not easily cast aside.

If αἰδώς, then, is indeed more like an emotion or a feeling than like a rational consideration in that it occurs 'spontaneously'[23] and takes some effort to overcome, this characteristic clearly distinguishes it from cαοφροςύνη, which is rather more like an ability for careful consideration, and which is, in this respect, a rather more 'cognitive' or 'rational' quality. Accordingly,

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[21] Incidentally, this is the passage that Socrates uses to defeat Charmides' claim that cωφροςύνη is 'the same as αἰδώς' (Pl. *Chrm.* 161a). This means, *pace* Heitsch (2000) 9-11, that Socrates' refutation is not as inane as it might seem, but points to a significant distinction: whereas αἰδώς is a spontaneous occurrence that can arise at an inappropriate moment, cωφροςύνη has to do with controlled response, and does not apply to spontaneous responses occurring at the 'wrong' time.

[22] *Od.* 6.135-6, ὣς Ὀδυςςεὺς κούρηιςιν ἐϋπλοκάμοιςιν ἔμελλε | μίξεςθαι, γύμνος περ ἐών· χρείω γὰρ ἵκανε. χρείω and χρέω can also be used to name a need that arises out of social obligations. Clear examples are *Il.* 11.409-10, ὃς δέ κ' ἀριςτεύηιςι μάχηι ἔνι τὸν δὲ μάλα χρεὼ | ἑςτάμεναι κρατερῶς, ἤ τ' ἔβλητ' ἤ τ' ἔβαλ' ἄλλον; 18.406-7 τώ με μάλα χρεὼ | πάντα Θέτι καλλιπλοκάμωι ζωιάγρια τίνειν (Hephaestus owes Thetis a favour). But in the case of Odysseus, the need is unmistakably personal, and this is underlined by the simile, comparing him to a lion spurred by his stomach (133 κέλεται δέ ἑ γαςτὴρ) to go for prey into a built-up area.

[23] It is precisely for this reason that Aristotle (*EN* 1128b10-15) distinguishes αἰδώς from the ἀρεταί: according to him, it is more like a πάθος than an ἕξις, absence vs. presence of προαίρεςις being among the distinguishing features between these two (1106a3-4).

we have seen how, at both *Il.* 21.462 and *Od.* 4.158, the appeal to
ϲαοφροϲύνη offers a rationalisation of a feeling of αἰδώϲ in situa-
tions where it can be doubted that restraint is, indeed, the ap-
propriate response. If αἰδώϲ inhibits improper behaviour, the
ϲαόφρων will be able to decide whether αἰδώϲ should prevail in a
given situation.

4. *Loss or Destruction of* φρένεϲ*:*
the Critique of Unaccountable Behaviour

An interpretation of the semantics of a lexical item should never
rely too heavily on the etymology of the word in question, but it
seems useful to note here that the interpretation of ϲαοφροϲύνη
and ϲαόφρων at which I arrived in section 2, seems fully compati-
ble with the sense of the words that etymology would suggest,
'having the φρένεϲ intact' or 'having sound φρένεϲ',[24] though
strictly speaking only the sense 'soundness of mind' could have
been predicted on the basis of etymology.

    In order to see better what 'having sound φρένεϲ'[25] may be
taken to suggest, it will be useful to examine briefly a number of

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[24] The etymology from ϲάοϲ/ϲῶϲ is generally accepted, see Chantraîne
(1978) and Frisk *s.v.*
    [25] I take for granted here that the term φρένεϲ is used both for an organ or
location in the chest (commonly identified as the diaphragm or pericardium,
but as the lungs by Onians (1951), 23ff., and more recently by Clarke (1999)
77; see Ireland and Steel, (1975), Sullivan (1988) 21-31 for a fuller discussion)
and to describe the source, faculty and products of a wide range of mental
processes, including especially (Sullivan (1988) 220-35, (1995) 36-53) 'ponder-
ing, deliberation and reflection', and the behaviour that is the result of such
deliberation. The debate on Homeric 'psychology' and its terminology of men-
tal life (relating φρένεϲ to νόοϲ, θυμόϲ, πράπιδεϲ, κῆρ, κραδίη and ἦτορ) shows
little sign of abating. Apart from Jahn (1987), who also offers extensive discus-
sion of earlier literature, important recent contributions in this field include
Sullivan (1988 and 1995, the last including references to earlier studies by the
same author on p. 15n.3), Caswell (1990), Schmitt (1990), and now Clarke
(1999), especially 61-126. By and large, the upshot of these recent studies has
been that, while these terms tend to overlap considerably in that they are all
used to refer to mental activity in a general sense (and thus are more or less
interchangeable in many contexts, see Jahn (1987) for a full assessment of the
metrical implications of this), some types of mental activity are typically, though
not exclusively associated with specific psychic 'entities', notably passionate
emotion and anger with θυμόϲ (Caswell (1990), 49-50), deliberation with φρένεϲ

contrasted expressions that interpret unexpectedly irresponsible behaviour[26] in terms of a (temporary) 'loss' or 'destruction' of the φρένες. While there is *a priori* no reason to assume that these expressions are antonyms of cαόφρων and cαoφροcύνη in the strict sense of the word, they still invoke the faded memory of a concept that provides us with what might be called an 'anti-scenario' to that of cωφροcύνη, in that they show what happens when a person does *not* have 'sound φρένες'. In the *Iliad* especially, it is said quite frequently that a god (or the gods) must have 'taken away', 'destroyed' or 'damaged' someone's φρένες.[27] A similar comment, but without reference to divine agency, is made when the φρένες are said to be 'gone', 'unstable', 'not according to what is due' or 'lacking completely'.[28] Or one may comment that one 'finds fault with' someone's φρένες, or call him 'crazed of φρένες'.[29] Of course, these expressions are highly standardised and metaphorical, and are probably to be taken as proverbial excuses for otherwise unaccountable behaviour rather

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(v. supra) and the 'products of thought' such as plans, intentions etc. with νόoc (see Claus (1981) chapter I, and Clarke (1999), 119-26). In fact, there may well be room for yet another semantic study in this field taking full advantage of the models provided by cognitive linguistics, especially prototype theory, cf. Clarke (1999) 109 n.122.

[26] I say '*unexpectedly* irresponsible' because this type of assessment is not applied to incorrigible 'bad guys' like Penelope's suitors, but rather to persons who might be expected to know better but occasionally fail to live up to this expectation and act 'out of character'.

[27] For φρένες affected by outside agents, cf. Sullivan (1988) 144-62. Several expressions are used. In the singular, it is said that a god has *taken away* the φρένες (φρένας ἐξέλετο or ἐξ … ἕλετο: *Il.* 6.234, 9..377, 18..311, 19.137), or *damaged* them (βλάπτε φρένας: *Il.* 15.724; *Od.* 14.178, cf. 23.14.). In the plural, it is said that the gods have *destroyed* the φρένες (*Il.* 7.360 = 12.234 ἐξ ἄρα δή τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ὤλεcαν αὐτοί).

These expressions seem semantically equivalent; metrical considerations may well be partly responsible for the choice of one rather than the other. On the other hand, when a specific deity is said to be the perpetrator, the choice of the deity does of course seem quite significant: Thus, e.g., it is Zeus who is said to have taken away the φρένες of Agamemnon at the occasion of the quarrel with Achilles (*Il.* 9.377, 19.137), whereas it is Pallas Athene, the indefatigable partisan of the Achaeans, who is said to cause the Trojans' misguided decision to stay outside the city-walls. (*Il.* 18.311).

[28] φρένες οἴχονθ' (*Il.* 24.201); oὐ(κ) … φρένες ἔμπεδοι (*Il.* 6.352; *Od.* 18.215); oὐ(κ) … φρένες ἐναίcιμοι (*Il.* 24.40, *Od.* 18.220); oὔ οἱ ἔνι φρένες oὐδ' ἠβαιαί (*Il.* 14.141, cf. *Od.* 17.454, 21.288). cf. Sullivan (1988) 186-8.

[29] ὠνοcάμην φρένας, *Il.* 14.95, 17.173), φρένας ἠλ(ε)έ (*Il.* 15.724; *Od.* 2.243).

than as serious *explanations* of that behaviour. But while cώφρων and cognates mostly occur in less proverbial and stereotyped surroundings, the concept of 'sound φρένεc' that the terms invoke is equally metaphorical.

A famous example of a man who loses his φρένεc is Glaucus, who changes armour with Diomedes, and receives weapons of bronze in exchange for golden ones (*Il.* 6.234-6 ἔνθ᾽ αὖτε Γλαύκωι Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς, | ὃc πρὸc Τυδεΐδην Διομήδεα τεύχε᾽ ἄμειβε | χρύcεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι᾽ ἐννεαβοίων, 'Then Kronos' son Zeus took away the φρένεc of Glaukon, who exchanged armour with Tydeus' son Diomedes, and gave armour of gold in exchange for bronze, a hundred cows' worth in exchange for nine'). That is an unprofitable deal indeed, so it must be assumed that no one who is in his right mind will be willing to make it.

Equally fruitless (cf. νηκερδέα βουλήν), but also positively dangerous, is Automedon's attempt to act as charioteer and fighter at the same time (*Il.* 17.470, Αὐτόμεδον, τίc γάρ τοι θεῶν νηκερδέα βουλὴν ἐν cτήθεccιν ἔθηκε καὶ ἐξέλετο φρέναc ἐcθλάc; "Automedon, who of the gods put this unprofitable plan in your mind and took away your good φρένεc?'). Serious risks are also at stake when Priam goes to supplicate Achilles, and Hecabe asks him 'where have your φρένεc gone?' (*Il.* 24.201, πῆι δή τοι φρένεc οἴχονθ᾽), or when Ares ignores the will of Zeus and is called 'mad and crazed of φρένεc' (*Il.* 15.128, μαινόμενε, φρέναc ἠλέ) by Athena. In such cases, individuals endanger their own safety, and their behaviour is the exact opposite of Telemachus' prudence in keeping the secret of his father's homecoming. Collective disregard of serious danger is exhibited by the Trojans, who ignore the warnings of Polydamas and acclaim Hector's decision to stay outside in the plain, 'for Athena had taken away their φρένεc' (*Il.* 18.311 ἐκ γάρ cφεων φρέναc εἵλετο Παλλὰc ᾽Αθήνη).[30]

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[30] In this case, it is not one of the poem's characters, but the narrator who makes the comment, and thus foreshadows disaster, cf. Schadewaldt (1966³), 106.

In the case of the leaders of the army, self-interest and one's own safety converge with the interests of the army as a collective, and 'bad' advice in council from the leaders is liable to be rejected in very similar terms. 'Now I wholly find fault with your φρένες', says Odysseus in reaction to Agamemnon's suggestion to return home (*Il.* 14.95, νῦν δέ ϲευ ὠνοϲάμην πάγχυ φρένας). In a similar tone of indignation, Poseidon suggests that Achilles may well take delight in the defeat of the Achaean host, as he 'completely lacks even the slightest φρένες' (*Il* 14.141 οὔ οἱ ἔνι φρένες, οὐδ' ἠβαιαί). In the opposing camp, Hector is unable to accept Polydamas' warning that they should not break into the camp of the Greek fleet, and supposes that 'If you, Polydamas, really and seriously mean this, the gods themselves must then have taken away your understanding' (*Il.* 12.233-4 εἰ δ' ἐτεὸν δὴ τοῦτον ἀπὸ ϲπουδῆϲ ἀγορεύειϲ, | ἐξ ἄρα δή τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ὤλεϲαν αὐτοί). Obviously deluded by his temporary successes, Hector later even claims that the caution of the Trojan elders was due to Zeus' damaging their φρένες, for the god now spurs the Trojans to action (*Il.* 15.724f. ἀλλ' εἰ δή ῥα τότε βλάπτε φρένας εὐρύοπα Ζεὺϲ | ἡμετέραϲ, νῦν αὐτὸϲ ἐποτρύνει καὶ ἀνώγει…, 'but if far-sighted Zeus then damaged our φρένες, now he spurs us on himself and encourages us…'). Here, caution is decried as 'madness' by a man of obviously deluded judgement.

If a loss or lack of φρένες frequently leads to disregard for the safety of oneself and one's dependants, it also leads to disregard for social norms and standards of behaviour. A notable offender is Paris, who does not give his best in battle, and Helen exclaims that she should have been the wife of a 'better' husband, who knew about the causes for popular disapproval and public reproaches, 'for this one does not have stable φρένες now, nor will he ever after.' (*Il.* 6. 352ff. τούτωι δ' οὔτ' ἄρ νῦν φρένες ἔμπεδοι οὔτ' ἄρ' ὀπίϲϲω | ἔϲϲονται). Similarly offensive, but this time to the gods who favour the Trojans, is Achilles' maltreatment of Hector's corpse, and Apollo claims that Achilles' φρένες are not 'according to what is due' and that he lacks both ἔλεοϲ and αἰδώϲ (*Il.* 24.40 ὧι οὔτ' ἄρ φρένες εἰϲὶν ἐναίϲιμοι … 24.44f. ὡϲ Ἀχιλλεὺϲ ἔλεον μὲν ἀπώλεϲεν, οὐδέ οἱ αἰδὼϲ | γίγνεται), and suggests that

'*good* as he may be, we gods may well disapprove of him' (*Il.* 24.53 μὴ ἀγαθῶι περ ἐόντι νεμεccηθέωμέν οἱ ἡμεῖc).[31]

Personal insults are likewise offensive, and thus Hector 'finds fault' with Glaucus' φρένεc (*Il.* 17.173 νῦν δέ cευ ὠνοcάμην πάγχυ φρέναc), when the latter outrageously (ὑπέροπλον, 170) hints that Hector is unable to compete with Ajax. The most blatantly offensive act in the *Iliad* is of course Agamemnon's assault on Achilles' γέραc Briseïs, and at *Il.* 9.377, after an elaborate rejection of the embassy's offers of compensation, Achilles wishes that Agamemnon may come to grief, 'for Zeus has taken away his φρένεc' (ἐκ γάρ εὑ φρέναc εἵλετο μητίετα Ζεύc). And this assessment is echoed by Agamemnon himself in his apology: ἀαcάμην καί μευ φρέναc ἐξέλετο Ζεύc, 'I was blinded and my φρένεc were taken away by Zeus' (*Il.* 19.137).

Thus, we see that several types of unaccountably ill-judged behaviour are assessed in terms of a proverbial loss of φρένεc, from neglect of one's self-interest, one's own safety and that of one's dependants to serious transgressions against social norms.[32]

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[31] The expression ἀγαθῶι περ ἐόντι is wrongly taken by Adkins (1960), 38, to imply that 'the gods do not approve of Achilles' action: but clearly the fact that he is *agathos* gives him a strong claim against gods and men to be allowed to do it.'. This view is untenable: on the one hand, Apollo clearly does *not* think that Achilles has a right to mutilate Hector's corpse, on the other hand, as Hera's reaction (24.56-63) shows, not all the gods disapprove of Achilles' behaviour. See Long (1970) 128, and Dover (1983), 37-8. The phrase ἀγαθῶι περ ἐόντι is in fact a scalar-concessive expression, and implies that Achilles, being ἀγαθόc as he is, is in general the person least likely to incur the *nemesis* of the gods, but now incidentally does something that should incur their disapproval. See Bakker (1988) 120-4. By prefacing his present disapproval of Achilles with a general recognition of his merits, Apollo makes his criticism more palatable for Hera, who is not likely to agree.

[32] Only the *Iliad* has been discussed in the above. In the *Odyssey*, expressions of this type are used less often, but the range of their application is not dissimilar. Neglect of one's personal safety is at stake when Eumaeus tells the beggar Odysseus that some god or man must have harmed the mind of Telemachus, who has gone to Pylos in spite of the danger of the suitors' ambush (*Od.* 14.178-82, τὸν δέ τιc ἀθανάτων βλάψε φρέναc ἔνδον ἐΐcαc | ἠέ τιc ἀνθρώπων· ὁ δ᾽ ἔβη μετὰ πατρὸc ἀκουὴν | ἐc Πύλον ἠγαθέην· τὸν δὲ μνηcτῆρεc ἀγανοὶ | οἴκαδ᾽ ἰόντα λοχῶcιν, ὅπωc ἀπὸ φῦλον ὄληται | νώνυμον ἐξ Ἰθάκηc Ἀρκειcίου ἀντιθέοιο. 'Some god damaged his well-built φρένεc inside, or some human being. He went for news of his father to holy Pylos. But the proud suitors plan an assault on his return, that the race of godlike Arkeisios may perish out of Ithaka, and its name be forgotten.'). Offensive behaviour is at stake in Penelope's irritation with Eurycleia (*Od.* 23.13ff.), when the suitor Leocritus takes offence at Men-

Though, in Homer, the scope for this type of expression is markedly wide compared with the smaller range of situations to which the terms ϲαόφρων and ϲαοφροϲύνη are applied, it is interesting to note that these expressions criticise many types of adult male behaviour that later texts typically assess in terms of (a lack of) ϲωφροϲύνη: as ϲωφροϲύνη is a type of controlled response, the expressions that we have considered provide an excuse for various types of behaviour that can not be accounted for unless it is assumed that this type of 'control' is temporarily lost: hence the idea of divine intervention that uncontrollably impairs one's normal cognitive faculties. As such, these expressions do indeed offer an anti-scenario for ϲωφροϲύνη: the blunders committed by men who lose their φρένεϲ are remarkably like the misdemeanours that the ϲώφρων man of later Greek literature will characteristically avoid.

Close to this type of expressions are two adjectives (and their cognate substantives): ἀεϲίφρων and ἄφρων. The former, signifying 'bewilderment of φρένεϲ'[33] is used to describe social offences, from a breach of fair play[34] to the rather more serious misdemeanour of the Centaur who wreaks havoc in the house of Pirithous.[35] But similarly, one may be induced to harm one's own interest. Thus, it is only out of ἀεϲιφροϲύνη (*Od.* 15.470) that Eumaeus follows the woman who will have him sold as a slave. Conversely, Achilles says that Priam will never give a special γέραϲ

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tor's warnings (*Od.* 2.243, φρέναϲ ἠλέε), and when Penelope criticises Telemachus for allowing the beggar Odysseus to be treated disgracefully (*Od.* 18.215 Τηλέμαχ', οὐκέτι τοι φρένεϲ ἔμπεδοι οὐδὲ νόημα, 'Telemachus, you do not have stable φρένεϲ any longer', cf. 18.220 οὐκέτι τοι φρένεϲ εἰϲὶν ἐναίϲιμοι οὐδὲ νόημα).

[33] On the doubtful etymology of ἀεϲίφρων (from ἄημι or, as ἀαϲίφρων, from ἀάω/ἄτη), cf. *LfgrE* s.v. ἀαϲίφρων, Chantraîne s.v. ἀάω, Clarke (1999) 82n.52.

[34] *Il.* 23.602-4 Ἀντίλοχε νῦν μέν τοι ἐγὼν ὑποείξομαι αὐτὸϲ | χωόμενοϲ, ἐπεὶ οὔ τι παρήοροϲ οὐδ' ἀεϲίφρων | ἦϲθα πάροϲ· νῦν αὖτε νόον νίκηϲε νεοίη. ('Antilochos, now I will give way to you spontaneously, because before you were not at all light-hearted nor *aesiphrôn*, but now your youth has conquered your mind.')

[35] *Od.* 21.301-2 ὁ δὲ φρεϲὶν ᾗϲιν ἀαϲθείϲ| ἤϊεν ἣν ἄτην ὀχέων ἀεϲίφρονι θυμῷ. ('He, blinded in his φρένεϲ, went about bearing his blindness in an *aesiphrôn* heart.')

to Aeneas, since he has children of his own and a mind that is
still 'stable' rather than bewildered.[36]

Even wider in range (and frequent as a very general antonym
of σώφρων in later literature) is the adjective ἄφρων with its cog-
nate ἀφροσύνη. These terms likewise decry both 'foolish' acts that
are dangerous and probably harmful to their agents[37], and 'so-
cial' offences like disregard for a suppliant or breeches of the
rules of *hospitality*.[38] Such 'social' considerations are also relevant
when Telemachus suggests to the suitors that he is ἄφρων to sit
and eat in the hall while his mother intends to leave the house.[39]
And when Pandarus is ἄφρων to let himself be persuaded by
Athena to break the truce,[40] the term no doubt conveys both that
it is not 'done' to do so, and the 'folly' of breaking a truce with,
ultimately, very bad consequences for one's own party.

But ἄφρων is also used when people make the impression of
being 'incapable of sensible speech';[41] here, the term stands in

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[36] *Il.* 20.182-3 οὔ τοι τοὔνεκά γε Πρίαμος γέρας ἐν χερὶ θήσει· | εἰσὶν γάρ οἱ
παῖδες, ὃ δ᾽ ἔμπεδος οὐδ᾽ ἀεσίφρων. ('For that, Priam will not give you a *geras*. He
has children, and his mind is stable, not *aesiphrôn*.')

[37] See *Il.* 7.109-110 ἀφραίνεις Μενέλαε διοτρεφέες, οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ | ταύτης
ἀφροσύνης ('You are mad, Menelaus, and you do not need such madness.' Me-
nelaus proposes to accept Hector's challenge to single combat); *Il.* 15.104
νήπιοι οἳ Ζηνὶ μενεαίνομεν ἀφρονέοντες. ('We fools, who in our folly fight with
Zeus.')

[38] Achilles' treatment of a suppliant: *Il.* 24.157-8 οὔτε γάρ ἐστ᾽ ἄφρων οὔτ᾽
ἄσκοπος οὔτ᾽ ἀλιτήμων, | ἀλλὰ μάλ᾽ ἐνδυκέως ἱκέτεω πεφιδήσεται ἀνδρός. ('He is
not mindless, not careless, nor insensitive to litigation: he will take care to spare
a suppliant.') Offences against the rules of *hospitality*: *Od.* 8.209 ἄφρων δὴ κεῖνός
γε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς πέλει ἀνήρ, | ὅς τις ξεινοδόκωι ἔριδα προφέρηται ἀέθλων. ('Fool-
ish and useless is the man who starts a quarrel with a host because of games.');
16.278 ἀλλ᾽ ἦ τοι παύεσθαι ἀνωγέμεν ἀφροσυνάων ('But really, do encourage
them to stop their folly'); *Od.* 24.456-7 οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ πείθεσθ᾽, οὐ Μέντορι ποιμένι
λαῶν, | ὑμετέρους παῖδας καταπαυέμεν ἀφροσυνάων. ('You do not listen to me,
nor to Mentor, herdsman of the people, and stop your sons from their folly.')

[39] *Od.* 21.102-5 ὢ πόποι, ἦ μάλα με Ζεὺς ἄφρονα θῆκε Κρονίων· | μήτηρ μέν
μοί φησι φίλη, πινυτή περ ἐοῦσα, | ἄλλῳ ἅμ᾽ ἕψεσθαι νοσφισσαμένη τόδε δῶμα· |
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ γελόω καὶ τέρπομαι ἄφρονι θυμῶι. ('O dear, Zeus, son of Kronos, did
make me mindless indeed. My dear mother says, sensible as she is, that she will
go with another man and leave this house. And yet, I laugh and entertain my
foolish heart.')

[40] *Il.* 4.104 τῶι δὲ φρένας ἄφρονι πεῖθεν. ('He persuaded his foolish heart.')

[41] See *Il.* 3.220 φαίης κε ζάκοτόν τέ τιν᾽ ἔμμεναι ἄφρονά τ᾽ αὔτως. ('You
would say that he was a sullen and downright mindless person.'); *Od.* 6.187 οὔτε
κακῶι οὔτ᾽ ἄφρονι φωτὶ ἔοικας ('You do not look like a bad man, nor like a

opposition to πεπνυμένος, which commends the ability to speak 'wisely' (see section 5 below). And it has already been noted that the term is used in contrast with ἐπίφρων by Penelope to mean 'inattentive' at *Od.* 23.12. The 'absence of φρένες' that ἄφρων decries, then, has many different manifestations; accordingly, ἄφρων functions as a very general opposite to several terms describing good sense and proper behaviour.

Thus, the present section has shown that someone who is tempted to do something that is either unaccountably harmful to himself, or unacceptable to his peers, is charged with a loss of control, and excused with the metaphorical explanation that this is due to a divine intervention and a (temporary) 'loss' of φρένες. This is what one may call the 'anti-scenario' to that of cαοφροςύνη, which commends the ability to refrain from such behaviour. Whereas a 'loss of φρένες' is usually regarded as a temporary (often indeed highly uncharacteristic) 'lapse' of a normally sensible person, ἄφρων and ἀφροςύνη may on occasion suggest a more permanent 'inadequate' mentality.

5. *Models of Good Sense and Control:*
Penelope, Telemachus and Odysseus

As we have seen in section 3, the considerable role of αἰδώς in social interaction in Homer is probably one factor in the explanation of the comparative rarity of cαόφρων and cognates.[42] Another important factor is the fact that epic diction has a number of other (poetic) adjectives that describe aspects of good sense that are elsewhere associated with cωφροςύνη.

This is especially clear from the case of the three protagonists of the *Odyssey*, who manage to deal with considerable hardship

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mindless one.') cf. 20.227); 17.586 οὐκ ἄφρων ὁ ξεῖνος ὀΐεται ('the stranger does not seem to be mindless.').

[42] There is probably a correlation here between the relative frequencies of the two terms: when cωφροςύνη grows in importance, αἰδώς would seem to go somewhat in decline. Cf. Cairns (1993), 48: 'In Homer the range over which αἰδώς is employed is at its widest, and to a great extent the subsequent history of the concept is one of refinement of its uses and diminution of its prominence.'

thanks to their good sense and intelligence, and thus manifest a sustained character of 'good sense'. Odysseus employs great cunning and endurance not only during his voyage, but especially in his strategy in regaining his house and possessions; meanwhile, Penelope remains the loyal wife and carefully manages to put off responding to her suitors, whereas Telemachus grows up to deal sensibly with the less-than-welcome guests in his house. In connection with all three, there is a remarkably rich vocabulary for praise of the various aspects of their 'good sense'.

All three, then, are models of 'good sense' in their various ways, and all three have at some time been regarded as a model of ϲωφροϲύνη.[43] The present section will consider some terms that are used specifically to describe these ϲώφρων-like characteristics.

5.1. *Penelope*

Penelope's main characteristic is of course her loyalty to Odysseus and his οἶκοϲ. On the basis of non-epic usage, one would expect her to be the ϲώφρων figure in epic poetry *par excellence.* Penelope is not called ϲαόφρων in Homer, however. Instead, there are specific poetic epithets that seem to be associated with this main feature of her character, notably περίφρων and ἐχέφρων. Of these, the former is the most common;[44] ἐχέφρων is used in its stead for metrical reasons, either to effect *correptio epica* after a diphthong, or to avoid the positional lengthening of a short syllable ending in a consonant.[45] Most occurrences of

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[43] See p. 42n1.

[44] Penelope: *Od.* 1.329, 4.787, 4.808, 4.830, 5.216, 11.446, 14.373, 15.41, 15.314, 16.329, 16.409, 16.435, 17.36, 17.100, 17.162, 17.492, 17.498, 17.528, 17.533, 17.562, 17.585, 18.159, 18.177, 18.245, 18.250, 18.285, 19.53, 19.59, 19.89, 19.103, 19.123, 19.308, 19.349, 19.375, 19.508, 19.559, 19.588, 20.388, 21.2, 21.311, 21.321, 21.330, 23.10, 23.58, 23.80, 23.104, 23.173, 23.256, 23.285, 24.404. Other women: Eurycleia: *Od.* 19.357, 19.491, 20.134, 21.381. Adrestine: *Il.* 5.412. Arete *Od.* 11.345.

[45] ἐχέφρων after a diphthong shortened through *correptio epica*: *Il.* 9.341 ἀγαθὸϲ καὶ ἐχέφρων (a man like Achilles); *Od.* 13.332 καὶ ἐχέφρων (Odysseus); *Od.* 4.11, 13.406, 16.458 καὶ ἐχέφρων/-ονι/-ονα Πηνελόπεια/-ηι/-αν; *Od.* 17.390 εἶόϲ μοι ἐχέφρων Πηνελόπεια | ζώει; after a consonant: *Od.* 16.130, 24.198,

these adjectives, περίφρων especially, are in formulaic utterances like speech introductions; in such cases, of course, it is not always easy to see what kind of 'good sense' exactly the adjectives commend, nor if there are any elements in the context that makes their occurrence especially appropriate. But both περίφρων and ἐχέφρων are also used in less stereotyped surroundings (occasionally also with reference to other persons) and these passages provide us with a clue for the interpretation of the words: in all of them, an association with the theme of 'loyalty' is established in these contexts.

In the single Iliadic occurrence of ἐχέφρων, for a start, Achilles compares his care for Briseïs with the great pains that the sons of Atreus take to recover Helen:

> ἦ μοῦνοι φιλέους᾽ ἀλόχους μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
> Ἀτρεΐδαι; ἐπεὶ ὅστις ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐχέφρων
> τὴν αὐτοῦ φιλέει καὶ κήδεται, ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν
> ἐκ θυμοῦ φίλεον, δουρικτήτην περ ἐοῦσαν.
> (*Il.* 9.340-3)

> Or are the only ones among men to be attached to their women the sons of Atreus? No: every man who is ἀγαθός and ἐχέφρων is loyal to, and cares for his own wife, just like I as well was fondly attached to this one, even though she was indeed captured in war.

In these lines, Achilles explains his anger at the loss of Briseïs explicitly in terms of marital loyalty (expressed by the verb φιλέειν): according to him, this loyalty is shared by any man who is ἀγαθός and ἐχέφρων, as can be seen from the care that Menelaus takes to recover Helen.[46] Loyalty, this time between goddess

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24.294 ἐχέφρων/-ονι Πηνελόπεια/-ηι. Echephron is also the name of a 'good' son of Nestor (*Od.* 3.413, 3.439).

[46] The passage has puzzled critics because of its, for Homer, exceptional use of ἀγαθός in a 'non-competitive' context, and Adkins (1960), 40, calls this a persuasive definition. He comments 'no successful *agathos* is likely to agree.'

The use of ἀγαθός in such a non-competitive context is indeed remarkable. (Pace Cairns (1993), 127, *Od.* 18.383, οὕνεκα δὴ παύροισι καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθοῖσι ὁμιλεῖς, 'because you converse with few men of no outstanding character', is not a non-competitive context, because the suggestion there is that the other men in the palace cannot compete with Eurymachos, just like Eurymachos himself could never compete with Odysseus.) But it must be noted that it is exactly the function of the addition καὶ ἐχέφρων to trigger the unusual interpretation of ἀγαθός; and Achilles presents the notion of loyalty as a common-

and man, is also relevant to the context of *Od.* 13.331-2, where Athena tells Odysseus that *she* could not let him down because he is 'a clever speaker, sharp-witted and *echephron*'.[47] More importantly, ἐχέφρων is used with reference to Penelope's loyalty when Agamemnon's ghost praises the ἀρετή of the wife of 'fortunate Odysseus':

ὄλβιε Λαέρταο πάϊ, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ,
ἦ ἄρα σὺν μεγάληι ἀρετῆι ἐκτήσω ἄκοιτιν·
ὡς ἀγαθαὶ φρένες ἦσαν ἀμύμονι Πηνελοπείηι,
κούρηι Ἰκαρίου, ὡς εὖ μέμνητ' Ὀδυσῆος,
ἀνδρὸς κουριδίου. τῶ οἱ κλέος οὔ ποτ' ὀλεῖται
ἧς ἀρετῆς, τεύξουσι δ' ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἀοιδὴν
ἀθάνατοι χαρίεσσαν ἐχέφρονι Πηνελοπείηι,
οὐχ ὡς Τυνδαρέου κούρη κακὰ μήσατο ἔργα,
κουρίδιον κτείνασα πόσιν, στυγερὴ δέ τ' ἀοιδὴ
ἔσσετ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, χαλεπὴν δέ τε φῆμιν ὀπάσσει
θηλυτέρηισι γυναιξί, καὶ ἥ κ' εὐεργὸς ἔηισιν.
  (*Od.* 24.192-202)

Fortunate son of Laertes, resourceful Odysseus: you have really acquired a woman with great ἀρετή. How good have the φρένες turned out to be of the irreproachable Penelope, daughter of Icarius, how well did she remember Odysseus, her one-and-only husband. Therefore her fame will never perish, the reputation of her ἀρετή, and the gods will give mortals a pleasing song in honour of ἐχέφρων Penelope, quite unlike the way the daughter of Tyndareus conceived bad deeds, killing the man to whom she was given first. This will be an awful song among men, and she brings an ill reputation on women, even on those who work well.

The passage is important, for it shows both that it is indeed Penelope's loyalty to Odysseus, strongly contrasted to the behaviour of Clytemnestra, which is highlighted by the epithet. It seems significant that in line 192, where Agamemnon is only ex-

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place applicable to every sensible man (ὅστις …), and exemplified very clearly by the very competitive Atreïds themselves. Thus, he clearly does *not* expect his fellow-*agathoi* to disagree.

   If there is a ring of special pleading to the passage, it is rather that Achilles wishes to prevent any feeling that his reaction is disproportionate by claiming that every sensible man would feel the same.

   [47] *Od.* 13. 331-2 τῶ σε καὶ οὐ δύναμαι προλιπεῖν δύστηνον ἐόντα, | οὕνεκ' ἐπητής ἐσσι καὶ ἀγχίνοος καὶ ἐχέφρων. ('Therefore, I can never let you down in your misery, because you are a speaker, sharp-witted and ἐχέφρων.')

pressing Penelope's general suitability as a marriage partner, ἀμύμονι ('irreproachable') and *not* ἐχέφρονι is used. Here, the reasoning goes that ἀμύμων Penelope turned out to have good φρένες, for she remained loyal to Odysseus. 'Loyal Penelope remained loyal' would make no sense in this context, and ἀμύμων here seems to draw attention to Penelope's general suitability as a wedding partner rather than to her tried-and-tested marital fidelity.[48] When Penelope's loyalty has been established, ἀμύμονι is duly replaced by ἐχέφρονι in line 198.

The passage also shows that it is loyalty of this kind that provides a woman with a claim to ἀρετή *tout court*. In many texts of the classical period, ϲωφροϲύνη in the sense of 'being a faithful wife' is regarded as *the* female virtue *par excellence*; one must conclude that the ideology has remained unchanged even if the labels have not.

The passage from *Od.* 24 echoes a similar, but less elaborate praise of Penelope by the ghost of Agamemnon in *Od.* 11, when he predicts that, unlike himself, Odysseus will not be killed by his wife: 'For the daughter of Icarius, *periphrôn* Penelope, is very much *pinutê* and has good thoughts in her mind.' (*Od.* 11.445-6 λίην γὰρ πινυτή τε καὶ εὖ φρεϲὶ μήδεα οἶδε | κούρη Ἰκαρίοιο περίφρων Πηνελόπεια.) Here, περίφρων is used in an exactly similar context; once again, it appears that it must indeed be Penelope's loyalty that is suggested by the epitheton.

If, on the basis of these examples, it seems probable that the use of the adiectives περίφρων and ἐχέφρων ('sensible') is especially associated with Penelope's main characteristic of loyalty to Odysseus, this hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the use of the epithets elsewhere: both adjectives typically occur in the many contexts where Penelope's attachment to Odysseus (and his *oikos*) is exemplified.[49]

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[48] For ἀμύμων with reference to girls about to be married, cf. *Od.* 4.4 (the daughter of Menelaus), and 7.303 (Nausikaa).

[49] Thus, περίφρων is first used in the description of Penelope's agonised reaction to the ἀοιδόϲ singing about the νόϲτοϲ of the Achaean heroes (*Od.* 1.329), and in *Od.* 4.111, Menelaus supposes that ἐχέφρων Πηνελοπεία must grieve for her absent husband. When Telemachus has gone to Pylus and Sparta, the worry for his safety becomes an additional source of grief, and her care for both Telemachus and Odysseus is a dominant theme of Penelope's

Elsewhere, Penelope is called πινυτή. Here, a specific associa-
tion with her characteristic loyalty is not so firmly activated;
rather, a more general and inclusive sense of social decorum
seems to be invoked by the word, which seems to relate to the
general good sense that runs in the family. The adjective πινυτός

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exchange with Athena (περίφρων at the start of the episode in 4.787, and in
speech introductions in 4.808, 830). Consequently, it is to περίφρονι/ἐχέφρονι
Πηνελοπείηι that both Eumaeus and a messenger bring the message of the
young man's safe return (*Od.* 15.41, 16.130, 16.329; at 15.314, Odysseus-the-
beggar offers to bring the message to her himself), even though Eumaeus is
instructed *not* to tell her yet about the homecoming of Odysseus himself
(16.458). Penelope is περίφρων when she comes out of her rooms to welcome
her son back (17.36). Earlier in the poem, Odysseus himself uses the word
περίφρων to praise his wife's loyal character when he tells Calypso that he wants
to go home to his own wife, even though she is but a mortal woman (5.216). In
the second part of the poem, περίφρων is used when the good connections
between Penelope and faithful Eumaeus are mentioned (13.406, 14.373,
17.390). Penelope is called περίφρων when she goes out to tell the suitors that
they should not plan further actions against Telemachus (16.409); in reaction
to this she is addressed as περίφρον by Eurymachos, who responds with a false
declaration of loyalty to Telemachus (16.435; a harsher response to Penelope's
feelings of loyalty to Odysseus is given by Antinous in 18.285); similarly, she is
περίφρων when she takes offence at the way the suitors treat guests (20.388).
But Penelope's main concern remains with Odysseus himself. She decides to
address the suitors in order to acquire greater τιμή in the eyes of her son and
husband (18.159) but refuses to dry her tears after weeping for Odysseus
(18.177), and when Eumaeus addresses her (18.245) to praise her beauty, stat-
ure and good sense (εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε ἰδὲ φρένας, 18. 249), she claims that her
ἀρετή, εἶδος and δέμας have been destroyed by the gods on the day Odysseus
left. Her concern even extends to Odysseus-in-disguise: she is περίφρων when
worried about the beggar who is injured by Antinous (17.492, 498). Unsurpris-
ingly, Penelope is called περίφρων whenever it is suggested that someone may
have some information about his fate (Telemachus in 17.100, Theoclymenus in
17.162, Odysseus-the-beggar in 17.528, 17.553, 17.562, 17.585). Therefore, the
adjective occurs frequently in the episode when Penelope comes out of her
rooms to speak to Odysseus-the-beggar (19.53, 59, 89, 103, 123,308, 349, 375,
508, 559, 588). When the beggar is washed by the faithful (κεδνὰ ἰδυῖα, 19.346)
Eurycleia, the old woman momentarily takes her place, and *she* is now credited
with the very same loyalty as her mistress (19.357, 491, 20.134). In book 21,
when the scene is set in preparation for Odysseus' revenge, Penelope is called
περίφρων when she decides to organise the contest of the bow (21.2) and insists
that Odysseus-the-beggar should also be given his chance (21.311, 321, 330), as
is Eurycleia when she is instructed to close the doors of the hall (21.381). Fi-
nally, the adjective highlights crucial stages in the recognition scenes:
Penelope's disinclination to believe that Odysseus has really returned for fear
that the stranger might be an impostor (23.10, 58, 80), her instruction to move
the bed that triggers the recognition (23.104, 173, 256), and Odysseus' narra-
tion of Tiresias' prophecies about his future toils and age.

is used by Athena to express that any sensible man would feel νέμεςιc at the way the suitors are feasting in the house of Odysseus, and the good sons of Nestor are called πινυτούς by Menelaus.[50] The adjective is applied to Penelope herself not only at *Od.* 11.445, where Agamemnon does indeed stress her loyalty to Odysseus, but also at 20.131, where Telemachus uses the phrase πινυτή περ ἐοῦca in mitigation of his criticism of Penelope's supposed neglect of Odysseus-the-beggar (in fact, she has taken good care of her disguised husband) and 21.103, where πινυτή περ ἐοῦca underlines the incongruity of Penelope's feigned plans to leave the house.[51] In *Od.* 23.361, when Odysseus commands his wife to stay inside while he goes to see Laërtes, in view of the grudge that many will bear against the house in which the suitors were killed, he mitigates his command by suggesting that she herself is sensible enough to see what is due.[52]

So the conclusion must be that the epithets ἐχέφρων and περίφρων are especially associated with Penelope's main characteristic of the loyal 'good wife'.[53] In commending the 'female' ἀρετή of marital fidelity, they express what in later texts will be very central uses of cώφρων. If it is puzzling at first sight that caόφρων and caοφροςύνη are rare in Homer, part of the answer is that Homeric diction uses specific poetic words (not normally

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[50] *Od.* 1.229 νεμεccήcαιτό κεν ἀνὴρ | αἴcχεα πόλλ' ὁρόων, ὅc τιc πινυτόc γε μετέλθοι. ('A man would feel anger to see these many disgraces, if someone *pinutos* came along.'); *Od.* 4.211 υἱέαc αὖ πινυτούc τε καὶ ἔγχεcιν εἶναι ἀρίcτουc. ('may my sons be *pinutoi* and excellent with the sword.').

[51] *Od.* 20.131, τοιαύτη γὰρ ἐμὴ μήτηρ, πινυτή περ ἐοῦca. ('that is what my mother does, *pinutê* though she is.'); 21.103f. μήτηρ μέν μοί φηcι φίλη, πινυτή περ ἐοῦca, | ἄλλωι ἅμ' ἕψεcθαι νοcφιccαμένη τόδε δῶμα ("My dear mother says, sensible as she is, that she will go with another man and leave this house.').

The substantive πινυτή occurs *Il.* 7.289, *Od.* 20.71, 20.228.

[52] 23.361 coὶ δέ, γύναι, τάδ' ἐπιτέλλω πινυτῆι περ ἐούcηι. ('This, my wife, is what I tell you to do, *pinutê* though you be.')

[53] Scholars have not failed to note that, for a long time during the poem, some (residual) uncertainty remains whether Penelope will in fact manage to remain the faithful wife and will not submit herself to a scenario similar to that of her 'foils', Clytemnestra and Helen. If so, the epithets stress an ideal that will not prove itself true until very late in the poem. The uncertainty concerning Penelope's role has been stated strongly in terms of 'character' by Marquardt (1985), Murnaghan (1987); Felson-Rubin (1988) and Katz (1991), stress the functional importance to the plot of this 'indeterminacy' (see especially Katz (1991) 94-112).

found in common usage) in contexts where later authors would have used cώφρων or cωφροcύνη.

5.2. *Telemachus*

Telemachus' good sense, praised in terms of cαοφροcύνη in connection with his youthful respect for Menelaus and for the commands of his father, is otherwise evident on many occasions when the young man acts more like an adult, especially in his many sensible speeches. There is also here an epithet that marks this particular quality of speaking sensibly and diplomatically, πεπνυμένοc.[54] The term is used most often in speech introductions (*Od.* 1.213 etc.) but a connection with speech is clear in the majority of passages: the term typically applies to professional speakers such as counsellors (*Il.* 3.148 etc.) and heralds (*Il.* 7.276 etc.), to Odyssean 'wise old men' such as Nestor (*Od.* 3.20 etc.), Menelaus (*Od.* 4.190 etc.), Odysseus (*Il.* 8.388 etc.) and Laertes (*Od.* 24.375), and to the various young men who imitate these role models, Diomedes (*Il.* 9.58), Antilochus (*Il.* 23.440), Hermes (*Il.* 24.377), Pisistratus (*Od.* 3.52 etc.) and of course Telemachus himself. In the underworld, the shade of Tiresias is the only one equipped with νόοc and φρένεc; consequently, he is the only one capable of πέπνυcθαι (*Od.* 10.495) and making a speech that makes sense even without drinking blood from the libation.[55] So it seems to be Telemachus' capability to speak sensibly

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[54] For πεπνυμένοc and its connection with speech and wise and diplomatic speakers, see Austin (1975), 74-8, Vivante (1982), 108, and M.P. Cuypers in *LfrE* s.v. πεπνυμένοc. Cf. also J. Heath (2001) 133: 'πεπνυμένοc and the other perfect forms related to it refer to a wisdom that comes through experience and age, and is very closely connected with speech.' Heath offers some good observations on Telemachus' maturation during the *Odyssey*, his 'growing into' the epithet πεπνυμένοc.

[55] *Od.* 10. 492-5 Θηβαίου Τειρεcίαο, | μάντιος ἀλαοῦ, τοῦ τε φρένεc ἔμπεδοί εἰcι· | τῶι καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περcεφόνεια | οἴωι πεπνῦcθαι. ('The Theban Tiresias, the blind seer, whose φρένεc are stable: to him alone Persephone granted the intelligence to *pepnusthai* even after death.') See also Rijksbaron (1997), 203. LSJ s.v. πέπνυμαι treat *to be conscious* as a meaning separate from the more frequent *to be wise*, but they cite only the present instance and Call. *Lav. Pall.*. 129-30 καὶ μόνοc, εὖτε θάνηι, πεπνυμένοc ἐν νεκύεccι | φοιταcεῖ in its favour. In both cases it is the 'status' of Tiresias that is special, rather than the meaning of the verb.

in the manner of an adult, quite distinct from his youthful re-
spect vis-à-vis Menelaus and Odysseus, with which the use of the
epithet is especially associated. Interestingly, when the speech
introduction τοῖϲι δὲ καὶ / τοῖϲ δ' αὖθιϲ μετέειφ' ἱερὴ ἲϲ
Τηλεμάχοιο is chosen in preference to one containing πεπ-
νύμενοϲ, the reference is to the assertive character of the young
man's speech rather than his good sense.[56]

The sensible words and assertive deeds of the near-adult
Telemachus strongly contrast with his helplessness, shyness and
lack of perception as a child. This child-like state still largely sub-
sists at the beginning of the poem, but after the encouragement
of Athena (*Od.* 1.296-7), it is increasingly shed, even if both
Telemachus himself and Penelope remain well aware of it
throughout the poem. It is expressed by means of the adjective
νήπιοϲ and the cognate substantive νηπιέη, and these terms indi-
cate his (former) speechlessness,[57] lack of perception (*Od.*
20.309-10 ἤδη γὰρ νοέω καὶ οἶδα ἕκαϲτα, | ἐϲθλά τε καὶ τὰ χέρεια·
πάροϲ δ' ἔτι νήπιοϲ ἦα.) and his helplessness against the suitors
(*Od.* 1.296-7 οὐδέ τί ϲε χρὴ | νηπιάαϲ ὀχέειν, (but kill the suitors)
ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι τηλίκοϲ ἐϲϲί).[58] The 'child-like' helplessness of the
νήπιοϲ is brought out by the fact that the adjective is frequently
applied to children who are in need of protection[59] as well as to
men who unwittingly make grave mistakes, especially mistakes
that bring about their own deaths.[60] At *Il.* 22.445, νηπίη is said of

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[56] *Od.* 2.409 (the command to go on board), 18.60 (encourages Odysseus-
the-beggar to fight with Iros), 18.405 (a reproach against the suitors), cf.
21.101, 21.130.

[57] The semantic opposition between νήπιοϲ and πεπνυμένοϲ is confirmed by
etymology, if νήπιοϲ is indeed a hypocoristically shortened form of νήπυτιοϲ ⟨
νάπυτιοϲ deriving from ἀπύω 'speaking loud and clear'. The meaning sug-
gested by etymology for νήπιοϲ would then be 'not speaking clearly (as adults
do). Cf. the remarks of Ruijgh, quoted by J. Heath (2001) 133n.1, where see
also for further references.

[58] For Telemachus as νήπιοϲ see also *Od.* 2.313, 4.818 (his misguided deci-
sion to sail to Pylos), 11.449, 18.229, 19.19, 19.530, 20.310.

[59] Cf. the Iliadic formula ἄλοχοι/-ουϲ καὶ νήπια τέκνα, *Il.* 2.136 etc., and see
Il. 6.366, 22.484, 24.726 (Astyanax), *Il.* 9.440, 9.491 (Achilles as a child).

[60] See *Il.* 12.113, 12.127 (Hyrtacides and his men), 16.46, 16.686, 16.833
(Patroclus), 20. 411 (Polydorus), 20.466 (Troas), 21.99 (Lycaon), 22.333 (Hec-
tor), *Od.* 1.8, 9.44 (Odysseus' men), 22.32, 22.370 (the suitors) and 24.469
(Eupeithes). Errors of great consequence are also discussed in *Il.* 2.38 (Aga-
memnon thinks that he will win the war), 5.406 (Diomedes fights the gods),

Andromache, and seems to draw attention to both her ignorance
of Hector's death and her helplessness now that her protector
has died.

5.3. *Odysseus*

Odysseus is perhaps primarily known as the cunning, ingenuous
schemer. These qualities are, of course, highlighted by epithets
such as πολύμητις (*Il.* 1.311 etc., *Od.* 2.173 etc., aptly used in the
introductions to Odysseus' autobiographical speeches, in which
invention flows freely:[61] *Od.* 9.1, 14.191, 19.165), πολυμήχανος
(*Il.* 2.173 etc., *Od.* 1.205 etc.),[62] ποικιλομήτης (*Il.* 11.482, *Od.*
3.163; the most significant use is at 13.293, where Athena ad-
dresses his insatiable habit of 'cheating'),[63] πολύτροπος (*Od.* 1.1,
10.330)[64] and πολύφρων (*Od.* 1.83 etc., an epithet he shares with
the clever craftsman Hephaestus: *Il.* 21.367, *Od.* 8.297, 327).[65]

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8.177 (the Greeks build a wall around their camp), 15.104 (the gods vs. Zeus),
17.236 (the Trojans), 17.497 (Hector and others hope to catch the horses of
Achilles), 18.295 (Polydamas' advice is misguided according to Hector), 18.311
(the Trojans ignore the warning of Polydamas); 20.296 (Aeneas in great dan-
ger), 23.88 (Patroklos commenting on his youthful manslaughter), and *Od.*
3.146 (Agamemnon thinks he can appease Athena), 4.371 (Menelaus lingering
on Pharos), 4.818 (Telemachus has gone to Pylus), (Odysseus' men), 9.442
(the Cyclops). Lack of knowledge or perception is described at *Il.* 20.264
(Achilles does not yet know how to handle his new weapons), *Od.* 9.273, 9.419
(Odysseus lacks knowledge about the Cyclops), 13.237 (Odysseus seems not to
know Ithaka), 21.85 (Eumaeus' 'inconsiderate' weeping decried by Antinous).

[61] On the rhetorical functions of the various typed of fiction deployed by
Odysseus, see Emlyn Jones (1998) 144-54, Pucci (1987) 98-109, and Pratt
(1993) 55-94.

[62] In the *Odyssey* especially, πολυμήχανος is used when Odysseus has con-
trived or is about to contrive the well-nigh impossible. Cf. Austin (1975) 52-3.

[63] Sacks (1987) 148-9 suggests that the formula Ὀδυσσῆα δαΐφρονα
ποικιλομήτην replaces the Iliadic Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντον (*Il.* 2.169 etc.) at *Il.*
11.482 (where Odysseus has been wounded) and in the Odyssey, just because
Odysseus, in these misfortunes, seems to be 'forsaken' by Zeus. His parallel
argument, ibid., that (νοστῆσαι) Ὀδυσῆα πολύφρονα (ὅνδε δόμονδε), significantly
stands *instead* of the Iliadic Ὀδυσῆα Διὶ φίλον (*Il.* 11.419, 11.473), is flawed in
as much as Διὶ φίλον would be long by position before (ϝ)όνδε.

[64] It is likely that πολύτροπος addresses both Odysseus' many wanderings
and his mental versatility, cf. Keil (1998) 110-4 and Pucci (1987) 24.

[65] Sacks (1987), 13-5, draws attention to the parallel between the cuckolded
god of *Od.* 8, and Odysseus, who may yet find himself cuckolded as well on his
return to Ithaca.

But Odysseus is also, on some occasions, a model of 'good sense'. Most relevant here is his endurance, signalled by the adjectives πολύτλας (*Il.* 8.97 etc., *Od.* 5.171 etc.), ταλασίφρων (*Il.* 11.466, *Od.* 1.87 etc.; the meaning 'with enduring φρένες' is confirmed in *Il.* 4.421 ὑπό κεν ταλασίφρονά περ δέος εἷλεν. ('Even a man with enduring φρένες would be seized by fear.'), and (πολυ)τλήμων (*Il.* 5.670 etc., *Od.* 18.319).[66] It is this 'καρτερία' that philosophical texts of a later period regard as Odysseus' most unequivocally positive quality (Pl. *R.* 390d, X. *Mem.* 1.3.7) and that is linked to σωφροσύνη by philosophical writers who conceive of σωφροσύνη in terms of 'self-control' (Pl. *Grg.* 507b, X. *Mem.* 1.2.1, Arist. *EN* 1145b14-15).

On two occasions, in fact, Odysseus shows unmistakable self-control, or at least control of his anger, in his reactions to the insults of Melanthius and Irus. To the provocations of the former, Odysseus does not react at all, even though he has clearly been angered by the goatherd's insults (the narrator mentions his emotion at 17.216 ὄρινε δὲ κῆρ Ὀδυσῆος):

... ὁ δὲ μερμήριξεν Ὀδυσσεύς,
ἠὲ μεταΐξας ῥοπάλωι ἐκ θυμὸν ἕλοιτο
ἦ πρὸς γῆν ἐλάσειε κάρη ἀμφουδὶς ἀείρας·
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπετόλμησε, φρεσὶ δ᾽ ἔσχετο.
  (Od. 17.235-8)

And he considered, Odysseus, whether he should run after him and kill him with a club, or lift him up at both ears and throw him to the ground. He endured, and with his φρένες stopped himself.

Total self-control is not required in the confrontation with Irus, because the two beggars have in fact been encouraged to a fight by Antinous. But a measure of restraint turns out to be important for Odysseus here as well, lest he should show his exceptional power and give away his disguise:

δὴ τότε μερμήριξε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,
ἦ ἐλάσει᾽ ὥς μιν ψυχὴ λίποι αὖθι πεσόντα,
ἦέ μιν ἦκ᾽ ἐλάσειε τανύσσειέν τ᾽ ἐπὶ γαίηι.

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[66] Critics have not failed to point out that the Iliadic instances of epithets like πολύτλας and τλήμων point predominantly to 'daring' and 'endurance' in battle, the Odyssean to 'endurance' of sufferings. See Heitsch (1964) 257-64, Marzullo (1952), esp. 24ff and 64-5, and Pucci (1987) 44-9.

ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάccατο κέρδιον εἶναι,
ἦκ' ἐλάcαι, ἵνα μή μιν ἐπιφραccαίατ' Ἀχαιοί.
(*Od*. 18.90-4)

Then, naturally, enduring noble Odysseus considered whether he should beat him so that his soul would leave him at his fall, or whether he should beat him less vehemently and stretch him to the ground. While he was thinking the following seemed to be more advantageous to him: to beat the man less vehemently, lest the Achaeans might recognise him.

Now the expressions μερμήριξε and ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάccατο κέρδιον εἶναι show that Odysseus' control of anger amounts to a calculation of pros and cons in view of the issues at stake (and therewith, it would seem, a rather good example of cωφροcύνη), a calculation that is decided by the choice for the 'more profitable' option.[67] But that should not be taken to imply that Odysseus' anger is less in evidence here: it certainly was in the description of the quarrel itself (see 18.14 ὑπόδρα ἰδών and Odysseus' warning μή με χολώcῃς, 18.20), and both the presence here of the adjective πολύτλαc, signalling his endurance of unpleasant experiences, and the very violence of the attack he re-

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[67] The formula ὧδε δέ / ὣc ἄρα οἱ / μοι φρονέοντι δοάccατο κέρδιον εἶναι is used three more times to describe the outcome of successful deliberation by Odysseus: *Od*. 5.474 (whether to stay on the river or sleep in the woods?), 6.145 (whether to take Nausicaa by the knee or keep at a distance?), 10.153 (whether go the house of Circe or back to the ships?), 24.239 (whether to tell Laertes all or try him first). Invariably, in dilemma's considering the most profitable line of action, the second alternative seems the more prudent. For the formula in connection with other persons, cf. *Il*. 13.458, 14.23, 16.652, *Od*. 15.204, 22.338. Elsewhere, at *Od*. 6.148, Od. speaks a κερδαλέον μῦθον to Nausicaa, 'a speech that is designed to bring him advantage': clothes and food (cf. Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.*). At *Od*. 11.358, he considers it κέρδιον to bring possessions with him to Ithaca, as this will make him seem more worthy of αἰδώc and thus further his safety (cf. Cairns (1993), 90, 113). At *Od*. 13.255, his cherishing a 'profitable plan' (νόον κερδαλέον) induces him to hide his identity to Athena, who cheerfully acknowledges his cunning deceit (13. 291f. κερδαλέοc κ' εἴη καὶ ἐπίκλοποc, ὅc cε παρέλθοι | ἐν πάντεccι δόλοιcι, καὶ εἰ θεὸc ἀντιάcειε. 'Intent on profit and a cunning cheat is the man who would surpass you in schemes of all kind, even if a god comes your way.'). Athena goes on to explain that they are both especially renowned for knowing κέρδεα (*Od*. 13.295, 13.297). It is only in his narration of the confrontation with the Cyclops, that Odysseus has to admit that it would have been κέρδιον (*Od*. 9.228) to leave immediately, as his comrades wished. Cf. Pucci (1987) 59n.13.

jects, suggest that it has not abated. Moreover, the passage echoes the even greater anger of Achilles at Agamemnon's insults. Achilles is in fact on the brink of losing *his* self-control when Athena intervenes:

> ὣς φάτο· Πηλεΐωνι δ' ἄχος γένετ', ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ
> στήθεσσιν λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν,
> ἢ ὅ γε φάσγανον ὀξὺ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ
> τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσειεν, ὁ δ' Ἀτρεΐδην ἐναρίζοι,
> ἦε χόλον παύσειεν ἐρητύσειέ τε θυμόν.
> ἧος ὃ ταῦθ' ὥρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,
> ἕλκετο δ' ἐκ κολεοῖο μέγα ξίφος, ἦλθε δ' Ἀθήνη
> οὐρανόθεν·
> (*Il.* 1.188-95)

> Thus he spoke. But the son of Peleus felt pain, and in his hairy chest his heart considered two possibilities, whether he should draw his sharp sword from his thigh and scatter the other men and kill Agamemnon, or stop his anger and restrain his θυμός. While he was considering this in his φρένες and θυμός, and already drew his big sword from its sheath, down came Athena from heaven.

In this passage, Achilles is about to be overcome by his anger, and it is only Athena who eventually manages to stop him and convince him that it is 'better' to listen to the gods and refrain from the killing (*Il.* 1.217). No doubt the hearer is invited to compare the two scenes, and to conclude that Odysseus has a different way of dealing with anger at insults than Achilles, and that he has a very good reason to do so.

What this discussion of the 'good sense' of the protagonists of the *Odyssey* has shown, I think, is that the comparative rarity of cαόφρων and cαοφροcύνη in Homer cannot be taken to imply that the *behaviour* associated with the concept elsewhere is in any sense undervalued in Homeric 'morality'. Rather, the very rich epic diction has specific poetic terms that are used in association with some aspects of what in the classical period would be called cωφροcύνη. The clearest example of this is Penelope, who appears as the very model of feminine ἀρετή, a superlative quality commended in the epic poems by περίφρων and ἐχέφρων rather than cαόφρων. Telemachus, on the other hand, *is* called cαόφρων when exhibiting the proper behaviour for a young man, and πεπνυμένος when showing an 'adult' kind of wisdom. Odysseus,

finally, shows great cunning and ingenuity (in later terminology
coφία or δεξιότης rather than cωφροcύνη), but also endurance
and control of anger, which are related to cωφροcύνη in fourth
century philosophical writings. Besides, he has a marked and
characteristic capacity for deliberation.

6. *Conclusion*

The present chapter has shown that in Homer, cαόφρων and
cαοφροcύνη are used in four ways: to describe a 'sound' state of
mind, responsibility for one's self-interest and quiet/submissive
respect of young men versus their elders, and of servants versus
their masters. (For an overview, see *Fig.* 3 in chapter 9.3.) Thus,
in Homer, the terms occur only in a limited number of situa-
tions, but in all these situations the 'other-regarding' notions of
quiet and obedient behaviour versus a superior are, directly or
indirectly, activated in the context, and this may point to a com-
parative centrality of these uses.

But though cωφροcύνη is clearly not the typical heroic quality,
this does not mean that the types of *behaviour* elsewhere com-
mended by cωφροcύνη are generally under-valued in Homer: the
epic diction is rich in expressions that criticise unacceptable be-
haviour in terms of a loss of φρένες, and besides, there is a large
number of terms that commend qualities rather similar to
cαοφροcύνη, including a range of epithets that describe aspects
of 'good sense', some of which will be seen to be typically ap-
praised in terms of cωφροcύνη in later Greek. Furthermore, epic
diction frequently employs αἰδώς and cognates, terms that desig-
nate an emotion-like inhibition. In view of all this, it is suggested
that it is the very richness of Homeric vocabulary above all that
accounts for the rarity of cαόφρων and cαοφροcύνη.

The next chapter, focusing on the late archaic poetry of the
Corpus Theognideum, will offer a radically different picture. Here
we meet the cωφροcύνη of men as citizens of the archaic πόλιc.
And where the words are used to apply to agents who have a far
more central position in society than boys and slaves, the terms
will be seen to be applied in a wider variety of ways, and to a far
larger number of situations and types of social interaction.

ARCHAIC POETRY

1. *Introduction:* cωφροcύνη *and the Male Citizen*

After Homer, we meet cώφρων and cognates again in late archaic poetry.[1] Here, we are confronted with a strikingly different range of uses. Most archaic poetry is of course firmly embedded in the life of the city state, hence we now meet cωφροcύνη as a quality of the free male citizen, who refrains from injustice against his fellow citizens, and tries to avoid civil strife (cτάcιc). (Section 2). A firm link between cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη emerges from the moral prescriptions of the *Corpus Theognideum* (379, 754, 756); and cωφροcύνη as a safeguard for εὐνομία and an antidote to cτάcιc is prominent both in one of the political poems of the *Corpus* (39-52) and in poems of Pindar (*Pae.* 1.10) and Bacchylides (13.182-9). All these poems betray a strongly elitist, aristocratic bias, and indeed from now on till the end of the fifth century, cωφροcύνη as a political quality seems to be a stock feature of aristocratic/oligarchic propaganda. (As far as we can see, it takes long, in fact until well *after* the political turmoils of the late fifth century for cωφροcύνη to gain comparable significance in the self-representation of democratic Athens: the orators, especially Isocrates, are our main witnesses here. In Thucydides and Aristophanes, by contrast, the terms often carry outspokenly elitist overtones.)

Apart from these political uses, archaic poetry also offers some glimpses of cωφροcύνη in private life (section 3). In the symposium poetry of the *Corpus Theognideum*, cωφροcύνη figures as the mental control which is lost in drunkenness (*Thgn.* 483, 497) and the untroubled state of mind of a man who is free from ἔρωc (*ibid.* 1326). Elsewhere, we first meet cωφροcύνη as the quality *par excellence* of the 'good wife' (Semonides 7.108), and as the 'prudence' of the man who saves his house by making sure that he gets such a wife (Hipponax fr. 182.1). And Pindar uses cώφρων

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[1] On the absence of the term cωφροcύνη in Hesiod, see p. 7 n.12.

in a consolatory poem for Hiero to praise Chiron, who taught
men to accept the limits of mortality (*P.* 3.63). This thought,
though apparently a standard phrase of consolation, is interest-
ing because it is linked to an idea prominent in tragedy (Aeschy-
lus, especially: see chapter 4) that cωφροcύνη enables man to ac-
cept the constraints of mortality and the superiority of the gods.

   2. *Political Uses of* cωφροcύνη: *Theognidea, Pindar, Bacchylides*

The poems of the so-called *Corpus Theognideum* — which stand
together not on account of their authorship strictly speaking,[2]
but because they belong to the context of the aristocratic sym-
posion, express essentially similar and distinctly 'aristocratic' val-
ues, and date from roughly the same epoch[3] — address a wide
range of themes proper to the aristocratic *symposion*, from love
and wine (and the proper ways to deal with these) to the various
moral prescriptions pertaining to the thoroughly aristocratic no-
tion of being a noble citizen. As such, they share the aim of im-
parting the political concerns and general values of the Me-

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   [2] Much of the discussion on the authorship has focused on the
interpretation of the poet's claim that there should be a *seal* (cφρῆγιc) on his
poetry (19-20). Some, e.g. Jacoby (1931), followed by West, have taken this to
refer to the name of the boy Cyrnus, and regard the poems where the vocatives
Κύρνε or Πολυπαΐδη occur as genuine. Jaeger (1945), 1.251-9, regards the
poet's own name (22-3) as the seal, and roughly regards the first part of the
collection (up to 237-54) and some later verses as genuine Theognis. For a
succinct and witty discussion of this view, see Van Groningen (1966), 446-9.
Apart from the identification of the cφρῆγιc, the interpretation of the word
itself has been disputed. Many take it as an expression of authorship;
Woodbury (1952), 20-41, has taken it as indicating ownership rather than
authorship, but fails to make the difference entirely clear. Ford (1985), 86,
takes it as connected with the codification and publication of a corpus of
aristocratic gnomological poetry; the *seal* then guarantees not the origin of the
verses, but their 'homogeneous political character and their aristocratic
provenience'.
   [3] West (1974), 65-71, takes 39-52 to be among the genuine works of
Theognis, and dates the lines to the time immediately before the rise of the
tyrant Theagenes., i.e. 640/630. Ancient chronographers, on the other hand,
give Olympiad 59 (i.e. ca. 544-541) as Theognis' *floruit*, probably in an attempt
to link Theognis to Phocylides. Their date is accepted by Podlecki (1984).
Lines 773ff. are almost certainly linked to the Persian invasion of 480. Nothing
in the *Corpus* is demonstrably later. On the general chronology of Megara, see
Figueira (1985).

garian aristocracy to younger members of their group.[4] This is
apparent almost from the outset, when after three introductory
invocations (1-10, 11-14, 15-18), the poet tells his addressee, the
boy Cyrnus, that he will kindly give him advice such as he himself
has learned from the ἀγαθοί, the nobles, in his youth (19-30).[5]
What makes the poems important for our purposes is that many
of them endorse cωφροcύνη as a full-fledged aristocratic value, a
virtue relevant not only to the ways in which the individual citi-
zen deals with the symposion-related phenomena of drink and
love, but also as a civic virtue that keeps truly 'good' citizens
from harming their peers.

Inextricably linked as it is with the life and views of the aris-
tocracy, much of the poetry centres on the question what it
means to have ἀρετή and be truly ἀγαθός and ἐcθλός,[6] qualities
that optimally involve descent from noble parents, a good educa-
tion and the acceptance of a number of 'aristocratic' values. The
values and qualities that the poems emphasise particularly in-
clude aversion to ὕβρις, adherence to δίκη, sense of measure,
endurance, cωφροcύνη. Of course it is generally impossible to
relate the poems to specific historic events on account of both

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[4] See West (1974), 11-2 and Patzer (1981), 203-7.

[5] 27-8: coì δ᾽ ἐγὼ εὖ φρονέων ὑποθήcομαι, οἷά περ αὐτός, | Κύρν᾽, ἀπὸ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν παῖc ἔτ᾽ ἐὼν ἔμαθον. 'I will kindly tell you what I myself, Cyrnus, learned
from the *agathoi* when I was still a boy.'

[6] For an excellent study of ἀγαθός, ἐcθλός and its opposites κακός and δειλός
in Theognis (and some parallels with Pindar), see Cerri (1968), 7-32. The
outcome of Cerri's discussion is that, in the *Theognidea*, the terms ἀγαθός and
ἐcθλός are reserved for those who combine high status with the appropriate
aristocratic moral education; κακός and δειλός are those who fall short in one of
these respects: 'Dunque ἀγαθός-ἐcθλός è colui che, appartenendo alla classe
aristocratica per γένος e πλοῦτος, ne ha compiutamente assimilato la γνώμη;
κακός-δειλός è chiunque sia privo di tale γνώμη, o perché, non appartenendo
alla classe aristocratica, non abbia ricevuto la παιδεία, o perché, pur
appartenendo alla classe aristocratica per γένος e πλοῦτος, non abbia tratto
giovamento, per intrinseca sordità morale, dall'educazione ricevuta.' (p. 24).
For a shorter discussion with essentially the same conclusions, see Von der Lahr
(1992), 19-22. Even in those poems where ἀγαθός and ἐcθλός overtly refer to
social classes (27-38, 39-52, 53-68, 183-6, 667-682, 891-4), it is nearly always
implied that ἀγαθοί also differ from κακοί on account of their 'moral
excellence' as well. The terms are used in a purely 'social' sense only in 57-8.
Here the context states that social roles are fully reversed: the present ἀγαθοί
are virtually savages who do not have any moral excellence, unlike the former
ἐcθλοί (οἱ πρὶν ἐcθλοί) who are now reduced to δειλοί, status-wise.

the scarcity of data on the history of Megara[7] and the essentially
gnomic nature (and uncertain provenance) of the majority of
the poems themselves. Yet they unmistakably suggest a defensive
attitude on the part of the elite, and their ideology seems to be
that of a privileged group that feels threatened by significant so-
cial and economical changes, changes which meant that high
birth and traditional education did no longer automatically go
together with the wealth and influence that was felt to accord
with it. In this respect, the 'promotion' of ϲωφροϲύνη to a central
'aristocratic' excellence must be due to the need to redefine tra-
ditional standards of excellence in order to re-substantiate an
elite's weakening claims to social superiority.[8]

   The social pressure felt by the poets is clearly in evidence in
lines 429-38, where the poet (whom we perhaps may identify as
Theognis on the testimony of Plato[9]) addresses the problem of
the 'bad' son of a 'good' father:

> φῦϲαι καὶ θρέψαι ῥᾷον βροτὸν ἢ φρένας ἐϲθλάς
>   ἐνθέμεν· οὐδείϲ πω τοῦτό γ᾽ ἐπεφράϲατο,
> ὧι τις ϲώφρον᾽ ἔθηκε τὸν ἄφρονα κἀκ κακοῦ ἐϲθλόν.
>   εἰ δ᾽ Ἀϲκληπιάδαιϲ τοῦτό γ᾽ ἔδωκε θεόϲ,
> ἰᾶϲθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰϲ φρέναϲ ἀνδρῶν,
>   πολλοὺϲ ἂν μιϲθοὺϲ καὶ μεγάλουϲ ἔφερον.
> εἰ δ᾽ ἦν ποιητόν τε καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,
>   οὔποτ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸϲ ἔγεντο κακόϲ,
> πειθόμενοϲ μύθοιϲι ϲαόφροϲιν· ἀλλὰ διδάϲκων
>   οὔποτε ποιήϲειϲ[10] τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ᾽ ἀγαθόν.
> (429-38)

   To beget and feed a human being is easier than to put noble
φρένεϲ in him. No one has yet found the device by which he has

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   [8] Adkins (1960), 75-9, gives a good account of the various ways in which this
can be done, though he seems to be one-sided in his account of the old
'values', stressing competitive excellence at the cost of anything else.
   [9] In *Men.* 95c9-96a2.
   [10] ποιήϲειϲ *o* Plato: -ηϲ P. Berol. 12310 (ostr.): ποιήϲει A. The reading of A is
difficult, as it lacks a subject, unless it is to be supplied from οὐδείϲ (430) and
τιϲ (431). Van Groningen's suggestion to take it as a second person middle is
implausible. The v.l. ποιήϲειϲ is supported by Pl. *Men.* 95e (and the third
century Berlin ostrakon, which, however, seems to depend on the text of Plato
rather than that of Theognis).

made ϲώφρων whoever is ἄφρων, or noble whoever is bad. If only
the sons of Asclepius had been given this ability by the god, to
cure badness and the blinded minds of men, they would have
made large sums on many occasions. If thought were a thing that
could be formed and put into a man, never would the son of a
good father be bad: he would listen to ϲαόφροϲιν words. But by
teaching you will never make the bad man good.

The poet expresses his concern that sometimes people, though
from noble birth, do not live up to the standards of their class,
and thus are not properly ϲώφρων and ἐϲθλόϲ. Thus, noble birth
is not a guarantee for ἀρετή, and is not a sufficient condition for
excellence. And, in the poet's sombre view, education is unable
to provide qualities that are not given by birth: it is unable to in-
still qualities that were not at least potentially given by nature.[11]

The gulf between the right mentality and the wrong one, is
similarly immense in 453-6:

> ὦνθρωπ', εἰ γνώμηϲ ἔλαχεϲ μέροϲ ὥϲπερ ἀνοίηϲ
>   καὶ ϲώφρων οὕτωϲ ὥϲπερ ἄφρων ἐγένου,
> πολλοῖϲ' ἂν ζηλωτὸϲ ἐφαίνεο τῶνδε πολιτῶν
>   οὕτωϲ ὥϲπερ νῦν οὐδενὸϲ ἄξιοϲ εἶ.
> (453-6)

> Sir, if only you had a share of sense, which you now completely
> lack, and were as ϲώφρων as in fact you are ἄφρων, you would
> seem enviable to many of the citizens of this town, as much as now
> you are utterly worthless.

Here is an addressee who apparently has some substantial assets
(wealth or power, probably) that would make him truly enviable
if only he had the right understanding (if only he had γνώμη
and were ϲώφρων) he now conspicuously lacks. And the poet
downplays these advantages by stressing the importance of this
type of mentality and insisting that one is worth nothing without
it.

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[11] The expression μύθοιϲι ϲαόφροϲι in 437 (and, again, μύθωι ϲώφρονι in
756) predicates what is properly speaking the quality of the agent to the agent's
utterances. This is of course a natural extension of the use of the adjective,
given that the quality of ϲωφροϲύνη typically manifests itself in the agent's words
and deeds.

What does this mentality of ϲωφροϲύνη entail, then? The gno-
mic poems quoted above tell us little about it, but there are oth-
ers which say a little more. In 753-6, one learns that a 'just' way of
acquiring goods is a sign of ϲωφροϲύνη:

> ταῦτα μαθών, φίλ' ἑταῖρε, δικαίωϲ χρήματα ποιοῦ,
>   ϲώφρονα θυμὸν ἔχων ἐκτὸϲ ἀταϲθαλίηϲ,
> ἀεὶ τῶνδ' ἐπέων μεμνημένοϲ· εἰϲ δὲ τελευτήν
>   αἰνήϲειϲ μύθωι ϲώφρονι πειθόμενοϲ.
> (753-6)

> Understand this, dear friend, and acquire goods in a just way,
> keeping a ϲώφρων θυμόϲ free from recklessness, always keeping
> these utterances in mind; and in the end, you will say it is a good
> thing to give heed to ϲώφρων advise.

The thought that one should not acquire wealth 'unjustly', what-
ever that may mean exactly,[12] recurs throughout the corpus. In
29-30, the poet tells his addressee Cyrnus that he should not ac-
quire honour, excellence and affluence through ugly and unjust
deeds.[13] In a famous double couplet that is probably the most
radical statement of the idea, poverty is said to be preferable to
'unjust' wealth, and δικαιοϲύνη is claimed to be the single neces-
sary and sufficient condition for virtue.[14] And in 197-208, wealth
that comes from Zeus in a rightful manner and in a 'pure' way
(καθαρῶϲ, 198), is contrasted with unjust riches acquired by
someone who has his mind set on κέρδοϲ (φιλοκερδέϊ θυμῶι,
199): the former will last, whereas the latter will not.[15] Justice can

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[12] None of the poems is very explicit about this, though it is not
infrequently (e.g. 200, 745, 1139, 1147) suggested that such injustice is
accompanied by perjury and deceit.

[13] 29-30, πέπνυϲο, μηδ' αἰϲχροῖϲιν ἐπ' ἔργμαϲι μηδ' ἀδίκοιϲιν | τιμὰϲ μηδ'
ἀρετὰϲ ἕλκεο μηδ' ἄφενοϲ. ('Be sensible, and do not employ disgraceful and
unjust deeds to seize honour and privileges or wealth.')

[14] 145-8 βούλεο δ' εὐϲεβέων ὀλίγοιϲ ϲὺν χρήμαϲιν οἰκεῖν | ἢ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκωϲ
χρήματα παϲάμενοϲ. | ἐν δὲ δικαιοϲύνηι ϲυλλήβδην πᾶϲ' ἀρετή 'ϲτι, | πᾶϲ δέ τ'
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθόϲ, Κύρνε, δίκαιοϲ ἐών. ('You should rather show respect and live with
little property, than to be rich if you have earned your possessions in an unjust
manner. In justice resides the whole of ἀρετή taken together, and every man is
ἀγαθόϲ, provided he is just.')

[15] 197ff. χρῆμα δ' ὃ μὲν Διόθεν καὶ ϲὺν δίκηι ἀνδρὶ γένηται | καὶ καθαρῶϲ, αἰεὶ
παρμόνιμον τελέθει. | εἰ δ' ἀδίκωϲ παρὰ καιρὸν ἀνὴρ φιλοκερδέι θυμῶι | κτήϲεται,
εἴθ' ὅρκωι πὰρ τὸ δίκαιον ἑλών, | αὐτίκα μέν τι φέρειν κέρδοϲ δοκεῖ, ἐϲ δὲ τελευτήν
| αὖθιϲ ἔγεντο κακόν. ('A property that comes from Zeus and with justice, in a
pure manner, is something that will stay forever. But if a man will get it
unjustly, at the wrong time, with a heart set on profit, or takes it by means of an

be pushed aside by desire for profit (κέρδος)[16] as it can by ἀναιδείη and ὕβρις.[17]

We have, then, roughly, two contrasted types of citizens: one type shows concern for δίκη, has αἰδώς and is cώφρων, the other practices ἄδικα, is given to ὕβρις and lusts for κέρδος. In real life, of course, it is not always clear that the former is better off. But in 197-108, the conviction is expressed that the gods will make unjust men pay for their trespasses in the end, though some may die before receiving their due (207-8). Other poems are less optimistic: in 373ff., Zeus is scolded for giving unjust and just men the same share, even though he is supposed to know the minds of all:

Ζεῦ φίλε, θαυμάζω cε· cὺ γὰρ πάντεccιν ἀνάccεις
  τιμὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μεγάλην δύναμιν·
ἀνθρώπων δ' εὖ οἶcθα νόον καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάcτου·
  cὸν δὲ κράτος πάντων ἔcθ' ὕπατον, βαcιλεῦ.
πῶς δή cευ, Κρονίδη, τολμᾶι νόος ἄνδρας ἀλιτρούς
  ἐν ταὐτῆι μοίρηι τόν τε δίκαιον ἔχειν,
ἤν τ' ἐπὶ cωφροcύνην τρεφθῆι νόος ἤν τε πρὸς ὕβριν
  ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκοιc' ἔργμαcι πειθομένων;
(373-80)

Dear Zeus, you astonish me: you reign over all, having honour yourself as well as great power. Concerning men, you well know the mind and θυμός of each of them, and your power is the very highest, my king. How then, son of Cronus, can your νόος dare to hold villains and the just man in the same esteem, whether the mind of men is set on cωφροcύνη or turns to ὕβρις, succumbing to unjust deeds.

Once again, then, we have cωφροcύνη in a socio-political context, associated with being δίκαιος, and contrasted to ὕβρις. In these contexts, as we have seen, cωφροcύνη commends the ability to practise restraint in civic life, especially to refrain from making

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oath contrary to justice, it will seem to bring some gain at first, but turns out to be bad in the end.')

[16] 465-6 ἀμφ' ἀρετῆι τρίβου καί τοι τὰ δίκαια φίλ' ἔcτω, | μηδέ cε νικάτω κέρδος, ὅ τ' αἰcχρὸν ἔηι. ('Stick to ἀρετή and consider what is just to be yours. Never let profit that is ugly get the better of you.')

[17] 291-2 αἰδὼς μὲν γὰρ ὄλωλεν, ἀναιδείη δὲ καὶ ὕβρις | νικήcαcα δίκην γῆν κατὰ πᾶcαν ἔχει. ('Αἰδώς is lost, shamelessness and ὕβρις have the whole world in their grip.')

profit in unjust ways. It is thus the expression of an unmistakably 'conservative', 'elitist' ideology.

Now this combination of cωφροcύνη and justice clearly is the ideal, but it is equally clear that these qualities are by no means always rewarded, and that the ideal is by no means shared by all. In 701, the 'cωφροcύνη of Rhadamanthys'[18] is included among those virtues that most people value less highly than wealth (πλουτεῖν, 700). Elsewhere, in 665f., it is said that the cώφρων fails to achieve his ends (665, καὶ cώφρων ἥμαρτε) whereas many times an ἄφρων has gained a good reputation (δόξα). Bleakest of all is the picture of the very Hesiodean lines 1135ff., where *Elpis* is said to be the only goddess left on earth now that *Pistis*, *Sôphrosyne*, and the *Charites* have all gone, with the result that people do not respect oaths anymore, and have no reverence for the gods.[19]

Occasionally, the ideology sketched above is applied more directly to the political situation in the poet's πόλις. Near the beginning of the collection, there are two poems that explicitly address political topics. The first of these, lines 39-52,[20] deplores

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[18] Once again, it is impossible to decide from the context which quality exactly the expression commends, though it will very likely be Rhadamanthys' righteousness and integrity as a judge in the netherworld. Pi. *P.* 2.73-4 praises him for his irreproachable φρένες and integrity, ὁ δὲ Ῥαδάμανθυς εὖ πέπραγεν, ὅτι φρενῶν | ἔλαχε καρπὸν ἀμώμητον, οὐδ' ἀπάταιcι θυμὸν τέρπεται ἔνδοθεν. Ibycus (fr. 28 Page) speaks of Ῥαδαμάνθυος τοῦ δικαίου. Cf. also Pl. *Ap.* 41a-b, and see the remarks of Cobb-Stevens in Figueira and Nagy (1985) 173.

[19] Ἐλπὶς ἐν ἀνθρώποιcι μόνη θεὸς ἐcθλὴ ἔνεcτιν, | ἄλλοι δ' Οὔλυμπόν⟨δ'⟩ ἐκπρολιπόντες ἔβαν· |ᾤχετο μὲν Πίcτιc, μεγάλη θεόc, ᾤχετο δ' ἀνδρῶν | Cωφροcύνη, Χάριτές τ', ὦ φίλε, γῆν ἔλιπον· | ὅρκοι δ' οὐκέτι πιcτοὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποιcι δίκαιοι, | οὐδὲ θεοὺς οὐδεὶc ἅζεται ἀθανάτουc. |εὐcεβέων δ' ἀνδρῶν γένοc ἔφθιτο, οὐδὲ θέμιcταc | οὐκέτι γινώcκουc' οὐδὲ μὲν εὐcεβίαc. (1135-42) '*Elpis* is the only noble goddess among people, the others have left us and gone to Olympos. Gone is *Pistis*, the great goddess, gone is men's cωφροcύνη, and the *Graces*, my dear boy, have left the earth. Rightful oaths are no longer to be trusted amongst men, and nobody has any reverence for the immortal gods. The race of respectful men has gone, and they do not know anything about rights and respect anymore.'

