COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNITY POLICING

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This paper examines the role of the public in community policing. Every definition of community policing shares the idea that the police and the community must work together to define and develop solutions to problems (Sadd and Grinc, 1994). One rationale for public involvement is the belief that police alone can neither create nor maintain safe communities. They can help by setting in motion voluntary local efforts to prevent disorder and crime; in this role, they are adjuncts to community crime prevention efforts such as neighborhood watch, target hardening, and youth and economic development programs. A common justification for diverting resources from responding to 911 calls is that community policing will ultimately prevent problems from occurring in the first place, and that many which still do will be dealt with locally without police assistance, or by agencies other than the police (Trojanowicz, 1986).

Community involvement is also frequently justified by pointing to the growing customer orientation of public service agencies, and to the political and social forces lying behind it. It is argued that by opening themselves to citizen input the police will become more knowledgeable about, and responsive to, the varying concerns of different communities. One strand of this argument is that police have "over-professionalized" themselves and their mission, and as a result systematically overlook many pressing community concerns because they lie outside of their narrowly defined mandate (Skogan, 1990). Because these concerns (which can range from public drinking to building abandonment) frequently have deleterious consequences for the communities involved, expanding the scope of the police mandate by making them more "market driven" helps the state be more effective at its most fundamental task, maintaining order.

However, in an environment dominated by skepticism about the ability of police departments to actually implement serious community policing efforts it is easy to underestimate how difficult it can be to build effective community commitment as well. In a recent evaluation of community policing programs in eight cities, the Vera Institute found that all of them experienced great difficulty in establishing a solid relationship between the programs and neighborhood residents (Grinc, 1994; Sadd and Grinc, 1994). Efforts to do so floundered in part on decades of built-up hostility between residents of poor or minority communities and the police. Distrust and fear of the police were rampant in many of the neighborhoods where community policing was instituted. Residents' fear of retaliation from drug dealers further stifled participation in public events. The evaluators concluded that the assumption that residents want closer contact with the police, and want to work with them, is "untested."

It is also uncertain that rank and file officers involved in these programs are any more enthusiastic, especially at the outset. Our surveys of officers involved in Chicago's community policing program found that they were resistant to letting citizens "set their agenda." For example, 72 percent of them were pessimistic about "unreasonable demands on police by community groups" under CAPS (Skogan, 1994). Police in Chicago were often cynical about who would participate in the program, fearing that "loudmouths" and "gimmie-guys" would dominate the proceedings and use the program to advance their own personal and political agendas. Behind the scenes they were nervous about how they would be greeted and treated at public meetings. At the outset, police often defined the public's appropriate role in community policing in the most narrow and traditional terms, as their "eyes and ears."

Another difficulty is that programs which rely on citizen initiative and self-help can be regressive rather than progressive in their impact. Often it is home

owning, long-term residents of a community who learn about and participate more readily in voluntary programs. My evaluation of community policing in Houston (Skogan, 1990) found strong evidence for this. In several experimental districts, community policing efforts were much more visible among whites than among blacks or Hispanics, and they were more likely to become involved. Analysis of the impact of the program indicated that its positive effects were confined to whites, while the lives of other residents of the heterogeneous program areas were unaffected. There seemed to be two reasons for this. First, better-organized whites were poised to take advantage of the resources that the program brought to their neighborhoods. Second, the management of the program allowed officers to pick and choose their target populations. They naturally focused their efforts in places where they felt most welcome, and where their initial efforts seemed to be most effective.

It is also clearly possible to conduct "problem solving policing" without widespread citizen participation, or even much public input. Several of the examples of problem solving documented in Newport News involved police analyses of calls-for-service and crime incident data, and data from other public agencies. The department's operating Task Force and Problem Analysis Advisory Committee were both made up just of police officers (Eck and Spelman, 1987). Newport News developed the "SARA" process for problem identification and problem solving for its own, internal consumption.

Murphy (1993) argues that the Canadian approach to community policing has been particularly conservative in this regard as well. He notes (p, 20-21), "... the community is viewed as a resource, a support group and an information source rather than as an authoritative body." In Canada, community policing remains police-managed, and seldom involves civilians in policy or accountability issues. For example, Edmonton relies on foot constables to gather community input

through their day-to-day contact with area residents and merchants (Hornick, et al, 1993). In Victoria, the principle role for civilians was to serve as staff volunteers in a store-front police office (Walker, et al, 1993). Leighton (1993) describes the appearance of "community consultative committees" in several cities, and indicates they are still finding a role for themselves in advising police operations. In contrast, Chicago's community policing effort provides a structured avenue for citizen participation in problem identification and priority setting, and creates a channel through which community residents can demand some measure of accountability for police performance in their area.

