

PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY INTERACTION WITH US FOREIGN POLICY MAKING BODIES (1947-2010): AN ANALYSIS

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Abstract

This paper reviews applied foreign policy, realism, the "Levels of Analysis" by Kenneth Waltz, and decision-making units to focus on the theoretical and analytical foundations of Pakistan's foreign policy. "Levels of Analysis" and realism are defined so that the entire face of the argument may be understood in its true perspective. It identifies decision making units in Pakistan as well as in the US and their interaction in the light of Waltz's "Levels of Analysis". Keeping Pakistan and its army's approach towards India in view, neighbouring relations are based on the norms of survival, jealousy, power, identity, and comparison. Therefore, the realist school of thought and Kenneth Waltz's "Levels of Analysis" are applied to the South Asian regional foreign and security policy paradigm as well as the Pakistan Army's relationship with the US policy-makers.

Introduction

To understand the theoretical and analytical foundations of Pakistan's foreign policy, we have to review certain basic facts. First, foreign policy as a concept and its effects on history is important to note. As the Pak-US institutional interaction (between the State Department, the White House and the Pentagon and the Pakistan Army) was based on the vested interests of each respective alliance-party, the realist school of thought is assessed with respect to the role of history in the foreign policy making process. Second, there is a need to scrutinise the "levels of analysis" given by Kenneth Waltz and its application on Pakistan's foreign policy. Though Waltz has given his levels of analysis for the study of the causes of war, I have applied Waltz's theory with respect to US policy making bodies' interaction with Pakistan's. And

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third, it is important to spotlight the policy making bodies and their decision-making process.

In general, foreign policy analysis can and should be open, comparative, conceptual, interdisciplinary and across domestic-foreign frontiers. Therefore, in this paper the focus is on the influence of decision-makers in policy making units, competing approaches, and history's influence on foreign policy. Though it will be a theoretical work with general terms, examples of the case study of Pakistan and the US will be highlighted so that it may not give the writing a look of aloofness and dryness.

Many characteristics may help in revealing the reasons why progress towards more orderly analysis of the foreign policy of South Asian nations, and especially Pakistan's, has been delayed. In fact in South Asia, more or less everything is related to the security of the country and "in the supreme interests of the nation" or "national interest". Several of these are well known. Data is notoriously hard to come by because governments are prone to suppress many things which the student of foreign policy must know and wants to know. There is no trend of publication of diplomatic records in Pakistan. The memoirs are published years after events have occurred and sometimes don't even see the light of the day. Negotiations, especially between Pakistan and India, are held in secret or in semi-secrecy. Security regulations - necessary and otherwise - hide many vital facts.

Foreign Policy: Applied

It will be pertinent, in the beginning, to bring in the dossier on academic foreign policy. A brief definition of foreign policy can be given as "the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations".¹ The ideal world as a homogenized entity is much divided into real but separate and characteristic countries with their own sacrosanct communities. The term foreign policy is a nineteenth-century expansion of the idea of policy, which had been in use since Chaucer to denote a government's conduct

¹ Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 3.

of affairs.² Foreign policy is also seen as “attempts by governments to influence or manage events outside the state’s boundaries”.³ Mostly, the relations formed with external countries are formulated in the Foreign Office of the country with the final verdict of diplomatic staff. However, in a world where important international disputes occur over the price of bananas or where, for the price of F-16s, the nation is forced to purchase soybean oil⁴, it would be absurd to concentrate foreign policy analysis on relations between national diplomatic services. Foreign policy is, therefore, both more and less than the “external relations” which states generate continuously on all fronts.⁵ In simple terms, foreign policy is constituted by two fundamental elements: the objectives of a state and the means required for their accomplishment.⁶ Hence it aims at the benefits of the state which conducts it. However, this is not a complete explanation of the term because it does not refer to the many different national objectives that a state may set itself and the variety of means which can be employed. For example, a state may pursue its regional objectives by achieving international support over its regional neighbours, and it may want to secure greater foreign military and economic assistance. So in order to achieve these objectives, a state can use traditional diplomacy through bilateral meetings and agreements, or join regional security blocs sponsored by a greater power. In serious cases, a national military can also influence the foreign policy of a country for its institutional benefits and may cause a military coup to control the government and have military agreements. One understanding of the above discussion is that the study of foreign policy

² Joel Krieger (ed.), Christopher Hill’s chapter titled “Foreign Policy,” in *Oxford Companion to Politics of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 312.

³ Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of European Member States* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 2.

⁴ During 1994-96, after the passage of the *Brown-back Amendment*, President Clinton resumed some aid and refunded Pakistan the F-16 money in the form of a barter agreement, i.e. soybean oil for F-16s. For further details, see “Musharraf, Vajpayee and Bush at UN,” editorial, *Dawn* (Islamabad), September 8, 2002.

⁵ Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, *Beyond Foreign Economic Policy: the United States, the Single Market and the Changing World Economy* (London: Printer, 1997), 21-22.

⁶ Cecil Crabb, *American Foreign Policy in The Nuclear Age* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 1.

is not an easy task. There are no clear-cut dimensions, patterns or lines, and, therefore, conclusions should be drawn very carefully.

