

OECD - Development Assistance Committee
Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)

**CONFLICT
PREVENTION
AND PEACE
BUILDING**

**Training Module on
Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding**

WORKBOOK FOR TRAINERS



ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING

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Foreword

Welcome to the *OECD training module on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* – released now for an extended test phase. This product, which includes a *workbook for trainees* and a *workbook for trainers*, is based on a variety of products that have been developed by the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) over the past years, including the *DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict and on Security Systems Reform and Governance*, and the paper *Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards a DAC Guidance*.

Donors are increasingly involved in financing and implementation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, which are now seen as a central component of development efforts to overcome fragility and conflict throughout the world, and there is a real need to ensure that those working in this expanding field acquire and refresh necessary knowledge and skill standards. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding training should thus be a key component of our joint effort to ensure that best practice is understood and implemented at donor headquarters and in the field, and that key terms and concepts are universally understood among international actors and partners alike.

The *training module* that you have before you is an international effort to provide a consolidated high quality Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding training package for policy makers and practitioners alike. The training material will be disseminated widely, to ensure that all concerned organisations, networks and associations have access to and can make use of the modules. It is envisaged that the *OECD workbook for trainers* will be especially useful for training associations and training focal points working for donor agencies, governments, international organisations and NGOs.

Just as there is no magical blue-print for conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts and policies, there is no single blue-print for training in this field. The OECD training package complements what already exists and can act as a good basis for more specialised training. ‘Context’ should always be taken into consideration when deciding how to use the package. Different trainers will decide to utilise the product in different ways and indeed the *workbook for trainers* provides various didactic approaches to learning that can be utilised in different circumstances. Trainers are also encouraged to target training efforts towards specific audiences and the material presented here can be combined with more specific modules on Security Systems Reform (SSR), which can be found in the accompanying training course on SSR.

The materials before you have been thoroughly researched, crafted and developed by leading Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding trainers. The product was also extensively piloted in order to ensure that content and approach are of the highest standard. As such, the OECD is confident that the *training module* can equip trainees with the necessary tools of the trade, which will be invaluable to you in the coming months and years. The *workbook for trainers* will also be a valuable tool for those with the important responsibility for conducting training courses within respective organisations.

The materials before you have been thoroughly researched, crafted and developed by leading Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding trainers, and have also been piloted among CPDC member countries to assess applicability. We thank all OECD members for valuable support in helping to prepare this work, and trust the final product will be of use to training departments in your respective ministries and agencies.



Richard Manning, DAC Chair

Acknowledgements

This publication was produced by InWEnt on behalf of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. Inge Halene coordinated the overall task of preparing the training material, while the Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding modules were prepared by Manuela Leonhardt and Wolfram Zunzer, with valuable support and input provided by Gabriele Hoehl, Sami Faltas (CESS), Alexander Loch and Mike Ashkenazi (BICC).

The OECD DAC is grateful to the many donor officials and experts who provided guidance and comments at various stages. In particular, we would like to recognise the support of the CPDC Co-chairs Inger Buxton and Cristina Hoyos, as well as the European Commission and the Austrian Development Agency for hosting and taking part in the pilot trainings that enabled this work to be comprehensively tested. Special thanks also go to the GTZ for financial support.

A team of OECD staff helped prepare this publication, which included Mark Downes, Rory Keane, Caitlin Maruno, Asbjorn Wee, and Lisa Williams. The work was carried out under the guidance of Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval.

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Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
30'	Input Questions & Answers	"Introductory presentation – A culture of conflict prevention" (ppt) Checklist for preparing the introductory presentation
30'	Total	

Materials

Presentation "Introductory presentation – A culture of conflict prevention" (ppt)

Checklist for host organisation

Instructions

The introductory presentation should be adapted and given in close liaison with the contracting agency. Ideally, a representative of the latter adapts the content and holds the speech. At the very least a substantial input from the host is needed for slide No. 3, "Training rationale and context". The presentation can either finish on the notion of 'lessons learned' and key insights for development cooperation from the DAC-produced literature, or address and exemplify the OECD DAC Guiding Principles (*optional*) as an essence of good practice in CPPB.

For the plenary discussion, you may choose a set of questions and facilitate more, either related to deepening general issues or to addressing the lessons learned, according to participants' needs and experiences.

Checklist for preparing the introductory presentation

Concrete institutional motivation for training

Explain and describe the institutional context and why the course is taking place now.

Relate to the course objectives: "To present an international consensus on good practice in the field of CPPB" and, more specifically, to the objective: "Skills for programming in conflict environments".

Explain why the training has been organised specifically for this group of participants.

Link to what's ongoing

1. Outline what CPPB activities are ongoing in your organisation. Optional: Describe the CPPB-related programming of your organisation per sector.
2. Describe what funding mechanisms for the CPPB programmes and projects exist.

Optional: Characterise the role of civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the larger context of possibly overlapping policy fields you engage in (i.e. trade policies, poverty reduction, environmental protection, integrated civil-military approach).

Link to further challenges and needs

Which further challenges and needs could be identified with respect to your own regional engagements, and which relevant protracted situations exist elsewhere?

1. A culture of conflict prevention: Why? (Opening speech)


Session: "Introductory presentation – A culture of conflict prevention"

Learning objectives

This session is intended to

- Inform participants about the concrete motivation of the host organisation for conducting this training and about linkages to ongoing projects and programmes;
- Make participants aware of key challenges, the definition of conflict prevention, the existing DAC body of knowledge including key elements of a 'culture of conflict prevention and peacebuilding' and key 'lessons learned' for development cooperation;
- Optionally: Introduce and exemplify the OECD Guiding Principles as the essence of a culture of conflict prevention and peacebuilding;
- Enable participants to familiarise themselves with the key orientation and essential elements of the curriculum, which will be further expanded and deepened during the training course.

PRESENTATION "INTRODUCTORY PRESENTATION – A CULTURE OF CONFLICT PREVENTION"



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Welcome address

- Welcome to the training course of the OECD training module on preventing conflict and building peace.
- The training was designed by the CPDC Network to facilitate the exchange of knowledge about peacebuilding and conflict prevention in joint donor training courses that include both field staff and representatives from headquarters.

2



Training rationale and context (host)

- Concrete institutional motivation for training
- Link to what's ongoing
- Link to further challenges and needs

3



Key challenge: Ongoing violent conflicts

- Most violent conflicts worldwide – taking a key criteria of more than 1,000 deaths per year, approximately 30-35 – are internal or unofficial protracted wars
- More than 40% of resolved conflicts turn violent again in a 5-year period
- Underlying these are complex root causes (economic, socio-historical, political, ethnic)
- **Key insight:** A stable security situation, together with conflict prevention and peacebuilding measures, encourages successful poverty reduction and sustainable development

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See Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research: Conflict Barometer 2004; among many others, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also publishes a well-reputed annual survey on violent conflicts worldwide, see: www.sipri.org/contents/webmaster/publications; see also BMZ (eds.): *Strategy for Peacebuilding*, 2005.

2. Root Causes

- Economic: It is important to understand and take account of the political economy of violent conflict. Powerful groups, businesses and individuals, using violent or non-violent means, can acquire a vested interest in sparking and perpetuating violent conflict.
- Socio-historical: Grievances and perceived injustices may date back a long time. However, the most important events of the modern history of the conflict are key.
- Political: Political in a broad sense, including traditional and influential civil-society actors, and external actors.


3. Key Insight

As understood during the many violent conflicts in the 1990s and after 2001, working around the conflict (i.e. trying to ignore conflicts and to only contribute to socio-economic development) is not an option for external (development) assistance and stakeholders alike. The 'lesson learned' is that successful socio-economic development presupposes a stable security situation in a comprehensive way (human security). Or, to put it bluntly, poverty will not be overcome unless the recurrence of violence and the lack of security for all citizens is ended.

What is conflict prevention ?

- **Definition**
Conflict prevention refers to actions undertaken to reduce manifest tensions and to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict
- The **key objective** is the prevention of the use of large-scale violence and activities leading to collective violence
- **Key insight for development cooperation**
**Move from reaction to prevention
and engage long term in building peace**

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Basic terms and definitions are clarified, for example, in *Helping Prevent Violent Conflicts* (HPVC, 2001), "Understanding violent conflict and its links with development", p. 86 and following pages. The new qualities of 'conflict prevention' over earlier definitions are exemplified in the following footnote:

"The notion of 'conflict prevention' has evolved. It has been extended to mean the prevention of *violent* disputes, controversies and conflict, as noted in Part I, 'Executive Summary'. It includes the notion of long-term engagement, not only short-term response. Non-violent conflict is a normal part of society. What has to be prevented is the use of large-scale violence to address or resolve conflict as well as activities that can destabilise and lead to collective violence." (HPVC, 2001, p. 86)

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Knowledge on conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the DAC (*optional*)

- DAC set up a **Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation** (1995) to *improve the transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development*.
- Ground-breaking **DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation** (1998) approved by Development Ministers, Agency Heads and the G8.
- The **DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict** (2001) updated this – focusing on developing a culture of prevention and principles of Do No Harm – through the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, established in 2001.
- **Preventing Conflict and Building Peace: A Manual of Issues and Entry Points** (2006) brings in operational programming advice to help with the implementation of the Guidelines.

6



A culture of conflict prevention and peacebuilding I

Preventive and long-term engagement fostering development and security should include:

- Sharing risk analyses among donors
- Acting rapidly where risk is high
- Looking beyond 'quick-fix' solutions to address the root causes of conflict and, when possible, state fragility
- Strengthening the capacity of regional organisations to prevent and resolve conflicts
- Helping conflict-affected states to establish resilient institutions which can withstand political and economic pressures non-violently

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See "Policy Statement on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century" (HPVC, 2001, pp. 79-83), and in the Issue Brief *Peace-Building Overview*.

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A culture of conflict prevention and peacebuilding II

Key insights for development cooperation

- Explore opportunities for preventive action analytically and continuously at the policy, programme and project level
- Build up the capacities of partner countries and actors to address the root causes
- Develop the institutions needed to facilitate the accommodation of competing interests within society, and the peaceful management of socio-political disputes

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See "The special role of development co-operation," HPVC, pp. 92-94:

1. Prevention is a systematic and medium-to-long-term endeavour and often empirical and analytical knowledge on many aspects is still lacking: "Detailed [and continuous] analytical work should form the basis of judgements to be made on the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict within development co-operation strategies" and programmes.
2. The central goal should be to strengthen local capacities to work on structural root causes in their own societies (actors with an inherent interest in retaining and expanding fora for peaceful exchange and coexistence, such as the business community, civil-society organisations, or ongoing cross-conflict political cooperation, i.e. in local government).
3. It is not sufficient to strengthen the individual and collective capacities of the stakeholders in a latent or acute conflict; the building of institutional capacities or institutionalised systems to manage socio-political disputes peacefully and constructively also needs to be fostered.

Summary OECD Guiding Principles

1. Recognise the potential – and limits – of external influence and reinforce local capacities
2. Work towards coherent donor policies and coordinated action
3. Be transparent, communicate intentions, and sustain dialogue with partners at all levels to ensure ownership
4. Ensure you do maximum good, and avoid unintended harm
5. Actively engage women, men and children in peacebuilding processes
6. Work in a flexible, constructive and creative manner, guided by conflict analysis, and think long term

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The selected six principles are a summary of the 8 principles mentioned in the Summary of HPVC, 2001, p. 14. Further explanations can be found in Chapter 1 "Some basic guiding principles", HPVC, 2001, pp. 23-30.

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Some positive current examples and relevant shortcomings of these principles are:

1. Haiti might be a good case in point, in which a multiplicity of civil support measures and UN peacekeeping interventions have only to a limited extent been able to transform the root causes of the conflict. A recent positive example would be Aceh in which a combination of private external peacebuilding initiatives, local stakeholders from both sides, as well as the EU and ASEAN were able to manage important steps of conflict transformation successfully.
2. Compared to some years ago, the coordination among donors in many conflict countries has been improved by organising additional areas and capacities for coordination on different levels (i.e. Uganda, Aceh, etc.). However, diametrical dynamics and interests among agencies, along with political dynamics, still put in question to what degree a joint strategy can be pursued.
3. How powerful the principle of transparent communication is can be especially shown in cases like South Africa or Southern Sudan. However, the principle of transparency has a short- to medium-term limit, namely how far an overlap of interests between conflict parties exists.
4. Reflection of conflict facilitating and the negative outcomes of project/programme activities have been improved substantially. However there are still many activities whose possible negative outcomes are not regularly monitored.
5. Creating positive peace means doing justice to all groups in society and creating room for the participation of the marginalised or of groups that are especially suffering. Including such voices has been helpful in many cases (South Sudan, Sri Lanka, etc.). Yet it is not sufficient only to work with those voices: they need to be heard in mainstream politics.
6. This principle has probably proven right in all conflicts currently existing, given both the protractedness and dynamism in conflict societies. For example: to achieve proper reconciliation, the time perspective should be generational rather than anything else.

Concluding remarks

- Short and long-term activities for conflict prevention and building peace are central to poverty reduction and sustainable development
- Greater coordination will improve responses to conflict, and good governance is fundamental to peace
- Building wide and deep partnerships helps to prevent violent conflicts
- Our actions will be guided by basic principles, systematic conflict analysis, and conflict-sensitive planning and assessment

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Key statements selected from the "Ministerial Statement on Helping to Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners" (HPVC, 2001, p. 13 ff), the "Policy Statement on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century" (HPVC, 2001, pp. 79-83) and the Issue Brief *Peace-Building Overview*.

These four elements, or insights, are the underlying rationale of many already ongoing projects and activities linked with the OECD and will guide this workshop on conflict prevention and peacebuilding as well.

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
20'	Input including basic theory (ABC triangle) and enriched with additional, pointed personal experiences and anecdotes by trainer	Presentation "Conflict-sensitive development cooperation" (ppt)
25'	Buzz groups of 3: "Identify and discuss examples of conflict-sensitive development practice from your own experience"	
15'	Collection of buzz group results	
60'	Total	

Materials

Presentation "Conflict-sensitive development cooperation" (ppt)

Instructions

1. Input and discussion (20')

- Introduce basic theoretical concepts including position/interest/needs and the ABC triangle for conflict transformation
- Explain types of interventions and conflict-sensitivity criteria as underlying the course
- Introduce, exemplify and deepen key concepts such as conflict-sensitive analysis, planning, implementation
- Explain challenges and limits of the concept for peacebuilding and development practice
- Instil additional, pointed personal experiences and anecdotes as appropriate
- Consider using the following questions to stimulate discussion and sharing:
 - How do you perceive the key insights, and more general lessons learned, as formulated by the OECD (see slides "Ensure you do no harm, and do the maximum good I+II")? – Are they consistent with your experience, and which are more relevant from your point of view?
 - What do you think is the best way of ensuring conflict-sensitivity throughout the whole project cycle (planning, implementation, monitoring/evaluation) for your work environment?

2. Buzz groups "Personal experience with conflict-sensitive development practice" (25')

- Explain rationale of the buzz group exercise
- Form groups of 3 (-4) persons
- Identify, share and discuss examples of conflict-sensitive development practice from your own experience
- Note down the most interesting examples, issues, insights on 3 cards.

3. Collection of buzz group results (15')

- Each group presents the results in a two-minute-input in the plenary, based on the 3 cards
- Summarise key learning points based on the results on the pinboard.

2. Introducing conflict-sensitive development cooperation

Introducing conflict-sensitive development cooperation

Learning objectives

This session intends to

- Introduce basic conflict theory and the ABC triangle;
- Inform about the importance and rationale of conflict sensitivity for different kinds of interventions, especially for development cooperation and peacebuilding interventions;
- Introduce and deepen key concepts such as conflict-sensitive analysis, planning, and implementation;
- Explain the added-value of the conflict-sensitivity method from a practitioner's perspective.

INTRODUCTORY PRESENTATION: CONFLICT-SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Introductory presentation: Conflict-sensitive development cooperation

OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and
Development Co-operation (CPDC)

Training module on Conflict Prevention and
Peacebuilding



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Structure

- Basic conflict theory and the ABC triangle
- What is conflict-sensitivity?
- Key insights and experiences in a policy perspective
- Contributions of conflict-sensitivity for programme/project practice
- Challenges

2



Basic conflict theory

- Conflict is a (perceived) incompatibility of interests between two parties
- Non-violent conflict is a 'fact of life', yet can be addressed constructively or destructively ("The Orange")
- Understanding differences in perceptions and differences in position/interests/needs of parties to a conflict are key for analysing, understanding and influencing conflicts constructively

3




The example of "The Orange" refers to Fisher, Roger and William Ury, 1981: *Getting to Yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. New York: Penguin. The conflict situation entails two protagonists quarrelling about an orange. While the positions are clear (both want the only orange), the underlying interests and needs are not explored in the initial situation by the protagonists: while one would like to drink the juice, the other was wanting to use the peel for baking an orange cake. An opportunity for resolution that had previously been hidden can be uncovered.

'Positions' are what a person (officially) says or demands. 'Interests' are what conflicting parties really want, encompassing the motivations underlying their positions. They are partly expressed, partly concealed. 'Needs' are fundamental, essential requirements for human beings and relate to security, identity, vitality of human life. Usually they are not stated publicly.

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The ABC conflict triangle

Galtung's triangle (1969) is an important clarifier of the interrelationships between external (context or conflict cause), psychological/perceptual (attitude) and behavioural elements (behaviour) in the driving dynamic of conflict. First of all there are the attitudes A (stereotypes, beliefs, other-images, suspicion, fear, hatred, offence, etc.) of the conflicting parties, which tend to become more and more hostile towards each other as the conflict escalates. Attitudes are very much affected by the behaviour B (aggression, oppression, discrimination, reaction, escalation, etc.) of the belligerents. Escalating degrees of violence make it more and more difficult to see the mutual benefit of ending a conflict. Furthermore, there is a contextual or structural conflict cause C (shortage of resources, unequal distribution of wealth, unequal access to services, etc.) as the key matter over which a conflict is waged. This is the objective reality to which the conflict relates and, without tackling that reality, changes in attitudes and behaviour will not be sustainable. However, in such a situation of goal incompatibility, conflict can begin at any of these points (ABC).


Galtung, Johan, 1969: "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 11-33.

See also: www.peaceworkers.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=233&Itemid=235

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Dynamic ABC triangle



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What is interesting is that the triangle can also be represented as a bi-directional circle where each of the points can reinforce each of the other points to produce the familiar process of escalation. Thus, the diagram becomes what it is above.

But now, the triangle has become a cycle, a loop between reinforcing points, which not only represents the escalatory spiral of violent conflict, but exemplifies the need to change attitudes, behaviour and contextual structures, if one is to achieve sustainable peace.

Therefore, the interdependent and dynamic concept of the ABC triangle can also be used to think more systematically about what would be needed to change the key driving forces of violent conflict. In order to finally reach some sort of settlement of the conflict, the parties must first change their attitudes and their perceptions of one another, tackle the violence itself in order to de-escalate the situation, change their behaviour, and work on the objective contextual or structural causes of the conflict to make a settlement sustainable. This is the essence of working on conflict, or peacebuilding activities.

Adopted from: Bloomfield, D. and N. Ropers, 2005: "The Berghof Perspective: From Third Party Facilitation to Systemic Conflict Transformation". Paper presented at the Berghof Seminar *Theories of Social Change and their Contribution to the Practice of Conflict Transformation: Developing the State of the Art in Conflict Transformation Theory and Practice*. Berlin: 26-27 September 2005.

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Conflict-sensitivity in peacebuilding and development cooperation I

Key assumptions

- All activities that are carried out in a conflict-affected area, whether they are described as taking place in, on or around conflict, need to be sensitive to conflict, including explicit 'peacebuilding' activities. (International Alert, 2004, p. 12)
- Many peacebuilding activities are similar to development cooperation activities in countries not affected by conflict, but the context and purposes are different. (OECD *Issue Brief 1*, 2005)

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Conflict-sensitivity in peacebuilding and development cooperation II

Definition

The ability of an organisation to

- Understand the context in which it operates
- Understand the interaction between its intervention and the context
- Act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.

Source: International Alert et al., *Resource Pack 2004*

7



Conflict-sensitivity in peacebuilding and development cooperation III

Conflict-sensitive planning

- Incorporate peacebuilding principles into agencies' strategies; relate project objectives to conflict analysis; ensure conflict-sensitivity of the planning process

Conflict-sensitive implementation

- Use conflict-sensitive tools and methodologies; use conflict advisors; cooperate closely with partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics; anticipate changes and develop contingency plans

Conflict-sensitive monitoring and evaluation

- M&E of programme impact on peace and conflict, and vice versa; use flexible process indicators; joint M&E with partners and communities

Source: International Alert et al., *Resource Pack 2004*

8



Notes

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Main underlying issues and questions:

- How does the conflict affect us?
- How do we affect the conflict?
- Transfer of resources
- Implicit messages

Ensure you do no harm, and do the maximum good I

Key insights

- Aid becomes part of the political dynamics and produces political results
- Policy-makers should do no harm and guard against unwittingly aggravating existing or potential conflicts
- Donors should pursue proactive and innovative approaches in different conflict situations that strengthen incentives for peace for key actors, and help strengthen security for the people
- They need to be open and flexible in their support (strategies)
- Coherence with other external actors and organisations responsible for assistance and relief is important
- Coordination of strategies and activities to ensure maximum impact and complementarity of programmes/projects

9



Ensure you do no harm, and do the maximum good II

Underlying experiences

- Perceptions of all involved often matter as much as facts
- Who gets – or does not get – which share of benefits can be as important as the total benefits generated
- 'Not doing harm' does not mean not taking considered risks
- Speed and 'efficiency' in development operations may sometimes need to be sacrificed to some degree for peace, and local 'ownership'
- Development discourse can be used and abused for many political purposes
- Broadly speaking, processes by which development outcomes are produced are as important as the results

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Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
35'	Input Questions & Answers	Presentation "Causes, dynamics and how to do conflict analysis" (ppt)"
45'	Group work: Which are the key causes, actors and dynamics relevant for the conflict case you are working on? (1 prepared case study, 2 case studies by participants) Reading of "Instruments and questions for causes (...)" Reading of EC checklist Reading/brainstorming of Case Studies (1 prepared, i.e. Sri Lanka, plus 2 selected by participants) Reflection and identification of the most important root causes, actors and dynamics for 3 cases in groups	Handout 3.1.1: "Instruments and questions for causes, stakeholders/actors, dynamics" (ppt) Handout 3.1.2: "European Commission checklist for root causes of conflict" (<i>optional</i>) Handout: Case Study (i.e. Sri Lanka)
20'	Presentation and discussion of major findings of the 3 working groups (3-5 min)	
5'	Wrap-up	
105'	Total	

Materials

Presentation "Causes, dynamics and how to do conflict analysis" (ppt)

Handout 3.1.1: "Instruments and questions for causes, stakeholders/actors, dynamics" (ppt)

Handout 3.1.2: European Commission checklist for root causes of conflict (*optional*)

Handout: Case study (i.e. Sri Lanka)

Instructions

1. Input and Q&A (35')

Introduce participants to the key concepts of "Conflict causes, dynamics and conflict analysis".

Present the key components and methods of conflict analysis and give examples.

Present the strengths and challenges of conflict analysis concepts and tools and give space to discuss participant's own experiences with the former. Ask participants to add aspects from their own experience.

Visualise conclusions.

>>> continued

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
3. Conflict analysis

3.1. Key elements of conflict analysis

Learning objectives

This session intends to

- Introduce and generate increased understanding of concepts and elements of conflict analysis, including root causes, stakeholders and dynamics;
- Make participants familiar with conflict cases, such as Sri Lanka;
- Reflect on the method.



2. Working groups: Identify the root causes of the conflict and key actors (45')

Ask participants to form 3 groups: 1 based on prepared case study (i.e. Sri Lanka), 2 case studies by participants.

Explain rationale of the "Identify the root causes of the conflict and key actors" exercise:

Rationale: Identify "conflict causes, key actors, dynamics"

Working group members should jointly work through their case studies on the basis of the material provided, or personal experience. Key questions should be taken from Handout A and inspiration from the conflict-tree tool. Optionally, aspects of the EC checklist could be applied to the cases. Only root causes, key actors and dynamics jointly identified through using the questions and tools presented in the group shall be elaborated.

Distribute and explain Handout 3.1.1: "Instruments and questions for causes, stakeholders/actors, dynamics"

Distribute and explain Handout 3.1.2: "European Commission checklist for root causes of conflict" (*optional*)

Distribute and explain Handout: Case study (i.e. Sri Lanka)

Present key question: "Which are the key causes, actors and dynamics relevant for the conflict case you are working on?"

Select a rapporteur/facilitator, who is asked to organise and systematise the joint brainstorming on the cases including key causes, actors and dynamics in the working groups.

3. Presentations and wrap-up (20')

Ask the working group rapporteurs to share their key insights in short summaries of 3-5 minutes.

Add key insights to the list of conflict causes, stakeholders/actors and dynamics.

Visualise conclusions in relation to fields of applicability of the method and practical challenges.

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Structure

1. Causes and dynamics of violent conflict
2. Conflict analysis in practice

2



Diversity of conflict causes

Structural factors

- Create a potential climate for violent conflict without making its eruption inevitable
- Must be viewed on a long-term horizon
- Include e.g. population density, the level and distribution of wealth and opportunity, the state of the resource base, the structure and ethnic make-up of society, and the history of inter-group relations

3



Diversity of conflict causes

Accelerating or triggering factors

- Accelerating or triggering factors are the events, actions and decisions which result in the escalation of disputes into violent conflict
- Examples range from economic decline, loss of livelihoods, changes in the degree of internal state cohesion, shifts in internal control of the central authority, to shipments of (small) arms to external state interventions

4



Notes

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Phases and dynamics of conflict

Four phases of conflict

- Situations of submerged tensions
- Situations of rising tensions
- Eruption phases of open confrontation and violent conflict
- Fragile transitional and post-conflict situations

Conflict trap

- Countries which have achieved a substantial settlement or cease-fires are highly likely to return to conflict within 5-10 years (Collier and Hoeffler 2002)

5



The term 'conflict trap' refers to Centre for African Economic Studies, 2003: "Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies," Working Paper. Published in the *European Economic Review*, 48 (2004), pp. 1125-1145.

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) use country as a unit; they define recurrence as the appearance of *any conflict* in country x if that country previously has experienced a conflict within the 1945-1999 timeframe of their data set.

Conflict causes and dynamics affect development cooperation

- Widening socio-economic disparities
- The exploitation of ethnic and other differences
- Resource-based conflicts
- The legacy of violence as a conflict trap
- Democratic deficiency in managing transition and change

6



Many root causes responsible for inhibiting just social development and the reduction of poverty in development countries overlap with root causes for socio-political (violent) conflicts in development countries.

In most conflict countries, widening social disparities have existed for a long time and continue to be one root cause of latent or manifest violence. This has been the case in, for example, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Colombia and Afghanistan. Many times these social cleavages run between urban and rural populations, and overlap with constructed – and sometimes politically manipulated – ethno-political identities.

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Typical root causes, inhibiting both, sustainable social development and the development of less violence-prone political processes between key stakeholders in a conflict situation, can be found in the unclear way the legacy of violence is dealt with (i.e. followers of the Frelimo and Renamo parties in Mozambique, or Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots), as well as in dysfunctional or manipulated democratic institutions and procedures, which promote a political culture of "the winner takes all", such as in Sri Lanka or in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

Conflict analysis

- Conflict analysis is one of the most prominent conceptual instruments for development agencies and peacebuilding organisations
- Conflict analyses should not be expected to deliver 'objective' results or a single 'truth'. They are based on perceptions and can depict the dynamics of a conflict system to some extent
- Every analysis should start with an assessment of what constitutes the conflict system, and what is not part of it
- The entire analysis should be based on local perceptions, and the definition of the boundaries of the system should be mainly decided by internal actors.

7



Concepts for conflict analysis

- Frequently used concepts for conflict analysis include the *Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA)* by DFID, 2002; the *Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Implementation* framework by GTZ/FES, 2004; the *Conflict Analysis Manual* by SIDA, 2006; and the *EC Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict*, 2002
- Conflict analysis tools differ conceptually with respect to their purpose, underlying assumptions, methodology, resource implications, and availability
- Main differences:
 - The DFID-SCA approach mainly targets the country and regional level and aims to combine political and economic dimensions
 - The GTZ instrument mainly targets the country and project level and aims to be as broad in the scope of methodologies applied as possible
 - The EC checklist for root causes of conflict/early warning indicators aims at raising awareness and ensuring sensitivity of policies

8



For a comprehensive overview of the various different instruments, see IA, Fewer et al., 2004: *Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment*, chapter 2.

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Tools for conflict analysis

Working definition conflict analysis:

Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the profile (context), causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict. It helps development, humanitarian and peacebuilding organisations to gain a better understanding of the context in which they work and their role in that context (see IA, Fewer et al., 2004)

9



All above-mentioned comprehensive concepts developed by development agencies take a core number of factors into account for analysing conflict situations. They may emphasise different elements to different degrees, but all aim at capturing perceptions of conflict causes, actors, and dynamics of a conflict. And they include instruments/tools, which allow for a better understanding of the relationship of these factors to a particular conflict context and the role of a particular organisation in such a situation. Three key conflict analysis tools will be introduced and one or two will be applied to specific conflict cases.

Tools for analysing conflict

1. Underlying causes of conflict, i.e. 'conflict tree'
2. Conflict dynamics, i.e. listing of triggering factors/trend scenarios
3. Stakeholder/actor relations, i.e. conflict mapping


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The analysis of triggering factors and conflict mapping will be applied to your own cases or to cases provided during the following exercises. The 'Conflict Tree' will be introduced subsequently. For all instruments, the discussion, systematisation of relevant factors, and the visualisation of different perceptions in groups is crucial.

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A 'conflict' or 'problem tree' is often used as an entry point for joint analysis and planning. It aims at identifying a core problem to which causes and consequences are then attributed. This allows for the discussion and documentation of the causes and impacts of the conflict. The central idea is to ensure that the core problem is correctly identified and, if necessary, to make changes to the conflict tree in the process. It is well possible that one issue (such as poverty, or dysfunctional democratic institutions and procedures) will be identified as both a cause and an effect of a particular conflict. Adopted by Wolfram Zunker from: Fisher, Simon et al., 2000: *Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action*. London.

The example of Aceh pertains to a situation prior to the Peace Talks in 2005 and does not claim to give an exhaustive list of conflict causes and results.

Further reading: Leonhard, Manuela, 2001: *Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Control – A Practical Guide*, version 2 (revised) for GTZ Eschborn.

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HANDOUT 3.1.1: "INSTRUMENTS AND QUESTIONS FOR CAUSES, STAKEHOLDERS/ACTORS, DYNAMICS"

Instruments for assessing conflict

Key questions for conflict analysis: Causes

- What are the structural causes of conflict?
- What issues can be considered as proximate causes of conflict?
- What triggers could contribute to the outbreak/ further escalation of conflict?
- What new factors contribute to prolonging conflict dynamics?
- What factors can contribute to peace?

Possible tools: Conflict layer models, problem tree



Instruments for assessing conflict

Key questions for conflict analysis: Stakeholders/actors

- Who are the main actors?
- What are their interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships?
- What capacities for peace can be identified?
- What actors can be identified as spoilers? Why? Are they inadvertent or intentional spoilers?

Possible tools: Conflict mapping; needs, interests and positions analysis



Instruments for assessing conflict

Key questions for conflict analysis: Dynamics

- What are current conflict trends?
- What windows of opportunity exist?
- What scenarios can be developed from the analysis of the conflict profile, causes and actors?

Possible tools: Tables with triggers/indicators, trend scenarios



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HANDOUT 3.1.2: EUROPEAN COMMISSION CHECKLIST FOR ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT

1. Legitimacy of the state

Are there proper checks and balances in the political system?

Respect of the constitution, ability of the parliament and the judiciary to check on the executive, devolution of powers and ability of regional authorities (if any) to counterbalance central power...

How inclusive is the political/administrative power?

Ethnic and religious representativeness of the government, equality of access to political activity, participative decision-making, fair recruitment in the administration and other public institutions...

What is the overall level of respect for national authorities?

Historical resentments against state authority, existence of independence movements, parties advocating extreme solutions (revolutionary or reactionary) to perceived shortcomings, perceived ability of the state to answer people's needs

Is corruption widespread?

Overall level of corruption, existence of anti-corruption programmes, widespread bribery in bureaucracies, collusion between private sector and civil servants

2. Rule of law

How strong is the judicial system?

Independence and effectiveness of the judiciary, equality of all citizens before the law, effective possibility of undertaking legal action against state decisions, enforcement of legal decisions

Does unlawful state violence exist?

Participation of security forces in illegal activities (road blocks, extortion, others), effective prosecution of human rights abuses by security forces, existence of a minimal human rights framework for their operation, prison conditions

Does civilian power control security forces?

Influence of security forces over political decision-making, role of the parliament in debating/checking their use, existence of open debate and media/academic scrutiny of the security sector

Does organised crime undermine the country's stability?

