The Many Faces of
Human Security

Case Studies of Seven Countries
in Southern Africa

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Contents

PREFACE

This book represents the combined efforts of a team of researchers at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), our partners and friends through the Southern African Peace and Security Network (SAPSNet) and the Royal Danish embassy in South Africa, who funded the work. At the Institute the most important word of thanks must be to Dr Roger Kibasomba, Senior Research Fellow, who joined the ISS from the University of the Witwatersrand to take up the challenge of advancing the cause of human security in a divided and complex region. Keith Muloongo, deputy director of the Institute, brought many of his talents to bear, as did Jemima Njeri Kariri, my previous close working partner and now the civil society liaison officer at the ISS. They laboured under difficult and sometimes frustrating conditions to complete this volume, working with and through our partners in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa, Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The efforts of the following individuals also demand a particular word of appreciation: Colonel Manuel Correia de Barros (ret) from the Centro de Estudos Estratégicos de Angola (CEEA); Hubert Kabungulu Ngoy at Labor Optimus, Democratic Republic of the Congo; Ana Leão from the ISS; Dr John Dzimba and Matsolo Matooane, from the Lesotho Institute for Public Administration (LIPAM); Dr Norman Mlambo from the Africa Institute of South Africa; Michael M Mataure from the Public Affairs and Parliamentary Support Trust (PAPST) in Zimbabwe; Dr Jonathan Lwehabura, then at the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation in Tanzania; Professor Gaudens Mpangala, Department of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and Dr Fredrick Mutesa, Department of Development Studies and Wilma Nchito, Department of Geography, University of Zambia.

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Compared with the rest of the continent, southern Africa is a recently liberated region. South Africa achieved majority rule only in 1994, and Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique some years earlier after destructive wars. Conflict in Angola, a legacy of the Cold War and South African destabilisation, concluded only after the death of Jonas Savimbi

in early 2002. It should come as no surprise that the concept of human security is a contested one in a region where state security, for much of the previous century, has been against rather than for the region's people. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has made a great deal of progress since its early days as an alliance of Frontline States against apartheid South Africa. Yet much remains to be done if the region is to move beyond the divisions of the past. If this volume demonstrates one issue, it is the real challenges facing people – rooted in poverty, marginalisation and a legacy of mistrust. It is these challenges, not the threats of armed invasion, international terrorism or failed states, that currently impact on much of Africa.

SADC, as an organisation, and the region need to invest heavily in a discourse on the nature of security and undertake policy research, development and planning in order to cease understanding security from a threat perception and vulnerabilities perspective. Peace, justice and order should come together to constitute the main pillars of our security in the future. We also need to find a way to manage power and the relative balance between states.

Finally, building security in southern Africa implies promoting and protecting common values, including a respect for human rights, individual freedom, democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Common values are important because they foster the idea of common vision, the sense of purpose of a given society. We have a long way to go, but the journey is well under way.

Jakkie Cilliers
Pretoria
July 2005

ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Anti-Crime Associations and Committees
AFRONET	African Network on Human Rights and Development
AGOA	Africa Growth and Opportunities Act
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ARV	Antiretroviral Drug
ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party
AU	African Union
BB	Butha-Buthe
BFD	Bunge Foundation for Democracy
BICE	Catholic International Bureau for Children
BR	Berea
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CAZ	Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
CC	Central Committee
CC	Constitution Commission
CCJPZ	The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CDP	Constituency Development Programme
CEEA	Centro de Estudos Estratégicos de Angola (Angolan Centre for Strategic Studies)
CFU	Commercial Farmers Union
CHS	Commission on Human Security
CMA	Common Monetary Area
CPRK	Penitentiary and Re-education Centre
CRC	Constitutional Review Commission
CRW	Constituency Relations Workshop
CSO	Central Statistical Office
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSO	Central Statistical Office
CSPR	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
CUF	Civic United Front
CYP	Commonwealth Youth Programme
DA	Democratic Alliance

DC	Delimitation Commission
DDCC	District Development Coordinating Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPO	District Planning Office
DPP	Director of Public Prosecution
DPRS	District Poverty Reduction Strategy
DPU	District Planning Unit
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSA	District Situational Analysis
DTV	Dar es Salaam Television
ECF	Electoral Commissioners Forum
EMB	Electoral Management Body
ENMSP	Special Protection Measures
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
ESAURP	Eastern and South African Universities Research Programme
ESC	Electoral Supervisory Commission
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FINNIDA	Department for International Development Cooperation of Finland
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FTLRP	Fast-Track Resettlement Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HR	House of Representatives
HSN	Human Security Network
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFES	International Foundation for Election Systems
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPC	Inter-Party Commission
IPLG	Institute of Leadership and Governance
ISPRA	Instituto Superior Privado de Angola
ISS	Institute for Security Studies

IZG	Independent Zimbabwe Group
JKU	Jeshi la Kujenga Uchumi
JPCSC	Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission
LEC	Lesotho Evangelical Church
LHWP	Lesotho Highlands Water Project
LIPAM	Lesotho Institute of Public Administration and Management
LMPS	Lesotho Mounted Police Service
LPLFSP	Luapula Province Livelihood and Food Security Programme
LPMS	Livestock Produce and Marketing Services
LR	Leribe
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFT	Mafeteng
MH	Mohale's Hoek
MKG	Mokhotlong
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
MP	Member of Parliament
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPs	Members of Parliament
MS-Zambia	Danish Association for International Cooperation
MSU	Maseru
NANGO	National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NCCR	National Convention for Constructive Reform – Mageuzi
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNP	New National Party
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAM	Programme Against Malnutrition
PAPST	Public Affairs and Parliamentary Support Trust
PDCC	Provincial Development Coordinating Committee
PEMD	Planning and Economic Management Department
PEMMO	Principles For Election Management, Monitoring and Observation
PF ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union (Patriotic Front)
PNA	Polícia Nacional de Angola
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
POZ	Parliament of Zimbabwe

PPU	Provincial Planning Unit
PRP	Poverty Reduction Programme
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSRP	Public Sector Reform Programme
PVO	Private Voluntary Organisation
QNEK	Qacha's Neck
QT	Quthing
RF	Rhodesian Front (later Republican Front)
RG	Registrar General
RG	Registrar General's Office
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SACD	Solidarity Action for Children in Distress
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC PF	Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum
SAG	Sector Advisory Group
SAPSNet	Southern Africa Peace and Security Network
SCY	Street Children and Youth
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
STA	Stock Theft Association
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
STOCKPOL	Stock Policing Unit
TADEA	Tanzania Democratic Alliance
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TEMCO	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
TLP	Tanzania Labour Party
TT	Thaba-Tseka
UANC	United African National Congress
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UP	Umma Party
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
UXO	Unexploded Ordinance
VAT	Value Added Tax
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association
ZANLA	Zimbabwe National Liberation Army

ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)
ZCC	Zionist Christian Church
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZEC	Zanzibar Electoral Commission
ZEMOG	Zanzibar Election Monitoring Group
ZESN	Zimbabwe Election Support Network
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZNP	Zanzibar Nationalist Party
ZPPP	Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

CHAPTER FOUR

CHAPTER SIX

CHAPTER SEVEN

Introduction

Keith Muloongo[1]

The concept for this book emanated from discussions in Pretoria, South Africa, between civil society actors and researchers from seven Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. The meeting was convened by the Southern African Human Security Programme's SADC Civil Society Project, which was initiated by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).[2] The project's primary aim was to support the development of a collaborative security community in SADC, built on common democratic values and institutions, an observance of human rights, strengthening the rule of law, and policies that are informed by a concern for individual as opposed to state security. To further this objective, the project established and supported a network of civil society actors and researchers committed to peace and security issues in the seven SADC countries. This book is the first concrete result of that process.

These civil society actors and researchers engaged in promoting partnership with the security structures and authorities in key SADC member countries, as well as on broader social issues that have an impact on human security in their countries. The organisations that are part of the project also engage regularly with critical human security issues at national and community levels. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation deals regularly with the same issues at regional level. In doing this, civil society actors are well within the SADC treaty mandate that identifies them as 'key stakeholders' in the implementation of the treaty.[3]

Since human security is the key and the common element to the studies that are presented in this volume, it is worth briefly considering human security as a concept and the frame of reference that gave rise to human security as a goal and a tool for development. For Kofi Annan, human security "… in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human and therefore national security."[4]

Therefore, to think in human security terms represents a shift away from the kind of thinking that sees 'security' purely in terms of territorial security or the protection of national interests from internal or external threats. Rather, human security concerns itself with the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who seek security in their everyday lives. As the Zambian contributors to this volume phrase it: "… the concept of human security equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms." It is bound up with social stability and economic opportunity. As well as involving safety from such threats as hunger, disease and oppression, it means the absence of sudden, unpredictable disruptions in day-to-day life. The United Nations Development Programme has defined human security in its 1994 Human Development Report as "[s]afety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives."[5]

Human security consequently intersects with a diverse range of social, economic and political issues and problem areas: the violation of human rights by state or non-state actors; homelessness and social dislocation; environmental degradation as the result of ill-considered development plans or of land shortages; crime, be it internally or internationally organised; gender-based and family violence; and disease and natural disasters. A lot rests on the strength and willingness of the state and civil society to take responsibility for such challenges and on their material and technical capacity to address them. That economic crises typically give rise to social unrest and violence – and that unrest in turn undermines economic confidence – is a clear indication of the interdependency of economic stability and human security.

The breadth of the concept of human security is matched by the social, economic and political diversity to be found in the countries under discussion. SADC includes one country (Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) that has yet to achieve comprehensive and lasting peace, another (Angola) that only recently emerged from civil war, several that have endured war or destabilisation within the past two decades, and others where peace is long established and unchallenged. Democratic participation in political decision-making is well established in some countries, non-existent in others. In economic terms SADC states include those that generate revenue from extractive industries involving a high degree of foreign investment, and others that are largely agricultural. Even within those states where the extractive industries are important,

varying proportions of the population are reliant on subsistence agriculture. Natural resources such as land and water are scarce in some SADC countries and plentiful in others.

No wonder, then, that while human security is a prerequisite for economic development and social progress in all of the countries studied, the specific needs of each country in terms of establishing and guaranteeing human security are likely to vary widely. With this in mind ISS convened a workshop in Pretoria in June 2004, bringing together like-minded non-state actors and researchers from various SADC countries to participate in an information exchange network on security problems affecting the region: the Southern Africa Peace and Security Network (SAPSNet). Over the two days of this meeting, participants made presentations on what they saw as the principal security challenges that confronted their home countries. Each non-state partner then selected one particular challenge that merited further research.

In Angola, a long civil war has compromised the education system and left large numbers of youth – many of them displaced by war – to make a living on the streets of the capital city, Luanda. This reality informed the decision by Angolan participants in the project to focus on education, the hazards of frustrated expectations, and their links to human security. Participants from the DRC likewise chose an urban focus within a country whose recent history has been charted by civil war and economic mismanagement: the needs and aspirations of street children in Kinshasa.

Lesotho, by contrast, is a predominantly rural society where livestock represents capital to a substantial part of the population; stock theft, which might be regarded as a relatively minor nuisance in other countries, therefore takes on the dimension of a national crisis and it was chosen by the partners from Lesotho as the focus for their contribution to this book. Zambian partners chose to focus on two rural locations as a way of examining issues of poverty and human security that impinge on the country and on the region as a whole.

For the partners from Tanzania and Zimbabwe, issues surrounding the democratic process were identified as problem areas for human security. In Zimbabwe, the transition to multiparty democracy, against the background of economic crisis and controversial land reforms, has been marked by tensions between government and opposition movements that have repeatedly spilled over into violence during election periods. Within Tanzania, the islands that constitute Zanzibar have long had an ambiguous relationship with the mainland; the way in which tensions

between islands and the mainland, and between the islands themselves, have played out in the political sphere is examined in this book, with a view to addressing the violence that has frequently tainted the exercise of democracy in Zanzibar.

However great the differences in priority and perspective, there are clear commonalities among the countries represented in this book. No country and no individual in southern Africa is not touched in some way by the interlinked challenges of poverty, education, urban and rural development, and health – particularly HIV and AIDS. By gathering together information and analyses from across the SADC countries, this book is intended to encourage fresh and ongoing reflection on questions of human security throughout the region, a process which can only be enriched by the exchange of experience and analyses across national boundaries.

NOTES

1   Keith Muloongo is the deputy director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). At the time of writing he was programme head of the Southern African Human Security Programme (SAHSP) at the ISS.
2   The participants were Centro de Estudos Estratégicos de Angola (Angolan Centre for Strategic Studies) (CEEA), Labor Optimus of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Lesotho Institute for Public Administration (LIPAM), the Public Affairs and Parliamentary Support Trust (PAPST) of Zimbabwe, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation of Tanzania, the Department of Development Studies, University of Zambia, and the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA).
3   SADC Treaty, Article 23.
4   Kofi Annan, Secretary General salutes international workshop on human security in Mongolia, Two-day session in Ulaanbaatar, 8-10 May 2000, Press release SG/SM/7382, <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc. html>.
5   The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security. Chapter 2 found on <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/.

Part I
POVERTY AND HUMAN SECURITY

Human security and poverty reduction in Zambia

Fredrick Mutesa and Wilma Nchito[1]

INTRODUCTION

The time has come to go beyond the state-centric view that has informed much of contemporary discourse on security. We do not intend to gloss over the fact that many violent conflicts that have engulfed humanity have been the result of the violation of national interests by external aggressors. The end of the Cold War has also witnessed the escalation of intra-state conflicts that in the past tended to be subsumed under the East-West ideological overlay.

In this study, however, we are arguing that there is a need to view countries gripped by severe poverty as legitimate security concerns. For this reason, this study has embraced the broader concept of human security as a useful analytical tool for addressing latent security problems. Not only does the concept of human security lead us to an understanding of the root causes of many conflicts, but it also possesses the potential to serve as an early warning mechanism when it is used to influence policy actions.

It is gratifying to note that world leaders have recognised the intricate links that bind issues of development, cooperation, and peace. The Millennium Declaration by the world leaders in September 2000 and the subsequent establishment of the United Nations Security Commission are testimony that, indeed, a broader concept of security is an imperative. The same spirit is evident in the thrust of the thinking of African leaders on security as embodied in the founding documents of the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Against this backdrop, this study regards the poverty that pervades Zambian society as a silent threat to human security. We contend that poverty is a silent threat to human security because it is an element of structural violence that can easily explode into open conflict. Our main

purpose is to demonstrate the need to factor the issue of poverty into the country's security policy considerations. The study also intends to make the point that many countries – such as Zambia – that have not experienced large-scale intra-state armed conflict are just as deserving of development assistance as countries in post-conflict situations. The study specifically analyses the issue of poverty in Zambia within the context of the country's adoption of the PRSP. Using data based on fieldwork conducted in Mansa and Samfya districts in one of the poorest provinces of Zambia, it is argued that a lot remains to be done to elevate poverty reduction to a priority national development strategy so that one of the most lethal threats to human security in the country may be tackled. Two issues that are relevant to policy are given prominence in the study, namely state capacities and popular participation in formulation and implementation of poverty reduction activities.

The study is divided into five main sections. Following this introduction, we look at the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of human security and efforts to operationalise it at various levels, including SADC and the Zambian government. This is followed by an analysis of the poverty situation in Zambia. In the fourth section data is presented from the study's fieldwork. The study concludes with recommendations that would help the Zambian government view poverty as a serious human security issue needing urgent attention.

METHODOLOGY

This study is based on data collected via a combination of secondary and primary sources. Secondary sources consisted of a review of reports by government, civil society, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, and academic publications. Primary data is based on results of fieldwork interviews conducted in the two districts of Mansa and Samfya in Luapula Province in north-eastern Zambia. Fieldwork interviews took the form of conversational interviews with provincial and district heads of government line ministries, civil society leaders and traditional rulers. Interview guides were prepared for each of the above categories of respondents and administered with the assistance of two research assistants, male and female. In addition, focus group discussions were held with four community groups, two in each district. Altogether 53 respondents participated in the study: 16 key informants (9 Mansa and 7 Samfya) and 47 community members (38 Mansa and 9 Samfya). Fieldwork was carried out between 25 October and 2 November

2004. A dissemination workshop was held at the Commonwealth Youth Programme (CYP) Africa Centre on 15 December 2004. The workshop was attended by participants from civil society, government, the University of Zambia and media personnel. Feedback from the workshop participants and comments by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) liaison person were then incorporated into the final report.

HUMAN SECURITY, POVERTY, AND PARTICIPATION

Pervasive poverty is a silent threat to human security. This is implicit in the definition of human security advanced by many commentators. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, asserted that:

> "Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities."[2]

The above definition clearly implies that for the multitudes of humanity caught up in the poverty trap, their human security is compromised. Chronic hunger, disease and repression are common features of poverty. Poverty also entails a precarious existence subject to "hurtful disruptions". Whereas traditional state-centric views of security occupy themselves with territorial interests and foreign aggression, the human security approach casts the spotlight on people's welfare.[3] In other words, the concept of human security equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms.[4]

Focus on the security of individuals, however, does not diminish the importance of national security, as expounded in the state-centric approaches. Many authors recognise that national security and human security are mutually supportive.[5] An effective, democratic state that promotes and protects the welfare of its people is a precondition for strengthening the legitimacy, stability, and security of its own existence. Seen from this perspective, security of the state is not an end in itself, but a means of securing security for its people.[6]

Poverty negates human security. Poverty, like human security, is a multidimensional social phenomenon. Poverty not only entails lack of what is necessary for material well-being, it also has important psychological

dimensions.[7] Poor people lack voice, power, and independence to participate effectively in community life.

Poverty aggravates social exclusion and disaffection. It undermines human dignity and self-esteem. Not surprisingly, hunger, unemployment, homelessness, and illiteracy provide powerful emotional appeals for separatist movements and those seeking to wrest control of state power, even by illegitimate means. It is unconscionable to think of human security while ignoring the problem of poverty.[8] This is because the multi-dimensional threats to human security, such as economic insecurity, food insecurity, political insecurity, and environmental insecurity, also work to aggravate poverty.

It follows, then, that strategies which address the above threats to human security ought to simultaneously address poverty and provide an enabling environment in which human development can take place. The Commission on Human Security has identified four priorities for policy action to promote human security:

- encouraging growth that reaches the extreme poor;
- supporting sustainable livelihoods and decent work;
- preventing and containing the effects of economic crises and natural disasters; and
- providing social protection for all situations.[9]

The Zambian government has explicitly recognised these priorities for policy action in order to promote human security. The government's poverty reduction strategy, among other things, exposes pro-poor economic growth and social safety nets for vulnerable groups in society. Similarly, the government has established a disaster management unit in the Office of the Vice-President to deal with sudden disruptions in social life.

Other governments hold a similar view. The Japanese government's approach to human security, for example, combines micro-credit schemes, promotion of basic education, provision of social safety nets, and support for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.[10] Understood in the manner we have described above, human security provides us with a holistic concept capable of "nipping conflict and instability in the bud".

Participation is the third leg of our triad. It also ranks as one of the important constitutive elements of human security. Our discourse on human security and poverty reduction would therefore be incomplete without showing how popular participation is linked to both.

Cardinal to an understanding of the essence of human security is the notion of developing the capabilities of individuals and communities to make informed choices. This view was aptly stated by the Commission on Human Security when the commissioners observed that "human security starts from the recognition that people are the most active participants in determining their well-being".[11] The potential of poor people and communities to contribute to their development is enormous, as many professional development practitioners have come to recognise.[12] It is now a truism that interventions aimed at reducing poverty are bound to meet with limited success if the poor themselves are not given a prominent voice in selecting, designing and implementing poverty alleviation programmes and projects. The reasons are obvious: "Poor women and men have detailed knowledge and have context specific criteria about who is poor and not poor."[13]

Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith[14] have defined participation as a process through which stakeholders shape and share control over development initiatives. Eberlei[15] has noted three important elements of this definition, namely the process character as opposed to one-off participatory events, inclusiveness of all societal actors (stakeholders), and a form of joint policy-making. He then expands on these three elements to define what he calls institutionalised participation:

> "Institutionalised participation can be defined as a rights-based, structurally integrated, and legitimized process through which capable stakeholders shape and share control over development initiatives."[16]

Eberlei's definition of institutionalised participation is particularly useful in the conceptualisation of poor people's role in the poverty reduction processes introduced by government and other outside agencies.

Unfortunately, practice presents a disconcerting picture. Pulverised by poverty and physical dislocation, many poor people and communities face serious obstacles in taking the destinies of their lives in their own hands. Yet guaranteeing human security demands that poor people and communities play an active role in development initiatives that promote giving community groups authority and control over planning, implementing and monitoring poverty reduction programmes. The challenge is to find facilitators who will help the poor to discover their inert potentialities and activate them, so that they do not remain passive victims of poverty and the attendant insecurities that it tends to spawn. As Narayan and others have reflected:[17]

> "Developing local organizational capacity requires facilitators who work with poor men and women to inform them about programs, rules, and assets. Poor people need organization to demand local-level transparency and accountability, a process that may also require protection from punitive actions taken by the local elite. So far, governments and most development assistance have focused on the rules, resources, and capacities of the formal systems of governance, and not on mechanisms to build the capacity of poor women and men to participate in local governance and to demand local-level transparency and accountability."

In many parts of the developing world, civil society groups are facilitating communities to make informed choices and to rebuild their organisational capacities to stake claims to development resources. This empowering process is tantamount to taking closer steps towards attaining human security. An outstanding example is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which has become a centre of excellence in showcasing how micro-finance can be used to fight poverty. That civil society has a special role in enhancing human security in Africa is no longer in question.[18] This has been recognised by many African leaders.[19] The real challenge is maintaining a climate of relations between the state and civil society that would allow the latter to thrive without being seen to be undermining the authority of legitimate states.

In concluding this section, we wish to point out that there is growing appreciation of the linkages between security, cooperation and development as suggested by the human security paradigm. At international level, the September 2000 Millennium Summit and its declaration to combat poverty is one of the best-known shifts in the conception of security by a collective body of international leaders. In the southern African region, the conceptual framework on peace and security of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security can also be classified as representing a paradigm shift. To its credit, the SADC Organ recognises the role of non-state actors in the promotion of peace and development. This has created, at least in theory, important political space for civil society groups to partner with states in the region in shaping the peace and development agenda in the member countries.

The challenge for most countries in the SADC region is to translate global views of human security into national programmes. For our purposes, we are concerned with the domestication of the human security agenda by the Zambian government. Zambia has yet to re-orient its approach to issues of security. This re-orientation is necessary if Zambia

is to have a holistic approach to security concerns. In other words, policy-makers and important non-state actors need to transcend the traditional state-centric approach to security with its narrow focus on territory and foreign policy interests as its main units of analysis. It is encouraging that many of the ideas that underpin the human security discourse are already present in the Zambian debate. There are many ways in which human security issues are discussed without consciously alluding to the understanding which has evolved at the global level. There is, for instance, a vigorous campaign to entrench economic, social and cultural rights in the republican constitution. To this effect, many submissions have been made by citizens to the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) appointed by President Levi Mwanawasa in 2003. This position has been clearly articulated by civil society groups like the African Network on Human Rights and Development (AFRONET) and Women for Change (WFC).[20] Similarly, other on-going national debates relevant to human security focus on good governance and poverty reduction.

It is also encouraging to note that Zambia, both as government and civil society, has participated in international gatherings where issues of human security have formed part of the agenda. For example, Zambia was represented at the Copenhagen summit on social development in 1995 where the UNDP's concept of human security was discussed. Again, Zambia was one of the signatories to the Millennium Declaration that defined the Millennium Development Goals. Closer to home, Zambia is a founding member of SADC and subscribes to the SADC Organ. Similarly, in 2004, the Zambian government signed up for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) under NEPAD. Zambia, therefore, already has the makings of what is required to formulate a comprehensive approach to peace and development based on the human security paradigm.

POVERTY SITUATION IN ZAMBIA

If poverty is a negation of human security, as we have argued above, then Zambia's situation can only be described as precarious. In comparative terms, Zambia is said to have the highest level of income poverty and the fourth largest level of human poverty in the SADC region.[21] Whether seen in relative or absolute terms, poverty in Zambia presents the greatest challenge to the country's human security.

Deterioration in human development as measured by the UNDP's human development index (HDI) is often associated with conflict

situations. Although Zambia has never been embroiled in large-scale armed civil uprisings on the same scale as some of its immediate neighbours (Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe), the country is no stranger to violent conflict. First, Zambia has experienced localised insurgency in the form of the Lenshina uprising in parts of Northern and Eastern provinces in 1965 and the Adamson Mushala-led guerrilla warfare in North-western province in the 1970s to early 1980s. Second, as host to several liberation movements that waged war against white minority regimes in the region in the 1970s and 1980s, Zambia paid a high price. Zambia suffered loss of human life and economic infrastructure as a result of military incursions by regimes which wanted to break the country's support to liberation groups. It does not therefore come as a surprise that the country's ranking in terms of the HDI closely resembles that of countries that are either in, or emerging from, conflict. Human insecurity and poverty in Zambia are therefore closely linked to a complex set of geo-political historical factors, economic policy failures, and the vagaries of dependence on a mono-economy. Seen from this perspective, the international community needs to treat Zambia in the same way that other countries in the post-conflict construction phase are treated.

Table 1 SADC human development index

Rank	Country
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius
3	South Africa
4	Swaziland
5	Namibia
6	Botswana
7	Lesotho
8	Zimbabwe
9	Democratic Republic of Congo
10	Zambia
11	Tanzania
12	Angola
13	Malawi
14	Mozambique

Source: SADC Regional Human Development Report 2000: Challenges and opportunities for regional integration. The report is published by the United Nations Development Programme, the Southern African Development Community and the Southern African Political Economy Series Trust.

Once a prosperous middle-income country, Zambia today is one of the least developed economies of the world. About 80% of the population of Zambia are reported to be living on the equivalent of US$1 per day.[22] According to the country's Central Statistical Office (CSO), 73% of the population live in poverty.[23] Poverty is more severe in rural areas (83%) than in urban areas (56%), though in recent years, poverty has increased most rapidly in the urban areas because of the decline in the fortunes of the economy, particularly its mining sector.[24]

Table 2 Overall and extreme poverty in Zambia in rural and urban areas, 1991–1998

Year	Zambia		Rural		Urban	
	Overall poverty	Extreme poverty	Overall poverty	Extreme poverty	Overall poverty	Extreme poverty
1991	69.7	58.2	88.0	80.6	48.6	32.3
1993	73.8	60.6	92.2	83.5	44.9	24.4
1996	69.2	53.2	82.8	68.4	46.0	27.3
1998	72.9	57.9	83.1	70.9	56.0	36.2

Source: CSO, Living conditions in Zambia 1998: The evolution of poverty in Zambia 1990–1996.

Households headed by females are the worst affected by poverty, an observation that was backed by the findings of the Zambia Poverty Assessment Study.[25] More recently, the Social Watch Report 2001 reported that social disparities between men and women in Zambia are widening. The report stated that: "When there is hunger in the home, its first victims are women and their youngest children. Unjust land policies in both modern and traditional tenure systems still restrict the advance of women."[26]

The HIV/AIDS pandemic has contributed to the worsening of poverty in the country. Not surprisingly, the population of orphans has reached alarming levels and child-headed households have become a common phenomenon. The number of orphans attributed to the impact of HIV/AIDS was estimated at 620,000 in 2000 and is projected to reach 974,000 in 2014.[27] Homelessness, particularly among children, is threatening to reach catastrophic levels. In 1996, the number of street children was put at 75,000.[28] Vulnerability to poverty is said to be highest among small- and medium-scale farmers. This is not surprising, given the agricultural liberalisation policy measures that withdrew state support to farmers in the early 1990s.

Poverty in Zambia has been defined as "lack of access to income, employment opportunities, normal internal entitlements for the citizens

such as freely determined consumption of goods and services, shelter and other basic needs of life".[29]

Poverty is linked to a combination of factors, both personal and societal. In rural areas, poverty is largely attributed to poorly functioning markets for both the supply of farming inputs and the purchase of produce. The situation is aggravated by low productivity, which is due to a combination of factors, including outmoded technologies, poor infrastructure, lack of credit, and weak extension services. At macro level, however, poverty in Zambia can be traced to the poor performance of the economy over the last three decades. Zambia's per capita income declined from US$752 in 1965 to US$351 in 2002.[30]

The implementation of economic reforms supported by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund is widely considered to have contributed to deepening poverty in Zambian society. Livelihoods have deteriorated tremendously and access to basic social services such as education and health care have declined as a result of the introduction of cost recovery and user fees in the provision of these services. The introduction of user fees and cost recovery have coincided with increased unemployment due to the closure of companies which could not withstand the flood of cheap imports brought about by economic liberalisation.[31] To compound the problem of poverty, the abolition of food subsidies and the decontrol of prices have not been accompanied by the development of adequate social safety nets that could cushion the impact of the harsh economic environment on those who are least able to fend for themselves.

HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC

Freedom from despair, though less tangible, is considered another important dimension of human security. Alongside the scourge of poverty that we have discussed above, the devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Zambia has deepened a sense of despair in the nation. Today, HIV/AIDS has become a serious impediment to Zambia's development process and the state of human security in the nation. Productivity and family life have been greatly battered by the pandemic. Statistics on the impact of HIV/AIDS present a sombre picture. At national level, studies indicate that one in six adults aged 15 to 49 years is HIV positive.[32] The proportion of the population living with HIV rises from 5% among 15–19 year olds to 25% in the 30-34 age group, before dropping to a level of 17% in the 45–49 age group.[33]

HIV/AIDS prevalence stands at 23% of the urban population, compared to 11% in rural areas. More women (18%) than men (13%) are infected with HIV/AIDS.[34] It is further estimated that 650,000 adults and children have died in the 17 years of HIV/AIDS in Zambia.[35]

Pervasive poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic have formed a deadly combination. Many households emaciated by poverty are failing to provide the kind of nutrition and care that can prolong the lives of HIV/AIDS sufferers. It is no wonder that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is having a field day – it has found a society whose capacities to cope with sudden shocks and sustained stress have already been severely weakened.

Pervasive poverty and an underfunded national health budget have become fertile ground for other diseases. There has been an alarming resurgence of opportunistic infections such as tuberculosis – which were well contained until the advent of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s. It is no coincidence that the spread of HIV/AIDS has occurred alongside many vices and practices often associated with high levels of poverty such as the prevalence of other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs); multiple sexual partners; low condom use; poor health; low status of women; urbanisation and mobility; early sexual activity; and archaic cultural practices that reinforce the low status of women.

The impact that HIV/AIDS has had on the national economy is incalculable. HIV/AIDS infection is highest among the most productive segments of the economically active population, which compounds the problem. Apart from slowing down economic activity, the disease has taken its toll on society through factors such as loss of bread winners; low productivity due to ill health; lost man-hours spent on visiting the sick in hospitals and caring for them in homes; and time off from work to attend funerals of relatives, workmates and neighbours.

STATE CAPACITIES

Government response to the threats to human security described above is generally considered weak.[36] This response has been in form of formulation of the PRSP mentioned above and a broad spectrum of policy reforms covering the entire public sector.

The PRSP consists of three broad thematic areas:

- the productive sectors comprising agriculture, tourism, transport, and energy infrastructure;
- the social sector consisting of education and health; and

- the cross-cutting issues of governance, HIV/AIDS, gender and environment.

Key public sector reforms include privatisation of state-owned enterprises, the Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP) and the decentralisation policy.

Progress in the above areas has been sluggish because of a combination of factors: a heavy external debt, high dependence on donors who are not always forthcoming in honouring their financial pledges, lack of political will, and poorly formulated strategies.

Zambia's economic recovery is constrained by the country's heavy external debt, which was estimated at US$7.1 billion in December 2002.[37] This translates into a per capita debt of about US$700, placing the population of the country among the most indebted people in the world.[38] Debt servicing reduces the state's capacity to provide basic services to the people, as few resources are left for development investments. The country's poverty reduction strategy is estimated to cost a total resource envelope of US$1,200 million.[39] Government has yet to prove that it can mobilise the necessary resources to fight poverty. Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), for example, has noted with great disappointment that "while there is an attempt to clearly classify and set aside money in the budget for Poverty Reduction Programmes (PRPs), the amounts have been inadequate to achieve meaningful poverty reduction. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, the amounts have been, respectively, 7.9%, 6.1% and 6.3% of the national budget."[40]

There are serious concerns that official rhetoric on poverty reduction has not been reflected in patterns of public spending.[41] In other words, the government needs to re-orient its national budget to increase spending on those areas that will immediately address the poverty that confronts the majority of the people, such as agriculture, education and health. A case in point is the attention given to addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the country. The 2003 national budget earmarked K12 billion for the purchase of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) intended for 10,000 AIDS sufferers across the country. But it took government a long time to work out the modalities of distributing these drugs. The general feeling in the country is that the budget for ARVs is too little to have any meaningful impact on the pandemic.

Other strategies must address the increasing problem of urban unemployment. Micro-credit and markets for the informal sector need priority attention. The issue of how to more effectively address the aspect of popular participation in the implementation of government policies is also important.

Vulnerability to the ravages of poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic that endanger human security in Zambia has been exacerbated by reduced state capacities to fulfil its obligations of providing adequate public goods and services. Public institutions have all suffered greatly in the wake of government efforts to adjust the economy to external shocks. Contraction in economic activities and formal employment has diminished government's revenue base. This has led to drastic cutbacks in public expenditure to the extent that nearly all public institutions are in no position to provide efficient and effective services. But even with the little resources available, Zambia's record of public resources management for development is abysmal. The World Bank calculates "government effectiveness" in Zambia to be only 26.9, on a scale from 0 to 100 (100 being the best).[42]

It is also argued that besides lack of resources to finance development, Zambia suffers from another fundamental problem, namely neopatrimonial politics. Neopatrimonialism is widely perceived as the defining feature of Zambia's political system.[43] The three features of neopatrimonialism put forward by Bratton and van de Walle are presidentialism, clientelism, and the use of state resources to sustain political interests. The tension that is said to exist between patrimonial interests and legal-rational principles of government results in mismanagement of public resources. In this sense, Zambia lacks a developmental state in the understanding advanced by Leftwich.[44] A major outcome of neopatrimonialism is that public expenditure will be tilted in favour of emoluments at the expense of development activities.

PARTICIPATION

Zambia formally launched its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2002. Advocates of the PRSP have pointed to the issue of participation and domestic ownership at both national and local levels as the new quality in tackling poverty introduced by this process. Therefore there are hopes that the approach, by opening up space for participation in processes of decision-making to non-state actors, might lead to better success than past attempts.

We have argued above that participation is an important ingredient in human security. Leaning and Arie have argued that human security facilitates participation in the constructive collective project, the foundation of a successful community or nation state.[45] In Zambia, there are doubts about the character and quality of participation of the ordinary people in the major spheres of public life. Democracy as a political system, for

example, thrives best when underpinned by popular participation. This is particularly so in a system of representative democracy such as Zambia has. If voter turn-out can be used as a measure of participation, then the majority of Zambians do not have a say in the choice of their rulers. In the 2001 general elections, for example, only 2.6 million voters out of an eligible population of 4.7 million were registered.[46] When it came to actual voting, only 1.8 million (68%) turned up. This is not just due to ignorance. It reflects the sense of hopelessness in the future that the majority of the people have with regard to the political life of the country.

In the economic sphere, the formulation of the PRSP was characterised by the participation of a wide range of stakeholders including government, the private sector, academia, NGOs, donors, and the provinces.[47] Critics of the PRS processes on the continent have tended to argue that "governments preferred to use the loose concept of participation, which focuses almost exclusively at allowing people to participate in a controlled manner where the final product is not jointly validated and owned".[48] It is particularly argued that the level of participation declined as the process approached finality. Indeed, in Zambia, civil society complained about being left out at the drafting stage.[49]

Eberlei's definition of participation is a useful guide to evaluation of the Zambian experience with the PRSP.[50] Eberlei argues that "institutionalized participation has clearly defined political structures for dialogue between all stakeholders at national as well as at regional and local levels".[51] These structures, though present in Zambia, are still very weak, particularly at local levels where poverty "resides". In addition, most poor communities lack the capacities, both human and technical, to be involved in decision-making. In a nutshell, participation remains a huge challenge for human security in Zambia.

In the next section, we turn from the general to look at the particular ways in which communities, state actors, and non-state actors in Zambia are addressing the issues of human security, poverty reduction and popular participation. Our aim is to demonstrate that poverty reduction is best addressed as a human security concern with a strong element of popular participation.

MANSA AND SAMFYA CASE STUDIES

PROVINCIAL POVERTY PROFILE

Mansa and Samfya are situated in Luapula province in the north-eastern part of Zambia bordering the DRC. For administration, Zambia

is divided into nine provinces, namely Central, Copperbelt, Eastern, Luapula, Lusaka, Northern, North-western, Southern and Western.

The 2000 census of population and housing put the population of Luapula province at 784,613 people, with a growth rate of 3.4%.[52] Mansa and Samfya districts were estimated to have populations of 182,506 and 166,863 respectively, making them the two largest districts in the province.[53]

In economic terms, fishing is the most important activity, employing an estimated 60% of the population.[54] Farming, mainly of a small-scale nature, is the next most important activity. Luapula province is ranked as the second poorest province in Zambia, after Western province. The province is estimated to have a poverty level of 81%, which is higher than the national average of 73%.

Table 3 Overall and extreme poverty in Zambia in rural and urban areas, 1998 (percentage of population)

Location	Overall poverty	Extreme poverty
Rural areas	83	70
Urban areas	56	36
Central	77	63
Copperbelt	65	47
Eastern	80	66
Luapula	81	69
Lusaka	52	34
Northern	81	67
North-western	76	63
Southern	76	60
Western	89	78

Source: CSO, Living conditions in Zambia, 1998.

Mansa and Samfya districts fall within the Luapula Valley, where the poverty situation is more pronounced, with prevalent chronic food insecurity and nutritional vulnerability. Mansa district is the provincial headquarters of Luapula province. The population is concentrated along perennial streams, the Luapula River, and in townships. Villages are scattered and thinly populated. Mansa Batteries was the major industry in the district until 1994, when it was shut down. Other companies include a milling company, National Breweries, and small private firms.

In Samfya, fishing and fish-based trading constitute the backbone of the district's economy. Agriculture is also important, particularly on the mainland. Other economic sectors are of minor importance. The major staple food is cassava, which is grown all over the district. However, the district is food insecure, particularly during the annual fishing ban, which paralyses the local economy almost completely.

Samfya's population densities shift substantially during the year. After the agricultural season is over (April), many people from upland migrate to the swamps to engage in fishing and return only just before the next rains in November. The importance of this seasonal migration has increased significantly in the last thirty years because of the decline of the lake fishery in the late fifties / early sixties, and a sudden population increase in the seventies owing to an influx of retrenched miners from the Copperbelt. According to some sources, the size of the population in the swamps oscillates between 15,000 and more than 30,000 each season as a result of migration.

Poverty is undoubtedly a serious challenge to human security in the two districts. Poverty in its diverse manifestations is well understood by government officials, civil society activists and community members in these two districts. Not surprisingly, both districts have drawn up their own district poverty reduction strategies (DPRSs). Interviews with our target respondents, however, revealed frustration with the low level of funding for poverty reduction programmes. The release of funds by central government to the two districts is erratic and below approved allocations. Although statistics for the two districts were not available, the provincial figures provide a reliable indicator of the funding situation in the two districts. In 2003, K8.4 billion was approved for poverty reduction programmes in Luapula, of which only K3.1 billion was released.[55] In 2004, the authorised budget was K5.8 billion, of which K1.8 billion was released (as at June).[56] This means that very little development activities funded by the public purse are taking place in the two districts. A traditional ruler in Samfya district remarked that "sometimes I wonder whether government departments in this district ever get any money for their programmes".[57] His frustration with the government's performance was echoed by many people we interviewed. This has created a hostile climate against government officials in the two districts. Another respondent in Samfya informed us that government officials are afraid to hold meetings away from the district council offices because of unfulfilled promises they have made to the people.[58]

Fragmentation appears to be a major problem which may cut across the entire country. Disparate programmes are difficult to monitor and may even result in duplication of efforts. What is needed is strategic targeting of poverty based on local priorities. But this is difficult to achieve when no funds are made available for approved development activities. It is important to bear in mind that, apart from government, other actors, such as bilateral development partners and NGOs, support poverty reduction programmes.

A related problem in the two districts is the lack of sustainability of development programmes. Respondents complained that many initiatives are abandoned just when the local population has come to appreciate their importance. This is particularly so with donor-funded initiatives.

HUMAN SECURITY

Fieldwork carried out in Mansa and Samfya reinforced the picture that obtains at national level regarding knowledge and utility of the concept of human security. Government documents consisting of district situational analyses (DSAs) and district poverty reduction strategies (DPRS) made no reference to human security. Security concerns in the province, which plays host to refugees from Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), are conditioned by the state-centric approach reviewed above.

Luapula has suffered from armed incursions by militia groups from neighbouring DRC and Rwanda. Like Western and North-western provinces, which border Angola, residents of Luapula are vulnerable to kidnappings and the seizure of property by marauding foreign militia groups. These factors have influenced government security policy in the province. Not surprisingly, the province tends to have a sizeable presence of government security forces, particularly along the border. Fortunately, unlike Western and North-western provinces, it has not reported any significant proliferation of small arms among the civilian population. This situation can change at any time if militia groups decide to exchange guns for food.

Interviews conducted in Mansa and Samfya revealed that threats to personal security are associated with increased crime levels. Unemployment and boredom, particularly among young people, were cited as the main factors contributing to crime in the two districts. It is clear from the literature and the discussions held with respondents that a holistic view of human security does not yet exist in the provincial debate. Yet it is evident from the situational analysis that a holistic view

of human security would clearly rank poverty among the major threats to peace and development.

PARTICIPATION

Participation of non-state actors is often lauded as the new quality in policy-making introduced by the PRSP. This opened-up space is viewed as important in shaping policy developments in the interests of the majority in society. In the context of our study, participation, if implemented in the manner discussed above, has the potential of enhancing human security through policies that effectively tackle poverty as well as by giving a voice to groups that have hitherto been mere bystanders in national processes.

At central government level, the overall coordination of the implementation of the PRSP is in the hands of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. However, it is expected that participation will come from other line ministries, other government institutions, civil society, and international cooperating partners.

Within the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, the Planning and Economic Management Department (PEMD) has been established as the focal point for PRSP coordination, monitoring and evaluation. Other departments of the Ministry of Finance, however, are expected to participate in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP. To facilitate these processes, a poverty reduction and analysis unit has been set up to achieve the desired focus on poverty reduction strategies.

At the time of formulation of the PRSP, eight thematic working groups were established to facilitate the participation of other important stakeholders like civil society and international cooperating partners in the planning process. In October 2003, the working groups were transformed into sector advisory groups (SAGs) and their mandate extended beyond planning to include implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP.[59]

Away from central government, line ministries and provincial planning units are expected to play important roles in the budgeting, sectoral coordination, and monitoring of the poverty reduction strategies. It is also envisaged that after commencement of implementation of the newly launched decentralisation policy, district and sub-district planning units will be linked to provincial and national level planning systems.

The Ministry of Finance and National Planning is charged with the responsibility of consolidating the provincial and sectoral plans and

ensuring that they are translated into annual budgets. The decentralisation policy proposes development of a framework for local and central government planning and resource sharing mechanism. At provincial level, provincial development coordinating committees (PDCCs) chaired by provincial permanent secretaries are expected to provide policy guidance to the provincial planning units (PPUs) under the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. The PDCCs are composed of provincial heads of line ministries and are representative of the private sector and civil society.

At district level, the district planning units (DPUs) are to perform the same tasks as the PPUs, albeit with reduced authority. These are housed in the local authorities and are linked to the PPUs at the higher level and the community-based organisations at the lower level. The DPUs are critical in the planning and monitoring of the poverty reduction strategies. They coordinate the drawing up of district plans and their submission to the higher levels for further scrutiny and sourcing of funding. District development coordinating committees (DDCCs), chaired by district commissioners and made up of representatives of heads of line ministries, the private sector and civil society, provide policy guidance to the DPUs.

The planning and implementation of the PRSP therefore is expected to be carried out within the above governance framework. Actual practice, however, deviates substantially from this ideal pattern.

From the interviews conducted with government representatives, it was observed that the institutional and management structure for the planning of public expenditure and policy did not function in a coherent manner. Rather a variety of loosely coordinated activities (mostly in the form of services, sensitisation programmes and workshops on issues that fell short of real value development) were observed. A number of projects arising from such activities were sometimes half-heartedly implemented by line departments and projects. Donor-driven initiatives and sector-wide approaches have been seen as separate, add-on activities rather than part of a holistic development strategy.

Officials from the planning unit unsuccessfully lead in organising other government departments and managing the planning process of development programmes and initiatives to operationalise the poverty reduction strategy paper at the local level. In order to deal with the wide range of development issues, the Provincial Development Coordinating Committee (PDCC) and District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) have been constituted, but are largely dominated by government

Human security and poverty reduction in Zambia

Table 4 Summary of interventions identified in PRSP and activities funded

Sector/area	Areas of intervention identified during provincial consultation	First PRSP progress report, January 2002 – June 2003	Second PRSP progress report, July 2003 – June 2004
Agriculture	• Sensitise farmers on Marketing arrangements • Empower farmer associations/ cooperatives in entrepreneur-ship	• Agricultural inputs to vulnerable but viable farmers under PAM – Programme Against Malnutrition	
Industry	• Invest in rural-based processing of agricultural, mineral and fishing products		
Mining	• Increase investment in mining sector		
Health	• Improve water and sanitation • Scale up HIV/AIDS campaigns	• Borehole construction • Rehabilitation of rural health centres	• Rehabilitation of health infrastructure
Education	• Improve education facilities, teachers' conditions, distribution of learning materials • More literacy classes/emphasise importance of education		• Provision of school desks
Environment			• Biodiversity and water conservation in all districts
Energy			
Governance	• Funding from treasury should be disbursed directly to districts • Form district joint commission		
Infrastructure development		• Roads, rehabilitation and maintenance • Resettlement programme • Dam and weir construction	• Rehabilitation of feeder roads • Rehabilitation of local courts • Beekeeping • Resettlement schemes
Gender	• Encourage girl child education and gender balance in planning and implementation of programmes		
HIV/AIDS	• Increase knowledge and attitude and behavioural changes, that is, practice		

Sources: Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2002), Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; Zambia's First PRSP Implementation Progress Report for the period January 2002 – June 2003; and Second PRSP Implementation Progress Report, July 2003 – June 2004.

line departments and institutions. The alluded-to dominance of the PDCC and DDCCs by government departments has compromised the effective planning and impact of development programmes. In practice, PDCCs and DDCCs are specifically assigned to deal with macroeconomic and expenditure issues. They are "supposed" to be responsible for preparing thematic plans and identifying priority areas for development that are derived from the poverty reduction programmes (PRPs). There has reportedly been political interference by political leaders, who have a habit of diverting public resources from their approved programmes at short notice to other sectors not listed among the district's development priorities.

The PDCC is housed at the Provincial Planning Unit (PPU) and chaired by the permanent secretary. On the other hand, the DDCCs are housed at the district council offices. Concerns have been raised over the relationship between the PPU and the District Planning Office (DPO). The DPO does not fall under the jurisdiction of the PPU and this arrangement creates problems in the formulation and coordination of development priorities. The PPU, as a secretariat to the PDCC, is responsible for organising meetings, consultations and preparation of framework papers. Non-state agencies like civil society and traditional leaders are conspicuously absent from this setting. The PDCC and DDCCs have no permanent staff and depend on regular government employees for support.

Apart from the apparent disharmony between the district planning and provincial planning units, there seems to be a continuing problem of top-down approaches in driving the development agenda, with central government in Lusaka calling most of the shots. The organisation of the provincial consultative forum that discussed the PRSP, for example, did not give the provincial and district planning units adequate notice to make the necessary consultations with local stakeholders. The haste with which the provincial consultation was done appeared to be tuned to satisfying an already set agenda in which the participation of the provincial and district planning units was more of a formality rather than a process of adding real value.

Finally, district development activities are still characterised by fragmentation as different line ministries and departments seem to be more vertically integrated with their superior offices in the province and Lusaka than well articulated horizontally with related field offices. But for most departments, the provincial offices do not appear to be well linked to district offices, particularly the Provincial Planning Unit and the Provincial Education Office.

Field data also seemed to suggest that local voices were not always carried into the formulation of final government planning documents. First, it appears that the process of aggregating information from provincial consultations into national priorities may have created a disjuncture between actual provincial priorities submitted at the consultative workshops and what central government has finally come to fund through the national budget. Table 4 presents a summary of what Luapula province indicated as priority interventions and the activities that have so far been funded from the national budget in the province.

Government notes that, apart from direct funding for poverty reduction programmes (PRPs) that was channelled through the provincial administration (office of the provincial permanent secretary), several other programmes were funded through the respective line ministry headquarters.[60] That aside, however, there are apparent inconsistencies between what were identified as priority areas of intervention during the provincial consultative forum and what government has actually disbursed funds for.

Next, we compare government interventions that have received some funding and what the respondents identified as priority poverty areas in the districts of Mansa and Samfya.

We need, however, to point out here that we did not have access to complete data on funded programmes, therefore the picture presented here may be a distorted one.

Table 5 Funded poverty reduction activities and local priorities in Mansa

Funded activities	Local priorities identified through fieldwork interviews
• Road rehabilitation and maintenance	• Unemployment
• Resettlement programme	• Teenage prostitution
• Sinking of boreholes	• HIV/AIDS
• Rehabilitation of Fiyongoli Dam	• Street children
• Rehabilitation of rural health centres and Mansa General Hospital	• Lack of diversification of economic activities
• Procurement of school requisites	

It is clear from the above two tables that there is an incongruence between the needs of the local population and the programmes being funded by the government under the auspices of PRPs. This calls for greater involvement of the local population in the design of PRPs.

To gauge exactly who participates at what stage of the planning process for development programmes depends on a number of factors, in particular government's readiness to invite a particular stakeholder to take part. Popular participation in PRPs – as is evident in other programmes and activities – is by invitation, though largely selective, by government officials. Opportunities and pathways for participation are not automatic. Civil society and other stakeholders have complained that the process of planning is "extremely non-consultative", with almost complete exclusion of civil society and other non-state actors.

There is excessive government interference. Internally, there are also wrangles between different line departments. The Provincial Planning Unit (PPU) is concerned that PRP planning processes take place outside the PPU. It was pointed out that the PPU's input into the planning processes for development programmes did not usually form part of the final decision by central government.

The relevance and impact of civil society groups in planning development programmes are difficult to measure. A look into the operations and capacity of civil society members could help provide some speculative answers. Whereas government personnel tend to be relatively well qualified, the same cannot be said of most individuals running civil society organisations. These qualifications count a lot when dealing with issues such as macroeconomic analyses, models and policy analysis.

The major avenue open for participation by different civil society groups and other non-state actors in PRP processes is through workshops, conferences and seminars. These include workshops focusing mainly on gender mainstreaming, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and environmental awareness programmes. However, there is little evidence of civil society and other non-state actors facilitating public input into PRPs. The other group of consultative workshops and meetings involve targeting donor-driven projects such as the Luapula Province Livelihood and Food Security Programme (LPLFSP) funded largely by Department for International Development Cooperation of Finland (FINNIDA) and Danish Association for International Cooperation (MS-Zambia).

Government-driven consultations usually last a day or a few days at most, and involve a negligible number of stakeholders with little emphasis on the ordinary citizen. These consultations fail to identify key issues and priorities for poverty reduction. Field interviews revealed that consultative workshops were dominated by elected officials (councillors and some members of parliament) and government employees (the police and line ministry heads and in some cases Office of the President

personnel). There was limited regard for traditional leaders. It was also clear from the study that women and the poor were underrepresented. Since government officials are largely responsible for drawing up the list of invitees, it can safely be concluded that the government does not provide women representation.

Government appears to be lacking stronger resolve to achieve a more representative cross-section of participants in formulating PRPs. Data from focus group discussions gives a strong indication that this is not by accident, but design. Local communities appear not to be aware of PRPs and are not sure if their problems are going to be catered for. Focus group discussions revealed that most people knew very little about government-supported PRPs.

The above analysis has serious implications for the implementation and the whole concept of ownership of PRPs. The interviews also revealed that people are less willing to accept and implement programmes that they were not consulted about. Most people were angry that such an important exercise as formulating and prioritising PRPs took place without their input. There was a common feeling that local people are used as conduits by some officials to get access to resources that are then mismanaged.

It is evident from the interviews that civil society groups are merely "passengers" in PRP processes. The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) has been instrumental through its secretariat in Lusaka in mobilising civil society to engage directly with the PRSP process, but unfortunately civil society groups are not party to formulating PRP programmes. The dialogue within civil society on issues of PRPs is weak. For example, there is no follow-up on members who belong to particular development committees within government. They do not have a formal mechanism for reporting back.

Participation of civil society in government development programmes is cosmetic. The CSPR, for example, has one representative on the provincial planning forum. Government is in the habit of calling meetings at short notice. This does not give CSPR member organisations time to consult their constituencies on issues to be included on the agenda. As a result, the only CSPR representative on the forum does not carry the views of other civil society groups in the district. The CSPR representative's contribution therefore becomes limited to the views of his own organisation. This cannot be said to be participation of civil society in the planning process.

The quality of civil society participation is affected by a number of factors, some of which have already been alluded to. Other impediments to civil society participation in government development programmes are listed below:

a **Lack of awareness of the PRSP process**

Many individuals did not understand the relationship of the PRPs to highly indebted poor country (HIPC) debt relief, its role in present and future International Financial Institution (IFI) conditionalities, and its links to reforms in the public expenditure management. A lot of them did not take ownership of the PRSP, thinking that it was meant only for government.

b **Lack of capacity**

Civil society groups did not have sufficient information and a mandate from their constituencies to represent them. Apart from documentations from the CSPR in Lusaka, there was no evidence of participatory research work to inform the PRSP process by any civil society group. There was also a lack of technical expertise especially in non-welfare issues, resulting in failure to field people in technical working groups.

c **Organisation of the consultative process**

Government's organisational failures in implementing innovative participatory approaches undermine civil society and other non-state actors' participation both in working groups and district development programmes. In some of the government working groups such as PDCCs and DDCCs, leadership problems existed.

d **Facilitation of PRP processes**

Civil society groups and individuals alike complained of government's domineering influence in PRP working groups and processes. In some working groups such as the LPLFSP, donors took on the facilitation role, leading to a more organised process.

e **Timing and time-scale**

Many respondents, including some government workers, felt the PRPs are hurried. The time pressures mean that civil society organisations (CSOs) have no chance to consult their constituencies even if they wanted to. Moreover, CSOs lacked the ability to initiate and the drive to engage in dialogue within civil society.

f **Inadequate information**

Limited and inadequate information is provided to stakeholders by government and civil society, in the various stages of formulating

Table 6 Funded poverty reduction activities and local priorities in Samfya

Funded activities	Local priorities identified through fieldwork interviews
• Konikalia-Mbulu road	• Unemployment
• Kapoma-Kauni road	• Inadequate health services
• Mwansa-Kombe Sashi	• Early marriages among both boys and girls
• Clearing of channels at Katanshya-Kampolombo, Kalimakonde-Itala, Kunkula Buchinda and Kampolombo Kalasa Mukosa	• High rates of school drop-outs
	• Increasing population of orphans
• Rehabilitation of Kapata Clinic	• Hunger
• Construction of septic tank at Samfya stage II Health Centre	• Teenage prostitution
	• Poor distribution of agricultural inputs and purchase of produce
	• Lack of alternative sources of livelihoods besides fishing
	• Lack of rural credit
	• Deforestation
	• Overfishing
	• Lack of sustainability of development programmes

poverty reduction programmes. Important documents are circulated only on the day of the meeting. This leaves no room for proper reading and critiquing or consultation.

g *Political boundaries on participation*

Clear limits exist on what civil society can comment on and participate in. Civil society is excluded from the main decision-making committees. At national level, for example, the macroeconomic framework was not made available to civil society organisations until a few weeks before a scheduled launch.