[20] Following Carrière (1948), Garzya (1955), Young (1961) a.o., I take verses 39-52 to be a single, continuous poem. Some commentators, among them Kroll (1936) and Van Groningen (1966), take line 43 to be the start of a new poem, but the thought of these lines seems to be entirely consistent, and the elements of *Ringkomposition* between lines 39-40 and 51-2 (πόλιc ἥδε – πόλει τῆιδε, ἄνδρα εὐθυντῆρα – μούναρχοι) seems decisive in favour of the unitarian view. For a full discussion of the matter, see Von der Lahr (1992) 11-17.

the ὕβρις of some of the present 'leaders', and addresses the imminent dangers of cτάcιc:

Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἥδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκηι ἄνδρα
    εὐθυντῆρα κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετέρης.
ἀστοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔθ' οἵδε cαόφρονες, ἡγεμόνες δέ
    τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεcεῖν.
οὐδεμίαν πω, Κύρν', ἀγαθοὶ πόλιν ὤλεcαν ἄνδρες,
    ἀλλ' ὅταν ὑβρίζειν τοῖcι κακοῖcιν ἅδηι
δῆμόν τε φθείρουcι δίκας τ' ἀδίκοιcι διδοῦcι
    οἰκείων κερδέων εἵνεκα καὶ κράτεος·
ἔλπεο μὴ δηρὸν κείνην πόλιν ἀτρεμέεcθαι,
    μηδ' εἰ νῦν κεῖται πολλῆι ἐν ἡcυχίηι,
εὖτ' ἂν τοῖcι κακοῖcι φίλ' ἀνδράcι ταῦτα γένηται,
    κέρδεα δημοcίωι cὺν κακῶι ἐρχόμενα.
ἐκ τῶν γὰρ cτάcιέc τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν
    μούναρχοί τέ· πόλει μήποτε τῆιδε ἅδοι.
(39-52)[21]

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[21] I generally follow the text printed by West, but in line 45 prefer φθείρουcι and διδοῦcιν (the reading of the oldest ms. A) to the subjunctives read by the *recentiores*, which look distinctly like a misguided attempt at syntactic 'normalisation'. However, pace Van Groningen (1966) 29 and Von der Lahr (1992), 14, I do not think that φθείρουcι and διδοῦcι can be taken as participles here, for two reasons:
(1) It is inconceivable that the present participles, connected with τοῖcι κακοῖcιν, expand the *dynamic* infinitive ὑβρίζειν, expressing what the κακοί *plan* or *intend* to do, rather than what they are doing already.
(2) The interpretation of φθείρουcι and διδοῦcι requires a strained interpretation of ἀλλ' ὅταν. As far as I have been able to establish, ἀλλ' ὅταν is used in contrasted expressions in two types of contexts:
- (I) 'Now/normally/often *x*, but when *y*..., then something else': e.g. Pi. *P.* 8. 95-7 cκιᾶς ὄναρ | ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ' ὅταν αἴγλα διόcδοτος ἔλθηι, | λαμπρὸν φέγγος ἔπεστιν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μείλιχος αἰών. Cf. S. *El.* 437, E. *Hel.* 296, *Or.* 773, Ar. *Ra.* 753 &c. Expressions with ἀλλ' ὅταν at the beginning of oracles that hint at an unexpected change of fortune/situation belong also to this type: Hdt. 1.55, 3.57, 6.77, 8.77.
- (II) 'Not now/normally *x*, but when *y*, (then indeed *x*)': e.g. Ar. *V.* 482-3 ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν οὐδὲν ἀλγεῖς, ἀλλ' ὅταν ξυνήγορος | ταὐτὰ ταῦτά cου κατανtλῆι καὶ ξυνωμότας καλῆι, '*Right now, you do not feel pain, but* (you will) *when* …'. Cf. Ar. *Pa* 338, *Av.* 967, *Lys.* 1019, Th. 2.11.6, X. *Mem.* 1.4.14, *Smp. 6.2* &c.
Here, the gnomic line 43 indicates that this is an example of construction (I); Von der Lahr's translation, '*das geschieht* aber *immer*, wenn es den Verkommenen zu freveln beliebt, *indem* sie das einfache Volk korrumpieren und den Ungerechten Recht sprechen' [my italics], tries to convert it into one of type (II).
After the subordinate clause ὅταν ὑβρίζειν … ἅδηι, one expects either a main clause expressing what happens when the κακοί decide to commit ὕβρις, or a continuation of the subordinate clause. φθείρουcι and διδοῦcι, if taken as

Cyrnus, this city is pregnant, and I am afraid that she may beget a man to correct our bad ὕβρις. For these citizens here are still *saophrones*, but the leaders are about to lapse into great κακότης. Never yet, Cyrnus, have good men ruined any city, but when it pleases the bad to commit acts of ὕβρις, they ruin the people and pass judgement in favour of the unjust for the sake of their own profit and power. Do not imagine such a city to be peaceful for long — not even if it is now in a state of utter tranquillity — when its bad men decide that they are pleased with such things: profits coming along at the people's expense. For this leads to strife, civil manslaughter and monarchs: may this city of ours never be attracted to such things.

In the first couplet, the poet tells his addressee, Cyrnus, that the city is 'pregnant', and that it is to be expected that it will produce a man to 'set straight' 'our' bad ὕβρις, which apparently means a tyrant.[22] This ὕβρις of the elite is contrasted to the behaviour of the common citizens, who still remain cαόφρονεc.[23] It is not im-

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indicatives, provide us with the former: 'but when the κακοί wish to commit ὕβρις, they ruin the people and pass sentence in favour of the unjust'.
Two possible objections to this interpretation are not decisive:
(1) τε .. . τε at the start of the main clause is no serious difficulty: cf. *Il.* 17.128-9 ἀλλ' ὅτε δή ῥ' ἐν τοῖcιν ἐλίξεται ἀλκὶ πεποιθώc, | ἄψ τ' ἀνεχώρηcαν διά τ' ἔτρεcαν ἄλλυδιc ἄλλοc.
(2) Nor is the asyndeton at 47 impossibly harsh, especially in view of the imperative ἔλπεο. Cf. line 29 πέπνυcο.
At line 47, I revert to the mss.' ἀτρεμέεcθαι, see Van Groningen *ad loc.*
[22] The v.l. ὑμετέρηc, which appear in the later mss. OXDUrI is to be discarded. As Van Groningen (1966) *ad loc.* states, this would implausibly suggest that the poet excludes himself from these *hybristic* circles, but includes young Cyrnus. Such a distance between poet and addressee seems unlikely.
[23] Cf. Kroll (1936), 115; Van Groningen (1966), 27. The qualification cαόφρονεc should not be taken to imply that Theognis in any sense identifies with these common citizens (pace Nagy, who claims for the poet 'a more even-handed, 'Solonian' stance', see Figueira and Nagy (1985), 46). The poet simply notes, with evident relief, that the commons still know their place and do not (yet) revolt.
Von der Lahr (1992), 26-31 argues that ἀcτοί here refers to a select number of *uncorrupted* leaders. (A similar interpretation of ἀcτοί was offered by Hasler (1959), 35-8.)
But in the two key passages for his argument, ἀcτοί refers either to parvenus (61 μηδένα τῶνδε φίλον ποιεῦ Πολυπαΐδη ἀcτῶν, where the term refers to farmers who are now influential inhabitants of the city) or to the population of the city proper in general (191, where the γένοc ἀcτῶν is said to 'become dim' (μαυροῦcθαι) by intermarriage with 'bad' citizens). In fact, ἀcτόc is a common word for an ordinary citizen living in the city itself, cf. Thuc. 6.54.2 on Aristogeiton (ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀcτῶν), where the author shows an unmistakable sense of superiority over his 'common' subject.

mediately stated what this means exactly, because the poet first
dwells on the transgressions of the 'leaders',[24] who commit all
the typical transgressions decried throughout the corpus: unlike
real ἀγαθοί, these depraved leaders ruin[25] the *dêmos* and pass un-
just sentences for the sake of their own profit and power. The
danger of such a situation is that such a city is not undisturbed
(ἀτρεμέεcθαι, 47) for long, even if it now 'lies in great calm'
(κεῖται πολλῆι ἐν ἡcυχίηι, 48). Clearly, the ἀcτοί who are
wronged are likely to revolt, and the present state of ἡcυχία will
last only as long as they are *still* (43) cαόφρονεc. The cωφροcύνη
of the ἀcτοί, then, means that they refrain from revolt and
cτάcιc. This is confirmed after a restatement of the ὕβριc of the
leaders (49-50)[26]: such injustice leads to strife (51, cτάcιεc), civil
manslaughter (ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν) and, finally, the rise of a
tyrant (μούναρχοι) (51-2). As it turns out, the citizens'
cωφροcύνη, which is still there but under considerable pressure,
shows that they still commendably refrain from revolting against
the 'bad' leaders, and thus give some hope that the dreaded tyr-
anny may still be avoided.

In this poem, then, we grasp the full dimension of cωφροcύνη
in the oligarchic πόλιc: in the ideal situation, the cωφροcύνη of
influential citizens who refrain from injustice is balanced by the
'quietness' of the common citizens, who have no need to revolt
against such injustice. The preservation of this balance will guar-

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[24] West (1974), 68-9 takes ἡγέμονεc as referring exclusively to 'popular
leaders' or champions of democracy. This view is not supported by Solon 4.7W,
where δήμου θ' ἡγεμόνων equally refers in general terms to those in power.
Moreover, if the poet specifically addresses the *kakotês* of a group from which
he tends to dissociate himself most strongly, it would be almost inevitable to
adopt the v.l. ὑμετέρηc in line 40, which effects an unwanted distance to his
addressee. See Fisher (1992), 208-9, Nagy (1985), 43 and Von der Lahr (1992),
23-4. For the passage of Solon, see Donlan (1970), 388-90.

[25] φθείρουcι must mean 'ruin' rather than 'corrupt'; Van Groningen (1966)
29: 'la plèbe est ameutée, excitée par des promesses illicites'; cf. Von der Lahr
(1992) 49-50). See, eg. Hes. *Th.* 876 (ναύταc), Hdt. 2.133 (ἀποκληίcαντεc τὰ ἱρὰ
καὶ θεῶν οὐ μεμνημένοι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺc ἀνθρώπουc φθείροντεc), Sem. Iamb. fr.
1.12-3 (τοὺc δὲ δύcτηνοι βροτῶν | φθείρουcι νόcοι); A. *P.* 244 etc. (φθεῖραι
cτρατόν), Th. 1.24.6 (δεόμενοι μὴ cφᾶc περιορᾶν φθειρομένουc) etc. In this
context, the 'ruin' seems to be of a material nature.

[26] As Van Groningen points out, 49-50 repeats the thought of 44-6 in
somewhat different terms. There are more elements of *Ringkomposition* in the
poem as a whole: μούναρχοι (52) echoes ἄνδρα | εὐθυντῆρα (39-40) and πόλει
τῆιδε (52) echoes πόλιc ἥδε (39).

antee the stability of the city as a whole, and thus to prevent the disasters of civil strife and, eventually, tyranny.[27]

The adaptation of lines 39-42 at 1081-1082b does not show much that is essentially different. Again, it is political instability (cτάcιc) that the poet fears most, and lines 1081-2 state the poet's fear that the πόλιc may produce a leader of a revolt, ἄνδρα | ὑβριcτήν, χαλεπῆc ἡγέμονα cτάcιοc, 'a man given to ὕβριc, leader of unbearable strife'.

This praise of cωφροcύνη as a safeguard for the stability of the city is paralleled in a number of passages from Pindar and Bacchylides. Εὐνομία cαόφρων is addressed in Ba. 13.186, near the end of a poem celebrating the Aeginetan Pytheas' pankration victory in Nemea:

> Καὶ μὰν φερεκυδέα ν[ᾶcον]
> Αἰακοῦ τιμᾶι, cὺν Εὐκλεί-
>   αι δὲ φιλοcτεφ[άνωι] πό-
>   λιν κυβερνᾶι,
> Εὐνομία τε cαόφρων,
> ἃ θαλίαc τε λέλογχεν
> ἄcτεά τ' εὐcεβέων ἀν-
>   δρῶν ἐν εἰ[ρ]ήναι φυλάccει.
> (Ba. 13.182-9)

> And she (Areta) does really honour the renowned island of Aeacus, and together with violet-crowned Εὐκλεία she governs the city, both she and cώφρων Εὐνομία, who is in charge of festivals, and guards the cities of respectful men in peace.

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[27] I do not engage in the discussion on the date and provenance of this poem. West (1974), 68, dates these lines to the period immediately before the rise of the tyrant Theagenes., i..e. 640/630, on the argument that the poem could not have been written in this form if it had been composed after Megara had itself experienced tyranny. This early date is incompatible, however, with the poem's supposed dependency on Solon fr. 4W. Hence Von der Lahr (1992), 10, opts for a later date, and denies a Megarian origin. By contrast, Campbell (1976) 289-90 argues that nothing in the poem excludes a previous tyranny in Megara, and relates the poem to the period of the 'unbridled democracy' that, according to Plutarch (*Mor.* 295 C-D) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1302b) the Megarians established soon after expelling Theagenes: 'It seems to me that all of Theognis makes sense if it is regarded as written during the Megarian democracy.' But see n. 24 above.

The passage seems to suggest that there was a serious threat of internal discord at the time in Aegina, and this is likely to reflect considerable tension between the aristocratic rulers of the island and a pro-Athenian, democratically oriented faction among the population: the poem must have been performed not long after the all-out war between Aegina and Athens described by Herodotus (6.73, 85-93), during which some Aeginetans defected to the enemy.[28] We cannot be sure whether the chronological connection between the two events is very close, but the poem itself suggests that both the internal instability and the anti-Athenian sentiments among the majority of the Aeginetans are still strong: the very defensive tone of the poet's praise of the youth's Athenian trainer, 13.190-209, is a strong piece of internal evidence for an anti-Athenian stance, and this is confirmed by the curt and grudging praise of the trainer in Pi. *N.* 5.48-9, composed for the same occasion.

If the combined problems of external hostility from Athens and internal conflicts are indeed the poem's historical background, the long second myth of the poem (13. 100-169) is highly relevant indeed: it focuses on the mighty figure of Ajax, son of Telamon, who stands his ground protecting the Greek ships from the Trojan invaders, while the other great grand-son of Aeacus, Achilles, is absent from the battle due to his conflict with Agamemnon. Thus, the myth seems to function as a carefully crafted piece of propaganda in two ways: on the one hand, the pernicious consequences of Achilles' absence illustrate the dangers of internal discord, and thus subtly dissuade from στάϲιϲ, while the figure of Ajax, standing as a mighty bulwark against the furious onslaught of the Trojans, seems to reflect on the role of

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[28] For the date of the fighting described by Herodotus, see Figueira (1988), 49-89. According to him, the ambush on the Athenian θεωρίϲ must have taken place in the spring of 489 or 488 BC, the hostilities that followed a considerable number of months later, in the summer season of 489, 488 or 487. The most commonly proposed date for Ba. 13 and Pi. *N.* 5 is 485 BC. For references see Pfeijffer (1995) 318-332, who arrives at 485 as the earliest possible date for both poems on the internal evidence of references in Pindar and Bacchylides to Aeginetan victories prior to Phylacidas' Isthmian victory of 478 (*I.* 5). Pfeijffer prefers 487 as a date for Ba. 13 and *N.* 5, in which case the poems may have been performed during the war, but even if 485 is correct, it is only self-evident that the impact of the hostilities is still strong.

his historical descendants, the oligarchic leaders who defend the island against the strong Athenian neighbours.

In accordance with this two-fold message of the myth, the praise of Aegina that stands at its close, suggests that the island is honoured by both 'Virtue', Ἀρετά, 176 (paralleling the martial prowess of Ajax), and cαόφρων Εὐνομία (186), the state of internal political stability that is the opposite of the internal discord decried in the myth. So the poem makes very good sense if read against the background of (recent or imminent) war and civil strife in Aegina.

As in Theognis 41, then, cαόφρων commends the good sense of those common citizens who acquiesce in the status quo, and refrain from civil strife and cτάcιc. An unmistakable 'aristocratic' bias is common to both poems: while Theognis' poems suggest that all is well as long as the power is in the hands of those who are really ἀγαθοί, Bacchylides subtly dissuades his public from cτάcιc (and apparently from pro-Athenian 'democratic' sentiments), and seems to suggest that they should come to terms with their traditional 'aristocratic' governors again.

So Bacchylides 13 suggests that cωφροcύνη was an important catch-word used by the Aeginetan elite to advertise the 'stabilising' effects of their regime. Two Aeginetan poems by Pindar offer support for this assumption, by claiming cαοφροcύνη as a quality of the mythical ancestors of the Aeginetan leaders, Aeacus and his grandsons. In Pi. *I.* 8, the poet stresses the Aeginetans' grief at the losses of the recent Persian wars.[29] Accordingly, the quality of cωφροcύνη is not directly connected to the political theme of εὐνομία here; rather, it applies to the mythical ancestors of the Aeginetans, the offspring of Aeacus, of whom it is said that

> τοῦ μὲν ἀντίθεοι
> ἀρίcτευον υἱέες υἱ-
>   έων τ' ἀρηίφιλοι παῖδες ἀνορέαι,
> χάλκεον cτονόεντ' ἀμφέπειν ὅμαδον
> cώφρονές τ' ἐγένοντο πινυτοί τε θυμόν.
> (Pi. I. 8. 24-26)

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[29] See for a discussion of the date Carey (1981) 184.

> His godlike sons and warrior-grandsons excelled on account of their manliness, in going about the bronze groaning din of war, and they were ϲώφρονεϲ and intelligent in spirit.

It seems reasonable to suppose that it is Peleus who is the best example of a ϲώφρων descendant of Aeacus, not only on account of the general tradition but also because he is called εὐϲεβέϲτατον at line 40. By contrast, the most notable example of a descendant excelling in ἀνορέα is of course Achilles (not for nothing, it is the grandsons rather than the sons of Aeacus who are distinguished with the epithet ἀρηΐφιλοι in line 24): his ἀρετά is mentioned and described in 48ff. Ajax is of course another grandson of Aeacus, but he does not play a further role in the ode.[30]

It is not stated here how Peleus' ϲωφροϲύνη manifested itself, but it seems quite likely that the terms alludes to his resistance to the amorous attempts of Hippolyta, wife of Acastus, an episode treated by the poet at some length in Pi. *N.* 5.26-37. Aristophanes alludes to the same story when he makes his Stronger Argument claim that Peleus got his knife on account of his ϲωφροϲύνη (*Nu.* 1067).[31]

Does Peleus' ϲωφροϲύνη reflect in any sense on his historical descendants? Achilles' ἀρετά certainly does: it is explicitly connected in the final strophe with the athletic prowess of Nicocles (61-65) and his nephew Cleandrus, who does his uncle's memory[32] proud (65a-70). And since the historical Aeginetans obviously take after their mythical ancestors in physical excellence, there may be a subliminal suggestion that they have got a share of the race's quieter qualities as well, which suggests that they are 'good' and 'moderate' rulers who further the political and social stability of Aegina. But it is the athletic excellence of the family that is emphasised here, and this emphasis on physical manliness is perhaps not surprising in a poem that clearly belongs to the immediate aftermath of the Persian wars.

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[30] Cf. Carey (1981) 206.

[31] Another allusion to Peleus' surpassing ϲωφροϲύνη is Pl. *R.* 391c2.

[32] Köhnken (1975) has suggested that Nicocles may well have been a victim in the Persian wars. But Pindar does not tell us so, and it is strange that, if the similarity between Nicocles and Achilleus is actually even greater than it now seems, the poet should have failed to exploit this. See Carey (1981) 186-7.

Something similar seems to be the case with *Paean* VI (Maehler), once again a poem that shows a link to Aegina.[33] In line 144, another member of the house of Aeacus is called ϲωφρο]νέϲτατον. This time, it is most likely to be Aeacus himself, and it may well be his capacity for settling disputes that is envisaged here, especially in view of the reference to the ϲτυγὸϲ ὅρκιον (155) and the verb δικάϲαι (156). The lacunae in this context do not allow us to infer more, but taken together the two poems seem to suggest that, if the poet repeatedly addressed the ϲωφροϲύνη of the Aeacids, the term must have been important for the members of the historical Aeginetan elite.

Where Bacchylides stresses the importance of ϲαόφρων Εὐνομία for the Aeginetans, Pindar does the same in connection with the Thebans, at the close of the fragmentary first Paean:

> πρὶν ὀδυνηρὰ γήραος ϲ[. . . . μ]ο̣λεῖν,
> πρίν τιϲ εὐθυμίαι ϲκιαζέτω
> νόημ' ἄκοτον ἐπὶ μέτρα, ἰδών
> [—]δύναμιν οἰκόθετον.
> ἰ]ὴ ἰή, νῦν ὁ παντελὴϲ Ἐνιαυτόϲ
> Ὧρα[ί] τε Θεμίγονοι
> πλάξ]ιππον ἄϲτυ Θήβαϲ ἐπῆλθον
> Ἀπόλ]λωνι δαῖτα φιληϲιϲτέφανον ἄγοντεϲ·
> Παιὰ]ν δὲ λαῶν γενεὰν δαρὸν ἐρέπτοι
> ϲώ]φρονοϲ ἄνθεϲιν εὐνομίαϲ.
> (Pi. *Pa.* 1.5-10)

> Before the painful .. of old age come near, let a man first put in the shadow of happiness his mind, free of anger, in due measure, if he sees the supply stored in his home.
> Iê, Iê, now the completed Year and the Seasons, born of Themis, have come to the horse-driving city of Thebes, bringing a garland-accompanied meal to Apollo. Long may Paian crown the offspring of its people with the flowers of ϲώφρων εὐνομία.

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[33] This is explicitly the case for the third triad, subtitled Αἰγ[ινήτα]ιϲ | εἰ]ϲ Αἰα[κό]ν |]προϲ[ό]διον. It is not clear how this section relates exactly to the first two triads (partly lost), which are said to be composed 'for the Delphinians in honour of Pytho' (Δελφοῖϲ εἰϲ Πυθώ). The second of these seems relevant to Aegina as well, since it recounts the deeds and death of two great Aeacids, Achilles and Neoptolemus. For a full discussion of this problem, see now Rutherford (2001) 298-338.

The context here suggests an annual (ἐνιαυτός, ὧραι) festival connected with the time of harvest (4, δύναμιν οἰκόθετον) and the image of the 'flowers' of εὐνομία stresses the idea of fertility and productivity. The context suggests peace and serenity rather than discord and danger; there are no dark shadows here, except for the happiness that eases the mind like a protecting shadow.

Unfortunately, we do not have a date for the poem, but here again, we seem to have a reflection of the cares of an aristocratic regime under pressure both on account of inner-political tensions and the threat of a strong democratic neighbour, Athens.[34] Something of the same tension is felt in *Paian* IX Maehler, again composed for Thebes, where the poet addresses the sun and asks for the reason of its recent eclipse (the date may be that of the partial eclipse of 17 February 478, or perhaps more probably the complete eclipse of 30 April 463[35]), and includes war (πολέμοιο … τινός, 13) and civil strife (15, cτάciν οὐλομέναν) among the catastrophes that such an eclipse may portend for the city. Later on, in the mythological part of the same poem, we are told that Thebes was entrusted by Apollo to the care of Tenerus, ἀνορέας … ἕκατι cαόφρονος (9.52), on account of his *saophron* manliness. Tenerus is thus a mythological model ruler of Thebes, and seems to be the paradigm for the oligarchs of the present, just as the sons of Aeacus were for the Aeginetans. Moreover, he exhibits much the same qualities as the Aeacids did, combining the ἀνορέα of the heroic warrior with the cαοφροcύνη characteristic of the self-presentation of a conservative and 'moderate' aristocratic regime.

The theme of cτάcιc threatening the stability of the good aristocratic hegemony is relevant to yet another fragment of a Theban poem, Partheneion fr. 94, where the family of Aeoladas is said to have incurred 'hateful strife' (ἐχθρὰν [ἔ]ριν) on account of their cώφρων care for the city (62, ἔνε[κε]ν μερίμναc cώφρονοc).

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[34] For a description of the fragmentary evidence on the history of Thebes after the Persian Wars, and on the conflict with Athens leading up to a decade of Athenian hegemony in Boiotia after the battle of Oinophyta in 457 BC, see Demand (1982), 27-35.

[35] See Boll (1909), 2354-5, Rutherford (2001), 192.

Thus, the fragmentary evidence from Pindar and Bacchylides offers essentially the same picture of political cωφροcύνη as the poems of the *Corpus Theognideum*: cωφροcύνη is a quality both of the 'good' aristocratic leaders who refrain from injustice against their subjects, and of those citizens who acquiesce in the status quo and refrain from cτάcιc. This political use of cωφροcύνη clearly reflects the interests of an elite under pressure, intent on preserving the existing social order. All of these poems do indeed betray a distinctly 'aristocratic' bias. It can hardly be a coincidence that the rhetoric of cαόφρων εὐνομία figures prominently in poems composed for aristocratic regimes, and plays no role, for instance, in Pindar's extensive and very different propaganda for the tyrants of Syracuse. cωφροcύνη thus emerges as a slogan in praise of moderate oligarchy. As we will see in chapter 7 (Thucydides), it is still used in this way near the end of the fifth century, although Thucydides' treatment suggests that this use of the terms as a political slogan has become increasingly problematic.

3. cωφροcύνη *in Private Life*

The emergence of cωφροcύνη as an oligarchic value in the poems of Theognis, Pindar and Bacchylides, is perhaps the most striking use of the term in archaic poetry. In other poems, however, we also have some glimpses of cωφροcύνη in the private life of the individual citizen. Here, we meet important early occurrences of a number of uses that will be much more prominent in the literature of the classical period.[36]

In the sympotic love poetry from the *Corpus Theognideum*, cωφροcύνη is invoked a single time, in a prayer to Aphrodite for

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[36] I do not take account of the amusing poem Archilochos 328 West, in which a decent life (βίου cαόφρονοc, 17) is contrasted to the wanton minds of the whore and the man who plays the passive role in sex (καταπύγων). This has been shown to be a falsification, probably from the early sixteenth century, by someone who had made thorough enquiries into the obscene vocabulary of both Aristophanes and Hesychius; see Tarditi (1961), 311-6. Finally, in Hipponax fr. 63.2, the sage Musôn (see Diog. Laert. 1.106-108) is said to be proclaimed by Apollo to be an ἄνδρα cωφρονέcτατον.

relief from pains and woes of love, and the restoration of the
happiness that belongs to the symposium:

> Κυπρογενές[37], παῦcόν με πόνων, cκέδαcον δὲ μερίμναc
>   θυμοβόρουc, cτρέψον δ᾽ αὖθιc ἐc εὐφροcύναc
> μερμήραc δ᾽ ἀπόπαυε κακάc, δὸc δ᾽ εὔφρονι θυμῶι
>   μέτρ᾽ ἥβηc τελέcαντ᾽ ἔργματα cωφροcύνηc.
> (1323-6)

> Cyprus-born, stop me from my woes, dispel the worries that eat
> away my *thymos*, and restore me to cheerfulness again; put an end
> to my bad troubles, and kind-heartedly[38] grant me, when I have
> reached the full measure of maturity, the deeds of cωφροcύνη.

Here, cωφροcύνη is the 'quiet' or 'untroubled' state of mind that
results from the absence of over-powering desire. This ap-
proaches the standard conception of cωφροcύνη as 'control of
desires', though unlike most later occurrences, the present pas-
sage adopts the lover's point of view rather than that of those
around him, and love is conceived as a source of distress rather
than as a potential source of unacceptable behaviour: it is a
source of distress and deflects from the joys of the symposium
(εὐφροcύναc, 1324). There is a connection here between
cωφροcύνη and maturity that is a standard phraes of popular mo-
rality: while cωφροcύνη is consistently demanded from the
young,[39] it is a commonplace observation that it is often only
achieved with old age.

As is to be expected in a collection of poetry related to the
symposion, drinking too is an important theme in the *Corpus
Theognideum,* and there is a number of poems that warn us about
the liabilities of excessive drinking. A good example is the poem

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[37] The mss. read Κυπρογένη, an aeolic vocative that elsewhere occurs only
in Alcaeus fr. 269b.1. Bekker was undoubtedly right to make the change here.

[38] εὔφρονι θυμῶι here refers to the kindness ('a mind thinking good
thoughts') with which the god grants her gifts, not to the cheerfulness with
which the worshiper accepts the gift, cf. *AP Epigr. Dedic.* 229.5 ἀλλ᾽ ἵλαοc, ὦναξ,
Ζωοῦc γένοc εὐφρονι θυμῶι | cῶζε.

[39] After the examples of Telemachus and Apollo in chapter 2, cωφροcύνη as
a special virtue of the good son is mentioned in an epigram by Simonides (fr.
513.4), where a dying son tells his father that the latter will never forget to long
for his son's ἀρετή and cωφροcύνη.

467-496,[40] where the speaker, after announcing his departure,
dwells extensively on the improprieties of excessive drinking:

> ὃς δ᾽ ἂν ὑπερβάλληι πόςιος μέτρον, οὐκέτι κεῖνος
>   τῆς αὐτοῦ γλώςςης καρτερὸς οὐδὲ νόου·
> μυθεῖται δ᾽ ἀπάλαμνα, τὰ νήφοςι γίνεται αἰςχρά,
>   αἰδεῖται δ᾽ ἔρδων οὐδέν, ὅταν μεθύηι,
> τὸ πρὶν ἐὼν ςώφρων, τότε νήπιος. ἀλλὰ ςὺ ταῦτα
>   γινώςκων μὴ πῖν᾽ οἶνον ὑπερβολάδην.
> (479-487)

> But whoever exceeds the measure of drinking is no longer in con-
> trol of his own tongue and mind. He speaks inconsiderate things[41]
> that to sober men are disgraceful, and he does not feel shame at
> doing anything when he is drunk, being ςώφρων before, but now a
> fool. You must recognise this and not drink wine to excess.

The point here is not that excessive drinking is unhealthy *per se,*
or that 'a ςώφρων man' will always be a moderate drinker, but
rather that a man who normally *is* ςώφρων will temporarily lose
that quality when drunk: the drunkard will say disgraceful things
(αἰςχρά) and do anything without feeling αἰδώς. In short, he will
not be ςώφρων anymore, but a fool, νήπιος. Apparently that is
why the poet argues against compulsive drinking (πᾶν γὰρ
ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ᾽ ἀνιηρὸν ἔφυ, 'for any sort of compulsion is dis-
agreeable', 472), which seems to have been the norm at the
symposion.[42]

The same thought is stated more crudely in the couplet 497-8:

> ἄφρονος ἀνδρὸς ὁμῶς καὶ ςώφρονος οἶνος, ὅταν δή
>   πίνηι ὑπὲρ μέτρον, κοῦφον ἔθηκε νόον.
> (497-8)

> Of a man who is ἄφρων and one who is ςώφρων alike, wine makes
> the mind light, when he drinks to excess.

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[40] Line 472, πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ᾽ ἀνιηρὸν ἔφυ, closely resembles
citations from Euenus by Aristotle (*Met.* 1015a28, *EE* 1223a31, *Rhet.* 1370a10,
with πρᾶγμ᾽ instead of χρῆμ᾽) and Plutarchus (*Non posse suaviter vivi*, 1102c, πᾶν
γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ᾽ ὀδυνηρὸν ἔφυ). This of course does not amount to proof
that the present poem is by Euenus; see Van Groningen (1966), 198.

[41] For ἀπάλαμνα, see Van Groningen ad v. 281.

[42] Thus, in Pl. *Smp.* 176a5-e6, many words are spent to establish that at that
particular party, the day after a heavy night, there should be *no* compulsion to
drink more than one wants. Evidently, absence of compulsion was hardly the
norm.

Here again the point is not that the cώφρων will always refrain from excessive drinking, but that excessive drinking leads to a 'light mind', and thus apparently to unacceptable behaviour, both from one who normally *is* cώφρων and *does* know how to behave, and from his ἄφρων foil who does not how to behave anyway.[43]

Ifcωφροcύνη emerges as control of desire, and as a check on unacceptable behaviour, in songs from the symposium, it can also manifest itself on occasion as a control of fear. In the seventh of the so-called Homeric Hymns (*To Dionysus*), the pilot of the pirates' ship is credited with a caόφρων *thymos* (*h.Bacch.* 49 κυβηρνήτην … caόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντα) on the ground that he remains calm and unperturbed when the god reveals himself, while the rest of the crew flees around him in panic. It is suggested that he also shows cωφροcύνη in another respect, for he alone recognises the divine status of Dionysus (15 νοήcαc) and tries to keep his fellow pirates from taking him captive. Thus, the use of the term caόφρων reflects both his lack of fear and his respect for the god.

The Homeric hymn *To Dionysus*, then, hints that the cώφρων will refrain, and dissuade others, from offending the gods. The thought is expressed more directly by Pindar (*P.* 3.63) in a consolatory poem for the ailing Hiero of Syracuse.[44] The poet here expresses the wish that cώφρων … Χίρων might be still alive to produce a second healer, and one who — unlike his predecessor Asclepius — would refrain from breaking into the realm of the divine by bringing back the dead from Hades. Here, then, the 'wisdom' of master Chiron is contrasted with his pupil's desire to achieve the impossible and ignore the limits of mortality (and, as it seems, Hiero is subtly persuaded to accept the inevitable).

These clashes between the humane and the divine are, of course, the stuff of mythology, and the link between cωφροcύνη and the idea that one should not offend the gods is especially

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[43] Similar standards of propriety apply in a poetic *sententia* by Phocylides, who states that 'many men seem to be cώφρονεc if they walk in an orderly fashion (cὺν κόcμωι cτείχοντεc), whereas they are really light-minded (ἐλαφρόν⟨ο⟩οί περ ἐόντεc). This seems close to the 'boyish' good manners extolled by the 'Stronger' Λόγοc from *Clouds*, and offered as a first attempt at the definition of cωφροcύνη by Charmides in the dialogue of the same name.

[44] See Burton (1962), 78.

prominent in Attic drama, notably Aeschylus. It is hardly, on the other hand, a typical manifestation of cωφροcύνη in every day private life. To return to this sphere, then, the cωφροcύνη of the ordinary male citizen does not only manifest itself negatively, in the control — or absence — of affects and undesirable types of behaviour. It also manifests itself more positively in prudent administration of one's *oikos.* One of the main problems connected with this issue is of course finding a suitable wife; accordingly, a fragment of Hipponax (182) states that for a cώφρων man, it is best to find a wife of good character (τρόπον γυναικὸς χρηστόν) , 'for this is the only dowry that saves his house' (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ προὶξ οἰκίαν cώιζει μόνη, fr. 182.1-3).

From the male point of view, the main concern about a wife seems to be how she deals with her husband and his estate. In this connection, cωφροcύνη is the virtue *par excellence* of the 'good wife'. In a diatribe against women, the poet Semonides (fr. 7 W.) offers a seemingly exhausting list of all that can go wrong. The poem starts with a catalogue of ten different types of women, each taking after an animal or a natural phenomenon and including only a single 'good' type. The catalogue includes the dirty swine, the cunning fox, the curious and insolent dog, the greedy earth, the changeable sea, the stubborn and sexually insatiable donkey, the thievish weasel, the vain horse, the ugly and shameless monkey, and — at the end of this rather depressing list — the bee who takes good care of one's estate (85 θάλλει δ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς κἀπαέξεται βίος), begets a decent and respected offspring (τεκοῦca καλὸν κὠνομάκλυτον γένοc, 87) and does not enjoy sitting with other women and talking about sex (91). The poet then reverts to the observation that all other women are the biggest evil wrought by Zeus, and adds that if a woman seemingly fails to exhibit the bad ways summed up in the first part of the poem, this is hardly a sign of her excellence, but rather of the blindness of men to the faults of their own wives:

> ἥτιc δέ τοι μάλιcτα cωφρονεῖν δοκεῖ,
> αὕτη μέγιcτα τυγχάνει λωβωμένη.
> κεχηνότοc γὰρ ἀνδρόc, οἱ δὲ γείτονεc
> χαίρουc' ὁρῶντεc καὶ τόν, ὡc ἁμαρτάνει.
> τὴν ἣν δ' ἕκαcτοc αἰνέcει μεμνημένοc

γυναῖκα, τὴν δὲ τουτέρου μωμήσεται·
(Semonides fr. 7 W., 108-9)

And she whom you may think is utterly *sophron*, she happens to act most outrageously. The man gapes in admiration, but the neighbours are happy to see that he as well is mistaken. Everyone will praise his own wife when mentioning her, and he will blame the other's.

The catalogue at the beginning of the poem is one of the most extensive enumerations of female 'sins' and gives the fullest picture of what the truly cώφρων wife will *not* do.[45] As in many passages in classical literature, loyalty and inconspicuous behaviour are indeed the most salient features of the cώφρων wife. But there are also a few hints that being a cώφρων woman does not just entail the avoidance of a myriad of vices, but also includes a few more positive aspects: the bee-like type of woman turns out to be a good house-keeper, under whose influence a man's estate flourishes, and who bears him a decent number of good children.

4 *Conclusion*

In what we have of archaic poetry, cώφρων and cognates are not exactly frequent, but some occurrences of the terms are highly informative and very significant. (For a diagram that tries to visualise the network connections between these uses, see Fig. 4 in Chapter 9.3.) Most important of all, no doubt, is the use of the terms in political contexts in Theognis, Pindar and Bacchylides. cωφροcύνη here belongs to the language of an aristocratic elite who wish to maintain the existing social order. In this context, cωφροcύνη is something of a two-sided affair: on the one hand, it is the quality of the citizens who refrain from revolt and avoid cτάcιc, on the other hand, it is recognised, especially in the poems of the *Theognidea*, that those in power must also be cώφρονεc

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[45] According to Verdenius (1968), 154 cωφρονεῖν here is used 'besonders in erotischer Hinsicht'; he cites A. *Cho.* 182, S. Fr. 682.2, E. *Ba* 314, *IA* 1159, Arist. *Pol.* 1263b9. But here the context does not allow us to narrow down the reference of cωφρονεῖν. It signals the wife's avoidance of, or rather the husband's inability to perceive, the typical vices of all nine types of bad women.

and refrain from injustice against their fellow citizens: thus, we
see how our terms are used to commend 'restraint of injustice',
and εὐνομία or 'restraint of civil strife'.

This association of cωφροcύνη and aristocratic politics is firmly
established by the end of the archaic period. In Attic drama
(chapters 4-6), it is criticised from a democratic point of view. By
contrast, we will see that in Thucydides (chapter 7), cωφροcύνη is
frequently used as a positive characterisation not only of types of
government that distinguish themselves from Athens's radical
democracy, notably Sparta, but also of the politics of the oligar-
chic coup of 411 in Athens itself. Plato's *Charmides* (chapter 10)
similarly addresses these oligarchic connotations of cωφροcύνη by
confronting Socrates with two representatives of the oligarchic
movement of the Thirty.

Otherwise, archaic poetry offers some comparatively early en-
counters with various types of cώφρονεc that are familiar figures
from classical literature. Thus, cωφροcύνη is used to commend
'control of desire' (and of shameful behaviour) and as well as
'quietness' and control of fear, and also the 'prudence' of the
man who takes good care of his estate. Besides, cωφροcύνη is the
quality of the (really or supposedly) 'good wife', who is not
found guilty of those many vices to which Greek women were
always believed to be incurably inclined.

AESCHYLUS

1. *Introduction*

In the last chapter on archaic poetry, we have seen how ϲωφροϲύνη was used to commend 'justice' and 'εὐνομία' and functioned as a slogan of political elites intent on the preservation of the status quo and the avoidance of civil strife. The tragedies of Aeschylus also focus to a large extent on war and violence, but they address these topics in an entirely different setting and from a markedly different point of view. Tragedy generally does not leave much room for overt political propaganda, but *Eumenides* provides one notable exception, and the play suggests that the solution to the sequence of murder and retribution witnessed in *Agamemnon* and *Choephori* lies with the courts of democratic Athens, whose citizens are ϲωφρονοῦντεϲ ἐν χρόνωι, 'for a long time to come' (A. *Eum.* 1000).

Given the prominence of the themes of war and violence, ϲωφροϲύνη is frequently invoked in praise of those who refrain from undue aggression (section 2). In *Seven Against Thebes*, which focuses on the civil war between the sons of Oedipus, the Thebans use the term ϲωφροϲύνη in praise of Amphiaraus, who tries to temper the aggression of his six fellow-warriors. ϲωφροϲύνη also plays a role in the propaganda on the shield of Polynices, who of course claims to have justice on his side and denies that he is an aggressor. Violence on a more intimate, but no less threatening, scale, the sequence of killings in the house of Atreus, is the main theme of the *Oresteia*. Throughout the trilogy, ϲωφροϲύνη is invoked in connection with the thought that such violence should be stopped (*Ag.* 181, 351, *Cho.* 140, *Eum.* 521; by contrast, at *Eum.* 136 Clytemnestra's ghost strikingly, but characteristically, appeals to the 'good sense' of the Erinyes when she incites them to continue the pursuit of Orestes). The impact of this 'lesson to mankind' is finally learned only by the Athenians.

In all these plays, there are strong religious overtones, and Aeschylus is a main source for the idea that the ϲώφρων will re-

frain from offending the gods. Thus, in *Seven Against Thebes*, the lack of ostentation of the cώφρων Amphiaraus is contrasted to the boastful and impious claims of most of his fellow warriors, and the killings in *Oresteia* are said to ignore Zeus' lesson to mankind.

On the side of the victims of aggression (section 3), cωφροcύνη consists in an appropriate response to the distress of imminent warfare, and takes the character of a quiet and controlled response to fear. Women especially are urged to keep quiet in distressful situations, and show cωφροcύνη. Thus, cωφροcύνη is invoked in condemnation of the fearful cries of the Theban women (*Th.* 186) by Eteocles, who at that stage of the play still manages to keep up his calm resolve. The case of the Danaids in *Supplices* is more complicated. Danaus keeps trying to temper his daughters' excitable responses to the various distressful situations in which they find themselves (*Supp.* 198, 710, 724, 992), but there are clear hints that the girls are likely to turn from victims into aggressors themselves, and that their father's injunctions will not meet with enduring success.

Finally, some Aeschylean characters who refer to cωφροcύνη show a strongly developed sense of hierarchy (section 4); to them, cωφρονεῖν is the prerequisite of the socially inferior, who should avoid offending their superiors by obeying and shutting up. Authoritarian figures like Clytemnestra and Aegisthus in *Agamemnon*, and Hermes in *PV*, do not accept being contradicted by their supposed inferiors (the chorus of Argives, Prometheus). From their mouths, the injunction to be cώφρων amounts to an order to obey and keep quiet (*Ag.* 1425, 1620, 1664, *PV* 982). The passages in *Agamemnon* are especially telling, because there is an implicit but unmistakable contrast between this cωφροcύνη of submissive acquiescence as demanded by the authorities in Argos (the old men of Argos are not allowed to speak out against the crimes committed by Clytemnestra and Aegisthus) and the rather more 'democratic' cωφροcύνη of the Athenian citizens (*Eum.* 1000), who, by acquitting Orestes, put an end to violence and reinstate peace and stability. Thus, *Eumenides* provides a rare but striking use of cωφροcύνη in an unequivocal piece of democratic, pro-Athenian propaganda.

In what follows, no account is taken of *Persians*, a play that is often regarded as the illustration *par excellence* of the Aeschylean conflict between ὕβρις and ϲωφροϲύνη, but in which the terms are not used except in a single corrupt passage in the speech of the ghost of Darius.[1]   Of course, there is no doubt, at least in the view of Darius, that Xerxes' decision to yoke the Bosporos and

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[1] A. *Pers.* 829-31, πρὸϲ ταῦτ' ἐκεῖνον †ϲωφρονεῖν κεχρημένοι† | πινύϲκετ' εὐλόγοιϲι νουθετήμαϲιν, |λῆξαι θεοβλαβοῦνθ' ὑπερκόμπωι θράϲει. ('In view of this, ... you must make him sensible by means of well-considered advice, to stop from doing harm to the gods with over-boastful audacity.') Commentators have despaired over the phrase ϲωφρονεῖν κεχρημένοι from the author of the Byzantine paraphrase (Φ in West) onwards: πρὸϲ ταῦτα ὑμεῖϲ οἱ κεχρημένοι τῆι ϲωφροϲύνηι, ἢ οἱ χρήιζοντεϲ καὶ οἱ θέλοντεϲ ϲωφρονεῖν, πινύϲκετε καὶ ϲυνετίζετε καὶ ϲωφρονίζετε ἐκεῖνον, τὸν Ξέρξην, ἐν ϲυνετοῖϲ νουθετήμαϲιν, ὥϲτε λῆξαι καὶ παύϲαϲθαι θεοβλαβοῦντα καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν βλάβην πάϲχοντα διὰ τῆϲ κενοδοξίαϲ. ἢ κεχρημένον ἀντὶ τοῦ χρείαν ἔχοντα καὶ ἄξιον ὄντα ϲωφρονεῖν. ('In view of this, you, who make use of your *sôphrosunê,* or who are willing and prepared to be *sôphrones,* should make him, Xerxes, sensible, shrewd and ϲώφρων, by means of perceptive advice, in order that he may stop harming the gods and suffering harm from the gods on account of his idle opinions. Or else, read κεχρημένον, which means 'to be in need of being ϲώφρων' and 'to be expected to be ϲώφρων'.')

κεχρημένοι can mean 'making use of', 'having at one's disposal' (as in *Od.* 3.266, 14.421, 16.398 φρεϲὶ γὰρ κέχρητ' ἀγαθῆιϲι); in this sense, the verb requires a complement in the dative. Stewart's conjecture τῶι φρονεῖν κεχρημένοι (*CR* N.S. 11 (1961), 107), 'making use of your good sense', meets this requirement, and yields acceptable sense. (It corresponds to the first paraphrase in Φ.) For a parallel for τὸ φρονεῖν without any specification, see E. *Ba.* 389ff. ὁ δὲ τᾶϲ ἡϲυχίαϲ | βίοτοϲ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν | ἀϲάλευτόν τε μένει καὶ | ξυνέχει δώματα. As Diggle's apparatus signals, at *Chr. Pat.* 1803, the expression is 'normalised': τό τε φρονεῖν εὖ ϲωφρονεῖν τ' ἐν τῶι βίωι | τηρεῖ τὰ πάνθ', ὡϲ ἀϲάλευτα προϲμένειν.

The participle can of course also mean 'being in need of'. It then requires a complement in the genitive. One should then *both* adopt the *varia lectio* κεχρημένον (it is not the chorus but Xerxes who is 'in need of good sense') *and* introduce a genitive of some kind (e.g. Broadhead's ὡϲ φρενῶν κεχρημένον or Butler's τοῦ φρονεῖν κεχρημένον). This is less likely altogether.

There is no parallel to support the Byzantine commentator's suggestion that ϲωφρονεῖν κεχρημένοι may mean χρήιζοντεϲ … ϲωφρονεῖν, or West's suggestion that ἐκεῖνον ϲωφρονεῖν κεχρημένοι may mean 'beseeching him to be sensible'.

Others take the phrase ϲωφρονεῖν κεχρημένον to mean 'it having been declared that one should be sensible' (Broadhead), citing *Ag.* 1620 ϲωφρονεῖν εἰρημένον ('while it has been said that you should be ϲώφρονεϲ') in support. The source of the declaration is then supposed to be the oracle mentioned by Darius at 739f. and 801. This, however, is an unusual interpretation of κεχρημένον, and the verb would have to be followed either by a declaration of what was about to happen, or a rather more practical instruction as to what to do: ϲωφρονεῖν will hardly fit as the content of the instruction of an oracle.

So on balance, one should either adopt Stewart's τῶι φρονεῖν κεχρημένοι, or obelise the phrase.

burn the temples of the gods on his way to conquering Hellas, was taken rashly (744, νέωι θράϲει) and ill-consideredly (749, οὐκ εὐβουλίαι), and that the king was not in his right mind to offend the gods in this way.[2] In this sense, Xerxes is the historical counterpart to the mythical aggressors of *Seven Against Thebes.* But the words ϲώφρων and cognates are not used except perhaps in that single corrupt passage where Darius tells the chorus to teach Xerxes some good sense,[3] and in fact most of the action of the play tends to focus on the misery of the Persians rather than the mentality of their king.

2. *Restraint of Violence and Respect for the Gods:* Seven Against Thebes, Oresteia

Seven Against Thebes deals with the prospect of imminent civil war from the perspective of the besieged city. Much attention is focused on the aggression of the attackers. Perhaps one should assume that Polynices has a claim of his own and that Eteocles is at least partly responsible for the conflict with his brother,[4] but

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[2] Cf. 725 ὥϲτε μὴ φρονεῖν καλῶϲ, 750 τάδ' οὐ νόϲοϲ φρενῶν, 782 νέοϲ ἐὼν νέα φρονεῖ, 808 ἀθέων φρονημάτων, 820 οὐχ ὑπέρφευ θνητὸν ὄντα χρὴ φρονεῖν, 827f. τῶν ὑπερκόμπων ἄγαν | φρονημάτων.

Similarly, the opposition between Persian ὕβριϲ and Greek ϲωφροϲύνη that many read in the text of *Persians* (e.g. North (1966) 33, 'Aeschylus draws in Xerxes a paradigm of ὕβριϲ and makes an unequivocal contrast between the barbarians whom he represents and the Greeks whose triumph at Salamis and Plataea is due to their possession of the virtues that their enemies lack.') remains largely implicit. Of course it is true that Xerxes is a hybristic figure, but the play contains little comment on the Greeks. When these are praised by some of the Persian speakers in the play, it is not for their ϲωφροϲύνη, but rather for their courage (e.g. 1024f. Ἰάνων λαὸϲ οὐ φυγαίχμαϲ. - ἄγαν ἄρειοϲ, cf. 349) and their martial skills which the Persians find very surprising in view of the 'democratic' organisation of the Greek forces (241-4).

[4] This is difficult to decide on the basis of the text of *Septem*, in which the events are seen through the eyes of the besieged Thebans alone. As for Polynices, it appears that he thinks he has δίκη on his side (cf. 644-8), though the seer Amphiaraus warns him that no δίκη is strong enough to warrant an attack against one's native city (cf. 584). Eteocles' position and responsibility are not discussed at all. It seems probable that in the lost earlier plays in the trilogy, the poet gave more information on how the conflict between the two brothers is to be assessed; in any case, one should not accept Eteocles' views on these matters uncritically, cf. Gagarin (1976) 120-5. Therefore, it is puzzling to read that North (1966), 39, judges Eteocles 'completely *sôphrôn*', at least until

the exclusively Theban characters in the play do not acknowl-
edge any such claim. By contrast, much is made of the boastful-
ness and violence of most of the warriors around Polynices, no-
where more so than in the long scene where the scout describes
each of them, and the excessive signs and claims on their shields,
to Eteocles.

The first five Argive warriors are, all in a roughly similar fash-
ion, described as a god-defying bunch of hooligans. First and
foremost among them is Tydeus, conspicuous for his animal-like
(391) aggression, his madly raging thirst for blood (380, 391,
ἀλύων) and the 'over-bold sign' (387, ὑπέρφρον cῆμ') on his
shield. Even worse, if possible, is Capaneus, who defies the gods
by his claim that he will sack the city whether the god accepts it
or not (427f., θεοῦ τε γὰρ θέλοντος ἐκπέρcειν πόλιν καὶ μὴ
θέλοντός φηcιν) and has a picture on his shield accompanied by
the text 'I will set fire to the city' (πρήcω πόλιν, 434). The third
man, Eteocles, adds to all this the impious claim that not even
Ares can throw him off the city-walls (469). Hippomedon carries
an image of Typhon on his shield (493). With Parthenopaeus,
finally, the insulting behaviour of these five reaches a climax: he
claims that he will sack the city of Cadmus against Zeus' will
(531f. ἦ μὴν λαπάξειν ἄcτυ Καδμείων βίαι | Διόc) and, to insult
the Thebans, carries the image of the sphinx (541) on his shield.

The seer Amphiaraus makes for the greatest possible contrast
to the excessive violence and boastfulness of these five fellow-
warriors, and the scout introduces him by calling him an ἄνδρα
cωφρονέcτατον (568) and mentioning that he really *is* a good
warrior (569, ἄλκην ἄριστον μάντιν, Ἀμφιάρεω βίαν) rather than
a mere aggressor. Unlike his fellows, Amphiaraus has the cour-
age to speak up against Tydeus (570-5), and he warns Polynices
that the expedition will bring him neither *philia* from the gods
(580), nor good fame with posterity (581), nor, even if he will be
successful, co-operation from the present citizens of Thebes
(585-6): whatever Polynices' claims may be, no right (δίκη, 584)
will ever justify an expedition against one's native city. On top of

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the Erinys strikes him and he becomes possessed by the frenzy of war. His harsh
treatment of the Theban women (*Th.* 186) shows that he is not blameless. He
may be rational and calm, but he is irascible and authoritarian as well.

all this, and in contrast to the ostentation of his colleagues, Amphiaraus has no sign on his shield, and the scout explains this by pointing out that the seer does not want to *seem* the best, but *be* the best (591-2).

The scout's positive evaluation of Amphiaraus' restraint is echoed by Eteocles, who laments the fact that good men have to suffer for the crimes of their fellows, and that Amphiaraus, a ϲώφρων δίκαιοϲ ἀγαθὸϲ εὐϲεβὴϲ ἀνήρ (610), will, because of his association with unscrupulous men (ἀνοϲίοιϲι ϲυμμιγεὶϲ θραϲυϲτόμοιϲιν ἀνδράϲιν, 611-2), be 'dragged down' (ξυγ-καθελκυϲθήϲεται, 614) with them.

The enumeration ϲώφρων δίκαιοϲ ἀγαθὸϲ εὐϲεβὴϲ has often been taken as an allusion (the second in extant Greek after Pi. *N.* 74-75) to a canon of four 'cardinal' virtues.[5] In fact there is no good evidence that anything like a fixed canon of virtues did exist before, or even in Plato,[6] but in any case the point of the present enumeration is not so much that Amphiaraus possesses all possible virtues, but rather that he fails to exhibit the specific vices for which his colleagues are conspicuous, and the adjectives are a pointed summary of his behaviour as narrated by the scout. His opposition to the unrestrained violence of Tydeus (ϲωφροϲύνη), his admonition that no claim is strong enough to justify an expedition against one's native city (δικαιοϲύνη), his status as a truly brave warrior who wants *be* rather than to *seem* best (ἀρετή), and his refusal to make any boastful, god-defying claims (εὐϲέβεια), all this sets him apart from his colleagues, and the enumeration serves to drive home the differences.

In contrast to both the boundless aggression pictured on the shields of the five Argive hooligans and the emphatic lack of ostentation on Amphiaraus' part, the emblem on the shield of Polynices is a careful piece of propaganda:

χρυϲήλατον γὰρ ἄνδρα τευχεϲτὴν ἰδεῖν
ἄγει γυνή τιϲ ϲωφρόνωϲ ἡγουμένη
Δίκη δ' ἄρ' εἶναί φηϲιν, ὡϲ τὰ γράμματα
λέγει· κατάξω δ' ἄνδρα τόνδε, καὶ πόλιν

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[5] So North (1966), 41n.18; cf. Bowra (1964), 181.
[6] For a full and perceptive discussion of the matter see Pfeijffer (1999), 639-42 on Pi. *N.* 3.74-5.

ἕξει πατρώιαν δωμάτων τ᾽ ἐπιστροφάς.
(A. *Th*. 644-8)

> A man of beaten gold, looking like a warrior, is led on *sôphronôs* by
> a woman. She claims to be Dike, as the inscription says: 'And I will
> bring this man back home, and he will have control over the city
> of his fathers and the affairs of his house'.

Polynices' claim is that the expedition against Thebes is not a
matter of aggression: instead, he claims to have *Dike* on his side.
The calm restraint of the figure of the goddess on his shield,
conveyed by the adverb ϲωφρόνωϲ ἡγουμένη, 'leading him on in a
restrained manner' (i.e. calmly), contrasts sharply with the vio-
lent giants and monsters on the shields of some of his associates,
and serves to underline his claim that he only comes to take what
belongs to him anyway. From his point of view, this claim may be
understandable enough, but as the passage on Amphiaraus has
shown, the spectators are invited to regard any such claim as too
weak to justify an attack on one's native city. From the perspec-
tive of Eteocles and the Thebans, Polynices is palpably wrong:
according to Eteocles, the Dike on the shield of his brother is 'by
all rights misnamed' (670 πανδίκωϲ ψευδώνυμοϲ), and the chorus
says that he makes 'very bad claims' (678 τῶι κάκιϲτ᾽ αὐδωμένωι).

The *Oresteia* deals with violence on a different scale: a sequence
of killing and retribution within the house of Atreus, beginning
in the distant past with the killings of the children of Thyestes,
and of Iphigenia, and continuing in the course of the trilogy
with the killings of Agamemnon and Cassandra, and of Clytemn-
estra and her lover Aegisthus. Throughout the trilogy, ϲωφρονεῖν
is invoked more than once in connection with the idea that it is
good to abstain from (further) violence, and thus to put an end
to this sequence of violence and retribution.

   This complex of ideas is voiced for the first time by the chorus
in the *parodos* of *Agamemnon*, in a passage fraught with worries
about the fate that awaits Agamemnon. As they dwell on the be-
ginnings of the expedition to Troy, they soon reach Kalchas'
prophecy at Aulis (104-59). Calchas predicts Artemis' demand
for the sacrifice of Iphigenia (147-50) as well as Clytemnestra's
revenge for the death of her daughter (151-5), which he con-
nects with a μῆνιϲ (155) that 'waits' in the house of Atreus: ap-

parently, the seer refers in general terms to retribution for the killing of the children of Thyestes.[7] They then break off their narration and state that if they *really* are to dispel their worries, they can find no other authority for doing so than Zeus:

> Ζεύς, ὅςτις ποτ᾽ ἐςτίν, εἰ τόδ᾽ αὐ-
> τῶι φίλον κεκλημένωι,
> τοῦτό νιν προςεννέπω.
> οὐκ ἔχω προςεικάςαι
>   πάντ᾽ ἐπιςταθμώμενος
> πλὴν Διός, εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος
> χρὴ βαλεῖν ἐτητύμως.
> (A. *Ag.* 160-6)

> Zeus, whoever he may be, if this is the name by which he wishes to be called, this is how I address him. I cannot identify[8] anything, throwing everything into the balance, save Zeus, if I must really cast away the fruitless anguish from my thoughts.

Zeus, they claim, if 'Zeus' is indeed the appropriate name for the supreme divine power, is the only possible source of relief, if the burden which troubles their mind, their concern for Agamemnon,[9] is indeed vain, and if they are really to cast it off.[10] For

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[7] Following Furley (1986) 109-21 and, in part, Lloyd-Jones (1962), 187-99, Käppel (1997) 86-92 convincingly argues for the meal of Thyestes as the 'cause' of Artemis' demand for the sacrifice of Iphigenia, which is otherwise not clearly motivated in the text of the *parodos* of *Ag.* (see *ibid.* 106-9 for illuminating schematic representations of the main interpretative positions). On Käppel's interpretation, Iphigenia's sacrifice, 'caused' by the meal of Thyestes, has in itself the double function of enabling the Greeks to conquer Troy and, more importantly for the plot of the trilogy, being a cause for the killing of Agamemnon (see *ibid.* 133).

[8] As Smith (1980) 8-12 has shown, προςεικάςαι (τινά τινι) in classical times does not mean 'compare *x* to *y*', but rather 'identify an unknown *x* on the basis of its likeness to *y*'. Cf. Bollack (1981), 216 'Quant à l'acte désigné par προςεικάζειν, il semble qu'il ne désigne pas une simple comparaison, mais une mise en rapport devant aboutir à une identification.'
To the passages discussed by Smith, one may add A. *Th.* 431 τὰς δ᾽ ἀςτραπάς τε καὶ κεραυνίους βολὰς | μεςημβρινοῖςι θάλπεςιν προςήικαςεν, 'he [Kapaneus] claims that the lightning and thunder [of Zeus] are merely like the midday heat'; E. *El.* 559 ἦ προςεικάζει μέ τωι;, 'does he [the old servant] identify me [the as yet unrecognised Orestes] as someone?', *Rh.* 696 τίνι προςεικάςω; 'With whom am I to identify [this man]?.

[9] I here concur with Denniston-Page ad 160ff.: 'The Chorus has in mind (153ff.) the danger which impends over Agamemnon on his return.' Fraenkel *ad loc.* credits the chorus with theological concerns which seem very irrelevant to the dramatic context: 'Thus τὸ μάταν ἄχθος is the burden of the folly which induces men to believe that Zeus is not the almighty ruler, who directs all that

Zeus, they state in the antistrophe, has done away with his violent predecessors, Uranus, 'swollen with all-fighting boldness' (παμ-μάχωι θράϲει βρύων, 168), and Cronus, and has instituted a new and (it is taken) permanent regime. By putting an end to violence and strife, he has now a 'lesson' to impart to mankind:

> τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺϲ ὁδώ-
>   ϲαντα, τὸν πάθει μάθοϲ
> θέντα κυρίωϲ ἔχειν.
> ϲτάζει δ' ἀνθ' ὕπνου πρὸ καρδίαϲ
> μνηϲιπήμων πόνοϲ· καὶ παρ' ἄ-
>   κονταϲ ἦλθε ϲωφρονεῖν.
> δαιμόνων δέ που χάριϲ βίαιοϲ
>   ϲέλμα ϲεμνὸν ἡμένων.
> (A. *Ag*. 176-83).

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is done among mankind.' Smith (1980) 17-8, takes the lines to mean that 'they have tried to explain to themselves Iphigenia's death, but they have found no ready way to make sense of it.' But in view of the reference to Clytemnestra's revenge in 151-5, their worries are likely to be rather more specific.

I take it that εἰ … χρὴ βαλεῖν ἐτητύμωϲ signals that they very much doubt whether there is indeed a good reason to do away with their fear. The point of μάταν would then be that their fear is of no avail (cf. LSJ s.v.) rather than that there is no good reason for being afraid. (Both Fränkel and Denniston-Page take ἐτητύμωϲ here in opposition to μάτην to mean '*truly* to cast off the *vain* burden of anxiety'.)

Unlike εἰ χρή + inf. praes., which implies that there can be no doubt that the act described by the infinitive is indeed the thing to do ('if one is to do *x*, as is clear by now'), εἰ χρή + inf. aor. is used when it is still open to debate whether the action described by the infinitive is indeed to be done ('if one is to do *x*, and not something else').

For the inf. praes., cf. E. *Hcld*. 491 (A girl has to be sacrificed) εἰ χρὴ μὲν ἡμᾶϲ, χρὴ δὲ τήνδ' εἶναι πόλιν, 'if we, and if this city must remain (as of course is desirable).' E. *Ba*. 207-9 οὐ γὰρ διήιρηχ' ὁ θεόϲ, οὔτε τὸν νέον | εἰ χρὴ χορεύειν οὔτε τὸν γεραίτερον, | ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁπάντων βούλεται τιμὰϲ ἔχειν. 'For the god has singled out no-one, neither young nor old, if (as is the case) one has to dance, no, he wants to be honoured by all.'

For the inf. aor., cf. S. *Tr*. 749 εἰ χρὴ μαθεῖν ϲε, πάντα δὴ φωνεῖν χρεών, 'If you must *know*, I obviously have to say everything.' E. *Alc*. 110 κομίζετ', εἰ χρὴ τήνδε δέξαϲθαι δόμοιϲ, 'bring her in, if I must receive her in my house.'

In *Ag*. 165-6, the inf. aor. in combination with ἐτητύμωϲ conveys that they very much doubt whether they really are to forget their cares. For ἐτητύμωϲ in expressions implying disbelief, cf. A. *Ag*. 1296-8, εἰ δ' ἐτητύμωϲ | μόρον τὸν αὑτῆϲ οἶϲθα, πῶϲ θεηλάτου | βοὸϲ δίκην πρὸϲ βωμὸν εὐτόλμωϲ πατεῖϲ; 'If you really know your own death, why do you, in the manner of a cow driven by a god, walk to the altar unperturbedly?'; S. *El* 1452 ἦ καὶ θανόντ' ἤγγειλαν ὡϲ ἐτητύμωϲ; 'Did they indeed bring the message that he really died?'; E. *Alk*. 1154 γυναῖκα λεύϲϲω τὴν ἐμὴν ἐτητύμωϲ; 'My wife, is it really her I see?'

> (Zeus), who puts men on the path of having sense, who has laid
> down the rule that 'understanding through experience' holds
> good. But instead of sleep, a pain that is mindful of misery drips
> in the heart; even to those who do not want it good sense will
> come. And as to the gods, their favour may, it seems, be forceful,[11]
> as they sit on their august seats.

By means of his victory over Cronus, Zeus has put an end to a
cycle of strife and violence between the gods. The new 'law'
which he has now laid down for all men is indicated here in very
general terms: φρονεῖν 'to have sense', and πάθει μάθος, 'learn-
ing/understanding through experience'. In this context, this
much-discussed proverbial phrase[12] is best taken to mean that he
who commits a grave error shall experience ('suffer') its conse-
quences and thereby recognise his error. This may amount to no
more than that the wrongdoer will be punished and suffer in re-
turn: this is what eventually happens to both Agamemnon and
Clytemnestra, and this is the meaning of the more 'nihilistic'
variations of the maxim encountered at *Ag.* 1564 παθεῖν τὸν
ἔρξαντα and *Cho.* 313, δράσαντα παθεῖν. But it is at least implied
here that man may learn from the πάθη of others and refrain
from doing wrong to others before suffering himself.[13] This must
be what is meant by φρονεῖν and it must be this on which the

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[11] I follow Page and others in accepting Turnebus' conjecture βίαιος for
βιαίως at 182. For a radically different interpretation see Pope (1984) 100-13,
and its rejection by Conacher (1976) 328-36.
[12] See especially the extensive discussions of Smith (1980) 21-6 and Bollack
(1981) 223-8.
[13] This interpretation of πάθει μάθος is closer to that of Conacher (1987), 11-
2 and 83-5, than to Fraenkel (1950) 113 and Denniston-Page (1957) 85, who
both offer a more restricted view of Zeus' lesson and more or less equate πάθει
μάθος to 'the doer shall suffer' (*Ag.* 1564 παθεῖν τὸν δράσαντα, *Cho.* 313
δράσαντα παθεῖν). But if Zeus' lesson of πάθει μάθος does indeed allow of a
relatively 'optimistic' interpretation (Conacher (1987) 83), it seems clear that
the chorus is not very optimistic about the chances for their masters.
    Others, including Gagarin (1976) 139-50, Smith (1980), 26-30, Thiel (1993)
104-110 and Käppel 94n.131, relate πάθει μάθος to the punishment of Paris for
the rape of Helen, and regard the hymn as an expression of hope for an
auspicious end to the Trojan war, and therewith as essentially *unrelated* to the
theme of violence and retribution in the house of Atreus. To my mind the
main arguments against this view are (i) its dramatic inappropriateness in *this*
part of the chorus' narration: after Calchas' prophecy, a prayer for a good end
to the Trojan War seems impossibly evasive, and (ii) the unmistakable
relevance of the violence of Zeus' ancestors (168-72), stopped only by Zeus'
himself, to the events in the house of Atreus, stopped only by Orestes' acquittal.

chorus found their tenuous hope: Agamemnon may not suffer
after all, if Clytemnestra is prepared to take Zeus' lesson to heart
and refrain from violence herself, as her present offerings of
thanksgiving may seem to imply.

But the chorus' hopes do not last: their 'pain that is mindful of
misery' (μνηcιπήμων πόνοc, 180) takes over. Not all are prepared
to take Zeus' lesson to heart without more ado. Those who are
not (ἄκοντας, 180-1) will have to learn to cωφρονεῖν (181) the
hard way. To them, the 'favour' of the gods (the lesson they will
have to learn) will rather be a 'forceful' one, a χάρις βίαιος.
Though the Argive elders do not yet fully accept this as an ines-
capable certainty (note the force of που, diminishing the asser-
tive value of the statement[14]), they evidently fear that their mas-
ters are among those who will learn Zeus' lesson the hard way,
on the principle of πάθει μάθος.

cωφρονεῖν, then, here commends the sensible restraint of those
who wisely do away with the use of violence and retribution as a
means to solve internal conflicts, whether they do so willingly, or
have to 'learn' this good sense through suffering. The members
of the house of Atreus exemplify the latter, and the theme of
their learning a hard lesson runs through the trilogy.

By contrast, the Athenian δῆμος in *Eumenides*, where the
theme of strife in the house of Atreus is elevated to a more uni-
versal political dimension, constitutes an example of a body of
men who willingly do away with this kind of violence. The institu-
tion of the Areopagus as a court to settle matters of murder and
manslaughter in a 'proto-democratic' fashion, by vote, puts an
end to the concatenation of killing and revenge that we have
been witnessing through the course of the trilogy. It is the en-
during good sense of the Athenians that the Erinyes acknowl-
edge when they hail the Athenian people as cωφρονοῦντες ἐν
χρόνωι (*Eu.* 1000), 'showing good sense in the course of time',
i.e. for a long time.[15] Earlier on, they believed that stronger de-

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[14] On this interpretation, που qualifies the assertive value of δαιμόνων χάρις
βίαιος, 'from the gods, there may well be a favour that is forceful'. Fraenkel,
reading βιαίως (qualifying cέλμα ἡμένων), takes που as qualifying the assertion
that the 'hard lesson' from the gods is indeed a χάρις; 'there is, I think, a
blessing'.

[15] cωφρονοῦντες ἐν χρόνωι is usually taken as 'becoming cώφρονες in time'
(e.g. Goldhill (1984) 277) and has puzzled critics who note that the Athenians

terrents (i.e. they themselves in their original function) were necessary to keep people from violence; they thought that 'it is good to show restraint under constraint', ξυμφέρει ϲωφρονεῖν ὑπὸ ϲτένει (ibid. 520-1); now Athena has persuaded them that the law and the court of the Areopagus will actually be more effective.

If the gods themselves take their time to understand the implications of Zeus' new order — in *Choephori,* it is Apollo himself who urges Orestes to kill his mother — it is not surprising that most of the human protagonists utterly fail to do so. For Agamemnon himself it is all too late. Naturally enough, he is unwilling at first to sacrifice his daughter, but then he sees that the sacrifice is inescapable if the expedition to Troy is to come about and he proceeds to 'put on the yoke of the inescapable' (218).[16]

Clytemnestra is even more single-mindedly determined. The first time we meet her, she claims to be worried about the safe return of the victorious army. She tells the chorus that the army may not keep from sacking the temples of the gods, that the spir-

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(unlike the Eumenides) have not gone through a perceptible change, and can hardly be described as 'becoming ϲώφρονεϲ'. Sommerstein *ad loc.* proposes to take ἐν χρόνωι as meaning *in due time,* i.e. before suffering anything untoward', or to take the whole phrase as meaning 'At last do we meet with a body of men endowed with ϲωφροϲύνη.'

But the inceptive interpretation of the phrase ϲωφρονοῦντεϲ ἐν χρόνωι is unwarranted. It is true that ἐν χρόνωι, 'in the course of time', when connected with a verb indicating a punctual or a terminative action, means '(x happens/comes about) in the course of time', i.e. 'in the long run, after a long time.' See e.g. Pi. *P.* 8.15 βία δὲ καὶ μεγάλαυχον ἔϲφαλεν ἐν χρόνωι, and cf. A. *Supp.* 138, 938, *A.* 857 etc. But when ἐν χρόνωι is connected with a verb describing a state, a position, or a durative and/or repeated action, this means that 'x is the case in the course of time', i.e. 'for a long time'. Cf. A. *Eum.* 498, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἔτυμα παιδότρωτα | πάθεα προϲμένει τοκεῦ-|ϲιν ἐν χρόνωι.; E. *Or.* 980, ἕτερα δ᾽ ἕτεροϲ ἀμείβεται | πήματ᾽ ἐν χρόνωι μακρῶι.; Pl. *Phdr.* 278d9, τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμιώτερα ὧν ϲυνέθηκεν ἢ ἔγραψεν ἄνω κάτω ϲτρέφων ἐν χρόνῳ, πρὸϲ ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν.

Groeneboom follows Weil's ϲωφρονοῦντεϲ ἔμφρονοϲ, *sensible* φίλοι *of a sensible goddess,* thus creating an unnecessary and rather mannered parallelism to παρθένου φίλαϲ φίλοι.

[16] The phrase ἀνάγκαϲ ἔδυ λέπαδνον seems to point to a conscious decision on Agamemnon's part to do what he had to do anyway (double determination). Thus, it seems wrong to assume that, since ἀνάγκη 'forced' him to kill Iphigenia, he himself was not responsible. See Conacher (1987) 85-92 for a full discussion of this issue. Käppel (1997) 123-126 argues that ἀνάγκαϲ ἔδυ λέπαδνον relates *only* to Agamemnon's acceptance of his present '*Zwangslage*', not of his future 'fate' and death.

its of the dead may be turned against them, or that something altogether unexpected may happen to endanger their home-coming. For these sensible words, she is duly praised by the cho-rus: 'Madam, you are speaking sensibly like a man of sensible restraint' (γύναι, κατ' ἄνδρα cώφρον' εὐφρόνως λέγεις, 351). The 'good sense' which Clytemnestra appears to be showing here is in fact exactly the kind of good sense that, in *Persians*, Xerxes lacked, and close kin to the good sense of Amphiaraus in *Seven Against Thebes*: she seems to be aware that one should not offend the gods. But of course there is a touch of dramatic irony in this assessment: the spectators know only too well that, on account of her liaison with Aegisthus, Clytemnestra is in fact a prototypical example of a woman who is *not* cώφρων. And on the basis of their knowledge of the myth, the spectators also have a very good rea-son to assume that she will indeed act 'like a man' (cf. the refer-ence early in the play to her ἀνδρόβουλον κέαρ, line 11), not in the sense of showing anything like the good sense that is associ-ated here with the male gender, but in the sense of assisting Aegisthus in killing her husband.

Thus, it is no surprise that near the start of *Choephori*, we over-hear Electra praying to the ghost of Agamemnon that she may become much more cώφρων than her mother:

ἐλθεῖν δ' Ὀρέcτην δεῦρο cὺν τύχηι τινὶ
κατεύχομαί coι, καὶ cὺ κλῦθί μου, πάτερ·
αὐτῆι τέ μοι δὸc cωφρονεcτέραν πολὺ
μητρὸc γενέcθαι χεῖρά τ' εὐcεβεcτέραν.
(A. *Cho.* 138-41)

> Let Orestes come back by some stroke of good fortune, I pray thee, and I ask you to listen to me, father; and for me myself I ask you to grant me that I may become more prudent by far than my mother and more reverent in deeds.

Most commentators take cωφρονεcτέραν (140) as a reference to Clytemnestra's liaison with Aegisthus, and εὐcεβεcτέραν as a ref-erence to the murder on Agamemnon.[17] This does indeed seem

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[17] See e.g. Garvie *ad loc.*: 'Electra is evidently thinking mainly of chastity, contrasted with Clytaemestra's adultery, while in χεῖρα εὐcεβεcτέραν it is the murder of Ag. that she has in mind. There is no need to suppose (Ammendola) [=ed. 1948] that it is the thought of bloodshed that terrifies her.'; Groeneboom: 'cωφ. wijst op het overspel, εὐc. op den moord'.

to be what Electra has in mind, though Bowen is surely right to
note that, apart from some passing references in *Ag.* 856-7, 1204,
1439, 1441, and *Cho.* 916-17, Aeschylus makes 'virtually no use of
sexual relations as a theme'.[18] But for a spectator who has kept
the hymn to Zeus of *Agamemnon* in mind, there is now something
more to being ϲώφρων than mere conformity to the conventional
view that a wife should be faithful to her husband: it requires a
fundamental change in the way one deals with conflicts within
the family and the state. Clytemnestra also lacked ϲωφροϲύνη in
that sense, because she insisted on revenge for Iphigenia. And
Electra herself is as unprepared to accept this type of ϲωφροϲύνη
as were Agamemnon and Clytemnestra.[19] While she will indeed
keep her hands clean, she is only too eager for Orestes to come
to do all the dirty work.

Orestes, then, is the only human individual in the trilogy who
is ultimately able to benefit from Zeus' new law, if perhaps with-
out himself embodying its ideology.[20] When he eventually gets
his acquittal in Athens, Orestes swears allegiance to Athens and
returns safely home.

Thus, in both *Seven Against Thebes* and *Oresteia*, ϲωφροϲύνη func-
tions as the restraint of unacceptable forms of violence. On the
human level, this restraint should prevent civil wars and murder
within the οἶκοϲ, and if the 'offenders' of these plays (Polynices,
Agamemnon, Clytemnestra) all have their own reasons for acting
as they do, it is invariably clear that these ends never justify their
drastic means. On the divine level, violence within the family or
against one's community offends the gods. To this extent, there
is also a religious dimension to this restraint of violence, and

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[18] Bowen (1986), 51.
[19] While Electra's 'innocent tones' (Conacher (1987), 105) avoid an
unequivocal reference to the vengeance she has in mind, the audience will not
fail to see through the *double entendre*. Lebeck (1971), 103, bluntly states that
'on the lips of Electra the traditional piety of this ... prayer [for vengeance] is
sacrilege.'
[20] At *Eum.* 44, the priestess in Delphi finds him at the altar, sitting ϲωφρόνωϲ.
The adverb however means 'quietly' here, as it usually would, and does not
imply that Orestes, at this stage at least, embodies the ideal of non-violence
(*Eum.* 44).

σωφροσύνη is used in a second way to commend the avoidance of religious offences.

3. *Quiet behaviour and Control of Emotion:* Seven Against Thebes, Suppliant Women

Whereas in the case of potential aggressors, there is a contrast between the control of violence of some and the aggression of the others, victims of an attack are torn between fear and dismay and composure. Women especially are represented as especially prone to extravagant displays of distress, but in such crises, an open show of emotion is unacceptable. When the Theban women unequivocally show their panic in the *parodos* of *Seven Against Thebes*, Eteocles calls them θρέμματα ἀνασχετά, 'unbearable creatures' (182), and σωφρόνων μισήματα, 'creatures hated by any sensible person' (186).[21] Of course, Eteocles here poses as the reliable, calm leader of the city, intent on keeping up decorum even in a state of crisis, even though the very vehemence of his rebuke raises the question whether he is as σώφρων as he pretends. Later on in the play, Eteocles indeed loses his calm: he is now seized not by fear, but by anger (ὀργήν, 678) and he lusts for war (δορίμαργος ἄτα, 687). The tables are now turned, and it is now the chorus who try to calm down their king. The chorus, however, avoid the suggestion that the king's anger is unacceptable (the term σωφροσύνη does not occur); rather, they fear that it is dangerous to go war in such a rage.

Suppliant Women is another play in which an imminent battle, and the strong fears it provokes, plays an important role, but here the situation is very different. The Danaids are a group of victims who conspicuously lack σωφροσύνη in the sense that they have great difficulty in controlling their emotions: they react in a forceful and potentially even violent manner to their precarious

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[21] Once again, one should not accept Eteocles' view of the chorus without questioning. For the conflict between Eteocles and the chorus as a conflict of 'male', militaristic and female values, see Gagarin (1976), 151-62.

situation, and thus constantly threaten to become aggressors themselves.

Thus, when towards the end of the *parodos* the girls have threatened to hang themselves and commit themselves to the Zeus of the underworld if the Olympian Zeus fails to take note of their plight (154-61), thereby involving the Argives in a μίαϲμα, Danaus enters with a summons to their good sense (παῖδεϲ, φρονεῖν χρή, 176) and urges his daughters to calm down and assume the proper modesty of suppliants:

> φθογγῆι δ᾽ ἐπέϲθω πρῶτα μὲν τὸ μὴ θραϲύ
> τὸ μὴ μάταιον δ᾽ ἐκ †μετώπω ϲωφρονῶν
> ἴτω προϲώπων ὄμματοϲ παρ᾽ ἡϲύχου·
> καὶ μὴ πρόλεϲχοϲ μηδ᾽ ἐφολκὸϲ ἐν λόγωι
> γένηι· τὸ τῆιδε κάρτ᾽ ἐπίφθονον γένοϲ.
> μέμνηϲο δ᾽ εἴκειν· χρεῖοϲ εἶ ξένη φυγάϲ·
> θραϲυϲτομεῖν γὰρ οὐ πρέπει τοὺϲ ἥϲϲοναϲ.
> (A. *Supp.* 197-203)

> And let your speech be accompanied by an air of not-boldness, and let no idle threat spring forth from ... your calm faces and quiet eyes. And do not be over-eager or tedious in your speech: the people over here strongly disapprove of that. Take care to yield: you are a banished stranger in need. To speak boldly does not befit the weaker ones.

The transmitted text of the second half of line 198, ἐκ μετώπω ϲωφρονῶν, is corrupt: μετώπω can hardly be right in view of προϲώπων in the next line, especially since there can be little doubt that προϲώπων ('faces') rather than μετώπων ('foreheads') is the more appropriate word here. Good sense is obtained if we accept Dindorf's ϲεϲωφρονιϲμένων: ϲεϲωφρονιϲμένων ... προϲώπων would mean 'faces that have been made ϲώφρονεϲ',[22] i.e. that have adopted the modest demeanour of young women. This introduces a by no means unwelcome signal for what was implicitly clear from the context, that their faces are far from calm at present. The comparatively rare middle perfect participle presents no difficulty: it is paralleled by the adverb ϲεϲωφρονιϲμένωϲ at line 724.[23] Otherwise, one should accept that

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[22] For the sense, cf. Hesych. π 1474 πεπνυμένον ϲτόμα· ϲεϲωφρονιϲμένον. ϲιγηλόν.

[23] The perfect ϲεϲωφρονίϲθαι is used in classical times at Pl. *Phd.* 69a4 (in the deliberately paradoxical phrase τῶι τρόπον τινὰ δι᾽ ἀκολαϲίαν αὐτοὺϲ

μετώπω is corrupt and retain cωφρόνων, accented as an adjective rather than a participle.[24] Either way, the general sense is clear: Danaus urges his daughters to drop their fierce emotional attitude: they should refrain from uttering bold (θραcύ) and vain (μάταιον)[25] threats, and beware of irritating the notoriously reticent Argives by a profusion of speech; instead, they should assume the quiet and modest attitude that befits a suppliant.

The association between cωφροcύνη and ἡcυχία as an appropriate response to distressful situations is again in evidence when the Egyptians arrive, and Danaus tells them not to panic, but to consider their situation in a calm and restrained manner:

> ἀλλ ἡcυχῶc χρὴ καὶ cεcωφρονιcμένωc
> πρὸc πρᾶγμ᾽ ὁρῶcαc τῶνδε μὴ ἀμελεῖν θεῶν.
> (A. *Supp.* 724-5)

> But you must in a quiet and becalmed manner keep an eye on the situation, and never ignore the gods over here.

The Danaids do in fact intermittently manage to be calm during the play. This is when Danaus brings the news that the king's plea on their behalf at the assembly has been successful. They now drop the harsh and threatening tones they had used before and exhort each other to utter 'good prayers in reward for good things' on behalf of the Argives (625f. ἄγε δὴ λέξωμεν ἐπ᾽ Ἀργείοιc | εὐχὰc ἀγαθὰc ἀγαθῶν ποινάc). The choral song that follows is indeed a prayer for the welfare of Argos, and when it is finished, Danaus re-enters to tell them that such a prayer was indeed in order: εὐχὰc μὲν αἰνῶ τάcδε cώφρονας, φίλαι, 'these sensible prayers I heartily approve of, my daughters' (710). The point of the adjective cώφρονας here is that these prayers dis-

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cεcωφρονίcθαι, 'that in a way they have acquired restraint because of their licentiousness', quoted by Stob. 3.4.122 and Iamb. *Protr.* 66) and X. *Cyr.* 3.1.19. Otherwise, it is found at schol. E. *Or.* 129; schol. *Il.* 2.212; Phalar. *Ep.* 129.1; *Hist. Alex. Magn.* 3.33.7; Cassius Dio 45.27.3; 53.4.1; Plt. *Pomp.* 31.6; Hesych. π 1474; Gregorius Nazianzenus, *Orat.* 42, 36.485.43; Michael Psellus *Or.* 1.2749; and Constantinus Porphyrogenitus *De virtutibus* 1.356.22.

[24] Cf. Friis Johanson and Whittle *ad loc.*

[25] When used of thoughts or utterances, μάταιος, commonly translated 'vain' or 'idle', means 'unjustified, having no basis in the situation' rather than 'empty'. Cf. *PV* 329 γλώσσηι ματαίαι ζημία προστρίβεται, *Th.* 438f. τῶν τοι ματαίων ἀνδράcιν φρονημάτων | ἡ γλῶcc᾽ ἀληθὴc γίγνεται κατήγορος, *Ag.* 1662 ἀλλὰ τούcδε μοι ματαίαν γλῶccαν ὧδ᾽ ἀπανθίcαι .

pense with the violent threats they had used before in favour of a
benevolent calm.

If the Danaids are prone to both fear and violence, they *do*
possess cωφροcύνη in a different sense, in that they are prepared
to defend their virginity at all costs. When the girls are finally
allowed to enter their new city, Danaus sends them on their way
with yet another 'admonition' or 'summons to good sense'
(cωφρονίcμαcιν, 992). These cωφρονίcματα come down to the
suggestion that the girls should guard their chastity no matter
what: he realises that they are young and beautiful, and that this
could get them into trouble in their new-found refuge much as it
did back in Egypt. Their long and arduous escape would then
have been in vain, and that would make them a disgrace to their
father and a laughing-stock for their father's enemies (1006-9).
Therefore, Danaus tells his daughters to value τὸ cωφρονεῖν, here
meaning their chastity, above all other things.

> μόνον φύλαξαι τάcδ' ἐπιcτολὰc πατρός
> τὸ cωφρονεῖν τιμῶcα τοῦ βίου πλέον.
> (A. *Supp.* 1012-13)

> Only do keep these injunctions of your father's in mind, valuing
> cωφροcύνη more highly than life.

This passage is commonly regarded as one of the earliest of
many instances where cωφροcύνη in women includes restraint in
sexual matters.[26] But it is important to note that the cωφροcύνη
of the Danaids is not that of the married woman who is supposed
to shy away from intimate contacts with other men; the Danaids
are unmarried girls who, as long as this status is to prevail, are
supposed to keep their virginity at any cost. There is a hint in
Danaus' words, and elsewhere in the vehement terms in which
the girls express their abhorrence of marriage with the Egyp-
tians, that the girls should and will go to extremes to preserve

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[26] Friis Johanson and Whittle ad loc. cite *Cho.* 140, S. Fr. 682.2, and E. *Andr.*
596, *El.* 923, *Hipp.* 80, 399, 494, 1365, *IA* 544, fr. 446.2, 503.2. None of the
instances from the complete extant dramas is exactly parallel to *Supp.* 1013. Of
the four instances from *Hipp.*, 80 and 1365 refer to the *ritual* chastity that
Hippolytus values so highly, 399 and 494 to the good sense that Phaedra cannot
exhibit due to her love. *Cho.* 140 and *El.* 923 refer to Clytemnestra's lack of
faithfulness, *Andr.* 596 and *IA* 544 (indirectly) to that of Helen.

this 'chastity'.[27] Here again, the 'victims' are likely to turn into aggressors themselves, as of course they will in the lost plays of the trilogy. That the theme of virginity preserved at a high price is indeed important to the remainder of the trilogy, is confirmed by the song of exit, in which the Danaids once more invoke the help of Artemis to escape marriage (1018-33), whereas their servant maidens warn that one cannot completely ignore Cypris.[28]

Thus, we see that in the violent conflicts of these plays, the women, who in principle are victims rather than aggressors, are required to keep their emotions in check, and react calmly in situations of danger and distress. The Theban women from *Seven Against Thebes* initially simply conform to the stereotype of women who fail to keep calm in distress; the Danaids are rather more complex: they are not only fearful but also assertive and even prone to aggression, and they constantly have to be reminded of the 'script' of appropriate behaviour: as suppliants, they have to assume an air of quiet modesty before their protectors without showing undue emotion or aggression; as unmarried girls, they are also to guard their prized virginity.