Control of a significant part of the country/economy by criminal networks (drugs, natural resources, human trafficking), existence of private armies or armed paramilitary groups acting with impunity, proper re-integration of former combatants into social life

3. Respect for fundamental rights

Are civil and political freedoms respected?

Respect of right to vote/eligibility, protection of civil liberties including freedom of speech and of assembly, free and fair elections respecting the rights of the opposition

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Are religious and cultural rights respected?

Punition by law of religious, ethnic or cultural discrimination, recognition of minority languages e.g. in education, definition of the state with no reference to a dominant religious/cultural identity

Are other basic human rights respected?

Prosecution of human rights violations (torture, illegal detention), gender equality, freedom of private practices (dress codes, private life, etc.), adherence to and implementation of commitments under international human rights treaties and conventions, effective operation of human rights monitoring by NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and/or international organisations

4. Civil society and media**Can civil society operate freely and efficiently?**

Protection of NGOs and right of association by the state, liveliness of civil society, access to staff, training, resources and others, ability to influence policy processes and solve tensions between communities

How independent and professional are the media?

Censorship by government, independence of the media from partisan agendas and political or private interests, ability to reflect the views of all social groups, access of journalists to professional training

5. Relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms**How good are relations between identity groups?**

Ability of major identity groups to mix together, frequency of outbursts of racial/religious violence, perpetuation of negative stereotypes or mutual suspicions by collective memory and culture, existence and effectiveness of reconciliation mechanisms (e.g. justice commissions)

Does the state arbitrate over tensions and disputes between communities?

Existence and effectiveness of mechanisms arbitrating between conflicting parties (wisemen, elders, ombudsmen), political manipulation of ethnic/identity differences, existence of regional fora for conflict prevention/resolution

Are there uncontrolled flows of migrants/refugees?

Social friction between migrant and host communities (e.g. adverse pressure on food, water, etc.), respect for basic rights of migrants/refugees, impact of migration flows on ethnic/identity balance of host regions

6. Sound economic management**How robust is the economy?**

Income dependency on a limited number of sectors (e.g. one single agricultural product or industry or remittance), capacity to react to natural disasters or international conditions (for instance, massive swings in commodity prices)

Is policy framework conducive to macro-economic stability?

Stability of main macro-economic fundamentals (inflation, public deficit, current accounts), ability to attract investment (both domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI)), implementation of policies negotiated with international financial institutions (IFIs)

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How sustainable is the state's environmental policy?

Fairness of management of natural resources (e.g. water), anticipation of possible internal or external conflicts over natural resources, risk of serious environmental degradation (for instance, desertification) forcing people into exile or threatening traditional ways of life

7. Social and regional inequalities

How are social welfare policies addressed?

Overall level of literacy, health, sanitation, development of safety nets and income policies (or, by default, existence of alternative social mechanisms ensuring local or family solidarity), correct anticipation of massive demographic changes by public policies (especially urbanisation and youth unemployment)

How are social inequalities tackled?

Trend regarding poverty and marginalisation (especially in absolute terms), vulnerability of least-favoured segments of society, fairness of access to education, health care, jobs, economic opportunities (including women and minorities), existence of public policies addressing inequalities among communities through land reform, quota systems, social programmes or others

How are regional disparities tackled?

Urban/rural gaps, existence of regions lagging behind in terms of economic development or particularly affected by lack of vital resources, redistributive policies between regions

8. Geopolitical situation

How stable is the region's geopolitical situation?

Relations with the country's neighbours, pending border issues, dependency of the country on unstable neighbours for vital assets (e.g. access to sea or water), effectiveness of regional conflict-resolution mechanisms

Is the state affected by external threats?

Destabilising policies of outside forces, existence of pro-active ethnic communities/diaspora abroad, ability to control arms trafficking

Is the state affecting regional stability?

Support to militias or rebel groups operating on neighbouring territories, protection of war criminals or rebel groups from neighbouring states, exploitation of the country's natural resources for foreign policy purposes, presence of illicit international activities on the country's territory

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Reference list conflict analysis tools

Conflict tree

A conflict or problem tree aims to identify a core problem to which causes and consequences are then attributed. It is often used as an entry point for joint analysis and planning, which allows for a discussion and visual documentation of the causes and impacts of the conflict. The most interesting usage is to take it as a visual and analytical guide for developing a correctly identified core problem of a conflict situation jointly in a group. It can be used to enter into a process of clarifying root causes, effects and develop a joint understanding of the core problem both with conflict outsiders and conflict insiders.

Further reading: Fisher, Simon et al., (2000): *Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action*, London; Leonhard, Manuela (2001): *Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Control – A Practical Guide, Version 2 (revised)* for GTZ Eschborn.

Listing of triggering factors, trends and dynamics

Based on already identified root causes and core problems (i.e. with a conflict tree), currently visible triggers and trends, which could contribute to the further escalation of conflict (i.e. arrest or death of a key leader; rapid price increase for basic commodities etc.) or contribute to peace dynamics (i.e. opposing parties start substantial talks, demobilisation process, fair elections etc.), can be identified and related to each other in a table matrix. This is an interesting tool as it allows speculating about likely conflict trends and "windows of opportunity". It can be used to analyse important factors which will be likely to influence the course of the conflict as well as to create a common understanding about conflict and peace trends within a group of conflict insiders and/or outsiders. Extended into a medium term perspective and supplemented by more systematic information gathering, it can, for example, be used to create 2-3 different scenarios to predict likely developments and use these scenarios as a basis for planning.

Further Reading: Leonhard, Manuela (2001): *Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Control – A Practical Guide, Version 2 (revised)* for GTZ Eschborn; Mischnick, Ruth (2007): *Nonviolent Conflict Transformation Training Manual (KURVE Wustrow et al.)*.

Conflict mapping

Conflict mapping helps to clarify a situation by giving you an understanding of the relevant stakeholders, their roles, and relationships as well as identifying the central conflict issues and dynamics. By putting actors and their relationships centre stage and being able to "zoom in or zoom out" regarding the different actor networks on different levels, it's a very powerful analysis and visualization tool both for outsiders and conflict insiders. It is mainly used to clarify situations, but it also helps to identify entry points and communication gaps in the social fabric of key stakeholders.

Further reading: Fisher, Simon et al., (2000): *Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action*, London.

Stakeholder mapping

Stakeholder mapping helps to identify and situate key stakeholders at the various levels of the conflict by using a three-level pyramid for analysing a society and key political actors. It helps to analyse who the pro-peace actors in a given conflict system are, to find entry points and also to plan peace building and conflict sensitive development activities tailored to the situation. It is a highly interesting tool as it sensitises participants to the intricacies of moving from an external view of analysing conflict situations to the realm and challenges of planning constructive conflict interventions. It can be used to develop skills in stakeholder-analysis, in identifying communication gaps on the horizontal and vertical levels, and for contributing to a conflict-sensitive conceptualising of development and peace-building activities.

Further Reading: John Paul Lederach: *Building Peace. Sustainable Development in Divided Societies*. Paper submitted to UN University, Tokyo, November 1994; Ropers, Norbert (2002): *Friedensentwicklung, Krisenprävention und Konfliktbearbeitung*, GTZ Eschborn; Fisher, Simon et al., (2000): *Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action*, London.

3.2 Conflict Analysis Exercise








Joint analysis and mapping of conflict cases

Learning objectives

This exercise will enable participants to

- Reflect on the causes, dynamics, actors/stakeholders and relationships in a conflict area;
- Recognise the importance of different perspectives on the conflict, both with respect to the region of application and to working-group dynamics;
- Become aware of the potential and short-comings of the conflict mapping instrument.

HANDOUT 3.2.1: ELEMENTS FOR CONFLICT MAPPING

A line between two actors represents a link and/or cooperation		Double connecting lines represent an alliance or community of interests	
Arrows indicate the predominant direction of influence or activity		Dotted lines represent an informal link between two actors	
Zigzag or wavy lines with a thunderbolt symbol represent a violent or very severe conflict between two actors		Zigzag or wavy lines represent a conflict or severe differences between two parties	
A line with two lines cross-cutting indicates a broken link/relationship			

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Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
15'	Introduction to identifying pro-peace stakeholders/actors and planning peacebuilding activities	Handout 3.3.1: "Lederach pyramid"
30'	Exercise/group work	
45'	Presentation of working group results (3 x 15 minutes - including results from prior conflict mapping exercise)	
1.30'	Total	

Materials

Exercise based on prior conflict mappings (Sri Lanka, East Timor, country N.N. by participants)

Handout 3.3.1: "Lederach pyramid"

Instructions

1. Procedure and guiding questions for identification of pro-peace actors and planning peacebuilding activities
 - a) Introduce Handout 3.3.1: "Lederach Pyramid" and show boards with prepared large-scale pyramids for each working group
 - b) Ask participants to refer to the existing conflict case mappings in the working groups. Give answers to the following questions and write these in a few words onto cards and pin them on the appropriate side and at the appropriate level of the prepared Lederach pyramid on the pinboards:
 - What pro-peace stakeholders/actors exist, and what are they currently doing?
 - Which further pro-peace stakeholders/actors exist, and what could be their additional activities (projects/programmes)?
 - c) Ask whether anyone has any questions regarding method or procedure.

2. Procedure and guiding questions for presentation of findings

Ask the two participants of each group identified beforehand to report from the first round of working groups on conflict mapping to the plenary. They should present their group's conflict mapping specifying the underlying causes, dynamics and major historical events of the conflict.

The main question is: What were the major findings of the joint conflict analysis/mappings, and what were the underlying key issues of the group discussions in coming to these conclusions?

Ask two more participants from each group identified beforehand to report from the second round of working groups on conflict-sensitive planning and to present their main findings. They should present the major results of the group's deliberations and visualisation.

>>> continued

3.3 Stakeholder analysis and peacebuilding planning

Learning objectives

This exercise will enable participants to

- Become sensitised to the intricacies of moving from an external view of analysing conflict situations to the realm and challenges of planning constructive conflict interventions;
- Develop skills in stakeholder analysis and conflict-sensitive conceptualisation of development and peacebuilding activities;
- Develop awareness of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding potentials when planning projects and programmes;
- Introduce a comparative perspective on the findings of all three groups, and reflect on the usefulness of the tools for specific circumstances.


HANDOUT 3.3.1: LEDERACH PYRAMID

ACTORS

High leadership level:
Civil and military elites

Middle leadership level:
Functional elites in economy, administration, education, culture, churches/religion, media and larger NGOs

Grassroots level:
Local leaders, priests/religious representatives, teachers, women's organisations, smaller NGOs



PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES

High-level negotiations, conferences, mediation, informal dialogue/workshops, promotion of non-violent strategies, clarifying responsibilities

Informal dialogue/workshops, cooperative activities, round tables and peace commissions, training courses for constructive conflict transformation, bridge-building, monitoring, development cooperation projects

Humanitarian aid, development cooperation projects, psychosocial work on experiences of violence, peace gatherings, dialogue work in education, culture and religion

Source: Revised on the basis of John Paul Lederach, 1994: "Building Peace. Sustainable Development in Divided Societies." Paper submitted to UN University, Tokyo, November, p. 16

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
5'	Introduction/Reconnecting with yesterday's results (planning of peacebuilding activities)	
30'	Input and discussion on conflict-sensitive planning (Do No Harm) and impact assessment	Presentation "Conflict-sensitive planning (Do No Harm) and impact assessment"
5'	Introduction to Do No Harm indicators	Handout 4.1: Indicators for assessing the impact of aid on conflict
10'	Introduction to activity impact mapping exercise/ group work	Handout 4.2: Activity-impact mapping matrix
30'	Exercise/group work	
25'	Presentation and discussion of findings	
1.45'	Total	

Materials

Exercise based on prior conflict, stakeholder and activities mappings (Colombia, Sri Lanka, East Timor, country N.N. by participants)

Handout 4.1: Indicators for assessing the impact of aid on conflict

Handout 4.2: Activity-impact mapping matrix

Instructions

- Use the presentation to deepen understanding of Do No Harm methodology and outlook on other approaches and tools (Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA))
 - Introduce Handout 4.1: Indicators for assessing the impact of aid on conflict
Explain with short examples the usefulness of questions and relate them to the following tool, the activity-impact matrix
- Procedure and guiding questions for working with the activity-impact mapping matrix
 - Introduce Handout B: Activity-impact mapping matrix and show pinboards with prepared large-scale impact mapping matrixes for each working group.
 - Copy the three major peacebuilding activities identified in the basic activity planning exercise and insert them into the lefthand column according to the country case you are working on.
 - Discuss and identify the likely impact of the proposed peacebuilding activity on the main stakeholders, conflict causes (issues and dynamics) as identified in the conflict mapping and planning exercises. Insert 1-2 cards with a few key words characterising the likely impact into the respective table-cell.
 - Read the identified impacts of the proposed peacebuilding activity horizontally. Reflect jointly what the possible negative consequences of this activity are and if/how they would need to be addressed. Insert 1-2 cards with a few key words in the 4th column.

>>> continued

4. Conflict-sensitive planning and impact assessment

"Do No Harm" indicators and activity impact mapping

Learning objectives

This exercise shall enable participants to

- Develop skills in conflict-sensitive conceptualising of development and peacebuilding activities, and in ex-ante impact assessment;
- Deepen awareness of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding potentials when planning projects and programmes;
- Reflect on the usefulness of the tools for specific circumstances.

Conflict-sensitive planning (Do No Harm) and impact assessment

OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and
Development Co-operation (CPDC)

Training module on Conflict Prevention and
Peacebuilding




Key questions for sensitive planning and evaluation

- How does the conflict affect us?
- How do we effect the conflict?



Conflict-sensitive approaches for practice: Do No Harm framework



3



Adopted from Mary B. Anderson, 1999: *Do No Harm – How Aid can support Peace – or War*, Boulder, p. 74 as in GATTIKER, Regula (2005). Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity in International Cooperation: A Local Example. Testing Ecumenical Humanitarian Organisation, Vojvodina (Serbia & Montenegro). Bern, Short Version, p. 46. Accessed July, 2006, www.swisspeace.org/koff/uploads/nl/35/gattiker.pdf#search=%22gattiker%20heks%20sensitivity%22

Conflict-sensitive approaches for programme/project practice

Six-step Do No Harm approach:

1. Context of conflict/conflict analysis
2. Tensions/dividers analysis (capacities for war)
3. Connectors analysis (local capacities for peace)
4. Project operation practice – How does the project operate?
5. Matching project against dividers/connectors (implicit ethical messages and resource transfers)
6. Redesign of project vis-à-vis both dividers and connectors

4



Notes

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Tensions/dividers analysis (capacities for war)

Definition:

Dividers are the obvious tensions and divisions or war interests in conflict situations

Main categories:

1. Systems and institutions
2. Attitudes and actions
3. Different values and interests
4. Different experiences
5. Symbols and occasions

5



Connectors analysis (local capacities for peace)

Defintion:

In the midst of warfare, there are a whole series of things that connect people who are fighting. These are called 'connectors'.

Main categories:

1. Systems and institutions
2. Attitudes and actions
3. Shared values and interests
4. Common experiences
5. Symbols and occasions

6



Resource transfers

Defintion:

- All aid programmes involve the transfer of a certain amount of resources into a resource-scarce environment of conflict
- These become part and parcel of the conflict, frequently changing the balance of power in the community.

The five key mechanisms:

1. Theft and allocation effects
2. Market effects
3. Distributional effects
4. Substitution effects
5. Legitimation/de-legitimation effects

7



Notes

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Theft and allocation effects - Diversion of resources

for example, by armed movements or army members stealing food, technical equipment, vehicles, etc. for using themselves or for funding war efforts.

Market effects - Distortion of the local economy/aid can feed war economies

"In Bosnia and Herzegovina, immediately after the Dayton Peace Agreement, drivers who had crisscrossed the country to deliver food and supplies to civilians under fire talked of their uncertainties once the convoys stopped. Which of them would be retained as drivers of the reduced number of NGO vehicles? How could they use their wartime experience to find peacetime jobs? One driver said, 'Driving the aid convoys during the war was dangerous, but this seems like nothing next to the dangers of peace. Not only my immediate family but also my grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins depend on my income. I almost dread this peace and wish for war again'." Mary B. Anderson, 1999, p. 43.

Distributional effects - Control of resources

"When an aid agency initiated a program of postwar housing reconstruction in Tajikistan, it targeted its program toward those who had suffered the most damage. This group, the Garmi, had also lost the war. (This is often the case – i.e. that aid assistance focused on those who suffered the most will most often reach those who lost the conflict). The Kulyabi who had won resented the fact that the international aid community was restrengthening the 'enemy' whom they had defeated. They saw this as a political rather than a humanitarian act." Mary B. Anderson, 1999, p. 46.

Substitution effects - Undermining local production and creating dependency syndrome

Legitimation/de-legitimation effects - Manipulation of persons and groups

"Some aid staff working in southern Sudan report that Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) – a system for negotiation established by aid agencies to ensure equal and unimpeded access to all civilian populations – has become a 'legitimizing' force in that region. Aspiring commanders have sometimes used negotiations with OLS to gain approval as legitimate wielders of power over certain populations or regions. When aid agencies have tried to avoid dealing with armed factions (...) they have become targets for theft and threats, and the intended aid recipients have sometimes been attacked." Mary B. Anderson, 1999, p. 51.

Implicit ethical messages

Definition:

While the intended message of aid is one of solidarity, the unintended messages from the attitudes, conducts and relationships of aid workers often reinforce violent conflict.

Seven types of negative implicit ethical messages:

1. Arms and power
2. Disrespect, mistrust among aid agencies
3. Aid workers and impunity
4. Different values for different lives and items
5. Powerlessness
6. Belligerent attitude
7. Publicity

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Arms and power – Acceptance of the terms of war

Example: Hiring armed guards to protect aid goods.

Disrespect, mistrust – Competition among aid agencies

Implicit message: "We do not need to respect people with whom we disagree".

Aid Workers and impunity – Waste of resources

Implicit message of extreme private parties: "If one has control over resources, one can use them for personal purposes and pleasure".

Different values for different lives and items – Undermining normal, peacetime values

Different salary levels, transportation means, evacuation plans carry the implicit message: "Inequality".

Powerlessness – Not taking responsibility for own actions

"It is the fault of my headquarters, of the evil warlord, etc."

Belligerent attitude – Tension, suspicion

Expecting the worst in others when, for example, approaching a checkpoint (self-fulfilling prophecy effect).


Publicity – Unbalanced reporting

Using gruesome pictures to elicit public sympathy and funds.

Outlook conflict-sensitivity and impact assessment for peacebuilding

- Activity-impact mapping
- Peace and conflict impact assessment:
 - Key methodology
 - Current debates on methode and approach

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HANDOUT 4.1: INDICATORS FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF AID ON CONFLICT

1. Relying on the categories of negative impacts of aid established through the LCPP (the Local Capacities for Peace Project), we are able to identify the following indicators of whether aid is having a negative (worsening) impact on conflict. The following questions constitute the

Indicators of negative impacts [A 'yes' answer indicates a negative impact]:

- Are aid goods stolen, especially by those connected directly to a warring side?
- What are the market impacts of aid in the given area?
 - Specifically:
 - Are prices of goods connected to the war economy rising?
 - Are incentives for engaging in the war economy rising?
 - Are prices of goods connected to the peacetime economy falling?
 - Are incentives for engaging in peacetime economic activities falling?
- Is aid provided in ways that benefit one or more sub-groups over others? Does the aid agency employ people more from one group than others? Do material goods go more to one group than others?
- Is aid providing a sufficiently significant amount of material to meet civilian needs so that:
 - More local goods are freed up to be used in warfare/by armies?
 - Local leaders take little or no responsibility for civilian welfare? (What are the manifestations of this?)
- Is aid being given in ways that 'legitimise' war-related individuals (giving them more power, prestige or access to international attention or wealth)? Is aid being given in ways that legitimise the actions of war (for example, reinforcing patterns of population movements that warriors are causing; linking to divisions in the society thus reinforcing them)? Is aid being given in ways that legitimise war-supporting attitudes (for example, rewarding those who are most violent; being given separately to all groups in assumption that they cannot work together)?
- Does the aid agency rely on arms to protect its goods and/or workers?
- Does the aid agency refuse to cooperate or share information and planning functions with other aid agencies, local government or local NGOs? Does it openly criticise the ways that others provide aid and encourage local people to avoid working with other agencies?
- Do field staff separate themselves from the local people with whom they are working and do they frequently use aid goods, or the power they derive from them, for their personal benefit or pleasure?
- Does the aid agency apportion its institutional benefits (salaries or *per diem* scales; equipment such as cars, phones, offices; expectations of time commitments to the job; rewards for work done; vacation, R & R, evacuation plans) in ways that favour one identifiable group of workers more than others?
- Do the aid staff express discouragement and powerlessness in relation to their staff superiors, home offices or donors? Do they express disrespect for these people but often cite them as the reason why something is "impossible"?
- Are aid staff frightened and tense? Do they express hatred, mistrust, or suspicion for local people (specific local people)? Do they frequently engage their local staff counterparts in

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conversation about violence, war experiences, the terrible things they have experienced (thus reinforcing the sense that these are the things that matter)? Does the agency promote or in other ways exceptionally reward staff members who have served in more violent places/situations?

- Does the aid agency's publicity and/or fundraising approach demonise one side of the war? Does it treat one group as always 'victimised' by the other?

In addition to deciding if an aid agency's programme deserves a 'yes' answer to the above questions, people involved in these implementation pilot projects must also assess the degree to which any of these actions, attitudes or situations actually matters in the given context.

The question to ask in this regard is: Does it directly relate to events that are effected by or caused by aid?

2. Again, following what LCPP has learned about connectors and local capacities for peace, the following represent the questions that reflect the

Indicators of positive impacts of aid on conflict (i.e. lessening tensions and/or supporting local capacities for peace):

- Has the aid agency actively sought to identify things in the conflict area that cross the boundaries and connect people on different sides? Has it designed its programme to relate to these connectors?
- Is the aid delivered in ways that reinforce a local sense of inclusiveness and intergroup fairness? Are programmes designed to bring people together? Are they designed so that for any group to gain, all groups must gain?
- Is the aid delivered in ways that reinforce, rather than undermine, attitudes of acceptance, understanding and empathy between groups?
- Is the aid delivered in ways that provide opportunities for people to act and speak in non-war ways? Does the agency provide opportunities for its local staff to cross lines and work with people from the 'other' side?
- Does the aid respect and reinforce local leaders as they take on responsibility for civilian governance? Does it provide rewards for individuals, groups and communities that take inter-group or peace-reinforcing initiatives?
- Do aid agency staff reinforce the attitudes of their friends and counterparts as they remember, or reassert, sympathy and respect for other groups?

Again, in addition to answering these questions with a 'yes', those involved in the implementation pilot projects must try to assess the significance of these actions in relation to the conflict, or its mitigation. The Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP), as a whole, will be engaged in refining ways to make this assessment in different settings and circumstances.

Adopted from: www.cdainc.com/dnh/archives/2001/07/indications_for_assessing_aids_impacts_on_conflict.php

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HANDOUT 4.2: ACTIVITY IMPACT-MAPPING MATRIX

Activities	Impact on stakeholder/actors	Impact on conflict causes (issues, dynamics)	Negative effects of this activity to be addressed	Recommended activity
Group A (Zimbabwe)				
Activity 1				
Activity 2				
Activity 3				

Activities	Impact on stakeholder/actors	Impact on conflict causes (issues, dynamics)	Negative effects of this activity to be addressed	Recommended activity
Group B (East Timor)				
Activity 1				
Activity 2				
Activity 3				

Activities	Impact on stakeholder/actors	Impact on conflict causes (issues, dynamics)	Negative effects of this activity to be addressed	Recommended activity
Group C (Case chosen by participants)				
Activity 1				
Activity 2				
Activity 3				

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Total duration: 4 hours

Time	Activity	Materials
30'	Introduction to the exercise, reading of material (Handouts 5.1-5.4), allocation of roles	Handouts 5.1-5.4
30'	First plenary session: Opening statements by the facilitator and all participants; discussion of agenda and expected outcomes of the meeting. The facilitator proposes a round of informal consultations and presents 2-3 basic questions for the delegations to consider.	Flipchart
45'	Round of consultations: The delegations discuss their response to the facilitator's questions. They consult informally <i>within</i> and <i>between</i> delegations.	
15'	BREAK	
60'	Second plenary session: The facilitator recalls the questions and asks delegations to respond, suggesting ways forward. The delegations speak, and the facilitator attempts to work towards a concept note that will have broad support. The facilitator presents the key elements of the concept note.	Flipchart or pinboard
15'	BREAK	
45'	Debriefing	
240'	Total	

Materials

Handout 5.1: Post-conflict needs assessment

Handout 5.2: Scenario

Handout 5.3: Role information

Handout 5.4: Breaking news

Handout 5.5: Instructions for observers

Instructions for controllers

Please read the **Instructions for participants** to familiarise yourself with the rules of the simulation exercise from the participants' perspective. The instructions here are intended to help you run a simulation exercise, even if you have never done so before. Because simulation exercises are inherently dynamic, you must be very flexible in controlling it. We will mention here some of the problems you may encounter, and try to suggest solutions, but our own experience has shown that simulation exercises are very much like the real world: they are unpredictable, and to make a success of them, you need to be flexible.

There are two polar issues you may well run into during a simulation exercise:

Over-enthusiasm

Players often take their roles to heart, and invest emotionally in them – particularly if the situation is one that replicates their real-life problems. Serious disagreements can result, sometimes

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5. Simulation exercise: Post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA)

Learning objectives

In this exercise, participants acquaint themselves with

- The realities of post-conflict recovery planning;
- The complexities of applying conflict analysis and conflict prevention and peacebuilding principles;
- The roles of different actors in negotiating post-conflict recovery.

Instructions for participants

A 'simulation exercise' is a teaching device intended to provide you with the opportunity to use the material from a course in a simulated environment. The exercise is guided by a **controller** who will issue instructions to the participants, control inputs from the players and the audience, and ensure the rules are kept. The trainer will also appoint one or more **observers** who will comment on and summarise the major points of the exercise and relate them to the themes of the course. The observers do not interact with the players and do not play a role. The players are the central element of the simulation. They are the participants of the course who are assigned a particular **role** within the exercise.

The simulation is divided into **time segments** which are started and ended by an announcement by the controller.

Process

The controller will provide the players with a set of documents. These consist of:

1. **Background** documents, known to all participants including observers (non-participants).
2. **Information about each role**, i.e. information about the position and interests of each institution and its representative.
3. **Special instructions**, e.g. guiding questions for observers.

Players determine their behaviour based on an individual mix of public and private role data. This provides 'real-world' dynamics to the simulation.

The players and the observers have a certain period of time to prepare in which they read the background and public role data, and (for the players) the private role data.

The game starts when the players present their arguments, discuss the issues, and negotiate with one another.

The controller calls **time-out**, for one of the following reasons:

- To allow a discussion, with the observers, of the events that happened during the previous segment of the exercise.
- To allow various combinations of players to negotiate deals in private (e.g. members of a coalition, political allies, workgroups).

because of relationships or ideologies that exist outside the framework of the exercise. In such a case, your job as the game **controller** is to keep the players on an even keel. Remind them that:

- This is a **simulation** and not real life.
- Our objective here is to simulate real life **so as to learn the principles** of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
- We need to approach the events here with a **sense of humour and proportion**.
- You can also use such tensions creatively (e.g. speaking to the audience and the players during a time-out): "As you have seen, Ms Jones and Mr Brown had serious difficulties with one another in dealing with this problem. This reflects a real issue in post-conflict peacebuilding: when two people from different backgrounds deal with the same issue, clashes can occur because of their backgrounds and not necessarily because of the issue ...").

"Drying-up"

In a few cases, a particular combination of players might find it difficult to express their roles or to exploit the negotiating potential of the events, and the game might end early with little dynamism.

In such a case, you, the game **controller**, have three options:

1. Insert additional data. This can be:
 - Public data (such as, for example: "Press reports appear stating that the family company of a leading government member is monopolising the construction of large water infrastructure, an issue the government has been advocating for").
 - A more interesting effect can be produced by providing one or more players with additional private role data. For example, an opposition member agrees to advocate the interests of a foreign oil company.
2. Turn to another phase of the game (e.g. "Now, let's see the effects of these deliberations on justice and reconciliation three months down the line").
3. Terminate the game and discuss the principles of conflict-sensitive development and reconstruction that have become overt through that part of the game that has already been played.

Other problems you may encounter:

1. Some participants may think simulation childish. It is useful to remind them that this is a recognised and valuable training tool which allows them to understand the principles of conflict-sensitive development **dynamically**.
2. Trainees may complain that they have insufficient information to play the role properly. Consider their comments, and during a time-out, you can add details that you feel may be necessary.
3. Individual **players** may be **reluctant** to participate, in a form of stage fright. This usually disappears during the process of the game. If someone is seriously stressed by the role, chose someone else, or – if absolutely necessary – play the role yourself, to ensure other roles have an interlocutor.
4. Players sometimes go outside the rules, introducing variables over which you have no control. Make sure players know this is possible **but changes must be accepted by you first**. Make sure the proposed change fits the learning objectives of the game, and the parameters you have set.

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- To move to another phase/time of the game (e.g.: "Time has now moved on three months, and we are now in the implementation phase after the donor conference").
- The exercise is resumed or terminated.

'Lessons learned' are discussed by the players and the observers, and the controller comments.

The controller may provide additional documents (of any of the three sorts) at any time.

Non-players should follow the action closely and consider:

- How does the process of the simulation exercise diverge from the theoretical procedures we have discussed during the course?
- What are the weaknesses (and strengths) of post-conflict reconstruction processes when these processes play out in reality?

Outcome

There is no 'correct' or 'incorrect' outcome; nor are there winners or losers. The objective of the simulation exercise is to be instructive, realistic, interesting and entertaining. For educational purposes, it is desirable that the debate is functional, but it is not necessary that it is perfect. Confusion, divisions, irrelevancies, mistakes and inappropriate behaviour (within reason!) can help to make the simulation life-like, challenging and enjoyable.

How to play

- This simulation exercise should be played seriously, but with a sense of humour and proportion. When playing, the characters should remain true to the role they are playing.
- The roles differ as regards size, complexity and attractiveness. However, all are important and contribute to achieving the educational goal. The sooner the characters grow into their role and start behaving accordingly, the more successful the role-play will be.
- Make use of the time provided for improvisation.
- The players have considerable liberty to flesh out their character and their character's actions. In improvisation, it is desirable to avoid fruitless arguments about claims made by other players, as it will be difficult to establish who is right. If possible, try to accept the claim, though perhaps qualifying it.

Evaluation: Lessons learned

After the simulation exercise, evaluation takes place in order to focus on 'lessons learned'.

The controller may start the evaluation by eliciting remarks from the observers. Issues are then identified and discussed by the entire audience, guided by the trainer and controller.

5. Sometimes players playing by the rules **interpret** their role very **creatively**. For example, a loyal subordinate may, when new information comes out, spontaneously turn on his/her superior. Or a player may keep some information to himself, waiting for an opportune moment to use it. This is part of the dynamism of the exercise. Make sure, however, that in such a case the player can justify this change within the role and context.

IMPORTANT!

Feel free to change any of the details of the three types of data we present below. **However, make sure to document each change.**

'Document' means authorise a change by a background, public, or private role information document, that you give audience and players, or individual players as appropriate. This ensures consistency (and helps you by providing a 'library' of additional material for using the simulation in another training session).

Examples:

- You may need to amplify some details, such as, for example, "The President has refused to accept the resignation of the Minister of Defence over his refusal to lower the armed-forces budget".
- You may want to add a dimension to private role data: "A member of your social club – an institution that is very important to you – is pressuring you to authorise, without a tender, the reconstruction of the country's road infrastructure".

Process for the trainer/controller

Distribution of tasks

For this exercise, you will need

1. A game **controller** who is responsible for preparation, monitoring and evaluation, but will only interfere in the simulation exercise in an emergency. Ideally it will be you, the trainer, but you may appoint someone else familiar with the group and the course themes to perform this function.
2. Three to six main characters (only having three is not recommended, but could be used when you have very little time or want to focus on one particular aspect of conflict-sensitive development).
3. If available, assistants to the main characters.
4. One or more observers.
5. The number of assistants, characters, and observers depends on the number of course participants.

Role information

The background material contains some basic information about each of the main characters. In this simulation exercise, each player knows the interests and position of the others beforehand.

Ground rules

The main facts of the story are provided. The guiding questions provided to each player are meant to help them focus their role. But the main characters have the freedom to interpret their role as they think best, even changing their position if they see a good reason for this.


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HANDOUT 5.1: POST-CONFLICT NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA)¹

Post-conflict needs assessments are intended to serve as a **common platform to identify and focus efforts on key post-conflict recovery priorities**, foster coherence between a multitude of stakeholders, and mobilise human and financial resources. They are usually led by national authorities and involve regional institutions, multilateral and bilateral donors, stakeholders and civil society. Cluster teams, comprised of national and international technical experts, conduct field and desk assessments of sectoral and/or regional needs. PCNAs are mainly carried out following the signing of a peace agreement, but can also be appropriate at other important transitions from war to peace (e.g. elections, new crisis). PCNAs play an important role in mobilising donor assistance for post-conflict recovery via international reconstruction conferences at which donors make pledges based on the PCNA's overall assessment of needs. This is to complement those portions that cannot be covered by domestic resources.