STATE CAPACITIES

It was evident from fieldwork carried out in Mansa and Samfya that often a serious gap exists between the lofty policy pronouncements by central government in Lusaka and the implementation realities as one

moves farther away from the capital. Resource constraints include lack of funding for approved programmes, a weak human resource base and poor logistics. In short, state capacities at local level are too weak to effectively implement government policies. The situation was most acute in Samfya district, where several public officials were serving in acting positions. Nearly all departments were understaffed.

High turnover of personnel was common in most government departments as officers left in search of the proverbial greener pastures because of low salaries and poor conditions of service.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This study reiterates the point made at the beginning; pervasive poverty such as is obtaining in Zambia is a serious human security concern. Poverty endangers human security through its effects on the quality of life. In a country where over 70% of the population live in poverty, the situation not only endangers personal security but can also lead to rising resentments against established order and result in explosive conflict. In thinking about security, Zambia is better served using a human security perspective than relying on the traditional state-centric approach.

The rudiments of the human security approach are already present in the Zambian national debate. Much of this has flowed from the global agenda on human security to which both the Zambian government and civil society have contributed as participants. The first step towards a comprehensive human security approach in Zambia therefore would be domestication of many of the international agreements to which it has appended its signature. This should run alongside continued participation in on-going international gatherings aimed at strengthening global human security. Again for Zambia, SADC and NEPAD protocols on human security would be useful starting points of such involvement.

The concept of human security also entails a heightened role for civil society. This is clearly enshrined in the regional protocols concluded by SADC and NEPAD. Although the regional protocols do not specify clearly the expected roles of civil society, they provide important recognition of their importance. It is up to civil society to seize this opportunity to explore ways of building partnerships with government that would translate the global agenda on human security into domestic policy actions.

Our case studies of Mansa and Samfya reveal that human security not only is a concept that is relevant to actors at the centre, but also has implications for areas farther away from the capital. In any

case, it is in the local communities that poverty is experienced and security endangered.

NOTES

1   Dr Fredrick Mutesa is a lecturer at the Department of Development Studies and Wilma Nchito is at the Department of Geography, University of Zambia.
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17 Narayan et al, op cit, p 277.
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19 For instance, civil society has been accorded a special role in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) arrangements.
20 AFRONET is a Lusaka-based human rights organisation that publishes the annual Zambia Human Rights Report, which advocates economic, social and cultural rights. WFC is a membership organisation that works with grassroots women around the country to sensitise them on issues of economic, social and cultural rights.

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23 Ibid, p 12.
24 Ibid, p 12.
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35 Ibid.
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Part II

MULTIPARTY POLITICS AND HUMAN SECURITY

Zanzibar
Conflict resolution and human security in the 2005 elections

Gaudens Phillip Mpangala and Jonathan M K Lwehabura[1]

INTRODUCTION

Tanzania is a United Republic comprising Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. Before establishment of the Union in April 1964, Tanzania mainland was known as Tanganyika. Zanzibar comprises two islands, Unguja in the south and Pemba in the north. According to the 2002 census[2] the United Republic of Tanzania had a population of 34,443,503, of which Tanzania mainland had 33,461,849 and Zanzibar 981,654 people.

Zanzibar has had unprecedented national movements fighting for national independence from the colonial hegemony since the 1950s. During that time, four political parties competed in four elections, culminating in independence in December 1963. Arising from those elections, hostile relations between political parties developed. Even after independence, the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in Tanzania posed problems for the various organs mandated with the powers to administer multiparty elections and culminated in a loss of confidence and trust from the political parties that participated in the elections, as well as subsequent conflicts.

Today's violent conflicts take place within existing states rather than as wars between neighbouring states. These conflicts are a result of differences of identity, nation and nationalism, competition for resources or recognition, and power. Obviously these conflicts vary from one state to another, but the main issue remains: unmet needs and the necessity to accommodate the interests of majorities and minorities.

In a nutshell, today's conflicts are played out among internal factions and take the form of civil strife. This has forced the international community and Southern African Development Community (SADC)

countries to seek various methods of conflict resolution, many of which relate to the electoral process and/or the entrenchment of democratic culture with a view to making peace sustainable.

Zanzibar is no exception. On 27 January 2001 news from Tanzania that scores of people had been killed in a political conflict and thousands had sought refuge in neighbouring Kenya shocked the world. In a world fatigued by violent conflicts, the events in Zanzibar nevertheless came as a shock, because for a long time Tanzania had enjoyed the reputation of being an island of peace in a continent that was pockmarked by violent and even genocidal conflicts. Indeed, Tanzania had been the recipient of refugees rather than a producer of refugees.

One might ask how this could have come about so soon after the demise of the revered Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere? While no society is free from dispute, events in Tanzania serve as a lesson as to why the society failed to resolve the conflict in its nascent stages before January 2001, and perhaps more importantly, how it was eventually convinced to make a resolute effort to find a solution through direct negotiation between the two conflicting parties of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF).

Although the events of January 2001 appeared to the outside world to be unexpected, they were in many ways a direct product of difficult political relations since the 1950s. The introduction of multiparty politics in 1992 was followed by multiparty general elections in 1995 and 2000. Both elections magnified the difficult political relations that eventually gave rise to the events of January 2001. A deeper analysis and critique of a historical perspective is therefore vital for understanding the source and causes of conflicts in Zanzibar.

RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This study is premised on the widely acknowledged proposition that conflict prevention and management strategies tend to be most effective in the early stages of the conflict cycle. If appropriate measures are not taken in time, the conflict could escalate to high intensity.[3]

Many African countries are embroiled in political violence. For example, the initial acts of violent conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Liberia generated cycles of retaliation and retribution that became difficult to break. The killings of 26/27 January in Zanzibar represent a low level of violence. Therefore, this is a crucial opportunity for conflict management and prevention, as the concerned parties still maintain channels of

communication. It would be regrettable if this opportunity were missed. This study has been taken as highly appropriate in contributing towards conflict control management and resolution, particularly in the building of human security as Tanzania embarks on the October 2005 general elections.

METHODOLOGY

Data for the report was collected through primary and secondary sources.

Dialogue, open-ended interviews and discussion with various stakeholders were the primary sources of data collection. A number of people were identified as stakeholders in political developments in Zanzibar. These include 10 senior officials of political parties, 11 members of political parties, 6 government officials, 10 leaders, 12 members of civil society organisations, 4 retired politicians, 6 members of the private sector, and 20 ordinary voters. The study team met the individuals and discussed with them various issues with a focus on multiparty elections in Zanzibar.

Secondary sources were grouped into three main categories. These include published research reports and books, published elections monitoring reports such as those by Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO), the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) and the Zanzibar Election Monitoring Group (ZEMOG), as well as papers presented at various conferences, workshops and seminars.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The atmosphere during the study was propitious and was marked by amicable discussions and focused responses from the fieldworkers. There were some constraints, however:

• The timing of the study coincided with the local government election campaigns in Tanzania and the resultant pressure on voters to register. Preliminary administration of study instruments and preliminary views from respondents made the study team focus more on issues of human security related to elections. Issues threatening human security were largely based on election management in Tanzania, particularly in Zanzibar.

• The issue of anonymity took preference during the study. Most interviewees/respondents preferred to remain anonymous and requested that their anonymity be adhered to.

• The incidents of insecurity that culminated in the death of two activists in Pemba and Temeke (Tanzania mainland) affected the rate of research in that most respondents feared to supply tangible data. We had to recruit research assistants to cross-check the validity of the data.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MULTIPARTY POLITICS AND THE BUILDING OF HUMAN SECURITY

A WORKING DEFINITION OF HUMAN SECURITY

There are many useful definitions and characterisations of human security. Sabina Alkire[4] proposed a working definition of human security as "… to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment". In concrete terms, human security is deliberately *protective*. It recognises that people and communities are threatened by events beyond their control. These events could be a financial crisis; a violent conflict; the HIV/AIDS pandemic; a national policy that undercuts public and private investment in health care or education; terrorist attacks; water shortages; chronic destitution; pollution in a distant land – to mention but a few.

According to Alkire, the safeguarding of human lives involves not only institutions that intend to promote human security overtly, but also institutions that unintentionally undermine it. Alkire identifies various strategies associated with providing human security: identifying threats and then seeking to prevent them from materialising; mitigating the harmful effects of those that do happen and helping victims cope; and respecting human security, meaning that all actors, be they institutional, corporate or individuals, must ascertain that their actions do not unintentionally threaten human security.

The emphasis on human beings distinguishes human security from the objectives of protecting state territories that dominated security policies in the 19th and 20th centuries. Human security, being 'people-centred', shifts that focus onto people, regardless of gender, race, religion, ethnicity, citizenship, etc.

Alkire concludes that the term 'safeguard' must not be misunderstood. She states that human security is not 'threat-centred' but 'people-centred'. It is a condition that results from effective political, social, economic, and cultural settings, not from executing a set of

administrative procedures. According to Alkire's definition of human security, the safeguarding of the 'vital core' of all human lives from critical pervasive threats focuses on fundamental human rights, basic capacities, and absolute needs of individuals in the society. The 'vital core' is a non-technical term describing the concerns that underpin human security. It could be defined in the context of capabilities; the freedom people have to do and to be. It encompasses elements of the fundamental human rights that all people and institutions are obliged to respect or provide, even if the obligations are not perfectly justifiable. The rights and freedoms in the 'vital core' pertain to survival, livelihood, and basic dignity.

Alkire's proposed working definition does not specify the rights and freedoms that pertain to the 'vital core', beyond identifying these three categories. The task of prioritising rights and capabilities is a value judgement and a difficult one, which may best be undertaken by appropriate institutions and researchers in accordance with a specific country dispensation, history, and party system. Yet, the judgement is necessary if human security is to be realistic and effective.

The concept of human security received its most familiar definition from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which stated that security has for far too long been interpreted narrowly – as security of territory or as protection of national interests or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust – and that it neglected the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. According to the UNDP, human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. Second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life:

> "… safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives. From a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments. Like other security concepts – national security, economic security, and food security – it is about protection. Human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk, and taking remedial action where prevention fails."[5]

In essence, the UNDP stipulates that the range of potential threats to human security should not be narrowly conceived. While the safety of people is obviously at grave risk in situations of armed conflict, a human security approach is not simply synonymous with humanitarian action. It highlights the need to address the root causes of insecurity and to help ensure people's future safety. There are also human security dimensions to a broad range of challenges, such as gross violations of human rights, environmental degradation, terrorism, transnational organised crime, gender-based violence, infectious diseases, and natural disasters. The widespread social unrest and violence that often accompany economic crises demonstrate that there are clear economic underpinnings to human security. The litmus test for determining whether it is useful to frame an issue in human security terms is the degree to which the safety of people is at risk.

The African Union Declaration on Elections, Democracy and Governance spells out the cardinal aspects of human security:

> "Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal franchise as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the branches/organs of government." [6]

The African Union Guidelines for African Union Observation and Monitoring Mission of February 2002 observed that:

> "Electoral observation and monitoring has become an integral part of the democratic and electoral processes in Africa. International, regional and national observers have come to play important roles in enhancing the transparency and credibility of elections and democratic governance in Africa and the acceptance of election results throughout the continent. Election observation and monitoring missions can also play key roles in diminishing conflicts before, during, and after elections."[7]

Given the political history of Zanzibar, the incidents during multiparty elections have been the major causes of human insecurity. Efforts have been made to tackle election management, monitoring and observation commensurate with the SADC Region Principles for Election

Management, Monitoring and Observation adopted on 6 November 2003 in Johannesburg, which recommended that human security principles should address the following:

- the need for a comprehensive constitutional and legal framework;
- the importance of transparent and accessible pre-election procedures (including the delimitation process, voter registration and candidate nomination);
- the equitable use of the media and public resources and issues of political party finance;
- the organisation and management of the election phase, including the location of polling stations, their layout, and access to them;
- the secrecy of the ballot and the counting process;
- the post-election phase, including the settlement of election disputes and ways of ensuring that results are acceptable; and
- the requirements for unhindered, credible, professional and impartial monitoring and observation of the electoral process.

Although AU and SADC countries have committed themselves to upholding what Alkire calls the 'vital core', for example the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in their constitutions and various accords and multiparty elections that are free, fair, credible and legitimate, their political will and commitment alone do not translate into 'best democratic practice', which is a crucial element of democracy. A vivid example is the Zanzibar conflicts, which, like others in the region, can only be resolved through a process of dialogue between the major stakeholders in the electoral process and by learning from the experience of others. This can be attained only if we are able to foresee tension between the need for participatory engagement and scrutiny of the elements of the 'vital core' by many (especially those whose security is endangered) and the need for international agencies, NGOs, researchers, and other public institutions, among others, to clearly define a 'vital core' and create procedures and institutions that prepare to protect it effectively. The imperfect but operational response to these tensions is to maintain a vague, wide-ranging definition of human security and to articulate procedures for operationalising the definition in concrete terms.

The management of the Zanzibar 2005 elections has much to learn from this working definition, particularly when linked to human security. Having in place a comprehensive constitutional and legal framework

that mirrors the fundamental rights and freedoms that are embodied in constitutions and various accords will enhance multiparty democracy in Zanzibar.

GROWTH OF PARTY POLITICS

The system of political parties is a contemporary phenomenon in the political history of humankind. The ideas underlying the system began to develop in Western Europe between the 17th and 19th centuries with the growth of capitalism and liberal political ideas that supported the new social system. The intention was to get rid of European monarchies based on the feudal social system. Capitalism demanded republican and representative governments and thus political parties played a significant role. By the 19th century the system of political parties began to consolidate in the form of multipartism, not only in Europe but also in North America.

In Africa the system of party politics began in the period of the struggles for national independence from the late 1940s to the 1960s. The colonised people established political parties in order to use them as institutions for demanding independence. In countries where independence had to be attained through armed liberation, political parties took the form of liberation movements. The party system took the form of multipartism up to the period soon after independence.

MULTIPARTY POLITICS AND THE BUILDING OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

This study was aimed at examining the extent to which multiparty politics can contribute to the development of human security. To do so it was necessary to examine how multiparty politics can facilitate the building of democratic societies.

Since the emergence and growth of multiparty politics in Western Europe and North America the system has been associated with the building of democracy. Concepts such as democracy were developed long before the party system was conceived, however. In the era of Ancient Greece, between the 5th century and 3rd century BC, democracy was one of the political systems applied in Greek city-states such as Athens. It was based on the direct participation of male citizens through city assemblies.[8] Although the system of democracy was biased in that it excluded women, slaves and foreigners, it was a direct democracy in which all those who were eligible participated.

In the period of the Roman Empire, from the 3ʳᵈ century BC to the 5ᵗʰ century AD, there was little democracy as the system was an imperial one imposed through conquest on many European and Mediterranean societies. A Greek philosopher, Polybius, based in Rome, developed ideas on a mixed system of government, which was periodically exercised at the headquarters of the Empire in Rome. In this system democracy through assemblies was mixed with elements of aristocracy and monarchy. The Roman Emperor represented the monarchy, while a council of advisors represented the aristocracy.[9]

The third stage in the development of ideas on democracy was the period of the growth of liberal ideas between the 17ᵗʰ and 19ᵗʰ centuries. Although this was partly a revival of ideas from Ancient Greece and the period of the Roman Empire, a number of new developments took place. Among the most important were demands for individual rights and freedoms, the establishment of parliamentary republican states, and representative forms of democracy instead of direct democracy. It was at this stage that democracy came to be associated with the multiparty system.

There has been a great deal of debate and discussion as to whether a multiparty political system represents real democracy.[10] At the centre of the discussion is the argument that the system negates real democracy, since political parties deny people direct participation through party representation. However, as we shall see later, in most parts of the world it has not been easy to avoid implementing the multiparty system.

With the consolidation of capitalism in the 19ᵗʰ century, ideas on socialism emerged that facilitated workers' struggle against the capitalist system. These ideas grew at that stage only in Europe. They had many dimensions, but our main concern here is to note ideas on democracy in relation to the party system.

Briefly, socialist democracy placed due emphasis on economic aspects. It was argued that real democracy could not be achieved in a system of economic exploitation and socio-economic inequality.[11] One cannot regard a system in which there is a big gap between the few rich and the majority poor as a democratic system. Real democracy must be based on both political and socio-economic democracy.

However, unlike liberal democracy, socialist democracy came to be based on a one-party system. Socialist ideas continued with the idea of having republican states with a one-party system. In Russia, after the socialist revolution, the one-party system was viewed as one that could facilitate dictatorship by the working class or the proletariat, and later,

in Third World countries such as China and Cuba, as dictatorship by the working people, including artisans and peasants.[12]

Ideas that associated democracy and a one-party system were developed soon after independence. Early African leaders and philosophers such as Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Kwameh Nkurumah and Sékou Touré advanced concepts of African democracy. They advocated a democratic system based on traditional African political systems and on consensus and reconciliation rather than political competition. Such democracy emphasised unity, brotherhood, cooperation, equality, justice, and the dignity of man. Nyerere was of the opinion that the party under the one-party system should be a strong party. He outlined the role and position of such a party as follows:

> "The job of a strong political party is to act as a bridge linking the
> people to the government they have elected, and the government to the
> people it wishes to serve … For the truth is that it is not the party which
> is an instrument of the government. It is the government which is the
> instrument through which the party tries to implement the wishes of the
> people and serve their interests."[13]

These ideas on democracy were associated with a one-party system for various reasons. First, a one-party system avoided political competition, which was not part of the traditional African political system. Second, a one-party system would ensure unity in the newly independent African nations. Third, because of national unity, the one-party system would ensure fast socio-economic development, particularly because African countries emerged from colonialism with undeveloped economies and social services.

However, in some cases the one-party system was regarded as a transitional phenomenon. For instance, although Nkrumah and Nyerere advocated a one-party system in post-independence Africa, they recognised the importance of a multiparty system. They both argued that the multiparty system could be adopted later, when African countries had achieved national unity and development. Given the colonial legacy of socio-economic backwardness, ethnicity, racism, regionalism and religious antagonism, Africa needed a transition period with a one-party system.

Ideas on a one-party system which were developed through ideas on socialism and African nationalism could not facilitate the building of democracy. In most socialist countries one-party states developed

bureaucratic and dictatorial tendencies, thus negating the very principles of socialist democracy. The one-party system in African countries also developed authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies. Military coups arising out of such tendencies brought about military regimes that were even more dictatorial and oppressive.

Thus struggles and movements towards the establishment of a democracy based on a multiparty system began in the late 1980s in socialist countries such as the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and in African countries. Besides internal struggles, there was pressure from Western capitalist nations and institutions to ensure democratisation through the adoption of multipartism. In African countries the process has popularly been regarded as the democratisation process.

The main concern in Africa has been how best democracy can be developed to avoid the shortcomings of the previous systems of democracy. Given the predominance of the multiparty system we would suggest the development of democratic developmental multiparty politics.[14] It is our hope that this type of multiparty politics will ensure the building of peace and human security.

TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL MULTIPARTY POLITICS

Although a few countries in Africa (for example Uganda) have not adopted the multiparty political system, most African countries and those elsewhere in the world have done so. Even in the few countries that have not adopted it, struggles and movements demand multipartism. For example, although Uganda is exercising a movement political system, there is serious demand for the adoption of the multiparty system by a number of unofficial opposition parties. Developments indicate that in the near future Uganda will officially adopt the multiparty system.[15]

Our argument here is that the multiparty political system is a factor in African countries. But we need to know how to transform it into a democratic developmental multiparty political system.

Many ideas have been developed as to how that transformation can be carried out. At the political level six aspects have been identified, including the establishment of democratic political parties, the development of strong political parties to ensure equality in political competition, and the existence of parties with non-ethnic politics and without divisive and segregated tendencies. Other aspects are ensuring both direct and representative democracy through the empowerment of the people,[16] developing traditional principles of politics of consensus and

reconciliation,[17] and ensuring people-centred politics and democracy. At the socio-economic level there is a strong need for rapid socio-economic growth and development, establishing principles of social and economic equality and justice, ensuring employment and lifting the standard of living of all the people through the provision of basic social services and all necessities of life, and creating conditions for people-centred development. When all these political and socio-economic aspects are achieved, conditions for peace and human security will be established under the multiparty system.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ELECTIONS IN ZANZIBAR TO 1990

Introductory remarks

Nationalist movements began fighting for independence from colonial powers after World War II in 1945. In Zanzibar the nationalist movements began in the 1950s[18] when anti-colonial consciousness became very high. Nationalist political parties were established: the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) in 1955, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in 1957; the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP) in 1959; and the UMMA Party (UP) in 1963. These parties competed in the elections. As a retired revolutionary veteran and leader during the advent of the Zanzibar revolution narrated when asked to comment on the growth of racial or ethnic consciousness and divisions in Zanzibar during the colonial period:

> "The colonial period was characterized by growth of racial or ethnic consciousness and division due to the colonial policy of divide and rule. This growth of racial groupings and divisions resulted into the establishment of racial associations since 1910, which latter formed racial nationalist political parties from 1950s. About twenty-three racial organizations were formed during this period. The strongest ones among them were the Arab Association, the African Association, the Shirazi Association, and the Indian Association. Each of these associations fought for the interest of its racial group."[19]

Two phases of elections will be analysed in this section. The first constitutes elections during the nationalist struggles for independence from 1950s to 1963. The second phase constitutes elections under a one-

party system from 1964 to 1990. Elections after the establishment of the current multiparty system in 1992 will be analysed separately.

The elections of 1957–1963

TEMCO has outlined four elections during this period. The first was in 1957. Two political parties contested the elections: the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). The aim of the first election was to choose six members of the Legislative Council, with the Sultan nominating six others. The ASP won a landslide victory, winning five out of six seats. A religious-based party called the Muslim Association won the sixth seat.[20]

The second and third elections were held in January and June 1961, respectively. These elections were held under a new constitution that was adopted in 1960. Three political parties participated: the ASP, ZNP, and Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP). The parties contested 22 seats in the Legislative Council. The ASP narrowly won by taking 10 seats, the ZNP got 9 seats, and the ZPPP got 3 seats. However, the ASP could not form a government, because two of the ZPPP representatives decided to join the ZNP, while only one ZPPP seat went to the ASP. Therefore, the ASP and ZNP each controlled 11 seats in the Legislative Council. A deadlock ensued and new elections were called for June.

In the June 1961 elections the three political parties contested 23 seats instead of 22. The turnout was high: 90,595 voters, constituting 96.15% of those who had registered. The ASP got 10 seats, the ZNP also won 10 seats, and the ZPPP got 3 seats. While the ASP and ZNP balanced in terms of the number of seats, the ASP gained a higher percentage of votes. However, based on winning the majority of seats in the Legislative Council, the ZNP and ZPPP formed a coalition government with 13 seats against the ASP's 10. ASP supporters were incensed that the ZNP and ZPPP combined had fewer votes than the ASP but were still able to form the government. Riots erupted and eight people died with 400 people injured and 1,000 arrested.[21] The riots, deaths and injuries occurred mainly in Unguja.

The last elections before independence were held in July 1963. This time, four political parties took part: the ASP, ZNP, ZPPP and UMMA Party, formed by members who had defected from the ZNP. However, the UMMA Party did not nominate candidates; they merely gave support to the ASP. The ZNP and ZPPP formed a coalition and together they won 18 seats. The ASP won 13 seats. Again the ASP won more votes by getting 54.2% of the votes. The ZNP got 29.8% and the ZPPP 15.9%.

Table 1 Eelection results for Zanzibar, 1963
Unguja

Constituency	ASP	ZNP	ZPPP	Spoilt votes	Total
Forodhani	175	2,403	–	59	2,637
Shangani	390	2,391	–	55	2,842
Mlandege	2,736	3,135	–	66	5,937
Kikwajuni	4,062	1,203	–	84	5,349
Mwembeladu	5,066	809	–	104	5,979
Kwahani	5,701	–	216	74	5,991
Nungwi	2,615	3,198	–	94	5,907
Tumbatu	2,310	3,667	–	119	6,096
Donge	4,564	545	–	64	5,173
Chaani	3,908	1,147	–	109	5,164
Mangapwani	1,898	3,290	–	57	5,245
Kiboje	2,958	618	–	35	3,611
Dole	2,965	1,518	–	55	4,538
Chwaka	3,785	720	–	55	4,558
Fuoni	3,534	1,928	–	76	5,538
Jozani	3,818	–	1,631	101	5,550
Makunduchi	2,741	–	2,725	89	5,555
Total	53,232	26,572	4,572	1,294	85,670

Pemba

Constituency	ASP	ZNP	ZPPP	Spoilt votes	Total
Konde	1,585	3,565	–	178	5,328
Tumbe	1,810	–	2,971	90	4,871
Wingwi	4,390	–	1,705	148	6,243
Wete	2,719	3,140	–	79	5,938
Piki	2,563	–	2,756	90	5,410
Shengejuu	2,042	–	3,581	83	5,706
Ziwani	1,793	3,038	–	112	4,943
Ole	1,793	3,397	–	124	5,655
Chake Chake	2,347	2,627	–	68	5,042
Pujini	2,746	–	2,983	146	5,875
Chambani	1,569	–	3,469	87	5,125
Kengeja	2,573	3,506	–	155	6,234
Mtambile	1,913	–	3,572	57	5,542
Mkoani	4,169	1,605	–	155	5,929
Total	33,853	21,378	21,037	1,573	77,841

Total votes for Unguja and Pemba

Constituency	ASP	ZNP	ZPPP	Spoilt votes	Total
Unguja	53,232	26,572	4,572	1,294	85,670
Pemba	33,853	21,378	21,037	1,573	77,841
Total	87,085	47,950	25,609	2,861	163,511

Percentage (%)			
	ASP	ZNP	ZPPP
Unguja	63.2	32.4	5.4
Pemba	44.4	28.0	27.6
Total	54.2	29.8	15.9

Source: Zanzibar Protectorate Report of Election Supervisors, Government Printer, 1963.

However, owing to the coalition between the ZNP and ZPPP the two parties formed the government that led Zanzibar to independence on 10 December 1963. After independence the two parties controlled the government with the Sultan as head of state. The ASP felt that the coalition between the ZNP and ZPPP was a conspiracy to deny the ASP its electoral victory and therefore organised the Zanzibar Revolution of 12 January 1964. Table 1 shows the election results of the 1963 elections.

Three lessons can be drawn from the elections during the nationalist struggle for independence. First, these were multiparty elections, but because of the colonial legacy, the political competition was characterised by both ethnic and racial tendencies[22] and class tendencies. In terms of racial and ethnic tendencies the ASP was identified with Africans of mainland origin, the ZNP with Arabs, and the ZPPP with the Shirazi people. In terms of class the ZNP was identified with the land-owning aristocracy, the ASP with permanent and seasonal labourers, and the ZPPP with the peasantry.

The second lesson is that despite ethnic and class tendencies, each political party tried to win the support of all ethnic and class-based groups in order to ensure strength in the elections. For instance, after their poor performance in the 1957 elections the ZNP sought support from the Shirazi and peasants, as well as from the working class and Africans of mainland origin. The alliance between the ZNP and ZPPP in the two elections of 1961 and 1963 are typical examples.[23]

The third lesson is that the level of competition was so high that in some situations it resulted in violent conflict. There was also mistrust in the management of the elections. For example the ASP, which received the majority of votes in all the elections, felt that the colonial authorities were

manipulating their victories. Consequently ASP refused to recognise the results of the 1961 and 1963 elections, and the situation culminated in the Zanzibar revolution of 12 January 1964, which was carried out by the ASP overthrowing the new independence government under the Sultan. In short, the elections were a threat to peace and human security.

The elections under a one-party system, 1964–1990

Soon after the Zanzibar revolution of January 1964, the ASP and the Zanzibar government decided to enter into a union with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania on 26 April 1964. From 1964 to 1980 there were no elections in Zanzibar and the Revolutionary Council was the main decision-making and policy-making body. However, the people of Zanzibar participated in the Union elections of 1965, 1970 and 1975.

After the revolution, Zanzibar adopted a one-party system because the revolutionary government abolished all other political parties and ASP remained the only party. In 1977 the ASP merged with the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) of Tanzania mainland to form a new party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). With the CCM as the sole party for the whole of Tanzania, steps began to be taken to ensure that elections were held in Zanzibar. In order to do so a new constitution was created for Zanzibar in 1979, which laid the foundation for the establishment of a legislative body, the House of Representatives.[24]

The first elections under a one-party system were held in 1980. They were elections for the House of Representatives and the Zanzibar president. the CCM played an influential role in the conduct of the elections. For instance, the party appointed the presidential candidate. A special committee of the party, which was responsible for the affairs of Zanzibar, proposed two names to the central committee of the party. The latter deliberated on the two names and made a recommendation to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party, which was to select one candidate to be voted for in the form of a yes or no.

During the elections of 1980 and 1984 the second candidate withdrew before the names were forwarded to the NEC.[25] The elections of 1984 were only presidential because President Aboud Jumbe had resigned and an election had to be organised to fill the position. In the 1984 elections Ali Hassan Mwinyi was elected president of Zanzibar.

The other two one-party elections – for the Zanzibar president and the House of Representatives – were held in 1985 and 1990. For the presidential election the CCM carried out the processes of nominating

the candidate, as usual. The nomination raised complaints from some people in Zanzibar, in particular those from Pemba. In the 1985 elections the complaints were caused by the nomination by the NEC of Abdulwakil as the sole candidate through a narrow margin against Seif Shariff Hamad.[26] That was viewed as an imposition of the CCM, which was dominated by Tanzania mainland. The people of Pemba expected Seif Shariff Hamad to become the first president from Pemba, because all presidents since independence had been from Unguja. As a result Abdulwakil got only 24% of the votes from Pemba.[27]

A similar complaint arose around the 1990 elections. In 1988 the Zanzibar president dismissed Seif Shariff Hamad from his post as chief minister. He was also removed from other leadership positions from the party and the government. Supporters of Seif Sharrif Hamad – from Zanzibar in general and from Pemba in particular – viewed that as a strategy to prevent him from becoming a presidential candidate in the 1990 elections. Since he could not become a candidate in those elections, the elections faced a number of problems. One major problem was that many eligible voters, particularly in Pemba, were reluctant to participate in the elections. After much government pressure only 72% registered, and of those only 38% of those eligible were registered in Pemba.[28] In those elections Dr Salmin Amour, also from Unguja, was elected president of Zanzibar.

Most people in Pemba boycotted the elections. These acts were met with repressive measures by the government soon after the elections. Public meetings were banned; many civil servants, teachers and students from Pemba were expelled from Unguja and sent back to Pemba. State organs such as the police, the Field Force Unit, the army, the militia and volunteers greatly increased. In short, the government pursued confrontational measures against the opponents.[29]

From the elections under the one-party system we learn a number of lessons. First, owing to the mood of the revolution, no elections were held for 16 years (1964–1980). Thus the people of Zanzibar were denied the democratic right and freedom to elect their representatives and leaders. Second, even when the elections did take place from 1980 to 1990, the predominant position of the party rather than the wishes of the people determined the nomination of candidates. Third, a regional divide between Unguja and Pemba grew sharply. The Wapemba developed a feeling of being oppressed and marginalised politically and economically. Fourth, there was a lack of consensus and reconciliation. The retaliatory measures taken by the government are indicative of that situation.

MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS UNDER CURRENT MULTIPARTY POLITICS IN ZANZIBAR

Establishment of the multiparty system in Tanzania

Tendwa[30] outlines the factors that helped Tanzania to adopt a multiparty political system and abandon the one-party system in 1992. External factors include the disintegration of the Soviet Union and other communist states of Eastern Europe together with their communist ideology, global economic changes towards a market-oriented economic system, and pressure from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as rich Western donor nations.

Internal factors include the first movements for the demand of democracy and the multiparty system. From about the mid-1980s civil society organisations and even underground political groups were formed and carried out campaigns for political reforms. One of the steps taken by the movements was the organisation of a seminar in Dar es Salaam in June 1991 where the reformists laid down strategies how to continue demanding a multiparty system. The second factor was the role played by Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere. Although he was the founder of the one-party system, his wisdom and foresight prompted him to advise the party and the government to carry out political reforms towards a multiparty system. The third internal factor was the contribution of the Presidential Commission for One Party or Multiparty System, commonly known as the Nyalali Commission, as the then chief justice, Francis Nyalali, headed it. The commission was established early in 1991 to collect views from people in Tanzania and even outside the country as to whether Tanzania should adopt multipartism or continue with a one-party system. In 1992 the commission produced a report which recommended the adoption of the multiparty political system.[31] Constitutional amendments were made and by July 1992 multipartism was officially declared the new political system in Tanzania.

The restoration of multipartism in Tanzania was much more enthusiastically received in Zanzibar. According to the conservative figures of the Nyalali Commission, 43% of the people in Zanzibar demanded multipartism, compared to 19% on the Tanzanian mainland. However, the road to multipartism was not easy, as one senior opposition leader commented:

> "Restoration of multipartism in Tanzania is only one part of democratization. On the other part Tanzania had to go through a painful process to overcome one-party mentality and her hegemonic government and state

institutions amid the turbulence of emerging opposition parties. The existing Constitutions and laws in Tanzania and Zanzibar were written under one-party systems, and they have been marginally amended to allow for existence of multiple political parties while leaving an enormous concentration of powers in the hands of the government and the ruling party CCM. A case in point is the recent 14th Constitutional amendment of 2005 where the opposition protested and marched out of the Union Parliament, still to have the amendment passed."[32]

The multiparty elections of 1995 and 2000 in Zanzibar

The 1995 and 2000 elections were held in a multiparty political system. These elections appeared to have more serious problems in terms of corruption and rigging tendencies, thus making the elections not free and fair. The problems grew more serious in the 2000 elections than in those of 1995.[33] Election monitors and observers identified the problems in the various stages in the election processes.

During the process of nominating candidates there were no serious problems, but there were complaints that, in some cases, decisions at lower levels of the parties were not respected by higher levels. During the elections of 2000 there were also complaints about ethnic bias against certain aspiring candidates.[34] Otherwise nomination processes were carried out according to laid-down regulations.

A number of problems arose in connection with the registration process. One problem concerned the illegal registration of voters. During the 1995 elections the CCM complained that 124 people had been illegally registered in favour of the CUF, while the CUF complained of 382 people who had been illegally registered in favour of the CCM.[35] In the 2000 elections there were more serious allegations of illegal registrations. It was alleged that the CCM had brought thousands of youths from Tanzania mainland to register in Unguja and Pemba under the pretext that they were transferred JKU (Jeshi la Kujenga Uchumi) members. The CUF was also alleged to have brought some youths from Kenya.[36]

Another problem concerning the registration process was restrictions on eligible voters from registering. It was observed that the *shehas*, local traditional leaders who acted as ex officio agents of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), were mainly responsible for the restrictions. Since most of them were said to favour the ruling party, the restrictions were mainly placed on people believed to be members or supporters of opposition parties, particularly the CUF. The restrictions were made

on the basis of age and residence. Young people of 18 or above were declared to be below 18 and thus could not be registered. There was an election regulation that anybody who had not been a permanent resident in his/her constituency for the previous five years could not be registered as a voter. This regulation could be used to prevent eligible voters from registering. There were other problems such as lodging unnecessary objections on those who had already registered.

Campaigns were normally carried out well, with enthusiasm. The level of participation of people in the campaigns was very high, indicating that the majority of people in Zanzibar were politically conscious. However, in both the 1995 and 2000 elections some problems arose. One major problem was that the political playing ground was not level. The CCM and CUF were financially powerful compared with the other political parties. These two parties, therefore, could carry out their campaigns much more effectively than the other political parties.

Other shortcomings included carrying out illegal campaign meetings through religious, wedding and other ceremonies, denying some opposition parties space for campaign meetings, and the use of abusive and threatening language. For example, other parties saw the common use of the word *ngangari* by CUF as threatening language.

On the whole the voting processes in the 1995 and 2000 elections went well. But a number of serious problems arose regarding the counting of votes and the announcement of results.

In the 1995 election the House of Representatives results were announced in time, but the announcement of the results for the president of Zanzibar was delayed for two days. When it was made, the CCM candidate, Salmin Amour, was declared the winner, defeating his opponent, CUF candidate Seif Shariff Hamad, by a narrow margin of 0.4%.[37]

The CUF did not accept the Zanzibar presidential results, for various reasons. First, the counting was prolonged for two days by the ZEC without a plausible explanation. Second, two days before the announcement of results, Dar es Salaam Television (DTV) and the newspaper *Majira* announced that Seif Shariff Hamad had won. Third, CUF party agents testified that according to their figures it was Seif Shariff Hamad who had won. Thus, the CUF believed that the delay in counting was a manoeuvre by the ZEC to steal votes from the CUF candidate and give them to the CCM candidate. This culminated in a serious political crisis between the CCM and CUF.

Various views were aired regarding the 1995 election results. At first, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Election Observer Group, the

"Non-Represented Peoples' Organisation", and the then United Nations Coordinator for the UN group, Victor Angelo, had positive views about how the elections were conducted, stating that they were satisfied with the results. But then they changed their minds. Owing to the crisis that arose in announcing presidential election results, they were no longer satisfied. The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES),[38] a US-based organisation, felt that the elections did not represent the will of the people. In their report ZEMOG (Zanzibar Election Monitoring Group) were not positive, stating that they could not affirm that the elections were free and fair.

The second multiparty elections took place in October 2000. Many political parties participated in the Zanzibar elections. Again, the strongest competitors were the CCM and CUF. The 2000 elections in Zanzibar were characterised by greater corrupt tendencies, such as rigging and other irregularities, than the 1995 elections. Again the CUF felt that victory in the presidential elections as well as some House of Representatives and parliamentary elections had been snatched by the CCM through illegal means. The CUF refused to recognise the results, boycotted the House of Representatives and parliamentary sessions, and demanded a rerun of the elections.

The views of local and international observer groups on the conduct and outcome of the 2000 elections were negative. The OAU Observer Group said that it was unable to endorse the 2000 Zanzibar general elections as having been free and fair and called for the ZEC to follow the cardinal principle of transparency and credibility in the conduct of elections. The IFES was of the opinion that the elections were mismanaged, particularly the voting process, and called for new elections. The Commonwealth Observer Group also called for the cancellation of the Zanzibar elections in their entirety and for reform of the organs responsible for elections. The Commonwealth Observer report strongly criticised the way the elections had been conducted and pointed out that in many places the elections were a shambles, because of massive incompetence or a deliberate attempt to wreck at least part of the election. It also emphasised that the outcome of the elections represented a colossal setback for ordinary Zanzibaris and their aspirations for democracy. It thus called for new properly conducted polls to be undertaken throughout Zanzibar under a reformed electoral commission and under new impartial electoral laws.[39] The main local observer group, TEMCO, issued a strongly worded statement soon after 29 October in Zanzibar characterising the elections as abortive. The statement declared that the

state instruments responsible for managing the elections in Zanzibar had let down the people and multiparty democracy. Like all other observers, TEMCO called for the cancellation of elections for all of Zanzibar and the organisation of fresh elections.[40]

Thus the 2000 elections in Zanzibar resulted in yet another serious political conflict between the CCM and CUF. On 26 and 27 January 2001 the crisis culminated in a violent confrontation between CUF demonstrators and the police. Thirty-one people were killed and more than 2,000 fled to Kenya. The report of the Presidential Commission that investigated the incident gave the number of deaths as 31, but the CUF claimed that more than 70 people were killed. A senior CUF party leader later confirmed this:

> "My party [CUF] had no confidence in the integrity of the October 2000 elections, and it blatantly refused to participate in the re-run in the town constituencies a week later. The dreaded Field Force Unit fully armed with antipersonnel carriers and bazookas as if they were going to war against a foreign enemy reinforced the police. A day after the election the full force of police brutality was unleashed against unarmed civilians in camera. After failing to get redress of our complaints my party called for a peaceful demonstration. More than 40 people were killed, hundreds were arrested, and more than 2000 became the first Tanzania refugees in Mombasa, Kenya. In our history, this was a time when a peaceful Tanzania lost its innocence in the eyes of the world."[41]

From the two multiparty elections two important aspects are identified. First, the elections were a source of conflict because they were not free, fair and democratic. Second, in multiparty elections each political party should be ready to win or to lose through free and fair elections. It is very difficult to avoid conflict if the elections are not free and fair. It was the violent aftermath of the 2000 elections that led to Muafaka II, as we shall see below.

The Pemba by-elections, 2003

The Pemba by-elections were held on 18 May 2003. The elections involved electing Union Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of the House of Representatives in 17 constituencies in which seats were vacant because of the political crisis that followed the 2000 elections. Since the CUF did not recognise the results of the 2000 elections, its

Union MPs and Members of the House of Representatives boycotted meetings of both the Houses of Representative and the National Assembly. They were eventually expelled from these Houses.

Holding by-elections was part of the agreements contained in the second reconciliation or Muafaka II. It had been stipulated in Muafaka II that the vacant seats in the 17 constituencies in Pemba should be filled through by-elections on completion of the implementation process of Muafaka. Although not all aspects of the Muafaka II agreements had been implemented, because the implementation process was in progress, it was decided that the by-elections should be held in May 2003.

Unlike the elections of 1995 and 2000, the performance of the by-elections was rated as very good. Both internal and external observer groups concluded in their monitoring reports that the elections were free and fair. The conclusion of the TEMCO report (2004) was as follows:

> "Considering all that has been said about how the by-elections were conducted, and taking into account the balance between the positive and negative things that occurred in the management of all stages of the elections, TEMCO awards a certificate of free and fair elections to the by-elections conducted in Pemba (17 constituencies) and a qualified free and fair certificate for the mainland by-elections (4 constituencies)."[42]

This indicates that the by-elections in Pemba were even better conducted and better managed than those in four constituencies on Tanzania mainland, which were held on the same day.

In the report TEMCO[43] pointed out a number of aspects that confirm this. These include transparency in conducting the elections in all stages; non-intentional election management discrepancies; fair and equitable dealing with all parties by state instruments of law (such as the police) and state media; and the making of critical decisions by the key actors such as political parties in resolving conflicts and misunderstandings. Other aspects were concurrence by internal and external observers that the electoral exercise in Pemba was largely free and fair, relative ease in obtaining information by media personnel, the opportunity to register complaints by key stakeholders (voters, candidates and party agents) and that the president of Tanzania and chairman of the ruling party, the CCM, Benjamin William Mkapa, publicly hailed the way in which the by-elections were conducted in Pemba.

Despite this very good performance TEMCO and other observers' reports revealed a few problems. At the nomination stage three problems

were observed. One was gender imbalance. Only 3.6% of the nominated candidates were women. This means that of 111 nominated candidates from all political parties, only four were women. The main problem was that the women themselves did not fill in nomination forms. Out of 150 people who returned forms to their parties only five (3.3%) were women. But in terms of registration, attending campaign rallies and voting, women were more numerous than men. The second problem was that some political parties failed to follow laid-down democratic procedures in the nomination process.

The third problem was the raising of a number of objections against some nominated candidates. Successful objections were made by the National Convention for Constructive Reform – Mageuzi (NCCR–Mageuzi) against CUF candidates. On 13 May the Zanzibar High Court upheld the ZEC's decision that the six CUF candidates should be barred according to Zanzibar Electoral Law 49 (5), which gives the ZEC final authority over interpreting and deciding cases involving electoral law. The objections were partly due to the weakness in the CUF's nomination procedures. However, they threatened to disrupt the by-elections and the Muafaka between the CUF and CCM.

There were not many problems with the process of registration, although only 76% of the eligible voters had registered. This means that out of an estimated 142,340 eligible voters, according to the 2002 census, only 108,271 had registered. A number of objections were made against some registered voters. Of the 217 objections only 29 were upheld.

The campaign stage had two main shortcomings. The first was the inequality between political parties in terms of financial resources and even followers. Of the five political parties that participated in the elections, the CCM and CUF were the only two that were financially strong. They could therefore hold all their campaign rallies according to the established programme. The CUF, followed by the CCM, was also the party that had the largest following.

The other political parties that participated were the National Convention for Constructive Reform (NCCR–Mageuzi), Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) and Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA). These three were relatively weak financially and had few followers, as indicated in campaign rallies. They could not hold all their campaign rallies and TADEA in particular held very few rallies. This means that the political playing ground was not level.

The second shortcoming was the use of abusive, foul and even threatening language. Some political parties complained that there were

some elements of segregation, as indicated by foul and abusive language. Another feature of the campaign rallies was the presence of large numbers of small children who should not have attended such rallies.

One serious problem arose in connection with the stage of voting and counting of votes. Although the processes went smoothly, it was realised while counting the votes for the House of Representatives elections that many votes in the six constituencies where the CUF's candidates had been barred were spoilt. The spoilt votes ranged from 61% to 82%. Table 2 shows spoilt votes and their percentage in each of the six constituencies.

Table 2 Spoilt votes for the House of Representatives elections in six constituencies

Constituencies	Total votes cast	Spoilt cotes	% of spoilt votes
Chonga	6,126	3,745	61%
Chake Chake	5,910	4,385	74%
Micheweni	7,330	4,659	63.5%
Wingwi	4,478	3,521	78.6%
Tumbe	6,116	5,019	82%
Kojani	6,528	4,963	76%
Total	36,488	26,292	72%

Source: TEMCO's Report on the May 18th 2003 Tanzanian elections, p 111.

During the campaign rallies CUF leaders urged their members and supporters to vote for ghost candidates, commonly known as *maruhani.* Those were spoilt votes. This meant that CCM candidates who won the seats in the six constituencies received a very small percentage of the votes, ranging between 10% and 20%.

The good performance of the Pemba by-elections was due to a number of factors. One of these was Muafaka II, which played a very significant role. Because of the Muafaka a number of election laws were reformed and a new ZEC, which was relatively independent, was established. The second factor was the roles played by the ZEC and NEC in managing all stages and processes of the elections. Even state organs – notably the police – tried to play neutral and impartial roles, unlike in the 1995 and 2000 elections. Third, the consciousness and commitment of the people to the elections was very high.

The Pemba by-elections enabled us to draw important lessons and experiences. First, through the spirit of reconciliation multiparty political competition through elections can be carried out successfully and peacefully. Second, in multiparty elections it is very important to

have independent and impartial managing election organs such as the ZEC and neutral state security organs such as the police. Third, in election processes it is important to avoid tampering with the wishes of the people. The *maruhani* votes indicate how the electorate were denied the right and freedom to elect candidates of their choice.

MUAFAKA (RECONCILIATION) AND THE BUILDING OF HUMAN SECURITY IN ZANZIBAR

Reconciliation

The principle of reconciliation has become a common phenomenon in Africa and elsewhere in the world as a means of resolving conflict. Steps taken in conflict-resolution processes include peace negotiations, the signing of peace agreements, and the implementation of such agreements.[44] Peace negotiations can be internally or externally based. In internally based peace negotiations the conflicting parties in a particular country decide to sit down and negotiate peace. The negotiations can be direct, between the conflicting parties, or they can be conducted through an external or an internal mediator or facilitator.

Muafaka in Zanzibar constitutes the two phases, Muafaka I and II. Both are unique in that the conflicts leading to processes of reconciliation emanated from multiparty elections. Muafaka, therefore, is a means not only of resolving political conflict but also of managing multiparty elections.

Muafaka I

We have already observed the problems that arose during the multiparty elections of 1995. Briefly, the CUF refused to accept the presidential election results and boycotted meetings in the House of Representatives. Tension grew between the CCM and CUF. The Zanzibar government carried out state repression and brutality against CUF members. As a result, internal and international pressure increased on the two political parties to negotiate and resolve the latent conflict.[45]

From 1996, respected Tanzanian elders such as Brigadier General Hashim Mbita, Ambassador Abbas Sykes, Ambassador Sued and the Honourable Joseph Sinde Warioba initiated dialogue in their individual capacities.[46] In February 1998 the Commonwealth Secretary General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, through his representative, Dr Moses Anafu, took over the task of mediating the negotiations between the CCM and CUF. With the support of the Tanzania Union government a reconciliation agreement was reached between the two political parties and signed on 9 June 1999 in the House of Representatives in Zanzibar. Chief

Emeka Anyaoku signed the agreement on behalf of the Commonwealth and two party leaders, from the CCM and CUF, signed on behalf of their parties.[47]

The agreement contained 15 items. The most important of these included the reform of the ZEC, constitution, judiciary, electoral laws and state media organs. Other important items were the establishment of a permanent voters' register, ensuring freedom of political parties to carry out their activities within the confines of the law, making an independent assessment of claims of properties destroyed or damaged, reinstating expelled employees and students, and instituting a programme of civic education. Further items included that CUF members of the House of Representatives were to resume attending sessions and the president was to appoint two CUF members to the House of Representatives and ensure the promotion of human rights, good governance and democratisation.[48]

However, Muafaka I was not implemented. Factors contributing to the failure are summarised below:

> "Despite the initial goodwill and effort that went into the agreement, Muafaka I was nevertheless beset by several problems from the outset. In the first instance, no provision was made for monitoring the agreement. Secondly, there was no mechanism for the implementation of the impact. Instead, the agreement largely depended on the good will of the parties, with the Inter-party Committee having only an advisory status. On its part, the Commonwealth was merely a moral guarantor of the accord. It was of little surprise therefore that Muafaka I remained a dead letter for the lack of political commitment, which was further fueled by suspicion between the parties. Both CCM and CUF viewed the dialogue initiators with suspicion."[49]

Only two of the 15 items were implemented. Those included representatives of the CUF resuming attending sessions of the House of Representatives and the CUF recognising the Zanzibar government. The serious problems that arose during and after the 2000 elections were to a large extent due to the failure of implementation of Muafaka I. One senior opposition leader lamented at a discussion over the failure of Muafaka I that:

> "The collapse of the Peace Agreement [Muafaka I] was a terrible disappointment to the people of Zanzibar, coming as it did only a few months before the next general election in October 2000. Tanzania had to

grapple with the new election with none of the safeguards to ensure free and fair elections on a leveled playing ground."[50]

Muafaka II

Soon after the 2000 general elections the relationship between the CCM and CUF grew very tense. The situation culminated in the violent conflicts of 26 and 27 January 2001, during which more than 30 people were killed, mainly in Pemba. Many more were injured and 2,300 fled to Shimoni near Mombasa in Kenya. The killings were the result of a confrontation between CUF demonstrators and the police. The events of January 2001 were followed by nearly two weeks of beatings, mass arrests and various forms of harassment and intimidation by state organs against the people.

Pressure came from the people, civil society organisations, intellectuals and the donor community to urge the CCM and CUF to come to the negotiating table. The Union government also took a proactive stand in finding a solution to the Zanzibar crisis. A negotiating team was established under the co-leadership of the secretaries general of the two political parties. This time there was no external mediator. The negotiations began in March and the Peace Agreement or Accord was signed on 10 October 2001.

In terms of items of agreement, nearly all the items of Muafaka I were taken as part of Muafaka II. The only new items were facilitating the return of the Shimon refugees based on the principles of voluntary repatriation, carrying out the Pemba by-elections, establishing a cordial relationship between the two parties through the mechanism of the Inter-Party Commission (IPC), and establishing the office of Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). This was driven by the need to separate the government and the ruling party from the DPP.

Unlike Muafaka I, Muafaka II has largely been implemented. From the very beginning efforts were made and steps taken to address the shortcomings of Muafaka I. Soon after the signing of the Muafaka a joint commission was established to supervise the implementation of the accord. Then it was translated into an Act of the House of Representatives. In 2002 it was entrenched in the Zanzibar constitution through the 8th and 9th Constitutional Amendments.

Mwakyembe[51] noted that by the end of 2003 nearly 80% of the dictates of the Muafaka had been implemented. Important areas that had been implemented included normalisation of the political situation, aspects of trust and reconciliation, aspects of good governance, and aspects of

establishing good conditions for free and fair elections. As a matter of our immediate interest this study will elaborate on the implementation of aspects related to the improvement of electoral conditions.

In an important step the electoral laws were amended so that the powers of the Director of Elections were reduced and the directorate had to follow instructions from the ZEC. The powers of the *shehas* (traditional village leaders) in voter registration were also reduced. Furthermore, residence requirements were reduced from five to three years.[52]

The second important step was the reformation of the ZEC, which became much more independent. Among its members two had to be appointed from the opposition, notably from the CUF, two were appointed on the advice of the leader of government business in the House of Representatives, the Director of Elections was to be appointed on the advice of the ZEC, and the ZEC was empowered to appoint its own returning officers.

The third important step was holding the Pemba by-election (discussed above), and here we would like to highlight its importance in terms of the implementation of Muafaka II. Unlike the implementation of other items of the agreement, the by-elections had a big impact nationally and internationally. That the by-elections drew more local and international election observers than the 1995 and 2000 elections is an indication of its importance.

Seif Shariff Hamad[53] criticised the implementation process for being slow. Even though the greater number of the items of the agreement had been implemented by the end of 2003, those that had not been implemented were the most important. He cited seven aspects that had not been implemented, including the establishment of a permanent voter register, reform of the judiciary, state media and the ZEC secretariat, employment in state organs without political ideological bias, and establishment of an organ of consultations between political parties. It appears that in 2004 steps have been taken to ensure that many of the previously un-implemented aspects were implemented. For instance, preparations for the permanent voters' register got under way.