4. *Subjects And Authorities: Obedience*

Apart from the ϲωφροϲύνη, or the lack of it, of 'aggressors' and 'victims', the plays of Aeschylus also offer some examples of how, in the interaction between superiors and subjects, a summons to

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[27] This is not necessarily to say that the Danaids have 'a horror of male contact of any form'. (Winnington-Ingram (1961), 144.) Psycho-sexual interpretations of the play which relate the Danaids' repulsion of the marriage to their cousins to a horror of men in general (notably Fritz (1936), Winnington-Ingram (1961), Lesky (1964), 70 and Kraus (1984) 105) or to a special intimacy with their fathers (a.o. Caldwell (1974) and Zeitlin (1988) 231-259) are probably anachronistic in method. The point is, simply, that they have had to go to great lengths to avoid *this* particular marriage, and now cannot and will not do away lightly with the virginity they have tried so hard to preserve.

For a critique of the various 'psychosexual' interpretations, see Rohweder (1998) 102-105 and 154-5.

[28] The sentiment expressed in 1034-52 is quite incompatible with 1018-33; therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that Kirchhoff was right to attribute these verses to a chorus of servant women.

ϲωφροϲύνη amounts to the injunction to 'shut up and obey'. This attitude is adopted by Hermes in dealing with the captive Prometheus (*PV* 982),[29] but rather more telling instances are found in the *Oresteia.* There, the peaceful, 'proto-democratic' spirit at Athens as represented in *Eumenides,* contrasts sharply with the authoritarian leadership of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus as shown at the end of *Agamemnon.* As soon as Clytemnestra emerges from the palace boasting that she rightfully killed her husband (1372-98),[30] the chorus comment adversely on her 'boldness of speech' (1399-1400), but Clytemnestra does not care whether they approve of her deeds or not. The old men then proceed to threaten her with banishment from the city, but Clytemnestra tells them to shut up in words that suggest that, to her, might is right:

> ... λέγω δέ ϲοι
> τοιαῦτ᾽ ἀπειλεῖν, ὡϲ παρεϲκευαϲμένηϲ
> ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, χειρὶ νικήϲαντ᾽ ἐμοῦ
> ἄρχειν· ἐὰν δὲ τοὔμπαλιν κραίνηι θεόϲ,
> γνώϲηι διδαχθεὶϲ ὀψὲ γοῦν τὸ ϲωφρονεῖν.
>   (A. *Ag.* 1421-5).

> I tell you to utter these threats in the conviction that I am prepared to confront you under equal conditions: if by force you beat me, you'll rule. But if the god brings about the opposite, you will, though belatedly, learn to recognise what good sense means.

To Clytemnestra, τὸ ϲωφρονεῖν means quite simply that inferiors refrain from contradicting and opposing their superiors and keep quiet, unless they have the means to enforce their views upon their masters. Otherwise, they will be forced to *learn* (γνώϲηι διδαχθείϲ) to have the good sense to shut up: a particularly nasty variation, this, on the theme of πάθει μάθοϲ.

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[29] This is no doubt a deliberate humiliation of the great hero, who is here treated like an 'ordinary' subordinate. On ϲωφροϲύνη as a quality not particularly appropriate to the hero, see especially chapter 5.2 (Ajax).

[30] Conacher (1987) 49–53, draws attention to the 'double determination' of Clytemnestra's deed. In her first speech, especially 1379ff., she asserts her own responsibility in the strongest possible terms, yet at 1501 she claims that it was not she but the ἀλάϲτωρ of Atreus. At 1505f., the chorus reject the apparent consequence of this second claim (ὡϲ μὲν ἀναίτιοϲ εἶ | τοῦδε φόνου τίϲ ὁ μαρτυρήϲων; "who will witness that you are innocent of this murder?").

Aegisthus is, if possible, even worse: when the chorus accuse him of ὕβρις (*Ag.* 1612) in response to his claim that he planned the murder and committed it voluntarily, he tells them even more bluntly to keep their peace:

cὺ ταῦτα φωνεῖc νερτέραι προcήμενος
κώπηι, κρατούντων τῶν ἐπὶ ζυγῶι δορός;
γνώcηι γέρων ὢν ὡc διδάcκεcθαι βαρὺ
τῶι τηλικούτωι, cωφρονεῖν εἰρημένον.
  (A. *Ag.* 1617-20)

Do you dare say such things, sitting at the lower bench, while the masters are those at the steersman's seat of the ship? You will learn, old as you are, that to be taught a lesson is a difficult thing for a man of your age, when it has been proclaimed that you should show good sense.

Again here, cωφρονεῖν amounts to 'having the good sense to keep quiet', and it is striking that Aegisthus simply tries to force this submission on his supposed inferiors by order. A few lines later, things threaten to get really out of hand. Now it is Clytemnestra who intervenes and prevents further bloodshed, but Aegisthus continues to assert his disregarded authority:

ἀλλὰ τούcδε μοι ματαίαν γλῶccαν ὧδ' ἀπανθίcαι
κἀκβαλεῖν ἔπη τοιαῦτα δαίμονοc πειρωμένουc,
cώφρονοc γνώμηc θ' ἁμαρτεῖν, τὸν κρατοῦντα ⟨–◡–⟩.
(A. *Ag.* 1662-4)

But that these men should pluck the flowers of ill-founded words against me in such a way, and throw up such words putting their good fortune to the test, and that they lack [?] a cώφρων mind <and> ... the ruler.

The text of the manuscripts is more than usually corrupt near the end of the play, and line 1664 is seriously damaged[31] but the sense is quite clear: once again, Aegisthus claims that the old men, as inferiors, should show the good sense to keep their mouths shut.

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[31]   For the mss.' ἁμαρτῆτον, Casaubon's ἁμαρτεῖν τὸν seems a sensible emendation. If one accepts his suggestion, it is probably best to follow Stanley and read θ' rather than the manuscripts' δ': the statement of 1664 seems exactly parallel to those in 1662-3. The lacuna at the end of the verse then should in all probability contain a connecting particle and another inf.: θ' ὑβρίcαι (Blomfield) is a make-shift supplement that gives a hint of what one might expect.

After one brief appearance in *Choephori*, Aegisthus is killed and is not seen again on stage. The shade of Clytemnestra, on the other hand, reappears at the beginning of *Eumenides* to incite the Erinyes, who had been enjoying a break in Delphi, to go on haunting Orestes on his way to Athens. She reproaches the terrible creatures for slacking off, and suggests that her just reproaches should sting their hearts: 'for to people of good sense these words are sharp as prickles' (τοῖς cώφροcιν γὰρ ἀντίκεντρα γίγνεται, A. *Eum.* 136). In what is surely the most strikingly paradoxical use of the word cώφρων in the entire trilogy, Clytemnestra treats the Eumenides as if they were a bunch of servants who fail to do as they are told by their master: the thought that people who have their good sense intact, will have the sense of honour to be touched by 'justified' reproaches (135 ἐνδίκοιc ὀνείδεcιν) and will be stirred to action in order to avoid such criticism in future, is put to the service of Clytemnestra's desire for revenge which is the very opposite of Zeus' lesson. Not even in death, then, does she learn the central 'message' of the trilogy: πάθει yes, μάθοc hardly.

5. *Conclusion*

In Aeschylus, cωφροcύνη is mainly the prerequisite of men, and is primarily connected with abstention from unjustified violence, especially that against one's city or one's family. (For a diagram that tries to visualise the network connections between the uses of the terms in Aeschylus, see Fig. 5 in Chapter 9.3.) In both *Seven Against Thebes* and *Oresteia* it is clear that unjustified violence also offends the gods, and cωφρονεῖν is used in a second way in connection with the idea that man should avoid offending the gods. In *Oresteia*, the unremitting sequence of killings is finally stopped by the court of the Areiopagos at Athens, who are the only mortals in the trilogy to learn Zeus' 'lesson to mankind'. *Seven Against Thebes* and *Suppliant Women* show some women who lose their calm, and their cωφροcύνη, when they can not control their emotions under extreme conditions. In *Suppliant Women* Aeschylus offers a fairly complex picture of the ideology of cωφροcύνη in connection with the excitable temperaments of the

Danaids. The daughters of Danaus are expected to control their
emotions and to keep calm in spite of their distressful situation
— apparently a quite difficult task for these irascible young
women. But, being the unmarried girls they are, they have also
gone to great lengths to preserve their virginity, and are now ex-
pected to guard it above all. There are strong hints that these
two requirements do not, in this particular situation, fit very well,
and that the girls will in fact go to extremes to satisfy them. Thus,
the girls have difficulties to live up to the 'script' of ϲωφροϲύνη in
two ways.

Meanwhile, a more overtly authoritarian view of ϲωφροϲύνη is
presented by both Clytemnestra and Aegisthus in dealing with
the Argive elders in *Agamemnon*, and by Hermes vis-à-vis Prome-
theus in *PV*. To these authoritarian figures, ϲωφροϲύνη means
that inferiors should have the good sense to shut up and obey.
(In *Oresteia,* this 'authoritarian' view of ϲωφροϲύνη is implicitly
contrasted with the more 'democratic' application of ϲωφροϲύνη
found at Athens in *Eumenides*). The complications connected
with this ϲωφροϲύνη of submission are treated in a more intricate
manner in a key text that will take up a large part of the next
chapter, Sophocles' *Ajax*.

SOPHOCLES

1. *Introduction*

As we have seen in the last chapter, there is a strongly hierarchical aspect to ϲωφροϲύνη in Aeschylus, where the term and its cognates are used a number of times when someone of superior status demands acquiescence and obedience from his inferiors. The problematic nature of this 'authoritarian' view of ϲωφροϲύνη is an important theme in the earliest extant play of Sophocles, *Ajax* (see section 2). Its protagonist is a strong and heroic figure who, on account of this heroic temperament, is unable to adapt to the hierarchical organisation of the Greek army, and is unwilling to bend to the demands of his 'superiors'. Ajax refuses to accept the authority of the commanders of the Greek army, Menelaus and Agamemnon (*Aj.* 677), who both state their claims to obedience in strong and unequivocal terms (*Aj.* 1057, 1259), and he even fails to acknowledge the superiority of the gods (*Aj.* 132). But if Ajax is unable to 'give in'[1] and be a ϲώφρων subject to anyone, even the highest authorities, this is simply because he himself has strong claims to superiority on the basis of his ἀρετή, and not because he questions the legitimacy of hierarchical relationships in principle: in fact we hear him demanding ϲωφροϲύνη from Tecmessa (*Aj.* 586) in much the same tone as it is demanded from him by Athena and the sons of Atreus.

Thus, Sophocles' treatment of the figure of Ajax suggests that the ϲωφροϲύνη of obedience, while a valid social value, is hardly compatible with the ethos and status of the 'hero'. To Ajax, ϲωφροϲύνη as understood by both himself and those around him, is a limitation of which he himself is utterly incapable given his heroic qualities. Here we note a strong clash between the strength of the individual and the restraint demanded by those around him, between ἀρετή/ἀνδρεία and ϲωφροϲύνη. In later

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[1] The refusal to yield (εἴκειν) seems to be a central characteristic of the Sophoclean hero in general, cf. Knox (1964) 15-17.

chapters we will see that, on the more mundane level of life in the πόλιϲ as well, it often seemed difficult to reconcile these very different qualities: the tension between ἀνδρεία and ϲωφροϲύνη is very apparent, for instance, in Thucydides' famous chapter on ϲτάϲιϲ (3.82, see chapter 7.3) and in some of the assertive but 'immoral' characters in the plays of Aristophanes (chapter 8.2). It will be Plato's *tour de force* to try to balance and reconcile the two qualities in his education of the guardians in *Republic* (chapter 10.6).

Ajax is a radically uncompromising character,[2] who is asked to restrain himself but cannot do so. Most Sophoclean heroes are similarly headstrong, 'larger-than-life' characters,[3] and perhaps it is no surprise to see that the self-restraint expected from ordinary mortals is not on their repertoire, and that ϲωφροϲύνη is not normally much of an issue for them.[4] It *is* an issue, however, for Electra: first, after voicing her grief and her desire for revenge, she excuses herself for her emotional and even violent reactions (*El.* 307), but then she appropriates the virtue when she tells Chrysothemis that the latter's acquiescence is not, in these particular circumstances, the commendable girlish virtuousness that it normally undoubtedly is (*El.* 365, see also 465). Here Electra bends the language of conventional morality to fit a highly unusual situation, and we meet with one of the earliest 'persuasive definitions' of the term.[5] (On Electra, see section 3.)

Elsewhere, the appeal to ϲωφροϲύνη is made only in connection with secondary and/or distinctly less heroic characters: apart from Chrysothemis, these are Creon (*OT* 589), Odysseus (in *Ph.* 1259, and, implicitly, in *Aj.*) and Lichas (*Tr.* 435). (See section 4 for these male characters.) Here we meet, for the first time in our survey, quite a substantial number of instances of

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[2] Cf. Knox (1964) 8, on the tendency of Sophoclean heroes to choose disaster in preference to a compromise that would betray the hero's conception of himself.

[3] For an extensive discussion of the type, see Knox (1964) 1-61.

[4] As it seems, ϲωφροϲύνη was never a particularly heroic quality. See Chapter 2.6, and cf. Winnington-Ingram (1980) 9.

[5] This is not deny, of course, that virtually all uses of ϲωφροϲύνη serve a persuasive goal (influencing the response of their addressees), save perhaps in some theoretical discussions. But here, the term is applied to a line of behaviour to which, under normal conditions, it would almost certainly *not* apply.

what is commonly called the 'prudential' sense of ϲωφροϲύνη
('having the good sense to avoid behaviour that is harmful to
oneself'). This 'prudence' is a characteristic of any man who has
the good sense and the responsibility to manage his own affairs
and avoid anything that could only harm him. But if this type of
ϲωφροϲύνη is not a grandly heroic feature, this does not mean
that it is in any sense a less than admirable quality. It clearly *is*
most desirable for Creon, who claims to be 'sensibly' enjoying
the benefits of belonging to the royal family without aspiring to
the supreme power of the monarch and its attending hassles.
Here we also get a first glimpse of the ϲωφροϲύνη of the
ἀπράγμων male citizen who quietly manages his own affairs, and
keeps out of affairs that may only harm his own interests.

2. *Ajax*

The *Ajax* is the only play among the extant tragedies of Sopho-
cles in which ϲωφροϲύνη is in any sense central to the main
theme of the drama. It concerns a notably 'strong' hero, μέγαϲ
Ajax, who on account of this very strength spurns divine help
and proves unable to submit himself to the hierarchy of the
Greek army. In his inability to submit to authority, Ajax lacks
ϲωφροϲύνη, and much is made throughout the play of ϲωφροϲύνη
in the sense, familiar from Aeschylus, of obedience to one's su-
periors.
     The first relevant passage occurs towards the end of the pro-
logue, where Athena shows Odysseus the sight of Ajax smitten
with madness, a powerful demonstration of the power of the
gods (118) and the instability of human affairs (125-6). The
goddess then proceeds to tell Odysseus what he should 'learn'
from this terrible example:

> τοιαῦτα τοίνυν εἰϲορῶν ὑπέρκοπον
> μηδέν ποτ᾽ εἴπηιϲ αὐτὸϲ εἰϲ θεοὺϲ ἔποϲ
> μηδ᾽ ὄγκον ἄρηι μηδέν᾽, εἴ τινοϲ πλέον
> ἢ χειρὶ βρίθειϲ ἢ μακροῦ πλούτου βάθει.
> ὡϲ ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν
> ἅπαντα τἀνθρώπεια· τοὺϲ δὲ ϲώφροναϲ
> θεοὶ φιλοῦϲι καὶ ϲτυγοῦϲι τοὺϲ κακούϲ.
>   (S. *Aj.* 127-133)

> In view of such things, you must never yourself speak any word of
> arrogance against the gods, nor assume any kind of pomp, if you
> pull more weight than another man, either by your deeds or by
> the depth of great wealth. See how a day brings down and brings
> back up again all human affairs; those who are cώφρονες win loy-
> alty from the gods, but they detest those who are bad.

According to Athena's words, there are two things which Odys-
seus must avoid if he is to be cώφρων and to get the help of the
gods: (a) he should not speak insolent words to the gods and (b)
he should not assume pompous airs (ὄγκον, 129) on account of
any superiority over others in prowess or resources.

 This anti-scenario of cωφροcύνη clearly applies to Ajax. As to
his lack of deference for the gods, he has already been heard
speaking 'insolent words' against Athena (notably his rejection
of her plea on behalf of Odysseus at 112-13, and his instruction
to her to remain his loyal ally at 116-17);[6] the spectator must at
this point assume that an earlier, similar, insult to the goddess is
the cause for his punishment. Uncertainty on this point will be
removed later in the play in the messenger speech that recounts
the words of Calchas: according to the seer, Ajax had claimed on
two occasions that he could do without the help of the gods: first
when he haughtily and foolishly (766, ὑψικόμπως κἀφρόνως) re-
jected his father's advice before sailing to Troy (766-9), and a
second time in battle, when he told Athena to help some other
Greeks who did really need her (774-5). So Ajax fails to show the
type of cωφροcύνη demanded by Athena: the goddess wants him
to submit to divinity, but Ajax flatly refuses to do so.[7]

 As to his pride and arrogance in dealing with his fellow men,
we have seen him gloating over the fate of enemies and revelling
in his martial superiority (96 κόμπος πάρεcτι). Here, however, it
is not only Ajax who falls short. A very similar kind of 'arrogance'
is displayed in the second half of the play by both Menelaus and
Agamemnon in their authoritarian dismissal of Teucer and their
refusal to let Ajax be buried. Again, Agamemnon and Menelaus

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[6] Winnington-Ingram (1980) 14: 'His tone is dismissive and almost
patronizing.' Kirkwood (1958) 102 speaks of 'bluff familiarity'.
 [7] On the authoritarian nature of Athena in this play, see Garvie (1998) 136,
Flashar (2000) 49: 'Der athenische Zuschauer, der Athene auch als
Schutzgöttin Athens versteht, dürfte irritiert gewesen sein.'

demand submission, Teucer refuses to submit. When Odysseus finally prevails upon Agamemnon, we see that he alone is capable of avoiding the arrogance of which most characters in the play are all too guilty. On this level, Odysseus is indeed seen to take Athena's summons to ϲωφροϲύνη to heart, if probably in a rather more 'humane' way than intended by his authoritarian patron deity.

Thus, Athena's final words are meant to ring in the minds of the spectators and accordingly, they are strikingly phrased. The thought that arrogance can be brought down in a single day, but that the gods look kindly upon those who refrain from insubordination, is familiar enough after, say, *Seven Against Thebes* or *Persians.* But what *is* striking indeed is that the 'bad guys' who fail to take Athena's lesson to heart are called κακούϲ (133). Κακόϲ is not a term that applies easily to Ajax or any of the heroes from the Trojan war, and it is surely significant that Athena effectively denies his ἀρετή.[8]

If Athena insists on the respect that humans should show for the gods, most human characters in *Ajax* do not fail to make clear that they also demand respect and obedience from their alleged inferiors. The point is driven home to Teucer by Menelaus, who uses quasi-political terms reminiscent of the arguments of the Erinyes in *Eumenides*:

> οὐ γάρ ποτ᾿ οὔτ᾿ ἂν ἐν πόλει νόμοι καλῶϲ
> φέροιντ᾿ ἄν, ἔνθα μὴ καθεϲτήκηι δέοϲ,
> οὔτ᾿ ἂν ϲτρατόϲ γε ϲωφρόνωϲ ἄρχοιτ᾿ ἔτι
> μηδὲν φόβου πρόβλημα μηδ᾿ αἰδοῦϲ ἔχων.
> (S. *Aj.* 1073-6)

> For it could never happen either that in a *polis* the laws are duly respected, if there is no fear, or that an army lets itself still be commanded ϲωφρόνωϲ without a sense of fear or αἰδώϲ thrown in.

Just as in a *polis* the laws will not be respected if people have nothing to fear, likewise, Menelaus claims, it is not conceivable that the soldiers of an army will respect the authority of their commanders any longer (ἔτι in 1075 seems to betray a real fear for the loss of authority on part of Menelaus), and let themselves be ruled in an orderly, quiet, sensible manner (ϲωφρόνωϲ, 1075),

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[8] Cf. Adkins (1960) 172ff., Winnington-Ingram (1980) 55.

unless there is fear and αἰδώς (1076);[9] otherwise, men will feel free to infringe on the rights of others and act as they like (1081, ὅπου δ' ὑβρίζειν δρᾶν θ' ἃ βούλεται παρῆι), and this is an immediate threat to the stability of a society or a collective enterprise. To Menelaus, Ajax was a mere subordinate, who by refusing to accept the verdict of the sons of Atreus threatened the order of the Greek army, and his insubordination constitutes ὕβρις, an assault on the authority of the commanders, which is to be punished by letting his corpse lie unburied.[10]

Menelaus' brother Agamemnon is even more unpleasantly authoritarian when he bluntly denies Teucer the right to plead on Ajax' behalf:

> καὶ σοὶ προσέρπον τοῦτ' ἐγὼ τὸ φάρμακον
> ὁρῶ τάχ', εἰ μὴ νοῦν κατακτήσῃ τινά·
> ὃς ἀνδρὸς οὐκέτ' ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἤδη σκιᾶς,
> θαρσῶν ὑβρίζεις κἀξελευθεροστομεῖς.
> οὐ σωφρονήσεις; οὐ μαθὼν ὃς εἶ φύσιν
> ἄλλον τιν' ἄξεις ἄνδρα δεῦρ' ἐλεύθερον,
> ὅστις πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀντὶ σοῦ λέξει τὰ σά;
> σοῦ γὰρ λέγοντος οὐκέτ' ἂν μάθοιμ' ἐγώ·
> τὴν βάρβαρον γὰρ γλῶσσαν οὐκ ἐπαΐω.
> (S. *Aj.* 1255-64)

For you as well I see this remedy [sc. the whip] coming up soon, unless you acquire some sense; you who, while the man is no longer there but is a shade already, have the nerve to insult and speak up freely. Will you not be σώφρων? Will you not realise who

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[9] The analogy of πόλις and army is presented in reverse by Creon in *Ant.* 663ff. Cf. Winnington-Ingram (1980), 63, who has good commends on parallel between the vindictive Menelaus' appeal to fear and that of the equally vindictive Erinyes at A. *Eum.* 516ff., 696ff.

[10] Throughout the play, both parties use ὕβρις-words to characterise the behaviour of their adversaries. For Ajax and his partisans, there are three insults to the hero's honour that constitute ὕβρις: first, Odysseus' victory in the contest for the arms of Achilles, for which the Atreids and, especially, Odysseus, are to be blamed (153, 196, 304, 955, 971); second, the disgraceful situation of the hero attacking the cattle instead of his enemies (304 ὑβρίσθην); and finally, the order of the Greek commanders that Ajax be denied burial (1092, 1151, 1385). At 560, Ajax utters the hope that Teucer will protect Eurysakes from ὕβρις. For the sons of Atreus, it is Ajax' refusal to accept the judgement concerning Achilles' weapons (1061, 1081, 1088) that constitutes ὕβρις, as well as Teucer's insolence (1258). Thus, the use of ὕβρις-terms is restricted to the conflicts on the human level; they are not applied to Ajax' insults to Athena. On ὕβρις in *Ajax,* cf. Fisher (1992) 312-22, Cairns (1993) 229-30, 236-9, Cairns (1996) 11-13.

you are by birth, and bring some other man hither, a free man,
who will in your stead plead your case in front of us? For when you
speak, I cannot even understand; because I do not know your for-
eign tongue.

For Agamemnon, it is Teucer's status as the son of a Greek (Te-
lamon) and a slave woman that denies him the right to speak
freely (ἐξελευθεροϲτομεῖϲ, 1258) in front of the Greek chief
commander,[11] and Agamemnon underlines the point by insult-
ingly and extravagantly suggesting that he cannot even under-
stand his opponent's foreign tongue. What Teucer does, is to
ignore the inequality between the two of them, and thus, Aga-
memnon thinks, to detract from Agamemnon's superior status.
Just like Ajax' insubordination as decried by Menelaus, this 'inso-
lent' behaviour constitutes ὕβριϲ (1258).
But Agamemnon's disparagement of Teucer may easily be re-
garded as hybristic too, and the chorus hint at this when they
cautiously suggest that his words are not a model of ϲωφροϲύνη
either:

εἴθ᾽ ὑμὶν ἀμφοῖν νοῦϲ γένοιτο ϲωφρονεῖν·
τούτου γὰρ οὐδὲν ϲφῶιν ἔχω λῶιον φράϲαι.
(S. *Aj.* 1264-5)

Would that the two of you had the intelligence to be ϲώφρονεϲ. I
have nothing better than this to say to you both.

Treating the son of a Greek hero, even if he is technically a
νόθοϲ, as a foreign slave is to detract seriously from his status, and
such treatment is not at all dissimilar from Ajax' (and Teucer's)
refusal to take the hierarchy in the Greek army for granted.

If Ajax himself is unable to accept the precedence of Agamem-
non, Menelaus and Odysseus, that does not prevent him from
treating *his* subordinates in a similarly authoritarian manner.[12]
When Tecmessa notes that Ajax hints at his imminent suicide,
and asks her master what he intends to do, Ajax gruffly points
out that she should show the good sense to shut up:

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[11] As Flashar (2000) 52, the Periclean law of 451, according to which
citizenship is restricted to offspring of two Athenian citizens, may be relevant to
this passage.
[12] For the parallel between Ajax and Menelaus, cf. Kirkwood (1958) 107.

Τε. ὦ δέςποτ' Αἴας, τί ποτε δραςείεις φρενί;
Αι. μὴ κρῖνε, μὴ 'ξέταζε· ςωφρονεῖν καλόν.
(S. *Aj.* 585-6)

— Master Ajax, what do you intend to do? — Do not examine, do
not question me; it is good to be ςώφρων.

Of course, the status difference between the male warrior Ajax
and the captive woman Tecmessa is indisputable in a way that
the hierarchy among the Greek heroes is not, and Ajax' dismissal
of her questioning is by no means as questionable as the authori-
tarian posturing of Menelaus and Agamemnon; it is simply a
rather blunt expression of the conventional view that a woman
should shut up if her man wishes her to do so.[13] But the parallel
with the authoritarian behaviour of Agamemnon and Menelaus
cannot be overlooked either, and the scene underlines the deso-
lation of Ajax, who feels treated as an inferior by his equals, and
can not himself accept the sympathy and concern of *his* inferi-
ors.[14]

In fact, Ajax of course feels that he has no choice but to kill
himself. His first hints at this, in his exchange with Tecmessa,
provoke considerable distress from the chorus; later on, there-
fore, he restates his intentions in far more subtle terms, that may
even be mistaken (as they are by the chorus) to suggest that he is
now prepared to give in to the Atreids.

τοιγὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰςόμεςθα μὲν θεοῖς
εἴκειν, μαθηςόμεςθα δ' Ἀτρείδας ςέβειν.
ἄρχοντές εἰςιν, ὥςθ' ὑπεικτέον· τί μήν;
καὶ γὰρ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ καρτερώτατα
τιμαῖς ὑπείκει· τοῦτο μὲν νιφοςτιβεῖς
χειμῶνες ἐκχωροῦςιν εὐκάρπωι θέρει·
ἐξίςταται δὲ νυκτὸς αἰανὴς κύκλος
τῆι λευκοπώλωι φέγγος ἡμέραι φλέγειν·
δεινῶν τ' ἄημα πνευμάτων ἐκοίμιςε
ςτένοντα πόντον· ἐν δ' ὁ παγκρατὴς ὕπνος
λύει πεδήςας, οὐδ' ἀεὶ λαβὼν ἔχει·
ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς οὐ γνωςόμεςθα ςωφρονεῖν;
(S. *Aj.* 666-677)

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[13] Cf. Heath (1987) 183-4 and ibid. n. 37, who refers to the comments of
the scholiast: ἐν τούτωι γὰρ μάλιςτα ἡ ςωφροςύνη ταῖς γυναιξὶ διαςώιζεται, εἰ μὴ
περιεργάζοιντο ὅ τι πράττοι ὁ ἀνήρ.
[14] For the isolation of the Sophoclean protagonist, see Knox (1964) 32-4.

Therefore for the rest of our lives we will know to yield to the
gods, and learn to revere the sons of Atreus. They are leaders, so
one has to yield. Why not? Even what is formidable and very
strong yields to τιμή. That is what happens when snowy winters
make room for a fruitful summer. And the everlasting circle of the
night steps aside for the white-horsed day to blaze forth its light.
And the blast of the fearful winds [ceased and] laid the roaring
sea to sleep; moreover, almighty sleep releases what it has bound,
and does not always keep what it has taken. As for us, how will we
not learn to show good sense?

Ajax' speech is carefully formulated to convey his intentions to
the public, while his reticent and euphemistic formulations turn
out to assuage the fears of Tecmessa and the chorus. First, there

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[15] This may hardly be the place to go deeply into the interpretation of the
so-called *Trugrede*, so I will limitate myself in the main to stating the position
that I myself take.
Interpretations of the *Trugrede* fall broadly into three categories.
(I) First, there are those who assume that Ajax really intermittently abandons
his intention to kill himself, e.g. Bowra (1944) 39-42, Webster (1969) 96-9,
Leiniks (1974) 200. The main arguments against this view are (i) that there are
no explicit indications in the text of the play that Ajax changes his mind twice,
and (ii) that it requires a singularly 'optimistic', 'naïve' reading of the speech
itself without regard for its dark undertones.
(II) Second, many commentators assume that Ajax does not give up his
intention to kill himself, but that he deliberately deceives Tecmessa and the
chorus, e.g. Jebb (1896) xxxviii, Whitman (1951) 75, Von Fritz (1962), Moore
(1977) 55-66, Winnington Ingram (1980) 47n109, Stevens (1986) 328-9,
Blundell (1989) 83-4. The main problem for this type of approach is that verbal
insincerity seems very much out of character for the blunt and forthright Ajax
as presented in this play. (His secret attack on the Greek leaders, ἔξω τοῦ
δράματος, does not provide an adequate parallel for *verbal* secrecy.)
(III) Finally, and in complete opposition to the first group, there are those who
take it that Ajax is still intent on suicide but does *not* mean to deceive his
dependants. Exponents of this view include Welcker (1845) 302-22, Ebeling
(1941), Kirkwood (1958) 160-2, Sicherl (1977), 92, Knox (1979) 136-8.
On a naïve reading, this last line of approach again forces interpreters to
ignore the many verbal ambiguities in the speech. But it remains possible that
in the speech, Ajax sincerely discusses his intention to kill himself, but in
slightly euphemistic terms that are perspicuous to all but the most willfully
optimistic interpreters. The chorus exactly fall into this latter category, cf.
Kirkwood (1958) 162: 'At the end the meaning is so thinly veiled that except to
Ajax' followers, who are ready to grasp at any straw, there can be no deception.'
The truth of the matter, then, I think, is somewhere between groups (II) and
(III), but rather closer to the latter: Ajax hints at, and argues for, his suicide in
a manner that is not so much deliberately deceptive as compassionately
reticent. From different angles, Moore (1977) and Sicherl (1977) come
especially close to this view. This, incidentally may well be the point of his
ἐθηλύνθην στόμα, 651: Ajax has 'softened his words' (cf. Knox (1964) 138-9,

are the verbs εἴκειν and ὑπείκειν; on a 'naïve' interpretation as
adopted by the chorus, they may be taken as 'yield, give in to'
(cf., e.g. *An.* 472, *Aj.* 371), but Ajax clearly has a much more
drastic way of 'getting out of the way' in mind, and the striking
and apparently incongruous juxtaposition of 'yield to the gods,
and revere the sons of Atreus', where the verbs seem to be given
the wrong complements, helps to discourage the spectator from
an innocent interpretation without explicitly blocking it for the
chorus. Then there is καὶ γὰρ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ καρτερώτατα |
τιμαῖς ὑπείκει. On an innocent interpretation, the expression
simply refers to the 'powerful' natural phenomena in the exam-
ples that follow, and serves as an introduction to the conclusion
a fortiori that Ajax should yield as well; but in view of the predi-
cate τιμαῖς ὑπείκει, it seems likely that for τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ καρ-
τερώτατα, Ajax is (also) thinking of a human paradigm rather
than one from nature: he himself is the most formidable and the
strongest warrior among the Greeks, and thus a human example
of τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ καρτερώτατα, and he is getting out of the way
now because of the prestige (τιμαί) of his opponents: what seems
an innocent generalisation turns out to be a wry statement of
facts. Thirdly, as has been observed, the examples of natural
phenomena 'yielding' to their opposites all involve not just a
change for the good (which goes well with the innocent inter-
pretation) but also the extinction of the original phenomenon,
which does not quite encourage the optimistic view. And it is the

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Winnington-Ingram (1980) 48n.111), but only his *words*, not his intentions, nor
even, I think, the *content* of his words, cf. Moore (1977) 55: 'Ajax is led into this
unnatural language [i.e. sustained *double entendre*] by his desire to *avoid verbal
falsehood*' (my italics). In this reticence (cf, Kirkwood (1958) 162), he is —
almost despite himself — remarkably successful: the fact that he is indeed
completely misunderstood does not so much prove his insincerity, as underline
his utter isolation from his surroundings (cf. Von Fritz (1962) 252).

    [16] Cf. Winnington-Ingram (1980) 49: 'If there is anything in the speech
which betrays its 'insincerity', it is this choice of words.' See further Knox
(1979) 157n.85, Garvie (1998) 189, and the scholion: ἐπιφθόνως ἔφρασεν ἐν
εἰρωνείᾳ ἀντιστρέψας τὴν τάξιν· ἔδει γὰρ εἰπεῖν θεοὺς μὲν σέβειν εἴκειν δὲ
Ἀτρείδαις. 'Spoken in a malignant, sarcastic manner, by turning around the
order: for he should have said 'revere the gods, and give in to the Atreidai.'

    [17] As Heath (1987) 188 notices, Ajax describes his suicide in terms of
healing at 581-2; in this respect, his suicide is a change for the good as well,
much as the natural changes in the exempla.

    [18] Likewise, the verbs chosen in the *similia* do not encourage an 'optimistic'
interpretation: ἐκχωροῦσιν (671), ἐξίσταται (672), ἐκοίμισε (!) (674), λύει (676).

same with the expression 'to learn to $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\rho\nu\epsilon\hat{\iota}\nu$'. On the inno-
cent interpretation, this may seem to mean, 'to learn to obey and
comply with those in authority', much as $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ is used else-
where in the play. But it is clear that Ajax is quite incapable of
this submissive type of $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$. He is a superlative example of
the martial, 'Homeric' hero; among his main defining qualities
are $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omega\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (154 $\mu\epsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omega\nu$ $\psi\upsilon\chi\hat{\omega}\nu$, 161, 205, 933 $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\alpha\varsigma$),
$\mathring{a}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$ (617, 1357), and 'raw strength' (205 the adi. $\mathring{\omega}\mu\omega\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma$).
These martial qualities are strongly contrasted to and, for Ajax,
utterly incompatible with the $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ of the subject vis-à-vis
his rulers. For Ajax, $\mathring{a}\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ and $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ clash. So if Ajax now
claims that he must 'learn to be $\varsigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu$', he does not mean that
he must now give up the 'arrogance' on account of his martial
prowess, but that he must now do what is clearly the only 'sensi-
ble' and 'honourable' thing left for him.[20]

3. *Electra*

Ajax has shown us a grand, heroic character incapable of the
submissive, obedient kind of $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ that his society demands
from him. The only other Sophoclean play in which $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ is
of more than passing interest is *Electra*. The play shows two girls
living under the regime of a mother and a stepfather who killed
their father. Chrysothemis is a conventionally 'decent' girl, to
whom $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ may well be an important quality. But for the
main character, Electra, things are very different.

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[19] The future tense $\gamma\nu\omega\varsigma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\varsigma\theta\alpha$ sugggests that he is not $\varsigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu$ now, see
Goldhill (1986) 190-1. In fact, he will only be so in death.

[20] I largely agree with Sicherl (1977) 81-82 here, save perhaps for the
emphasis he puts, following North (1966) 50ff., on the element of self-
knowledge. Ajax is $\varsigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu$ not in that he submits to his supposed superiors,
but in that suicide is the only sensible option if he is to leave the world without
suffering humiliation, with his honour intact. This is an impressively 'sinister'
type of good sense, perhaps, but not one that requires particularly deep self-
knowledge.

A similarly 'sinister' interpretation for $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\rho\nu\epsilon\hat{\iota}\nu$, incidentally, applies to E.
Hipp. 1034, where $\mathring{\epsilon}\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\varsigma\epsilon$ $o\mathring{\upsilon}\kappa$ $\mathring{\epsilon}\chi o\upsilon\varsigma\alpha$ $\varsigma\omega\phi\rho\rho\nu\epsilon\hat{\iota}\nu$ is to be understood as 'she
did a sensible thing (i.e. saving her honour by killing herself), while incapable
of being sensible (i.e. being a loyal wife).' See also chapter 6.5.

As soon as she makes her entrance towards the end of the pro-
logue, she starts lamenting her distress (ἰώ μοί μοι δύϲτηνοϲ are
her very first words in 77, and she is announced by Orestes in 80
as ἡ δύϲτηνοϲ Ἠλέκτρα). In reaction, the chorus-members,
though by and large sympathetic to her, give a number of hints
that her mourning is somewhat excessive (e.g. 123 ἀκόρεϲτον
οἰμωγάν, 'insatiable lamentation'; 140 ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων, 'immod-
erately', 155 τῶν ἔνδον εἶ περιϲϲά, 'you are more extreme than
the others inside'; 177 μηθ᾽ ὑπεράχθεο, 'do not feel too much
pain'). After the entrance song, Electra concedes that she may
indeed have offended by showing excessive signs of grief (254f.
αἰϲχύνομαι μέν, ὦ γυναῖκεϲ, εἰ δοκῶ πολλοῖϲι θρήνοιϲ δυϲφορεῖν
ὑμῖν ἄγαν. 'I am ashamed, ladies, if you feel that by my many
lamentations, I am bearing things badly too much'). But she ar-
gues that in her present situation, which she describes at length,
she could not possibly do otherwise:

> ἐν οὖν τοιούτοιϲ οὔτε ϲωφρονεῖν, φίλαι,
> οὔτ᾽ εὐϲεβεῖν πάρεϲτιν· ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖϲ κακοῖϲ
> πολλή 'ϲτ᾽ ἀνάγκη κἀπιτηδεύειν κακά.
> (S. *El.* 307-9)

> My point is that in such a situation it is not possible to be ϲώφρων,
> nor to be *eusebês*. No, in bad situations it is very much necessary to
> plot bad things as well.

The passage echoes Electra's prayer in *Cho.* 140 (see chapter
4.2), but the interpretation of ϲωφρονεῖν will be different here.
In view of the preceding context, the ϲωφρονεῖν of which Electra
claims to be incapable in her present situation, is primarily the
kind of 'quiet' behaviour and repression of the emotions nor-
mally expected from women and girls (cf. A. *Th.* 186 and various
references in *Supp.*, chapter 4.2 and 4.3 above): they are ex-
pected to keep quiet, but Electra is unable to do that. And οὔτ᾽
εὐϲεβεῖν refers to her repeated deprecating remarks on her
mother (261-2 τὰ μητρόϲ ... ἔχθιϲτα ϲυμβέβηκεν, 273-4 μητέρ᾽ εἰ
χρεὼν ταύτην προϲαυδᾶν, 287 λόγοιϲι γένναια, 293 ἐξυβρίζει, 299
ὑλακτεῖ). But Electra is a woman of action too, and ἐπιτηδεύειν
κακά changes the tone of the passage. Electra has been planning
'bad schemes' by arranging the escape of Orestes, and thus by
keeping open the possibility of revenge, and in fact, even her

breaches of modesty are in themselves a kind of 'revenge'. Thus, 'not *cωφρονεῖν*' acquires a sinister undertone in retrospect, when *κἀπιτηδεύειν κακά* reminds the audience of the terrible things to come.

Whereas Electra, in her present situation, firmly rejects the standards of morality that normally apply to a girl, her sister Chrysothemis is a far more conventional character; for her, conventional standards still hold good, and it is no surprise that she is more susceptible to appeals to *cωφροcύνη* than her sister.[21] In their first confrontation, Electra tries to persuade her sister that, like herself, she should no longer comply with Aegisthus and their mother, and give up the life of affluence, of which Chrysothemis herself has hinted that it is important to a free girl (339-40), and to which, according to Electra, she attaches too much value (359-62). For, Electra suggests, if Chrysothemis will continue to 'hate' them only in words, but does nothing, she will lose her reputation:

> τῆc cῆc δ' οὐκ ἐρῶ τιμῆc τυχεῖν,
> οὐδ' ἂν cύ, cώφρων γ' οὖcα. νῦν δ' ἐξὸν πατρὸc
> πάντων ἀρίcτου παῖδα κεκλῆcθαι, καλοῦ
> τῆc μητρόc· οὕτω γὰρ φανῇ πλείcτοιc κακή,
> θανόντα πατέρα καὶ φίλουc προδοῦcα cούc.
> (S. *El.* 364-8)

> But this status of yours, I do not desire to get it, nor would you, at least if you are *cώφρων*. As things are, while it is possible for you to be called a child of the very best father, you must now be called a child of your mother. For in this way you will seem bad to most people, as you forsake your dead father and your *philoi*.

The appeal to *cωφροcύνη* and a good reputation seems conventional enough, where a girl like Chrysothemis is concerned. But whereas good sense of this kind normally leads precisely to the quiet behaviour and obedience that Chrysothemis exhibits (and that is apt to be rewarded by the kind of comfortable affluence that Chrysothemis presently enjoys), Electra claims that Chrysothemis must now, for the sake of her very *cωφροcύνη* and her all-

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[21] MacLeod (2001) 67 argues out that Chrysothemis is nevertheless less than admirable in that she acts out of concern for herself rather than for conventional morality.

important good reputation, forsake all these things and join her sister in resisting their mother and stepfather, and share the hardships that Electra suffers. This is striking rhetoric indeed, for ϲώφρων γ' οὖϲα here commends a line of behaviour that is utterly different from what normally constitutes ϲωφροϲύνη for a girl: Electra's concern is for their reputation (366 κεκλῆϲθαι, 367 φανῆι) in the long term, what people will say if they fail to take action and stand up in defence of their father.[22] It is this concern with a good reputation which may ultimately justify the interpretation of Electra's behaviour in terms of ϲωφροϲύνη, but Electra's 'active', almost 'masculine' view of the behaviour that safeguards this reputation is thoroughly unconventional for a woman, and from this point of view, hardly constitutes typical female ϲωφροϲύνη.[23]

Thus it is no surprise that Chrysothemis is not immediately convinced. She counters with the warning that Electra will be shut up in the dark if she does not stop making trouble (378-84), and she suggests that her sister too could do with some good sense: not the ϲωφροϲύνη of the young girl this time, but the sound 'common sense' (384 φρονεῖν, 390 ποῦ ποτ' εἶ φρενῶν, 394 εὖ φρονεῖν, 398 μὴ 'ξ ἀβουλίαϲ) to put up with those in power and to avoid getting herself in worse trouble.

The chorus too try to influence Chrysothemis with an appeal to ϲωφροϲύνη. Towards the end of the same *epeisodion*, when it has transpired that Clytemnestra has sent Chrysothemis to bring some offerings to the grave of Agamemnon (405-6), Electra tries to dissuade her sister from doing this; she points out that it would be a religious offence to obey and bring the dead man the gifts of the woman who has harmed him most (428ff.). Instead,

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[22] Later on, when they think Orestes has died, Electra argues that the girls should now perform the act of revenge themselves, and that this act will bring them 'good fame', εὔκλεια (973.) She here shows an almost 'masculine' concern for κλέοϲ, radically different from Chrysothemis' conventional sense of decency. For the difference between the girls on a wide range of values, cf. Kirkwood (1958) 137f, 240f. For the second confrontation between the girls, cf. MacLeod (2001) 135-52.

[23] Electra's 'redefinition' or 'private interpretation' of ϲωφροϲύνη has been emphasized by Blundell (1989) 159, North (1966) 65. MacLeod (2001) 62-70 is right to point out that Electra is not at all idiosyncratic in content; what is unusual is that Electra appropriates a type of ϲωφροϲύνη that is normally reserved for males.

she should offer some locks of hair of her sister and herself. The chorus-leader agrees that Chrysothemis would indeed do well to comply with her sister's wishes:

πρὸς εὐϲέβειαν ἡ κόρη λέγει· ϲὺ δέ,
εἰ ϲωφρονήϲεις, ὦ φίλη, δράϲεις τάδε.
(S. *El.* 464f.)

> It is with an eye to reverence that this girl speaks. And you, if you will be ϲώφρων, you will do as she says.

Again this is an appeal to conventional ideas of ϲωφροϲύνη, the good sense to avoid offending the gods this time, in the service of a not wholly conventional line of action. But what Electra suggests here is obviously respectful vis-à-vis her father, as the chorus admit when they acknowledge Electra's εὐϲέβεια (again, the two virtues are paired: for girls ϲωφροϲύνη is expected to be accompanied by respect for their elders).[24] And though it falls outside conventional ϲωφροϲύνη in that it does involve disobedience of Clytemnestra's orders, it can be done without Clytemnestra knowing it. Hence Chrysothemis is easily persuaded this time, and shows no major hesitation except for the warning that this must be kept secret from their mother.

4. *The 'Prudential'* ϲωφροϲύνη *of the Non-Heroic Citizen*

We have now met with two Sophoclean protagonists, Ajax and Electra, who, in view of their strong character and the extreme situation in which they find themselves, find it impossible to comply with the ϲωφροϲύνη of convention. We also met one lesser figure, Chrysothemis, who, as a model of conventional 'girlish' ϲωφροϲύνη, is subjected to appeals to this quality, in order that she may be engaged for a special and perilous cause.

In the other plays, ϲωφροϲύνη is never invoked in connection with any of the protagonists, and the quality seems entirely irrelevant to their characters or to the situations in which they find themselves. What we do get, however, are glimpses of the ϲωφροϲύνη of a very different type of person, not the powerful

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[24] Cf. Blundell (1989) 160, 'in this instance it [viz. Electra's brand of ϲωφροϲύνη] is perhaps not incompatible with the conventional *sophrosyne* of decorum.'

hero, but the private citizen, who circumspectly manages the affairs of himself and his οἶκος in a cautious, prudent and well-advised manner. These are not the great tragic heroes on their way to an inevitable and pitiable downfall, but men whose good sense prevents them from actions and aspirations that bring no gains but only trouble. This kind of prudence is often appealed to in a generalising statement that serves a persuasive goal.[25] Typically, it is invoked to break off an unwelcome theme of discussion, or to cut short deliberations.

A straightforward example of the ideology of good sense occurs in a passage where Philoctetes summarises his explanation why nobody ever visits his island:

> φέρ', ὦ τέκνον, νῦν καὶ τὸ τῆς νήσου μάθηις.
> ταύτηι πελάζει ναυβάτης οὐδεὶς ἑκών.
> οὐ γάρ τις ὅρμος ἔστιν, οὐδ᾽ ὅποι πλέων
> ἐξεμπολήσει κέρδος ἢ ξενώσεται.
> οὐκ ἐνθάδ᾽ οἱ πλοῖ τοῖσι σώφροσιν βροτῶν.
>   (S. *Ph.* 300-4)

> Well, my boy, now you must also learn the nature of this island. No seaman ever visits it on purpose. For there is no anchorage, nor is it a place to which one can sail in order make a gainful deal or be received as a guest. Not hither is the course of any mortal who is σώφρων.

Sailing to a desert island that has no harbour brings no promise of trade or hospitality, and involves the risk of damage to the ship. A merchant has nothing to gain from it, and a great deal to lose, hence no one in his right mind will come to the island on purpose.

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[25] Many of these take the form of γνῶμαι. Lardinois (1995) 13-19, (2001) 94-5, following Aristotle's definition (*Rhet.* 1394a21-26 Kassel) defines γνῶμαι as 'not concerning particulars ... but general, and not about all things ... but about all things that are actions' (Lardinois (2001) 94, translating Ar *Rhet. ibid.*). According to him, γνῶμαι typically combine standard syntactical and lexical structural patterns and certain standard themes. Of the examples considered below, *Tr.* 435, with its nominal phrase and and genitive ἀνδρὸς οὐχὶ σώφρονος, is strongly gnomic in form, but not, probably, in content: Lichas is indeed trying hard to present his evasiveness as self-evident. *OT* 589 (σώφρονες do not want to be king) is gnomic in form (the indefinite relative clause) and commonplace in content (cf. *Hipp.* 1013, chapter 6.4.). *Ph.* 304 is a general statement (τοῖσι σώφροσιν) but not properly gnomic, for it contains a statement not about an action, but about a thing (Philoctetes' island). *Ph.* 1259-60 is not a general statement.

Now Philoctetes' description of his island is presented as a straightforward statement of facts, explaining why the desert island is indeed deserted. Elsewhere, this 'prudential' ϲωφροϲύνη is usually invoked in the service of a persuasive goal. A good example is Creon in *OT*, who tries to refute Oedipus' suspicion that he wishes to usurp Oedipus' royal power. Creon points out that the kingship holds no attractions for him, as he is already the second man in the state; the royal power would only bring worries that would keep him from sleep:

> ϲκέψαι δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον, εἴ τιν' ἂν δοκεῖϲ
> ἄρχειν ἑλέϲθαι ξὺν φόβοιϲι μᾶλλον ἢ
> ἄτρεϲτον εὕδοντ', εἰ τά γ' αὔθ' ἕξει κράτη.
> ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὔτ' αὐτὸϲ ἱμείρων ἔφυν
> τύραννοϲ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τύραννα δρᾶν,
> οὔτ' ἄλλοϲ ὅϲτιϲ ϲωφρονεῖν ἐπίϲταται.
>   (S. *OT* 584-9)

> Consider this first: Do you think that anyone would choose to rule with fears rather than to do so while sleeping peacefully, if he is going to have the same power? I at any rate am not myself a man who desires to *be* a king rather than *do* the things a king would do; nor is anyone else who is able to be ϲώφρων.

Such cautionary reasoning, that one should not aspire to kingship if it brings only disadvantage, is not likely to appeal to heroic figures, and Creon's generalised appeal to ϲωφροϲύνη ('no one in his right mind would want kingship') fails to do away with Oedipus' suspicions.

The appeal to prudence is applied more successfully, if with unconcealed sarcasm, to the notably 'unheroic' figure of Odysseus in *Philoctetes*. Odysseus threatens to use violence to prevent Neoptolemus from restoring the bow to Philoctetes, but hesitates to put his threat into practice when the young man proves ready to retaliate. In order to do away with the threat of violence altogether, Neoptolemus condescendingly praises Odysseus' prudence and sarcastically suggests that this is the kind of good sense that will save him a lot of trouble in future:

> Οδ. καίτοι ϲ' ἐάϲω· τῶι δὲ ϲύμπαντι ϲτρατῶι
>   λέξω τάδ' ἐλθών, ὅϲ ϲε τιμωρήϲεται.
> Νε. ἐϲωφρόνηϲαϲ· κἂν τὰ λοίφ' οὕτω φρονῆιϲ,
>   ἴϲωϲ ἂν ἐκτὸϲ κλαυμάτων ἔχοιϲ πόδα.
>   (S. *Ph.* 1257-60)

(Odysseus): Very well, I will let you; but to the entire army I will
tell this on my return; they will punish you.
(Neoptolemus). Now you are σώφρων! And if you go on thinking
like this, you may well keep yourself out of misery.

To refrain from an act that would put oneself in considerable
danger (as a warrior Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles, is supe-
rior to Odysseus) obviously makes sense; this argument of pru-
dence is applied by Neoptolemus in sarcastic approval of what,
one feels, is perhaps rather mean cowardice: Odysseus obviously
has wicked intentions, but lacks the guts to fulfil them.

Thus the σώφρων man will stay out of trouble and danger, and
he will wisely not engage in senseless activities. This last notion is
exploited by Lichas in *Trachiniae*, who tries to cut short the em-
barrassing conversation with the messenger with the claim that
the man is mad, and that it makes no sense to engage in further
discussion:

ἄνθρωπος, ὦ δέσποιν᾽, ἀποστήτω. τὸ γὰρ
νοσοῦντι ληρεῖν ἀνδρὸς οὐχὶ σώφρονος.
(S. *Tr.* 434-5)

Let the fellow, my queen, depart. For to chatter with a deranged
man is not the mark of a σώφρων man.

The rhetoric of the σώφρων man who will not engage in things
that make no sense is here applied in the service of an attempt to
escape from an embarrassing and precarious situation.[26]

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[26] This 'prudential' kind of σωφροσύνη is also invoked, it seems, in fr. 896
εἴθ᾽ ἦσθα σώφρων ἔργα τοῖς λόγοις ἴσα, as this is cited by the scholiast on E. *Rh.*
105 εἴθ᾽ ἦσθ᾽ ἀνὴρ εὔβουλος ὡς δρᾶσαι χερί. Similarly, in fr. 936 (ὅπου γὰρ οἱ
φύσαντες ἡσσῶνται τέκνων, | οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη σωφρόνων ἀνδρῶν πόλις), prudent
men are said not to accept that children take precedence over their parents,
for the sake of the well-being of their πόλις.
The other fragments in which the adjective occurs address familiar 'other-
regarding' types of σωφροσύνη: filial respect for one's parents (fr. 64. 1 ῥῆσις
βραχεῖα τοῖς φρονοῦσι σώφρονα | πρὸς τοὺς τεκόντας καὶ φυτεύσαντας πρέπει),
the chastity of the loyal wife (fr. 682, from *Phaedra*: οὕτω γυναικὸς οὐδὲν ἂν
μεῖζον κακὸν | κακῆς ἀνὴρ κτήσαιτ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ σώφρονος | κρεῖσσον), respect for δίκη
(fr. 683.1-3 οὐ γάρ ποτ᾽ ἂν γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀσφαλὴς πόλις | ἐν ἧι τὰ μὲν δίκαια καὶ τὰ
σώφρονα | λάγδην πατεῖται, also from *Phaedra* and probably spoken by Theseus
in condemnation of Hippolytus, cf. Radt (1977) 478), and disinclination to
ὕβρις (fr. 786 ὕβρις δέ τοι | οὐπώποθ᾽ ἥβης εἰς τὸ σώφρον ἵκετο, | ἀλλ᾽ ἐν νέοις
ἀνθεῖ τε καὶ πάλιν φθίνει).

5. *Conclusion*

As we have seen in the present chapter, the Sophoclean protagonist is hardly the figure to look at in search of models of cωφροcύνη. Of the seven extant plays, *Ajax* is very important as it features a hero who on account of his extreme ethos, with its headstrong and exclusive emphasis on honour, merit and courage, is unable to accept the claims to (superior) τιμή of divine and human others, and his inability to comply with divine and human authority is construed throughout the play in terms of a lack of cωφροcύνη: Ajax offends the gods, and is incapable of the obedience demanded by the Atreids. For Ajax, martial prowess and (this particular type of) cωφροcύνη are utterly incompatible, and it seems that his stance, though extreme, is not atypical for Greek thought, given that some Platonic dialogues will have to go to extreme lengths to show that ἀνδρεία and cωφροcύνη are compatible after all, and that their combination is not just possible, but, ultimately, necessary.

Such a combination of 'strength' and cωφροcύνη is not the forte of the Sophoclean protagonist, however. Thus we see that Electra, on account of her very determination and strength, is incapable of cωφροcύνη in the conventional sense of calm and decorous behaviour, unlike her sister, but she is very apt at employing the conventional rhetoric of (masculine) cωφροcύνη to suit her own particular ends.

But in spite of this, cωφροcύνη in Sophocles is not just the 'negatively defined' quality of observing one's limitations. His plays offer us important glimpses of cωφροcύνη as the quite positive and desirable quality of the non-heroic, free individual citizen, who 'prudently' manages his own affairs and avoids behaviour that will bring only losses and no gains.

This 'prudential' cωφροcύνη, while not particularly relevant to the Sophoclean protagonist, as we noted above, will be seen to be of great importance for the Athenian citizen of the classical period (see especially Chapter 8 on Aristophanes and the Orators).

(For a diagram that tries to visualise the network connections between the Sophoclean uses, see Fig. 6 in Chapter 9.3.)

In the next chapter, things will be radically different. Euripid-
ean protagonists are, by and large, perhaps rather more like con-
temporary πολῖται than those of Sophocles, in any case we will
find them discussing the pros and cons and contrasting aspects
of cωφροcύνη at far greater length than any of the characters
from the earlier tragedians. This makes Euripides one of the
primary sources for cωφροcύνη in the classical period, and it is to
this source that we shall turn now.

EURIPIDES

1. *Introduction*

In relation to the theme of ϲωφροϲύνη, Euripides differs from his tragic predecessors in at least two important respects. Euripides uses ϲώφρων and cognates in a far wider range of senses than ever before in our extant sources, and in studying the use of the terms in his plays, we come substantially nearer to an appreciation of the rich and complex polysemy of the terms in classical times. Besides, Euripides is also 'the first tragic poet to exploit fully and deliberately the dramatic possibilities inherent in the manifold connotations of sophrosyne'.[1] This is not completely without precedent, of course. In the last chapter, we have seen that Ajax' inability to live up to the ϲωφροϲύνη demanded by those around him is a central theme in that play, even if Ajax' understanding of the virtue does not differ fundamentally from that of his fellow-warriors, and the polysemy of the term is only incidentally exploited in the deliberate ambiguity of the so-called *Trugrede*. We have also seen Electra using a 'persuasive' definition of the virtue in order to get Chrysothemis' help. But Euripides goes further. In some of his plays, incompatible interpretations of ϲωφροϲύνη are a central source of conflict for the protagonists, nowhere more so than in *Hippolytus* and *Bacchae*, but also in *Medea* to a considerable degree. In a sense, these plays can even be said to offer a dramatic counterpart to the great moral debates on ϲωφροϲύνη in some of the Platonic dialogues.

The aim of this chapter is, then, twofold. Its first sections will offer a conspectus of the uses of ϲώφρων and cognates in Euripides, giving a concise overview of the relatively straightforward instances. Section 2 will focus on a number of general senses in which the terms are used in relation to (mostly) male characters, including 'sanity' as opposed to various states of frenzy, 'prudence' as opposed to inopportune behaviour (frequently in

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[1] North (1966) 69.

'gnomic' expressions), 'control of desires' (especially relevant to those male characters who respect the sexual integrity of their female guests, like the farmer in *Electra* or Proteus in *Helena*) and — in the suppliant dramas — the clash between the ϲωφροϲύνη of the good Athenian protectors and the irreverent violence of the non-Athenian heralds. The next section (3) will complete this survey by focusing on the ϲωφροϲύνη of women. Euripides is our richest source on the ideology of ϲωφροϲύνη in relation to women. The fullest example of the ϲώφρων woman in Euripides is Andromache (*Andr., Tr.*), for whom ϲωφροϲύνη includes, next to the all-important marital 'fidelity', 'quietness' and 'obedience' (*Tr.* 645ff.) and, in *Andromache*, absence of jealousy. Examples of ϲωφροϲύνη in extreme situations are offered by the self-sacrifice of the παρθένοϲ in *Hcld.*, a rare example of juvenile ϲωφροϲύνη, and more extensively by the self-sacrifice of Alcestis.

The second part of this chapter (sections 4-7), will discuss some passages and plays in which the polysemy of the words is exploited to dramatic effect. The most straightforward example is offered by the farmer in Electra, who argues that his refusal to sleep with Electra *is* indeed ϲωφροϲύνη even though people are likely to view this behaviour in very different terms (section 4). More complex examples are offered by three plays, *Hippolytus, Medea* and *Bacchae*. For Hippolytus (section 5), true ϲωφροϲύνη consists in his own particular brand of religiously motivated 'chastity', but this ϲωφροϲύνη is offset by his arrogant contempt of those whom he considers incapable of this kind of 'purity', including notably his stepmother. Phaedra, by contrast, is incapable of ϲωφροϲύνη in that she is overcome by ἔρωϲ; but she does show concern for ϲωφροϲύνη in the sense that she tries hard to save the reputation of herself and her children, and eventually commits suicide as the 'honest' way out of her predicament. In *Bacchae* (section 6), women who are supposedly incapable of ϲωφροϲύνη in matters of sex are a primary concern for king Pentheus too. In his enraged insistence on these aspects of the virtue, Pentheus quite forgets about other aspects of ϲωφροϲύνη: his behaviour gravely offends the god Dionysus. The aggression of the Theban king is here contrasted effectively with the uncanny quietness of Dionysus in his impersonation of the Lydian stranger.

More complex, finally, are the issues in *Medea* (section 7). Medea's fierce and ultimately violent response to Jason's marriage is viewed by the latter in terms of sexual jealousy and a failure to comply with the plans of her husband, and thus, ultimately, as as a lack of ϲωφροϲύνη (*Med.* 1369). But Medea has a charge against Jason too. She does not adhere to the Greek ideal of the submissive wife, but treats Jason as an equal, and demands recompense for all that she did for him. For her, Jason falls short in φιλία. And Medea is also an expert in manipulation. Thus, she uses the expression 'you were ϲώφρων to do as you did' to both Creon and Jason (*Med.* 311, 884) in order to lull them into thinking that she is not angry with them any longer.

Thus, the themes of ἔρωϲ and the difficulty of controlling desire are especially important in a number of Euripidean dramas, and ϲωφροϲύνη as 'control of desires' and 'fidelity' is prominent in his plays in many guises, and to a far greater extent than we have seen thus far. In this sense, study of Euripides especially deepens our appreciation of the discussion of ϲωφροϲύνη as 'control of desires' in the philosophical discussions in Plato.

2. *The Use of* ϲώφρων *and Cognates in Euripides: Men*

The second section of this chapter offers a conspectus of the relatively 'straightforward' uses of ϲώφρων and cognates in Euripides, starting with those uses that are applied mostly to male characters; section 3 will focus on the specific senses of ϲώφρων and cognates in relation to women.

(1) 'Sanity'. In a number of instances, the verb ϲωφρονεῖν is used to describe a 'normal' or 'sane' state of mind, as opposed to 'madness' or 'frenzy'. (In this use, the verb ϲωφρονεῖν is closely associated with εὖ φρονεῖν, cf. *Ion* 520-1 quoted below.) In *Hel.* 97, for instance, Helen supposes that Ajax must have been mad (μανέντ') to kill himself, for no one would do so while sane (ϲωφρονῶν). In this use, the focus is on someone's state of mind, rather than on the behaviour in which this state of mind manifests itself. A person's abnormal state of mind will often be adduced in explanation of what is otherwise inexplicable and/or

unacceptable behaviour. Thus, while there is no doubt that sui-
cide is abnormal and regrettable, the tone of Helen's comment
on Ajax is one of compassion rather than disapproval. Similarly,
it is with regret, and not with disapproval that Electra notes the
frenzy of Orestes, who is now a helpless victim to the Erinys, but
was sane only just before (*Or.* 254 ἄρτι cωφρονῶν). And again, it
is with no more than gentle reproach that Hecuba describes the
embarrassing frenzy of Cassandra, and urges her daughter to
hand over her torch:

> παράδος ἐμοὶ φῶc· οὐ γὰρ ὀρθὰ πυρφορεῖc
> μαινὰc θοάζουc’, οὐδὲ c’ αἱ τύχαι, τέκνον
> cεcωφρονίκαc’, ἀλλ’ ἔτ’ ἐν ταὐτῶι μένειc. [2]
> (E. *Tr.* 348-50).

> Give me that torch. You do not handle it rightly in your present
> state of frenzy, nor have our misfortunes made you cώφρων, child;
> you remain in the state in which you were before.

While there is no doubt that Cassandra's frenzy is both embar-
rassing (it is hardly a dignified reaction to the distress of defeat)
and even downright dangerous ('you do not handle that torch
rightly'), Cassandra is, again, not accountable for her inappro-
priate and dangerous behaviour due to her state of divinely-
inspired ecstasy.

Twice, this 'intellectual' use of the word is combined with an
unequivocally 'moral' sense to comic effect. In *Ion* 520-1, the un-
suspecting Ion is greeted with overwhelming enthusiasm by his
new 'father' Xouthus. Ion can only excuse this lack of restraint
by supposing that this stranger must be mad, but Xouthus replies
that it is a grim norm that forces a parent to stay away from his
new-found child:

> Ιων. εὖ φρονεῖc μέν; ἤ c’ ἔμηνεν θεοῦ τιc, ὦ ξένε, βλάβη;
> Ξο. cωφρονῶ τὰ φίλταθ’ εὑρὼν εἰ φυγεῖν ἐφίεμαι;
> (E. *Ion* 520-1)

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[2] The best way to make sense of the manuscripts' c’ αἱ τύχαι …
ἐcωφρονήκαc’ is to read cεcωφρονίκαc’ (from cωφρονίζω *make* cώφρων), as
implied by the scholiast's periphrasis cώφρονα πεποιήκαcι (see Diggle's
apparatus). Good sense is also obtained by reading οὐδὲ caῖc τύχαιc (Heath) …
ἐcωφρόνηcαc (Nauck), 'you have not become cώφρων in view of your
misfortunes'. However, ἐcωφρόνηcαc is definitely the *lectio facilior*, and
ἐcωφρονήκαc’ is probably best explained as a partial 'normalisation' of the rare
cεcωφρονίκαc’.

(Ion:) Are you in your right mind? Or did a god harm your sense
and make you mad?
(Xouthus:) Am I in my right mind if I find my dearest one and
then want to run away from him?

Ion understandably thinks that the stranger who embraces him
so enthusiastically must be out of his wits, but Xouthus' rhetori-
cal question in reply points out that the usual standard of re-
straint and control of emotion does not apply when a father
finds his lost son, and that it would be an unusually strict norm
of cωφροcύνη indeed that forced him to 'run away' from his
loved one: he is, in short, not a 'mad' stranger, but a rightly over-
joyed father who has found his long-lost son.[3]

A second pun on two senses of cωφρονεῖν occurs in a passage
from *Heracles.* The goddess of frenzy, Lyssa, is brought in by Iris
to knock Heracles out of his wits, but Lyssa strongly disapproves
of Iris' and Hera's plans, and starts moralising on Heracles' re-
nown (849) and on the merits (851-3) that show his loyalty (846
φίλουc) vis-à-vis the gods (851-3). Iris tells her that she was not
brought hither in order to 'be cώφρων':

> Ιρ. μὴ cὺ νουθέτει τά θ' Ἥρας κἀμὰ μηχανήματα.
> Λυ. ἐc τὸ λῶιον ἐμβιβάζω c' ἴχνοc ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ.
> Ιρ. οὐχὶ cωφρονεῖν γ' ἔπεμψε δεῦρό c' ἡ Διὸc δάμαρ.
> (E. *Her.* 855-7)

> (Iris:) Stop criticising the intrigues of Hera and myself. (Lyssa:) I
> set you on the better track, instead of the wrong one. (Iris:) It was
> not in order to be cώφρων that Zeus' wife has sent you hither.

Again, the pun is a juxtaposition of the 'mental' sense of
cωφρονεῖν ('sanity' versus 'madness') and an 'other-regarding'
one ('restraint of violence'). Lyssa shows cωφροcύνη in her plea
not to use violence against a φίλοc of considerable merit, but Iris

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[3] The reading of L is to be retained in line 521. Diggle adopts Jacobs' οὐ
φρονῶ for cωφρονῶ, and Triclinius' φιλεῖν ('kiss') for φυγεῖν ('Am I not in my
right mind if, on finding my dearest, I kiss him?'). The two changes hang
together (one necessitates the other), but they are quite unnecessary. While
φιλεῖν is evidently what Xouthus does, φυγεῖν is what Ion thinks he should do:
'Would you call me cώφρων if, on finding my dearest, I would run away from
him?'.

cuts this short by suggesting that, for the goddess of 'madness', ϲωφροϲύνη ('sanity') is not on the agenda.

(2) 'Prudence' and 'common sense'. A second group of uses is the use of ϲώφρων to commend the 'prudence' or 'good sense' of those who do only what is good for themselves. Even more obviously than in Sophocles (chapter 5.4), the appeal to 'good sense' of this kind often occurs in general phrases, and it is frequently invoked to cut short unwelcome topics of deliberation.

Two passages repeat Creon's argument from OT (chapter 5.4) against the desirability of royal power.[4] These are spoken by Hippolytus in his self-defence, and by Jocasta in her confrontation with Polynices. Both contrast the πράγματα of the king with the quiet life of normal citizens.

> ἀλλ' ὡϲ τυραννεῖν ἡδύ; τοῖϲι ϲώφροϲιν
> ἥκιϲτά γ', εἰ μὴ τὰϲ φρέναϲ διέφθορεν
> θνητῶν ὅϲοιϲιν ἁνδάνει μοναρχία.
> ἐγὼ δ' ἀγῶναϲ μὲν κρατεῖν Ἑλληνικοὺϲ
> πρῶτοϲ θέλοιμ' ἄν, ἐν πόλει δὲ δεύτεροϲ
> ϲὺν τοῖϲ ἀρίϲτοιϲ εὐτυχεῖν ἀεὶ φίλοιϲ·
> (E. *Hipp.* 1013-18)

Will you argue that it is pleasant to be king? Not for men of good sense, unless royal power has utterly destroyed the wits of those that it attracts. As far as a victory in the Greek games is concerned, I'd certainly like to be first, but in the polis I prefer to be the second man, and enjoy a life of happines with the very best of friends.

> τί τὴν τυραννίδ', ἀδικίαν εὐδαίμονα,
> τιμᾶιϲ ὑπέρφευ καὶ μέγ' ἥγηϲαι τόδε;
> περιβλέπεϲθαι τίμιον; κενὸν μὲν οὖν.
> ἢ πολλὰ μοχθεῖν πόλλ' ἔχων ἐν δώμαϲιν
> βούληι; τί δ' ἔϲτι τὸ πλέον; ὄνομ' ἔχει μόνον·
> ἐπεὶ τά γ' ἀρκοῦνθ' ἱκανὰ τοῖϲ γε ϲώφροϲιν.
> (E. *Pho.* 549-54)

Why do you put such extreme value on kingship, that pleasant injustice, and do you consider it something great? Is it such honour to be a prominent figure? No, it is meaningless. Do you really pre-

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[4] Both passages are γνῶμαι not only in form but also in content: note the general plural τοῖϲι ϲώφροϲιν in *Hipp.* 1013 and *Ph.* 554; the latter also takes the typical form of a nominal phrase. Cf. Lardinois (1995) 13-19, (2001) 94-5.

fer many labours combined with many possessions? What is this
'more'? It's but a word. 'Sufficient' is enough for men of sense.

The first of these passages is spoken by Hippolytus to convince
Theseus that he did not have any reason to assault Phaedra; the
second passage by Jocasta who wishes to dissuade Polynices from
an armed confrontation with his brother. Both clearly fail to
have any effect on their addressee, and both are formulated in a
way that seems to draw the public's attention to this inefficacy. In
Hippolytus' case, it is the renewed appeal to cωφροcύνη itself so
shortly after his unsuccessful defense of his own cωφροcύνη (994-
1007, see section 5) that is almost offensively clumsy;[5] in Jocasta's
speech, the appeal is to arguments that are truisms for a private
citizen of modest means in a democratic πόλιc, but that are con-
spicuously unlikely to appeal to a dethroned prince of Polynices'
status.[6]

Another rhetorical truism is that 'everywhere, to people who
are cώφρονεc, life is sweeter than death' (*Or.* 1509, πανταχοῦ ζῆν
ἡδὺ μᾶλλον ἢ θανεῖν τοῖc cώφροcιν). This maxim, paralleling
Helen's comments on Ajax' suicide (see above) is employed by
the Phrygian captive in defense of his προcκύνηcιc for Orestes,
who threatens to kill him and takes offence at this oriental act of
submission. Also from the book of common-sensical wisdom
comes the comment of the messenger who warns Theoclymenus
of the Spartans' deceit and drives home the point by stating that
'sensible lack of gullibility is a most useful thing for mortals'
(*Hel.* 1625-6 cώφρονοc δ' ἀπιcτίαc | οὐκ ἔcτιν οὐδὲν χρηcιμώτερον
βροτοῖc).[7]

One passage free from the appeal to commonplaces, but is
still clearly calculated to round off an unwelcome discussion, is
the excuse of the nurse in *Hipp.*, who, when blamed by Phaedra
for approaching Hippolytus, apologizes by stating: 'we are wast-

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[5] See Barrett (1964) *ad loc.*, and Kovacs (1982) 30, who deletes the passage
on the ground of its rhetorical inadequacy.

[6] Hence, these verses too are condemned by Kovacs (1982).

[7] Again, these lines take the typical form of γνῶμαι: note the nominal
phrase and the plural τοῖc cώφροcιν in *Or.* 1509, and the use of the evaluative
statement οὐκ ἔcτιν οὐδὲν χρηcιμώτερον in *Hel.* 1626. For this type of expression,
cf. Lardinois (2001) 95n.11.

ing words. I had no good sense to do as I did.' (*Hipp.* 704 μακρηγοροῦμεν· οὐκ ἐcωφρονοῦν ἐγώ).

As in the case of the use of cωφρονεῖν in the sense of 'being sane', the appeal to 'prudential' cωφροcύνη can be misapplied to comic effect. An example is offered by the Cyclops, who claim that he does not care about the Zeus xenios, and that it makes no sense to do so:

> ἀγὼ οὔτινι θύω πλὴν ἐμοί, θεοῖcι δ' οὔ,
> καὶ τῆι μεγίcτηι, γαcτρὶ τῆιδε, δαιμόνων.
> ὡc τοὔμπιεῖν γε καὶ φαγεῖν τοὔφ' ἡμέραν,
> Ζεὺc οὗτοc ἀνθρώποιcι τοῖcι cώφροcιν,
> λυπεῖν δὲ μηδὲν αὑτόν.
>   (E. *Cy.* 334-8)

> These sheep of mine I offer to no one except myself, — not to the gods! — and to my stomach, mightiest of divinities. For to drink and eat one's daily portion, that is Zeus to a man of sense, that and not to harm oneself.

Here, the rhetoric of common sense is misapplied to comic effect, and invoked in defence of a wildly outrageous cannibalism that breaks all the rules of hospitality and thus offends the very same Zeus about whom Polyphemos claims not to care (341). Again, the joke plays with two uses of cωφροcύνη: the 'prudence' or 'common sense' that the monster claims to observe, and the respect for divinity (see (3) below) that he utterly ignores.

(3) 'Restraint of violence and respect for the gods.' In a third group of uses, cωφροcύνη is used to commend those who restrain their aggression, and refrain from undue violence. As in Aeschylus (chapter 4.2), Amphiaraus with his lack of ὕβριc and ostentation is again a model of cωφροcύνη in this respect and he is mentioned twice in passing (*Ph.* 177, 1112).

Violence of *dramatis personae* is also criticised as a lack of cωφροcύνη. Thus, when Menelaus in *IA* rebukes Agamemnon for his unwillingness to sacrifice Iphigenia, the latter suggests that his brother should drop his insolent (379) and fierce (381) attitude and instead show the cωφροcύνη not to kill one's φίλοι (379, 407). Later on, when Agamemnon yields, it is Clytemnestra's turn to plead with *him* to spare his daughter's life, and to suggest that he will be cώφρων to do so (*IA* 1208, cώφρων ἔcηι).

The killing of Clytemnestra by Orestes is another violent act that is not readily accepted; Tyndareus complains to Menelaus that Orestes could have pursued a αἵματος δίκη ('trial for manslaughter') against his mother (*Or.* 500) and send her back to her father (501) instead of killing her; such restraint would have earned him a reputation of cωφροcύνη instead of his present misery (*Or.* 502 τὸ cῶφρόν τ᾽ ἔλαβ᾽ ἂν ἀντὶ cυμφορᾶc).

Violence on a larger scale, between πόλειc, is at stake in the suppliant dramas. In the debate between Demophon and the Argive herald in *Hcld.*, the latter suggest that Athenian protection for the suppliant children of Heracles would be an unacceptable offence to Argos, and that the Athenian would show good sense if he did not harm the Argives (*Hcld.* 263, βλάπτων γ᾽ ἐκείνουc μηδέν, ἢν cὺ cωφρονῆιc). Against this threatening use of the 'prudential' type of cωφροcύνη ('you will only harm yourself if you resist us'), Demophon warns the Argive not to use violence against the suppliants, for Demodocus is prepared to kill him if the Argive fails to learn cωφροcύνη (*ibid.* 272, εἰ μή γ᾽ ὁ κῆρυξ cωφρονεῖν μαθήcεται). In the second half of the play, the aggressive animosity between Alkmene and Eurystheus is contrasted with the more peaceful attitude of the Athenian πόλιc, which cωφρονοῦcα acquits the Argive after his defeat (1012).

As in *Eumenides*, and also in Euripides' *Supplices,* and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus,* the foreign policy of Athens is presented here as one that does away with violence, and protects those in need of protection. The content of Athenian propaganda in tragedy seems to have been remarkably consistent throughout the age of the Athenian empire.

(4.) 'Control of desire'. If in public life, restraint of violence is a main feature of 'male' cωφροcύνη, in private life, control of desires is prominent. This control is most obviously conspicuous in those male characters who respect the integrity of women who do not belong to their *oikos* but are entrusted to their care. Thus, Proteus is chosen to guard Helen because Hermes judges him to be 'most cώφρων among men' (*Hel.* 47, cωφρονέcτατον βροτῶν). Another prominent example of male restraint in sexual matters is the farmer in *Electra*, who does not touch his wife because of her higher status (*El.* 45-6). Electra tells her brother that the

man never touched her, not only for fear of Orestes' revenge, as Orestes supposed, but *also* because of his own cωφροcύνη (261 τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ταρβῶν· πρὸc δὲ καὶ cώφρων ἔφυ. 'That is indeed what he feared. But besides, he was cώφρων as well). Such lofty morals are not shared by everyone, apparently, and the farmer himself is well aware that some people apply very different criteria to de-cide what cωφροcύνη is (*ibid.* 53) and judge him a fool (50) rather than a cώφρων (on this passage, see section 4 below).

Another mythical model for whom restraint in sexual matters is the decisive criterion for his proverbial cωφροcύνη is Peleus (see chapters 3.2 on Pi. I. 8. 24-26, and 8.2 on Ar. *Nu.* 1067). His reputation is important for his scene in *Andromache*. Peleus speaks with the voice of an expert when he launches his attack on the adulterous Helen, and on the general lack of cωφροcύνη of Spartan women (*And.* 595-601); in response, Menelaus has a hard time vindicating his decision not to punish Helen as a to-ken of his own cωφροcύνη (*And.* 681-2 εἰ δ' εἰc πρόcοψιν τῆc ἐμῆc ἐλθὼν ἐγὼ | γυναικὸc ἔcχον μὴ κτανεῖν, ἐcωφρόνουν, 'If, on com-ing eye to eye with my wife, I refrained from killing her, I had good sense to do so'). His far-fetched argument is that Helen provided the Greeks with an opportunity for learning courage. And when the irascible and violent Menelaus suggests that *he* himself will have a word with Neoptolemus to see if Peleus' grandson will have the cωφροcύνη to punish Andromache and to avoid future offences to the Spartans (*And.* 740-1, κἂν μὲν κολάζηι τήνδε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἦι | cώφρων καθ' ἡμᾶc, cώφρον' ἀν-τιλήψεται, 'And if he punishes her, and will from now on be cώφρων to us, he will get a cώφρων treatment in return.'), there is the strange effect of the *ignoramus* teaching the expert in his own field. The cωφροcύνη advocated here by Menelaus, so utterly different from the traditional 'decency' embodied by Peleus, amounts to the submission demanded by an arrogant ruler from his 'inferiors'; it strongly reminds one of the Menelaus from S. *Aj.,* and is fully consistent with the anti-Spartan sentiments that abound in *Andromache*.

Peleus' son Achilles is not commonly thought of as a model of cωφροcύνη, probably because the quality is not very relevant to his Iliadic role of the greatest Greek warrior. The young Achilles as portrayed in *IA*, however, is a different matter altogether. The

respectful, almost reverential manner in which he first confronts Clytemnestra seems typical of the well-behaved young man (his αἰδώc being very evident, 821, 833), and the Argive queen duly applauds his respect for cωφροcύνη (824, αἰνῶ δ' ὅτι cεβεῖc τὸ cωφρονεῖν). A more 'adult' manifestation of his cωφροcύνη occurs later in the same *epeisodion*, when he offers to plead with Agamemnon on Iphigenia's behalf. Here, it is his disinclination for violence, his willingness to act λελογιcμένωc rather than cθένει (1021), that invites Clytemnestra's recognition of his cωφροcύνη (1024 ὡc cῶφρον' εἶπαc).

More or less without a parallel in Euripidean drama is the figure of Heracles in *Alcestis*. On hearing that Admetus has a funeral to attend, Heracles is duly reluctant to enter the house as a guest, but when Admetus is vague about the identity of the deceased and encourages Heracles to enter the house, Heracles has no scruples about enjoying Admetus' hospitality. This is deplored in a semi-comic passage by the servant, who complains that Heracles entered the house at all, and adds that this ill-behaved guest was not content to accept 'quietly' (cωφρόνωc, *Alc.* 753) what he was offered, but had the nerve to order all kinds of extras. Heracles' lack of quietness obviously violates the rules of decency in a house in mourning, and his immodest demand for extras of course fits in with the comic stereotype of Heracles the glutton.

3. *The Use of* cώφρων *and Cognates in Euripides: Women*

The senses that we dealt with in the last section are either unrelated to a specific sex or age category, or else predominantly manifestations of cωφροcύνη in adult males. 'Sanity' as opposed to madness or frenzy is of course relevant to both male and female figures, but 'prudence'/'good sense', for instance, is a type of cωφροcύνη far more relevant to adult male citizens, who are responsible for the well-being of themselves and their dependents, rather than to any type of person in a subordinate position, who have fewer opportunities to act as autonomous agents. (But the nurse in *Hipp.* offers an exception.) By and large, the same goes for 'control of violence', and again, the explanation may

simply be that women, children and slaves have fewer opportuni-
ties to show aggression, and are therefore less in need to control
it. Other types of cωφροcύνη, control of desires and quietness,
typically manifest themselves in different ways according to sex
and age category: in view of the fact that these uses ('control of
desires', 'fidelity', 'chastity') differ considerably and are easily
activated without the help of extensive contextual signals, it
seems justified to speak here of different uses altogether.

   The present section will focus on cωφροcύνη in relation to
women. Euripides is probably our richest source on female
cωφροcύνη, and throughout his plays, we meet a great number of
typically 'good' and notoriously 'bad' women.