Post-conflict recovery planning includes four steps:



Pre-assessment

The pre-assessment often consists of a meeting or series of meetings between key national and international actors to **identify the key strategic objectives and outcomes** of the PCNA which will be important for peacebuilding. These early discussions are important to help set strategic direction while nurturing an early sense of national ownership.

One of the key challenges of post-conflict recovery consists in recognising and transforming the structures which contributed to conflict; otherwise, recovery assistance risks rebuilding a society that contains the seeds of future violence. The pre-assessment needs to produce a **basic shared understanding of the causes and characteristics of the conflict** in order to identify priority outcomes that will keep the peace process on track. This may focus on identifying key population groups who may constitute a risk to the peace process if they do not perceive the benefits of peace; regions and localities at risk, where visible reconstruction is important; state institutions where reform is critical to avoid undermining the process; actions to stem the flow of resources to spoilers (e.g. armed groups). It may also include scenarios that explore how upcoming events

1 This handout is based on material provided in: United Nations Development Group/World Bank, 2007: "Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning using Post Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks." Working Draft, September.

This happens in reality too, and it can make the game more interesting. Their assistants, if available, will aid and support them (or, as has happened, betray them for a more attractive protector, because of ideology, or for a consideration).

The **observers** are requested to:

- Follow the action closely (observers may follow players and observe them even when they engage in 'back-room' negotiations, though they may **not** interact with the players: they are only a 'fly on the wall', so to speak, and may **not** inform anyone of the results of their observations until the discussion phase).
- At the end of the simulation exercise they will describe the events as they saw them, and interpret the events in light of what has been learned during the proceedings.
- Provide feedback during the evaluation.

Introducing the journalist

- You may decide to introduce an additional role – that of the TV reporter. If you do, this should be done in one (or both) of two ways:
- Ask the player to provide an ongoing bulletin, from time to time, on the talks as he/she sees them. Putting the negotiators under public pressure is an element of the negotiations on post-conflict needs assessment that needs to be kept in mind. Any of the players *may* be allowed to demand the reports be censored or stopped, which may add an extra dimension to the process.
- The journalist may report about riots in the capital. You may instruct the player to provide this news bulletin at some stage during the negotiations, as an added dimension.

Deciding on whether to employ this additional role depends on whether you have enough people, and whether you feel the need to put pressure on the proceedings.

Drawing to the close

- About 15 minutes before ending the role-play, indicate to participants that the simulation exercise is soon going to end.
- Make sure that the entire group is aware that the simulation exercise has ended. It should be stressed that the actors have left their roles and are now themselves once more.

Debriefing and feedback

- The debriefing should take place in the following order: (1) characters of the simulation exercise, (2) their assistants (if there are any), (3) observers, (4) trainer/controller.
- Ask the characters how they perceived the dynamic of the simulation exercise and how they felt during the experience. Ask them what went well for them and why. Ask whether they are able to draw some conclusions from their experience. – Then debrief the assistants, using the same questions.
- Ask the observers to relate their perception of what was going on, focusing on the issues related to conflict-sensitive principles, and then to provide feedback to the characters.
- Finally, you may offer your own observations.

Drawing conclusions from the simulation exercise

- Ask the observers to present their representation of the OECD principles for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
- Ask the characters whether they were aware of these principles during the role play, and

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(elections, transitional justice processes; events in neighbouring countries) may have an impact on risks and opportunities for recovery.

The pre-assessment aims to produce an **agreed concept note** that will provide a road map for the PCNA process, which communicates:

- **A peace-building vision** that articulates peace-building objectives to guide recovery planning – for example, to ensure that early social and economic results are delivered in regions vulnerable to renewal of conflict;
- Identification and scope of **priority clusters** (sectors) and cross-cutting issues to be considered;
- Parameters for selecting **national and international counterparts** for a full recovery planning process, and for involvement of national institutions in implementation (e.g. basic parameters for the strengthening of national, regional and/or local administrative structures);
- **Coordination arrangements** for the PCNA: Roles and responsibilities for the PCNA cluster (sector) leaders and other focal points; leadership and structure of the PCNA Secretariat; and estimated costs and funding of the PCNA exercise.

Example of a peacebuilding vision

In a conflict that divided down ethnic East-West lines and was fuelled by illegal logging, where state institutions have been largely controlled by one ethnic group and are viewed as corrupt and abusive, a vision statement might read: "A country which is peaceful, prospering economically and governed by democratic institutions that serve the people; where everyone has opportunities to work in the state or the private sector regardless of their ethnicity or region of origin; and where the riches coming from our natural resources are used to reduce poverty and build a future for our children."

In order to achieve that vision, specific key peacebuilding activities and milestones might be defined, perhaps including the following:

- Ensure that key commitments in the comprehensive peace agreement are fulfilled;
- Ensure that state institutions are associated with basic improvements in public services and job opportunities in both East and West;
- Ensure that decision-making bodies and recruitment into state institutions reflect a credible balance in ethnic and regional composition;
- Re-build trust by demonstrating transparent management of forest resources including community and civil-society oversight; and
- Communicate with the population on progress on these key issues.

Process

Broad participation in the PCNA is essential for ensuring financial support to and effective implementation of the recovery programme. National ownership is ensured by the involvement of the **political leadership, conflict parties, military leadership, civil society** and **community leadership**. International organisations such as the **multilateral system** (UN, IFIs, regional organisations) and **bilateral donors** should be involved to provide technical inputs and commit financial support.

This requires a **joint co-ordination structure**. The co-ordinating organisations (national government, regional organisations, UNDG, World Bank, bilateral donors) usually appoint a group of technical coordinators with ultimate responsibility for report-writing and prioritisation of activities. These guide the PCNA Secretariat that is responsible for the overall coordination of the PCNA.

HANDOUT 5.2: SCENARIO

Background

Oxania (capital city: Loma) is a middle-income country of 30 million inhabitants. As a legacy of colonial rule, Oxania is a composite of two larger and several smaller ethnic groups. The Tibu live in the South and constitute more than 60% of Oxania's population. The Sana live in the North and make up around 30% of its population. Tibu and Sana speak different languages. National languages are Tibu and English.

Oxania's key economic activities include agriculture, commerce, logging and mining. Oxania was able to achieve its middle-income status due to important uranium mines in the South. The formerly abundant forest resources in the North have been greatly reduced by illegal logging activities. Oxania is a formal democracy, although its institutions are weak. The Tibu-dominated army plays an important role in politics and has established a tight security regime all over the country.

In the late 1980s, the Sana leadership grew increasingly frustrated with their increasing marginalisation from the political system by hardliners of the then governing PROGRES party. Some of them went underground and formed the Sana Liberation Front (SLF) to fight for the independence of the Sana territories from the South. Since then, the SLF has been engaged in open warfare against government forces trying to re-establish control in the North and in terrorist attacks in the South. Its main revenues come from logging and a war tax imposed on the Sana population.

As a result of the war, development indicators in the North strongly deteriorated. In addition, the government expelled Sana people living in the South on charges of supporting the insurgency. There are now 500,000 Sana refugees living in camps near the North-South border.

In face of the high costs of war and the impossibility of a military victory, international facilitators recently managed to broker a cease-fire agreement between the government and the SLF. A peace agreement is still under negotiation. Key issues of the peace negotiations are:

- Power sharing arrangements between Sana and Tibu and the future political status of the North (autonomy? federalism?)
- Return of Sana refugees and restitution of their properties in the South
- Demobilisation of the SLF and integration of SLF fighters into the Oxania armed forces
- Persecution of war crimes committed by the army and the SLF.

The event: Pre-assessment meeting

During the war, the government did not allow any international assistance to reach the North, except for some humanitarian assistance to IDPs (internally displaced persons) provided by the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross). To support the peace process and deliver an early peace dividend to the population, the international community has expressed its interest in supporting an inclusive post-conflict recovery programme. It is also hoped that joint work on post-conflict recovery issues will boost confidence between the conflict parties. The government agreed to initiate a post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA) to identify recovery needs in the North and the South.

A first preparatory meeting took place two weeks ago between representatives of the main stakeholders. As a first encounter, the meeting was more or less successful – the tone and atmosphere were relaxed – but it did not yield any concrete results. The meeting merely

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touched upon recovery priorities, the pre-conditions for aid disbursement to the conflict zones, the distribution of international aid between the North and the South, the role of the SLF in channelling aid to the North, and the governance and composition of the PCNA team. Hence a second meeting is taking place today in order to draft the PCNA concept note. As expected, the positions, strategies and means of the participants diverge considerably.

The participants of today's meeting are:

1. A representative of the government of Oxania, Mr Nasim Moras, with one or more ministers or officials;
2. Dr Gloria Thomson, leader of the opposition party PROGRES, accompanied by one or more of her colleagues;
3. Commander Kayetan, chief negotiator of the SLF, accompanied by one or more of his comrades;
4. Mr Dan Clarke, UN representative, accompanied by one or more assistants;
5. Ms Erica Butoni, representative of the largest bilateral donor of Oxania, accompanied by one or more assistants;
6. Ms Sara Fatumo, President of the "Alliance for Peace", accompanied by one or more civil-society representatives;
7. Optional character: Ms Magda Prada, journalist.

The meeting is being chaired and hosted by Mr Dan Clarke, the representative of the United Nations. Mr Clarke and his staff are in Oxania at the invitation of the parties to the cease-fire. His agreed mission is

1. To assist the parties in carrying out the cease-fire and negotiating the peace agreement;
2. To mobilise and coordinate international support for the peace process.

Mr Clarke's stated aim in this meeting is to launch the post-conflict needs assessment on the basis of an agreed concept note. Mr Clarke has no power to impose anything on the parties, but all parties are aware that, unless they take some positive action on post-conflict recovery at this meeting, donor countries will be very hesitant to commit large funds for development and peacebuilding in Oxania. This is not a desirable outcome to most at the table.

Tasks of the pre-assessment meeting

Agree on the content of a pre-assessment concept note, including:

- A peacebuilding vision for Oxania;
- Basic agreement on the distribution of international aid between the North and the South;
- Basic agreement on the channelling of international aid to the North (government and/or SLF structures or other);
- Identification of priority sectors and themes for post-conflict recovery in the North and the South;
- Composition and coordination of the PCNA team;
- Pre-conditions for the disbursement of aid by donor countries.

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HANDOUT 5.3: ROLE INFORMATION

Mr Nasim Moras, Vice President of the Republic and party leader of "United Oxania", representing the Government

The government party "United Oxania" won the last elections against the hardline pro-Tibu PROGRES party on the promise to engage in peace negotiations with the SLF and bring peace to Oxania. Nearly halfway through its electoral term, it has worked hard to deliver on its promise, while facing stiff protests from the army and radical Tibu elements. "United Oxania's" constituency are moderate Tibu and some of the minority groups; it has not succeeded in attracting moderate Sana.

The government wants the peace negotiations to succeed, but will not negotiate Oxania's unity. It is prepared to grant the North some degree of autonomy within a new decentralised or federal political system, integrate ex-SLF fighters into the army, and allow the return of Sana IDPs expelled from the South and facilitate their integration. However, the government sees itself as the leader of post-conflict recovery both in the North and the South. It wants to be seen as the coordinator of the PCNA and channel the expected international assistance through its own structures. The government has said it would consult the SLF and civil society on recovery priorities in the North.

Mr Nasim Moras, 55-years-old, Tibu, married to a Sana woman, 4 children. Started his career as a human rights lawyer, co-founder of "United Oxania", well-connected within his party, trusted by the international community. Moderate, but with a strong view to electoral success.

Dr Gloria Thomson, representing the opposition party PROGRES

PROGRES is highly critical of the peace process since it believes that legitimate Tibu interests are being betrayed. It is against any concessions to the SLF such as the devolution of power to regional structures in the North, the return of refugees or the introduction of Sana as a third national language. PROGRES considers the SLF a terrorist group and favours efforts to gain a military victory over the insurgents. In this position, it is supported by large parts of the Oxania army and radical parts of the Tibu population, particularly among the conservative elites and impoverished Tibu urban migrants. PROGRES is capable of staging powerful protest actions against the government and hopes to capitalise on the government's failure to bring peace at the next elections.

PROGRES agreed to participate in the PCNA because it does not want to be perceived as a spoiler by the international community. In addition, it intends to promote Tibu and southern interests during the assessment. PROGRES wants the international assistance to be distributed proportionally according to population size, meaning that 60-70% would come to the South. It alleges that the SLF will misuse international assistance coming to the North for military purposes. PROGRES advocates for a strong role of local governments in the channelling of aid resources – since it holds many southern municipalities.

Dr Gloria Thomson: leader of the PROGRES party, Tibu, 40-years-old, married, 1 child, economist, ambitious. Her family owns the largest uranium mine of the country. The next elections are her best opportunity to become president of Oxania.

Commander Kayetan, chief negotiator of the SLF, accompanied by one or more of his comrades

The SLF reluctantly agreed to the cease-fire but remains on guard fearing a sudden change in the government's strategy. Moderate elements within the SLF are in favour of a peace agreement

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with the government if it brings real improvements to the lives of the Sana all over the country. They demand substantial cultural, economic and political autonomy for the North with the right to secession. The SLF wants to take over the role of the regional government, including the control of the North's forest resources (which corresponds with the actual status quo). In addition, it demands equal rights for all Sana living in Oxania, including the recognition of Sana as a national language.

The SLF wants to lead the PCNA in the North and demands the largest part of international recovery assistance, since the North has suffered disproportionately from the war and shows the worst development indicators. As the self-proclaimed future government of the North, it demands that all international assistance coming to the North shall be channelled through its structures. At various occasions, the SLF leadership has made it known that peace cannot be bought. They are prepared to forego international assistance if no progress can be made on the substantial issues of the peace agreement.

Commander Kayetan: SLF chief negotiator, Sana, 35-years-old, widower, former primary-school teacher, moderate. Well-spoken, but little experience of international processes. Has to follow instructions from SLF leaders remaining in hiding, little margin for negotiation.

Ms Sara Fatumo, President of the "Alliance for Peace", representing civil society

Oxania's civil society is small and reflects the ethnic divisions of the country. As a response to the war-induced deterioration during the last years, however, a group of civil-society organisations formed the multi-ethnic "Alliance for Peace" with the aim of advocating for a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The "Alliance for Peace" has been engaged in confidence-building measures between Sana, Tibu and smaller minority groups and developed practical proposals for resolving key issues of the peace negotiations. Among others, it developed a proposal for the federalisation of Oxania to allow the devolution of a significant degree of autonomy to the North within a single state framework. The "Alliance for Peace" has repeatedly drawn international attention to the war crimes committed by both parties to the conflict, including forced displacement, illegal exploitation of natural resources, forced recruitment, and the use of child soldiers.

The "Alliance for Peace" regards itself as the voice of the victims of the war, who so far have not been heard in the peace negotiations. It demands that the peace agreement should contain proper provisions to prosecute war criminals and compensate their victims. It demands full participation in the PCNA to represent the interests of war victims and ordinary people.

Ms Sara Fatumo: Founder and president of the "Alliance for Peace", minority group member, single, 49-years-old, political scientist, involved in civil-society affairs for over 20 years. Imprisoned by the former PROGRES government for alleged subversive activities. The Alliance receives funding from the bilateral donor.

Mr Dan Clarke, representing the United Nations

The UN is serving as a facilitator in the peace process. The main instruments used by the UN so far have been political and diplomatic pressure. Now, it wants to initiate the PCNA as a confidence-building measure between the conflict parties and to mobilise donor support to the peace process. UN success in brokering a peace agreement in Oxania would greatly enhance its reputation in the region.

Mr Dan Clarke: Resident Representative, 50-years-old, married, 3 children, background in economics, 4 years' experience in Oxania. Has been working in the field of post-conflict recovery for several years and has accompanied peace accords in various countries. He is very

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experienced in diplomatic matters and successfully facilitated the first meeting two weeks ago. He is determined to come to an agreement today, at least on the PCNA concept note and the initiation of the PCNA.

Ms Erica Butoni, representing Oxania's largest bilateral donor

The bilateral donor has a long-standing political and economic relationship with Oxania. During the war, it provided development assistance in the South and funded a number of peacebuilding initiatives, among others the "Alliance for Peace". The bilateral donor imports most of its uranium from Oxania.

Representing a group of donors, the bilateral donor proclaims a strong interest in a sustainable peace accord on the basis of a unitary state. It is prepared to provide substantial financial support to post-conflict recovery. However, donors decided to condition disbursement of post-conflict recovery funds on demonstrable progress in the peace negotiations, namely steps towards SLF disarmament and demobilisation. The international community also expects the government to use its considerable uranium revenues to co-finance post-conflict recovery.

Ms Erica Butoni: Peacebuilding advisor, married, 35-years-old, 2 children, 1 year posted in Oxania. Recently completed a post-graduate course on post-conflict recovery.

Optional character: Ms Magda Prada, journalist, commentator of the Oxania TV station

44-years-old, single. Prada has a reputation for honest reporting and strong commentary on the issues. She has produced a number of reliable documentaries on aspects of the internal war.

Questions for preparing the meeting:

You should develop consistent and rational positions for the negotiations. You should be considering the following questions:

- How would you argue your position?
- What is important for you in order to emphasise your general goal?
- What is your strategy in the meeting with respect to moving a step towards your interest?

HANDOUT 5.4: BREAKING NEWS

The items of Breaking news are delivered by Magda Prada.

News items:

"Shock and confusion are everywhere in Loma city centre. Around 8 o'clock this morning violent riots broke out, triggered by radical Tibu parties opposed to the ongoing peace negotiations. They say the government would betray their interests by agreeing to channel uranium revenues to the North. Stores and shops were looted, and some buildings and cars around the main square are still burning now. Some observers say people were injured or killed here today, but we have no reliable information yet. Around 11 o'clock, the military intervened to stop the riots.

"Speaking on behalf of the government, the Minister of the Interior His Excellency Ezekiel Kazan promised that the leaders of the riots would be brought to justice. He said that the peace negotiations were at a critical point and were not allowed to be undermined by narrow interests. His Excellency also announced a public hearing on the management of the country's uranium revenues. Everyone will have an opportunity to speak about their concerns. This is Helena Nistrow, reporting from Loma for Oxania TV."

Procedure

All participants have the opportunity of sharing their thoughts on the new situation.

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
10'	Brainstorming on the notion of 'peacebuilding'	
20'	Input Questions & Answers	Presentation "Guiding principles" (ppt)
30'	Exercises "Linking guiding principles to own experience" or "Comparing guiding principles" (optional)	Handouts 6.1-6.4
60'	Total	

Materials

Presentation: Guiding principles for engaging in conflict environments and peacebuilding (ppt)

Handout 6.1: OECD Guiding Principles for Engaging in Conflict Environments and Peacebuilding

Handout 6.2: WANEP (West Africa Network for Peacebuilding) Guiding Principles

Handout 6.3: Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Peacebuilding Principles

Handout 6.4: International Alert (IA) Guiding Principles for Conflict Transformation

Instructions

On the following pages, you will find suggestions for exercises on the subject of guiding principles. You may choose one or two of them according to participants' needs and the overall course schedule. If you introduce the guiding principles towards the end of the training course, you may omit the reflections on the term 'peacebuilding'.

1a. Brainstorming on the term 'peacebuilding' before the input (10')

This exercise activates participants' own thinking on the subject and gets them involved.

- The trainer asks participants to call out all terms they associate with peacebuilding and writes them on a large flipchart. Continue for about 5 minutes or until the topic appears to be exhausted.
- Review the terms together with participants and try to cluster them. Identify and clarify key concepts.

Alternatively: 1b: Drawing conclusions and defining guiding principles for conflict-sensitive development cooperation and peacebuilding (5')

If this session takes place towards the end of the course, encourage participants to draw their own conclusions from the training course and define guiding principles based on their own experience and what they have learned during the course.

- Ask participants to reflect on the key messages of the course. Invite them to note down individually what they would see as the essence of conflict-sensitive development and peacebuilding. How should it be done? Ask them to write their reflections on cards (one card – one idea). (5')

>>> continued

6. Guiding principles for engaging in conflict environments and for peacebuilding

Learning objectives

This session is intended to

- Familiarise participants with the OECD Guiding Principles for Engaging in Conflict Environments and for Peacebuilding;
- Encourage participants to critically reflect on the Guiding Principles and explore their applicability to their own work context;
- Enable participants to understand the key learning points reflected in the OECD Guiding Principles by comparing them with the guiding principles of other peacebuilding organisations;
- If the session is placed towards the end of the training course, encourage participants to draw their own 'lessons learned' from the inputs and discussions during training and synthesise them as guiding principles.

Guiding principles for engaging in conflict environments and peacebuilding

OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and
Development Co-operation (CPDC)

Training module on Conflict Prevention and
Peacebuilding



- Collect the cards and pin them on the board. Structure them according to themes. Ask participants for clarifications and additions, if needed. You may set up one column each for conflict-sensitive development and peacebuilding.
- For each theme, ask participants to formulate one guiding principle.
- Present the OECD Guiding Principles and ask participants to compare them with the principles developed in this exercise (see exercise 2).

2. Guiding questions for plenary discussion after the input (10')

- Do we need peacebuilding as a distinct field of activity?
- Who are the key actors in peacebuilding?
- What is the difference between peacebuilding and 'normal' development assistance?
- With which guiding principles do you agree? With which principles do you disagree? Why?
- From your own experience, can you give examples in which these principles have been applied or ignored?
- Given that the OECD developed these Guiding Principles in 2001, how would you adapt them to the present situation? What new principles would you add? What principles would you reformulate or drop?
- If following exercise 1b: What additional issues are raised in the OECD Guiding Principles that did not figure in your own principles? Should they be added to your list? If not, why?

3. Linking the Guiding Principles to participants' own experience (30')

Ask participants to reflect individually on the following two questions and note down their answers (10'):

- Can you give an example from your own experience in which one (or several) of the Guiding Principles were successfully applied?
- Why was the principle important? How was it applied? What were the benefits? What were the challenges?
- Can you give an example from your own experience in which one (or several) of the Guiding Principles were ignored?
- Why was the principle important? Why was it ignored? What were the consequences of ignoring it? With hindsight, what should have been done differently?
- Can you give an example from your own experience that would suggest an additional guiding principle?

Ask participants to form groups of two or three to share their experiences. Ask them to note down similarities and differences in their experiences. (10')

Back in plenary, ask the groups to share their main observations and 'lessons learned' on applying the Guiding Principles in conflict situations. Visualise the key learning points. Note any additional guiding principles suggested by participants. (10')

4. Comparing different sets of guiding principles (30')

Guiding principles, code of conducts and similar instruments assume an important function in defining the identity and ethical orientation of an organisation or company. Besides the "Guiding Principles for Engaging in Conflict Countries and Peacebuilding" developed by the OECD/DAC,

>>> continued

Structure

1. What is peacebuilding?
2. The OECD Guiding Principles for peacebuilding

2



Source:

DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict. "Ministerial Statement on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners", 2001. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf


The DAC Guidelines *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century* (1997) and the supplement *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners* (2001) were endorsed by the Development Ministers, Aid Agency Heads and other Senior Officials responsible for development cooperation at the High-Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in April 2001.

Remarks

1. This presentation is an adapted version of the OECD Guiding Principles for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding of 2001. These represented the 'state-of-the-art' of peacebuilding practice at the time. Today, however, they represent aspirations that are still far from being achieved. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of 9/11 the political context of peacebuilding changed a great deal, triggering new discussions on the role and contribution of development actors in this field.

When reflecting on the Guidelines, be aware of their historical dimension. You, or your organisation, may want to add new principles of your own.

2. This presentation may be used at the beginning or towards the end of the training course. Used towards the end, it may help you structure your learning on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.



Peacekeeping: Reducing levels of violence

Peacemaking: Contributing to peaceful settlements and relationships

Peacebuilding: Tackling the root causes of conflict

Peacebuilding

When?

- Emerging, current and post-conflict situations

Purpose?

- Preventing violent conflict and promoting sustainable peace

How?

- Political, developmental, humanitarian and human-rights programmes

OECD


4

- Peacebuilding is **complementary to diplomatic and military efforts** to prevent or halt violent conflict (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, conflict resolution, peacekeeping operations).
- Some peacebuilding activities are similar to development cooperation activities in countries that are not affected by conflict, but the context and purposes are different. A **conflict-sensitive approach** to what should be done, and how it should be done, is required. This includes conflict analysis as well as peace and conflict impact assessments.

Source: *OECD Manual of Issues, 2005*, www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/issuesbriefs

Notes

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Security dimension

1. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants
2. Humanitarian mine action
3. Improving control of small arms and light weapons
4. Security system reform

Governance and political dimension

1. Support for political and administrative authorities and structures
2. Reconciliation and promotion of non-violent conflict resolution
3. Support for good governance, democracy and human rights
4. Support for civil society and the media
5. Legal action and truth commissions: balance between truth, justice, punishment, reconciliation and impunity

Social, economic and environmental dimension

1. Reduce socio-economic differences and unequal distribution of benefits or burdens as root causes of conflict
2. Include marginalised and vulnerable populations and geographical regions
3. Reduce competition for limited natural resources (e.g. land, water) and environmental degradation
4. Support control of exploitation and trade in valuable natural resources (e.g. diamonds, oil, metals)
5. Repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons
6. Rebuild infrastructure ("quick impact projects")
7. Support high-quality and accessible health and education services
8. Stimulate productive sector development, employment, trade and investment (legal and economic reforms, institutional and technical cooperation)

Source: *OECD Manual of Issues, 2005: "Peacebuilding Overview"*

Notes

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OECD Guiding Principles

1. Recognise the potential – and the limits – of external influence
2. Work towards coherent donor policies and coordinated action
3. Be transparent, communicate intentions, and sustain dialogue with partners at all levels to ensure ownership

6



1. Recognise the potential – and the limits – of external influence

Limited influence of outside actors in most conflict situations – powerful internal dynamics and long histories of grievance and recrimination

Adopt a realistic modesty and set priorities

Address the root causes of conflict – and the political will to act on them

2. Work towards coherent donor policies and coordinated action

Donor support needs to be coordinated, open and flexible to support a variety of – often evolving – options

Acknowledge national ownership of the peace process, but ensure that it is truly representative and does not perpetuate existing divisions in society

The international community's peacebuilding efforts should be based on joint analyses, common needs assessments and common strategic frameworks for action, and aligned with partner countries' policies and procedures (see Paris Declaration, 2005)

In weak or illegitimate states, donors should coordinate their efforts and harmonise their procedures in a way that is compatible with government systems

Peacebuilding activities should be closely coordinated with peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts where appropriate.

3. Be transparent, communicate intentions, and widen and deepen dialogue with partners at all levels to ensure ownership

Be accountable, open and clear towards key actors inside and outside the partner country to foster mutual trust

Define basic ground rules of engagement with local protagonists

Encourage and sustain broad and inclusive dialogue – provide acceptable platforms

Support accurate and responsible media coverage

Notes

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OECD Guiding Principles

4. Ensure you do maximum good, and avoid unintended harm
5. Actively engage women, men and children in peace-building processes
6. Work in a flexible and timely manner, guided by conflict analysis, and think long-term

7



4. Ensure you do maximum good, and avoid unintended harm

All aid becomes part of the political dynamic and produces political results

"Do No Harm" principle: avoid unwittingly aggravating existing or potential conflicts

"Do No Harm" does not mean not taking considered risks

Conflict-sensitivity may preclude speedy and 'efficient' development operations

5. Actively engage women, men and children in peacebuilding processes

War is a 'gendered' activity with a strong division of labour

Men, women, youth and children are differently affected by war

Women can play important roles as bridge-builders and peacemakers

Supporting children and youth in overcoming the experience of war is critical to breaking intergenerational cycles of violence

6. Work in a flexible and timely manner, guided by conflict analysis, and think long-term

Peace is a process, requires long-term vision and long-term commitment

Build action on political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations

Support peacebuilding initiatives early on and continue even when peace processes seem to have been completed

Adjust level of funding to absorptive capacity of post-conflict states

Provide adequate funding over the mid and long-term for recovery and reconstruction

The critical period for preventing the recurrence of conflict can last more than 10 years

Notes

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OECD Guiding Principles

7. Reinforce local capacities to influence public policy, and tackle social and political exclusion
8. Use constructive engagement and creative approaches that provide incentives to peace

8



7. Reinforce local capacities to influence public policy, and tackle social and political exclusion

Identify and support local capacities for preventing and resolving conflict issues and for finding innovative solutions

NGOs in donor countries can provide long-term support to civil society in partner countries; roles: advocate, watchdog, agent of reconciliation, etc.

Role of NGOs as service providers should be phased out with improvements in national capacities

Where appropriate, consider supporting indigenous or customary peacebuilding capacities

8. Use constructive engagement and creative approaches that provide incentives to peace

Central role of UN in coordinating peacebuilding with peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts (UN Peacebuilding Commission)

Improve coordination between international financial institutions, regional organisations, bilateral donors and NGOs

Increasing capacity of regional organisations (AU, EU)

Aid creates incentives and disincentives for peace (to a limited degree)

Possible aid instruments: (a) long-term, constructive engagement with partner governments, (b) negotiated benchmarks (e.g. for governance improvements), (c) transparent and coordinated conditionalities, (d) 'smart' sanctions

Peacebuilding funds from different government budgets require close political and administrative coordination

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HANDOUT 6.1: OECD GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR ENGAGING IN CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS AND PEACEBUILDING

This is an adapted version of the OECD Guiding Principles for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding of 2001.

1. Recognise the potential – and the limits – of external influence

- Limited influence of outside actors in most conflict situations – powerful internal dynamics and long histories of grievance and recrimination
- Adopt a realistic modesty, and set priorities
- Address the root causes of conflict – and the political will to act on them

2. Work towards coherent donor policies and co-ordinated action

- Donor support needs to be coordinated, open and flexible to support a variety of – often evolving – options
- Acknowledge national ownership of the peace process, but ensure that it is truly representative and does not perpetuate existing divisions in society
- The international community's peacebuilding efforts should be based on joint analyses, common needs assessments and common strategic frameworks for action, and should be aligned with partner countries' policies and procedures (see Paris Declaration, 2005)
- In weak or illegitimate states, donors should coordinate their efforts and harmonise their procedures in a way that is compatible with government systems
- Peacebuilding activities should be closely coordinated with peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, where appropriate

3. Be transparent, communicate intentions, and sustain dialogue with partners at all levels to ensure ownership

- Be accountable, open and clear towards key actors inside and outside the partner country to foster mutual trust
- Define basic ground rules of engagement with local protagonists
- Encourage and sustain broad and inclusive dialogue – provide acceptable platforms
- Support accurate and responsible media coverage

4. Ensure you do maximum good, and avoid unintended harm

- All aid becomes part of the political dynamics and produces political results
- "Do No Harm" principle: Avoid unwittingly aggravating existing or potential conflicts
- "Do No Harm" does not mean not taking considered risks
- Conflict-sensitivity may preclude speedy and 'efficient' development operations

5. Actively engage women, men and children in peacebuilding processes

- War is a 'gendered' activity with a strong division of labour
- Men, women, young people and children are affected differently by war
- Women can play important roles as bridge-builders and peacemakers

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- Supporting children and youth in overcoming the experience of war is critical to breaking intergenerational cycles of violence

6. Work in a flexible and timely manner, guided by conflict analysis, and think long-term

- Peace is a process, requires long-term vision and long-term commitment
- Build action on political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations
- Support peacebuilding initiatives early on and continue even when peace processes seem to have been completed
- Adjust level of funding to absorptive capacity of post-conflict states
- Provide adequate funding over the mid- and long-term for recovery and reconstruction
- The critical period for preventing the recurrence of conflict can last more than 10 years

7. Reinforce local capacities to influence public policy, and tackle social and political exclusion

- Identify and support local capacities for preventing and resolving conflict issues and for finding innovative solutions
- NGOs in donor countries can provide long-term support to civil society in partner countries; roles: advocate, watchdog, agent of reconciliation, etc.
- Role of NGOs as service providers should be phased out with improvements in national capacity
- Where appropriate, consider supporting indigenous or customary peacebuilding capacities

8. Use constructive engagement and creative approaches that provide incentives to peace

- Central role of UN in coordinating peacebuilding with peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts (UN Peacebuilding Commission)
- Improve coordination between international financial institutions, regional organisations, bilateral donors, and NGOs
- Increasing capacity of regional organisations (AU, EU)
- Aid creates incentives and disincentives for peace (to a limited degree)
- Possible aid instruments: (a) long-term, constructive engagement with partner governments, (b) negotiated benchmarks (e.g. for governance improvements), (c) transparent and co-ordinated conditionalities, (d) 'smart' sanctions
- Peacebuilding funds from different government budgets require close political and administrative coordination

Source:

DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, 2001. "Ministerial Statement on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners." www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf

The DAC Guidelines *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century* (1997) and the supplement *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners* (2001) were endorsed by the Development Ministers, Aid Agency Heads and other Senior Officials responsible for development cooperation at the High-Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in April 2001.