Despite considerable success in the implementation of Muafaka II, it has been observed that the Muafaka has considerable shortcomings that make the overall realisation of its objectives difficult.[54] Such shortcomings include lack of popular participation, non-involvement of other political parties, doubts about the political will of the two political parties, personalisation of Muafaka to the general secretaries of the CCM and CUF, the position of the CCM as a ruling party, thus making

it difficult to make a distinction between the party and the government in many issues, the unclear relationship between the Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission (JPCSC) and the House of Representatives, unclear roles of the presidents of Zanzibar and the Union, and the timing of the implementation of the Muafaka. All these issues need to be taken into consideration.

Since the signing of Muafaka II, the governments of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar have been working hard, though at a slow pace, to make sure that all the dictates in the agreements are adhered to. These include establishment of a permanent voters' register, reform of the judiciary and state media, employment in state organs without political ideological bias, and establishment of an organ of consultations between political parties.

Muafaka and the Union

It is important to discuss Muafaka in connection with the Union, since the Union holds a central position in the implementation and success of Muafaka. For instance, the failure of Muafaka I and the success of Muafaka II cannot be separated from the position and role of the Union. We have already observed that one of the main factors for political conflict is the lack of free and fair elections. Since political parties are a Union matter, the Union can play a central role in ensuring free and fair elections.

The Union was established on 26 April 1964 through a mutual agreement between President Julius K Nyerere of Tanganyika and President Abeid Amani Karume of Zanzibar. The Zanzibar revolution of 12 January 1964 provided an important background for the establishment of the Union. Soon after the revolution the new government in Zanzibar experienced external security threats and therefore found it wise to unite with Tanganyika.

The Union was established with a structure of two governments, the Union government and the Zanzibar government. According to this structure Tanganyika could not have its government, as it was part of the Union government. Even the name "Tanganyika" was abandoned and "Tanzania" adopted for the United Republic. Tanganyika was referred to as Tanzania mainland. There were few questions about the structure under a one-party system, but with the coming of multipartism, demands for a separate government for Tanganyika began to arise. However, to date the structure has not changed.

On 26 April 2004 Tanzanians celebrated forty years of Union. In the four decades the Union has experienced successes and some challenges. In

terms of success a number of aspects deserve mention. First, the fact that the Union has existed for forty years is a success in itself. The first East African Community collapsed after only one decade. Second, historical cultural ties between the people of Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland have been strengthened. Third, economic ties between the two parts of the Union have been greatly strengthened. Both parts have benefited from the economic links.[55] Fourth, both parties to the Union have benefited from the joint system of defence and security and international relations.

With regard to challenges, they seem to be numerous. At the open-ended interviews and discussions in Bagamoyo on 7 January 2005 participants from both Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar cited three problems as being important. One of the complaints was about the structure of the Union. Whereas Tanzania mainland complaints constitute demands on not having the Tanganyika government, the complaints from Zanzibar are based on fears of being overshadowed under the two-government system. Thus some of the opposition parties are in favour of changing into a three-government structure comprising the Union government, the Zanzibar revolutionary government, and the Tanganyika (Tanzania mainland) government, all with sovereign powers.

The second problem has hinged on economic relations. Zanzibar complaints have grown in a number of areas, including too much centralisation of the Bank of Tanzania, taxation and customs union arrangements, and the small share of donor funding. Information about the existence of oil reserves around Pemba has also raised complaints that issues of gas and oil are a Union matter. This means that exploration of the oil will be carried out under the Union government rather than the Zanzibar government. Tanzania mainland complaints are based on the fact that being a small country with a small population Zanzibar is favoured in terms of economic benefits. The 4.5% share of donor funding is taken to be too high.

The third problem concerns the issue of sovereignty. Despite political divisions and conflicts on the issues of sovereignty all Zanzibaris are united. There are feelings that the current set-up of the Union is marginalising the sovereignty and identity of the people of Zanzibar. A separate Zanzibar flag and a Zanzibar national anthem are a reflection of this. Zanzibar also demands autonomy of membership in international organisations. The formation of "blue guards" by the CCM and "red guards and secret white guards" by the CUF is clear testimony that both parties take them as defensive measures in the 2005 elections. As one ordinary voter in Zanzibar noted:

"Zanzibar's merger with the mainland Tanzania was a marriage of convenience. No wonder Zanzibar has pressed hard to have its own identity of the national flag, national anthem, and now is training its militia under the pretext of Jeshi la Kujenga Uchumi (JKU). At the same time Zanzibar boasts of being part of the sovereign state of United Republic of Tanzania. You cannot have dual sovereignty. This is becoming clear as we approach the 2005 election seeing the formation and training of party cadres, mostly youth as blue and green guards fully being trained in military gear. What is the aim of this training if not defensive! What is the fear for if the country aspires for rule of law and democracy? We have to watch this move as the end product is human insecurity if not massacre of our innocent citizens."[56]

This is a critical indicator of human insecurity in union matters. The fourth problem relates to articles of the Union. When the Union was established in 1964 it contained 11 articles of Union. By now the number has increased to 22. Some circles in Zanzibar have interpreted the increase as deliberate steps by Tanzania mainland to overshadow Zanzibar. Shelukindo[57] has tried to explain this increase. The following statement (translated from Kiswahili) elaborates as follows:

"Thus, as time passed by, it was clearly realized that there were a number of aspects whose implementation was made by the authority of the Union though they were not part of articles of the Union. Therefore, after research and deep investigation on Union matters by the two governments it was realized that there were some shortcomings. In an effort to address the shortcomings the Union Parliament and the House of Representatives were given the task of making constitutional amendments in 1994 so that more aspects could become part of the articles of the Union. The amendments were eventually made on the Union Constitution of 1977 on 30 April 2000; resulting in 22 articles of Union."[58]

Despite Shelukindo's explanation, the increase in the number of articles of Union is one of the problems in terms of relations in the Union. Having generally discussed the successes and challenges which the Union has experienced during the forty years of its existence, it is important to examine this in relation to elections and Muafaka. The introduction of elections in 1980 was to a large extent due to the Union. We have seen that after the Zanzibar revolution in 1964 no elections were held until 1980. It was due to the Union spirit that

TANU and ASP merged into one party, the CCM, in 1977. This means that the CCM became the sole ruling party for the Union and for Zanzibar. It was under the CCM and the Union that steps were taken to establish the constitution of 1979, which led to the elections of 1980 and subsequent elections.

As the ruling party for both the Union and Zanzibar, the CCM played a significant role in determining the course of elections under the one-party system. In particular the process of nominating candidates (including presidential candidates) was highly centralised. The role of the Union in the elections under the multiparty system is very clear, both in 1995 and 2000. To a large extent the victory of the CCM in both elections, as the reports of observers indicate, was due to the Union. For instance, during the elections of 2000 the Union government deployed large numbers of the army, the field force police and the ordinary police. There is no doubt that the Union is crucial in ensuring free and fair elections and thus avoiding conflict in Zanzibar. This means that the success of Muafaka in ensuring human security greatly depends on the position and role of the Union.

EXPERIENCES FROM THE 2004 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS AND THE
2005 VOTERS' REGISTRATION IN THE PERMANENT VOTERS' REGISTER

The 2004 local government elections

The Tanzanian local government elections of 2004 were marred by incidents that threatened human security. The opposition believes that the ruling CCM and its government had planned to circumvent local government election management procedures in order to slide through and win with a majority. During the election period, one young activist was killed in Temeke Municipality, Dar es Salaam, following CUF discontent over the manner in which the elections were conducted. The CUF and other opposition parties claimed that the correct procedures of election management were not followed. These include:

- Failure of the returning officer to prepare a voters' list from the register of actual inhabitants. Voters had to register on the day of the election. The opposition claims that this process of verification of eligible voters was intentionally staged to give room for manoeuvre.

- According to the regulations, the minister responsible for local government was to announce the date of the election three months

before the election. However, the announcement was made only one month before the election.

The registration of voters in the permanent voters' register has been problematic, particularly in Zanzibar. Since the registration process to create a voters' list for the general elections in October 2005 started in Pemba Island in November 2004, several violent incidents have occurred.

On 1 December 2004 the police shot and killed a primary school student at a voters' station in Pemba, the second largest island of Zanzibar. CUF militants were throwing stones and accusing the electoral officials of allowing people to register even though they had not resided on the island for the mandatory three years. On 2 December 2004 Abubakar Kyanga, commander of South Pemba District, said that "[l]ocal police had to act because the crowd was continually throwing stones at the centre [police] in Ngo'mbe". This incident occurred when CUF activists were countering the action of electoral officials who were blocking the registration of those whom they thought did not qualify. On the day of the incident the CUF deputy secretary general, Juma Duni, said that the CUF had to demonstrate and throw stones. He affirmed: "We had told our youth not to allow this. Someone from Pemba cannot be denied registration while the right is given to someone from Unguja Island."[59]

On 30 November 2004 the registration centre in Kengwa area was petrol-bombed. Attacks also occurred in the Kisiwani area and Chake Chake District, where stone throwers among CUF militants injured the deputy electoral officer. It was reported that after this incident 12 local electoral officials resigned out of fear for their lives. For this reason the Union government has taken stern steps to increase security measures in Zanzibar, particularly during the time of voters' registration and the voting and counting of votes. A sizeable force of police and military has been deployed in Zanzibar.

Although the immediate concern was to identify the threats to human security in views of the operative situation in the Zanzibar elections, experiences from outside Tanzania could benefit elections in both Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland. Since outside experiences are very

wide and diverse, this study looked at the election principles developed by SADC and the AU. Also, one SADC case study of the recent elections in South Africa was examined.

Since the beginning of the democratisation process in Africa in 1990, a number of initiatives and declarations have been made by the OAU (and later the AU) on issues of democracy in general elections in general and elections in particular. In July 1990 the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world issued a declaration in Addis Ababa. The member states undertook to continue with the democratisation of African societies and consolidation of democratic institutions.[60]

In 1995 the OAU adopted the Cairo Agenda of Action, which stressed the imperative of ensuring democratic governance through popular participation based on respect of human rights and dignity, free and fair elections, as well as on the respect of principles of freedom of the press, speech, association and conscience. Furthermore, the Algiers Decision of July 1999 and the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 were made within the framework for an OAU response to unconditional changes of government and laid down a set of common values and principles for democratic governance.[61]

At its 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, the OAU/AU adopted the Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. In addition to putting emphasis on regular democratic elections within the context of management of conflicts it was clearly stipulated how democratic elections should be conducted. Among the important aspects emphasised were free and fair elections, ensuring democratic and supportive institutions, the system of separation of powers and an independent judiciary, impartial, all-inclusive, accountable and competent electoral institutions, and elections at regular intervals in accordance with national constitutions.[62]

These OAU/AU principles on elections appear to be similar to the UN principles. In 1994, the UN Centre for Human Rights based in Geneva, Switzerland, produced a handbook on democratic elections titled *Human rights and elections: A handbook on the legal, technical and human rights aspects of elections.* A number of issues were covered in the handbook, including UN involvement in elections, UN human rights standards regarding elections, international criteria for elections, and common elements in electoral laws and procedures. On international

criteria emphasis was placed on free and fair elections, the periodicity of the electoral timeframe, genuine elections, and the roles of police and observers.[63]

The SADC guidelines and principles governing democratic elections were adopted at the annual summit of the Heads of State and Government in Mauritius in August 2004. It has been observed that the origins of the SADC principles and guidelines were the UN and OAU/AU principles as well as various SADC initiatives.[64] Such initiatives include the SADC–Parliamentary Forum (SADC–PF) Norms and Standards (2001) and EISA/ECF Principles (2003). While the SADC–PF is an initiative of SADC parliamentarians, the EISA/ECF is an initiative of civil society organisations (CSOs) and electoral management bodies (EMBs) within SADC.

The SADC Principles and Guidelines on elections cover a number of sections and aspects. Here we shall outline the main sections and the summary of their contents. The first section is on elections and individual rights, thus covering the rights of citizens in electing the governments of their choice. It includes aspects of voting, voting secrecy and freedom of association and expression. The second section is on elections and government and includes issues such as commitment to pluralism and multiparty democracy, dates of elections, misuse of public resources and funding of political parties, relations between governments, political parties, NGOs, and the media and electoral commissions.

The third section is concerned with transparency and integrity in the electoral process. It covers many aspects that are concerned with the electoral process from registration of voters to the announcement of election results. It also deals with other important issues such as voter education, managing post-election conflicts, the role of election observers, and reform of electoral laws. On acceptance of election results emphasis is put on the context of free and fair democratic elections. A focused review of the recommended Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region is elaborated on later in this report.

As far as the experience from the recent elections in South Africa is concerned, the *SADC Barometer* of 2 August 2004[65] has outlined a number of lessons for SADC countries. The elections, which were held in April 2004, were the third democratic elections in that country. The elections were the third elections within one decade, and were described as free, fair, tolerant and exemplary. An Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) managed the elections.

Registration processes were carried out successfully in November 2003 and January 2004. Campaigns were carried out with a high level

of tolerance. The ANC won 70% of the votes, while the combined opposition of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) obtained 19.3%. The ANC formed an alliance with the New National Party (NNP), though the position of the latter party was very weak.

The success in conducting free, fair, tolerant and democratic elections is partly due to the lack of will and commitment in maintaining the system of a Government of National Unity (GNU) which South Africa adopted in the advent of the first elections in 1994 and which culminated in the defection of the IFP from the government. The inclusion of several of the opposition parties in the government was believed by the South African government to forge greater national unity, although South Africa believes that good governance is largely connected to a democratically elected government.

Furthermore, the current chairman of SADC, Mauritian Prime Minister Paul Bérenger, once said at a SADC summit:

> "Really free and fair elections mean not only an independent electoral commission but also include freedom of assembly and absence of physical harassment by the police and another entity, freedom of the press and access to national radio and television and external and credible observation of the whole electoral process."[66]

The *SADC Barometer* also carried the view that democracy is not vested only in the narrowly defined bodies that make elections possible, but ultimately in the democratic culture that pervades when principles are respected and implemented, and there is proper censure (without prevarication) of those who do not.[67]

Despite the AU and SADC Principles and Guidelines and the good example of the elections in South Africa, it is argued that the SADC countries and Africa as a whole have a long way to go in building democratic societies. Developments from the early 1990s in terms of adopting a multiparty system and holding regular elections are positive steps but not sufficient to realise democratic societies.[68] Multipartism and elections are merely outward semblances of democracy, without deepening and strengthening the content and practice of a democratic system. Democracy that merely puts an emphasis on periodic elections has been referred to as electoral democracy, which does not even qualify as liberal democracy.

In many countries in the SADC region and Africa as a whole electoral democracy is the most common, as periodic multiparty elections have become the norm. In the SADC countries even the democratic transition in terms of multiparty elections has not reached the same level of

development. Matlosa[69] has classified SADC countries into four segments in terms of democratic transition as the following description indicates:

> "… [in] three countries, namely Angola, DRC and Swaziland, democratic transition is yet to occur even before we could entertain any discussion and thoughts around democratic consolidation. In three others, namely Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia, although the transition has indeed occurred, this is fraught with violent conflict, especially election-related conflict. This conflict adversely affects the consolidation process for it brings about the contested legitimacy and credibility of the state and the acceptability of the rules of the game … In Namibia, Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi the transitions are relatively stable although still in their fairly embryonic formation, and it could be argued that the early stages of consolidation are fraught with enormous challenges in this group of countries. In three other states, namely South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius, the transition has been undoubtedly successful and these countries, arguably, are already in the early stages of consolidation. Given the stability in these countries; the maturity of the political institutions; and conducive political culture, prospects for a sustainable democratic consolidation path are brighter in the latter group of countries."[70]

The above description is more clearly elaborated by Table 3 below.

Table 3 Country classification regarding progress on democratic transition and consolidation

Blocked transitions	Conflict-ridden transitions	Embryonic and relatively stable transitions	Relatively stable and mature transitions
Angola	Zimbabwe	Namibia	South Africa
Democratic Republic of Congo	Tanzania	Mozambique	Mauritius
Swaziland	Zambia	Lesotho	Botswana
		Malawi	

Source: K Matlosa, Managing democracy: A review of SADC principles and guidelines governing democratic elections, 2004, p 4.

Another shortcoming in the building of democracy in the SADC countries that Zanzibar should learn from is the issue of gender equality. Gender inequality is very high, though there are some differences between countries. Such inequality is reflected in the low percentage of women in governance structures compared to men. For instance, it is noted that

the percentage of women in the parliaments of SADC countries ranges from 3.1% in Swaziland to 32.8% in South Africa.

THE 2005 ELECTIONS AS THE BASIS OF BUILDING HUMAN SECURITY IN ZANZIBAR: THE WAY FORWARD

Introductory remarks

Despite the past history of elections in Zanzibar, it is very difficult to predict how the 2005 elections will be conducted and what the outcome will be. To what extent will the elections be free, fair and peaceful in order to facilitate human security in Tanzania?

The wishes of the people of Zanzibar and Tanzania as a whole and particularly those interviewed are that the 2005 Zanzibar elections should be free, fair and peaceful. The questions were, how can that be attained and how can it be a sustainable solution?

At one of the open-ended discussions on CCM and CUF negotiations, one senior CUF officer suggested pragmatic solutions:

> "Addressing root causes of conflicts between CUF and CCM was a sustainable answer. In doing so we should not always be thinking about conflict management, as we did during Muafaka I. We should always be thinking about conflict resolution just as doctors think towards a more pragmatic interest in eradicating a disease rather than treating the symptoms. Managing deep-rooted conflicts requires foresighted leadership, which can bring conflicts to a sustainable settlement. The leaders must therefore be ahead of the sentiments of the larger portion of their followers in counselling for peace and they must have authority to carry their supporters with them through difficult times."[71]

He cautioned, however, that:

> "It is very obvious that the task becomes very difficult when the leaders at the negotiating table are often the very same ones who provoked or maintained the conflicts in the first place." [72]

Another political activist and an ardent supporter of the CCM had this to add:

> "The question of trust is very important during negotiation. At most times, negotiations tend to focus on issues, but for a successful negotiations

process, the relationship between the conflicting parties must be enhanced in order to create a functional working relationship between CUF and CCM. We all need to play our role in order to promote trust among ourselves irrespective of ones political creed."[73]

He continued:

"It is my cherished wish that when fully and truly implemented, Muafaka 2 will provide a very valuable opportunity for Zanzibaris to launch a true democratic society characterized by respect for human dignity, the rule of law and good governance, which of course are the prerequisites for social-economic development."[74]

One Zanzibar businessman and renowned political activist reflected on the 2005 multiparty elections with a caution:

"Zanzibar has no other alternative but to fully and genuinely implement the terms of Muafaka if human security is to be preserved. Muafaka is only a temporary relief that would take the country through to the election in 2005. There is need to focus beyond the October 2005 election, and think in terms of creating mechanisms, institutions and norms that would enhance national unity and cohesion. But the prerequisite to that is first for Zanzibaris to come to terms with their past."[75]

The potential of having free and fair elections in Zanzibar should be based on three important foundations. One is drawing lessons from all past elections from the time of struggle for independence to the present. The second is harnessing experiences and views from people in field studies, research reports and discussions through seminars, workshops and conferences. The third involves learning from outside experiences such as elections in other countries and election principles developed by international organisations such as SADC and the AU.

Lessons from past elections in Zanzibar

The discussion above on the history of elections in Zanzibar provides us with concrete lessons and experiences which can be very useful for the 2005 elections. As noted earlier, four elections in seven years' struggle for independence, from 1957 to 1963, have provided us with two important lessons. One is that in order to avoid conflict, it is very important to avoid multiparty political competition with elements of

racial and/or ethnic ideological perspectives. Second, as managed by the colonial government the elections were not free and fair.

On elections under a one-party system, 1980–1990, again two important lessons suffice. First, over-dominance by the party in the processes of nominating candidates marginalised the wishes of the people, causing resentment and election boycotts. The second lesson, and arising from the first, is that the elections and what followed afterwards resulted in the growth of regionalism between Unguja and Pemba. Such developments were accompanied by the tendency to lack tolerance on the part of the government and the ruling party.

The experiences and lessons from the multiparty elections of 1995 and 2000 are clear. First, like the elections of the colonial period, according to observers and other analysts these elections were not free and fair.[76] Arising from that, the elections became a source of conflict, from latent to violent. Aspects of mistrust and lack of tolerance were common.

The Pemba by-elections of 2003 provided positive experiences and lessons. First, a reconciliatory spirit between competing political parties is paramount. Second, it has been realised that free and fair elections demand the impartiality and independence of the ZEC and state security organs such as the police. Third, the wishes of the people who aspire to elect their leaders should be above the wishes of political parties. In other words, elections should be people-centred.

However, in past elections one common lesson cuts across all of them. This is the willingness to participate in the elections as an important democratic principle. If Tanzanians, and in particular Zanzibaris, are keen for their 2005 elections to be free, fair and peaceful, they should avoid the negative lessons and strive to adopt and strengthen the positive lessons. Failure to meet these challenges will:

> "… result in a failure in the implementation of Muafaka 2 and this will be the siren for unwanted events similar to these of January 26th and 27th 2001. CUF and CCM will bear the responsibility of the genocidal bloodshed and will have to be crucified for that." [77]

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH REPORTS AND DISCUSSIONS THROUGH SEMINARS, WORKSHOPS AND CONFERENCES AND VIEWS FROM THE PEOPLE

Overview of research reports from institutions and individuals

In recent years, particularly after 1995, various institutions and even

individuals have carried out a number of research projects. Those reviewed include the following:

The Eastern and South African Universities
Research Programme (ESAURP)

The Eastern and South African Universities Research Programme (ESAURP) is one of the institutions that have been carrying out research projects. A research project that was carried out in the late 1990s culminated in the publication of a book titled *The political plight of Zanzibar*, edited by T L Maliyamkono. Another research project by ESAURP was on Muafaka and its published research report is titled *Muafaka: The roots of peace in Zanzibar.*

The salient issues and recommendations from these reports include the following:

• To establish peace and unity in Zanzibar the people should forget old ethnic and racial divisions and antagonistic relations and regard themselves as one people.

• Given the nature of politics and the close power relations between the CCM and CUF, Zanzibar should adopt the system of a government of national unity.

Kituo cha Katiba (Constitutional Centre)

Kituo cha Katiba is another institution that has conducted a study on constitutionalism and political development in Zanzibar. The study was in the form of a fact-finding mission and culminated in the publication of a report titled *Constitutionalism and political stability in Zanzibar: The search for a new vision* (Joseph Oloka Onyango and Maria Nassali, October 2003).

Among the main recommendations of the report are the following:

• There needs to be a comprehensive discussion of constitutional and governance issues in Tanzania that encompasses both the current constitutional instruments and the content of laws and regulations that do not pass constitutional muster.

• It is essential to have a frank, candid and comprehensive discussion of all aspects of the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, with a focus not only on what the Union was intended to be, but also on what it has

actually evolved into, and in which direction the peoples of Tanzania and Zanzibar want it to develop.

- There is a need for a comprehensive intra-Zanzibaris dialogue focusing on the specific aspects of Zanzibar's constitutional and governance arrangements and specifically those issues (such as citizenship) that tend to promote feelings of xenophobia and political persecution.

- Mechanisms for civic and political education, especially for the promotion of greater citizenship participation, need to be put in place in Zanzibar.

- The Muafaka process is commended for providing a positive dispute settlement mechanism as well as a tool for progressive negotiations. The dialogue among the top party leadership should nevertheless be replicated at the village level.

- The independence of the judiciary should be entrenched in the constitution, through ensuring security of tenure and the creation of a credible and independent Judicial Service Commission.

- The CUF and CCM need to be more tolerant and appreciative of each other as political competitors. The mission emphasises that there is an acute need in Zanzibar to move away from the 'winner takes all' attitude.

The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO)

The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), based at the University of Dar es Salaam, has conducted research mainly in the form of monitoring the elections of 1995, 2000 and the Pemba by-election of 2003. All the monitoring reports have been published by TEMCO.

The salient issues and recommendations from these reports are the following:

- Electoral laws and regulations should be improved. In particular the aspect of residence qualification, which has been modified, should be completely abolished.

- Though during the Pemba by-election of 2003 the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) was made more independent than before, more work needs to be done to make it more independent.

- All efforts and strategies need to be made to ensure that the elections in Zanzibar are free and fair.

Electoral management in southern Africa

Electoral management in southern Africa by Dr David Pottie with Professor Tom Lodge (eds) gives a broad and interesting survey of issues related to electoral management in southern Africa. They believe that a fair election usually implies equitable treatment of all competitors and they produced a compendium of key strategies to support political pluralism and multiparty electoral politics, which include:

- establishment of an independent electoral administration and capacity building by having an independent and autonomous electoral commission;

- generating a binding code of conduct for all registered political parties to govern the behaviour of political parties, their candidates, and supporters;

- ensuring freedom of expression and freedom of the press, especially in relation to the electoral process. A free media is an essential tool for the open exchange of political opinion, and reporting on election process;

- support for civic education. A basic component of free and fair elections is ensuring that voters not only understand how to vote, but also that they have a broad understanding of their political and civil rights to consolidate democracy;

- more public funding and disclosure of party funding;

- party liaison and conflict management committees to facilitate consultations and communication in addressing issues and potential debates before they disrupt the overall electoral process.

*Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and
Observation (PEMMO) in the SADC Region (2003)*

The Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO) in the SADC Region were developed as a result of the Southern African Electoral Forum Conference held from 11 to 14 June

2000 in Windhoek, Namibia, and adopted at a regional conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 November 2003 under the auspices of the Electoral Commissioners Forum of SADC Countries (ECF) incorporating participants from 14 SADC countries and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. It recommended:

- that the constitutional and legal framework should guarantee fundamental human rights, promote good governance and the values of political stability; promote mechanisms with which to address conflict management in the electoral process; make provision for the review of the constitution in keeping with principles of domestic practice, and provide explicitly for gender equality and affirmative action as a temporary measure until balanced representation is achieved;

- that electoral systems should be adopted in each SADC state in accordance with its own political dispensation, history and political system; be entrenched in the constitution; promote and protect fundamental human rights as well as the secrecy of the ballot and adopt, as a part of inter-party affirmative action, including quotas for women and other disadvantaged groups, and mechanisms be put in place to ensure their enforcement;

- that the electoral commissions should be independent and autonomous in discharging their duties; have a representative composition of the society, comprising at least 30% of women with one being a high court or supreme court judge; promote financial sustainability and cost-effectiveness management of elections; and be accountable to the National Assembly with its budget decided by vote in the National Assembly;

- that election-related conflict management should ensure that alternative conflict management process is incorporated in the legislative framework; the establishment of conflict prevention and management process by electoral commissions, political parties and civil society is facilitated to deal with election-related disputes;

- that agreements reached through mediation, reconciliation and arbitration under independent, skilled and well-trained mediators should be enforced by law; and appeal procedures should be established for all elections and should be dealt with by the courts;

- that the delimitation process should be managed by an independent body that is representative of the society, comprising persons with appropriate skills; be conducted by one body on the basis of clearly identified criteria, such as population distribution, community of interest, convenience, geographical features and other natural or administrative boundaries; be made accessible to the public through a consultative process; and be devoid of manipulation of electoral boundaries to favour particular groups or political interests;

- that for the purpose of identifying persons who are eligible to cast a ballot on election day, the voter registration process should promote broad participation without inhibiting the participation of eligible voters; provide a continuous and accessible voter registration facility to all eligible voters; provide ample time to register, for public inspection of the voters' roll, for objections, and for adjunction of appeals; and provide access to the voters' roll to political parties to enable them monitor the voter registration process through party agents appointed by themselves;

- that the nomination and campaign process should ensure that the nomination of candidates is transparent; candidates have sufficient time to comply with the requirements of the nomination process; there is sufficient time for the public to inspect candidate nomination lists and for objections to be lodged and disputes resolved; political parties respect equal gender representation of at least 30% of women candidates by 2005 so as to be in line with the 1997 SADC declaration on gender and development; and in the campaign process, there is a complete adherence of political parties and their candidates to the electoral code of conduct that guides their behaviour and enough time is allotted for carrying out their election campaigns;

- that since the governing parties in some SADC countries have an unfair advantage of using the media and public resources to which they have exclusive access for campaign purposes, or to further their political ends, there should be equal access to the public and private media; a code of conduct for media coverage of election designed to promote fair and equitable reporting; and a regulation of the use of public assets and funds given on a quota basis in order to level the playing fields for political competition;

- that since there can only be a free, fair, credible, and legitimate electoral process in a climate that is free from political violence and intimidation, it should be ensured that all electoral stakeholders promote and commit themselves to a culture of peace and tolerance at all times pursuant to a code of conduct adopted through a consultative process between them; and the army, police, and intelligence forces' role in protecting the security and integrity of election process is properly established in order to maintain their neutrality and impartiality.

Vote counting and announcement of overall election results have always been a potential source of suspicion and fraud, just as it was in the case of Zanzibar during the 1st and 2nd multiparty elections of 1995 and 2000 respectively. While the electoral commissions maintain the responsibility for the management of counting and announcing of overall election results they should make known procedures for counting to election officials who are permitted to be present during the counting of votes; count the ballots at the same polling station immediately after the closure of voting and have the results announced immediately after counting and posted at the same polling station; and make sure that the polling-cum-counting stations have adequate lighting, communication systems and proper security. Where possible, the staff who count the votes should not be the same as those who have been involved in the voting process. It should be ensured that there is a specific time frame for confirmation, public announcement of overall election results, and allocation of seats contested, and a culture of acceptance of election results and promotion of transparent electoral process through civic education should be cultivated.

These principles for election are vital in sustaining human security. If Zanzibar could adapt them, peace and security would inevitably be sustained.

Overview of seminars, conferences and workshop reports on issues of election

In addition to the research projects and programmes reviewed above, a number of seminars, workshop and conferences have been conducted in Zanzibar in the past decade. The outcome of ESAURP research projects has normally been followed by conferences. The last conference was at Bwawani Hotel, Zanzibar, on 15–16 September 2004. It was a conference on Muafaka. In the same year the Bunge Foundation for Democracy (BFD) conducted two workshops-cum-seminars on district and regional political

parties, in Zanzibar at Bwawani Hotel from 4 to 6 March 2004 and at Gombani Stadium, Chake Chake, Pemba, from 30 to 31 March 2004.

These conferences, seminars and workshops have generated a lot of ideas, views and recommendations on how political and socio-economic problems can best be handled and conflicting relations put to an end. A summary of the ideas, views and recommendations reviewed from workshops, seminars and conferences include the following:

GENERAL ISSUES

- Generally, most people in Zanzibar have accepted the system of multiparty politics. There appear to be no views on the need to return to one-party politics or to no-party politics. People want multipartism to be strengthened and encouraged.

- The Zanzibar constitution and other legal aspects are issues that are taken seriously. There is need for discussions on how the constitution and the other legal aspects can be improved.

- The Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar needs to be discussed honestly and candidly. According to the vast majority of views, while Zanzibaris definitely want a union and accept the original articles as the legal basis for the Union, they are largely dissatisfied with several aspects of its current operation. While the ideals of the Union are not in dispute, there are different preferences for the form that the relationship should assume. Zanzibaris are extremely nationalistic and proud of their island heritage and culture, irrespective of political affiliation. Indeed, it is felt that there is a widespread conviction that Zanzibar is a sovereign state and that the Union is an agreement between two sovereign states and must be treated as such.

- Important issues on the Union which need to be resolved include its structure and economic relations. On the structure, the question of two or three governments needs to be resolved. As for economic relations, there is a need to review current relations to remove fears of marginalisation and an inequitable sharing of resources. The increase of articles of the Union from 11 to 22 needs to be reviewed.

- There is a need to develop free and independent media in Zanzibar. All political parties should have equal access to the public media.

- The office of the registrar of political parties should be as independent as possible. The registrar and other members of the office should not belong to or be supporters of any political party. The office should not show signs of favouritism to any political party.

ISSUES RELATED TO ELECTIONS

- During elections all political parties which take part should have equal access to the mass media and should be empowered financially to ensure levelling of the playing ground as far as possible.

- There is a need to review the electoral process system from the present system of first past the post in which the winner takes all to the system of proportional representation in which representation is determined by the number of votes a political party obtains.

- A permanent voters' register should be supervised by the government to make sure that eligible people register and to avoid illegal registration from Zanzibaris from the mainland thronging for registration in the islands.

- Voters' education should be established as a permanent system. Emphasis should be on providing such education to *shehas* as ZEC agents, party agents and party leaders.

- The close alliance between the CCM and CUF during elections calls for the need to establish the system of power-sharing and the government of national unity. Such a system in turn calls for decentralisation of power to regional authorities. However, a full study should be made to determine how best the new system should be established.

- The position and role of the ZEC is very important in election processes in Zanzibar. It is important to ensure that such a body is impartial and independent. Such attributes should also be true of state organs supporting it, notably security organs such as the police and the courts.

- In processes of political competition through elections there is a need to develop a democratic culture of tolerance and reconciliation.

Inflammatory and abusive language should be avoided by political party leaders, members and supporters.

- All efforts should be made to ensure that elections are free, fair and peaceful. Parties should be ready to accept election results when elections are free and fair.

- Efforts should be made to make sure that the implementation of Muafaka II is completed before the elections of 2005. The completion of the permanent voters' register is of special significance. The principles of Muafaka II should be developed and consolidated not only for the 2005 elections, but also for future elections based on human security.

- The ZEC should supervise all elections in the country. The present system of using local government municipal, district directors and ward executive officers should be disbanded.

- Tanzania in general, and Zanzibar in particular, should learn from the internal outcomes of research findings and views and ideas emanating from conferences, seminars and workshops and experiences from outside Tanzania, in particular the AU and SADC principles and guidelines and democratic developments within the SADC region to enable the elections of 2005 to be free, fair and peaceful. This will lay an important foundation for the establishment and consolidation of human security, Zanzibar in particular.

Additional views collected from open-ended interviews, discussions and focused dialogue during the field study

As indicated earlier in this report, open-ended interviews and discussions, as well as dialogue with various stakeholders during the field study, produced constructive views which helped the researchers complement and ascertain various claims in the reviewed research reports and papers.

During the fieldwork, all participants exchanged views about the determinants of best electoral practice, especially those issues related to improving election management, monitoring and observation and enhancing the transparency of the electoral process. They defined criteria that would guide electoral process and foster an environment in which elections could take place.

Despite the marginal achievement in the implementation of Muafaka II, the interviewees and participants in open-ended discussions noted the following major challenges to free, fair and legitimate elections in Zanzibar:

- the need to secure the integrity of the electoral process by adopting people-centred voting procedures and facilities;
- to establish a culture of peace and tolerance;
- to establish alternative dispute resolution mechanisms focused particularly on election-related conflicts while complementing existing legal provisions;
- to deepen democracy by developing a generally accepted set of values that ensure fair electoral practice premised on representation, accountability, inclusiveness, transparency, gender equality and equity, tolerance and respect of diversity;
- to inculcate a sense of political will and commitment in the process of dialogue among the major stakeholders in the electoral process in order to reach consensus;
- to realign constitutional and legitimate provisions to conform to the requirements of the democratic plural politics.

In addition, Tanzania and Zanzibar should commit themselves to upholding fundamental rights and freedoms as embodied in their constitutions and various accords in order to have credible, free, fair and legitimate multiparty elections.

The other main concern on human security in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar is how good democratic governance can best be developed amid the shortcomings of the previous system of democracy. The participants emphasised that good democratic governance could be developed by:

- establishing democratic political parties;
- developing strong political parties to ensure equality in political competition;
- having parties with no ethnic politics and divisive tendencies;
- ensuring direct and representative democracy through empowerment of the people by developing traditional principles of politics of consensus, reconciliation and forgiveness, and ensuring people-centred politics and democracy; and
- enhancing social-economic development by establishing principles of social and economic equality and justice, and ensuring employment,

lifting the standards of living and creating conditions for people-centred development.

CONCLUSION

Human security is an important foundation for national unity and development. For multiparty elections to facilitate the development of human security, it is not enough that elections are free, fair and peaceful. The elections should be based on a long-term perspective and strategies of building a real democratic society. Multipartism and multiparty elections constitute the first stage of electoral democracy, which in itself is a stage towards liberal democracy. It has, however, been argued that African countries need to go beyond liberal democracy and establish people-centred developmental democracy.[78]

It has also been argued that liberal democracy is anchored more in respect for and observance of civil liberties, while people-centred developmental democracy is renowned for respect and observance of the civil liberties and socio-economic rights of the people. It is this type of democracy that ensures political and economic empowerment of the people. Some people have regarded this as an approach that should lead to democratic developmental societies.[79]

This means that the fight for democratic and peaceful elections should go side by side with the fight for fast socio-economic development. Zanzibar's economy is at a low level of development and is mainly dependent on the export of cloves, for which the world market has greatly declined. Although efforts are made to diversify the economic sectors by encouraging the growth of tourism, its impact on the overall economy is still not substantial. The majority of the people are very poor.

Furthermore, there are serious complaints about regional development disparities between Unguja and Pemba. For instance, during this study and the campaign rallies of the 2003 Pemba by-elections, the grievances of the Wapemba emerged very clearly. They complained that the Island of Pemba has been marginalised not only politically, but also economically and socially. Although Pemba produces 80% of the cloves, much of state investments in terms of infrastructure and social services was made in Unguja.[80] What all this means is that the democratisation process should go together with policies and strategies for fast socio-economic development based on regional and social equality and social justice.

Lastly, what Zanzibar needs is to transform not only multiparty elections, but the whole society. The new society should be based on a

new political and socio-economic culture, the culture of developmental democracy in the context of multiparty politics. Such a culture needs reconciliation, tolerance and mutual trust. Past history should be taken constructively by incorporating positive aspects to enrich the new developments. Unnecessary hardliner positions should be avoided without losing the spirit of constructive criticism. All Zanzibaris should respect important national historical events in a spirit of national unity.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The report contains tangible views and recommendations on how to have free, fair, legitimate and democratic elections in Zanzibar. All these are important and should be taken as key recommendations by the authorities in both the Zanzibar revolutionary government and the Union government. These recommendations could be grouped under four major recommendations:

- In Tanzania in general, and Zanzibar in particular, the democratisation process should be guided by the principles of a people-centred rather than a party-centred democracy. This means that political competition between political parties and individual politicians should be under the control of the people and their institutions.

- Besides educating and sensitising people on elections, civic education and other forms of education should be used as important tools of ideological transformation. Such transformation should be far from the legacies of divisive and segregationist ideologies of ethnicity, racism, religious antagonism and regionalism but should strive for a national ideology based on human equality, human rights, dignity and justice.

- Political competition under conditions of economic backwardness and poverty tends to lead to conflict. Zanzibar therefore needs rapid socio-economic development with a reasonable balance between Unguja and Pemba. Such economic development should be based on social justice.

- Problems related to the Union should be discussed and solved. The Union should facilitate elections in Zanzibar without any form of bias or favouritism.

NOTES

1   At the time of writing this report Dr Jonathan Lwehabura was a senior programme officer at the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation - he is currently the chairman of the Africa Centre for Peace and Development in Dar es Salaam. Professor Gaudens Mpangala is a professor in the Department of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

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Individual confidence and personal security in the 2005 Zimbabwean elections

Michael M Mataure[1]

Section 1

INTRODUCTION

The concepts relating to one's individual confidence and personal security can be defined from various perspectives. Generally, personal security entails the safety of an individual from harm, attack or violence perpetuated by the environment, other individuals, groups or the state. Personal security is a multi-dimensional and all-inclusive concept, which not only seeks to satisfy a person's survival needs, but also aims at the creation of conditions conducive to the sustenance of a healthy and peaceful life.

Personal security is contextual and therefore should be defined as the product of circumstances affecting a person's being at a given moment. It is best to view the personal security of an individual in the broader context of political security, which, in a way, is a determinant of the latter. Political security and the development of a political culture form the foundation of all other kinds of security.

Security comes with many other human values, among them individual confidence, assurance, belief and certainty. In this set of value judgement processes, individual confidence is the ultimate feeling one gets in being satisfied by a system. In an electoral process, individual confidence is high when individuals perceive the process to be free, fair and just.

To fully appreciate the setting of the 2005 elections it is necessary to understand the historical background of the country and the electoral processes before the 2000 parliamentary elections. Close analysis of the

electoral processes in Zimbabwe since 1980 reveals that there are phases that characterised each election period. An understanding of this history will help to appreciate the polarisation that has prevailed between the main political parties, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

This research was undertaken during a period in which people were preparing themselves for a major general election. The 2000 elections were characterised by intensive conflict and intolerance between the two major political parties. This culture of intolerance seems to have been carried forward to the fifth parliamentary period and as such, the electorate have become suspicious, uncertain and unwilling to divulge information of a political nature.

While traditional and conventional methods are usually applied to research of this nature, this study has had limitations in that a number of unique and manifestly dramatic changes occurred in the political environment between the time the study began and the cut-off date. The study clearly illustrates the level and magnitude of the developments in Zimbabwe in the nine months between August 2004 and May 2005.

The pace of these changes brought with it major challenges among analysts and observers of Zimbabwe's political system. While similar challenges confronted the Public Affairs and Parliamentary Support Trust (PAPST) team in the course of this exercise, it was deemed a worthwhile process because of the importance of the time, the nature of changes and the uniqueness of Zimbabwe and its history in the southern Africa subcontinent. (Despite an 18 March cut-off date being set, a follow-up and rounding-off study will be undertaken post-election to complete the project.)

The 2005 elections are the sixth parliamentary elections since Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980. The first popular elections in Zimbabwe were held after the attainment of independence from colonial rule in 1980 and were held under the Lancaster House constitution, which provided for a bicameral legislature and reserved 20 seats for the minority whites. The election was based on the party-list electoral system that saw ZANU PF winning 63% of the votes (57 seats), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Patriotic Front) (PF ZAPU) 24% (20 seats) and the United African National Congress (UANC) 8% (3 seats). The major characteristics of these elections were the jubilation and euphoria of the black majority, who were experiencing universal suffrage for the first time. This was a reflection of their increased individual confidence and personal security.

The 1985 parliamentary elections were conducted under the party-list electoral system. The period leading to and after these elections was marred by inter-party conflict, which almost resulted in civil strife. This would have reduced personal confidence and personal security, especially in the Midlands and Matebeleland regions (1981–1987) where armed dissidents operated. In the 1985 elections, ZANU PF won 64 seats (77%), PF ZAPU 15 seats (19%) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 1 seat (1%).

In 1987 ZANU PF and PF ZAPU signed the Unity Accord to form a united ZANU PF party, marking the end of the armed conflict. The constitution was amended, abolishing the provision reserving 20 seats for whites. The Senate was also abolished and an executive presidency was established. In terms of that amendment, presidential elections are held every six years and parliamentary elections after five years. Parliament is now composed of 152 + 1 members, 120 of whom are directly elected to represent constituencies; 10 become MPs by virtue of being appointed governors by the President; 10 represent traditional leaders; and the President appoints a further 12 from society at large. The Attorney General is the 153rd member. It is also important to point out that ordinary people were not always free to express political opinions and individual security had been negatively affected by the dissident menace that had plagued the country.

(Constitutionally, Parliament should constitute 150 + 1 members. Originally, Zimbabwe had eight provinces but two metropolitan provinces were created (Harare and Bulawayo), which necessitated the addition of two more governors to bring that number to ten. The constitution is yet to be amended to address that issue.)

In 1989 a new political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), was formed, but this did not deter inter-party conflict in the build-up to the 1990 elections. It must be noted that the 1990 elections saw the country shift from the party list to the first past the post electoral model. The candidate selection process in ZANU PF was democratised with the holding of the party's first self-nomination primary elections in preparation of the revamping of the national electoral model. The outcome of the 1990 elections was that ZANU PF secured 117 of the 120 seats contested, ZUM won 2 seats and ZANU won 1 seat.

In 1995 there was relative calm in the country and the elections were characterised by the absence of an active opposition. ZANU PF won 118 of the 120 parliamentary seats and ZANU won 2 seats. ZANU PF candidates were not contested in 55 constituencies.

In 1990 the government adopted an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The programme failed to reach the intended objectives, leading to a drastic decline in the standard of living, especially of the working class. The economic hardships led to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which contested the 2000 and the 2002 elections. In the parliamentary elections ZANU PF won 63 seats, the MDC 57 seats and ZANU 1 seat. These elections were marred by violence and allegations of vote rigging. The MDC argued that the 2000 parliamentary elections and 2002 presidential elections were 'stolen' by the ruling party. Some internal and external observers did not accept the outcome of the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential plebiscite. The non-acceptance of election results by some stakeholders resulted, among other things, in the suspension and subsequent withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth Club made up of former British colonies.

METHODOLOGY

The main methods used for data collection were documentary analysis and review of information generated from secondary sources, including PAPST constituency relations workshops (CRWs) held between October 2001 and November 2004. The purpose of the CRWs was derived from the baseline survey conducted by PAPST in 2001 and from evaluations conducted subsequently. It should be pointed out that the process of determining and responding to the needs of representatives and leaders constitutes a major area of PAPST's activities.

The main beneficiaries of the CRWs were the leaders at constituency level, especially the MPs, traditional leaders, councillors, civil servants, council executive, civic leaders and political party leaders. The documentary sources of information included workshop reports, evaluation reports, and audiovisual data sources. The research also involved fieldwork where focused interviews were conducted during the CRWs with MPs, political party representatives, traditional leaders, local authority councillors, businesspersons, and ordinary members of the community.

Although survey instruments were designed initially, in many instances these were not administered directly because of the sensitivity of the issues that were raised. Under those circumstances the information was collected by indirect methods. The menu of the CRWs was strategically changed to facilitate discussion of issues relating to elections, for example candidate selection, campaigning methods, and violence in intra- and inter-party conflicts. This approach enabled participants to discuss freely

some of the pressing issues in a non-threatening environment as opposed to the use of structured questionnaires. The workshops addressed other topics such as roles of leadership, role conflict, culture, and images and values of organisations.

Policy and institutional activity reviews were also carried out. These involved a review of relevant documents and analysis of secondary data. The documents that were reviewed included Acts of Parliament and political party manifestos.

The research also involved participation in activities organised by or for other civil society organisations. These included activities conducted by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) and the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO), as well as public hearings by portfolio committees.

ZESN is a network of civil society organisations whose major focus is to promote democratic processes and free and fair elections. A series of meetings and workshops were held in the latter half of 2004 to contribute towards the initiation and adoption of SADC principles and guidelines by the government of Zimbabwe (GoZ). As well as the consultative and negotiation meetings in Harare, there was a regional conference organised by ZESN at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, which involved government, local and regional civil society groups, and which discussed the draft SADC election guidelines. Two officials from PAPST attended the Victoria Falls workshop in August.

Some of the recommendations proffered at Victoria Falls were incorporated into the SADC election principles and guidelines in Mauritius. Contributions from that meeting were also taken into account as part of a wider consultation process during the review of Zimbabwe's electoral legislation in October/November 2004.

Through its strategic partnership with the Institute of Leadership and Governance (IPLG) at Africa University in Mutare, Zimbabwe, PAPST also received support for this project.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS IN ZIMBABWE

In the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe a number of factors influenced the development of the political environment, security and individual confidence. Many historical legacies still influence the political context and human security issues in Zimbabwe today. Such factors include colonialism, land policy, the protracted armed liberation struggle and subsequent attainment of political independence, women in politics,

constitutional review, economic reform programmes and, recently, the deepening economic crisis and the proposed turnaround strategies.

The colonial system effectively resulted in the subjugation of indigenous systems, which were replaced by Western systems of governance and values. The colonial system was meant to meet the objectives of the minority colonisers at the expense of the indigenous majority. The minority settler regime had little regard for human rights and the personal security of the indigenous population. Under colonial rule individual confidence and security were low, as the legal system and practice were meant to deny the indigenous people any rights on issues of governance.

The oppressed African population of Zimbabwe took up arms and waged a protracted armed struggle in a bid to gain independence from colonial rule. Taking up arms in 1963 followed a series of attempted settlement talks that failed to deliver the demand for sovereignty by indigenous Zimbabweans. The armed struggle led to negotiations that culminated in the Lancaster House Constitutional Talks of 1979 at which the Conservative government of Mrs Margaret Thatcher agreed to grant independence to the former colony of Southern Rhodesia. Independence on 18 April 1980 followed an election held in March of the same year. The attainment of majority rule directly increased the confidence of the indigenous majority. Independence meant freedom from racial abuse, freedom of movement, the right to train for careers that had been reserved for the white minority population, and, more importantly, the right to vote and choose their representatives. At independence there was a conscious effort to reverse the colonial laws, policies, and structures. Voter turnout at the 1980 general elections was very high. People had confidence in their ability to change the system for the betterment of their lives. The extension of electoral franchise in 1980 generally created the need for the establishment of new structures that responded to the needs of the majority indigenous population. Most reforms since independence have been targeted at correcting colonial practices and systems, and oppressive legislation.

In 1989 an opposition party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), was formed. In the run-up to the 1990 elections many intellectuals began to participate in national politics. The 1995 elections were contested by a number of Independents. Though the environment was largely peaceful and provided a good context for nurturing personal confidence and security, the elections were characterised by voter apathy.

The 2000 parliamentary election and 2002 presidential elections were characterised by the emergence of a formidable opposition party in the form of the MDC. There was increased interest in national politics and

more voters turned up. The 2000 parliamentary elections were tightly contested by ZANU PF and the MDC.

There were few women candidates, with the result that the 2000 elections produced fewer women parliamentarians. The smaller number of women MPs should have undermined the confidence of the female politicians, as it seems the entry cost to higher office had been increased and women were losing the ground they had previously gained. However, after a ZANU PF Congress resolution that one of the two vice-presidents of the party should be a woman, Mrs J T R Mujuru was appointed one of the two party vice-presidents. This action will increase the confidence of women to scale the leadership ladder in the public and private sectors.

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

INDIVIDUAL CONFIDENCE AND PERSONAL SECURITY DURING ELECTIONS

Individual confidence and personal security are critical factors for citizen participation in the electoral processes of a democratic state. Elections for their own sake can be meaningless in whatever nature of state, democratic, despotic or otherwise. To be worthwhile the electoral process should promote democratic governance. It should reconfirm the equality of people by enabling them to make an individual choice about who will govern them and how.

Elections are at the core of democratic governance, especially where universal adult suffrage determines the political leadership of a country. If elections are this significant, it is imperative that the socio-economic and political playing fields should not only be levelled for the participation of political parties, but, more importantly, should allow the voters to have confidence and guaranteed personal security during and after the election.

The onus is on the government to ensure the existence of a non-violent political environment in which free and fair elections are conducted. Citizens have an equally important duty to exercise tolerance and display non-violent behaviour. Ultimately it is government's responsibility to put into place mechanisms and processes that promote peaceful campaigning, human security, safety, and an adherence to lawful electoral procedures.

SADC PARLIAMENTARY FORUM

Among the notable regional initiatives aimed at introducing common electoral practices within SADC countries, the SADC Parliamentary

Forum (SADC PF) drafted and presented norms and standards for elections in the southern African region in early 2001. These norms and standards, which were adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum Plenary Assembly in Windhoek, Namibia, on 25 March 2001, noted that democratic governance leads to political stability and economic gains. Since the advent – or re-introduction – of multiparty politics, there have been significant gains in promoting democratic governance in most southern African nations. SADC PF noted that much remains to be done to improve the political environment in which elections are conducted, despite the gains made by a number of countries to date.

It should be noted that in spite of the existence of SADC PF and the outstanding work carried out by it, the organisation's legal status, political space and functions remain contentious in a number of countries in the SADC region. Part of this legacy stems from the focus of the forum, which has been acting as the region's chief election monitor.

It is noted that in southern Africa, neither constitutions, nor the electoral systems, nor the practices of most institutions have been aligned to the new multiparty democratic culture. Levels of tolerance of contesting views are still too low, including the empowerment of women to participate in decision-making processes. When examining the factors that undermine the participation of women in elections, as well the influence of individual confidence and personal security, one should look beyond the electoral process and take into account the socio-economic and political environment of a country.

CONCEPTS RELATED TO INDIVIDUAL CONFIDENCE AND PERSONAL SECURITY

The concepts relating to an individual's confidence and personal security can be defined from various perspectives. Wohlgenmuth, Rothschild and Lennrt observe that the geometry of common or extended security is complex. They view this complexity as one that:

> "... usually involves an extension of the domain of security (to the security of the individuals and groups as well as nations), of the sources of security (international, local and non-governmental, as well as national governments), and of the characteristics of security (economic, social, political, environmental, and human, as well as military)".[2]

Generally, personal security entails the safety of an individual from harm, attack or violence perpetuated by the environment, other individuals,

groups or the state. Although personal security is multi-dimensional and an all-inclusive concept, which not only seeks to satisfy a person's survival needs but also aims to create conditions conducive to the sustenance of healthy and peaceful life.

One cannot define personal security in a vacuum, as it is a product of circumstances affecting a person's being at a given moment. It is best to view the personal security of an individual in the broader context of political security, which in a way is a determinant of the latter. Wohlgenmuth, Rothschild and Lennrt argue that political security and the development of a political culture are the foundations of all other kinds of security.[3]

Security is associated with many other human values, among them individual confidence, assurance, belief and certainty. In this set of value judgement processes, individual confidence is the ultimate feeling one obtains from being satisfied by a system. In the electoral process, individual confidence is high when individuals perceive the process to be free, fair and just.

A country's legal and political institutions are critical in evaluating the electoral process. Ultimately, an individual's judgements are made in view of how the system enhances individual rights and human development. Depending on the degree of satisfaction, an individual can get assurance when he/she approves of the system in place and may end up with a belief if the system is consistent over time. An individual has more confidence in the electoral process if it is guided by clearly laid-down procedures that are applied consistently.

The UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) Development Report 2000 suggests that individual rights and development have a desired common vision and common purpose "to secure the freedom, well-being and dignity of all people everywhere – freedom from fear of threats to personal security, from torture, arbitrary arrest and other violent acts".[4]

Elections should specifically deal with democracy in order to facilitate living well in a mass society.[5] In this case one could theorise that the election process is linked to the quest for stability and development.

STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS CONDUCTING ELECTIONS (1980–2004)

Since 1980 Zimbabwean elections have been conducted according to the constitutional provisions under the guidance and direction of the

Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC); the Registrar General's Office (RG) Office); the Delimitation Commission (DC); and the Judiciary.

ELECTORAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

The ESC is mandated to supervise the registration of voters and conduct of elections of MPs. Any proposed Bill or statutory instrument relating to the registration of voters or to the election of MPs falls under its purview. The ESC is responsible for preparing reports to the President concerning matters under its supervision. The commission is meant to operate as an independent, impartial constitutional body whose entire membership is appointed by the President. The impartiality and degree of independence of the ESC have been questioned and challenged by various stakeholder groups, including the opposition parties, human rights activists, and constitutional experts. These concerns resulted in revised provisions in the draft constitution that was rejected in February 2000.

It is apparent that public confidence, and certainly that of individuals, is compromised by any arrangement perceived to favour the Executive and be insensitive to the concerns of private citizens.