Foreign policy as a subject has been extensively studied by historians, at first through detailed accounts of diplomatic historians and then through the “scope of *domestic history*” which strove to relate diplomacy to its domestic roots, whether political, social, economic or cultural”.⁷ Indeed, one finds a synergy of foreign policy studies for historians increasingly interesting as international relations move towards its own discipline. The tools of decision-making analysis are readily adaptable to detailed cases, and opening up many state archives has made it impossible to avoid the evidence of such pathologies as bureaucratic politics or small group dynamics.⁸ National Archives London and the US National Archives in Washington DC are the few such examples. In the United States, in particular, there has been a deliberate encouragement of links between historians and political scientists, with much useful cross-fertilization.⁹

Impact of History on Foreign Policy

For a policy-maker, history offers some lessons for his education. If policy-making is not limited to public servants, bureaucrats, diplomats and politicians, academia may serve as a think tank to advise the government or concerned departments of policy making in the light of history and its lessons. “Social scientists in particular spend their lives analysing history and seeking to discern patterns in it”.¹⁰ In the absence of such an advisory class, policies become person-oriented, which proves Hegel’s statement that “we learn from history that we do not learn from history”.¹¹ This is true with respect to the US-Pakistan collaboration against the former Soviet Union during the 1950s and 60s which benefited the US at the cost of Pakistan’s interests. In the later part of Pakistan’s history, no lessons were learnt from such individualistic policies and the mistakes were repeated again during the 1980s’ “Afghan

⁷ Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, 5.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Christopher Hill, “History and International Relations,” in *International Relations: British and American Perspectives* Steve Smith, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 126-145.

¹⁰ Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, 118.

¹¹ Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past: the Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 179.

Crisis”, as well as in the post-9/11 scenario during the “War against Terror” in its relations with the US. Repetition of mistakes forced Pakistan to face the worse security, regional and political crisis of its history. Decision-makers’ simple historical comparisons and analogies end up in difficulty.¹² Every historical study varies from issue to issue and, hence, must be analysed individually to learn for the future. But if history is ignored, it punishes a nation by repeating itself.

In the absence of lessons from history, refuge is usually taken behind the term “national interest” to pursue violent, peaceful and abrupt policies. From granting a job to a clerk or the construction of a motorway to the declaration of war against an enemy country, everything falls within the definition of “national interest”. But can there be any *interest* that is not *national* for a country? Hence, declaring any policy as a “national interest” in the foreign policy of a country is over-emphasis. If for a policy-maker something is national interest, then what is not “national interest”? One might not be against the use of the phrase “national interest” but against confused use of the term. Interestingly, there is no straightforward antonym to the term “national interest” which further favours the limiting of its use in the foreign policy formulation process.

Foreign Policy and Realism

For a country like Pakistan, foreign policy needs to demonstrate political will and military power to have friendly relations in order to keep a check, for example, on a hostile India, the former Soviet Union, and present day terrorist threats. It also needs to perfect democratic practice. This can be synchronized by a foreign policy with a prudent realism. It is the traditional way in which practitioners have thought about international relations,¹³ emphasising the importance of power in the region. Realism became the orthodoxy in academic writing after the discrediting of the “legalistic-moralistic” approach of the inter-war period. Realists maintain that definitions of morality must change too. As George F. Kennan writes in “Morality and Foreign Affairs”, the “primary obligation [of a government] is to the interests of the national society it

¹² Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 97.

¹³ Henry Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 4.

represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience".¹⁴ In the Cold War, it seemed self-evident that states and military force were the main features of the international system. Much realist thought was more subtle, as any encounter with the work of E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Martin Wight and Arnold Wolfers reveals. Christopher Hill says: "What realism did not do was probe into decision-making or other domestic sources of international behaviour in general"¹⁵ and in the mirror of history in particular. However, the entire course of the history of relations between the US and Pakistan was a manifestation of the application of realism, both at a South Asian regional as well as at a global level. This will be explained in later parts of this paper.

Realism is "state-centric" but with rational motives and ideologies. However, realism can be justified if all those who believe that states are of continued significance in international relations are deemed *eo ipso* realists.¹⁶ Realists were advanced by Kenneth Waltz's formation of neo-realism in the late 1970s. Neo-realism is a systemic approach in which the international structure acts as a constraint on state behaviour so that only states whose outcomes fall within an expected range survive.¹⁷ However, the neo-realist theory could not deal with a foreign policy that could also influence domestic policy. Realists were not sure of the origin of power from the level of analysis – human, state, or the world. Hence, Waltz came with compartmentalization of the "levels of analysis"¹⁸, along with the logic of Balance of Power to curb "the logic of anarchy"¹⁹. Though levels of analysis deal with the foreign as well as domestic policy of a country like Pakistan, the neo-realist theory is limited only to the levels

¹⁴ George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Affairs," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 64, no. 2, (Winter 1985-86): 206.

¹⁵ Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, 6.

¹⁶ Though I am supporting realism, here a very basic mistake is happening by supposing that all the realists are realists because they study foreign policy. Such views are also given by John Vasquez in his *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (London: Printer, 1983), 47-79 and 205-15.