The Chicago Evaluation

This paper examines the role of citizen participation in a new community policing program. It focuses on two roughly comparable police districts, and contrasts what happened there to changes in matched comparison areas that represent "what would have happened" if there had been no program. The data are drawn from an on-going evaluation of the adoption of community policing by the City of Chicago (Skogan, et al, 1994). While the new model of policing that is being crafted by the Chicago Police Department (CPD) is multi-faceted, at its core lies the (anticipated) formation of police-community partnerships focused on problem identification and problem solving at the neighborhood level. The agency's mission statement notes, "... the Department and the rest of the community must establish new ways of actually working together. New methods must be put in place to jointly identify problems, propose solutions, and implement changes. The Department's ultimate goal should be community empowerment" (Chicago Police Department, 1994: 16). Behind the lines, the agency seems driven by two concerns: to increase the effectiveness of the patrol force by targeting issues of public concern, and healing the yawning breach which has opened between the police and racial and ethnic minorities in the community.

The first 14 months of the program provide a laboratory for examining the role of the public in community policing. While it is too soon to determine if the public has indeed been "empowered" by the program, there is now some evidence concerning patterns of program awareness and participation in several experimental police districts.

The Program to Date

Beginning in May, 1993, Chicago's community policing program (dubbed "CAPS," for Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy) has been tested in five police districts. In those areas, patrol officers were divided on a rotating basis into beat teams and rapid response units. Tasks were assigned so that beat team members would have sufficient free time to attend meetings and work with community members. An average of 45 extra officers (an increment of about 12 percent) were assigned to each district, so that commanders had the personnel they needed to attend to both beat and rapid response needs. Other units were decentralized, so that local commanders had control over various plain-cloths tactical units and youth officers and could integrate their efforts with plans being developed at the grassroots level. The department launched a massive training effort to ensure that officers and their immediate supervisors understand the new roles and responsibilities that they are being called upon to adopt. In recognition that problem-solving policing needs the support of a wide range of agencies, an effort was made to rationalize the delivery of city services by linking them to service requests generated via beat teams.

Beat Meetings

One of the most visible components of the new CAPS structure is the beat meeting. Beats are the smallest geographical unit of police organization in Chicago. The city's 25 Police Districts are divided into 279 beats, or about 12 per area. At the median, a beat in the five prototype areas covers 48 city blocks and includes about 9,000 people and 3,000 households. Before CAPS, officers were not regularly

assigned to work in small areas; the bulk of police work in the districts was done by pairs of officers responding to 911 calls, driving anywhere in (and sometimes out of) their assigned District. The CAPS model of policing, on the other hand, is turf based. Beat teams are assigned to their job for a year. The prototype districts were staffed to allow beat officers to stay on their beat about 70 percent of the time, handing selected classes of routine calls as well as doing less traditional work.

Beat meetings are regular gatherings of small groups of residents and police. The meetings are open to the public, and for the period considered here, most beats met once a month. In each of the two prototype police districts that will be examined below there were approximately 135 beat meetings — one per beat, per month — during the evaluation period. These gatherings were held in church basements, meeting rooms in park buildings, and school rooms throughout the districts. The principal function of beat meetings is to be the forum for the development of joint police-citizen plans to tackle neighborhood problems. The vision driving the program entails the formation of "partnerships" between the police and the public, in both identifying, prioritizing, and solving those problems. The program calls for police to become proactive problem seekers, along with their civilian partners. They are to work together to prevent crime, rather than just continuing to respond to an endless stream of seemingly disconnected incidents (Goldstein, 1990).

To this end, police and residents are supposed to meet one another at the beat meetings, so that civilians will know who is working in their area and police will learn who the "good people" are in their area. To facilitate this, officers who serve on beat teams from all three working shifts are assigned to be present at each meeting, along with a sergeant who supervises activities on the beat, gang and tactical unit officers, and other officers from the Neighborhood Relations unit. In one of the prototype areas considered here, meeting logs compiled by the

department indicate that an average of seven officers attended each meeting. At least one representative of a city service agency was usually also present, and someone representing a local community organization made a statement at about one-half of the meetings.