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HANDOUT 6.2: WANEP OPERATING PRINCIPLES

- Local ownership of peacebuilding processes. Those who are directly or indirectly involved in a conflict situation are critical to peacebuilding efforts. Third parties must ensure that they are empowered to make decisions and must not be made decisions for them. WANEP's strategy is to locate, empower, support and accompany local actors as they respond to the conflicts in their communities
- Peacebuilding is a process, not an event. It can be gradual or rapid depending on the nature of the conflict and the personalities of the parties. All this must be considered as we set goals and formulate expectations
- Reconciliation is at the heart of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is about repairing broken human relationships. It includes empowering victims to work for the healing of their trauma, increasing the awareness of the perpetrators to take responsibility for their actions, and facilitating communication amongst the two sectors that will restore both their humanity and their relationships
- Collaborative peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is about complementarity and not about duplication; about collaboration and not about competition. WANEP's strategy focuses on mobilising actors to clearly delineate their roles, responsibilities, strengths and limitations and evolve a coordinated and harmonised response to any conflict and process of change
- People and their transformation are crucial to peacebuilding. Transformation instead of ad hoc management or resolution of conflict is at the core of WANEP's philosophy. We believe people are the agents of their own change. Conversion instead of manipulation or coercion is central to WANEP's transformative philosophy. WANEP targets people's attitudes, understanding, behaviour, interest, culture, and context for transformation
- Peacebuilding is a call to commitment and not to a career. Sacrifice and endurance are the intangible fortresses that guide WANEP
- Peacebuilding is strategic and requires long-term commitment and flexibility. It cultivates imagination where immediate reactive tendencies are prevalent. It leads protagonists to look beyond their problems and see a future. Envisioning is the strategy that WANEP initiates as first entry in any conflict situation
- Understanding the root causes of conflict is key to any intervention. Beginning with an in-depth assessment of all conflict situations is the strategy
- Inclusiveness in response by involving all actors and stakeholders. There are many different actors, instruments, and systems that affect the peace of a relationship, community and society. Bringing all actors on-board and planning with the whole picture in mind is critical
- Keeping the process simple. Conflicts already lead to confusion and bewilderment. Helping the parties to respond gradually in a less complicated fashion removes the fear that conflicts, especially intractable conflicts, are insurmountable
- Respect for the dignity of any and every person irrespective of sexual, religious, or cultural orientation is the bedrock of human relationships. Peacebuilding is about demonstrating reverence and appreciation for our common humanity and living with our differences
- Accountability. Our first line of accountability is to those who are the beneficiaries of our intervention. The source of WANEP's legitimacy is the members and the communities we serve. We ensure that our reports are sensitive to the needs of this audience

The second group consists of the partners who support us financially, and the third includes all parties interested in the work of peacebuilding

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- Solidarity. African traditions and values impel us to see beyond our territories and give a hand to any human being in need, especially a fellow African. Problems are never ones of the individual; they are communal
- Cost effectiveness. We work in a cost-effective way

Source:

WANEP (West Africa Network for Peacebuilding) Guiding Principles. See http://www.wanep.org/op_principles.htm

HANDOUT 6.3: CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES' (CRS) PEACEBUILDING PRINCIPLES (ADAPTED)

Catholic Relief Services' staff and partners crafted this Statement of Purpose to complement the agency's vision that solidarity will transform the world and enable it to cherish and uphold the sacredness and dignity of every person commit to and practice peace, justice and reconciliation; as well as to celebrate and protect the integrity of all creation.

Peacebuilding Statement of Purpose

Peacebuilding

- Is a process of changing unjust structures through right-relationships;
- Transforms the way people, communities and societies live, heal and structure their relationships to promote justice and peace;
- Creates a space in which mutual trust, respect and interdependence is fostered.

Within CRS, peacebuilding is

- Rooted in CRS' guiding principles and engages the local church, religious institutions, organisations and other actors in a mutual process of dialogue and transformation;
- Is both a broad conceptual understanding that provides guidance for changing unjust systems and practices, as well as specific activities that change attitudes and behaviours to promote peace, tolerance and reconciliation;
- Essential for transforming the world through solidarity

Peacebuilding definitions

Reconciliation: Refers to restoring right-relationships between people who have been alienated and separated from each other during conflict. Reconciliation occurs not only in relationships, but also at the spiritual, personal, social, structural and environmental levels.

Justice in peacebuilding: Social justice is a central concern of CRS peacebuilding and provides a set of principles that inform our peacebuilding activities. Peacebuilding has to create constructive ways to confront injustice and respect the human dignity of everyone involved when focusing on justice issues that might escalate the conflict.

Conflict transformation: Describes the constructive changes in personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions that caused or were affected by conflict. It also refers to the process of change itself that is required to ensure long-term peace and stability.

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Peacebuilding principles

1. Respond to the root causes of violent conflict, including unjust relationships and structures, in addition to addressing its effects and symptoms
2. Are based on long-term commitment
3. Use a comprehensive approach that focuses on grassroots while strategically engaging actors at middle-range and top levels of leadership
4. Requires an in-depth and participatory analysis
5. Provides a methodology to achieve right-relationships that should be integrated into all programming
6. Strategically includes advocacy at local, national and global levels to transform unjust structures and systems
7. Builds upon indigenous non-violent approaches to conflict transformation and reconciliation
8. Is driven by community-defined needs and involves as many stakeholders as possible
9. Is done through partners who represent the diversity of where we work and share common values
10. Strengthens and contributes to a vibrant civil society that promotes peace

Source:

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Peacebuilding Principles. See www.crs.org/our_work/what_we_do/programming_areas/peacebuilding/principles.cfm

HANDOUT 6.4: INTERNATIONAL ALERT (IA), CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION WORK (1998)

1. Primacy of people in transforming conflict
2. Humanitarian concern
3. Human rights and humanitarian law and principles
4. Respect for gender and cultural diversity
5. Impartiality
6. Independence
7. Accountability
8. Confidentiality
9. Partnerships
10. Institutional learning

International Alert: Requirements for peacebuilding (2006)

We have concluded from our own experience and from studies of other peacebuilding organisations that approaches to peacebuilding, whether post-war or in an effort to pre-empt escalation of violence, should in all cases meet seven criteria:

1. *Tailored* – to fit the needs of the situation, requiring a broad palette of adaptable methods rather than an off-the-shelf technique or standard template;

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2. *Holistic* – to address the full range of peace and conflict issues, the long-term causes as well as the immediate symptoms;
3. *Inclusive* – to engage and benefit the whole of society, since limiting the engagement and benefits to only some sectors will entrench the conflict problems;
4. *Participatory* – to involve people not merely as beneficiaries but as active participants;
5. *Respectful* – of the qualities of leadership and courage required for peacebuilding and with willingness to learn from ordinary people's knowledge and understanding of their own society;
6. *Sustained* – so that the process of building peace is supported for as long as is necessary, rather than being subject to arbitrary political or bureaucratic timetables;
7. *Knowledge-based* – because peacebuilding has much greater prospects of success if it is based on research and strengthened by continuing monitoring and assessment.

In fulfilling these conditions, peacebuilding must also address the gender dimensions of conflict and peace.

These requirements represent standards that International Alert aspires to fulfil in its own work and that it encourages others to aspire to through its work on international peacebuilding policies.

Source:

International Alert (IA), Code of Conduct for Conflict Transformation Work. See www.international-alert.org/about_alert/code_of_conduct.php?page=about March 2006

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
15'	What kind of activities can be held accountable to CPPB evaluation criteria? CPPB versus conflict-sensitivity	Handout 7.1: Eligibility for CPPB evaluation
30'	Input Questions & Answers	Presentation "Evaluating CPPB interventions" (ppt) Handout 7.2: Possible criteria for evaluating CPPB Handout 7.3: Theories of change
65'	Exercise "Preparing a mid-term review"	Handout 7.4: Preparing a mid-term review
10'	Wrap-up	
120'	Total	

Materials

Presentation "Evaluating CPPB interventions" (ppt)

Handout 7.1: Eligibility for CPPB evaluation

Handout 7.2: Possible criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Handout 7.3: Theories of change

Handout 7.4: Preparing a mid-term review

Instructions

1. What kind of activities can be held accountable to CPPB evaluation criteria? (15')

Not all interventions in conflict settings have conflict prevention or peacebuilding goals. When is it legitimate to apply CPPB evaluation criteria to such programmes?

This exercise provides a good opportunity to critically review the definitions of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and conflict-sensitivity introduced in earlier sessions. Participants need a good understanding of these terms in order to decide when it is possible to evaluate programmes and policy according to peacebuilding criteria.

- Ask participants for examples of programmes to which CPPB evaluation criteria should be applied. Encourage participants to discuss the case studies already covered or the simulation exercise. Note them down on cards.
- Cluster the cards according to the categories 'pure', 'mixed' and 'other' programmes (see Handout 7.1). If necessary, introduce an additional category.
- Explain the categories and ask participants for further examples.
- Review the concept of 'conflict-sensitivity' and remind participants of the need to apply conflict-sensitive principles to ALL interventions in conflict settings.

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7. Evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Learning objectives


This session is intended to

- Familiarise participants with the draft OECD criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives;
- Sensitise participants to the methodological issues of CPPB (conflict prevention and peacebuilding) evaluation;
- Enable participants to plan and manage a CPPB evaluation.

Evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives


OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)

Training module on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding



What types of interventions can be evaluated according to CPPB evaluation criteria?

Held to CPPB evaluation criteria		Discretionary application of CPPB criteria
1. Interventions in conflict contexts with CPPB objectives	2. Interventions in conflict contexts with 'mixed' CPPB and other objectives	3. Interventions in conflict contexts with 'other' (non-CPPB) objectives
← Conflict sensitivity criteria →		



It is good evaluation practice to assess interventions according to their own standards only. What kind of interventions can be evaluated according to conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) evaluation criteria?

Definitions:

1. Primarily CPPB objectives: Interventions that clearly intend to have a direct impact on conflict and peace
2. Mixed CPPB and other objectives: Interventions that have both CPPB and other objectives (development, relief, governance, etc.)
3. Primarily other (non-CPPB objectives): Interventions whose primary objectives are not related to peace and conflict (usually development and/or humanitarian relief), but which may have inadvertent effects on conflict dynamics

Types 1 and 2 ('pure' and 'mixed' CPPB projects) can be legitimately evaluated according to CPPB criteria, since CPPB is part of their stated goals.

Type 3 (non-CPPB projects) may be evaluated according to CPPB criteria if their presence may lead to expect significant (inadvertent) impact on the conflict situation.

Every programme carried out in a conflict context becomes a part of that conflict and must be accountable for its inadvertent side-effects on the conflict. → Conflict-sensitivity criteria (= Do No Harm) need to be applied to ALL kinds of interventions in conflict settings.

Purposes and types of evaluation

- Why evaluation? Learning and accountability
- Stage of programming cycle (monitoring, review, evaluation)
- Level of analysis (project, programme, country, multi-donor, etc.)
- Level of results (process, outputs, outcomes, impact)

3

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Draft OECD evaluation criteria for CPPB interventions

- Relevance/appropriateness
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency

4



1. Relevance

- Is the CPPB intervention based on an accurate analysis of conflict?
- Does it address the key driving factors or key driving actors of the conflict?
- Is the theory of change on which the activity is based a logical or sensible one in this context at this time?
- Has the effort responded flexibly to changing circumstances over time?

2. Effectiveness

- Has the intervention achieved its stated (or implicit) purpose, or can it reasonably be expected to do so on the basis of its outputs?
- Are the stated goals and objectives relevant to issues central to the conflict?
- Is the effort achieving progress in a reasonable timeframe? Is it possible to speed up the process? Should the effort be slowed down for any reason?

3. Efficiency

- Does the intervention deliver its output and outcomes in an efficient manner (results against costs)? By what quantitative and qualitative measures? Are these results related to the conflict?
- How does this particular programme or policy approach compare in terms of costs to other options for achieving the same goal?

Notes

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Draft OECD evaluation criteria for CPPB interventions

- Impact
- Sustainability
- Linkages

5



4. Impact

- What are the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting effects of the effort?
- How do they relate, in non-trivial ways, to the conflict and its key elements?

5. Sustainability

- Will new institutions designed to reduce conflicts survive? Are they being used?
- Will hard-won improvements in intergroup relationships persist in the face of challenges?
- Will the parties to a negotiated agreement honour and implement it? Are effective mechanisms in place to facilitate implementation?
- Will the resources necessary for implementation be forthcoming?
- Have those who benefit from ongoing conflict or would resist movement towards peace ('spoilers') been addressed adequately?

6. Linkages

- Are individual and grassroots projects linked to higher levels (national, regional) and parallel efforts in other domains (micro-macro, across sectors)?
- Are country-level initiatives addressing regional/international dimensions of the conflict or linking to efforts that are?
- Are interventions focused on key decision-makers or power brokers linked with efforts to engage larger populations and constituencies – and vice versa?
- Are efforts aimed at promoting individual changes in behaviour, skills and attitudes linked with change efforts at the socio-political level?
- Are different efforts contradictory or undermining each other?

7

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Draft OECD evaluation criteria for CPPB interventions

- Coverage
- Consistency with CPPB values
- Coherence (and coordination)

6



7. Coverage

- Do donor policies effectively cover all conflicts or does donor funding adequately reach all areas where conflicts occur?
- Are there 'hidden conflicts' that receive little or no international attention?
- Is sufficient attention being paid to emerging violence and conflict prevention in all potentially violent regions?

8. Consistency with CPPB values

- Are implementation staff members sensitive to others, unbiased in their judgements, and respectful of people with different opinions or approaches?
- Are the means of the intervention consistent with peacebuilding ends? (e.g. democratic decision-making within the organisation)
- Is the intervention conflict-sensitive or does it inadvertently exacerbate intergroup divisions and antagonisms?

9. Coherence (and coordination)

- Are efforts to coordinate CPPB programming or policies resulting in improved effectiveness and greater positive impacts on peace or not?
- What are the effects – positive and negative – on CPPB activities of 'whole-of-government' approaches?
- How do coordination efforts affect local ownership of peace processes?

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CPPB indicators

- No universal indicators of peace and conflict exist yet
- Develop context-specific indicators

Possible impact areas:

- Intergroup relations
- Decrease in violence/security
- Institutions for conflict management (democratic, justice)
- Changes in driving factors and actors of conflict

7



Elements of an evaluation process

- Conflict analysis
- Underlying theory of change of the intervention
- Assess process, outputs, outcomes and impacts according to CPPB evaluation criteria
- Assess for conflict-sensitivity ('Do No Harm')
- Compare interventions with policies
- Engage in learning process

8



Conflict analysis

- Include all perspectives, including all contending parties
- Identify key driving factors of conflict (i.e. major elements that contribute to the conflict, without which the conflict either would not exist or would be significantly different; these can be long-term structural issues, more immediate triggers, or anything in between)
- Show the dynamics of and relationships between the driving factors
- Include a stakeholder and key actor analysis (people or constituencies that perpetuate or mitigate the conflict)
- Reflect the stage/trends of the conflict

Theory of change

- Identify the specific original theories embedded in the programme design
- Determine whether the assumptions have proved true – or if they have evolved over time

Methodological considerations

CPPB evaluations themselves are interventions in the conflict context!

- Inclusiveness
- Testing of theory of change
- Mixed-methods approaches
- Unexpected impacts
- Ethics

9



Inclusiveness

- Include a range of points of view in the evaluation, from both within and outside of the programme context
- Involvement of national government: as they are often a party to the conflict, national governments should not co-sponsor evaluations, rather: consult them
- Participatory evaluation methods: may be sensitive in contexts with great power differentials between participants and a climate of fear

Theory of change

- Should be both relevant to the specific context and plausible

Mixed-methods approaches

- Combine quantitative and qualitative methods

Unexpected impacts

- Be open and look actively for unexpected impacts

Ethics

- Consider: safety of participants and respondents in the evaluation, trauma
- Protect the evaluation from political pressures

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HANDOUT 7.1: ELIGIBILITY FOR EVALUATION ACCORDING TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING CRITERIA

What kind of interventions can legitimately be evaluated according to CPPB criteria?

CPPB evaluation criteria applicable		Discretionary application of CPPB criteria
1. 'Pure' CPPB programmes: CPPB as primary objective	2. 'Mixed' programmes: Programme aims to achieve both CPPB and other objectives (e.g. development, humanitarian relief)	3. 'Other' programmes: Interventions in conflict contexts with 'other' objectives (e.g. development, humanitarian relief)
← Conflict-sensitivity criteria ("Do No Harm") →		

Definitions:

1. 'Pure' CPPB programmes: Interventions that clearly intend to have a direct impact on conflict and peace
2. 'Mixed' programmes: Interventions that have both CPPB and other objectives (development, relief, governance, etc.)
3. 'Other' programmes: Interventions whose primary objectives are not related to peace and conflict (usually development and/or humanitarian relief), but which may have inadvertent effects on conflict dynamics.

Types 1 and 2 ('pure' and 'mixed' CPPB projects) can be legitimately evaluated according to CPPB criteria, since CPPB is part of their stated goals.

Type 3 (non-CPPB projects) may be evaluated according to CPPB criteria if their presence may lead to expect a significant (inadvertent) impact on the conflict situation.

Every programme carried out in a conflict context becomes a part of that conflict and must be held accountable for its inadvertent side-effects on the conflict.

- Conflict-sensitivity criteria (= Do No Harm) need to be applied to ALL kinds of interventions in conflict settings.

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HANDOUT 7.2: DRAFT CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES

1. Relevance

- Is the CPPB intervention based on an accurate analysis of conflict?
- Does it address the key driving factors or key driving actors of the conflict?
- Is the theory of change, on which the activity is based, a logical or sensible one in this context at this time?
- Has the effort responded flexibly to changing circumstances over time?

2. Effectiveness

- Has the intervention achieved its stated (or implicit) purpose, or can it reasonably be expected to do so on the basis of its outputs?
- Are the stated goals and objectives relevant to issues central to the conflict?
- Is the effort achieving progress in a reasonable timeframe? Is it possible to speed up the process? Should the effort be slowed down for any reason?

3. Efficiency

- Does the intervention deliver its output and outcomes in an efficient manner (results against costs)? By what quantitative and qualitative measures? Are these results related to the conflict?
- How does this particular programme or policy approach compare in costs to other options for achieving the same goal?

4. Impact

- What are the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting effects of the effort?
- How do they relate, in non-trivial ways, to the conflict and its key elements?

5. Sustainability

- Will new institutions designed to prevent and manage conflicts survive? Are they being used?
- Will hard-won improvements in intergroup relationships persist in the face of challenges?
- Will the parties to a negotiated agreement honour and implement it? Are effective mechanisms in place to facilitate implementation?
- Will the resources necessary for implementation be forthcoming?
- Have those who benefit from ongoing conflict or who would resist movement towards peace ('spoilers') been addressed adequately?

6. Linkages

- Are individual and grassroots projects linked to higher levels (national, regional) and parallel efforts in other domains (micro-macro, across sectors)?

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- Do country-level initiatives address regional/international dimensions of the conflict or are they linked to efforts that do?
- Are interventions focused on key decision-makers or power brokers linked to efforts to engage larger populations and constituencies – and vice versa?
- Are efforts aimed at promoting individual changes in behaviour, skills and attitudes linked to efforts to promote change at the socio-political level?
- Are different efforts contradictory or do they undermine each other?

7. Coverage

- Do donor policies effectively cover all conflicts or does donor funding adequately reach all areas where conflicts occur?
- Are there 'hidden conflicts' that receive little or no international attention?
- Is sufficient attention being paid to emerging violence and conflict prevention in all potentially violent regions?

8. Consistency with CPPB values

- Are implementation staff members sensitive to others, unbiased in their judgements, and respectful of people with different opinions or approaches?
- Are the means of the intervention consistent with peacebuilding ends (e.g. democratic decision-making within the organisation)?
- Is the intervention conflict-sensitive or does it inadvertently exacerbate intergroup divisions and antagonisms?

9. Coherence

- Do efforts to coordinate CPPB programming or policies result in improved effectiveness and greater positive impacts on peace or not?
- What are the effects – positive and negative – on CPPB activities of 'whole-of-government' approaches?
- How do coordination efforts affect local ownership of peace processes?

Source: Draft OECD Guidance on evaluating CPPB activities

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HANDOUT 7.3: THEORIES OF CHANGE

Theory of change	Methods (examples only)
Individual change: If we transform the consciousness, attitudes, behaviours and skills of many individuals, we will create a critical mass of people who will advocate effectively for peace.	Individual change through training, personal transformation or consciousness-raising workshops or processes; dialogues and encounter groups; trauma healing.
Healthy relationships and connections: Strong relationships are a necessary ingredient for peacebuilding. If we can break down isolation, polarisation, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups, we will enable progress on key issues.	Processes of intergroup dialogue; networking; relationship-building processes; joint efforts and practical programmes on substantive problems.
Withdrawal of the resources for war: Wars require vast amounts of material (weapons, supplies, transport, etc.) and human capital. If we can interrupt the supply of people and goods to the war-making system, it will collapse and peace will become possible.	Campaigns aimed at cutting off funds/national budgets for war; conscientious objection and/or resistance to military service; international arms control; arms (and other) embargoes and boycotts.
Reduction of violence: If we reduce the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants and/or their representatives, we will increase the chances of bringing security and peace.	Cease-fires, creation of zones of peace, withdrawal/retreat from direct engagement, introduction of peacekeeping forces/interposition, observation missions, accompaniment efforts, promotion of non-violent methods for achieving political/social/economic ends; reform of security sector institutions (military, police, justice system/courts, prisons).
Social justice: If we address the underlying issues of injustice, oppression/exploitation, threats to identity and security, and peoples' sense of injury/victimisation, it will reduce the drivers of conflict and open up space for peace.	Long-term campaigns for social and structural change; truth and reconciliation processes; changes in social institutions, laws, regulations, and economic systems.
Good governance: Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, justice, and fair allocation of resources	New constitutional and governance arrangements/entities; power-sharing structures; development of human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption; establishment of democratic/equitable economic structures; economic development; democratisation; elections and election-monitoring; increased participation and access to decision-making.
Political elites: If we change the political calculus and perception of interests of key political (and other) leaders, they will take the necessary steps to bring peace.	Raise the costs and reduce the benefits for political elites of continuing war and increase the incentives for peace; engage active and influential constituencies in favour of peace; withdraw international support/funding for warring parties.
Grassroots mobilisation: "When the people lead, the leaders will follow." If we mobilise enough opposition to war, political leaders will be forced to bring peace.	Mobilise grassroots groups to either oppose war or to advocate for positive action. Use of the media; non-violent direct action campaigns; education/mobilisation effort; organising advocacy groups; dramatic events to raise consciousness.

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Theory of change	Methods (examples only)
Peace agreements/accords: Some form of political settlement is a prerequisite to peace – we must support a negotiation process among key parties to the conflict and violence.	Official negotiations among representatives of key parties; "track 1.5/2" dialogues among influential persons; civil-society dialogues in support of negotiations.
Economic action: As a politician once said, "It's the economy, stupid!" People make personal decisions, and decision-makers make policy decisions based on a system of rewards and incentives and punishment/sanctions that are essentially economic in nature. If we can change the economies associated with war-making, we can bring peace.	Use of government or financial institutions to change supply and demand dynamics; control incentive and reward systems; boycotts and embargoes.
Public attitudes: War and violence are partly motivated by prejudice, misperceptions, and intolerance of difference. We can promote peace by using the media (television and radio) to change public attitudes and build greater tolerance in society.	TV and radio programmes that promote tolerance; modelling tolerant behaviour; symbolic acts of solidarity/unity; dialogues among groups in conflict – with subsequent publicity.
Transitional justice: Societies that have experienced deep trauma and social dislocation need a process for handling grievances, identifying what happened, and holding perpetrators accountable. Addressing these issues will enable people to move on to reconstructing a peaceful and prosperous society.	Truth and reconciliation commissions; criminal prosecutions and war crimes tribunals; reparations; community reconciliation processes; traditional rites and ceremonies; institutional reforms.
Community reintegration: If we enable displaced people (IDPs/refugees) to return to their homes and live in relative harmony with their neighbours, we will contribute to security and economic recovery.	Negotiation and problem-solving to enable returns; intergroup dialogue; ex-combatant community engagement; processes for handling land claims; trauma healing.
Culture of peace: If we transform cultural and societal norms, values and behaviours to reject violence, support dialogue and negotiation, and address the fundamental causes of conflict, we can develop the long-term conditions for peace.	Peace education; poverty eradication; reduction of social inequalities; promotion of human rights; ensuring gender equality; fostering democratic participation; advancing tolerance; enhancing the free flow of information/knowledge; reducing the production and traffic in arms.

Source: Draft OECD evaluation criteria for CPPB interventions (2007)

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HANDOUT 7.4: PREPARING A MID-TERM REVIEW

Task

You are working for an international donor that is supporting a "peace and development programme" (PDP) in a conflict-affected region of the country. The programme is implemented by an international NGO together with local partners. The first two-year phase of the programme is soon coming to an end. You agreed with the implementing organisation to conduct an external mid-term review of the programme in preparation of the second phase.

Prior to drafting the terms of reference for the mid-term review, you need to clarify a number of key questions. Please reflect on the following guiding questions and highlight, if appropriate, whom you will involve in taking the decision. Visualise your answers.

Case study

Please return to the groups that worked together in the stakeholder and impact mapping exercise. Use the case that received the highest score in the impact mapping peacebuilding activity as the basis for this exercise.

Guiding questions for preparing the mid-term review

1. What do we want to learn (evaluation objectives)?

- Review the OECD draft evaluation criteria for CPPB and select 4-5 criteria most relevant for the programme.
- What should the scope of the review be (community, specific institutions, regional, national)?
- Brainstorm possible methods to assess the programme against these criteria.

2. Who should be involved in the mid-term review?

- What should be the role of the evaluator? What kind of qualifications should he/she have?
- What other stakeholders should be involved in the review?
- Should the government and/or conflict parties be involved? How?

3. How should the mid-term review be used?

- Who will be the primary user of the review (i.e. apply its recommendations)? How should he/she be involved?
- Who else should be informed about the results of the review?
- Identify possible means of communicating the results and facilitating learning/action.

4. Logistical issues

- Are there any logistical and timing issues to be considered?

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Resources on monitoring and evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives

- Beck, Tony (2006): *Evaluating Humanitarian Action Using the OECD-DAC Criteria. An ALNAP Guide For Humanitarian Agencies*. London: ODI. www.alnap.org/publications/eha_dac/pdfs/eha_2006.pdf
- CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2004): *Reflecting on Peace Practice Handbook*. Cambridge, MA. www.cdainc.com
- Church, Cheyanne/Rogers, Mark M. (2006): *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*. Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground. www.sfcg.org
- International Alert et al. (2004): *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack*. London. www.conflictsensitivity.org
- OECD/DAC (1999): *Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies*. Paris. www.oecd.org
- OECD/DAC (2002): *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management*. Paris. www.oecd.org
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- OECD/DAC (2006b): *An Approach to DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*. Paris.
- OECD/DAC (2008): *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities – Working Draft for Application Period*.
- Paffenholz, Thania (2005): *Evaluation of Peacebuilding Interventions: A Comprehensive Framework*.
- Smith, Dan (2004): *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting their Act Together*. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding. Oslo. www.prio.no

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
25'	Input Questions & Answers	Presentation "Dialogue as a key approach for preventing conflict and building peace" (ppt)
45'	Listening Chair Example Mozambique Reflection on a specific dialogue facilitation technique, the Listening Chair, focusing on non-directive questioning and paraphrasing	Handout 8.1: Political conflict in post-war Mozambique Handout 8.2: Selected methods for facilitation of dialogues
20'	Wrap-up	
90'	Total	

Materials

Presentation "Dialogue as a key approach for preventing conflict and building peace " (ppt)

Handout 8.1: Political conflict in post-war Mozambique

Handout 8.2: Selected methods for facilitation of dialogues

Resources on dialogue and facilitation

Instructions

1. Input and Q&A (25')

Introduce participants to the key concepts of 'dialogue'.

Present the key methods of dialogue and give examples.

Present and discuss the strengths, challenges and shortcomings of dialogue methods. Ask participants to add to these lists from their own experience. Visualise conclusions.

2. Working groups: 'Listening Chair' (45')

Ask participants to form groups of four

Distribute Handout 8.1: Political conflict in post-war Mozambique

Explain rationale of the 'Listening Chair' exercise

Rationale Listening Chair exercise

Each person to be interviewed is requested to pick someone with a different view to be his/her 'listener'. The listener or paraphraser sits in a designated listener's chair. The interviewer/facilitator asks questions, the interviewee responds, and the listener paraphrases everything that the interviewer says. This obliges the speaker to pause every few minutes to give the listener a chance to paraphrase.

Ask participants to take on a specific role:

1. Interviewer (impartial dialogue facilitator)
2. Interviewee (Renamo or Frelimo party member perspective)
3. Listener/paraphraser (Renamo or Frelimo party member perspective)
4. Rapporteur

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8. Dialogue as a key approach for preventing conflict and building peace

Learning objectives

This session intends to

- Introduce key concepts of dialogue;
- Generate increased understanding, particularly of which preconditions are necessary and which impacts are likely;
- Accustom participants to basic methods of dialogue facilitation, including interviewing and paraphrasing/listening;
- Reflect on the method of the 'Listening Chair'.

Dialogue as a key approach for preventing conflict and building peace

OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)

Training module on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding



Key concepts

Addressing root causes and fostering participation

- To find the root causes of problems such as conflict, we need to focus on the micro-level of human interaction
- We need to better understand the connection between personal transformation and institutional change, especially as it involves political decision-makers
- This means using the nature and quality of dialogue as a fundamental means of injecting vitality into democracy and increasing meaningful participation in the political process

Definition 'dialogue'

- 'Dialogue' may be understood in two ways: as a communication approach that can be used in all forms and contexts of social interaction, and as a political process with a timeframe

Source: OECD/DAC Brief on Dialogue (2005)

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Comment on definition: Clearly, the process will need to use the dialogue communication approach, although the dialogue communication approach does not necessarily involve setting up a process.

Distribute and explain Handout 8.2: Selected methods for facilitation of dialogues

- Ask the interviewer: To use non-directive questioning skills to learn more about the background of the incident, the actors involved and their interests and needs (see Handout A).
- Ask the interviewee: To put him-/herself into the position of a party member of either Renamo or Frelimo and give inspiring but realistic answers to the questions on the background of the current conflict situation in Changara.
- Ask the listener/paraphraser: To put him/herself into the position of a party member (Renamo or Frelimo) opposite to the party selected by the interviewee. At the same time, the paraphraser is obliged to be as impartial as possible, to paraphrase in such a way that the content is agreeable, and to support the dialogue (trialogue) to dig deeper.
- Ask the rapporteur to pay attention and later on give a short (3 min.) feedback on the following questions:
 - What were key facts (interviewee speaking from Renamo or Frelimo perspective, key issues mentioned, atmosphere)?
 - Were there any kind of changes of attitudes and issue-related perceptions of the interviewee and the paraphraser, and, if so, what kind?
 - How would you describe the process of using the 'Listening Chair' method?

3. Wrap-up (20')

Ask the working group rapporteurs to share their key insights in short three-minute summaries.

Add key insights to the list of strengths and weaknesses gathered during the session. Visualise strengths, weaknesses and fields of applicability of the 'Listening Chair' exercise to wrap-up session.

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Specific qualities of dialogue

Dialogue differs from mediation, debate and negotiation because it has specific qualities:

1. The primary objective of dialogue is to change relations in order to create new bases for mutual respect and collaboration (e.g. facilitating reconciliation) and not in the first place to obtain an agreement on the division of tangible goods and rights
2. Its expected result is to increase human capacity, including political capacity, to resolve problems, rather than to satisfy specific interests through an agreement between actors
3. Dialogue may be useful in situations where actors are not ready for negotiation
4. Dialogue is considered successful when participants are able to open up to the values, judgments and positions of others as well as their own.

3



Two more characteristics are mentioned in the OECD Brief (OECD/DAC Brief on Dialogue, 2005):

5. Dialogue develops a collective knowledge base that goes beyond the sum of individual wisdom, and:
6. It has been noted to generate innovative, creative and more sustainable solutions.