   The mythological paragon of the good, faithful wife surely is
Penelope, and Hecuba refers to her in *Tr.* 422-3 by merely men-
tioning her quality of cωφροcύνη: cώφρονοc δ' ἔcηι λάτριc
γυναικόc, 'you [i.e. Cassandra] will be the servant of a cώφρων
woman'. If Penelope is the universal paragon, the fullest exam-
ple of the good woman in Euripides' plays is undoubtedly An-
dromache, whose exemplary cωφροcύνη in her role as a wife with
Hector is contrasted, both in *Andromache* and *Troades*, to the lack
of cωφροcύνη exhibited by the daughters of Tyndareus, specifi-
cally Helen and her daughter Hermione. Andromache herself
gives a full self-assessment in her long speech in *Troades*:

> ἐγὼ δὲ τοξεύcαcα τῆc εὐδοξίαc
> λαχοῦcα πλεῖον τῆc τύχηc ἡμάρτανον.
> ἃ γὰρ γυναιξὶ cώφρον' ἔcθ' ηὑρημένα,   645
> ταῦτ' ἐξεμόχθουν Ἕκτοροc κατὰ cτέγαc.
> πρῶτον μέν, ἔνθα (κἂν προcῆι κἂν μὴ προcῆι
> ψόγοc γυναιξίν) αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐφέλκεται
> κακῶc ἀκούειν, ἥτιc οὐκ ἔνδον μένει,
> τούτου παρεῖcα πόθον ἔμιμνον ἐν δόμοιc·   650
> ἔcω τε μελάθρων κομψὰ θηλειῶν ἔπη
> οὐκ εἰcεφρούμην, τὸν δὲ νοῦν διδάcκαλον
> οἴκοθεν ἔχουcα χρηcτὸν ἐξήρκουν ἐμοί.
> γλώccηc τε cιγὴν ὄμμα θ' ἥcυχον πόcει
> παρεῖχον· ἤιδη δ' ἅ μ' ἐχρῆν νικᾶν πόcιν   655
> κείνωι τε νίκην ὧν ἐχρῆν παριέναι.
> καὶ τῶνδε κληδὼν ἐc cτράτευμ' Ἀχαιικὸν
> ἐλθοῦc' ἀπώλεcέν μ'· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡιρέθην,
> Ἀχιλλέωc με παῖc ἐβουλήθη λαβεῖν
> δάμαρτα· δουλεύcω δ' ἐν αὐθεντῶν δόμοιc.   660

κεἰ μὲν παρώςαϲ᾽ Ἕκτοροϲ φίλον κάρα
πρὸϲ τὸν παρόντα πόϲιν ἀναπτύξω φρένα,
κακὴ φανοῦμαι τῶι θανόντι· τόνδε δ᾽ αὖ
ϲτυγοῦϲ᾽ ἐμαυτῆϲ δεϲπόταιϲ μιϲήϲομαι.
καίτοι λέγουϲιν ὡϲ μί᾽ εὐφρόνη χαλαῖ   665
τὸ δυϲμενὲϲ γυναικὸϲ εἰϲ ἀνδρὸϲ λέχοϲ·
ἀπέπτυϲ᾽ αὐτὴν ἥτιϲ ἄνδρα τὸν πάροϲ
καινοῖϲι λέκτροιϲ ἀποβαλοῦϲ᾽ ἄλλον φιλεῖ.
(E. *Tr.* 643-68)

As for me, I aimed at a good reputation (*eudoxia*), obtained more
than just that, but did not turn out to have good luck. For all
deeds of ϲωφροϲύνη that were invented for us women, all these I
dutifully practised in Hector's house. First, given the fact that
(whether or not there is an outspoken reproach to women), the
very deed produces a bad reputation if someone does not stay
within, I said farewell to the desire for that, and did remain at
home. And within the house, I did not allow the smart gossip of
women in: I had my own mind as a good instructor from within
the home, and so I was quite self-sufficient. I gave my husband a
silent tongue and an untroubled eye; and I knew when I had to
prevail over my husband, and to leave the victory to him when it
was good to do so. Rumour of all this has reached the Achaean
army; this has destroyed me. For when I was made captive, the son
of Achilles set his mind on having me as a partner: I will be a slave
in the house of killers. And if I cast aside my love for Hector, and
open my heart to my present master, I will appear a bad wife to
my dead man; but if I openly abhor the other, I will earn the ill
will of my masters. Mind you, they say that one night removes the
dislike of a woman for a man. I despise a woman who drops her
former husband in favour of a new one, and transfers her loyalty
to another.

Andromache is confronted with an impossible dilemma: if she
refuses Neoptolemus because of her loyalty to Hector, she will
incur his ill will, and be treated accordingly, but if she gives in in
spite of herself, she will have to face the reproach of disloyalty to
Hector (663). And the irony of her situation is that it is her very
excellence that is the source of her distress, because it is her
fame as a good wife that is the reason for Neoptolemus' desire.
This excellence includes (i) acceptance of the quiet seclusion in
the house: she remained inside (647-50), and did not indulge in
gossip with other women (651-3) but was content on her own;
(ii) quiet and obedient behaviour (654) and indulgence of her
husband (655-6): she was not concerned to score points over

him at all cost; and, crucially, (iii) her faithfulness to Hector
(661-4), which she now will be forced to give up. Quietness, obe-
dience, and marital fidelity, here we do indeed seem to have the
main pillars of female ϲωφροϲύνη, and Andromache presents us
with a full statement of the ideology.[8]

In *Andromache*, the Trojan princess finds herself threatened by
the jealousy of Neptolemos' official wife, Helen's daughter
Hermione. Hermione accuses Andromache of using φάρμακα
(157) to attract Neoptolemus. In reply, Andromache again
claims that Neoptolemus was attracted by her virtues (ἀρεταί,
208), and that Hermione falls short in this repect because she, as
a haughty Spartan, disdains her humble surroundings and hurts
the pride of her husband (214-5, χρὴ γὰρ γυναῖκα, κ᾿ᾂν κακῶι
πόϲει δοθῆι, | ϲτέργειν, ἅμιλλάν τ᾿ οὐκ ἔχειν φρονήματοϲ, 'For a
woman, even if she is given to a man of humble status, must
cherish him, and not make a competition of pride.'). She then
cites her own lack of jealousy as a sign of her indulgence with
Hector, and warns Hermione that jealousy is nothing less than
φιλανδρία, 'infatuation with men', and that the Spartan girl is in
danger of emulating her mother Helen in that respect:

> ὦ φίλταθ᾿ Ἕκτορ, ἀλλ᾿ ἐγὼ τὴν ϲὴν χάριν
> ϲοὶ καὶ ξυνήρων, εἴ τί ϲε ϲφάλλοι Κύπριϲ,
> καὶ μαϲτὸν ἤδη πολλάκιϲ νόθοιϲι ϲοῖϲ
> ἐπέϲχον, ἵνα ϲοι μηδὲν ἐνδοίην πικρόν.
> καὶ ταῦτα δρῶϲα τῆι ἀρετῆι προϲηγόμην
> πόϲιν· ϲὺ δ᾿ οὐδὲ ῥανίδ᾿ ὑπαιθρίαϲ δρόϲου
> τῶι ϲῶι προϲίζειν ἀνδρὶ δειμαίνουϲ᾿ ἐᾶιϲ.
> μὴ τὴν τεκοῦϲαν τῆι φιλανδρίαι, γύναι,
> ζήτει παρελθεῖν· τῶν κακῶν γὰρ μητέρων
> φεύγειν τρόπουϲ χρὴ τέκν᾿ ὅϲοιϲ ἔνεϲτι νοῦϲ.
> (E. *Andr*. 222-31)

Dearest Hector, I by contrast went along with your desire for your
pleasure, whenever Cypris did somehow knock you off your feet,
and many times now have I given the breast to your bastard sons: I
did not want in any respect to displease you. And by doing so, I
brought my husband close to me by means of my *aretè*. You on the
other hand do not even allow a drop of heavenly rain to touch
your husband in your present fear. You should not try to emulate

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[8] Andromache essentially accepts, here and in *Andr.*, the *male-generated*
ideology of female ϲωφροϲύνη, cf. Allan (2000) 181-2.

your mother in *philandria*, madam: if the mother is bad, the chil-
dren must avoid her ways, if they have any sense.

The point is striking, but certainly relevant to the context. The
childless Hermione blames Andromache of sleeping with her
dead husband's killer (171-2: incidentally exactly the reproach
that Andromache anticipates in *Tr.*), and connects Andro-
mache's faithlessness to the general promiscuity of foreigners
(173-6). In response to this stereotypical view of barbarians, An-
dromache also links Hermione's behaviour to her lineage. She
retorts that the female ἀρετή of obedience to and indulgence of
her husband even includes tolerance with regard to paramours,
and that it is this ἀρετή of hers that was ingratiating to Hector.
Hermione's intolerance of Neoptolemus' liaison with Andro-
mache, by contrast, is to be taken as a sign of infatuation with
men, φιλανδρία; this, Andromache suggests, is precisely what mo-
tivated Hermione's mother Helen to commit adultery.[9] Thus,
the daughter equals the vices of her mother, and it is not the
barbarian captive but the Spartan princess who lacks cωφροcύνη.
Hermione's answer shows that Andromache's speech does in-
deed amount to an accusation of a lack of cωφροcύνη:

Ερ. τί cεμνομυθεῖc κἀc ἀγῶν' ἔρχηι λόγων,
ὡc δὴ cὺ cώφρων, τἀμὰ δ' οὐχὶ cώφρονα;
(E. *Andr.* 234-5)

Why these pompous words, why do you engage in a battle of
words? Am I to take it that *you* are cώφρων, and what I do is not?

Hermione is thus a true daughter to her mother, both on ac-
count of her χλιδή (stressed right at her first entrance, *Andr.*
147) and her φιλανδρία. That a woman's jealousy is regarded as a
sign of φιλανδρία and a lack of cωφροcύνη may seem striking, but
the passage is by no means unique. As we will see below (section
7), there is a similar charge against Medea when she fails to ac-
cept Jason's new marriage, and Jason's complaint that Medea
lacks cωφροcύνη is confirmed by the chorus of that play. And of
course it is exactly this type of jealousy that is the source of the

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[9] For the sense of φιλανδρία as 'being infatuated with men' and the
association of this with μοιχεία, cf. Pl. *Smp.* 191e καὶ ὅcαι αὖ γυναῖκεc φίλανδροί
τε καὶ μοιχεύτριαι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένουc γίγνονται. On the lack of 'self-control' of
both mother and daughter, cf. McClure (1999) 181.

tragic error of Deianeira (S. *Tr.*).[10] It seems, then, that absence of jealousy, and absence of a possessive infatuation with men, is indeed part of the ideology of female ϲωφροϲύνη.

If Hermione falls short of the ideal, her mother Helen is of course the classic example of the faithless 'bad' woman. In the discussion between Peleus and Menelaus in the same play, she is attacked on account of her infidelity by Peleus (*Andr.* 594, 596, 601), who supports his attack with a diatribe against Spartan ethics. The main idea here is that the freedom that Spartan girls enjoy to go out of the house and practice sports together with boys (597-600), precludes their ϲωφροϲύνη. As in the Greek Hermione's invectives against the 'promiscuous barbarian' Andromache, the accusation of a lack of ϲωφροϲύνη is here linked to an ethnic stereotype, the idea being this time that Helen's lack of fidelity is typical of her Spartan descent.

Elsewhere, Helen is also charged with ostentation (χλιδή), just like her daughter Hermione. This is in *Troades*, where Helen appears in full regal pomp, thus providing the fullest possible contrast to the dejection and misery of the Trojan women; Hecuba suggests that in recognition of her transgressions (*Tr.* 1027), Helen should 'show ϲωφροϲύνη' rather than her present ἀναιδεία. ϲωφροϲύνη here amounts to 'modesty' as opposed to ostentation, though this modesty is supposed to result from a sense of responsibility for the disastrous consequences of Helen's infidelity. It is only in *Helen*, in which the conventional story of Helen is inverted in vindication of her virtue, that Helen is — paradoxically, but appropriately in this context — credited with the ϲωφροϲύνη (*Hel.* 932, 1684) of marital loyalty.

Clytemnestra, Helen's sister, is also very much the bad adultress of tradition that we already met in the *Oresteia* and in

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[10] When confronted with Iole, Heracles' new conquest, Deianeira tries not to respond with anger, but to outdo her rival by regaining Heracles' attentions. Sending the magic garment is, for her, a sincere, if tragically misguided, attempt to win back Heracles' favours without openly showing hostility to his affair with Iole. See especially verses 552-4 ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ, ὥϲπερ εἶπον, ὀργαίνειν καλὸν | γυναῖκα νοῦν ἔχουϲαν· ἧι δ' ἔχω, φίλαι, | λυτήριον λώφημα, τῆιδ' ὑμῖν φράϲω. 'But as I said, it is not good for a sensible wife to be angry. I have however, ladies, a means of relief that will solve the problem. Let me tell you how it works.'

Sophocles' *Electra*. Thus she provokes withering remarks about her lack of ϲωφροϲύνη both by Electra (*El.* 923, 1080, 1099) and, after her death, by Orestes and Pylades (*Or.* 558, 1132). Long before her liaison with Aegisthus, however, we find her in *IA* pleading with Agamemnon for Iphigenia's life, and adducing her own impeccable behaviour as an argument in favour.

> οὗ ϲοι καταλλαχθεῖϲα περὶ ϲὲ καὶ δόμουϲ
> ϲυμμαρτυρήϲειϲ ὡϲ ἄμεμπτοϲ ἦ γυνή,
> ἔϲ τ' Ἀφροδίτην ϲωφρονοῦϲα καὶ τὸ ϲὸν
> μέλαθρον αὔξουϲ', ὥϲτε ϲ' εἰϲιόντα τε
> χαίρειν θύραζέ τ' ἐξιόντ' εὐδαιμονεῖν.
> (E. *IA* 1157-61)

> When I had left him [Tyndareus] for your sake, you'll have to confirm that I was a blameless wife to you and your house: I was ϲώφρων with respect to Aphrodite and also made your palace thrive. As a consequence, when coming home, you had every reason to rejoice, and when you went out, to feel happy.

As in the case of Andromache's speech in *Tr.*, it appears from this passage that marital fidelity is again the central point of female ϲωφροϲύνη, but that this fidelity combines with other qualities (Clytemnestra being a good housekeeper, in this case) to turn the conventionally decent wife into a truly ἄμεμπτοϲ γυνή.[11]

The instances quoted above are remarkably consistent in the impression they give of female ϲωφροϲύνη: the ϲώφρων woman is (i) faithful to her husband, (ii) quiet and inconspicuous in her behaviour (preferably staying inside the house, and not indulging in gossip and ostentation), and (iii) obedient and indulgent to her husband. Apart from these moral prerequisites, it might almost seem a bonus if, as in the case of Clytemnestra in *IA*, she also (iv) makes a good job of the administration of the household.

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[11] There is an interesting parallel in Lys. 1.7, where Euphiletus claimed that ἐν μὲν οὖν τῶι πρώτωι χρόνωι (i.e. shortly after the birth of their son, and before his wife's liaison with Eratosthenes started) παϲῶν ἦν βελτίϲτη, and then explains this by drawing attention to the fact that his wife, apart from then still being faithful, had many other qualities: καὶ γὰρ οἰκονόμοϲ δεινὴ καὶ φειδωλὸϲ καὶ ἀκριβῶϲ πάντα διοικοῦϲα, 'for I must say that she was a terrific housekeeper, economical, and she managed to arrange everything accurately'.

In one case, there is a suggestion that female ϲωφροϲύνη goes even further, and may even include the self-sacrifice of a woman for the sake of those to whom she belongs. With Alcestis, loyalty to Admetus is put to an extreme and unusual test when it appears that she is the only one who is prepared to die in his stead. Alcestis' self-sacrifice goes way beyond what is in normal circumstances required from a ϲώφρων woman (she is indeed what her servant woman calls a 'superlative' wife, a ὑπερβεβλημένη γυνή, Alc. 153-4), but her superlative loyalty is valued in terms of ϲωφροϲύνη.[12] Even Pheres to grant her this quality.

> ἥκω κακοῖϲι ϲοῖϲι ϲυγκάμνων, τέκνον·
> ἐϲθλῆϲ γάρ, οὐδεὶϲ ἀντερεῖ, καὶ ϲώφρονοϲ
> γυναικὸϲ ἡμάρτηκαϲ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν
> φέρειν ἀνάγκη καίπερ ὄντα δύϲφορα.
> (E. *Alc.* 614-17)

> I have come to share in your trouble, son. You are bereft of a noble and ϲώφρων wife — there is no denying that. But these things one has to bear, even if it is hard to do so.

Pheres' compliment seems remarkably ungenerous, and at the least it almost completely ignores Admetus' strong sense of grief at the loss of his wife. To Pheres, the loss of a 'good and ϲώφρων' wife seems to be the regrettable loss of a useful thing, and little more. This lack of empathy is even more poignant, given that Admetus regards his father, or his father's wife, as a more appropriate substitute for his own death, given the fact that Alcestis was both younger and, strictly speaking, ὀθνεῖα, i.e. not belonging to the family in the strict sense (645, cf. *ibid.* 532-3, 810-1).[13]

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[12] For 'masculine' aspects of Alcestis' behaviour, notably her courage and protection of the house of Admetus, see Foley (2001) 314-7.

[13] In calling Alcestis an ὀθνεῖαν γυναῖκα, Admetus seems to be drawing the borders very strictly. At 645, he does so in order to make it clear that Pheres is closer to him than Alcestis, and should have been more willing to make the sacrifice. At 533, his claim to Heracles that the deceased is ὀθνεῖοϲ is positively misleading, but motivated by the desire not to turn away his *xenos* Heracles. Alcestis remains a very atypical example of an ὀθνεῖοϲ, and the servant woman's sarcastic remark at 811 does not fail to make that clear: ἦ κάρτα μέντοι καὶ λίαν ὀθνεῖοϲ ἦν, 'no indeed, she was absolutely not one of the family, too much so'.

But nevertheless, it seems that marriage does not make for family ties in the truest sense. Again, one may compare Lys. 1, where Euphiletus claims that it is the birth of a child, rather than marriage as such, that (in principle) makes for a really strong bond between the married couple: 1.6 ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι παιδίον γίγνεται, ἐπίϲτευον ἤδη καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐκείνηι παρέδωκα, ἡγούμενος

But if Pheres' compliment is unpleasantly ungenerous, this does not mean that he is wrong to view Alcestis' sacrifice in terms of cωφροcύνη. In fact, Alcestis herself does much the same thing:

> cὲ δ' ἄλλη τιc γυνὴ κεκτήcεται,
> cώφρων μὲν οὐκ ἂν μᾶλλον, εὐτυχὴc δ' ἴcωc.
> (E. *Alc.* 181-2)

> Another wife will have you (sc. the λέκτρον); more cώφρων she can hardly be, but perhaps she will be better off.

In her own view, Alcestis is 'superlatively' cώφρων (no woman can surpass her on the point of loyalty to her husband), and it is her tragedy that this superlative cωφροcύνη means her own death. In fact, she wittingly does what Andromache in *Troades* did unwittingly: bringing about her own misfortune by her supreme loyalty with regard to her husband.

Of course, Alcestis' situation is extreme. But if she is justified in taking her self-sacrifice as a sign of (superlative) cωφροcύνη, it is surely significant that one Euripidean female protagonist who is definitely less blameless, Medea, is quite unwilling to sacrifice her own interests for the sake of her husband's well-being (see below, section 7). Medea of course has reasons of her own to demand something more from Jason. Hers is one of those dramas where the conflicting parties judge each other, and their possession or lack of cωφροcύνη, from very different points of view and on the basis of very different criteria, the tragic point being that, up to a certain point, both are right.

4. *Different Views on* cωφροcύνη: *The Farmer in* Electra

The overview in the previous two sections has shown a considerable variety of senses of our terms. Given this variety, people can adopt very different points of view and use different criteria to decide whether, in a given situation, the term cωφροcύνη applies at all to a given way of behaviour. As a result people may seem to hold very different views of what cωφροcύνη *is*, and Euripides

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ταύτην οἰκειότητα μεγίcτην εἶναι. ('When I got a son, I trusted her from then on, and handed over all my affairs, for I thought that this makes for the strongest possible tie.')

seems more keen than any writer before him to explore these clashes for the sake of dramatic effect. In this respect, it does indeed seem that Euripides offers something new, and the three dramas in which these clashes are most central to the plot, will concern us in the remainder of this chapter.

On one occasion, Euripides even makes a character explicitly state the fact that people use different criteria to decide on the issue of cωφροcύνη, and it is useful to examine this passage first. The passage that concerns us here is the close of the speech of the farmer in the prologue of *Electra*. The farmer states that, though Electra has been given to him by Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, he did not have sexual contact with her, for he considers it ὕβριc to do so in view of her superior status (46). He also shows concern that his 'brother in law' Orestes may, in the event of his return, be dismayed to see his sister caught in a 'miserable' marriage (47-9). The farmer thus treats Electra as a woman who is entrusted to his care but does not belong to him, and he shows a restraint similar to that of Proteus with regard to Helen (*Hel.* 47, see section 2 above), even without having been instructed to do so. The farmer clearly sees his sexual restraint and his respect for the status of his wife in terms of cωφροcύνη, but he is also aware that many people will not adopt such lofty criteria to judge his behaviour, and will consider him not cώφρων at all, but a fool:

> ὅcτιc δέ μ᾿ εἶναί φηcι μῶρον, εἰ λαβὼν
> νέαν ἐc οἴκουc παρθένον μὴ θιγγάνω,
> γνώμηc πονηροῖc κανόcιν ἀναμετρούμενοc
> τὸ cῶφρον ἴcτω καὐτὸc αὖ τοιοῦτοc ὤν.
> (E. *El.* 50-3)

> Whoever says that I am a fool if I have a young girl in my house and then refrain from touching her, he must know that he uses wicked yardsticks of mentality to measure what is cῶφρον; and that he himself is similarly wicked.

The passage is interesting because it explicitly acknowledges the existence of radically different criteria for moral judgements. The farmer does not state *what* the 'wicked' criteria adopted by others are, but it seems clear that these others judge his behaviour on the view that it is foolish to ignore such an overt chance for sexual self-gratification: on such a view, the farmer is μῶροc, a

fool, if he does not take what he is offered. They judge his be-
haviour in terms of self-interest only. By contrast, the farmer
himself claims that in ignoring the exceptional circumstances of
the marriage (status difference, no authorisation by the real
κύριος of the bride, cf. *El.* 259), and in advocating the ruthless
pursuit of one's own interests, these people use base criteria to
disparage behaviour that is, in fact, cῶφρον in the sense of 'self-
controlled'. And for him, these people, in applying such stan-
dards, merely show that they are base themselves.

5. *'Hippolytus'*

It is hard to find a literary text to which the theme of cωφροcύνη
is more central than it is to *Hippolytus*. The play shows a conflict
between two main characters who both acknowledge the ideal of
cωφροcύνη, and yet both fail to attain a complete realisation of
that ideal. Hippolytus explicitly and repeatedly claims to be the
very model of cωφροcύνη (994-5 ἐν τοῖcδ' οὐκ ἔνεcτ' ἀνὴρ ἐμοῦ, |
οὐδ' ἢν cὺ μὴ φῇc, cωφρονέcτεροc γεγώc, 'there is no man on this
earth who is more cώφρων than myself, even if you deny it'; cf.
1100, 1365), mainly on account of his ritual purity and total sex-
ual abstinence, and his claim is confirmed by no less an authority
than Artemis herself (1402). But Hippolytus is not only chaste in
the extreme, he is also arrogantly intolerant of those who do not
live up to his rigorous standards, and this gives Phaedra a good
reason to say that Hippolytus still has to learn to be cώφρων
(731). Phaedra herself, by contrast, is incapable of controling
her desire for her stepson, and in this respect, she is incapable of
cωφροcύνη in the sense of 'control of desires'.[14] But Phaedra
does by no means disregard the ideals of female cωφροcύνη: she

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[14] Euripides' repeated treatment of the mythological figure of Phaedra
seems to have contributed greatly to the comic stereotype of Euripides the
misogynist: Phaedra is named as a prototype of the Euripidean 'bad woman' at
Ar. *Th.* 497, 547, 550. But in the extant play at least, she is not without
redeeming features, and in fact she comes to grief through no great fault of her
own. It may well be that the first *Hippolytus*, Καλυπτόμενος, in which Phaedra
seems to have been far more outrageously shameless, did far more than the
extant play to earn Euripides his reputation as a detractor of women. See
Barrett (1964) 11-12.

tries very hard to uphold at least a semblance of cωφροϲύνη (see especially *Hipp.* 399, 413) and struggles to find a way out of her predicament with her honour intact.[15] Ultimately, she decides on suicide, and even Hippolytus has to acknowledge the cωφροϲύνη of that decision (1034). As a result, the two main characters are both much concerned with cωφροϲύνη as they see it, and the poet makes his characters employ the term in a variety of conventional and less conventional uses; the adaptability of cωφροϲύνη is here exploited for dramatic effect more than anywhere else in Attic drama, with the posible exception of *Bacchae*.

Most important, of course, is the figure of Hippolytus himself. From the prologue onwards, he is characterized as an ardent devotee of Artemis, and an equally virulent detractor of Aphrodite (10-16), and this means that his particular brand of cωφροϲύνη unusually and strikingly involves not only complete, religiously motivated chastity but also a marked intolerance of those who do not uphold the same ascetic standards. In the prologue, he makes the radical claim that a devotee of his kind must 'always be cώφρων in every respect' (80, ἐc τὰ πάνθ᾽ ἀεί), and must possess this quality by nature rather than education (79). This implies that cωφροϲύνη means rather more to him than chastity alone (though that certainly *is* the central element), and this impression is confirmed in the fullest and most straightforward exposition of his cωφροϲύνη, which occurs in his long self-defence in the confrontation with Theseus:

> πρῶτα δ᾽ ἄρξομαι λέγειν
> ὅθεν μ᾽ ὑπῆλθεc πρῶτον ὡc διαφθερῶν
> οὐκ ἀντιλέξοντ᾽. εἰcορᾶιc φάοc τόδε
> καὶ γαῖαν· ἐν τοῖcδ᾽ οὐκ ἔνεcτ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἐμοῦ,
> οὐδ᾽ ἢν cὺ μὴ φῆιc, cωφρονέcτεροc γεγώc.   995
> ἐπίcταμαι γὰρ πρῶτα μὲν θεοὺc cέβειν
> φίλοιc τε χρῆcθαι μὴ ἀδικεῖν πειρωμένοιc
> ἀλλ᾽ οἷcιν αἰδὼc μήτ᾽ ἐπαγγέλλειν κακὰ
> μήτ᾽ ἀνθυπουργεῖν αἰcχρὰ τοῖcι χρωμένοιc,
> οὐκ ἐγγελαcτὴc τῶν ὁμιλούντων, πάτερ,   1000
> ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸc οὐ παροῦcι κἀγγὺc ὢν φίλοιc.
> ἑνὸc δ᾽ ἄθικτοc, ὧι με νῦν ἔχειν δοκεῖc·
> λέχουc γὰρ ἐc τόδ᾽ ἡμέραc ἁγνὸν δέμαc.
> οὐκ οἶδα πρᾶξιν τήνδε πλὴν λόγωι κλύων

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[15] On Phaedra's concern for reputation, see McClure (1999) 116-19.

γραφῆι τε λεύccων· οὐδὲ ταῦτα γὰρ cκοπεῖν   1005
πρόθυμός εἰμι, παρθένον ψυχὴν ἔχων.
καὶ δὴ τὸ cῶφρον τοὐμὸν οὐ πείθει c'· ἴτω.
δεῖ δή cε δεῖξαι τῶι τρόπωι διεφθάρην.
 (E. *Hipp.* 991-1008)

I shall start to speak from the point where you first sought to trap
me, where you thought you were going to destroy me without my
speaking back. You see this world, the earth: there is no man
there, even if you'll deny it, who is more cώφρων than myself. For
first of all I know how to revere the gods, and how to consort with
associates who try not to do wrong, but who shun both to send evil
messages and to render shameful services to those who send
them. I'm not a man to mock my companions, father, but the very
same to them whether they are absent or I am close to them. And
there is one thing with which I have not been in touch, the very
point on which you think you have trapped me: to this very day my
body is undefiled by sex. I do not know these deeds except from
hearsay, and from seeing it in pictures; for I am even disinclined
to really *look* at these, because my soul is still a virgin. Oh well, I
see that my cωφροcύνη does not convince you. Never mind. You
must of course *prove* in which respect I've been corrupted.

Hippolytus starts his self-defence with a full exposition of his
ethos. On account of his supposed assault on Phaedra, Theseus
had openly denied the justification of his son's claims to moral
superiority and cωφροcύνη (948-51, cὺ δὴ θεοῖcιν ὡc περιccὸc ὢν
ἀνὴρ | ξύνει; cὺ cώφρων καὶ κακῶν ἀκήρατοc; | οὐκ ἂν πιθοίμην
τοῖcι coῖc κόμποιc ἐγὼ | θεοῖcι προcθεὶc ἀμαθίαν φρονεῖν κακῶc.
'Are you the one who is known to consort with the gods, as a su-
perior man? Are you cώφρων and untouched by evil? I could
never believe your boastful claims, and therewith suppose that
the gods are so ignorant as to have no good sense.'). Therefore,
Hippolytus responds with an elaborate claim that he *is*, indeed,
the paragon of cωφροcύνη.

The first part of Hippolytus' exposition combines two ele-
ments that are familiar as belonging to the conventional
cωφροcύνη of the adult citizen. First, there is respect for the gods
(996 θεοὺc cέβειν), second, a concern for δίκη that not just pre-
vents him from doing wrong, but even makes him avoid the
company of *philoi* who are less scrupulous (997-1000). To The-
seus, these may sound like conventional and rather flat claims,
straight from the book of conventional aristocratic wisdom, so to

speak, but the addition that Hippolytus refuses to 'send evil mes-
sages' and 'help those who do send them' shows the audience
that Hippolytus is covertly denouncing Phaedra and the nurse
for their machinations: θέους cέβειν seems to hint that *he* will
keep his oath of secrecy none the less.

The second part of Hippolytus' exposition is its climax, and
concerns what for Hippolytus is the pivotal element of his
cωφροcύνη: his chastity. Restraint in sexual matters is once again,
at least for a young man like Hippolytus, a recognizably conven-
tional ideal of cωφροcύνη (one thinks immediately of the re-
straint commended in young males in texts such as *Clouds* and
Charmides, see chapters 8.2 and 10.8), but for Hippolytus this
ideal is taken to the extreme of continuous chastity, because of
his devotion to Artemis. Such persistent religiously motivated
asceticism, even if it is not unheard of,[16] is hardly what the aver-
age Greek male would call cωφροcύνη; it is Hippolytus' idiosyn-
crasy that this enduringly ascetic lifestyle is, for him, a *sine qua
non* of cωφροcύνη.

Thus, Hippolytus uses various conventional elements of 'male'
and 'juvenile' cωφροcύνη in defence of his very particular view of
life. The message of the entire passage is, of course, that he is
not the type of man to assault Phaedra or to indulge in amorous
schemings and machinations of the kind of which he thinks
Phaedra is guilty; and the spectators will not fail to see that Hip-
polytus' claims are quite true. But taken as a piece of rhetoric
aiming to persuade Theseus of his innocence, Hippolytus'
speech is rather naïve. Theseus is by now convinced that Hip-
polytus' much-vaunted cωφροcύνη is merely a sham. Such a con-
viction can never be succesfully refuted by means of a full re-
statement of the original claim, and it seems clear that Hippoly-
tus only takes up this naïve strategy because his oath of silence
prevents him from speaking out clearly. Indeed, he is quick to
see that Theseus is quite unimpressed by his elaborations (1007),
and 'desperate' enough to adorn the next part of his self-
defence — in which he argues that he cannot have had any

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[16] Cf. *El.* 254, where Orestes names a religious vow as a possible explanation
of the farmer's restraint versus Electra.

sound motive to assault Phaedra — with yet another appeal to σωφροσύνη (1013, see section 2 (2) above).

Hippolytus' idiosyncratic view of chastity as the essence of σωφροσύνη is even more radically expressed in the prologue, when the young man is dedicating a garland to Artemis.

> Ιπ. coὶ τόνδε πλεκτὸν cτέφανον ἐξ ἀκηράτου
> λειμῶνος, ὦ δέσποινα, κοσμήσας φέρω,
> ἔνθ' οὔτε ποιμὴν ἀξιοῖ φέρβειν βοτὰ
> οὔτ' ἦλθέ πω cίδηρος, ἀλλ' ἀκήρατον
> μέλιcca λειμῶν' ἠρινὴ διέρχεται,
> Αἰδὼς δὲ ποταμίαιcι κηπεύει δρόcοις,
> ὅcοις διδακτὸν μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἐν τῆι φύcει
> τὸ cωφρονεῖν εἴληχεν ἐς τὰ πάντ' ἀεί,
> τούτοις δρέπεcθαι, τοῖς κακοῖcι δ' οὐ θέμις.
> (E. *Hipp.* 73-81)

> To you I bring this woven garland I have arranged, mistress, from an untouched meadow, where no farmer lets his cattle graze, and iron has never come. No, untouched is this meadow where the bee passes through in spring; and Αἰδώς tends it with river waters, for those who have acquired nothing by means of education, but in whose nature cωφροcύνη, enduring and all-embracing, firmly has its place; for them to pluck; but bad men have no right to do so.

The metaphor of the 'pure' meadow, untouched by cattle or agricultural instruments, clearly stands for Hippolytus' own virginity. There is an unmistakable allusion to a fragment of lyric poetry here, Ibycus fr. 286 *PMG*, which speaks of an 'untouched garden of virgins' (3-4 παρθένων κῆπος ἀκήρατος), who attract the attention of, and thus are threatened by, the never-sleeping ἔρος of the poet (6-7 ἐμοὶ δ' ἔρος οὐδεμίαν κατάκοιτος ὥραν, 'My desire is at no time asleep'). This aptly parallels Hippolytus' 'virginity' under threat from the amorous attentions of Phaedra.[17] But even without this parallel, the audience will know what to make of the image, because it has been given the key to its interpretation by Aphrodite in the first part of the prologue. Aphrodite has told of her master plan to punish Hippolytus by making Phaedra fall in

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[17] See Cairns (1993) 315-16.

love with him, and she has also expounded her reasons for this revenge:

> ὁ γάρ με Θηcέωc παῖc, Ἀμαζόνος τόκος,   10
> Ἱππόλυτος, ἁγνοῦ Πιτθέωc παιδεύματα,
> μόνος πολιτῶν τῆcδε γῆc Τροζηνίαc
> λέγει κακίcτην δαιμόνων πεφυκέναι·
> ἀναίνεται δὲ λέκτρα κοὐ ψαύει γάμων,
> Φοίβου δ' ἀδελφὴν Ἄρτεμιν, Διὸc κόρην,   15
> τιμᾶι, μεγίcτην δαιμόνων ἡγούμενος,
> χλωρὰν δ' ἀν' ὕλην παρθένωι ξυνὼν ἀεὶ
> κυcὶν ταχείαιc θῆρας ἐξαιρεῖ χθονός,
> μείζω βροτείαc προσπεcὼν ὁμιλίαc.
> τούτοιcι μέν νυν οὐ φθονῶ· τί γάρ με δεῖ;   20
> ἃ δ' εἰc ἔμ' ἡμάρτηκε τιμωρήσομαι
> Ἱππόλυτον ἐν τῆιδ' ἡμέραι·
> (E. *Hipp.* 10-22)

> The son of Theseus, borne by an Amazon, Hippolytus, who was brought up by the reverent Pittheus, is the only one among the residents of this city of Trozen to say that I am the worst of the gods. He spurns the bed and does not touch a woman. But Phoibos' sister Artemis, Zeus' daughter, he honours; he thinks she is the greatest of gods. In the green woods he is always together with the Virgin god, and with his swift-footed dogs he kills all the beasts in the land, having fallen on a superhuman companionship. Well, against them I bear no grudge. For why should I? But for his wrongs against me, I'll take revenge on Hippolytus this very day.

From this passage, it transpires that Aphrodite is offended most by Hippolytus' insults against herself (note 13 λέγει κακίcτην δαιμόνων πεφυκέναι) and his intolerance of those who do not share his revulsion at all sexual matters. This is confirmed in the garland scene by his extravagant advocacy of complete (80 ἐc τὰ πάνθ'), enduring (80 ἀεί) and innate (79 ἐν τῆι φύcει) cωφροcύνη, and his rejection of all others as κακοί (79). This part of the gar-land speech provokes the unease of Hippolytus' man-servant, who admonishes Hippolytus that Aphrodite also deserves her share of honour. The young man's devotion to Artemis and his ascetism are, it seems, unobjectionable if rather unusual in themselves, but with Hippolytus these spill over into contempt for Aphrodite and for humans who do not share his ascetism. Here, Hippolytus' superlative cωφροcύνη borders on the very op-posite of cωφροcύνη: an insulting arrogance vis-à-vis others. This

is Hippolytus' ἁμαρτία and the tragic justification of his down-fall.[18]

Hippolytus' lack of cωφροcύνη in this sense is confirmed by Phaedra's last words. When the queen has made up her mind that suicide is the only way out for her, she states her intention to implicate Hippolytus in her downfall, and suggests that this will teach her stepson cωφροcύνη instead of his present haughtiness:

> ἐγὼ δὲ Κύπριν, ἥπερ ἐξόλλυcί με,
> ψυχῆc ἀπαλλαχθεῖcα τῆιδ' ἐν ἡμέραι
> τέρψω· πικροῦ δ' ἔρωτοc ἡccηθήcομαι.
> ἀτὰρ κακόν γε χἀτέρωι γενήcομαι
> θανοῦc', ἵν' εἰδῆι μὴ 'πὶ τοῖc ἐμοῖc κακοῖc
> ὑψηλὸc εἶναι· τῆc νόcου δὲ τῆcδέ μοι
> κοινῆι μεταcχὼν cωφρονεῖν μαθήcεται.
> (E. *Hipp.* 725-31)

> As for me, I will please Cypris, who is destroying me, by leaving life this very day. I am defeated by a bitter love. But I will be a source of trouble to another man as well by my death: may he learn not to be haughty over my misery. This illness of mine, he and I will take part in it together, and he will learn to cωφρονεῖν.

Phaedra herself is, of course, in an even more dubious position with regard to cωφροcύνη. She has fallen in love with Hippolytus, shameful enough in itself, but Phaedra is still very much con-cerned to save at least a semblance of cωφροcύνη, and is deter-mined not to act upon her desire. She herself tells of her diffi-culty to find the 'best' way to deal with her illicit love:

> ἐπεί μ' ἔρωc ἔτρωcεν, ἐcκόπουν ὅπωc
> κάλλιcτ' ἐνέγκαιμ' αὐτόν. ἠρξάμην μὲν οὖν
> ἐκ τοῦδε, cιγᾶν τήνδε καὶ κρύπτειν νόcον·
> γλώccηι γὰρ οὐδὲν πιcτόν, ἣ θυραῖα μὲν
> φρονήματ' ἀνδρῶν νουθετεῖν ἐπίcταται,
> αὐτὴ δ' ὑφ' αὑτῆc πλεῖcτα κέκτηται κακά.
> τὸ δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ἄνοιαν εὖ φέρειν
> τῶι cωφρονεῖν νικῶcα προυνοηcάμην.
> τρίτον δ', ἐπειδὴ τοιcίδ' οὐκ ἐξήνυτον
> Κύπριν κρατῆcαι, κατθανεῖν ἔδοξέ μοι,
> κράτιcτον (οὐδεὶc ἀντερεῖ) βουλευμάτων.
> E. *Hipp.* 392-402)

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18 Cf. Stinton (1975) 247-8 = (1990) 176-7.

> When erôs had wounded me, I decided to see how best to bear it.
> Well, I started with this, keeping silent about this illness and hid-
> ing it. One cannot trust the tongue: it is well able to criticise the
> thoughts of men outside, but left to itself, it burdens itself with
> immense trouble. Second, I resolved to bear my madness well and
> keep it in check by means of cωφροcύνη. And then, since in these
> ways I did not succeed to conquer Cypris, I thought it best to die,
> the strongest and best of my intentions, there is no denying that.

Phaedra's first strategy is simply to keep silent about her love,
apparently without actually doing anything about it (392-7).
When this does not work, she decides that she must actively fight
her love, and 'conquer' it by means of her cωφροcύνη (398-9).
On this view, cωφροcύνη is not the pure immunity to desire on
which Hippolytus prides himself, but rather the ability to reject
one's desire and the struggle to keep it in check. This cωφροcύνη
is not the effortless purity of people who are disinclined to do
wrong (Hippolytus' view of the virtue), but the hard-won
achievement of those who may be very much inclined to do
wrong, yet firmly restrain their desires.[19]

   This view of cωφροcύνη as resistance to illicit desire, inciden-
tally, is readily accepted by the nurse. When Phaedra has con-
fessed her love, she is terribly shocked, but remains clear-headed
enough to see that οἱ cώφρονεc γὰρ οὐχ ἑκόντεc ἀλλ᾽ ὅμωc | κακῶν
ἐρῶcι, 'people who are cώφρονεc do not want to, but yet they
cherish bad desires' (358-9).

   But Phaedra soon has to acknowledge that this cωφροcύνη
does not work for her. She then decides that if she wishes to
keep her good name intact, suicide is the only way out. Her ex-
planation of this decision confirms that her love itself was shame-
ful, and that she could never have preserved her good name if
she had succeeded in 'fighting' her desire, but had been found
out to be in love:

> ἐμοὶ γὰρ εἴη μήτε λανθάνειν καλὰ
> μήτ᾽ αἰcχρὰ δρώcηι μάρτυραc πολλοὺc ἔχειν.
> τὸ δ᾽ ἔργον ἤιδη τὴν νόcον τε δυcκλεᾶ,
> γυνή τε πρὸc τοῖcδ᾽ οὖc᾽ ἐγίγνωcκον καλῶc,
> μίcημα πᾶcιν·
>   (E. *Hipp.* 403-7)

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[19] Cf. Cairns (1993) 338.

> For I do not wish to escape notice when I do well, nor to have many witnesses when doing wrong. And I knew that both the deed and the illness are disreputable. And moreover, I was well aware of being a woman, regarded with ill will by all.

According to Phaedra, not just the 'deed', but the 'illness', the desire, itself[20] brings disrepute, is δυcκλεήc. This means that her reputation would be lost not only if she acted on her desire, but also if she did restrain it but were known to be 'in love'. She would be regarded as a 'bad' woman, as not-cώφρων, so to speak, even if she were successful in conquering her desire by means of cωφροcύνη as a controlling force. Besides, she is well aware that the stereotypical view of women as inclined to faithlessness (406-9) is not to her advantage, and she curses both the female inventor of adultery, and also the hypocritical woman who is cώφρων ('faithful') in words but faithless in fact (413-4 μιcῶ δὲ καὶ τὰc cώφροναc μὲν ἐν λόγοιc, | λάθραι δὲ τόλμαc οὐ καλὰc κεκτημέναc, 'I also despise those who are cώφρονεc in words, but who in secret dare to do wrong.').

The nurse has little patience with Phaedra's moralising. For her, Phaedra's love is life-threatening, and requires swift and effective action:

> τί cεμνομυθεῖc; οὐ λόγων εὐcχημόνων
> δεῖ c' ἀλλὰ τἀνδρόc. ὡc τάχοc διοιcτέον,
> τὸν εὐθὺν ἐξειπόνταc ἀμφὶ coῦ λόγον.
> εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν coι μὴ 'πὶ cυμφοραῖc βίοc
> τοιαῖcδε, cώφρων δ' οὖc' ἐτύγχανεc γυνή,
> οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εὐνῆc οὕνεχ' ἡδονῆc τε cῆc
> προῆγον ἄν cε δεῦρο· νῦν δ' ἀγὼν μέγαc,
> cῶcαι βίον cόν, κοὐκ ἐπίφθονον τόδε.
> (E. *Hipp.* 490-7)

> Why these solemn words? You are not in need of decorous speech, you need the man. We must quickly make a move, speaking out the straight word about you. For if your life did not happen to be at such a risk, and if you were a cώφρων woman, I would not now be bringing you to this point for the sake of sex and pleasure. Now there is a big issue at stake: to save your life. That is not something to disapprove of.

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[20] See Barrett (1964) on 405-407.

For the nurse, Phaedra is not-ϲώφρων, not in the sense of 'faith-
less' but in the sense that she is victim to an overpowering desire.
The struggles against desire even threatens her life, and that re-
quires immediate action: Phaedra must have 'the man' to still
her desire. On the view that the nurse adopts here, ϲωφροϲύνη is
not something that can be attained by struggle: one either has or
lacks ϲωφροϲύνη, and has to accept the consequences. Phaedra,
on account of her desire, is definitely not-ϲώφρων, almost a
counterpart, in fact, to Hippolytus with his 'innate' purity. For
the nurse, this situation overrides all concern for conventional
morality.

Phaedra's, then, is a complex and paradoxical position in this
play. She clearly and unequivocally falls short of the conven-
tional ideal of the chaste and loyal ϲώφρων woman who does not
have 'illicit' desires, but in spite of this she still shows herself to
be much concerned with ϲωφροϲύνη in her determination not to
give in, and she sincerely tries to find the most honourable way
out of her predicament. Even Hippolytus has to acknowledge as
much, and his final comments on Phaedra's suicide concisely
sum up his stepmother's ambivalent position:

> ἐϲωφρόνηϲε δ' οὐκ ἔχουϲα ϲωφρονεῖν,
> ἡμεῖϲ δ' ἔχοντεϲ οὐ καλῶϲ ἐχρώμεθα.
> (E. *Hipp.* 1034-5)

> She acted wisely while not being capable of ϲωφροϲύνη. I am capa-
> ble of it, but did not put it to good use.

According to Hippolytus, suicide was the honourable and sensi-
ble thing to do for Phaedra, given that she was generally incapa-
ble of (true) ϲωφροϲύνη. By contrast, he himself was unable to
use his own superlative ϲωφροϲύνη to good advantage, now that
the machinations of Phaedra and the nurse have brought him
into such trouble.[21]

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[21] There is no suggestion in the words οὐ καλῶϲ ἐχρώμεθα that Hippolytus is
in any sense taking responsibility for his own downfall, cf. Barrett (1964) *ad loc.*:
'In οὐ καλῶϲ Hipp. is not of course reproaching himself for being over-
censorious with Ph. ... : he is thinking of his behaviour not as wrong but as
unwise.'

Phaedra and Hippolytus thus, in a sense, complement each other nicely. Hippolytus is the model of ϲωφροϲύνη, but so proud of his achievement that his ϲωφροϲύνη veers over into an intolerant arrogance that is the very opposite of ϲωφροϲύνη. Phaedra, by contrast, is typically not-ϲώφρων because she is subject to adulterous love; but she is an unwilling victim, and shows genuine concern to find the sensible and honourable way out of her predicament. In this sense, both of them are ϲώφρων and not-ϲώφρων, and both of them confound conventional and simplistic ideals of ϲωφροϲύνη.[22]

6. 'Bacchae'

Like *Hippolytus, Bacchae* is a play in which conflicts concerning ϲωφροϲύνη are central to the plot. In the play, the supposed lack of ϲωφροϲύνη of the followers of Dionysus (ecstasy, sex, alcohol) is contrasted to the more fundamental lack of ϲωφροϲύνη of those who resist the god. In this sense, Pentheus is another character who is both ϲώφρων and not-ϲώφρων: he is much concerned about the morality of the Theban women, but fundamentally lacks ϲωφροϲύνη in his ill-considered resistance to the god. Apart from these moral issues, the characters in the play use many terms from the cognitive domain to comment on the ra-

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[22] This section has focused on the two main figures of *Hippolytus*. Two other passages call for passing comment. At 704, the Nurse grants the failure of her plan to approach Hippolytus with the words οὐκ ἐϲωφρονοῦν ἐγώ, 'I had no good sense to do as I did.' This has, of course, little to do with either Phaedra's or Hippolytus' ϲωφροϲύνη, but serves as an acknowledgement that her scheme was not sensible, and as an attempt to end the discussion of that issue (see section 2 (2) above).

At 966, ἀλλ' ὡϲ τὸ μῶρον ἀνδράϲιν μὲν οὐκ ἔνι, | γυναιξὶ δ' ἐμπέφυκεν; 'but will you argue that there is no wantonness in men, but that there is in women?', the manuscripts' text is not to be altered. After arguing that Hippolytus' individual claim to ϲωφροϲύνη is a sham, Theseus proceeds to argue that his son cannot have recourse to the stereotypical claim that men are ϲώφρονεϲ and women are not. For, Theseus claims, this is not true: especially young men can be equally prone to mischief (967ff. οἶδ' ἐγὼ νέουϲ | οὐδὲν γυναικῶν ὄνταϲ | ἀϲφαλεϲτέρουϲ, | ὅταν ταράξηι Κύπριϲ ἡβῶϲαν φρένα, 'I know young men who are no less fallible than women, when Cypris disturbs a young mind.'). Reading τὸ ϲῶφρον for τὸ μῶρον (..., adopted by Diggle in his OCT) destroys the point, and the claim ὡϲ τὸ ϲῶφρον ἀνδράϲιν μὲν οὐκ ἔνι is unlikely to be made by *any* Greek male, least of all Hippolytus.

tionality/sanity or madness/ecstasy of each others minds. Here, terms like (εὐ) φρονεῖν and οὐ/κακῶς φρονεῖν come into play. And finally, an important issue in the play is whether true cοφία rests with the rational/sane opponents of the Dionysiac cult, or with its ecstatic adherents. Thus the play provides for some dazzling debates in which the various parties use cognitive terms to vindicate their own good sense, soundness of mind and wisdom, and decry the lack of these on the part of their opponents.[23]

Pentheus suspects that the Dionysiac rituals celebrated by the Theban women are nothing but a pretext for alcoholic and sexual diversions. One important motivation for his fight 'against' the god Dionysus is the overriding concern for feminine fidelity he shares with many Greek males. In this respect, Pentheus is a champion of conventional, female cωφροcύνη, and whenever Pentheus is told that the cωφροcύνη of the Theban women is not impaired by the rites, the speakers mean that the women are not given to sex and alcohol, but remain decent.

> οὐχ ὁ Διόνυcος cωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάcει
> γυναῖκας ἐc τὴν Κύπριν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῆι φύcει
> τὸ cωφρονεῖν ἔνεcτιν εἰc τὰ πάντ᾽ ἀεί.[24]
> τοῦτο cκοπεῖν χρή· καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμαcιν

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[23] In the following, I argue that in *Bacchae,* among many other intersting things, we find a dramatic juxtaposition of two conflicting interpretations of cωφροcύνη, as well as two types of *sophia* and of *eu/ou phronein.* My findings concerning cωφροcύνη seem entirely compatible with, and modestly supplement, the admirable interpretation of Versnel (1990) 98-205, who interprets the tragic conflict in the play as a clash between two forms of *asebeia* (*ibid.* 172-5): Dionysus-the Stranger is ἀcεβής because he introduces a new religion, Pentheus is ἀcεβής because he fights what turns out to be a very real god after all. Versnel (*ibid.* 176-7) also points to the conflict of two kinds of *sophia* in the course of the play.

[24] Both Murray and Diggle follow Kirchhoff and delete line 316. The reasons for doing so are: (i) its resemblance to *Hipp.* 80 τὸ cωφρονεῖν εἴληχεν ἐc τὰ πάνθ᾽ ἀεί and (ii) it is omitted by Stob. 4.23.8, who reads ἀλλ ᾽ εἰc τὴν φύcιν | τοῦτο cκοπεῖν χρή. (Stob. 3.5.1 has the verse.) But the verse is impeccable in itself (for ἐν τῆι φύcει … ἔνεcτι, cf. *Ba.* 269 ἐν τοῖc λόγοιcι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔνειcί cοι φρένεc, and see Rijksbaron (1991) 54); it makes good sense ('cωφροcύνη is not effected, or, *per implicationem* destroyed by Dionysus, no, it resides in one's nature'); and the resemblance to *Hipp.* 80 is insufficient to warrant suspicion.

Reading ἐν τῆι φύcει | τοῦτο· cκοπεῖν χρή· ('That resides in nature. See for yourself.') or ἐν τῆι φύcει | τοῦτο cκοπεῖν χρή ('one must look out for that in nature') is no improvement; Stobaeus' εἰc τὴν φύcιν τοῦτο cκοπεῖν χρή ('One must turn to nature to look for that') reads like a makeshift correction of a corrupted text.

οὖϲ᾽ ἥ γε ϲώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήϲεται.
(E. *Ba.* 314-18)

(Tiresias:) It is not Dionysus who will force women to be sober in
respect to Cypris. No, it is in one's nature that the capacity for
ϲωφροϲύνη, in every respect and always, is to be found. That you
must consider; even during bacchic rites, a woman who is ϲώφρων
will not be corrupted.

ηὗδον δὲ πᾶϲαι ϲώμαϲιν παρειμέναι,
αἱ μὲν πρὸϲ ἐλάτηϲ νῶτ᾽ ἐρείϲαϲαι φόβην,
αἱ δ᾽ ἐν δρυὸϲ φύλλοιϲι πρὸϲ πέδωι κάρα
εἰκῆι βαλοῦϲαι ϲωφρόνωϲ, οὐχ ὡϲ ϲὺ φὴιϲ
ὠινωμέναϲ κρατῆρι καὶ λωτοῦ ψόφωι
θηρᾶν καθ᾽ ὕλην Κύπριν ἠρημωμέναϲ.
 (E. *Ba.* 683-8)

(First Messenger:) They all slept, their bodies quite relaxed, some
lying on their backs on pine's needles, others had rested their
head on oak leaves; scattered about, but *sôphronôs*. They were not,
as you allege, drunk on wine and flute music and did not go out in
the woods on their own to hunt for love.

ἦ πού με τῶν ϲῶν πρῶτον ἡγήϲηι φίλων,
ὅταν παρὰ λόγον ϲώφροναϲ βάκχαϲ ἴδηιϲ.
(E. *Ba.* 939-40)

(Dionysus in disguise to Pentheus:) I dare say that you will count
me as the first among your allies, when, against your expectation,
you will find the bacchic women to be ϲώφρονεϲ.

In this respect, then, Pentheus is wrong. The women in the
mountains *are* ϲώφρονεϲ in the sense that they do not practice
extra-marital sex. In other respects, however, they are hardly
ϲώφρονεϲ, and if this is not stated explicitly anywhere, it becomes
abundantly clear from the messenger speeches and from the fi-
nal scene. The women are — intermittently, at least — in a state
of divine ecstasy, and thus *per implicationem* not ϲώφρονεϲ in that
they are not in a normal frame of mind. In this state, they are
also capable of extreme violence, including the ϲπαραγμόϲ of
Pentheus himself. Thus, where we are told that the women are
ϲώφρονεϲ on one level, and have no reason to doubt that, we wit-
ness that they are not ϲώφρονεϲ on another, no less disturbing,
level.

Pentheus himself is also an intriguing mix of good common
sense and, ultimately, utter lack of ϲωφροϲύνη. For while his con-

cern for the *ϲωφροϲύνη* of the bacchic women seems reasonable enough, he is not *ϲώφρων* himself in two respects: most importantly, he utterly fails to recognise that Dionysus is indeed a god, and thus offends divinity, and, on a more mundane level, he is unable to control his anger and keep calm at the provocations of the worshippers of the new god.[25]

Most important is his failure to acknowledge Dionysus' divine status, and the bitter fight against the god that is connected with this lack of insight. He initially shares this with all the members of the royal house: Agaue and her sisters are entirely unwilling to accept Dionysus, but are forced to do so when the women of Thebes are driven out of their houses in ecstasy, and if Cadmus is a less involuntary convert, he remains a convert for opportunistic reasons.

Thus, whenever the lack of *ϲωφροϲύνη* of the members of the royal family is addressed, the point is that they fail to honour the god Dionysus.

> τὸ ϲωφρονεῖν δὲ καὶ ϲέβειν τὰ τῶν θεῶν
> κάλλιϲτον· οἶμαι δ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ϲοφώτατον
> θνητοῖϲιν εἶναι κτῆμα τοῖϲι χρωμένοιϲ
>   (E. *Ba.* 1150-2)

(The second messenger, drawing the 'moral' from his story of Pentheus' destruction:) Being *ϲώφρων* and respecting all matters divine is best. I think it is also the wisest possession for those who practice it.

> ταῦτ᾽ οὐχὶ θνητοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγεγὼϲ λέγω
> Διόνυϲοϲ ἀλλὰ Ζηνόϲ· εἰ δὲ ϲωφρονεῖν
> ἔγνωθ᾽, ὅτ᾽ οὐκ ἠθέλετε, τὸν Διὸϲ γόνον
> ηὐδαιμονεῖτ᾽ ἂν ϲύμμαχον κεκτημένοι.
> (E. *Ba.* 1340-3)

(Dionysus, at the end of his speech to Cadmus:) This is what I, Dionysus, being the son not of a mortal father, but of Zeus, have to say. If you had had the insight to be *ϲώφρονεϲ*, when you were not prepared to do so, you would have enjoyed good fortune, having the son of Zeus as your ally.

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[25] The treatment of Leinieks (1996) 252-6 suffers from reducing the conflicting interpretations of *ϲωφροϲύνη* to the single, under-descriptive notion of 'discipline'.

The striking thing here is that the γνῶμαι of the second messenger are confirmed, with direct and explicit reference to Cadmus and the Theban royal family, by the god Dionysus in the *exodos* of the play. For the common man, who is not immediately involved in the drama, as well as — of course — for the god himself, there can be no doubt that Pentheus and his kin were wrong to deny the divinity of Dionysus.

Thus it is no surprise to see that, conversely, Tiresias is credited with cωφρocύνη by the chorus after singing the praise of Dionysus to Pentheus: he is cώφρων to honour Bromios, and in doing so does not detract from the honour of the 'old' god Apollo.

> Χο. ὦ πρέcβυ, Φοῖβόν τ' οὐ καταιcχύνειc λόγοιc,
> τιμῶν τε Βρόμιον cωφρονεῖc, μέγαν θεόν.
> (E. *Ba.* 348-9)

> Dear Sir, your words are no digrace to Phoebus, and you show cωφροcύνη by honouring Bromios, a mighty god.

Unlike Pentheus, Tiresias *does* recognise the divine status of Dionysus, and acknowledges the τιμή of this 'mighty' god.

In connection with his hybristic[26] failure to acknowledge Dionysus' divinity, however, Pentheus is also not-cώφρων on a more mundane level. From his very first entry (214 ὡc ἐπτόηται, 'how excited he is'), Pentheus is barely in control of his anger,[27] and his agitation strongly contrasts with the composure of the divine stranger.

> Δι. αὐδῶ με μὴ δεῖν, cωφρονῶν οὐ cώφροcιν.
> Πε. ἐγὼ δὲ δεῖν γε, κυριώτεροc cέθεν.
> (E. *Ba.* 504-5)

> (Dionysus in disguise:) I order not to bind me, speaking as man who is cώφρων to men who are not. (Pentheus:) And I order to bind you, I have more authority than you.

Dionysus the Stranger here drives home the point that Pentheus and his men are aggressive, whereas he himself remains almost

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[26] For Pentheus' and the Cadmeans' dishonouring ὕβριc against Dionysus, see 375, 516, 555, 1297, 1347. Conversely, Pentheus regards the subversive activities of the Stranger and his βακχαί as ὕβριc (247, 779), and Dionysus in disguise describes the humiliating delusion he casts on Pentheus in similar terms (616 καθύβριc' αὐτόν).
[27] On anger control, cf. Harris (2001), Allen (2000), esp. 58-9.

uncannily calm. The spectators will also see that Pentheus is also
not-cώφρων in the sense that the tries to imprison a god, and
thus offends divinity. Thus οὐ cώφροcιν is doubly relevant for the
spectators, even though Pentheus himself will, at this stage, only
take it as a slight on his aggression.

> ῥαιδίωc γὰρ αὐτὸν οἴcω, κἂν πνέων ἔλθηι μέγα·
> πρὸc cοφοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸc ἀcκεῖν cώφρον᾽ εὐοργηcίαν.
>   (E. *Ba.* 640-641)

> (Dionysus in disguise:) I will deal with him easily, even if he will
> make a great fuss. It's the mark of a clever man to preserve a
> cώφρων quiet temper.

Here again, Dionysus the Stranger is cώφρων because, unlike
Pentheus, he is not given to fear and anger. By his lack of
cωφροcύνη in the sense of 'control of anger', Pentheus acquires
traits of the irascible tyrant, always a less than ideal figure in
tragedy,[28] and loses the 'good sense' ideally associated with male
cωφροcύνη.

Thus, in *Bacchae*, all human protagonists arguably both have and
lack cωφροcύνη: the Theban woman are not faithless, but they
are ecstatic and downright violent; Pentheus claims to be sensi-
ble, but he is in fact both irascible and totally blind to the fact
that he offends a god. And even Dionysus in his guise of mortal
stranger is, in his appearance, both cώφρων and not-cώφρων. He
is criticised by Pentheus for his effeminate appearance (455-8,
493) and for corrupting women (454, 459, 487), and in this re-
spect, he seems not-cώφρων, but, as we have seen, he at least
manages to keep calm where his adversary Pentheus loses his
temper.[29]

    The spectators are obviously expected to relish the paradoxes.
To add to the complexity, the protagonists of the play also fre-
quently comment on other aspects of each other's state of mind
and cognitive abilities. We may distinguish two main themes

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[28] Compare, for instance, Eteocles' aggression in the last scene of A. *Th.*,
Aegisthus' anger at the chorus in the final scene of *Agamemnon*, or the anger of
Oedipus with Tiresias and Creon in *OT*. If this irascibility already falls short of
ideally worthy behaviour, his 'degradation' is completed when, in 912ff., he
appears in women's clothes in order to spy on the βακχαί.
[29] The choral verse 1002, corrupt beyond hope, is not dealt with here.

here: (i) delusion versus good sense, mostly described by expressions such as (εὖ) φρονεῖν (the verb cωφρονεῖν is *not* used in this sense in the play: cώφρων and cognates are used only with reference to the moral and religious issues in the play), and (ii) wicked cleverness versus real 'wisdom', both described by cοφία and cognates.

(i) The cult of Dionysus being the ecstatic and 'non-rational' rite that it is, his devotees are obviously in an 'abnormal' state of mind. The full measure of delusion to which the βακχαί are subjected appears from the second messenger speech and the entrance of Agaue, who during the killing of Pentheus 'does not think as one should' (1123 οὐ φρονοῦc᾿ ἃ χρὴ φρονεῖν), lacks perception of what she has done (1259-60 φρονήcαcαι μὲν οἷ᾿ ἐδράcατε | ἀλγήcετ᾿ ἄλγος δεινόν, 'if you will realise what you have done, you'll suffer terrible woe'), and is only gradually brought back to her former normal state of mind (1269-70 γίγνομαι δέ πωc | ἔννουc, μεταcταθεῖcα τῶν πάρος φρενῶν, 'I am somehow coming to my senses, taking leave of my former state of mind.').

But in its more innocent manifestations, the unfamiliar cult also provokes considerable human unease. This is notably the case in the scene with Cadmus and Tiresias: they are the only men in Thebes to join in the worship of Dionysus, and the old king is understandably apprehensive that people will think him a fool. Thus, Tiresias has to reassure him that *they* are the only ones to have 'good sense' (196, μόνοι γὰρ εὖ φρονοῦμεν, οἱ δ᾿ ἄλλοι κακῶc). The two old men thus seemingly act like fools, but in fact have 'wisdom' on their side as compared to the other men.

Conversely, Pentheus in spite of his agitation has at least the semblance of reason and rationality as compared to these two dancing old men, but in as far as he completely disregards Dionysus, his apparent good sense completely misses the point and is indeed no good sense at all. Both Tiresias and Cadmus insistently drive the paradox home to him:

cὺ δ᾿ εὔτροχον μὲν γλῶccαν ὡc φρονῶν ἔχειc,
ἐν τοῖc λόγοιcι δ᾿ οὐκ ἔνειcί cοι φρένεc.
  (E. *Ba.* 268-9)

(Tiresias:) You have a well-versed tongue as a man of sense, but in your words there is no sense at all.

μηδ᾽, ἢν δοκῆις μέν, ἡ δὲ δόξα cου νοcῆι,
φρονεῖν δόκει τι·
(E. *Ba.* 311-2)

(Tiresias:) ... and do not, if you have an opinion, but that opinion of yours is ill, think that you have any sense.

οἴκει μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν, μὴ θύραζε τῶν νόμων·
νῦν γὰρ πέτηι τε καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς.
(E. *Ba.* 331-2)

(Cadmus:) Do dwell with us, not on the outside of our customs. For now you are in the air, and for all your reason have no good sense at all.

μέμηνας ἤδη, καὶ πρὶν ἐξεστὼς φρενῶν.
(E. *Ba.* 359)

(Tiresias:) You're mad beyond cure now. Even before you were out of your mind.

Thus Pentheus, for all his apparent rationality, is completely wrong to fight the 'ecstatic' βακχαί. But in these scenes at least, Pentheus is still in a more or less normal frame of mind. That is changed by Dionysus, who drives him out of his mind in order to persuade him to spy on the βακχαί in women's dress:

Διόνυcε, νῦν còν ἔργον· οὐ γὰρ εἶ πρόcω·
τειcώμεθ᾽ αὐτόν. πρῶτα δ᾽ ἔκcτηcον φρενῶν,
ἐνεὶc ἐλαφρὰν λύccαν· ὡc φρονῶν μὲν εὖ
οὐ μὴ θελήcηι θῆλυν ἐνδῦναι cτολήν,
ἔξω δ᾽ ἐλαύνων τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐνδύcεται
 (E. *Ba.* 849-53)

Dionysus, this is now your work: I know you're not far off. Let us punish him. First, drive him out of his mind, by inducing a giddy madness. For in his right mind, he will never agree to put on a woman's dress, but if out of his normal state of mind, he will.

Thus, whereas cώφρων and cωφρονεῖν deal with some of the main 'moral' aspects of the drama (respect for the gods, taboos on illicit sex and Pentheus' emotionalism), expressions like (εὖ) φρονεῖν and οὐ φρονεῖν are used to focus on the various states of mind of the characters in the play, whether 'normal'/'rational' versus 'ecstatic' or 'right'/'sensible' versus 'wrong'/ 'unreasonable'.

(ii) Beside all this, there is the opposition of wicked cleverness versus 'real' wisdom, being, in this particular play, 'real' insight in matters divine. Both are described by ϲοφόϲ and cognates.[30] As ϲοφόϲ is a term most typically used for 'experts' in various types of arts, crafts and knowledge, in the context of this play it is applied to the expert who has insight in religious matters, notably Tiresias (179 bis, 186) and Dionysus the Stranger, who has to conclude that 'words of insight' fall flat if spoken to someone who completely lacks this kind of insight, like Pentheus[31] (480 δόξει τιϲ ἀμαθεῖ ϲοφὰ λέγων οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν, 'If one speaks words of insight to a man who knows nothing, one will seem to have no sense.').

But just as there is a contrast in the play between 'apparent good sense' (as exemplified by Pentheus) and 'real good sense' (as shown by the worshippers of Dionysus), there is also a contrast between 'ill-founded, apparent' ϲοφία and 'real' ϲοφία. The former is the ϲοφία of the 'clever' man who uses this cleverness to ill effect. For Tiresias, this is the man who invents clever rationalisations that detract from the status of the gods (200 οὐδ' ἐνϲοφιζόμεϲθα τοῖϲι δαίμοϲιν, 'and we do not invent clever reasonings against the gods', cf. 203). For Pentheus, by contrast, the bad ϲοφόϲ is Dionysus the Stranger, who shows considerable cleverness in defending his wicked religion (e.g. 489 δίκην ϲε δοῦναι δεῖ ϲοφιϲματῶν κακῶν, 'you have to be punished for your bad reasonings').[32] Thus when Pentheus states that his prisoner is clever in every aspect, but lacks insight in essential matters, the Stranger, being a god and thus an expert in religious matters, is able to retort that he is especially ϲοφόϲ in the field where it matters most:

> Πε. ϲοφὸϲ ϲοφὸϲ ϲύ, πλὴν ἃ δεῖ ϲ' εἶναι ϲοφόν.
> Δι. ἃ δεῖ μάλιϲτα, ταῦτ' ἔγωγ' ἔφυν ϲοφόϲ.
> (E. *Ba*. 655-6)

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[30] For the conflicting views on ϲοφία in this play, cf. Versnel (1990), 176-7 with references to older literature, and Oranje (1984) 159-64.

[31] For Pentheus' utter lack of insight/expertise in religious matters, see 490 ϲε δ' ἀμαθίαϲ γε [sc. δίκην δίδοναι δεῖ] κἀϲεβοῦντ' ἐϲ τὸν θεόν.

[32] Characteristically, Pentheus' appreciation of the Stranger changes appreciably when the latter leads him to the mountains to spy on the βακχαί. At 824, ὥϲ τιϲ εἶ πάλαι ϲοφόϲ is a complementary remark on the Stranger's prudent foresight.

(Pentheus:) You are a clever, clever man, except in that respect in which ϲοφία is required. (Dionysus:) Where it is required especially, in that respect *I am* ϲοφόϲ.

The paradox of this contrast between (apparent) ϲοφία and (real) ϲοφία is succinctly formulated by the chorus in the phrase τὸ ϲοφὸν δ' οὐ ϲοφία (395), 'being clever is no (true) insight'.

Bacchae thus plays a virtuoso game with the paradoxes connected with the various ways in which people respond to a new and disturbing religion. A whole apparatus of 'mental' terminology is used to deal with various aspects of its protagonists' 'mentalities'. Whereas ϲώφρων and cognates focus on the 'moral' issues of the play (chastity, respect for the gods, control of anger), (εὖ) φρονεῖν and οὖ φρονεῖν and the like are used in connection with the paradoxical states of mind of the god's adherents and his detractors: Pentheus was found to be 'sensible' and yet 'not sensible'; the opposite goes for the god's adherents. ϲοφόϲ and ϲοφία finally play on the contrast between mere 'cleverness' and 'real' insights in religious matters. The god himself does not, of course, come in for judgement of his behaviour in human terms, except when, in his disguise as a human follower of Dionysus, he reacts quietly and submissively to the aggression of his opponent.

7. *'Medea'*

In *Medea* too, we witness a conflict between two protagonists who, from different points of view, both possess and lack ϲωφροϲύνη. Here, the issues are rather more complicated, and that is the reason why we will deal with this play last.

For Medea herself, ϲωφροϲύνη is an issue not in connection with the cruel killing of her children (unequivocally an ἔργον δυϲϲεβέϲτατον, according to Jason, *Med.* 1328), but concerning the question whether she is right to take offence at Jason's marriage to the Corinthian princess. For Medea, Jason is a betrayer, oblivious to all that she has done for him,[33] but Jason thinks oth-

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[33] Medea herself describes Jason as a προδότηϲ oblivious of the past services of his former φίλοι, thereby employing norms that apply to the interaction

erwise. In their first confrontation, Jason accuses Medea of μωρία, both because she does not stop her accusations against Creon (457f *cὺ δ' οὐκ ἀνίεις μωρίας, λέγους' ἀεὶ | κακῶς τυράν-νους*) and because she refuses to see that this marriage is the best way to secure the position of her children (614 *καὶ ταῦτα μὴ θέλουσα μωρανεῖς, γύναι*): Jason attributes Medea's anger to sexual jealousy (568-73), rather than to his own lack of loyalty (Medea's charge against him: 488-98). Later on, when Medea makes her feigned excuses, Jason readily welcomes her new-found *cωφροcύνη*:

> ἀλλ' ἐc τὸ λῶιον cὸν μεθέcτηκεν κέαρ,
> ἔγνωc δὲ τὴν νικῶcαν, ἀλλὰ τῶι χρόνωι,
> βουλήν· γυναικὸc ἔργα ταῦτα cώφρονοc.
>   (E. *Med.* 911-13)

> But your heart made a change for the better, and you have recognised, although it took some time, the plan that wins. These are the deeds of a *cώφρων* woman.

For Jason, Medea now seems to be the good Greek wife, who does not oppose her husband's plans, but sees that his will is best. The indulgence she now shows in fact strongly reminds one of the indulgence of Andromache with regard to Hector's paramours (*Andr.* 222-231, see section 3 above).[34]

The final discussion between Jason and Medea shows that Jason did indeed expect a *cώφρων* wife to put up with his second marriage:

> Ια. οὔτοι νιν ἡμὴ δεξιά γ' ἀπώλεcεν.
> Μη. ἀλλ' ὕβριc οἵ τε coὶ νεοδμῆτεc γάμοι.
> Ια. λέχουc cφε κἠξίωcαc οὔνεκα κτανεῖν;
> Μη. cμικρὸν γυναικὶ πῆμα τοῦτ' εἶναι δοκεῖc;
> Ια. ἥτιc γε cώφρων· coὶ δὲ πάντ' ἐcτὶν κακά.
> (E. *Med.* 1365-9)

> *Jason:* It is not *my* hand that killed them. *Medea:* No, it was your *ὕβριc* and the new wife you took. *Jason:* Did you actually think it

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between two male φίλοι, but not so readily to the bond between a man and his wife. On this position of Medea, which is understandable, but problematic from the point of view of Greek convention, see Palmer (1957), and Sicking (1998), 63-76. Below I hope to show that Medea's behaviour is problematic from the viewpoint of conventional notions of cωφροcύνη, as much as she is a difficult figure in her idiosyncratic view of φιλία.

    [34] Cf. Mastronarde (2002) ad 913.

worthwile killing them for the sake of our bed? *Medea*: Do you
think that is a small grief to a woman? *Jason*: Yes, if she is ϲώφρων.
You, however, take offence at everything.

This is in fact the same norm by which Andromache is 'right' to
put up with Hector's paramours, and Hermione 'wrong' to plot
against Andromache (see section 3 on *Andr.*). Again, we see how
Jason connects Medea's lack of acquiescence to an obsession
with sex (λέχουϲ, 1367): he stubbornly views Medea's anger in
terms of the jealousy of the stereotypically sex-obsessed woman.

Still, regardless of the issue of ἔρωϲ, it seems no eccentricity
from the Greek point of view that Jason demands Medea's ac-
quiescence. And in fact, the same norm finds a fuller expression
in the choral ode that follows on the first confrontation between
Jason and Medea. In the first strophe, the chorus dwell on the
disastrous effect that strong *erôs* has on men,[35] but in the antis-
trophe their thoughts turn to Medea, and they pray that they
may never find themselves in a situation in which they might re-
act in a similarly vehement way to a new liaison.

> Χο. ἔρωτεϲ ὑπὲρ μὲν ἄγαν ἐλθόντεϲ οὐκ εὐδοξίαν   627-8
> οὐδ' ἀρετὰν παρέδωκαν ἀνδράϲιν· εἰ δ' ἅλιϲ ἔλθοι   629-30
> Κύπριϲ, οὐκ ἄλλα θεὸϲ εὔχαριϲ οὕτω.
> μήποτ', ὦ δέϲποιν', ἐπ' ἐμοὶ χρυϲέων τόξων ἀφείηϲ
> ἱμέρωι χρίϲαϲ' ἄφυκτον οἰϲτόν.   635
>
> ϲτέργοι δέ με ϲωφροϲύνα, δώρημα κάλλιϲτον θεῶν·
> μηδέ ποτ' ἀμφιλόγουϲ ὀργὰϲ ἀκόρεϲτά τε νείκη
> θυμὸν ἐκπλήξαϲ' ἑτέροιϲ ἐπὶ λέκτροιϲ   640-1
> προϲβάλοι δεινὰ Κύπριϲ, ἀπτολέμουϲ δ' εὐνὰϲ ϲεβίζουϲ'
> ὀξύφρων κρίνοι λέχη γυναικῶν.
> (E. *Med.* 627-44)

Whenever *erôs* comes with too strong a force, it does not bring
good fame or *aretè* for a man. But if Cypris comes in due measure,
there is no more graceful god than she. Never, o mistress, fire at
me from your golden bow the inescapable arrow that is anointed
with desire.

May *sôphrosyna* remain faithful to me, the fairest gifts from the
god. May awesome Cypris never send me quarrelsome tempers

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[35] The chorus seem to have Jason's marriage to the princess in mind, and
seem to agree with Medea's view that Jason was motivated by desire (cf. 491,
623-4). It seems justified here to take ἀνδράϲιν (630) as 'men' rather than
'humans' in general (Mastronarde *ad loc.*), see Rademaker (forthcoming).

and insatiate strife, and upset me over an extraneous affair. May she respect peaceful liaisons, and so sharply judge the partnerships of women.

The antistrophe is commonly taken to mean that the women pray that they may remain cώφρονεc and never conceive the desire for another man. This interpretation depends on taking line 640, θυμὸν ἐκπλήξαc᾽ ἑτέροιc ἐπὶ λέκτροιc, to mean 'making my heart aflame for a love other than my husband's'.[36] But with a verb that describes a mental state or emotion (ἐκπλήξαcα), ἑτέροιc ἐπὶ λέκτροιc means 'because of another bed' rather than 'in desire of another love';[37] the expression then refers to the type of liaison at which Medea was so gravely upset only moments ago, and which we have already seen to provoke 'quarrelsome tempers' and 'insatiable strife'. What the ladies pray for, is that Cypris may distinguish sharply (644) between marriages that are peaceful (ἀπολέμουc ... εὐνάc), such as their own, and those that are not, and that she may refrain from disturbing the former. Thus, they hope that they will never be in a situation where they might stir up quarrels in anger at a 'faithless' husband; the cωφροcύνα which they wish to keep is the peace at home, in which they have no cause for quarrel.[38]

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[36] Page ad loc., cf. Valgiglio (1957) ad loc.: 'colpirmi l'animo col desiderio di un talamo altrui'.

[37] For ἐπί + dat. indicating a 'cause' or 'occasion' in expressions of 'emotions' and 'mental affection', see LSJ s.v. ἐπί B.III.1, K.-G. I 502, and cf. E. *Hipp.* 686 ciγᾶν ἐφ᾽ οἷcι νῦν κακύνομαι, *ibid.* 903 τὸ μέντοι πρᾶγμ᾽ ὅτωι cτένειc ἔπι | οὐκ οἶδα.

It is true that ἐπί + dat. can indicate a result or purpose, but this use occurs in descriptions of events and actions rather than emotions. Cf. E. *Hipp* 511-2 ἅ c᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αἰcχροῖc οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ βλάβηι φρενῶν | παύcει νόcου τῆcδ᾽, and see the examples quoted by K.-G. I 502-3, e.g. ἐπὶ δόρπωι (*Od.* 18.44) or ἐπὶ κακῶι ἀνθρώπου cιδηρὸc ἀνεύρηται (Hdt. 1.68).

Cf. Meridor (1986), Rademaker (forthcoming).

[38] According to North (1966) 73-4, it is Medea who is said to be subject to 'too strong *erôs*', not the 'cold, calculating' Jason; on this reading both strophe and antistrophe are addressing Medea's case. But (i) this is not likely in view of ἀνδράcιν in the strophe; (ii) it is not confirmed by cτέργοι δέ which suggests that the antistrophe will bring a new point rather than the exact obverse of that of the strophe (for which one rather needs ἀλλά); (iii) it is unlikely in view of the context of the play: throughout it is understood that Medea was indeed strongly 'in love' with Jason (8, 350) when she saved him and followed him from Colchis (her perturbed state of mind thus explaining her lack of loyalty to her own φίλοι), but there is absolutely no suggestion that her present distress is

Thus Medea falls short in ϲωφροϲύνη in the sense that she can not reconcile herself to Jason's new marriage. But she herself has a charge against Jason too, and Jason unsuccesfully tries to persuade her that his marriage was by no means base betrayal, but, on the contrary, the sensible thing to do (*Med.* 548-50 ἐν τῶιδε δείξω πρῶτα μὲν ϲοφὸϲ γεγώϲ, | ἔπειτα ϲώφρων, εἶτά ϲοι μέγαϲ φίλοϲ | καὶ παιϲὶ τοῖϲ ἐμοῖϲιν, 'In this, I will show you first that I am clever, second that I am ϲώφρων, and third that I am most loyal to you and to my children'). Jason claims to act in the interest of his own οἶκοϲ, and he resolutely denies any erotic desire for his new bride; as such, his behaviour can indeed be evaluated not only in terms of ϲοφία and φιλία, but also in terms of ϲωφροϲύνη, and in this sense he is right to claim that he was clever, in control of his desire, and a great φίλοϲ to Medea and her children.

It is this notion of ϲωφροϲύνη as unobjectionable behaviour that Medea addresses when she tries to convince both Jason and Creon that she is no longer angry with them. In turn, she praises both for their ϲωφροϲύνη.

> οὐχ ὧδ' ἔχει μοι, μὴ τρέϲηιϲ ἡμᾶϲ, Κρέον,
> ὥϲτ' ἐϲ τυράννουϲ ἄνδραϲ ἐξαμαρτάνειν.
> ϲὺ γὰρ τί μ' ἠδίκηκαϲ; ἐξέδου κόρην
> ὅτωι ϲε θυμὸϲ ἦγεν. ἀλλ' ἐμὸν πόϲιν
> μιϲῶ· ϲὺ δ', οἶμαι, ϲωφρονῶν ἔδραϲ τάδε.
> καὶ νῦν τὸ μὲν ϲὸν οὐ φθονῶ καλῶϲ ἔχειν·
> νυμφεύετ', εὖ πράϲϲοιτε· τήνδε δὲ χθόνα
> ἐᾶτέ μ' οἰκεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἠδικημένοι
> ϲιγηϲόμεϲθα, κρειϲϲόνων νικώμενοι.
> (E. *Med.* 307-315)

(To Creon:) My situation is not such — Don't be afraid of me, Creon! — that I might do wrong against a king. After all, what have you done to do me wrong? You gave your daughter to the man you wanted. No, it is my husband against whom I bear a grudge. You on the other hand, I suppose, were ϲώφρων to act as you did. And now I don't begrudge the fact that your affairs are

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due to 'love' rather than anger at the fact that Jason does not keep his part of the deal.

 As for Jason, Medea does indeed accuse him of strong, and inappropriate ἔρωϲ for the Corinthian princess (330, 491, 697-8), and Jason denies the charge at 555-6; the ladies of the chorus here seem to share her view on the matter.

well-arranged. Enjoy the wedding, and good luck to you. But let me live in this country. I have been wronged, and yet I will keep quiet: I'll let the stronger win.

ταῦτ᾽ ἐννοηθεῖϲ᾽ ἠιϲθόμην ἀβουλίαν
πολλὴν ἔχουϲα καὶ μάτην θυμουμένη.
νῦν οὖν ἐπαινῶ ϲωφρονεῖν τέ μοι δοκεῖϲ
κῆδοϲ τόδ᾽ ἡμῖν προϲλαβών, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἄφρων,
ἧι χρῆν μετεῖναι τῶνδε τῶν βουλευμάτων
καὶ ξυμπεραίνειν καὶ παρεϲτάναι λέχει
νύμφην τε κηδεύουϲαν ἥδεϲθαι ϲέθεν.
 (E. *Med.* 882-8)

(To Jason:) When I thought of all this, I was aware that I was very much ill-advised and had no reason to be angry. Now, as I say, I consent, and I think that you were ϲώφρων to acquire this additional family tie for us. I, however, was stupid. I should have joined in making these plans, and help you to carry them out. I should have stood over this bed, and have been happy to attend your bride.

Medea pretends to agree that Jason and Creon are both doing what is best for their οἶκοϲ. The ϲωφροϲύνη with which Medea credits them is very much the 'prudence' of the free adult male who takes good care of the interests of himself and those that depend on him.

But these passages are hardly a matter of fact acceptance of the men's merits; both have a strong rhetorical flavour. Medea, who is known to have been very much offended by the marriage, now pretends that she takes no offence at the behaviour of her addressees. 'You were ϲώφρων to do as you did' here amounts to the suggestion 'I see you had a good reason to act as you did, and do not think (any longer) that you did anything offensive'. This seems an almost patronizing attitude on Medea's part, who shows once again that she is not the meek and submissive Greek woman that the norm envisages.

These passages, then, highlight the more problematical aspects of Medea's behaviour. In the earlier stages of the play (before her decision to kill her children, that is), there is little doubt that she is understandably distressed at Jason's lack of loyalty and her own exile; the sympathetic reaction of the Corinthian women leaves no doubt about that, and the one male who is not directly involved in the Corinthian affairs, Aigeus, consents that

it is 'excusable' (cυγγνωcτά, 703) for her to be offended at the
marriage, and that he does not approve of her exile either (707
οὐδὲ ταῦτ' ἐπῄνεca). But however right she may be, Medea's be-
haviour, even long before the murder of the children, is higly
problematical from the point of view of conventional female
cωφροcύνη. Jason may well be wrong to attribute Medea's anger
and revenge to ἔρωc: in this respect, Medea may not be not the
archetypically not-cώφρων woman for which Jason seems to take
her. But he seems to have a point when he demands her acqui-
escence: in this respect, Medea does *not* live up to the ideal of
female cωφροcύνη. As for Jason, he may be cώφρων and coφόc in
his concern for the well-being of his οἶκοc, as he himself claims.
But it is also possible to regard his behaviour as motivated by de-
sire, as both Medea and the chorus seem to do. According to the
point of view one adopts, then, Jason may also be regarded as
cώφρων or not-cώφρων.

8. *Conclusion*

Euripides uses cώφρων and cognates in a conspicuously greater
range of sense than any of his predecessors. (For a visualisation
of the network connections between the main uses, see Fig. 7 in
chapter 9.3) These include a 'sane' state of mind, 'pru-
dence'/'good sense', 'respect for the gods', 'control of aggres-
sion and violence', and 'control of desire'. (Section 3.) With re-
gard to women, Euripidean drama is a very full source on the
ideology of female cωφροcύνη, which centres on 'marital fidelity',
but also includes quiet and inconspicuous behaviour, obedience
to, and indulgence of, one's husband, and (in the case of Alces-
tis) even self-sacrifice. Euripides' plays show a whole range of ex-
emplary women (Andromache, Alcestis, the παρθένοc) and
rather less blameless ones (Hermione, Helena, Clytemnestra,
Phaedra, and, most complex of all, Medea).
   A remarkable feature of Euripidean tragedy is that the poet
fully exploits the dramatic possibilities inherent in the juxtaposi-
tion of two strongly contrasted views of cωφροcύνη. On a small
scale, the farmer's remarks in *El.* (section 4) show an acute
awareness that people adopt different standards to judge a given

line of behaviour ('good and bad standards' to measure
cωφροcύνη), and then may use strongly contrasted terms in their
judgements.