Beat meetings are also supposed to lead to the exchange of information between police and the public. Over time, we observed that police increasingly brought with them district and crime maps, lists of offenses and arrests, and other information. For their part, residents were rarely reticent to bring up specific problems or problem areas. Beat meetings are intended to break barriers of distrust between residents and the police. Officers initially objected to working with people who came to meetings because they perceived that they would be somehow "unrepresentative" of the community. We observed that over time some of the initial fears that police brought to them — that the meetings would be dominated by "loud mouths," and that the officers present would be "put on the hot seat" as charges against the police were hurled around the room — were not founded. What they encountered were, by and large, reasonable and concerned people who applauded when they stood to be introduced. Officers also seemed to overcome their initial fear they would not be good public speakers, for speeches were rarely called for.

On both CAPS areas there were extensive efforts to advertise beat meetings, and to turn out residents in large numbers. Community newspapers printed beat meeting schedules. Activists posted announcements and shoved flyers into people's mail boxes. In a related study, we identified 250 neighborhood organizations active in the five CAPS prototype areas and interviewed two informants each about their organization's activities. Ninety organizations were studied in the two prototype districts examined here: 58 of them were active in Rogers Park, and 45 in Morgan Park. Table 1 indicates the percentage of those

organizations who were involved in each of a checklist of efforts to mobilize their communities around CAPS. Encouraging people to attend beat meetings and sending representatives to them was nearly ubiquitous. A large majority of these groups were involved in advertising CAPS-related activities. A majority even held their own public meetings about the program, and as will be detailed below, community groups played an important role in hosting and running them as well.

Table 1
Organizational Efforts Surrounding CAPS Meetings

Organizational Activity	Morgan Park	Rogers Park
holding general, public meetings related to CAPS	53%	57%
distributing newsletters or flyers related to CAPS	64	66
encouraging people to attend CAPS-related meetings	87	83
sending representatives to CAPS-related meetings	89	90
Number of organizations	(45)	(58)

While it hard to judge what a "good" attendance figure would be, police department logs for Morgan Park indicate that an average of 35 people attended each beat meeting in that district. In a survey conducted 14 months after the program began we asked respondents who had attended a meeting how many people typically came; their average estimate was similar, 31 in Morgan Park, and 30 in Rogers Park. A plot of the over-time data on beat meeting attendance in Morgan Park indicates that it was seasonal, low in January and February.

Data and Research Design

To gauge public opinion on the eve of the new program, survey interviews were conducted with residents of the prototype districts and matched neighborhoods that serve as comparison areas for the evaluation. The interviews were conducted

by telephone, using a combination of listed directory and randomly generated telephone numbers. The first round of interviews was completed before the program began. In June, 1994, respondents in two of the prototype districts and their comparison areas were reinterviewed, in order to assess changes in levels of program awareness and contact during the first 14 months of the program. Residents of the remaining prototype and comparison areas were reinterviewed later.

The two prototype areas were both diverse. Morgan Park (District 22) residents were 60 percent African-American, and 80 percent were home owners. Nine percent of households there fell below the poverty line, and 62 percent of residents had lived in the community more than 10 years. Rogers Park (District 24) residents were 58 percent white, 17 percent African-American, and 14 percent Hispanic. About 16 percent of households were below the poverty line, and only 24 percent of residents had lived there more than a decade.

Opportunities for Participation

Potentially, one of the most important aspects of CAPS is that it created new opportunities for participation in anti-crime efforts that were relatively uniform across the city. This is quite unlike the distribution of autonomously created and independently active groups. Research on the social and geographic distribution of opportunities to participate in organized group activity indicates that they are least common where they appear to be most needed — in low-income, heterogeneous, deteriorated, high turn-over areas. Ironically, community organizations focusing on crime issues are more common in better-off neighborhoods, while poorer areas characterized by high levels of fear, fatalism, mutual distrust, and despair are less well served.

This is important because individuals participate within a neighborhood contact that defines the alternatives open to them. With the exception of those few

entrepreneurs who create new organizations, people can participate only by affiliating with active groups. Who participates and in what capacity thus turns on what opportunities for participation are available — which varies from place to place. By creating relatively uniform opportunities for participation, CAPS went one step down the road toward mobilizing wider participation among all segments of the community.