Debate versus Dialogue

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Assuming that there is a right answer and you have it• Combative: Participants attempt to prove the other side wrong• Is about winning• Listening in order to find flaws and giving counterarguments• Defending assumptions as truth• Criticising the other side's position• Defending one's own views against those of others• Searching for flaws and weaknesses in other positions• Seeking a conclusion or vote that ratifies your position | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Assuming that many people have pieces of the answer and that together they can craft a solution• Collaborative: Participants work together towards a common understanding• Is about exploring common ground• Listening in order to understand and to find meaning and agreement• Revealing assumptions for re-evaluation• Re-examining all positions• Admitting that other people's thinking can improve one's own• Searching for strengths and values in other people's positions• Discovering new options, not seeking closure |
|---|--|

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Range of dialogue activities

Wide spectrum of dialogue activities:

- From grassroots human-relations dialogue meetings, i.e. focusing on individual stereotypes of participants to
- Dialogue/problem-solving workshops with middle and top-leadership levels, dealing with concrete political problems and how to overcome them

On a national level and broad in scope, examples include:

- National dialogue programmes to decrease political tensions
- Dialogue to build civil society and promote a resilient society
- Dialogue to develop a common vision for a country's future

5



Source: OECD/DAC Brief on Dialogue, 2005, p. 4

An example of a national dialogue is "Bambito I" on the future role of the Panama Canal.

An example of civil society dialogue-building is the "Inter-Tajk Sustained Dialogue Process by the International Institute for Sustained Dialogue (ISSD)"

Examples of vision-building for a country's future are South Africa's "Mont Fleur scenario-building project" (1991-1992) and "Vision Guatemala" (1998-2000).

Differences in dialogue measures

Dialogue projects differ regarding key aspects:

- Number and influence of people involved
- Result-orientation and number of meetings organised
- Complementarity with and support to existing democratic procedures
- Complementarity and cooperation with development projects, NGO networking, and institution-building projects

6



Complementarity with and support to existing democratic procedures

Examples include institutionalised forms of participation on all levels of the polity, official top-level peace negotiations etc.

Complementarity and cooperation with development, NGO networking, and institution-building projects

Examples include grassroots dialogues that develop income-generating activities; sector-specific NGO information and advocacy activities, and the creation of official reconciliation commissions or district mediation boards etc.

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Joint qualities of dialogue measures

Joint qualities:

- Aim to foster relationship-building
- Address the interpersonal (conflict) level in groups
- Are all based on communication and on reflections on how to improve personal communication (*organised group encounters*)
- Link personal transformation with structural transformation

7



Key issues for planning dialogue

- **Problem/conflict analysis**
Actors, issues, dynamics, resolution attempts in the past, conditions for dialogue
- **Designing the process**
Purpose of dialogue, co-design process, confidence/ownership-building, input into established democratic institutions, timing, spoilers
- **Facilitation: mandate, skills, method**
(i.e. dialogue as problem-solving)

8



Levels of cooperation in dialogue/ problem-solving processes

- Pre-negotiations
- Joint action
- Explorative problem-solving
- Analysing issues
- Mutual understanding
- Contact

Source: Ropers 2004, McCartney 1986

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Contact

Clarifying different points of view and substance of the conflict, and securing mutual acknowledgement of these.

Mutual understanding

Reflection of the underlying needs and fears of the actors, their values, experiences of conflicts and their hopes. Acknowledgement of conflicting biographies.

Analysing issues

Identification of shared interests and similar needs and fears.

Explorative problem-solving

Most cases need a very long preparation phase and personal confidence-building, involving:

- Discussing approaches and ideas for addressing the substantive issues in dispute
- Reflections on how these approaches and ideas might be implemented
- The initiation of practical measures for their resolution.

Joint action and feeding into official pre-negotiations are possible further steps.

Strength of dialogue for building peace

- Fosters initial contacts, trust-building, mutual understanding
- Addresses root causes
- Works with the stakeholders of the conflict and aims to develop a framework for joint transformation
- Not only perceptions are transformed, but also the relationships of the opponents; in the long term, even their identities are transformed.

10



Challenges and shortcomings of dialogue approaches

- Dialogue is not a panacea for every problem. For example, when violent conflict is ongoing, the most valuable tools will be mediation and negotiation among leaders who have the power to call a halt to fighting
- Or, within a sharply divided political system, it may be necessary to negotiate formal agreements among political leaders or parties to establish a context in which dialogue can go forward

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HANDOUT 8.1: POLITICAL CONFLICT IN POST-WAR MOZAMBIQUE

In Mozambique, the national civil war between the then and currently ruling party, Frelimo (Liberation Front of Mozambique), and the former insurgents, Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance), was settled with support from the churches and the international community in 1994.

Since then, a number of measures to consolidate peace and democracy have been implemented, including reintegration of ex-combatants; in addition four rounds of national and municipal elections were successfully conducted.

One of the basic principles of the accord is that both political parties are allowed to organise and mobilise in all areas of the country. However, political election-related conflicts are common and have time and time again resulted in substantial number of killings of party members in the run-up to the elections.

In the North-Western province, around a major agricultural centre, there are strongholds of both the Frelimo and the Renamo, typically separated by the Zambezi River. Recently, substantial natural resources, suitable for industrial extraction, such as coal on the western side, and titanium on the eastern side of the river have been discovered.

In Changara, on the eastern bank of the river, the Frelimo are very dominant, however Renamo wanted to start political work in the community. Renamo opened an office only recently and tried to raise the party flag. This was first prevented by the influence of Frelimo over the local authorities, and then by the physical force of a group of influential persons, many of whom had official designations, including members of the local police and local administration, and most were Frelimo party members.

In reaction, some of the local Renamo leaders have threatened to use violence to counterbalance this non-legal suppression of party-political activities. They warn that the Renamo paramilitary youth from the countryside, which has not yet been completely disarmed, could be re-mobilised.

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HANDOUT 8.2: SELECTED METHODS FOR FACILITATION OF DIALOGUES

Paraphrasing (Listener)

1. Repeat in your own words what you understand someone else to be saying:
 - "The way you see it ... "
 - "If I understand you correctly, you are saying ... "
2. The paraphrase should be shorter than the speaker's statement.
3. A paraphrase mirrors the meaning of the speaker's words, but does not merely repeat the exact words of the speaker.
4. A paraphrase does not judge but only describes empathetically:
 - "So your understanding is that ... "

Interviewing (Asking questions)

1. Establish personal connection to each speaker at the beginning:
 - "Tell me a little about yourself... "
2. Move to issues at hand:
 - "How do you personally view these issues? "
3. To dig deeper, go beyond simplistic answers and follow-up statements by the interviewee with responses such as the following:
 - "Explain that a little further... "
 - "Give me some background to understand why this event means so much to you... "

Resources on dialogue and facilitation

Baruch Bush, Robert A. and Joseph P. Folger (eds.) (1994): *The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict through Empowerment and Recognition*. San Francisco.

Roger Fisher and William Ury (1991) (second edition): *Getting to Yes – Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In*. New York: Penguin Books.

Kraybill, Ron (2004): "Facilitation Skills for Interpersonal Transformation," in: Austin, Fischer, Ropers (eds.), *The Berghof Handbook – Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict*. Berlin, pp. 210-226.

Ropers, Norbert, 2004: "From Resolution to Transformation: The Role of Dialogue Projects," in: Austin, Fischer, Ropers (eds.): *The Berghof Handbook – Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict*. Berlin, pp. 255-270.

Saunders et al. (2005): "The Process of Sustained Dialogue", www.sustaineddialogue.org .

Schulz von Thun, Friedemann (1981): *Miteinander Reden 1: Störungen und Klärungen – Allgemeine Psychologie der Kommunikation*. Hamburg.

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
30'	Input Questions & Answers	Presentation "Civil society and peacebuilding: Orientations for donors" (ppt) Handout 9.1: Civil society functions in peacebuilding
45'	Buzz groups Reflection on civil-society contributions to conflict prevention and peacebuilding and enhancing partnerships	
15'	Wrap-up	
90'	Total	

Materials

Presentation "Civil society and peacebuilding: Orientations for donors" (ppt)

Handout 9.1: Civil-society functions in peacebuilding

Resources on civil society and peacebuilding

Instructions

1. Input and Q&A (30')

Introduce the participants to the key concepts 'civil society' and 'NGOs', explaining the difference.

Present the key functions of civil-society actors in peacebuilding and offer examples from your own experience.

Present and discuss the strengths, limitations and challenges of NGO peacebuilding. Ask participants to add to these lists from their own experience.

Start drawing conclusions from this analysis for enhancing partnerships between donors and civil-society actors for effective peacebuilding. Visualise the conclusions on a flipchart.

2. Buzz groups (45')

Ask participants to form groups of 3-4.

Ask participants to share their experience of specific countries they are familiar with and reflect jointly on the following questions:

- Think about a conflict country you are well familiar with. What roles do civil society actors play in the conflict? Positive? Negative? Describe these roles.
- What positive things are civil-society actors doing to prevent or reduce conflict? What issues are they working on? How would you assess their overall impact? How could their impact be enhanced? What are the limitations?
- Do civil-society actors also play negative roles in the conflict? In what ways? How could their negative influence be changed?
- What is the role of international NGOs in the country? How would you assess their positive contributions and weaknesses? What is their image locally?

>>> [continued](#)

9. Civil society and peacebuilding


Learning objectives

This session is intended to

- Familiarise participants with key concepts of civil-society peacebuilding;
- Familiarise participants with modalities, strengths and limitations of civil-society peacebuilding;
- Generate recommendations for enhancing partnerships between donors and civil-society actors in peacebuilding.

**Civil society and peacebuilding:
Orientations for donors**

OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and
Development Co-operation (CPDC)
Training module on Conflict Prevention and
Peacebuilding



Key concepts


Civil society

- "Arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values"
- Public sphere, between the state, the family and the market

NGO

- "Non-state, non-profit orientated groups who pursue purposes of public interest"

Sources: World Bank (2006); Fischer (2006)



2

We have seen a rapid growth of the NGO sector in the past two decades. Currently there are about 37,000 – 50,000 development, human-rights, humanitarian and peacebuilding NGOs operating worldwide, channelling around 15% of overall ODA.

Reasons for this rapid growth of the NGO sector: UN World Conferences as incentives to organise globally, globalisation of communication facilitates international networking, international NGOs as substitutes for former state-driven welfare services (health, education, social policy).

Civil society actors in peacebuilding

- Specialised conflict management NGOs
- Advocacy groups
- Interest group organisations
- Community-based organisations (CBOs)
- Informational/educational organisations

3



- Specialised conflict management NGOs
- Advocacy groups (human rights, social justice, peace)
- Interest group organisations (faith-based, women, youth, professional associations, trade unions)
- Community-based organisations (CBOs) (peasants, self-help groups, traditional leaders, informal networks)
- Informational/educational organisations (independent media, journalist associations, academic institutions, think tanks)

Civil society functions in peacebuilding

- Protection
- Monitoring/early warning
- Advocacy/public communication
- Socialisation/democratic attitudes
- Social cohesion
- Intermediation/facilitation
- Provision of services

Source: World Bank (2006)

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Examples of NGO activities in peacebuilding

- Establishing alternative media; reporting on war and peace
- Monitoring of elections and state institutions; activities related to democratisation
- Youth work (community-based social policy; income generation; education; empowerment)
- Support for education sector reforms and initiatives for peace education
- Establishing peace cultures: incentives for overcoming cultures of war via the arts, music, films and cultural events
- Strengthening local "peace constituencies"
- Initiatives for inter-religious dialogue
- Empowerment of women; campaigns for women's rights and against human trafficking
- Initiatives for demobilisation, disarmament and demilitarisation
- Protection of endangered individuals; providing security for minority groups or refugees and returnees
- Re-integration of returnees and community-building
- Human rights monitoring
- Documentation of war crimes; fact-finding and support in identifying missing people
- Dealing with trauma and psycho-social support for war victims, refugees and returnees
- Initiatives for dealing constructively with the past (fact-finding, story-telling, reconciliation initiatives)

Strengths of NGO peacebuilding

- Better information on the reality on the ground
- Can work in areas where government cannot
- Can speak to parties government cannot reach
- Can work on social-change issues government often cannot
- Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are 'grounded' better, particularly community-based organisations who enjoy trust and legitimacy
- Can inform and monitor policies ('the view from below')
- CSOs operate more flexibly and adapt better to the context

Source: World Bank (2006)



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Limitations of NGO peacebuilding

- Limited organisational capacity
- Often a local focus (particularly community-based organisations)
- Weak networking and coordination mechanisms among CSOs
- Questionable constituency base and legitimacy of NGOs
- Often tense relations with, disregard and mistrust from government
- Capacity to act in situations of violent conflict equally hampered
- NGOs may weaken the state, by substituting service delivery for too long periods

6



Challenges of NGO peacebuilding

- Sheer diversity of NGOs, hence differing motivations, capacities, contributions
- Effectiveness of NGO peacebuilding initiatives difficult to measure
- Tension between having constituency ties (leading partisanship) and impartiality and neutrality
- Key conditions for peace are often out of reach for NGOs

7



Orientations for donors

- Assess legitimacy of NGOs seeking funds
- Support a broad range of civil-society actors
- Differentiate support for national and international NGOs
- Invest more systematically in capacity building for civil society actors
- Support networking and coordination among national and intermediary NGOs
- Improve donor coordination with NGOs, create enabling environment for civil society action

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HANDOUT 9.1: FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY CIVIL SOCIETY IN PEACEBUILDING

Function	Activities	Typical actors
Protection	Protecting citizens' life, freedom and property against attacks from state and non-state actors	Membership organisations, human rights, advocacy NGOs
Monitoring/early warning	Observing and monitoring the activities of government, state authorities and conflict actors. Monitoring can refer to various issues (human rights, corruption), particularly those relevant to the drivers of conflict and early warning	Think tanks, human rights NGOs, operational NGOs (in conjunction with CBOs (community-based organisations)
Advocacy/public communication	Articulation of specific interests, especially of marginalised groups and bringing relevant issues to the public agenda. Creation of communication channels, awareness raising and public debate. Participation in official peace processes	Advocacy organisations, independent media, think tanks, networks
Socialisation	Formation and practice of peaceful and democratic attitudes and values among citizens, including tolerance, mutual trust and non-violent conflict resolution	Membership organisations
Social cohesion	Strengthening links among citizens, building social capital across societal cleavages	CBOs and other membership organisations
Intermediation/ facilitation	Establishing relationships (communication, negotiation) to support collaboration between interest groups, institutions and the state. Facilitating dialogue and interaction. Promoting attitudinal change for a culture of peace and reconciliation	Intermediary NGOs, CSO networks, advocacy organisations, faith-based organisations
Service provision	Providing services to citizens or members can serve as an entry point for peacebuilding, if explicitly intended	NGOs, self-help groups

Source: World Bank (2006)

Notes

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Resources on civil society and peacebuilding

- Anderson, Mary B. and Lara Olson (2003): *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*. Cambridge, MA, www.cdainc.com.
- Bächler, Günther (ed.) (2002): *Promoting Peace. The Role of Civilian Conflict Resolution*. Berne: Staempfli.
- Banfield, Jessica, Canan Gündüz and Nick Killick, (eds.) (2006): *Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector*. London: International Alert, www.international-alert.org.
- Fischer, Martina (2006): *Civil Society in Conflict Transformation. Ambivalence, Potentials and Challenges*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, www.berghof-handbook.net.
- Forster, Reiner and Mark Mattner (2006): *Civil Society and Peacebuilding. Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors*. Washington DC: World Bank, www.worldbank.org.
- Kaldor, Mary (2003): *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Orjuela, Camilla (2004): *Civil Society in Civil War. Peace Work and Identity Politics in Sri Lanka*. Göteborg: Göteborg University Department of Peace and Development Research.
- Paffenholz, Thania and Christoph Spurk (2006): "Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding". Research paper commissioned by the Social Development Department of the World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Richmond, Oliver P. and Henry F. Carey (eds.) (2005): *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenge of NGO Peacebuilding*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publications.
- Van Tongeren, Paul, et al. (eds.) (2005): *People Building Peace 2. Successful Stories of Civil Society*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
30'	Input Questions & Answers	Presentation "Coordination and cooperation in the context of violent conflicts" (ppt) Handout 10.1: Coordination and cooperation in peacebuilding
45'	Working groups Reflection on coordination/cooperation in building peace: Participants' experiences and their recommendations	
15'	Wrap-up	
90'	Total	

Materials

Presentation "Coordination and cooperation in the context of violent conflicts" (ppt)
Handout 10.1: Coordination and cooperation in peacebuilding

Instructions

1. Input and Q&A (30')

Introduce participants to the key concepts of 'coordination' and 'cooperation'.

Present the key principles and mechanisms (leadership, consultation, division of labour) of strengthening coordination and cooperation and contribute examples from your own experience.

Present and discuss the strengths of and challenges for cooperation and coordination between international, national, state and non-state organisations aiming to build peace by taking own examples and ones from OECD publications (HPVC, 2001, p. 95 ff: Cambodia, Angola, structure of strategic frameworks, etc.). Ask participants to add further issues from their own experience.

Start developing conclusions from these joint insights regarding the nexus of agency coordination and effective peacebuilding. Visualise the results on a flipchart.

2. Working groups (45')

Ask participants to form groups of 3-4.

Distribute table "Coordination and cooperation in peacebuilding: Type, quality and recommendations" (Handout 10.1).

Ask participants to reflect jointly on the following questions and *put the main findings on cards*:

- What is your experience with coordination/cooperation in (post-)conflict countries? What were major, remarkable experiences both positive and negative?
- Describe a key activity/experience and the quality of cooperation according to the *qualities scheme* on 1-2 cards and put them on the board in a row according to the *level of coordination*.

>>> continued

10. Coordination and cooperation in the context of violent conflicts

Learning objectives

This session intends to

- Familiarise participants with the basic notions of coordination and cooperation;
- Accustom participants to building-blocks for effective donor coordination and cooperation;
- Analyse the quality of coordination/cooperation from your own experience;
- Generate recommendations for enhancing the quality of coordination/cooperation at different levels.

Coordination and cooperation in the context of violent conflicts

OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)

Training module on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding



Key principles

- In crisis and conflict situations, donors and implementing agencies should strive to work with representative actors at the national, regional and local level, rather than defining priorities themselves
- Even if a settlement has been reached amongst all stakeholders in official negotiations, agencies should aim to work with representative actors at all levels
- Coordination should be based on a broad consensus among the main actors
- Local ownership should be given the maximum effect possible

2



Source: DAC Guidelines (2001), *Helping to Prevent Violent Conflict*, p. 94-104.

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- Go through the identified cooperation/coordination experiences in the group and develop further recommendations about how to improve the quality of cooperation, either amongst all stakeholders, or in specific sectors.
- Write down these complementary or alternative activities and how to improve cooperation on what level on cards and pin them on the board, including tentative indications of what kind of improvements can be expected in practice.

3. Wrap-up (15')

Ask the working groups to share their key experiences, and elaborate their recommendations on how to improve the level of coordination/cooperation in the selected cases.

Summarise findings and highlight areas which were of major concern, adding a general conclusion.

A common strategic framework for assistance

- Donors should develop a *common integrated strategic framework* addressing the contents and priorities of the programme as well as the policy and operational roles of different actors according to their comparative advantages
- It must be based on an intimate understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict (including the "political economy of war")
- This situation-specific and time-specific strategy will implicitly define the respective mandates of different actors
- Based on a shared analysis of the immediate needs for political, economic, administrative or social rehabilitation, the strategic framework can provide a guide for prioritising resource allocations across sectors and geographical areas
- It is not a list of projects but rather a dynamic instrument mapping out the transition from relief to longer-term recovery assistance

3



Flexible resources and procedures

- The availability of flexible resources, combining elements and features of emergency relief and development, contributes to effective aid responses in unstable environments
- Planning, programming and disbursement procedures must allow for timely responses to changing circumstances and take account of the exceptional human resource constraints facing many countries emerging from crisis
- Flexibility with regard to the areas and activities eligible for support, in line with the special needs and priorities of countries in crisis or recovery, is also essential
- Flexible fund-raising instruments such as inter-agency appeals, special donor consultations, round-tables, consultative groups, etc. are needed
- The strategic framework maps out the rationale and funding requirements of peacebuilding and reconstruction and can help guide donors in their decisions.

4



Leadership among international actors

- While always seeking to encourage local capacity and ownership, reaching consensus on and commitment to a common strategy may require a facilitating mechanism for external partners
- Recognised credibility of leadership of a bilateral or multilateral agency or donor
- The lead agency is responsible for the proper dissemination of information in the otherwise disorderly environment
- This aims to ensure that the various activities are consistent with agreed-upon policy principles, and are mutually supportive
- Criteria for selection of lead agency:
 - Willingness to take the corresponding risks
 - Knowledge of cultural, historic, ethnic and linguistic factors
 - Capacity to mobilise qualified personnel and financial resources promptly

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Mechanisms for operational consultation

- Coordination at the operational level requires clearly defined relations between headquarters and the field
- The mechanisms of coordination for relevant assistance should be as decentralised as conditions permit, involving established national, regional and local capacities
- At the local level, a representative cross-section of the organisational interests at hand can meet regularly. This contributes to the effectiveness of coordination
- The importance of having a common information base and a shared assessment of the situation and its evolution cannot be overestimated
- Each actor should have at his disposal information on all relevant factors, including the assistance provided by others
- Where NGOs are present in significant numbers, they should be encouraged to create coordinating structures of their own

6



Earmarking resources for coordination

- United Nations agencies cannot usually accommodate coordination requirements within their normal administrative budgets
- Accordingly, they fall back on financing coordination work from project funds or from the proceeds of special appeals to the donor community
- In a few cases, coordination costs have been covered under peacekeeping budgets voted for by the UN General Assembly
- The lack of predictability of these various methods for raising resources for coordination have often led to seriously underfunded situations, and inefficiencies

7



Partnerships and division of labor

- UN agencies and other multilateral organisations are often called upon to assume coordination and leadership responsibilities
- Where these organisations are not judged appropriate, other coordination mechanisms can be established
- NGOs are significant actors in crisis and post-crisis situations. Their sheer number, diverse mandates, and varying operational capacities make coordination essential to ensure the coherence of their combined efforts
- As NGOs are often the first to initiate relief operations, they face particular challenges. The exceptionally difficult circumstances in which humanitarian operations are conducted to meet immediate life-saving objectives can detract from needs assessment and coordination efforts.

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Best practices

- To the extent possible, and wherever appropriate, the government is encouraged to lead the coordination process
- Efforts at coordination should concentrate on promoting coherent approaches to critical objectives, but should not inhibit rapid responses
- Within an agreed strategic framework, individual actors should conduct their operations according to their own comparative advantages
- Active support for the lead agency by other donors by:
 - Streamlining regulations and simplifying procedures
 - Staying in the confines of the common strategy
 - Contributing to joint trust-funds
 - Assisting the collection of information
 - Offering to second staff to the coordinating entity
- NGO funders should
 - Agree on common principles for funding specific kinds of operations
 - Ensure transparency in funding NGO activities
 - Establish criteria for oversight and accountability of NGO activities
 - Strengthen the capacities of local NGOs for networking with international actors
 - Promote gender-integrated staff

9



'Good governance' definitions:

Since the 1990s, a variety of views of what 'good governance' means have developed amongst academics and development practitioners alike. Nonetheless, there is consensus on a number of fundamental principles and these can thus be viewed as universal.

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Key orientation for donors

- All parties should support the coordinating entity in its effort to collect and process information, and to join collective action
- Managers and operational staff in the field are the best placed to observe and judge what actually works
- Field-level coordination requires mechanisms to agree upon the main rules of coordination and the means to translate them into practice
- Local NGOs should be invited into operational and coordination mechanisms as full partners
- Embassies are familiar with policy and funding issues, and participate in coordination networks (World Bank Consultative Group, round tables co-chaired by government). They should be well-positioned to bring their experience to bear on the coordination process
- Sectoral committees or working groups can greatly facilitate the effectiveness of coordination efforts
- The costs of coordination, in terms of financial resources and staff time, must be explicitly taken into account in the formulation of aid programmes and budgets

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Practical challenges and limits

- Coordination is a means of supporting the shared goal of conflict resolution (and development)
- Negative competition may develop in the field when implementing agencies compete with each other for resources and donor support
- Coordination should be avoided to the extent that it may unproductively drain resources, waste time, or compromise independence of action
- In addition, coordination should not be taken to the extreme of compromising confidentiality

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Source: Nan, Susan Allen (2004): *Intervention Coordination*.

HANDOUT 10.1: COORDINATION AND COOPERATION IN PEACEBUILDING

10

Coordination levels	Type and quality of coordination/cooperation	Recommendations
'Whole-of-government' – coordination between individual departments of donor agencies		
Between donor countries		
Between donors and host governments		
Between donors, IGOs (inter-governmental organisations) and NGOs, both national and international		
Between the regional actors (governmental, multilateral and non-governmental)		

Quality of cooperation²

1. Sharing information
2. Sharing analysis
3. Planning together
4. Resource sharing
5. Working in collaboration

² Source for modi/quality of cooperation: Adopted from Nan, Susan Allen (2004): *Intervention Coordination*.

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
30'	Input Questions & Answers	Presentation "Good governance as a foundation for peacebuilding" (ppt) Handout 11.1: Key social actors relevant for good governance in post-conflict societies
45'	Buzz groups Reflection on good governance contributions to dispute prevention and building peace	
15'	Wrap-up	
90'	Total	

Materials

Presentation "Good governance as a foundation for peacebuilding" (ppt)
Handout 11.1: Key social actors relevant for good governance in post-conflict societies
Resources on good governance for peacebuilding

Instructions

1. Input and Q&A (30')

Introduce participants to the key concepts 'governance', 'good governance', and 'democratisation'.

Present the key entry points and activity areas for strengthening governance and peacebuilding and contribute examples from your own experience.

Present and discuss the strengths and challenges of projects fostering good governance for conflict prevention and peacebuilding by taking own examples and ones from OECD publications (HPVC, 2001 and Issue Brief, 2005).

Ask participants to add further aspects from their own experience.

Start developing conclusions from these joint insights regarding the nexus of good governance and effective peacebuilding. Visualise the conclusions on a flipchart.

2. Working groups (45')

Ask participants to form groups of 3-4.

Distribute table of "Key social actors relevant for good governance in post-conflict societies" (Handout 11.1) as background information.

Ask participants to apply their experiences in specific (post-)conflict countries they are familiar with, identify relevant governance-support activities, the involved stakeholders as well as their roles ('reformers', 'preservers', 'spoilors') for promoting good governance and building peace.

Reflect jointly on the following questions and *put the main findings on cards*:

- Think about a conflict country you are well familiar with. What role do measures to promote good governance play in building peace? Positive? Negative? Describe a key activity with a positive influence.

>>> continued

11. Good governance as a foundation for peacebuilding

Learning objectives


This session intends to

- Familiarise participants with key concepts of good governance and democratisation;
- Accustom participants to modalities, strengths and limitations of approaches to strengthen good governance for building peace;
- Generate recommendations for governance challenges and good practices in strengthening governance for preventing conflicts and building peace.

Good governance as a foundation for peacebuilding

OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)

Training module on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding



Key concepts


Peacebuilding

- Peacebuilding seeks to foster a spirit of tolerance and reconciliation. Broad acceptance throughout society of the legitimacy of the state and the credibility of the institutions of governance is a key aspect of forging such a civic spirit

Governance

- The Commission on Global Governance defined it as: *"The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed or perceive to be in their interest."*

Source: Commission on Global Governance (1995)



'Good governance' definitions:

Since the 1990s, a variety of views of what 'good governance' means have developed amongst academics and development practitioners alike. Nonetheless, there is a consensus on a number of fundamental principles and these can thus be viewed as universal.

Commission on Global Governance (1995): *Our Global Neighborhood*, Oxford.

- Who are the stakeholders in this key activity? What are they working on? What are their roles ('reformers', 'preservers', 'spoilers')?
- Regarding mainly the *reformers*: What are their interests and possibilities for action?
- Summarise the *strengths and weaknesses of the activity fostering good governance and peacebuilding*
- What is the role of international donors in promoting good governance in the country? How would you assess their positive contributions and weaknesses?
- What recommendations can you draw from your reflections on enhancing the contributions of good governance measures to peacebuilding?

3. Wrap-up (15')

Ask the working groups to share their key recommendations and pin the main findings written on cards on a jointly used pinboard.

Summarise findings and highlight areas that generated concern and that have of a more generic quality.

Fundamental principles of good governance

- Respect for human rights, particularly the rights of women and children
- Respect for the rule of law
- Political openness, participation and tolerance
- Accountability and transparency
- Building administrative and bureaucratic capacities and efficiency

3



All elements are clearly interrelated, mutually reinforcing, and cannot stand alone, see Bigdon (2006), p. 37.

Prerequisites for fostering the democratisation process

Democratisation

Democratisation is a complex, gradual, and participatory process whereby citizens, civil society, and the state create a set of norms, values, and institutions to mediate their relationships in a predictable, representative and fair manner

Local ownership and assistance

Donor's assistance efforts should consistently aim at strengthening the partner-countries' own capacities for good governance

4



Local ownership & assistance:

Mechanisms to help strengthen political will for reform in partner countries often involve elements of policy dialogue and incentives.

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Entry points for good governance strengthening peace

- Support to government institutions and other organisations, including the business community, which are able to establish or maintain social networks and associations enhancing participation in mainstream society, or who support or promote commonly shared values.
- Support for access to information through education, and institutions such as citizens advice bureaus, local media, etc.
- Support to local NGOs and community-based organisations to help them become more capable and responsive to their constituencies.

1



Examples for activities to strengthen social networks and joint values across boundaries include cultural or sport-related programmes and activities.

Participatory processes and structural reform I

- **Strengthening participation**
 - Providing specialised technical assistance and expertise in the field of *decentralisation policy* (introduction of decentralised planning and administration structures)
 - Clarifying functional responsibilities between central and local levels of government. This includes support for the establishment of *systems to allocate fiscal revenues*
 - Strengthening organisational capacities of intermediary bodies, including *regional parliaments and local councils*
 - Strengthening the *representation of marginalised groups* in civil service posts

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Participatory processes and structural reform II

- Democratisation through articulation of interests and reform in the distribution of power
- Strengthening public institutions
- Strengthening systems of justice and security
- Strengthening security sector reform

7



Examples of broad approaches to strengthening democratisation with direct conflict prevention and peacebuilding objectives (in relation to points 1-2):

- Support for constitutional reforms, including provision of advice to governments
- On constitutional and legislative issues
- Assistance to strengthening representative political institutions, including political parties
- Support for legislative systems and electoral processes, including informing the electorate about their rights, election monitoring, analysis and reform of laws governing elections
- Assistance for the organisation and monitoring of elections and referendums. This should contain a capacity-building element so that a country may develop the pool of skills necessary for the organisation and monitoring of its electoral processes
- Assistance for the organisation and monitoring of other democratic institutions (e.g. courts, legislative bodies and the executive branch)

In relation to point 3 (justice and security) development assistance should be focused on:

- Formal law and justice institutions (i.e. courts, ombudsmen, law reform commissions, civilian police forces, and prison/detention services)
- Communal, traditional law enforcement/dispute-resolution structures and groups
- Facilitating access to legal systems for individuals and groups, especially those which are marginalised

In relation to point 4 (security sector reform):

- Conditions of socio-political conflict can often contribute to increasing the power and independence of military and police forces vis-à-vis civilian authorities and the population. Reforming security forces to improve accountability and professional conduct and strengthening civilian oversight can play an important role in peacebuilding. One example of specific activities would be human-rights training for military personnel, (ex-)insurgents, or police staff.

(For further details on approaches and activities, see training module on SSRG.)

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Reinforcing civil society and state/non-state actor communication

- Supporting key traditional institutions
- Promoting dialogue and cooperation in divided societies
- Inter-community relations (reconciliation)
- Mediation and negotiation
- Supporting freedom of and access to information

8



Dialogue/reconciliation can include, for example:

- Within standard relief and rehabilitation work, incorporating measures to facilitate the reconciliation of conflicting groups in a society. For example: programmes which focus on reintegrating potentially destabilising elements (e.g. ex-combatants, youth) within wider social and economic life
- Programmes which focus on providing support to, or distributing resources through, "stabilising points" (e.g. multi-ethnic committees, women's organisations) within communities as a means of strengthening trust. Important target groups for such activities include farmers' cooperatives, youth associations, and other goal or issue-oriented associations with multicultural memberships. Women can play special roles as bridging partners in dialogue, peace negotiations, reconstruction and rehabilitation strategies, and contribute their special experience and perceptions to peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts (see OECD/DAC Guidelines (2001): *Helping to Prevent Violent Conflict*, part I, chapter V, "Women as peacemakers")

Freedom of/access to information can include, for example:

- During periods of crisis, simple access to free, fair and complete information can contribute significantly to easing tensions

Specific areas of donor support include:

- Helping establish or revise appropriate laws on the independence and freedom of the media (e.g. slander laws)
- Training for local editorial staff in reporting on conflicts, to help develop high quality, accurate coverage
- The establishment/maintenance of autonomous (or independent) national and local media institutions (including community-level or rural radio broadcasts) and their commitment to high professional and ethical standards, through technical and financial support
- Local coverage of events by the international media in circumstances where it would otherwise not be financially viable
- Projects and programmes which assist state actors to understand and support the role of the media in a democratic society, and which provide material, financial, and legal assistance to the media to pursue the same goal

Source: OECD (2001)

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Key orientation for donors

- **Developing a more democratic system of governance**

Means increasing a state's capacity to develop and maintain representative, responsive, and fair political institutions

Facilitating the transition to more democratic systems of government may require donors to provide

- Assistance in planning, conducting, and monitoring elections
- Capacity development within civil society itself to articulate interests through non-violent channels
- Developing mechanisms necessary for pursuing those interests in the public arena

9



Incentives/disincentives: In principle, international assistance aims at establishing a constructive and cooperative working relationship based on joint values and goals. Only in extreme cases should the (intelligent) use of direct incentives and/or disincentives be considered in funding allocations; that is, in-line with the principle that approaches to governance must be adapted to national circumstances. For example, when dealing with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states, the scope for constructive dialogue may be severely limited, and donors may have to restrict their assistance to non-governmental sectors committed to reform.