On a larger scale too, Euripides makes full dramatic capital
out of these clashes of opinion. The extremist 'purity' of a Hip-
polytus (section 5) is contrasted with the cωφροcύνη of Phaedra,
who is incapable of such 'inner' purity but tries very hard at least
to control her desire (and both contrast yet again to the cynical
pragmatism of the nurse). Pentheus (section 6) acts as a fanatic
protector of the cωφροcύνη of the maenads whom he suspects of
illicit sex, but is himself not in control of his anger, and fatally
blind to the fact that he offends the god Dionysus. Medea (sec-
tion 7) is understandably offended by Jason's lack of loyalty and
his desire for his new bride, and she only pretends to acknowl-
edge his 'prudent' care (cωφροcύνη) for his φίλοι, yet in her
fierce protest and revenge, she also violates an ideal of
cωφροcύνη: the norm of the quiet and obedient Greek woman.

Euripides being the dramatic poet he is, he is careful to make
these clashes sufficiently obvious in order to make them register
with a mass audience. In this sense, the manner in which Eurip-
idean characters 'manipulate' cωφροcύνη ideally complements
that of philosophical texts like the Platonic dialogues, in which
the same polysemy of the terms is exploited in a way that is more
covert, more subtle and potentially infinitely more 'manipulat-
ive'.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

1. *Introduction*

The tragedians tend to use ϲώφρων and cognates predominantly in connection with great issues of other-regarding morality (how human beings should deal with their fellows and the gods). In the historians, a different type of use predominates. Here, the terms are used mostly by speakers in council, debating the pros and cons of a certain policy; and speakers will invoke ϲωφροϲύνη sometimes to argue that their addressees should observe their moral duties with regard to others, but much more often to suggest that they should observe their own self-interest. This means that the use of ϲώφρων to commend 'well-advised good sense' or 'prudence' is much more prominent in the works of the historians than it is in tragedy. It is the predominant sense in Herodotus, whereas in Thucydides, speakers both use arguments of self-interest and arguments of responsibility versus others, and the two are often juxtaposed in a telling way (e.g. in the debate between Archidamus and Sthenelaïdas in book one, and the confrontation between Cleon and Diodotus in book three).

But if the frequency of the use of the 'prudential' sense in 'symbouleutic' settings is what Herodotus and Thucydides have in common (this prudential sense is in fact also frequently employed in those parts of the speeches in the orators where a direct appeal is made to win the vote of the Athenian citizens, as we will see in chapter 8), the two authors otherwise differ substantially in their use of ϲώφρων and cognates. Herodotus (section 2) uses these terms sparingly, and mostly in the 'prudential' sense described above, but the few relevant passages make a subtle yet telling contribution to the characterisation of the personages involved. Five times, the terms are used in scenes that are dominated by an 'oriental despot', and in most of these, there is an implicit contrast between the monarchs, who typically lack ϲωφροϲύνη, and their counsellors, who possess the quality. Thus, the terms are used in connection with the 'madness' of Cambyses, to characterise Darius as a strong, autocratic figure, and to

highlight the deliberation and lack of resolve of Xerxes. Early on
in the work, there is also a hint of a more general Persian 'arro-
gance', when the Persian sources are said to make the morally
dubious claim that the Greeks were fools to start the Trojan ex-
pedition for the sake of a faithless woman. Thus, the use of
ϲώφρων and cognates in Herodotus makes a subtle but substan-
tial contribution to the characterisation of oriental tyrants as
temperamentally disinclined to ϲωφροϲύνη (thus addressing the
problem of the 'tyrannical' temperament that is very important
in Platonic dialogues like *Gorgias* and *Republic*). Some of these
passages also seem to hint that ϲωφροϲύνη is a Greek rather than
a Persian virtue. But overt propaganda is not on Herodotus'
agenda here, and such a claim is never made explicitly. The case
is, rather, that the counsellor figures include a Greek (Demara-
tus) and a Persian who nevertheless shows a typically Greek aver-
sion to monarchy and preference for democracy (Otanes).

Thucydides (section 3) is less interested in individuals and
more in πόλειϲ as collective bodies. In his speeches, he gives im-
pressive demonstrations of how speakers in council use value
terms to influence the votes of their audience. In the delibera-
tions of the city councils, ϲώφρων and cognates are used with ref-
erence to external and internal politics (section 3.1). In external
politics, the terms are used by speakers to commend the 'pru-
dence' of a cautious policy, generally speaking either a 'non-
interventionist' policy or the formation of a defensive alliance;
occasionally, speakers also use the words in a different sense, to
remind the councils of their responsibility with regard to other
cities. A telling juxtaposition of the use of ϲωφροϲύνη in these two
types of argumentation ('caution' vs. 'responsibility') occurs in
the great debate at Sparta between Archidamus and Sthenelaïdas
(for which, see section 3.2). In internal politics, the terms are
used to influence the way in which decisions are taken. Likewise,
there are two main senses here, commending either a rather
authoritarian type of obedience to the laws and to earlier deci-
sions ('εὐνομία'), or, on the contrary, 'prudent' deliberation and
the ability to think twice and revise an earlier opinion, if neces-
sary. The two senses are juxtaposed sharply in the confrontation
in the Athenian βουλή between Cleon and Diodotus in book
three.

If many of these senses occur in isolation at many places in the *Histories*, they all come together in Archidamus' eulogy on the ϲωφροϲύνη of Sparta. Here, and indeed at many places in the *Histories*, there is the suggestion that ϲωφροϲύνη was the typical virtue of Sparta, or at least that the Spartans were very susceptible to the persuasive use of the terms (section 3.2). In fact, the speeches of Archidamus and Sthenelaïdas *both* centre on an appeal to ϲωφροϲύνη, yet the policies that they commend are fundamentally opposed.

And if ϲωφροϲύνη is strongly associated with Sparta, it is no surprise to see that it is also important to Athenians with pro-Spartan sympathies. Thus, we see that ϲωφροϲύνη is the favourite slogan of those in favour of oligarchic reforms on the Spartan model at Athens, particularly so in the times of the government of the Four Hundred (section 3.3). Here the terms are used almost as a slogan, and even if there is at least one passage that seems to suggest that Thucydides himself may not be out of sympathy with the Spartan type of 'prudence' (his complimentary comparison between Chios and Sparta), what is most striking is his evident awareness of how value terms tend to be abused and become hollow when employed by the wrong speakers.

Thus, throughout the *Histories*, we can observe how speakers use value terms with different goals; accordingly, they will not agree whether a given line of action comes in for approbation at all. For some, non-intervention will be a prudent observance of self-interest, for others, it will be a despicable failure to support their allies. For some, terms of approbation like ϲωφροϲύνη apply; for others, they do not apply at all. This tension in the application of value terms reaches a climax in the narrator's typology of ϲτάϲιϲ, prompted by the civil unrest in Corcyra (3.82, see section 3.4). In ϲτάϲιϲ as the narrator describes it, extremes of violence are embraced and restraint is rejected; violence, formerly despised, now comes in for evaluation in unequivocally positive terms like ἀνδρεία (rather than derogatory ones like τόλμα), restraint, on the other hand, is no longer appreciated as ϲωφροϲύνη but condemned as 'cowardice'. Thus, the application of evaluative terms changes beyond recognition. Moreover, slogans that allegedly address the theme of the common good are ruthlessly abused in service of a dishonest personal agenda. As such, ϲτάϲιϲ

amounts to an intensification and perversion of the processes
that can be observed, in a less extreme form, in the public de-
bate in the Greek πόλεις throughout the *Histories.*

2. *Herodotus*

Herodotus uses ϲώφρων and ϲωφρονεῖν five times in scenes
dominated by oriental kings or kings in the making, and in these
scenes, it is understood that these monarchs lack the ability to
avoid excessive and rash action that ϲωφροϲύνη typically involves.[1]
ϲωφροϲύνη in these settings is, rather, the prerogative of the wise
counsellors, who frequently act as a foil to these rash and tyran-
nical monarchs.[2] One of these counsellors is Otanes in book
three, who argues against the immediate execution of the coup
against Smerdis, and takes Darius' haste as a sign of the latter's
desire to emulate the ἀρετή of his father:

> ὦ παῖ Ὑϲτάϲπεος, εἶϲ τε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐκφαίνειν ἔοικας
> ϲεωυτὸν ἐόντα τοῦ πατρὸς οὐδὲν ἥϲϲω. Τὴν μέντοι ἐπιχείρηϲιν
> ταύτην μὴ οὕτω ϲυντάχυνε ἀβούλωϲ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ
> ϲωφρονέϲτερον αὐτὴν λάμβανε· δεῖ γὰρ πλέοναϲ γενομένουϲ
> οὕτωϲ ἐπιχειρέειν.
> (Hdt. 3.71.3)
>
> Son of Hystaspes, you are the son of a good father, and you seem
> to show that you yourself are no worse than your father. But mind,
> this coup is not to be hurried in such an ill-considered manner;

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[1] It is important to note that lack of ϲωφροϲύνη is, in Herodotus, a
characteristic of monarchs rather than orientals in general. Accordingly, there
is little or nothing in Herodotus to suggest that, for him, ϲωφροϲύνη is typically
Greek quality (as opposed to an oriental one). The term is never used with
explicit reference to the Greeks, except for one passage where the adverb
ϲωφρόνωϲ is used to characterise the Spartans: the Scythian Anacharsis is
reported to have said to his king that Ἕλληναϲ πάνταϲ ἀϲχόλουϲ εἶναι ἐϲ πᾶϲαν
ϲοφίην πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, τούτοιϲι δὲ εἶναι μούνοιϲι ϲωφρόνωϲ δοῦναί τε καὶ
δέξαϲθαι λόγον. 'The Greeks are frantically occupied with all kinds of ϲοφία but
for the Spartans; these are the only ones with whom one can *sôphronôs* (quietly)
have a discussion.' (Hdt. 4.77.1.)

[2] The classic accounts of these adviser figures are Bischoff (1962 repr.) and
Lattimore (1939). Of the figures mentioned in the present section, Artabanus
and Demaratus roughly belong to the type of the 'tragic warner', and Otanes
(omitted by Lattimore) is perhaps more of a practical adviser.

> no, you must undertake it in a *cώφρονεcτερον* way. We must see
> that there will be more of us, and attack only then.

Otanes' is a plea for prudence: careful preparations are better
than ill-considered action. But apart from the fact that Otanes'
suggestion to acquire more accomplices has a vulnerable spot of
its own (the risk of betrayal), it is clear that such 'caution' is un-
likely to appeal to a typical 'son of an *ἀγαθός* father', with a char-
acteristic penchant for heroism, the 'noble' trait that Otanes
recognises in Darius.[3] Thus it is no surprise to see that Darius is
displeased with Otanes' advice, and Darius' plea for action easily
wins the day.

In a similar fashion, Darius' argumentation in favour of mon-
archy immediately after the coup prevails over Otanes' rather
striking proposal of *ἰcονομίη*, and that of Megabyxos in favour of
ὀλιγαρχίη. It is clear by now that Darius himself is the most ap-
propriate candidate for the post of monarch. By contrast, Otanes
is portrayed as an advocate of *cωφροcύνη* and even a champion
of *ἰcονομίη* to mirror the courage and the autocratic inclinations
of Darius.[4] Given that *ἰcονομίη* is hardly the Persian way, we seem
to be invited to think of Otanes as a character with an almost
Greek way of thinking; in retrospect, there might be a subliminal
suggestion that his *cωφροcύνη* is not a very Persian quality either;
at any rate, it is not a characteristic of the typical Persian mon-
arch.

Book seven contains an even more salient example of the con-
trast between a Persian king who lacks *cωφροcύνη* and a counsel-
lor who has this quality. This is the confrontation between

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[3] This is, of course, a polite and adroit way of uttering criticism: by starting
with a general acknowledgement that Darius is *ἀγαθός*, Otanes suggests that his
criticism is incidental rather than permanent, and moreover that it is a
relatively less grave issue on which they now dissent. A famous example of this
strategy is the notorious Homeric phrase *Il.* 1.131-2 *μὴ δ' οὕτως ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν
θεοείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ | κλέπτε νόωι*, 'You should not, *ἀγαθός* as you are, god-like
Achilles, deceive me as you are now trying to do', on which see Bakker (1988)
133-7, and cf. ch. 2.3. p. 58 n.31.
   Otanes' speech has something of the delicate 'court-atmosphere' that
Pelling (1991) 130f. notes in connection with Artabanus and Xerxes.
   [4] There is no suggestion in Herodotus that Darius, though very different
from his son, was in any sense a truly 'better' king, as there is in Aeschylus'
Persians. Cf. Hartog (1980), ch. 2, and Fisher (1992), 382-5.

Xerxes and Artabanus.[5] Xerxes is less of a resolute autocrat than
Darius, but he too essentially lacks good sense: he does not fore-
see the disastrous outcome of his expedition against Greece.
Artabanus warns that the Greeks are not to be underestimated
(his description of the dangers of the expedition pretty much
foreshadows the eventual outcome), and urges the king at least
to think again. Initially, Xerxes answers angrily that Artabanus is
a hopeless coward (7.11.1 ἀθύμωι ὄντι καὶ κακῶι) who must be
left behind with the women; on a later occasion, however, he
apologises to Artabanus that he now agrees with him, but cannot
act on this opinion because of an unfavourable dream:

> Ἀρτάβανε, ἐγὼ τὸ παραυτίκα μὲν οὐκ ἐσωφρόνεον εἴπας ἐς σὲ μάταια
> ἔπεα χρηστῆς εἵνεκα συμβουλίης· μετὰ μέντοι οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον
> μετέγνων, ἔγνων δὲ ταῦτά μοι ποιητέα ἐόντα τὰ σὺ ὑπεθήκαο. οὐκ ὦν
> δυνατός τοί εἰμι ταῦτα βουλόμενος ποιέειν· τετραμμένωι γὰρ δὴ καὶ
> μετεγνωκότι ἐπιφοιτῶν ὄνειρον φαντάζεταί μοι, οὐδαμῶς συνέπαινον
> ἐὸν ποιέειν με ταῦτα.
> (Hdt. 7.15.1-2)

> Artabanus, I was not σώφρων the other day: I said ill-founded
> words to you because of your good counsel. You must know that I
> soon changed my mind, and I recognised that I have to do what
> you suggested. But mind you, I am unable to do this as I want to:
> when, as I said, I had reversed and changed my mind, a dream
> came to visit me, and it did not at all consent that I should follow
> your advice.

On the surface, the words οὐκ ἐσωφρόνεον suggest a simple ex-
cuse: Xerxes admits to an inappropriate response ('your counsel
was good, my rejection of it was unfounded') and nothing
more.[6] But if this is the surface meaning of οὐκ ἐσωφρόνεον here,
the reader will be aware that Xerxes will ultimately reject Arta-
banus' advice, with disastrous results that prove his ulterior lack

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[5] For an extensive treatment of the figure of Artabanus, see Pelling (1991).

[6] There is, on the surface at least, no hint in this passage of a more
fundamental flaw in Xerxes' mentality, and the passage differs considerably,
pace Van Ophuijsen & Stork (1999) 204-5, from 3.35.2 and 3.64.5, discussed
below, where (μὴ) σωφρονεῖν is used in relation to the long-term mental
derangement of the mad tyrant Cambyses.

 More directly comparable is *Hipp.* 704, where the nurse uses exactly the
same apology to Phaedra when her scheme to approach Hippolytus has gone
awry (see chapter 6.5 above).

of ϲωφροϲύνη. The contrast with the typical prudent adviser
Artabanus, who *is* ϲώφρων but, in Xerxes' view, lacks the more
assertive 'manly' qualities (7.11.1 ἀθύμωι ὄντι καὶ κακῶι) under-
lines Xerxes' ultimate 'rashness'.

A second ϲώφρων counsellor to Xerxes is the Spartan Demara-
tus. Here we have a ϲώφρων couseller who not only *sounds* Greek
(as Otanes did) but actually *is* Greek, and as such he seems to be
a suitable candidate for the role of ϲώφρων counsellor. Demara-
tus praises the martial prowess of the Spartans and thereby pro-
vokes the king's irritation. He assures the king, however, that
these are not the words of a pro-Spartan partisan; they rather
acknowledge an unpalatable truth:

> καίτοι ὡϲ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω τὰ νῦν τάδε ἐϲτοργὼϲ ἐκείνουϲ, αὐτὸϲ
> μάλιϲτα ἐξεπίϲτεαι, οἵ με τιμήν τε καὶ γέρεα ἀπελόμενοι πατρώια
> ἄπολίν τε καὶ φυγάδα πεποιήκαϲι, πατὴρ δὲ ϲὸϲ ὑποδεξάμενοϲ βίον
> τέ μοι καὶ οἶκον ἔδωκε. Οὐκ ὦν οἰκόϲ ἐϲτι ἄνδρα τὸν ϲώφρονα εὐνοίην
> φαινομένην διωθέεϲθαι, ἀλλὰ ϲτέργειν μάλιϲτα.
> (Hdt. 7.104.2)

> (I knew I would provoke your displeasure, but when asked I sim-
> ply told the truth about the Spartans.) Mind you, you know all too
> well yourself how much I am in my present situation devoted to
> them: they took away my honour and my family possessions, and
> made me a landless fugitive; it was your father who took me in and
> gave me a living and a place to live. Well, it is hardly likely that a
> ϲώφρων man will push aside the favours granted him; on the con-
> trary, he will cherish them.

On the surface, Demaratus reassures Xerxes of his loyalty to the
Persians rather than the Spartans, and suggests that he would
not be ϲώφρων if he still adhered to those who banished him: a
clear case of prudence in one's own interest. But again, the pub-
lic will be aware that Demaratus' admonitions show that he is
indeed ϲώφρων in a more far-reaching sense, whereas Xerxes,
who does not act on the Spartan's advice, is not.

The remaining two instances relate to a tyrant who is downright
mad.[7] ϲωφρονεῖν is here used to describe a normal, sound state of

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[7] The 'mad tyrant' is itself something of a prototypical figure in Herodotus,
see Hartog (1980) 330ff, and cf. Fisher (1992) 360-5.

mind as opposed to the long-term mental derangement of Cam-
byses, who went mad after killing the sacred bull of Apis (3.30
Καμβύϲηϲ δὲ ὡϲ λέγουϲι Αἰγύπτιοι αὐτίκα διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀδίκημα
ἐμάνη, ἐὼν οὐδὲ πρότερον φρενήρηϲ. 'Cambyses is said by the
Egyptians to have fallen mad immediately after because of this
crime. Before, he was not very stable-minded either'). Cambyses
does not recover until he receives the predicted mortal wound
he has desperately tried to escape:

> καὶ δὴ ὡϲ τότε ἐπειρόμενοϲ ἐπύθετο τῆϲ πόλιοϲ τὸ οὔνομα, ὑπὸ τῆϲ
> ϲυμφορῆϲ τῆϲ τε ἐκ τοῦ μάγου ἐκπεπληγμένοϲ καὶ τοῦ τρώματοϲ
> ἐϲωφρόνηϲε, ϲυλλαβὼν δὲ τὸ θεοπρόπιον εἶπε· "ἐνθαῦτα Καμβύϲην
> τὸν Κύρου ἐϲτὶ πεπρωμένον τελευτᾶν."
> (Hdt. 3.64.5)

> And, as you can imagine, when he then inquired and heard the
> name of the town, he was knocked over by the misfortune caused
> by the *magos* and by his wounds, and because of the shock, he be-
> came ϲώφρων again. He understood the oracle and said: Here
> Cambyses, son of Cyrus, is fated to die.

Now Herodotus has made it very clear that Cambyses' madness
caused him to commit a great number of crimes (treated at
length in 3.27-38), but the term ϲωφρονεῖν focuses here on his
newly-gained state of mental health, without explicitly addressing
the moral consequences of this 'madness'.

    This is even more clear from 3.35.2, where Persian rumours
about his madness and alcoholic proclivities have come through
to the king, who immediately knows a means to put these ru-
mours to the test:

> τούτων δὴ ὦν ἐπιμνηϲθέντα ὀργῆι λέγειν πρὸϲ τὸν Πρηξάϲπεα· "ϲύ
> νυν μάθε [αὐτὸϲ] εἰ λέγουϲι Πέρϲαι ἀληθέα εἴτε αὐτοὶ λέγοντεϲ ταῦτα
> παραφρονέουϲι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παιδὸϲ τοῦ ϲοῦ τοῦδε ἐϲτεῶτοϲ ἐν
> τοῖϲι προθύροιϲι βαλὼν τύχοιμι μέϲηϲ τῆϲ καρδίηϲ, Πέρϲαι
> φανέονται λέγοντεϲ οὐδέν· ἢν δὲ ἁμάρτω, φάναι Πέρϲαϲ τε λέγειν
> ἀληθέα καὶ ἐμὲ μὴ ϲωφρονέειν."
> (Hdt. 3.35.1-2)

> After mentioning these things, he said angrily to Prexaspes: Now
> see for yourself if the Persians are right or if they themselves are
> out of their mind (*paraphroneousi*, to 'think off the mark') to say
> so. I will aim at this son of yours who stands at the gateway, and if
> hit him in the middle of his heart, it will appear that they talk

rubbish. But if I miss, then you may say that the Persians are right and that I am not *cώφρων*.

As the contrast with *αὐτοὶ λέγοντες ταῦτα παραφρονέουσι* ('they are utterly wrong to say so') shows, it is only the state of mental derangement which Cambyses here conditionally accepts. The moral issues connected with his madness are, again, not addressed directly, but they are immediately clear from the context: the irony of the situation is that what Cambyses considers proof of his own sobriety and sanity, in fact constitutes a further crime to prove him mad.

Thus, in all these instances, the use of *cώφρων* and *cωφρονεῖν* subtly contributes to the portrayal of the oriental kings as figures who do not care for, and crucially lack, *cωφροσύνη*, with far-reaching consequences.

The perverse application of *cωφροσύνη* by Cambyses, committing an atrocity as 'proof' of his sanity, is foreshadowed early in the *Histories*, when the narrator describes the Persian view on the origins of the conflict between Hellas and Persia. *cωφροσύνη* is invoked here by the Persians to push aside the Greeks' justification of the expedition to Troy. On this view, the abduction of Helen should have provoked a counter-abduction at most, but never the 'disproportional' reaction of a military campaign.

> τὸ μέν νυν ἁρπάζειν γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν ἀδίκων νομίζειν ἔργον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἁρπασθεισέων σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι τιμωρέειν ἀνοήτων, τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ὤρην ἔχειν ἁρπασθεισέων cωφρόνων· δῆλα γὰρ δὴ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ αὐταὶ ἐβούλοντο, οὐκ ἂν ἡρπάζοντο. cφέας μὲν δὴ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης λέγουσι Πέρσαι ἁρπαζομένων τῶν γυναικῶν λόγον οὐδένα ποιήσασθαι, Ἕλληνας δὲ Λακεδαιμονίης εἵνεκεν γυναικὸς στόλον μέγαν συναγεῖραι καὶ ἔπειτα ἐλθόντας ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην τὴν Πριάμου δύναμιν κατελεῖν. ἀπὸ τούτου αἰεὶ ἡγήσασθαι τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν σφίσι εἶναι πολέμιον.
> (Hdt. 1.4.2-3)

Now abducting women, they consider, is the behaviour of unjust men, but to make serious work of taking revenge for the abducted is something for the foolish; by contrast, not to care for the abducted is a characteristic of *cώφρονες*. For it is clear that, unless these women were willing themselves, they would not have been abducted. Now according to the Persians, they themselves, the people of Asia, have never made a fuss about the women that were

abducted, but the Greeks gathered an immense army for the sake
of a Spartan woman, and then went over to Asia to crush the
power of Priam. Ever since, they have regarded all that is Greek as
inimical to them.

Of course the justification of the Greek cause is not entirely de-
nied here (the Persian accounts at least grant that abduction is
an 'injustice' mutually committed by both Greeks and Persians)
but it is pushed aside by the consideration that it makes no sense
to make a great fuss about such an injustice.[8] For, the reasoning
goes, an abducted woman is not a victim but a willing accom-
plice. That is why setting up a military expedition for the sake of
such a woman makes no sense, and one has only oneself to
blame for the hazards and hardships that go with it. Moreover,
revenge for the rape of Helen cannot be taken seriously on this
count as a motivation for the Trojan war, which now becomes an
act of unwarranted aggression that justifies the perennial enmity
between the states.

Now there can be no doubt that, from a Greek point of view,
the reasoning here is perverse. Rape inflicts $\dot{a}\tau\iota\mu\dot{\iota}a$ on the de-
prived husband, and it is out of the question that doing nothing
about a dishonouring insult is commended as evidence of good
sense. The Persian account is thus utterly suspect, for it wilfully
puts aside all moral considerations. As such, it gives evidence of
Persian 'arrogance'; the Greek public is bound to conclude that
it is the Persians rather than the Greeks who lack $c\omega\phi\rhooc\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ and
are to blame for the big clash between the two cultures.

To summarise, Herodotus' use of $c\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu$ and cognates is re-
markable for the light it sheds on the characterisation of the ori-
ental kings who crucially lack the virtue. Subliminally, there are
perhaps a few hints as well that $c\omega\phi\rhooc\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ is a Greek rather than
a Persian quality: this is most clear from the last passage quoted
(1.4.3); elsewhere, $c\omega\phi\rhooc\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$ in oriental settings only belongs to
those prudent oriental $c\upsilon\mu\beta\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau a\acute{\iota}$ who will seem sympathetic

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[8] Heath (1990), 385-400, investigates a number of speeches by Athenians in
Thucydides, where considerations of justice are pushed aside, and concludes
from external evidence that to a fifth-century readership, it was unacceptable to
do. So it seems reasonable to suppose that the 'immorality' of the Persian
argument must also be immediately obvious to Herodotus' public.

to a Greek addressee. (One of them, Demaratus, is of course in-
deed Greek.) We will return to the problem of the 'hybristic'
temper, and its antithesis to ϲωφροϲύνη, in discussing the psy-
chology of Plato.

3. *Thucydides*

Herodotus used ϲώφρων and ϲωφρονεῖν to characterise individu-
als, specifically a number of oriental despots (who typically lack
the virtue) and their more sensible advisers (who have this qual-
ity). Thucydides, by contrast, focuses on πόλειϲ as collective bod-
ies, and uses the terms almost exclusively in characterisations of
the internal or external policy of a πόλιϲ as a whole.[9] The collec-
tive body of a πόλιϲ is, to a considerable degree, presented as an
autonomous entity, and as such, the moral obligations ascribed
to a πόλιϲ resemble those of the individual male citizen within
the πόλιϲ, but on a grander scale: where the citizen will have to
take good care of his household, but in such a way that he will
help his φίλοι, and will not wrong those who are not his ἐχθροί,
the πόλιϲ as a whole is primarily concerned with the careful
management of its own affairs (in this respect, considerations of
prudence and self-interest are key factors that determine the be-
haviour of a ϲώφρων πόλιϲ), but it also has clear obligations to-
wards its allies.

   In debates on external politics (section 3.1), ϲωφροϲύνη is
regularly invoked to commend a cautious policy in preference to
one that is perceived as more outgoing and risky: the safety of
the πόλιϲ itself is ostensibly the most important consideration
here. On a rather similar line of argumentation, ϲωφροϲύνη may
also be used to advocate a more 'positive' line of action, notably
the formation of an alliance that (allegedly) aims at self-defence
rather than military aggression. In debates on the internal poli-
tics of a πόλιϲ, ϲωφροϲύνη is used to comment on the process of
deliberation in the city council. Here, it is invoked both by

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   [9] An apparent exception is the characterisation of Archidamus as an ἀνὴρ
καὶ ξυνετὸϲ δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ ϲώφρων, see p. 210 n. 19 below.

speakers who plead for a careful (re)consideration of the issues at hand (εὐβουλία) and by those who wish to cut short such deliberations, and simply demand 'order' and 'obedience' to earlier decisions (εὐνομία). The debate between Cleon and Diodotus in book three juxtaposes the two types of argument.

All political associations of cωφροcύνη come together in the great debate at Sparta between Archidamus and Sthenelaïdas in book one (section 3.2). The ideology of cωφροcύνη seems to have been important to Sparta, and Archidamus offers the fullest exposition of the ideology of cωφροcύνη when defending the Spartans' 'slowness' to go to war. Archidamus is countered, however, by Sthenelaïdas, who also appeals to cωφροcύνη when reminding the Spartans of their obligations to Corinth.

If cωφροcύνη is something of a 'Spartan' quality, it is also embraced by pro-Spartan Athenians. In Athens, cωφροcύνη becomes a slogan of those in favour of restrictions on radical democracy (section 3.3).

Thus, it is a limited number of types of policies — and invariably those wherein a certain kind of 'restraint' can be perceived — that come in for appraisal in terms of cωφροcύνη; but it is a very different question whether a certain policy calls for praise at all or is to be severely criticised instead. On such matters, there is bound to be considerable disagreement between opposing parties, and Thucydides is sensitive throughout to the adaptability of value terms in the service of persuasive and manipulative strategies. With the exception of the author's remark on the cωφροcύνη of the Chians and Spartans (8.24), all the uses of our terms reflect the point of view of one or more agents in the historical narrative; as such, they are used virtually everywhere in service of clearly discernible persuasive strategies. The extreme case of this, where persuasive use shades into sheer abuse, is of course found in the chapter on the corruption of values after the revolt at Corcyra (3.82, see section 3.4). But the 'perversion' of moral standards described there is no more than an intensification of the 'normal' situation in the *Histories*: throughout, it is evident that one and the same situation is likely to be evaluated by different parties in entirely different terms.

3.1. cωφροϲύνη *in External and Internal Politics*

Given that the *Histories* tell the story of Greek πόλειϲ at war, it is perhaps no surprise that cωφροϲύνη is most frequently invoked to commend caution in foreign affairs, and our terms occur frequently where it is debated whether such caution is indeed the policy to be adopted. A case in point is the very first instance of cωφροϲύνη in the *Histories*, where the citizens of Corcyra, who previously were reluctant to accept any state as their allies, now seek the help of the Athenians against Corinth. They suggest that their isolationism, originally motivated by the desire to prevent involvement in the conflicts of others, and as such a fairly typical case of 'prudential' caution and thus of cωφροϲύνη,[10] turns out to be an ill-considered and weakening policy now that they stand alone in their conflict with the Corinthians:

> καὶ περιέϲτηκεν ἡ δοκοῦϲα ἡμῶν πρότερον cωφροϲύνη, τὸ μὴ ἐν ἀλλοτρίαι ξυμμαχίαι τῆι τοῦ πέλαϲ γνώμηι ξυγκινδυνεύειν, νῦν ἀβουλία καὶ ἀϲθένεια φαινομένη.
> (Th. 1.32.4)

> And it has turned out that what once seemed to be our cωφροϲύνη, not to involve ourselves in alliances with other states lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of our neighbour's making, appears in fact to be lack of deliberation and weakness.

According to the citizens of Corcyra, their isolationism now disqualifies as cωφροϲύνη because of its effects: their isolationism turns out to be weakness and a threat to their city. For their Corinthian opponents, this policy of the citizens of Corcyra does not qualify for the label of cωφροϲύνη at all, but on account of its *intentions* rather than its *effects*. According to the Corinthians, the citizens of Corcyra refused to form any alliance not for the sake of their safety and out of 'prudence' (1.37.2 διὰ τὸ ϲῶφρον), but because they wanted a free hand to commit injustice (ἐπὶ

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[10] Hornblower (1991) ad loc., cites Dover (1974) 119 who states that the criterion for cωφροϲύνη is 'the overcoming of the impulse to immediate or short-term pleasure or gain'. In most contexts, it is the avoidance of long-term risks rather than resistance to short-term pleasure that is really relevant to the prudential use of cωφροϲύνη, as is the case here. A 'persuasive' connection between the two is made by Archidamus in 1.84.2 (see section 3.2 below).

κακουργίαι) against their neighbours; Corcyra's isolationism
meant a licence to harm others. It is up to the Athenians, the
Corinthians suggest, to show *genuine* prudence for the sake of
the safety of their city: if they do so (1.40.2 εἰ cωφρονοῦcι), they
will not accept now an ally who is bound to involve them in a
conflict with the mightier city of Corinth, but they will rather
consider it prudent (1.42.2 cῶφρον) to alleviate the already exist-
ing tensions between Athens and Corinth.

In these cases, then, cωφροcύνη in external affairs clearly aims
at the self-interest of its citizens: it promotes the safety of the
πόλιc and deters intervention abroad that may involve cities in
great risks. These considerations are the main points in most
contexts where speakers plead for cωφροcύνη in external af-
fairs.[11] If this type of cωφροcύνη is typically concerned with the
avoidance of a dangerous policy, it can occasionally also encour-
age more positive action, notably the formation of a defensive
alliance against a large external threat. In this sense, cωφροcύνη

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[11] Thus, a Spartan embassy invokes cωφροcύνη to remind the Athenians of
the instabilty of fortune, in order to make them accept negotiations over the
captives at Pylos rather than continuing the hostilities (4.18.4); more cynically,
the Athenians suggest to the Melians that open resistance to Athens is not
cῶφρον and that abstention from open hostilities is, for the Melians, a means to
limit the damage (5.101.1, 5.111.3).

In the Sicilian context, the Syracusans suggest to the citizens of Camarina
that is unrealistic to hope both that Syracuse will be defeated in order that it
may become less prone to external aggression (6.78.2 ἵνα cωφρονιcθῶμεν), and
at the same time that the city may yet be spared in order to defend others
against Athens.

To discourage the Camarineans from an alliance with Athens, the Syracusan
messengers invoke the example of Rhegion, a city which refused to help the
Leontinians against Syracuse, in spite of their common Euboian origin; this,
the ambassadors suggest, is the paradoxical phenomenon of 'prudence-against-
the-odds' (6.79.4 ἀλόγωc cωφρονοῦcιν), the innuendo being that the
Camarineans have all the more reason to refrain from anti-Syracusan activities.
In reply to this, the Athenians suggest that Athens is not in need of criticism by
the Camarineans of Athens' interventionist foreign policy: Athens does not
need them as cωφρονιcταί, as critics encouraging restraint (6.87.3); for, the
Athenians claim, it is the mere prospect of Athenian intervention that deters
other cities from aggression and forces them to be prudent, while non-
interventionist cities gain their safety from Athens (6.87.5, ἀμφότεροι
ἀναγκάζονται ὁ μὲν ἄκων cωφρονεῖν, ὁ δ' ἀπραγμόνωc cώιζεcθαι, 'both are forced,
the one to be prudent against his will, the other to use his policy of non-
intervention as a means to safety').

is repeatedly invoked by those who advocate the formation of a Sicilian alliance against Athens (4.60.1, 4.61.1, 4.64.4).[12]

A more overtly moral appeal is made after the capitulation of Plataea by the spokesmen of that city to their Spartan judges.[13] The Plataeans plead that their alliance with Athens was only made after a Spartan refusal to help them against Thebes (3.55.1); as such, this alliance was not a deed of aggression against Sparta, and certainly not severe enough to outweigh the Plataean merits in the Persian wars: the Plataeans claim that they are not enemies to the Spartans, but friends who had no other choice but to fight (3.58.2, οὐκ ἐχθρούς... ἀλλ᾽ εὔνους κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην πολεμήσαντες, 'we are not enemies but sympathisers who were forced to wage war'). And since there is no enmity between the two cities, they argue, it would be an unwarranted deed of aggression for the Spartans to kill them. The Spartans should not do this to gratify their Theban allies; they should do the Thebans a favour that is cώφρων rather than shameful (3.58.1 cώφρονά τε ἀντὶ αἰcχρᾶc κομίcαcθαι χάριν), for killing the Plataeans would constitute a sin against the conventions of war to kill those who deliver themselves freely (3.58.3), and besides, the Spartans would be responsible for the fact that the graves of their ancestors who fought Plataea would be left untended (3.58.4). The Spartans should deal with Plataea in a spirit of 'sensible compassion' (3.59.1 οἴκτωι cώφρονι) rather than unwarranted aggression.

Here, then, the appeal is to the unwritten moral code of international politics, that prohibits violence against a state that is not openly hostile. The Plataean evidence of their 'friendship' to the Spartans is evidently tenuous (the Persian wars of decades ago seem to be the strongest case in point), and it is clear that the Plataeans argue in these moral terms (even invoking the Spartans' sense of duty towards their ancestors) mainly because they cannot very well argue that it is in any sense in the present interest of Sparta to show lenience: their plea is expectedly un-

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[13] For the speech of the inhabitants of Plataea, see Macleod (1977) 227-46 [= id. (1983) 103-139]. Hogan (1972) draws attention to the importance in this speech of the appeal to οἶκτος, with interesting parallels from E. Hec.

successful and the narrator leaves no doubt that the Spartan cru-
elty against Plataea was motivated by the consideration that the
Thebans were useful allies in the war against Athens (3.68.4).

Turning now to the field of the internal affairs of a πόλις, we
find that cωφροcύνη is invoked in the context of two types of ar-
guments. Occasionally, the term is employed by speakers who
claim that careful deliberation is the key to the management of
the city's affairs. This is another use of cωφροcύνη in a prudential
sense, this time with reference to internal politics, and closely
associated with the concept of εὐβουλία. Alternatively, the term
is employed by speakers who are less in favour of an open discus-
son, and simply urge obedience of the city's νόμοι. (In section
3.2 below, we will see how Archidamus connects the two, and
presents obedience to the laws as the safeguard of Spartan
εὐβουλία.)

The clash between these two uses of cωφροcύνη is illustrated
by the second Athenian debate on the punishment of Mytilene.
Here, it is Cleon who, in his argumentation against a revision of
the council's decision, uses the argument that, if Athens seri-
ously aspires to dominate an empire, the city's νόμοι are to be
respected at all costs:

> πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῖν μηδὲν καθεστήξει ὧν ἂν δόξῃι
> πέρι, μηδὲ γνωcόμεθα ὅτι χείροcι νόμοιc ἀκινήτοιc χρωμένη πόλιc
> κρείccων ἐcτὶν ἢ καλῶc ἔχουcιν ἀκύροιc, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ cωφροcύνηc
> ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότηc μετὰ ἀκολαcίαc, οἵ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν
> ἀνθρώπων πρὸc τοὺc ξυνετωτέρουc ὡc ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον ἄμεινον οἰκοῦcι
> τὰc πόλειc.
> (Th. 3.37.3)

> But it is most extremely disturbing if nothing that we decide on
> will stand firm, and if we do not realise that a city that maintains
> *nomoi* that are less good but unchallenged is stronger than one
> that has good *nomoi* that lack authority; we must be aware that a
> lack of sophistication that goes with cωφροcύνη is rather more use-
> ful than dexterity without discipline; simple people generally
> achieve, in comparison to more intelligent ones, a better admini-
> stration of their cities.

Cleon wishes to prevent reconsideration of the expedition
against Mytilene, and in order to prevent this, he suggests that it

is ϲωφροϲύνη simply to obey the νόμοι.[14] The argument against
the dangers of excessive sophistication (used by Archidamus in
the conservative setting of Sparta, see section 3.2), is employed
in the democratic setting by the demagogue Cleon to silence his
elitist opponents. In the course of this argument, Cleon manages
to turn 'ignorance' (ἀμαθία) into an asset, and the 'agility' (δε-
ξιότηϲ) of the elite into a liability, for it may, he suggests, hide
corruption (ἀκολαϲία); for Cleon, ϲωφροϲύνη is firmly on the side
of the 'law-abiding' masses rather than on that of the 'subversive'
elite.[15]

   Cleon's opponent, Diodotus, argues in favour of a renewed
debate on Mytilene and deliberately ignores the strategy of in-
timidation ('don't you dare think again') employed by Cleon.
He places full emphasis on the self-interest of the Athenian
council, and stresses the importance of εὐβουλία. This εὐβουλία,
Diodotus suggests, is incompatible with the rashness and excit-
ability (3.42.1 τάχοϲ τε καὶ ὀργήν) now displayed and advocated
by Cleon. What is worse, when Cleon accuses his opponents of
corruption, he threatens to rob the city of good advisors. For
useful counsellors of a πόλιϲ should be able to speak freely with-
out fear for their reputation:

> χρή ... τὴν δὲ ϲώφρονα πόλιν τῶι τε πλεῖϲτα εὖ βουλεύοντι μὴ
> προϲτίθεναι τιμήν, ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἐλαϲϲοῦν τῆϲ ὑπαρχούϲηϲ, καὶ τὸν μὴ
> τυχόντα γνώμηϲ οὐχ ὅπωϲ ζημιοῦν ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἀτιμάζειν.
> (Th, 3.42.3)

> A ϲώφρων polis will neither add to, nor detract from, the timê of a
> man who is mostly successful in offering advice; and a speaker
> who does not meet with approval will not only not be punished by
> the city, neither will he suffer disgrace.

This care for integrity is, in Diodotus' view, all the more pressing
because the council is likely to hold their speakers responsible

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[14] There seems to have been no juridical distinction in the fifth century
between a νόμοϲ and a ψήφιϲμα, see Hornblower (1987) 423f. and (1991) 423,
Hansen (1978), even if a conceptual distinction was occasionally made, cf.
Macleod (1978), 69 [= (1983), 93].
   [15] For a discussion of the paradoxes in Cleon's argumentation, see Leppin
(1999) 93-4. For the ambiguity of δεξιότηϲ, usually suspect to the speakers in
Thucydides, see Meyer (1939) 70-1.

for the outcome of the policy on which it decides; if they were to hold themselves responsible, they would be more inclined to decide in a well-considered manner (3.43.5 cωφρονέcτερον ἂν ἐκρίνετε). Therefore, Diodotus concludes, the Athenians would be well-advised (3.44.1 εἰ cωφρονοῦμεν) to regard the present debate as one concerning the εὐβουλία of the πόλιc rather than the injustice of Mytilene.

Against Cleon's suggestion that the cώφρων πόλιc should rigidly stick to its own decisions, Diodotus places full emphasis on the cωφροcύνη of attending to good advice. Like Cleon, he seems aware of a strong contrast between the city's masses and the politicians who advise them, but in his representation of these matters, it is the elitist leaders rather than the masses who are especially vulnerable, in view of the fact that their reputation is easily damaged. Therefore, if the Athenian council is cώφρων and acts out of well-advised awareness of its own interest, it will not accept Cleon's incrimination of the city's political elite.[16]

Thus, we see that for a city state, cωφροcύνη consists in a limited number of typical policies. In external politics, cωφροcύνη commends caution for the sake of one's own safety, typically a non-interventionist policy or the formation of defensive alliance; occasionally, cωφροcύνη also serves as a reminder of one's moral obligations versus other states. In internal politics, cωφροcύνη is used to influence the process of deliberation, and either urges 'obedience' to the city's νόμοι as they are, or 'careful deliberation' before making a decision.

3.2. cωφροcύνη in Sparta

All the notions connected with cωφροcύνη in politics that we have noted above, are addressed in the great debate at Sparta on the issue of war against Athens between Archidamus and Sthenelaïdas. This episode does not only show how different parties

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[16] On the figure of Diodotus, otherwise unknown, see the remarks of Hornblower (1991) ad 3.41. Ostwald (1979) construes a fuller career for him, but, as Hornblower remarks, 'It is artistically satisfying to have the famous and raucous Cleon defeated on his own terms by an utterly obscure figure who then retires into the shades.'

tend to evaluate one and the same policy in entirely different terms, and how both Spartan speakers invoke ϲωφροϲύνη in defence of an entirely different policy; it also offers a very full statement of the ideology of a ϲώφρων πόλιϲ as advocated by the Spartan king Archidamus, in which he manages to combine virtually all ideas connected with political ϲωφροϲύνη, and present this amalgam as a typically Spartan asset.

The main point of the debate is the Spartans' reluctance to intervene against Athens on behalf of their allies. The Corinthians, who of course intend to spur their allies, grant the Spartans ϲωφροϲύνη on the rather irrelevant point of internal politics (1.68.1 καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ [sc. τὸ πιϲτὸν ... τῆϲ καθ' ὑμᾶϲ αὐτοὺϲ πολιτείαϲ] ϲωφροϲύνην μὲν ἔχετε, 'in view of the stability of your own state, you possess ϲωφροϲύνη), but then go on immediately to suggest that this introverted position also leads to lack of understanding (ἀμαθία, 1.68.1) of external affairs, especially the danger Athens constitutes. This 'lack of perception' (cf. 1.69.3 τὸ ἀναιϲθητὸν ὑμῶν) leads to 'sluggishness' and 'conservatism',[17] and to the failure of the Spartans to intervene on behalf of their wronged allies (1.68.3, 1.71.4-7). And the Corinthians stress that these characteristics are extraordinarily dangerous because the Athenians posses all the opposite, out-going and aggressive qualities.

Later on, before the Peloponnesian council, the Corinthians take a similar position. Having won over the Spartans to their side, they now try to consolidate the rest of the alliance, and state that

> ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ϲωφρόνων μέν ἐϲτιν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖντο, ἡϲυχάζειν, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἀδικουμένουϲ ἐκ μὲν εἰρήνηϲ πολεμεῖν, εὖ δὲ παραϲχὸν ἐκ πολέμου

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[17] 1.69.4 ἡϲυχάζετε ... οὐ τῆι δυνάμει τινά, ἀλλὰ τῆι μελλήϲει ἀμυνόμενοι, 'you remain inactive, defending yourselves against others not by means of your power, but by your slowness to actually use it'; 1.70.2, 'ὑμεῖϲ δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ϲώιζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν καὶ ἔργωι οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέϲθαι, 'you are prone to keep what you have got, to think of nothing new, and in action never even to go as far as necessary'; 1.70.4 καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸϲ ὑμᾶϲ μελλητάϲ, 'and mind you, they have no doubts, whereas you always linger'; 1.71.1 διαμέλλετε, 'you continue to delay'; 1.71.3 ἀρχαιοτροπὰ ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, 'your actions are outdated'; 1.71.4 βραδύτηϲ, 'slowness'.

πάλιν ξυμβῆναι, καὶ μήτε τῆι κατὰ πόλεμον εὐτυχίαι ἐπαίρεσθαι
μήτε τῶι ἡσύχωι τῆς εἰρήνης ἡδόμενον ἀδικεῖσθαι.
(Th. 1.120.4)

> It belongs to men who are σώφρονες to keep quiet if they suffer no
> injustice, but to *agathoi* to put and end to peace and go to war if
> they are wronged, and then, when a suitable opportunity arises, to
> stop the war and come to an agreement. They are neither carried
> away by their successes in warfare, nor do they allow themselves to
> suffer injustice because they delight in the tranquillity of peace.

This is essentially the same argumentation: a peaceful foreign
policy is fine when one does not suffer injustice; in such circum-
stances, it is the typical behaviour of σώφρονες to keep quiet; but
when one suffers injustice, restraint is not in demand (and
σωφροσύνη does no longer apply): in such circumstances, it takes
ἀρετή to go to war. In order to make the war more palatable to
their allies, the Corinthians now downplay its time scale and in-
tensity (to the Spartans, they had stressed the threat from Athens
in order to spur them on); otherwise, however, they make it
equally clear that it is now no real option to do nothing and
dress that up as σωφροσύνη.[18]

When the Spartans come to debate the Corinthian demands for
action against Athens, their own views are divided. Caution is
urged by king Archidamus, of whom the narrator states that he
had a reputation for being both 'intelligent' and σώφρων (1.79.2
ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων)[19] and who is thus estab-

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[18] As we have seen, the appeal to σωφροσύνη ('prudence') is often a
perfectly acceptable strategy for those who *do* wish to prevent military actions.
Speakers seem to have opposing types of arguments at their disposal, according
to the position they wish to defend. See Roisman (2003) 132-6, for different
types of appeals to *andreia* in arguments for peace and war.

[19] Therewith, Archidamus is the only individual to whom the term σώφρων
is applied in Thucydides, cf. Badian (1990) 173n.39. In view of the contents of
his speech, it is clear that the point of this remark lies in Archidamus' view on
Sparta's internal and foreign politics; in this respect, we have the same
'political' usage here.

Incidentally, it is to be noted that remark on Archidamus, ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνετὸς
δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων (1.79.2), does not represent the point of view of the
narrator, but that of the Spartans. It is not implied that the narrator considers
Archidamus to be an exceptionally good leader: for all his renown for
σωφροσύνη and intelligence, his leadership is not presented in the *Histories* as

lished as someone who is unlikely, in view of his intelligence, to be completely insensitive to the Corinthian demands, yet equally unlikely, in view of his very Spartan ϲωφροϲύνη, to react strongly to them. Archidamus indeed pleads for a combination of negotiations and preparations for war. He then counters the Corinthian attack on Spartan slowness, without denying any of the actual charges, but by suggesting that they are to be viewed in entirely different terms:

καὶ τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον, ὃ μέμφονται μάλιϲτα ἡμῶν, μὴ αἰϲχύνεϲθε. ϲπεύδοντέϲ τε γὰρ ϲχολαίτερον ἂν παύϲαιϲθε διὰ τὸ ἀπαράϲκευοι ἐγχειρεῖν, καὶ ἅμα ἐλευθέραν καὶ εὐδοξοτάτην πόλιν διὰ παντὸϲ νεμόμεθα. (2) καὶ δύναται μάλιϲτα ϲωφροϲύνη ἔμφρων τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι· μόνοι γὰρ δι᾽ αὐτὸ εὐπραγίαιϲ τε οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν καὶ ξυμφοραῖϲ ἧϲϲον ἑτέρων εἴκομεν· τῶν τε ξὺν ἐπαίνωι ἐξοτρυνόντων ἡμᾶϲ ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐπαιρόμεθα ἡδονῆι, καὶ ἤν τιϲ ἄρα ξὺν κατηγορίαι παροξύνηι, οὐδὲν δὴ μᾶλλον ἀχθεϲθέντεϲ ἀνεπείϲθημεν. (3) πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὔβουλοι διὰ τὸ εὔκοϲμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὅτι αἰδὼϲ ϲωφροϲύνηϲ πλεῖϲτον μετέχει, αἰϲχύνηϲ δὲ εὐψυχία, εὔβουλοι δὲ ἀμαθέϲτερον τῶν νόμων τῆϲ ὑπεροψίαϲ παιδευόμενοι καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι ϲωφρονέϲτερον ἢ ὥϲτε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουϲτεῖν, καὶ μὴ τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντεϲ τὰϲ τῶν πολεμίων παραϲκευὰϲ λόγωι καλῶϲ μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίωϲ ἔργωι ἐπεξιέναι, νομίζειν δὲ τάϲ τε διανοίαϲ τῶν πέλαϲ παραπληϲίουϲ εἶναι καὶ τὰϲ προϲπιπτούϲαϲ τύχαϲ οὐ λόγωι διαιρετάϲ.
(Th. 1.84.1-3)

And as to our being slow and hesitant, that which they criticise most in us, do not be ashamed at that. For if you hurry, you may well take more time to finish because of ill preparations. At the same time, it is also true that we have always lived in a free and respected city. This quality may in fact well be sensible ϲωφροϲύνη: for we are the only ones who do not become arrogant when we have success, and are less than others inclined to give in when we suffer misfortune. If people praise us in order to incite us to take risks against our own good judgement, we are not carried away by pleasure; and if someone uses ugly words in order to spur us on, we are — of course — not any more inclined to give in out of annoyance.

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especially far-sighted or successful. See Westlake (1968) 122-35, and Pelling (1991). A more positive estimation of Archidamus is given by Bloedow (1983) 27-49.

> We are both warlike and well-advised on account of our orderli-
> ness. We are warlike because αἰδώς is rooted in cωφροcύνη, and
> courage in a sense of shame; we are well-advised because by edu-
> cation we are not sufficiently sophisticated to know better than
> our laws, and the severity of our upbringing leads to too much
> cωφροcύνη to disobey them. We are not unduly clever in useless
> matters, so that we might verbally criticise the preparations of our
> adversaries well, but fail to stand up against them when it comes
> to action. No, we take it that the intentions of other people are
> rather like our own, and that the quirks of chance are impossible
> to determine by calculation.

Archidamus starts by countering the Corinthians' accusation of
sluggishness. He suggests that the Spartans have every reason to
be proud of their city, and claims that the Spartan slowness in
going to war is not unacceptable sluggishness, but far rather well-
considered prudence (1.79.2 cωφροcύνη ἔμφρων). The very same
caution in external affairs that was criticised by the Corinthians is
now praised in the most emphatic terms. But Archidamus goes
on to corroborate his view on the good sides of Spartan restraint
by stressing other aspects of the Spartan πολιτεία that can be
viewed in terms of cωφροcύνη; in the process, he gives as com-
plete an ideology of political cωφροcύνη as one is likely to get.

   According to Archidamus (§ 4), the cωφροcύνη of the Spartans
also entails constancy in fortune and misfortune: the Spartans do
not abuse their power when successful (1.84.2, οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν),
and they are constant when suffering misfortune (ξυμφοραῖς
ἧccον ... εἴκομεν). According to Archidamus, this constancy
means that the Spartans do not allow themselves to be unduly
influenced by the pleasure of flattery and the pain of critique (1.
84. 2 τῶν τε ξὺν ἐπαίνωι ἐξοτρυνόντων ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ παρὰ τὸ
δοκοῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐπαιρόμεθα ἡδονῆι, καὶ ἤν τις ἄρα ξὺν κατηγορίαι
παροξύνηι, οὐδὲν δὴ μᾶλλον ἀχθεσθέντες ἀνεπείς-θημεν). The
prudence that had already been claimed to be the essence of the
Spartan reluctance to help their allies (note ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ and
παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν, which suggest that there are sound reasons
for remaining inactive) is now combined with resistance to ἡδονή
and ἄχθος, introducing the notion of cωφροcύνη as self-control.
Of course, the claim sounds like special pleading given the fact
that Archidamus' speech has the very aim of preventing the
Spartans form overreacting to the Corinthian criticisms.

In the next section (1.84.3), Archidamus counters the accusation that Sparta fails to stand up for her allies, and the suggestion that the city is not up to a confrontation with the aggressive and outgoing Athenians. Archidamus now invokes Spartan cωφροcύνη as a source of courage (εὐψυχία) and careful deliberation (εὐβουλία). The virtue is now linked, strikingly, to a 'warlike' attitude (πολεμικοὶ … γιγνόμεθα): cωφροcύνη in the sense of 'self-control' or orderliness (τὸ εὔκοcμον, a notion already well established in 1.84.2) is now regarded as a source of αἰδώc,[20] which in turn is considered a source of courage and martial prowess.[21] The connection between cωφροcύνη and martial courage, always difficult to establish and as such a recurrent concern for thinkers concerned with ethics,[22] is of course apposite to a context where Sparta has been charged with sluggishness: in 1.83.1, Archidamus is responding to Corinthian critique here, and presses a point that he has already made: that it is not ἀνανδρία not to attack immediately (1.83.1).

And to corroborate the view that the Spartans are well able to respond to challenges in an adequate manner, Archidamus stresses that they are well-advised (εὔβουλοι) because they are not clever enough to know better than their laws and too cώφρονεc to disobey them. This respect for their own laws (a point granted even by the Corinthians) is now said to lead to εὐβουλία (1.84.3) in external affairs, in as much as the Spartans are not so clever that they look down on their enemies, and hence do not run the risk of underestimating them.

Thus, Archidamus combines some well-established conceptual fields associated with cωφροcύνη, 'prudence' both in internal and external affairs, 'constancy' in success and ill-fortune and 'resistance' to pleasure and pain, and 'respect' for the laws; besides, he establishes one rather more tenuous link, that of

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[20] On the difficulties concerning the use of μετέχει in this passage, see Hornblower (1991) ad loc, and cf. Nussbaum (1986) 508n.24. As Nussbaum states, Thucydides is tracing εὐψυχία back via αἰδώc to cωφροcύνη, not the other way round.

[21] For the connection between αἰδώc and shame in battle, see Cairns (1993) 68-87 (Homer), 265-8 (Euripides), 420-2 (Aristotle's ethics).

[22] Hussey (1985) 123-4 specifically links the present passage to the thought of Democritus.

ϲωφροϲύνη with martial courage; out of all this he construes an elaborate defence of Sparta against the charge that the Spartans let their allies down.

Does this speech mean that, in the *Histories*, ϲωφροϲύνη is established as a typically Spartan quality, in contrast to the more outgoing nature of the radical democracy at Athens?[23] It seems unmistakable that ϲωφροϲύνη is an important value at Sparta: Archidamus' speech centres on the contention that Sparta's policy is not shameful sluggishness but well-considered ϲωφροϲύνη. And it is striking to see that his opponent Sthenelaïdas, who wins the day, also appeals to ϲωφροϲύνη when he suggests that the Spartans simply should not let their enemies down if they are ϲώφρονεϲ (1.86.2 ἢν ϲωφρονῶμεν). This seems to suggest that, though the Spartans obviously do not all share Archidamus' very defensive view of the virtue,[24] ϲωφροϲύνη is important to them, and the appeal to the virtue seems, in Sparta, to be a powerful rhetorical tool.

On a number of occasions, indeed, we see that foreigners also tend to appeal to ϲωφροϲύνη when pleading with the Spartans. One example are the citizens of Plataea who plead for their own lives (see section 3.1 above). Another example occurs in the same debate, when the Thebans defend themselves against the charge of taking sides with the Persians, by pointing out that Thebes was, at the time, neither a democracy, nor a moderate constitutional oligarchy after the Spartan model (an ὀλιγαρχία ἰϲόνομοϲ, 3.62.3), in which a certain measure of wealth is the condition for enjoying full political rights, nor a democracy, but a near-tyranny of a dynasty of very few men (δυναϲτεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν, 3.62.3). This kind of government, they claim, is 'utterly opposed to laws and what is most sensible, and closest to tyranny' (νόμοιϲ μὲν καὶ τῶι ϲωφρονεϲτάτωι ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τυράννου, 3.62.1). Here then, is an implicit compliment on the ϲωφροϲύνη of the Spartan constitution, and unsurprisingly, the Thebans leave no doubt that in their view it is indeed oligarchy

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[23] North (1966) 102-4. Edmunds (1975) 76-9 also argues that Thucydides' use of ϲώφρων betrays oligarchic or Spartan sympathies.

[24] For the resemblance of Archidamus to the wise and unheeded warners in Herodotus, see Pelling (1991) and Bischoff (1962).

rather than democracy which qualifies for this predicate. This happens when they implausibly claim that they did not actually occupy Plataea, but were asked in by the local aristocrats, who aimed at closer proximity to the oligarchic Boeotians elsewhere, and accordingly are described as ϲωφρονιϲταί (3.68.3) of their city: here, the stereotype of the ϲώφρων aristocracy, as opposed to ill-considered or rash democracy is invoked. This stereotype will further concern us in connection with the oligarchic reforms in 411 at Athens (see section 3.3 below).

There is even one passage in which the narrator drops his mask of objectivity, and confirms that for him, too, the Spartans are exceptionally ϲώφρονεϲ. This is Thucydides' famous judgement on the Chians. The narrator praises the Chians for their exceptional quality of ϲωφροϲύνη in prosperity, a quality which they are said to have shared only with the politically and constitutionally utterly different city of Sparta.

> καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη οὐκέτι ἐπεξῇιϲαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν χώραν καλῶϲ κατεϲκευαϲμένην καὶ ἀπαθῆ οὖϲαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε διεπόρθηϲαν. Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίουϲ ὧν ἐγὼ ἠιϲθόμην ηὐδαιμόνηϲάν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐϲωφρόνηϲαν, καὶ ὅϲωι ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλιϲ αὐτοῖϲ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, τόϲωι δὲ καὶ ἐκοϲμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον. καὶ οὐδ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπόϲταϲιν, εἰ τοῦτο δοκοῦϲι παρὰ τὸ ἀϲφαλέϲτερον πρᾶξαι, πρότερον ἐτόλμηϲαν ποιήϲαϲθαι ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων ἔμελλον ξυγκινδυνεύϲειν καὶ τοὺϲ Ἀθηναίουϲ ἠιϲθάνοντο οὐδ' αὐτοὺϲ ἀντιλέγονταϲ ἔτι μετὰ τὴν Ϲικελικὴν ξυμφορὰν ὡϲ οὐ πάνυ πόνηρα ϲφῶν [βεβαίωϲ] τὰ πράγματα εἴη.
> (Th. 8.24.3-5)

> After that, the Chians did not go out to meet them on the battlefield anymore, and the Athenians ravaged the country that was well-tended and had not suffered since the Persian wars. For as far as I am aware, the Chians were the only ones except for the Spartans to be both prosperous and ϲώφρονεϲ, and as their *polis* grew, they strained harder to keep it in good order. Even in the case of the present defection, when they may seem to have acted rather recklessly, they did not have the nerve to undertake it before they had many strong allies to take part in the venture, and before they saw that the Athenians themselves were, after the Sicilian disaster, no longer denying the utterly desperate state of their affairs.

As transpires from the context, the Chians' ϲωφροϲύνη is a combination of internal 'order' in the πόλιϲ (ἐκοϲμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον) and good caution in external affairs, which shows in the fact that

their land suffered no plundering armies for decades. But if they
are said to share these qualities with the Spartans, it has to be
kept in mind that this complimentary comparison is between the
general behaviour of the populations, not between their substan-
tially different constitutions. If the narrator here shows undeni-
able admiration for Sparta, this is not by any means an explicit
endorsement of the Spartan oligarchic constitution.[25] Up to that
point, the mask of objectivity remains intact.

It thus seems that we are indeed supposed to take it that
σωφροσύνη had a special appeal for Sparta, and that the author
thinks that the Spartans generally lived up to their ideology. The
link between σωφροσύνη and Spartan politics is confirmed by the
use of σωφροσύνη as a political slogan by Athenians in favour of
anti-democratic reforms after the Spartan model, as we will see
in the next section.

3.3. σωφροσύνη *as a Political Slogan in Athens*

In the last section, we saw how σωφροσύνη is an important value
in a constitutional oligarchy like Sparta. Likewise, σωφροσύνη in
Athens tended to be claimed as a distinctive ἀρετή by elitist citi-
zens who disapproved of the excesses of democracy and favoured
a modified, more 'moderate' form of government. Something of
this bias may already be present in the words of Diodotus in the
debate on Mytilene (see section 3.1 above), but the connection
becomes more clear in the debate on the expedition to Pylus.
There, the narrator states that Cleon's boastfulness was welcome
to the σώφρονες among the people (4.28.5 ἀσμένοις … ἐγίγνετο
τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων), who reckoned that they would ei-
ther beat the Spartans, or — even better — get rid of Cleon.
Now it is hardly an indication of σωφροσύνη for a πόλις to decide
on what seems a reckless undertaking in the hope that it may go
wrong, and τοῖς σώφροσι can hardly be an auctorial commenda-
tion of the 'prudence' of such cynical and even irresponsible

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[25] Cf. on this point Leppin (1999), 178. The passage is problematical for
those who take Thucydides' use of the term σώφρων as an unequivocal
indication of elitist/oligarchic sympathies, notably Edmunds (1975) 76-9, for
before 411, Chios was a democracy.

reasoning.[26] Moreover, the phrase τοῖϲ ϲώφροϲι τῶν ἀνθρώπων strongly suggests that Thucydides is thinking here of a more or less well-defined group of Cleon's opponents. The deliberate paradox of the ϲώφρονεϲ welcoming what looks like an utterly irresponsible decision, once again shows Thucydides' awareness of the ways in which slogans are prone to suffer abuse.

If the passage quoted above does indeed show that ϲωφροϲύνη tended to be claimed by the aristocratic opponents of the radical post-Periklean democracy, this tendency becomes much more evident after the Sicilian expedition, when the call for oligarchic reforms became much stronger. Thus at 8.53.3, Pisandrus states bluntly that Athens cannot hope to win the support of the Persian king, unless they adopt a 'more sensible' constitution and transfer all official posts to a limited number of people (εἰ μὴ πολιτεύϲομέν τε ϲωφρονέϲτερον καὶ ἐϲ ὀλίγουϲ μᾶλλον τὰϲ ἀρχὰϲ ποιήϲομεν). Here, ϲωφρονέϲτερον πολιτεύειν openly refers to 'founding an oligarchy'.

This use of ϲωφροϲύνη as a political slogan is soon adopted by the narrator, again in an utterly sarcastic mode, to underline the unintended effects of the regime of the Four Hundred. After the reforms at Athens, the Athenians proceed to found oligarchies everywhere among their allies, with the claim that they bring ϲωφροϲύνη. The cities, however, feel disinclined to accept the Athenian 'gift', and sense that they can now resist Athens without fear of retribution:

> ϲωφροϲύνην γὰρ λαβοῦϲαι αἱ πόλειϲ καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πραϲϲομένων ἐχώρηϲαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυϲ ἐλευθερίαν τῆϲ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίαϲ οὐ προτιμήϲαντεϲ.
> (Th. 8.64.5)

> As soon as the cities got ϲωφροϲύνη and the opportunity to act without risks of punishment, they went straight for outright independence, without appreciating the festering εὐνομία offered by the Athenians.

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[26] Cf. on this point Woodhead (1960), 314, Flower (1992), 56, and Leppin (1999), 177-8. North (1966) 111, and Coray (1993), 396, take τοῖϲ ϲώφροϲι in a politically neutral sense, and assumes that it refers in a neutral way to 'men of sense' (North), or the 'mentally superior' (Coray: 'die geistig Souveräneren').

Here, ϲωφροϲύνη is the 'moderate', oligarchic government Athens has now forced onto their allies; significantly, the term is once again associated with εὐνομία. But this εὐνομία is a sham. The allies do not appreciate the Athenian gift of ϲωφροϲύνη and refuse to act as obedient subjects. On the contrary, they now feel that they can act without fear of retribution (they have ἄδειαν τῶν πραϲϲομένων), reject the Athenian pretence of εὐνομία and go straight for independence. Once again, the author shows how established values lend themselves for manipulative treatment and can easily become hollow in the process.

Even if, in the last book of the *Histories*, ϲωφροϲύνη tends to become the special virtue of the Athenian oligarchs, the word is still by no means entirely monopolised by them. Thus the general Phrynichus, when predicting the allied states' lack of enthusiasm for the oligarchic reform, is able to claim that the Athenian δῆμοϲ acts as an ϲωφρονιϲτήϲ in that it restrains the severity of the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (8.48.7, for the term ϲωφρονιϲτήϲ, see chapter 9.4).

3.4. *The Chapter on* ϲτάϲιϲ

Throughout the earlier sections of this chapter, we have seen Thucydides to be exceptionally aware that actions tend to be evaluated in different terms by different people. Various kinds of restraint (whether in foreign or internal affairs) tend to be commended in terms of ϲωφροϲύνη when people feel that restraint is called for, and deprecated in quite different terms when it is felt that a different response is in order. This implies that valuation is perceived as a more or less scalar phenomenon: ϲωφροϲύνη is considered to be an appropriate measure of restraint, because the term applies when restraint is called for; in situations in which a different reaction is felt to be appropriate, such restraint will be felt to be 'too much' and called by the name of βραδύτηϲ or some other deprecatory term. Similarly, assertive and/or aggressive behaviour will be called ἀνδρεία if such behaviour is called for, but τόλμα or something similar when displayed to excess. In extreme situations, people may incline heavily to aggressive behaviour and its opposite, restraint, may fall out of favour. It will then happen that ϲωφροϲύνη is no longer a term that can be

applied meaningfully, because the kind of behaviour it recommends is not valued at all. Under such circumstances, it may seem a full 'transvaluation' of values has occurred.

This is, according to Thucydides, what happens in cases of cτάcιc, of which the civil war in Corcyra was the first and prime example during the Peloponnesian wars:

> καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωcιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐc τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῆι δικαιώcει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιcτοc ἀνδρεία φιλέταιροc ἐνομίcθη, μέλληcιc δὲ προμηθὴc δειλία εὐπρεπήc, τὸ δὲ cῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόcχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸc ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν·
> (Th. 3.82.4)

> And people changed the customary valuation of words in as much as they apply to deeds, in their judgements. For senseless daring was taken to be courageous loyalty to one's friends, and thoughtful deliberation was regarded as specious cowardice; the quality cῶφρον was considered to be a cloak for what lacks manly courage, and complete perception of affairs was held to be an utter lack of efficacy.

As the narrator has it, the tendency to violence and rash action is so strong in circumstances of cτάcιc, and restraint and caution are so utterly thrown to the winds, that people would seem to think that violence is the only appropriate type of behaviour. cωφροcύνη will then become a qualification that never applies seriously, because restraint is never appreciated; it will seem a mere cloak for 'unmanly' diffidence.[27] In a state of cτάcιc, value terms still mean the same in as much as they still refer to the same type of behaviour; but one group of terms, those commending cῶφρων-like, 'quiet' and 'careful' behaviour, cannot be meaningfully applied any longer because the behaviour that goes with it is totally 'out of fashion': the positive connotations of these terms do not conform to people's present negative evaluation of

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[27] This means that it is not the *meanings* of the words themselves that have changed, but the situation in which people think they can be *meaningfully applied*, cf. Wilson (1982) 18ff. and Worthington (1982) 124, and cf. Hornblower (1991) ad loc.
There is no indication in the present passage that 'Thucydides' sympathies are ... Spartan or oligarchic' (Edmunds (1975) 78); τὸ cῶφρον is not used here as a party parole; at 3.82.8, Thucydides even goes on how in times of cτάcιc, both oligarchs and democrats abuse their slogans.

restraint. Therefore other, more negative terms will be used instead. By contrast, rash and excessive action is now valued greatly,
and terms like ἀνδρεία are over-employed in defence of all types
of behaviour of this kind.

Another phenomenon of political life that becomes ruthlessly
apparent in a situation of cτάcιc is the use of noble political slogans as a cloak for ignoble private ends.

> οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖc πόλεcι προcτάντεc μετὰ ὀνόματοc ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦc,
> πλήθουc τε ἰcονομίαc πολιτικῆc καὶ ἀριcτοκρατίαc cώφρονοc
> προτιμήcει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγωι θεραπεύοντεc ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ
> δὲ τρόπωι ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεcθαι ἐτόλμηcάν τε τὰ
> δεινότατα ἐπεξῇcάν τε τὰc τιμωρίαc ἔτι μείζουc.
> (Th. 3.82.8)

> For the leaders in the cities all used fine slogans, one group pro
> fessing to honour equality of political rights for all the people, the
> other a cώφρων aristocracy,[28] but while they claimed to serve the
> common interest, they in fact held a private competition. While
> using all means in their struggle for supremacy, they dared the
> worst and went to even greater lengths to take revenge.

According to the narrator, both parties invoke non-competitive
ideals (cωφροcύνη, ἰcονομία) to disguise the fact that their actual
behaviour comes down to the ruthless pursuit of personal ends.
Thus, there is a clash between the political ideologies and the
actual behaviour of their adherents. This is the first occurrence
in the *Histories* of cώφρων as a political slogan of the oligarchs,
and it seems typical of Thucydides that it is immediately apparent
how hollow the terms may be when compared to reality. What
was implied in a case like that of the regime of the Four Hun-

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[28] This is the traditional interpretation of these lines. Graham and Forsythe
(1984) argue for taking προτιμήcει with cώφρονοc only: 'government by the best
men, which is responsible *by reason of preferment*'. [My italics]. Against this
interpretation, the following considerations seem to weigh heavily: (i)
προτιμήcει seems a necessary addition to explain how the preposition μετὰ
(ὀνόματοc ... εὐπρεποῦc) is to be understood; (ii) as the present chapter
hopefully has shown, cώφρων, when used as a party slogan, is never qualified by
a limiting apposition; there is no need to think that ἀριcτοκρατίαc cώφρονοc
would have been considered 'a rather banal expression' (Graham and Forsythe
(1984) 34); (iii) 'responsible by reason of preferment' seems impossibly short,
since it is by no means clear what qualities or assets would have been
'preferred'.

dred, that their ideology of ϲωφροϲύνη is used to mask the ruthless pursuit of self-interest, is described here as a general mechanism in a city in discord.

4. *Conclusion*

Herodotus and Thucydides both offer interesting, if very different views on the way in which ϲωφροϲύνη is important in politics. (For schematic representations of our findings, see figures 8 and 9 in chapter 9.3). To a large extent, Herodotus focuses on individuals, and is an important source of stories that illustrate the problematical nature of the tyrannical temperament, a condition that is subtly shown virtually to preclude ϲωφροϲύνη: Herodotus' tyrants lack 'prudence' or even 'sanity'; but it is subliminally suggested that their defective mentalities are the sources of many crimes against both mortals and gods. Thucydides focuses almost exclusively on the πόλιϲ as a collective body, and offers rich insights in the ways in which ϲωφροϲύνη can be invoked to influence a city's internal and external policy: in Thucydides, ϲωφροϲύνη is used to urge both 'caution' and 'assistance of allies' abroad, and both εὐνομία and εὐβουλία at home.

Thucydides is also extremely aware of the elusive nature of value terms: people tend to value the same events in entirely different terms, and are prone to employing 'noble words' in the service of some particular, and not necessarily honourable, agenda. Many of the speakers in Thucydides who invoke these terms may seem 'sophistic', and indeed we often feel, in the speeches in Thucydides, to be close to the tone and content of the debates in the great political dialogues of Plato. Indeed, a very few cases excepted (the Chians, and to a large extent, prudent Spartans like Archidamus), it may well be the case that the moment the narrator makes one of his characters use a value term like ϲωφροϲύνη, the reader is positively invited to feel alarmed and look beneath the surface. The same even applies to some of the relatively rare instances in which the narrator uses the terms himself; even there, he seems intent to show how people abuse their 'noble words', and more often than not, beneath the polished surface, there is a quite disturbing core.

ARISTOPHANES AND THE ORATORS

1. *Introduction*

In the last chapters, we have seen how the tragedians (chapters 4-6) and Herodotus (chapter 7.2) both focus on what can be regarded as larger than life characters, the tragic hero and the oriental despot. In this connection, we have been able to observe how for many of these 'strong' figures, ϲωφροϲύνη, with its various elements of prudence and restraint, was an important, yet often intensely problematical quality. In a different sense, the *Histories* of Thucydides also have 'big' protagonists (chapter 7.3), given that the work shows great interest in the characteristics and behaviour of city states as a collective. With him, we have been able to observe the application of ϲωφροϲύνη to various types of political ideology, and we have seen how our terms are used in the interest of persuasive, and sometimes downright manipulative strategies.

All these genres had comparatively little to say, by contrast, on the ϲωφροϲύνη of the individual ordinary citizen (with the notable exception of the importance of female ϲωφροϲύνη in Euripides). An important gap is filled, in this respect, by the comedies of Aristophanes and the speeches of the orators, as they show us what the quality means for the individual democratic citizen. Here we meet the 'prudence', 'decency', 'justice', and 'inconspicuous behaviour' of the individual ordinary citizen (and, in Aristophanes, we also get important information on what the virtue means for the young, especially for boys). This is very much the ϲωφροϲύνη of popular morality, and here, more than in the epics, tragedy or historiography, we meet the conventional interpretations of ϲωφροϲύνη that form a starting point for the discussion in a dialogue like *Charmides*.

Even given the considerable difference in genre between comedy and oratory, both speak to the ordinary citizen, and clearly appeal to his values and views of morality. Comedy, unlike tragedy, deals to a large extent with ordinary citizens in unusual,

comic situations, and even when famous figures from public life
or mythology figure on the comic stage, we see them adopting
the frame of mind of 'ordinary' men, often incongruously so.
Speakers in the orators hope to win the vote of a jury of ordinary
citizens, and they will support their plea by giving the impression
that they are, essentially, decent ordinary fellows much like their
addressees.

Given that both genres strongly appeal to conventional moral-
ity, it is indeed significant that the ϲώφρων πολίτηϲ as we meet
him in these two corpora is, by and large, a remarkably consis-
tent figure. In Aristophanes (section 2), we see how the ϲώφρων
citizen is moderate in pleasures and desires (but not to the ex-
tent of depriving himself of all that is pleasurable in life), obeys
the laws and refrains from injustices like perjury, theft and vio-
lence. The most persistent trait of the ϲώφρων citizen in Aristo-
phanes, however, is his inconspicuous behaviour in public life:
the ϲώφρων citizen is essentially ἀπράγμων, and does not engage
in lawsuits and politics. This is partly the comic stereotype, no
doubt, that all politicians and jury members are corrupt, but
some of the relevant passages adopt a more serious tone. In
these cases, it is a source of regret that those who do not engage
in the city's affairs would be the best to manage these affairs. The
sentiment appears to be wide-spread, and seems to appeal to a
wide range of citizens, from the ordinary man who has no time
for 'πράγματα' to the elitist citizen who regards the institutions
and practices of the Athenian democracy with distrust.

Aristophanes is also an important source of information on
ϲωφροϲύνη in boys. The key text here is the defence of traditional
education by the so-called 'Strong Argument' in *Clouds*. This
laudator temporis acti extols the orderliness, obedience, decency
and modesty of boys in the good old days, and while he is a cari-
cature in his stereotypical view of the old days, and in his hypo-
critical delight in naming the vices of today, the ideal that he
voices is essentially serious. In fact, for all the exaggerations and
comic distortions, the decent boys of *Clouds* are essentially simi-
lar to the modest and shame-faced Charmides in Plato's dialogue
of the same name.

In speeches in court in the orators (section 3), the ϲωφροϲύνη
of the ordinary citizen is also much in evidence. Speakers before

the law courts will try to convince the juries that they are decent, virtuous citizens, and the cωφροcύνη of such a citizen consists, much as in Aristophanes, of (i) control of desires and emotions, (ii) aversion to injustice and violence, and (iii) aversion to πράγ-ματα and inexperience with lawsuits. Pleas of this kind will be made with direct reference to the charge in hand, especially when the charge is one involving aggression and violence, but also strictly speaking *extra causam*, to support the speaker's case with the suggestion that *he* is a trustworthy fellow who is generally decent and disinclined to litigation. In such cases, the appeal to cωφροcύνη offers indirect support for the speaker's innocence or for the justice of his case.

Of course the works of the orators also contain a number of political speeches. As appears from these fourth-century speeches, the application of cωφροcύνη in Athenian political discourse (section 4) differs significantly from that of the earlier century, which we observed in Thucydides. No longer is cωφροcύνη connected to the ideals of an elite with oligarchic, or at least pro-Spartan sympathies. After the restoration of democracy in 404, cωφροcύνη becomes firmly connected to the Athenian democratic constitution, and especially to its earlier, 'unadulterated' stages from, say, Solon to the times of Perikles. In the politics of the Athenian city state, the cώφρων citizen is now a man of the people, δημοτικόc, the anti-type of the ὀλιγαρχικόc.

2. *Aristophanes: The* cωφροcύνη *of the Ordinary Citizen*

Many of the uses of cώφρων and cognates in Aristophanes are by now familiar, and need not detain us long. These include what the poet has to say on female cωφροcύνη,[1] as well as his jocular

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[1] What Aristophanes has to say on female cωφροcύνη is, for the reader of Euripides, mostly familiar. Quietude, obedience and marital fidelity are still the main aspects of the virtue. Thus, in the quarrel with the police officer and the chorus of old men, the women in *Lysistrata* claim that all they want to do is 'to sit cωφρόνωc ('quietly') like a girl without offending anyone here' (*Lys.* 473f. ἐπεὶ 'θέλω 'γὼ cωφρόνωc ὥcπερ κόρη καθῆcθαι | λυποῦcα μηδέν' ἐνθαδί), provided they are not irritated by anyone. Later on in the same scene, Lysistrata herself explains that it was their obedient cωφροcύνη that always kept the women from protesting against the war: 'Earlier on, in the beginnings of the

use of ϲωφρονεῖν in the sense of 'being prudent'.[2] But on the other hand, Aristophanes has a lot to say about the ϲωφροϲύνη of boys and normal male citizens. Both these groups figure prominently in what is undoubtedly the most famous passage on

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war, we used to put up with anything you men did, thanks to our ϲωφροϲύνη' (*Lys.* 507-8 ἡμεῖϲ τὸν μὲν πρότερον πόλεμον καὶ χρόνον ἠνεϲχόμεθ' ⟨ὑμῶν⟩ ὑπὸ ϲωφροϲύνηϲ τῆϲ ἡμετέραϲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἅττ' ἐποιεῖτε). As in Euripides (*Tr.* 422), Penelope is still the model of ϲωφροϲύνη, and Euripides is criticised for not making *her* the subject of a tragedy (*Th.* 548).

Given that women in Aristophanes are often portrayed as remarkably self-assured (*Lys.*) and licentious (the alcoholic inclinations of the ladies in *Th.* and *Ec.*), it is perhaps remarkable that there is only one woman on stage who is explicitly said to lack ϲωφροϲύνη. This is the old woman in *Women at the Assembly*, who takes advantage of the new laws and tries to rape a young man: his younger girlfriend tries to stop her by suggesting that she is not ϲώφρων to do so, since she might well have been his mother (*Ec.* 1038-40 οὐ ϲωφρονοῦϲά γ'· οὐ γὰρ ἡλικίαν ἔχει | παρὰ ϲοὶ καθεύδειν τηλικοῦτος ὤν, | ἐπεὶ μήτηρ ἂν αὐτῶι μᾶλλον εἴηϲ ἢ γυνή. 'You are not ϲώφρων to do so, for he is not of the right age to sleep with you; you could be his mother rather than his wife.').

   [2] The prudential sense of ϲωφροϲύνη is used more rarely, and always in jokes. It may be used, for instance, to commend the 'good sense' of what is not obviously the right thing to do. Thus, in *Wealth*, Hermes is commended for his 'good sense' not to care for the welfare of the other gods, only for himself (*Plut.* 1119 ϲωφρονεῖϲ): the notion that prudential ϲωφροϲύνη amounts to taking good care of one's own interest, is converted here into an egoistic indifference to the well-being of one's peers. In *Frogs*, the standard phrase εἰ ϲωφρονεῖϲ is used to tell Euripides that he would be wise to run away and take shelter from the anger of Aeschylus (*Ra.* 853). In *Wasps*, Philocleon tells the woman who accuses him of stealing twelve loaves of bread that, instead of her ugly 'barking' she would do better to buy new wheat (*V.* 1404-5 εἰ νὴ Δί' ἀντὶ τῆϲ κακῆϲ γλώττηϲ ποθὲν | πυροὺϲ πρίαιο, ϲωφρονεῖν ἄν μοι δοκεῖϲ. 'If, by Zeus, instead of using this evil tongue, you would go and buy wheat somewhere, you would seem sensible to me.'). And in *Lysistrata*, the excited Spartan and Athenian soldiers are told that, if they have good sense (*Lys.* 1093 εἰ ϲωφρονεῖτε), they will put on their mantles, not because decency requires it, but lest one of the ἑρμοκοπίδαί may come along and castrate them. Finally, reviving a familiar anti-feminine theme dating back at least to Semonides (Semonides 7), the grumpy old men of the chorus claim that they are ϲώφρονεϲ (*Lys.* 796) to be as much disgusted with women as the young and chaste Melanion, not because 'chastity' is desirable in itself, but because the insolence of women they have experienced is a thing best avoided.

   In *Knights,* the poet claims 'prudence' for himself too, reminding the audience that he himself 'prudently' refrained from presenting his first plays in his own production and under his own name and from 'jumping before the public in a foolish manner to talk rubbish' (*Eq.* 545 ὅτι ϲωφρονικῶϲ κοὐκ ἀνοήτωϲ εἰϲπηδήϲαϲ ἐφλυάρει). The reasons for this are the alleged fickleness of the audience, and his awareness that he first had to master all aspects of the comedian's art: his restraint is thus allegedly due to the 'prudence' of one who is afraid of being hissed off the stage. (For ϲωφροϲύνη in relation to the poet and his play, cf. n. 3 below.)

ϲωφροϲύνη in Aristophanic comedy, the ἀγών in *Clouds*.[3] In this debate, two so-called arguments or Λόγοι, 'Strong' and 'Weak',[4] vie for the dubious privilege to educate Phidippides. The Strong Argument (Κρείττων Λόγοϲ) declares that his is the old-fashioned education, from the times 'when I flourished by saying what is just, and ϲωφροϲύνη was current coinage' (*Nu.* 962 ὅτ' ἐγὼ τὰ δίκαια λέγων ἤνθουν καὶ ϲωφροϲύνη 'νενόμιϲτο).[5] This ancient education is, rather inappropriately for a young man like Phidippides,[6] limited to the traditional basic education for young boys (with an emphasis on traditional forms of μουϲική — modern music is not allowed (966-72) — and on gymnastics), and it is decidedly anti-intellectual in that it has nothing to do with the contemporary higher education of the 'sophists'. Throughout his exposé, 'Strong' emphasises aspects of good behaviour that are closely associated with ϲωφροϲύνη in boys and young men: quiet (963, 983) and orderly (964) behaviour, physical hardiness (965), modesty and moderation in matters of food (981-2), and,

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[3] It can hardly be a coincidence that in this play in which ϲωφροϲύνη plays such a central role, the poet claims ϲωφροϲύνη for the play itself too. In the revised παράβαϲιϲ, he makes the — palpably wrong — claim that this comedy is ϲώφρων ... φύϲει (*Nu.* 537), because it rejects all the vulgarities of comedy (phalluses, jokes on bald men, wild dances, old men waving their sticks, young men beating their fathers, processions with torches and cries of 'iou, iou') in favour of trusting its own ingenious plot. 'In the conflict between Aristophanes and his dramatic rivals, he aims to create comic irony by making complaints to the audience for rejecting the first production of the play, false claims to originality and superiority, false disapproval of popular forms of humour, and false claims to resisting repeated personal ridicule. In using these devices Aristophanes' purpose is to win the favour of the audience and the judges' (Fisher (1984) 152).

