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Source: *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 61-80

Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601231>

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## **Non-separatist Policies Regarding Ethnic Minorities: Positive Approaches and Ambiguous Consequences**

WILLIAM SAFRAN

**ABSTRACT.** This paper provides a *tour d'horizon* of institutional and other nonseparatist responses to ethnic minority claims, including affirmative action, ethnic recruitment, ethnic language maintenance and instruction, communalism, multiculturalism, supranationalism, and “corporatist” arrangements. It is suggested that these responses may have positive as well as unintended or perverse consequences both for society at large and for the minority ethnic group. These consequences depend on a variety of factors, among them the degree of economic and political development; the rootedness and cohesion of the ethnic minority community; the nature and attitudes of the ethnic elite; the intensity of ethnic cultural commitment; and the sincerity of national policy makers. Finally, the paper sets out the conditions conducive to combining “national integration” with ethnic minority accommodation.

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### **Introduction**

It is widely taken for granted that the construction of a stable, cohesive, and well-functioning political system implies the existence, requires the creation, or results in the formation, of a united nation. To some, this has meant that the state is the dependent variable: that it can—and might—be created as the political expression of a nation that already exists in a prepolitical form;<sup>1</sup> to others, the nation is the consequence of the establishment of the state.<sup>2</sup> The state is the integrative agent that transforms one or more “primordial” communities into a nation whose members tend to act politically, not as members of ethnic groups, but either as amorphous individuals or as members of socioeconomic classes, professions, or other units based on “objective” criteria.

Ideally, the simplest approach involves a process whereby each ethnic community, conscious of its culture, language, common experiences, and collective

memories, sets up its own political system on a territory that it dominates. In practice, however, this is not a simple task: patterns of settlement have often been complex, involving the presence of several ethnic minority communities on the same soil, so that a territorial solution to the nation-building process—that is, carving out a multiplicity of sovereign political units in a given space—becomes unrealistic. We are familiar with many instances of nonterritorial “solutions.” They range from forcible assimilation and the denial of the *existence* of ethnic minorities (as in France and Romania)<sup>3</sup> to patterns of political, social, and economic discrimination, ghettoization, and extermination.

### **Positive/Pluralistic Approaches**

Many of these negative solutions cannot be seriously entertained today, not merely because they are unfashionable and, in many cases, impracticable; they might provoke international condemnation and (in rare cases) resistance; and they do not accord with the image of countries that claim to be nonviolent, humane, and democratic. Fortunately, there have been a number of attempts to accommodate the existence of a diversity of ethnic communities that have resulted neither in separatism nor in the dismantling of the state. They include the following:

—federalism according to ethnic criteria (Switzerland, India, ex-Soviet Union, ex-Yugoslavia, and [in part] Canada);

—quasi-federalism and pseudo-federalism (Belgium,<sup>4</sup> Spain [Catalunya], Italy [Trentino-Alto Adige, Aosta Valley], Czechoslovakia [intermittently, after World War II]);

—local/regional autonomy, local options (Flemings and Walloons in Belgium; Poles and Russians in Vilnius; Magyars in Transylvania);

—consociation (Belgium, the Netherlands, and [to a lesser extent] Austria and Switzerland);

—functional decentralization (Sri Lanka);

—the rotation of public offices (presidencies of the regional council of Trentino-Alto Adige and the provincial assembly of Bolzano as well as the venue of the regional council [Italy]);

—mixed local autonomy—functional decentralization (the [Jewish] Council of the Four Lands in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Poland; [selective] Tamil regional autonomy in Sri Lanka);

—communalist representation (in the parliament of Lebanon, stemming from the *millet* system traditional in the Ottoman Empire, and applied originally not to ethnic or language communities but to religious ones—though these two or three were sometimes congruent);<sup>5</sup>

—guaranteed legislative representation (minimum quotas) for major ethnoracial groups (Fiji and Trinidad);

—multiple, functionally differentiated legal systems and courts (tribal courts in Nigeria, the United States [southwest] and Canada; rabbinical, sharia, Christian, and Druze courts in Israel);

—official language equality and multilingualism, in particular in dealings with public authorities (Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, Israel, Italy [Trentino-Alto Adige], Finland, Malaysia, Singapore, Cameroon, and New Mexico);

—toleration of practical language equality/multilingualism (German, Yiddish, Ukrainian in interwar Poland; currently, various languages in sub-Carpathian Ukraine and in US cities with large ethnic minorities);

—affirmative action (United States [racial minorities], Australia [aborigines], New Zealand [Maoris], Israel [Sephardim]);  
 —distinction between *citizenship* [as a legal-political status] and *nationality* [membership in “primordial”—and culturally identifiable—community] (United States—a practical distinction; Canada and the former Soviet Union—legal distinctions);  
 —distribution of patronage, political appointments, and electoral candidacies according to ethnopluralistic criteria (*dédoublement* in Belgium; ministerial posts in Switzerland; ethnically “balanced tickets” in the United States);  
 —encouraging and subsidizing the development and diffusion of the cultural creations of ethnic minorities, as was done by socialist governments in France between 1981 and 1986 and (in limited fashion) after 1988.