THE DELIMITATION COMMISSION

The functions of the DC are to determine the limits of the boundaries for the 120 constituencies into which Zimbabwe is divided for elections. The President appoints the DC in consultation with the Judiciary. Like the EDC, it is very difficult to appreciate how the DC can remain independent of the influence of the appointing authority. Allegations of gerrymandering when drawing up constituency boundaries have been levelled at the ESC.

Thus, the degree of independence of this commission still requires improvement.

THE REGISTRAR'S GENERAL'S OFFICE

The RG's Office is primarily involved with the registration of births and deaths in the entire country. Additionally, the department is responsible for the issuing of travel documents and national identification documents, as well as the registration of voters. Until the 2005 elections it was responsible for the administration of local government and conducting national elections. Being a unit of state bureaucracy the

department is viewed as being aligned to the Executive, and its role in the administration of elections has often caused contention among stakeholders.

POST-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS

The first popular elections in Zimbabwe were held in 1980. The Lancaster House constitution provided for a bicameral legislature, that is, a House of Assembly (the Lower House) and a Senate (the Upper Chamber). The constitution also provided for a titular president and an executive prime minister. The 1980 elections were based on the party-list electoral system.

Sithole observed that:

> "… under the system the country was divided into eight electoral districts to encourage parties to nominate candidates for each district. In turn, each district was allocated a number of seats based on the estimated number of voters in that district. A party had to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast in any election district for it to be eligible to have seats allocated in that district."[6]

In the 1980 elections ZANU PF won 63% of the votes (57 seats). PF ZAPU obtained 24% (20 seats) and UANC 8% (3 seats). The other 20 seats were reserved for whites in terms of the Lancaster House constitution. Cowen and Laabso observed that although intimidation was not restricted to any particular party, the British governor for Rhodesia concluded that activities of the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) constituted the main constraint against peaceful electoral campaigning.[7]

Sithole asserts that people were left without any doubt that peace meant a ZANU PF victory. By voting for ZANU PF, the majority voted for peace.[8]

In general, the 1980 elections were a watershed in the Zimbabwean history, as they ushered in independence and majority rule for the first time. The elections enhanced individual confidence and personal security as people looked forward to the prospect of peace, security, prosperity and self-determination. In the period afterwards followed the declaration of the policy of reconciliation and formation of a government of national unity, which included representatives from the belligerent forces. This increased investor confidence and personal security. However, this

scenario was short lived because of the 1981–1987 disturbances, which culminated in near civil war between the former liberation movements ZANU PF and PF ZAPU. In this period a culture of conflict, intolerance, violence, fear and silence prevailed.

The 1985 parliamentary elections were the last to be held under the party-list electoral system. The elections were allegedly marred by the violence that had begun just after independence, in the 'dissident' era (1981–1987), when many people died as a result of activities of 'dissidents' and the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). The dissidents were, in the main, breakaways from the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), who had refused to come into the fold.

> "Many were involved in the ZIPRA uprising in Bulawayo in February 1981, and thereafter took to the bush. The 1985 elections were conducted in a polarised environment as a result of this civil strife and were subsequently won by ZANU PF, which acquired 64 seats (77%), PF ZAPU 15 seats (19%) and ZANU 1 seat (1%). But individual confidence was highly compromised."[9]

The political clashes were concentrated in the Midlands and Matebeleland regions, both PF ZAPU strongholds. The situation of near civil war in some parts of the country undermined individual freedom and security. It also curtailed economic growth and freedom of movement.

The 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU marked the end of the dissident era as Senior Minister Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, "pledged to intercede with the bandits and ask them to give themselves up, with the promise that they would be rehabilitated".[10]

After the signing of the Unity Accord there was peace and freedom once more in the country. The 'togetherness' implied in the Unity Accord improved the sense of individual security and confidence to express political opinion.

The constitution was amended at almost the same time in order to abolish the provision reserving 20 seats for whites. The amendments abolished the party-list electoral system and this was replaced by the single-member, first past the post electoral system. The Senate was abolished and an Executive Presidency was established. According to that amendment, presidential elections are held every six years and parliamentary elections every five years.

The opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) was formed in 1989 and gained its strength from the allegations of corruption

and the deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals. During the 1990 elections violence undermined individual security, as the electorate were vulnerable to physical harm.

A number of intellectuals entered the field of national politics and went on to contest the elections. Most of them joined the ruling party and some were appointed as cabinet ministers. This was a sign of confidence by the intellectuals in campaigning for political office when previously they had refrained from participating because of the characterisation of politics as a dirty game. ZANU PF secured 117 of the 120 seats contested. ZUM captured nearly 20% of the votes but won only 2 seats. ZANU won 1 seat.

In 1995 the election environment was largely peaceful, though there was marked voter apathy. ZANU PF won 118 of the 120 parliamentary seats and ZANU Party the remaining 2 seats. Of the seats secured by ZANU PF, 55 were unopposed.

Following the outcome of these elections, there were claims that the voters' roll had not been updated. Examples were cited of registered people whose names did not appear on the voters' roll, names that appeared twice, and those of people who had died years earlier. This period was marked by indifference by most of the electorate. It is probable that many individuals had low levels of confidence in the electoral system as it did not easily accommodate or encourage alternative political viewpoints.

The period after 1995 was marked by a sharp decline in individual living standards as a result of the unsuccessful Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The resultant economic hardships led to spontaneous demonstrations that eventually led to the formation of civil society groups that sought to challenge the sitting government, which they accused of financial misadministration. There were intense demonstrations that compromised individual security, especially that of property owners, as there was rampart looting and destruction of private property. On the other hand these demonstrations increased individual confidence as civil society became more organised and struggled to change the status quo. The formation of the MDC in 1999 from a broad alliance of civil society groups boosted the confidence of the working class, as it was seen as a vehicle to replace the sitting government, especially as it had been formed on the eve of the general elections.

The 2002 presidential elections were almost a repetition of the 2000 parliamentary elections. There was high confidence, especially

among urban voters, who thought they would accomplish what they had failed to do in the 2000 elections. However, the outcome was different from their anticipation of victory. ZANU PF's candidate, incumbent president Robert Mugabe, won the elections. Allegations of vote rigging led the MDC to appeal against some of the results. The process was judged to be not free and fair by a number of observers, including the Commonwealth. That led to the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth and its subsequent 'withdrawal' from the Commonwealth Club. This was followed by targeted sanctions imposed by the European Union and the USA, including travel bans on ZANU PF and senior GoZ officials. This left civil society dejected as people felt that the outcome was determined by what were perceived to be unfair electoral laws, whilst others cited the need to overhaul the constitution. The 2005 parliamentary elections were thus held in a polarised environment as a result of these factors.

SUMMARY OF THE FIVE POST-INDEPENDENCE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Table 1 Election results of the five post-independence parliamentary elections

Political party	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
ZANU PF	57	64	117	117	62
PF ZAPU	20	15	–	–	–
ZANU Party	0	1	1	2	1
MDC	–		–	–	57
UANC	3	0	0	0	0
ZUM	–	–	2	0	0
RF/CAZ	20	15	–	–	–
IZG	–	4	–	–	–
Independent	0	1	0	1	0
Total	100	100	120	120	120

RF indicates Rhodesian Front (then Republican) Front, later renamed Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe. The Independent Zimbabwe Group (IZG) splinter group from Ian Smith's CAZ contested the reserved 20 seats.

Source: Adapted from Richard Saunders, *Never the same again: Zimbabwe's growth towards democracy 1980–2000*, Richard Saunders, Harare, 2000.

Table 2 Zimbabwe parliamentary elections: popular vote and turnout (% of valid votes cast) between 1980 and 2000

Party	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
ZANU PF	62.99	77.19	75.4	81.36	48.45
ZAPU	24.11	19.31	-	-	-
ZANU Party	2.01	1.25	0.85	6.50	
MDC	-	-	-	-	47.06
UANC	8.28	2.24	0.44	-	-
ZUM	-	-	16.6	-	-
Independent	-	-	0.34	5.86	
Forum	-	-		6.28	-
Total votes ('000)	2.650	2.893	2.055	1.404	
Turnout (%)	98+%	97.3%	42.8%	53.9%	

NB: Figures for the 'white roll' in 1980 and 1985 are not included.
Turnout % is as % of total number of registered voters.
The 1980 registered voters are estimated, as there were no registration figures.
In 1995 only 65 of the120 constituencies were contested.
In 2000, 37 ZANU PF constituencies were legally contested for reversal.

Source: Adapted from Saunders, op cit.

THE SADC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON ELECTIONS

The practices followed in conducting elections in Zimbabwe have evolved since independence. This evolution has included participation in regional and international reviews on conducting elections. SADC leaders adopted key principles and guidelines on democratic elections at a meeting in Mauritius in August 2004. According to SADC, the development of the principles and guidelines governing democratic elections aims at enhancing the transparency and credibility of elections and democratic governance as well as ensuring the acceptance of election results by all contesting parties.

It is pertinent to note that SADC member states agreed to observe the following principles and guidelines in the conduct of democratic elections:

• full participation of the citizens in the political process;
• freedom of association;
• political tolerance;

- regular intervals for elections as provided for by the relevant national constitutions;
- equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media;
- equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for;
- independence of the judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions;
- voter education;
- acceptance and respect of the election results by political parties proclaimed to have been free and fair by the competent National Electoral Authorities in accordance with the law of the land; and
- challenge of the election results would be as provided for in the laws of the land.

In early August 2004 the MDC threatened to withdraw from the 2005 parliamentary elections unless the electoral laws were amended to conform to the SADC principles and guidelines that were agreed in Mauritius. The MDC argued that the electoral laws were flawed and apparently biased in favour of the incumbent ZANU PF party and its government. The MDC requested an extension of the election date to allow for full installation of these principles and guidelines. The government's response was that it would be illegal for ZANU PF to remain in power beyond the date sanctioned by law. The ruling party also cited the provisions for electoral practices that were contained in the rejected draft constitution proposed by the government in February 2000. It was pointed out that the rejected constitution contained provisions that would have provided a more favourable electoral environment had they been adopted ahead of the 2000 parliamentary and the 2002 presidential elections.

ELECTORAL LAW REFORMS

The government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) accepted and ratified the SADC principles and guidelines after the meeting in Mauritius in August 2004. In fulfilment of these, the GoZ enacted two new electoral laws, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act (Chapter 2:12), and the Electoral Act (Chapter 2:13). These laws were passed with input from various stakeholders, including the opposition parties and the NGO networks.

The ZEC Act created the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission consisting of five members (and a secretariat) who are responsible for the conduct of all elections in Zimbabwe.

The ZEC commissioners are appointed from a list submitted by a special parliamentary committee comprising representatives from the political parties that currently have seats in the Zimbabwean Legislature, namely ZANU PF, MDC and ZANU Party.

The Electoral Act (Chapter 2:13) replaces an Act of the same name (Chapter 2:01). This legislation provides for the setting up of the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and its functions with respect to monitors and observers and for the duties of the ZEC towards the Electoral Supervisory Commission, among other responsibilities. The passing of these two Acts was characterised by long sessions of parliament at which there was vigorous debate and several amendments had to be negotiated.

In addition, and as a response to concerns raised by the electorate and civil society, a number of measures have been put in place to ensure an environment that is conducive to free and fair elections. It may be important to note, here, that PAPST has a firm conviction that the use of free and fair as terms to describe election outcomes does not do justice to the following:

- zero tolerance for violence among the political contestants/parties;
- increased access to media for political parties for both free and paid airtime coverage;
- setting up of an electoral court to hear expeditiously any matters related to elections;
- provision by the government, under the Political Parties Finance Act, of the equivalent of more than R3 million each to ZANU PF and MDC for the 2005 campaign; and
- the annual appropriation for both parties from the national fiscus for 2005.

In January 2005 the MDC announced its intention to contest the March parliamentary elections, albeit under protest. This has to some extent contributed to individual confidence and personal security, since before that statement, many voters felt that it would be a one-sided race that would not genuinely reflect their choices or be a real contest.

DIASPORA VOTE (PROVISION FOR NON-RESIDENT ZIMBABWEANS)

Though there are no accurate figures, it is estimated that about four million Zimbabwe citizens live outside the country, mostly in South Africa, the UK and the US. Up to 60% of these individuals are probably eligible to vote. Zimbabweans outside the country contribute to the

economy through remittances via the 'home link' programme.

There has been ongoing debate about whether non-resident Zimbabweans should be allowed to vote in the March 2005 poll. The present government has cited a number of legal, administrative and logistical constraints that make it difficult for elections to be conducted outside the country. They have indicated that the travel bans imposed on leaders and state bureaucrats who are associated with ZANU PF create a situation that militates against adequate preparations for and supervision of any polls that are held externally. The government has conceded to postal voting only by officials serving abroad in diplomatic missions and uniformed personnel on national or international duty.

It was clear that under the present legal framework and political context other non-resident Zimbabweans would not vote in the 2005 parliamentary elections.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The colonial administration's control was based on separating the races and enacting different laws and providing different facilities for the various racial groups. The African people were confined to areas with poor soil that were 'reserved' for them and were not permitted to be permanent residents in the reclassified 'European areas'. Suffrage was limited to non-blacks. Africans could not take part in the electoral process and any elective bodies established for black people at sub-national level were necessarily advisory. Under such a system individual confidence was low and personal security a challenge. Instead anger and frustration, among other reasons, drove the African population to take up arms against the colonisers.

The independence from colonial rule that was attained in 1980 ushered in a new dispensation. Universal suffrage was extended to all adult citizens and the restrictive racial laws and policies were amended and repealed to accommodate the aspirations of the majority indigenous population. For the first time in a century the indigenous people felt free and in charge of their destiny. Consequently individual confidence and security rose significantly. The people had confidence in their ability to change the system, hence the very high voter turnout in the 1980 general elections.

ZANU PF, ITS POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE

On attaining power in 1980, the ZANU PF government took some positive steps towards nation building. In 1980 ZANU PF established

a government of national unity that included PF ZAPU and white politicians in the cabinet. The new government integrated former Rhodesian ZANLA and ZIPRA forces to form a single armed force, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). The police were reconstituted as the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP).

On the eve of independence the Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, made an impassioned plea for national reconciliation among all former warring combatants.

> "These acts of inclusion and political tolerance were matched by impressive steps towards addressing the severely unequal and intolerable differences between the economically privileged minority, and the impoverished black majority. In this regard, the government invested heavily in education, health and other social services in the first half of the 1980s."[11]

The ZANU PF policy of reconciliation and the establishment of a government of national unity greatly raised personal confidence and security among black and white people. Former enemies could cooperate for the progress of the nation and the policies of the new nationalist government could bring about political stability.

The government introduced free compulsory primary education. There was also massive expansion in secondary schools and teacher training:

> "… primary schools nearly doubled between 1979 and 1985 (from 2,401 to 4,324), with the number of teachers (and notably trained teachers) also rising rapidly from a total of 28,455 teachers in 1980 to 63,718 in 1995. Secondary school expansion was even stronger. Enrolments went from 66,215 in 1979 to 148,690 by 1981 with the number of secondary schools increasing from 177 to 694 over the same period. This expansion would continue into the 1990s, with teachers coming to make up the largest single sub sector within ranks of government employees."[12]

At the same time an extensive system of community primary health care was developed. The provision of social services to the previously underprivileged had the effect of raising confidence and security among the population as their access to essential social services was guaranteed.

From 1980 to 2000 all parliamentary elections attracted the attention and participation of a number of political parties. It was and is easy for

political parties to participate, as the law does not require registration at the time of formation. However, the ruling ZANU PF party had a clear majority until the 2000 elections, when the MDC won a substantial number of seats in the House of Assembly and various local authorities, including the municipalities of Harare, Bulawayo and Gweru.

Since assuming political power in 1980 ZANU PF has been guided by the desire to consolidate its political gains and to maintain power for as long as the party can secure votes at elections. This is not unique to ZANU PF, but is characteristic of political parties and their activities all over the world.

The leaders of ZANU PF have worked hard to ensure that with each election the party maintains a significant parliamentary majority to enable it to deliver on its election promises.

Evidence from some of the PAPST CRWs indicated that many rural people were confident that ZANU PF would be able to return the country to economic and political stability. They cited the land reform programme as an important and effective empowerment tool, which would help to turn around the economy and the country's fortunes. The GoZ's efforts to fight corruption and reduce inflation were hailed as major milestones on the road to recovery. Supporters of ZANU PF felt secure and confident in participating in the 2005 elections to ensure that their party wins and continues to deliver 'progressive programmes'. It remains to be seen how some of the major resource and capacity constraints will be tackled so that the people's expectations can be realised.

MDC, ITS FORMATION, POLICY AND PERFORMANCE IN THE 2000 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed in September 1999 under the leadership of former Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) secretary general Morgan Tsvangirai. It has been stated that the MDC emerged from the anger, frustrations, despondency and anxieties of urban-based Zimbabweans over the fast-deteriorating standard of living and frustrated expectations of independence. Most of the MDC leaders came from labour unions and civic groups. The ZCTU had voiced discontent with the deteriorating economic situation and successfully organised 'mass stayaways' as one of their strategies to secure redress from the state. Some of the leaders of the MDC came from the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), an unregistered pressure group that has been advocating a constitution process driven by civil society since 1997.

From its formation the MDC has received substantial financial and material backing from white landowners, industrialists, the labour movement, civil society and certain Western countries. The party adopted an externally based policy according to which it mostly looks outside the country for support to entry into government. For any major contribution to national issues the MDC has found it a viable strategy to lobby SADC, African leaders and the EU with the hope that they will exert influence on the ZANU PF government. However, this external policy led to the unity blunder when the MDC leader called on South Africa to cut off critical energy supplies as a way of forcing the ZANU PF government out of office. The MDC has maintained close relations with labour unions and occasionally has called for successful 'mass stayaways'.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND REFERENDUM – BACKGROUND AND PROCESS

The ZANU PF annual conference in Bulawayo in December 1996 began the debate on the need to amend the 16-year-old constitution that had already been amended more than fourteen times. The main reasons for the debate centred on the provisions of land and property rights, which were inextricably linked.

The debate continued at the 1997 ZANU PF annual conference in Mutare. The issue was eventually acted on decisively at the ruling party's annual conference in Gweru when a three-member task force comprising the late Dr Edson Zvobgo, the Hon Emmerson Mnangagwa and the Speaker of Parliament, Dr Cyril Ndebele, was set up to work out modalities for reviewing the constitution.

A similar initiative was started in 1997 by civic society organisations encompassing human rights groups, religious groups, opposition parties and labour unions, which held a series of meetings to discuss the proposals for a new constitution. Their major argument was that the existing constitution, which had been adopted at Lancaster House in 1979, needed to be updated.

The group officially launched the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), an externally sponsored initiative, in January 1998. Its three-pronged strategy on constitution-making involved "education, mobilisation and awareness media and publicity" as well as "advocacy and linkages towards a people centred constitution".[13]

In May 1999 the government set up a Constitution Commission (CC), which included all MPs and more than 300 other people representing civil

society interests. The commission was given 180 days in which to collect evidence and produce proposals for a new Zimbabwean constitution. The President indicated that the product of the commission's work would be put to a national referendum in order to obtain people's approval before enacting it. The CC had two main mandates. The first of these was to review the Zimbabwe constitution as amended, paying particular attention to the distribution of powers among the three pillars of state, that is, the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. The second mandate involved several activities, the primary aim of which was to collect the views of the public through a process of consultation and distil them into a draft constitution.

The NCA refused to be part of the government-appointed CC, claiming that this arrangement excluded key stakeholders such as trade unions, women's groups, the youth, and political and human rights organisations. The NCA also claimed that the commission's membership was largely in favour of ZANU PF, as all MPs, of whom 147 belonged to ZANU PF, were eligible for membership. This proved to be shortsighted, because the commission eventually had more than 420 members and the product it tabled contained provisions that were far-reaching compared to those that have remained in place over the past five years.

The NCA and newly formed MDC party, together with the sympathetic white farming community and civic groups, campaigned vigorously against the draft constitution. They agitated for more radical reforms, especially limitation of the powers of the president. They were also unhappy with a clause in the proposed new constitution on acquisition of land to correct historical imbalances.

The referendum on the constitution was held on 12 and 13 February 2000. Of the 1,284,670 votes cast, 687,122 (53,49%) were opposed to the proposed new constitution, while 561,151 (43,68) were in favour. The remainder were spoilt papers.[14]

Political analysts, including those who agitated for the 'No' vote in the constitutional amendment referendum, have argued with the benefit of hindsight that the referendum results were not based on the proposed constitution. The debate between those 'for' and those 'against' the proposed constitution was raised to a level beyond the desirability of the new constitution to the desirability of the sitting government.

> "In essence, the government had taken, and lost, a major gamble by subjecting the draft constitution to a referendum. Many voters cared less about the referendum being a test of acceptability of the proposed law. To

them, the referendum was about gauging the government's popularity, of which opinion was low."[15]

It has since emerged that groups such as the MDC and civic groups that campaigned for a 'No' vote are now agitating for reforms that had been adequately catered for in the rejected draft constitution. The 'No' vote during the constitutional referendum signalled a major turning point in Zimbabwe's political and human rights landscape and triggered a number of events. The referendum result was followed immediately by 'spontaneous' occupation of white-owned land by war veterans. Government amended the constitution to facilitate the acquisition of farms without paying for land but only for improvements and developments.

There was also gross polarisation of issues, to which the media added spur and impetus as well as bias. The media were divided along partisan lines. The public media tended to side with government. Even when constructive criticism was needed, this was not given.

The private media became pro-opposition and condemned everything that was done by government. There was an onslaught on government activities and programmes from the international community. This situation left people at the mercy of the media houses. The confidence of individuals in making informed decisions was highly compromised. Ordinary people had to read between the lines to glean the truth, because most issues had to be viewed as pro- or anti-government.

There was unprecedented violence between major political parties at the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections. This violence threatened to spill into the 2005 elections, as political intolerance remained high and effectively undermined personal security as candidates and voters could not be guaranteed against harm.

The growth of political intolerance seriously reduced individual confidence and security in participating in politics. It became very risky to put on party regalia.

The Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which was promulgated in 2001, compromised freedom of association, as permission has to be sought for any political meeting.

THE LAND ISSUE

The issue of land has been a problem for successive colonial governments and the independent Zimbabwe government. The colonisation of

Rhodesia included the forcible dispossession of Africans of land by European colonisers. Europeans took possession of the prime land and 'reserved' the least fertile land for Africans. Land was one of the major issues that drove the Africans to take up the armed struggle and was also contentious at the Lancaster House constitutional negotiations in 1979.

The Lancaster House constitution contained clauses that prevented the new government from addressing land issues within the first seven years, when whites were guaranteed 20 seats in parliament. Conditions specified the following:

- Government could only acquire land on a willing buyer, willing seller basis.
- Owners of land had to be paid promptly, that is, within 90 days of the sale.
- The seller had to be paid in a currency of his or her choice.
- The seller could withdraw from the sale without prejudice, provided the reasons for so doing were not frivolous.

Until compulsory acquisition was formally initiated in early 2000, land and property rights were linked in the constitution as provided for in the Lancaster House Agreement. Up to 1999, nearly two decades after independence, the government strictly observed the ownership of land, especially privately owned farms and commercial estates. Between 1980 and 1990 government resettled 71,000 families on 3,498,444 hectares of land. After the promulgation of the Land Acquisition Act in 1992 government resettled 4,697 families on 168,264 hectares of land between October 1998 and June 2000.[16]

Government arrested and forcibly removed any unauthorised settlers (referred to in official circles as 'squatters'), especially from these properties.

The 1990s witnessed an unprecedented demand for better farmland for arable farming and ranching. Efforts by the GoZ to redress the land imbalance received a lukewarm response or were resisted outright by landowners.

In a bid to raise sufficient resources for the Phase II Resettlement Programme government organised a donors' conference in Harare in September 1998, which was attended by 46 donor representatives, NGOs and other interested parties. The 32 donor representatives who were present pledged support for the land reform programme, but emphasised that such a programme would have to conform to certain conditions:

- It should be implemented in a transparent manner.
- It should address the issues of poverty alleviation.
- It had to be conducted within the capacity and resources available to the government.
- Its implementation and activities had to be legal and comply with the laws.
- It should be conducted with the full consultation of interested stakeholders.

The conditions encompassed the position taken by the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) as the basis for its support of the government's land reform programme. The conference agreed that the second phase of the land reform programme was to begin with an inception phase covering 12 months and involving 118 farms[17] Government had intended to raise US1.9 billion (about $Z42 billion) to resettle 100,000 families. Of this amount 35.8% would come from government, 60.7% from donors and 3.5% from beneficiaries[18] The pledges from donors were disappointing to government, and local institutions pledged $Z7,339,000. Foreign donors pledged support in agricultural machinery, technical assistance, technical support in the form of building schools, clinics, expertise and technology transfer. There was no pledge of money from foreign donors or governments.[19]

There was to be little progress on land reform programme in the following eighteen months:

> "Until the rejection of the draft constitution in February 2000, much time and effort were spent on wrangling between government and commercial farmers on the identification of the 118 farms for acquisition under the inception phase and the modalities of doing so."[20]

In 1997 the Labour Party returned to power in Britain after winning the general election. The Labour government claimed that money would be available for resettlement, on condition that violence against white farmers was stopped. In an about-turn the British government later stated that it had no colonial obligations to fund land reform in Zimbabwe.

> "Despite the financial dilemma emanating from the donors conference and apparently frustrated, government went ahead to launch the second Phase of Land Reforms and Resettlement Programme in 1999. It was to

acquire 5 million hectares to resettle 150 000 families in five years. The programme would start with a two year inception phase in which 118 farms would be acquired."[21]

Through an amendment of the Land Acquisition Act in May 2000 and an amendment to the constitution (Zimbabwe Constitutional Amendment Bill No 16) in June 2000, the GoZ assumed power to compulsorily acquire land and to compensate only for improvements. It launched the accelerated Land Reform and Resettlement Implementation Plan, otherwise known as the Fast-Track Resettlement Programme (FTLRP), in July 2000.

The 'spontaneous' land occupations of mostly white-owned large-scale commercial farms led by war veterans of the liberation struggle added impetus to the fast-track programme, which aimed at the equitable distribution of land through decongestion of communal areas and indigenisation of the agricultural sector.

The FTLRP consists of two models. Model A1, which is intended to decongest communal areas, has two variants, the villagisation model and the self-contained one. Twenty per cent of A1 model schemes are reserved for war veterans. The land resettlement programme was also potent in straining relations between Zimbabwe and its former colonial master, Britain.

At the time of writing the MDC has apparently aligned with the West, and its policies, including that on land, have not been widely publicised locally. It has not put forward a realistic land policy that will address the concerns of the wide spectrum of people, including those who benefited and those did not benefit from the scheme. This lack of information policies reduces individual confidence. Ownership of and access to land potentially improve food security and raise family incomes. In heightened anxieties among ordinary citizens, especially since the overall productive capacity of the agricultural sector has fallen dramatically over the past four years. The long-term investment and level of personal dedication that is required in agriculture mean that it is not business as usual where the country's food security is concerned.

Unfair land distribution, the attendant lack of capacity to sustain people's livelihoods in terms of food self-sufficiency, and the challenges of implementing well-planned and comprehensive agrarian reform have reduced individual confidence and the sense of personal security for family units and communities. However, the results of agrarian reforms will only be realised in a few years' time when adequate

numbers of trained and well-resourced farmers are in full production on the farms.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY ACT (POSA)

After the 11 September 2001 bombings in the US, it became apparent to most states that terrorism was a reality and that everyone was at risk and so all should be on guard. It was also the period in which Zanu PF leaders were placed under targeted sanctions by the US, Britain, and a number of EU countries. It was in that context that the government enacted the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) to "make provision for the maintenance of public order and security in Zimbabwe". Most countries have legislation that is similar in intent to POSA.

However, the opposition political parties and civic organisations have registered serious concerns with POSA. Section 24(1) requires an organiser of a public gathering to give four clear days' written notice of a gathering to the regulating authority for the area in which the gathering is to be held. Section 26 provides that if the regulating authority believes on reasonable grounds that a public gathering will occasion public disorder, the official may by notice prohibit the public gathering.

While criticisms have been raised in the context of Zimbabwe's polarised political environment it is clear that variations of the provisions contained in POSA apply in a number of countries, albeit for different reasons. Given that there is need for improvement in current legislation that includes POSA, those in political parties and public office must search for and arrive at points of common agreement in the interests of the electorate. States are increasingly regulating who, where and why their citizens associate with various individuals and organisations.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND PROTECTION OF PRIVACY ACT (AIPPA)

Since 2000, when the GoZ implemented the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme, it has faced lot of criticism and 'demonisation' by local and external media. It enacted the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which, according to its preamble, seeks to:

> "… provide the public with a right of access to records and information held by public bodies; to make public bodies accountable by giving

the public a right to request correction of misrepresented personal information; to prevent the unauthorized collection, use or disclosure of personal information by public bodies; … to establish a Media Information Commission …"[22]

The setting up of the Media Information Commission caused anxiety since it required the registration of journalists and media organisations. The intransigence of two private newspapers that refused to register resulted in their closure. Some journalists and media houses have erroneously assumed that since they do not agree with or support the provisions of AIPPA, they can operate illegally. Further complications have been caused because most privately owned publications and external media houses have tended to report negatively on most, if not all, activities of the government and ZANU PF in particular. The same is true of the state media for the MDC and its allies. This situation presents a dilemma for the electorate who try to make sense of news items and information.

It is irrefutable that communities that have access to information benefit from enhanced capacity to participate in decisions and planning for their development and are able to call for greater accountability from their leaders and representatives.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS BILL

The GoZ introduced a Non-Governmental Organisations Bill at the end of 2004. Its import is that government will register and regulate the operations of NGOs, especially those involved in governance and human rights work in the country. The proposed legislation seeks to curtail foreign funding to these NGOs. (Similar legislation regulating the activities of NGOs exists in a number of countries in the SADC region.) The need to register and regulate NGOs arose from instances where non-registered organisations allegedly engage in political work while purporting to be providing relief and humanitarian support. After vigorous debate in parliament the NGO Bill was passed in February 2005 and at the time of writing the President had not assented to it. It has transpired that a number of local and international organisations and groups have carried out clandestine activities in the country, especially involving support to the MDC and other pressure groups. It should be noted that the requirement for organisations operating in that country to register is not peculiar to Zimbabwe and indeed many SADC states have similar legislation, although provisions differ.

NGOs in the country have had difficulty in agreeing on a code of conduct over the past two and half decades of Zimbabwe's independence. However, since the introduction of proposals to regulate NGOs there have been significant efforts to agree on minimum standards for their operations and conduct.

The level of panic and challenge experienced by a number of NGOs after the Bill was tabled created concern and uncertainty, especially among their genuine beneficiaries. There are many individuals whose livelihood and access to development and humanitarian support have been provided through contributions from a number of international benefactor donors.

WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS

Karam argues that women's participation in politics is an essential part of the democratic process.[23] However, there are many socio-economic and socio-cultural obstacles to participation. The main impediments are:

- lack of political party support;
- male-oriented norms;
- male-dominated structures;
- insufficient media support;
- lack of a focused quota system;
- electoral systems that are not conducive to women's participation;
- lack of leadership orientation and training for women; and
- insufficient networking within women's organisations.

These constraints are similar in most countries, despite cultural and geopolitical differences, but they effectively reduce women's confidence and sense of security in participating in the electoral process.

Besides cultural, religious, patriarchal and socio-economic constraints, the few women who choose to enter politics face further impediments. Foster cites the following:

- limited experience of and skills in procedures of public office;
- societal prejudices against women seeking leadership positions;
- lack of capacity within political parties and other state institutions to provide a level playing field for female leadership aspirants;
- limited professional experience;
- limited educational and training opportunities for women.

- lack of resources, and transport to service constituencies; and
- limited knowledge and appreciation of issues.[24]

It can be argued that independence from colonial rule and the return to the multiparty system of elections has not meant equal participation in politics and decision-making for women in Africa. In these circumstances women's participation in politics and electoral processes should be analysed in the context of the country's political development and power dynamics. These directly influence participation by women and the extent to which they effectively interact as equal human beings in determining the future dispensation.

But, as Gnanadason warns, one of the problems in analysing women's political action is the way in which the term 'political' has usually been defined.[25] She gave the example of women's activities in community being labelled 'voluntary', 'charitable' or 'social', even though they have a political impact. Thus she concludes that women's role in politics will remain obscured until the definition of politics is broadened to include the everyday struggle to survive and to change power relations societies.

In Zimbabwe women largely initiated the food riots of the 1990s. Recent marches from Bulawayo to Harare to present a petition against the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill and urban demonstrations over the high cost of sanitary pads were women-led. Neither the media nor societal and bureaucratic patriarchies have credited women in their political quests.

It is clear that the violence and intimidation that characterised the elections in 2000 and 2002 reduced women's personal security and deterred them from participating in politics and elections. In addition, African women are socialised to shy away from violence and other anti-social behaviour.

As in many other instances all over the world, much of the violence that afflicts the personal security and individual confidence of women and men stems from the lack of equity of access and opportunity. The poverty that prevents the fulfilment of basic human needs and the injustices and inequalities that constitute gross violation of human rights are often the roots of tension and distrust, threats and conflict. These behaviours tend to destabilise family units and the communities in which families are located.

In the SADC region, Tanzania, Mauritius and South Africa (each with at least 45% of females representing constituencies) have achieved and surpassed the 30% parliamentary quota of women representation suggested by SADC member states. It is unlikely that Zimbabwe will

be able to meet the 30% target in the 2005 elections at parliamentary level. But this principle has been met within the Presidium, the country's top power echelon, with the appointment of the Hon Joyce Mujuru as vice-president.

Evidence from PAPST's CRWs indicated that current and prospective women leaders and representatives face problems of acceptance in a patriarchal society. It is especially difficult for female politicians to be accepted by traditional leaders. Prejudice against women permeates most bureaucratic and civil structures. Women politicians face the challenge of proving their capacities beyond reasonable doubt, not only once, but always.

Male chauvinists find it difficult to compete against women. In many situations women are regarded as not being ready to take up senior positions in the party. Women are often ridiculed, verbally abused and subjected to various degrees of sexual harassment, resulting in a reduction of their confidence levels. It is not uncommon to find that only the strongest survive the battle. Most abuse comes from within their party structures and often extends throughout the patriarchal organisation. In closely contested constituencies many political parties deem that their probability of success will be greater with male candidates, irrespective of merit or leadership potential demonstrated by the women.

The appointment of the Hon Joyce Mujuru as one of the two state vice-presidents on 7 December 2004 is historic in both the Zimbabwean and the African context, given the obstacles that women face to be elected on local community structures, let alone parliament.

Much more work needs to be done to bring about gender equity in the spheres of public and private representatives. However, the foundation has been laid and now the task of building on it must be tackled with determination and focus.

TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP

Traditional leaders have been active participants in Zimbabwe's administrative, judicial and political system from pre-colonial times to the present day. Historically chiefs have had to toe the line of the government of the day since their tenure of office is often at the pleasure of those wielding state authority. In 1980 "the chieftainship was retained as symbols of traditional values, but the chiefs themselves were stripped of all their administrative and judicial functions, while retaining their salaries".[26]

The fortunes of traditional leaders were reversed with the enactment of a new law, the Traditional Leaders Act, in 1998.

The powers of chiefs were extended to include administrative, judiciary, planning and development coordination, traditional, cultural and policing powers. Systematically the chiefs have been elevated to near-absolute authorities in areas under their jurisdiction. After the 1998 Traditional Leaders Act and its implementation from 2000, the traditional leaders have increasingly been co-opted into modern partisan politics and often expected to display allegiance to the government and the ruling party. Their status has been significantly enhanced and their perquisites increased considerably.

Legally, traditional leaders are not supposed to be actively involved in politics, but their open support of the ruling ZANU PF has caused some anxiety within opposition political parties and civic groups. The MDC claims that ZANU PF is buying off chiefs by providing them with new vehicles at highly subsidised prices. The MDC has not raised the same argument for parliamentarians of both parties who have a duty-free vehicle purchase facility when they assume office. Chiefs by dint of being public office bearers for life obviously require some level of state support. The issue of the nature or quantum of support and its conditionalities is probably something that should be negotiated by a competent parliamentary committee rather than in a general newspaper article or by speculation.

THE ROLE OF THE WAR VETERANS IN THE ELECTION PROCESS

The War Veterans Association of Zimbabwe has been one of the civil society organisations (CSOs) that have played a significant role in post-independence electoral processes. The general perception from deliberations during the PAPST CRWs is that the association is part of or an extension of the ruling ZANU PF and government. The war veterans actively support the ruling party's position and are often at the forefront of political campaign activities.

The consensus among the ZANU PF leadership is that war veterans should mobilise people to vote for the party and also ensure that they follow and support the party's position.[27]

> "We have been campaigning for our party and its part of our role as revolutionaries to coerce people *(kutinha vanhu)* to attend ZANU PF meetings and also guard against the enemies of our country."[28]

The activities of the local members of the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association (ZLWVA) have reduced the security and confidence of individuals in communities, including members of the opposition.

It is evident that in many instances the role of the war veterans has not been clearly defined or, for that matter, discussed and agreed to with the general electorate or the political leaders. This has resulted in a mix-up of roles and responsibilities with the attendant confusion that often arises and causes conflicts.

ACCESS TO FOOD AND INDIVIDUAL SECURITY

There are differing estimates of the maize (staple food) harvest with the GoZ insisting that Zimbabwe produced 2.4 million tonnes of maize in the 2003/04 farming season, whereas other estimates put the figure much lower, to between 900 and 1,200 tonnes. What is beyond dispute is that some areas, especially those in the low rainfall regions, require food aid. When government projected an adequate local supply of grain, they formally advised the UN Agencies and INGOs that they were no longer required to provide wide-scale food distribution. INGOs, bilateral agencies and multilaterals were requested to concentrate on supporting the vulnerable, especially the AIDS orphans, the aged and the destitute in the country.

The GoZ has stated that its main challenge is a logistical one, that is, to move grain and other food from storage and production surplus areas to those in need. The MDC alleges that the interlinked roles and identity of ZANU PF and those of government can deliberately confuse people, to the benefit of the ruling party. The opposition alleges that the ruling party distributed food through the government in exchange for votes. The implication is that if any party presents food in exchange for votes, the effect is to reduce individual security and confidence in the electoral process. An individual without sufficient food is vulnerable, insecure, and ready to be directed in most processes, including the electoral process, as long as his or her actions improve food security. However, temporary or long-term relief gained through people sacrificing their rights and choices will further erode individual confidence and security.

Most political campaigns link political support to some material benefit and regrettably this has been seen in many instances in Zimbabwe and on the African continent. There is often a lower sense of urgency of response from leaders for requests and calls for help that originate from areas identified as politically hostile or marginally supportive. Here

again it is more productive to seek engagement and dialogue rather than confrontation and condemnation, since this only widens the chasm that people have to bridge to solve the crisis and challenges at hand.

THE ROLES OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS IN ZIMBABWE

The term 'civil society' is a fairly recent one, having gained currency in the 1980s. Civil society can be regarded as a 'third sector', distinct from government and private enterprise. According to this view, civil society refers essentially to the so-called intermediary institutions such as professional associations, religious groups, labour unions, and citizen advocacy organisations that give voice to various sections of society and enrich public participation in matters of governance and representation. CSOs often represent diverse and sometimes contradictory and conflicting interests that originate from different platforms, constituencies and thematic orientations. The cluster of CSOs has tended to embrace NGOs, which in many countries are apt to be closely associated with competing state initiatives in a variety of activities.

- Government, being the 'first sector', has the primary responsibility of providing public goods and services that by their very nature would not normally be provided by private business. These include national/state security, education, health and a clean environment. Government's realm of operation is prescribed in the national constitution and the obligations are normally captured in the Bill of Rights. Resources are mobilised from taxation and other forms of tariff collection.

- The 'second sector', business or private enterprise, produces goods for private consumption. The main motive is profit. There are many goods, such as vehicles and textiles, that can best be produced by the private sector for profit. Various statutes and regulations prescribe what and how it should fulfil its mandate to govern this sector. Private individuals provide expertise and other resources in the form of equity and working capital for this sector.

- The 'third sector', non-governmental/voluntary, provides the services that the first two sectors usually do not or are unable to. Such services include capacity building, relief work and the setting up of coalitions and networks that specialise and focus on specific themes and projects. The 'third sector' is a very big sector encompassing all who are not in

the 'first' and 'second sector'. Even prominent members of the 'first' and 'second sectors' participate in civil society when not undertaking first sector and second sector roles. Resources are secured mainly from donations and concessionary grants.

Since 1980 NGOs in Zimbabwe have worked in a number of sectors to promote improved standards of living for the general population, especially in rural areas. These organisations worked with state agencies to raise awareness among communities of the merits of being active and self-reliant in providing for the needs of their families. It was only in the post-ESAP launch phase that there was a proliferation of human rights-focused NGOs, mainly externally funded and in many instances with foreign headship.

The role of these rights-based NGOs has tended to be associated with general and targeted activism, rights-based programmes and unofficial scrutiny of state machinery and incumbent public office bearers. Often their approach and strategy is confrontational and adversarial, such that those officials whose attention is being attracted perceive only confrontation and arrogance. This is the characterisation that has prevailed in the minds of political leaders and state officials of how relations have developed between them and NGOs. It therefore has been a major challenge for NGOs, and indeed some of their activist leadership, to revise their strategies and engage with political leaders in a win-win contest where all stakeholders find fulfilment in the outcome.

The win-win approach has guided PAPST in its activities. This has facilitated dialogue among individuals holding different political affiliations and permitted them to understand and embrace the strength found in diverse views.

It is becoming increasingly clear that more platforms need to be created by various organisations to enable individuals to openly express themselves without fear or insecurity.

PAPST Constituency Development Programme

PAPST is a private voluntary organisation (PVO), registered in 2000 with the main purpose of empowering elected representatives in Zimbabwe, the SADC and the entire African continent. A number of stakeholder review workshops have been held, bringing together MPs and other leaders whose constituencies had benefited from PAPST programmes. The objectives of these workshops were for the trust and beneficiaries to jointly review the successes and challenges of the programmes implemented and map the way forward.

The overall findings from the testimonies of MPs and community representatives indicated that the services provided to constituencies by PAPST have been successful and beneficial to MPs, local leaders, communities and individual constituents. The CRWs to a very large extent raised the level of trust, removed suspicion and improved cooperation among local leadership. Further testimony was provided by the external evaluation and reviews conducted separately by consultants Mr H Sibanda and Ms D Nupen.

In designing and rolling out its menu of themes and topics for discussion and sharing with constituency stakeholders, PAPST was under no illusion that the exercise would bear fruits with time and that there needed to be flexibility and ongoing adjustments during implementation.

CDP impact on building individual security and confidence among leaders and their communities

One outcome for which PAPST can claim direct credit is the significant reduction in violence during the current parliamentary election campaign, exemplified by increased tolerance levels and acceptance of differing views and opinions in many constituencies that were labelled no-go areas for any opposition party members in the 2000 and the 2002 elections. A significant number of these were targeted for attention and servicing by the trust. The trust negotiated with representatives from both ZANU PF and the MDC and provided a common platform where members were able to exchange views and begin to break down the attitudinal prejudices separating them.

It was evident that issues of personal security and individual confidence improved as participants and members of the communities realised that it was not necessary to be violent to those who hold different political opinions. Participants to the PAPST workshop found the CRWs were beneficial in facilitating dialogue and debate between the main rival parties of the MDC and ZANU PF. Improved communication between these parties reduced conflict and improved tolerance among members.

There is clear empirical evidence in the form of audio/visual recordings showing community leaders and individuals debating and condemning violence as unnecessary and retrogressive over the past 48 months.

The footage was shared with other stakeholders in different areas, such that the trust believes there has been a multiplier effect.

PAPST's CDP initiative must be classified as work-in-progress and it is clear that very few of the leaders in the more than 50 constituencies that

were serviced by the trust in the past four years will revert to intolerant behaviour and violent conduct, especially if further support and ongoing service are offered.

Economic developments

The immediate post-1980 years saw significant investment in the social sectors of education and health. There were more pupils to be educated as primary education was made free and compulsory, while in health the poor and indigent received free medical treatment. With guaranteed access to these essential social services individual confidence and personal security grew significantly. In the first two years of independence the national economic growth rates surged, reaching 10.7% in 1980 and 9.7% in 1981. However, these impressive national economic growth rates fell in 1982–1984 because of drought and the challenge brought by the internal strife caused by the dissident element in the southern half of the country, as well the volatility of the international economy, which was experiencing a recession. Economic growth suffered further decline as tourism dropped to a trickle, especially after the 1985 abduction of a group of tourists who were en route to Victoria Falls.

After the conflict in Matebeleland was resolved in December 1987, the GoZ began to negotiate with the Bretton Woods institutions and in early 1990 the government agreed to adopt the World Bank/International Monetary Fund-designed and supervised Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). This quick-fix five-year remedy was intended to reverse economic decline, bring about growth through domestic and external investment, and generate high export inflows from industry through value addition. Other components of the reform programme included budget deficit reduction through reforming and reducing expenditure on items causing the deficit, price and wage decontrol; cost recovery; trade liberalisation; parastatal reforms and the particularly unpopular civil service rationalisation/reduction. ESAP turned out to be an economic placebo, as most targets were not met. Many reasons have been proffered for ESAP's failure and, with hindsight, the country need not have followed the ESAP route had the economy been managed differently. In fact, many developing countries that were compelled to follow the ESAP route all failed to meet the theoretical targets set by the Bretton Woods experts.

After the failure of the Structural Adjustment Programme by 1995, the GoZ attempted to revive the economy using a different strategy and approach. Most Zimbabweans became very insecure financially as they

failed to meet basic needs such as shelter, food, clothing, health and education costs.

It is clear that in the short term it was not possible to come up with another quick-fix option, especially after the failure of ESAP. After a series of concerted demands for redress for the plight of the war veterans over a long period of time, in November 1997 the GoZ yielded and conceded to paying out amounts of Z$500,000 (as a once-off settlement) and subsequent monthly payments for life of Z$50,000 to more than 20,000 former freedom fighters. These concessionary settlements, though justified, had not been factored into the 1997/98 budget but had to be met from domestic sources before Christmas 1997.

The net effect was that the Zimbabwean dollar crashed against international currencies from Z$8.00 to US$1.00 to a rate of Z$45.00, then Z$18.00 to US$1.00 by year-end. The initial crash occurred on 14 November 1997 (a day now referred to as Black Friday*)*.

Zimbabwe's positive response to a request for military support from SADC states to ward off a major rebel attack by the late president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Laurent Kabila, in 1998 meant that a significant quantity of resources were committed to that effort. At the peak of Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC conflict more than 10,000 troops were deployed in that country and the bulk of the costs was borne by Zimbabwe's taxpayers. There were anticipated returns in terms of concessions for timber, diamond, gold and copper mining and general commerce. Regrettably these developments remain on paper in the form of joint cooperation agreements, but tangible benefits have yet to be realised. The DRC war had the additional effect of straining an economy that was already under stress, resulting in further devaluation and budget deficits.

This trend and mode of devaluation has continued and despite a number of interim corrective measures, from around October 2003 to October of 2004 the exchange rate has been pegged at ±Z$6,000 to US$1.00. In practical terms (at a personal level) this means that with the continued decline of the local currency's value, especially over the past five to seven years, most citizens do not have life savings or any emergency reserves, should a crisis develop. Any extra income is immediately converted to tangible goods or consumed, since its purchasing power is volatile and subject to the vagaries of a highly inflationary environment. The rate of inflation shot up from just over 20% in 1999 to peak at over 600% in December 2003 and is now said to be declining

The deterioration and apparent stagnation of the Zimbabwean economy has had the effect of creating an extremely challenging living

environment for the average citizen. Individual confidence, self-esteem and personal security are therefore challenged for most individuals, and this has resulted in waves of migration.

Analysts and political activists tend to concentrate on Zimbabwe's electoral issues from 2000 onwards, yet fundamental issues lie in the history and relationships among various stakeholders since 1980 and before the date of independence. Any person or institution who wishes to appreciate the why, how and what of Zimbabwean politics needs to appreciate the historical, political and socio-economic context of the country before making rushed assessments and conclusions.

Civil society organisations and NGOs must deliberately engage political leaders and bureaucrats to initiate dialogue and exchange views on issues of mutual concern.

Contact should not take place only when a petition is being presented or when protests are being organised. There should be a culture and strategies that nurture confidence and enhance appreciation of any diverse opinions held by individuals and policies pursued by organisations. There should also be acknowledgement and commendation when progressive policies and actions are pursued. Similarly, there should be constructive criticism of any actions that are retrogressive or harmful to communities and individuals. CSOs and NGOs must also take time to appreciate that politics is not about setting up and operating social gatherings and neighbourhood talk-shops. On the contrary, it is about the pursuit and competition for political power, control and influence. This is absolutely critical if conflicts of interests are to be avoided and minimised.

CONCLUSION

PAPST is able make the following preliminary observations about Zimbabwe's 2005 parliamentary elections:

• The campaigns have to a large extent been peaceful and the overall environment conducive to enhanced individual confidence and personal security as exemplified by the wearing of party apparel and the holding of open meetings without interference or threat.

• The playing field has to a significant extent been levelled through the adoption of the SADC election principles and guidelines, which were used in enactment of revised electoral legislation and regulations.

- Nearly equal amounts of campaign funds for ZANU PF and the MDC have been provided under the Political Parties Finance Act.

- The GoZ has not been ambiguous about who would be allowed to observe the elections. Local representatives and a significant number of regional and international observers and media representatives observed the process.

- It is important to appreciate that the country has been targeted for negative media coverage and classified in the same mould as many failed states when the issues can and should be resolved through dialogue and bridge building, not doubt and scepticism.

- The principal lesson for some of the 'half-baked' political novices masquerading as human rights activists and governance specialists is to allow the Zimbabwean electorate to find free expression in the vote on 31 March and respect the outcome.

Section 2: Election Observation Report of the Public Affairs and Parliamentary Support Trust (PAPST)

INTRODUCTION

The Public Affairs and Parliamentary Support Trust (PAPST) dispatched three teams to observe the pre-election and polling periods in the 2005 parliamentary election held on 31 March 2005. The group of 14 observers were deployed to eight provinces, namely Harare, Mashonaland East, Masvingo, Manicaland, Midlands, Bulawayo, and the two Matebeleland provinces.

In preparation for the observation exercise PAPST commissioned desk research, perusal of documents, newspapers and tracking of media reports. The findings recorded in the period from January to March 2005 constitute an important component of the process. PAPST observer teams detailed the pre-poll observation that they noted since January 2005. The teams would also base their reports on each team's observations made at their constituency visits on the eve of the election and afterwards.

PAPST made the following findings with respect to the election, despite certain logistical and procedural challenges that were observed and recorded:

- The enactment of legislation and implementation of procedures based on the SADC principles and guidelines provided the framework for an electoral process that was significantly improved compared to the 2000 and 2002 polls.

- The peaceful environment, tolerant behaviour and overall media coverage of candidates and their parties provided Zimbabwe's electorate with the opportunity to cast their votes without threat or hindrance.

- The increased number of polling stations, coupled with efficient voter processing by election officials, significantly enabled many voters to cast their ballots within reasonable time and distance of their homes.

- The single-day balloting, use of translucent boxes and counting

immediately after the close of the poll greatly contributed to the voters' confidence in the process.

• The presence of a significant number of international and local observer groups and media personnel provided an independent overview of the election.

RATIONALE FOR OBSERVING THE 2005 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

PAPST sought to gain a better understanding of the processes involved in the election of parliamentarians by participating in the 25th anniversary election.

The trust was keen to appreciate the background and prevailing environment leading up to the 2005 poll in the light the adoption of many of the SADC principles and guidelines by the GoZ in January 2005.

PAPST pre-poll observation began in January 2005 and examined election-related issues concerning electoral reforms and legislation and the adoption of the SADC principles and guidelines on democratic elections by the GoZ. The trust also observed primary elections by some political parties, the delimitation of constituency boundaries, voter registration, inspection of the voters' roll and the prevailing political environment.

Realising the importance of this election, PAPST hired reputable consultants to conduct a refresher-training workshop at the beginning of March 2005 to equip prospective observers with the necessary knowledge, information and skills in the conduct and observation of a national election.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ADMINISTRATION

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Since independence in 1980, the GoZ has held parliamentary elections every five years and presidential elections every six years. Elections help to restore the values of legitimacy and orderly transformation. Democratic elections ensure the creation of governments that are sensitive to the needs of people.

CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS

In the past, the Election Directorate was responsible for logistics, while the Registrar General's Office was responsible for voter registration.

The institutions that are currently mandated to run elections in Zimbabwe are the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). The ESC engages people who monitor the election, while ZEC conducts voter education and registration (by giving instructions to the Registrar General's Office). The Delimitation Commission sets out constituency boundaries ahead of the parliamentary elections.

The following statutes are used to run elections in Zimbabwe:

1 Constitution of Zimbabwe
2 Electoral Act
3 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act
4 Electoral Supervisory Commission Act
5 Political Parties Finance Act
6 Other statutory instruments, for example the Broadcasting Services Regulations 2005 and the Electoral Regulations, also gazetted in 2005.

THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE

The constitution of Zimbabwe provides for the holding of elections within a period not exceeding four months after the issuing of a proclamation, dissolving parliament. Of the 150 parliamentary seats in Zimbabwe, political parties contest 120, while the other 30 are reserved for the Head of State to appoint MPs. Ten people are appointed as provincial governors, another 10 as non-constituency MPs, and the remaining 10 are traditional chiefs. The National Chiefs Council sitting as an electoral college elects two chiefs while the remaining eight chiefs are elected by provincial electoral colleges.

(Constitutionally, Parliament should constitute 150 + 1 members. Originally, Zimbabwe had eight provinces, but two metropolitan provinces were created (Harare and Bulawayo), which necessitated the addition of two more governors to bring that number to ten. The constitution is yet to be amended to address that issue.)

ELECTORAL REFORMS AND REGULATIONS

Zimbabwe is the first SADC country that adopted and implemented the SADC principles and guidelines acceded to in Mauritius in August 2004. These included:

- the establishment of impartial, all-inclusive, competent and accountable national electoral bodies;
- an environment conducive to free, fair and peaceful elections;
- equal opportunity for all political parties to access state media; and
- political tolerance.

IMPROVEMENTS ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Zimbabwe implemented the SADC principles and guidelines by amending its Electoral Act and established the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to administer the election as an independent board. The improvements are:

- the use of translucent ballot boxes;
- voting in one day;
- counting of the ballot at the polling stations soon after closure;
- opening of the airwaves to contesting political parties to sell their manifestos and participate in discussion programmes on radio and television;
- enhanced political tolerance;
- use of visible indelible ink; and
- setting up an electoral court to deal with electoral disputes.