Elsewhere, in the political plays, the poet makes exaggerated claims of courage, stressing the risks of fighting the 'monstrous politicians that threaten the city', see Hubbard (1991), 61-3 (on *Knights*) and 118-21 (on *Wasps*), Rosen (1988) 59-82, Sluiter & Rosen (2003) 13-20.

[4] On the names, see Dover (1968), lvii-lviii, Nussbaum (1980) 50n.15, Fisher (1984) 192-3, MacDowell (1995) 137-8.

[5] Strong's speech combines traditional ideals of ϲωφροϲύνη with traditional ideals of ἀνδρεία/masculinity; his opponent rejects both, and suggests that unmanliness and depravity makes for more successful and more pleasant living. See Rademaker (2003), esp. 116-19, on which part of the following is based.

[6] This is not to say, as MacDowell (1995) 139 suggests, that the speech is 'inappropriate to its context in the play', just that it is designed to be obviously and comically inappropriate for its addressee. The point is, of course, that traditional education had little to offer on the teaching of rhetoric and politics.

above all, a sense of decorum in sexual matters.[7] The result of this education will be that he will acquire an athletic body fit for war (986-9, 1005-8, 1009-1014), an aversion to the ἀγορά,[8] rhetoric and πράγματα (991, 1003-4, 1018), a sense of shame and honour (992), respect for his elders (993, 998-9), and he will refrain from disreputable contact with dancing girls and prostitutes (996-7).

No doubt, there is a good deal of comic exaggeration in this idealisation of the old days, and there is a very witty incongruity in hearing such exalted ideals formulated by a champion who takes an obvious delight in stating all the details of the forbidden behaviour.[9] But the humour of this situation is stronger if the ideals embraced by this hypocritical idealist are serious enough in themselves, and there are sufficient parallels to suggest that this is indeed the case: quiet orderliness and a sense of shame are, for instance, the essential ingredients of the intuitive, unreflective type of boyish cωφροcύνη as formulated and shown by Charmides in the dialogue of the same name, and decency and aversion to πράγματα are vital characteristics of the adult cώφρων citizen elsewhere in Aristophanic comedy. The nobility of Strong's ideals is, moreover, acknowledged by the Chorus, who take delight in the 'decent bloom' (1027 cῶφρον … ἄνθοc) on the pedagogue's words. This is, then, a noble ideology defended by an unworthy spokesman.

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[7] Boys should not press their thighs together when sitting at school (965); avoid showing their genitals (973), wipe out the imprints of their genitals from the sand (975-6), not use oil below their navels (977-8), and not use seductive voices and lascivious glances when speaking to an ἐραcτήc (979-80).

[8] For the Athenian elite's disdain of the ἀγορά and those who made their trade in the place, including some politicians who were called 'men of the market', see Ostwald (1986) 203n.16, 214-15.

[9] Strong's hypocrisy has been described in strong terms by Dover (1968) lxiv-lxvi, Henderson (1975) 76-77, 217-218 and Fisher (1984) 198. MacDowell (1995) 139 argues against this: 'He likes the boys to be handsome but not to misbehave themselves, and this view was probably shared by a large proportion of the Athenian audience.' That may be true, but there can be no doubt that the audience will see in Strong, with his interest in boys and disgust at καταπυγοcύνη, a particularly vivid embodiment of the double standards (and the possibly wide gulf between ideology and practice) to which the duplicity of the Athenian norms with regard to paederasty (encouraging to the suitor, discouraging the boy) would lead. Cf. *Plut.* 153-9 and Cohen (1991) 199.

Weak (Ἥττων Λόγος), in his counter-attack, focuses on men rather than boys. He reduces cωφροcύνη to sexual decorum and resistance of pleasure, and dismisses this as a κακὸν μέγιστον (1060), because it brings no gains (1061-2) but deprives a man himself of all pleasures that make life worthwhile (1071ff.): boys, women, games, food, drink and laughter. Strong's counterexample of Peleus (1067), who was married to Thetis as a reward for his cωφροcύνη, is easily dismissed: Peleus was deserted because he was not a good, dominant lover (1068 ὑβριcτήc), and the rewards of πονηρία are far greater.

Weak then dismisses cωφροcύνη in its use of control of desires. The humour of his counter-attack is that he adopts an unashamedly amoral, hedonistic stance, and makes the attractive and unrealistic suggestion that one can get away even with gross immoral acts such as adultery, provided one has the rhetorical agility to refute all accusations: this suggestion is reinforced by the humorous admission by Strong that virtually all prominent and not-so-prominent Athenians have adopted Weak's immoralist stance and become εὐρύπρωκτοι. As has been noted, there are some similarities between Weak's ruthlessly egoistic view of the ῥήτωρ and that of Callicles in *Gorgias*.[10] The main difference is of course that Weak's immorality leads to a carnival-like subversion of values (climaxing in the argument of his pupil Phidippides, who ends up arguing that he is right to beat his father), and presents his programme in a tone of light-hearted inconsequentiality, whereas Callicles aims at the use and abuse of power, and is introduces by Plato to show the dangers of the immoralist's position at its grimmest.

Thus, where the ἀγών of *Clouds* humorously rejects cωφροcύνη in favour of shameless pursuit of one's own desires, other passages stress that the cώφρων citizen will refrain from injustice and violence. In *Women at the Assembly*, when Chremes is about to hand over his property and is derided for it by another man, he indignantly confirms that he does indeed think that the cώφρων man must obey the laws and do what has been ordered (*Ec.* 767 τὸ τα ττόμενον γὰρ δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν cώφρονα; | - μάλιcτα πάντων.), even

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[10] North (1966) 97.

in this absurd situation. This is of course an absurd case of law-abidingness given the fantastic absurdity of the law in question, but the passage confirms that observing the instructions of the law is an entirely familiar, almost proverbial, interpretation of ϲωφροϲύνη.

There is a similar kind of joke in *Plutus*, where Poverty argues that ϲωφροϲύνη and κοϲμιότηϲ are on her side, and ὕβριϲ is the domain of Wealth. (*Plut.* 563-4 περὶ ϲωφροϲύνηϲ ἤδη τοίνυν περανῶ ϲφῶιν κἀναδιδάξω | ὅτι κοϲμιότηϲ οἰκεῖ μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ, τοῦ Πλούτου δ᾽ ἐϲτὶν ὑβρίζειν.) Here again, there is an absurd application (in an argumentation for the desirability of Poverty) of a quite 'normal' thought: that rich men lack the sound morals of the poor.[11]

The most persistent trait of the ϲώφρων citizen in Aristophanes, however, is that he keeps away from law courts and politics, and leads a life of ἀπραγμοϲύνη. The idea is implied by Strong's appreciation of the 'smell' of ἀπραγμοϲύνη (*Nu.* 1007) and it recurs persistently throughout Aristophanic comedy.[12] In such contexts, it is suggested that decent citizens keep away from public life, especially from the courts, and that it is only the mad or the depraved who pursue such a career. Thus, it is said that Philocleon has come to his senses and is now ϲώφρων (ϲωφρονεῖ, *V.* 748) when he has been healed from his earlier manic (744) court addiction, and a sycophant, who has described himself as 'in search of πράγματα' (πραγματοδίφηϲ, *Av.* 1424) is told that there are other, decent jobs (*Av.* 1433 ἕτερα ἔργα ϲώφρονα) by which one can make a living. Warfare is also described as an unwanted form of 'trouble'. The biggest joke of this type occurs when the son of the proverbial coward, Cleonymus, is invited to sing, and Try-

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[11] The argument is employed in Lysias 24.17 by the speaker to support his claim that he, a poor invalid, cannot possibly be βίαιοϲ.

[12] Carter (1986) portrays three groups of ἀπράγμονεϲ among Athenian citizens: the noble youth (52-75), the peasant farmer (76-98) and the rich quietist. Hardly any character in Aristophanes belongs to that last type, but the two other types are quite common. For the former, one may think of the chorus from *Knights*, Bdelycleon in *Wasps*, and — to some extent — Phidippides in *Clouds*. Many protagonists belong to the second type, most clearly Dicaeopolis in *Acharians,* Trygaeus in *Peace* and Pisthetaerus and Euelpides in *Birds.*

gaeus tells him that 'you will not make a song of trouble, for you are the son of a *cώφρων* father' (*Pax* 1297 οὐ πράγματ᾽ ἄιcει· cώφρονοc γὰρ εἶ πατρόc).[13] Here, the cowardice of the alleged deserter is turned into an asset: abstention from warfare and πράγματα.

A central factor in the ordinary man's aversion to πράγματα is that they take time, and are open only to those who are not forced to do the 'real work'. An example of this is the remark in *Acharnians* that all the young men evade military service by going abroad on an embassy, whereas the old have to do the real work: old Marilades ('Son of Coal Dust') has never been on an embassy, even though he is cώφρων κἀργάτηc (*Ach.* 611), a cώφρων and hard-working fellow. By contrast, the elitist's view is that those who engage in πράγματα usually lack the necessary background to do so in a proper manner. Clearly nostalgic in tone is a choral passage in *Frogs*, where it is deplored that the city fails to honour and employ the noble, sensible, just and good men among their citizens, who have received the traditional education (*Ra.* 727-9 οὓc μὲν ἴcμεν εὐγενεῖc καὶ cώφροναc | ἄνδραc ὄνταc καὶ δικαίουc καὶ καλούc τε κἀγαθοὺc | καὶ τραφένταc ἐν παλαίcτραιc καὶ χοροῖc καὶ μουcικῆι, 'men who are noble and sensible, just and good, were raised in the wrestling fields and with dance and music') but prefers newly-arrived villains instead.

Thus, an aversion to πράγματα is common to both the elitist citizen and the ordinary man, if perhaps partly for different reasons. Indeed, it seems that the ideal of ἀπραγμοcύνη appeals to 'quiet' citizens of all classes, from the rich elitists down to the ordinary men who have to work for their living and lack time for public life.

The clear antitype to the cώφρων πολίτηc is the Sausage Seller of *Knights*, who in view of his depravity and lack of education is the only man who can do away with the 'Paphlagonian' Cleon. The Sausage Seller is of base origins (*Eq.* 181 ἐξ ἀγορᾶc) and was reared with beatings in the smokehouses (1235-6), he is shameless and has hardly learned anything at school except to steal,

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[13] For Cleonymus' δειλία and unmanliness, see *Eq.* 1372, *Nu.* 353, 673-80 (according to Socrates, he should be called Cleonymê), *V.* 19-20, 822-3, *Pax* 446, 673-9, 1295ff., *Av.* 289-90, 1473-81.

perjure and look others shamelessly in the face while doing so (1238-9); moreover, he is, like Weak's pupils, a καταπύγων as well: as an adult he earned a living by selling his sausage and occasionally 'getting fucked' himself (1242),[14] and he practised this trade at the city gates among the prostitutes.[15] Accordingly, when this man is invited to start his ἀγών with Cleon, he is encouraged to show that 'it makes no sense to have been educated cωφρόνωc' (*Eq.* 334 νῦν δεῖξον ὡc οὐδὲν λέγει τὸ cωφρόνωc τραφῆναι). Here, then, we observe a paradoxical consequence of the ideal of ἀπραγμοcύνη: given that the cώφρων citizen is disinclined to engage in dubious affairs, it takes a man who is both shameless and ruthlessly assertive to deal with the depraved politicians of the day.

This, then, is the comic paradox of cωφροcύνη in the life of the πόλιc: it takes a cώφρων to do a really good job in the administration of the city, yet the very same quality will deter people from the unpalatable aspects of public life. Thus, the irony arises that real-life politicians lack this political quality *par excellence.*

The centrality of cωφροcύνη for the administration of an ideal πόλιc is shown by a passage in *Birds.* Here, in the heavenly city of Zeus as administrated by Basileia, cωφροcύνη figures, together with lawfulness and good council, among the elements from which a successful city is built. Basileia is said to wield 'Zeus' lightning, and all the rest: his good council, lawfulness and cωφροcύνη, his dockyards, invectives, the officer that pays the wages, and the jury pay of three obols' (*Av.* 1538-41 ταμιεύει τὸν κεραυνὸν τοῦ Διὸc | καὶ τἄλλ᾽ ἀπαξάπαντα, τὴν εὐβουλίαν, | τὴν εὐνομίαν, τὴν cωφροcύνην, τὰ νεώρια, | τὴν λοιδορίαν, τὸν κωλακρέτην, τὰ τριώβολα.). The political ideals of εὐνομία, εὐβουλία and cωφροcύνη — serious ideals in the administration

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[14] *Eq.* 1241-2 τέχνην δὲ τίνα ποτ᾽ εἶχεc ἐξανδρούμενοc; | ἠλλαντοπώλουν καί τι καὶ βινεcκόμην. ἀλλαντοπωλέω here seems to be used in the 'obscene' sense of 'selling one's penis'. No certain parallels support this interpretation, but the ἀλλᾶc seems to stand for the penis in Hipponax 84.16-7 ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐβίνε[ον   ]τε κα[ὶ |]ἐπ᾽ ἄκρον ἕλκ[ων ὥσπε]ρ ἀλλᾶ[ντα ψήχων. Cf. Henderson (1975) [1991] 20, and Rosen,(1988a) 39-40.

[15] *Eq.* 1245-7 καί μοι τοcοῦτον εἰπέ· πότερον ἐν ἀγορᾷ | ἠλλαντοπώλειc ἐτεὸν ἢ ᾽πὶ ταῖc πύλαιc; | - ἐπὶ ταῖc πύλαιcιν, οὗ τὸ τάριχοc ὤνιον. For prostitution at the city gates, cf. *Eq.* 1398-1400 and Sommerstein (1981) on *Eq.* 1246.

of the πόλις, as we have seen in Thucydides[16] — are mixed up here with all the everyday affairs of the city as vital constituents of a πόλις.

Thus, the cώφρων πολίτης as he emerges from Aristophanic comedy is a man of decent morals: in control of his desires, averse to injustice and violence, and inconspicuous in the active public life of the city. In the emphasis on ἀπραγμοcύνη resides the big paradox of Aristophanic comedy: those who are best suited in principle to run the state, are often disinclined to engage in such affairs, and they may even be a bit too scrupulous and unassertive to deal successfully with less blameless colleagues.

3. *The Attic Orators: the* cώφρων πολίτης

The image of the cώφρων πολίτης that emerges from Aristophanes' comedies, is by and large confirmed by the use of cώφρων and cognates in speeches in passages that defend the ἦθος of the speaker, or decry that of his opponents. In law speeches, especially, but in political speeches as well, speakers will do much to convey the impression that they are 'good' citizens and essentially trustworthy, and that their opponents are not. A favourite strategy is to make a claim of cωφροcύνη, and appeals to cωφροcύνη are made both *ad rem,* to prove that a speaker is innocent of certain types of aggression, and *extra causam*, to suggest that he is generally incapable of injustice.[17] From these passages, one can see what cωφροcύνη means for the citizen as an individual, and they form an essential supplement

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[16] See chapter 7.3.1 on cωφροcύνη in relation to the internal politics of the state.

[17] The appeal to cωφροcύνη is of course not the only value to which speakers may appeal. Roisman (2003) 136-41, shows Demosthenes negotiating between cωφροcύνη and ἀνδρεία in the speech *Against Meidias.* Demosthenes claims that he was cώφρων to refrain from instant retaliation for the physical abuse inflicted by Meidias, but goes to great lengths to suggest that he was 'manly' enough to have done so if necessary. 'Overall, the speech shows that there were rival notions or paths for a man to adopt in defending his honor and displaying his courage. Demosthenes claims that he was capable of taking the one but chose to follow the other.' (*ibid.* 140).

to the picture of the ϲώφρων normal citizen that arises from Aris-
tophanic comedy.

The ϲώφρων πολίτηϲ as portrayed by the Attic orators is one
who is (i) 'decent' in social interaction and sexual matters,[18] and
'moderate' in his desires and expenses, (ii) 'just' and law-
abiding' and not given to violence and ὕβριϲ against his fellow
citizens, and (iii) 'quiet' and ἀπράγμων to the point of ignorance
of the procedures of the law courts. As the juridical issues of
cases vary, ϲωφροϲύνη may be invoked to commend any of these
qualities, or a combination of them.

A fairly full and concentrated statement of the ideology of the
good citizen is provided by the speaker in Lysias 21. After citing
his many liturgies to the state to refute the accusation of taking
bribes and holding state money (21.16 ὡϲ τοῦ δημοϲίου χρήματα
ἔχοντα), he supports his claim with the oratorical cliché[19] that his
biggest λῃτουργία to the state is his quiet life: he has never prof-
ited from the state by holding ἀρχαί, has never been involved in
law suits and has never been guilty of misconduct (21.18):

⟨οὐ γὰρ ἂν⟩ τοῦτό γε εἰπεῖν ἔχοι τιϲ, ὡϲ πολλὰϲ ἀρχὰϲ ἄρξαϲ ἐκ τῶν
ὑμετέρων ὠφέλημαι, ἢ ὡϲ αἰϲχρὰϲ δίκαϲ δεδίκαϲμαι, ἢ ὡϲ αἰϲχροῦ
τινοϲ αἴτιόϲ εἰμι, ἢ ὡϲ τὰϲ τῆϲ πόλεωϲ ϲυμφορὰϲ ἀϲμένωϲ εἶδον· ὑπὲρ
ἁπάντων δὲ καὶ ⟨τῶν⟩ ἰδίων καὶ τῶν δημοϲίων οὕτωϲ ἡγοῦμαί μοι πε-
πολιτεῦϲθαι καὶ ὑμᾶϲ εἰδέναι, ὥϲτε οὐδὲν δεῖν με ἀπολογήϲαϲθαι περὶ
αὐτῶν.
δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρεϲ δικαϲταί, τὴν αὐτὴν νῦν περὶ ἐμοῦ
γνώμην ἔχειν ἥνπερ καὶ ἐν τῶι τέωϲ [χρόνωι], καὶ μὴ μόνον τῶν
δημοϲίων λῃτουργιῶν μεμνῆϲθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων
ἐνθυμεῖϲθαι, ἡγουμένουϲ ταύτην εἶναι [τὴν] λῃτουργίαν
ἐπιπονωτάτην, διὰ τέλουϲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον κόϲμιον εἶναι καὶ
ϲώφρονα καὶ μήθ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆϲ ἡττηθῆναι μήθ' ὑπὸ κέρδουϲ
ἐπαρθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον παραϲχεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὥϲτε μηδένα τῶν
πολιτῶν μήτε μέμψαϲθαι μήτε δίκην τολμῆϲαι προϲκαλέϲαϲθαι.
(Lys. 21.18-19)

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[18] Decency in the sense of chastity remains very much the essence of
ϲωφροϲύνη where women are concerned: thus, Euphiletus claims that he
thought his wife to be παϲῶν ϲωφρονεϲτάτην (Lys. 1.10) when he means that he
believed her to be faithful. The same meaning of ϲωφροϲύνη applies in the
speech *Against Neaira* (Ps.-D. 59.86, 111, 114), and cf. also Ps.-Andocides *In
Alcibiadem* 14.
[19] Cf. Isaeus fr. 13.4.

> For nobody could claim either that I held many offices and prof-
> ited from common property, or that I was involved in unjust law
> suits, or that I am guilty of any misconduct, or that I have been
> pleased to see the misfortunes of the city. In all affairs, both pri-
> vate and public, I consider myself to have been such a citizen —
> and I suppose you know it — that I have nothing about which I
> should apologise.
>   I ask you, gentlemen of the court, to keep the same opinion of
> me now that you have had hitherto. Do not only remind your-
> selves of my public services, but also keep my private behaviour in
> mind. For you should consider this a liturgy of the most laborious
> kind, ever to remain orderly and *cώφρων* throughout one's life,
> and not to allow oneself to succumb to desires or take pride in
> gains, but to prove oneself such a person that no citizen may dis-
> approve of or have the nerve to bring a charge against.

According to the speaker, being *cώφρων* and *κόcμιοc* is the great-
est service to the state, and his *cωφροcύνη* shows in that he has
not been chasing gains (no offices), has shown resistance to
pleasure and desire (no misconduct) and gains (implying resis-
tance to injustice), and has led an impeccably 'quiet' life (no law
suits).

If the passage cited above provides us with the full ideology *in
abstracto*, others provide more specific information on the indi-
vidual senses in which *cώφρων* is used. Some of these will be dis-
cussed briefly in the overview that follows:

3.1. *Decency in sexual matters and social interaction and moderation in
expenses.*

Orderliness in one's private life is perhaps *the* most common in-
terpretation of *cωφοcύνη* in the orators, but this decency is fre-
quently linked with moderation in expenses. The thought here
seems to be that love costs money, money that cannot be spent
in favour of the city, and has perhaps even to be procured by
sordid methods. Thus, control of desire and control of expenses
are often presented almost as two sides of the same coin.[20]

Orderliness in sexual matters is relevant to a large number of
speeches, most notably Lysias 3 and Aeschines 1. Of these, the
former shows the violent excesses to which erotic rivalry could

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[20] See Dover (1974) 179 and refs.

lead, but the speaker is well aware that it is not only the actual charge of violence that may well be discreditable to him, but also the fact that some may consider him lacking in control of his desires.

> ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀποδείξω ὡς οὐκ ἔνοχός εἰμι οἷς Cίμων
> διωμόσατο, ἄλλως δὲ ὑμῖν φαίνωμαι παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ
> ἀνοητότερον πρὸς τὸ μειράκιον διατεθείς, αἰτοῦμαι ὑμᾶς μηδέν με
> χείρω νομίζειν, εἰδότας ὅτι ἐπιθυμῆσαι μὲν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις
> ἔνεστιν, οὗτος δὲ βέλτιστος ἂν εἴη καὶ cωφρονέcτατος, ὅcτις
> κοcμιώτατα τὰc cυμφορὰc φέρειν δύναται.
> (Lys. 3.4)

> Maybe I will be able to show with respect to these things that I am not liable to the charges that Simon brought under oath, but will still be thought by you to be foolishly infatuated with the boy in a way that does not befit my age. If so, I ask you not to lower your opinion of me, for you should be aware that desire is common to all people, and that he who is able to bear his fate in the most orderly way will be the best and the most cώφρων.

The speaker here shows awareness that even if he is able to disprove the formal charge of molestation, he may still be thought ἀνόητος because of his strong and 'immature' desire for the boy. His strategy of defence is to separate the desire itself from the behaviour that is its typical manifestation (a distinction that is clearly not automatically made by the public), and to argue that ultimately, cωφροcύνη resides not so much in the absence of disreputable desire, but in the ability to control it and not to lapse into disreputable behaviour.[21] Throughout the narrative that follows, he emphasises the circumspection with which he tried to avoid a confrontation with his rival.

In such a passage, the uses of cώφρων and κόcμιοc are differentiated: the former is used here to indicate 'self-control', the latter to signal its manifestation in 'orderly' behaviour. Else-

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[21] There is a parallel here to Phaedra's idea of 'conquering my foolishness by means of cωφροcύνη' (E. *Hipp.* 398-9, see Chapter 6.5). In Antiphon fr. 59, this line of thought is pushed to the extreme claim that desire for what is wrong is a condition for cωφροcύνη, because in its absence, there is nothing to conquer. But this is clearly one step away from the popular conception of cωφροcύνη, in which the presence of strong temptation is hardly a *sine qua non*. Aristotle (*EN* 1146a9-12) makes a technical distinction between the ἐγκράτεια that controls strong desires and cωφροcύνη: according to him, the cώφρων does not have strong and bad desires, but the ἐγκρατήc does (*ibid.* 1151b34-1152a3).

where, such a systematic distinction is not made, and the two terms are used as if roughly synonymous.[22] Given that cώφρων is the more flexible term, κόсμιος will then frequently be one of the contextual signals that trigger the right interpretation of the word.

As we have seen, the speaker of Lysias 3 is aware that his desire is disreputable in itself, even if he proves innocent of molestation of his rival. One reason for regarding ἔρωс with suspicion may be that in most cases, desire cannot be fulfilled without harm being done to others. Free-born girls and women belong to the custody of another man, and are 'ruined' if they give in to a lover; free-born boys lose the right to act as a free citizen. Thus, the speaker of D. 45.80 accuses his opponent of hiring (ἑταίρειν) a citizen and depriving him of his freedom of speech, of corrupting (διαφθείρειν) the wives of many, in short of being cώφρων during the day, but guilty of capital crimes at night.

The fact that a citizen boy who submits to prostitution forfeits his citizen rights is especially relevant to Aeschines' first speech, *Against Timarchus.* In this speech, Aeschines made a successful attempt to escape a sentence of corruption (on the occasion of an embassy to Philippus) by striking first: he prosecutes the official complainant, Timarchus, on the charges of playing the paid ἑταῖρος to a number of Athenian men, and squandering his patrimony, offences both punishable with ἀτιμία, the loss of active citizen rights[23] (for, according to Aeschines, the man who wastes his own money and sells his body, is likely to 'sell' the interests of the city as well: here again, sexual profligacy and financial mismanagement go hand in hand). Throughout, Aeschines takes great efforts to demonstrate that the laws aim at instilling the cωφροсύνη which Timarchus allegedly lacks. The law on the assessment of public speakers (cited in full in 1.28-31) brackets prostitution with a number of various other offences, notably (i) beating and failing to sustain one's parents, (ii) desertion or evasion of military service, and (iii) squandering one's patrimony.

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[22] For the association of cώφρων and cognates with κόсμιος and cognates in the orators, see, for instance, Isoc. 1.15, 2.31, 3.38, 7.37, 15.24, Is. fr. 13.4, Aeschin. 1.22, 1.189, 3.2, Lys. 14.12, 14.41, 19.16.

[23] On the main issues in the case against Timarchus, see Dover (1978), ch. 1, Fisher (2001), especially 25-7, Harris (1995) 101-6.

But in the context of his speech, Aeschines interprets this law especially in terms of the ancient lawgiver's overriding concern for ϲωφροϲύνη. Accordingly, Aeschines presents a quasi-systematic enumeration of prescriptions that show how ϲωφροϲύνη for all ages was a top priority for the lawgiver. This concern is said to show, among other things, in prescriptions for the proper education of boys: these required that there were no school hours before dawn and after sunset, and that παιδαγωγοί had to be over forty years of age (they had to be 'in their most ϲώφρων age, ἐν τῆι ϲωφρονεϲτάτηι αὐτοῦ ἡλικίαι, 1.11, apparently in order to be able to keep their hands off their pupils). Moreover, Solon, Perikles and other ancient politicians are cited as models of ϲωφροϲύνη in that they spoke without vehement gesticulation, but kept their arm in their mantles (1.25)[24] — here, the fluidity of the concept of ϲωφροϲύνη makes for a passing transition from decency *in sexualibus* to dignity in outward appearance.

But Aeschines is, of course, primarily concerned with decency in sexual matters, and throughout the second half of his speech, we find him maximising the conceptual gap between Timarchus' alleged prostitution and more readily acceptable forms of pederasty.[25] Thus, he puts great emphasis on the fundamental difference between a so-called ϲώφρων ἔρωϲ (to which he admittedly has been susceptible himself, 1.136-7) and the mercenary love between Timarchus and his men. Instead of really making himself clear on the difference between these forms of ἔρωϲ, he dwells on the 'historical' exemplum of Harmodios and Aristogeiton (1.140), Homer's reticent treatment of the love of Achilles and Patroklos (1.141ff.) and a number of quotes from Euripides (1.151-2), and continues to name a number of decent (1.156) and not so decent (1.158) ἐρώμενοι among contemporary Athenians. The conclusion of this long detour is that 'on one side, there are those who are loved according to ϲωφροϲύνη, and on

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[24] On physical and gestural indications of ϲωφροϲύνη, cf. chapter 9.3.3.

[25] In modern times, the consensus is that submission to anal intercourse was regarded as unmanly, and was believed to reduce a man to the status of a woman, slave or foreigner, see, a.o., Winkler (1990), Halperin (1990), Stewart (1997) 156-71. A different view is taken by Davidson (1997), who argues that it is sexual insatiability that is especially offensive. For a discussion, see Fisher (2001) 45-53.

the other, there are those who do wrong against themselves'
(1.159 χωρὶς μὲν τοὺς διὰ cωφροcύνην ἐρωμένουc, χωρὶc δὲ τοὺc εἰc
ἑαυτοῦc ἐξαμαρτάνονταc).[26]

If Timarchus is officially responsible for the law suit against
Aeschines, Demosthenes is of course the mastermind behind the
attack, *and Against Timarchus* is just one stage in the story of the
continuing antagonism between the two leading politicians of
their time. In the speeches that deal with these conflicts, per-
sonal animosity and downright slander play an important role,
and allegations of the opponent's debased morals recur
throughout. Thus, in his speech *On the False Embassy*, Demosthe-
nes seeks to discredit Aeschines by recounting the story of the
latter's presence (during the embassy) at a symposium at which a
captive woman from Olynthus, 'beautiful but also freeborn and
cώφρων, as the events proved' (D. 19.196 εὐπρεπῆ μὲν ἐλευθέραν
δὲ καὶ cώφρονα ὡc τὸ ἔργον ἐδήλωcεν) refused to sing like a slave
girl to the guests, and received a whipping in punishment.
(Again, in the background, there is the idea that if she had com-
plied, the woman would have been 'ruined'.) Further on, he
points out that the statue of Solon at Salamis, cited as a paradigm
of oratorical cωφροcύνη in Aeschines' *Against Timarchus*, is less
than fifty years old, and hence not in any way authentic (19.251);
he then goes on to conclude that it was not concern for the
cωφροcύνη of Athens' youth that moved Aeschines' complaint
against Timarchus (they are already cώφρονεc and least of all in
need of Aeschines as cωφρονιcτήc, guardian of cωφροcύνη — a
reference to the official cωφρονιcτήc of the ephebes), but rather
his wish to escape sentence himself (19.215-6).

In his reply, Aeschines states that he was happy to see that
Demosthenes' slander about the Olynthian woman was ill re-
ceived by the public, who apparently trust in Aeschines'
cωφροcύνη (2.4 ἥcθην δέ, ὅτ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῆc αἰτίαc ὄντα ταύτηc
ἐξεβάλετε, καὶ τῶν cεcωφρονημένων ἐν τῶι βίωι μοι χάριν
ἀπειληφέναι νομίζω, 'I was glad that when he was making this

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[26] The point of ἐξαμαρτάνονταc is that Timarchus and his like submit to acts
that a free-born male would in principle only experience when suffering sexual
assault: Timarchus has permitted this assault and is thus guilty, so to speak, of
ὕβριc against his own body/himself, cf. 1.108, 1.116, 1.185.

accusation, you hissed him down,[27] and I take it that I have herewith received a reward for all the proofs of σωφροσύνη I have given throughout my life.') and further on compares his 'decent' in-law Philo to the effeminate Demosthenes (2.151, κίναιδος).[28]

In the final round of this battle of giants, Aeschines constructs, in the course of his speech *Against Ctesiphon*, a description of the citizen who is δημοτικός, 'well-disposed to the dèmos' and σώφρων — a description that is tailor-made to 'prove' that Demosthenes belongs to the opposite type of the ὀλιγαρχικός and φαῦλος (3.168-176).[29] According to Aeschines, the decent citizen (i) is of free birth on both sides of his lineage, (ii) has forebears who have done something good for democracy (or at least have done nothing against it), (iii) is σώφρων and μέτριος in his daily life, (iv) is εὐγνώμων and eloquent and (v) ἀνδρεῖος. In a show of fake generosity, Aeschines grants Demosthenes a free-born father and eloquence, and then 'proves' him deficient on all other points: his mother is the daughter of a Scythian woman (i) and an Athenian who preferred exile to impeachment (ii); he has squandered his patrimony so that he has to live on what he earns as a λογογράφος and bribes from the Persian king (iii, a combination of two bits of slander: the loss of his patrimony is generally believed to be the fault of his guardians, and his alleged venality is intended to put his anti-Macedonian stance in a discreditable light); moreover, he is both perverted (iv)[30] and (v) so δειλός that in the days of the lawgiver, he would have suffered ἀτιμία.[31]

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[27] This is a subtle reply to another piece of slander in Demosthenes' speech: at 19.337, Demosthenes recounts how Aeschines, when making a living as a 'tritagonist', was driven off the stage and hissed down by the public (ἐξεβάλλετ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξεσυρίττετ' ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων).

[28] For allegations of effeminacy and sexual deviancy against Demosthenes, see Fisher (2001) 272-3 (ad Aesch, 1.131).

[29] The tone of the whole passage is not that the concept of the σώφρων citizen is 'still worth an orator's serious intention' (North (1966), 142) but rather that Demosthenes is its antitype in every conceivable respect.

[30] Because what seems to be a lack of firm evidence, Aeschines 'tactfully' uses the periphrase οὕτω γὰρ κέχρηται καὶ τῶι ἑαυτοῦ σώματι καὶ παιδοποιίαι ὥστ' ἐμὲ μὴ βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἃ τούτωι πέπρακται, 'He has used his own body and his fertility in such a way that I would not wish to say what has been done to him' (3.173). In 2.151, he uses the term κίναιδος for Demosthenes.

[31] For Demosthenes' weak constitution that made him unfit for physical exercise, see Libanios' *Hypothesis*, § 3.

Aeschines' characterisation of the decent citizen, the antitype to Demosthenes, interestingly includes both a very general, inclusive use of the term ϲώφρων and a more specific use: in the broader use, the adjective indicates the generally 'decent' qualities of the good citizen; in the more specific use, ϲώφρων commends 'sensible' moderation in expenses, and with μέτριοϲ is opposed to Demosthenes' depraved morals and his lack of parsimony.

As the passage shows, μέτριοϲ is another term often added to ϲώφρων in order to establish the right interpretation of 'moderate' in one's expenses. In this sense it functions much like κόϲμιοϲ in the sense of 'orderly' or 'decent', providing the more specific term to trigger the appropriate interpretation of the more general ϲώφρων.[32] In this sense of 'moderation', one also finds expressions like 'managing one's life in a sensible way' (Isoc. 1.46 ϲωφρόνωϲ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον οἰκονομεῖν) or 'saving one's property through ϲωφροϲύνη' (D. 38.26 ϲωφροϲύνηι τὰ ὄντα ϲώιζοντεϲ). As we have seen, the contrast here is, essentially, between parsimonious administration of one's own estate and irresponsible expenses in pursuit of one's own pleasures: in this respect, the ϲωφροϲύνη of moderation is a kind of 'sub-group' under the general heading of 'control of desire'.

Another striking passage in which ϲωφροϲύνη is used to commend propriety in sexual matters, and is then linked to 'justice' in financial matters is found in Nicocles' letter to his people, written by Isocrates. In this passage (3.36-44), the Cypriot ruler claims that ever since he became king, he has consistently practised ϲωφροϲύνη[33] (§ 44 ἤϲκηκα τὴν ϲωφροϲύνην) and has not touched any boy or woman other than his own wife (36 ἐξ οὗ τὴν βαϲιλείαν ἔλαβον, οὐδενὶ φανήϲομαι ϲώματι πεπληϲιακὼϲ πλὴν τῆϲ ἐμαυτοῦ γυναικόϲ), because he did not want to offend any

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[32] For the association between ϲώφρων and μέτριοϲ, or ϲωφροϲύνη and μετριότηϲ, in the context of 'moderation', see Isoc 7.4, D. 21.128, 25.76, 25.77, 58.62, *Exord.* 43.2

[33] Though Nicocles is, of course a king, he claims for himself much the same qualities that apply to the individual citizen of a democratic πόλιϲ: 'Oddly enough, the criteria for assessing a king's actions ... turn out to be provided by ordinary, unwritten codes of civility among members of a society', Poulakos (1987) 28. Poulakos rightly speaks of a 'democratic vein' traversing this text (*ibid.* 29).

κύριος or father (§ 36), regarded it as despicable for a king to preach morality without himself being more *cώφρων* than his citizens (§ 37), valued monogamy as a means to a harmonious marital life (§ 38), and did not want 'unlawful' children because *cωφροcύνη* and δικαιοcύνη, unlike ἀνδρεία and δεινοτής, are the exclusive property of people who are truly καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (§ 43). In this passage too, it is clear that the scope of *cωφροcύνη* extends beyond mere sexual abstinence to other qualities, for the King claims that δικαιοcύνη is best tested in times of need, ἐγκρατεία, self-control, in one's youth, and *cωφροcύνη* when one has the power (§ 44 ἐν ταῖc δυναcτείαιc).[34]

A few passages contain interesting observations on the outward manifestations of *cωφροcύνη*. We already saw how Aeschines invoked the example of Solon (1.25) as a *cώφρων* orator who refrained from wild gesticulation. Quiet and dignified behaviour is also treated as a, potentially misleading, outward manifestation of *cωφροcύνη* in Apollodorus' first speech against Stephanus (D. 45). In this speech, the speaker's adversary, Phormio, is said to walk about with a consistently stern expression (§ 68 ἐcκυθρωπακώc), which according to the speaker does not testify to his *cωφροcύνη* but rather to his misanthropy; conversely, the speaker himself may make an unfavourable impression because of his looks, and his habits of walking fast and talking loud, but *he* has been μέτριοc (§ 78) in his expenses so as to be able to spend some money on the πόλιc whereas Phormio has allegedly hired a boy to be his ἑταῖροc and has corrupted many women: the conclusion from this is that Phormio is *cώφρων* by day but does things at night that should call for a death sentence (45.80 μεθ' ἡμέραν εἶ cὺ cώφρων τὴν δὲ νύκτ' ἐφ' οἷc θάνατοc ἡ ζημία ταῦτα ποιεῖc). Here then, the 'quietness' of appearances is contrasted to 'real' inner *cωφροcύνη*.

Thus, we see that in private life, the *cώφρων* citizen is orderly and in control of his desires (κόcμιοc), moderate in his expenses (μέτριοc), and preferably 'quiet' and dignified in his behaviour. Throughout, the argument of having lived an 'orderly' life —

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[34] Isocrates frequently voices the familiar idea that a monarch can do as he pleases, and thus needs self-control. Cf. Isoc. 1.21, and see Poulakos (1997) 41-3 on the corruption of power.

more often than not strictly speaking *extra causam* — can be invoked in one's own defence, or said not to hold good in the case of ones' adversary.[35]

3.2. *Abstention from Injustice and Violence Against Others*

Moderation and orderliness are aspects of cωφροcύνη that primarily concern the private life of the individual citizen, more specifically the regulation of one's pursuit of pleasures. In a second group of uses, cωφροcύνη commends respect for the rights of others, and amounts to lawfulness and abstention from injustice and violence. In these contexts, cωφροcύνη is associated with δικαιοcύνη and opposed to παρανομία and ἀδικία, or ὕβριc.

Thus, the defendant in Lysias 1 spells out for his public under which conditions he would have been 'wrong' or 'right' to kill Eratosthenes.

> εἰ μὲν γὰρ λόγων εἰρημένων ἔργου δὲ μηδενὸς γεγενημένου μετελθεῖν ἐκέλευον ἐκεῖνον, ἠδίκουν ἄν· εἰ δὲ ἤδη πάντων διαπεπραγμένων καὶ πολλάκις εἰcεληλυθότος εἰc τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐμὴν ὡιτινιοῦν τρόπωι ἐλάμβανον αὐτόν, cώφρον' ἂν ἐμαυτὸν ἡγούμην.
> (Lys. 1.38)

> If, on the one hand, it had been on the basis of mere talk and no real fact that I gave order to send for him, I would indeed have been in the wrong. But if all had already been accomplished and he had frequently entered my house, and I then took hold of him in whichever way, I would consider myself cώφρων.

The speaker's point here is that under the circumstances, the killing of Eratosthenes was no crime, and that he was cώφρων because he was not guilty of an ἀδικία.

One of the clichés of the courts in connection with cωφροcύνη and (in)justice is that punishment of the guilty will deter future transgressors, and make them more cώφρονεc and δίκαιοι. The following passage is from a speech *Against Alcibiades* that goes under the name of Andocides:

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[35] See, e.g., Lys. 14.41 (*In Alcibiadem* I), 21.19 (*Apologia Dorodokias*). An explicit statement of the practice of using such arguments, and of the impossibility for the adversary to do so, is made by the speaker in (Ps.-)D. 25 (*Against Aristogeiton* I), §§ 76-7.

Οὐ μόνον δὲ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν παρανομούντων, ἵνα δίκην διδῶσιν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἄξιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπως τούτους ὁρῶντες δικαιότεροι καὶ cωφρονέcτεροι γίγνωνται.
(Ps.-Andocides 4.40)

It is not only for the sake of those who transgress against the law, in order that they be punished, that it is worthwhile to take care of their punishment, but also for the sake of the others, that they may see them and then become more law-abiding and more cώφρονεc.

The point of such passages is that others, when they see how the guilty are punished for their trespasses, will learn to refrain from such acts themselves. In view of the restraint implied in such a scenario of 'crime prevention', it is very appropriate to state that by witnessing a stern and just judgement, people will become not only δικαιότεροι but cωφρονέcτεροι, because it is not just lawful behaviour in general that is at stake here, but more specifically the willingness to restrain criminal impulses.

When cωφροcύνη can be used to applaud the willingness to restrain criminal impulses, ὕβριc is often used as an antonym. Thus, the defendant in Lysias' speech *For the Disabled Man* claims that the prosecutor's allegation that he is a ὑβριcτήc, violent and unruly of character (24.15 λέγει δ' ὡc ὑβριcτήc εἰμι καὶ βίαιοc καὶ λίαν ἀcελγῶc διακείμενοc) cannot be true for various reasons, including the commonplace consideration that poverty forces him to be cώφρων (*ibid.* 17 οἱ δὲ πένητεc ὑπὸ τῆc παρούcηc ἀπορίαc cωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάζονται, 'For the poor are forced to be cώφρονεc by the need they are in.'). Similarly, the defendant in Antiphon's Third tetralogy counters the claim that the dead man cannot have been the aggressor in their fight because of his age, with the assertion that this would only hold 'if it were a fact of nature that the young commit ὕβριc and the old are cώφρονεc ', (Antiphon 4.4.1 εἰ μὲν γὰρ .... κατὰ φύcιν ἦν ὑβρίζειν μὲν τοὺc νέουc, cωφρονεῖν δὲ τοὺc γέρονταc ...). This passage plays with the stereotypical view that young men are given to ὕβριc and incapable of cωφροcύνη:[36] the speaker claims that youth is not a necessary condition for ὕβριc, and old age does not preclude it.[37]

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[36] Antiphon 4.3.1, 4.4.1, Lys. 24.16, Demades fr. 84.19.
[37] Notwithstanding the fact that the young are not always capable of cωφροcύνη, it is also acknowledged that they have less opportunity for

Whereas lawful behaviour and abstention from violence in social interaction is important in the orators, they rarely show the tragedians' preoccupation with the religious implications of violence. Cωφρονεῖν is used in opposition to ἀcεβεῖν only in connection with the notorious affair of the Hermocopidae (Lys. 6.54, 14.41). Elsewhere, the juridical discourse of the court speeches is conducted in predominantly secular terms, and the ethos of the cώφρων citizen is rarely acknowledged to be determined by religious considerations.

3.3. *Quietness and Inexperience of Conflict*

As in Aristophanes, the ideal citizen who lives a life of decency, moderate expenses, and avoids injustice against his peers, is also a model of peacefulness; in the orators, cωφροcύνη is frequently associated with ἡcυχία and the like.

This quietude is not the politically charged, pro-Spartan ἀπραγμοcύνη of the fifth century that we met in Thucydides, and which has left a few traces in the comedies; rather, what we have here is the inconspicuous behaviour of the individual citizen in the democratic πόλιc, who avoids offending others and bringing charges against his peers. The claim to ἡcυχία is, again, a strategy to underline the innocence of the speaker.

In Isaeus' speech *On Cleonymus*, for instance, the concept of cωφροcύνη is linked to the well-known cliché of inexperience with the law courts: the speakers claim to have been brought up in such a cώφρων manner that they have never visited the law courts even to listen (Isaeus *On Cleonymus* 1 τότε μὲν ... οὕτωc ... cωφρόνωc ἐπαιδευόμεθα, ὥcτ' οὐδὲ ἀκροαcόμενοι οὐδέποτε ἤλθομεν ἐπὶ δικαcτήριον). In similar terms, the speaker of Lysias 19 cites his 'silence' throughout his life in support of his credibility:

> ἀλλὰ πρὸc θεῶν Ὀλυμπίων, ὦ ἄνδρεc δικαcταί, βούλεcθε ἡμᾶc δικαίωc cῶcαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδίκωc ἀπολέcαι, καὶ πιcτεύετε τούτοιc

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displaying other virtues, and in some contexts, it is indeed claimed that cωφροcύνη is, in principle at least, the virtue *par excellence* of the young. See Isoc. 1.15, 8.48, 9.21, Hypereides *Epitaphios* 4.15.

ἀληθῆ λέγειν, οἳ ἂν καὶ ϲιωπῶντεϲ ἐν ἅπαντι τῶι βίωι παρέχωϲι
ϲώφρονας ϲφᾶϲ αὐτοὺϲ καὶ δικαίουϲ.
(Lys. 19.54)

I implore you in the name of the Olympian gods, gentlemen of
the court: you should choose to save us justly rather than unjustly
to destroy us. And do not doubt that those people speak the truth,
who also by their life-long silence prove themselves to be ϲώφρονεϲ
and just.

In such cases, the argument of silence and quietness provides
another *extra causam* argument, closely related to the arguments
from orderliness and moderation. Speakers are also aware that
this type of argument is open to rhetorical misuse: in Lys. 26.5,
the speaker claims that the true test of Euandrus' ἡϲυχιότηϲ is
not his present ϲωφροϲύνη but his former lawlessness (in the time
of the oligarchic revolution):

πρὸϲ δὲ τὴν ἡϲυχιότητα τὴν τούτου, ὅτι οὐ νῦν δεῖ αὐτὸν ἐξετάζειν εἰ
ϲώφρων ἐϲτίν, ὅτ᾽ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεϲτιν ἀϲελγαίνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν
χρόνον ϲκοπεῖν, ἐν ὧι ἐξὸν ὁποτέρωϲ ἐβούλετο ζῆν εἵλετο
παρανόμωϲ πολιτευθῆναι.
(Lys. 26.5)

In answer to his quietude I state that one should not investigate
whether he is ϲώφρων at present, now that he has no chance to be
unruly, but rather look at those days past, in which he had the
opportunity to choose between two ways of life, and preferred un-
lawful citizenship.

Here, the crimes of the past are the accused's crimes during the
oligarchic regime of the Thirty and the civil war between oli-
garchs and democrats. According to the speaker, it is these
crimes that count against the defendant's ϲωφροϲύνη, not his
present ἡϲυχία. Incidentally, the passage shows that ἡϲυχία is no
longer the prerequisite of the anti-democratic elite, as it once
was thought to be. The political slogans have changed, and
ἡϲυχία now rather belongs to the individual democratic citizen,
who is unassuming and not quarrelsome in respect to his peers.

Thus, we see how, for the citizen of the Athenian πόλιϲ,
ϲωφροϲύνη is linked to an extensive ideology of civic morality.
The ϲώφρων defendant in the orators is in many respects a
blameless citizen. He is orderly in his desires and therefore also
moderate in his expenses, so as to be able to take a substantial

share of expenses for the public good. He refrains from injustice and violence against his fellow citizens. And in general, he is not a litigious person but leads a quiet and dignified life far away from the courts.

4. *The* cωφροcύνη *of the* πόλιc

If the orators have much to say on what cωφροcύνη is to the individual citizen, they are, on the whole, surprisingly reticent on the relevance of cωφροcύνη to the community of the city as a whole. Generally speaking, there is little to match the use of our terms as slogans for a certain type of policy that was such a marked feature of the speeches in Thucydides. Of course, in political speeches especially, speakers try to persuade the audience that their own proposals are beneficial to the πόλιc, and that those of the opponents are not. In such contexts, the standard directive phrase 'ἐὰν cωφρονῆτε (if you are cώφρονεc), you will do as I propose' is used many times to drive home this point. cωφρονεῖν is used in its prudential sense here: '*x*, which I propose, serves the interests of the πόλιc and its citizens; therefore, if you are cώφρονεc, you will do *x*'. Isocrates uses the phrase, for instance, to back up his plea for a Pan-Hellenic peace,[38] and Demosthenes does so to drive home the point that it would be unwise to trust Philippus.[39]

Apart from this persuasive/directive use of the verb cωφρονεῖν, cωφροcύνη is mainly, in the orators, a virtue of restoration. The most persistent idea is that the return to democracy after the oligarchic revolutions marks a return to a cώφρων form of constitution. The late fifth-century use of cωφροcύνη as a party

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[38] Isocrates' main speeches in favour of a Pan-Hellenic peace are *On Peace* (8), see §§ 58, 63, 104, 119 for cωφροcύνη in this connection, and the *Panathenaicus* (12), see especially § 14. Where cωφροcύνη is invoked in this connection, the argument is that peace is more expedient, not that keeping peace is *intrinsically* more cῶφρον than waging war. This can be seen from the *Panegyricus*, where Isocrates argues for Hellenic unity as a means to military superiority over Persia, and pleads for a prophylactic attack on Persia (4.197).

In *Archidamus* (9.59), the Spartan speaker pleads for a prudent attack on Messene; in *Philippus* (5.7), the speaker congratulates Philippus and Athens on the prudence of their peace treaty.

[39] See 1.27, 2.22, 3.20, 6.19, 6.23, 7.19.

slogan for aristocrats has, of course, become obsolete now that oligarchic sympathies have fallen in disrepute, and the ϲωφροϲύνη of the restored democracy is the restoration of peace after the violence of the civil wars. In this connection, Aeschines speaks of ϲωφρόνωϲ πολιτεύεϲθαι,[40] contrasting the restoration of peace to the violence of war and civil strife; many years after the events, he still cites Demosthenes as the very opposite of a δημο- τικόϲ and ϲώφρων citizen (3.168-176, see section 3 above). Isocrates states that after the end of the civil war, the citizens have become ϲωφρονέϲτατοι and εὐδαιμονώτατοι.[41] Andocides (1.109, 140) stresses the vital contribution of amnesty to this new-found harmony in the city, unsurprisingly so, because am- nesty is what he hopes to obtain himself.

Another recurrent theme, notably in Isocrates, is that the Athenian democracy in its early stages, roughly from Solon down to the age of Pericles, showed rather more ϲωφροϲύνη in its atti- tudes and its handling of political institutions than the present generations. The *Areopagiticus* is a plea for the restoration of the court of that name, and dwells extensively on the πολιτεία of the past, with its alleged concern for ϲωφροϲύνη. A dominant idea here is that in its humble origins, a city is forced to moderation, ϲωφροϲύνη and μετριότηϲ (7.4), and to careful deliberation (7.14). These are supposed to lead to growth, whereas wealth and ill judgement is followed by decline. This model of growth and subsequent decline is illustrated by references to the histori- cal examples of Sparta (7.7) and Athens itself (7.6). Throughout the speech, the frugality of the ancient city is linked to the ϲωφροϲύνη in private life of its individual citizens, for which the Areopagos is believed to have been an essential safeguard. As such, the integrity of the πόλιϲ of the old days consists in its su- perior ability to imbue its citizen with the characteristic virtues of the ϲώφρων πολίτηϲ, and ϲωφροϲύνη comprises much the same traits that we met in section 3 above. Similarly, in the *Panathenaicus*, ϲωφροϲύνη is associated with the time before the Athenian supremacy at sea (12.115),[42] and the ϲωφροϲύνη of that

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[40] Aesch. 2.176.
[41] Isoc. 18.46.
[42] Cf. Poulakis (1987) 42.

period is again said to show in the superior civic morality of its citizens (12.138, 140, 151). Pericles is named as a model of ϲωφροϲύνη in *De bigis* (16.28) and *Antidosis* (15.111), and the proto-democratic Athenian leader Theseus in the epideictic speech in praise of Helen (9.31, 38).[43] In a similar vein, Aeschines (1.25) cites the dignified posture of the ancient politicians of Solon's time, and Demosthenes (3.26) praises the small and inconspicuous houses of the politicians of the past as proof of their ϲωφροϲύνη in private life.[44]

Thus, we see that in the orators, ϲωφροϲύνη as a political virtue clearly belongs to democracy; there is now no trace of a link between ϲωφροϲύνη and a predilection for an elitist oligarchic government. The content of this democratic ϲωφροϲύνη is hardly spectacular, however. It mainly consists in a concern for the morality of the citizens: the ϲώφρων city will take care that its citizens will behave in the orderly, moderate, just and quiet way that is appropriate to the individual ϲώφρων πολίτηϲ.

5. *Conclusion*

The ideas on the ϲωφροϲύνη of the individual male citizen in the orators complement, and largely confirm, the data from Aristophanic comedy. In combination, the two genres show what ϲωφροϲύνη typically means to the ordinary male citizen, much as Euripides did in the case of women. (For diagrams that try to visualise the network connections between the uses of the terms, see Figures 10 and 11 in Chapter 9.3.)

Central to the conception of the ϲώφρων man in both these genres is 'control of desire' in social interaction and sexual conduct, and 'moderation' in expenses. Besides, the ϲώφρων citizen is 'just' and 'disinclined to violence'. The use of these terms in these last two senses is more marked in the orators, which is understandable in view of the settings in which the speeches were

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[43] Theseus' incontestable ϲωφροϲύνη is cited in connection with his infatuation with Helen, in proof of the rather more debatable point that the latter deserves praise (an 'argument from authority', cf. Bons (1996) 188).

[44] On the ideal of the 'Solonian' democracy, see Hansen (1991) 296-300, and Thomas (1994).

pronounced, but it is also relevant to some Aristophanic an-
titypes of the cώφρων πολίτης, such as the Sausage Seller from
Knights.

Finally, the cώφρων citizen is 'quiet' and ἀπράγμων. In com-
edy, the ideal of ἀπραγμοcύνη is very marked, and connected
with a strong desire for an escape from the cumbersome πράγ-
ματα of a city in trouble. In the orators, 'quietness' plays an im-
portant role in passages where the speaker argues that he is not
one to get involved in law suits and trials in general, and hence is
unlikely to be guilty in the present case.[45]

In political contexts, speakers use the phrase ἐὰν cωφρονῆτε in
support of various policies: thus, Isocrates suggests that it is ex-
pedient to go for a Pan-Hellenic peace; Demosthenes, by con-
trast, commends war on Philippus. On the theoretical level, the
orators praise the restoration of democracy as a return to
cωφροcύνη in contrast to the violence of the civil war, and claim
that the cωφροcύνη of a πόλιc consists in her concern for the mo-
rality of the private citizen (and that democracy in its original
'Solonic' form was rather more cώφρων in this respect than its
contemporary counterpart). In both respects (absence of civil
strife, and civil morality), cωφροcύνη is perceived as a contribu-
tion to the stability of the πόλιc. Ultimately, it has a similar func-
tion in the works of Plato (chapter 10), but Plato's political theo-
ries are on a different level of sophistication altogether.

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[45] All three aspects of cωφροcύνη will be seen to be used in the Platonic
dialogues, not only in dialectics, but also, and arguably more memorably, in the
portrayal of Socrates, who, in his control of ἔρωc (*Charmides, Symposion*), his law-
abiding justness (e.g. *Gorgias*) and his inactivity in politics (*ibidem*), shows many
traits of the superlative cώφρων πολίτης.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS:
THE MEANING OF *SOPHROSYNE* IN PLATO'S TIME:
A SYNCHRONIC DESCRIPTION

1. *Introduction*

It is time now to take stock of our findings in the previous chapters (2-8) and provide a synchronic description of the meanings of ϲώφρων and cognates that were available to Plato.

In the first part of this overview (section 2), I will present the various clusters of uses of our terms that I think can be identified on the basis of our data. I will present them in an order that is designed to emphasise the family resemblance between the various clusters of uses, and therefore, I will start with the more obviously 'intellectual' uses, and end with the most evidently 'moral' ones. If this order helps to bring out the family resemblance between the various senses of our terms, it does *not* imply that the first senses to be discussed are by any means the most central ones. In fact, the uses that seem most easily activated without extensive contextual preparation are those commending 'control of desires' in men, 'fidelity' in women, and 'quietness'/'obedience' for boys and girls; these I take to be the prototypical senses (and they are discussed, in connection with some argumentation for their centrality) in the central section of the survey under numbers 6-7 and 12-13. The centrality of these senses will be visualised, however, in the diagrams presented at the end of this chapter (figures 1 and 3-11 on pages 277, 279-287 below).

In section 3, I will discuss how these individual clusters of uses can be grouped into a 'network'. I will discuss the parameters according to which the network will be ordered (9.2.1: the persons to whom ϲωφροϲύνη is attributed and the behaviour in which ϲωφροϲύνη more clearly manifests itself), and also look into some parameters that would have seemed relevant but were ultimately not decisive for the construction of the network (9.2.2 and 9.2.3: the speakers who attribute ϲωφροϲύνη and the physical

symptoms of ϲωφροϲύνη). Finally, in this section, I will provide
some explanation of how the diagrams and tables in figures 1-11
are to be read (section 3.4).

The previous chapters have, I think, given no reason to reject
the assumption, implied by all existing description of the terms,
that the adjective ϲώφρων, the noun ϲωφροϲύνη and the verb
ϲωφρονεῖν etc. can be regarded as belonging to a single lexeme,
by which I mean that each of these terms basically expresses one
and the same concept, and exhibits essentially the same, very
full, range of senses (one apparent exception to the general rule
will be noted in the main text below, section 2, sub 1). ϲωφρονεῖν
then generally means 'to be ϲώφρων' in all the relevant senses of
that word, and ϲωφροϲύνη is the 'quality of being ϲώφρων'. Thus I
will continue to speak of ϲωφροϲύνη while freely including in-
stances of the adjective and the verb and other cognate terms.
The somewhat more restricted/specialised use of ϲωφρονίζειν
('to make ϲώφρων'), ϲωφρονιϲτήϲ ('person who makes people
ϲώφρων'), ϲωφρόνιϲμα (a 'summons to ϲωφροϲύνη'), and the ad-
verb ϲωφρόνωϲ ('in a ϲώφρων manner') will be discussed briefly
in section 4 below.

2. *The Uses of* ϲώφρων *and Cognates in Plato's Time:*
A Synchronic Conspectus

(1) *'Soundness of mind'.*[1] It is convenient to start with the one
group of uses where ϲωφροϲύνη means exactly what etymology
would seem to suggest: with unimpaired φρένεϲ' (ϲῶϲ), i.e. 'with
a normal, properly functioning mind' as opposed to various
states of madness and frenzy.

This is how the verb is used when Herodotus tells us that
Cambyses ἐϲωφρόνηϲε (Hdt. 3.64.5, see chapter 7.2) on recovery
from his 'madness'. As we have seen, Cambyses' madness was the
source of his many crimes to his subjects. Similarly, in *Od.* 23.13,
Eurycleia's 'madness' (lack of ϲαοφροϲύνη) led to her uncharac-
teristically inconsiderate behaviour vis-à-vis Penelope. In such

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[1] In the descriptions below, Arab numerals represent the 'nodes' of the
network, clusters of uses of the words that seem to belong together.

cases, then, some of the more overtly moral senses of the word are also secondarily activated, but the terms may also be used simply to describe sanity in contrast to abnormal states of mind that are not necessarily reprehensible, such as the prophetic frenzy of Cassandra (E. *Tr.* 350) or the madness of Orestes when by the Erinyes (E. *Or.* 254) (see chapter 6.2).

For this group of uses, the standard antonyms are μαίνεϲθαι/ μανία, but verbs with the root -φρον also occur, notably χαλι- φρονεῖν (*Od.* 23.13), and παραφρονεῖν (Hdt. 3.35); accordingly, εὖ φρονεῖν may occur as an associated term (E. *Ion* 520).

If these uses are semantically quite straightforward, they are by no means very central uses of our terms. It seems significant that this group of uses alone forms an exception to the general rule that our three main terms cover the same range of uses: in our data, we encounter instances of the verb and the noun for this group of uses, but none of the adjective.[2] This may be a coincidence of distribution, but it may well be the case that 'madness' and 'soundness of mind' are regarded as - more or less temporary - states of mind rather than permanent characteristics of a person. (Even Cambyses finally recovers.)

In any case, the use of ϲωφρονεῖν and ϲωφροϲύνη to describe soundness of mind, would seem relatively rare, and I find no reason to assume that this use is in any sense central to the network. In this connection, it seems relevant to note that this is most probably not a use that has contributed significantly to the high position of ϲωφροϲύνη on the scale of Greek values: 'sanity' provides the *basis* for morally desirable behaviour, but no more than that (which, in my view, supports the view that one should not assign prototype status to this use).

(2) *Men: avoiding harmful behaviour.* A second, and considerably more frequent, group of uses is formed by those instances in which the terms are applied to a person who wisely refrains from an act that is harmful to himself or those who depend on him. In this sense, as indeed in most others, ϲώφρων and cognates are

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[2] In some cases, the participle ϲωφρονῶν is used as a predicative adjective, see e.g. E. *Hel.* 97. One may compare the lack of an adjective proper to μαίνεϲθαι/μανία, instead of which μανείϲ/μαινόμενοϲ can be used.

used to focus not primarily on a person's state of mind as such, but rather on the *behaviour* that is its typical manifestation: behaviour that, in these particular cases, betrays a prudent and responsible concern for one's self-interest. A paraphrase of this use may be something like 'with the soundness of mind to refrain from irresponsible behaviour'. It has been argued above (chapter 1.3) that it probably cannot be maintained that this is a purely 'intellectual' use of the word, and this is borne out by its very first occurrence: In *Il.* 21.462f. (ἐννοσίγαι' οὐκ ἄν με cαόφρονα μυθήcαιο | ἔμμεναι, εἰ δὴ cοί γε βροτῶν ἕνεκα πτολεμίξω, 'Earth-shaker, you could not say that I am cαόφρων if, as you suggest, I am to wage war on you for the sake of mortals'), Apollo would seem to suggest that it makes no sense for the gods to fight on behalf of mortals, but in the background there is the idea that it is unseemly to fight with one's uncle, as the narrator's comment on Apollo's words (21.468 αἴδετο γάρ ῥα, 'for he was ashamed') makes clear.

More straightforward is S. *Ph.* 304, οὐκ ἐνθάδ' οἱ πλοῖ τοῖcι cώφροcιν βροτῶν, where Philoctetes explains that sensible men with a sense of responsibility avoid visiting his island because it would be a wasted effort to land on a shore that offers no harbour and no opportunities for trade. In this type of context, cώφρων and cognates often stand in contrast to terms that decry the ill-considered 'rashness' of the opposite line of behaviour, notably ἀνόητοc, ἄβουλοc, ἄφρων, νήπιοc and ἠλίθιοc.

Of this 'prudential' sense, we do not find many instances before Sophocles, but it becomes quite frequent after. Indeed, the appeal to this prudential type of cωφροcύνη becomes a cliché of persuasion, and can be made whenever a speaker wishes to prevent further deliberation and commend the line of action that he or she proposes (see especially chapter 5.4, 6.2). Here, there is a specific sub-group of uses, phrases of the type ἂν cωφρονῆτε, 'if you are/will be *sôphrones*', where persuasive value tends to take precedence over semantic content. To this extent, De Vries is justified to speak of an *emploi affaibli*.[3] Perhaps it is because of this relative semantic emptiness that cωφροcύνη does not always take the characteristic form of an inhibition from harmful ac-

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[3] De Vries (1944) 99.

tion, but may also turn out to be a spur to action, when a speaker suggests action and hints that it would be harmful *not* to follow his or her advice.

It appears that in the majority of cases, ϲωφροϲύνη of this kind is ascribed to free-born adult men, and this is a first pointer to the importance of the various roles connected with gender, age and social status. Apparently, responsibility for oneself and one's affairs is regarded typically as a masculine characteristic, though there are some hints that a woman can show a similarly responsible ϲωφροϲύνη by taking good care of the household,[4] and ϲωφροϲύνη in this sense is also claimed by some women who show a very 'masculine' sense of responsibility, notably Electra (S. *El.* 365).

(3) *The citizens of a πόλιϲ: observing what is good for the city.* Closely related to this 'prudential' use of ϲώφρων and cognates are those cases where the terms are applied to the male citizens of a πόλιϲ as a collective, notably in speeches before the assembly or in court. Responsibility and self-interest are also decisive factors here, though this is not the self-interest of individual citizens, but of the entire πόλιϲ as a whole. Both in court and in the assembly, speakers will not fail to point out that voting in favour of, or following the advise of, their opponents will harm the community of the πόλιϲ; therefore, if they are 'wise' or 'well-advised', the addressees will vote in favour of the speakers instead.

In court or before the assembly, the appeal to this prudential type of ϲωφροϲύνη becomes a cliché of persuasion (see especially chapter 8.4), and it is here that phrases of the type 'ἂν ϲωφρονῆτε, you will (not) do *x*', are most naturally at home. Again, persuasive value takes precedence over semantic content here, and again, ϲωφροϲύνη does not always take the more characteristic form of an inhibition from harmful action, but may also turn out to be a spur to action, when it is suggested that it would be harmful *not* to follow the speaker's advice.

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[4] At X. *Oec.* 7.15, Socrates suggests that good care of the estate is a characteristic of ϲώφρονεϲ both male and female. His female interlocutor, however, clearly has a rather more restricted view of female ϲωφροϲύνη ('being quiet and doing basically nothing').

In such cases especially, then, being *cώφρων* typically involves not only avoiding a harmful policy, but at the same time adopting one that is more beneficial. A typical example is a remark taken from Diodotus' speech in favour of reconsidering the aggression against the people of Mytilene advocated by Cleon, Th. 3.44.1, οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, εἰ cωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας ('It is not the *adikia* of the people of Mytilene that is the topic of our present debate, if we are well-advised, but our own good judgement.', see chapter 7.3.1).

If the *cωφροσύνη* of *euboulia* and good council is one way in which *cωφροσύνη* typically relates to the citizens of the *πόλις* as a collective, the use of *cωφροσύνη* to commend respect for the laws or εὐνομία is another. Here, the citizens of a *πόλις* are not so much presented as an autonomous group of agents with a responsibility for their own welfare, but rather as subjects who would do well to submit to the status quo in order not to undermine the stability of the community. This is, then, a more 'other-regarding' use of *cωφροσύνη*, and it is discussed under number 14 below.

(4) *The πόλις: Good caution in international affairs.* For the *πόλις*, good management of external affairs is equally important, and here the flexibility of *cωφροσύνη* is especially in evidence when some kind of military intervention is discussed (see chapter 7.3.1). In such cases, *cωφροσύνη* will most often be invoked in order to dissuade the council from rash intervention that may put the *πόλις* in danger (at Th. 1.84.2, for instance, Sparta's slowness to intervene on behalf of their allies is commended in these terms by Archidamos), but here too, *cωφροσύνη* may on occasion also be invoked to commend intervention for the sake of self-defence, as when the people from Egestae try to persuade the Athenians to fight Syracuse (Th. 6.6.2 *cῶφρον* δ' εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἔτι ξυμμάχων ἀντέχειν τοῖς Cυρακοσίοις, ἄλλως τε καὶ χρήματα σφῶν παρεξόντων ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανά, 'It is wise to side with those allies still left and stand your ground against the

Syracusans, especially when they will provide money that is quite
sufficient for this war').[5]

(5), (6) *Men: Control of Pleasures and Desires; Moderation (metriotês)*.
In this section, I deal with with two groups of uses that seem
closely related: 'control of desires' in general, and 'moderation'.
This second group of uses seems to be a sub-group to the first: it
is closely connected with a specific number of contexts.

If good care of one's self-interest is required from male citi-
zens in the management of their private affairs, and from the
πόλις as a whole both in internal and in foreign affairs, individ-
ual citizens are of course also required to observe standards of
propriety in social interaction. Cωφροσύνη in men means here
that one has the good sense to observe standards of propriety,
and takes the guise of 'self-control' or 'control of pleasures and
desires'.

One is at some distance here from the 'prudential' senses de-
scribed above, as 'self-interest' is clearly no longer a decisive cri-
terion, and this is borne out by the fact that in this type of con-
text a rather different set of associated and contrasted terms
shows up. Some general terms like ἀνόητος, νήπιος and ἄφρων
(but not the more specific ἄβουλος) still function as antitheses,
but the cώφρων man will also be given the more specific term
κόσμιος; his counterpart will be said to be ἀναιδής, 'lacking in
αἰδώς' (a sense of shame and respect for others), μιαρός
('filthy'), πανουργός ('up to everything'), θρασύς ('bold'), κα-
ταπύγων ('depraved'), or even a ὑβριστής ('given to physical in-
fringement on the integrity of others').

This use of our terms is not exactly frequent in works of high
literature with an heroic or 'grand' subject matter: in fact, it is
absent from Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Herodotus. By
contrast, it is very common in authors and genres who have more
room to pay attention to the conduct of the non-heroic 'com-
mon' citizen, and we find many instances of this type of
cωφροσύνη in the *Corpus Theognideum* (Thgn. 483, 497 and 665),

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[5] Thus, notions associated with cωφροσύνη can be exploited to commend
policies that are fundamentally opposed. For a similar phenomenon in
connection with ἀνδρεία, see Roisman (2003).

in Euripides (where the farmer in *Electra* is a very marked example of the type, see E. *El.* 53, 261 and chapter 6.4), in comedy (where the Weaker Logos, Phidippides and the Sausage Seller provide vivid antipodes to the ϲώφρων citizen, see chapter 8.2) and in the orators (e.g. Lys. 3.4, 14.41, 19.16, 21.19, see chapter 8.3).

It is also a sense that is activated without much contextual preparation. Mythical exemplars with a reputation for ϲωφροϲύνη such as Peleus (Pi. I. 8.24-6, Ar. *Nu.* 1067) and Proteus (E. *Hel.* 47) are called ϲώφρων without any further explanation. Now of course hearers will be familiar with the traditional stories, and it can perhaps still be argued that they will activate that background knowledge in order to arrive at the right interpretation of ϲώφρων, but even so it still seems quite significant that they apparently need no more than a hint. (An even more striking example is E. *Tr.* 422-3 where ϲώφρονοϲ … γυναικόϲ is used to name Penelope, who is not mentioned in the context at all. See under 7 below.)

But we also have indications elsewhere that this use is one that is easily activated. An example is Isocrates 3.36, where Nicocles claims ϲωφροϲύνη for himself, goes on to provide the motivation that people strongly resent offences against women and boys, only then to explain what ϲωφροϲύνη meant for him in practice: as a ruler, he has not touched *any* boy or woman other than his own wife. Evidently, his addressees will have the right interpretation of ϲωφροϲύνη readily available if they are to follow his argument. Other examples are provided by discussions of ϲωφροϲύνη in Plato: both in *Gorgias* (491D-E) and in *Republic*, it is *this* use of ϲωφροϲύνη that is activated when ϲωφροϲύνη is introduced into the discussion. By contrast, in *Charmides*, the boy Charmides starts with a definition of ϲωφροϲύνη that is typical for *him* as a boy , but before that, ϲωφροϲύνη as 'control of desire' has been invoked in the portrayal of Socrates' self-control after an accidental glance inside the boy's himation (155D). Here, this particular notion of ϲωφροϲύνη is invoked even *without* the use of the word; and in view of the discussion that follows, there can be no doubt that the readers are to take the scene as a typical example of ϲωφροϲύνη.

This, then, is a use both relevant to daily life and evidently easily activated, and there seems to be a strong case to regard this as *the* prototypical use of ϲώφρων in relation to those who are arguably the most central members of Greek society, male citizens.[6] (For my criteria for prototypicality, cf. chapter 1.7 under (4), pp. 33-5.) For those reasons, this is the group of uses that will be placed at the very centre of our representation of the network.

In this use, and most of the uses considered below, ϲωφροϲύνη is unequivocally an inhibition, not a spur to action (as we have seen in parts 3 and 4 of this overview, this was less unequivocally the case for 'prudential' ϲωφροϲύνη). Still it is important to see that, for a man, ϲωφροϲύνη does not normally amount to abstinence of any kind, but rather means that one will be careful not to fulfil one's desires in excessive or improper ways. Thgn. 483 and 497 both mean that even a man who is normally ϲώφρων will no longer be so when drunk, because he will have lost control over his behaviour; it is not suggested that the ϲώφρων man will abstain completely, or even that he will never drink too much. Similarly, the speaker in Lys. 3.4 points out that though his admittedly strong attraction to the boy from Plataea may seem excessive to some of the jury, desire is common and human enough: the test of ϲωφροϲύνη lies in the ability to deal with this desire in the most orderly fashion (κοϲμιώτατα), which in his case amounts to avoiding (or, at any rate, not starting) quarrels and fights with a rival.

A sub-group that seems closely related to this group of uses is the use of ϲώφρων in association with μέτριος to mean 'moderate' in one's expenses. This use is met especially in the orators (chapter 8.3), and we can see why it is a good persuasive strategy to draw attention to this type of 'moderation': in such contexts, the

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[6] A further indication is probably that expert definitions of ϲωφροϲύνη in philosophical texts often address *only* this use. See, e.g. Antiphon Soph. fr. 16, Pl. *Grg.* 491d-e and cf. the pseudo-Platonic definition, 411e6-8, ϲωφροϲύνη μετριότηϲ τῆϲ ψυχῆϲ περὶ τὰϲ ἐν αὐτῆι κατὰ φύϲιν γιγνομέναϲ ἐπιθυμίαϲ τε καὶ ἡδονάϲ· εὐαρμοϲτία καὶ εὐταξία ψυχῆϲ πρὸϲ τὰϲ κατὰ φύϲιν ἡδονὰϲ καὶ λύπαϲ, 'ϲωφροϲύνη is moderation of the soul with regard to the desires and pleasure that arise in it according to nature, a well-adaptedness and orderliness of the soul concerning the natural desires and pains.'

thought is that fulfilment of one's private desires costs money
that cannot be spent on the community of the πόλις, and that
extreme expenses may even endanger the preservation of the
οἶκος and spoil the chance of future liturgies. We are dealing
with a use that is close to the normal, central use of 'control of
desire'; the main reason for distinguishing it as an individual
group of uses is that its typical associated term, μέτριος, is not
found in connection with the mainstream uses of cώφρων in the
sense of 'control of desires'. As the use of cώφρων in the sense of
'moderate' embraces aspects of 'self-interest' (preservation of
one's estate) as well as of other-regarding morality (serving the
interests of the πόλις), its rightful place will be *between* the
cωφροcύνη of 'prudence' and the mainstream central uses of
'control of desires'. (Hence, in the schemata, this use gets num-
ber 5, the mainstream uses will be found under 6.)

(7) *Women: Marital Fidelity.* For women, standards of propriety
are considerably stricter. In our texts, written almost uniformly
from a masculine bias, a 'good' woman is one who is a good wife
to her κύριος, and a woman will be cώφρων if she avoids any con-
duct that may harm or offend her husband. (Euripides is a main
source here, see chapter 6.3).

First and foremost, the general concern for standards of de-
cent and proper behaviour expected from men has its parallel in
the more specific and restrictive rule that a woman will be sexu-
ally faithful to her κύριος, and shall not give potential μοῖχοι a
chance. Penelope (E. *Tr.* 422-3, Ar. *Th.* 548) is the positive
mythological exemplum here - indeed, in *Troades*, Penelope is
identified by calling her 'a cώφρων woman'. By contrast, Helena
and Clytemnestra constitute the negative counter-examples. But
this use is not restricted to the mythological figures of high po-
etry: when the speaker in Lys. 1.10, Euphiletus, says that he was
so naïve as to think that his wife was the most cώφρων woman in
town (οὕτως ἠλιθίως διεκείμην, ὥστε ᾤμην τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ γυναῖκα
παcῶν cωφρονεcτάτην εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῆι πόλει), he similarly simply
means that he mistakenly thought her faithful.

Here again, we may note (without repeating the complete ar-
gumentation under 5, 6 above) that 'fidelity' is a central concern
in the case of women, and that the use of cώφρων to signal a

woman's fidelity is, again, very easily activated. Here, it seems, we have *the* prototypical sense where women are concerned.

The thought that fidelity is the core of female ἀρετή is also borne out by the fact that a woman who is cώφρων in this sense is occasionally called ἀρίcτη (E. *Hel.* 1684) or ἄμεμπτος (E. *IA* 1159) for this very reason, whereas her counterparts will be simply κακή (E. *Hipp.* 667, *And.* 594, *Or.* 1139) or πονηρά (E. *El.* 1099, Ar. *Th.* 549).

(8) *Girls: Chastity.* For unmarried girls, the rule is of course sexual abstinence per se rather than marital fidelity (the old-fashioned English word 'chaste' naturally applies to both, whereas German 'keusch' or Dutch 'kuis' seem to apply more typically to the former only): when Danaus tells his daughters that they should value τὸ cωφρονεῖν more highly than their lives (A. *Supp.* 1013, τὸ cωφρονεῖν τιμῶcα τοῦ βίου πλέον), he means that they should preserve their virginity at all costs.[7]

(9) *Boys: Decency in Dealing with* ἐραcταί. Boys did not, of course, suffer the seclusion to which women and girls were confined, and the standards of decent behaviour that apply to them are rather more complicated and less unequivocal.[8] Nevertheless, it seems clear that free-born boys were not expected to have any sexual contact with other males at all, let alone to enjoy it. The most notorious offender against cωφροcύνη in this respect, at least as represented by Aeschines) is Timarchus (Aeschines 1 *passim*, see chapter 8.3), who allegedly prostituted himself in his youth. A comically overstated view of the standards of propriety is given in the *agôn* of *Clouds* by the defendant of the 'old education' (Chapter 8.2).

All the same, it can be doubted whether the uses of cωφροcύνη in the sense of 'chastity' for girls, and 'circumspection'/'decency' for boys are quite as central as 'fidelity' for

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[7] Total sexual abstinence is also an important element in the cωφροcύνη of Hippolytus in Euripides' play. For him, complete 'chastity' is a condition for ritual purity. But this seems to be a rather idiosyncratic view (see Barrett on E. *Hipp.* 79-81 and Cairns (1993) 314-19).

[8] See, for instance, Dover (1978) 23-31, Halperin (1990) 88-104, Winkler (1990) 45-70, Cohen (1991) 171-202.

women, or 'control of desire' for men. Our texts are generally
not especially lavish in their attention to minors, and when they
are mentioned, it is quite often from the perspective of adult
males: this may have encouraged a one-sided view of girls as be-
ings that are to be strictly secluded and guarded until given away
in marriage, and of boys as vulnerable victims to the lusts of
ἐρασταί. Yet it can be doubted whether in daily life, children were
primarily regarded as embodiments of innocence under severe
strain. As we will see below (see 17 below), Charmides names
hêsuchia, 'quietness' as a first definition of cωφροcύνη, and when
for instance the women in *Lysistrata* claim that all they want is to
sit cωφρόνως ὥcπερ κόρη, 'quietly like a girl' (A. *Lys.* 473f.) with-
out offending anyone, they mean that they will keep quiet.[9] Per-
haps, then, the uses of cώφρων and cognates to commend 'quiet'
behaviour are even more central where minors are concerned.
In that case there may be no exact correspondence with the uses
of our terms with respect to adults. For adults, 'control of de-
sires' and 'fidelity' seem to be the prototypical uses, but where
children are concerned, 'quiet/obedient' are perhaps rather
more central than 'chaste' and 'decent'. (Incidentally, these uses
probably again very much reflect *adult* expectations with regard
to desirable juvenile behaviour.) But our data are too scarce to
justify any definite conclusions.

(10)-(14) *Quietness And Obedience.* In this group, a number of uses
are included that define cωφροcύνη in terms of 'quiet' behaviour.
In case of men, 'quietness' means especially inconspicuous be-
haviour in public life, and avoidance of πράγματα such as law
courts; in the case of women, children and servants, 'quietness'
means orderly behaviour and obedient submission to their supe-
riors. Whereas women, children and servants offend their κύριοι
and infringe on standards of decency somewhat similar in kind
to the standards of propriety discussed above, men who are not
'quiet' but engage in law suits (e.g.) are frequently also felt to do
actual harm to their fellow citizens. Here, 'quietness' borders on

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[9] Cf. chapter 8.1, n. 1.

the avoidance of injustice and violence discussed in the fifth and last main group of uses.

(10) *Men: the Quiet Life.* The ideal of the quiet citizen is not very marked in all the genres we have been surveying, but it is important in Aristophanes and the orators. In Aristophanes, the ideal of ἡcυχία and ἀπραγμοcύνη is most extensively formulated by the Strong Argument in *Clouds* (chapter 8.2), who seems to be a dubious spokesman for essentially serious ideals. Strong extols aristocratic pursuits such as athletics, and abhors the courts and places of gossip such as the bath house and the *agora*. Various antipodes of the quiet citizen occur in Aristophanic comedy, such as the court addict Philocleon in *Wasps*, and the Paphlagonian and the Sausage Seller in *Knights*. Aversion to πράγματα also informs the escapist visions of a better city (*Birds*) or a better Athens (*Ra.* 727-9).

In the court speeches of the orators, the notion of quietness and ἀπραγμοcύνη is invoked when a speaker wishes to suggest his innocence by claiming that he is inexperienced with the procedures of the courts, and, it will be implied, that he is disinclined to engage in conflict.

Men who do not live up to the ideal of 'quietness' but engage in πράγματα are often felt actually to harm their fellow citizens; an example from outside the orators is Pentheus (E. *Ba.* 504, 641), who cannot control his anger and threatens to harm the Lydian stranger.

(11), (12) *Women and Girls: keep quiet and obey.* Women are commonly required to 'keep quiet' in front of their husbands: they are supposed to refrain from contradicting their men or to interfere with their activities. 'Do not question me, do not inquire. It is good to be cώφρων.' (S. *Aj.* 586), says Ajax to Tecmessa. Similarly, at Ar. *Lys.* 507-8, the women claim that they used to put up with anything their men would do because of their cωφροcύνη (ἡμεῖc τὸν μὲν πρότερον πόλεμον καὶ χρόνον ἠνεcχόμεθ᾽ ⟨ὑμῶν⟩ | ὑπὸ cωφροcύνηc τῆc ἡμετέραc τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἅττ᾽ ἐποεῖτε…, 'during the previous time of this war, we used to bear with anything you men would do because of our cωφροcύνη'). Various expressions for ἡcυχία and cιγᾶν are associated terms in this type of context,

and expressions for 'making trouble' (λυπεῖν, δυϲφορεῖν) act as counterparts.[10]

Injunctions to 'keep quiet' are also heard when women show strong emotions such as fear or anger (see especially chapter 4.3) that they would do better to suppress. Notorious examples are the Danaids in A. *Supp.* (198, 710, 724, 992), the Theban women in A. *Th.* 186, Electra (S. *El.* 304) and Medea (E. *Med.* 913). Examples of men unable to control such emotions are encountered less frequently. A very significant exception is Pentheus (E. *Ba.* 504, 641); his fear and anger strongly contrast with the almost uncanny quietness of Dionysus-the Stranger.

Next to 'marital fidelity', then, 'keeping quiet' is the secondary pillar of female ϲωφροϲύνη, and the ideology of fidelity-*cum*-quietness is more or less fully expressed by some of the 'good' women in Euripides (Macaria in *Hcld.* 476ff., Andromache in *Tr.* 645ff., see chapter 6.3). In fact, ϲωφροϲύνη has been rightly considered the *virtus feminarum* par excellence,[11] and this is hardly because female ϲωφροϲύνη embraces every conceivable aspect of admirable behaviour, but rather because conventional ideology allows women few opportunities to exhibit other qualities conventionally classed as ἀρεταί, such as ϲοφία, ἀνδρεία and so on. It seems that, by and large, men wished their women to be, primarily chaste, silent and generally inconspicuous. That is not to say, of course, that all women conformed to the male ideology, even in our sources. Even in our limited and possibly biased sources, we see women taking on far more active roles, and many of these are not Clytemnestras or Medeas, but rather more estimable figures like Electra and Antigone, and unequivocally good ones like Lysistrata. It seems, however, that the vocabulary to praise women as autonomous agents is rather underdeveloped: the terms of praise that *are* used in such cases, often have a definite 'masculine' ring to them, or they are used in ways in which they usually apply only to men.[12]

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[10] On silence, see Rutherford (1996), David (1999).

[11] North (1966) 21.

[12] A striking example of the former is Electra's speech to Chrysothemis at S. *El.* 967-985, which draws on the notions of ἐλευθερία, εὐκλεία and even ἀνδρεία and κλέοϲ. ϲωφρονεῖν etc. can occasionally be used in a rather 'masculine' way to apply to women: at E. *Hipp.* 704 for instance, the nurse uses the phrase οὐκ ἐϲωφρόνουν ἐγώ to admit that her plan to approach Hippolytus has not been

The 'quietness' of the adult woman has its virtually exact counterpart in that of girls, who are likewise expected to be mainly modest, silent, and obedient; and as we suggested above (under 8), 'quietness' may well be an even more central quality for girls in daily life. A good example of the kind is the girl in Euripides' *Children of Heracles,* who apologises profusely when coming out of the house to offer her life for the sake of her siblings (E. *Hcld.* 476-7).