¹⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 44, no. 1, (Spring/Summer 1990): 21-37.

¹⁸ K. N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Waltz's level of analysis will be explained under next heading.

¹⁹ Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy in International Relations: Neo-realism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 132-154.

of analysis without any direct impact on the decision-maker and domestic politics of a country.

In an international environment, every nation has its state-centric foreign policy values which usually confront with the supra-national values. The supra-national values include peace, freedom, democracy, humanity, etc. Nations join international forums and get into relationship with other nations to abide by such values. However, every nation gives more weight to its national state-centric values and interests than the supra-national values. The latter must be in conformity with the former and when a major clash occurs between the two, the former dominate.²⁰ Whenever there is a clash between the two sets of values and interests, it reveals the egocentric character of the foreign policy- a realist approach. The foreign policy of a state can be called realist-egocentric only when it pursues the national progression or at least defends its interests against an international system of states whose policies have the same character.²¹ Here a state contradicts its own ethics that exists within a state. While inside, the state calls upon the individuals to act as a community and accept sacrifices for the sake of the common good; in external affairs the state acts as a selfish individual which has the right to pursue the national interests whatever the cost to the international community.²²

Realism was applicable during the East-West tension, when the Cold War imposed security needs upon the leadership of the third world countries. This imposition was especially for those situated on the periphery of the Communist world. These third world leaders maximised their power by aligning themselves with either of the poles – the US or the former Soviet Union – to maintain their own independence. But David Lake considers this view an oversimplification. He says: “there is no necessary reason why the interests of self-seeking politicians should coincide with the national interest”²³. However, contrary to what Lake said, the Cold War history is full of the combination of personal and national interests. Its manifestation is that the Pakistan Army achieved its

²⁰ Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy; An Analysis of Decision-Making* (London: OUP, 1963), 119-20.

²¹ David Vital, “The Making of British Foreign Policy,” *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 39, issue 3, (July 1968): 18.

²² Peter Calvert, *The Foreign Policy of New States* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 25.

²³ David A. Lake, “Realism,” in Joel Krieger (ed.), *Oxford Companion to Politics of World*, 773.

goals of the country's security against hostile neighbours and internal governance through foreign policy without any hindrance and objection. The C-in-C Mohammad Ayub Khan, who was to retire in 1954,²⁴ remained the focal point of Pakistan in the politics of the Containment until 1969. During this span of time, he remained the leader as well as the policy-maker of the country. Similar was the case with General Musharraf who remained Chief of Army Staff for almost nine long years as well as a foreign policy pronouncer of the country later on. Thus personal and national interests did coincide in South Asia.

The “Levels of Analysis” Approach to Pakistan's Foreign Policy

David Singer identifies three levels in analysing the formation of foreign policy as being those of the decision maker, the national level and the systemic level. He further explains the three levels of analysis as “the point along that vertical axis from the single individual to the global system at which one's objects of analysis are to be found”.²⁵ Before Singer, Kenneth Waltz gave his levels of analysis: the individual, the state, and the state system. A prior study of realism and foreign policy are the pre-requisites of Kenneth Waltz's model of analysis. His entire paradigm is based on realism. Pakistan's foreign policy just after its independence can be analysed at the level of analysis approach in the study of international relations.

For the sake of clarity and its application in this thesis, I take the third level of analysis, also called “third-image analysis” first. At the third level, the behaviour of the state is shaped by the international system along with respect to international law for its survival and security. Waltz concludes, with Rousseau, that “in anarchy there is no automatic harmony”, and that “among autonomous states, war is inevitable”.²⁶ He suggests that the roots of international conflict lie in both the clash of interests among states and the absence of effective supranational agencies for the regulation of the clash of interests. At this level, the basic

²⁴ Hamida Khuhro, *Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, A Life of Courage in Politics* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1998), 440.

²⁵ David Singer, *A General Systems Taxonomy for Political Science* (NJ: General Learning Press, 1971), 16.

²⁶ K.N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 186.

proposition is clear: “everybody’s strategy depends on everybody else’s,”²⁷ and any belief in the autonomy of national foreign policy can only lead to disaster. Here the balance of power doctrine is seen not only as a powerful descriptive device but as a normative and prescriptive requirement of national survival.²⁸ To this Waltz befittingly says that “if some states act on this rule [*do whatever you must in order to win*], or are expected to act on it, other states must adjust their strategies accordingly”. Waltz supports the balance of power without accepting its logical consequences. This can be witnessed in his closing section that “the obvious conclusion of a third-image analysis [third level analysis] is that world government is the remedy for world war. The remedy, though it may be unassailable in logic, is unattainable in practice”.²⁹ Morgenthau also speaks on this subject from the same side by saying that “there can be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with the confines of the political world... [But] a world community must antedate a world state”.³⁰

For keeping world peace, the world’s leaders and countries form supranational institutions and organizations like the UN, NATO, SEATO and CENTO. This is done in order to either keep peace or to contain the adversary from disturbing the international system. Hence, the US-Pakistan relations touched new heights in US efforts to check the spread of Communism. Both nations formed “supranational agencies” in the shape of SEATO and CENTO for the “regulations of their clash of interests” with the Soviet Union. Pakistan, it is said, took advantage of this whole scheme and also tried to settle its scores with India. The Pak-US institutional interaction honoured the third level of analysis as an umbrella over the first and the second; which will be explained in the later pages.