Electoral management and administration

The outgoing parliament worked tirelessly and enacted the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act and the Electoral Act, which were used to administer the 2005 parliamentary election. It succeeded in producing the new laws despite the following challenges.

Challenges of administering the poll

- The Act establishing the ZEC was passed by Parliament in December and brought into effect on 1 February 2005.
- The ZEC came into being when the electoral process had already started.
- The ZEC had 60 days to prepare for and hold the poll.
- Inspection of the voters' roll had already begun and the ZEC had to request an extension of one week.
- ZEC commissioners were appointed when parts of the process had been completed. These included delimitation of constituency boundaries, mobile voter registration units, inspection of the voters' roll and voter education.

Table 3 Polling stations for 2005 parliamentary election

Province	Number of constituencies	Number of polling stations	Registered voters	Total vote cast
Bulawayo	7	210	339,990	109,687
Matebeleland North	7	630	342,732	158,652
Matebeleland South	7	594	341,258	145,907
Midlands	16	1,177	745,822	367,111
Masvingo	14	1,020	675,234	321,963
Harare	18	530	832,571	352,415
Mashonaland West	13	983	593,354	286,244
Mashonaland East	13	1,157	610,715	326,690
Mashonaland Central	10	822	490,181	279,353
Manicaland	15	1,112	686,767	348,648
TOTAL	120	8,235	5,658,624	2,696,670

- The ZEC convened the Nomination Court only on 14 February 2005.
- The President promulgated boundaries when there was inadequate opportunity for voters to check the roll and verify their constituencies.
- The list of polling stations was published one day late (18 March 2005). It generated confusion among the electorate, especially those outside towns and cities. Section 51 of the Electoral Act (Chapter 2:13) requires information regarding polling stations to be provided at least 14 days before the polling date.

State of preparedness

Election officers (constituency election officers, presiding officers, polling officers) were trained and deployed between 5 and 28 March 2005. Election officers and monitors were drawn from the Public Service.

Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) officers were deployed at all polling stations. Before the poll, ZRP set up a committee chaired by Assistant Commissioner Mary Masango, whose sole job was to make sure there was peace and tranquillity. They educated their officers on the laws governing elections to ensure lawful conduct of their duties. They also launched an extensive mass media campaign encouraging people and political parties to desist from violence.

The number of polling stations was increased to accommodate all eligible voters. Fifty thousand translucent ballot boxes were procured and distributed to the constituencies on time. According to the chairperson of ZEC, 5,789,912 voters were registered for the election. Members of the public were able to buy copies of the roll if they so wished.

Adequacy of polling stations

When the national distribution of polling stations was announced, there was an outcry from some people who thought urban areas were given fewer stations than rural areas. ZEC was vindicated after the poll, as the polling stations proved more than adequate for every constituency. When PAPST observed the election, it found that most people were able to vote and in most instances stations were not busy, so that polling officers were waiting for voters to arrive. The distribution of polling stations per province appears in Table 3.

ACCREDITATION OF ELECTION OBSERVERS

Accreditation ran from 7 to 29 March 2005. Prospective local observers were invited by the Ministry of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs to apply for accreditation as observers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited specific international observers and journalists. These included SADC, AU, Malawi, Libya and South Africa. Notable absentees were Britain, the US, the EU and SADC PF, who were not invited. However, all diplomatic missions resident in Zimbabwe and those that were not resident but were servicing Zimbabwe had up to ten staff members accredited.

CODE OF CONDUCT

After registration, observers were invited for briefing to a joint meeting organised by the two commissions (ZEC and ESC), where they issued a code of conduct for the accredited observers.

PRE-ELECTION PERIOD

In the run-up to this election, the governing ZANU PF party and the main opposition party, the MDC, each made internal preparations for the elections with the ruling party conducting primary elections, while the opposition carried out their own confirmation/primary elections.

The methods used to choose candidates that were adopted by both parties caused some intra-party disgruntlement. However, these methods did not have much bearing, as the outcome seems to suggest that voters went for the party and not individual candidates.

However, in August 2004 the MDC had announced that they would not participate in any elections until the GoZ rectified or made changes to the electoral laws to level the playing field and make the environment conducive to a democratic election. Although this was the party's public stance, indications were that the MDC were campaigning quietly. It came as no surprise, therefore, when the party stated that they would participate under protest, citing pressure from their own political structures and supporters.

ZANU PF INTRA-PARTY ELECTIONS

PAPST reviewed the practices followed in the selection of candidates by the governing party. The ZANU PF primary elections were noteworthy. For the first time, the ruling party adopted the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, which stipulates that there must be at least 30% of women in political decision-making structures by the end of 2005 (quota system).

ZANU PF set criteria that allowed only members of the provincial executives, National Consultative Assembly and Central Committee to participate in the primary elections that were held on 15 January 2005. One also had to be a card-carrying member who was known as a fervent, consistent and active supporter of the party and party's aims and objectives and was prevented from holding a position in any of the structures of the party by virtue of his or her employment in the service of the state.

It has been observed that the methods of candidate selection and campaigning tactics have a bearing on the outcome of elections. The choice of a representative can affect the interests of voters in any election. The electorate may either boycott or cast a protest vote if they dislike the candidate or arrive in large numbers when they like the candidate.

However, the quota system did not please aspiring candidates who found themselves out of the race after the constituencies they eyed were reserved for female candidates. Others chose to defy the party and stood as independent candidates against party policy. Those who defied were expelled. But an interesting scenario evolved in Tsholotsho Constituency, Matebeleland North, which Professor Jonathan Moyo contested and won

against Musa Ncube after ZANU PF denied him the right to represent them and fielded Ncube on the basis of the quota system.

Another method of candidate selection that was used by the ruling party was consensus, where some candidates were selected unopposed. However, the Presidium and Election Directorate often intervened where there was disagreement to reverse earlier decisions or ask for re-runs. For instance, some aspiring candidates who were initially elected unopposed were later contested. Others who won could find themselves in a re-run and lose out in the second primary.

MDC INTRA-PARTY SELECTION METHODS

The opposition used what they termed 'confirmation' for the sitting candidates. Those who failed to garner two thirds of the vote were asked to contest in primary elections with other aspiring candidates. Some of the sitting MPs who lost the primaries went on to contest as independent candidates.

THE QUOTA SYSTEM

ZANU PF fell short of implementing the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development after they had to reverse in four constituencies an earlier decision to reserve them for female candidates. In those constituencies the aspiring women candidates competed with men and lost. As a result, of a possible 40 women 36 were fielded. Of those fielded in the parliamentary election, 14 were elected as members of parliament.

Although the opposition MDC did not apply the quota system, they fielded 16 female candidates and only five succeeded in the 31 March poll. Zanu Ndonga had five female candidates, who all lost. The other two independent female candidates did not make it either.

COUNTDOWN TO THE ELECTION

PAPST is concerned that the Delimitation Commission Report was not made public on time for constituents to determine where they were placed. President Robert Mugabe only promulgated boundaries when there was inadequate opportunity for voters to check the roll and verify their constituencies. Section 51 of the Electoral Act (Chapter 2:13) requires information about polling stations to be provided at least 14

days before the polling date. Late publication of the list of polling stations (18 March 2005) by one day generated confusion among the electorate, especially those outside town and cities.

The Delimitation Commission was appointed on 14 September 2004 and completed its work in December of the same year. By this time voter registration and inspection of the voters roll were closed. This might be one of the reasons for the high number of people who were turned away for trying to vote in the wrong constituency.

The President announced the date for the election only when he returned from his annual leave in February 2005. The indecision of the MDC may also have affected the turnout at the voters' roll inspection centres countrywide. Some people may have elected not to inspect since they assumed that the main opposition party would not contest.

PAPST believe that more time was needed to educate potential voters on the new voting requirements such as the use of translucent ballot boxes, voting in a single day and the use of three different voters' rolls and ballot boxes.

Nomination fee

The nomination fee that was required for parliamentary candidates to be considered for contest disadvantaged smaller opposition political parties. The opposition political parties argued that initially they were advised that it would cost Z$100,000 per candidate. Instead, each candidate was asked to pay Z$2 million, resulting in parties such as Zimbabwe Youth

Table 4 Candidates

Political party	Number of candidates	Gender	Comments
ZIYA	2	Male	
ZPDP	1	Male	
ZANU PF	120	Male 84: Female 36	
MDC	120	Male 104; Female 16	
ZANU	15	Male 10; Female 5	
Independents	17	Three candidates withdrew before the election began. One was persuaded to step down	

Alliance (ZIYA) fielding two and Zimbabwe Peoples Democratic Party (ZPDP) fielding only one candidate. Zanu Ndonga, which was reported in local media to be willing to field in every constituency, ended up fielding only 15 candidates, citing high nomination fees as the reason.

ZANU PF and the MDC were not affected because they benefited from the Political Parties Finance Act, which stipulates that all parties with more than 15 representatives in parliament are entitled to funding from government. Both parties have benefited since 2002.

Access to the electronic media

Local radio and television continued to cover the campaigns and party activities of the governing party. Although the statutory instrument allowing all political parties time on radio and television had been gazetted earlier, the Act stipulates that the broadcasting authority may start coverage only two weeks before the election. In spite of this arrangement, the opposition parties complained of unfair coverage. On the other hand, the broadcasting authority argued that the opposition parties were not forthcoming in taking up slots allocated to them.

Some of the panellists who presided over discussion programmes were accused in some quarters of aligning themselves with policies of certain political parties. The general sentiments were that the moderators were more critical of the policies of opposition parties than discussants from the governing party. This resulted in an outcry from listeners, who wrote to local newspapers to express their displeasure over the conduct of some the moderators.

Campaign methods

Political parties, individual candidates and electoral authorities held separate campaigns in preparation for the parliamentary election. Campaign methods used during the run-up to the election varied from rallies to text messages, media adverts, posters, party regalia, door to door canvassing, moving car canvassing, meet-your-candidate meetings, inter-party public meetings, imaginative use of language, panel interviews and donations.

PAPST observed that when the MDC failed to obtain clearance from the police to hold rallies as required under the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the opposition party used a moving car to address its officials. The officials would be bussed and addressed while the vehicle was moving slowly around the chosen venue. Aspiring candidates used local languages to address the audience at rallies. The languages that were used most were Shona, Ndebele and English.

The words used at rallies and some jingles on ZTV and radio were mild and less offensive than at the 2002 election campaigns. The statement by President Mugabe denouncing political violence made a huge difference, as there was evident tolerance from contesting parties, and candidates who complied took heed of his call for peaceful campaigns. The police provided security without regard to politics. Those who tried to disrupt peace and order were arrested and fined. This greatly helped improve political tolerance.

PRE-POLL OBSERVATIONS, 28–30 MARCH 2005

This section discusses observations by the three PAPST team member who travelled across the country days before polling day. The reports are based on the observations of these teams.

Table 5 Provinces and constituencies visited

Province	Constituency
Mashonaland East	Chikomba
Masvingo	Bikita East, Bikita West, Chivi North, Masvingo North, Masvingo Central, Zaka East, Zaka West
Manicaland	Buhera, Chimanimani, Mutare Central, Mutare North, Mutare South, Mutasa South

Those who attended the rallies were jovial. There was a lot of tolerance among the different party supporters throughout the rallies. Speakers used moderate language. The rallies that were observed are tabulated below.

MASVINGO PROVINCE
Masvingo Central

The team observed that the environment was conducive to campaigning without disturbances. Campaign materials of the main parties were displayed, ranging from clothing to flyers and posters.

The ZRP should be commended for a job well done since they were at most polling stations by 28 March 2005. The security personnel showed zeal in executing their duties.

Table 6 Rallies observed

Venue/ date/ constituency	Speakers	Main messages	Observations	Campaign materials
Chivhu 28/03/2005 Chikomba ZANU PF	Pres R G Mugabe Hon Elliot Manyika Hon Ray Kaukonde Governor David Karimanzira	• Those who attended were urged to vote for ruling party candidates • The history of the party was narrated • People were urged to go and vote in large numbers and to vote in peace	• The team was not prevented from attending the rally • Security agents were supportive and cooperative	Posters, T-shirts, wrappers, bandanas
Masvingo 29/03/2005 Masvingo Central MDC	Tongai Matutu	• Urged the audience to vote for the MDC in order to realise development in Masvingo • Explained the manifesto of the party especially their RESTART, which he said would turn around the economy	• The observer team was well received by the people manning the rally • There was order at the rally	T-shirts, posters, banners, loudspeakers
Manicaland 30/03/2005 Sakubva Stadium Mutare Central	VP Joyce Mujuru	• Introducing aspiring candidates • Voters urged to rally and vote for ruling party candidates • The history of the liberation struggle and the role played by people of Manicaland were narrated	• The team visited Sakubva Stadium • The rally was characterised by entertainment activities • Security was adequate	T-shirts, posters, banners, entertainment groups

Masvingo North

Observations in this constituency included a hive of activity such as the dispatch of polling stationery and the deployment of polling officers. The team had access to the polling stations, where the police officers were cooperative. Posters and other ZANU PF and MDC campaign materials were displayed and a high degree of political tolerance was exhibited in the area.

Police officers had been deployed well in advance and there was order and peace in and around the polling stations in this constituency. Police officers whom the team spoke to indicated that very few incidents of politically motivated violence were reported in the area.

Zaka West

Zaka District Office was a hive of activity since it was a command centre and a polling station. Police details and polling officers provided the team with the information they required. There was order and only isolated incidents of violence were reported.

MANICALAND PROVINCE

Mutasa North and Mutare North

Manicaland was no exception when it came to maintaining order and planning for the forthcoming election. Campaign materials for the MDC and ZANU PF were visible throughout the constituencies. One non-governmental organisation, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), distributed flyers on voter education in both constituencies.

ZRP officers who were deployed in the area provided security. On the eve of the election the officers manning the polling stations had arrived, but the election material still had to be delivered.

MIDLANDS / MATEBELELAND SOUTH / MATEBELELAND NORTH / BULAWAYO TEAM

Table 7 Provinces and constituencies visited

Province	Constituency
Midlands	Gweru Rural, Gweru Urban, Kwekwe, Mkoba, Silobela
Matebeleland South	Insiza
Matebeleland North	Bubi-Umguza, Tsholotsho
Bulawayo	Bulawayo East, Makokoba, Pumula-Luveve

Midlands

Kwekwe

The team observed in Amaveni and Mbizo suburbs as well as in the city centre of Kwekwe. It then moved on to Silobela, where it visited Torwood Suburb. The team observed that the constituencies were calm and peaceful. Supporters wearing different party regalia mingled freely on the streets and at shopping centres. Campaign posters were visible, though some had been torn/vandalised. In Torwood, ZANU PF youths rode bicycles, inviting people to a meeting, but no one felt intimidated or compelled to attend.

The officers with whom PAPST observers interacted were cooperative and showed a high sense of duty. The team were allowed to take details of the scheduled rallies for the coming days for the different political parties. No reports of violence had been recorded. The police reported that peace had prevailed since campaigns were officially launched.

Gweru Rural

Gweru Rural did not provide a different scenario and Gambiza Business Centre in Chiundura area was as peaceful as Gweru Urban and Mkoba. Police details had been deployed at Gambiza Preschool. No reports of violence were recorded in Chiundura.

People went about their normal business in Mkoba and Gweru Urban. Campaign posters were visible in these constituencies. This was in contrast to Gweru Rural, where isolated posters were noticeable.

Matebeleland South

Insiza

It was raining heavily when the observer team reached this constituency. At Pangani School polling station, monitors, polling officers and the police were already deployed.

Matebeleland North

Bubi-Umguza

Outgoing members of the Fifth Parliament of Zimbabwe and representing the MDC in Matebeleland constituencies, Gibson Sibanda (Nkulumane), Welshman Ncube (Bulawayo North East), Jacob Thabani (Bubi-Umguza), and Paul Themba Nyathi (Gwanda South) had addressed a rally in

Thabazinduna at the Council Hall. The observer team arrived as this was dispersing. The team visited Nyamandhlovu polling station where a peaceful environment was reported.

Tsholotsho

Mvundhlana Primary School, Thabisa Preschool polling stations and the command centre were visited at which election officers had been deployed. The team had an opportunity to meet foreign observers of the SADC Mission who had also visited the command centre. Agents of Professor Jonathan Moyo, an Independent candidate, held a peaceful voter education session at an open space near Mvundhlana School. No incidents of violence had been recorded and various party supporters were mixing and socialising.

Bulawayo

Bulawayo Metropolitan

The team attended a discussion forum organised by Bulawayo Agenda at Royal Hotel where some contesting party candidates were represented. Peter Nyoni (ZANU PF), Felix Mafa (MDC), Joshua Mhambi (on behalf of Professor Moyo) and Themba Dhlodhlo, a political commentator spoke at the forum, which was moderated by Mr D Matshazi.

Messages from the discussion forum were persuasive and the speakers pleaded with the audience to vote for their parties or candidates. The audience were also given an opportunity to ask questions of the speakers.

MASHONALAND EAST AND HARARE TEAM

Table 8 Provinces and constituencies visited

Province	Constituency
Harare	Harare East, Hatfield, Glen Norah, St Mary's, Zengeza, Chitungwiza
Mashonaland East	Goromonzi, Hwedza, Marondera East, Marondera West, Murehwa North, Murehwa South, Mutoko North, Mutoko South

Observations

There was peace and tranquillity in all these constituencies. Ruwa Rehabilitation Centre was one of the deployment centres for polling

officers in Harare Province. Deployment of election officials was in full swing a day before the election in Mashonaland East Province.

A polling station in Nyameni was the first visible evidence that there would be an election. Otherwise, Marondera East constituency did not have any events that signified a national event. At Dhirihori Business Centre in the same constituency, the team came across some curious ZANU PF youths but they did not interfere with their work. The team was made most welcome at Mupazviriyo Business Centre.

It was difficult to obtain any information about scheduled rallies in Marondera because police stations kept referring the team to a senior police officer who could not be located. However, the prevailing peace boosted individual security and personal confidence among the prospective voters. Posters for both parties were more evident in Harare than in the rural constituencies. ZANU PF posters and regalia dominated the rural areas compared to the MDC.

In the rural constituencies of Goromonzi, Murehwa and Mutoko, people went about their business in an extraordinarily peaceful manner. Most polling stations were ready and deployment of election officials was almost complete.

The police had already been deployed in all the constituencies three days before the election. No incidents of violence were reported in the province, where fewer posters of ZANU PF and the MDC were visible. Fewer people were seen wearing party regalia in Mutoko than in Marondera and Murehwa. In some areas the gatherings that the team came across were ruling party supporters who were waiting for party officials to give them T-shirts.

EVENTS ON POLLING DAY

PAPST observers checked on the conduct of the election at four different stages, that is, the opening, voting, closure and counting stages. This process would determine the openness and conduciveness for potential voters to exercise their choice.

Opening

The election was conducted between 07:00 and 19:00 on 31 March 2005. In most constituencies voters queued very early, anticipating that the process would take time, a characteristic of previous elections. But the electoral reforms that had been implemented meant that polling officers were able to effect the process with only minor hitches. Witnessing

the opening of polling to the electorate was critical for observers to ascertain the improvements and effectiveness of voting in one day and interpretation of the ordinary voter on the use of translucent boxes instead of the wooden ones that have been in used since independence in 1980.

Acceptable proof of identity

- Valid passport
- Driver's licence
- Metal and plastic national identification card

Since Zimbabwe was implementing the SADC Principles and Guidelines for Democratic Elections for the first time, it was important to observe prospective voters casting their vote because some political parties contesting this election had expressed fears that voter education had not been adequate and therefore that their supporters would be prejudiced.

Confusion over use of three ballot boxes

The use of ballot boxes according to the alphabetical order of surnames of the voters caused confusion at some polling stations because some voters wondered why polling officers were holding them up while allowing latecomers to cast their votes first! At most of the stations the teams visited, political party agents were present and were reportedly pleased with the way the election was being conducted.

Polling

Only one incident was reported. At Meeting House polling station in Murehwa North Constituency, Mashonaland East Province, a woman arrived wearing ruling party regalia. The presiding officer, party agents and police handled the matter and voting proceeded without other incidents of a similar nature.

A notable number of voters asked for assistance. The reasons that were advanced included disability, blindness and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas whose most voters are elderly people. Voters who spoiled their papers were not aware that they could ask for another ballot paper.

Turned away

The observers were informed of an alarming number of people who were unable to cast their vote for various reasons, including names missing

from the voters' roll, going to the wrong constituency, and failure to produce identification.

Table 9 Spoilt votes per province in 2005 elections

Province	Spoilt votes
Bulawayo	828
Matebeleland North	4,612
Matebeleland South	4,519
Midlands	8,036
Mashonaland West	6,784
Mashonaland Central	6,560
Mashonaland East	8,988
Masvingo	9,333
Manicaland	6,644
TOTAL	59,679

There was evidently no hostility between party agents representing contesting candidates as some were seen exchanging notes or chatting. Monitors and police officers helped maintain order and directed voters to their respective rolls for further assistance by polling officers.

Closure

Nearly all polling stations where the observers chose to witness counting closed on time. Prospective voters within hundred metres of the station were allowed to cast their votes. However, many voters had already cast their votes during the day and most of the stations were not busy at closing time. Polling in one day proved a resounding success.

Counting

The PAPST observers reported various ways of counting that were used by presiding officers. In spite of the way in which the presiding officers conducted counting, the procedures for counting were followed and transparent. Some PAPST observers noted that some presiding officers did not immediately post the result outside their station after counting.

Announcement of results

Results at each polling station were relayed to the constituency command centre, which in turned relayed them to the provincial centre. The

provincial command centre relayed the results to the national command centre where the chief election officer announced them to the public on local radio and television. The international media that witnessed the election also beamed live to their respective stations.

Challenges of transmitting results

Some polling stations relied on police officers to transmit the result using their walkie-talkies. PAPST was concerned that the presiding officer who was lawfully mandated to do so left it to the police to transmit the results. Poor communication led to delays in announcing results for rural constituencies.

POST-ELECTION PERIOD

The end of the election and announcement of the results did not stop some people wearing their regalia, even after their candidates had lost the election. Celebrations were mostly peaceful, although some isolated incidents of provocative celebrations were reported. However, these did not disturb the peaceful atmosphere that had characterised the pre-poll period and the actual polling day.

Following the final count of the votes, the opposition challenged the results in a number of constituencies where they alleged that the numbers did not tally. In the event the ESC and the ZEC both pronounced that in their view the election had been free and fair.

Many of the observer missions were also of the view that the peaceful environment in the pre-poll period had enabled the electorate to express their choice in the poll of 31 March 2005. It is clear that the reports will carry recommendations about how improvements can be made in future elections, especially on the critical issue of voter education.

VOTER EDUCATION

Before the ZEC came into existence, the ESC was responsible for voter education. The knowledge base of a voter has a profound effect on the election returns as it determines the quality and effectiveness of the poll result. Political parties and their candidates should regularly interact with their supporters and share information that would reduce chances of spoilt votes. Imparting knowledge and skills to voter educators should be a timely and ongoing exercise so that their education is relevant and effective.

Following the number of people who were turned away and the spoilt vote, PAPST is of the opinion that voter education was inadequate and untimely. While it is argued that the ZEC (and the ESC before it) carried out voter education, the material content and quantity were evidently inadequate.

Dissemination of voter education materials

- Voter education materials were disseminated through the electronic and print media.
- Posters and flyers were posted in some parts of the constituencies.
- Candidates and their campaign teams actively used every opportunity to inform their supporters and public whenever an occasion presented itself.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

- Peace generally prevailed in all the constituencies visited with people mixing freely while wearing their party regalia.
- Supporters of the various political parties exhibited a high degree of tolerance and maturity.
- The security agents were alert, cooperative and on top of the situation. This enabled citizens to exercise their democratic right to vote freely.
- Deployment of election officials went smoothly with only minor hitches. These were attended to by the relevant authorities administering the election.
- Urban centres dominated in the display of campaign materials for all parties involved compared to rural areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The ZEC should work with more organisations that are in civic education in order to consolidate the quality, quantity and distribution of voter education materials.
- Television should be used to demonstrate voting procedure where appropriate.
- Visual aids should be used as much as possible to reach areas where television is not available.
- Bubi-Umguza command centre could have been in Bulawayo and not Inyati for easy access by polling stations.
- The ZEC and the ESC should inspect all polling stations and verify their suitability for elections.

- In future elections communications between polling stations and command centres should be improved.
- Polling stations should be in areas that are easily accessible.
- Organisations mandated to carry out voter education should emphasise the importance of inspecting the voters' roll and familiarisation with the voting procedure in order to minimise spoilt votes.
- Voter education is needed on voting procedures and other aspects such as the physical layout of polling stations.

NOTES

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Part III
THE SECURITY OF THE YOUNG

Urban security in Kinshasa
A socio-demographic profile of children in distress

Hubert Kabungulu Ngoy[1]

Section 1: The research

INTRODUCTION

This study provides a socio-demographic profile of youth and urban security in the city of Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The study aims to identify long-term actions to be undertaken in terms of a recuperation and reinsertion policy for children with marginal behaviours, with the expectation that the findings of the study will help to reduce the consequences of the rise of social insecurity among children in distress.

The study was conducted on two occasions: 2–4 December 2004, data collection, and 21–27 December 2004, data analysis in the communes of Gombe, Kalamu, Kasa-Vubu, and Masina. Ninety-three children were involved in the study, including 21 street children and 31 children in shelter homes. The study was completed with interviews with public authorities and people in charge of shelter homes and detention homes on 7–8 January 2005.

RESEARCH QUESTION

Since the onset of the political transition process in the DRC in April 1990, recurrent insecurity in Kinshasa has become a social phenomenon. As a result of the state's incapacity to provide a favourable economic and social environment for parents, and for other reasons yet to be identified, young men and women adopt delinquent behaviours as they roam the streets looking for a way to survive. To control this delinquency it is imperative to reconsider the educational system, given the failure up to

now of the family and the state to prepare young people for a place in society and in the job market.

In a world where people and stability are rocked by conflict and tension – as on 11 September 2001 in the United States – no nation is safe from assaults on its property and people. It therefore becomes imperative to devise strategies to fight urban insecurity in order to lead Central Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) towards development projects and the well-being of the population.

The phenomenon of street children and youth (SCY) is a reality in DRC cities. In Kinshasa the number of street children and youth is estimated at 12,000, according to a study conducted in 1999 by staff members in charge of children in distress or children in need of special protection measures (ENMSP) in collaboration with Save the Children.

In the DRC, the national programme to fight insecurity and criminality needs new operational modes. This study analyses the socio-demographic characteristics of street children who are responsible for insecurity. The term 'children in distress' has been agreed upon because of the confusion caused by pejorative concepts such as 'street children' or 'children in the street'. As we shall see, an analysis of variables in the socio-demographic profile will allow us to define a 'child in distress' as a child who develops a sense of rebellion as part of a survival reflex when faced with social exclusion.

Hence the following research questions have been formulated: Who are these young people? What is their level of education? Where do they come from? Why are they on the streets? What kinds of insecurity are they involved in?

We hope that the answers to these questions will contribute to these young people being accepted again in Congolese society.

OBJECTIVES

GOAL

The rehabilitation of young people with delinquent behaviour patterns seems to be a difficult and costly undertaking for many Third World countries and for the DRC in particular, because of the rising the number of young people who are agents and/or victims of street insecurity. The goal of the project is to provide recommendations for the recuperation and rehabilitation policies for children in distress.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the study were:

- to obtain a socio-demographic profile of children in distress who are agents and/or victims of insecurity in the city of Kinshasa;
- to pinpoint the most recurrent cases of insecurity in Kinshasa whose agents and/or victims are children in distress;
- to assess the impact of the socio-demographic profile of children on insecurity of which they are agents and/or victims;
- to evaluate government policy of care for children in distress;
- to provide the government, public administration, and national and international partners with reliable data so that they can understand the threat that thousands of children in distress pose to society, to define their problems and to find solutions; and
- to identify research topics with a view to taking action to control the phenomenon.

METHODOLOGY

To achieve these objectives two approaches have been used: a thorough review of literature and data collection on site.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

In order to maximise data precision and taking time constraints into consideration, it was decided to conduct research in three types of location in the city of Kinshasa:

The streets

The Central Market, Gambela Market, Masina Pascal Market and the area around Tata Raphael Stadium are points where anti-social behaviour is regularly observed.

Shelter homes

Two shelter homes were selected: Solidarity Action for Children in Distress (SACD), and Monseigneur Munzihirwa Centre. One reason for this choice is that these two institutions have as their mission "the recuperation of street children and their rehabilitation in their respective homes or in specialised institutions". Another reason is that the first is specifically for girls and the second for boys.

The Kinshasa Penitentiary and Re-education Centre

Also known as CPRK, formerly Makala Jail. Wards 9 and 10 are packed with criminal minors.

SUBJECTS

It was recommended that data be collected in a sample population of 60 people, but because of the realities on the ground and the need to include both genders, the sample was increased to 100 people distributed as follows:

Table 1 Distribution of subjects according to location and gender

Location	Gender		
	Females	Males	Total (%)
The streets (Central Market, Gambela Market, Masina Pascal Market, Tata Raphael Stadium)	0	21	21
Shelter homes (SACD, Munzihirwa)	21	10	31
Kinshasa Penitentiary and Re-education Centre (CPRK)	21	20	41
Public authorities and people in charge of shelter and detention homes	1	6	7
TOTAL	43	57	100

Selection of the sample was determined by, inter alia, access, the availability of subjects, and gender representation.

DATA COLLECTION

Two instruments were used in data collection: a quantitative questionnaire conforming to ISS standards, and a questionnaire that was administered as an individual semi-structured interview.

Data was collected by a team of ten trained investigators, two controllers, one supervisor, and one coordinator.

DATA ANALYSIS

Data was analysed as follows:

- theme identification;
- explanation of code books;
- application of code books (coding);
- matrix construction (for example frequencies of variables or themes);
- establishing comparisons; and
- making and visualising models.

We conducted a triangulation of data collected in the various locations and in the various phases.

THEME IDENTIFICATION

Theme identification consisted of the following:

- listing patterns in the collected data that relate to the objective of the study;
- discovering the meaning of these elements by examining words and expressions used by the subjects (for example "I have been baptised" is an expression used by young street residents to describe the brutality with which they were welcomed by existing residents);
- drawing similarities and differences between elements (for example one young man said that he was not brutally welcomed by existing residents because he was able to give them some money, but when he found himself in a different location and did not have any money to offer, he received an "unforgettable baptism");
- synthesising elements for each objective; and
- identifying characteristics of each theme in analysing the content of the interviews.

ELABORATION OF CODE BOOKS

This was conducted in two steps:

- Code Book 1 for Modules 1 and 2 concerning identification and the socio-demographic profile of the study: coding answers to open-ended and semi-closed questions.

- Code Book 2 for interview guidelines in the various sites: coding different aspects of selected themes and describing each theme and the structural organisation of codes.

APPLICATION OF CODE BOOKS

Answers to interview guidelines were marked with the appropriate codes.

GENERATION OF FREQUENCY TABLES AND VARIABLE CRISS-CROSSING

- Analysis of Modules 1 and 2 data on Epi-Data and SPSS Software generated frequency tables for variables related to the socio-demographic profile of the subjects.

- Analysis of interview guidelines data per site (Module 3) generated frequency tables for the various themes and theme crossing in relation to the objective of the study.

ESTABLISHING COMPARISONS

Results for the various sites were compared and then enriched with information from public authorities and heads of shelter and detention centres (triangulation).

DIFFICULTIES

All kinds of challenges had to be overcome at each stage of this study, from design to data collection, to data analysis. They relate to:

- a change in the instrument of data collection from a quantitative to a qualitative approach resulted in non-adherence to operation dates;
- mobility of the subjects during the interview;
- weather (it was the rainy season); and
- the end-of-year holidays (2004) disturbed operations: public authorities and heads of shelter and detention homes were not available.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful to all those who have contributed to the implementation of the project, and would like to mention a few:

Section 2: The results

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF SUBJECTS

The results presented in Tables 2–7 on page 190–193 provide answers to the key questions of the study concerning the socio-demographic profile of children in distress.

To pinpoint these characteristics, the following variables were considered:

- level of education
- residence
- age
- gender
- whether biological parents are alive or dead
- marital status of parents
- religion of origin
- province of origin (for father and mother)

RELIGION OF ORIGIN

Figure 1 Distribution of subjects according to religion of origin

Figure 2 Distribution of subjects according to father's province of origin

Figure 1 indicates that 96% of the population concerned are religious, and more specifically Christian.

In understanding the demographic phenomenon, religion is a cultural factor that needs to be taken into account in the study of a target population. Beliefs, values and dogmas related to religious practice influence and determine the perceptions, behaviours and attitudes of believers.

FATHER'S PROVINCE OF ORIGIN

Figure 2 indicates that 34% of the population studied come from Bas-Congo, followed by Equator (20%) and Bandundu (17%). The two Kasaï represent 16%, with 10% for Eastern Kasaï and 6% for Western Kasaï. Foreigners account for only 5%.

One explanation for this composition is that the provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu, together with the city of Kinshasa, constitute what used to be Central Congo Province. People from these two provinces live close to the capital city of Kinshasa, which facilitates rural depopulation. The precarious quality of life in rural areas will continue to encourage rural depopulation and migration to big cities.

Figure 3 Distribution of subjects according to mother's province of origin

MOTHER'S PROVINCE OF ORIGIN

Figure 3 has almost the same composition as Figure 2 (father's province of origin), with the same explanation. There is a slight increase for

Figure 4 Distribution of subjects according the life status of biological parents

Figure 5 Distribution of subjects according to level of education

women in Bandundu (22%) and Bas-Congo (20%). They are followed by women in the two Kasaï, with 9% for Eastern Kasaï and 12% for Western Kasaï.

LIFE STATUS OF BIOLOGICAL PARENTS

Figure 4 indicates that almost half the subjects (42%) have both parents alive, as opposed to 18% who have lost their father and mother. Furthermore, the study indicates that 39% of subjects have one parent alive, while 1% of subjects have no idea whether their parents are alive or dead.

SUBJECTS' LEVEL OF EDUCATION

Figure 5 indicates that 50% of the subjects had not completed elementary school, 14% had graduated from elementary school, 24% had started high school but had not graduated, and 2% had graduated from high school.

Education changes the individual, both culturally and intellectually. Educating a child means leading the child to adult life so that he or she can fulfil future responsibilities.

Figure 6 Distribution of subjects according to the marital status of their parents

PARENTS' MARITAL STATUS

Thirty four per cent (34%) of the subjects' parents are legally married: 22% in monogamous households and 12% in polygamous households. Nine per cent (9%) have remarried. Figure 6 also shows that 17% of parents are widows or widowers, 19% are divorced and 4% are single. However, 17% of the subjects do not know their parents' marital status.

RESULTS: THEMES

STREET CHILDREN

Early ambitions

All the subjects who were interviewed stated that before going to live on the streets, they had dreamed of having a career as they grew up. Most of them dreamed of becoming a driver or mechanic (57.14%), a business person (19.85%), chief executive of a business (14.28%), an engineer (4.7%), a medical doctor (4.76%), or a musician (4.76%).

Family affection

Family love, affection and warmth are factors of growth and success in children. It is therefore worth examining to what extent the subjects

enjoyed these qualities, and whether deprivation of them might have contributed to their ending up living on the streets.

Here are some statements about family life by street children who were interviewed in Kinshasa.

> "We are on good terms with them; they give me everything I need."
> "My stepmother insulted me and didn't give me enough food."
> "As for me, I consider them enemies. In fact, when my father and his current wife come here to the market, we pass each other as if we did not know each other."
> "When my father's wife did not want give me any food, my brothers and sisters secretly gave me some."

Statements such as the above indicate the following:

- There is some presence of affection towards them by other family members (47.6%).
- There is a lack of affection (33.3%).
- There is mixed affection (19.0%).

The results indicate that presence or lack of affection does not necessarily account for the presence of these children on the street. In this case, what could be the reasons for these young people leaving the parental home and going to live on the street?

Main reasons for leaving the parental home

> "I wanted to earn money through my own efforts."
> "What dragged me onto the street is lack of money."
> "My uncle's wife started to dream that we were sorcerers. Then my uncle started to ill-treat us."
> "I already had a friend with whom we were hanging around at the market. When my father died, I left with him and never came back home."
> "I stole something, and for fear of being arrested, I ran away from home and found myself on the street."

Statements such as the above indicate that young people leave home for reasons that include the following:

- search for freedom and autonomy (33.3%);
- accusation of witchcraft resulting in ill-treatment (19%);

- peer pressure (19%);
- banditry/fear of parental correction and/or of justice (19%); and
- family antagonism/jealousy (14.2%).

Welcoming new members

> "You are new in the business of street children you therefore have to be baptised.' They started to beat us up, including my young brother, who was only seven years old."
>
> "I was beaten severely by other street children they burned me with cigarette and pot butts, and even with a candle; they put pepper in my eyes and anus. That is why I treat all new members in the same way. I give them 'baptism'."
>
> "Welcome was hard. Like all new members, we were beaten up. We underwent humiliation. For example, they threw faeces on our bodies."
>
> "In my case, I had a friendly welcome from other street children because I already had my friends in the group."

Of the street children interviewed 52.3% said they were welcomed brutally when they first arrived on the street, whereas 47.6% said they received a friendly welcome.

Daily activities

Subjects were asked about their daily activities. Responses included the following:

> "I am a 'luggage carrier'. Sometimes I sell water in plastic bags."
>
> "I beg, especially as I am physically handicapped. I have no choice."
>
> "I clean and set market tables and they pay me."
>
> "I steal things from sellers."

Street children are involved in a variety of activities. These activities are mostly ambulatory. Sometimes they pretend to be in need just to give them an opportunity to be in contact with passers-by and operate at the slightest opportunity.

These activities include:

- acting as carrier (28.57%)
- selling (23.8%)
- anything (23.8%)
- theft and ransom (19.4%)

- cleaning (14.28%)
- begging (9.5%)

Caretaking

> "I take care of my own health, but if the situation becomes serious, I go to my grandmother's for help."
> "When I fall sick, I get assistance from other street children, and sometimes from kind people."
> "I go to Lisalisi Medical Centre, where I get free treatment. We young men [boys] are sometimes chased because some of us sometimes cause trouble there."

As for food and clothing, these young people take care of themselves through the activities listed above. As for medical care, each one takes care of him- or herself (27.2%); some go to their families for help (9.0%); some receive assistance from friends or from kind passers-by; others go to medical centres run by NGOs, religious organisations, or the Red Cross (27.2%).

Satisfaction

> "I am here because I eat when I want to and nobody disturbs me."
> "Nothing pleases me here on the street. At 18, I should be practising an occupation, but until now I am nowhere."
> "I am not happy with my situation because we suffer a lot. Sometimes, our clothes are confiscated by others when it rains or when it is cold."

As can be seen, 5% of the street children say that they are satisfied with their new situation; 40% say they are not and would like to reintegrate into normal life; and 10% have mixed feelings, that is, sometimes they are satisfied, sometimes not.

Possibility of reintegration with the family

> "I long very much for life in my parental home since life on the street is a mere adventure. If my mother were alive, I would rather go back home than suffer this predicament."
> "I very rarely think of my family. When I think about my stepfather, I feel like killing him, especially as the house in which he lives belongs to my late father."

According to their responses to these issues, the majority of interviewees

(72.2%) seem to be ready to reintegrate into the parental home, whereas a minority (27.7%) hate the idea of returning home.

Sexual health

> "I have had protected sexual intercourse with street girls using condoms."
> "I satisfy my sexual needs with girls we live with on the market. Girls use condoms sometimes, but as far as I am concerned, condoms totally reduce sexual pleasure. I prefer to have sexual intercourse without condoms."
> "Yes, I do it. Condoms? No, she is the girl of my heart."
> "I am not really interested in sexual relationships. My friends who are here are aware of that. I am afraid of diseases like HIV and AIDS."

Results indicate that 47.3% of young people do not use condoms during sexual intercourse; only 5.2% do; and 47.3% avoid sexual relationships for fear of disease.

Predisposition to acts of terrorism

> "I just go to drop off the parcel to earn some money, and then I run away."
> "If I am given money, I can pull off any job, whatever the content of the parcel – provided you give me money and I don't get killed."
> "The way I see things today, I would accept being enrolled in an armed movement because I can't see anything of interest in what I am doing now."
> "I would 'correct' him for you. If he happens to be stronger than I am, I would use another strategy to control him (stick, metal bar, etc). You yourself would decide how to pay me."
> "No, the money you will give me is not worth my life. And then I risk going to jail while you will be free."

Results indicate that the majority (68.4%) of interviewees are prepared to commit acts of violence but never terrorism; 31.5% do not seem to be prepared to become involved in such acts.

Drug use

> "I smoke pot and I sell it, too. In fact, I left people selling it for me. That is how I earn my living."
> "To get some courage, I smoke cigarettes; I take drugs, alcohol or Valium."

> "I don't take any drugs because I am a Kimbanguist Christian. In my church, it is forbidden to take these things."

The results show that 63.1% of young people take drugs including alcohol, while 36.8% do not.

Street children are exposed to the use of drugs, and trafficking networks develop easily in this environment.

Current ambitions

> "My intention is to go back to school, study, get a job, and earn money. I would like to be a driver or mechanic as I always dreamed. Marriage is very important for me. I want to get married and have three children."
> "My dream, as I said, is to have a shop, and also to learn other skills, have a family, wife and children. However, how I am going to fulfil this dream is something I don't know."
> "I don't believe in my future any more."

Results indicate that most of these young people continue to believe in their future and retain their ambitions: 61.1% say they wanted to learn and become drivers or mechanics or pursue another technical occupation; 5.5% say they wanted to become musicians; 5.5% say they wanted to become chief executive officers; and 22.2% did not seem to have any ambition.

These results become interesting, then, as there are candidates among street children who can be trained to take technical jobs and thereby solve the problem of shortage of manpower. Competent authorities have some work to do here.

Comparing past and current ambitions of interviewees, results indicate that 63.1% of young people have held on to their ambitions and 36.8% have changed them.

Expectations

> "Let the state take care of me. I cannot go back home as long as my father is living with that woman. Let the state take care of me by teaching me a skill."
> "I cannot ask anything from my family. Instead, it is my responsibility to help my family."
> "We have nothing to expect from the Congolese government. They are useless. It is a group of thieves and selfish people. We trust in God, our creator and Saviour."

Results indicate that almost all young interviewees (84.2%) expect help and support from one partner or another – the state, an NGO, the family. But a small percentage (15.7%) are resigned and hopeless.

Early ambitions

> "I went to school and intended to become a pastor one day."
> "With the help of God, I wanted to become a rich woman and help my family. I also wanted to become a singer."
> "I wanted to become God's singer. Apart from that, I wanted to become a tailor."
> "I wanted and still hope to become a soccer star and a computer programmer."

Early ambitions of young people interviewed in shelter homes include:

- star – 23.3%
- receptionist, air hostess, tailor, beautician – 16.6%
- chief executive – 13.3%
- servant of God – 10%
- technical occupations – 10%
- merely to be employed – 6.6%

Becoming a star (musician, dancer, etc) is the dominant ambition. This is not surprising, since the two shelter homes are located in the Kalamu Commune, in the Funa and Matonge neighbourhoods, where there is a lot of musical activity.

Many girls (25%) want to become beauticians, tailors, or receptionists (two thirds of the sample in shelter homes were girls). Boys prefer technical occupations. In fact, that was their sole choice of occupation.

Family affection

> "My stepmother and her son never wanted me. They inflicted insults and mockery on me without any good reason" (15-year-old boy).
> "Yes, we love each other. I love them and they love me. I often visit them, and if I need school fees, they give it to me. They sometimes visit me as well" (13-year-old girl).
> "Some, yes; others, no. We do not get along and I don't like them. When my father died, they began to ill-treat us and still do" (14-year-old girl).

> "In the beginning, I could feel that my aunt and other family members loved me. But when I was accused of sorcery, their attitude towards me changed. I was denied breakfast, I had to wait for dinner, and at dinner time, I was given very little food. Everybody avoided me, nobody wanted to be near me to talk to me. I was not feeling at ease at all" (18-year-old girl).

Results indicate that these interviewees experience:

- affection from family members – 21.4%
- lack of affection – 46.4%
- mixed feelings – 32.1%

For many children a lack of affection seems to be the major reason for leaving the parental home. These results are mainly valid for girls because the sample here is mostly female. Results obtained from street children who are exclusively males are different. Why is there a lack of affection? Here are the children's main reasons for leaving their parental homes.

Main reasons for leaving parental home

> "I was living with my grandmother, and she did not have enough money to feed us, that is why I went on the street" (13-year-old girl).
> "When my mother passed away, her family members accused us (my younger brother and I) of killing our mother" (15-year-old boy).
> "My father did not want to see me at home. He chased me and to go and get rid of sorcery. I was beaten up and tortured. The situation became such that I ran away to protect myself" (13-year-old girl).

Results indicate that the main reasons for leaving include:

- accusations of sorcery and consequent ill-treatment – 48.2%
- a search for freedom and autonomy – 0.6%
- family antagonism/jealousy – 17.2%
- banditry/fear of punishment – 6.9%
- peer pressure – 6.9%

The 'child sorcerer' phenomenon has assumed alarming proportions. This is illustrated by the proportion of children who state that this is the main reason they left their parental homes. So-called child sorcerers may be scapegoats and charged with causing family problems. One author pointed out that in Kinshasa, for example, 30% of street children have

been abandoned and turned to vagrancy, after being accused of sorcery or witchcraft.[2]

Welcoming of new members

> "When we arrived, we had a warm welcome" (14-year-old girl).
> "I had a nice welcome, I was even pampered" (15-year-old girl).
> "There has been a warm welcome here at the centre" (16-year-old boy).

All the children in shelter homes who were interviewed said that they had received a warm welcome. This is quite normal considering the educational and humanitarian missions of the centres.

Care

> "I am happy. I go to school, School items are given to me free of charge. When I need clothing, it is bought for me. I eat well and enjoy myself (playing volley-ball, football)" (girl).
> "We are now growing up in an educational environment; we are really taken care of: education, housing, clothing and learning."
> "We are well prepared for reintegration into our respective families" (girl).
> "We don't study here. If we were home, perhaps we would be in school. As for food and clothing, these are taken care of by the centre, including medical care" (boy).

From these comments by interviewees in shelter homes, it was inferred that 86.6% receive total care from centres, whereas 13.3% receive partial care.

The heads of the two centres say that their main goal is reintegration of the children into their own families or into specialised institutions where they can be fully cared for. During the transit period the centre for girls provides total care, whereas the centre for boys provides only food, housing and clothing. Some special cases receive school assistance. (We will come back to this in the section on heads of shelter homes.)

Satisfaction with current environment

> "Here, I am calm, I am free, I eat, I dress, I go to school and I have friends. Most of all, I am free."
> "I am particularly happy, because I go to school and I study aesthetics. It is as if God blessed me to recover my early ambitions."
> "Satisfaction is not total here: we eat cassava bread with beans every day, and they have us do some chores."

"We don't go to school here. If we were home, we would be going to school. However, food and clothing are taken care of by the centre."

The results of our meetings with young people in shelter homes indicate:

- satisfied – 80.6%
- dissatisfied – 3.2%
- mixed satisfaction – 16.1%

It appears that children are more satisfied in shelter homes than on the street, and even more than in parental homes.

Possibility of reintegration

"Yes, I feel homesick when I think of living with my brothers at home, because it is home."
"I have never felt homesick, because home is hell for me."
"I am homesick, but the family has rejected us for good. They said: 'Stay here until you get married so that the centre can take your dowry.'"

From these statements it can inferred that the possibility of reintegration is easy in 66.3% of cases and difficult in 33.3% of cases.

The centres are transit locations before children are reintegrated into their respective families. The high rate of reintegration can be explained by the fact that many children already have contact with their families with a view to reintegration.

In addition, the head of one centre commented: "We only accept children who are predisposed to reintegration; those who accept going back."

For one third of the children reintegration is difficult. Their parents have categorically refused to allow them to go back home. There were a few cases of children who were temporarily accepted at the centre while they were waiting to be transferred to a full care institution.

Street children are more likely to return to the family home (72.22%) than those living in shelter homes (66.66%).

Sexual health

"Sexual relationships? I don't know much about this. In fact, since I was born, I have never known a woman. I dreamed of becoming a priest one day."
"I always require a condom because there are so many diseases."

"I was raped in the daytime by a group of four street children."
"Some days we use condoms; other days we don't."

Results indicate that:

- 51.6% of young interviewees do not have any sexual relations;
- 35.4% have unprotected sex; and
- 12.9% have protected sex.

When the genders are considered separately, 60% of males are not yet sexually active, 20% have unprotected sex and 20% have protected sex. As for females, 47.6% are not yet sexually active, 42.8% have unprotected sex, and 9.5% have protected sex.

The results indicate that girls are more exposed to sexually transmitted infections than boys.

Predisposition to terrorism

"Yes, I know how to shoot. Our uncle showed us how to use a weapon. If you hand me a gun right now, I will be able to operate it quite easily. Quite often, my uncle used me to carry out an armed robbery."
"I would accept the offer because it is a job, and I would be paid for it … Even if I had to lose my life, at least my family would benefit."
"I would drop off a parcel because I want to earn some money. What is inside is none of my business."
"No, I would never accept that, despite the money …"
"No, I wouldn't use it because I hate weapons and everything related to war, violence, and fighting."
"No, but as there is some payment, I would accept if only to get money."
"Yes, I have already told you: for money, I would do anything."

Results from these statements indicate:

- 58,0% of young interviewees are predisposed to terrorism;
- 38,7% are not predisposed to terrorism; and
- 3,2% have mixed feelings.

If the genders taken separately, 70% of males are predisposed towards terrorism and 30% are not, while 52,5% of females are predisposed towards terrorism and 47,5% are not.

Although no one wanted to talk about their predisposition towards

becoming mercenaries, there is only one step between being mercenaries and terrorism – especially when these children are prepared to do anything for money.

These results are alarming in a country that is prone to political insecurity, because young boys know how to shoot and are ready to join gangs for money.

Drug use

> "Yes, I sometimes smoke cigarettes and pot once a day. I feel dizzy and courageous at the same time. I started smoking it when I was ten."
> "I smoke and take pot, Valium and drugs. I started taking drugs on the street, mainly in order to get the courage to steal, to think, and to control events."
> "When I was on the street, I smoked pot and took Valium. I started at 13. When I came here, at first I continued to do so. Then I stopped and I don't take it any more."
> "I don't smoke and never will."

Results indicate that 80.6% of children in shelter homes do not take drugs, but 28.5% do.

Genders taken separately:

• All the males said that they do not take drugs any more, but that they used to take drugs when they were on the street.

• A total of 28.5% of females still take drugs, even in shelter homes and despite formal prohibition by the heads of the shelter homes; 71.4% have never taken drugs and still don't.

The reason why males do not use drugs is that the centre for boys belongs to the Jesuits, where moral education is very rigorous. The centre for girls belongs to an NGO.

Current ambitions

> "I am not sure about my future since both my parents are dead. But, since the centre sends us to school, God bless."
> "I really don't care about my future, either with or without school …"
> "I would like to become a priest and serve the Lord."

Results indicate:

- business executive – 25.8%
- receptionist, tailor, beautician – 25.8%
- star – 19.3%
- technical occupation – 12.9%
- religious – 9.6%
- middle-class employment – 6.4%
- no ambition – 3.2%

Genders taken separately:

- Males: 40% of young men chose a technical occupation; 30% wanted to become stars; 20% wanted to become middle-class employees; and 10% chose the priesthood or a religious life.

- Females: 38.1% of young women wanted to become receptionists, dressmakers, or beauticians, 28.5% business executives, 14.2% stars, 9.5% middle-class employees, and 9.5% chose a religious life.

When previous and current ambitions are compared, it emerges that 54.8% of young people retained their ambitions whereas 45.8% changed their ambitions.

Expectations

"The government need to arrest mothers who refuse to allow their children to return home. I want the government to take us back home by force. My family should leave me alone. I need to be treated like any other child. My stepmother should leave me alone. I need to enjoy love and affection and I need to go to school like my stepbrothers."
"The government cannot do anything for me. My wish is that the centre should point us in the right direction. If they could find us a safe place to go after here. I don't know if my family can do anything for me."

It emerges that all the young people we interviewed expect something to be done by NGOs, their families, and/or the government.

YOUNG PEOPLE IN DETENTION HOMES

Early ambitions

"I thought I would become a famous mechanic."
"My ambitions were to become a female soldier in an army somewhere."

> "My ambitions were to go to school and then get married to a supportive husband; then to become a servant of God" (young female detainee, 16 years old).

All the young people (males and females) said that before they were detained, they had hoped to become somebody in life.

Technical occupations (driver, mechanic, fitter, mason, etc) attract these young people most (21,9%). Other occupations include:

- businessman/woman – 19.5%
- receptionist, dressmaker, beautician – 17%
- servant of God – 14.6%
- executive – 9.7%
- star – 4.8%

Family affection

> "Total harmony."
> "My parents are divorced, and my stepmothers do not want me."

Statements by interviewees indicated the family affection / lack of family affection in their families of origin:

- affection present – 46 .3%
- affection absent – 26.8%
- mixed affection – 26.8%

These results indicate that lack of affection is not the main reason for leaving the parental home.

Reason for detention

> "I am detained because I stole an outfit, a watch, and a bag from our neighbour. Unfortunately, his son was hiding somewhere. He saw me and told his mother. That evening the police came to arrest me. I gave back everything except her son's bag. She got angry and refused to have me released. I was sent to court and later transferred to jail."
> "My friend and I were watching DCMP [a soccer team] training on television. Suddenly, we saw a young boy get in the police. The young boy said we were with them when they stole whiskey. We were arrested on the spot and taken to the police station. Here, the young boy told the police officer that they were with us when they killed that man …"

"A girl called … slandered me and said that I had raped her."
"I am 16 years old. I am here because I performed an abortion …"

Since the detained young people tended to try to justify themselves and claim their innocence, hoping to attract the investigator's sympathy, we decided to take into consideration only the reason for their detention. The following crimes were listed:

- theft – 41.4%
- fighting/banditry – 26.8%
- abortion – 9.7%
- manslaughter – 7.3%
- rape – 7.3%
- drug use and drug trafficking – 7.3%

Young people are detained mainly because of theft and fighting on the street or in their neighbourhood. It is deplorable that under-age young people should be detained for minor reasons.

Of the girls in detention, 19.5% had been detained for having had an abortion. This is a health security issue for young girls.

Congolese law regards abortion as a crime and condemns it.