Key orientation for donors

Donor agencies should continue to support efforts to

- Ensure a transparent, and accessible functioning of all government institutions
- Encourage vigorous community consultation and participation in public policy
- Ensure provision of effective services and equal access
- Ensure that government interacts in an inclusive, non-discriminatory manner
- Facilitate the empowerment of the public, including women, in government processes, policies and projects
- Ensure that the officials and staff of government institutions are representative of communities served
- Ensure that government officials and staff are trained or retrained in the skills necessary to fulfil the above objectives

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Ensure that all government institutions function in a transparent and accessible manner to the benefit of all members of society.

Encourage vigorous community consultation and participation in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policy.

Ensure provision of affordable, effective, and accessible services and facilities as well as their equitable distribution to all affected communities.

Ensure that government interacts with members of the public, organisations and interest groups in an inclusive, non-discriminatory manner.

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Facilitate the empowerment and education of the public, including women in government processes, policies and projects.

Ensure that the officials and staff of government institutions are representative of communities served.

Involve the staff of government institutions at all levels of planning and decision-making processes.

Ensure that government officials and staff are trained or retrained in communication and other skills necessary to fulfil the above objectives.

Challenges for good governance fostering peacebuilding


Cultural and contextual adequateness

- The strengthening of public institutions must be suited to the political, economic, social, cultural, and historical context within which it is undertaken

Incentives/disincentives

- In extreme cases, where governments, or elements within them, are particularly resistant to supporting these key elements of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, donors may have to consider the use of direct incentives and/or disincentives in their funding allocations
- Such approaches, despite their limitations, may in some cases provide an effective stimulus for recipients to strengthen the underpinnings of peacebuilding and conflict prevention in their national development

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Example of cultural and contextual adequateness: Institutional strengthening may draw on the examples and experiences of donor countries, among others; but, ultimately, the institutions adopted in a given country may be very different in form, if not in function.

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HANDOUT 11.1: KEY SOCIAL ACTORS RELEVANT FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

	Reformers	Preservers	Spoilers
Diaspora			
Political but also technical and economic elites	Western-style diaspora without alienation from homeland, 'government in exile'	'Royalists'	Fundamentalist counter-elites, foreign representatives of armed opposition groups
National level			
Political and military elites	Reformist politicians, independent and courageous judges, (secular orientation), reformist officers, parliamentarians	Concordance-oriented elites, top officials, co-opted opposition	Defence, interior and information ministers, military leaders, paramilitary units, presidential guard, intelligence services, revolutionaries, fundamentalist interpreters of law
Counter-elites and rebels	Constructive-critical opposition, groups willing to engage in dialogue	Co-optable opportunists	Uncompromising wings prepared for violence or armed, 'living by the gun' groups, old rebel guard
Civil society	Human rights and peace groups, trade unions, business associations, women's constituencies, welfare-oriented work, religious leaders	Conservative lobbies, religious communities, mass organisations brought in line with the regime	Veteran movements
Media	Critical investigative journalists	State and party media	'Hate propagandists'
Economy	World market-oriented companies, lawless informal sector, private entrepreneurs	Profiteers from status quo, de facto state-owned firms	Oligarchs, profiteers from weak states (drugs and weapons dealers)
Administrative apparatus	Ambitious youth, investment agencies,	'Wait and see' groups	Domestic secret services, special police
Sub-national level			
Formal elites	Community elites	Judges, administrative heads	Old guard of governors, mayors, party leadership, police chiefs
Informal elites	Local development brokers, welfare-oriented elders, teachers	Traditional elders (status and clan interests)	'Big men', religious leaders
Counter-elites	Opposition, small business people, intellectuals	Business people benefiting from clientele networks	
Civil society	Civil rights advocates, women's and youth groups, migrants, entrepreneur associations, development committees	'For-profit' NGOs	Neo-traditionalist organisations
Local administration	Oppositional local authorities and officials striving for increased decentralisation of responsibilities	Jurists, civil servants, administrative bodies	Loyalists in the old elites, supporters, militia, civil defence units

Source: Adopted from Debiel, Terlinden (2005): GTZ.

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Resources on governance and peacebuilding

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- OECD Issue Brief (2005): *Democratisation and Violent Conflict*
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/47/35033677.pdf
- OECD Issue Brief (2004): *Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/47/31642508.pdf

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
XX'	Taking a head-and-shoulder photograph from each participant upon arrival Handing over name-tag, photo, as well as Handout 12.1 (Before training starts)	Instant developing camera and film(s) Name-tag, photo, Handout 12.1: 'Introducing yourself'
10'	Introducing the instrument 'Market Place' (MP)	Handout 12.2: "What is the Market Place?"
5' (each)	Introduction of participants (using the MP)	Flip-chart/Metaplan paper
XX'	Visiting and completing the MP during the training (e.g. during breaks)	
30	Visiting the MP and connecting with 'Support after training'	
30' + X	Total	

Materials

Handout 12.1: "Introducing yourself"

Handout 12.2: "What is the Market Place?"

Instructions

1. Prepare the MP in advance (each participant needs a sheet of flip-chart/Metaplan paper fixed on the Metaplan board or wall). Pins, tape or glue sticks and Metaplan-cards should be available.
2. Explain the purpose of this unit, and distribute the handouts.
3. Encourage participants to share their experience.
4. Give details about the schedule of activities.
5. Invite participants to use creative elements for documentation and presentation.
6. Connect the unit with the networking issue.
7. Q&A about the method if needed.
8. Moderate the introduction of participants as the first step of the MP.
9. Advise participants individually about the information needed.
10. Lead participants through the MP when finished and connect with the networking unit.
11. Document the MP by taking photographs.

Alternative: Initiate a virtual MP

If there is not enough time to carry out the unit during the training session, participants could be asked to prepare the necessary information in advance. The introduction and documentation of work processes, case studies, project information, etc. could be presented through a 'Shared Working Space' in the net. The main advantages of working electronically:

>>> continued

12. The Market Place

Learning objectives

The various activities are intended to

- Introduce participants to each other (professionally and personally);
- Create team identity by helping participants to learn about each other's work;
- Gain knowledge about project types, organisations as well as methods of working on the CPPB topic;
- Draw 'lessons learned' from the presentations, discussions and experiences of other participants;
- Be the basis and connection for networking .

HANDOUT 12.1: INTRODUCING YOURSELF

One of the most important steps in getting acquainted with all participants is the introduction at the beginning of the training course. Therefore, each participant will introduce himself or herself, giving some basic information.

To make the job of introducing yourself easier, take a few minutes and consider the following questions. There is some space for writing down your thoughts and ideas. If you like, you can also use Metaplan cards to write down your answers, if you want. Whatever method you are using: Your name, photo and your answers will be presented by you yourself on a sheet of flip-chart or Metaplan-paper and will accompany you through the training course like a central thread. Consequently, more information will be added at different stages of the training. Please start with the basic questions for the first stage of introduction:

Who am I? What others need to know

Whom do I work with? (employer, position, responsibility, country of duty)

What motivates me in working on/around the subject of CPPB?

What can I offer professionally?

What else is important for others to know about me?

- User circle is not limited to course participants
- No time limit for using the information
- Information can be updated
- Networking can encompass a broader group

Guiding questions for the final visit to the MP (30')

- What are your 'lessons learned' from the MP?
- What is your greatest achievement?
- How can you make use of the information given?

HANDOUT 12.2: WHAT IS THE MARKET PLACE?

The Market Place (MP) will be used as a symbol and platform for bringing together people from different places. Each participant of the training course will get a place (or 'stall') to present her/his knowledge (like goods). The MP will be a central thread and permanent arrangement from the beginning until the end of the training course.

Each participant will use his/her 'stall' for offering professional and personal information, sharing and exchanging experience, providing information about organisations, partner institutions, project results, etc. regarding CPPB as well as related work. The following steps are recommended:

First, you should set up your place (stall) by presenting your basic information (see Handout A). Second, to attract people you can add as much information as you want (e.g. project description, case studies, topics you want to discuss, working group results, offers of support, etc.). You should take enough time for the preparation during breaks or after dinner.

Thirdly, the final training session will be used to visit your stall, to discuss and share information, and to get acquainted with projects working on the subject of CP & PB (SSR). Therefore, the presentation has to be ready by then.

Finally, the MP will connect people working on similar topics, and interested in making use of the information provided in the future.

The MP will be documented and each participant will be given a copy of this documentation.

Some ideas you might consider:

1. You can make your 'stall' as creative as you want. You will be provided with different materials like flip-chart-paper, coloured cards, pins, markers, etc.
2. Present what other participants should know about you and your work.
3. The project you are working in (location, organisation, team, facts & figures).
4. What is going on, what is going well, or what kind of problems your project is facing?
5. Name the topics you are interested in.
6. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to your project approach.
7. What do you expect from the training course in relation to your own work.
8. Exchange details necessary to contact partners for networking.

Trainer notes

Suggested schedule

Time	Activity	Materials
5'	Introduction to networking and other possibilities of support	
5'	Identifying one's own further needs	Handout 13.1
35'	Exchange ideas in the plenary and with organisation	
45'	Total	

Materials

Handout 13.1: Networking: By individuals, coalitions and alliances

Instructions

1. Explain the purpose of this unit, if possible summarising results of the Market Place; name some sources of further support (including the participants' organisations as well as the OECD), then concentrate on networking. (Explain the benefits or distribute the handout if you want the participants to have some more written information).
2. Explain the following procedure.
3. Ask the participants to write down their needs on 3-5 Metaplan cards (5 min., catchwords only).
4. Collect and structure the cards on a pinboard.
5. Ask for explanations if needed; summarise and discuss possibilities of networking and support from organisations.

Alternative: Initiate a networking project

If you find a good correlation between the objectives of (some of) the participants, a more intensive unit of actual networking would be preferable.

1. Look at the projects offered in the Market Place
2. Ask participants (2-3) to form a team related to:
 - Regional projects
 - Aspects of content/cross-cutting issues
 - Field staff
 - Policy staff
3. Give Handout 13.1 to participants. Let them reflect, and then discuss the different levels and functions of networking.
4. Team tasks
 - Name a coordinator
 - Exchange contact data
 - Agree on how to communicate (email, telephone conference, chat, etc.)
 - Arrange first session (date for a chat)
 - Agree on the topic for the first session
 - Sign a commitment (?)
5. Ask for a short summary of results in the plenary.

13. Supporting your own work after training: Networking and support from organisations

Learning objectives

This training unit will enable participants to

- Identify further needs of support for their own work;
- Understand the benefits of networking and how to initiate a networking project;
- Identify networking projects, possibly among the group of participants;
- Ask for support in their own organisation, from the OECD and/or other relevant organisations.

HANDOUT 13.1 NETWORKING: BY INDIVIDUALS, COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES



Conflict prevention and peacebuilding is a relatively complex and difficult area where all of us have to share lessons learned. The training may provide a first step to learn and know more about project ideas, working experience, approaches, examples, connectors, etc. but it is first and foremost an opportunity for introducing people working on this important issue to one another.

Networks often connect individuals

People usually join networks because of a shared approach or philosophy, or because they do the same kind of work. They expect to be able to learn from each other and be supported by others in the network. They may conduct a project together, but more often they meet to share ideas, to provide further training for themselves or others, or to raise public awareness about their work.

An example of a network could be work related to SSRG (security system reform and governance). This might bring together people who do different kinds of work, but share a commitment to SSRG as a way towards a new direction and understanding of the security development nexus.

Coalitions often connect organisations, and sometimes individuals as well.

Coalitions are usually formed around a project or task, because their organisations share a commitment for or against something and agree to work together for a time. The target issue is what the members have in common, but they may use quite different methods or aim at different long-term results. A coalition expects to include both individuals and organisations. Each member conducts specific work with respect to conflict prevention and peacebuilding while the commitment to each other is for the part of the work that involves conflict.

An **alliance is a link between organisations** which are similar enough in goals, type of work, and methods to decide to work closely together on a long-term basis.

Organisations are often in a kind of alliance that shares aims and values, a similar approach, and an intention to support each other in various ways. Two organisations in an alliance are likely to expect more of each other than non-allied organisations and individuals. This can enable them to work together fruitfully, with less competition. The OECD is a good example of connected organisations with similar goals.

The Peacebuilding Training Course will bring together individuals from organisations which are allies in one way or another.

Therefore, think about identifying networking-projects!

Quick guide for trainers and hosts

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1. Introduction to the Quick Guide

This Quick Guide is meant for trainers and hosts of the OECD DAC training courses "Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding" (CPPB) and "Security Sector Reform and Governance" (SSRG). It provides guidance for trainers and administrators who are responsible for preparing and delivering these courses. Although there are many specific instructions in this guide, the key message is to be flexible and to adapt the training content and methods to the particular characteristics and needs of the trainees.

The Quick Guide does four things:

- It provides trainers with concrete suggestions for preparing and implementing training courses based on the OECD training modules;
- It suggests to host organisations ways of planning and managing the courses;
- It briefly introduces the training courses "Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding" and "Security Sector Reform and Governance";
- Finally, it recommends further training resources.

We hope you will enjoy working with these materials.

PART 1: ORIENTATION FOR TRAINERS

2. How adults learn

"I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand." (Confucius)

The learning process is fundamental to training. A basic understanding of it will enable you to choose the most effective approach to training in a given situation.


One useful working definition of learning is: "A relatively permanent change in behaviour that occurs as a result of practice or experience." Training should therefore be a process for providing directed practice and experience for the purposes of encouraging learning.

Research on how adults learn most effectively shows that training tends to be more successful when:

- Participants have been involved in defining, or refining, their own learning objectives;
- The content is focused on real problems faced by the participants;
- Training is undertaken in a varied and participatory environment.

This thinking underpins one of the standard models of training, known as the learning cycle, illustrated in the diagram below. Developed by David Kolb, it draws a close link between doing and learning. The learning cycle involves experiencing, observing, thinking, and applying.

Learning Cycle (David Kolb)



Reflection occurs based on experience, and conclusions involving new ideas are formulated. These are then used to generate new experiences, starting the process again.

Kolb's learning cycle includes both inductive learning and deductive learning:

- Inductive learning means experiencing and drawing conclusions from experience;
- Deductive learning starts with a principle or rule and applies it to a situation.

It is the inclusion of both forms of learning within the cycle that makes it so powerful.

In developing the methodology for the OECD DAC training programme, this model of experiential learning has been a guiding principle. You should continually check back to ensure that your own methodology reflects this process.

Tips for facilitating learning

- Ensure that a good learning environment is created in advance (good physical conditions; respect, acceptance, and trust);
- Clarify the learning objectives together with the participants. Participants must have an expectation that the learning will make their work more effective;
- Provide the information in doses that the trainees can digest. As a rule of thumb, allow a 5 minute-break after every 45 minutes of intensive learning. Allow for reflection and adjust the pace of learning to the capacity of participants; summarise and restate key messages;
- Focus the subject matter on the current needs and problems of the participants. Link new information to the personal experience of the participants;
- Use a variety of training techniques that are rooted in the participants' own knowledge and experience. Alternate learning methods, e.g. follow a presentation by group work, use different visualisation tools;
- Take account of the level of education of participants and adapt the material to their capacities. Participants must be able to achieve the course objective relying on their own resources;
- Ensure flexibility, allowing for adaptations to training activities as they progress;
- Understand the training as a multidirectional process. Participants learn from you, you learn from the participants' experience, and the participants learn from each other. The trainer should not pretend to know everything;
- Apply the subject matter to practical examples, have participants practice their new skills during the training;

- Understand the training as one step in an ongoing learning process. Follow-up and support in applying the new skills are important complementary elements of successful learning and need to be planned beforehand.

3. Being a trainer

In OECD DAC training programmes, students learn mostly by doing. This section provides some pointers on this form of education, which we refer to as training.

Imagine you are a driving instructor and your trainee is a young woman. She is in the driver's seat. You give her guidance and encouragement. You tell her how to operate the gears, the clutch and the brake, and how to move safely through the traffic. Then she starts to drive. Most of the time now, she is teaching herself to drive. As long as she is on the right track you don't need to do much. Sometimes you intervene to avoid a dangerous situation. But mostly, let her get on with the job. When she gets her driver's licence, it will be her own achievement. But your help as a trainer made her task easier and less dangerous.

Your job is not to convey as much relevant information to your students as possible. As a driving instructor, you wouldn't dwell on the technical development of vehicles over time, explain the physics of the internal combustion engine or discuss the complexities of traffic law. In class, don't try to dazzle the trainees with PowerPoint. Don't impress them with your detailed knowledge. Spare them the quotations from the classics. No one cares much anyway what you say or do. You are just a helper. What counts is what your trainees achieve. When they reach their goals, your job is done. And if they achieve this through their own efforts rather than yours, all the better. You can be proud of them and pleased with yourself.

Usually, lectures are not an appropriate form of teaching in a training course. But now and then, a short and focused introduction can be useful, especially if afterwards you ask the students to apply what you have been telling them. Similarly, you can demonstrate something and then ask them to do it themselves.

You love your subject, or you wouldn't be teaching it. So *show* the trainees what is so fascinating about it. Better still, let them find out for themselves. The more eager they are, the better they will learn. As Yeats said: education is not filling a bucket, it is lighting a fire. Once the trainees are committed, push them to achieve their goal. When they do, shower them with praise. Your main concern is to monitor and encourage them as they learn. Are they interested and attentive? Are they eager? Are they working together and helping each other? Are they more or less on course? If so, then let them get on with it. If not, give them a hand.

Skills of a good facilitator

- Ask open questions. A facilitator asks questions that invite participants to reflect and share with the group, like "What do you think about X?" rather than closed questions that only require a yes or no answer;
- Encourage participation and make sure everyone has enough opportunities to contribute. Keep a list of people who want to speak, and then create speaking rules with the group;
- Allow group members to answer each other's questions;
- Summarise discussions and review the main points at the end of a discussion;
- Acknowledge different viewpoints;
- Be alert to sensitive issues;
- Listen rather than talk;
- Keep the group focused on content;

- Acknowledge that you are aware of the issues and themes participants want to discuss;
- Allow for short periods of silence, as silence creates a time in which participants can reflect before or after speaking.

4. Preparing the training course

A successful workshop requires careful preparation. Make the participants and their learning needs the starting point for all workshop planning.

Knowing the participants

Ideally, the trainer will develop the training together with a small planning group of resource people who have a good understanding of the organisation and the targeted training group. It is important to know and understand:

- Why they are attending;
- Their hopes and expectations;
- Their fears and concerns;
- Their range of experience, degree of discipline, age, gender, and status.

It is good practice to send out a questionnaire together with the invitations to find out about participants' knowledge and expectations. You will find a pre-training questionnaire in the annex of this workbook.

As the combination of factors varies from group to group, the trainer also needs to consider the **characteristics of the group** being trained. These include the group's previous experience of training, their own organisation's attitude to training, the purpose of the training, the preferred learning style of the participants, the group's understanding of the process of learning, how the group expects the facilitator to act and the type of training it expects as well as, particular needs of the group, e.g. special starting and finishing times, and accessibility for people with disabilities.

Planning the training event then involves six steps:

- 1. Specify learning objectives:** Based on the participants' training needs, define the general objective of the whole training event and specific objectives for each session within the workshop. Learning objectives describe what the participants will be able to do as a result of the training.
- 2. Identify content and sequence of learning:** Select relevant material from the training manual according to the identified learning objectives. You may separate content according to what participants *must know*, *should know*, and *could know*.

In planning the *sequence of learning*, consider that learners learn best in situations where they start with what they know and move in gradual steps towards the unknown.

- 3. Decide on learning methods:** Identify what learning methods might be most appropriate for the workshop. Select learning methods based on the learning preferences of the participants, and aim for a mix of different methods, balancing short lectures, mini-activities and interactive exercises.
- 4. Devise activities and other input:** Devise activities and other types of input that reflect your planning. Keep presentations simple and relevant and do not exceed 15-20 minutes. They can always be supplemented by handouts and further references. Make use of participatory learning methods, ice-breakers and quick review methods.

5. **Prepare training materials:** Prepare the training materials, equipment, and resources people require for each session. The materials of this training manual can be used as published, or in a form modified by the trainer.
6. **Produce a training plan and programme:** Write a detailed training plan or programme to be given to the participants at the beginning of the workshop. Prepare a more detailed, session-by-session plan to guide the trainer and the planning group through the event. You can find one example of a training programme in this manual. Detailed plans for individual sessions can be found in the trainer notes.

5. Implementing the training course

The following are some points as to what should normally appear at the beginning, the middle, and the end of a training event.

The beginning

- Welcome to the course (by a representative of the host organisation);
- Participants introduce themselves and express their expectations towards the workshop;
- The trainer presents and discusses the objectives and programme of the workshop. This is a two-way 'contracting' process, in which the trainer and participants negotiate expectations and learning objectives. The aim is to create a shared vision of the workshop;
- Arouse the participants' interest in the topic. Do this by using several approaches, e.g. a discussion, interesting input, or a good icebreaker.

The middle

This is the longest phase, when participants work actively to achieve the learning objectives. When planning this phase, consider:

- People do not concentrate well for long periods of time. Divide the programme into sessions of 90 minutes duration, followed by a 20-30 minute break. Presentations should not exceed 20 minutes;
- Initiate each day with a brief review of the learning of the day before. The group may designate a participant to do this. Then announce the topics of the day;
- Consider people's changing learning capacity during the day. Introduce complex issues in the morning, when participants are alert and active. Start with an energiser after the lunch break and plan for a participatory activity;
- At the end of each day, conclude the workshop with a quick review session, which gives participants the opportunity to offer their feed-back.

Individual training sessions may follow this structure, although you should aim for variation in your training methods.

Training session model

- An introductory exercise that draws out participants' own ideas/understanding relating to the topic (e.g., brainstorming, personal experiences);
- A relevant participatory activity (e.g. case study, role play, discussion topic) for the participants to experience together, forms the main body of the training session;
- General reflection and discussion on the exercise (this could be a group-work exercise, discussion in pairs, question and answer);

- Analysis of the basic principles/model/concepts involved or development of a conceptual framework (this might take the form of a short presentation, handouts, overheads, video);
- Experimentation or practice (either during or after the workshop) of the concepts, skills, attitudes developed within the training session;
- Review, feedback, and evaluation.

In the OECD DAC training modules, you will find materials for a variety of learning activities related to each subject area.

The end

The final stage of the workshop is extremely important and requires as much planning as both the beginning or middle.

- Consolidation is important! Go back over the key ideas and areas of learning covered;
- Set up exercises to show that the learning objectives have been achieved;
- Provide adequate time for the exchange of feedback between the trainer and participants and course evaluation. This exchange is vital, as it provides both with a clear understanding of how the contents of the training were perceived.

6. Variety in techniques and instructors

Learning by doing is an approach, not a method. There are many different ways in which trainees can learn by doing. Vary them throughout the course. No single teaching method is perfect for all situations. Some situations call for teaching by dialogue, others for discussion, group work, or a simulation exercise. At each stage, the training workbook will suggest a teaching tool for the job at hand. Variation will not only make your teaching more effective, it will also make the course livelier. You don't want the trainees to get bored.

This also applies to instructors. Your programme should have a lead trainer who is responsible for the course as a whole and makes sure that all is going well. But however good this lead trainer is, he or she should not do all the teaching. Invite other instructors or resource persons to lead some training sessions. They may be especially good at managing a simulation exercise, knowledgeable about a particular part of the security system, or familiar with a particular case study.

Do your best to get a healthy mix of instructors. For instance, if they are all middle-aged men from northern countries with a background in defence, you will miss some important perspectives in your course. The problem is the same if they are all young women from peace organisations in the South.

Some of the trainers or resource persons will also serve as observers in the simulation exercise. If from time to time there is disagreement in class among instructors, this need not be cause for alarm. It will show the trainees that opinions can legitimately differ on issues such as security system reform.

You may not be able to select your trainees, but if you can get a mixed group, that will also make the course richer and more colourful. It is highly desirable to have a mix of women and men and professional backgrounds and cultures in your classroom.

In general, make sure you make good use of the talent and expertise in the room. Don't miss an opportunity to get a student to make a point, instead of an instructor. Preferably not the same student every time.

7. Dealing with problems

Any number of things might go wrong in the course of a training event. One of the most demanding tasks for a trainer is to know how best to handle the situation when something is not going according to plan.

a. Dealing with anxieties

There are two useful ways of dealing with pre-workshop anxieties (and we *all* have them!):

- Analyse your anxieties and think about how to deal with them: make a note of the worst things that you think might happen during the workshop. Then, for each item on the list, note down two ways in which you could deal with that situation. This should make you feel more confident;
- Accept that you won't be able to cope with everything perfectly. You don't have to be perfect. If you feel stressed by the thought of potential crises, or by real training problems, the concept of a 'good enough' trainer may be helpful. You are developing your training skills and knowledge every time you facilitate a training session. If the participants seem to be learning something, you are probably doing fine! After the training event (as soon as possible), make a note of the things that you did not do so well, and consider how you might handle them differently if they arise again. This exercise will contribute to your own learning process.

b. Preparing for contingencies

One of the easiest ways of dealing with contingencies in training workshops is to apply the notion that, if what you are now doing is not working, try doing the opposite. For example:

- If a plenary session is not working, break into smaller groups;
- If a practical exercise is not working, change it to a demonstration;
- If a thinking session is not working, move on to a practical activity;
- If a facilitator's example is not appropriate, seek out a participant's example.

Another way of planning contingencies is to develop a series of simple exercises or activities that can be relied upon to assist in resolving the most common problems encountered in any group. These can be used as necessary when the problem arises. For example:

- If participants are becoming disengaged from the content, divide them into smaller groups and ask them to apply the material to situations from their own experience;
- If you are unsure what to do next, announce a short break (for refreshments, if there are any) to give yourself more time to think;
- If there seems to be resistance, call for a round where participants express how they are feeling;
- If the present session is not working, move to the next part of the programme early;
- If you are running out of material, end the session early rather than creating fillers;
- If the group is becoming fragmented, bring participants back together and ask them to work on clarifying the purpose of their work together.

Many of these common contingencies rely upon the use of opposites. They also generate the space for the trainer to reassert a measure of control or for the participants to express their own difficulties in a legitimate way within a group.

8. Evaluating the training course

Evaluation is an important part of the training process. As a trainer of the OECD DAC Training Programme, you are responsible for performing two levels of evaluation:

Learning evaluation examines whether the training objectives have been achieved. It measures changes in the participants' skills, knowledge, attitudes, and practice, by comparing pre-training standards with post-training results. Post-training does not always mean at the end of the whole workshop or programme; it can be after the completion of specific parts of the event.

Learning evaluation starts during the training. For this, you need to build ways of monitoring whether or not the participants can do the things set out in the training objectives. This can be done in a variety of ways:

- Practical and written tests;
- Case study and problem-solving exercises (e.g. working on own cases, role-play).

It is important that the participants know the results of this evaluation because they need to be clear how they stand in relation to completing the training objectives.

Reaction evaluation seeks to gather the reaction of the participants to the whole, or a section, of the training. Good feedback is essential for trainers to improve their own effectiveness and the quality of the programme.

Throughout the workshop, feedback should be continually sought from participants to ensure that the trainer is aware of how the course is going. If the participants express discontent, the trainers need to consider revisions to structure and content of the event. Structured feedback is also important for participants to develop a sense of ownership over the training process and to be able to vent frustrations. Quick review methods, which can be applied at the end of a training session or the day, can provide trainers with essential feedback. These methods include:

Talking wall: The trainer prepares several flipcharts as posters in advance and places them around the walls of the room. Each poster contains an open statement at the top (e.g. "What I think is missing in this workshop is..."). Participants are given a marker and invited to walk around the room adding appropriate comments to each sheet. Everyone should be encouraged to read the comments written by others;

Feedback rounds ('flashlight'): Rounds provide a quick and simple method of gathering an instant reaction from all participants to the current state of the course or group. At a natural break or between exercises, the trainer announces that he/she would like to hear from all the participants how the course is going. After a few minutes, each participant makes a brief statement (1-2 sentences, one word);

Choose your corner: Set up four flip-charts, one in each corner of the room, each with the title of a session from the previous day (or a subject area). Ask participants to go to the subject that most interested them. The group gathered around each sheet brainstorms about the main things they learned about the session. These are written up on the sheet. Feedback from each group should be requested in one sentence.

At the **end of the workshop**, it is good practice to have an oral and a written evaluation of the training course. It is important to reserve sufficient time for this part of the training. The **oral feedback session** can depart from the participants' expectations expressed at the beginning of the training. Alternatively, the trainer needs to prepare a set of questions for the participants to discuss. This last round of feedback is not a time for discussion. The trainer should make an effort to listen and understand everyone's perspective on the event.

The OECD DAC training material contains an **evaluation form** that can be given to participants at the end of the training. Make sure they complete the form before leaving the course.

Note: *Parts of these notes have been adapted from a training kit designed by Action for the Rights of Children (ARC).*

PART II: ORIENTATION FOR HOST ORGANISATIONS

Training courses represent an important investment in terms of time and resources. Yet good training courses don't just happen: they require a lot of careful preparation. This checklist has been prepared to help you remember the key steps involved in organising a good training course.

Some remarks on terminology:

- The 'coordinator' is the person designated by the host organisation to organise the training course. It can be a staff member or a person contracted specifically for this task;
- The 'trainer' is the person responsible for the conceptual aspects of the training. He or she designs and facilitates the overall training event;
- Sometimes, it makes sense to invite 'experts' who can provide specialised inputs on key issues or share their experience with participants. They can contribute to specific training sessions;
- High-level or large training events require the support of training assistants, assuming responsibility for workshop logistics, seminar assistance and documentation.

1. Defining training needs and learning objectives

It is the coordinator's responsibility to identify the training needs and learning objectives of the training and make sure that the right content is delivered by the right trainers. The following questions should help you define objectives and content of the training.

1. Analysis of training needs

- Deficit or problem to be addressed by the training course?
- Who should be involved in addressing this problem?
- What kind of knowledge and skills do these persons need if they are to be able to find solutions to the problem?

2. Define the objectives and scope of the training

- Do we need a training course? Alternative – more cost-effective – ways to achieve this objective?
- Training objective? Expected results?
- Who is the training for? (profile of participants)
- Topic of the training course? Knowledge and skills to be taught?
- Training methodology?
- Possible cooperation with other organisations?
- Profile of trainers and experts?

- Date and duration of the training?
- Expected cost of the training? Resources available?
- Time needed to prepare the training course?
- Location of the training? Suitable facilities?

3. Identify participants' training needs

- If there is a fixed group of participants, identify their specific training needs (e.g. by a pre-training questionnaire, telephone interviews, meeting with their superiors);
- Consider participants' professional position, their job descriptions and tasks, the institution they work for, their experience and previous knowledge of the subject, their motivation and attitude towards the subject, gender, age, cultural issues, and the overall number of participants.

4. Design the training programme

- Define the thematic and methodological focus of the training;
- Develop the initial workshop programme;
- Prepare appropriate teaching materials;
- Plan social activities;
- Develop a detailed training plan.

5. Design the follow-up process to the training

- Define an appropriate follow-up process (e.g. written evaluation, networking, help desk, coaching, follow-up workshop)

2. Preparing and running a training course

This section offers advice on the administrative aspects of preparing and running a training course.

Budget

Typically, the budget for a training course comprises the following items:

- Salaries and honorariums (training coordinator, trainer, experts, support personnel);
- Rent of training facilities (e.g. conference centre, hotel, rent of equipment);
- Travel costs (trainers, participants, representatives of host organisation);
- Accommodation (trainers, participants, representatives of host organisation);
- Meals (breakfast, breaks, mid-day, dinner in the evening);
- Training materials (e.g. paper, photocopies, training documentation);
- Communication costs;
- 5-7% margin for unforeseen expenses.

Recruiting the training team

Define the kind of background, experience and skills you expect from the trainer. Invite the submission of CVs. Double-check key skills with previous clients of the trainer.

Clarify whether you need to invite experts on specific issues. Obtain recommendations.

Identify whether you need support personnel. Try to obtain suitable personnel from your organisation.

Define the tasks and responsibilities of the training team. Draw-up terms of reference and contracts.

Dates of the training

Double-check that the dates of the training do not coincide with important events of the organisation or fall at peak-times during the year.