The focal point of the third level is the regional and international environment in which a state exists. The system imposes its own

²⁷ John McDonald, *Strategy in Poker, Business and War* (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 1950), Also see Thomas C. Schelling, “The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II, no. 3, (September 1958): 203-64.

²⁸ David Singer, “International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis,” review of *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* by Kenneth N. Waltz, *World Politics*, vol. 12, no. 3, (April, 1960): 453-461.

²⁹ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 205.

³⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd edition (New York: Knopf, 1960), 477 and 485.

understanding and logic on the whole world. It is the most comprehensive of the levels available, encompassing the totality of interactions which take place within the system and its environment. This level of analysis requires that we postulate a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policy operational code of our national actors.³¹ Hans J. Morgenthau supports this argument by saying that the international system should “assume that [all] statesman think and act in terms of interest defined as power”.³² However, Morgenthau’s statement may not be taken completely because “just as individuals differ widely in what they deem to be pleasure and pain, or gain and loss, nations may differ widely in what they consider to be the national interest”.³³ Power, in the sense in which Morgenthau defined it, might not be the interest of every nation.

The second level explains state-behaviour not as a result of the international environment but explores the nature of the state - civilian or military, or military-dictated civilian; developed or developing; and capitalist or socialist - which gives rise to policy. At this level of analysis, Waltz proceeds from the assumption that the nature of a state’s political institutions, its modes of production and distribution, the quality and origins of its elites, and (sometimes) the characteristics of its people determine whether that state will be peaceful or belligerent. Thus there are “good” states and “bad” states, and bad states can become good (and peace-loving) only by turning to liberal democracy, or socialism, or free enterprise, etc.³⁴ Therefore, the cause of the war lies not in the mere existence of states but in the state-behaviour. A national state is the primary actor in international relations. The point here is the economic, political and class structure of the system and society. It also looks at the structure of society, its elite class, its national character and the level of tolerance of the masses for the governmental system.

The basis of the state level of analysis is that it is the domestic system and nature of a state that determines its policy. Adopting the nation as the level of analysis also therefore raises the entire question of

³¹ David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” *World Politics*, vol. 14, no. 1, *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, (October 1961): 77-92.

³² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5-7.

³³ Singer, *The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations*, 81.

³⁴ David Singer, *International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis*, 453-461.

goals, motivation, and purpose in national policy.³⁵ Goals and motivations are both dependent and independent variables to explain a nation's foreign policy.³⁶ The expansion of international relations has further broadened the scope of a nation. A nation can no longer be seen in terms of political science and law alone. In 1934, Edith E. Ware noted that "...the study of international relations is no longer entirely a subject for political science or law, but that economics, history, sociology, geography – all the social sciences – are called upon to contribute towards the understanding...of the international system".³⁷ It is pertinent to mention here that the nation-as-actor model questions the behaviour of the state in terms of "objective factors". They ask, do we examine our actor's behaviour in terms of the objective factors which allegedly influence that behaviour, or do we do so in terms of the actor's *perception* of these "objective factors"? Both approaches give divergent models of national behaviour.³⁸ The first approach was adopted by the Pakistan Army in its relations with US policy-making institutions during 1950s, 60s and 80s. The Army wanted to check the regional hegemony of India – the objective which influenced its behaviour to move towards the US for support. The second approach was taken up by the US to contain Communism, and, therefore, sought Pakistan Army's help. The same phenomenon was repeated in the post 9/11 Pak-US relationship during President Musharraf's regime. According to Kenneth Waltz, "survival depends on a state's material capabilities and its alliances with other states".³⁹ Hence, the resultant phenomenon was an alliance between the US policy making bodies (State Department, The White House, and the Pentagon) and the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army – known as the institutional interaction.

The first level explains foreign policy in the light of people and their nature involved in the making and accomplishment of taking decisions. The individual leaders play an important role in the formation of foreign policy, as well as the officials at the various bureaucratic levels.

³⁵ Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (NJ: Princeton, 1954), 92-117.

³⁶ Singer, *International Conflict*, 86.

³⁷ Edith E. Ware, *The Study of International Relations in the United States*, survey for 1934, (New York, 1934), 172.

³⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1931), translated by W. R Boyce Gibson, 365.

³⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (London: McGraw-Hill; Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 103-4.

According to Waltz, as long as man is as he is, war may be anticipated as a natural, recurrent inevitability. But this also raises the question whether man will remain the sinful entity of the past and present and will not change. Here Waltz divides the human nature theorists into two camps: the pessimists and the optimists. I will not go into the details of the two groups. However, it is in the experience of history that similar States (two developed or two under-developed states) with different people often pursue diametrically opposite foreign policies.⁴⁰ Therefore, it is necessary to look at the people and institutions involved in foreign policy making and the processes of decision making to understand why specific states act the way they act. In third world countries, the role of leaders is particularly important because they make policies in accordance with their perceptions or misperceptions of the situations, whereas in developed societies there are many people who influence the leaders directly or through institutional provisions.⁴¹ Therefore, in Pakistan's case during the 1950s and 60s, the C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, General Ayub Khan, acted as policy-maker and pronounced policies from within and outside the GHQ. He was in the hub of foreign policy of the country during the 1950s when he was only the C-in-C, as well as during the 1960s when he was the Chief Martial Law Administrator and later on the President of the country. This all can be said for President General Zia-ul-Haq and General Musharraf during their respective reigns.