Welcoming new members

"There is a tradition of brutalising newcomers here."
"The welcome was good. When I came in, Christians gave me the chore of cleaning the ward, the dormitory, and toilets for six months. I was given a friendly welcome, and that is why I also welcome newcomers."

Results indicate the following for detained young people:

- brutal welcome – 50%
- friendly welcome – 50%

Acts of brutality are forbidden in jail, but there are always some detainees who commit them and threaten newcomers if they dare denounce them.

Care

"We don't eat here. Every day, we are served *viengele* [a mixture of beans and maize].

"I was OK on the streets, except that I suffered from the cold a lot at night. Here in jail, the situation is worse: we eat poorly, and as for clothing, forget it."

"When we fall sick, we go to the hospital for treatment. As for clothing, we receive donations from churches. For food, they give us some when they feel like it. As you can see, I have not eaten since yesterday …"

All interviewed detainees (100%) say that they are taken care of by the prison administration only whey fall sick. Even in that case, some detainees claimed that when the illness is serious, most prescriptions are taken care of by the detainee's family. When the detainee has no family, anything can happen.

Satisfaction

"This is a house of suffering. Nothing can satisfy us here, whether it be food or clothing …"

"No possible satisfaction for me. I hate being in jail."

"I am not satisfied. I have always said to myself: if I am here it is because my father and my mother are dead. I am not happy here. I am already a grown woman, but I do nothing. My boyfriend misses me, and he is afraid to come and see me."

Possibility of social reintegration

"My wish is to go back so that I can see my father, my sisters, and my friends."

"I am ready to go home, even today. I miss my boyfriend, my business."

"I think about my family all the time. I took care of my sisters; now that I am here, I wonder who takes care of them."

Sexual health

"I feel like having sex, but my situation as a detainee does not allow me to do so. Quite often I let the feeling go without satisfaction. It is difficult to be in contact with a man here."

"I masturbate, and then I think about my boyfriend. I wonder whether he also thinks about me because he caused the pregnancy I aborted."

"I have not started sexual relations yet."

"Since I have been detained, I have not had sexual relations."

Nobody has said he or she had sexual relations in jail, whether homosexual or heterosexual. It is forbidden. However, some people masturbate, which has no impact on sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and HIV/AIDS.

Predisposition to terrorism

> "I would drop off the parcel because you pay me for it."
> "I know how to operate a gun because my uncle is a soldier and he taught me how to do so."
> "I have never used a gun, but if it is to make money, I will do it. I could agree to work for an armed movement."
> "I cannot take it because I don't know what is in the parcel. I cannot agree to conduct any mission which leads to death."

Results indicate that 45% of young people are prepared to commit acts of terrorism, deliberately or non-deliberately; 55% are not prepared to do so for fear of being sentenced. Detention seems to have had a positive impact on the majority of young detainees.

Drug use

> "Here, I don't do it, but when I was on the street, I used to take Valium."
> "I don't take anything."

Since prison is a re-education centre for these young people, the use of drugs is forbidden. They are also not in contact with any drug distribution network.

Current ambitions

> "I intend to become a mechanic or a driver, and then get married."
> "I will still be a dressmaker or perhaps a seller if it doesn't work. I hope to get married one day and have seven children."
> "It looks as if my life is lost. No husband … what is going to happen? God knows. No hope. I have no-one to support me."

From these statements, it emerges that the current ambitions of interviewees are as follows:

- technical occupations – 28.5%
- receptionist/tailor/beautician – 20%
- marriage – 20%
- businessman/woman – 11.4%

- company executive/employee – 8.5%
- star – 5.7%
- no ambition – 5.7%

Technical occupations seem to be the first choice of the interviewees. Half of the interviewees were females and that is why becoming a receptionist, a dressmaker or a beautician accounts for 40%.

In spite of being detainees, females say they would like to become good mothers (40% of interviewees).

A comparison of early and current ambitions shows the following:

- Have retained their ambitions – 52.5%
- Have changed their ambitions – 47.5%

Expectations

> "I would like the government and NGOs to help me leave jail. I would like the government to pay for my training as a tailor. Once I become a tailor, I would like NGOs to find me a job."
>
> "I would like the government to get me out of here. My life has stopped with the five months I spent in jail. Possibly, I would have learned a skill, or got a fiancé. To the NGOs, I would say that I don't need the food they bring us; on the contrary, I want them to help me get out of this hell."

All young detainees wish to get out of jail.

RESULTS: MATRIXES

CHILDREN ON THE STREETS

Table 2 shows that the majority of children (42.8%) whose parents are both alive landed on the streets through peer pressure, whereas 100% of those who lost both parents are on the streets in search of freedom and autonomy. Children who have lost one parent are also on the streets in search of freedom and autonomy – 28.4% of those who have lost their mothers and 40% of those who have lost their fathers. Of those who are on the streets for having committed reprehensible acts, 28.5% have lost their mothers and 20% have lost their fathers. Most children accused of sorcery have lost their mothers (28.5%).

Table 2 Distribution of street children according to life status of biological parents and main reason for deserting the parental home

Parents alive or dead	Main reason for desertion					Total (%)
	Search for freedom and autonomy	Accusation of sorcery and ill-treatment	Peer pressure	Family antagonism or jealousy	Banditry and/or fear of punishment	
Both parents alive	14.29	14.29	42.86	28.57	0	100
Both parents dead	100	0	0	0	0	100
Father alive, mother dead	28.57	28.57	0	14.29	28.57	100
Father dead, mother alive	40	0	20	20	20	100

RELIGION OF ORIGIN AND DESERTION

Despite religious teachings in general, and Christian teachings in particular, children still roam the streets for various reasons, including family antagonism and jealousy (25% Catholic, 20% Protestant, 33,3% Revival churches).

Table 3 Distribution of street children according to religion of origin and reason for deserting the parental home

Religion of origin	Main reason for desertion					Total (%)
	Search for freedom and autonomy	Accusations of sorcery and ill-treatment	Peer pressure	Family antagonism or jealousy	Banditry and/or fear of punishment	
Catholic	25	25	25	25	0	100
Protestant	20	20	40	20	0	100
Kimbanguist	66.67	0	0	0	33.33	100
Revival churches	16.67	16.67	16.67	33.33	16.67	100
Moslem	0	0	0	0	100	100
No religion	100	0	0	0	0	100

Table 4 Distribution of street children according to biological parents' marital status and the main reason for deserting their parental home

Parents' marital status	Main reason for desertion					Total (%)
	Search for freedom and autonomy	Accusations of sorcery and ill-treatment	Peer pressure	Family antagonism or jealousy	Banditry and/or fear of punishment	
Single	0	0	0	0	0	0
Married/monogamous	28.57	14.29	28.57	14.29	14.29	100
Married/polygamous	0	0	0	0	0	0
Divorced/separated	0	50	50	0	0	100
Widow/widower	50	16.67	16.67	16.67	0	100
Remarried	0	0	0	0	100	100
Don't know	0	0	0	0	0	0
No response	50	0	0	50	0	100

The question is whether the church plays its traditional spiritual role of teaching one to love one's neighbour. Some early youth religious movements such the Boy Scouts, Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and Xaveri contributed to the supervision of children. It is worth considering whether these movements are able to adapt to the present context with a view to becoming a more effective force in the socialisation of young people.

PARENTS' MARITAL STATUS AND DESERTION

Table 4 indicates that children who have lost one parent roam the streets in search of freedom and autonomy (50%). This means they feel that they are victims of injustice and that the streets seem to be the last recourse when all other possibilities of hanging onto the family have failed.[3]

Children of monogamous parents are on the streets more in search of autonomy (28.5%) and because of peer pressure (28.5%).

Table 5 Distribution of children in shelter homes according to life status of biological parents and main reason for deserting the parental home

Parents alive or dead	Main reason for desertion					Total (%)
	Search for freedom and autonomy	Accusations of sorcery and ill-treatment	Peer pressure	Family antagonism or jealousy	Banditry and/or fear of punishment	
Both parents alive	10	50	10	20	10	100
Both parents dead	12.50	75	0	0	15.50	100
Father alive, mother dead	25	37.50	12.50	12.50	12.50	100
Father dead, mother alive	40	40	0	0	20	100
No response	0	0	0	0	0	0

CHILDREN IN SHELTER HOMES

Parents' life status and desertion

Whether parents are alive or dead, accusations of sorcery appear to be the main reason for deserting the parental home (50% for children with parents alive, 75% for those who have lost their mothers, and 40% for those who have lost their fathers). (As a reminder, in this category two thirds of our sample are female. When girls are left with their fathers and stepmothers, they usually encounter rivalry and antipathy, which lead to victimisation. The stepmother might seek any reason to get rid of the girl. Accusations of sorcery are used most often because they are the most difficult to prove.)

Parents' marital status and desertion

Table 6 indicates that in stable relationships (monogamous couples), the probability of children being accused of sorcery is very low, if it exists at all (0%). However, in unstable relationships the percentage of children accused of sorcery is high: 50% for children of polygamous parents, 100% for children of divorced or separated parents, 66.6% for orphans of father or mother, and 50% for children of remarried parents. However, the highest percentage (40%) of children who have gone onto

Table 6 Distribution of children in shelter homes according to biological parents' marital status and the main reason for deserting the parental home

Parents' marital status	Main reason for desertion					
	Search for freedom and autonomy	Accusations of sorcery and ill-treatment	Peer pressure	Family antagonism or jealousy	Banditry and/or fear of punishment	Total (%)
Single	0	0	0	0	0	0
Married/monogamous	40	0	20	40	0	100
Married/polygamous	20	50	0	0	30	100
Divorced/separated	0	100	0	0	0	100
Widow/widower	33.33	66.67	0	0	0	100
Remarried	0	50	0	50	0	100
Don't know	33.33	0	33.33	0	33.33	100
No response	0	100	0	0	0	100

Table 7 Distribution of children in detention homes according to life status of biological parents and main reason for arrest

Parents alive or dead	Main reason for arrest						
	Rape	Theft	Illegal abortion	Fighting	Man-slaughter	Drugs/banditry	Total (%)
Both parents alive	4.55	50	13.64	18.18	9.09	4.55	100
Both parents dead	11.11	22.22	0	33.33	11.11	22.22	100
Father alive, mother dead	0	33.33	0	66.67	0	0	100
Father dead, mother alive	0	100	0	0	0	0	100
No response	0	100	0	0	0	0	100

the streets come from monogamous couples. Again, poverty is a possible reason for deserting the parental home.

CHILDREN IN DETENTION CENTRES

Parents' life status and reason for arrest

Whether parents are alive or dead does not seem to have anything to do with children's arrests. However, all the girls who were arrested for voluntary abortion have both parents alive (13.6%). They therefore commit offences and are subsequently arrested.

Religion of origin and reason for arrest

Table 8 Distribution of children according to religion of origin and reason for arrest

Religion of origin	Main reason for arrest						
	Rape	Theft	Illegal abortion	Fighting	Manslaughter	Drugs/ banditry	Total (%)
Catholic	0	29.41	5.88	47.06	0	17.65	100
Protestant	12.50	50	12.50	0	25	0	100
Kimbanguist	0	100	0	0	0	0	100
Revival churches	0	69.23	7.69	15.38	7.69	0	100
Moslem	0	0	0	100	0	0	100
No religion	100	0	0	0	0	0	100

Table 8 indicates that theft is the main reason for young people being arrested and that all religions are represented: 24.4% Catholic, 50% Protestant, 100% Kimbanguist, 69.2% Revival churches.

Parents' marital status and reason for arrest

Table 9 indicates that girls who were arrested for illegal abortion mainly have parents who have separated (14.3% girls with divorced or separated parents, 20% with remarried parents). This is evidence that the separation of parents correlates with the practice of illegal abortion.

Table 9 Distribution of detainees according to biological parents' marital status and reason for arrest (%)

Parents' marital status	Main reason for arrest						
	Rape	Theft	Illegal abortion	Fighting	Man-slaughter	Drugs/banditry	Total
Single	0	50	0	50	0	0	100
Married/monogamous	0	85.71	0	14.29	0	0	100
Married/polygamous	0	100	0	0	0	0	100
Divorced/separated	7.14	28.57	14.29	37.71	14.29	0	100
Widow/widower	14.29	28.57	0	42.86	14.29	0	100
Remarried	0	80	20	0	0	0	100
Don't know	0	0	0	0	0	100	100
No response	0	25	0	25	0	50	100

MEETINGS WITH PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND HEADS OF SHELTER HOMES

AUTHORITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Main challenges of the 'street children' phenomenon

- To design a global policy to protect street children and children accused of sorcery;
- To appoint qualified manpower and create shelter homes for these children;
- To budget for the rehabilitation and social reintegration of street children.

Problems caused by the 'street children' phenomenon[4]

Problems commonly dealt with include theft, rape, fighting, aggression, illegal seizure of the property of others, prostitution, delinquency, pimping, social insecurity, disobedience, and banditry.

Existence of action programmes to control the 'street children' phenomenon

According to the authorities, action programmes exist, but they are still in an early stage and need to be implemented.

Other possible reasons for deserting parental home

The main reasons that were indicated include parental poverty, ill-treatment of the children, parental irresponsibility and instability in the homes.

Actions to halt the phenomenon of 'street children'

- Utilise the media media to advise parents, public authorities and institutions in charge of vulnerable children.
- Create and equip shelter homes to take full care of vulnerable children.
- Train staff in charge of vulnerable children.
- Raise parents' salaries and pay them regularly.

Intervention capacity of the police and specialised services

The police and other specialised services in charge of public order are not equipped to reinforce the police and other services' ability to deal with situations.[5]

Main challenge posed by criminal children

Succeed in the re-education, reintegration and security of detained children.

Serious problems posed by criminal children

The CPRK is not qualified to deal with criminal minors. Since there is no qualified centre, the Catholic International Bureau for Children (BICE) looks after children in prison.

Action programmes for the rehabilitation and reintegration of criminal children

There was no appropriate programme for looking after criminal children, as can be seen from the following statements by heads of the CPRK:

> "Honestly, I don't know if there is one" (CPRK/personnel manager).
> "Actually, there is no action programme because of funds. NGOs usually take care of that."

Other possible reasons for deserting the parental home

There are many reasons, including the breakdown of marriages and accusations of sorcery. In short, children's rights are not respected. Orphans are neglected. The government seems to have abandoned measures to protect children. Similar reasons were given by the children themselves and by public authorities.

Actions to halt the phenomenon of 'street children'

- The government should organise the necessary structures for child protection.
- The government should disseminate family codes.

Capacity of the police and specialised services to intervene

The police and other services in charge of public order do not have the necessary tools to face the 'street children' phenomenon. This can be seen from the following statements:

> "First, the police should be equipped to play its role. They should be given power to enforce the law. Currently, interventions come from all over, which reduces its power. The police should have its own law, which allows them to act instantly without waiting orders from anyone" (personnel manager, CPRK).
> "The police and services in charge of public order are not equipped in terms of human resources. These children need psychologists and ethics experts who should them re-integrate in society" (deputy director CPRK).

PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF SHELTER HOMES

Main challenge posed by sheltered street children

The main challenge that has been pinpointed by people in charge of shelter homes is long-term reintegration of the children into their nuclear families or substitute families.

Main problems posed by sheltered street children

These include:

- difficulty in reintegrating children accused of sorcery even in their own nuclear families;
- poor living conditions in some families into which these children expect to reintegrate;
- limited material and financial means to take care of most children; and
- the lack of protection of street children. They are manipulated by politicians who wish to maintain their positions and it is not unusual for children to lose their lives as the result of a political dispute. The police and the army have an obligation to protect and not to harm children.

Possible reasons for desertion of parental home

Reasons that were stated include the poverty of the children's own families, polygamy, divorce, parents' separation and superstitious beliefs (child sorcerer phenomenon).

Actions to halt the phenomenon of 'street children'

- The government should establish the necessary structures for child protection.
- The government should disseminate family codes.
- The government should pay civil servants well and regularly.
- The government should rehabilitate towns and villages so that people can stay in their original environment, thereby reducing rural depopulation.

Capacity of the police and specialised services to intervene

Heads of shelter homes have come to the conclusion that the police are not equipped to take care of children in distress or to do their job properly.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS FROM EXPERIENCES ON THE SPOT

Contacts with the children, particularly in the street, have in essence revealed the following:

- Contrary to preconceived ideas, rather than vectors of disorder and disturbers of the public order, these children are victims of poor adaptation because of the disintegration of the social order.

- If the street children generally come from poor families, poverty is not necessarily the fundamental cause of criminality. Criminality is only the result of childhood suffering.

- The Family Code, which was promulgated in 1987, and which should protect the rights of the child, defines the reciprocal rights and obligations of husband and wife, and also the rights and obligations of parents for their children. The code is not readily available to the public and therefore not well utilised.

- The child is almost an abandoned cause. Fifteen years of economic embargo on the DRC for breaking a multilateral agreement in 1991 have

only increased the suffering of the population and the fate of the Congolese child. Since 1999 the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) has spent thousands of dollars per day without financing an ongoing programme for Congolese children.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on results of this study, a number of recommendations need to be made to the government, people in charge of public order, heads of shelter homes, as well as families, NGOs, churches, and so on.

These include the following:

- Design a global policy to protect street children and so-called sorcerer children.
- Budget for the rehabilitation and social reintegration of children in distress.
- Use the media to call on parents, public authorities and institutions in charge of vulnerable children and inform them of the danger of the phenomenon of 'street children'.
- Create and equip shelter homes to take full care of vulnerable children.
- Train staff in charge of vulnerable children.
- Create and train a specialised police force to take effective care of young delinquents.
- Raise parents' salaries and pay them regularly.
- Disseminate the Family Code, as it protects the child.
- Rehabilitate towns and villages so that people can stay in their original environment, thus reducing rural depopulation.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that the results of this study will constitute a database to be used by the various actors who are involved in trying to reduce the prevalence of the phenomenon known as 'street children'. The research will provide a tracking system that may help to obtain a full understanding of the variables involved in the phenomenon studied.

NOTES

1   Hubert Kabungulu Ngoy is a research consultant at Labor Optimus, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

2   B Nzuzi, Approches africaines de la sorcellerie, Présentation de l'ouvrage par son auteur, *Congo-Afrique* 316, juin–août 1997, p 365.
3   B Kabanga, Rapport de l'inquête sur l'administration de la Justice pour mineurs dans la Ville de Kinshasa, *CODE*, janvier 2004.
4   Statement by the head of the Office for Child Protection / Urban Division of the Ministry of Social Affairs.
5   Statement by the head of the Urban Division of the Ministry of Social Affairs.

Profiling youth involved in the informal markets of Luanda

Colonel Manuel Correia de Barros[1]

INTRODUCTION

Following the civil society workshop held in June 2004 at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) the Angolan Centre for Strategic Studies (CEEA) identified health, education, poverty, lack of economic opportunities, land, political rights, safety, and state and governance as challenges to Angolan security in the post-conflict period. Although participants acknowledged that much had already been done by the Angolan government after the end of the conflict, they felt that each of these areas should be the object of further research and support. The CEEA identified 'education' as the topic they would like to research.

METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL CONSTRAINTS

Linking education to security proved to be a challenge. Literature about education in emergencies and reconstruction periods does not make an obvious link to human security; it focuses, rather, on the difficulties around the rehabilitation of the formal education system. The research team, however, felt the need to establish a link between education, human security and regional implications. This was not entirely uncharted territory. Many authors have recently related education to conflict[2] and a short time ago the World Bank published an outstanding report on education and post-conflict reconstruction.[3]

In this report the World Bank team incorporates and systematises findings that, in spite of coming from other fields of knowledge, relate to education and stress the role that education can play in post-conflict reconstruction. "The central message of this book is that education has a key role in both preventing conflict and rebuilding fractured post conflict societies."[4]

This seems to indicate that the impact of education on human security is an area opening up for study. "The outpouring of analysis, publications,

and research projects in this field in the past two years suggests that there is now strong recognition of the importance of early investment in education as a prerequisite for successful post conflict reconstruction."[5]

Furthermore, education features prominently in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and pressure is put on governments to restore or reform the education system as a vital component of national reconciliation in post-conflict situations. The MDGs consist of a set of goals and targets, with the respective indicators, that "... commit the international community to an expanded vision of development. One that vigorously promotes human development as the key to sustaining social and economic progress in all countries ..."[6]

The second goal of the MDGs is to "achieve universal primary education" and its target is to ensure that by 2015 children everywhere will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. The indicators developed for this goal include:

• net enrolment ratio in primary education;
• proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5;
• primary completion rate (suggested but still to be adopted); and
• literacy rate of 15 to 24 year olds.[7]

While the MDGs consider education an indicator of development, the Human Security Network establishes the link between development and human security as follows: "Human security and human development are thus two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing and leading to a conducive environment for each other."[8]

Furthermore, the report from the Commission on Human Security (CHS)[9] cites "Empowering all people with universal basic education" as one important policy conclusion, stating that "The human security perspective underscores the importance of basic education, particularly for girls."[10]

This report argues that policy development in education should not only be framed by development considerations but should also be evaluated in terms of its implications on human security. Although the impact of education on conflict and on reconstruction seems to be acknowledged, indicators and analysis seldom (if ever) include a human security perspective – none of the MDGs' indicators for education take into account the impact of education on human security. The chosen indicators focus on measurable rates of school enrolment and completion, but there is no indicator to evaluate the quality of the education or the impact education is having on the social fabric.

When thinking about this subject – education and human security – their relation seems obvious: education means more opportunities and choices; education is the engine of economic development and growth; education is an essential tool in poverty reduction; education leads to personal enrichment. In short, education and human security seem to go hand in hand. The connections between security and education seem to be manifold – from the obvious physical security of the school environment to other more subtle forms of articulation with human security – power relations.

In terms of physical security of the school environment, the existence of landmines and other unexploded ordnance all over the territory poses a real threat. However, in Luanda, as in many other urban centres, the threat to students and teachers comes rather from crime. The National Police of Angola (PNA) have recently established a school policing programme in an effort to control the violence and criminality plaguing some schools in Luanda. According to an article published in the PNA magazine, the police are setting out to tackle crimes in schools "… that evolved from a minor problem or an occasional incident to a social problem; civil society commented and condemned the constant assaults, by well organized groups of delinquents, that victimised the students".[11]

To respond to this problem, the PNA created the School Security Brigade. The brigade relies on the support of various committees and multiple disciplines, such as sociology and psychology, taking into consideration that most of these incidents happen with and to minors. The PNA agents assigned to the brigade use deterrence strategies by making sure their presence is obvious and visible in the school grounds and neighbouring public places.

The PNA considers the programme effective and "… is carrying out a survey of schools in order to assess the efficiency of this programme, the performance of their officers, the exact number of victims and also to profile [perpetrators], so that better prevention strategies may be developed".[12]

It was now time to brainstorm on education as an instrument of power, exploring ideas around the following:

- how unequal educational systems, such as under the apartheid system, may be the source of social tension and resentment;
- how education can be used to alienate (or deny) group identity;
- education as a vehicle of dissemination of ideology, as happens in most dictatorial regimes and also in missionary schools, for instance where

political indoctrination and religious education may be provided on a
par with other school subject matters;

• how the education system has been used to co-opt youth into political
affiliations or into military recruitment – be it through the attribution
of scholarships or by raids on school buildings; and

• how the quality of the education provided may be equally important
as it will probably impact on the range of economic opportunities
available to school leavers.

The team then looked at the recent history of countries in Africa and
realised that some intrastate conflicts and coups have apparently been
staged by semi-educated youth who are discontented with the lack of
opportunities. In Ghana, for instance, many authors claim that supporters
of former military leader Jerry Rawlings were mainly high-school
leavers. Another case in point is the conflict in Sierra Leone, where the
founders of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were educated and
semi-educated youth, while the recruitment pool was formed by youth
pervaded by feelings of exclusion.[13]

  This discussion seems to have provoked another set of questions linked
to the hopes and expectations raised by education. The ultimate question
was: What happens when after leaving school those hopes and expectations
do not materialise? The ISS has been a pioneer in the development of the
concept of 'recruitment pools' – educated and semi-educated youth with
few economic opportunities leading to a sense of social exclusion and
ready to be co-opted by networks of crime.[14] The World Bank team seems
to have used the concept of recruitment pools in its analysis too:

> "Slow progress in the expansion of the secondary and tertiary education
> tends to generate a backlog of frustrated and unemployed youth ripe for
> recruitment into violence or crime. In addition to its impact on security and
> social stability, this situation hampers economic development and, in the
> longer term, weakens the entire educational system. Two clear implications
> emerge from this: the importance of focus on sector-wide reconstruction, and
> the need to attend to the learning needs of youth who lost out on educational
> opportunities as a result of conflict and who run the risk of becoming a 'lost
> generation' for the education system and the wider society."[15]

According to the same report by the World Bank and building upon
findings from existing literature and a database of 52 countries affected
by conflict since 1990, several factors may increase the risk of social

conflict in a society. The team confronted the Angolan context with the risk factors mentioned in the report.[16]

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Poverty alone is not a cause of violent conflict, but is associated with an increased risk of civil war. In spite of being portrayed as a wealthy country, Angola is among the poorest countries in the region. War was the main cause of the underfeeding of 50% of the population; of the lack of improved sanitation for 70% of the urban population; and of the lack of access to clean water for 34% of the urban and 40% of the rural population. In terms of the human development index (HDI) of the SADC region, Angola is only ahead of Mozambique and Malawi. Whereas poverty alone does not lead to armed strife, widespread poverty in post-conflict situations increases the risk of renewed conflict and slows down national recovery.

IDENTITY-BASED FACTORS

Ethnic and religious diversity

Diversity can decrease the risk of violent conflict, but only on the condition that there are no hegemonic tendencies in any of the coexisting groups. The Angolan conflict is often referred to as a conflict disputed by three ethnically (and, some would argue, religiously) defined movements, all with hegemonic intentions – the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) – mestiço-dominated, urban-based; the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) representing the Bakongo peoples of the north; and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) – as the representative of black peasants, the Ovimbundu.[17] Support provided by opposing sides during the Cold War compounded divisions among the three movements and reinforced ideologically identities that were already defined ethnically. Adding to this, peace in Angola seems to have been achieved through the military victory of one of the opponents.

However, this was disputed by the Angolans on the research team and later confirmed during the research. In general Angolans were quick to point out that an analysis of the membership of the three movements would not sustain this perception. Ethnicity and tribalism, according to them, have been political cards played at different times to legitimise political agendas, but have currently no weight in terms of political affiliation. What seem to be prevailing these days in Angola are widening socio-economic inequalities and geographical imbalances. Angolans

disputed also the perception that the conflict was won by military victory, even if this perception was spreading internationally. People would often mention that the guerrilla war could have continued for some more years, especially in the north; that the death of the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, in February 2002 would not have meant peace unless both parties were ready for peace. Furthermore they stress that peace was achieved by an agreement – the Memorandum of Understanding agreed in Luena. It is true that the Luena memorandum refers mainly to military and security questions, but according to the Angolans interviewed social concerns were already being addressed long before the end of the hostilities. In education, for instance, Angolans pointed out that professionals, such as teachers, trained in UNITA-controlled areas had already been integrated into government structures. They agreed though that education could play a vital role in reinforcing national identities. The way Angolan history will be analysed and taught may contribute to cementing or curtailing an emerging national identity. They seemed to agree that in Angola special care should be given to this aspect of school curricula and regular assessment should be undertaken in order to determine the impact of education in national reconciliation.

Language

Language can be a symbol of identity and union but also of division and exclusion. During the war internally displaced persons (IDPs) from different regions of Angola gathered in the same camps, which helped to develop Portuguese not only as the official language but also as the *de facto* lingua franca.[18] Currently, Angolans are debating the introduction of local languages into the formal education system. Reactions to the debate have been mixed: whereas some agree with the reform, others believe this to be an artificial way of keeping alive a language that would otherwise disappear. This report does not argue that Angola should drop the inclusion of local languages; on the contrary, this inclusion may be a vehicle of cohesion. But it can have the adverse outcome and reinforce ethnic differences where they are disappearing. Particularly when internationally the conflict continues to be analysed in ethnic and tribal terms, ethnicity remains a card that is open to misuse.

CIVIL WAR-RELATED FACTORS

Countries affected by civil strife are more likely to revert to conflict within the first decade of peace. Angola has experienced conflict since the 1960s,

with occasional periods of relative peace. According to the World Bank report, if education is to play a role in national reconciliation, the sooner the education system is rebuilt and reformed, the more the likelihood of renewed conflict decreases.[19] But the rebuilding of the education system in Angola should also provide for education opportunities for those youth that are already outside the regular schooling system, be it due to age, economic circumstances or family constraints. Given the decades of violence that Angola has experienced, providing diversified educational opportunities may be the incentive youth need so that they do not continue to engage in violent alternatives.

EDUCATIONAL FACTORS

As mentioned above, the education system can multiply and reproduce the causes of conflict and create new imbalances. Angola has already experienced the impact that a distorted educational system can have on the social fabric: the colonial regime used the education system to accentuate existing social divisions in Angola and the system favoured some social groups to the detriment of others. Given the difficulties that the education system experienced in Luanda during the decades of conflict (lack of teachers and classrooms), private schools opened all over the city. This trend seems to have expanded to private secondary and tertiary institutions, and it is in the interest of the Angolan authorities to monitor it closely.

Currently, in Luanda, according to the Angolan press, "It's enough to own a yard, a garage, an annex, and some money, to be in condition to open a private school, without any of the pedagogic, psychological and administrative considerations that are recommended by the Ministry of Education."[20]

Furthermore, the Ministry of Education has strong evidence that many of these private schools did not apply for the necessary permits, thus being unable to provide students with legal certificates of education. Although private initiative may be welcome and represent a lesser burden on state education, the government should undertake measures to guarantee not only the quality of education in these private institutions, but also that education provided both in public and private learning institutions reaches the same level of quality. Privatising education may entail the risk of having the best teachers abandon the state schools in favour of better paying private institutions. The Ministry of Education may wish to consider the inclusion of incentives for teachers who remain in state

schools. It is equally important to guarantee that quality education is extended to rural as well as urban areas. Given the socio-economic and geographic tensions existing in Angola, the perceived association of a particular group with better education, and thus better economic opportunities, can lead to further resentments and feelings of exclusion.

Several interviews carried out during the fieldwork seem to indicate there is already a perception in Angola that uneven reconstruction and growth may be widening the development gap between the coastal region and the interior of the country. Expanding and decentralising education facilities and training programmes may contribute to removing this geographical imbalance.

The research team then debated which demographic group should be included in this research. From the various readings and discussions it became obvious that links between education and human security would have to be threaded through children and youth, as the first beneficiaries of education and the primary protagonists in most African conflicts. The team thus identified the target group – youth – and decided to focus on those engaged in the informal markets of Luanda, as they seemed to be the youth group currently most vulnerable to violence, either as victims or as perpetrators.

Youth is the biggest demographic group in SADC countries. In Angola, 50% of the population are under the age of 12 and more than 70% are under the age of 35.[21] The streets of Luanda are crowded with hundreds of people selling their wares among the long queues of cars and buses small stalls seem to pop up unexpectedly, and informal markets are spread all over town. Most of the Angolans involved in these informal activities are young men and women, and they could well become the universe of our sampling. This decision was also based on the findings of a 1998 survey on the informal market of Luanda, such as:

> "The informal sector is dominated by economic agents who are mainly illiterate … The average age in this sector is considerably lower than in the formal sector … The informal sector sustains almost 55% of families of Luanda but it has the highest levels of poverty."[22]

And later in the same report:

> "… the index of creation of employment for heads of household shows a fall of 53 points from 1991 to 1995, which indicates a general withdrawal

of supply of employment, particularly affecting the heads of household segment of the market. The informal sector contribution to the creation of employment for heads of household is 40% in the last ten years."[23]

According to the same report, the low salary was the reason for 72% of people leaving the formal private sector and entering the informal sector. It commented that "the informal market is like a shelter/refuge for the youngest heads of households".[24]

The fundamental questions were:

- What level of education, if any, have youth selling in the informal markets of Luanda?

- If they have some level of education, why are they working in the informal sector?

- Does the education provided in the education system in Angola capacitate youth to enter the job market?

- What expectations did they have when they joined school? Were those expectations fulfilled when they left school? If not, how do they feel about it?

- When and why did they leave school?

- Given the chance, would they go back to school?

- Could the hopes and expectations raised by education, and not realised due to few economic opportunities or poor quality of the education received, create in these youth a sense of frustration and social exclusion, thus forming the recruitment pools necessary to networks of crime or warlords?

- And if so, given the geo-strategic importance of Angola, could recruitment pools pose a regional problem?

This report does not aim to respond to all these questions, but to provoke thoughts around these issues and contribute to the ongoing debate on education and security. Post-conflict situations represent a difficult challenge, but also an opportunity for analysis and reform

of the education system. Being a vital tool in human development, education in post-conflict situations should be able to address the educational needs of vulnerable youth. Profiling youth involved in the informal sector could provide insights into a reform of the education sector or for the development of education initiatives targeting this group.

The immediate physical danger that many of these youth face every day is obvious – they squeeze between cars and buses; they constantly dodge traffic; and they spend long hours unattended on the streets, subject to nearly every kind of abuse. This group seems to be more exposed to violence, be it as victims or as perpetrators.

Luanda seemed a good choice of city for research: Luanda did not experience direct war[25] and thus became a haven for people fleeing more affected areas – according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the population of Luanda grew to an estimated 3.8 million during the war years;[26] being the capital and under government authority the education system in Luanda was never severely disrupted by war, but rather by overcrowded classrooms, lack of school facilities, and lack of qualified teachers; and Luanda is likely to be the first place in Angola to experience the full impact of any education reform. But Luanda should not be regarded as representing Angola and rural areas will probably experience different needs and outcomes. Thus, findings from this survey and report should not be extrapolated to the whole country.

Finally, the team decided to undertake a quantitative survey of youth involved in the informal sector of Luanda and their education, hopes and expectations. Respondents were chosen randomly in the places where they trade. Trained interviewers posed the questions and filled in the questionnaires.

The quantitative survey was developed and undertaken by ISPRA, in partnership with the CEEA and ISS. The interviewers, also trained by ISPRA, targeted 16 of the best-known informal markets and randomly interviewed 1,344 people. Although youth are usually defined as being between 16 and 25 years, in Luanda, the team decided the target age would be from 16 to 30 years, given the constraints to school life that students may have faced during the war.

This quantitative survey was complemented by a qualitative survey of 98 respondents, undertaken in the same way – a random choice of participants and questions posed by trained interviewers. This survey was developed and undertaken by the CEEA, ISS and ISPRA.

The following section presents the results from the analysis of both reports.

FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEYS

The statistical analysis of the data gathered via the surveys and some of the findings turned out to be surprising, even to attentive observers of Angolan society. The analysis and the findings of the surveys were thoroughly discussed with Angolan citizens from different economic sectors. The team asked people how they would interpret a specific outcome or how would they explain certain findings. The team hopes that, together with the observations *in loco*, these comments will add richness to the interpretation of the data and will help to clarify or raise some issues.[27]

The first surprise the research team encountered when analysing the survey data was the gender ratio of the sample – 73% of the respondents were male (980) while women made up only 27% (364) of our sample. Why did our sample have such a gender gap, particularly when there seem to be far more women than men involved in the informal market?

Besides, according to OXFAM UK:

> "As a result of the deaths of many young men during the war, Angola has developed an unusual demographic profile. Recent figures released by UNICEF show that there are only 91 men for every 100 women in Angola. This imbalance is even greater among Angolans between the ages of 20 and 35 – the principal fighting age groups. While, in the longer term, this imbalance might create new leadership or employment opportunities for women, in the short term it means that there are very large numbers of households headed solely by women."[28]

Many explanations were given for this outcome: some say women are more zealous and dedicated to their work; others argue that time is too precious for women to be 'wasted' replying to surveys – women spend the whole day walking, carrying merchandise, sweating, and labouring on the streets and markets, only to arrive home and find all the household chores, children and husband waiting for them. Men, the team were told, are busy in the informal market for lack of a formal job, they do not consider this activity 'proper' work and always find time for a chat, a drink or even a flirtation, so why not answer a survey?

A comment provided by one of the respondents to the qualitative survey seems to illustrate these statements. Respondent 63, a female lottery seller, when halfway through the survey, said:

> "Hey little lady, don't you think that you have already asked too many questions? Look the papers [meaning the lottery tickets] are finished, I earn daily, I didn't leave lunch prepared at home so come back tomorrow, OK. Ya! I must go home and talk to my neighbour [the man who sells her the lottery tickets]. Sorry but I can't answer any more, I am also very hungry. Sorry."[29]

Another plausible answer is that women seem to be generally less educated than men and might feel inadequate to participate in surveys. Unequal gender access to education seems to be a pattern in most developing countries and, some would argue, even in developed societies. Already in 1998 "in the informal sector women heads of household [formed] a high-risk group, given that 42.2% of them cannot read or write".[30]

However, the findings from the current survey seem to be different. An analysis by gender of other variables, such as monthly income levels, age, and education, showed that while there was a differential in monthly income between the two groups – 5,600 kwanza (US$70) for women versus 7,400 kwanza (US$92.5)[31] for men – the male and female cohorts were similar in many other ways. While female respondents found themselves in a particularly invidious situation with average earnings only three quarters those of men, the average age of respondents in both groups was 21 and both groups had, on average, similar education levels (slightly over five years each). The difference in earnings does not seem to be attributable to education or age, and this was probably the first surprise of the survey – why this difference in income?

This income gap may be due to the gender gap of the sample; or men may be more inclined to inflate their income; or it may even reflect attitudes towards gender. Further research on this topic should endeavour to clarify the income gap, as many households in Angola are headed by women.

Where the two groups do differ markedly is in their exposure to economic activity. While 63% of male respondents who named their activities sold goods, female respondents were almost totally confined to this sector: 92% of women who declared an economic activity were sellers. Men enjoyed greater exposure to other opportunities in the informal sector as well as to work as mechanics and 'middle men'.

Selling constituted 77% of all the economic activities declared by respondents, making this sector a key driver of economic trends and attitudes, while 20.6% of the respondents were connected to services in the informal sector (guarding and washing cars, *roboteiros,*[32] 'middle men', prostitutes). However, slightly more than one third (36%) of respondents said they were not economically active or declined to declare in which sector they operated.

When sellers are considered on their own, neither the predominance of men nor the income differentials disappear. Women made up only 38% of sellers. The gender differential in earnings is reduced, but does not disappear. Female sellers earn on average 6,200 kwanza (US$77.5) a month compared to 7,800 kwanza (US$97.5) earned by male sellers.

When clustered by monthly income, the sample presents the following picture:

- 7.2% earn more than US$200
- 20.7% earn between US$100 and US$200
- 10.6% earn between US$50 and US$100, and
- 13.8% earn less than US$50

Although profit is very low, it is higher than was originally assumed by the research team, particularly considering that the minimum national salary for formal employment in Angola is US$50.

The second most striking thing about the respondents is the size of their households and the number of people who depend on them. The average household size is 5.7 (approximately double the average household size in South Africa, for instance). Half of all households have more than five members. Despite their relative youth (the average age of respondents is 21), the respondents have an average of 2.1 children each, indicating that household facilities are shared with kin or other families. The large household size is reflected in the high dependency ratio (the ratio of economically active to not economically active). The average household has 2.2 economically active members. Therefore every economically active household member has, on average, 1.6 other household members depending on him/her – despite the abysmal income levels.

Once again female respondents find themselves in an adverse situation. Their households have fewer economically active members (2 versus 2.3) and are larger (5.8 versus 5.7) than those of male respondents. Female respondents similarly had, on average, 2.2 children versus the 2.0 reported by the male respondents.

The questionnaire included a question on marital status. Most respondents considered themselves 'single', although they may co-habit with a partner and even have children with that partner (and/or others). When the research team confronted their Angolan family and friends with this finding, all of them agreed that most Angolans do not 'marry officially'. Stating that one has a husband or wife seldom has to do with marriage. For instance, women regard a man who contributes to household expenses as a husband, independently of whether they live together or not and of being married to him or not. This fluidity in relations merits further research.

Another common feature in Angola seems to be polygamy:

> "Each man with some wealth gets a second woman, sometimes even a third and more women. Doing this, he fulfils an old African tradition, and also satisfies his ego, shows his machismo, splits his bad temper, and he has a shelter to hide in case of domestic quarrel. She accepts the situation, a little by tradition – her parents and grandparents have lived like that – but also because having a man at home increases her respectability, gives her some protection, enlarges her financial capacity, and she gets a father for her children. But this is not always the case, since many men don't have the financial capacity to maintain even one family, don't help, and only come when the problems on the other side are too big and they must run away from them."[33]

According to many of these interviewees, another consequence of the gap between female and male seems to be prostitution:

> "Prostitution is often the outcome of these relationships, only with much worse consequences. It seems to affect all kinds of women – young and old, illiterate or academics, poor or rich. The motives can be the most disparate – some so frivolous as getting a dress, a mobile phone, or just to go for a walk, others for poverty and necessity, like paying for studies, feeding a son or buying medicines. Always a risky profession, but now much riskier with the HIV/AIDS threat. But all of this is the result of a society experiencing many problems, without means to guarantee the livelihoods of everybody, with great economic differences and where war left a deep imprint not only in terms of emotional and social relations but also in terms of living for the day with little consideration for the future."[34]

Concerning this last point – the future – it is interesting to notice that 58.6% of the respondents do not know what retirement is, and many others have a distorted notion of what a pension might mean.

Another surprise in this survey is the literacy level of the respondents. Whereas the initial assumption was that many of these youth would be illiterate, the survey sample revealed only 1% of illiterates, even though Angola's national illiteracy rate is 58%.[35] On the other hand, 44.9% of the respondents have attained more than the fifth grade. The explanation is linked with the high rates of unemployment, which seem to be sending many qualified people to the informal market. This finding also surprised the Angolans with whom the team discussed the results. The most frequent remark was: "If people with education are selling in the informal market, what are the illiterate supposed to be doing?"

A further unexpected finding concerned the kind of family structure in which respondents said they had grown up. It is inevitable that the war would have had a pronounced impact on how households are constructed physically and socially. And yet most respondents (77%) say they grew up with one or both parents, while 19% grew up with another family member. Almost one quarter (23%) of respondents who answered the question reported growing up with someone other than a parent. Four per cent of respondents reported growing up with neighbours, friends or other people who were not relatives.

Respondents who did not grow up with a parent were asked where their parents were. Almost all of those who answered the questions explained their parents' absence in terms of reasons that might – though not necessarily – have been directly related to the conflict. Over half of those growing up without a parent said their parents were dead or had 'disappeared'. Whereas one can assume that the 'disappearance' may have been caused by the war, it is more difficult to relate the war to death, as the questionnaire did not include a question on the cause of death. Given the low life expectancy in Angola, one should not extrapolate and assume that these deaths may be attributable to the war.

And yet one cannot argue that the sample seem to enjoy familial instability, as most of the respondents continue to live in stable families. Thus, 75.3% still live with family (parents, husband/wife, others); 93.3% claimed to have had a well-cared-for infancy; 83.9% were sent to school by a member of their family; relatives helped 63.9% of the respondents with their homework; 50.1% left school for familial reasons ('parents, difficulties', 'hunger at home', 'help parents'); helping the family was the aim of 34.4% of the respondents when they started working; 46.5% of the respondents support their family with their income from work; and 74.3% want to give a medium (professional) or higher education to their children. Statements provided by respondents to the qualitative survey

seem to indicate family stability and eagerness to have the children educated:

> "I had a religious education, my parents are religious, I'm the youngest of 14 siblings, my father is a gardener and my mother a *lavadeira*[36] and with what they earned they had to feed us … we were well respected due to our education."[37]

> "I had a very nice infancy, I grew up with my parents. My parents were always very good and tender with me … we were 30 siblings, some died, now we are 14, and this because my father had three wives."[38]

Another important finding of this survey was the degree of stability that most respondents claimed to have, in spite of all the violence of war. This feeling of stability may be related to the family situation. Thus, 92% of the respondents said that they had friends in school; 76% of them felt equal to everybody in the same school; 92.8% liked their teachers; 93.5% liked do to homework; 74.3% liked attending school; 94.8% wished to pursue their studies; and 70.8% feel that studying had been worth even if it did not seem to improve their livelihoods.

In spite of all the negative and counterproductive events that have taken place in the recent history of Angola – civil war, economic difficulties, and social conflicts – it seems that at least some aspects of the African traditional family may have survived, even in a big urban centre such as Luanda. If so, this could represent a solid ground on which to build peace education and national reconciliation.

The impact of the war is also evident in the degree of mobility shown by the respondents. Less than a quarter (22%) of respondents said they had been born in Luanda province.

The answers respondents gave to the question on what they would like to have been as an adult also seem to suggest the value and the hopes that respondents (and their families) pinned on education: 32.7% were aiming for a tertiary education. All the professions that were mentioned most require education or some kind of technical knowledge: 12.1% mentioned businessman, 11.6% wished to become drivers and 10.6% were aiming at becoming teachers.

It is interesting that respondents expressed their wish for tertiary education by using the term 'doctor'. In Angola 'doctor' has very wide use, and applies to physicians, lawyers, economists, mathematicians: in short, to any profession requiring tertiary education. These are commonly

regarded as liberal professions, well paid and bringing prestige to those who practise them. Businessmen are considered influential people, without any employer. 'Driver' may seem a strange choice, but given the circumstances it may be not so surprising. Angolans who live in urban centres had their mobility severely curtailed by the war and 'driver' seems to invoke a wandering life, the ownership of a truck and the money you can earn when travelling, ferrying goods from one place to another.

The qualitative survey gives a different picture, as more male respondents prefer technical professions such as engineers and mechanics. This may be because in the qualitative survey this was an open question, whereas in the quantitative survey it was a closed question with several options, among which was 'doctor'. The results of the quantitative survey seem to indicate the high regard most Angolan have for education and the clear perception that better education equals better economic opportunities. However, the qualitative survey provided insights into the frustrations of some respondents:

> "I still didn't stop dreaming of being a teacher so I can teach my sons."[39]

Some showed more altruistic and social concerns:

> "He insists on being a soccer player as he likes very much soccer. But then he said that he wanted to be a politician to finish with banditry."[40]

And others proved to be dreamers and ambitious too:

> "He didn't like to do anything, but had a dream being president to help his friends."[41]

Professions such as soldier, policeman, sportsman and artist were hardly mentioned. That most respondents omitted soldier and policeman could be attributed to the war. After periods of protracted violence people commonly reject professions associated with it. In Mozambique, for instance, most combatants preferred demobilisation to integration with the new armed forces, and youth have consistently been evading mandatory conscription.[42] But this does not seem to be true of Angola. When talking to people involved in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process in Angola, they all stated that most fighters were looking forward to remaining with the armed forces. They felt they would have shelter, food, a salary, and a pension. Not an unpleasant life

in peacetime. Civilian life seemed too uncertain for most fighters and the DDR kits would not last forever. In a conversation with officers of the armed forces they mentioned that they are often asked when they will start recruiting again. Thus, the research team was quite surprised that military professions were chosen so seldom.

When analysing the graphic about the years in which respondents joined school, peaks are clearly visible on the years 1992, 1999 and 2003. The same peaks appear in relation to the years in which respondents dropped out of school. Going back to the historical context, 1992 was the year of the first peace agreement and elections; 1999 was when the war started to turn into the foreseeable defeat of UNITA; and 2003 was the first year of total peace since the 1960s. These years may have been ones of great hope, thus encouraging families to send their children to school and probably to take older ones out of school to maximise the window of economic opportunity that the end of a conflict always brings.

But there may be another explanation. If we look at the average age of respondents, most of them are between 16 and 25 years. Assuming that entry to school is usually at 7 years, the majority of the sample should have joined school between 1986 and 1994. Leaving school would then be between 1994 and 2000 for those who dropped after Level 1 and between 1999 and 2004 for those completing Level 2. For one reason or another, this finding may require further research, particularly if cross-referenced with the reasons respondents gave for dropping out of school.

Answers to this question – why did you leave school – were clustered in external (92.3%) and personal reasons (4.3%). Under 'external', the team considered all reasons that were beyond the control of the respondent, such as war or poverty, and 'personal reasons' expressed individual choice, such as "I wanted to marry and start my own family". The qualitative survey showed that many girls abandoned school because of pregnancy:

> "I left studying because I became pregnant, but even pregnant I used to go to school, but the headmaster said that they didn't accepted pregnant students, only in the evening class, but at that hour there were many bandits so I decided to leave school."[43]

This particular reply illustrates how lack of security, even in peaceful times, may hinder school attendance.

Sometimes children were taken out of school for reasons that they perceived as unfair :

"My father made me go and live with a man, because I was assimilating little. I was sad looking at the other ones going to school and me staying at my in-laws not being able to join them on the way to school."[44]

But going to school in some cases was an difficult process requiring tough choices and acceptance:

"I went to school when I was 5 years old, but I only finished 3rd grade when I was 8 years old, the 4th grade at 9, 5th grade at 11, and this because when I passed I had to stay one year at home without studying because the money was not enough for all of us siblings to study at the same time. The same happened to my brothers and sisters, we were many at home."[45]

The team tried to cluster the replies into different categories and produced the following analysis: 67.8% of the respondents claimed economic reasons for dropping out of school, while 26.9% blamed war, and 1.9% gave other reasons. This cluster of replies seems to imply that economic reasons may weigh more heavily than war when families have to face decisions regarding the education of their young. It is true that Luanda may not be the best place to make such an analysis, as the city itself was hardly hit by war. However, the education system suffered impacts from the conflict: the influx of refugees and displaced people translated into overcrowded classrooms; lack of facilities and equipment; and shortage of qualified teachers. So, it is not very clear what respondents meant when they mentioned war as a reason for dropping out of school – they could be referring as much to lack of schools and teachers as to having been drafted or even to economic hardships brought about by the conflict. However, this finding seems to be relevant and deserves more research, as many governments in the region are under pressure from international financing agencies to control state expenditure and privatise many services, education being one of them.

The survey also inquired into the origin of the goods respondents were trading. The general perception in Angola seems to be that informal markets are the preferred means of passing on stolen or illicit goods. The research team clustered the replies to this question – where do you get the goods you are trading – into licit acquisition (wholesale warehouses): 56%; illicit acquisition (goods from hospitals are most likely stolen): 0.2%; and doubtful acquisition (goods procured at the airport and harbour may be the result of theft, but they also may be procured through airplane and boat crews, which implies at worst tax evasion): 2%.

Only 12.9% of the sample claimed to have a selling licence, while 44.8% openly stated that they did not have one. However, 31.3% acknowledged being harassed by the economic police, to whom they seem to pay regular 'informal fees'. Since this was a quantitative survey with a direct question, it is likely that many respondents may have felt intimidated into admitting to bribing the police. In fact, *gasosa*[46] seems to be common and widespread in Angola.

> "It exists at all levels, mainly in the public sector. Largely created by an excessive bureaucracy; by the lack of legislation to penalise it; by the low wages and the lack of respect for 'things' of the state."[47]

The replies regarding the place where they trade confirms that most activity is undertaken in open public spaces, such as streets and open markets, while only 8.4% claim to trade in institutions such as government departments and schools. This reinforces the vulnerability of these youth by increasing their risk of becoming victims of crime – they walk unaccompanied on the streets, carrying goods and money, thus becoming targets for corrupt officials and thieves alike.

One must keep in mind that street selling is undertaken in two different ways. The first, mainly by young males, is done in places where cars often stop (near traffic lights, fuel pumps, or where traffic jams often occur). The seller takes this opportunity to show and try to sell his products. The seller seldom moves, except when the economic inspectors come near. The second is practised mainly by women, usually young, who carry the product to sell on their heads, almost all with a baby on their backs, and many of them pregnant again, almost permanently moving on the streets, selling to passers-by or knocking door to door. They are known as *zungueiras* and they seem to embody the courage of Angolan women.

And what do respondents do with the income they make? Clustering the replies one obtains the following:

- 72.5% spend their income on essential items, such as family support
- 7.4% spend it on personal gratification, such as entertainment or nice clothing; and
- 2.4% claim that they save money.

It is striking that so few respondents (1.7%) claimed to be working to pay for education. This seems to stress the effect that economic hardship may have when families are considering the education of their young.

It also seems to argue in favour of state intervention and investment in social sectors.

CONCLUSIONS

Although this survey refers to Luanda, it provides some insights that should be further researched.

Education is regarded by respondents and their families as an investment in the future, something that will bring prestige and will open up a range of choices to the family and the individual. Most respondents entered school with great hopes and had to leave out for reasons beyond their control. When they realised they had to drop school most respondents said that they experienced sadness and anger.

This seems to be indicative of an emerging feeling of exclusion, which should be taken seriously and duly addressed. Education can play a vital role in keeping these youth within social accepted parameters and in harnessing their contribution to the reconstruction and development of Angola.

But to achieve this goal, this group has to be targeted with special education opportunities – be they flexible hours of attendance, or specially developed curricula.

Given the economic hardship experienced by most families in Angola, the government may be required to increase expenditure on social sectors. According to a report on public financing in Angola:

> "Compared with the majority of other SADC countries, Angola is in a worse position, in terms of the percentage of Government expenditure carried out in the education and health sectors. This fact, which should be cause for concern, is one of the underlying reasons for the weak performance of the education and health sectors in Angola. The average share of education in Government expenditure, in the period from 1997 to 2001, was 4.7% in Angola, while, in the 14 SADC countries, the average was 16.7% ... In short, as a proportion of its total Government expenditure, Angola devoted ... to the education sector less than a third. In the case of education, some countries, like South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, exceeded 20%. In these countries, the weight of education in Government expenditure is four or even five times higher than in Angola."[48]

Angola has emerged from a long conflict and has tremendous potential to become a key player in the region. Investment in education may

contribute not only to national reconciliation but also to a tremendous increase in the human capital of Angola.

Yet education, insofar as it raises hopes and aspirations in youth and their families, can contribute to a sense of frustration if and when these hopes and aspirations are not realised. The finding of our surveys among street traders, as far as education was concerned, revealed the presence of a large number of relatively well-educated young people forced through economic circumstances to make a living by selling on the street: an occupation which, as we have noted, was regarded at least by the young men as not being a 'proper job'. Such a situation raises the spectre of social exclusion, which may make youth liable to be drawn into a life centred on violence. It is in the interest of both Angola and the remaining SADC countries that such recruitment pools should be confined and controlled. Education on its own can only be a partial solution. As Angola reaps the benefits of peace and booming oil prices experienced over the last two years, a priority must be the development of the economy in a way that draws increasing numbers of young people into the formal employment sector. Only in this way will increasing access to education be matched by the channelling of skills in productive activity, and the kind of social stability that Angola has desired for so long.