(13) *Boys: quietness and 'shame'.* Boys are likewise expected to behave quietly and obediently, and, as we saw most fully in the case of Charmides (chapter 1.1), this is expected to go with a sense of modesty. The fullest exposition of cωφροcύνη as discipline (and decency) in boys is given in the speech on old education by Stronger Argument in *Clouds* (depicting the time ὅτε ... cωφροcύνη | 'νενόμιcτο, 'when cωφροcύνη was generally practised', Ar. *Nu.* 962-3, see chapter 8.2). What Stronger Argument gives us here is an exaggerated and one-sided picture, of course, but comparison with the portrayal of Charmides suggests that Aristophanes offers caricature rather than fiction. Charmides himself is notably modest and shameful (inclined to blushing), and it will be no coincidence that the first two definitions of cωφροcύνη he offers are 'doing everything in an orderly fashion and quietly' (τὸ κοcμίωc πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡcυχῆι, 159b7) and 'the same as αἰδώc' (ὅπερ αἰδώc, 160e4). A much earlier instance of youthful cωφροcύνη is Telemachus in *Od.* 4.158 (chapter 2.2), who shies away from addressing Menelaus before his turn.

As we argued above, *Charmides* seems to indicate that for boys, 'quiet' and 'orderly' behaviour was very much a central norm and a central interpretation of cωφροcύνη. Here, we seem to have yet another prototypical use.

If cωφροcύνη is sometimes regarded as the special virtue of youth, the reason for this once again seems to be - as in the case of women - that boys were not yet expected to exhibit the full range of adult masculine ἀρεταί, whereas the quiet, obedient and decent behaviour associated with cωφροcύνη were highly valued

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successful: it was a piece of 'bad thinking'. On women's ἀνδρεία, cf. Hobbs (2000).

for their age category. A clear case in point is Isocrates' praise of
Euagoras (9.22-23), who is said to have had beauty, strength and
cωφροcύνη in his youth, and, in addition to the matured versions
of these qualities, ἀνδρεία, coφία and δικαιοcύνη in adulthood
(9.23 ἀνδρὶ δὲ γενομένωι ταῦτά τε πάντα cυνηυξήθη καὶ πρὸς
τούτοις ἀνδρεία προcεγένετο καὶ coφία καὶ δικαιοcύνη).

   At the same time, not all boys live up to the ideal, and one of-
ten hears complaints that young people typically lack cωφροcύνη
(e.g. S. fr. 786, Democritus fr. 294, X. *Mem.* 1.2.26, Arist. *Rhet.*
1390b), which means that they do not yet fully master their pas-
sions and desires or have the prudent consideration associated
with adulthood. Here we seem to have the stereotypical idea that
'good sense' only comes with age.

(14) *Subordinates: Do not resist.* Finally, for subjects vis-à-vis their
superiors, cωφροcύνη again amounts to obedience and the good
sense not to speak up against those in power. This 'authoritar-
ian' view of cωφροcύνη is characteristically rare in our literary
texts, which are of course dominated by the discourse of free
males of high status. The most significant instances occur when
'free' men are treated like 'slaves'; in such cases there is a strong
sense of insult. Thus, this view of cωφροcύνη is expressed by some
notoriously despotic characters in tragedy, notably Klytaimnestra
and Aegisthus in *Agamemnon* (1425, 1620, 1664, all spoken to the
chorus of elderly citizens, see chapter 4.4) and Menelaus and
Agamemnon in *Ajax* (1075, 1259; Ajax sarcastically adopts their
view at 677, see chapter 5.2).

(15), (16) *Men: Avoiding Injustice and Violence.* Whereas the man
who is cώφρων in the sense of 'in control of his desires' is willing
and able to comply with standards of decency, cωφροcύνη can
also be used to commend the willingness to avoid acts that vio-
late the rights of his fellow men, rights that under normal condi-
tions are protected by the νόμοι. cώφρων is close to δίκαιος here,
and ἀ δικεῖν, ἁμαρτάνειν and ὑβρίζειν will often be used as anto-
nyms of cωφρονεῖν in this sense. Thus, 'cώφρων and δίκαιος' be-
comes almost a standard combination in court, where people
will plead innocent of the charge at hand, and support this by

pointing out that they are generally 'decent' fellows (Chapter 8.3). A straightforward example of the close association of the two is provided by Lys. 1.38, where the defendant claims that if he had lured Eratosthenes into his house in order to kill him on the basis of mere rumours, this would have been an injustice (ἠδίκουν ἄν), whereas if he had done so on the basis of very real and repeated facts, he would not consider this an infringement on the spirit of the law, but would (still) consider himself ϲώφρων (ϲώφρον' ἂν ἐμαυτὸν ἡγούμην).

The use of ϲωφροϲύνη in the sense of 'respect for the rights of others' is prominent in poems from the Theognidean corpus (chapter 3.2), poems that reflect the distressing view that in a changing society, some (new) ways of acquiring property openly disregard the claims of others but are not (yet) sufficiently precluded by a universally accepted code (Thgn. 41, 379, 431, 437, 454, 701, 754, 756, 1082a). In these poems, ϲώφρονεϲ are those who refrain from ἀδικία, even if, as it seems, they would have every opportunity to practise it.

Physical violence is, of course, a specific category of injustice (the speaker in Lys. 1.38 has to go to some lengths to argue that in his case, this does not apply), and there is an important subgroup here where ϲώφρων etc. are used to commend those who refrain from such physical violence.

(17) *Men: do not offend the gods.* The last two groups of uses concerned violence and injustice against one's fellow men; this category deals with acts that infringe on the rights of the gods. In high literature from the late archaic and early classical periods, human beings are frequently said to offend the gods. This they do either by directly insulting them (Ajax in Sophocles, see chapter 5.2) or actually 'fighting' them (Pentheus in *Bacchae*, see chapter 6.6), or, more typically perhaps, by violating human relationships that are specifically under divine protection. This second category includes violence against one's own kin and one's own country (of which the *Oresteia,* the *Electras* and the plays dealing with the expedition of the Seven Against Thebes are the main examples), and also violence against suppliants (Aeschylus' *Supplices,* Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* and the suppliant dramas of Euripides) and *xenoi* (*Cyclops*). In such cases, a condemnation

of human violence is often backed up on a 'vertical' level by the thought that such deeds of aggression offend the gods. In such contexts, *cώφρων* applies to the man who has the good sense to avoid offending the gods (offences which are typically characterised in terms of *ἀcέβεια* and *ὕβρις*), and this particular brand of *cωφροcύνη* regularly goes with a kind of 'modesty' that results from awareness of the limitations of human nature. The fullest exposition of the thoughts connected with this use of *cώφρων* etc. is in the prologue of Sophocles' *Ajax*, where Athena warns Odysseus not to follow the example of Ajax (who had claimed, as becomes clear later on in the play, that he could win his battles without Athena's help):

> τοιαῦτα τοίνυν εἰcορῶν ὑπέρκοπον
> μηδέν ποτ᾽ εἴπηιc αὐτὸc εἰc θεοὺc ἔποc
> μηδ᾽ ὄγκον ἄρηι μηδέν᾽, εἴ τινοc πλέον
> ἢ χειρὶ βρίθειc ἢ μακροῦ πλούτου βάθει.
> ὡc ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν
> ἅπαντα τἀνθρώπεια· τοὺc δὲ cώφροναc
> θεοὶ φιλοῦcι καὶ cτυγοῦcι τοὺc κακούc.
> (S. *Aj.* 127-133)

> In view of this, you must never yourself speak a word of arrogance against the gods, nor assume any kind of swollen pride, if you pull more weight than another man either by your deeds or by the depth of great wealth. See how a day brings down and brings back up again all human affairs; those who show good sense win loyalty from the gods, but they detest those who are bad.

Passages such as this are universally regarded as highly significant for the history of Greek thought, as of course they are, and accordingly, this religious 'humility' or 'self-awareness' is widely seen as an equally significant element in the concept of *cωφροcύνη*. It undoubtedly is, yet it should not be forgotten that the use of *cώφρων* etc. in direct connection with this type of religious thinking is largely restricted to the high poetry of Pindar and the tragedians. Mythological atrocities like the expedition of the seven warriors against Thebes, the killings in the house of Atreus, or the various deeds of aggression by non-Athenians in the suppliant dramas are condemned not just on the basis of their inhumanity, but also on the ground that such deeds offend the gods. By contrast, in the discourse of the court in the ordi-

nary πόλιϲ, violence is more usually condemned in purely legalistic terms, and this condemnation is rarely backed up by an appeal to religion. In such contexts, the expression 'to be ϲώφρων concerning the gods' is used mostly on a more mundane level to mean that one should avoid the juridical offence of ἀϲέβεια (Xenophon's discussion of the trial of Socrates in *Mem.* 1 offers the prime example here; the expression ϲωφρονεῖν περὶ θεούϲ occurs in 1.1.20); in such passages, associations from Pindar and tragedy do not seem present to a very significant extent.[13]

It would seem, then, that here we have one of the more peripheral uses of ϲωφροϲύνη: ϲωφροϲύνη as conceived in religious terms is largely confined to specific genres of literature, and almost invariably directly connected with specific, almost larger-than-life, crimes and offences.

(18) Εὐνομία. In internal politics, ϲωφροϲύνη understood as responsibility for one's πόλιϲ may be especially associated with avoidance of strife and concern for stability and order (Ba. 13.186 for instances commends Εὐνομία ϲαόφρων, see chapter 3.2). In such contexts, ϲωφροϲύνη is the quiet obedience of the law-abiding citizen, who wisely refrains from the 'injustice' of civil strife.

As can be expected, this use of the term easily lends itself for the formation of political slogans: in the aftermath of the Sicilian expedition (and again in the time around 404), ϲωφρόνωϲ πολιτεύεϲθαι (Th. 8.53.3) is, in Athens, the slogan of those in favour of a moderate oligarchy in the Spartan manner (see chapter 7.3.3). Here again, ϲωφροϲύνη is more akin to caution than to a more assertive line of action, for the virtue of this policy is mainly that it avoids the allegedly rash and ill-considered decisions of the democratic assembly.

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[13] The thought expounded in Pl. *Lg.* 716d, that the ϲώφρων man wins the loyalty of the gods because he is similar to them (φίλοϲ, ὅμοιοϲ γάρ), influential in later philosophy and early Christian writers, is a different conception altogether.

3. *Turning Our Data into a 'Network':*
Parameters and Some Legenda

In the diagrams that follow the present section, a visualisation
will be offered of the network by which the various uses discussed
above are connected. Figures 1 & 2 offer a full conspectus of the
uses of our terms that must have been familiar to Plato; figures 3-
11 offer representations of the uses of our terms in individual
authors or genres.

   In the present section, I will briefly discuss the main criteria
according to which I have ordered my data (especially *who* is
called cώφρων and *how* he/she behaves); and also some criteria
that would seem potentially relevant but did not turn out to be
decisive for the construction of the network (*who* insists on
cωφροcύνη?, physical signs of cωφροcύνη).

   This will then be followed by some words on how my diagrams
are to be read. Specifically, the diagrams in figures 1 and 3-11
aim to visualise the various surface uses of our terms and their
comparative centrality or decentrality; the schema in figure 2
shows how groups of surface uses may be subsumed under ab-
stract schemata.

3.1. *The central parameters: Who is* cώφρων *and what are the manifes-*
tations of cωφροcύνη*?*

Figure 1 offers a conspectus of the network by which the uses of
cώφρων and cognates familiar at the time of Plato are connected.
In this network, the vertical axis represents the various *types* of
behaviour in which cωφροcύνη manifests itself. At the top, we
have the use of cωφρονεῖν/cωφροcύνη to indicate a sound state of
mind *tout court*, next, we find the 'prudential' use, in which
cωφροcύνη is primarily beneficial to the agent himself. Further
down are those uses where cωφροcύνη increasingly affects others
than the agent himself: roughly in the middle, we find the uses
of cώφρων and cognates where cωφροcύνη helps one avoid of-
fences against social norms of behaviour (among these groups
are what I take to be the most central uses of our terms); at the
bottom of the schema, we find those uses where cωφροcύνη helps
to avoid actually doing harm to others.

On the horizontal axis, we find the various social groups to whom ϲωφροϲύνη is typically ascribed. In the centre of this axis, we find men, both individually and in the collective of the πόλιϲ. It would probably be uncontroversial to say that men were the dominant part of the population in classical Greek society (at least as represented in our sources), and on account of this male dominance, we are justified in placing those uses of ϲωφροϲύνη that relate most typically to males in the centre of our system. On both sides of the axis, there are those groups who are a more marginal presence in society, at least from the point of view of our texts, which are of course largely the work of adult male authors. (In my corpus, all texts are by male authors; in the fragments of Sappho, our terms do not occur.) Apart from the ϲωφροϲύνη of adult males, ϲωφροϲύνη is most intensely discussed with respect to women, and to a lesser degree boys. Girls on the one hand, and servants/subjects on the other hand are, where the attribution of ϲωφροϲύνη is concerned, relatively the most marginal categories in society.

So my claim is that that for the interpretation of any use of ϲώφρων and cognates, the two most pertinent questions to ask are: (i) *Who* is called ϲώφρων? (Which type of person from which segment of society?) and (ii) *Which kind of behaviour* is the manifestation of this ϲωφροϲύνη and who is affected by it, and benefits from it? I think the analysis of my data has shown that the answers to these two questions can provide one with sufficient data to classify each individual instance of the terms.

3.2. *Individual Perspectives: Which Speakers Insist on* ϲωφροϲύνη?

If the above are the main parameters according to which I have ordered my data, I have found little reason to make a systematic distinction between various groups of speakers who *use* ϲωφροϲύνη, and who insist that others live up to the values that the uses of our terms represent. The reason why I have found no reason to do so in a systematic manner is, I think, that basically *all* uses of the terms to some extent represent a masculine bias. This is especially clear where the ϲωφροϲύνη of other groups is concerned: it is undoubtedly the adult *males* who like their women loyal and obedient, their daughters chaste and incon-

spicuous, their sons orderly and their servants obedient, and
there is no sign at all - at least in our sources - that the non-
dominant groups of society have anything like a parallel set of
values of their own.

What is quite normal, of course, is that speakers disagree on
whether a particular type of behaviour is indeed an indication of
ϲωφροϲύνη, or that they use the term for what seem to be entirely
different interpretations. The conflicting interpretations of
ϲωφροϲύνη in some of Euripides' plays are particularly good ex-
amples in this respect. What happens in these cases is that
speakers draw on different parts of the network: they activate dif-
ferent uses of the terms and perhaps ignore others, and insist
that *their* particular interpretation is singularly relevant to the
situation at hand. But mostly, speakers seem to select individual
uses from roughly the same larger set of uses; I have not encoun-
tered examples where one has to assume that speakers draw on
entirely unrelated concepts that are necessarily strange to their
addressees, so that communication is doomed to fail altogether.

What also happens quite often, is that women (and to a far
lesser degree, members of other non-dominant groups) take a
more active and dominant role than conventional morality
would require. These women in a way appropriate the masculine
role, and claim merits for themselves that normally belong ex-
clusively to the domain of men. Notorious examples are Aeschy-
lus' Clytemnestra, Sophocles' Electra and Euripides' Medea, but
also - a more positive example perhaps, Aristophanes' Lysistrata.
In such cases, these women adopt the 'masculine' rhetoric of
ϲωφροϲύνη, and the passages in which they do so will always be
striking and rhetorically 'charged'. But these cases remain com-
paratively rare, and there seems to be insufficient ground to
make them a decisive factor for my system of categorisation.

3.3. *Physical Manifestations of* ϲωφροϲύνη

As we have seen above, ϲωφροϲύνη typically, in fact, almost in-
variably manifests itself in social interaction. By contrast, there
are surprisingly few passages in which attention is drawn to the
physical *symptoms* of ϲωφροϲύνη. This will largely be due to the

fact that ϲωφροϲύνη typically manifests itself in *controlled* re-
sponses (or the mentality that enables one to exert control)
rather than spontaneous ones, and that the exertion of control
more often than not means the *repression* of undesirable types of
social interaction rather than the manifestation of desirable
types.

Sometimes, the loss or absence of control is physically visible.
This is the case with persons who lose their normal state of mind,
and get into a state of frenzy, such as Cassandra (E. *Tr.* 348-50),
or Orestes when haunted by the furies (E. *Or.* 254). Loss of con-
trol also shows with drunkards, and Theognis 479-84 names
some of the symptoms (notably loss of control of speech). Loss
of control also shows when people cannot suppress fear or anger
and thus fail to keep quiet. Many women in distressful situations
show these symptoms, notable examples are provided by the
Danaids in A. *Supp.* (198, 710, 724, 992), the Theban women in
A. *Th.* 186, Electra (S. *El.* 304) and Medea (E. *Med.* 913).

Physically visual symptoms that betray the *presence* of
ϲωφροϲύνη are comparatively rare, and mostly confined to the
ralm of 'quiet' behaviour. Thus, for women and girls, manifesta-
tions of ϲωφροϲύνη are that they stay in the house and keep quiet
(e.g. E. *Hcld.* 476-7, cf. Ar. *Lys.* 473 sitting ϲωφρόνωϲ ('quietly')
like a girl). We are somewhat better informed where boys are
concerned. Charmides speaks of 'doing everything in a quiet
manner' (Pl. *Chrm.* 159B) and names walking in the streets and
talking as examples. The boys of Stronger Logos' good old days
are similarly disciplined (Ar. *Nu.* 963-4), and their ϲωφροϲύνη is
also visible in that they avoid to provide potential ἐραϲταί with
any sexual *stimuli*: thus, they hide their genitals (*ibid.* 973), and
avoid seductive glances at men (*ibid.* 979-80). The result of their
generally austere lifestyle ultimately shows in that they acquire an
athletic body with a healthy complexion (*ibid.* 1009-14).

Charmides also shows his 'modesty' when blushing after being
praised by Critias. This is a rare *spontaneous* physical symptom of
ϲωφροϲύνη and perhaps it is significant that Socrates relates the
symptom to 'his liability to feel shame' (τὸ αἰϲχυντηλὸν αὐτοῦ,

158C6) and therewith arguably more directly to the 'emotion-like' αἰδώς than to the controlled response of ϲωφροϲύνη.[14]

Physically visual manifestations of ϲωφροϲύνη in adult men are again more rarely mentioned. Aeschines (1.25) mentions the orators of the good old days, notably Solon, who according to him refrained from wild gesticulation. The speaker in D. 45, Phormio, contrasts the quiet gait and stern expression of his adversary (D. 45.68) with his own habits of talking loud and walking fast (*ibid.* 78), but claims that such outward appearances are downright misleading if taken as symptoms of ϲωφροϲύνη and the lack of it: for all his quietude, Phormio has allegedly been all but ϲώφρων in the pursuit of his own pleasures. Thus, the speaker here contrasts the outward appearances that manifest the ϲωφροϲύνη of 'quietude' to the not-directly-visible ϲωφροϲύνη of control of desires. He leaves no doubt that for him, the latter is the real thing, while the physically visible manifestations are potentially deceptive.

3.4. *The Connections between the Groups of Uses: The Synchronic Conspectus and Individual Authors; the Abstract Schemata*

In the diagrams that follow, the circles representing groups of uses are connected by lines that indicate a close connection between groups of uses that show a marked family resemblance. The similarity usually consists either in a similarity of *effect* (comparable types of behaviour), or in a similarity of *agent* (different types of behaviour exhibited by persons from the same social category).

This is not in any way to say that these lines are the *only* connections between groups of uses that can be drawn. In particular, we have seen how in some cases more than one use of our terms is activated, and these frequently concern what would seem to be relatively distant relatives in the network. (The four Homeric instances discussed in chapter 2.2 provide some good examples.) It is quite impossible to represent all these connections in a single diagram on a two-dimensional sheet of paper. (In some respects, it might be helpful to adopt a *three-dimensional* model in-

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[14] Cf. Cairns (1993) 373n.87.

stead of a two-dimensional one, a 'molecule', say, rather than a 'network'.) A single two-dimensional representation will necessarily be selective. Therefore, to counter the impression of arbitrariness that might arise, I have chosen to represent, in figures 3-11, schemata for the uses and connections between uses as they occur in individual authors or genres. (The diagram in Figure 1 is essentially a compacted summary of these subsidiary diagrams, summarising which uses must have been familiar at the time of Plato.)

In figure 1, I have marked what I take to be the prototypical uses by means of a a grey background. In figures 3-11, I use this background with a different function: to highlight which uses are activated in any particular author or genre. It will be seen in these diagrams, that the prototypical uses of the terms are quite common in Euripides, Aristophanes and the orators, and less so in Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Herodotus and Thucydides. It seems reasonable to suggest that where the use of cώφρων and cognates is concerned, Euripides, Aristophanes, and the orators (and Plato, as we will see in chapter 10) are probably to be bracketed as conforming rather more closely to ordinary language use.

Whereas diagrams 1 and 3-11 aim to give an easy conspectus of the network, and to visualise the relative centrality (prototypicality) or marginality of uses, the aim of the table in figure 2 is rather different. This aims to show how various groups of uses can be subsumed under abstract schemata that define the salient characteristics that they share. Here, at the lower end of the table, the various groups of uses that we have identified are represented. The identification of a group of uses is in itself a process of abstraction from a (large) number of rather similar individual uses: in this sense, the various groups of uses are schemata at a low level of abstraction. These groups are then, on the middle level, subsumed under schemata at a higher level of abstraction, that show the family resemblance between a number of groups of uses. At the top level, a very high degree of abstraction is reached, and a characteristic is defined that is probably shared by all uses of our terms, that of being 'of sound mind'. In accordance with its high level of abstraction, this characteristic is neat

and clear, but undoubtedly under-descriptive for most groups of uses, save those in group 1 ('sanity').

So the two diagrams of figures 1 and 2 are designed to complement rather than replace each other: they intend to visualise different aspects of the complex category that the uses of σώφρων and cognates constitute. Roughly speaking, Figure 1 represents the inner constitution of the network, figure 2 the abstractions that can be made to explain the various types of resemblance between the network's constituent parts.

Fig. 1. ϲωφροϲύνη and cognates: the network

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

Fig.2. The Abstract Schemata

Fig. 3. cωφροсύνη and cognates: Homer

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

Fig. 4. cωφροcύνη and cognates: Archaic Poetry

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

Fig. 5. ϲωφροϲύνη and cognates: Aeschylus

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

Fig. 6. ϲωφροϲύνη and cognates: Sophocles

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

sanity

εὐβουλία

prudence

caution

μετριότηϲ

chastity — marital fidelity — control of desires — decency

quietness — quietness obedience — ἡϲυχία — order, quietness — obedience

no injustice — εὐνομία

no violence

respect for gods

girls   women   men   polis   boys   servants

Fig. 7. cωφροcύνη and cognates: Euripides

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

Fig. 8. ϲωφροϲύνη and cognates: Herodotus

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

sanity

εὐβουλία

prudence

caution

μετριότηϲ

chastity · marital fidelity · control of desires · decency

quietness · quietness obedience · ἡϲυχία · order, quietness · obedience

no injustice · εὐνομία

no violence

respect for gods

girls   women   men   polis   boys   servants

Fig. 9. ϲωφροϲύνη and cognates: Thucydides

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

sanity

εὐβουλία

prudence

caution

μετριότηϲ

chastity   marital fidelity   control of desires   decency

quietness   quietness obedience   ἡϲυχία   order, quietness   obedience

no injustice   εὐνομία

no violence

respect for gods

girls   women   men   polis   boys   servants

Fig. 10. *cωφροcύνη* and cognates: Aristophanes

sanity: good sense

sanity

εὐβουλία

good sense to avoid harming oneself

prudence

caution

μετριότηc

good sense to avoid indecency

chastity   marital fidelity   control of desires   decency

good sense to avoid disorder

quietness   quietness obedience   ἡcυχία   order, quietness   obedience

good sense to avoid harming others

no injustice   εὐνομία

no violence

respect for gods

girls   women   men   polis   boys   servants

Fig. 11. ϲωφροϲύνη and cognates: Orators

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

girls women men polis boys servants

4. *The Specialised/Restricted Use of Some Cognate Terms:*
A note on ϲωφρόνωϲ, ϲωφρονίζειν, ϲωφρονιϲτήϲ and ϲωφρόνιϲμα

As I have argued above, ϲώφρων, ϲωφρονεῖν and ϲωφροϲύνη in
principle cover the whole range of uses that I have identified in
the network described above, one notable exception being that
ϲώφρων is not used to indicate a 'sound state of mind' *tout court.*

   Some cognate terms, notably the adverb ϲωφρόνωϲ and the
derivatives ϲωφρονίζειν/ϲωφρόνιϲμα/σωφρονιϲτήϲ seem rather
more restricted in their uses within our corpus. These terms will
be briefly discussed below.

(1) ϲωφρόνωϲ. The adverb ϲωφρόνωϲ would of course mean 'in a
ϲώφρων manner' and may be expected to be used in all the ways
in which the adjective is used (uses 2-18). This is indeed the case.
But what is peculiar is that outside tragedy, the use of the adverb
generally seems relatively restricted and more 'standardised'
than that of the adjective. Outside tragedy, the instances of
ϲωφρόνωϲ in my corpus mostly mean either 'prudently' (drawing
on uses 2-3) or 'decently, soberly, in a way that betrays control of
desires' (drawing on uses 5-7) or 'quietly' (drawing on uses 10-
13). Thus, the adverb seems to show a tendency to restrict itself
to a limited number of uses, and generally, these are uses that I
take to be quite central. In this respect, the use of the adverb
confirms my hypothesis as regards the constitution of the net-
work.

   As I have indicated, most of the relatively 'marginal' uses are
from tragedy. In some cases, ϲωφρόνωϲ relates to respect for re-
ligion (my use 17). In A. *Eum.* 44, Orestes is ϲωφρόνωϲ ἐϲτεμμένον
('ϲωφρόνωϲ crowned') in a way that betrays his quiet respect for
the oracle. Similarly, Amphiaraus has ϲωφρόνωϲ chosen to bear a
shield without signs (E. *Ph.* 1112) that make the god-defying
claims of his fellow warriors, and Dikê on the shield of Polynices
leads her protégé ϲωφρόνωϲ (A. *Th.* 645), because his claim is
that his expedition is not an impious war against his own city
state.

   Restraint of violence (my use 16) is at stake when in E. *Hcld.*
1007, Eurystheus asks Alcmene if *she* would have let *him* live
ϲωφρόνωϲ ('unscathed') in Argos, if their roles had been re-

versed. And submission to authority (my use 14) is at stake when Menelaus in S. *Aj.* 1075 claims that an army can not be commanded ϲωφρόνωϲ ('in an orderly manner') if subjects have no fear for authority.

Elsewhere, ϲωφρόνωϲ often means 'quietly'. In Hdt. 4.77, the claim of the Scythian is that the Spartans are the only ones with whom one has time to discuss ϲωφρόνωϲ, Aeschines 3.2 claims that a speaker should ascend the rostrum ϲωφρόνωϲ ('in a calm and dignified manner'), the servant in Alcestis complains that Heracles did *not* receive his meal in such a way (E. *Alc.* 753), and the ladies in Ar. *Lys.* 473 promise that they will remain seated ϲωφρόνωϲ ('quietly') like a maiden; the defendants in Isaeus 1.1 claim that they were brought up ϲωφρόνωϲ and consequently lack any experience with the courts, and never even went only to witness the proceedings.

Prudential uses of the adverb are met in expressions such as ϲωφρόνωϲ βουλεύεϲθαι (Th. 5.101.1, D. 21.74) and ϲωφρόνωϲ ἐκλογίζεϲθαι (Th. 1.80.3), and also in the notion of the ϲώφρων administration of a πόλιϲ (Pl. *Chr.* 162A4 ϲωφρόνωϲ οἰκεῖν).

In the last case, ϲωφρόνωϲ is bound to shade over into 'soberly', 'in a manner that shows moderation and control of desires'. Isocrates is fond of using the adverb in this way in expressions like ϲωφρόνωϲ ζῆν ('living soberly', 4.81, 6.59, 7.7),[14] ϲωφρονῶϲ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίου οἰκονομεῖν (1.46, 'administering one's own life in a moderate/self-controlled way') and ϲωφρονῶϲ πολιτεύεϲθαι (15.24 'show self-control in one's citizenship'); Aeschines (2.176) uses this last expression with regard to the restoration of democracy, where ϲωφρόνωϲ also invokes the notion of the avoidance of ϲτάϲιϲ.

Control of desire is also most frequently relevant to contexts where the adverb is not addressed to the collective of citizens. Aristophanes' knights claim, in their encouragement of the Sausage Seller, that τὸ ϲωφρόνωϲ τραφῆναι ('a decent upbringing', *Eq.* 334) brings no success in politics. Both Plato (*R.* 403A7) and Aeschines (1.151) introduce the notion of ϲωφρόνωϲ ἐρᾶν (even if their interpretations rather differ in detail). Finally, in E. *Ba.*

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[14] Cf. also Lys. 14.41, D. 24.126.

686, the Theban maenads are reported to sleep ϲωφρόνωϲ, to counter Pentheus' suspicions of extra-marital sex.

(2) ϲωφρονίζειν, ϲωφρονιϲτήϲ and ϲωφρόνιϲμα. The derivatives ϲωφρονίζειν, ϲωφρονιϲτήϲ and ϲωφρόνιϲμα are closely connected. The verb ϲωφρονίζειν means 'to make ϲώφρων', a ϲωφρονιϲτήϲ is a person or institution that makes people ϲώφρων, and a ϲωφρόνιϲ-μα is a piece of good advice, a 'summons' to ϲωφροϲύνη.

The use of these term is restricted to the other-regarding senses; there are no uses where they have to do with prudence in one's self-interest, or with sanity per se. This probably accords well with the intrinsically transitive meanings of the terms.

On one occasion, the verb ϲωφρονίϲαι is used in connection with moderation of expenses; this is in Thucydides 8.1.3, where the Athenians decide to cut down the expenses in the city itself (τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐϲ εὐτέλειαν ϲωφρονίϲαι) in order to rebuild the navy after the Sicilian expedition. The verb is also used once in connection with 'control of desires': the *Phaedo* speaks of rejecting some pleasures for fear of being deprived of greater pleasures, and calls this 'to have become ϲώφρων some-how out of wantonness' (Pl. *Phd.* 69A4, τῶι τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκο-λαϲίαν … ϲεϲωφρονίϲθαι). The term ϲωφρονιϲτήϲ is used to refer to the official supervisor of the Athenian ephebes, when Demosthenes (19.285) claims that the Athenian youth does not need Aeschines as ϲωφρονιϲτήϲ.

In connection with 'quiet behaviour', Antiphon the orator (1.3.3.7) speaks of ϲωφρονίϲαι τὸ θυμούμενον τῆϲ γνώμηϲ, ('calming down the temper of your minds') and Danaus advises his daughters to consider the arrival of the Egyptians in a quiet way (A. *Supp.* 724, ϲεϲωφρονιϲμένωϲ). This play also offers the only use in our corpus of ϲωφρόνιϲμα, in connection with the many admonitions that Danaus has in store for his daughters (A. *Supp.* 992).

The terms are more frequent in connection with injustice and punishment. Plato (*Grg.* 478D6) claims that punishment ϲωφρο-νίζει ('makes ϲώφρων') and keeps people from further injus-

tice[15], hence the prison for not-incorrigible prisoners in *Laws* is called cωφρονιcτήριον (*Lg.* 908A4, 909A1); Demosthenes 21.227 subscribes to the same view, and elsewhere (25.94) expects the same effect from misfortune.

In Thucydides, finally, cωφρονίζειν and cωφρονιcτήc are used in connection with criticism and punishment of violence, both between πόλειc and within the single πόλιc (in the context of civil strife or cτάcιc). According to the Syracusans, the Camarineans should not secretly hope that Syracuse will be defeated by Athens in order that the aggressive impulses of the neighbour state may be held in check (Th. 6.78.2 ἵνα cωφρονιcθῶμεν);[16] by contrast, the Athenians advise these same Camarineans not to act as 'censors' (6.87.3 cωφρονιcταί) of the Athenian foreign policy. In internal politics, supporters of democracy at Athens claim that the δῆμοc is a cωφρονιcτήc of the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (8.48.7) and provides a check on their ruthlessness. Conversely, the supporters of oligarchy in Plataea, who hand over their city to the oligarchic Boeotians, are seen by the latter as the cωφρονιcταί (Th. 3.65.3) of their democratic fellow citizens. Here, the use of cωφροcύνη and cognates as an oligarchic party slogan rings in the background.

5. *An Outlook: Towards Plato*

We have now established, in section 2, the range of traditional uses of cώφρων in non-philosophical texts. In the next chapter, we will consider how Plato deals with the concept of cωφροcύνη. Here, I will note roughly speaking two tendencies.

On the one hand, we shall observe that Plato fully exploits the polysemy of our terms in argumentative passages, especially in passages that argue for the compatibility, or indeed 'unity', of the individual virtues. For arguments of this type, cωφροcύνη offers obvious advantages. We have observed how, in one of its uses (my number 15), cωφροcύνη is particularly close to δικαιοcύνη.

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[15] Cf. *Crit.* 121C2, *Lg.* 854D5.
[16] Plato echoes this type of use when claiming (*R.* 471A7) that in war between Greeks, good citizens will only fight as cωφρονιcταί of their fellow Greeks, not as enemies (πολέμιοι) in the conventional sense of the word.

And we will see that it is easy to establish a link between cοφία and the use of cωφροcύνη in the quasi-intellectual sense of prudence. With ἀνδρεία the case is not so simple. In many texts, we have observed a tension between the self-assertive qualities associated with martial ἀρετή and ἀνδρεία, and the more other-regarding uses of cωφροcύνη, nowhere more so, perhaps, than in Sophocles' *Ajax* and Thucydides. Similar tensions exist between ἀνδρεία and other 'non-competitive' ἀρεταί, notably δικαιοcύνη. In a number of dialogues, we observe how Plato sets up arguments to establish a link between ἀνδρεία and one of those non-competitive ἀρεταί. The potential of cωφροcύνη in establishing such a connection is most marked in *Gorgias*, where various uses of the term are used to bridge the huge conceptual gap between ἀνδρεία and δικαιοcύνη.

On the other hand, in establishing a technical definition of cωφροcύνη, Plato greatly reduces the vast range of conventional uses. The definitions in *Charmides* all contain terms and expressions *associated* with cωφροcύνη in one or other of its uses, and these are all rejected as not touching the core of the matter. Only the notion of cωφροcύνη as 'control of desire' goes unchallenged: it is in fact not even discussed but very clearly invoked at the beginning of the dialogue, so that it is bound to be active in the minds of the readers. We will observe how, elsewhere in Plato, this prototypical use is always the use of the term taken as a point of departure when it is discussed what cωφροcύνη actually *is*. Ultimately, the definitions of cωφροcύνη in the individual and in the state, as given in *Republic*, would seem to represent Plato's elaboration of two quite central traditional uses of the term, 'control of desire' in the individual and εὐνομία in the πόλιc (my numbers 6 and 18). Here, we see how, in his attempt to go to the heart of the matter, Plato ignores most peripheral uses of the terms, and focuses on the most central uses.

Incidentally, we will also observe how Plato focuses on the most central members of society. He ignores the uses of cώφρων and cognates that typically apply to women, girls and servants, and rejects the 'boyish' interpretations given by Charmides, concentrating instead on the prototypical examples of the cωφροcύνη of men, both as individuals and in the πόλιc.

PLATO

1. *Introduction*

In the previous chapter, I sketched an overview of the uses of ϲώφρων and cognates in non-philosophical Greek texts as they were available at the time of Plato (chapter 9.2). I have also tried to show how this polysemy can be fruitfully accounted for by bringing these many uses together in a network of relatively central (prototypical) and marginal uses, connected with each other by family resemblance.

In this chapter, I will try to establish how Plato uses these traditional notions in his discussions on ethics and politics, and in the construction of his own theory of virtue. I think that in this connection, two tendencies can be observed. On the one hand, Plato fully exploits the polysemy of our terms for persuasive effect, specifically in passages that argue for the co-existence, or indeed 'unity', of the seemingly disparate traditional virtues. On the other hand, in his own construction of a theory of virtue, Plato greatly reduces this polysemy, and arrives at a definition of ϲωφροϲύνη of his own that is based on a very limited number of central uses of the term. Here we can observe how, in his attempt to get to the 'essence' of the virtue, Plato focuses on the prototypical uses at the expense of the rather more peripheral ones.

In connection with Plato's use of the polysemy of ϲωφροϲύνη in persuasive argumentation, it must be observed that ϲωφροϲύνη — given the considerable range of uses sketched in chapter 9 — can easily be linked to each of the other main virtues. In one of its uses (its 'civic' use, group 15 in my diagrams), ϲωφροϲύνη is nearly synonymous with δικαιοϲύνη. In its prudential use (group 2), ϲωφροϲύνη is more obviously a mental-cognitive capacity, and this use provides a possible link with ϲοφία (both share the general antonym ἀφροϲύνη), exploited in the discussion in *Protagoras*. And Plato even manages to relate the seemingly very different quality of ἀνδρεία to ϲωφροϲύνη. In *Laches*, he suggests that a measure of 'steadfastness' or 'courage'

is also involved in controlling one's desires, thus extending the range of ἀνδρεία to include prototypical cases of cωφροcύνη. In *Gorgias*, by contrast, he argues that the ἀνδρεῖοc ruler cannot pursue all pleasures, but needs a faculty to decide which pleasures best serve his long-term interests. Here, ἀνδρεία is connected with the prudential use of cωφροcύνη in order to show that the brave ruler also needs cωφροcύνη in the sense of self-control. Thus cωφροcύνη can be invoked to argue for the compatibility of such seemingly disparate qualities as δικαιοcύνη, cοφία and ἀνδρεία. As such, it is used (in *Protagoras*) by Socrates to undermine the position of Protagoras who asserts the essential disparity of the virtues, and it plays a crucial role in *Gorgias* in Socrates' defence of δικαιοcύνη against the attacks of Callicles. The first parts of this chapter (sections 2-7) will describe how Plato exploits the polysemy of cωφροcύνη to achieve this 'reconciliation of opposites', with particular reference to *Laches, Protagoras, Gorgias* and *Republic.*

In texts that concern themselves with the quest for a definition of cωφροcύνη, on the other hand, Plato tends to reduce the polysemy of cωφροcύνη to a few central uses. This is the subject of sections 8 and 9. In *Charmides* (section 8), the definitions of cωφροcύνη that are discussed and rejected, all consist of terms and expressions associated with uses of cωφροcύνη that are less than absolutely central. Thus, the dialogue rejects a total equation of cωφροcύνη with such concepts as αἰδώc, δικαιοcύνη or cοφία. Ultimately, only the prototypical conception of cωφροcύνη as 'control of desires' remains unchallenged; in fact, this notion is not discussed at all, but it is unmistakably activated in the dramatic setting of the dialogue.

In other texts, this notion of control of desires is either taken for granted as a definition of cωφροcύνη (*Gorgias*) or taken as a point of departure for further exploration (*Republic*). In *Republic* (section 9), where Plato finally achieves clear-cut technical definitions of each of the virtues, cωφροcύνη is defined as a consensus between the ruling and the ruled, both in the individual soul and between the citizens of a πόλιc. This twin definition seems to be Plato's elaboration (and, partly, his re-interpretation) of two quite central traditional uses of cωφροcύνη: 'control of desire' for the individual male citizen

(my group 6) and 'εὐνομία' (respect for the conventions and the *status quo* in the πόλις, number 18) for the citizens of the πόλις as a collective. The centrality of these two notions seems of great help to Plato in establishing his analogy of soul and state. Thus, the attempt to define the 'essence' of cωφροcύνη turns out to be remarkably centripetal: it reduces the concept to what are its prototypical manifestations for the dominant members of society, adult male citizens, both as individuals and as members of the collective body of citizens. As we will see, Plato excludes uses of cωφροcύνη that are less than absolutely central, dismisses the 'boyish' interpretations of cωφροcύνη offered by Charmides, and even completely ignores uses of cωφροcύνη that typically apply to women and girls. Incidentally, this 'centripetal' definition also serves to establish a clear, if perhaps slightly arbitrary, distinction between cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη: δικαιοcύνη is now defined as 'doing one's own things', and as such, seems closely associated with two other relatively central ordinary language uses of cωφροcύνη that are not covered by the 'consensus'-interpretation: 'quiet'/ἀπράγμων behaviour and restraint from injustice (my groups 10 and 15; for Plato's demarcation of cωφροcύνη as against δικαιοcύνη, see fig. 14 on page 253).

2. *Polysemous* cωφροcύνη *and the 'Unity' of Virtue*

In the first parts of this chapter, we will investigate how Plato exploits the polysemy of cωφροcύνη (as described in chapter 9) in persuasive argumentation. Specifically, this polysemy offers considerable dialectical advantages in passages that argue for the compatibility, or indeed the 'unity', of the individual virtues or ἀρεταί.

Semantically speaking, the basic phenomenon behind the thorny issue of the 'unity of virtues' as defended in *Laches, Charmides* and *Protagoras* is the following.[1] There are some

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[1] For the discussion on the 'unity' of virtue, see especially Penner (1973), Vlastos (1973) 221-69, Irwin (1977) 86-92, Kraut (1984) ch. 8, esp. 252-70, Penner (1992) 127-8 and n.21, Irwin (1995) 41-4. Penner and Irwin defend the thesis that Socrates took the virtues to be essentially identical (ἀνδρεία = cωφροcύνη = δικαιοcύνη = coφία), Kraut (1984) devotes more attention to the

types of behaviour that are typically assessed in terms of (one particular use of) one virtue term, but can *also* be assessed in terms of (one particular use of) another virtue term. This means that there is a partial overlap between the uses of the two virtue terms: in these particular uses, both terms can refer to the same type of behaviour. An obvious case from our survey has been the close association between the 'civic' uses of ϲώφρων (my group 15 in chapter 9, figure 1) and δίκαιοϲ. In many contexts in the orators, especially (see chapter 8.3), the two terms are virtually synonymous. But the Platonic dialogues at hand establish many more such connections: *Laches* hints at an affinity of ἀνδρεία and ϲωφροϲύνη when it speaks of the 'courage' of 'fighting' desire (see section 4), both *Laches* and *Protagoras* seize on cognitive, ϲοφία-like aspects of courage, and *Protagoras* and *Charmides* address similar associations for ϲωφροϲύνη (for *Protagoras,* see section 3, for *Charmides,* see section 8). In semantic terms, the existence of such connections means that the virtue terms are connected in a larger 'network', in which some of their uses overlap and commend the same type of behaviour. There are cases where one type of behaviour can be assessed in terms of more than one virtue.

Now it seems to be good Socratic practice to locate virtue at the 'background' level of the 'state of the soul' that 'explains' virtuous behaviour, rather than on the 'foreground' level of the virtuous behaviour itself.[2] For Socrates, virtue is the quality 'by which' virtuous acts, and virtuous persons, are virtuous; and his

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fact that at surface level, the virtue terms are used differently: for him, the virtue terms have a different scope and cover different parts of the same continuum. Vlastos by contrast, concentrating on *Protagoras*, claims that Socrates merely held the 'equivalence' of the virtues (the ἀνδρεῖοϲ is also ϲώφρων etc.).

As the discussion below will show, I think that the positions of Penner and Kraut are compatible: the first looks at virtue on the level of the 'quality' of the soul, the latter focuses on differences of surface level-behaviour.

Vlastos' views on *Protagoras* will not be dealt with here; they seem to require that the strong claims in *Protagoras* are taken at considerably less than their face value.

[2] Thus, Penner (1973) 45 locates the 'unity' of the virtues on the level of 'motive-forces' or 'states of soul': 'And we will lay it down that the same motive-force or state of soul can result in different kinds of behaviour.'

claim is that a definition of virtue will identify that quality and explain what makes virtuous action virtuous.[3]

Now in the dialogues that concern us here, *Laches, Charmides* and *Protagoras,* the typical Socratic response to the situation of single types of behaviour called by multiple virtue names is to conclude that these names refer not only to the same type of behaviour but also to the same state of soul: if the behaviour of repressing or 'fighting' desire is a token of ἀνδρεία as well as ϲωφροϲύνη, it follows that in such a case the terms ἀνδρεία and ϲωφροϲύνη describe not only the same type of behaviour but also the same state of soul: they in fact identify the same one and the same state of mind, 'virtue'. This conclusion is by no means inevitable (it may well be unjustified: in principle, nothing precludes the conception of *two* states of soul leading to the same type of behaviour) but the inference seems quite natural at face value, and is in fact made tacitly in these texts.

But if the quality of ϲωφροϲύνη overlaps with that of ἀνδρεία in one of their manifestations, it should follow that the qualities overlap throughout their different manifestations: for it is a 'Socratic' axiom that it is *one-and-the-same* state of soul that explains all different types of behaviour that are called by the same virtue term.[4] Thus the quality of ἀνδρεία that explains the 'courage' of 'fighting desire' will be identical with the quality of ϲωφροϲύνη that explains *all* types of acts of ϲωφροϲύνη, and *vice versa*. In short, all acts of ἀνδρεία and all acts of ϲωφροϲύνη are explained in terms of one and the same state of soul, and to that extent, ἀνδρεία is identical with ϲωφροϲύνη. And given that links can be established between all the individual virtue terms, the conclusion seems to be that the individual virtue terms, however different in their use on surface level,[5] name the same

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[3] For this Socratic criterion for definitions, cf. Kraut (1984) 254.

[4] See for instance Socrates' instruction at *La.* 191D10-11 πάλιν οὖν πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν τί ὂν ἐν πᾶϲι τούτοιϲ ταὐτίν ἐϲτιν, 'now please try again to formulate concerning ἀνδρεία what it is that it is the same in all those cases'.

[5] Kraut (1984) 261 seems to focus on this difference in surface level use, when he says that 'the particular virtues blend imperceptibly into one another, like subsegments of a continuous and uniform object.' He quotes the comparison from *Prt.* 329D6-8 of the parts of virtue to the parts of gold, that differ from each other merely (or mainly?) in size. In fact Kraut seems to allow *only* quanti-

'state of soul' and are to that extent identical with each other and with virtue *tout court*.[6]

A second characteristic of Socrates' response in *Laches, Protagoras* and *Charmides* is the fact that Socrates identifies this single state of soul behind the particular virtues with a kind of knowledge, the knowledge of good and bad. This is the well-known 'intellectualism' of Socrates' ethics,[7] and in practice, this intellectualism amounts to (re)defining the virtues in terms of ϲοφία. Now there would seem to be two problems with this intellectualist approach. First, it seems by no means obvious that ϲοφία is the suitable candidate to unify the particular virtues: in fact, it does *not* seem to be the central part of the 'continuum' (in Kraut's terms) or 'network' of virtue terms. For one thing, there hardly seems to be a direct link between ϲοφία and δικαιοϲύνη: in *Protagoras*, they are only indirectly linked, *via* ϲωφροϲύνη (*Prt.* 332A4 and following, see section 3 below). Moreover, the link between ἀνδρεία and ϲοφία as established in *Laches* would seem counter-intuitive rather than self-evident.[8] But there is a second problem connected with the identification of virtue with knowledge, and that is that this identification leaves no room for non-intellectual motives for virtuous action, and, as is well known, even forces one to make the counter-intuitive denial of the possibility of *akrasia*.

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tative differences between parts of virtue. At the 'surface level' of behaviour, I do not see that this is necessary.

[6] Penner (1973) 45: 'Socrates thought that all and only those men with tendencies to brave actions had tendencies to wise actions (these actions being in general different from the former actions). But he may have believed that all of these tendencies sprang from the same motive-force or state of soul (e.g. a certain kind of knowledge).' Penner's formulations focus on the background level of the state of soul rather than the foreground level of actions. As such, I think, his views are largely compatible with those of Kraut. The most relevant difference between the two would seem to be that Penner is less restrictive as to what kind of surface-level differences are to be allowed.

Incidentally, Penner's formulation shows that it is not inevitable, however 'self-evident' for Socrates, to identify the virtuous state of soul with 'a certain kind of knowledge'.

[7] On the intellectualist approach to virtue, see the critique of Arist. *MM* 1182a15-23, and the discussions by Irwin (1995) 75-6, Penner (1992) 125-6.

[8] Cf. Laches' reaction in *La.* 195A4 χωρὶϲ δήπου ϲοφία ἐϲτιν ἀνδρείαϲ, 'I had assumed that ϲοφία is completely different from ἀνδρεία.'

Thus, Plato's approach elsewhere is different in *two* ways. First, cωφροcύνη replaces cοφία as the connecting element in the web of virtue. This is most obviously the case in *Gorgias* (see section 5), but in *Republic* the affinities of cωφροcύνη with other virtues are also exploited for the construction of the larger network. Besides, Plato also gives up the idea of a strict unity between the virtues. *Gorgias* (507A) shows that the cώφρων will *also* be δίκαιοc and ἀνδρεῖοc, and thus seems to argue for a co-existence of virtues (even if, below surface level, this co-existence still seems to spring from a specific 'ordering', or τάξιc, in the soul). *Republic* on the other hand gives up even this idea of co-existence of all the virtues; for instance, it allows for citizens with ἀνδρεία and cωφροcύνη who lack cοφία. By contrast, the dialogue has much to say on how the problematic reconciliation of cωφροcύνη and ἀνδρεία is to be achieved (section 6).

In the following, I will first discuss *Protagoras* and its connection between cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη and cοφία (section 3). The reconciliation of the 'opposites' of ἀνδρεία and cωφροcύνη is the subject of the sections that follow (4-6) Here, *Gorgias* (section 5) is the culmination point, but the theme of ἀνδρεία runs through Plato's work, so we will briefly look into some other texts, *Laches* (section 4), which hints at a partial overlap between ἀνδρεία and cωφροcύνη without pressing the point, and *Republic* and *Politicus* (section 6), which have rather a lot to say on the reconciliation between ἀνδρεία and cωφροcύνη on a practical level.

3. Cωφροcύνη, cοφία *and* δικαιοcύνη : Protagoras

A dialogue that offers an elaborate example of an argumentation for the unity of the virtues, is *Protagoras*. At the start of the dialectical discussion that forms the second part of this dialogue, Protagoras is led to claim that the ἀρεταί are fundamentally distinct from each other: the 'parts' of ἀρετή are more like the parts of a face than like parts of gold (329D-E).

The claim that the virtues are fundamentally distinct from each other seems quite compatible with the views ascribed to

Protagoras in the myth at the beginning of the dialogue.[9] In
fact, in the myth the virtues seem so thoroughly distinct that
they vary considerably in function and importance. Protagoras'
story stresses the vital importance of αἰδώς and δίκη (322C2),
sent by Zeus to ensure the possibility of a stable community.
This means that the virtues that correspond to αἰδώς and δίκη,
ϲωφροϲύνη (in the 'political' or 'civic' sense of 'keeping from
injustice and violence') and δικαιοϲύνη (323A1-2), are essential
qualities for the stability of the πόλιϲ.[10] And the later sections
of Protagoras' exposé suggest that ὁϲιότηϲ performs a similar
function. [11] On the other hand, Protagoras' theory of political
ἀρετή does not incorporate all traditional virtues. The myth ad-
dresses ϲοφία only at the level of technical skills that human
beings need for survival (321D4 τὴν περὶ τοῦ βίου ϲοφίαν),
places religious practices at largely the same level (man's pen-
chant for religion is ascribed to his share in the technical skills
of the gods, 322A3-5), and completely ignores the martial qual-
ity of ἀνδρεία. Protagoras' political theory as represented by
Plato seems to be very much a peacetime political theory, surely
groundbreaking in its emphasis on co-operative values,[12] but

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[9] In recent times, commentators mostly tend to the view that in the myth
(as opposed to the following dialectical sections of the dialogue), Plato is giving
us a reasonably fair representation of what he took to be Protagoras' views. For
a discussion, see Dietz (1976) 115-6, Morgan (2000), 132-54. Cautionary re-
marks in Sihvola (1989) 78-84.

[10] Cf. Kahn (1996) 217: 'Protagoras does offer a solid defense for what Ad-
kins has called the quiet or cooperative virtues of justice and temperance.
These are precisely the virtues that Plato in the *Republic* will assign to all the
citizens, including the lowest and most numerous of his three classes.'

[11] The role of ὁϲιότηϲ in relation to ἀρετή here is not entirely clear. In the
myth itself, worshipping the gods is included among the basic skills of human-
ity (322A3-5) and thus excluded from πολιτικὴ ἀρετή, and this would seem to
accord well with Protagoras' reputation for 'agnosticism', but in 323E3,
ἀϲεβεία is included among the opposites of political ἀρετή, and afterwards,
ὁϲιότηϲ tends to be bracketed with δικαιοϲύνη and ϲωφροϲύνη among the politi-
cal ἀρεταί. It may well be that the gradual inclusion of ὁϲιότηϲ is to be ascribed
to a persuasive strategy of Plato rather than to Protagoras' political theory itself.
   Protagoras' reputation for 'agnosticism' is based on fr. DK 80, B 4; for the
'agnostic' (rather than a more fundamentally 'atheistic') interpretation of this
fragment, see Dietz (1976) 138-40, De Romilly (1988) 147-8. On the limited
contribution of religion to the political aspects of society, cf. De Romilly
(1988) 228.

[12] Cf. Sicking (1998) 178.

arguably naive in its complete reliance on these 'quiet' virtues for dealing with potential conflicts.[13]

Protagoras offers this long exposé of his political views in answer to Socrates' question whether ἀρετή can be taught. In defence of his reputation as a teacher, Protagoras firmly asserts that ἀρετή can indeed be taught.[14] According to him, political ἀρετή, based on αἰδώc and δίκη (322C2) and thus including cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη, is to some extent shared by all people, and all education — of which his own teaching apparently constitutes the summit (328B2) — aims at the enhancement of this quality (324D-326E). The cωφροcύνη encountered here is not the purely 'individual' ἀρετή of control of desires that we will meet in *Gorgias* and at the start of *Charmides*, but rather the civic type of cωφροcύνη that keeps men from aggression against their fellow citizens (use 16).

In response to Protagoras' exposé, Socrates leads his interlocutor to concede that ἀνδρεία and cοφία are also virtues — a fatal move for Protagoras' position, as it turns out, but Protagoras seems to be too respectful of tradition to make radical claims and exclude ἀνδρεία from the list of virtues. Protagoras is then asked to consider whether these five virtues (δικαιοcύνη, cωφροcύνη, ὁcιότηc, ἀνδρεία, cοφία) are identical or not, and so he is made to claim that these five virtues are not different names for what is essentially the same thing, but in fact separate parts of ἀρετή that are wholly distinct from each other, like the parts of the human face. Protagoras even claims that one may have one ἀρετή but lack another; thus, there are many soldiers who are ἀνδρεῖοι but ἄδικοι, and others who are δίκαιοι but not cοφοί (329E5-6).[15]

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[13] αἰδώc and δίκη are supposed to cope with cτάcιc. Otherwise, there is no mention of conflict between humans: wars between πόλειc are ignored in the *Protagoras* myth; the only type of 'war' that the myth acknowledges is that against wild animals (322B4).

[14] It is on this point that the dialogue runs into ἀπορία: at the end of the dialogue, it is Socrates who now seems convinced that ἀρετή is teachable, whereas Protagoras seems to hold the opposite (361A-B). On Socrates' use of 'tactical moves' and 'manipulative and insincere' reasoning, see Kahn (1996) 241-3.

[15] If the δικαιοcύνη that some people lack is not the basic sense of δίκη prominent in Protagoras' λόγοc, but the 'advanced' δικαιοcύνη of more civilised

This claim is challenged by Socrates in the remainder of the dialogue, the aim of which seems to be to show that Protagoras cannot uphold this claim about the ἀρεταί, which in turn of course undermines his trustworthiness as an expert in the field of virtue.

In the first dialectical part of the discussion, Socrates challenges Protagoras' thesis by identifying as many virtues as possible.[16] Protagoras is first challenged by an argument that centres on the close affinity between δικαιοσύνη and ὁσιότης.[17] The second argument (332A4-333B6) hinges on the point that σωφροσύνη (in its prudential use) and σοφία share ἀφροσύνη as an opposite; on the agreed assumption that a πρᾶγμα has only one opposite (332D1-3), this would mean that σωφροσύνη and σοφία are just two names for the same thing. Together, these two arguments suggest — though no attempt is made to make Protagoras agree with the conclusion[18] — that ὁσιότης is δικαιοσύνη and

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standards (cf. 327C-D), there is no direct contradiction with Protagoras' speech. Still, what Protagoras says here perhaps reflects common Greek usage, in which ἀνδρεία is frequently contrasted to the more 'quiet' virtues, rather than any particular views expressed in Protagoras' speech. On the possibility that Plato misrepresents Protagoras' views, see Sicking (1998) 189-190.

[16] The arguments are not finished properly, but they unmistakably suggest that the virtues in question are *identified* by Socrates. Thus, I prefer Penner's straightforward reading of the passage (1973) 49-60 to Vlastos' reinterpretation, (1973), 234-46, according to which the unity thesis means that the particular virtues share the same qualities. For this, there seems insufficient signals in the text.

[17] 331A-332A. In what seems to be a parody of Protagoras' eristic methods, Protagoras states that δικαιοσύνη and ὁσιότης are both rather similar (331D2) and somewhat different (331C2), so that one could argue both cases.

The argument about the similarity between the two virtues of course calls to mind the conclusion at Euthyphro 12D 1-3, that τὸ ὅσιον is a part of τὸ δίκαιον. In the remainder of that dialogue, it is fruitlessly attempted to identify what specific part ὁσιότης is, see Kahn (1996) 173. In view of the very different functions of religious activities and δικαιοσύνη in the myth (cf. p. 300 n. 11 above), it seems doubtful again that Plato is addressing Protagoras' own views here; it may rather be the case that he proceeds on the assumption that Protagoras is unwilling to contradict idées reçues on morality.

[18] On Plato's reading of Protagoras' *homo mensura*, it would be meaningless for Protagoras to agree with one statement rather than the other, for both are necessarily equally true, cf. Sicking (1998) 193-4, and *ibid*. 168.

ϲωφροϲύνη equals ϲοφία; all that is still missing is a link between
the two groups.

This link is, significantly, provided by ϲωφροϲύνη. The third
argument addresses the question whether or not it is possible to
be ϲώφρων while committing injustice (ἀδικῶν … ϲωφρονεῖν,
333B8-9). This is a thesis that Protagoras emphatically refuses to
accept himself, and indeed, it is at least paradoxical given the
traditional close association of the two. One would probably
have to think of someone who prudently serves his own inter-
ests while doing injustice: maybe the farmer in E. *El.* 50-3, who
claims that there are some who consider him a fool because he
does not take advantage of his marriage with Electra, has a
rather similar type of person in mind. (Read like this, it is, in
fact, the sort of view that Callicles in *Gorgias* might have taken,
if Socrates had not lured him into a complete rejection of
ϲωφροϲύνη.) In any case, the conception of the ϲώφρων ἄδικοϲ
is in principle fully compatible with Protagoras' thesis that the
virtues differ from each other, and Protagoras agrees that many
people do indeed accept it.

Socrates embarks on the refutation of this thesis (333D3-E1)
by suggesting that ϲωφρονεῖν, in its prudential sense of εὖ
βουλεύεϲθαι (333D6), entails that one is successful in one's ac-
tions: ϲωφρονεῖν entails εὖ πράττειν ('faring well', 33D7). But εὖ
πράττειν can also be taken as 'acting right', and this prepares
for a re-interpretation of 'prudential' ϲωφροϲύνη in other-
regarding terms: it is now suggested that ϲωφροϲύνη in its guise
of 'εὖ πράττειν' means 'doing ἀγαθά', i.e. doing what is useful
(ὠφελιμά, 333D9) for people. This of course prepares for the
conclusion that ϲωφροϲύνη, *even in its prudential use,* is nothing
else than justice. But the argument is not finished properly, but
interrupted by an exposé by Protagoras on the various uses of
the term ὠφέλιμον. Thus, again, Protagoras is not forced to ac-
cept the outcome of the argument, but if the reader accepts
Plato's reinterpretation of 'prudential' ϲωφροϲύνη in other-
regarding terms and finishes the third argument for himself, it
should read that ϲωφροϲύνη is the same as δικαιοϲύνη. Given
that the first two arguments established the identity of δι-
καιοϲύνη and ὁϲιότηϲ as well as that of ϲωφροϲύνη with ϲοφία,
the conclusion now seems to be that four of the five virtues un-

der examination are not distinct after all. The essential seman-
tic links that lie at the basis of this identification are provided
by cωφροcύνη, which is associated with both δικαιοcύνη and
cοφία.

That leaves ἀνδρεία. When the discussion of Protagoras' the-
sis on ἀρετή is resumed, Protagoras now claims 'that the four vir-
tues are quite close to each other, but that ἀνδρεία is utterly dif-
ferent from them all' (349D3-5 τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς
παραπλήcια ἀλλήλοιc ἐcτίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον
πάντων τούτων).

In the refutation of this claim, it is demonstrated by Socrates
that ἀνδρεία also depends on a proper judgement concerning
the 'things' to be pursued and avoided, and so it appears that
ἀνδρεία is in fact nothing else than cοφία. Now everyone is
found to agree against Protagoras[19] that the virtues are not dis-
tinct from each other, but that they are all ultimately based on
one and the same thing, cοφία or knowledge.

Thus we see how, in *Protagoras*, cωφροcύνη plays a role in Soc-
rates' arguments against Protagoras, for the unity of the virtues.
Specifically, cωφροcύνη has semantic links with both cοφία and
δικαιοcύνη, and is thus at the basis of the identification of these
three virtues. The link of ἀνδρεία with the other virtues is not
made via cωφροcύνη, but by means of the 'Socratic' notion that
virtue is based on a proper judgement about the good and the
bad, and hence resides in knowledge. As we will see in section
5, *Gorgias* offers a rather similar type of argument in which ἀν-
δρεία is linked not with cοφία but with (the prudential use of)
cωφροcύνη. It seems that here we have an argument that can be
pursued in two directions: when ἀνδρεία is shown to involve
good judgement, it can be linked either to the 'wisdom' of
cοφία, or the 'prudential' variety of cωφροcύνη, according to the
needs of the passage at hand.

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[19] Collecting a maximum number of counter-votes is not the normal pro-
cedure of Socratic elenchus; for its significance in a discussion with Protagoras,
see Sicking (1998) 197-8.

4. *Cωφροсύνη and ἀνδρεία : Laches*

We have observed how, in *Protagoras*, ἀνδρεία is redefined in terms of (Socratic) *cοφία* or knowledge. By implication, the 'martial', 'self-assertive' quality of ἀνδρεία is then also linked to the more typically other-regarding virtues of cωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη. But there is a long history of tension between ἀνδρεία and these other-regarding virtues.

At first sight, it would not perhaps seem that cωφροσύνη provides a suitable tool to accomplish the reconciliation of the self-assertive ἀνδρεία and the more other-regarding, cooperative qualities. In the earliest instance of cαόφρων in Greek literature, there is in fact already an implicit tension between cωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία. In *Iliad* 21.462-9, Apollo is challenged to combat by his uncle, and thus invited to display his martial ἀρετή, but he declines with an appeal to cωφροσύνη (chapter 2.2). And while, in the *Iliad*, it is never in doubt that martial success depends on a measure of deliberation and prudence (as can be seen from the example of heroes who lose their φρένες and make fatal mistakes, chapter 2.3), it is equally clear that cαοφροσύνη itself hardly belongs to the discourse of war and courage. The tendency is reinforced in later literature. In archaic literature, cωφροσύνη is mainly the province of citizens who refrain from cτάcιc and revolt (chapter 3.2), and similarly, in Aeschylus, cωφροσύνη is the quality of those who refrain from undue violence (chapter 4.2). The tension between the two concepts is put forward even more strongly in Sophocles' *Ajax* (chapter 5.2). Because of his eminent martial qualities, the hero of that play is temperamentally incapable of the cωφροσύνη demanded by his surroundings. And the most vivid illustrations of the clash between a martial attitude and prudent restraint occur in Thucydides, climaxing in the description of cτάcιc at Corcyra (3.82, see chapter 7.3.4), where restraint is decried as ἀνανδρία, and unwarranted aggression vehemently embraced.

So the general tendency of Greek thought would seem to be that ἀνδρεία and cωφροσύνη, though both acknowledged virtues, belong to fundamentally different contexts and are in fact rarely found in conjunction. Nevertheless, there are several pas-

sages where Plato manages to establish an affinity between the two. In this section, we will first look briefly into *Laches*, where Plato *implies* an affinity between ἀνδρεία and ϲωφροϲύνη but does not explicitly pursue this point. After that (section 5), we will examine *Gorgias*, where ἀνδρεία is explicitly linked to ϲωφροϲύνη and δικαιοϲύνη. Finally (section 6), we will briefly examine some passages from *Republic* and *Politicus*, that throw further light on Plato's thought concerning the tenuous link between the two qualities.

In *Laches*, ἀνδρεία is ultimately linked to ϲοφία, as it was in *Protagoras*. Yet there is one passage that implies that ἀνδρεία is also relevant to behaviour that would normally be regarded as the prototypical manifestation of ϲωφροϲύνη. To this extent, *Laches* already seems to suggest that ἀνδρεία can be directly linked to the latter, in the sense that the terms are synonymous in one of their uses.

The approach that Plato chooses in *Laches* is to extend the concept of ἀνδρεία to include the prototypical manifestation of ϲωφροϲύνη as 'control of desire'. This can be done when 'desire' is construed as a 'danger' that has to be 'fought'. For this purpose, the conceptualisation of the ϲωφροϲύνη of 'control of desires' as 'having power over oneself' (κρατεῖν ἑαυτόν) or 'being stronger than oneself' (κρείττων ἑαυτοῦ) helps establish martial associations for this type of use.[20] To that extent, Plato here elaborates on the conventional imagery of ϲωφροϲύνη.

In the dialectical discussion on ἀνδρεία, Laches starts with providing a suitably 'martial' definition of ἀνδρεία as 'being prepared to remain at one's post and fight the enemy without fleeing' (190E5-6 εἰ γάρ τιϲ ἐθέλοι ἐν τῆι τάξει μένων ἀμύνεϲθαι τοὺϲ πολεμίουϲ καὶ μὴ φεύγοι). Not content with what merely seems to be an (admittedly appropriate) *example* of ἀνδρεία, Socrates cites a number of further examples of ἀνδρεία, and greatly expands the scope of the virtue to include the behaviour typically associated with ϲωφροϲύνη:

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[20] Cf. especially E. *Hipp.* 398-9 (chapter 6.4) and Antiphon frr. 58, 59 (cited in section 6 below).

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος μὴ καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἠρόμην—βουλόμενος γάρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῶι ὁπλιτικῶι ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῶι ἱππικῶι καὶ ἐν ςύμπαντι τῶι πολεμικῶι εἴδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῶι πολέμωι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰςιν, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοί εἰςιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ μάχεςθαι, καὶ μένοντες καὶ ἀναστρέφοντες—εἰςὶ γάρ πού τινες, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖοι.
(Pl. *La*. 189C7-E2)

Well, this is what I meant just now, that I am to blame if you did not answer in the right manner, because I did not ask in the right manner. For I wanted to hear from you not only about those who are brave in the infantry, but also about those in the cavalry and in the entire category of warfare. And I had in mind not only those who are brave in warfare, but also those who are brave in dangers at sea, and those who are brave with regard to disease and poverty and public life. And yet again not only those who are brave with regard to pain and fear, but also those who are good at fighting desire and pleasure, both in standing firm and turning away. For surely, Laches, there are also people who are brave in such circumstances.

Starting with the prototypical example of ἀνδρεία, [21] — fighting a human enemy while remaining at one's post without fleeing — Socrates extends the scope of the virtue to include what are probably less typical cases. (The threefold repetition of μὴ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί draws the reader's attention to the process of extension.) In these additional examples, ἀνδρεία is first made to include firm action in the face of non-human dangers (such as storms at sea) in addition to actually fighting human enemies. The scope of ἀνδρεία is then extended to endurance of distressful situations (illness, poverty), situations that are no doubt to be feared, but that perhaps require a measure of forbearance rather than immediate physical action. Finally, the scope of ἀνδρεία is extended yet further (ἔτι αὖ) to include the highly metaphorical 'fighting' of pleasures and desires. Here, one has to suppose that these pleasures and desires constitute a

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[21] For martial courage as the prototypical example of ἀνδρεία, see Sluiter & Rosen (2003), 5-8, and cf. Hobbs (2000).

kind of danger, and that they have to be 'fought' or 'fled' rather than pursued. This suggests that control of desires is also a 'martial' activity, and the formulation (πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς) δεινοὶ μάχεςθαι, καὶ μένοντες καὶ ἀναςτρέφοντες ('those who are *good at fighting* desire and pleasure, both in *standing firm* and *turning away*') emphasises the martial associations. If so, the term ἀνδρεία also applies to situations that could equally be regarded as typical manifestations of cωφροςύνη (in the sense of 'control of desires'): to this extent, the virtues are made to overlap, and there is a subliminal suggestion that — in Socratic terms — they name manifestations of the same state of the soul.

In *Laches*, however, the equation of ἀνδρεία and cωφροςύνη, while strongly suggested in the passage we have examined, is not pursued further. In the remainder of the dialogue, ἀνδρεία is linked to cοφία, and therewith to virtue as a whole. On the basis of the examples given by Socrates, Laches now redefines ἀνδρεία as καρτερία τις, 'some kind of endurance' (καρτερία, 192D10) — for all his lack of dialectical sophistication, Laches is well able to identify correctly the common factor between courage and control of desire.[22] This definition is again found wanting, for it soon transpires that καρτερία is a broad term that includes many types of 'obdurate' behaviour that do not qualify as ἀνδρεία. Accordingly, the definition is modified: it is now suggested that it is only φρόνιμος καρτερία that may count as ἀνδρεία (192E10). This is a notion that Laches is disinclined to challenge, but incapable of defending adequately.

The idea that ἀνδρεία requires some kind of 'sensible endurance'[23] is then taken up by Nicias, who follows the Socratic equation of virtue with knowledge (194D1-2) and defines ἀνδρεία as a type of cοφία, and more specifically as the 'knowledge of what is to be feared and what is not' (194E11-195A1, τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἐπιςτήμην). In the discussion that follows Nicias makes

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[22] For the link between cωφροςύνη and καρτερία, cf. Thgn. 479-83, X. *Smp.* 8.8 (linked with ῥώμη and ἀνδρεία), Pl. *Grg.* 507B4-8, Arist. *EN* 1145b14-15, *Pol.* 1334a19-25, Isoc. 12.197.

[23] It seems clear that the reader is intended to infer that καρτερία *is* a central element of ἀνδρεία, even though Laches' definition is defeated. See O'Brien (1963), D.T. Devereux (1977). Contra Irwin (1995) 360n.29.

two important observations on this type of 'knowledge': first, that ἀνδρεία is unlike technical knowledge in that it entails a value judgement on which dangers are to be faced and which are not, a type of judgement that is not necessarily available to ordinary craftsmen like doctors or seers (195b-196A),[24] and second, that this type of rational judgement is indeed unavailable to animals, children, and many adults with insufficient capacity for reasoning (196D-197B). Here, we seem to be close to the capacity of 'measurement' from *Protagoras.*

Indeed, Nicias' definition and his Socratic equation of ἀνδρεία and ἐπιστήμη runs into trouble precisely on the ground that ἀνδρεία is now to be equated with virtue in general. If ἀνδρεία is 'knowledge of what is to be feared and what is not', and hence of future good and evil (198B), it is impossible to distinguish ἀνδρεία from knowledge of good and evil *tout court*, and hence from virtue in general (199C-D), for knowledge of the future can not be separated from knowledge about the past and present (198D-199A). Thus, the Socratic equation of ἀνδρεία with σοφία runs into problems of demarcation that are quite similar to the problems connected with the definition of σωφροσύνη as a type of 'knowledge' in *Charmides* (for which, see section 8). It is on this account that the discussion reaches its ἀπορία: Socrates and his interlocutors prove unable to give an account of ἀνδρεία that shows the virtue to be akin to, and yet distinct from, the other virtues.

Thus, while *Laches* ends with the thoroughly Socratic reduction of all virtues to knowledge, the dialogue offers an important hint how ἀνδρεία could be linked to σωφροσύνη even outside the context of this equation. A second, more elaborate and more sophisticated approach is taken in *Gorgias,* to which we will now turn.

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[24] For Nicias, doctors are ordinary craftsmen who are unable to decide on the moral issue whether it is better for the patient to live or die, and thus whether he should apply or withhold treatment. This refers to a medical debate on the the issue whether the doctor was free to withhold treatment in desperate cases. See Rosen & Horstmanshoff (2003).

5. Cωφροcύνη *and* ἀνδρεία : Gorgias

In *Gorgias*, Socrates is confronted with a discussion partner, Cal-
licles,[25] who firmly rejects δικαιοcύνη and extols ἀνδρεία and
φρόνηcιc. Hence Callicles presents Socrates with a direct chal-
lenge to demonstrate the compatibility of ἀνδρεία and the
other-regarding virtues. In the process, *Gorgias* is the first full-
scale discussion[26] of political ἀρετή.[27]

   Though it starts, as its sub-title suggests, as a dialogue on
rhetoric (περὶ ῥητορικῆc), the two themes of 'rhetoric' and the
moral foundations of political life are connected as soon as Gor-
gias, Socrates' first interlocutor, is led to claim that the true sub-
ject matter of rhetoric is 'what is just and unjust' (454B7 περὶ
τούτων ἅ ἐcτι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα). Gorgias at first claims that his
job as a teacher of rhetoric is only to teach persuasion, and ad-
mits the possibility that others may misuse this skill, but then
feels 'ashamed' to claim that the orator does not need moral
expertise or the ability to teach it; consequently, he is forced to
admit that the orator will have to know what justice is and can-
not willingly abuse this knowledge. Thus, he is shown to con-
tradict himself.

   The second interlocutor, Polos, now takes an explicitly im-
moralist stance, and claims that 'doing wrong' (ἀδικεῖν) is better
than 'suffering it' (ἀδικεῖcθαι), but he lacks the temerity to
deny against common usage that doing wrong is 'more un-
seemly' (αἴcχιον, 474C7), and on this account he is also caught
up in contradiction. It is left for the third interlocutor, Callicles,
to make a full 'immoralist' attack on the conventional notion of
δικαιοcύνη, which he regards as invented by the weak in order
to check the ambitions of the strong, and to launch a parallel

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[25] On the enigmatic figure of Callicles, otherwise unknown to us, see
Dodds (1959) 12-5.

[26] It is impossible to date the *Gorgias* in relation to other 'early' dialogues
considered here, such as *Charmides* and *Protagoras*. Dodds (1959) 18-24 argues
that *Gorgias* comes relatively late in the first group of dialogues, Kahn (1996)
128 claims that it is probably an early work in view of the absence of many of
the methodological procedures found in the so-called dialogues of definition.

[27] Olympiodoros p. 3.6 Norvin defines the cκοπόc of the dialogue as περὶ
τῶν ἀρχῶν διαλεχθῆναι τῶν φερουcῶν ἡμᾶc ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. See
Dodds (1959) 1.

attack on the life of the philosopher, whom he regards as singu-
larly unequipped for a successfully self-assertive life in the
πόλις. And it is in answer to these attacks that Socrates has to
show the paramount value of δικαιοςύνη as a political virtue, and
to demonstrate that the philosopher is the only πολιτικός in
the true sense of the word.

What Socrates has to show, then, in his discussion with Calli-
cles, is that strong men who should rule cannot do so without
δικαιοςύνη, i.e. that δικαιοςύνη is a necessary condition for ἀν-
δρεία as understood by Callicles. Here, ςωφροςύνη is explicitly
given the role of an intermediary between ἀνδρεία and δι-
καιοςύνη. Socrates will argue that Callicles' strong men, rather
than acting on each and every impulse, need the ability to de-
cide which pleasures to pursue and which not. This is basically
the argument that the ἀνδρεῖος should be able to make right
decisions, familiar from *Laches* and *Protagoras*, but this capacity is
now related to (prudential) ςωφροςύνη rather than the Socratic
conception of ςοφία. Socrates eventually makes Callicles accept
(i) that the ἀνδρεῖος needs a kind of prudence that can be re-
lated to ςωφροςύνη, and (ii) that ςωφροςύνη entails δικαιοςύνη.

Now the second of these arguments does not necessarily fol-
low from the first. It relates to a different use of ςωφροςύνη
(other-regarding 'restraint of violence and injustice' vs. self-
regarding 'prudence'). Therefore, if it is accepted that ἀνδρεία
does not go without ςωφροςύνη in the sense of prudence, this
does not mean that the ἀνδρεῖος as ςώφρων should also be
δίκαιος. Socrates' argumentation is plausible only if he manages
to gloss over the different uses of ςωφροςύνη involved in the
two arguments, and to secure the acceptance of ςωφροςύνη *tout
court* from his opponent.

Paradoxically, perhaps, Socrates first elicits from Callicles a
complete *rejection* of ςωφροςύνη in the prototypical use of 'con-
trol of desires'. This control of desires is something that Calli-
cles loathes, and he is persuaded to reject ςωφροςύνη entirely
and adopt a position of undiscriminating hedonism.[28] This re-
jection of ςωφροςύνη serves to strengthen the plausibility of
Socrates' arguments against Callicles. For when Callicles is ulti-

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[28] On the connection between the two, see Irwin (1977) 119-20.

mately forced to accept that his rulers do after all need ϲωφρο-
ϲύνη (if in a different use), it seems that he is caught in contra-
diction.

Socrates' introduction of ϲωφροϲύνη into the discussion is
very elaborate, and this seems to underline both the vital role
of ϲωφροϲύνη for the discussion, and Callicles' complete hostility
to the type of ϲωφροϲύνη at hand. When Callicles states that
the strong are those who are φρόνιμοι and ἀνδρεῖοι, and that
they have the right to rule without regard for justice, Socrates
asks whether they should also rule over themselves.

> ϹΩ. τί δὲ αὑτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε;
> ΚΑΛ. τιὴ τί;
> ϹΩ. ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;
> ΚΑΛ. πῶϲ λέγεις;
> ϹΩ. ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν
> δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;
> ΚΑΛ. πῶϲ ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;
> ϹΩ. οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥϲπερ οἱ πολλοί, ϲώφρονα ὄντα καὶ
> ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν
> ἑαυτῶι.
> ΚΑΛ. ὡϲ ἡδὺϲ εἶ· τοὺϲ ἠλιθίουϲ λέγειϲ τοὺϲ ϲώφροναϲ.
> (Pl. *Grg.* 491D4-E1)

> *So.* But what about themselves, my friend?
> *Kal.* What on earth do you mean?
> *So.* Are they to rule or to be ruled?
> *Kal.* How do you mean?
> *So.* I mean that every single one of them rules over himself.
> Or is there no need whatever for that, to rule over oneself, but
> just to rule over the rest?
> *Kal.* What do you mean by 'ruling over oneself'?
> *So.* Nothing intricate, but the same as the many, being
> ϲώφρων and in control of oneself, ruling over one's inner
> pleasures and desires.
> *Kal.* How funny you are! You call the silly the ϲώφρονεϲ.

Socrates' interpretation of ϲωφροϲύνη as control of pleasures
and desires is, indeed, 'nothing intricate', (οὐδὲν ποικίλον), but
rather the central use of the word. In this respect, Callicles' ap-
parent failure to grasp Socrates' intention seems surprising. But
Socrates' initial paraphrase of this familiar concept is indeed
puzzling. Taking his clue from Callicles' speech, in which the
concept of 'ruling' (ἄρχειν) was very dominant, he describes the

concept as αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν ('ruling over oneself'), substituting the verb ἄρχειν for the more idiomatic κρατεῖν ('being stronger than oneself'). This makes for a seemingly 'spontaneous' introduction of cωφροcύνη, and in a context where its presence was hardly to be expected.[29] This sufficiently explains Callicles' initial misunderstanding.

   Now this 'control of pleasures and desires' is something that Callicles is bound to reject after his insistence that the strong should rule and should be allowed to 'have more' (πλέον ἔχειν). And indeed, Callicles duly rejects it. His remark that Socrates wrongly identifies the silly with the cώφρονεc is perhaps a hint that there is an alternative interpretation of cωφροcύνη that Callicles would not so readily reject: that of cωφροcύνη as the prudent deliberation that allows the strong to maximise the fulfilment of their own interests. He has insisted, after all, that his rulers should be φρόνιμοι (491B1). But Socrates has invited him to either accept or fully reject the notion of 'ruling over oneself' (491D8 ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν), and in response, Callicles goes for the rejection of cωφροcύνη (a term which he now uses three times in the 'incorrect' conventional sense he just rejected: 492A8, 492B4, 492C1). This cωφροcύνη, he suggests, is used as a term of approval only by those who are unable to gratify all their desires because of their 'lack of manliness' (492B2 διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν.)[30] Callicles therewith commits himself to an unqualified hedonism that does not go well with his elitist political views, and forces him to

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[29] In fact, cωφροcύνη was not mentioned earlier in the dialogue, except for a passing allusion in Socrates' discussion with Polos, where Socrates briefly hints at the affinity between the two virtues: *Grg.* 478D6-7 cωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρουc ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίαc ἡ δίκη. 'Punishment makes people sober and more righteous, I suppose, and is a healing for wickedness.'

[30] As in Thuc. 3.82, ἀνανδρία substitutes for cωφροcύνη as a term to describe the same type of unassertive behaviour. Unassertive behaviour is cωφροcύνη for those who find it commendable, ἀνανδρία for those who wish to reject it.

   Callicles' expression of the common thought that cωφροcύνη and ἀνδρεία are strongly contrasted, prepares us for the passage at 506C-507C, where Socrates deduces the need for, and co-occurrence of, cωφροcύνη, δικαιοcύνη, ὁcιότηc *and* ἀνδρεία.

accept consequences that he himself finds utterly vulgar and shameful (cf. 494E7).[31]

Indeed, Callicles does not manage to keep up this position of unqualified hedonism. Socrates makes him agree that not all pleasures are good, and that the good prevails over the pleasant: hence not all pleasures are to be fulfilled (499B-500A).[32] This implies that one needs sound judgements on the relative merits of various kinds of pleasures. What one needs is, in fact, a kind of prudence.

From here on, ϲωφροϲύνη is brought back into the discussion, though in the rather different use of 'prudence'. The search is now for a τεχνικόϲ who can decide on the question which desires are to be fulfilled and which are to be rejected. Socrates suggests that such a man will act like craftsmen who take good care that their products acquire a certain 'order and structure' (504A7 τάξεωϲ καὶ κόϲμου), and like doctors who procure τάξιϲ and κόϲμοϲ in the body, i.e. health and strength (504B7-9). The analogous order in the soul, he suggests, is δικαιοϲύνη τε καὶ ϲωφροϲύνη (504D3).

The analogy is shrewdly chosen, and ϲωφροϲύνη is gradually introduced only so that it seems only natural that Callicles gets 'trapped'. The association of τάξιϲ with ϲωφροϲύνη in the sense of self-control is not particularly strong in ordinary language use,[33] and thus it is no surprise that τάξιϲ is the first term to be introduced (503E6) and that its introduction does not alarm Callicles. The association of κόϲμοϲ with ϲωφροϲύνη is rather stronger: ϲώφρων in the use of 'in control of one's desires has κόϲμιοϲ as an associated term, and in the context of the dia-

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[31] Kahn (1996) 136-7, draws attention to the fact that, as with Gorgias and Polos, it is a sense of shame that precipitates Callicles' defeat. In fact, Callicles does not feel he can indiscriminately accept *all* kinds of pleasure, and this allows for the introduction of the notion of rational deliberation: after all, one will have to be able to decide which pleasures to pursue, and which to reject.

[32] The thought of ϲωφροϲύνη has been kept alive, of course, by the passage in which unrestricted gratification of desires is compared to filling leaky jars (493D-494A), and the use of τοῦ τε ϲώφρονοϲ καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάϲτου at 493D7 signifies as much.

[33] Isoc. 12.115 associates ϲωφροϲύνη and εὐταξία in the context of good order in battle. That seems to be, outside philosophy, the natural non-figurative application of εὐταξία (given its association with τάξιϲ). Cf. Th. 6.72.4, X. *M.* 3.3.14, Isoc. 8.102 etc.

logue, cωφροcύνη and κόcμοc are made to share the antonym
ἀκοcμία.[34] Thus, the term κόcμοc is introduced later (504A7)
than τάξιc, and its introduction is carefully prepared by the rela-
tively unobtrusive phrase κεκοcμημένον πρᾶγμα (504A1).

When Socrates uses the notion of 'order in the soul' to estab-
lish his earlier suggestion that it is good to be punished for
one's vices (505B11-12), Callicles refuses to answer and suggests
that Socrates should continue the discussion by questioning and
answering himself. This provides Socrates with the opportunity
for a more formal and clearer restatement of the preceding ar-
gument: the pleasant and the good are not the same (506C6);
the good, and thus, ἀρετή, prevails over pleasure (506D9); ἀρετή
implies τάξιc (506D7) and κόcμοc in the soul (506E2; note
again the precedence of the less obtrusive term); a soul with
κόcμοc is κοcμία (506E6), and hence also cώφρων (507A1).