The three levels cannot be taken as an alternative to each other; as no one level can explain adequately the behaviour of a state. Application of the entire set of levels determines who takes a decision and how a policy decision is taken. This also tells, amongst various alternatives, the policy choices available in international and regional environment – non-alignment, peaceful coexistence, isolation or alignment. Waltz in his book, *Theory of International Politics* says: Countries that are highly dependent, countries that get much of what they badly need from a few possibly unreliable suppliers must do all they can to increase the chances that they will keep getting it. The weak, lacking leverage, can plead their cause or panic.⁴² Therefore, in a country like Pakistan, the Army opted for alignment with the US for containment of Communism and India, as

⁴⁰ John Spanier, *Games Nations Play: Analysing International Politics* (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1984), 19-44

⁴¹ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 230-3.

⁴² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 153.

well as for its own institutional betterment through military aid. The alignment option was opted for in the name of threat perception.

Application of the “Levels of Analysis” Approach and Realism

According to David Singer, “threat perception arises out of a situation of armed hostility, in which each body of policy-makers assumes that the other entertains aggressive designs; further, each assumes that such designs will be pursued by physical and direct means if estimated gains seem to outweigh estimated Capability”. Singer also gives a formula to calculate the perceived threat: Perceived Threat = Estimated Capability X Estimated Intention.⁴³

Pakistan strongly felt a threat from India due to its estimated intentions, large size with greater resources, and its military’s numerical and qualitative superiority (estimated intention and capability). The Pakistani leadership perceived that the Indian leadership was not reconciled to the division of the Subcontinent. They suspected that the acceptance of the establishment of Pakistan was a mere tactical move in order to hasten the British departure. Such doubts were further reinforced and strengthened by threatening statements made by important and influential leaders like Acharya Kripalani and Sardar V.B. Patel. In conversation with high officials of the South Asian Affairs Division of the State Department, the American Ambassador to India Mr. Grady confirmed that Patel was extremely sceptical about the future of Pakistan. Patel personally told the US ambassador that East Pakistan would go back to India within a year.⁴⁴ Acharya Kripalani, the then Congress President, said at Calcutta on August 15, 1947: “Neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a United India”.⁴⁵

Pakistan lacked the minimum required strategic depth for defence and this heightened anxieties at the time of the birth of the state. Most of its big cities were situated along the border and were vulnerable to Indian attack. Most of the inherited borders were un-demarcated. Pakistan shared a 1400-mile long border with India on its Western part, and East

⁴³ For Details, see David J. Singer, ‘Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma,’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. II, no. 1, (March, 1958): 90-105.

⁴⁴ *FRUS 1947*, memo of conversation by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs, vol. III, (Washington: US Government Printing Press, 1972), 175-9.

⁴⁵ *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, (Calcutta), National Archives, London, August 18, 1947.

Pakistan was almost entirely surrounded by India with the exception of a small strip with Burma and the Bay of Bengal in the South.⁴⁶ In addition, Pakistan also shared a 1200-1400 mile border with Afghanistan.⁴⁷ Over and above, the two wings of Pakistan were separated by large tracts of Indian territory. Pakistan had an organized, well trained, well-disciplined but poorly equipped army. Its arms industry was in shambles. The first ordinance factory of Pakistan became operational in 1951.⁴⁸ A lack of good administrators, weak political institutions which were accompanied by internal wrangling of politicians, scarce resources, and the threats from India and Afghanistan produced a sense of insecurity for the nascent nation. According to Singer's formula of threat calculation, the sufficient estimated capability and estimated intention of India resulted in palpable threat perception for Pakistan. The larger area and large army and hostile statements of the leadership of India together translated into a noticeably high threat perception against Pakistan.

The perceived threat from India was overwhelming for a still weak, newly-born, democratic system. Pakistan was created for a democratic form of government. With an initial constitution-making assembly, a ceremonial head of State as Governor General and a powerful Prime Minister as the head of a cabinet, an independent foreign policy and an independent press, Pakistan was ready to take off with all the norms and traditions of a true democracy. Still as a country, it could not proceed as a democracy. A democracy with an independent foreign policy depends on the location and distribution of power. In a democratic society, power is located in institutions at various levels. The transfer of power into institutions away from individuals demarcates the democratic norms from autocracy. From its inception, Pakistan's system of government remained weakly institutionalized and strongly personalized. The country experienced a hybrid of civil-military government during the 1950s and then exclusively military government from 1958 till 1969. The same trend was witnessed during 1980s and in the post 9/11 era. Governance was a fragile and sensitively balanced phenomenon between the military Commander-in-Chief/Chief of Army Staff and the civilian

⁴⁶ Mujtaba Rizvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan* (Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1971), 69.