NOTES

1   Colonel Manuel Correia de Barros (ret) is the head of the Southern Africa Research Department Centro de Estudos Estratégicos de Angola (CEEA).
2   Paul Collier, Paul Gaultier and Jan Willem Gunning, *The microeconomics of African growth, 1950–2000,* although focusing mainly on the economics of conflict, often refers to education as a factor impacting on conflict, for instance.
3   The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, *Reshaping the future – education and post conflict reconstruction,* 2005.
4   Ibid, p xii.
5   Ibid.
6   <www.developmentgoals.org/About_the_goals.htm> (February 2005).
7   Ibid.
8   <www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.php> (February 2005). According to their website, the Human Security Network (HSN) is a group of like-minded countries from all regions of the world that, at the level of foreign ministers, maintains dialogue on questions pertaining to human security. The network includes Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand and South Africa as an observer. The network has a unique inter-regional and multiple agenda perspective

with strong links to civil society and academia. The network emerged from the landmines campaign and was formally launched at a ministerial meeting in Norway in 1999. Conferences at foreign minister level were held in Bergen, Norway (1999), in Lucerne, Switzerland (2000), Petra, Jordan (2001), Santiago de Chile (2002), Graz, Austria (2003) and Bamako, Mali (2004).

9   The Commission on Human Security was established with the initiative of the government of Japan as a contribution to the UN goals as expressed at the UN Millennium Summit. According to their website, it is co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. It benefits from the participation of ten distinguished commissioners from around the world.

10 *Human security now,* Commission on Human Security, New York, 2003, p 114.

11 S Conceição, Brigada de Segurança Escolar, *Tranquilidade,* Issue 0, 2004, p 8.

12 Ibid, p 9.

13 Although the team did not research this phenomenon, newspapers in Angola periodically include news on youth gangs led, apparently, by educated upper-class youth.

14 This concept has been originally developed by Angela McIntyre, a former senior researcher with the ISS. See any of the many writings of this author on children and conflict.

15 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, op cit, p 25.

16 Ibid, pp 3, 7 ff.

17 <www.fas.org/irp/world/para/unita.htm> (February 2005).

18 T Hodges, *Angola from Afro-Stalinism to petro-diamond capitalism*, Indiana University Press, 2004.

19 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, op cit.

20 Fernanda Bravo, Há colégios privados com níveis inferiores aos do Estado, *Jornal de Angola*, 21 October 2004.

21 Global survey on education in emergencies – Angola Country Report, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, December 2003.

22 Alves da Rocha, preface to M Adauta de Sousa, *Informal sector in Luanda – contribution for a better understanding*, Author's edition, Luanda, 1998, p 7.

23 Adauta de Sousa, op cit, p 39.

24 Ibid, p 33.

25 Luanda did not experience open conflict, except in 1975 and 1992.

26 <http://mirror.undp.org/angola/Country%20Profile.htm> (February 2005).

27 All the members of the research team approached their Angolan relatives, friends and acquaintances and discussed with them the findings of the analysis. These were informal interviews but the team felt that they could add a lot of wealth to the final report.

28 <www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/where_we_work/angola/menandwomen.htm> (February 2005).

29 Respondent 63.
30 Adauta de Sousa, op cit, p 39.
31 The exchange rate used throughout this report is US$1 = 80 kwanza.
32 In Angolan slang this means a man who pushes a cart.
33 Núria, Angolan female in her twenties, single with one child, January 2005.
34 Nela, Angolan female in her thirties, married with children, January 2005.
35 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Relatório do Desenvolvimento Humano 2003, 2001 data.
36 In Portuguese this means a woman who washes the laundry from different households. Usually these women collect the laundry from different houses, wash it in the river, dry and iron it and then deliver the washed items to the respective households against a token payment.
37 Respondent 62. Male, 25 years old, married, 2 children, 8th grade, 13 siblings.
38 Respondent 60. Female, 27 years old, married, 1 son, studies 7th grade, from a family of 29 siblings (now 13).
39 Respondent 62. Male, 25 years old, married, 2 children, 8th grade, 13 siblings.
40 Respondent 58. Male, 17 years old, single, no children, studies 7th grade.
41 Respondent 59. Male, 22 years old, single, no children, 4th grade.
42 A Leão, *Weapons in Mozambique – reducing availability and demand*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2004.
43 Respondent 63. Female, 19 years old, married, 1 son, 8th grade, lottery seller.
44 Respondent 42. Female, 21 years old, married, 2 children, 5th grade.
45 Respondent 60. Female, 27 years old, married, 1 son, studies 7th grade, from a family of 29 siblings (now 13).
46 *Gasosa* means soft drink, but in Angola is the usual colloquial term for a bribe or tip.
47 M C Barros and F Njele, Human security in Angola, Unpublished essay, CEEA, 2004.
48 Public financing of the social sectors in Angola, UNPD, IOM, UNICEF, WHO in partnership with the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, August 2002, Luanda, p 13.

Perceptions of human security in democratic South Africa
Opinions of students from tertiary institutions
Norman Mlambo[1]

INTRODUCTION

In South Africa, the end of apartheid in 1994 brought relative peace and state security and an end to state involvement in violent conflict, both internally and externally. The end of apartheid also appeared to fit in well with the end of the Cold War between the Western democracies and the Eastern communist block. The hope then was that, while the end of apartheid would bring a regional peace dividend in southern Africa, the end of the Cold War would usher in a global period of peace and security.

However, the world in general has not enjoyed the peace dividend expected after the end of the Cold War. In fact, the state of international peace and security is much worse today than it was at the end of the 20th century. International terrorism and the global war against it have left the world much more vulnerable, especially after the events of September 11 in the United States of America. These developments continue to affect South Africa. Moreover, even in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, the post-apartheid era did not bring tranquillity to the region. New conflicts erupted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho and Zimbabwe, which continue to affect South Africa negatively.

PURPOSE

This paper seeks to analyse the perceptions and reactions of selected students to human security threats in South Africa in the post-apartheid era and how these perceptions might affect the country's human security-related policies. It aims to provide an understanding of the security concerns of selected students in South Africa and how policymakers

Table 1 Nationality of respondents

Nationality	Percentage of respondents
South Africans	83
Non-South Africans	17
Total	100

Source: Research results.

Figure 1 Gender of respondents

Source: Research results.

Figure 2 Age group of respondents

Source: Research results.

might address these concerns. This study is driven by the observation that voices of students are not adequately projected in policy formulation on matters of security. The paper is also an attempt by civil society to make a positive contribution to a national discourse which is crucial to the formulation of a national human security policy.

PERCEPTIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY

Reports of personal expressions of whether individuals feel secure in their environments in South Africa are few. On student impressions, one important, utterly repugnant report entitled 'Scared at school' describes sexual violence against girls in South African schools. The report observes that:

> "South African girls often encounter violence in their schools. South African girls continue to be raped, sexually abused, sexually harassed, and assaulted at school by male classmates and teachers. For many South African girls, violence and abuse are an inevitable part of the school environment."[2]

One report records youth views on crime in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality in the Eastern Cape.[3] The report concentrates on identifying the most common risk factors that push youth into crime and it searches for these factors in the youths' family life, school experience, community and peer relationships.

This report continues the exploration of youth experiences of human security issues and focuses on selected students in tertiary institutions in South Africa. The study begins with a general question on personal security as follows: "In general how would you describe your personal security situation?" The result is that 13% of respondents feel very secure, 64% just secure and 23% very much insecure. This information is obtained from questionnaires administered to 14 institutions of higher learning throughout South Africa from where 828 respondents took part. Of that number, 83% were South Africans and 17% were foreign; 57% were females and 43% were males; 74% were black, 3% coloured, 7% white, 3% Asian and 13% others. This information is presented in Table 2 and Figures 1–4.

STATE SECURITY

In order to place the research on selected student perceptions of security into context, in the following two sections it is important to describe

Figure 3 Ethnic group of respondents

Figure 4 Participating institutions

the major issues in security discourse in South Africa, using secondary sources as references.

Traditional notions of security have for a long time been state-centred, focusing on external aggression.[4] In South Africa, the apartheid notion of security was the security of the state against a perceived communist takeover. This dovetailed well with Cold War perceptions of Western security, which revolved around keeping the communist threat at bay. Connected to that, the apartheid notions of security included the suppression of anti-apartheid movements, which were seen as fronts for the communist threat. This is the context in which intelligence and security agents pursued anti-apartheid activists from townships such as Soweto across borders into Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe and even beyond. With the end of the Cold War, however, there is not likely to be any such security threat to the South African state based on ideology either now or in the near future.

The democratic government that came to power in South Africa in 1994 set out, among other things, to change the manner in which defence issues were being handled in the country. This process was achieved by the adoption and implementation of three important documents:

- The Defence White Paper, 1996;
- The Defence Review, 1998;[5] and
- The White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, 1999.

Together, these three documents changed the country's defence policy, posture, roles, composition, structure, size and tactics. They changed the general understanding of security from mere state security to national security, regional security and human security. They emphasised the defensive and non-militaristic nature of the South African security system. They also established clear civilian control of the military, subjected South African defence to conform to democratic governance and international law, rationalised defence production and procurement, and enabled the integration of formerly belligerent forces.

To date, however, state security remains inadequate despite the various peace and security initiatives. One government report states that this is particularly the case "in respect of the state of protection accorded to Very Important Persons and their residences; the security of government information (which is compounded by the absence of an enabling policy regarding vetting); and the general uncertainty that attends the state of readiness of security-related disaster management systems".[6]

In March 2004 President Thabo Mbeki received death threats from unidentified people. The threats came a day after a gunman was short dead outside the Cape Town home of the former president, Nelson Mandela. The gunman, Major George Makume, was a disgruntled ex-soldier with a history of mental illness who claimed that he was on a 'revenge mission' after being discharged from the South African National Defence Force.[7]

A growing trend worldwide is that people are placing their security above all else, including above the protection of human rights. This has seen an international public tolerance for suspending civil rights in the face of threats to public security – both criminal threats to personal security and terrorist threats to national security, creating new challenges for human rights activists. It has also been pointed out that in their preoccupation with the rights of perpetrators, human rights activists have ignored the rights of victims or potential future victims and are thus failing to advance social justice.

FROM STATE SECURITY TO HUMAN SECURITY

Since the end of the Cold War there has been growing international recognition that security means much more than the state's ability to counter external threats. While it remains true that the state is still the major player in providing security, it is also recognised that state security alone is no longer adequate to ensure human peace, security and development. For the ordinary South African, and for the majority of civil society, however, the most pressing security issues are those that affect individual lives, and that is human security.[8]

The United Nations Commission on Human Security qualifies the definition of human security as follows:

> "Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential."[9]

Human security ensures the creation of "political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity".[10] These systems are often threatened by menaces that may emanate from outside the particular state or nation, but which in some cases may have 'internal'

or intra-state causes, or may be caused by the state itself. For South Africa, some of these menaces that threaten human security include the following:

- violent crime
- rape
- terrorism
- racially motivated violence (of the Boeremag type)
- politically motivated violence
- farm murders/attacks and land conflicts
- illicit arms and drug deals
- private armies (mercenaries)
- illegal migration
- xenophobia-related violence
- illegal firearms
- poverty and inequality
- regional instability

This study looks at how selected South African students are affected by these and other security threats, and what they consider to be the major threats to their security and that of others.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The general perception inside South Africa and even outside is that, between 1994 and 2004, political activity was conducted in a democratic, transparent and peaceful manner. In this research, respondents were directed to focus on the issue of political violence in South Africa. In line with the general feeling in South Africa, the majority of the respondents (53.3%) said political violence is low in the country. Table 2 illustrates the research findings.

Table 2 Perceptions of political violence in South Africa

	Scale	Percentage of respondents
How serious is political violence in SA?	High	40.8
	Low	53.3
	None at all	5.9

Source: Research results.

However, a significant minority (40.8%) think that political violence is still high in South Africa and that perception is perhaps influenced by some incidences explained below. The South African tourist publication *Let's Go: South Africa* considers political violence a major security concern for South Africa. As a result, the publication warns tourists that:

> "Travellers should maintain a low political profile and a low level of political involvement at all times. Avoid carrying political leaflets or buttons, wearing shirts with political logos, attending political speeches and rallies, or criticizing a country's president, ruling party, police, or armed forces in public."[11]

Political violence was indeed a big problem in the 1990s when Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), African National Congress (ANC) and United Democratic Movement (UDM) activists often clashed. One prominent case was the assassination on 25 January 1999, of Sifiso Nkabinde, the general secretary of the UDM in the Richmond area of KwaZulu-Natal. One of Nkabinde's bodyguards was also killed later that day. On the same day, 11 members of one ANC-supporting household were shot dead, while they were asleep, in Mswazini, Richmond.[12]

However, by 2004 that violent political situation had changed. The interventions that were implemented by political leaders have evidently reduced the levels of political intolerance and violence, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal and some areas of the Eastern Cape and Gauteng. Parties now tend to use constitutional and legal means to settle disputes and achieve their objectives, though isolated incidents of political violence still do occur.[13] For example, in January 2005 Thomas Shabalala, a member of the IFP National Council and of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature, was gunned down at his home in Lindelani, north of Durban. The IFP Youth Brigade chairman, Thulasizwe Buthelezi, said of the incident: "When fathers are murdered in front of their children it is a clear indication that something is very wrong in society. In fact, it is like a loud red neon light, flashing that people are not safe."[14]

POLICE BRUTALITY

Cases of police brutality, police violence and police accountability in South Africa are well documented.[15] However, the majority of respondents (48.2%) are of the opinion that police brutality in South Africa has been low in the ten years following the advent of democratic

rule, even though a significant number (47.1%) said police brutality was still high in the country. Table 3 illustrates these impressions.

Table 3 Police brutality

	Scale	Percentage of respondents
To what extent is police brutality a problem in SA?	High	47.1
	Low	48.2
	Non-existent	4.7

Source: Research results.

Police brutality in post-apartheid South Africa was highlighted in April 1999 after a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report showed white South African police officers beating and kicking black suspected car thieves. One of the men later died in hospital. The video caused such uproar in South Africa that Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President, was compelled to issue a statement blaming the whole incident on the legacy of apartheid.[16] In November 2000 another video was aired on South African national television showing members of the North East Rand Dog Unit setting their dogs on three Mozambican immigrants.[17] The dogs were shown savaging the three men, after which the police further brutally assaulted the men physically and hurled racial abuses at them. Besides these high-profile cases, there are numerous reports of excessive use by the police of force and torture, as well as unnecessary shootings and deaths in police custody.[18]

In South Africa, despite the fact that much of the population experienced at first hand the military police's brutality under apartheid, the public has supported legislation that gives the police the right to shoot.[19] However, some of the police shootings have been fatal. On 8 January 2000, Yusuf Jacobs was shot by police who were attempting to disperse a demonstration by Muslim organisations against the visit to Cape Town by the British Prime Minister. A number of other people were injured, but Yusuf Jacobs died in hospital four days later.[20] On 30 August 2004 police fired rubber bullets at 4,500 youths who were demonstrating near the town of Harrismith, along the highway linking Johannesburg and Durban. One youth died and 20 were injured.[21] As a result of such cases, there have been some calls for police to be more careful with their use of force. One report claimed that between 2003 and 2004 some 800 people died in the hands of the police.[22]

In their country report on human rights practices for the year 2004, the US Department of State – which normally praises the South African government – chose to condemn South Africa's human rights record for 2004. The major point raised is that "deaths due to the use of excessive force by security forces and deaths in police custody were serious problems".[23] The report was in turn condemned by the South African government as not reflecting the true situation in the country.

EXTERNAL SECURITY THREATS TO SOUTH AFRICA

In southern Africa, the end of apartheid was followed by new regional conflicts and challenges such as regional hegemonic and balance of power struggles and conflicts over resources. The DRC conflict, which erupted in 1998, soured relations between the then South African president, Nelson Mandela, and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe over the use of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. Also in 1998, historically peaceful Lesotho erupted into violence, triggering the military intervention of South Africa and Botswana. The Zimbabwean land, political and economic crisis which erupted in 2000 has brought much anxiety not only to South Africa, but to other countries in the region such as Namibia.[24] Political and other pressure groups in South Africa have constantly demanded South African action against Zimbabwe; some have even suggested military invasion.

Against this background, respondents were asked the question, "Do you consider some foreign countries to pose threats to the security of South Africa, and if so, what kind of threats?" To the first part of the question, 52% of respondents responded yes, some foreign countries are a threat to South Africa, 28% said no and 20% were uncertain. Regarding the second part of the question, the majority of respondents did not think that foreign countries are likely to pose military threats to South Africa. Some 43% of respondents thought that foreign countries, or rather foreigners, are likely to increase crime in South Africa and 34% said that foreigners increase the levels of unemployment in the country. Only 14% thought that any foreign country may pose a military threat to South Africa and 9% thought that there may be a nuclear threat to the country. Some of these statistics are illustrated in Figure 5.

A follow-up question on external threats required participants to name countries which they thought posed the biggest threats to South Africa. A list of 20 countries was supplied and respondents could name as many countries as they wanted. The result was that 38% thought

Figure 5 Possible security threats by foreign countries

that Zimbabwe was South Africa's biggest threat, followed by Nigeria at 31%, Iraq at 22%, the US at 18%, the DRC at 17% and Mozambique at 15%. Other countries named as threats were Burundi, Israel, China, and Lesotho, but these were named by less that 10% of the respondents. The listed country that was named by the least number of respondents and therefore perceived as least threatening to South Africa was Sudan.

THE ZIMBABWEAN THREAT PERCEPTION

The perception of Zimbabwe as the biggest security threat to South Africa is fuelled mainly by negative media reports on Zimbabwe and by a number of other factors which our respondents were well aware of. The first is that the South African public know very little of the capability of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. The curiosity increased when in 1998 Zimbabwe decided to go to war in the DRC on the side of the late Laurent Kabila and managed to stay on for three years despite international pressure and the formidable Rwandese and Ugandan forces. Not only did Zimbabwe pull its military weight in the DRC in the face of South Africa, but it also managed to draw in Angola and Namibia onto Kabila's side under cover of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, despite protestations from former

Figure 6 Countries perceived as potential threats to South Africa

South African president Nelson Mandela who, as chairman of SADC at that time, wanted to have full control of the Organ. More recently, the mystery of the unknown strength of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces was deepened by reports of Zimbabwe secretly buying sophisticated aircraft from China, reportedly to counter South Africa's much talked about and scandal-ridden arms procurement deal.

Another factor which came up in 2004 is the mercenary connection. A group of mercenaries (most of them South African citizens) were arrested in Harare in February 2004 on their way to effect a military coup in Equatorial Guinea. Despite the facts and the complicated legal and international aspects of the case, some of it touching on the British Thatcher family, the South African press continued to portray the arrest of the South Africans in Zimbabwe as an unfriendly act by 'a paranoid dictator', Robert Mugabe.

There are other factors such as the perception of threats to job security posed by the increasing number of Zimbabweans living and working in South Africa, whether legally or illegally, the fear of a spillover into South Africa of Zimbabwe-style violent land invasions,

and a general anti-Mugabe campaign led by such people as Tony Leon and the Southern Africa Bishops Conference – to name a few. A most recent factor is the political heat caused by the friction between the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the African National Congress (ANC) as a result of disagreements on how to respond to the unceremonious expulsion by the Zimbabwean authorities of COSATU fact-finding missions from Harare.[25]

Former Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa has also expressed his discomfort with the Zimbabwean government which, he said, makes a mockery of African democracy.[26] Even though the ANC government has publicly pronounced a policy of quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe, privately the South African government is alleged to have engaged a ring of spies to keep an eye on the activities of both the Zimbabwean government and the ruling party, ZANU PF (Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)).[27] However, since 1994 neither the Zimbabwe government nor the South African government has been regarding the other as a threat to its security. In fact, the South African government was the leading nation in the SADC pronouncement that Zimbabwe's March 2005 parliamentary election was credible and democratic, despite some protestations to the contrary.

XENOPHOBIA

A major problem in South Africa today is the perception that people have of foreigners. In a 2001 survey, Jonathan Crush found that the majority of South Africans believe that immigration and migration impact negatively on the country.[28] Locals believe that migrants – especially from African states such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Nigeria – are responsible for the high rate of crime in South Africa, take jobs meant for South Africans, and bring diseases to the country. As a result, there have been a number of high-profile violent assaults on migrants by citizens and a number of foreigners have lost their lives. This is despite the fact that major reason for foreigners (especially those from African countries) coming to South Africa is that they are trying to escape war and violence in their countries of origin.[29] However, the South African government, especially President Thabo Mbeki, has made several calls on citizens not to regard migrants from Africa as enemies. There have also been programmes to educate the public and the media that an irrational hostility towards migrants is uncalled for. One such programme is the Roll Back Xenophobia (RBX) Campaign initiated by the South African Human Rights Commission in 1998.

Table 4 Nationalities considered foreigners

Nationality	Percentage of respondents
Americans	7.5
Asians	5.5
Africans (non-South Africans)	28.0
Europeans	8.0
All of the above	51.0

Source: Research results.

In this research, one question sought to measure the perception of who is considered by respondents to be a foreigner. Although 51% of the respondents said all non-South Africans are foreigners, a significant minority (28%) said only Africans from the rest of Africa are considered foreigners. On a follow-up question of whether it is mainly African migrants who disturb the peace in South Africa, again the impression of a significant minority (36%) was a yes, while a narrow majority of 38% said no and 26% were uncertain. This uncertainty may have been caused by the involvement of South African-based British subjects such as Mark Thatcher in coup plots in other parts of Africa. (This theme will be explored in the next section.)

MERCENARIES

The problem of mercenaries continues to haunt not only South Africa, but the continent as a whole. Early in 2004, a group of mercenaries were arrested in Zimbabwe allegedly on their way to effect a military coup d'état in Equatorial Guinea. The next day, another group of mercenaries were also arrested in Equatorial Guinea. Both groups – a total of 85 men – were travelling with South African passports. The regional, continental and international speculation as to the likely fate of such a large group of South African citizens greatly disturbed the South African public. Internally there were demonstrations and court processes against the South African government in an attempt to force South Africa to demand the extradition of these people from Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe to South Africa.

The whole mercenary saga was complicated by the arrest, in Cape Town, of Mark Thatcher, son of former British prime minister Margaret

Figure 7 African migrants disturbing peace in South Africa

Thatcher, on charges of bank-rolling the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea.[30] The case is being handled through the legal systems of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea. Despite this, on the question of whether mercenaries are a threat to South Africa, only a small number of respondents (24%) thought that they are a big problem, while the majority (62.9%) was uncertain and 12.8% said mercenaries were not a threat at all. The uncertainty may have arisen from the fact that most of the mercenaries involved in the Equatorial Guinea saga were South African citizens and their commanders were British, a country that is not normally considered a threat to South Africa.

TERRORISM

Although there is no agreed-on UN definition of terrorism, there are various conventions and protocols which forbid organisations from practising terrorism and prohibits states from sponsoring and/or financing terrorism.[31] South Africa has inevitably been caught up in the current global war against terrorism. In 2004, two South Africans were apprehended in Pakistan, reportedly among Al Quaeda operatives. The incident caused much panic in diplomatic and security circles in South Africa and even beyond. Some South Africans have been linked to terrorism even as far as Mexico and the US. Also, South African

Table 5 The mercenary threat to South Africa

	Percentage of respondents
Very big threat	24.3
Uncertain	62.9
No threat at all	12.8

Source: Research results.

private security companies and individuals are operating in war-torn Iraq, providing security to people and installations. Some South Africans have been killed in Iraq.[32] More chilling perhaps, were media reports that suggested that South Africa was at one time targeted by terrorist groups such as Al Quaeda.[33]

Despite the above facts, the majority of respondents (67.1%) still felt that global terrorism posed very little threat to South Africa. However, 55% felt that there was terrorism in South Africa and 44.6% said that religious differences caused most of that terrorism. These views may have been influenced by the activities of the Muslim group People Against Gangsters and Drugs (PAGAD), which terrorised some urban areas in the 1990s. In their fight against drug dealers and gangsters, PAGAD activists broke into several police stations to steal guns. They gunned down any suspected drug dealers, bombed gay night clubs, restaurants and tourist attractions, and killed magistrates and judges, even in court.[34]

Figure 8 Views about the existence of terrorism in South Africa

Source: Research results.

Table 6 Extent to which global terrorism is perceived as a threat to South Africa

	Percentage of respondents
Very much	17.1
Little	67.1
Not at all	15.8

Source: Research results.

THE WHITE RIGHT

Some 78% of respondents said that racism is still a big problem in South Africa. The political violence and intolerance that seemed to characterise some South African provinces (notably KwaZulu-Natal and some areas of the Eastern Cape and Gauteng) in the 1990s gave way to a new type of political violence perpetrated by the 'White Right', although on a much smaller scale.

Since 1991 the town of Orania in the Northern Cape has been maintaining an exclusive Afrikaner identity. The town of only 700 inhabitants cherishes old Afrikaner customs practised under apartheid. People of colour are not encouraged to stay or visit the town.[35] Recently the town introduced its own currency, the Ora, a move that some analysts think is a dress rehearsal for secession. However, locals maintain that they are simply trying to preserve their culture and also that they are protecting themselves from violent crime so rampant in the rest of South Africa.[36]

The most extreme of the white right has been the Boeremag, a group of Afrikaner commandos who in 2002 were accused of planning to topple the government of President Thabo Mbeki through a military coup.[37] Besides the nostalgia for apartheid, the Boeremag believed that they had a religious mission to maintain apartheid as a system. In 2002 a Boeremag group planted bombs in Soweto and other places in South

Table 7 The problem of racism

	Reponse	Percentage of respondents
Is racism a problem in South Africa?	Yes	78.8
	Uncertain	15.6
	No	5.6

Source: Research results.

Figure 9 White extremists could cause serious problems in South Africa

Africa. After the explosion of eight of the bombs on 30 October, a Boeremag press release announced that:

> "Hereby the Boeremag declares that we give all honour to our Heavenly Father. The enemy should know that they are not challenging the lower order of the Boerevolk, but the God of Blood River."[38]

Many analysts have commented on the readiness of the Boerevolk to associate the planting of bombs with God. What is clear is that Afrikaner groups like the Boeremag revel in being the chosen people whom God placed in South Africa for a specific mission. This feeling was well captured by one member of the Boeremag during the trial when he said:

> "I am a Boer. We are fighting God's battle here on earth. Every Sunday of my life I sat in the Dutch Reformed Church and was told that apartheid was the will of God. Then Johan Heyns comes along and said apartheid was a sin. I am white with fury ['wit-woedend']. Nobody could have done more church than me – we were 'churched' to death in order to become good Boere."[39]

However, despite the much publicised and continuing court case against the Boeremag group, 45% of respondents still felt that such white

Figure 10 Views on whether religious differences cause terrorism in South Africa

Source: Research results.

extremists do not pose serious problems for South Africa. This may be because there is general agreement that majority rule is here to stay and that minority white power is no longer an option in South Africa.

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT

Despite the Boeremag's association with the conservative Christian sector, inter-faith conflict is almost non-existent in South Africa. This is so mainly because there is general agreement that the South African state is neutral, and treats different faith communities evenhandedly. The state is in fact regarded as an arbiter which recognises that South Africa is multi-religious and that each faith community ought to be treated equally and with respect. The state is in turn empowered by the constitution, which in Section 15 of Chapter 2 guarantees "freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion". The one inter-faith sore point has been between the Muslim and Jewish communities as they "express both anguish and involvement over the spillover of the Middle Eastern conflict into South Africa".[40]

State response to right wing and other terrorist groups has been swift and decisive. As noted earlier, in the 1990s the Muslim group PAGAD took the law into their own hands in their fight against crime in Cape Town and other urban areas. On the basis of coordinated investigations, the law enforcement authorities rounded up the leaders of the group and

Figure 11 Chances that South Africa may be attacked with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction

some of the targeted gangsters, confiscated large amounts of firearms, ammunition and explosives, and foiled some assassination plans. The law enforcement authorities are also working with their counterparts abroad with respect to cross-border crime and international terrorism.[41]

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include any nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons and the systems and missiles for their delivery.[42] Although South Africa is known to have experimented with nuclear technology and chemical warfare during the apartheid era, the post-apartheid period is generally considered to be free of weapons of mass destruction. Also, the neghbouring countries which are perceived to pose a threat to the security of the country, such as Zimbabwe, are themselves free of weapons of mass destruction. The majority of respondents (45%) also think that the chances that South Africa may be attacked with weapons of mass destruction are low. However, a significant minority of 39% were uncertain, while only 16% thought that the country could be attacked with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

Figure 12 Views as to who should be allowed to possess guns in South Africa

Source: Research results.

SMALL ARMS

Despite the many experiences and reported cases of serious crimes committed using firearms, 46.2% of respondents said anyone who can obtain a licence should be allowed to possess a firearm.

Police records show that between 1995 and 2003 some 193,000 firearms were reported stolen. Of these, only 125,000 were recovered.[43] In April 2003 the South African Police Service launched Operation Sethunya to get rid of illegal arms circulating in society. Between April and October 2003, 14,140 illegal weapons were recovered, 1,565,273 rounds of ammunition confiscated, and 3,206 people arrested for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.[44]

There is a close relationship between national peace and security and the socio-economic and political well-being of people. The proliferation of small arms intensifies violence and perpetuates crime. The effects of the uncontrolled flow of small arms lead to obvious links between arms, conflict and violence against individuals. This has also led to a situation where it has become much more difficult for the police to carry out their duties effectively. By their very nature, the illegal procurement, possession and transfer of firearms are precursors to other criminal activities. This is more so given a situation where third parties less linked

to national governments are sometimes engaged in the transfer of even these sophisticated weapons.

On the positive side, the South African Police Service continues to score successes in their fight against illegal firearms. Their efforts are also being enhanced by new gun laws which will compel approximately two million South African gun owners to take stringent competency tests when reapplying for licences.[45] The Firearms Control Act, which came into effect in July 2004, aims to establish a comprehensive and effective system of firearms control and management. However, there is still a lot of work to be done by the police, as huge quantities of firearms continue to be discovered. In July 2004 large quantities of arms and ammunition were discovered in a disused complex in Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal. These arms were linked to some politicians of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).[46] The weapons were destroyed together with others as part of Operation Sethunya.

CRIME

A major cause of insecurity in South Africa is the high rate of crime, especially violent crime such as murder, rape and hijacking. Contrary to expectations, crime trends did not decrease with the end of apartheid in 1994 – rather, the levels of recorded crime stabilised at the high rates recorded in 1995 and 1996 and some forms of crime continued to increase up to 2000.[47]

A National Victims of Crime Survey carried out by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) found that between September 2002 and August 2003, nearly one quarter of all South Africans had been victims of crime. The survey also found that although police reports indicate that reported crime decreased between 1998 and 2003, feelings of insecurity among South Africans increased from 25% in 1998 to 58% in 2003.[48]

However, official reports continue to emphasise government crime prevention strategies, which, they say, are having a positive effect on crime. These include the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS), and the Integrated Justice System (IJS). These measures have had the effect of stabilising and reducing some crime trends. One official report shows that with the exception of common assault and theft, the 20 most serious crimes in South Africa have been decreasing.[49]

Perceptions of crime do not always coincide with the reality on the ground. The South African Police Service are of the opinion that crime

has been declining in absolute terms since 1994. With the exception of robbery with aggravating circumstances, illegal possession of firearms and drug-related crime, all crime figures are reportedly declining. Some selected figures of actual police crime statistics are given in the table below.

PERSONAL SECURITY AND CRIME

The main national disturbance to peace in South Africa for both young and old is violent crime. In the study of youth perceptions of crime in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, it was found that more that 28% of the participants had been victims of violent crime between July 2002 and July 2003. Robbery topped the list of crimes in that study, with close to 60% of victims saying they were robbed at knife- or gun-point.[50]

Table 8 Incidence of crime per 100,000 of the population

Crime categories	1994/ 95	1996/ 97	1998/ 99	2000/ 01	2002/ 03	2003/ 04
Murder	66.9	62.8	59.8	49.8	47.4	42.7
Rape	115.3	126.7	118.3	121.1	115.3	113.7
Attempted murder	69.1	70.4	70.4	64.4	78.9	64.8
Assault GBH	555.8	570.4	566.3	630.2	585.9	560.7
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	218.5	163.0	220.6	260.3	279.2	288.1
Arson	28.2	24.9	23.9	20.5	20.2	19.0
Housebreaking, residential	596.2	602.9	652.7	694.0	704.0	645.2
Car theft	272.8	239.8	255.9	229.0	204.9	190.0
Stock theft	121.9	103.5	98.8	95.1	102.7	89.0
Illegal possession of firearms	28.3	31.4	35.0	33.8	34.8	36.3
Drug-related crime	118.4	99.5	94.0	102.9	118.4	135.1
Drunken driving	66.2	60.4	59.8	58.4	48.7	53.7
Commercial crime	162.5	153.2	150.9	152.4	123.7	120.4
Carjacking		31.0	37.6	34.2	32.3	29.7
Bank robbery		1.4	1.2	1.1	0.3	0.1

Source: South African Police Service Annual Report, 2003/04, p 19.

Figure 13 Day-to-day personal fears of what might happen

The survey finds that, on a national scale, the major fear of South African students (23.2%) is that they might be murdered. This is corroborated by other reports, one of which is from the Gun Control Alliance (GCA). In one of their reports, the GCA writes that:

> "The youth of South Africa are its future leaders. But many youngsters will not live to fulfil this role. In South Africa, homicides are the leading cause of death for males between 15 and 21 years of age."[51]

A 2003 report by the ISS also cites murder as the crime most feared by South Africans. In this survey, other fears cited include injury resulting from criminal violence (22.3%), hijacking (22.2%) and rape (20.4%). Comparative data is presented in Figure 13.

POVERTY AND ECONOMIC INSECURITY

The large majority of respondents (91%) were of the opinion that economic insecurity causes violent crime in South Africa.

Figure 14 Contribution of economic inequality to violent crime

Source: Research results.

The survey did not unpack the economic dimensions during field work, but enough secondary information was gathered to cover the most important questions. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report for South Africa for 2003 states that about 48.5% of the South African population currently live below the national poverty line. The report points out that income distribution remains highly unequal and is deteriorating, that the gini coefficient is rising and that the human development index (HDI) is falling.[52]

There are few up-to-date national analyses of poverty for South Africa. Among the most used are figures compiled by Statistics SA and the annual All Media and Products Survey (AMPS). In a 2002 study, Lawrence Schlemmer used data from these sources to compile a series of poverty measures based on the poverty line of R400 and disaggregated them according to population groups (Table 9).[53]

From this and other tables, Schlemmer concludes that the number of households living below the poverty line has increased from 1989 to 2001.[54]

The 2003 South African Human Development Report highlights the fact that poverty in South Africa continues to have gender, race, family type and spatial dimensions. The report also shows that 11.9 million of the poor are female, compared to 10 million males. It also shows that

Table 9 Poverty trends in South Africa, 1989–2001

	Minimum living level	African (%)	Coloured (%)	Indian (%)	White (%)
1989	R400	51	24	6	3
1993	R755	50	26	8	3
1996	R960	57	22	9	3
1997	R1,040	55	21	6	4
2001	R1,270	62	29	11	4

Source: Lawrence Schlemmer, *Focus* 26, 2002, p 21.

in 2002 the poverty rate among the African population living under the national poverty line was eight times the poverty rate among the white population.[55]

A recent study (2004) focuses on current trends and future policy options in narrowing the economic divide in South Africa and concludes that ten years after democracy, the country is still characterised by pervasive poverty and inequality.[56] This, and another report compiled by various academics as part of a study by the Ecumenical Foundation of Southern Africa (EFSA), argues that social stability in South Africa is at risk because of growing inequality. The EFSA report asserts that:

> "The single most important issue facing South Africa 10 years after the transition to democracy is breaking the grip of poverty on a substantial portion of its citizens … This means that approximately 18 million out of 45 million people have not experienced the benefits of our newly found freedom. This poses a moral challenge to all South Africans – to work together towards the economic and social integration of the poorer section of our fellow citizens."[57]

Inequality is prevalent in many countries in the Third World and in a number of developed countries as well. In South Africa, however, three centuries of colonial rule and four decades of apartheid introduced a number of context-specific causes of poverty and inequality. Nina Hunter et al highlight some of these historical factors, such as the stripping of people of their assets, specifically land; distorted economic markets and institutions through racial discrimination; violence; and general destabilisation of certain sections of the population.[58] It is against

this background that the current and unacceptable levels of poverty must be understood.

INCOME INEQUALITY AND INSECURITY

Leibbrandt et al[59] show that up to 2000, only 6% of South Africa's population enjoyed over 40% of national income. This experience of income inequality carries over to the social indicators as well, with the HDI reported by the UNDP revealing the significant spatial and racial differences in South Africa. In 1991, while white South Africans had an HDI similar to that of Canada or Israel, the HDI score for sections of the African population was lower than that of Swaziland. A provincial comparison also shows that in 2000 the score for Limpopo Province was lower than that of neighbouring Zimbabwe.[60]

Another important variable is wealth inequality. Ownership of financial wealth is a significant source of income. Therefore, inequality in the distribution of wealth implies a corresponding inequality in the distribution of dividends, interest, rent and other income received by those who own assets.[61] Wealth also provides security and brings with it some political power.

In South Africa the average white family has much more home and vehicle equity and many more financial assets of all types than the average black family. These include interest-bearing bank accounts, bonds, equity and land. In 2000 some 37.3% of household disposable income in South Africa came from property, and most of that property is controlled by the white population.[62]

UNEMPLOYMENT AND INSECURITY

The majority of respondents (67%) were of the opinion that unemployment is one of the major causes of crime.

In 1995 the South African government set out to create a million jobs through its Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) over a period of five years. It was estimated that the exercise would cost R15.5 billion. Between 1995 and 2002, some 1.6 million new jobs were created by this and other employment creation programmes. This represented an average growth rate of employment of 2.1% per year in both the formal and informal sector of the economy.[63]

By 2003, the number of people in employment in South Africa, including the informal sector, had risen by 2.3 million, an increase of

Figure 15 Unemployment is a serious cause of crime

17.7%. At the same time the demand for jobs increased by 5.3 million. The net result is that there were 3 million more unemployed people, pushing the total number of unemployed to 5.25 million, of which 59% have never worked and 70% were long-term unemployed (more than one year).[64]

THE EFFECTS OF HIV/AIDS

Another factor contributing to insecurity is the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. In 2004 about 15.2% of South Africans were estimated to be suffering from HIV/AIDS – most of them from poor communities. Poverty reduces the ability of poor people to cope with the disease, while the loss of employment due to the disease and the death of wage earners contribute to the increase of poverty in the already poor communities. The majority of respondents (46%) listed disease as the major cause of recent death of people close to them, with accidents coming second, violence third, and old age fourth.

LIFE EXPECTANCY

Although the survey did not ask questions on life expectancy, the ultimate measure of human security is how long individuals can be expected to

Table 10 Cause of death of persons close to the respondent who had died recently

Cause of death	Percentage of respondents
Disease	46.0
Accident	20.4
Violence	13.4
Old age	19.1
Other	1.1

Source: Research results.

live. In South Africa, population projections using the 1991 and previous census results did not take HIV/AIDS into consideration. In these calculations, an upward trend in life expectancy at birth was assumed. Statistics SA calculated life expectancy tables for the four population groups for the years 1985, 1994 and 1996 using these assumptions. The methods of calculation changed after 1996 with the inclusion of the effect of HIV/AIDS. Table 11 shows the detailed life expectancy figures from 1985 to 2004 with the effect of HIV/AIDS taken into account.

LAND CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA

There are two dimensions to the issue of land conflict in South Africa. The first is the slow pace of land reform in the country and the potential that is created for mass revolt, both in rural and urban areas. The second dimension is arguably a criminal, rather than a land question, and has to do with the spate of farm attacks that have plagued the country in the last ten years.

Table 11 Life expectancy at birth, 1985–2004

Year	African	Coloured	Asian	White	South African
1985	60.7	58.7	62.7	68.8	61.8
1991	62.7	60.1	63.8	69.3	63.5
1996	60.4	59.8	64.3	68.1	61.4
2001	52.3	57.6	63.8	64.9	54.2
2004	49.2	56.2	63.5	63.6	51.4

Source: Statistics South Africa, Mid-year population estimates, South Africa 2004, p 11.

Table 12 Views about how the land question will be resolved in South Africa

Means	Percentage of respondents
Violently	8.4
Uncertain	17.5
Negotiation	74.0

Source: Research results.

The majority of respondents (74%) were of the opinion that the land question in South Africa will be resolved through negotiation. Only a small percentage (8.4%) thought that land reform in South Africa might be violent, while 17.5% were uncertain.

Like other southern African states, South Africa is faced with the challenge of addressing the injustices of the past, in particular with regard to land ownership and other economic opportunities. By 1993 white South Africans owned about 85% of the land in South Africa. The ANC government tried to address the situation by, among other steps, passing the Land Restitution Act of 1994, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act of 1996, and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997. The new government also set up the National Land Committee, a Land Claims Commission, and a Land Claims Court. The aim of the process was to decide on land restitution claims up to the cut-off date of December 1998. However, by the end of 1998, only 68,878 cases of land restitution had been dealt with by the Land Claims Court, and only 41 of those had been settled.[65] Owing to unforeseen complexities involving land claims, the deadline for settling claims was extended to 2005. By April 2003 some 36,686 claims had been settled, out of a total submission of 79,000 claims, and by February 2005 the number of settled claims had risen to 57,000.[66] The Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs has since announced that the cut-off date for settling land claims has again been extended, to 2007.[67]

In the meantime, a number of individuals, groups and organisations have been agitating for a faster land reform process. One such group is the Landless People's Movement. The movement charges that the new South African government promised land to the landless as part of the national liberation project, and yet ten years after apartheid, only 2% of the country's land has been transferred from white to black ownership.[68] The movement popularised its agitation for land in Durban in 2001 during the United Nations Conference on Racism at which

they launched the Landlessness = Racism campaign.[69] The Landless People's Movement captured the limelight again in April 2004 when they campaigned for a boycott of voting by its members during South Africa's 3rd general election. Their campaign theme was No land! No vote![70] The state responded by arresting some of the activists, a response which some people claim included excessive use of force.

While academic land discussions were going on, the situation on the ground was different. Illegal land occupations were taking place in the rural areas and in and around urban centres like Johannesburg. Unlike the Zimbabwean case, most of the land occupied by illegal settlers belonged to the government and there was little or no violence. Most of the disputes were settled through the courts. The Bredell land invasion near Johannesburg in 2001 is a case in point.[71] Some 'squatters' occupied peri-urban state and private land in Bredell, Kempton Park, just outside Johannesburg. These people were evicted by security forces in a manner that some observers likened to apartheid-era forced removals.[72] Some commentators have suggested that the strong tactics used by state agents to remove squatters from the land may be linked to the desire by South Africans to demonstrate that, unlike in Zimbabwe, the rule of law is effectively in force in South Africa.[73]

FARM ATTACKS AND MURDERS

There has been a number of farm attacks and murders on farms throughout South Africa. Although black farm workers have been killed in some of these farm attacks, the majority of victims have been white farm owners. Between 1991 and May 2004 more than 1,630 white farmers have been killed.[74] The general trend has been that of a year by year increase in farm attacks. One activist who has been monitoring farm attacks, Jan Lamprecht, gives the figures reflected in Table 14.

A government commission of inquiry into farm attacks set up in 2001 reported in September 2003 that the motive for most of the farm murders was criminal and not racially or politically motivated.[75] These facts coincide with the opinion of the majority of respondents (50.3%) who said that farm attacks are simply criminal acts, while only 38% said they could be politically motivated. However, some groups do not agree with such conclusions and they have included South Africa on the list of countries being monitored for possible genocide. The list is maintained by a vigilante group called Genocide Watch and is accessible on the Internet.[76]

Table 13 Farm attacks and murders

Year	Number of attacks	Number of murders
1991	327	66
1992	365	63
1993	442	84
1994	442	92
1995	551	121
1996	468	109
1997	434	84
1998	827	145
1999	834	136
2000	902	142
2001	809	142

Source: Jan Lamprecht, Farm murders in South Africa (from 1994–2004), <www.africancrisis.org/photos16.asp>.

Some activists against farm attacks have been very dramatic. Jan Lamprecht has posted some gruesome pictures of white people who have been murdered on farms around South Africa, with accompanying notes that stir up terrible emotions in anybody who views the pictures.[77] Lamprecht has also written articles encouraging white farmers in South Africa and the rest of southern Africa to take up arms in order to defend themselves. One such article ends as follows:

> "While politically we are about 10 years behind Zimbabwe in terms of 'land reform' we could easily end up where they are. But, given the different demographics here, the Zimbabwean tactics need not succeed at all. A few well-trained Security operatives could easily chase off hundreds of unarmed or semi-armed black attackers. For farm invasions to then succeed they would have to be undertaken as military operations by the blacks.

> "I believe that in the long term South Africa is actually slouching towards a fully blown race war – which is something I have written about in the past and which I believe can happen in 10–20 years time."[78]

As explained earlier, farm murders have been interpreted differently, the police taking them as mere criminal acts while some farmers

Table 14 Killing of white farmers in South Africa

Characterised as	Percentage of respondents
Criminal acts	50.3
Uncertain	11.7
Politically motivated	38.0

Source: Research results.

consider them to be politically motivated. This situation has created a security vacuum which in some way encourages some white farmers to look for alternative ways of ensuring the security of their families and properties.

CONCLUSION AND OBSERVATIONS

- Respondents were very much aware of the human security situation in post-apartheid South Africa.

- In general, respondents felt that the human security situation in the country is satisfactory.

- Student perceptions of state security in South Africa tend to coincide with official pronouncements. Perceptions of external threat to the country are however shaped mainly by the media, which in the past few years have been obsessed with developments in Zimbabwe. The predominant perception of respondents was therefore that Zimbabwe is the one country that poses the greatest security threat to South Africa.

- Respondents were comfortable with the current political climate in the country and considered political violence to be low and to be a thing of the past.

- Despite some high-profile cases of excessive use of force by the police, the majority of respondents still feel that police brutality in the country is low.

- On foreign migrants, respondents feel that although all foreigners cause one problem or the other, those migrants from the rest of Africa are particularly problematic.

- Mercenaries are not considered to be a threat, despite the high profile case of an attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea by a group of mercenaries operating from South Africa, the majority of whom are South African citizens.

- Respondents also appear to be more worried about internal acts of terrorism than global terrorism.

- Respondents were very much aware of the continued existence of racism in certain sections of South African society. However, the majority do not think that white extremists such as the Boeremag pose a serious threat to the country.

- The menace of firearms in society is known, but respondents still feel that carrying a licensed firearm is necessary for personal protection.

- Everyone is anguished by the prevalence of violent crime in the country. Respondent perception of the prevalence of murder, hijackings and rape coincides with police statistics.

- It is recognised that poverty and economic inequality are major causes of crime and human insecurity. Unemployment is particularly singled out as a major cause of insecurity.

- In recognition of the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS, the majority of respondents consider that disease is the major killer in the country followed by accidents, old age and lastly violence.

- The majority of respondents think that South Africa's land problem will be resolved by negotiation and that the farm killings experienced so far are just criminal acts and are not politically motivated.

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Part IV

RURAL INSECURITIES

The impact of stock theft on human security
Strategies for combating stock theft in Lesotho
Dr J Dzimba and Matsolo Matooane (LIPAM)[1]

INTRODUCTION

It is time that the objectives of security policy go beyond achieving an absence of war to encompassing the pursuit of good governance, peace and security of people, crime prevention, protection of fundamental freedoms, sustainable economic development, social justice, and protection of human rights and the environment. The use of military force is a legitimate means of defence against external aggression, but it is not an acceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and settling disputes. It recognises that states can mitigate the security dilemma and promote regional stability by adopting a defensive military doctrine. Threats to security are not limited to military challenges to state sovereignty and territorial integrity; they include abuse of human rights, economic deprivation, social injustice, and destruction of the environment.

The Southern African Development Community's (SADC) conceptual framework on peace and security recognises a new approach to human security that emphasises the security of people and non-military dimensions of security. In essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition of state characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives.[2] It is about the protection of the individual by taking preventative measures to reduce vulnerability and insecurity, to minimise risk, and to take remedial action where prevention fails. This model recognises that security of states does not necessarily have the same meaning as security of people. Its philosophy is based on the principle that security is conceived as a holistic phenomenon, which is not restricted to military matters, but broadened to incorporate the security

of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life. It encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of the individual, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, respect for human rights, good governance, and access to education and healthcare. It is about ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Its objects are not confined to states, but extend to different levels of society that include people, geographic region and global community.

The Lesotho stock theft project is a response to the call by SADC heads of state on civil society, academics and research institutions, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to engage in combating matters that threaten peace and human security in their countries. A workshop organised by the Lesotho Institute of Public Administration and Management (LIPAM), and supported by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), was held in Maseru on 2 and 3 June 2004. At the workshop – which was attended by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), NGOs, academics and research institutions – participants defined HIV/AIDS and stock theft as the greatest threats to human security in Lesotho. The workshop provided consensus that the major threat to human security, peace and democracy in Lesotho comes from high levels of crime, which impact negatively on the country's already fragile economy.[3] The problem of stock theft was considered to be one of the major threats to human security, peace and democracy in Lesotho. This chapter is an abbreviated version of a monograph published by the ISS.

METHODOLOGY

The study is intended to analyse the strategies used to combat stock theft in Lesotho. Interviews were held with various stakeholders, that is, chiefs, police, army, Ministry of Agriculture officials, prosecutors, magistrates, and members of parliament. The interviews were focused on obtaining background information on the state of stock theft in Lesotho. This information was collected with a view to, among other things, identifying villages with a high incidence of stock theft (information from the chiefs); obtaining the relevant statistics on stock theft and recoveries[4] (from the police); and identifying border patrol areas that are serviced by the army in conjunction with the police and their counterparts in South Africa. Information on the registration and identification of stock, including grazing permits and marketing channels (from the

Ministry of Agriculture), was also important. Prosecutors and magistrates provided statistics on court cases lodged, processed and pending, and the police identified hot spots for stock theft and gave their general impressions on the issue of stock theft. This information was augmented through literature review and formed the basis for questionnaire design and development.

Themes for discussion revolved around roles and competencies in combating stock theft; the successes and challenges of countering stock theft; and recommendations for future improvements. The above process occurs within the context of existing strategies to combat stock theft.

SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

Because the study was qualitative and quantitative, purposive and biased sampling techniques were used to select areas that best reflect characteristics of stock theft in Lesotho. Subjective information and

Table 1 Sampling of districts

Level of stock theft incidence	District	Village cluster	Remarks
High	Thaba-Tseka	Sehonghong	Highlands
		Matsoku	Highlands
	Maseru (pre-test district)	Qeme	Lowlands (border)
		Thaba Bosiu	Foothills
	Berea	Mosalemane	Foothills
		Menyameng	Foothills
Medium	Leribe	Mphosong	Foothills
		Maputsoe	Border/lowlands
	Butha-Buthe	Monontsa	Border/highlands
		Tsime	Foothills
	Qacha's Neck	Ramatseliso	Border/highlands
		Matebeng	Highlands
Low	Mohale's Hoek	Ketane	Highlands
		Mpharane	Foothills
	Mafeteng	Van Rooyens	Border/lowlands
		Matelile	Lowlands

experts were used to identify the research samples. The experts in this particular study are the Stock Policing (STOCKPOL) Unit of the Lesotho Mountain Police Service (LMPS).

Sampling was done in a manner that is representative of the country and covered three ecological zones, namely highlands, foothills and lowlands in the seven districts involved in the study, including areas around the border.

Relevant information on stock theft was obtained to identify hot spots in these districts. Statistical information on the incidence and recovery of stock was obtained from STOCKPOL and analysed. The districts were ranked according to the extent of stock theft. Sampling of districts was done by selecting two high-, three medium- and two low-incidence districts. This took into account the districts that have a high incidence of across-border stock theft. (The data from Maseru was omitted from the analysis, because the district was a pre-test area. Consequently information from only seven districts was used in writing the report.)

A cluster sampling strategy was used to select villages. Cluster sampling refers to subdividing the population into subgroups called clusters, then selecting a sample of clusters and randomly selecting members of the cluster. The villages were clustered according to groups of villages falling under gazetted chiefs in offices where bewys are issued.

A sample of two clusters per district was selected. A total of 315 respondents were interviewed in the seven districts, comprising a sample of 210 stockowners (including shepherds and stock theft associations, STAs), 42 chiefs (including 14 headmen), 42 police officers, 14 prosecutors, and 7 magistrates. Data was collected from directly and indirectly affected categories of respondents as follows:

- at least 15 stockowners in a cluster of villages;
- at least two chiefs with offices where bewys are issued (these were in areas serving the above stockowners);
- one headman under these chiefs;
- one station commander and one patrol officer at the police station serving the selected village clusters; and
- two prosecutors and one magistrate at the local court serving the selected village clusters.

Fifteen closed police dockets were also analysed for each of the sampled districts, using a structured docket analysis form.

Data was captured using EPI-Info and analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). Subsequently the relevant stakeholders were invited to a workshop to validate the findings, build consensus, and develop a way forward.

SOURCES OF DATA AND DATA-COLLECTION STRATEGIES

Pitsos were held for stockowners, shepherds, members of community policing and STAs, and closed and open-ended questionnaires were administered. Police posts, army bases, local courts, gazetted chiefs and bewys writers were selected for the administration of questionnaires. Data was collected from highlands, foothills and lowlands, as well as villages around the South African border. Separate questionnaires were developed for each category of interviewee. Most questions were open-ended to allow the respondents to air their views or give additional information. Names of respondents were not included in the questionnaire to enable them to freely express their views.

The questionnaires were designed to assess the impact of existing strategies in alleviating stock theft. These strategies involved the following:

- community policing (working with the police to exchange information);
- STAs (to exchange information with the police on stock theft);
- border patrols that included both the police and the army;
- the Stock Theft Act No 4 of 2000, which contains measures for combating stock theft. These measures include marking and registration, sale and transportation, and increased powers of search and seizure by police. Penalties for stock theft offenders are harsher.

The questionnaires were designed to assess the following:

- the extent to which stock theft has affected the livelihoods of the rural communities;
- the strengths of the existing strategies in combating stock theft;
- the reason why current strategies have not been successful;
- the causes of the lack of confidence in the police and the courts displayed by communities;
- recommendations to be made that will regain the confidence of communities in the police, courts and government; and

- strategies that will curb the problem of stock theft.