Thus, the notion of τάξιc and κόcμοc are invoked to demon-
strate that ἀρετή entails cωφροcύνη. Callicles' original complete
rejection of cωφροcύνη has now been refuted in as far as
cωφροcύνη is not to be entirely rejected. It is to be accepted in
as far as the ἀνδρεῖοc needs a kind of 'order' in the soul that is
closely akin to the 'prudential' type of cωφροcύνη. And since
neither Socrates nor Callicles envisages the possibility that
cωφροcύνη is used in more than one way, this seems to imply
that the virtue has to be entirely accepted.

Socrates now proceeds to infer, with remarkable ease, that
since a cώφρων will do what is due to gods and men (507A7-8 ὅ
γε cώφρων τὰ προcήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ
ἀνθρώπουc), he will necessarily also be 'just' and 'correct in re-
ligious matters' (507B3-4 ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅcιον εἶναι). Here,
Socrates activates two additional uses of cώφρων: the use in
which the term applies to those who avoid injustice (my use 15)
and that in which they avoid offending the gods (my use 17).
This is the formal refutation of Callicles' initial rejection of δι-
καιοcύνη as a true ingredient of ἀρετή. Moreover, on the basis of
the notion that the cώφρων will persevere in pursuing and
avoiding the right things, Socrates now establishes that the
cώφρων will be steadfast (507B8 (cώφρονοc ἀνδρόc ἐcτιν) καρ-

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[34] Pl. *Grg.* 508A4, cf. North (1966) 162n.21.

τερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ). Hence, he will necessarily also be ἀνδρεῖος, and, in fact, fully and completely ἀγαθός (507C2). This corrects Callicles' earlier suggestion that cωφροcύνη is something that people praise in order to conceal their own ἀνανδρία.

Herewith, a refutation is achieved of Callicles' thesis that δικαιοcύνη and cωφροcύνη are detrimental to the good of the man who possesses the competitive qualities. In order to be a successful Calliclean strong man, one needs to be cώφρων and indeed possess all the virtues. Thus, it is asserted that the virtues are co-existent. The stronger claim of strict unity between these virtues that we have observed in *Laches* and *Protagoras*, is not made explicitly here, although the virtues still seem to spring from one and the same 'order' (τάξιc) in the soul. More importantly, it is no longer cοφία which offers the unifying factor between the virtues, and *Gorgias* avoids Socrates' reduction of all virtue to knowledge. Instead, cωφροcύνη with its multiple uses now provides Socrates with a powerful tool to vindicate the *compatibility* of the virtues, without having to identify them all with knowledge. This unifying function of cωφροcύνη anticipates aspects of the *Republic*, where one function of cωφροcύνη is to ensure the 'harmony' between different classes of citizens with their specific qualities.

Thus, *Gorgias* offers an impressive argumentation that ἀνδρεία and cωφροcύνη can be combined. The question remains *how* they can be combined. On a theoretical level, *Gorgias* offers some general hints in comparing the order (τάξιc) in the soul to the health of the body and the 'order' in the *kosmos*.[35] But the dialogue does not explore how people acquire both cωφροcύνη and ἀνδρεία, even though the qualities might seem to belong to very different temperaments. This is a topic to which Plato turns in two later texts, *Republic* and *Statesman*, and it is to these that we will now turn our attention.

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[35] On the weakness of the analogy between soul and natural order, and the rejection of similar analogies in *Chrm.* 166B7-C3, see Kahn (1996) 143.

6. *Cωφροcύνη and ἀνδρεία :* Republic *and* Politicus

In the fourth book of *Republic*, Plato will finally offer his techni-
cal definitions of the main virtues, and these will include a
definition of *cωφροcύνη* to which we will return later (section
9). Earlier on, in the long section on the education of the
state's military class, some thought is again devoted to the prob-
lem of the combination and reconciliation of the very different
qualities of *ἀνδρεία* and *cωφροcύνη*. The issue is now no longer a
theoretical one, of establishing the 'unity' (*Laches*, *Protagoras*)
or 'co-existence' (*Gorgias*) of the virtues; in fact, *Republic* fully
allows for people who have some virtues but lack others (espe-
cially *coφία*, and , for the 'lower' classes, *ἀνδρεία*). In *Republic*,
the issue is an eminently practical one: the search is for soldiers
who are both gentle and spirited (375C6-7, *ἅμα πρᾶιον καὶ θυ-
μοειδέc*), for they must be gentle to their own countrymen, and
spirited against their enemies. This means that they are to pos-
sess the very different qualities of *ἀνδρεία* and *cωφροcύνη*, and
the search is for a method of education in poetry and musical
education (*μουcική*) and gymnastics that will be able to further
these qualities.

For poetry, this means that verses describing the fear of
death, or the mourning of the dead are to be banned, as these
are detrimental to the soldiers' *ἀνδρεία* (386A-388D). Similarly,
verses that are detrimental to *cωφροcύνη* are equally to be
banned. This assumption triggers an allegedly non-technical
'popular' definition of *cωφροcύνη*:

> *cωφροcύνηc δὲ ὡc πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιάδε μέγιcτα, ἀρχόντων μὲν ὑπη-
> κόουc εἶναι, αὐτοὺc δὲ ἄρχονταc τῶν περὶ πότουc καὶ ἀφροδίcια καὶ
> περὶ ἐδωδὰc ἡδονῶν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.* (Pl. *R.* 389D9-E3)

> (Socrates) Of *cωφροcύνη* as conceived by most people, is not
> this the essence, that they are obedient to those who rule, but
> rule themselves over their desires for alcohol, sex and food?
> — (Glauco) I think so.

This 'popular' conception of *cωφροcύνη* combines two common
uses of *cωφροcύνη*: that of 'control of desires' (my use 6) and of
'obedience to one's superiors' (my use 14). Plato returns to the
'authoritarian' type of *cωφροcύνη* as 'obedience'. The combina-

tion of these two elements is of course tailor-made for the con-
ditions that the military servants of the state are to fulfil: they
must have the self-control to obey their superiors and persevere
in the execution of their tasks without distraction. Hence, the
type of ϲωφροϲύνη that is to be combined with ἀνδρεία is rather
different from the 'prudent' τάξιϲ from *Gorgias*. The emphasis is
now firmly on the ϲωφροϲύνη of sub-ordinates, and this
ϲωφροϲύνη has little to do with rational deliberation, and every-
thing with obedience.

For poetry, the furthering of ϲωφροϲύνη means that verses
containing references to insubordination (such as in Achilles'
quarrel with Agamemnon in the first book of the *Iliad,* 389E13)
or luxury (such as in Odysseus' words of gratefulness for the lav-
ish welcome given by Alcinous in *Od.* 9.8-10, 390A10-B2) are to
be banned, whereas verses describing obedience or endurance
are to be encouraged.

But the most important point made in the section on the
education of the soldiers comes toward the end of the passage.
Here, Socrates insists that music and gymnastics must be com-
bined in the education of the soldiers throughout their careers.
For the qualities that the soldiers need, the 'spirited' (τὸ θυ-
μοειδέϲ) and the calm (τὸ ἥμερον) both lead to excess if they
are stimulated by a one-sided training. Only when the two quali-
ties are mixed in the right proportion do they deserve the
names of ἀνδρεία and ϲωφροϲύνη.

> — Οὐκ ἐννοεῖϲ, εἶπον, ὡϲ διατίθενται αὐτὴν τὴν διάνοιαν
> οἳ ἂν γυμναϲτικῆι μὲν διὰ βίου ὁμιλήϲωϲιν, μουϲικῆϲ δὲ μὴ
> ἅψωνται; ἢ αὖ ὅϲοι ἂν τοὐναντίον διατεθῶϲιν;   10
> — Τίνοϲ δέ, ἦ δ' ὅϲ, πέρι λέγειϲ;
> — Ἀγριότητόϲ τε καὶ ϲκληρότητοϲ, καὶ αὖ μαλακίαϲ τε καὶ   d
> ἡμερότητοϲ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ—
> — Ἔγωγε, ἔφη· ὅτι οἱ μὲν γυμναϲτικῆι ἀκράτωι χρηϲάμενοι
> ἀγριώτεροι τοῦ δέοντοϲ ἀποβαίνουϲιν, οἱ δὲ μουϲικῆι μαλα-
> κώτεροι αὖ γίγνονται ἢ ὡϲ κάλλιον αὐτοῖϲ.   5
> — Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γε ἄγριον τὸ θυμοειδὲϲ ἂν τῆϲ
> φύϲεωϲ παρέχοιτο, καὶ ὀρθῶϲ μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρεῖον ἂν εἴη,
> μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντοϲ ϲκληρόν τε καὶ χαλεπὸν
> γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ὡϲ τὸ εἰκόϲ.
> — Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.   10
> — Τί δέ; τὸ ἥμερον οὐχ ἡ φιλόϲοφοϲ ἂν ἔχοι φύϲιϲ, καὶ   e
> μᾶλλον μὲν ἀνεθέντοϲ αὐτοῦ μαλακώτερον εἴη τοῦ δέοντοϲ,

καλῶc δὲ τραφέντοc ἥμερόν τε καὶ κόcμιον;
— Ἔcτι ταῦτα.
— Δεῖν δέ γέ φαμεν τοὺc φύλακαc ἀμφοτέρα ἔχειν τούτω τὼ
φύcει.   5
— Δεῖ γάρ.
— Οὐκοῦν ἡρμόcθαι δεῖ αὐτὰc πρὸc ἀλλήλαc;
— Πῶc δ᾽ οὔ;
— Καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡρμοcμένου cώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία ἡ ψυχή;   411
— Πάνυ γε.
— Τοῦ δὲ ἀναρμόcτου δειλὴ καὶ ἄγροικοc;
— Καὶ μάλα.
(Pl. *R.* 410E5-411A4)

(Socrates) Have you not observed what kind of mentality peo-
ple acquire if they practice gymnastics all their lives, and
completely ignore music? Or people of the opposite disposi-
tion? — (Glauco) What are you talking about? — (Socrates)
Lack of civilisation and ruthlessness on the one hand, and
weakness and softness on the other. — (Glauco) Yes, I no-
ticed. Those who practise nothing but gymnastics end up
rather too uncivilised, and those who only practise music be-
come weaker than is good for them. — (Socrates) Now this
lack of civilisation might well be caused by their being spir-
ited: if their spirited quality is trained in the right way, it
will become courageous, but if it is strained further than it
should be, it may well become hard and harsh, it would
seem. — (Glauco) I think so. — (Socrates) And how about
this? Is calmness not a quality of the philosophical tempera-
ment: calmness will be softer than it should if the man is re-
laxed too much, but will become calm and orderly if he is
trained in the right manner? — (Glauco) That is true.
— (Socrates) Do we say that the guards must have both these
natural qualities? — (Glauco) Yes indeed, they need both. —
(Socrates) Then these must be in accord with each other, must
they not? — (Glauco) Of course. — (Socrates) And the man
who is in accord has a soul that is cώφρων and courageous? —
Certainly. — (Socrates) And the man who is in discord has
one that is weak or brutish? — (Glauco) Very much so.

Here we have an explicit statement that both the quiet behav-
iour typically associated with cωφροcύνη and the assertive behav-
iour associated with ἀνδρεία only qualify as virtuous if they are
counter-balanced with their opposites. Exclusive emphasis on
μουcική leads to a display of restraint even in situations in which
it is not appropriate. Such people seem excessively restrained,
and are not cώφρονεc but 'soft'. By contrast, exclusive emphasis

on gymnastics is said to produce people who are only aggressive and competitive on each and every occasion. They seem not courageous but brutish. As in the famous digression on ϲτάϲιϲ in Thucydides (see chapter 7.3.4), the valuation of behaviour is here acknowledged to be a scalar phenomenon: to the degree that restraint is commendable, it qualifies for the name of ϲωφροϲύνη, whenever it is inappropriate, it becomes 'too much' and shades over into softness. And the same goes for ἀνδρεία and brutish behaviour. One-sided training, Socrates suggests, will teach people to display only one type of behaviour, whether appropriate or not. The name of virtue applies only when people are subjected to both types of training, so that they can display both types of behaviour at the right times.

In this passage, ϲώφρων is associated with two groups of terms that are used to design the 'softness' of excessive restraint: μαλακία/μαλακόϲ and ἡμερότηϲ/ἥμεροϲ. Unsurprisingly, the two are not usually associated with ϲωφροϲύνη. μαλακία and μαλακόϲ seem to be unequivocally negative terms in common language use.[36] By contrast, ἡμερότηϲ and ἥμεροϲ are perhaps less unequivocally negative: in 410E3 at least, ἥμεροϲ is associated with the positive term κόϲμιοϲ to describe the character with the right degree of 'tameness'; but this positive association between ἡμερότηϲ and ϲωφροϲύνη is not found outside Plato.[37] The term ἡρμοϲμένοϲ, 'regulated', 'tuned', used to describe the moderate qualities of the well-trained soul, recalls the metaphor of τάξιϲ ('order') or ἀρμονία ('harmony') in the soul from *Gorgias*; the term is not elsewhere found in association with either ϲώφρων or ἀνδρεῖοϲ.

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[36] X. *Smp.* 8.8 names μαλακία as a characteristic of a bad ἐρώμενοϲ, and in X. *Apol.* 19 becoming μαλακόϲ is named as one of the possible results of Socrates' putative bad influence. Arist. *EN* 1145b10 names μαλακία as a ground for disgrace. I have found some associations of μαλακόϲ and ϲώφρων, but only in Plato: in *Pol.* 307A, C, predilection for μαλακά features among the characteristics of the 'quiet' temperament; in *Lg.* 734A1, the desires of the ϲώφρων life are called μαλακαί.

[37] In *Phd.* 82B people who possess the non-philosophical, 'civic' type of ϲωφροϲύνη are compared to 'tame' animals like bees, wasps or ants. In *Tht.* 210C3, Theaitetos will be 'meeker' (ἡμερώτεροϲ) to his fellow-men, if he proves ϲώφρων enough to be aware of the limits of his own knowledge. In *Plt.* 309E1, ἡμεροῦϲθαι is used for the 'taming' of the courageous spirit; in *R.* 591B3, the same verb is used to describe the effects of punishment for injustice.

What Plato proposes here, is — in a way — a strict, and re-
strictive, use of language: the virtue terms apply to the associ-
ated types of behaviour if and only if that type of behaviour is
appropriate to the situation at hand. Thus, restraint only quali-
fies as cωφροςύνη if it is supplemented by an amount of the
'spirited' behaviour typically associated with ἀνδρεία, and *vice
versa.* Plato returns to this problem of 'mixing' the two types of
behaviour in *Politicus* 306A12-311C8. In that passage, the 'asser-
tive' and 'quiet' temperaments are not so much the result of
one-sided education, rather, they are natural inclinations of
character. Hence, the main danger to the state is that there are
too many people of either character. If there are too many
'quiet' people, the state will be unable to defend itself if neces-
sary, and if there are too many who incline to ἀνδρεία-like ag-
gression, the state will be involved in unnecessary wars (307E-
308A). Therefore, the 'mix' that will cure this imbalance is not
a mix of different types of education, but rather a matter of
eugenetics: the statesmen will encourage marriages between
people of different temperaments, and see to it that both quali-
ties are 'woven into the fabric' of the state.

What makes the passage puzzling for the reader of *Republic,* is
that in *Politicus,* Plato is not so restrictive in his use of language
as in the third book of *Republic.* The stranger does not withhold
the terms cώφρων/ἀνδρεία φύcιc or cῶφρον/ἀνδρεῖον ἦθος from
these one-sided temperaments as Socrates took care to do in
Republic. Hence, the stranger even has to concede — with evi-
dent hesitation — that 'ἀνδρεία and cωφροςύνη are in a way very
much in a state of enmity and disturbance vis-à-vis each other in
many beings' (306B9-10 ὡς ἐcτὸν κατὰ δή τινα τρόπον εὖ μάλα
πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔχθραν καὶ cτάcιν ἐναντίαν ἔχοντε ἐν πολλοῖc τῶν
ὄντων). Thus, the passage might at first sight seem to contradict
the *Republic* and assert the incompatibility of ἀνδρεία and
cωφροςύνη, whereas in fact, it seeks to establish a similar 'mix'
of temperaments by different means.

7. *Polysemous* ϲωφροϲύνη *and the 'Unity' of Virtue: Conclusion*

In the dialogues that we have been looking at so far, we have seen how Plato uses the polysemy of ϲωφροϲύνη in argumentative passages to establish links with several other virtues.

In *Protagoras*, 'prudential' ϲωφροϲύνη is linked to ϲοφία and this prudential ϲωφροϲύνη is re-interpreted in other-regarding terms and then linked with δικαιοϲύνη. In *Protagoras*, this is all part of a large scale manoeuvre to suggest the 'unity' of the virtues (see section 3 on the issue of 'unity') and undermine the expert Protagoras' claims that the virtues are distinct.

In *Laches,* Plato briefly hints how ϲωφροϲύνη can be connected with, or in that passage rather subsumed under, ἀνδρεία. As in Protagoras, the particular virtues are ultimately identified with the whole of virtue and defined in terms of ϲοφία or 'knowledge'.

A link between ϲωφροϲύνη and ἀνδρεία is much more elaborately established in *Gorgias*. In that dialogue, Socrates faces an attack on δικαιοϲύνη by the 'immoralist' Callicles, who advocates a self-gratification that is compatible with ἀνδρεία and φρόνηϲιϲ but incompatible with δικαιοϲύνη. Here, the polysemy of ϲωφροϲύνη is exploited to establish a link between ἀνδρεία and δικαιοϲύνη and bridge the gap between self-gratification and other-regarding morality. Here, the *demonstrandum* is not complete 'unity' of the virtues, but rather the compatibility and co-existence of ἀνδρεία/φρόνηϲιϲ with δικαιοϲύνη. Socrates has Callicles reject ϲωφροϲύνη in the use of 'control of desires' and later has him accept that the courageous strong man needs a measure of prudence. When Callicles now has to accept ϲωφροϲύνη (in the use of 'prudence'), he seems caught in contradiction, and is forced to admit also the other-regarding qualities of δικαιοϲύνη and ὁϲιότηϲ that are closely associated with some (other) uses of ϲωφροϲύνη. Thus, the polysemy of ϲωφροϲύνη serves to bridge the conceptual gap between ἀνδρεία and δικαιοϲύνη and takes a central position in a 'network' of virtues.

In *Republic* and *Politicus*, Plato turns to the 'practical' problems connected with ἀνδρεία and ϲωφροϲύνη, and specifically to the question of how the very different temperaments and types of

behaviour typically associated with the two virtues are to be mixed in such a way that both the military self-defence and the inner peaceful stability of the city state are guaranteed as much as possible. In *Republic*, the answer is sought in a 'mixed' education, in which μουϲική and gymnastics are combined to provide the soldiers with a temperament both spirited and calm, *Politicus* adopts a demographic perspective, and envisages a balanced mix between people of different natural inclinations.

8. *The Definition of* ϲωφροϲύνη*:* Charmides

In the next sections, we will turn to dialogues in which Plato establishes a technical definition of ϲωφροϲύνη. Here, instead of choosing freely from various uses of the term, Plato rather tends to reduce ϲωφροϲύνη to a number of its prototypical manifestations. *Charmides* (section 8) explores, and dismisses, a wealth of expressions associated with various uses of the terms. Specifically, the dialogue gives much attention to the problems of identifying the 'cognitive' aspects of ϲωφροϲύνη with knowledge, and by implication insists on a distinction between ϲωφροϲύνη and ϲοφία. By contrast, the central notion of 'control of desire' is only hinted at in the dramatic discussion; it is not discussed at all, but to that extent remains unchallenged. In *Republic*, a definition of ϲωφροϲύνη is reached that is Plato's own elaboration on two prototypical manifestations of ϲωφροϲύνη, the control of desires of the individual citizen and the lawfulness of the citizens of the πόλιϲ as a collective (section 9). *Republic* also establishes a technical distinction between ϲωφροϲύνη and δικαιοϲύνη, qualities that in some uses are closely connected.

Belonging to the group of so-called aporetic dialogues, *Charmides* is an intriguing and perplexing work. Starting as a quest for a definition of ϲωφροϲύνη, it seems to remove itself far from conventional notions of ϲωφροϲύνη when Socrates and Critias embark on a very complicated epistemological discussion. Moreover, while it offers four definitions of the virtue that sound familiar and intuitively 'right', two of them are rejected

straight away, and the others are extensively modified and ac-
cepted only hypothetically. The dialogue ends in ἀπορία when
it appears impossible to give a definition of cωφροcύνη in terms
of knowledge and at the same time keep clear what the distinc-
tive value of cωφροcύνη might be. This may appear to be a dis-
appointing work, then, lacking both unity and satisfying results.

On second thoughts, however, the dialogue may not turn out
to be so perplexing and frustrating after all. The dialectical dis-
cussion on cωφροcύνη touches on many terms and expressions
conventionally associated with some uses of cωφροcύνη and
points to the problems that arise when these notions are taken
as the *single* definition of cωφροcύνη. In this connection, the
dialogue deals with the following associations of cωφροcύνη:

(1) (Charmides) τὸ κοcμίωc πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡcυχῆι, 'doing
everything in an orderly manner and quietly' = ἡcυχία, cf. the
uses to commend 'boyish' quietness in my group 13 (Pl. *Chrm.*
159B).

(2) (Charmides) δοκεῖ ... αἰcχύνεcθαι ποιεῖν ἡ cωφροcύνη καὶ
αἰcχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδὼc ἡ cωφροcύνη, 'it
seems ... that cωφροcύνη causes a feeling of shame and makes a
man liable to feel shame, and that it is in fact the same as
αἰδώc.' = αἰδώc, cf. the sense of decency from the uses in my
group 9 (Pl. *Chrm.* 160E).

(3) (attributed to Critias) τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 'doing one's
own things', cf. the 'quiet' behaviour of the adult citizen, my
group of uses no. 10, and cf. the definition of δικαιοcύνη in *Re-
public* (section 9). ' (Pl. *Chrm.* 161B)
(3a) τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν, 'doing good things' (163E10).

(4) (Critias) τὸ γιγνώcκειν ἑαυτόν, 'knowing oneself'. (Pl.
Chrm. 164D).
(4a) ἐπιcτήμη ... ἑαυτοῦ, 'knowledge of oneself' (165C5-7).
(4b) τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιcτημῶν ἐπιcτήμη ... καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆc,
'knowledge of other fields of knowledge and of knowledge it-
self' (166C2-3).

(4c) τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, 'to know what one does and does not know' (167A6-7), .

(4d) εἰδέναι ... ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, 'to know that one does and does not know' (170D2-3)

In the discussion of the concept of 'self-knowledge', specific attention is paid to the problems that arise when ϲωφροϲύνη is identified with some kind of knowledge and, thus, by implication, with ϲοφία. What remains unchallenged throughout the dialogue, is the prototypical use of 'control of desires', which is not discussed at all, but activated in the dramatic setting of the dialo gue. Thus, the dialogue might seem to suggest *a negativo* that we are to regard this prototypical use as the core of the matter, and this will indeed be the use that is taken as a point of departure in further discussions of ϲωφροϲύνη in *Republic*.

Another feature that seems important and recurs throughout the dialogue, is the ἦθοϲ of the ϲώφρων man, as embodied in a superficial and ultimately unconvincing manner in the young Charmides and his elitist uncle Critias, and in a far more serious manner in Socrates. The portrayal of Socrates as the true ϲώφρων (and, consequently, as the most serious benefactor of the πόλιϲ) is an important unifying factor in what might otherwise seem a text with strong centrifugal tendencies.

The relevance of ἦθοϲ to the introductory scene in the παλαίϲτρα is obvious, and has not been missed.[38] Right at the start, attention is drawn to Socrates' bravery in the battle at Poteideia (432 BC) and also to his temperamental ϲωφροϲύνη: he desires to see the boy 'stripped' in a mental rather than physical sense (154E5 τί οὖν ... οὐκ ἀπεδύϲαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, 'Why don't we strip him of that?', sc. τοῦ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι), and, though he is strongly moved when the boy looks him in the eyes (155C8) and even more when he gets a glance inside the boy's *himation* (155D3-4), he still manages to control himself and start a serious discussion. The suggestion of the passage is,

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[38] See Tuckey (1951) 19, North (1966) 154, Santas (1973) 106, Irwin (1995) 39, Kahn (1997) 187-8, Stalley (2000) 265-6.

of course, that Socrates possesses cωφροcύνη in the prototypical use of control of his desires.[39]

Thus, we are at the start of the dialogue immediately reminded of the prototypical use of cωφροcύνη, a use that everybody would instantly think of, and that is clearly recognisable even if the term itself is not used. The reminder is timely, for this sense is completely ignored in the dialectical section that follows. Here, the attention of Socrates and his interlocutors soon turn to other aspects of the virtue.

8.1. *The first definition:* ἡcυχία

The conversation starts with the question whether Socrates knows a cure for Charmides' headaches. This medical question allows Socrates to draw a parallel between physical and mental health, and to suggest that the boy can only be truly cured if he possesses mental health in the sense of cωφροcύνη as well (157B). There is an analogy here between physical health and mental cωφροcύνη that recalls the insistence on τάξιc in *Gorgias* (and, of course, the etymology of cωφροcύνη as *soundness* of mind); here, it is accepted readily. [40]

Critias states that Charmides is indeed more cώφρων than anyone else of his age (157D3), and Charmides spontaneously demonstrates his cωφροcύνη by blushing (158C5). Besides, the boy feels that he can neither immodestly confirm, nor dishonestly deny, that he has the virtue. Here, then, the boy demonstrates cωφροcύνη in yet another sense: that of youthful bashfulness and modesty.

Socrates suggests that the test of the boy's cωφροcύνη would be to see if he knows what it is: 'for it is clear that if there is cωφροcύνη in you, you must have some intimation about it'

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[39] The combined themes of Socrates' cωφροcύνη and ἀνδρεία are both even more powerfully stated by Alcibiades in *Symposium*.

[40] The same analogy between physical and psychic 'health' is suggested by the fact that the discussion on cωφροcύνη is set in the παλαίcτρα, a place for the display of physical prowess and health (North (1966) 153). Besides, the παλαίcτρα has associations with cωφροcύνη all of its own, because of its vital function in the traditional education of the elite. Thus, it plays an important part in Strong's description of the old education from the times of cωφροcύνη (Ar. *Nu.* 973-8, 1002, 1006).

(158E7-159A1 *δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ coι πάρεcτιν cωφροcύνη, ἔχειc τι περὶ αὐτῆc δοξάζειν*). The point here is that someone who possesses a certain quality, must in some way sense what the quality is and what it effects. To have a virtue thus implies that one 'knows', however intuitively, what that virtue is.[41] The notion that virtue entails self-knowledge, of paramount importance later on in the dialogue, is foreshadowed here in a subtle way.

   Charmides at first still hesitates to answer (159B1) but then offers his first definition of *cωφροcύνη*:

> *ἔπειτα μέντοι εἶπεν ὅτι οἷ δοκοῖ cωφροcύνη εἶναι τὸ κοcμίωc πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡcυχῆι, ἔν τε ταῖc ὁδοῖc βαδίζειν καὶ διαλέγεcθαι, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὡcαυτῶc ποιεῖν· καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, cυλλήβδην ἡcυχιότηc τιc εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτᾶιc.*
> (Pl. *Chrm.* 159B2-6)

> After a while, however, he said that he had the impression that *cωφροcύνη* was doing everything in an orderly fashion and quietly, walking in the streets and also talking, and doing everything else in the same manner. 'And I think', he said, 'that the thing you ask for is, in short, some kind of quietness'.

This first definition is, for someone with the frame of reference of a Charmides, an obvious and correct answer to Socrates' question, in that its focus is on those types of behaviour that are commonly taken as typical manifestations of *cωφροcύνη* in boys; and in fact it strongly resembles the classroom discipline extolled by the old-fashioned teacher in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (see chapter 8.2). As such, the definition accounts for one group of prototypical manifestations of *cωφροcύνη*, the orderliness expected from boys (my use 14). It also shows that Charmides is capable of discussion at a certain level of abstraction, for this 'orderliness and quietness' is in fact a quality that manifests itself in different manners in a number of activities: as such, it is the common denominator of a number of examples of youthful *cωφροcύνη*. Thus, this definition is on the level of Laches' *sec-*

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[41] In the set-up of *Chrm.*, the search for the definition of *cωφροcύνη* is no end in itself; rather, it serves as a preliminary to see whether Charmides is indeed *cώφρων* so that he does not need an incantation to cure his headache. Similarly, in *Laches*, the definition of *ἀνδρεία* is a preliminary to the answer to Lysimachos' question about the use of hoplomachy. See Kahn (1996) 153-4.

ond definition of ἀνδρεία in the dialogue of that name.[42] At the same time, it is obvious that, for Socrates, the definition is highly deficient as a full definition: it does not even cover the prototypical manifestations of the virtue in adults, let alone less typical manifestations; and its focus is on outward appearances, not on the cognitive/emotional state of which Charmides himself has just given a demonstration, and on the self-awareness of that state of which Socrates has just demanded an account.[43]

Socrates dismisses the identification of cωφροcύνη with school boy discipline by pointing out that cωφροcύνη is among the good things, but ἡcυχιότηc is sometimes inferior to speed, ergo the two cannot be the same (159C-160D). His counter-examples are well chosen to appeal to the boy's limited frame of reference, for they draw on music lessons, athletic training, and learning and teaching and similar mental pursuits. And while the argument itself may seem simplistic,[44] it makes the very important point, again crucial to the later stages of the discussion, that whereas ἡcυχιότηc is (for males at least) not 'good' independent of setting and context, cωφροcύνη is one of those values that are invariably and universally good,[45] and that any

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[42] For Laches' first definition is in fact really a (prototypical) *example* of ἀνδρεία, see section 4 above.

[43] Cf. Tuckey (1958) 19, North (1966) 155-6, Schmid (1998) 22-4, Stalley (2000) 266. That is not to say that the definition is intrinsically inadequate, except that it does not meet with the demands just formulated by Socrates. As we have seen throughout the central chapters of this book, most uses of cωφροcύνη focus on its characteristic behaviour rather than on a mental state.

[44] Cf. Schmid (1998) 24.

[45] Thus, any suggestion that cωφροcύνη is not a good thing, or is not appropriate in a given situation, is either a joke or plainly outrageous, for the use of the positive value term is incongruous when the situation requires a very different types of behaviour. This is why the use of ἀνδρεία and cωφροcύνη in *Politicus* is difficult, for there the positive terms are also applied to *excesses* of assertive and quiet behaviour (see section 6).

This incongruity is what makes Weak's position in *Clouds* hilariously immoral (see chapter 8.2), and Callicles' rejection of cωφροcύνη shockingly so (see section 5). Comically incongruous is also Iris' remark to Lyssa (whose function is to incite Heracles' madness) that she is not there in order to be cώφρων (i.e. in order to moralise on the immorality of Hera's actions against Heracles, E. *Her.* 857, see chapter 6.2).

definition that would lead one to think otherwise cannot be accepted without reservations.[46]

8.2. *The second definition:* αἰδώς

Charmides is now invited to practice some introspection (160D6 εἰς ϲεαυτὸν ἐμβλέψαϲ) and then to state 'well and courageously' (D8-E1 εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείωϲ) what he really thinks on the matter. His second definition is indeed rather more 'inward-looking' than the first and betrays a measure of self-awareness in that it reflects Charmides' sense of shame:

> δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, αἰϲχύνεϲθαι ποιεῖν ἡ ϲωφροϲύνη καὶ αἰϲχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδὼϲ ἡ ϲωφροϲύνη.
> (Pl. *Chrm.* 160E3-5)

> 'Well then', he said, 'I think that ϲωφροϲύνη causes one to feel shame and makes man liable to feel shame, and that ϲωφροϲύνη is the same as αἰδώϲ.'

This second definition may be said to mark an advance in that it turns attention away from the outward manifestations of ϲωφροϲύνη to the mental/emotional experience behind these manifestations; it is still tied to a boy's frame of reference (in this case, the sense of decency in my group of uses no. 9) but perhaps less exclusively so, for αἰδώϲ relates to a more general sense of respect for propriety and can be associated with ϲωφροϲύνη in rather more types of other-regarding behaviour.[47] But the definition still does not get to the heart of the matter, and it is refuted by Socrates on the objection that, like quietness, αἰδώϲ is not always a good thing either; Homer *(Od.* 17.347) is cited as a decisive and effective authority on the point.[48]

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[46] Again, there is a clear parallel with the refutation of Laches' *second* definition of ἀνδρεία as καρτερία, which also fails on the ground that καρτερία, unlike ἀνδρεία, is not always a good thing: *La.* 192D-193D.

[47] Thus, in *Prt.* 322C2, it is αἰδώϲ that is conducive to ϲωφροϲύνη in the political sense of respect for the rights and claims of others. For Plato's use of conventional uses of αἰδώϲ, cf. Cairns (1993) 371-8.

[48] Stalley (2000) 266 is not entirely right to suggest that 'whether a sense of shame is appropriate depends on one's social position'. It is true that αἰδώϲ will naturally spring from a perceived status difference (see, e.g. Cairns (1993)

8.3. *The third definition:* τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν

Charmides then remembers that he heard someone say that
cωφροcύνη means τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 'doing one's own things'
(161B6), and offers this as a third definition. There is a strong
and repeated suggestion that this definition stems from Critias
(161B8, 162C4-6), even though Critias himself denies it
(161C2), and this brings the ideal of the quiet, ἀπράγμων citi-
zen in view (my use 10), an ideal that at the date of the dra-
matic setting of the dialogue reflects a conservative and elitist
political ideology associated with cωφροcύνη (cf. chapters 7.3 on
Thucydides and 8.2 on Aristophanes).[49] This adds an important
motive to the thematic material associated with cωφροcύνη in
the dialogue, for it will eventually be argued that the true
cώφρων will indeed have a vital 'political' function in his su-
preme care for the well-being of the city, though the view on
political cωφροcύνη offered by Socrates will in fact differ sub-
stantially from what Critias has to offer.

   Socrates at first takes this phrase, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, in an
obviously far too limited sense,[50] and observes that there are
many people who do not just 'do their own things' and yet can
be called cώφρονεc: teachers and school children write other
names as well their own, doctors heal others and artisans make
things not just for themselves (161D-162A). He concludes that
this definition is a kind of riddle, constructed by the anonymous
expert to point out 'that it is difficult to recognise what that
'doing one's own things' actually is' (162B5 ὡc ὂν χαλεπὸν τὸ τὰ
αὑτοῦ πράττειν γνῶναι ὅτι ποτε ἔcτιν).

87-9), but when αἰδώc is said to be *inappropriate*, it is the special exigencies of a
situation that make the difference. For the beggar of the Homeric example, it
is his need for food; at *Od.* 3.14, Telemachus is told that he should overcome his
αἰδώc for Menelaus (a natural reaction for a young man versus a great hero) in
view of his need for information.
   [49] On the connections of Socrates with Critias and Charmides, see Stone
(1980), Krentz (1992), esp. 82-3, and Notomi (2000). On the choice of Critias
and Charmides as discussion partners in the dialogue, see Kahn (1996) 185-7.
   [50] His use of ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε as a contrast term to ἐcωφρονεῖτε (161E11)
gives a hint, however, that he is quite aware of the interpretation of cωφροcύνη
in terms of ἀπραγμοcύνη that Critias obviously had in mind.

The remark makes two important points. First, it prepares us for the fact that τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν will eventually be relevant to cωφροcύνη in a more sophisticated way: the cώφρων will take care that everyone does 'his own things' in the sense of doing what one can do best (171D-E, a striking anticipation of the division of labour proposed as the definition of δικαιοcύνη in the *Republic*). Second, it subtly points to the problems connected with cωφροcύνη and 'cognition' (γνῶναι) that are a prominent theme in the later stages of the discussion. Thus, we are reminded of the connections between cωφροcύνη and the other virtues; but here these connections are questioned rather than exploited.

Critias now takes over from his nephew, and objects — in a show of semantic subtlety à la Prodicus, as Socrates does not fail to point out (163D3-4)[51] — that Socrates has understood the verb πράττειν in the sense of ποιεῖν ('making'), a sense that is both mundane and too inclusive. On the authority of Hesiod, he suggest that it is τὰ ... καλῶc καὶ ὠφελίμωc ποιούμενα ('what is done well and in a useful way') that comes in for the lofty name of ἔργα and that only such 'doings' can rightfully be called πράξειc (163C3-4). Again, two notions that will be crucial to the final stages of the discussion are introduced: first, that cωφροcύνη aims at the good, τὸ καλόν, and ultimately implies 'understanding of good and bad', second, that cωφροcύνη must be 'useful'.

Socrates suspends his judgement on Critias' modified definition that 'it is not the man who does what is bad but the man who does what is good who is cώφρων' (οὐκ ἄρα cωφρονεῖ ὁ τὰ κακὰ πράττων ἀλλ' ὁ τἀγαθά, 163E4). Perhaps this is surprising, for this definition — while too inclusive from the point of view of ordinary semantics — would seem to suit Socrates' notion that virtue is one and aims at the good.[52] In fact, however, Socrates goes on to refute Critias' definition by pointing out an unacceptable consequence of the definition. A doctor may do

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[51] Cf. *La.* 197D, where it is also Socrates' second interlocutor, Nicias, who is the more sophisticated and 'sophistic' discussion partner.

[52] His resistance to premature acceptance of theses that he himself seems to believe, is a characteristic of Socrates' philosophical 'integrity' that runs through the dialogue. One may compare his treatment of Nicias in *Laches.*

something useful or harmful without knowing so: ἐνίοτε ἄρα ...
ὠφελίμως πράξας ἢ βλαβερῶς ὁ ἰατρὸς οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς
ἔπραξεν, 'sometimes, a doctor acts in a useful or damaging way,
and does not know about himself in what way he acted'
(164B11-C1). On Critias' definition this means that he is
cώφρων without knowing that he is (cωφρονεῖ, ἀγνοεῖ δ' ἑαυτὸν
ὅτι cωφρονεῖ, 164C6).

8.4. *The fourth definition: Self-Knowledge*

Being cώφρων without knowing that one is cώφρων is a concep-
tion that Critias refuses to accept, and this prompts an entirely
'new' definition, well prepared in fact by the formulation of
Socrates' leading questions,[53] namely that cωφροcύνη is 'under-
standing oneself' or 'knowing oneself' (τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν,
164D4).

What Critias seems to mean with his definition of cωφροcύνη
as 'self-knowledge' is probably that man should know his place
and comply with human and divine authority (cf. especially the
'submissive' types of cωφροcύνη in my groups of uses nos. 14 and
17).[54] This compliance implies an aristocratic/authoritarian view
of cωφροcύνη familiar from some characters in Aeschylus, and
openly defied by Sophocles' Ajax. As such, this new definition
gives some hints about Critias' own political inclinations and, by
implication, a reminder of the excesses to which these led. But
'know thyself' can also be taken in a more strictly epistemologi-
cal sense[55] — as it was probably done by Heraclitus who claimed
that it was given to any man to know himself and be cώφρων.[56]
This second interpretation is now taken up by Socrates, and this
prepares us for the introduction of the thoroughly Socratic no-
tion that cωφροcύνη is a form of knowledge, and more specifi-
cally a form of knowledge that has to do with the awareness of

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[53] Cf. Tuozzo (2000) 300. The earliest hint for an interpretation of
cωφροcύνη in terms of self-knowledge is Socrates' earlier suggestion to Char-
mides that cωφροcύνη should produce some kind of awareness of itself.

[54] Cf. Tuckey (1958) 24.

[55] Cf. Kahn (1996) 191.

[56] fr. 116 ἀνθρώποιcι πᾶcι μέτεcτι γινώcκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ cωφρονεῖν, 'it is
given to all people to know themselves and be *sôphrones*'.

what one does and does not know. Thus, this definition might seem to appeal to both Socrates and Critias, but when the latter strongly invites Socrates to accept the definition, Socrates declines — with a characteristic disclaimer of knowledge — and suggests further inquiry.

In discussing this fourth definition of ϲωφροϲύνη as self-knowledge, Socrates suggests that it implies that ϲωφροϲύνη is a form of 'knowledge' with a certain object (ἐπιϲτήμη … τιϲ καὶ τινόϲ (165C5) and Critias specifies that the object is ἑαυτοῦ. This is a covert modification of the earlier definition of ϲωφροϲύνη as τὸ γιγνώϲκειν ἑαυτόν for the shift from γιγνώϲκειν / γνῶϲιϲ to ἐπιϲτήμη / ἐπίϲταϲθαι effects that 'self-knowledge' cannot be taken to be some kind of generalised, non-technical 'insight' about oneself and one's position in society (as the phrase might suggest in ordinary usage) but that it has to be a formal and technical body of knowledge on the analogy of a craft or science.[57] On the analogy of the crafts, Socrates asks Critias to identify a specific *product* of 'knowledge of oneself', but Critias protests that self-knowledge is not like ordinary productive crafts (165D-166A). Socrates then states that crafts have an object outside themselves, and invites Critias to name a similar object for self-knowledge. Again, Critias protests that self-knowledge is unlike the other crafts: it has no object outside itself, but is unique in being 'knowledge of other types of knowledge and of knowledge itself' (ἡ δὲ μόνη τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιϲτημῶν ἐπιϲτήμη ἐϲτὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆϲ, 166C2-3).[58] On this definition, ἐπιϲτήμη ἑαυτοῦ amounts to understanding what knowledge is and whether one — or someone else — has it or not.[59]

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[57] Cf. Stalley (2000) 271; 'The question is … whether the kind of understanding which one may have of oneself can properly be assimilated to the expert's knowledge of his subject.'

[58] It is significant that Socrates assures Critias that he is not interested in scoring points in the discussion, but really fears that he may think he knows what he does not know (166C7-D2): here we have yet another clear demonstration that Socrates cares about ϲωφροϲύνη also in this sense of 'self-knowledge'.

[59] Cf. Stalley (2000) 271: 'Plato makes it clear in this passage, that, whatever the original meaning of 'knowing oneself', the thesis under consideration is to be identified with the Socratic ideal of knowing what one does and does not know.'

The shift from 'self-knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη ... ἑαυτοῦ) to ἐπιστήμη ... αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆc may seem fallacious,[60] but it would seem to follow naturally from Socrates' interpretation of the concept of self-knowledge. As we have seen earlier on, it is Socrates' assumption that someone who is cώφρων will be aware of his cωφροcύνη and will be able to say what cωφροcύνη is (158E-159A). Given that, in Socratic terms, virtue is a kind of knowledge, this could be reformulated in a more general statement that 'if one has 'knowledge of *x*', one will be aware of one's 'knowledge of *x*', and be able to say what 'knowledge of *x*' is. On this reading, if one has self-knowledge, this self-knowledge will (among many other things that one may happen to know about oneself) include an awareness of this knowledge, and produce the ability to say what this knowledge is. Thus, on a Socratic reading, the interpretation of 'self-knowledge' as 'knowledge what knowledge is and whether one has it, or not', is not fallacious but at most a reduction of the inclusive notion of self-knowledge to its most salient feature.[61] This 'Socratic' reading of the Delphic instruction of γνῶθι cαυτόν seems entirely in accordance with Socrates' interpretation of the oracle in *Apology* (21A), viz. that his supreme wisdom consists in the unusual awareness of his ignorance.[62]

To the new definition of cωφροcύνη as τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆc (166C2-3), Socrates adds

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[60] For a discussion, see Tuckey (1958) 33-7 and 107-8.

[61] Critias' inclusion of the other ἐπιστῆμαι in the definition of self-knowledge (τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐcτὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆc, 166C2-3), though criticised by Tuckey (1958) 31, seems to follow naturally from Socrates' assumption that knowledge produces an awareness of itself. On this assumption, 'self-knowledge' cannot be entirely reduced to 'knowledge of self-knowledge', but must include awareness of whatever other types of knowledge one may happen to have.

[62] Cf. Kahn (1996) 191. It is striking that Critias seems only too willing to give the adequate 'Socratic' answers (cf. Tuckey (1958) 24). Is this because he adheres to many Socratic formulations, even if he interprets them in a more traditional way? In any case, Socrates presents him with quite a number of leading questions. For instance, his invitation to Critias to name an object of self-knowledge that is different from knowledge itself (166B1-2) seems to imply that he holds that the earlier formulation ἐπιστήμη ... ἑαυτοῦ (165C7) does *not* specify such an object.

the notion that ϲωφροϲύνη, if it is knowledge of knowledge, must also be knowledge of ignorance (καὶ ἀνεπιϲτημοϲύνηϲ ἐπιϲτήμη ἂν εἴη, 166E7). This easily leads to the conclusion that the typical Socratic activity of interrogating the expert and exposing his defective knowledge is, in fact, the proper function of 'knowledge of knowledge' and therewith of 'self-knowledge' and ϲωφροϲύνη.[63] At the same time, we are far removed from traditional notions of ϲωφροϲύνη. The plausibility of the identification of ϲωφροϲύνη with self-knowledge is based on the fact that the traditional interpretation of γνῶθι ϲαυτόν commends acceptance of the limitations of mortality and recognition of the superiority of divinity; this is indeed close to a traditional use of ϲωφροϲύνη (use 17) to commend compliance with divine authority. When, however, γνῶθι ϲαυτόν is reinterpreted in terms of Socratic self-knowledge, we are considerably removed from conventional interpretations of the virtue.[64] But given that the re-interpretation of γνῶθι ϲαυτόν is not characterised as such, the reader may easily go along with the discussion, and accept that ϲωφροϲύνη is indeed the Socratic expertise in assessing the knowledge and ignorance of oneself and others:

> ὁ ἄρα ϲώφρων μόνοϲ αὐτόϲ τε ἑαυτὸν γνώϲεται καὶ οἷόϲ τε ἔϲται
> ἐξετάϲαι τί τε τυγχάνει εἰδὼϲ καὶ τί μή, καὶ τοὺϲ ἄλλουϲ ὡϲαύτωϲ
> δυνατὸϲ ἔϲται ἐπιϲκοπεῖν τί τιϲ οἶδεν καὶ οἴεται, εἴπερ οἶδεν, καὶ τί
> αὖ οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδεν δ' οὔ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδείϲ· καὶ ἔϲτιν δὴ
> τοῦτο τὸ ϲωφρονεῖν τε καὶ ϲωφροϲύνη καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν
> γιγνώϲκειν, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν.
> (Pl. *Chrm.* 167A1-7)

> So the ϲώφρων will be the only one who will know himself and will be able to enquire what he does and does not know; and with respect to other people he will in the same manner be able to judge what someone knows and thinks he knows, and see if he really knows it, and also what he thinks he knows, but does not really know; no one else will be able to

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[63] It seems right to say that 'temperance in the ordinary sense drops out of sight' (Kahn (1996) 191). Still, there are some suggestions in the epistemological discussion that self-knowledge produces results that are commonly associated with ϲωφροϲύνη, notably 'doing one's own things' and successful management of one's οἶκοϲ and the πόλιϲ (cf. the prudential uses in group 2).

[64] It will be clear that I am not convinced that the prominence of 'Self-Knowledge' in the subtitle of North (1966) is justified from the point of view of ordinary language use.

do so. And this is what being ϲώφρων and ϲωφροϲύνη and
knowing oneself amounts to, that one knows what one does
and does not know.

Here we have a conclusive affirmation of what has been the
drift of the discussion for some time now, namely that the es-
sence of ϲωφροϲύνη is the ability to perform something that
looks remarkably like the Socratic method of ἔλεγχοϲ, and that
this ability is the true test of genuine ϲωφροϲύνη.

  Instead of accepting this apparently very satisfactory conclu-
sion, Socrates confesses bewilderment, and goes on to show
that there are complex and seemingly unaccountable difficul-
ties involved in this notion of self-knowledge, thereby showing
that it is no trivial and simple matter. First of all, ἐπιϲτήμηϲ
ἐπιϲτήμη is shown to be an utter anomaly in that, unlike other
cognitive faculties, it has no object outside itself and no δύναμιϲ
with respect to anything outside itself (167B-169B). But even if
one tentatively accepts that such an anomaly is possible, as Soc-
rates generously does (thereby giving a hint that the notion
may be correct even if it cannot at present be accounted for), it
still means that it is difficult to see what the use of such knowl-
edge would be. For it would be impossible to assess the validity
of the knowledge of an expert in a certain field of expertise,
without also having the specialised knowledge in question.[65]
This means that ϲωφροϲύνη is 'knowing that one does and does
not know' rather than 'knowing what one does and does not
know' (170D1-3) and the unpleasant consequence is that the
ϲώφρων will not be able to assess the validity of the knowledge
of a doctor or any other expert, because he lacks the specialist
knowledge of the field in question.

  Thus, the benefit of ϲωφροϲύνη as self-knowledge proves elu-
sive, and Socrates expresses annoyance at this, because he is
assured that if ϲωφροϲύνη really meant that one knows what one
does and does not know, it would be greatly beneficial to the
πόλιϲ:

  ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν αὐτοί τε [καὶ] οἱ τὴν
  ϲωφροϲύνην ἔχοντεϲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντεϲ ὅϲοι ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἤρχοντο.

―――――――

  [65] On the assumption that branches of knowledge are firmly separate and
do not overlap, see Stalley (2000) 271-2.

οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἃ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα, ἀλλ'
ἐξευρίϲκοντεϲ τοὺϲ ἐπιϲταμένουϲ ἐκείνοιϲ ἂν παρεδίδομεν, οὔτε τοῖϲ
ἄλλοιϲ ἐπετρέπομεν, ὧν ἤρχομεν, ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἢ ὅτι πράτ-
τοντεϲ ὀρθῶϲ ἔμελλον πράξειν—τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἄν, οὗ ἐπιστήμην
εἶχον—καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ ϲωφροϲύνηϲ οἰκία τε οἰκουμένη ἔμελλεν
καλῶϲ οἰκεῖϲθαι, πόλιϲ τε πολιτευομένη, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν οὗ
ϲωφροϲύνη ἄρχοι.
(Pl. *Chrm.* 171D6-E7)

We would live our lives without making mistakes, both w e
ourselves who possess ϲωφροϲύνη and all others who were
ruled by us. For we would never undertake to do anything
ourselves that we did not know how to do, but we would find
the experts and leave it to them; and we would not order the
others, whom we ruled, to do anything but what they were
bound to do well — that is to say, the things of which they
had knowledge. And in that way, under the influence of
sophrosynè, a household would be managed in the right way,
and a city would be governed well, and the same thing goes
for anything in which ϲωφροϲύνη had the lead.

Here, the notion of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 'doing one's proper
things', is subtly reintroduced in the discussion as a direct result
of the discussion of ϲωφροϲύνη in the sense of self-knowledge,
and it is now given a political significance that goes way beyond
the aversion to democratic πολυπραγμοϲύνη that Critias probably
had in mind. 'Doing one's own job' is of course the definition
of δικαιοϲύνη in the *Republic*. And if 'true' ϲωφροϲύνη remains
elusive at this stage in the *Charmides*, the present passage gives
a clear hint of the directions that Platonic investigations of the
virtue will take.[66]

The benefit of this 'doing what belongs to one' is that it
makes for successful management of the household and the
city. Here the 'prudential' aspects of ϲωφροϲύνη (successful and
circumspect management of one's household and the πόλιϲ,
always traditionally taken as a sign of ϲωφροϲύνη in the male
πολίτηϲ, cf. the uses from my group 2) come into view. They
have not been directly addressed in the discussion, for most of
the time, Plato has been more concerned with a defence of the

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[66] It is also a hint that Socrates, in his pursuit of self-knowledge, is of benefit
to the city *because* of his ἀπραγμοϲύνη. To this, one may compare the defence of
the contemplative life in *Gorgias*, and his advice to stay out of politics to Alci-
biades in *Smp.* 216A4-6. (See section 4).

other-regarding aspects of the virtue. It is typically in a passage
where the benefits of virtue are explicitly stated, that he will
suggest that it is in fact (also) in the interest of the agent him-
self.

When the ultimate political goal of ϲωφροϲύνη has been estab-
lished, Socrates and Critias undertake one final attempt to 'save'
the definition. Socrates suggests that he is prepared to allow
the possibility of one ἐπιϲτήμη that assesses all specific kinds of
knowledge, and that produces the happiness that ensues when
everyone does his own proper job and does it well.

  Unfortunately, it turns out that living 'knowingly'
(ἐπιϲτημόνωϲ ζῆν, 173E) does not suffice for living well or 'hap-
pily', because what one needs to that end is not knowledge of
knowledge, but rather knowledge of good and bad (174B τὸ
ἀγαθὸν … καὶ τὸ κακόν). Thus, ϲωφροϲύνη as 'knowledge of
knowledge' seems useless unless it is equated with 'knowledge
of good and bad', and therewith, by implication, with virtue *tout
court*.[67] It now seems fully impossible to establish what use there
is for ϲωφροϲύνη if it is defined as 'knowledge of knowledge':
for then it does not produce the obviously useful effects of con-
ventional crafts, and is also distinct from the knowledge of the
good that is to assure the correct application of these crafts.
Thus, the final *aporia* of *Charmides* seems to warn against the
identification of ϲωφροϲύνη with a 'technical' type of self-
knowledge: this would amount to an equation of ϲωφροϲύνη and
virtue in general.[68]

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[67] To this extent, *Charmides* runs into exactly the same *aporia* as *Laches*, the
impossibility of distinguishing between ϲωφροϲύνη and virtue in general.

[68] Stalley (2003) 276 seeks the solution of the *aporia* in the point that the
two definitions are to be combined: : 'A definition of virtue as the knowledge
of good and evil would be true but would conceal the important point that this
knowledge is not simply a matter of being well informed about the conse-
quences of our actions but, rather, requires a redirection of our souls towards a
true conception of the good.' This elaborates on Stalley's prior conclusion
(*ibid.*) that ϲωφροϲύνη can not be a technical type of knowledge. See Stalley
(2000) 266: '*Charmides* implies that knowledge of the good is different in kind
from *technai* such as those of medicine and navigation. ... This knowledge is
achieved not through conventional instruction but through self-examination.'
In both cases, Stalley seems more concerned with 'virtue' in general than with
the specific function of ϲωφροϲύνη.

8.5. Charmides: *Conlusions*

In surveying *Charmides*, we can observe that the dialogue ex-
plores a number of notions conventionally associated with tradi-
tional uses of cώφρων and cognates, only to reject them all as
definitions of the concept. Charmides' first definition (τὸ
κοcμίωc πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡcυχῆι, 'doing everything in an or-
derly manner and quietly', Pl. *Chrm.* 159B) describes the use of
cώφρων to commend quiet and orderly behaviour in boys (use
13). It is found wanting on the ground that 'quietness', or
rather slowness, is not always a good thing. The same refutation
goes for the second definition, (cωφροcύνη = αἰδώc, Pl. *Chrm.*
160E) which builds on the association of αἰδώc with cωφροcύνη
in various uses where cωφροcύνη expresses a sense of propriety
(as in my use 9). The third definition (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 161B
invokes the ideal of the quiet, ἀπράγμων citizen (use 10). The
formulation τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν is rejected because it does not
account for the *awareness* that one is doing the right things,
which Socrates takes to be central for cωφροcύνη and does in-
deed seem to be implied by the 'intellectualist' associations of
the term. (Remarkably, the notion of 'doing one's own job' re-
turns as the definition of δικαιοcύνη in *Republic*, and there we
find a neat division of labour between the two virtues: where
δικαιοcύνη is a 'practical' division of tasks between the various
classes of the state, cωφροcύνη consists in their mental assent
that this is indeed how things should be.) Finally, the fourth
definition (τὸ γιγνώcκειν ἑαυτόν, 'knowing oneself', 164D) in-
vokes the Delphic maxim, reminiscent of cωφροcύνη in the use
of man's compliance with the superiority to the gods (use 17).
The definition is redefined in terms of Socratic self-knowledge
and self-investigation, and while it is suggested that this is a
very commendable activity, it is ultimately dismissed because
cωφροcύνη then cannot be distinguished meaningfully from
other types of virtue.

Most of the uses of cωφροcύνη that are activated by the asso-
ciated terms and expressions contained in the four definitions
are quite central. (For a diagram, see figure 12 at the end of
this chapter.) They are not *absolutely* central, however: the pro-
totypical interpretation of cωφροcύνη as 'control of desires' is

not discussed. Are we to take it that it is not challenged either? If so, this accords well with the fact that in later discussions of ϲωφροϲύνη, Plato takes this prototypical use as a point of departure. In *Charmides*, then, Socrates' display of self-control in the dramatic setting of the dialogue may well offer a hint as to how the dialectical *aporia* is finally to be solved.

Besides, *Charmides* offers a strong vindication of Socrates' possession of virtue. His ϲωφροϲύνη is shown on a mundane level in his self-control at the sight of young Charmides. But apart from that, it is suggested that it is Socrates who is most earnestly in search of the 'knowledge of what one does and does not know', and that it is he who, ultimately, offers the greatest benefits to his city and constitutes the best example of the ϲώφρων πολίτηϲ.[69] Here, the setting is important again, for Socrates is contrasted to two characters — Charmides and Critias — who, through their inadequacy in discussion and their dubious subsequent political careers, are exposed as 'false experts' on political virtue; in spite of their reputations, they do not really possess the quality.[70]

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[69] The encomium of Socrates by Alcibiades in *Symposium* offers a far more complete and complex account of Socrates' ἀρεταί. Again, Socrates' ϲωφροϲύνη is an important ingredient in this eulogy, and again, ϲωφροϲύνη takes the prototypical form of 'control of desires', for Socrates successfully withstands the attempts at seduction by Alcibiades. But Socrates 'self-mastery' is related to many other situations in which he is firmly 'in control': his endurance of hunger and the cold (219E-220C), his concentration in thought (220C-D), his composure and courage in battle (220D-222C), and arguably even the 'justice' of his advice to Alcibiades not to manage the affairs of the Athenians as long as he cannot properly manage his own 'affairs' (216A). In that sense, Socrates offers an illustration of how the virtues can co-exist, and here too, ϲωφροϲύνη would seem to take a quite central place in the 'network' of Socrates' various manifestations of virtue.

On the eulogy of Socrates in that speech, see Bury (1932) lx, Dover (1980) 164, Rowe (1998). On the relation of the speech to epideictic oratory, see North (1994) 206.

By contrast Gagarin (1977) and Nussbaum (1979) stress the *hybristic* element of Socrates in the speech, and argue that the reader is to take it as a criticism of the detached rationalism of the philosopher. Segoloni (1994) 13-108 is the most extensive recent treatment of the speech as an 'accusation' of Socrates.

[70] On the connection of Socrates with Critias and Charmides, see Vlastos (1994a) esp. 87-90, Notomi (2000) 237-241.

9. *The Definition of* ϲωφροϲύνη*:* Republic

The fourth book of *Republic* offers definitive technical defini-
tions of all the main virtues, ϲοφία, ἀνδρεία, ϲωφροϲύνη and —
the *definiendum* proper of the dialogue — δικαιοϲύνη. In con-
trast with the early aporetic dialogues, the problematic identifi-
cation of the virtues with knowledge is now given up, and this
has the consequence for ϲωφροϲύνη that Plato now firmly takes
the prototypical notion of 'control of desires' as his point of de-
parture, instead of trying to explain the virtue in terms of 'self-
knowledge'.

    The distinction between ϲωφροϲύνη and δικαιοϲύνη in *Repub-
lic* remains somewhat problematic. Socrates defines δικαιοϲύνη
on the basis of a process of elimination. He explicitly assumes
that if ϲοφία, ἀνδρεία and ϲωφροϲύνη are defined first, what is
left must be δικαιοϲύνη. This implies that these four virtues to-
gether cover the whole of civic and individual ἀρετή, and that
there is no separate function for other qualities like, for in-
stance, ὁϲιότηϲ.[71] More importantly, it also implies that there is
no significant overlap between the four virtues. This may seem
intuitively 'right' for ϲοφία and ἀνδρεία, which are characteristic
functions of specific classes in the state and parts of the soul.
The assumption is more problematic, however, where
ϲωφροϲύνη and δικαιόϲυνη are concerned, for these two are of-
ten closely associated, especially in their 'civic' senses with
which a political text like *Republic* is naturally specifically con-
cerned. In fact, the dialogue achieves a very neat, but arguably
contrived distinction between the two virtues: δικαιοϲύνη is now
defined as τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν — as we have seen one of the
definitions of ϲωφροϲύνη in *Charmides* — and as in *Charmides*,
this phrase is interpreted as implying that the various classes
and parts of the soul all perform their proper function. So in a
sense, δικαιοϲύνη amounts to a proper division of labour be-
tween the virtues, and covers the practical sides of good citizen-

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[71] In defence of Socrates' procedure here, one may perhaps point to
Euthypro 12D1-3 (cf. p. 302n17 above), where τὸ ὅϲιον is defined as a part of τὸ
δίκαιον. But it seems pertinent to note that, while religion has its traditional and
wholly uncontested place in Plato's state, political ἀρετή itself is not by any
means defined in religious terms.

ship. By contrast, cωφροcύνη is defined as the 'harmony' or 'mu-
tual agreement' between the various classes of citizens and parts
of the soul about who should be in charge. Here, cωφροcύνη
covers the mental acceptance of the 'rightness' of this division
of labour. Thus, the definition of cωφροcύνη covers very much
the same ground as that of δικαιοcύνη,[72] if from a slightly dif-
ferent perspective, cωφροcύνη representing the emo-
tional/cognitive endorsement of the practical division of labour
envisaged by δικαιοcύνη.

Thus, the technical distinction between cωφροcύνη and δι-
καιοcύνη is likely to strike the contemporary reader as somewhat
artificial, and it seems to be in this respect that Plato, in his at-
tempt at establishing clear-cut technical definitions, most obvi-
ously removes himself from the less categorical distinctions of
ordinary language use.

After the discussion on the education of the soldiers (see sec-
tion 6), Socrates turns to the distribution of the virtues within
the state, in order to determine, by means of the process of
elimination signalled above, the definition of δικαιοcύνη in the
πόλιc.

After cοφία and ἀνδρεία have been established as qualities
that are, within the πόλιc, the specific property of separate
classes, the rulers and the soldiers, cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη
are addressed next. Socrates now suggests that he would like to
see if they can jump to δικαιοcύνη straight away, and skip the
theme of cωφροcύνη altogether. When pressed by Glauco not to
do so, he explains that cωφροcύνη is rather more complex than
the other two virtues because it is 'rather more like some kind
of 'concord' or 'harmony' than the earlier two' (cυμφωνίαι τινὶ
καὶ ἁρμονίαι προcέοικεν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρότερον, 430E3-4). In ex-
planation of this thesis, he returns to the 'popular' conception
of cωφροcύνη as self-control (this time, unlike what we saw in
the earlier discussion of the education of the guardians, without
the addition of 'obedience'):

Κόcμος πού τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ cωφροcύνη ἐcτὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ
ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὥς φαcι κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ οἶδ'

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[72] Cf. Williams (1973) 200 = (1997) 153.

ὄντινα τρόπον, καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἴχνη αὐτῆς λέγεται. ἢ
γάρ;
(Pl. *R.* 430E6-9)

'I suppose that ϲωφροϲύνη is some kind of order', I said, 'and
control of certain pleasures and desires, as they claim when
they use the expression 'stronger than oneself' in some
strange way, and there are some other similar things that
point us to the track of ϲωφροϲύνη. Right?'

Here, Plato takes up the prototypical notion of ϲωφροϲύνη, and
starts to elaborate on this notion by working out the implica-
tions of the associated phrase 'being stronger than oneself'. It
is suggested that this oxymoron means that some better 'part'
of the soul is in control of a worse part (which neatly paves the
way for the introduction, later on, of the notion of the tripar-
tite soul). In the πόλιϲ, this is taken to mean that the 'better'
desires of those educated for leadership take precedence over
the worse desires of those who are not.

Now this would seem to suggest that ϲωφροϲύνη is the exclu-
sive property of the leaders rather than their subjects (and, in
the individual ψυχή, of the rational part rather than the oth-
ers), but there are evidently some problems connected with
such a conclusion. First, this would mean that ϲωφροϲύνη would
again not be clearly distinguished from ϲοφία, the expertise *par
excellence* of the leaders. Second, the whole discussion of the
education of the military training in book III seems to show that
ϲωφροϲύνη cannot be the exclusive property of the leaders, for
the ordinary soldiers under their command must possess
ϲωφροϲύνη and ἀνδρεία as well.[73]

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[73] It is disputed whether individual members of the lower classes in the
state should *individually* have the virtues of their classes at the level of the city,
ϲωφροϲύνη and δικαιοϲύνη. At first sight, Plato's analogy between the city and
the soul suggests that the city as a whole on the macro level is comparable to the
individual soul as a whole on the micro level: both are essentially tripartite,
each of the parts having its specific virtue(s). Now the parts of the state consist
of individual citizens, each having souls that consist of three parts with their
specific function. On a strict reading of the analogy, this second subdivision
should apply not only (a) to the parts of the city, but also (b) to the parts of the
individual souls, which leads to the absurdity of a subdivision of the parts of the
soul, each with its *logistikon, thumoeides* etc.

But Plato paves himself a way out of this dilemma by activating the traditional notion that cωφροcύνη involves obedience as well as control (see 389D-E, section 5 above), which implies that cωφροcύνη belongs to the ruled as well as the rulers. This implication is now taken up to prepare for the conclusion that cωφροcύνη in the state is some kind of consensus between rulers and subjects about who should be in charge, and that cωφροcύνη in fact belongs to both these classes (431E6); cωφροcύνη is now redefined as 'a concord between what is weaker and stronger by nature about which of the two should govern, both in the city and in each individual' (χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνονος κατὰ φύcιν cυμφωνίαν ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάcτωι, 432A7-9).

Thus, Plato takes up the prototypical notion of cωφροcύνη as control of desires, and extends this notion by means of his concept of the tri-partite soul: cωφροcύνη is now the state in which the lesser parts of the soul let themselves be governed by the *logistikon*. He then extrapolates this conception to the city as a whole, and develops his notion of 'political' cωφροcύνη as a concord between the superior and inferior classes in the state about who should govern the city. In a sense, Plato now offers a new and highly original interpretation of the traditional notion of cωφροcύνη as εὐνομία, in which cωφροcύνη was traditionally used with an aristocratic bias to commend acquiescence in the *status quo* (my use 18).

When this definition of cωφροcύνη in the state is accepted, Socrates once again stresses the elusiveness of δικαιοcύνη (432B7-D1), and then goes on that it must be 'what is left' (τὸ

The clearest statement of the analogy is Williams (1973). The most common way out of the dilemma is to deny that the analogy with the πόλιc holds for the souls of the lower classes: these do not have virtue. So, esp., Irwin (1977) 331, (1995) 229-231 with 383n.9, where see for further references.

The opposite view (to which I subscribe here) is defended by Vlastos (1973) 111-39, esp. 133-4, and Lear (1997). Lear (1997) claims that the isomorphism of soul and state is not a strict analogy between the whole and its parts ('the state is just etc. if its parts (the men) are just etc.'): it depends on psychological relations between 'inside' (the soul) and 'outside' (the city). On this reading, a city is just *in the way* that a soul is just (its justice being an 'externalisation' of that of the soul and *vice versa*), and this statement does not imply a judgement on each and everyone of the city's members. Thus, the problem of the analogy is, I think, solved.

ὑπολειφθέν, 433C1) of virtue in the state after the other three have been defined. Here he introduces the notion of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 'doing one's own job', familiar as a characteristic feature of cωφροcύνη in *Charmides*: δικαιοcύνη in the state means that the members of the subordinated classes do their jobs without contesting that the rulers should govern. Thus, in a sense, δικαιοcύνη ensures a division of labour that is very much the practical implementation of the 'consensus' achieved by cωφροcύνη.

Arguably, Plato has not made life easy for himself here in at least two ways.

    First, it seems clear that the long detour via the virtues of the state back to those of the individual was necessary because it was not easy to convince sceptics that δικαιοcύνη is beneficial to the individual. But it seems equally clear that for a demonstration of Plato's conception of cωφροcύνη, it would have been far easier to start with the case of the individual soul. In fact, Plato does indeed appeal to the individual soul in the discussion of cωφροcύνη in the state (at 431A3-B3) and thus seems to acknowledge this problem. However, if Plato had chosen to treat cωφροcύνη in the individual soul first, it would have been exceedingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that cωφροcύνη is the domination of the rational part. This would have been damaging to the comparison with the state, for in the state, cωφροcύνη is not the exclusive property of the leading class, but a concord between classes. The detour pays off then, for cωφροcύνη is now the shared property of the various classes with their distinct individual virtues. More than ever before, it is the function of cωφροcύνη to bind these qualities together, and to ensure that, say, ἀνδρεία and δικαιοcύνη cannot be opposed to each other as they can in ordinary usage.[74]

    Second, Plato sets out to distinguish cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη in the field of political ἀρετή, an area where they are almost interchangeable in common Greek usage. What Plato

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[74] The distribution of the virtues over the classes and the parts of the soul implies, I think, that Plato in *Politeia* no longer assumes complete reciprocity or unity between the virtues: among the non-philosophers at least there should be 'virtue without knowledge'. Contra Irwin (1995) 230-1, 236-9.

achieves here, it seems, is a technical distinction by which
cωφροςύνη is narrowed down to two quite central uses ('self-
control' and 'εὐνομία'), and two others, almost equally central,
are reserved for δικαιοςύνη ('no injustice' and 'quiet-
ness'/ἀπραγμοςύνη). (See figure 14 at the end of this chapter
for a visualisation of the division.) On balance, the focus of the
term δικαιοςύνη is more on the 'behavioural' uses (each group
performs 'its own proper functions'), and cωφροςύνη focuses
rather more on the recognition of each of these groups that
this division of labour is indeed how things should be. Of
course, the technical distinction is neat, but Plato finds himself
at one remove here from conventional Greek usage, in which
both terms are used more freely to cover both the behavioural
and cognitive aspects of the same type of acceptable civic be-
haviour. The advantage of defining δικαιοςύνη in terms of τὰ
ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν seems to be that this is a formula to which even
hardened cynics are unlikely to protest: even a Thrasymachus is
likely to agree with Socrates that it is just that the rulers should
rule, and that the ruled should not interfere with their gov-
ernment, although he may well still disagree with Socrates on
the question *who* the rulers should be.

Now that the distribution of virtues in the state has been estab-
lished, Socrates sets out to look for their equivalents in the soul
of the individual. It is on the analogy of the state that the fa-
mous notion of the tripartite soul is introduced (436A-441C).
    This notion of a composite soul seems to some extent a natu-
ral extrapolation from conventional ideas on ἐγκρατεία and
cωφροςύνη. In the section on the definition of cωφροςύνη, Plato
had already shown that an expression like κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι
implies some kind of division of the soul. Plato seems to have
had a precursor here in Antiphon the sophist, whose remarks
on cωφροςύνη show he was on the brink of a similar conception:

> cωφροςύνην δὲ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο ὀρθότερόν τις κρίνειεν, ἢ ὅςτις
> τοῦ θυμοῦ ταῖς παραχρῆμα ἡδοναῖς ἐμφράccει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ⟨καὶ⟩
> κρατεῖν τε καὶ νικᾶν ἠδυνήθη αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· ὃς δὲ θέλει χαρίcαcθαι
> τῶι θυμῶι παραχρῆμα, θέλει τὰ κακίω ἀντὶ τῶν ἀμεινόνων.
> (Antiphon fr. 58,12-6.)

> As to the cωφροсύνη of a man, there is no way to judge it
> more correctly, than if someone blocks himself to the instant
> desires of his spirit and proves able to rule and defeat him-
> self. But the man who wants to gratify his spirit immedi-
> ately, wants what is worse instead of what is better.

Antiphon in this fragment goes as far as to identify the θυμός as
the part to be mastered, but without identifying a specific
dominating part. But if 'being stronger than oneself' at least
implies a rudimentary complexity of the soul, Plato's division
into *three* parts, rather than two, which he needs for the sake of
the analogy to the state, still seems a novel extension of the
concept. It seems necessary to accommodate the more assertive
drives connected with ἀνδρεία, [75] and Plato introduces this nov-
elty at length and with conspicuous circumspection. Again, he
seeks the support of common Greek usage, appealing this time
to Odysseus' 'dialogue' with his κραδίη in *Od.* 20.17.[76]

When the notion of a tripartite soul has been sufficiently es-
tablished, the identification of the ἀρεταί in the soul proceeds
smoothly. First, it is established that cοφία and ἀνδρεία are the
distinguishing virtues of the λογιcτικόν and the θυμοειδές re-
spectively, then the soul is said to be cώφρων 'when the govern-
ing part and the two governed parts agree that the rational part
is to rule, and they do not revolt against it' (ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ
τὼ ἀρχομένω τὸ λογιcτικὸν ὁμοδοξῶcι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ
cταcιάζωcιν αὐτῶι, 442C10-D1), and δικαιοcύνη in the individual
means that the inferior parts of the soul perform their own
functions without interfering with the domination of the ra-
tional part (443C-444A).

What Plato achieves here is the sophisticated and complex twin
structure of a political and psychological account of virtue, built
on many notions explored separately in his earlier dialogues. It
is clear that for his definition of cωφροcύνη in individual and
state, he draws on *two* traditional notions associated with con-
ventional uses of cώφρων and cognates. In the case of the indi-
vidual, Plato takes the notion of 'being master of oneself', asso-

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[75] Cf. Cross & Woozley (1964) 115-8, Irwin (1995) 216-7.
[76] cτῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθωι.

ciated with the prototypical notion of ϲωφροϲύνη as 'control of
the desires', and uses this as the basis for the construct of a
complex soul with one part controlling two others. Transposed
to the state, ϲωφροϲύνη means that the ruling class rules *with*
the consent of the two subjected classes. This consent is of
course vital for the stability and unity of the state, and this is
probably why Plato — again with justification in popular usage
— has carefully avoided the natural conclusion that ϲωφροϲύνη
only has to do with κρατεῖν and ἄρχειν. Here, Plato takes a sec-
ond traditional notion of ϲωφροϲύνη, again quite central to
ϲωφροϲύνη in the context of the πόλιϲ (if perhaps elsewhere
belonging to a predominantly aristocratic/conservative dis-
course): that of 'εὐνομία' or compliance with the existing *nomoi*
in the state. This is brought in to ensure that ϲωφροϲύνη is a
property of the subjects as well as their masters. But Plato makes
sure that this notion is brought in only after ϲωφροϲύνη has
been freed from its conventional aristocratic associations: the
idea of εὐνομία discussed in *Republic* is significantly more sophis-
ticated than the convervative class awareness ('doing one's own
job') of a Critias.

This means that ϲωφροϲύνη is a virtue of all classes and all
parts of the soul, and that the other ἀρεταί that are specific to
some parts are yet to be given a well-defined individual profile.
In a sense, ἀνδρεία fares best. The long section on the educa-
tion of the soldiers is in fact to be regarded as a virtuoso effort
to balance and reconcile ϲωφροϲύνη with the traditional martial
quality of ἀνδρεία (cf. section 6). The virtue of the leaders and
of the λογιϲτικόν, ϲοφία, is by no means as well defined at this
stage of the discussion. It would seem clear that they need some
capacity for 'deliberation' in order to perform their controlling
tasks, but it is not yet clear what this quality means and how it is
to be acquired. It is in fact the purpose of a large section of the
remainder of the dialogue, from the end of book V (471C)
down to book VII, to argue that what these rulers need is a full
philosophical training, and to give a full account of true phi-
losophical ϲοφία.

Ironically, δικαιοϲύνη is perhaps still not so very clearly distin-
guished from ϲωφροϲύνη. The definition of δικαιοϲύνη is in fact
derived from a notion conventionally associated with yet an-

other use of cωφροcύνη, the political notion of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράτ-
τειν (my group of uses no. 10). To this extent it might be ar-
gued that in Plato's account, cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη very
much represent two sides of the same coin, δικαιοcύνη focusing
on the practical sides of life of the πόλιc, and cωφροcύνη on the
mentality that goes with this just behaviour.

10. *Plato and* cωφροcύνη: *Conclusions*

In the first sections of this chapter (sections 2-7), we investi-
gated a number of passages in which Plato links cωφροcύνη to
other virtues. As we have seen, Plato makes use of the multiple
uses of cώφρων and cognates to establish such similarities.

Protagoras (section 3) argues for the similarity between pru-
dential cωφροcύνη and cοφία (both share the antonym
ἀφροcύνη), and then reinterprets cωφροcύνη in other-regarding
terms to link these two virtues with δικαιοcύνη. In *Protagoras*,
these associations are used to argue for the 'unity' (see section
2) of the virtues in refutation of Protagoras' denial of this unity;
ultimately, all virtues are defined in terms of 'knowledge'.

Laches suggests a link between cωφροcύνη and a quality that
at first sight might seem to be one of its opposites, the asser-
tive, and even aggressive quality of ἀνδρεία. The dialogue con-
tains a fleeting suggestion that 'courage' also applies to con-
fronting the 'dangers' of one's desires and that ἀνδρεία includes
the prototypical manifestations of cωφροcύνη in the use of 'con-
trol of desires' (section 4). But the dialogue does not press the
point: again, the virtues are ultimately identified with knowl-
edge. In this respect, *Laches* claims a unity of virtues very similar
to *Protagoras*.

The establishment of a link between ἀνδρεία and the non-
competitive qualities of cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη becomes a
rather more pressing task with opponents who question the
value of these non-competitive qualities. In *Gorgias* (section 5),
the polysemy of cωφροcύνη is vital for establishing a link be-
tween ἀνδρεία and the utterly other-regarding quality of δι-
καιοcύνη. Here, a different strategy is applied: now, the *demon-
strandum* is not that the virtues are one, but rather that they are

compatible and co-existent. Socrates first elicits from Callicles a rejection of cωφροcύνη in its use of 'control of desires', and then brings in cωφροcύνη again in its use of 'prudence', as soon as Callicles has to accept that one needs the ability to decide which pleasures to pursue and which to reject. When Callicles admits to the necessity of prudence, Socrates can vindicate the necessity of cωφροcύνη in general, and infers the necessity of δικαιοcύνη from it. Thus, *Gorgias* suggests that cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη are both necessary for the pursuit of the 'good', and the association of cωφροcύνη with 'prudence' suggest that the pursuit of the good by means of these virtues is not merely a matter of respect for others at the expense of one's self-interest, but that it actually benefits the agent himself.

In later texts, there are more practical issues connected with cωφροcύνη and ἀνδρεία. Plato repeatedly deals with the problem of ensuring that the citizens of the state acquire both cωφροcύνη and ἀνδρεία in the appropriate measure, even though the qualities might seem to belong to entirely different temperaments (section 6). *Republic* answers this problem by means of a programme of education in music/poetry and gymnastics, both reformed in such a way that they contribute exclusively to the enforcement of these two qualities. In *Politicus,* on the other hand, the problem is addressed as one of demography, and the task of the statesman is said to be to ensure an appropriate 'mix' in the state between people of a martial temperament and those with a quiet nature.

Now the success of Plato's persuasive use of the polysemy of our terms depends on the reader's lack of awareness of what is going on: a reader will follow only if he does not see sharply which persuasive moves are being made. Therefore, the texts that exploit the polysemy of cωφροcύνη will never do so explicitly, and will never call attention to the fact that more than one use of our terms is activated. Things are very different in the dialogues that attempt a definition of cωφροcύνη. Here, Plato explicitly names many of the uses of our terms, if with the goal of reducing this polysemy and focusing on its prototypical use of 'control of desires'. In *Charmides* (section 8), a wealth of terms and expressions traditionally associated with various uses of cώφρων

and cognates is explored. They are all rejected as *definitions* of
cωφροcύνη, and specifically, the dialogue deals extensively with
the problem of defining cωφροcύνη along 'Socratic' lines in
terms of 'knowledge'.

One notion that is suggested, but left unchallenged, in
Charmides is the prototypical use of cωφροcύνη as 'control of de-
sire'. In *Republic* (section 9), Plato elaborates on this notion in
order to define cωφροcύνη both in the individual and in the
state. The self-control of the individual is now described as a
concord between the 'rational' part of the soul and the inferior
parts, which submit to its control. Similarly, cωφροcύνη in the
state is an agreement between the various classes that the lead-
ing class should indeed be in charge, and this 'political'
cωφροcύνη seems to represent a sophisticated interpretation by
Plato of the traditional 'aristocratic' idea that cωφροcύνη in the
state manifests itself as compliance with the *status quo*, or
εὐνομία.

Meanwhile, the main problem in book Four is the demarca-
tion between cωφροcύνη and δικαιοcύνη. When cωφροcύνη is
used in its 'civic' sense, it covers such aspects as respect for the
laws, and restraint of injustice and violence, and is often virtu-
ally synonymous to δικαιοcύνη. The discussion of *Republic* man-
ages to establish technical definitions of the virtues that
achieve a more or less clear-cut distinction between the two:
δικαιοcύνη is now confined to the practical aspect of 'keeping to
one's own job', both for the various classes of citizens in the
state and for the various parts of the soul: each class and each
part of the soul is to confine itself to the performance of its
own proper function. By contrast, cωφροcύνη is now defined as
the cognitive/emotional aspect of this practical type of self-
restraint: it is defined as the consent of each class and every
part of the soul that this division of labour is indeed right. Thus,
a technical distinction between the two virtues is achieved,
even if this is done at the cost of a certain degree of abstrac-
tion: Plato's technical definitions are clearly at some distance
from ordinary language use, which does not always allow for
strict distinctions.

Thus, in summary, we can observe how Plato uses quite a number of traditional uses of ϲωφροϲύνη, but in his attempt at definition centres on its prototypical manifestation of 'control of desires' (group of uses no. 6), and a larger-scale pendant of εὐνομία for the πόλιϲ as a whole (group of uses no. 18).

The senses used by Plato in *Charmides* are shown in figure 12: uses that are activated are highlighted in grey, and the single central use that is not formally rejected is higlighted in darker grey. The uses in Plato in general are shown in figure 13. Here, all active uses in Plato are highlighted by means of a light grey background. Figure 14 tries to visualise the technical definitions of ϲωφροϲύνη and δικαιοϲύνη in *Republic.* Here, the uses with a dark-grey background are those that are covered by the definition of ϲωφροϲύνη; those with a lighter background are 're-served' as the province of δικαιοϲύνη.

What the diagrams generally show is the fact that there are some marked 'centripetal' tendencies. Plato is evidently aware of the whole range of traditional uses of the term, and uses them (or at least those uses that apply to men) for purposes of persuasion, but he nevertheless shows a strong tendency to focus on what is the prototypical use of the term, 'control of desire'. Of the uses in *Charmides,* this is only one that goes unchallenged (fig. 12). And it is also the use that forms the basis for the definition in *Republic* of ϲωφροϲύνη as applied to the soul of the individual (fig. 14). *Republic* in fact shows Plato's tendency toward the central uses in its strongest form: here, the definition of ϲωφροϲύνη ultimately derives from two quite common and central uses of our terms: 'control of desire' as shown by the individual adult male citizen, and εὐνομία as shown by the citizens of the *polis* as a collective.

Besides, even in texts which allow for a relatively great variety of uses (*Charmides*), there is one centripetal tendency that must not be overlooked: the 'androcentricity' of Plato's conceptions. The uses of ϲωφροϲύνη that Plato addresses are mostly those that in ordinary language use apply to free adult male citizens, the 'central' members, so to speak, of society. Plato gives some attention to 'boyish' manifestations of ϲωφροϲύνη in *Charmides*, but gives them relatively short shrift. In the hierarchical construct of the state in *Republic,* ϲωφροϲύνη incorporates

some aspects of the submission demanded of subjects in rela-
tively authoritarian traditional views of ϲωφροϲύνη. But that is it.
All other uses are on the main central axis representing the
free individual male citizen. Women and girls are ignored com-
pletely. The contrast with some other genres and authors, Eu-
ripides above all, could hardly have been more striking.

Thus we see how, in his attempts to get to the 'core' of
ϲωφροϲύνη, Plato generally focuses on the most central mem-
bers of society, and then in his definitions concentrates on the
most typical ways in which our terms are applied to these central
members. In semantic terms, the Platonic attempt to define the
essence of an entity, may be described as a definition of its pro-
totypical uses in relation to the most central members of soci-
ety.

Fig. 12. ϲωφροϲύνη in *Charmides*

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

girls women men polis boys servants

Fig. 13. ϲωφροϲύνη and cognates in Plato.

sanity: good sense

sanity

εὐβουλία

good sense to avoid harming oneself

prudence

caution

μετριότηϲ

good sense to avoid indecency

chastity — marital fidelity — control of desires — decency

good sense to avoid disorder

quietness — quietness obedience — ἡϲυχία — order, quietness — obedience

good sense to avoid harming others

no injustice — εὐνομία

no violence

respect for gods

girls   women   men   polis   boys   servants

Fig. 14. ϲωφροϲύνη and δικαιοϲύνη in *Republic*.

sanity: good sense

good sense to avoid harming oneself

good sense to avoid indecency

good sense to avoid disorder

good sense to avoid harming others

girls   women   men   polis   boys   servants

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