⁴⁷ Kazi S. Ahmed, *A Geography of Pakistan* (Karachi/Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1964), 1-3.

⁴⁸ James Everett Katz, ed., *Arms Production in Developing Countries* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1984), 265.

government. The military had a very important influence over foreign, security and vital domestic policies.

Pakistan has been variously described as neo-colonial, a post-colonial state, a praetorian state or “a state of martial rule”⁴⁹. Each description directs to a system. However, the more one studies about Pakistan, the more one confirms one’s conviction that there was no such political system during the 1950s and 60s. A strong political system of 1970s but on a bumpy road of political disturbance was thwarted by military. The lack of discipline and system encouraged a system and decorum-based institution – the Army – to govern the country and give it a direction. Pakistan, believing in realism, was submissive to the US during this period (1950s and 60s), 1980s and the post 9/11 era. A Foreign Office did exist, but it was under the domination of the country’s defence policy. It is only in the period of the first half of the 1960s and again since General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani has taken over command of the army that we witness the military’s defiance against the US. My argument is that the Pak-US institutional interaction aptly fits into the set of levels of analysis and the theory of realism as stated above to institutionalise power and interests at all three levels. Governance of the Pakistan Army along with its foreign policy formulation was what could be called militarised institutionalism. It was the result of the replacement of a civilian policy-maker by a uniformed officer. Waltz takes the levels of analysis for defining the causes of war only, whereas these are applicable in the situations of hot peace and cold war especially in the Pak-US relations.

To illustrate further, one could, at the systemic level, postulate that when the distribution of power in international system is highly diffused, it is more stable than when the discernable clustering of well-defined coalitions occur. And at the sub-systemic or national level, the same empirical phenomena would produce this sort of proposition: when a nation’s decision-making finds it difficult to categorize the other nation’s readiness as a friend or foe, they tend to behave toward all in a moderate and realist fashion.

About the importance of the three levels, Waltz puts it, “all three images [level of analysis] are a part of nature. So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image,

⁴⁹ Ayesha Jalal, *State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

entirely overlook the other two”.⁵⁰ He also describes the interrelation of the three levels in the final sentence: “The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; [equally] the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results”.⁵¹

Foreign Policy, Decision-making, Formulating Process

My analysis will be built around power-centres or policy making bodies called units for a very practical reason. As a student of foreign policy, when I think of foreign policy-making in Pakistan, I think of numerous agencies (henceforth called units); such as the Foreign Office (FO), meetings of the Corps Commanders in the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Army, the National Security Council, Federal Cabinet, and security and secret agencies’ influence—which are involved in the conduct of foreign affairs. The units are organizational systems, which mean “the system of activities and the structure of relationships”⁵². Each unit has its own organization. Thus a unit with its own organization means that it has its own establishment, its own members, and, hence, its own stakes in the policy making of the country. It is reasonable and logical to consider these units as the power centres in the foreign policy formulation process of a country. But it is obvious that there are several difficulties in this approach. First, not everyone working in these agencies or units is a responsible decision-maker under all circumstances. It would be absurd to include, say, a clerk in the FO and a Captain in the GHQ as a policy maker. Second, not all these agencies are involved on the same level in all decisions. Each may have different kinds and levels of potential roles it can play in various international and national issues or states of affairs. Third, not all these agencies are equally important. The Foreign Office has, obviously, a larger overall role than, say, the Ministry of Finance. But when it comes to military rule in Pakistan, the opinion from the GHQ in the conduct of foreign affairs is preferred. Fourth, when these agencies participate in policy making process, they are not necessarily

⁵⁰ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 160.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 238.

⁵² Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 95.

related to each other on an equal footing. Sometimes they are equals, other times some of them are completely ignored in the policy making process. Fifth, in terms of power and organizational coherence, one agency is much stronger and integrated than another. Such strength and integrity gives the stronger agency the liberty to dictate to other agencies of the country. Hence, the GHQ is accommodated in pronouncements of the Foreign Office especially on the country's relations with the US, India and the policy on Kashmir. Hence, for these reasons it is difficult to correlate these units with each other in the decision making process. Due to such diverse background of the units involved in the foreign policy decision making process, the levels of analysis by Kenneth Waltz and David Singer have been applied on the Pak-US institutional interaction.

Besides the units that are involved in decision making, it is necessary to mention the objectives of these decisions. "The objective is taken as being a particular desired future state of affairs having a specific referent".⁵³ It is of great importance that the objective be viewed as being specific because it is only possible to speak of the organization or decision-making system with respect to a specified objective. This means that, with respect to any foreign policy objective, there is an organizational unit so constituted as to be able to select a course of action to achieve that objective. The objective is a concrete envisaged state of affairs.⁵⁴

It is immediately apparent that there are numerous foreign policy objectives of different kinds – political, economic, and military – or some other combination. The degree of urgency attached to them must be considered. Furthermore, it would be of considerable importance to take into account whether the objective is considered to be long-term or short-term. This is not to indicate that many treatments of foreign policy-making do not speak of, for example, "short-term military objectives" or "long-term political objectives". What is needed, however, is a systematic classification with clearly stated and easily applicable criteria.⁵⁵ For a student of foreign policy, unit and the identity of objectives is essential. It is important to know the decision-maker, the unit, and the objective of the decision-maker. Objectives define, for the decision-maker, the kinds of systems involved in the decision making.