Stockowners

To analyse the factors that determine the extent or impact of the problem of stock theft, stockowners were used as the first point of contact because they are the primary victims of stock theft and the people most likely to suffer insecurity as a result. Stockowners were interviewed to gather information about their perceptions of the following:

- whether stock theft has become more widespread and/or violent in the last three years;
- whether the marketing channels and uses of livestock make it easier to trade in stolen stock;
- the progress Lesotho has made in developing and implementing sound systems for combating stock theft, focusing on the community infrastructure, technical issues in the policing services and the criminal justice system, and institutional arrangements in the police, the community and the courts;
- examining the importance of the rearing of livestock to communities in Lesotho;
- the uses of livestock, how these are affected by stock theft, and how these effects impact on community cooperation, activities and initiatives;
- whether violence has escalated within communities because of stock theft and how this has impacted on community relations and the economic structures within these communities;
- the consequences of escalating stock theft on the processes of social protection and good governance, with particular emphasis on corruption and conflict;
- whether there is any harmony and linking of policy strategies so that human and financial resources are used efficiently and effectively; and
- management and leadership principles that should be emphasised in order to lead to a better partnership among stakeholders.

All these have an impact on the formulation and implementation of strategies to combat stock theft, and understanding these views, opinions and perceptions forms the context for a review of the strategies. For instance, if stock theft has become more violent, then we need to ascertain how this affects strategies such as community policing.

Chiefs

Chiefs form an important part of the governance system. Their responsibility is to maintain peace, law and order in collaboration with the police. With regard to live stock rearing they are authorised to write bewys as official documents for the transfer of ownership of animals from one person to another. They have the power to arrest and hand over to the police any person who disturbs the peace or breaks the law of the land. When members of the public have apprehended lawbreakers, they hand them to the chief, who in turn passes them on to the police.

Chiefs live in the communities with the people they rule. This makes them the people closest to the communities. Thus, for issues of crime in general and stock theft in particular, they become the first authorities that people report to or seek assistance from. They are strategically placed to be effective in assisting their communities, but can be destructive if they are corrupt. They are also important stakeholders in stock rearing.

For these reasons the study devoted time to chiefs as important stakeholders. Because of their intermediary role between the community and the police, chiefs are summoned as state witnesses in most cases of stock theft and other crimes. Thus they interact regularly with the police and are well placed to give an opinion on the police.

Chiefs were interviewed to determine the following:

- the chiefs' perception of their role in combating stock theft;
- the level of crime in their areas. As the first people to whom communities report crime in villages, the chiefs are the first to know what is happening in their communities;
- strategies that communities employ against crime. As the authority that has to know and approve all legal activities in the village, the chief would know what initiatives have been taken by the community to combat crime; and
- the problems and challenges that they face as intermediaries between the police and the communities they rule. Chiefs liaise with the police in that they refer victims of stock theft to the police for assistance.

When the police go to any village or area, their first contact is with the chief, so the questionnaires tried to determine the levels of communication and cooperation between the communities and the police.

The Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS)

The police force is central in eliminating stock theft and protecting the citizens from criminals. In dealing with this problem the police have established a stock theft unit and implemented strategies to combat the problem. It was crucial to interview them to find out:

- how the police are managing the problem of stock theft, what structures and operations they have implemented to support the strategies, and the constraints they face in implementing the strategies, in order to have an overview of the magnitude of the problem;
- the reasons for the difficulties in reducing the level of crime and stock theft;
- the working relationship between the Criminal Justice System and the police, and the problems in working together in the process of justice;
- how the police work with the communities they protect and how the relationship between the police and the communities – in particular the chiefs – impacts on the social protection of this communities, with the emphasis on stock theft; and
- whether the allegations of corruption in the LMPS can be substantiated.

Prosecutors and magistrates (the Criminal Justice System)

Magistrates, prosecutors and the police have to work together to ensure the efficient and effective administration of the judicial system. Because magistrates work closely with the prosecutors, who in turn work closely with the police, they can easily determine whether prosecutors and police are competent in dealing with stock theft cases – particularly with regard to the preparation of the case, the quality of the evidence, their knowledge of the relevant legislation, and their experience.

The magistrates are the neutral third parties appointed by the state on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission to decide on matters in case of a conflict. They arrive at decisions according to the principles of fairness and impartiality, while upholding constitutional and fundamental human rights. They are there to enforce the law and ensure that it is applied strictly. Their primary duty is to enforce decisions they have reached. They also decide on the questions of law and protect the judicial services.

Interviews were held to determine the following:

- the problems that hinder the efficient and effective administration of justice, particularly pertaining to stock theft;

- whether the communities' lack of confidence in the courts is justified;
- whether allegations of corruption within Lesotho's justice system can be substantiated; and
- the reasons for the slow movement of justice in Lesotho's courts, particularly in case handling, the emphasis being on periods of remand of cases.

One of the objectives of the study was to determine the efficiency of the Criminal Justice System in dealing with stock theft. In the process dockets would be researched and analysed to determine whether they are serving their purpose.

Dockets contain the following information/statements: the type of crime committed; the time and place of the crime; background information on victims and perpetrators; and previous convictions of the perpetrators. This information is used as evidence in magistrate's courts.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW OF LESOTHO

To conceptualise the importance of the study on stock theft and its impact on human security, one has to take cognisance of the social and economic structures of Lesotho.

Lesotho is a predominantly mountainous country, with an average altitude of more than 1,600 metres above sea level. It covers about 30,350 square kilometres and has limited natural resources. One quarter of the land is lowland and the remainder foothills and highlands. Although it remains one of the least developed countries, it has achieved a real annual average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 4.2% between 1980 and 2002 and the national economy has now reached M7.5 billion (approximately US$1 billion).[5] Lesotho has a population of 2.2 million growing at an average of 2.4% per annum, and the literate but largely unskilled labour force represents the main national resource.[6] It is entirely landlocked within the territory of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and its economic development centres on its membership and participation in activities of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

DISTRIBUTION OF LIVESTOCK

In developing programmes to assist the poor, cognisance must be taken that the proportion of households that own livestock is declining

(between 1993 and 1999 cattle ownership fell from 48% to 39% while ownership of sheep and goats fell from 32% to 26%).[7] The average number owned is low (1.43 for cattle and 3.96 for small stock) with very limited variation across income quintiles. However, a small percentage of rich households own large herds. These wealthier members of the community are able to benefit more from the communal resource than those who do not own any livestock. In the early 1990s an attempt was made to introduce locally managed grazing fees, which would have resulted in livestock owners effectively paying their communities for the use of range land, but this failed owing to lack of popular support and the absence of proper implementation structures. The issue of unequal access to natural resources remains, and it is necessary to work towards consensus with the various stakeholders about the way forward.

CONSUMPTION PATTERNS OF STOCK

It is estimated that household slaughtering accounts for 2%, 5% and 4% for cattle, sheep and goats respectively, which explains the varying decline in the levels of cattle, sheep and goats.[8] Current slaughter trends are likely to vary, but do indicate higher percentages owing to increasing deaths from the HIV/AIDS pandemic. This is substantiated by the traditional practice of slaughtering animals in the event of deaths or for funeral ceremonies. With the proliferating increase in statistics of death related to the HIV and AIDS pandemic, we are observing a sharp decrease in the accumulation of stock as a result of increasing slaughter rates. Furthermore, cattle are used for lobola (payment for a bride), payment of school fees, and festive celebrations. Stockowners sell their stock to meet these obligations. For an ordinary Mosotho, stock is his or her finance bank.

Livestock production contributes to the economic development in Lesotho in many ways. Animals are:

- a source of barter for other commodities;
- a source of food;
- a source of household fuel, particularly in rural areas;
- a source of draught power and transport; and
- a readily marketable asset for meeting household financial needs.

The formal marketing channels, which were supported extensively, are in the process of being privatised. Livestock owners sell directly to traders,

Table 2 Livestock census, 2000/01[9]

District	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Pigs	Horses	Donkeys	TOTAL
Butha-Buthe	39,065	59,945	41,645	5,140	4,325	11,510	161,630
Leribe	129,875	108,450	119,500	21,625	16,625	30,750	426,825
Berea	86,625	60,250	37,875	29,250	5,625	26,250	245,875
Maseru	128,125	153,700	88,875	35,000	16,875	28,250	450,825
Mafeteng	79,894	138,564	55,938	14,750	6,313	22,688	318,147
Mohale's Hoek	55,750	86,645	150,750	14,125	10,125	17,375	334,770
Quthing	43,500	99,375	96,125	8,250	6,750	7,625	261,625
Qacha's Neck	22,675	52,200	14,800	2,800	3,975	4,500	100,950
Mokhotlong	43,875	165,125	72,250	0	8,875	11,000	301,125
Thaba-Tseka	80,500	192,375	152,500	4,125	17,250	2,000	448,750
TOTAL	709,884	1,116,629	830,258	135,065	96,738	161,948	3,050,522

butchers and individual buyers. Currently 15 auction sites are organised by Livestock Produce and Marketing Services (LPMS). These auctions are experiencing less and less support from buyers and sellers in favour of informal channels.[10] Most stockowners are not commercial operators. Animals on the hoof are regarded as live wealth which owners are loath to part with. Stockowners do not plan their sales and sell only when there is an urgent need for cash, such as for paying school fees. Recently, informal channels seem to attract stock thieves, as owners are willing to part urgently with stock and readily accept the buyer's price.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Livestock production is one of the economically viable and sustainable sectors in the agricultural industry. This is primarily because of the favourable topography and climate, which renders Lesotho free of major epizootic diseases. According to livestock census figures published in 2001 there were 3,050,522 animals in Lesotho in 2000/01.

In cases of theft, the livestock owner loses all the economic values of livestock and is left destitute. This affects the entire household, the community and the country. In Lesotho syndicates from both sides of the

border often steal animals at gunpoint, thus the risk of keeping livestock has become unacceptably high. In addition, it is becoming increasingly attractive to exchange stolen livestock for guns, vehicles and drugs.[11] This form of barter system has detrimental effects on the socioeconomic development of the nation. There is increasing suspicion and mistrust among stockowners. Also, violence has escalated within villages because community members do not know who the thieves are, who harbours them, and who their informants are.[12] Bribery and corruption impede justice and the recovery of stolen animals.

MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM OF STOCK THEFT

Stock theft has become a national crisis in Lesotho. The Bureau of Statistics[13] estimated that there were 580,000 cattle, 1,132,000 sheep, 749,000 goats, 98,000 horses and 163,000 donkeys in Lesotho in 1998/99. Cattle numbers have remained stable, while sheep have declined significantly in the same period. The primary reason for the decline of livestock has been quoted as stock theft. This has also adversely affected wool yields from 2.9 kg to 2.4 kg per sheep as stockowners disinvest in the livestock sector.[14]

According to the National Livestock Development Study Phase 1 report of March 1999, stock theft has reached epidemic proportions throughout Lesotho. However, there has been a decline in stock theft since 2001. Table 2 represents the incidence of stock theft and recoveries between 2000 and 2004. The average recovery of livestock is 38%.

According to the study conducted by Kynoch et al[15] the fundamental cause of stock theft is poverty. The distribution of income is biased against most of the rural population. This situation has been aggravated by the reduction in agricultural productivity and high unemployment. The rate of unemployment has been increased by the retrenchment of Basotho mineworkers in South Africa. While the Lesotho government hoped

Table 3 Summary of livestock stolen and recovered, 2000–2004[16]

	Number of animals stolen	Number of animals recovered	% Recovery
2000/01	33,950	11,150	33
2001/02	30,105	11,074	36
2002/03	26,678	13,369	50
2003/04	18,442	7,847	43
TOTAL	109,268	41,862	38

that the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) would offset the retrenchment of mineworkers, Phase II of the project – which employed a lot of manual labour from the ranks of the retrenched mineworkers – has been scrapped. In essence this means that agriculture remains the primary means of livelihood for rural communities in Lesotho.

For these reasons, among others, escalating stock theft presents a challenge to the consolidation of the fragile democracy in the kingdom. Stock theft impoverishes people and causes conflicts within and between villages, which in turn threatens stability and efforts to achieve the long-term National Vision 2020.[17]

STOCK THEFT NATIONALLY AND REGIONALLY

The incidence of stock theft is serious in Lesotho and the rest of the SADC sub-region. In 1999, the Council of Ministers agreed that all member states should embark on sound livestock identification, trace-back and information systems. Subsequently Lesotho conducted a feasibility study on the National Livestock Registration, Marking and Information systems in 1999. Lesotho is at a disadvantage compared to South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which have already developed and implemented sound systems for combating stock theft.

Lesotho is currently implementing a livestock registration, marking and information system with a view to curbing and managing stock theft within and across its borders. The Ministry of Agriculture is currently procuring equipment and supplies as a follow-up to the Stock Theft Act of 2000. The provisions of the Act are being implemented as the registration comes into effect. It is hoped that there will be a significant reduction in theft, increased recoveries, arrests, and sentencing of offenders.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF STOCK THEFT

Communities perceive stock theft as a significant cause of poverty which is also limiting the growth of herds. Although the reduction of herds allows some recovery of range lands in certain places, this is of little consolation to those households who have lost their livelihoods overnight. Some members of communities demonstrate how they have been cast into poverty and hunger through stock theft. Descriptions of the thefts suggest high levels of organisation implying that the thieves are fully resourced with sound financial and asset backing (in some cases trucks were involved in moving the animals). Moreover, there is

a strong perception that some police, chiefs, officials and businessmen are involved in these criminal networks. In border areas, there are clear indications of the international dimensions to stock theft that will need to be addressed if any progress is to be made.[18]

Donkeys and horses are no longer readily lent for transportation to those who do not have animals. Furthermore, some farmers who do not have animals are unable to plough their fields. Women generally prefer to sell stock to secure scarce resources and meet their basic needs rather than keep the animals for thieves and invite possible injuries or death. Spouses engage in serious conflicts over the sale and retention of stock.

Cow dung is used for fuel in the rural areas and stock theft has resulted in households resorting to wood for fire. It is not uncommon for women to spend up to six hours a day collecting firewood, in addition to other duties. Deforestation has caused major soil erosion problems.

Studies indicate that the economic status of about 90% of households in rural areas has been negatively affected by stock theft. There are reports of the entire wealth and livelihood of a household being wiped out in one stock theft operation. This has resulted in loss of income from the sale of milk, animals, wool, mohair and hides.

Grazing patterns have been affected by stock theft. Animals have been removed from grazing areas around the borders to the hinterland, where high stock densities have resulted in the poor condition of animals and severe land degradation.

IMPACT ON CROSS-BORDER, INTER- AND INTRA-VILLAGE RELATIONS

Cross-border stock theft has resulted in high levels of violence, causing injuries and death. The Kroon Report[19] equates the situation to a regional disaster. Shepherds experience high levels of victimisation, particularly in cattle posts. Thieves often cannot distinguish stockowners from non-stockowners and terrorise the whole village. They steal animals, rape women, loot homes, and kill villagers indiscriminately. This has resulted in a number of villages being abandoned.[20]

There is also suspicion and mistrust among villagers. One village suspects that the other village helps thieves to steal animals. People are no longer free to visit other villages. Any unknown person is regarded with suspicion.[21]

Stock theft has affected relations within villages on a number of different levels. The level of mistrust among villagers has reportedly

Figure 1 Level of violent crime per district

increased. This mistrust is not targeted at any neighbour in particular, but manifests itself in underlying tensions among villagers.[22] People are afraid to quarrel with neighbours because of the suspicion that if quarrels break out, animals may be lost. Neighbours are discouraged from having unfamiliar visitors, as they are viewed with suspicion.

CURRENT TRENDS IN STOCK THEFT

Stock theft has become more organised and violent. Studies conducted by Kynoch et al indicate that stock theft syndicates transport animals from one village to another and eventually to local butcheries and market outlets in South Africa.[23] Stolen animals can be transported easily within Lesotho's rugged terrain and readily exchanged for cash, dagga and guns. This renders stock theft a lucrative venture.

Stockowners reported that they were vulnerable and could not protect themselves against thieves armed with guns. This vulnerability is conducive to vigilantism and is the primary reason for increased violent conflict in villages. For instance, when asked what the government could do to make their villages safer, respondents gave answers that ranged from "Allow us to kill thieves" and "Give us authority to kill perpetrators" to "We should be given guns". These are all signs of the desperation of people whose lives are threatened every day.

Cattle are stolen more frequently than other animals, possibly because more people own cattle. Sheep are stolen in larger numbers because they are owned in larger numbers than any other stock.[24] The study shows that between January and December 2002 and January 2003 to January 2005 there was a decrease of 3.6% in cattle stolen, from 33.1% to 29.5%. There was also a decrease in the theft of donkeys in these two periods from 10.1% to 5.1%. The decline in stolen cattle may be because cattle are harder to sell, and would-be buyers do not have between R1,200.00 (US$200.00) and R5,000.00 (US$834.00) in ready cash, which is the going price of cattle (as shown by the data). Sheep are a much better deal for stock thieves as they are found in larger numbers, and are easier to sell informally since they are cheaper and cost R250.00 to R400.00. This means more people can afford them.

Most animals are stolen from village kraals and from cattle posts, where only shepherds guard them.

Most stock thieves are armed; therefore, in most cases attempts by stockowners to trace and recover animals on their own have been futile and risky.

CORRUPTION

Members of the community are of the view that the police and the army orchestrate stock theft operations and that they are involved in registering, transporting and marketing stolen animals. Some farmers across the border hire thieves and buy stolen animals. Unemployed youth and retrenched miners are often used for this purpose. Some chiefs contribute to the problem in various ways, from turning a blind eye to stolen animals in their villages to protecting and harbouring thieves and providing false documentation for stolen stock.

SLOW PROSECUTION

Closely related to the issue of corruption is the tedious and slow prosecution process. The police are experiencing serious problems and cannot respond promptly to crimes. They take too long to investigate thoroughly and consequently there is a delay in handing dockets over for prosecution. There are huge backlogs and suspects either have to remain in custody for a long time before they start serving their actual prison term or are acquitted. This worsens the problem of prison overcrowding. Many suspects lose their means of livelihood and are more likely to

Figure 2 Area levels of vulnerability to stock theft

turn to crime as an alternative. Thus families are negatively affected psychologically, economically and socially.

INEFFICIENCY OF THE COURTS IN ATTENDING TO STOCK THEFT CASES

Stock theft cases require great expertise. This pool of expertise can be harnessed from High Court judges, but the fundamental problem with the distribution of judicial services in Lesotho is that the High Court is centralised and that there are not enough judges to attend to cases timeously. On the other hand, the lower courts are subject to hierarchy, are understaffed, lack expertise, or are under-resourced, with inadequate rooms for operations. More often than not, the courts lack facilities for the safe storage of exhibits and valuable evidence is lost or misplaced. There is no modern case record management mechanism in place and cases often drag on for years. Often witnesses, victims, perpetrators and their relatives have to attend courts for lengthy periods of time. People want speedy delivery of justice: if they have to wait too long for this to happen, they lose confidence in the judicial system. Quite often they take the law into their own hands which has at times led to feuds, killings and destruction of property, leaving countless families destitute.

CURRENT INTERVENTIONS ON STOCK THEFT

A number of strategies and systems have been developed in Lesotho to combat stock theft, but with very little success. These strategies and systems were developed and spearheaded by the police authorities, and were called "Local partnership: A practical guide to crime prevention". These guides incorporated the approaches for dealing with crime in the communities.

The interventions are set against the background that it is not the sole responsibility of the police to tackle crime since crime affects everyone, at individual and community level. "Current interventions on stock theft" identifies the need for the public to help authorities to combat crime, and indeed, a working partnership can reduce fear of crime and improve community safety, thereby producing excellent results.

These initiatives date back as far as 1993 with the establishment of crime prevention committees. The general interventions document describes what works in crime prevention and how to make it work by operating in partnership. This was followed by approaches to crime prevention in general and is designed to orient those who are to promote a partnership approach to crime prevention in the community.

Current partnership approaches and interventions include:

• review of the legislation and introduction of the Stock Theft Act 2000, as amended;
• community-police cooperation through establishment of crime prevention committees; and
• patrols by the army or the police and joint patrols.

The rigorous role set for communities in the intervention strategies discussed below demonstrates that the role of the state has been widened to include all of society, not only the policy makers. A secure environment is not created by the state through security officers, but duty is also vested in the members of the community to assist authorities. The structure of the current intervening units is such that they have a tripartite nature involving the state (policies), community members and the state authorities (the courts of law, army officials or police officers).

In the context of stock theft and related crimes, partnerships are forged and a crime profile drawn up to devise an operational plan for addressing the areas of greatest need. The validity of the programme lies in that it details the way in which actions are implemented and evaluated

for success and failure. This recognises that the partnership approach is a consulting agency that reviews policies and practices and evaluates the situation in the described areas. The steps are:

- considering the operational plan;
- prioritising the problem of stock theft;
- developing options for dealing with the matter;
- appraising options to choose the most suitable;
- preparing an operational plan based on the selected option; and
- having the task force implement the plan.

At the end of each year since its implementation, an evaluation committee has reviewed the programme and pinpointed strengths and challenges, if any, as well as the need for work plan adjustments. This initiative recognises that stock theft is not limited to theft of property. Its philosophy is that theft is not restricted to crimes involving moveable property, but includes crimes that threaten the security of individuals, including threats to their social and economic well-being, their health and safety, and their fundamental freedoms and self-determination. Government and security officials should therefore pay great attention to the implementation of these interventions. The implementation of interventions in stock theft will demonstrate a clear commitment by government to address the administration of justice in order to promote the peace and security of individuals in communities.

COMMUNITY POLICING

Some members of the community hold regular meetings to develop strategies for combating crime. They patrol their villages at night. The idea of community policing stems from the concept of social crime prevention. It is a strategy that focuses on combating and preventing crime through the Criminal Justice System as well as community agencies. Community policing is a response to a social need for the protection of lives while reducing the incidence of crime. Ascription and membership are built by community chiefs who nominate teams of trustees to join these programmes. Professionalism is guaranteed through training provided by police officers. Activities in community policing aim at reducing, deterring or preventing the occurrence of specific crimes. It seems that communities are taking responsibility for their own protection and are becoming involved in neighbourhood watches and anti-crime

associations and committees. A total of 61.6% of respondents said that an organisation or group (other than the police) provided protection against crime in their communities. Of this number, 54.5% said the organisation was a volunteer group, and of these, 36.9% admitted that they paid a fee for their services.

The Lesotho Mounted Police Services (LMPS) are influencing this line of thinking by prioritising crime prevention through targeted visible policing, enhancing cooperation with external roleplayers such as local authorities and crime prevention committees, and building partnerships that will address the root causes of stock theft.

The government has a major stake in this endeavour and is focusing on:

- researching and developing accessible sources of information;
- developing policies and programmes for social crime prevention;
- coordinating the delivery of social crime prevention programmes;
- developing programmes based on research that try to deal with the economic causes of stock theft as a crime; and
- monitoring the effectiveness of social crime prevention programmes.

Local government structures implement government policies that are already in place. This initiative will help to set joint crime prevention priorities and agreeing on strategies to ensure their implementation. The local government structures will help to identify flashpoints, crime patterns and community anti-crime priorities and communicate these to the police and the local authorities who would participate in problem-solving activities. The mobilisation of resources and organisation of community campaigns are important to make sure that approaches to stock theft prevention are understood. Conventionally, the most effective way of dealing with crime is through the Criminal Justice System, which focuses on punishing and rehabilitating the offender. Using many different ways ultimately requires the involvement of the community and multiple stakeholders in order to think and work creatively. In community policing the role of the police officer is that of a peace officer rather than a law enforcement officer on crime patrol. In community policing the police not only enforce the law, but also prevent crime, promote public order, resolve conflict, enhance police community relations and render general assistance to the public. This improves communication and helps to combat this crime in partnership with those who are greatly affected.

STOCK THEFT ASSOCIATIONS / CRIME PREVENTION COMMITTEES

The primary tasks of these associations are to search for stolen animals and to investigate issues related to stock theft and hand over thieves to the police. They also hold regular meetings to discuss strategies for reducing stock theft and patrol the villages at night to guard against theft. Membership fees are paid to defray expenses incurred in their operations. This study shows that collaboration of stock theft associations from neighbouring villages increases the recovery of stolen animals. However, these associations are sometimes rendered ineffective by thieves who join them. In some instances, stock theft associations cease to operate because of clashes with police and murder of members by armed thieves.

The police authorities initiate this project to encourage communities to establish community kraals closer to grazing posts. This is intended for group members of the community so that they can be given firearms, where necessary, or an army officer or police official can be deployed at each grazing post or community kraal for protection. The process of implementing these approaches to crime prevention is under way. Cognisance must be taken that the primary role of these committees is to report to the authorities where they suspect offences are imminent. As per Section 26 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1981, like all other citizens, members of these committees are empowered to arrest and apprehend suspects, with immediate follow-up action to be taken by the police authorities.

POLICE PATROLS

Police patrols are based on the Police Act, which prescribes the primary role of the police authorities as protecting the property and lives of all citizens. Stock theft is property theft and citizens must be protected. The Stock Theft Unit of the LMPS is responsible for managing and reducing stock theft. However, patrols are not carried out regularly, possibly because of a lack of human and material resources, and it is safe to say that these initiatives are not so successful, owing to the lack of adequate resources.

Of the police respondents, 43% indicated that their most critical constraints with regard to combating stock theft are a shortage of resources: clothing, storage units, patrol rations, helicopters, bullet-proof vests, sleeping bags and vehicles. For example, 73% said their police stations do not have secure exhibit storage, whereas 26% said that they did. Moreover, 70% said that they do not have 4x4 vehicles, whereas 30% confirmed that they had. There are plenty of horses (85% indicated that they have horses) and they are used mostly in mountainous areas.

The police often reach the crime scene long after the thieves have gone. Stock theft from cattle posts are reported to the villages and subsequently to the police. Distances and poor communication prohibit timely response. The credibility of the Lesotho police is weakened by their inability to deal effectively with South African raiders. The police are sometimes out-gunned by thieves from South Africa. Patrols attempt to reduce crime related to stock theft, including robbery, murder and rape. They are visible at all points of the beat area, especially in giving directions to passers-by. Primarily they demonstrate the importance the authorities have attached to community policing and forge good relations with the community.

Police patrols work in consultation with community policing in the beat areas. This usually necessitates arrest and apprehension of suspects and offenders.

The intervention of police patrols has a substantial impact on the trends of stock theft and related crimes, negative and positive.

- At one end of the spectrum, transport shortages hit these initiatives negatively. This is witnessed on rainy days or when patrols need to be carried out in remote areas inaccessible by road. But the services need to go on as offenders usually take advantage of the situation.

- Lack of communication aids such as portable radios means that helpful information is received late or patrols are late in reaching the scene of the crime. The patrols therefore seem to be unprofessional.

- Lack of arms and ammunition has a serious impact on patrols, especially where serious crimes have been committed. Police personnel are unable to apply self-defence and safety precautions.

Despite these difficulties, patrols in beat areas are usually carried out for 24 hours with armed men in uniform deployed at each strategic area. Each point is given a portable radio to facilitate communication. All things being equal, the beat crews are supposed to be checked regularly by a sergeant on patrol, but in some cases this is impossible owing to the above constraints.

JOINT POLICE/ARMY PATROLS

The purpose and importance of police patrols also applies to army patrols. Army patrols are responsible for controlling illegal cross-border

Figure 3 Levels of joint army/police patrols by district

movements. In most cases they play a key role in protecting communities from cross-border attacks. Villagers have applauded their presence because they are a deterrent to raiders. Of the respondents who had had army patrols in their areas, 79% indicated that joint patrols had reduced crime. The following reasons were given:

- Reports of crimes go down while the patrol is taking place (73.4%).
- People stop moving around at night during these patrols (10.9%).
- People know that the army/police are serious about cracking down on crime (7.8%).
- Stolen stock is recovered (2%).

The distinguishing factor in the two patrols above is that the army has always had a attitude that brings fear to the perpetrators; hence army patrols sometimes appear to be more successful than the police. It should be noted that when they did not achieve their objective, it was primarily because of leakage of information when members of the community with inside information alert the offenders that patrols will be undertaken.

COURTS

Courts are responsible for the administration of justice; however, their role may sometimes be challenged by the lack of human and material resources. In most districts there are only two prosecutors and one magistrate. When one considers the incidence of stock theft, it becomes clear that three administrators of justice will find it difficult to to handle the resultant workload. Thus understaffing is a major concern.

Certain other factors influence the performance of the courts, including the judicial structure and the line of responsibility of the courts.

Current legislation designates subordinate courts / magistrate's courts as the courts of first instance in the handling of stock theft matters. However, owing to the way in which investigating authorities handle the cases, stock theft cases are often dismissed on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Investigating authorities often use methods of investigation that are not acceptable, and as a result the evidence is usually discarded in the formal courts of law as circumstantial. Traditional courts, on the other hand, accept circumstantial evidence, so stock theft cases may ultimately be heard in these courts. Thus traditional courts have become the preferred forum for dealing with stock theft matters, although they do not have statutory authority to hear these cases.

STOCK THEFT ACT NO 4 OF 2000

The purpose of the Act is to combat the theft of stock. It provides for compulsory national registration and marking of stock to curb theft. It encourages farmers to invest in livestock, improve the quality of their herds, and implement national livestock tracking numbers for better range-land management and animal health planning programmes.

The definitions in the Act subsume the wrongful taking, retention, and disposition of the property of another with the intention of depriving the owner of it permanently. If this is accompanied by violence or use of force, it becomes robbery. The practical interpretation of these definitions seems to be that receiving stock in the knowledge that it has been stolen constitutes theft; similarly accepting the meat of animals that the recipient knows to have been stolen constitutes wrongful conduct.

The above interpretation clearly constitutes ordinary theft. But punishments in Section 8 read in conjunction with Section 13 are disproportionate to the jurisdiction to try matters placed in the magistrate's courts. According to Section 16 of the Laws of Lerotholi, the actions that are related to stock theft are treated as common theft.

Nowadays disposition, retention and permanent deprivation connotes intention to steal, and this applies to the related offence of stock theft, though certain elements may vary slightly. For these variations, the Stock Theft Act of 2000 places the jurisdiction to hear such matters in the magistrate's courts, but these are far from the remote areas where this crime seems to be high, and only traditional authorities exist there. A lot of petty decision work has to be administrated by magistrates, although traditional courts could handle these matters. The Criminal Justice System has therefore become overloaded with stock theft cases from the hinterland.

Stock theft is defined as violations of Section 8 and Section 13, which include

- making a false statement in a bewys;[25]
- disposal without a bewys or with a bewys that does not state the particulars of stock;
- inciting, hiring, abetting, directing, tampering with, altering, forging and making additions to a bewys;
- falsely declaring stock or produce;
- conveying without a bewys;
- conveying, delivering or accepting stock at night; and
- threatening or using violence to take stock.

Current trends in the implementation of this law show that borrowing without the intention of retaining permanently does not constitute theft *(Makalakaqa vs Ramatseku JC 54)*.

It is difficult to establish the truth of the matter, however. In addition, when stock stray and and attempts to restore them to the rightful owner are unsuccessful, this constitutes a strict liability case. From this perspective apparent stock theft can be defended if it can be proved, for example, that one was the agent of someone else. The court may impose a fine or imprisonment or both.

The Act itself prescribes a scale of fines and periods of imprisonment for offences under Section 13. If the prosecution cannot dispute that stock was lost and kept without the intention of restoring the animals to their rightful owner, this constitutes misappropriation, which is an offence; but if it is reported, it may be restored to the rightful owner without imprisonment or fine. The Act was intended to punish stock theft and related crimes stringently, but seems to be sabotaged by procedural inconsistencies and inapplicability in practice. The penalties prescribed

in Section 13 cannot be operational as this theft occurs among ordinary people. It is also strange that we administer this legislation together with the traditional laws of punishment, thus confusing the law enforcers.

However, the stock theft legislation under which the accused is normally charged prescribes minimum penalties that exceed the magistrate's penal jurisdiction. In many cases, magistrates decide to invoke the provisions of Section 293 (1) of the Criminal Law and Evidence Act No 7 of 1981, which commit such case to the High Court for sentencing. The penalties prescribed in the Stock Theft Act indicate that magistrate's courts do not have the necessary penal jurisdiction and consequently do not have sufficient power to try stock theft cases. Stock theft matters are therefore reviewed in the High Court. In protection of humanity, magistrate courts give proportionate sentences that compensate for the lack of legal training and invest the courts with the necessary institutional legitimacy. The sentences spelled by the Stock Theft Act are outrageous to the ordinary Mosotho and are likely to evoke public scorn and anger and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It appears that the increased penal jurisdiction of central and local courts is not tenable. But stock theft cases must be heard and determined. As stated, the penalties prescribed under Section 13 are grossly disproportionate, with no regard for the ability to pay the fines. A period of 25 years is excessive, even for a crime of violence. Penalties laid down by Section 13 therefore conflict with the provisions of Section 8 (1) of the constitution. The Act thus is at variance with other legal instruments in stipulating what is appropriate for enforcing the law. Human rights must be considered but the enjoyment of these rights should not prejudice other rights and freedoms. Section 13 is likely to nullify most of the trials in stock theft and proceedings will be set aside.

CONCLUSION

The following observations are critical in summarising the stock theft situation in Lesotho.

DYNAMICS OF STOCK THEFT

- *Stock theft is on the increase, and so is related violence:* Violence related to stock theft is perpetrated not only by thieves, but by community members against suspected thieves. Violence is bound to increase as more community members call for arms in order to defend themselves. Therefore there is a need for the state machinery and civil society to

work together in order to address the security system and the poor administration of the Criminal Justice System.

- *Unemployment is the leading cause of stock theft:* Stock theft is committed by unemployed young men, not because they are poor and have nothing to eat, but because they do not have much to do. Their pride as the traditional providers for their families is being eroded as they are not able to obtain jobs and the number of animals that was traditionally used as a measure of their status is on the decline. Consequently they try to regain their status through stock theft.

- *The marketing channels of stock make it easier to trade in stolen stock:* Most of the stock in Lesotho is sold to individuals for use in funerals, wedding celebrations, and other communal celebrations. It is customary to buy animals to be butchered informally. With the increase in demand engendered by funerals, more stock for butchering is bought without the necessary documentation and stolen stock is cheaper. Documentation is only required when the animals are to be kept.

- *Most stolen stock is herded into inhospitable terrain to make it more difficult to track:* Stock in Lesotho is primarily herded, and the inhospitable terrain makes it impossible for police to track animals, even with off-road vehicles.

- *Religious beliefs have an impact on the responses of communities to crime:* Most stockowners seem to depend on prayer when it comes to crime.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STOCK THEFT

- *Loss of mobility as animals are used for transport:* Over 70% of the respondents rely on animals for transport, either for pulling carts or for riding. Community members are unable to travel any distance when their main form of transport is taken away from them. Lack of road infrastructure means animals remain the most important form of transport for the Basotho. Animals are also the cheapest form of transport for disadvantaged communities.

- *Loss of earnings:* Sheep and goats are stolen in larger numbers. These animals provide earnings not only when they are sold, but also from sales of wool and mohair. Cattle are stolen most frequently, and this

entails a huge loss of earnings for stockowners. Cattle sell for between M1,200 and M5,000. Even when the cattle are used by the family, money can be earned from the sale of the leather.

- *Loss of lives:* The escalating violence related to stock theft is causing more deaths; usually of young men, who are not only the primary providers for their families, but also the protectors.

- *Decreasing levels of education:* More and more children are leaving school early because parents are unable to pay for their schooling.

STOCK THEFT INTERVENTIONS

- *The roles of the different stakeholders are not clear with regard to stock theft issues:* The roles of the police and the chiefs are not adequately defined. The procedures to be taken by the stockowner to get assistance to search for his/her stolen stock from both the chief and police are too bureaucratic.

- *The mandate of the various stakeholders in dealing with stock theft issues is not clear:* Because the roles are not defined, the mandates of the stakeholders are not clear either. For instance, the STAs think that their mandate is to search for stolen stock, catch the perpetrators, and hand them over to the police. The police think their mandate is to take statements, fill in dockets and act as witnesses in court. Prosecutors think that going to court with a docket that has been completed by the poice is the extent of their mandate. The stakeholders have carved niches for themselves and do not try to address the problem in its entirety.

- *The lack of resources hinders implementation of the strategies:* STAs and police patrols do not have the money to conduct extended operational searches for stolen animals. They lack essential equipment such as flashlights, bulletproof vests, dry rations and shortwave radios.

- *STAs are rendered ineffective by violence:* STAs are ceasing to exist as members fail to patrol at night because they are afraid of stock thieves. Also, the inability of members to defend themselves against armed stock thieves means that even when they patrol, they can do nothing to prevent thieves from taking stock.

- *Lack of means of communicating with police makes it impossible to report stock theft in time for the police to respond:* For communities that are far from police stations, it is impossible to report crime in time for an effective response from the police. Reporting crime is at an all-time low as villagers feel it is futile.

- *Community policing is failing because of a lack of organisation:* Because of the lack of formalised structures and remuneration, communities cannot agree on responsibilities.

THE LESOTHO MOUNTED POLICE SERVICE (LMPS)

- *The lack of resources hinders performance:* The police need off-road vehicles to deal effectively with stock theft. They also need a helicopter for regions that are impenetrable, except on foot. The lack of weapons, bulletproof vests, dry rations, tents and cold weather clothing makes their job difficult. The only resources they have in abundance are horses, but these are inadequate long-distance search operations.

- *The police are committed to the social protection of the communities they serve:* The reason that the police are not doing stellar work is not because they are lazy or lack commitment, but because they are not motivated. The relationship between the police and the communities they serve is very good, showing that they make an effort to be involved in the communities they serve.

- *The police crime prevention policy has not been implemented:* There is no problem identification, or prioritising of areas that need urgent attention or operational planning. This means the already limited resources are not used efficiently. For example, district headquarter stations have off-road cars, while the stations where they are needed, in rural areas, do not.

- *Police records are a major weakness in the police procedural system:* Police dockets do not contain the information that prosecutors need for convictions. The procedures and processes followed in opening and maintaining records are inadequate. For instance, dockets are not assigned to particular officers - everyone in the department may deal with cases as and when he or she pleases. Even if officers are assigned

cases, any officer in the station can open, change or add to the case docket if the officer in charge of that case is not available.

- *Police are vulnerable to corruption:* That the police do not have the requisite tools for their work makes them vulnerable to corruption. In most cases when they go on patrol or on a mission, no sleeping arrangements are made for them, nor are they provided with food. Once they are hungry and desperate it becomes easy to accept bribes from thieves. If basic resources are provided, the police should be able to improve delivery and their vulnerability to corruption reduced tremendously.

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF LESOTHO

- *The practical application of the law as it stands is not clear:* The Stock Theft Act places jurisdiction to try cases in the magistrate's courts. However, the question of proper jurisdiction is regularly disputed, because the penalties in the Act are either minimal or are outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate's courts. The contradiction created by Sections 8 and 13 of the Stock Theft Act needs to be clarified because it poses great difficulties in the implementation of the interventions on stock theft.

- *Case law has developed judicial precedence that gives magistrate's courts jurisdiction to try stock theft cases (Fatane and Others v Rex cc 03/2004)*: There has been a significant shift from the severe punishments prescribed in the statutes to more humane and enlightening sentencing policies. For instance, one cannot comprehend why a person who fails to mark livestock timeously could be sent to prison for 25 years or pay a fine of M25,000, as the Stock Theft Act provides. Even a person suspected of this is required to pay bail of M20,000. The objective of the Stock Theft Act is made ineffective by this anomaly.

- *Conflict of laws:* The problem that confronts the prosecuting authorities and the magistrate is to decide on the law that will allow strict liability as the proportionate punishment conferred in the Act. The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act No 7 of 1981 gives magistrate's courts the power to impose penalties in stock theft cases. This conflicts with the Subordinate Court's Order of 1988, which indicates that magistrate's courts cannot try cases with penalties exceeding M20,000. This leaves

the High Court as the court of jurisdiction to try stock theft cases. The conflict of these statutes creates another problem of constitutional and fundamental human rights as per the provisions of Section 12(2) of the constitution. For instance, the Stock Theft Act gives powers to the authorities to apprehend suspects without a warrant when no reasonable cause is shown. This is contradictory to the provision in the constitution, which demands a warrant of apprehension when an arrest is made. There is a need to harmonise the laws and to improve the working partnership between the community, the police, the army, the prosecutors and the magistrates.

NOTES

1   John Dzimba is the Director, Academics and Matsolo Matooane a consultant at the Lesotho Institute for Public Administration (LIPAM).
2   Human Development Report of the UN Development Programme, 1994.
3   J Dzimba and M Matooane, Workshop report on engaging civil society organisations in matters of peace and security in Lesotho, Maseru, 2004, p 6.
4   See appended tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.
5   Kingdom of Lesotho: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2004/2005 – 2006/2007, Government of Lesotho.
6   Government of Lesotho, *Pathway out of poverty: An action plan for Lesotho*, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1996 (with support from the World Bank, USAID and the EU).
7   National Livestock Registration, Marking and Information Project – feasibility study, Government of Lesotho, Department of Livestock Services, November 1999, p 10.
8   National Livestock Development Study, Government of Lesotho, Department of Livestock Services, March 1999, p 2.
9   National Livestock Development Study, Government of Lesotho, Department of Livestock Services, March 2002, p 4.
10 Ibid.
11 Cross-border raiding and community conflict in the Lesotho–South African border zone, *Migration Policy Series* 21, p 11.
12 Gary Kynoch and Theresa Ulicki et al, *The socio-economic impact of stock theft in southern Lesotho*, Morija, Maseru, June 1999, p 8.
13 Bureau of Statistics, Estimated livestock numbers and distribution, 1998/99.
14 National Livestock Registration, Marking and Information Project, op cit, p 5.
15 Kynoch et al, op cit, p 8.
16 Obtained from the Stock Theft Unit headquarters in Maseru, November 2004.
17 By the year 2020, Lesotho shall be a stable democracy, a united and prosperous nation at peace with itself and its neighbours. It shall have a healthy and well-developed human resource base. Its economy will be strong, its environment well managed and its technology well established.

18 Kynoch et al, op cit.
19 Report of the Commission to Inquire into the Tsolo Violence and Related Matters (Kroon Report), October 1995, Section 111, p 5.
20 Kynoch et al, op cit, pp 20–21.
21 Ibid, p 23.
22 Ibid, p 24.
23 Ibid, p 39.
24 See appended tables 3, 4, 6 and 12.
25 Bewys are documents issued by chiefs to transfer animals from one individual to another.

APPENDIX 1: SUPPLEMENTARY LESOTHO STOCK THEFT STATISTICS

Table 4 Summary of livestock theft and recovery, 2000–2004

	Number of animals stolen	Number of animals recovered	% Recovery
2000/01	33,950	11,150	33
2001/02	30,105	11,074	36
2002/03	26,678	13,369	50
2003/04	18,442	7,847	43
TOTAL	109,268	41,862	38

Table 5 Trend of stock theft by year and district

District	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	Total	Rank
BB	2,239	2,169	1,458	1,005	6,871	7
LR	2,179	1,562	3,577	1,739	9,057	5
BR	3,117	3,382	4,318	2,215	13,032	4
MSU	4,785	6,469	6,329	3,877	21,460	2
MFT	1,342	1,033	1,222	1,087	4,684	8
MH	476	287	811	390	1,964	10
QT	546	565	516	727	2,354	9
QNEK	3,332	1,639	1,586	1,850	8,407	6
MKG	7,231	4,949	2,280	2,889	17,349	3
TT	8,703	8,050	4,581	2,663	23,997	1
TOTAL	33,950	30,105	26,678	18,442	109,175	

Table 6 Number of animals stolen during 2000/01

District	Cattle	Horses	Donkeys	Sheep	Goats	Pigs	Mules	Total
BB	611	107	75	944	499	3	0	2,239
LR	1,023	88	69	607	390	2	0	2,179
BR	1,240	108	136	1,089	544	0	0	3,117
MSU	1,812	246	175	1,508	1,036	8	0	4,785
MFT	332	37	27	775	171	0	0	1,342
MH	139	16	2	141	177	1	0	476
QT	202	102	47	172	222	2	1	546
QNEK	704	340	90	1,475	722	0	1	3,332
MKG	1,196	641	217	4,509	665	0	3	7,231
TT	1,533	567	237	5,125	1,241	0	0	8,703
TOTAL	8,792	2,252	1,075	16,345	5,667	16	5	33,950

Table 7 Number of animals recovered in 2000/01

District	Cattle	Horses	Donkeys	Sheep	Goats	Pigs	Mules	Total	% Recovery
BB	102	28	7	162	28	1	0	328	15
LR	534	23	45	805	596	1	1	2,005	92
BR	513	51	22	143	65	0	0	794	25
MSU	788	97	43	437	211	2	0	1,578	33
MFT	33	5	5	85	12	2	0	142	11
MH	100	10	2	63	80	0	0	255	54
QT	287	49	31	89	96	0	0	552	101
QNEK	560	177	44	1,246	66	0	1	2,094	63
MKG	509	155	85	223	124	0	2	1,098	15
TT	446	222	87	1,083	466	0	0	2,304	26
TOTAL	3,872	817	371	4,336	1,744	6	4	11,150	
% Recovery	44	36	35	27	41	25	80		33

Table 8 Number of animals stolen during 2001/02

District	Cattle	Horses	Donkeys	Sheep	Goats	Pigs	Mules	Total
BB	560	56	107	903	543	0	0	2,169
LR	680	70	44	546	219	3	0	1,562
BR	1,597	143	129	1,155	356	2	0	3,382
MSU	2,594	335	237	2,186	1,108	9	0	6,469
MFT	214	25	17	644	129	4	0	1,033
MH	65	12	1	163	46	0	0	287
QT	181	53	52	153	125	1	0	565
QNEK	557	243	49	466	324	0	0	1,639
MKG	840	598	120	3,138	250	0	3	4,949
TT	1,561	608	226	4,893	761	0	1	8,050
TOTAL	8,849	2,143	982	14,247	3,861	19	4	30,105

Table 9 Number of animals recovered during 2001/02

District	Cattle	Horses	Donkeys	Sheep	Goats	Pigs	Mules	Total	% Recovery
BB	176	12	21	110	110	1	0	430	20
LR	222	34	16	173	117	1	0	563	36
BR	342	42	12	189	38	1	0	624	18
MSU	1,062	131	99	923	349	2	0	2,566	40
MFT	9	2	0	83	21	0	0	115	11
MH	55	11	3	125	14	0	0	208	72
QT	364	73	83	56	158	0	0	734	130
QNEK	377	102	27	162	214	0	0	882	54
MKG	889	282	71	1,423	131	0	4	2,800	57
TT	565	101	86	1,170	230	0	0	2,152	27
TOTAL	4,061	790	418	4,414	1,382	5	4	11,074	
% Recovery	45	36	43	31	36	25	100		36

Table 10 Number of animals stolen during 2002/03

District	Cattle	Horses	Donkeys	Sheep	Goats	Pigs	Mules	Total
BB	464	77	94	600	220	1	2	1,458
LR	1,509	129	112	1,238	585	3	1	3,577
BR	2,155	85	127	1,339	608	4	0	4,318
MSU	2,790	220	226	2,856	231	6	0	6,329
MFT	218	17	19	785	182	1	0	1,222
MH	198	47	27	339	200	0	0	811
QT	198	49	50	144	74	1	0	516
QNEK	448	216	43	596	282	1	0	1,586
MKG	528	298	72	1,231	151	0	0	2,280
TT	1,319	407	113	2,150	591	0	1	4,581
TOTAL	9,827	1,545	883	11,278	3,124	17	4	26,678

Table 11 Number of animals recovered in 2002/03

District	Cattle	Horses	Donkeys	Sheep	Goats	Pigs	Mules	Total	% Recovery
BB	278	40	23	235	4	1	0	581	40
LR	849	79	59	338	543	2	0	1,840	51
BR	600	38	30	392	62	0	0	1,132	26
MSU	914	78	70	2,207	612	1	0	3,880	61
MFT	30	11	8	231	82	1	0	363	30
MH	83	62	6	166	86	0	0	403	50
QT	340	48	55	113	112	0	0	668	132
QNEK	491	112	41	24	151	2	1	822	52
MKG	653	141	72	985	344	0	4	2,095	92
TT	490	183	85	484	218	0	0	1,370	30
TOTAL	4,728	792	449	5,175	2,214	7	5	13,369	
% Recovery	48	51	51	46	71	41	125		50

Table 12 Number of animals stolen in 2003/04

District	Cattle	Horses	Donkeys	Sheep	Goats	Pigs	Mules	Total
BB	402	24	50	322	204	1	2	1,005
LR	686	43	69	564	361	15	1	1,739
BR	1,138	78	86	624	285	3	1	2,215
MSU	1,325	180	126	1,623	617	6	0	3,877
MFT	149	28	19	811	80	0	0	1,087
MH	77	13	5	224	71	0	0	390
QT	206	83	90	225	123	0	0	727
QNEK	340	219	79	831	372	0	9	1,850
MKG	616	304	90	1,655	224	0	0	2,889
TT	690	169	121	1,373	309	1	0	2,663
TOTAL	5,629	1,141	735	8,252	2,646	26	13	18,442

Table 13 Number of animals recovered in 2003/04

District	Cattle	Horses	Donkeys	Sheep	Goats	Pigs	Mules	Total	% Recovery
BB	219	21	19	181	52	0	1	493	49
LR	433	19	25	140	153	0	2	772	44
BR	492	42	44	102	99	2	0	781	35
MSU	446	49	13	416	218	4	0	1,149	30
MFT	38	26	7	145	56	0	0	172	16
MH	73	9	2	60	27	0	0	169	43
QT	239	83	60	144	178	0	0	704	97
QNEK	502	229	71	333	249	0	0	1,384	76
MKG	371	91	71	760	177	0	0	1,470	51
TT	169	37	20	325	99	3	0	653	25
TOTAL	2,982	606	332	2,606	1,308	9	4	7,847	
% Recovery	53	53	45	31	49	35	31		42

Conclusion

Roger Kibasomba[1]

The conclusions to be drawn from the research presented in this volume are as many and as various as the countries where the research was conducted and the issues which the participating partners chose to investigate. There are nevertheless common lessons to be learnt that reflect the shared history and present-day challenges of the various countries that were examined.

All of the researchers recommend greater government intervention in some way, be it through the improvement of police services to combat stock theft in Lesotho, in taking the lead in providing services for street children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), or through engaging in dialogue with civil society and political opposition groups with a view to the peaceful resolution of political disputes. Engaging in dialogue requires nothing other than the political will to do so, a fact which several states in the region would do well to note. Intervention in a more material way has hitherto been held back through the weakness of states that are still recovering from war (hence the lack of attention given to youth needs in the DRC and Angola) or which simply lack the funds or the capacity to take appropriate action: witness the fact that police plans to tackle stock theft in Lesotho have had only a mixed success up to now.

Yet the SADC states find themselves at a uniquely favourable moment in history, for several reasons. First, the region is closer to absolute peace than at any time since the end of the colonial period. Angola, which once seemed to be blighted by the region's most intractable conflict, has enjoyed three years of peace. While the ongoing conflict in the east of the DRC is not to be downplayed or regarded as something that will disappear on its own accord, the war has been contained to the point where it no longer poses an immediate threat to the country as a whole.

Second, changing attitudes towards debt relief among rich country governments are bound to have positive consequences for Africa as a

whole. Within SADC, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia have met the criteria to qualify for immediate debt relief from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Fund. Moreover, the rich countries' acceptance in principle of the possibility of 100% debt write-offs bodes well for the eventual extension of such measures to other countries in the region. It is now up to civil society to monitor whether the funds that will become available through debt relief are channelled into the sort of measures that the authors of the papers in this book have identified: measures aimed at poverty reduction, physical security, development and care for society's most vulnerable members, especially children, unemployed youth and women. As our partners from Zambia have noted, "poverty endangers human security through its effect on the quality of life"; governments and parliaments, through shaping policy and allocating funds, are uniquely privileged to make a difference when it comes to reversing poverty.

Action from government does not come without pressure, especially where resources are scarce. Civil society organisations have an essential role to play in identifying problem areas and lobbying for them to be addressed. Civil society cannot, however, see its role as simply one of providing direction to the efforts of government. The research presented in this book amply demonstrates cases where direct civil society involvement has been the answer to problems that seem beyond the reach of even the best-intentioned government; witness, for example, the gains made by community-based policing in Lesotho.

When it comes to dealing with political unrest, our Tanzanian partners warn that when a negotiated settlement is sought, "the leaders at the negotiating table are often the very same ones who provoked or maintained conflicts in the first place". Here, civil society organisations have an irreplaceable role to play in taking forward the interests of human security, as opposed to those of political expediency. Our partners in Zimbabwe make this explicit: "CSOs and NGOs must also take time to appreciate that politics is not about setting up and operating social gatherings and neighbourhood talk-shops. On the contrary it is about the pursuit and competition for political power, control and influence. This is absolutely critical if conflicts of interests are to be avoided and minimised."

On a positive note, Tanzania at the same time presents the idea of 'Muafaka', an indigenous approach to problem-solving that other societies in conflict could do well to emulate. Insofar as the reconciliation and dialogue model presented by Muafaka has been applied, it has been

notably successful; it is now up to government, political players and civil society alike to ensure that its application is carried through to its logical conclusion. As the analysis presented throughout this book makes clear, responding to issues of human security is not primarily about immediate humanitarian action, but about identifying and addressing the root causes of insecurity with a view to securing longer-term benefits. This implies solutions that are devised from the grassroots upwards, with local knowledge and insight the key to policy-making and to action.

All these case studies portray the many faces of human security in the selected SADC countries. Most of these countries are still struggling with post-independence or post-conflict security and development challenges. The cases clearly demonstrate that the security of people matters. Without educated, healthy and working people, states are unlikely to maintain sustainable peace, organise democratic elections, police national boundaries, prevent social unrest, consolidate democratic practices, promote economic development, control population growth that leaves children abandoned on the street, and, above all, protect political institutions (including government itself) from bad governance and poor service delivery. From these studies, it is clear that street children in the city of Kinshasa (DRC) and uneducated youth in the city of Luanda (Angola) may become a real security concern in urban governance; that politically alienated populations may increase electoral insecurity and political activism as it was the case in Zimbabwe and Zanzibar; that poverty in Zambia can lead to political disengagement and serious democracy deficits; and finally, the South African case proves that even educated populations may fail to perceive government and SADC efforts correctly when university learning is completely disconnected from policy processes.

In brief, civil society engagement with security community in the region may provide the state with field information and knowledge of people at risk of human insecurity. One of the noble goals of democratic governance systems consists of empowering, supporting and building partnerships with credible civil society organisations, the private sector and community organisations for effective delivery of public services. These services include protection of vulnerable people and mobilising fiscal revenues that sustain government activities such as affordable public schools, healthcare, housing, water, electrification, transport, justice, police, army and voting. From this study, it appears that credible civil society organisations should form working partnerships with local government and municipalities for effective service delivery or policy

implementation, and sensitise central government authorities on critical policy and governance issues affecting the quality of political and economic life for all citizens.

NOTE

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