The first question is, then, Did the program indeed create new opportunities for citizen participation? If there was little awareness of the new program or knowledge of how to participate, the impact of all of the effort surrounding the inauguration of beat meetings in the prototype districts would be severely muted. To examine this, respondents were asked two questions in sequence that probed their awareness of neighborhood opportunities to participate:

> *During the past year, have you heard about efforts to get community meetings started up in your neighborhood?*
>
> *During the past year, have there actually been any community meetings held here in your neighborhood to try to deal with crime problems?*

These questions gave respondents two opportunities to recall instances of organizational efforts in their community; we did not ask specifically about "beat meetings" because that term was unlikely to be recognized by people who did not attend any meetings, which was most respondents. Responses to these two questions were combined to identify the extent of awareness of organizing efforts in the program and comparison areas. Changes in levels of program awareness in the prototype and comparison areas between 1993 and 1994 provide evidence about the impact of the program.

Figure 1 illustrates the extent of this impact. In both prototype areas, awareness of organized activity increased during the 14 months between the

surveys, and both changes were significant. Awareness of opportunities to participate actually declined in the Morgan Park comparison area, and they did not change significantly in the Rogers Park control area. Likewise, awareness of opportunities to participate did not change for city residents as a whole, as gauged by city-wide surveys.

Although still significant, the magnitude of the program versus comparison group differences depicted in Figure 1 probably were muted by the sheer level of pre-existing organized activism in Chicago. It is highly neighborhood-oriented city with strong local political organizations, decentralized municipal services, and a long tradition of achieving community goals through turf-based organizing. As a result, even before the program began, levels of awareness of opportunities for participation were already very high. This imposed a "ceiling" on potential program effects against which even the most effective program must bump.

Who got the message?

Not surprisingly, awareness of opportunities to participate in community policing was not evenly distributed in the population. In fact, it very much resembled the findings of past research on the distribution of opportunities to participate. By the time of our second survey, stable, family-oriented people with investments in the community were more likely to have gotten the message. While patterns of awareness varied a bit by area, program awareness in the prototypes was more extensive among higher-income, more highly educated people, middle aged married couples, home owners, and whites. Awareness was higher in households that were heavily networked with others in the community. Compared to those who had not heard about community organizing efforts in their area, those who had were already (measured at Wave I) more concerned about crime, physical decay, and disruption in the schools serving their neighborhood. People with past victimization experience also were more likely to have heard about

organizing efforts. The impact of many of these factors on program awareness is illustrated in Figure 2.

Patterns of Participation

The next question is, Who took advantage of these new opportunities to participate? Two issues are involved in that question. The first is levels of participation. That is, Did more people participate following the onset of CAPS, taking advantage of the regular, visible opportunities for participation that it created? The second, and perhaps more important, issue is that of the distribution of participation. Inevitably, relatively few residents will ever be directly involved in community policing, even to the level of just attending a public meeting. In our view, more important questions are, Are the processes of public involvement broadly inclusive? Are all of the interests and issues facing the community being represented? In particular, we are interested in whether participation followed familiar patterns, encouraging yet higher levels of activism among better off people who already dominated organized community life. Or, was participation in some fashion redistributive; that is, did CAPS bring in "new blood" that along important dimensions represented new and less enfranchised elements of the community? We have already seen that awareness of the opportunities to participate that CAPS provided were more distributive than redistributive, calling for a close look at the data concerning this issue.

The issue of levels of participation is addressed in Figure 3. It illustrates the results of before-and-after surveys of residents of the prototype and comparison areas. If respondents indicated that they had heard of organized group efforts in their neighborhood, they were asked, *Were you able to attend any of the meetings?* Figure 3 classifies each respondent as a participant or non-participant (those who had never heard of meetings were non-participants), and charts the percentage of respondents in each evaluation area who fell in the former category.

None of the before-after differences in levels of participation depicted in Figure 3 are statistically significant. In Morgan Park, participation rose an insignificant one percentage point, and in Rogers park it stood rock-steady. The slight declines in participation in the two comparison areas were not significant, in light of the sample sizes involved. More elaborate analyses that pooled program and comparison areas and controlled for the effects of individual-level demographic factors such as sex, age, and length of residence before looking for effects attributable to the program did not change this picture at all.