⁵³ Ibid., 93.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 94.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 95.

“Decisions take place in the decision-maker’s mind whereas actions take place in the environment”.⁵⁶ The policy makers generally have the ability to understand and decide in a rational and objective manner. However, their personal beliefs, the national objectives, their own feelings about their country’s history, character, and international position, impose limits on the rationality with which they can interpret the existing environment. So, during the policy-making, it is their image about the prevailing environment that really matters.⁵⁷ While the decision-makers’ state is a part of an already existing international environment and has some of its main lines of foreign policy imposed on it, they can find some margin for independent decision. Such decision will be determined by their interpretation of the political environment and their conception of alternatives.⁵⁸ A decision taken for action is driven from a field of choice which lies in the decision maker’s image.⁵⁹

In the background of the identity of the decision maker, his objectives and the decision-making units, I have discussed a few institutions that were involved in the foreign policy decision-making process. It is due to two reasons: first, foreign policy decision making has never been and is not limited to the Foreign Office only. Many decision-influencing units were in operation to counter, alter or completely reverse the Foreign Office policy.⁶⁰ All decision-making units do not come under the scope of this study. Second, historically, there were not many activities in the foreign policy function apart from relations with the US, India, later on China, and the issues of Pakhtoonistan with Afghanistan and Kashmir. Other than these, the Foreign Office had routine practices of data and information collection, analysis and synthesis with the country’s interaction with a political issue or relationship with other countries. But certain units were the focal point of policy formulation and domination. Policy was executed by the Foreign Office. This means there was an intermingling of institutions in the making and dictating of foreign policy.

⁵⁶ Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy*, 1.

⁵⁷ Harold Sprout and Margaret, “Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics,” in Karan Harold Jacobson and William Zimmerman, *The Shaping of Foreign Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), 68.

⁵⁸ Henry Kissenger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” in *The Shaping of Foreign Policy*, Karan Harold Jacobson and William Zimmerman ed., 140-1.

⁵⁹ Kenneth Boulding, “National Images and International Systems,” in *ibid.*, 163.

⁶⁰ These units include meetings of the Corps Commanders, National Security Council, Federal Cabinet, Security agencies, etc.

US Institutional Complications and their Sluggish Response to Urgent Priorities Abroad

Institutional complications and entanglements in the decades immediately after World War Two were not limited to Pakistan alone. Americans were equally troubled by strategic and foreign policy institutional innovations and their tardiness in coping with events during the 1950s and 60s. With the passage of time, as the nature of Cold War conflict became clearer, organizational innovations were made within the US Executive Branch of the government to deal with the new situation. In 1947, the formation of the National Security Council was followed by a Psychological Strategy Board to deal with the more dynamic aspects of the Cold War.⁶¹ In 1953, it was replaced by the Operations Coordinating Board. This idea was further polished by the Jackson Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery studying the idea of a “super Secretary of State”. President Eisenhower wanted a new post, “Chief of Staff to the President”, to help him coordinate the activities of the various departments and agencies. And Vice President Nixon favoured giving the Vice President greater authority and responsibility in waging the Cold War to coordinate several key government agencies.⁶²

All such steps of coordination amongst various governmental agencies and departments were fulfilled, but this resulted in an increasing number of setbacks for US national prestige in the world. Its allies complained about its pedestrian pace bureaucratic and interagency coordinating procedures. President Ayub Khan observed, in June 1960, that the Pakistanis were beginning to doubt that the governmental machinery of the US was attuned to the requirements of the nuclear age. He conceded that the US had the military striking power to repel any attack. However, he questioned whether the US bureaucracy – “cumbersome, sluggish and a clumsy juggernaut” – was able to cope with the fast-moving events of the Cold War? According to him this constituted “the greatest danger to the free world” today.⁶³

Such a disappointing comment from a very close US ally is sufficient to suggest that their failure to anticipate events and, what was worse, their ability to react promptly to events once they occurred was

⁶¹ CIA-RDP-80B01676 R001100140001-6, National Security Operations Centre, August 23, 1960, US National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

becoming doubtful. They were spending billions of dollars on “military weapons system to a 15 minute response period,”⁶⁴ but their non-military Cold War actions were tied to a time-consuming system of committee discussion and debate. It was at this stage that Dr Oppenheimer remarked sadly, “There is a widespread impression that we live from astonishment to surprise, and from surprise to astonishment, never adequately forewarned or forearmed, and more often than not choosing between evils, when forethought and fore-action might have provided happier alternatives”.⁶⁵

Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Coming back to Pakistan which is the case in focus here, a very interesting aspect of the foreign policy of Pakistan during the 1950s and 60s is that only diplomats in the FO were considered as decision-makers. No unofficial or private person was considered or consulted in the policy formulation. Sometimes the policy was influenced by the press, but that was rare. When Ayub Khan assumed the office of the President, the presidency became the hub of a foreign policy formulation institution. The presidency was the combination of the GHQ and the presidency itself. The FO fell a bit further down in its role in decision making. During Ayub's era, the FO was just “a post office” receiving mail from the GHQ-Presidency and sending it ahead to the country concerned and vice versa. It was a complete distortion of the proper organizational set-up of a country's policy making process. It is not the case in the current policy making and executing process where people like former foreign secretaries Agha Shahi and Niaz A. Naik in their unofficial capacity worked officially for *Track II* and secret diplomacy despite their retirement from their diplomatic posts.