Training facilities

The training facilities should offer at least one large room for plenary work and 2-4 small rooms nearby for group work and as office space for the training team. The rooms should come with the required technical infrastructure (telephone, electrical wiring, audiovisual equipment, and Internet). It is advisable that the training facility be near to participants' accommodation, safe, quiet, and easy to reach by public transport. Office and medical services should be near at hand.

The quality of the training facilities, accommodation and meals contribute to the overall atmosphere of the training. Select clean and quiet accommodation with good communication facilities, where participants will feel comfortable.

Invitation of participants

Inform the institutions from which you expect to receive participants about the training course. Make sure you address your letter to the relevant person in charge of training or the thematic issues dealt with in the training course.

Draft an official invitation letter signed by a high-level person in your organisation. Prepare documentation about the training course to be sent out with the invitation. The material should provide information on the background and objectives of the course, the topics to be covered, information about your organisation, a preliminary training programme, dates and the location of the course, possibly a brief questionnaire for participants, and details about registration for the course (costs, deadline, obligations of the participants, etc.).

Communication with participants

Register participants and draw up a list of participants at the latest 4-6 weeks before the training begins. Send out confirmation notes to participants, providing more detailed information about the course, a questionnaire asking for their knowledge and expectations, an introductory reading list; requests for material to be prepared by participants beforehand, logistical information (accommodation, transport, meals, etc.), etc. About one week before the course is due to start, contact participants again to communicate the final agenda and further logistical details (e.g. travel map, contact numbers, local climate).

Training materials

Work together with the trainer to prepare a checklist of required training materials. They usually include:

5-10 pinboards, 1-2 flipcharts, pin board paper (5-10 pages per day), flipchart paper, cards of different colours and shapes, pins, markers, adhesive tape, scissors, printing paper, digital camera, PowerPoint projector, and screen for video projections.

The day before the training

Finalise all preparations and meet the training team for a final briefing and planning session. Check technical equipment, prepare the room, have all teaching materials ready (e.g. print-outs, folders), coordinate with service personnel for meals, transport and social activities. Try to create a welcoming atmosphere for participants! The training team needs time to meet (sometimes for the first time) and agree on the final details of the programme.

3. Checklist for course preparation

This checklist summarises the key steps of planning and running a training course in chronological order.

Task	Responsible	Deadline before the training	Done
Initial analysis of training needs	Coordinator	6 months before	
Define training objectives	Coordinator	6 months before	
Initial contact with partner and co-financing organisations	Coordinator	6 months before	
Draw up budget	Coordinator	5 months before	
Identify and contract trainer(s)	Coordinator	5 months before	
Revise the training objectives according to the identified training needs	Coordinator and trainer	5 months before	
Concretise the training content according to the training objectives	Coordinator and trainer	5 months before	
Define the follow-up to the training	Coordinator and trainer	5 months before	
Prepare the preliminary workshop programme and methodology	Coordinator and trainer	5 months before	
If applicable, contact experts (for technical presentations)	Coordinator	4-5 months before	
Select and visit training facilities (e.g. conference centre, hotel)	Coordinator	3-5 months before	
Define profile of participants to develop an initial participants' list (for invitations)	Coordinator and trainer	4 months before	
Announce training to relevant institutions, from which participants are expected	Coordinator	3 months before	
Final selection of experts and verification of their availability	Coordinator	3 months before	
Contract invited experts	Coordinator	3 months before	

>>> continued

Develop training programme and methodology	Coordinator, trainer, experts	2-3 months before	
Identification of required technical equipment, rent or purchase	Coordinator	1-2 months before	
Select and contract support personnel (e.g. training assistant)	Coordinator	1-2 months before	
Follow-up invitation letters	Coordinator	6 weeks before	
Registration of participants	Coordinator	4 weeks before	
Confirmation letter to participants	Coordinator	3 weeks before	
Last clarification of logistical needs with the training facility, including social activities (e.g. cocktail, joint dinner, games)	Coordinator	3 weeks before	
Double-check participation of the trainer and experts, send them up-to-date information (e.g. list of participants)	Coordinator	2 weeks before	
Buy and organise all materials for the training (e.g. paper, markers)	Coordinator	3 days before	
Prepare the first day of the training	Coordinator, trainer, experts, support personnel	1-2 days before	
Meeting of the training team	Coordinator, trainer, experts, support personnel	Afternoon before the training	

Source: Adapted from WWF/DSE/IFOK 2003

PART III: HOW TO USE THE OECD DAC TRAINING MODULES

A. Module on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB)

As an instructor in this programme, you will be helping the students as they learn to understand and apply the main points of the DAC Guidelines "**Helping Prevent Violent Conflict**" (2001), the DAC manual "**Preventing Conflict and Building Peace. A Manual of Issues and Entry Points**" (2005) and the draft **OECD criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives (2007)**.

You will be using this **trainer's workbook** which was specially developed for this programme. Some of its instructions are only meant for the trainers, so keep it away from the students. The workbook is divided into thematic sessions, which can be used independently of each other, as a collection of thematic sessions, or as a whole training package. The length of sessions varies between 45 minutes and a full day. For each session, you can expect to find the following materials:

- **Trainer notes** outlining the learning objectives of the session, a suggested schedule, suggested learning activities, and a list of required materials;
- **Powerpoint presentation:** You may decide to either present the powerpoint presentation or to use it as an input for a brainstorming or a dialogue session;
- **Handouts:** Handouts include summaries of key learning points, participants' instructions for group work and exercises, and materials for a range of learning activities.

In a number of exercises, participants will be asked to apply newly learned skills to real-life situations. Depending on the trainer's and participants' experience, you may want to present your own cases or encourage participants to work on situations they know personally. Alternatively, the workbook offers you three **country cases** (Sri Lanka, Timor Leste, Colombia) as material for practical exercises.

A slightly different **student's workbook** is available for participants. Please give it to them at the beginning of the course. It contains handouts and exercises they will need to look at during the course. During the course, ask them only to consult the parts of the workbook that you refer to, and not to read ahead. The reason is that some exercises will work best if the students come to them unprepared. After the course, the student's workbook will serve to refresh their memories and provide additional material for reference and further reading.

The standard OECD DAC training course on CPPB lasts 2^{1/2} days. It familiarises practitioners with some instruments for conflict-sensitising development assistance and for enhancing the contribution of development assistance to peacebuilding. It also highlights some of the challenges they can expect to face when applying these instruments.

The CPPB material can also be offered in other teaching formats. For example, shorter introductory courses for busy policy-makers with a first introduction to the subject, and longer courses that prepare students for a specific task in the field of CPPB.

The standard 2^{1/2}-day CPPB training course comprises the following interactive training sessions:

DAY 1

1. In the opening session, the participants are welcomed and introduced. A representative of the organisation hosting the course may briefly outline the background and rationale of the course.
2. After that, the trainer explains the objectives and programme of the course. He/She briefly highlights the linkages between development, conflict prevention and peacebuilding and refers to the DAC Guidelines. Participants have the opportunity to provide feedback. Trainer and participants define ground rules of appropriate behaviour for the training course.
3. The trainer or a representative of the host organisation introduces the concepts of conflict prevention and peacebuilding and introduces the DAC Guiding Principles for engaging in conflict situations. Alternatively, participants may define and reflect on these concepts in a brainstorming session.
4. The trainer or another resource person presents key concepts of conflict theory and introduces the main elements of conflict analysis. In working groups, participants then have the opportunity of applying these concepts to case studies or specific cases from their own experience. They then reconvene to report and discuss their findings.
5. The trainer or another resource person presents key concepts of conflict-sensitive planning, Do No Harm and impact assessment. Participants are then asked to apply these concepts and tools to deepen their analysis of the cases of the previous session. Participants return to the same working groups. They then reconvene to report and discuss their findings.
6. In the evening, participants are offered the opportunity of participating in a 'Market Place' to present their knowledge and current activities to each other. This is an excellent opportunity for networking and mutual learning. If this exercise is used, participants need to be informed beforehand so that they can bring relevant materials to the course.

DAY 2

7. After reviewing the learning of the previous day, the trainer introduces dialogue as a key approach for preventing conflict and building peace. Participants practice their dialogue skills in practical exercises.
8. The largest part of Day 2 is taken up by the role-play on negotiating and preparing a Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) in the fictitious country of Oxania. Under the chairmanship of a UN diplomat, representatives of the government, opposition, civil society and the international community meet to explore the need and possibilities for a PCNA in Oxania. The background information, a rough programme for the simulated conference and pointers on how to play the game are all in the workbooks for instructors and students. The trainer leading the role-play needs to have had adequate experience in such exercises.

The role-play serves to consolidate what has been previously learned about the DAC Guiding Principles, dialogue and conflict analysis and impact assessment. At the same time, it offers practical experience of the challenges encountered in promoting conflict-sensitive development in a war-torn environment. A thorough debriefing of the exercise is essential for stimulating learning.

9. The last part of Day 2 is devoted to acquainting participants with a specific dimension of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The training module contains materials on good governance, the role of civil society, and co-ordination and co-operation in the context of violent conflict. This session might be taught by a trainer with specialised knowledge of the topic concerned.

DAY 3

10. Day 3 again begins with a review of the activities of the previous day. Participants then work on the issue of evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives. The trainer introduces the draft OECD Guidelines for evaluating peacebuilding and then sets up a practical exercise to apply these criteria.
11. In the final substantive session, trainees receive an introduction to the CPDC e-learning material and explore the use of networks and organisations to support their CPPB-related work. Led by a trainer, they map out the main relevant institutions and networks along with their roles.
12. The last session is devoted to evaluating the course (oral feedback and evaluation form provided in the workbook) and to giving the trainees their diplomas.

A sample of the suggested programme is provided in the annex.

B. Module on Security System Reform and Governance (SSRG)

As an instructor in this programme, you will help the students as they learn to understand and apply the main points of the **Handbook on Security System Reform**. This was published in 2007 by the OECD Development Assistance Committee. You will be using a **trainer's workbook** specially developed for this programme. Some of its instructions are only meant for the trainers, so keep it away from the students.

A slightly different **student's workbook** is available for them. Please give it to them at the beginning of the course. It contains handouts and exercises they will need to look at during training. During the course, ask them only to consult the parts of the workbook that you refer to, and not to read ahead. The reason is that some exercises will work best if the students come to them unprepared. After the course, the student's workbook will serve to refresh their memories and provide additional material for reference and further reading.

The standard OECD DAC training course on SSRG lasts three days. It familiarises practitioners with some knowledge of the security sector using the mainstream approach to SSR and the challenges they can expect to face when applying it.

The SSRG material can also be offered in other teaching formats. For example, shorter introductory courses for busy policy-makers with a first introduction to the subject, and longer courses that prepare students for a specific task or mission in the field of SSR.

The standard three-day SSRG training course comprises the following interactive training sessions:

1. In the opening session, the students and resource persons are welcomed and introduced. A good way to do this is to have each person introduce his or her neighbour. This requires a few minutes of preparation for them to get to know each other.
2. The trainer then explains the objectives and programme of the course. The trainer also discusses and illustrates the relationship between security and development, as well as the OECD DAC Guidelines on SSR. Finally, the trainer asks the students to observe some ground rules for the training course: One, their full attendance and active participation is essential. Two, interruptions that serve to clear up misunderstandings, illustrate a point or present a different view are most welcome. Three, everyone should switch off their mobile phones.
3. The group familiarises itself with methods of assessing the need for and focus of SSR from preparation up to execution of the programme. As a specific setting, they use the case of fighting police corruption in the fictitious post-Soviet republic of Franconia.
4. The trainees break up into working groups to work on an assessment for a programme to combat police corruption in Franconia.
5. They then reconvene to report and discuss their findings.
6. Continuing their work on the case of police reform in Franconia, the trainees now familiarise themselves with the guidelines for programme design and begin to apply them.
7. Having broken up into groups, they sketch the outlines of an SSR-support programme for the police in Franconia.
8. Then they reconvene to report and discuss their findings.
This concludes Part One of the course, which takes up the largest part of the first day.
9. At the end of Day One, the trainees explore the use of networks and organisations to support their SSR-related work. Led by a trainer, they map out the main relevant institutions and networks as well as their roles (Market Place).
10. Day Two is mainly devoted to a simulation exercise, but first the trainees acquaint themselves with a part of the security system not previously discussed. This could be any of the sectors outlined in the Handbook on SSR except police reform. Defence reform, justice reform, democratic oversight or civil society reform are all important and attractive options. This session can be taught by a trainer with specialised knowledge of the sector concerned. However this person must be willing and able to train, rather than lecture. There is a similar session on Day Three, which would focus on yet another part of the security system.
11. The remainder of Day Two is taken up by a simulation exercise on negotiating and preparing for SSR in a post-conflict setting (the fictitious country of Assra). Under the chairmanship of a UN diplomat, representatives of the transitional government, the opposing and formerly warring factions, and the international community meet to explore the need and possibilities for SSR in Assra. Actually, Assra is not ready for SSR, but the international community feels the need for local stakeholders to identify the country's main security concerns, address them and, by doing so, pave the way for stability, government reform and development in Assra. The background information, a rough programme for the simulated conference and

pointers on how to play the game are all in the workbook for instructors and students. The trainer leading the role-play needs to have had experience in such exercises.

12. Day Three begins with a detailed review of the simulation exercise. Independent rapporteurs who observed the game report their findings. The trainer does the same, and the trainees reflect on lessons to be learned about the substantive issues and the process of negotiating SSR.
13. Another part of the security system is discussed (see item 10 above).
14. In the final substantive session, the trainees get an introduction to the CPDC e-learning material. Furthermore, they discuss ways of building political support for SSR in the host country, in the donor country and in the international community.
15. The last session is devoted to evaluating the course (a questionnaire is provided in the annex of this workbook) and to giving the trainees their diplomas.

PART IV: FURTHER RESOURCES

This list suggests books and manuals that may be useful, but also web sites where a wealth of relevant material can be found. Make sure of exploring some of the sites recommended.

The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) in Germany has developed a range of 'TRESA' training modules on small arms control, reintegration of combatants and how to be a trainer. Most can be downloaded for free. Consult www.tresa-online.org. BICC also provides training courses.

The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) in the Netherlands is developing a 'Starlink' series of training modules on SSR, which are freely available to *bona fide* users. Consult www.cess.org/publications for summaries of the modules and how to obtain them. CESS also provides training courses.

The Centre for Security Sector Management (CSSM) at Cranfield University in the UK used to operate the GFN-SSR. It remains engaged in research and training on SSR. Consult www.ssronline.org/

CICO InWent Handbook (2004): *Strengthening Civil Competency in Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management*. Pretoria: InWEnt.

Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (www.clingendael.nl) is engaged in research and training on topics related to conflict prevention and SSR.

The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (www.conflict-prevention.net) is a clearinghouse for debate, research and training on conflict prevention.

Fisher, Simon et al. (2000): *Working with Conflict. Skills and Strategies for Action*. Birmingham: Zed Books.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (www.dcaf.ch) publishes a wide range of reports, books, manuals and briefings on various aspects of SSR, many of which can serve as training tools.

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (www.gcsp.ch) has published various books and reports on subjects related to SSR. GCSP also provides training courses.

The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), now based at the University of Birmingham, is a service funded by the UK government. It is a clearinghouse of information, analysis and training on SSR. See www.ssrnetwork.net. GFN-SSR also provides training courses.

Hulley, Charlotte (2006): *Youth Peacebuilding Training Sudan*. International Rescue Committee.

InWEnt (www.inwent.org) in Germany provides training and has published on various topics related to conflict prevention.

Mischnick, Ruth (2007): *Nonviolent Conflict Transformation: Training Manual for a Training of Trainers Course*. Bratislava: KURVE Wustrow.

Neufeldt, Reina et al. (eds.) (2002): *Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual*. Vatican City: CARITAS Internationalis.

The OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), is the international forum that brings together conflict prevention and peacebuilding experts from bilateral and multilateral development agencies, including those from the UN system, the EC, the IMF and the World Bank. These experts meet to define and develop common approaches in support of peace. The CPDC is a subsidiary group of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Go to www.oecd.org/dac/conflict for OECD and CPDC publications on conflict prevention and SSR.

Saferworld et al. (2004): *Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Training Manual*. London.

Schmelzle, Beatrix (2007): *Training for Conflict Transformation – An Overview of Approaches and Resources*. Berghof Handbook. www.berghof-handbook.net

The UN Department of Economic and Social Development has an internet site on Conflict, Peace-Building and Development. www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/

The UN Peacebuilding Commission offers political documents and research reports at www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding .

On Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, the clearinghouse is the UN DDR Resource Centre. Among many other things, you can download the full three-kilos of the UN's Integrated DDR Standards, or a more readable Operational Guide to the IDDRS (www.unddr.org).

UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is one of the leading agencies in conflict prevention and SSR support programmes. Visit www.undp.org/cpr/

The University of Bradford in the UK has a large and productive department of peace studies with publications on conflict prevention, SSR and related topics. www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/

The World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (<http://go.worldbank.org/3QZPKY2XU0>) offers research reports and other useful resources.

Zelizer, Craig and Linda Johnston (2005): "Skills, Networks and Knowledge. Developing a Career." In: *International Peace and Conflict Resolution*. Alexandria, VA: Action for Conflict Transformation. www.conflictransformation.org

ANNEX

I. CASE STUDY: COLOMBIA¹

1. General introduction

Colombia has experienced more than 40 years of internal armed conflict between the state and left-wing ELN and FARC guerrillas and, since the 1990s, rapidly growing paramilitary forces. Further sources of violence are repression against political opponents, extortion, "ordinary" crime and the narcotics trade, which is dominated by drug cartels and illegal armed groups. As a result, Colombia accounts for one of the highest homicide and kidnapping rates in the world. About 3 million people have been internally displaced due to the armed conflict.

Attempts at negotiating peace have remained largely unsuccessful. The latest effort was made by the administration of President Pastrana (1998-2002). It followed a two-pronged strategy of engaging the FARC guerrilla forces in peace negotiations and offering them a zone of retreat, while trying to weaken them militarily by the largely US-supported Plan Colombia. As a result, violence and insecurity increased all over the country. This led to the electoral success of independent candidate Uribe in 2002 who promised tough policies against the insurgents. The initial successes of his "democratic security policy", which involved substantial support for the Colombian military forces, the formation of rural militias and a network of informants, contributed to his wide popularity and re-election in May 2006. His second term will be judged on his ability to conclude the controversial demobilisation of the paramilitary forces, achieve tangible results in the negotiations with the ELN, and re-initiate the peace process with the FARC.

2. Historical background

Until the mid-20th century, Colombian politics had been dominated by the conflict between the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. Civil wars occurred frequently, notably in 1899-1903 and 1948-1953 ("La Violencia"). In 1958, the Liberal and Conservative Party entered into a power-sharing agreement, which *de facto* excluded other parties. This sparked the emergence of left-wing guerrilla movements in the 1960s, notably the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which drew the government into a drawn-out military campaign. The rise of the illegal drug trade in the 1980s complicated the political-military situation. Right-wing paramilitary groups, often linked to the drug cartels, emerged. FARC guerrillas began to control and draw funds from drug production and trafficking in the areas under their control. In the late 1980s, attempts at reaching a negotiated solution with the guerrilla groups largely failed due to paramilitary political violence against left-wing and liberal political leaders. Since then, the narcotics trade has become the major source of income for both FARC and paramilitary groups, with the ELN mainly drawing its finances from kidnapping and extortion. In 1997, a number of paramilitary groups merged to form the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) with pretensions to political party status.

3. Causes and problems

The persistence of violent conflict in Colombia can be attributed to a number of root causes. These include:

1. The **weakness of the central state** which is unable, particularly in the rural regions, to enforce its monopoly of violence and provide basic social services for the population. Together with corruption and clientelism, this weakens the legitimacy of the central state and favours the emergence of areas beyond the rule of law, which regional groups are using to pursue their own interests. There is a notable tradition of "violent clientelism" by dominant groups, meaning the threat of violence to obtain favourable political results.

¹ This country case study example has been researched and compiled by independent consultants and does not necessarily represent the opinion or view of the OECD.

2. Despite Colombia's progressive constitution, citizens only have **limited possibilities of political participation**. The margin of action for civil-society organisations is reduced. Political murders and disappearances of indigenous leaders, trade unionists and human-rights activists, often attributed to the paramilitary groups, are frequent. This is compounded by the deficiencies of the justice system, which is largely inaccessible for marginalised population groups and produces high rates of impunity. This situation reduces people's confidence in the capacity of the state to define and enforce clear rules for the management of conflicts, which again leads them to take justice into their own hands.
3. **Social inequality**, particularly regarding access to land and other natural resources, has again been on the rise since the mid-nineties and increases the conflictivity of Colombian society. Colombia is one of the countries with the largest social differences in Latin America, about 62% of the population live below the poverty line (HDR, 2005). An agricultural "counter-revolution" has taken place over the last ten years, driven by the acquisition of extensive areas of land by drug barons and paramilitary leaders, reversing all previous – timid – efforts at land reform. Insecurity, displacement, impoverishment, and the lack of legal economic opportunities both in the towns and in the countryside favour migration towards the coca-growing areas and recruitment by illegal armed and/or criminal groups. Many Colombians also seek emigration as an exit strategy.
4. Political and criminal violence is a long-standing feature of Colombian history. This **historical experience of violence** and trauma renders some parts of the population more prepared to engage in acts of violence. The additional high degree of politicisation and fragmentation of Colombian society impede constructive dialogue and non-violent conflict resolution.
5. Although not a cause of conflict in itself, the ongoing and even intensified production and trade of **illegal drugs** (coca, opium) are an important source of finance for all illegal armed actors. Colombian cocaine has a global market share of around 80%. Revenues from drug production and trafficking accrue to both guerrilla and paramilitary groups and contribute to their military strength and interest in continuing the armed conflict. Yet drug interests also infiltrate the wider society, illustrated by the frequent uncovering of links between criminal and legal elites.

4. Actors

Government of Colombia (GoC): The GoC regards itself as the democratically elected representative of the Colombian people and thus in a legitimate position to either negotiate with or defeat the illegally armed groups. Socially, the GoC represents the social and economic elites of the country. With the breakdown of peace negotiations with the FARC under the Pastrana government (1998-2002), the "iron fist" policy of the present Uribe administration has gained wide popularity among the elites and the urban middle classes, which have benefited most from its policies. The re-election of president Uribe in 2006 renewed his mandate to complete the demobilisation of the paramilitaries, conclude ongoing peace talks with the smaller ELN, and engage the FARC. A major drawback in his policy has been the scandals of early 2007, which revealed close links of a number of Uribista politicians to paramilitary politics.

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC): The FARC emerged in 1964 from the self-defence groups of small-scale farmers against large landowners during the "Violencia" (1948-1953). Its proclaimed goal has been the improvement of the living conditions of the rural population by means of a "revolutionary land reform". During the 1980s, they adopted a more offensive military strategy and increased their numbers to around 15,000 combatants. The failure of peace negotiations under the Betancur administration (1986-1990) and the assassination of 3,000-4,000 members of the Unión Patriótica, founded as the political arm of the FARC in the course of the negotiations, triggered the return to a purely military logic on the part of the FARC

leadership. From that time on, the FARC broadened their financial basis by heavily engaging in the narcotics trade and increased their personnel and arms stock. The FARC leadership is characterised by extraordinary stability and personal continuity but, in contrast to the other guerrilla groups, never managed to attract wide-spread support outside their rural strongholds.

Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN): Colombia's second largest guerrilla group emerged in the cities during the mid-1960s. Always the "more intellectual" guerrilla, it draws its ideas from liberation theology and socialist theoreticians and promotes the Cuban model. Its main sources of finance have been kidnappings and the extortion of multinational companies. The ELN has suffered militarily from the attacks by paramilitary groups during the last years. In December 2005, the ELN entered into a negotiation process with the Uribe government in Cuba, supported by Cuba and an international group of friends.

Paramilitary groups: Paramilitarism in Colombia has long been related to the absence of an effective state monopoly of violence and the development of parallel structures. In the rural areas, the formation of paramilitary groups can be regarded as a reaction of regional elites against kidnapping and extortion by the guerrillas as well as to the democratisation and decentralisation of the state in the 1980s, which led to the emergence of oppositional groups threatening the traditional position of regional elites. In the large cities, paramilitarism has been related to armed youth gangs that controlled entire quarters and engaged in criminal activities. There are close links between the paramilitary forces and the drug cartels as well as informal linkages between them and the Colombian armed forces.

During the 1990s, the paramilitary groups grew independent of their former sponsors and adopted a more political outlook. Their political identity is based on the ideology of 'self-defence' against the guerrillas; otherwise they largely support the political and economic status quo. Their military strategy changed from individual murders of left-wing politicians, trade unionists, journalists and human-rights activists towards a 'cleansing' of entire territories. Their stated goal is to gain territorial control. During the Pastrana peace negotiations, they increased their military activities to enforce their recognition as a negotiating partner. As the first Colombian government, the Uribe administration engaged them in a negotiation and demobilisation process (see below).

The **economic elites** are divided in their support of Uribe policies. The urban elites largely support his "iron fist" policies, whereas regional elites tend to resent his attempt to extend the writ of the state.

Civil society: Towards the end of the 1990s, Colombian civil society experienced an extraordinary degree of activity, culminating in the "Referendum for Peace" of 1997, in which 10 million Colombians voted in favour of peace negotiations. With the failure of the peace process under Pastrana, these initiatives rapidly lost influence. Uribe's re-election by a land-slide vote in 2006 further consolidated the demise of the civilian peace agenda. – The **media** play an important role in Colombia's conflict dynamics. At the same time, Colombia is one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists; outside the large cities, there is hardly any space for independent journalism.

External actors: The US are supporting the military strategy of the current administration with the funds of the US\$ 1.3 billion Plan Colombia. European donors have been advocating for economic and political solutions to the violent conflict, financially supporting so-called "peace laboratories" that represent large-scale rural development and peacebuilding programmes. There is no consensus among the international community on its attitude towards the demobilisation process of the paramilitary forces.

5. Current dynamics

Since its first election in 2002, the Uribe administration has promoted a process of demobilisation of the paramilitary forces as part of its overall peace strategy. By 2006, the process had resulted in the demobilisation of about 32,000 paramilitary forces. Despite its importance, international observers have criticised the process for a number of reasons:

- a) Fragmentation of the paramilitary groups since 2002: The paramilitary interlocutors of the government do not seem to represent the entire movement, which is internally split. A number of individual factions pulled out of the negotiations and demobilisation process.
- b) The cease-fire agreement negotiated in 2002 has not been observed. There is evidence that paramilitary forces continue to carry out massacres and kidnappings.
- c) Impunity: Under the guise of paramilitary demobilisation, a number of leading drug traffickers may escape punishment and extradition to the US, since they are classified as political prisoners. In addition, the Justice and Peace Law, approved in June 2005 and modified by the Supreme Court in 2006, does not correspond to national and international legal standards. Finally, it may contribute to absolving paramilitary violence and legalising its assets. Furthermore, victims have been reluctant to come forward to report paramilitary crimes for fear of possible retributions. The National Reconciliation and Reparation Commission, founded in 2006, suffers from structural flaws and has been slow to proceed.
- d) Despite the demobilisation process, the paramilitary structures retain their influence in the communities. As such, it appears that the process may merely contribute to the legalisation of paramilitary power structures and illegally acquired property.

6. Guiding questions

- Should the international community support the demobilisation process with the paramilitary groups?
- What can be the contribution of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding programmes to a negotiated peace process in Colombia?
- How should the international community react to the recent emergence of proven links between members of the national government and paramilitary forces?
- What can the international community do to revive the negotiation process with the FARC?
- How can the international community apply the lessons learned from supporting other peace processes to Colombia?
- What should the operational priorities for a rural peacebuilding programme in Colombia be?
- What does 'conflict-sensitivity' mean for a rural peacebuilding programme in Colombia? With what criteria and standards should it comply? What might be the challenges of conflict-sensitive programme implementation?

7. Sources

International Crisis Group, War and Drugs in Colombia. Latin American Report No. 11 Brussels/Bogotá, January 2005

International Crisis Group, Colombia's New Armed Groups. Latin America Report No. 20. Brussels/Bogotá, May 2007

International Crisis Group, Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN? Latin America Briefing No. 16, Brussels/Bogotá, October 2007

Kurtenbach, Sabine (2004): *Estudios para el análisis de conflictos de carácter nacional*. Colombia. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn.

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (2003): *Callejón con Salida*. Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano Colombia. Bogotá/New York

II. CASE STUDY TIMOR LESTE (EAST TIMOR)¹

Content

This case study addresses several of East Timor's conflicts and their dynamics. To illustrate the conflicts of this newly born, 192nd member of the United Nations, four different perspectives² have been chosen:

1. Conflict portrayal by a high-ranking East Timorese government official
2. Conflict portrayal by an elderly local farmer
3. Conflict portrayal by a former resistance fighter
4. Conflict portrayal by a young university student

Annexed to these portrayals you will find further information, such as didactical suggestions for the conflict trainer, as well as a map of East Timor, photos for multimedia-based and e-learning presentations of this case study and a bibliography for further reading on East Timor.

Background

The peninsula East Timor was a Portuguese colony for more than 350 years. In 1975, shortly after the overthrow of the Salazar regime in Lisbon, Indonesia seized its neighbour on the fringes of the archipelago by means of a military invasion. The attempt to integrate East Timor as the 27th province of Indonesia was never approved by the United Nations. The consequent East Timorese conflict between the local population, guerrilla fighters and occupying forces lasted for more than 24 years.

In 1999, 78.5 % of the East Timorese voted for the country's independence in an internationally organised and supported referendum. In the aftermath, militias and soldiers systematically destroyed around 80% of the country's infrastructure. 600,000 people (i.e. almost three-quarters of the total population) were forced to leave their homes and approximately 1,000 were killed. Armed UN-troops set an end to the atrocities and established a United Nations interim administration (UNTAET: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor). Xanana Gusmão, the national hero of the resistance, was elected the first president.

On 20 May 2002, East Timor became formally independent. In the following years, however, there was much post-conflict disagreement among the new fractions in East Timor. A truth-finding commission (CAVR: Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) and later a friendship commission with Indonesia tried to cope with the violent past. When, in spring 2006, soldiers from the western part of the country were dismissed from the army despite protests, violent riots occurred. A latent East-West conflict within the country became an open ethnic issue and many gangs emerged. East Timor's Prime Minister, Mr Alkatiri, was forced to resign. J. Ramos-Horta, former Nobel Prize for Peace laureate, took over his office. Internal security could only be re-established with the help of international security troops.

1 This country case study example has been researched and compiled by independent consultants and does not necessarily represent the opinion or view of the OECD.

2 The characters are fictitious; the situations and perception of conflict are, however, prototypic.

Conflict portrayal by a high-ranking East Timorese government official

Speech of an East Timorese official at the assembly of the *International Organisation for a Better World*:

Distinguished guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The situation in East Timor is much more complex than people generally assume. It can only be understood by observing our country's historical and political development, particularly with regard to our former sandalwood resources, our strategic position and the oil resources at our southern coast.

Would you allow me to start with the point that we are deeply bound to the International Community and our big bilateral donors Portugal, Australia and Japan. They financially backed us in the years following the restoration of our independence with almost 3 billion USD. I would like to thank the UN interim administration – that, after 1999, for the first time in the history of the UN administered a whole country under international law – as well as the international *Peace Keeping Forces* and many humanitarian and Non-Governmental Organisations. Thank you for your solidarity with a small people whose *nation-building* has proven so difficult.

The contemporary situation is fairly sobering. According to UNDP data, East Timor is Asia's poorest country and ranges, as far as statistics are concerned, among the ten least developed countries worldwide, with regard to most indicators:

- The infant mortality rate is 80 for every 1,000 live births;
- Only 43% of the population is literate; 46% have never attended school;
- More than 40% live on less than 55 US cents a day;
- The Gross Domestic Product per capita is much less than 500 USD.

The list can be continued – and you will quickly understand the immense problems our country faces. Internally, our governing party, Fretinlin, has 55 out of 88 seats in parliament, the absolute majority. They could actually attempt to fight poverty and encourage the sustainable development of the country which so far has consisted of many subsistence economies. However, it is not the concepts that are scarce; it is the *human resources*. Besides, our democracy is young, and many young elements in our society have not yet learned to solve conflicts within the bounds of our constitutional democracy. Externally, we maintain friendly relations with our big neighbours, Indonesia and Australia. However, these relations are not always easy: The *Serious Crimes Unit*, for example, brought the 339 UN bills of indictment in an action against Indonesians in our capital while our politicians at the diplomatic level pursue understanding and reconciliation as an interest of East Timor as well as for the stability of the region. Remember: Indonesia has more than 200 million inhabitants; we have about 1 million. 42.8 % of our imports come from Indonesia.

Our southern neighbour Australia doesn't want to share the oil and gas resources near our coast according to the middle distance between our two countries as envisaged in the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (1982). They negotiated so long that we agreed to a contract that indeed gives us the urgently required revenues; however we get much less than we had expected.