However, it was still possible that extensive outreach and organizing efforts in the prototype areas changed the character of participation. CAPS may not have had to rely so heavily on "self-starters," given the broad opportunities for participation created by the program and the extensive effort that went into generating participation in beat meetings. Unlike many past efforts at local organizing, the structure imposed by CAPS ensured that meetings were held on a regular basis in every beat, not just in places that had the resources to sponsor them, or where initial organizing efforts were well received. As Table 1 above indicated, considerable effort was also put into generating participation in beat meetings, by many organizations in each of these relatively small areas. In Morgan Park, a large and powerful community organization representing white home owners in one part of the district extended their franchise to cover the entire district, and put their considerable resources and political influence into generating participation in meetings all over the area. Another powerful organization serving the southern end of Rogers Park hired a professional community organizer to generate attendance and nurture the program in their service area. The most intensive organizational efforts in Rogers Park were in its higher-crime beats, which are diverse and feisty neighborhoods.

In both Morgan Park and Rogers Park, our evaluation indeed found some evidence that both program awareness and actual participation was mildly redistributive in character. That is, new elements in the community were mobilized as a result of CAPS.

To examine this it was necessary to distinguish between two groups of activists: those who at Wave II were involved in organized community efforts for the first time ("new blood") and those who had been involved in community affairs before the onset of CAPS and continued to be aware and active after it came to their district ("retreads"). At the time they were reinterviewed, about 68 percent of residents in Morgan Park and Rogers Park who were aware of opportunities to participate in their area were retreads, while the remaining third were newly informed. Among participants, those in Morgan Park split about 50-50, while about 70 percent of participants from Rogers Park were experienced activists and 30 percent were new to the scene.

Retreads and newly informed or involved area residents differed on several important dimensions. The first of these is illustrated in Figure 4. It depicts the percentage of retreads and new blood in June, 1994, who were either black, Hispanic, or of another race ("percent nonwhite"). It compares respondents drawn from the prototype and comparison areas, to examine the potential impact of CAPS on the breadth of community mobilization. All prototype and comparison-area respondents are grouped together because of the smaller sample sizes involved in this detailed analysis, but the trends described here were at work in each experimental and control area. As Figure 4 suggests, differences in the racial composition of the two groups were large (and statistically significant) in the prototype areas, and small (and insignificant) in the comparison areas.

Table 2
Demographics of Awareness and Participation
by New and Continuing Status

Demographics of New and Continuing Involvement	Awareness Proto	Awareness Control	Participation Proto	Participation Control
Percent Nonwhite				
retreads	33%	22%	26%	29%
new blood	54	28	55	29
(p)	(.01)	(.46)	(.01)	(.99)
Percent Non-college				
retreads	48	69	48	67
new blood	53	44	70	52
(p)	(.58)	(.01)	(.05)	(.36)
Percent Own Home				
retreads	76	78	69	81
new blood	64	51	81	76
(p)	(.06)	(.01)	(.21)	(.72)
Percent Female				
retreads	62	67	48	62
new blood	54	56	76	76
(p)	(.29)	(.24)	(.01)	(.33)
Number of Cases				
retreads	229	121	42	21
new blood	61	39	33	21

The same pattern can be observed for other key demographic factors, some of which are detailed in Table 2. Relative to events in the comparison areas, it appears that CAPS beat meetings expanded involvement for women, nonwhites, and those nearer

the bottom of the educational ladder (here presented as the percent who did not go to college, a significant general predictor of awareness and participation). One important factor which did not appear to change as a result of this apparent expansion in the participation base for the program was home ownership. In the prototypes, slightly more new participants than old were home owners.

Did new participants differ in significant ways in terms of the kinds of concerns they brought to the meetings? The survey included questions measuring three different views of the police. One set of ten questions tapped respondents views of the quality of police service; three others asked about police aggressiveness on the street and their use of excessive force; and two judged respondent's optimism about the future of policing in Chicago. None of these attitudes varied significantly with participation status. Similarly, new participants were neither more nor less fearful of crime, nor more or less concerned about crime or neighborhood decay. In terms of their views of the neighborhood, they closely resembled those who were already involved in anti-crime efforts. Both groups differed more from non-participants; those who were not involved perceived less crime and neighborhood decay, and were less positive about the future of policing in Chicago, than participants of any stripe.