To illustrate this point one might examine the relief of General MacArthur in 1951 from his several positions as American and Allied Supreme Commander in the Far East. If one takes as the organizational system the one involving President Truman as Commander-in-Chief and members of the appropriate executive agencies at home and, also, General MacArthur with his aides and subordinates in the Far East, “it is apparent that the General's competence involved great and, to a high degree,

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Robert Oppenheimer, “An Inward Look”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 36, no. 2, (January, 1958): 209-220.

unspecified areas of latitude. When the General's decisions began to threaten the organization as constituted, the maintenance of that particular system seemed to require, in President Truman's view, that action he took".⁶⁶ It should be quite clear that this analysis does not rest on any view of which side was "right" or "wrong" in this instance. From the point of view of organizational analysis, General MacArthur's interpretation of his competence was apparently threatening the organizational system as constituted, and the man at the head of this system felt that it could only be maintained if the General was relieved of his posts. "Some of the General's supporters might accept the organizational analyses" but a change in the organizational system as constituted would have been better for the country.⁶⁷ No such organizational care was taken in the case of "diverting the plane in which General Pervaiz Musharraf was returning back to Pakistan after a foreign visit".⁶⁸ At the same time, one may find a lack of organization in the Pakistani General's response to diversion of his plane – taking-over the reign of the country by sacking the existing government. Pakistan's case was played out in just the opposite manner to what happened in American history in 1951. Even during the Indo-Pak border clash of 1999, also called the *Kargil* war, the PM's house expressed its ignorance of the Kargil operation;⁶⁹ whereas General Musharraf claimed "everyone was on the board"⁷⁰. This further compels us to investigate, in the study of foreign and defence policy making, the question of authority.

As this paper is not intended to be a discourse on the organization of an institution, it is hoped that a brief reference to factors needing to be taken into account will suffice. There are, nevertheless, instances in which the authority relationship becomes decisive. Authority is used to denote the relationship between superior and subordinate. It may be defined for the purpose at hand as "the ability to issue orders, instructions, and commands with the probability that they will be obeyed".⁷¹ The availability of the use of sanctions by the bearer of authority is a pre-requisite. Most prominently, this is true in the

⁶⁶ Richard, Bruck, Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, 114.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Owen Bannet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (New Heaven London: Yale University Press, 2002), 46.

⁶⁹ Syed Ali Dayan Hassan, "Double Jeopardy," *Herald* (Karachi), July, 2000, 26.

⁷⁰ Owen Bannet Jones, *Pakistan*, 101-2.

⁷¹ Snyder, Bruck, Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, 117.

following classes of cases: first, where there is a challenge to the source of authority; secondly, where there is a challenge to the bearer of authority; thirdly, where there is a quality of authority; and, fourthly, where there are differences in the interpretations of the rules, objective, or similar matters.⁷² But as a matter of fact, a balance of authority and of responsibility is necessary over the long run for stability of policy making and its effectiveness. There was authority and responsibility, but the hierarchy of Pakistan's military and civilian leadership lacked balance between the two. And that was the place where the fault rested.

Conclusion

To conclude, it can be argued that one country's domestic problems can be another country's solutions. History is full of many dictatorial regimes which helped the US in the pursuit of its long term objectives. Domestic politics is the reflection of a country's foreign policy. Another country might be gaining a lot from a particular regime while the indigenous people governed under that regime may ultimately be suffering. This is particularly so where states are intensively connected, whether through security alliances or strategic partnerships. The institutional interaction between the US and Pakistan is the best example to quote here. The Pakistan Army was hard in domestic politics but was soft in its terms with the US, apart from those two periods earlier mentioned i.e., during the first half of 1960s and the post-Musharraf's era of today. It joined the US sponsored alliances to have a check on India's growing power and the "war on terror" against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and to have a strong bargaining position in Pakistan's domestic politics. In this sense, domestic and foreign policy developments are often intimately connected.

After debating on policy-maker, foreign policy, decision-making, and the theory of realism, one may say that the countries' action-oriented policies are based on the behaviour of decision-makers. A general openness of thought and process gives more space for manoeuvring, but that is only possible if we go for analysis of the multi-layered politics of the country and the country in focus. However, a sense of direction is the pre-requisite of any planned and successful foreign policy. This can be achieved if the policy-maker keeps his options open to have plans "B" and "C" always ready in case plan "A" does not work. Throughout this

⁷² Ibid.

process, the sense of rationality is not to be abandoned; otherwise, it will give an unnatural look to the phenomenon of foreign policy. ■