None of the ethnic institutional accommodations and positive ethnopluralistic policies listed above have led of themselves to an escalation of ethnic mobilization culminating in separatism; on the contrary, such accommodations and policies, if pursued in good faith, have tended to make separatism unnecessary. The collapse of the Lebanese communalist arrangement was due not to its unfeasibility but to the destabilizing presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization and to Syrian and Israeli military and political interventions. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was essentially a delayed response to the *failure* to institute satisfactory ethnic accommodation as well as to the lack of legitimacy of the system as a whole (Frye, 1992: 620–621). According to one source, the Bengalis had originally sought to gain “autonomy within a multiethnic federated polity and economy,” and Bengali separation from Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971 were desperate measures reflecting a perceived injustice: lack of adequate language accommodation, which translated into lack of access to education, jobs, and economic opportunities, all of which were relatively scarce (Das Gupta, 1985: 201–203; Wheeler, 1978).

This last example would seem to substantiate the economic determinist thesis—namely, that economic decline tends to exacerbate ethnic consciousness because it produces or reflects a weak cooptative capability. But does the causal relationship work in reverse? Although it is true that ethnic demands leading to political mobilization contribute to regime instability, their effect on economic stability and growth is less clear. Ethnic mobilization is disruptive only if an ethnic group is an important enough component of the work force and is concentrated in crucial economic sectors and if ethnic discontent leads to work stoppages. Such a concentration may have existed, as Furnivall has pointed out repeatedly, in colonies in the Third World, where there was a certain congruence between ethnoplural society and a “plural economy”—for example in Southeast Asia, where Europeans were the capitalists, Chinese and Indian settlers constituted the middle class, and the natives were the common laborers. This ethnically based economic differentiation served to inhibit the development of “a common social will” to resist the domination of the colonial masters (Furnivall, 1941: 21, 61–65, and *passim*). But in industrialized countries economic differentiation is much less clearly tied to ethnicity. In these countries, despite the selective instances cited by Gurr (Maghrebis in France, Koreans in Japan, Gypsies in Europe, and people of color in Britain and the United States), ethnically specific workers—“ethnoclasses,” as Ted Gurr has called them—are not necessarily “situated at or near the bottom of the economic hierarchy” (Gurr, 1993). Moreover, such classes are rarely indispensable enough to have a decisive impact on the economy as a whole: unskilled immigrant workers in France, Chicano agricultural laborers in the United States, Jewish diamond cutters in

Belgium, Pakistani hotel clerks in Britain, Palestinian “guest workers” in Kuwait, and perhaps even Turkish factory workers in Germany—all these can easily be replaced in a flooded labor market. The economic (relative deprivation) thesis does seem to apply in some cases; for instance, economic factors have contributed to the political mobilization of winegrowers in Occitania, autonomists in Corsica, Catholics in Ulster, Ibos in Nigeria, and (to a lesser extent) the Scots in the United Kingdom;<sup>6</sup> conversely, the economic thesis is inadequate in the cases of Breton and Alsatian autonomists in France, Flemings in Belgium (in the 1920s), Zionists in Eastern and Central Europe, Albanians in Kosovo province, and Croatian separatists.<sup>7</sup>

None of the positive ethnopluralistic policies is by itself incompatible with institutional pluralism, democracy, or individual liberties. On the contrary, the experiences of Imperial Russia, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Falangist Spain suggest that authoritarian or totalitarian regimes—at least in relatively developed societies—tend to be incompatible with both institutional pluralism *and* “plural society” and with both individual rights *and* ethnic community rights. (In a number of countries, the articulation of ethnocultural and ethnolinguistic demands is considered just as subversive of the nation as the articulation of opposition ideologies is viewed as subverting the state.) Conversely, the Anglo-American experiences suggest that institutional pluralism (in the form of federalism in North America and traditional local–provincial autonomies in the United Kingdom, and, in both regions, in the form of competition among interest groups and between them and the public authorities) can coexist comfortably with a diversity of ethnic identities and communal structures within an autonomous “civil society.”<sup>8</sup> In fact, there is evidence suggesting that the two kinds of pluralism fortify each other. In Spain, the return to constitutional rule and the efflorescence of institutional pluralism—in the form of interest-group competition, multiparty politics, free elections, and meaningful regional autonomy—encouraged the majority of Catalans to identify with the new regime (Frye, 1992: 620–621). In Ukraine, the Popular Movement for Restructuring (RUKH) envisages the development of democracy and institutional pluralism *and* “the development of the cultures and languages of all nationalities residing [in the country] . . . [including] the right to open schools with their native language as the language of instruction” (RUKH, 1989: 29).<sup>9</sup> The French republican situation is ambiguous: while (during the Third Republic) the ethnic cultures and languages (such as those of the Bretons, the Basques, the Occitans, and the Alsatians) were discouraged and suppressed in the interest of “national” integration, there were advances in constitutional democracy, equality before the law, and individual liberties. But the suppression of minority ethnic cultures was not a necessary condition for France’s democratic development, which was in any case uneven and sporadic.