Effectiveness of Participation

Has anything come of beat meetings? In our report on the first year of the program we were fairly critical of the beat meeting process. In important ways what happened there did not fit a community policing model. Meetings that we observed were frequently run by community relations specialists, and did not actively involve beat officers. They frequently sat mute in the back, unless called upon. Too often the exchange between residents and the police was one-sided; the former would bring up a long list of specific complaints, and the latter said they "would check on it." Everyone involved still had a narrow, crime-related view of what kinds of problems were suitable for discussion at the meetings, and they all took a traditional, enforcement oriented view of what appropriate solutions for these problems might look like.

However, our survey respondents took a much more sanguine view of the meetings. If they indicated they had attended a meeting, they were asked a series of

questions about what typically happened there (we asked them to typify meetings because they went to an average of 3.8 meetings apiece). Their responses were similar enough across the two districts to combine them. They reported that someone from the community or a community organizer had conducted two-thirds of the meetings, and that the police had run only 21 percent on their own. Seventy percent thought that the meeting itself has been arranged by a community group, 17 percent thought that police had jointly sponsored the meeting with a group, and only 10 percent thought police organized the meeting on their own. Fully 86 percent of those who went to a meeting indicated that they had learned something at the meeting, and 71 percent reported that action was taken or something happened in their neighborhood as a result of the meeting. When asked how useful these meetings were "... for finding solutions to neighborhood problems," 38 percent said they were very useful, 53 percent somewhat useful, and only 9 percent not useful. Half thought the meetings were very useful "... for improving the community's relationship with the police," and another 42 percent thought they were somewhat useful in this regard.

Other Vehicles for Participation

It is important to note that beat meetings are not the only vehicle for public participation in CAPS. Another is the Advisory Committees that have been established in each district to advise the District Commander. Advisory Committees typically involve 15-20 civilians. They are named by the District Commander, and are to include area residents, local merchants, religious leaders, and representatives of civic associations. We have observed all of the District Advisory Committee meetings in the five prototypes, but can only report now that their efforts have been highly variable. Participation has ranged from highly inclusive to closed and exclusionary. Some Committees have close links with beat-level activists, while others are fairly disconnected from events at that level. Some Committees have

focused on broad social issues important to the community, while others have focused on internal organizational processes. Some view themselves as a support group for their District Commander, while others are viewed by commanders as contending with them for control of operational policies in the district. No single model of how these committees should be organized has yet to emerge from this stew.

On instruction from City Hall, each District Advisory Committee has also formed a Court Advocacy program. Residents are encouraged to attend selected criminal and civil cases to show solidarity with officers and impress judges and prosecutors with their firmness of purpose.

Community members have also been involved at the city-wide level, agitating on behalf of the program and pressuring its administrators to hew closely to their commitment to keep the public informed and involved. To date, city-wide organizations have been concerned about police performance measures, their accountability to the public, the extent to which beat teams have actually been freed from responding to 911 calls, and the openness of beat officers to information sharing and cooperation in problem solving. They are convinced that the program cannot work unless the community "comes to the table" as a powerful, informed, and competent partner, rather than as a supplicant (Friedman, 1994). For example, with a $4 million contract from the City, one of them is organizing a series of beat-level training sessions that will prepare both police and neighborhood residents to be more effective problem solving partners.

CONCLUSION

Chicago's new community policing program provides an opportunity to examine a fledgling effort to involve the public in joint police-citizen efforts at preventing crime and responding to neighborhood decay. Structural changes were made in police task organization to facilitate this new model of policing, and the

program was linked to the improved management of a broad range of city services. The principle mechanism for coordinating this effort with the public is beat-level public meetings that are to provide police and citizens an opportunity to identify, prioritize, and discuss solutions to a broad range of neighborhood problems.

This paper has examined some aspects of the success of this effort. It found that awareness of the opportunities for participation that the program provided was widespread, and was significantly higher in the prototype districts than in the evaluation's comparison areas 14 months after the onset of the program. Levels of organized participation were not significantly higher in the program areas than in the comparison areas. However, there was some evidence that both awareness and participation were more widely distributed within the prototype areas, perhaps as a result of the uniform nature of the opportunities for participation created by CAPS beat meetings and extensive efforts by groups and organizations to stimulate participation in the meetings.

The last finding is important because it was not necessarily so. As noted above, Houston's experience illustrated how merely making opportunities available for informal contact with the police and participation in their programs was divisive rather than integrative in its consequences. Near the bottom of the status ladder awareness and contact with community policing programs was less common, and people there were unaffected by their operation.

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