At the same time, particularly the development of our education and health system, which is the key to lasting peace, would need these revenues. Our population is growing at a rate of 4.9%. The creation of employment for a growing number of young people is a crucial challenge for our

economic and social stability. At the same time, we have to cope with growing gang crimes and social fragmentation. Young people affiliate as *martial-art* groups. Protesting soldiers had to be suspended in 2006 and later attacked the national police. Acts of revenge are increasing.

Our next parliamentary elections will be in 2007.

If the international community doesn't want one more country where a Catholic majority is neighbour to an Islamic country where there is a constant risk of conflict and instability, it is extremely important to strengthen the democratic forces from outside, to support the civil society, especially in the rural areas, in its efforts to gain good nutrition, and to accompany our weak administration on its long way to becoming a professional force in the service of the constitution.

Conflict portrayal by an elderly local farmer

Records of a reporter's interview who visited a village at the edge of the Matebian Mountains

"*Senhor*, you come from far away to ask me how we are today in *Timor Loro-Sa'e*³? This is very friendly. Do you chew betel nut?

(He offers his guest seeds of the Arecca palm tree.)

You are not the first *malae* (foreigner) who has appeared in our village ... - shortly after our independence many men from the UN, the World Bank and from international organisations came and they all wanted facts and our stories. They promised us a lot, like our politicians, but four years after that, my situation with eight children hasn't improved much compared to the time when we were under Indonesia. We still have little money and few buffalo. Yes, buffalo are very very important for us, particularly for the weddings. When the young men want to marry, they need buffalo. If they don't have buffalo, they won't get a wife. When the country was still sound, many had 77 buffalos for one wedding! The *Fataluku*, from the eastern part of the country, still demand it ... As you can imagine, this is open to discussion. Particularly, when half of them find out the buffalos' value in measuring the horn's inside and the others measure the outside.

But you don't want to talk to me about buffalos, even if we old people can tell you a lot about cattle-breeding and life and death rituals. We *lia nain* (old wise people) are also in charge of disputes. We mostly solve them on a *biti* (big local straw mattress). All parties take their time and listen to everybody. We make sacrifices to our ancestors and ask them for advice to settle our disputes. Everybody saves face, we chew betel nut together and the culprit, for example, has to give a buffalo to the claimant. Do you now understand why we need buffalos?

You think that this does not have anything to do with the Timor conflict? Well, when the *bapaks* (Indonesians) came and the Portuguese left our island, there began a period of 24 years that thoroughly changed our culture. Believe me, I have seen many rainy seasons. I served in the Portuguese army, my father fought side-by-side with the Australians against the Japanese. But then, in 1977, suddenly there were Bronco fighting jets above our heads. And many, many people died. My brother fled to the Matebian Mountains. He was captured. They took him to the old Hotel *Poussada*; he didn't survive the torture. His soul is still wandering around there.

You know, for us East Timorese our ancestor's soul is very important. 'Peace' is not only something outside; we have to be in peace with our ancestors. Since we've regained our independence we have constructed here, far away from the capital, our traditional ancestor's homes that the

3 Literally: the Timor of the rising sun.

Indonesians had burned because they had thought that the *Falintil*⁴ would hide there. They destroyed our culture and wanted us to have only two babies per family. *Independensia* to us farmers still today means to rebuild what is so important for us. And we want to nourish the flood of life; we want to have many children. If you want me to state my opinion: Our tradition is the only thing that has the power to solve our country's new problems!

Far away in our capital, the *firaku* (East Timorese from the eastern part of the country) and the *kaladi* (East Timorese from the western part of the country) fight each other. They've simply forgotten their origins: that both of them are descendants of the crocodile. You certainly know that our island's shape resembles a sleeping crocodile and that we East Timorese don't kill any crocodile; they're sort of our grandparents.

At the same time we are Catholics. Our bishops don't want us old people to point to the power of our ancestors. In our villages, our bishops, as well as the old *lia nain* and our president Xanana Gusmão, get our general respect. However, we don't like the *governo*, particularly the Muslim Mari Alkatiri (Prime Minister 2002-2006). But we love our country for which we've suffered so much!

Please give my best regards to the people in your country and tell them that we East Timorese are peaceful. Actually, we only argue about bride prices. It may be true that we have a history of more than 500 years of *funu* (resistance, war), but now we finally want to build our ancestor's homes. And see buffalos on our rice fields

Conflict portrayal by a former resistance fighter

Portrayal by a former member of the resistance at a public hearing

*Maun alin sira*⁵!

What have I been fighting for? Why did I suffer for years in the mountains? Bore burning cigarettes on my skin when I was captured?

I did it for our country. *Viva Timor!*

It hurts to see what has become of our country. And that there's no justice. If today, anyone beats his wife, the police come and put him into jail. And on the other part of the island, people who disgraced our wives are at large!

I'm not talking about the small wrongdoers and the collaborators, they are all our Timorese brothers. They could tell the truth on the *biti*, in church or at the CAVR. I'm talking about the big culprits who have blood on their hands and who are not called to account.

Do you know what the former US Foreign Minister Henry Kissinger said to the Suharto Regime in 1975, before they brutally started invading our country? "Do it quickly, efficiently and don't use our weapons." Those were his words. Instead, the invasion was unbearably long, thousands of our brothers and sisters lost their lives and at the beginning we *Falintil* only had a few weapons from former Portuguese arsenals against a western-equipped army. But: We fought for our country! Do you understand? For the freedom of our children who today fly our flag, and not the red and white one from Indonesia.

I want their history books to tell the truth: Not "dozens" of fatalities, but 1,400. Not "migration", but deportation.

I am old now. Exhausted. I killed and I lived with death on my back. After 1999 I was no longer useful. What the international programmes paid me to recognise

4 Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (East-Timor National Liberation Armed Forces); resistance fighters

5 Traditional address, literally: "Dear older and younger siblings!"

old combatants was neither enough to live nor enough to die. My wife is dead; my brothers are dead; I've never seen a school from the inside; I haven't learnt a lot in my life apart from running away and killing.

And I tell you: I'm prepared to bear arms again if it is true what people from the village tell me that, in the capital, they set fire to my uncle's house just because he is from here, from the eastern part.

Most of the *asuwain* (heroes) are from the eastern part. Everybody knows that. The bravest *Falintil* came from here. In the Matebian Mountains, the Indonesian troops found us a hard nut to crack. It is obvious that in the army, the bravest soldiers are expedited; nobody from the west should get upset about that. Many soldiers in the new army are former members of the resistance and it is not a secret that many policemen of the adversaries had been recruited from the west. It is still obvious that when worst comes to worst, we soldiers will all support our old commandant and today's president. As long as we respect each other, there's no problem. Respect – that is something we've learned. Long before the Portuguese came. But when a *kaladi* (East Timorese from the western parts of the country) now dares to set fire to my uncle's house then he shall suffer like the small cock in today's afternoon cockfight! Don't underestimate us old combatants ... - that's what our last enemies did.

Conflict portrayal by a young university student

Email from an East Timorese student to her friend in Frankfurt, who worked in East Timor as an International United Nations' Volunteer after the referendum on independence in 1999

July 2006

Bon dia Christine,

It's been a couple of years now since you worked with the UNTAET⁶ here with us, and I'm finally, finally writing to you to tell you what has happened here since you left. You won't believe what was going on after the celebration of independence on 20 May 2002. News of a tsunami or a world cup might reach you via TV on the other side of the globe. But now, once again, 155,000 people fled their homes because violence is spreading, 50,000 are now "internally displaced" and 37 even died. This is probably not reported, is it?

After we solved the problem with our big neighbour Indonesia through the referendum, which resulted in a 78.5% majority voting for independence, the trouble was just about to begin... . We were called a "fledgling nation" by all of the reporters worldwide, and now, Washington even fears that we might end up as a "failed state".

Things are as follows: Our old enemy is gone, and now, our men fight each other. Christine, do you know George Orwell's *Animal Farm*? One group of rulers is overthrown and immediately replaced by another. Here, in the capital, this latter group consists of those who were lucky to be abroad, in exile, during the resistance. They studied in Mozambique, Brazil and Portugal, whereas our *Falintil* fighters engaged in desperate guerrilla warfare in the mountains. A large part of the population supported them, and so did I.

I always smuggled food to the mountains for the guerrillas. Once, I even met Xanana personally; he is our president now. It was quite dangerous – I couldn't tell anyone about it. If the Indonesian army catches you, then pray to God! In November 1991, the massacre at the cemetery of Santa Cruz showed the world that these soldiers are even prepared to shoot at mourning people, if they're ordered to do so.

6 United Nations Transitional Administration of East Timor

But I wanted to tell you about today. You see, the old stories still hurt. And today, we pay the costs

An example: I can speak Indonesian fluently – of course I can: they made me study it during my whole time at school. But our politicians happen to have lived in Portuguese-speaking countries until 1999. As a consequence, they decided to make Portuguese our new official language. They say that our national language, Tetum, is not complex enough to write a constitution. Well, I don't mind learning Portuguese, but do you understand what that means? Our new generation, that has suffered here at home, is now excluded from the real decision-making processes!

Who wonders that people marched on the streets in 2002? We were frustrated. I mean, as a student, I'm still fairly well off, but, of course, the demonstrations are also joined by the unemployed guys who only hang out with martial-arts groups. They define themselves by being tough – that's what they had to be for 24 years. This country probably needs new men.

To be honest, I think it's sick that they burned down the house of the Muslim Prime Minister in 2002. But in 2005, when he tried to abolish religious classes at state schools in our Catholic country, I joined the priests and nuns on the streets to protest against him. And then, in 2006, it was the climax: it became known that our highest politicians are involved in the arming of paramilitary gangs to play Timorese off against Timorese! It's enough. We already had that in 1999. History repeats itself. And our President has not enough political power to keep the Prime Minister in check. Thank God we still have a couple of these persons of high integrity, like our Nobel Peace Prize winners Belo and Ramos-Horta. The latter is now Prime Minister until the elections in 2007, by the way. But, of course, he's no magician.

But as a former UN diplomat he has contacts. That's why at least there are international protection corps (troops) in the country again. However, you have to figure out carefully who has which interests in our country... – I don't want to say anything against the Australians: we all thought that it was great when they arrived here with INTERFET⁷ in 1999. Too late after all, but anyway. Today, we are cruelly ripped off in the political poker on oil. Canberra did not even approve the joint dispute resolution at the International Marine Court but preferred to retreat! Many people ask themselves what influence the Australian wife of our president has on him. The country is full of rumours

Furthermore, we haven't gone through the truth-finding process consistently. We had the CAVR, the Commission for Hearings, Truth and Reconciliation. The public *hearings* and the *community reconciliations* were a success. These were the internal affairs, addressing somehow the small guys. However, those people who were responsible for acts against human rights, torture and murder were not punished. They don't appear in our courts; they stay in Indonesia where the high-ranking military is not prosecuted. And our international *Serious Crimes Unit*? They can investigate and serve warrants. If these warrants are not internationally forwarded by our General Attorney because of political reasons, the culprits can continue shopping in Singapore instead of being arrested there. And we East Timorese know that. Another humiliation for the victims.

Instead, they have established a so-called friendship commission between East Timor and Indonesia. Because, allegedly, nobody is interested in an international tribunal and we should rather reconcile. But honestly: Who really believes that those responsible are called to account, in as much as they repeatedly asserted their innocence? The names are all well-known! And we Timorese don't hold anything against the people of Indonesia. They're our neighbours, they eat rice and the same noodle soups like we do. We don't have to reconcile with the country Indonesia. We have to fight oblivion. The culprits, that is to say, they play out.

First of all we need internal stability. I want to live in a country where there's order and respect. And not, where dismissed soldiers shoot at policemen. Of late, people ask if somebody is from the west (those soldiers who weren't expedited in spring and then left the army, they were all

7 International Force in East Timor; Protection Corps 1999 under Australian command

from the west). The situation has grown acute. So many families prefer to spend their nights on the territory of an international organisation or at a sisters' or priests' place. You never know who is threatening you! Is it just a criminal gang or somebody whose house has been set on fire by someone from the east or the west and who is now taking revenge? When I was a child, there was no division of East Timorese in people from the west and people from the east. We were all *maubere*, brothers, comrades. We had one common enemy: the Indonesian military that had killed so many of us. And today suddenly people talk of people from the east and people from the west. Strange.

Guess who suffers most with all that! Women, of course. There has always been violence against women, like, for example, arranged marriages and physical violence. But after 1999 it became increasingly obvious how much violence in our country happens behind closed doors. Women's organisations bravely fight against it, but of course, in times of crisis we are particularly vulnerable. Imagine, you're already poor, you have to marry someone from the capital, your body has given birth to eight children and you're escaping from people who still were your neighbours the day before. That is *reality* here.

In my opinion, what our country needs would be, first of all, some non-corruptible politicians and, secondly, a good education for the next generation. The old generation is exhausted. And our budget for education for the whole country is as much as the one for one single German university library.

Sorry, I have to stop right now because there will probably be a power blackout throughout the city in about ten minutes. Christine, haven't you undertaken training in mediation? Please send an e-mail to me explaining how you can change something in the heads of politicians, policemen, soldiers and gangs, in short: men! Okay?

Best wishes,
Maria

Background information for conflict prevention trainers

Processing details

- First of all it is important to gather the diverse conflicts as well as their different dimensions:
 - 1. The political dimension**
Among other topics: the breach among the Fretilin-leadership and Xanana Gusmão as directorate of the National Council of Resistance; police versus army
 - 2. The social dimension**
Among other topics: the tensions in the community, the East-West division, gender problems, the different interests of church/modern spirit/tradition, class divide; the power of rumours because of reduced access to information, conspiracy theories
 - 3. The economic and development political dimension**
Among other topics: poverty, the formation of "support groups" in martial-arts groups; disillusionment following independence; oil (historically: sandalwood)
 - 4. The historical dimension**
Among other topics: CAVR's work of the past; the conflict with Indonesia; the changes in a globalised world (note: 1974, Cold War, Domino Theory, Vietnam War)
 - 5. The psychological and cultural dimension**
Among other topics: trauma, re-traumatisation; dislocation of violence; no justice for victims; explanation of a complex reality with the help of cultural patterns; at the same time: traditional forms of solving conflicts and of reconciliation
- Correlate the different actors when doing a conflict-mapping.
- Include the 2007 elections when considering the conflict timeline.
- Analyse the role of the international community and transnational actors when considering possible prevention measures.
- Analyse the role of the Catholic Church not only as an opportunity but also as a problem (self interests!) when considering local capacities for peace.

Bilateral relations East Timor

Name:	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (Portuguese: República Democrática Timor-Leste; in Tetum: Timor Loro Sa'e, German: Demokratische Republik Timor-Leste)
Climate:	Tropical with temperatures of about 20-33°C in the dry season (May – Nov) and 29-35°C in the rainy season (Dec-Apr)
Position:	Eastern part of the Timor island (West Timor is part of Indonesia)
Size:	18,889 square miles; Oecussi-Ambeno exclave 2,461 square km; Ataúro island 144 square km; Jaco island 8 square km
Capital:	Díli (about 200,000 inhabitants)
Population:	About 930,000 inhabitants
Languages:	Official languages: Portuguese and Tetum, Working languages: Indonesian and English
Religions/ confessions:	About 95% Catholics; small Muslim, Protestant, Buddhist and Hindu minorities
National holiday:	28 November
Independence:	20 May 2002
Type of government:	Parliamentary-democratic republic
Head of state:	Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão
Head of government:	Dr José Ramos-Horta (since 2006), successor of Dr Mari Alkatiri (Fretilin)
Parliament:	One-chamber system with a total of 88 seats
Governing party:	Fretilin (55 seats)
Administrative structure:	Divided into 13 districts
Membership in international organisations:	United Nations, Non-Aligned Nations, ASEAN Regional Forum, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank, AKP States, Interpol
Media:	Suara Timor Lorosae (Engl., Port., Indon., Tetum), Timor Post (Tetum, Indon.), Diario Tempo (Port.), Diario Nacional (Port.), Seminario (Port.), Lia Foun (Tetum)
Gross domestic product (GDP):	349 million USD (2005)
Per capita income:	378 USD (2005); the income of about 40% of the population is under the absolute poverty level of 1 USD per day
Main export products	Oil, gas, coffee

Data source (German): www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laender/TimorLeste.html

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III. CASE STUDY: SRI LANKA FIVE YEARS AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE – 'NO PEACE', 'NO WAR'?¹

1. Context, conflict causes and main actors

The protracted conflict in Sri Lanka can best be characterised as ethno-political. Underlying the conflict, which turned latently violent in the mid-1970s, is a struggle between the Tamil minority and Sinhalese majority population. Open violence became endemic after atrocities by Sinhalese mobs against Tamils throughout the island occurred in 1983, which were passively accepted and likely supported by some state representatives. This, in turn, was a reaction to the attack of the Liberation Tamil Tigers (LTTE) on a group of soldiers in Jaffna.

However, the root causes and key factors of the current conflict date back much longer. One factor is the majority-minority character of the ethnic composition of the population. The Sinhalese form a 75% majority, while three substantive minorities (Sri Lankan Tamils, Muslims, Indian-origin Tamils) are regional majorities in different parts of the country, i.e. approx. 70% of the population of the Northeastern Province are Tamils.

The conflicting parties identify themselves by their ethno-political identities (culture, language, belief, political worldview), which is mainly the result of two competing projects of Tamil and Sinhalese nationalism. At the same time, without taking the colonial history of disempowerment, of 'divide-and-rule' policies and the formerly strongly rent-seeking character of economic activities into account, the current conflict cannot be understood either.

Important constitutional turning points in recent history triggered negative dynamics: the post-colonial state of 1948 was rooted in the liberal Westminster tradition and led to a *de facto* Sinhalese-dominated state. The "Sinhala Only Act" of 1956 established Sinhala as the official language while the constitutions of 1972 and 1978 established a centralised/unitary state and gave prominence to Buddhism (over Hinduism to which the majority of Tamils is attached). Other factors include development failures and deprivation of marginalised communities both in the South and in the Northeast, majoritarian politics and a political culture favouring a 'winner takes all' attitude, and the rise of anti-state militant movements using terrorist means, most prominently the LTTE.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a number of war-like situations over the territory claimed by the Tamils as their traditional homeland in the North and East occurred; in addition a number of unsuccessful attempts to find a negotiated settlement were undertaken. The latter reinforced the division of the state into a North(east) dominated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and a South dominated by the government of Sri Lanka.

At the end of 2001, the newly elected government, formed by the centre-right United National Party (UNP), was able to abolish the former "war for peace" strategy and tried to find a new approach to finding a settlement with the LTTE. Initially, in the ceasefire-agreement (CFA) of February 2002, both the existence of the LTTE as a military and civilian force controlling substantive parts of the Northeast and an overall balance of forces were accepted as a starting point for future negotiations. The CFA was intended to prepare for a two-step strategy: in a first step, the military balance of power was to be frozen, with normalisation of civilian life and confidence-building between the conflicting parties taking place; in a second step, core political issues, such as establishing a (joint) interim administration for the Northeast and subsequently redistributing/devolving powers within the Sri Lankan state structure, were aimed at. A Norwegian team became official facilitators

1 This country case study example has been researched and compiled by independent consultants and does not necessarily represent the opinion or view of the OECD.

and functioned as a third party which was a substantive step forward in comparison to former peace initiatives that failed. Compliance to the CFA was monitored – but not sanctioned – by the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), originally consisting of a group of civilian specialists from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland.²

In reality, the two parties got caught up in positional bargaining, leading to endless mutual accusations concerning the lack of any progress beyond simply adhering to the CFA. From September 2002 to March 2003, six peace negotiation sessions with the LTTE took place, in which a so-called Oslo Formula was adopted: "... the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka." To attain this goal, a fundamental restructuring of the Sri Lankan state and the transformation of the LTTE from being a purely military organisation into becoming a reliable political player would be required. In reality, even a functioning agreement on creating a joint mechanism for the administration of humanitarian and development assistance did not even exist, a fact that further frustrated expectations of a peace dividend in the Northeast. However, development organisations had recognised the importance of addressing the consequences of war and embarked on large-scale humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, even prior to the CFA. With the increased flow of aid funds for reconstruction, the North-East Reconstruction Fund was established with the World Bank serving as a custodian; unfortunately, however, this fund became a victim of the discarded peace talks in April 2003 and was never really implemented. Most donor-supported programmes for the Northeast had become sensitised to the challenges of the conflict. Nonetheless, support for programmes in the South, which still receive a large majority of ODA (official development assistance), persist notwithstanding the state of the conflict in Sri Lanka. At a donor conference in Tokyo in June 2003, aid donors pledged US \$4.5 billion as reconstruction and development aid to Sri Lanka. This was explicitly tied to progress in the peace process, which was perceived by the parties to the conflict as a form of peace conditionality. Conditionalities or the incentives for increased aid did not have the desired outcome, as they laid too much importance on the role of development aid. At the same time, there were no mechanisms for ensuring compliance. The common position originally expressed in Tokyo was subsequently undermined by the lack of willingness on the part of the larger donors to attach political or conflict-related conditions to their assistance. Beyond the increased and largely conflict-sensitive aid implementation for the Northeast, a preparatory meeting for the donor's conference organised by the World Bank to which the LTTE was not invited and which took place in Washington – where the LTTE was legally regarded a terrorist organisation – led the organisation to withdraw from the peace negotiations in 2003.

2. Structures, dynamics and key issues

At the international level, there is no particularly strong interest in Sri Lanka by any superpower. However, the geostrategic security interests of India and the USA play an important role. India has additional regional and historical linkages, and it is its assumed interest that any constitutional solution should not have negative effects on the Indian Union states, especially on the state of Tamil Nadu with approximately 62 million Tamil inhabitants.

In national politics, a major change occurred, as the social democrats (PA) under President Chandrika Kumaratunga together with the Marxist-nationalist Janatha Vimukth Peramuna (Peoples' Liberation Front, JVP) won the elections in April 2004 with a very small majority, ousting the current Prime Minister, Ranil Wickramasinghe (United National Party, UNP), who had signed the cease-fire agreement in February 2002 and re-launched negotiations with the LTTE. Both the government and the LTTE had to struggle with the secession of the "Karuna group" from the LTTE in the East, which led to a number of extra-judicial killings and other human rights violations and, in the medium term, to the weakening of LTTE's military capabilities when parts of the Karuna

² Contributing countries were later reduced to Norway and Island due to the classification of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation by the EU in 2006.

faction started to collaborate with the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF). The risk of a resumption of large-scale conflict was temporarily contained by the Tsunami disaster of 2004: not only did it trigger massive international support, but also the initiation of negotiations for cooperation between GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) and LTTE on grounds of the "Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)". It was signed by both parties but rejected by the Supreme Court before being implemented.

In the last quarter of 2005, the killing of Foreign Minister Kardirgamar saw a further deterioration of the situation. The killing resulted among other things in a travel ban being imposed by the EU on the LTTE. In November 2005, Mahinda Rajapakse was elected as the new president on a ticket explicitly rejecting any federal solution. International pressure then led to the stop of the constantly increasing level of violence as well as the revitalisation of the peace talks in Geneva in February 2006. The meeting ended with a consolidation of the CFA but the various differing positions could not be accommodated. Shortly thereafter, another escalation of violence took place with the attempted assassination of the Army Chief and in return the shelling of LTTE positions in the East. This triggered further reactions internationally and in Sri Lanka itself. The LTTE was subsequently proscribed a terrorist organisation in all EU Member States, and the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) further strengthened contacts with Pakistan, India and the USA for procurement and technical assistance for weapon systems, including air force support and surveillance capabilities. In Sri Lanka the so-called "shadow war" of mainly extra-judicial killings of middle-level leaders, including state officials, suspected members of the LTTE and the Karuna group, as well as intellectuals, turned into an open war-like situation and was characterised by well over 1,000 killings per year along with artillery exchanges for territorial control, mainly in the East. However, both main stakeholders and signatures of the cease-fire agreement were reluctant to officially pull out of the CFA and declare an open war situation.

There has been a robust and diverse response by external actors to conflict and peace dynamics since 2002. These included security guarantees, cease-fire monitoring, facilitation of peace negotiations (Tracks One and Two), and humanitarian/development aid provision (Track Three). On this palette, the importance of Track Two initiatives should be highlighted. Backdoor talks helped initiate the peace process and have played a vital role in maintaining communication since the end of negotiations. A crucial challenge is how a more robust architecture for the peace process that strengthens the interface and synergies between Tracks One, Two, and Three can be created.

While the consolidation of the security situation seems currently very difficult, it is nonetheless still a crucial prerequisite for the resumption of talks. Furthermore, any substantial negotiation process would require the renewed willingness on the part of all parties to deal with the core issues – a situation that currently seems highly unlikely. For the time being, the crucial questions are, firstly, how the suffering of the civilian population can be limited and, secondly, how unilateral approaches to trust-building can be fostered on both sides. Only after that could unilateral approaches for state reform in the South or the widening of the democratic space in the Northeast constitute constructive further steps which might in turn precede or supplement any further peace negotiations in the future.

3. Questions for reflection

- During the interim phase of negotiations from 2001 to 2004, smaller groups such as the Muslims and upcountry Tamils have also made their voices heard. What would the proper application of the principle of 'inclusivity' have implied for the period of negotiations?
- The ceasefire agreement has lasted much longer than all previous agreements, and it has created a unique opportunity for achieving a lasting peace, as the vast majority of people living in Sri Lanka surely do not want to risk a re-escalation of the ethnic conflict. However, the dynamics have turned negative – What would you see as the main reasons?
- Coordination, cooperation and the use of "peace conditionalities" by development cooperation actors vis-à-vis the stakeholders have been largely unsuccessful in the last round of talks – Which are the most important principles, actors and potentials that could be built upon?

Resources

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IV. SUGGESTED COURSE PROGRAMME: CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING (CPPB)

DATE	TIME	SUBJECT
1st day	9.00	Course welcome, presentation of programme, introduction round for participants
	9.30	A culture of conflict prevention: Why (Opening speech)
	10.00	Introducing conflict-sensitive development cooperation
	11.00	<i>BREAK</i>
	11.30	Causes, dynamics of violent conflicts & How to do conflict analysis
	13.15	<i>LUNCH</i>
	14.15	Conflict analysis exercise: Joint analysis and mapping of conflict cases
	15.15	<i>BREAK</i>
	15.45	Stakeholder mapping and peacebuilding planning
	17.15	Wrap-up of the day's activities
	17.30	<i>BREAK AND DINNER</i>
	19.00	The Market Place
2nd day	9.00	Conflict-sensitive planning and impact assessment
	10.45	<i>BREAK</i>
	11.00	Role play: Post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA)
	12.45	<i>LUNCH</i>
	14.00	Continue role play
	16.00	<i>BREAK</i>
	16.15	Guiding Principles for engaging in conflict environments and for peace building
	17.15	Wrap-up of the day's activities
	17.30	<i>DISPERSE</i>
3rd day	9.00	Evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding
	11.00	<i>BREAK</i>
	11.30	Options for self-study: CPDC e-learning material
	12.00	Supporting your own work after training: Networking and support from organisations
	12.30	Evaluation of training, comments
	13.00	<i>DISPERSE</i>

V. PRE-TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTICIPANTS

This questionnaire has been designed with two objectives in mind:

- First, it will support you in taking stock of and reflecting on your experience of working with or in countries affected by violent conflict.
- Second, it will help the trainers of this course to become familiar with your level of experience and understand your needs and expectations towards the training course as a whole.

We kindly request you to fill out the questionnaire and send it back to ... (...@....org) at least one week before the beginning of the training course. – The information you provide in this questionnaire is considered personal and is only accessible to the trainers.

I. Personal data

Name	
Institution	
Position	
Email	

II. Personal experience of working in or with countries affected by violent conflict

2.1. Do you have any personal experience of living or working in a country affected by violent conflict? If yes, what do you consider the most difficult aspects of it?

2.2. Do you have any experience in implementing conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes or projects? If so, what have been success factors for the projects you know? What were the main challenges?

2.3. What kind of general lessons learned for conflict prevention and peacebuilding work would you draw from your own experience?

2.4. Do you have any formal training (e.g. postgraduate course) in a conflict-related subject? If so, what?

2.5. Have you already participated in a training course on conflict-related issues? If so, what issues did you find most complex or difficult to understand?

2.6. What relevant examples and cases from your own experience can you contribute to the training course?

III. Training needs and expectations towards the course

3.1. How do conflict prevention and peacebuilding apply to your current work?

3.2. What are the main challenges you face in your current position in relation to conflict and peacebuilding issues?

3.3. How could the training course support you in dealing with these challenges?

3.4. How do you intend to apply your existing expertise to this course?

3.5. Do you have any specific suggestions for the training course?

VI. EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Participants,

You have been participating in an OECD programme. We strive to continuously improve our performance and meet your specific needs and requirements with our programmes. We would therefore like to ask you to help us with your experience and recommendations regarding the course you have just completed.

It goes without saying that we will evaluate this questionnaire anonymously. Your data will not be made available to third parties. It is for internal use only and will enable us to draw conclusions about the quality of our training measures. Please be sure to fill in the complete questionnaire.

Thank you for your support,
Your Training Team

1. General information

Programme title	Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
Duration	From _____ to _____

2. Achieved objectives

In your opinion, have the following workshop objectives been achieved?	Yes ++	Mostly yes +	Can't say 0	Mostly not -	No --
You are familiar with the OECD Guiding Principles for engaging in a conflict environment					
Your understanding of violent conflict and its links to development has improved					
You are familiar with methods of conflict analysis					
You are familiar with conflict-sensitive impact assessment					
You have reflected on the challenges of working in a conflict environment					
You know how to gain further knowledge of conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches and how to obtain further support for your own work					

Please add any special notes on the achievement of course objectives	
--	--

3. Impact on daily work routine

	Yes ++	Mostly yes +	Can't say 0	Mostly not -	No --
Were the course's topics relevant to your work?					
Please name topics that were not covered, but would have been important for your work!					

	Yes ++	Mostly yes +	Can't say 0	Mostly not -	No --
Will you be able to apply your newly acquired skills to your work?					
If not, please give your reasons					

Please tick

Do you have any concrete plans to implement your newly acquired skills?	Yes	No
Please explain these plans in brief		
What support do you need for efficient implementation?		

	Yes ++	Mostly yes +	Can't say 0	Mostly not -	No --
Will you be able to pass on your new expertise to colleagues and others in your working environment?					
If not, please give your reasons					

4. Methodology/Learning effect

How would you assess	Excellent ++	Good +	Fairly good 0	Could be improved -	Poor --
• The training's methodology and teaching efficiency?					
• The quality of course materials (presentations, handouts)?					
• The balance between theory and practice?					
• The training's overall length?					

5. Trainers

Trainer's name: _____

How would you assess	Excellent ++	Good +	Fairly good 0	Could be improved -	Poor --
• The trainer's technical qualification?					
• Your cooperation and communication with the trainer?					

Trainer's name: _____

How would you assess	Excellent ++	Good +	Fairly good 0	Could be improved -	Poor --
• The trainer's technical qualifications?					
• Your cooperation and communication with the trainer?					

6. Participants

How would you assess	Excellent ++	Good +	Fairly good 0	Could be improved -	Poor --
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The exchange of information and experience at group level? 					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The working atmosphere within the group? 					

7. Organisation

How would you assess	Excellent ++	Good +	Fairly good 0	Could be improved -	Poor --
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The overall organisation of the event? 					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The information, you received prior to the training, e.g. organisational tips, programme agenda, list of participants, technical details? 					

In your view, what materials or information were/was missing?	
---	--

8. Follow-up

What follow-up activities would you recommend?	
--	--

9. Overall approval

	Excellent	Good	Fairly good	Could be improved	Poor
	++	+	0	-	--
What is your overall assessment of the training course?					

Please tick

Would you recommend this course to others?	Yes	No
--	-----	----

Further comments and suggestions for improvements.	
--	--

Thank you!

Your Training Team

IMPRINT

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This training module is based on the DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict and on Security Systems Reform and Governance, and the paper Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards a DAC Guidance.

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Promoting a harmonised approach and agreed international good practice through CPDC endorsed training courses

In recent years, CPDC has increasingly focused on behavioural change and impact on the ground through encouraging the transformation of policies into practice. To help this trend, the CPDC has created training materials that target policy and field staff from development agencies and other government departments.

Course I – Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

CPDC training materials aim to make its participants aware of the main policy issues in the area of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and allow participants to see how this impacts upon their work in situations of conflict and fragility, whether they work on or in conflict areas. The course outlines how participants can use this training practically to promote a culture of conflict prevention in their work.

Course II – Security System Reform (SSR) and Governance

The training course on security system reform focuses on the skills necessary to support security and justice reform processes. It helps participants to learn what SSR means, why democratic governance is a pivotal part of it, and how to develop SSR assistance programmes. The training course is focused on the skills needed to assess, design, implement, and evaluate programmes, as based on the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform.

Course III – Train-the-Trainer Modules for i) Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding and ii) Security System Reform (SSR) and Governance

These two modules are aimed at staff of training institutions and training focal points working for donor agencies, governments, international organisations and NGOs and offer various didactic approaches to learning that can be utilised in different circumstances. As such, the material provides an important tool for preparing and delivering training courses on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, and on Security System Reform (SSR) and Governance.