### **Ambiguous Policies, Spurious Measures, and Perverse Consequences**

There are, however, certain ethnopluralistic approaches that, unless handled with great sensitivity, may have a chilling effect on system stability, general (individual) liberties, or transethnic equality.

*Distinction between Nationality and Ethnicity.* One way of combining ethnic pluralism with political integration is the acceptance of the idea of a simultaneous membership in an ethnic community—defined in hereditary and/or cultural terms—and a

national community—defined in terms of citizenship and political rights and obligations. In some countries, this dual, or “hyphenated,” status presents no problem: for example, in Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Nigeria, and Cameroon, where one can be, respectively, a Scot, a Jew, a Quebecker, an Ibo, or a Bamileke while also being recognized as a member of the larger “nation.” But there are countries in which such a status is not easily accepted. In Hungary, Istvan Csurka and other right-wing politicians deny that a Gypsy, a Jew, a Slovak, or even a communist could be a Hungarian as well. In France, hyphenated status was recently rejected in a formal manner when (in 1990) the Constitutional Council nullified a phrase in a government bill that referred to “the Corsican people, a component of the French people.” However, such differential attitudes may tell us little about practical consequences. Thus the maintenance of ethnic minority culture is no less possible in France than in Britain and the United States. Conversely, the grant of legal “national” status to Jews and (Volga) Germans in the Soviet Union was a form of ethnic legitimation; but without a genuine territorial base, the requisite cultural institutions, and a credible ethnic cultural elite such a status was empty of positive content and often amounted to an invitation to practical discrimination.

*Ethnicity-Based Exemptions.* The exemption of Arabs in Israel from military conscription relieves them of the risk of fighting fellow Arabs, but transforms them into second-class citizens (in the sense that they are deprived of the benefits accorded to veterans).

*Sedentarization.* Forcible sedentarization without adequate provision for culture maintenance (a policy applied to Gypsies in Hungary before World War II) may breed antisocial and antisystem behavior among members of the minority community and may contribute to an “overloading” of schools, housing projects, and social services, thereby raising the level of hostility among members of the majority.

*Separate Approaches to Instruction.* The maintenance of separate schools for Turkish guest workers in selected Länder of the German Federal Republic and the use of the Turkish language as the language of instruction are measures introduced not for the purpose of fostering a culturally pluralistic society, but for purposes of functional isolation or exclusion, of impeding full integration, and of fostering the notion (or myth) of an eventual repatriation to Turkey [*Heimkehrillusion*] (Schmitter-Heisler, 1986: 79–80). Conversely, the use of non-English languages as media of instruction for immigrant pupils in the United States is designed not to promote the maintenance of a multilingual society, but to provide a measure of equal legal protection to speakers of minority languages and a purely temporary vehicle for eventual assimilation.<sup>10</sup> However, many children are kept in bilingual (or non-English language) classes beyond their needs; this may strengthen the vested interest of the specialized language teacher but may delay the integration of the pupils into the mainstream and hamper their upward mobility (Berger, 1993).

In order to promote the political and economic integration and the upward mobility of members of ethnic minorities, well-meaning governments have fostered unilingual education. This has been the inspiration behind French efforts at discouraging the use of ethnoregional “dialects” as well as behind the popular referenda in various American states to make English the sole official language. However, the “US English” legislation may not have the intended effect. (1) In most states it is

not enforced and is therefore practically meaningless; (2) its selective enforcement—and sometimes its very existence—produces a “reactive” ethnic consciousness among minorities, particularly among Hispanics, who perceive it as an insult; (3) it is unnecessary, since most members of ethnic minorities (including second-generation Hispanics) speak English.

Conversely, ethnic language maintenance for its own sake is not necessarily synonymous with ethnic *culture* maintenance; it may, in fact, be resorted to for the dissemination of majority political ideologies or the creation of a “bastard” ethnic culture. Thus in the former Soviet Union, the Lithuanian language was used to de-Catholicize Lithuanian culture, books printed in the Armenian language in Erevan were often used to eliminate traces of the (Apostolic or Catholic) Armenian religion, and Yiddish publications were used to de-Judaize Jewish culture. This adaptation may be voluntary: an ethnic minority culture may be “indigenized,” that is, may dress itself in the cultural clothing or express itself in the language of the majority.<sup>11</sup>

There may be situations in which ethnic minorities are permitted freely to maintain ethnoculturally specific schools for the sake of culture and language maintenance, as in the case of the United States, Canada, France, and other European countries, where private schools coexist with public schools. But there is often a tendency of these schools to be parochial: to offer not only the ethnic culture and language but a religious curriculum that ethnically sensitized but secular parents may not have wanted for their children—for example, a Roman Catholic curriculum in Polish-language schools in Vilnius and the *écoles libres* in Brittany and the Basque region; and a Jewish religious curriculum in Yiddish-language schools in prewar Eastern Europe and in North America. Moreover, the choice of an ethnically oriented parochial school may be made not primarily for ethnic reasons but for non-cultural ones, such as dissatisfaction with the available secular public school—in which case ethnic consciousness-raising and culture promotion may be regarded as by-products. Finally, the curricular content may not be in accord with the democratic and pluralist values that are crucial for political coexistence—for example, the Koranic schools in France that promote Islamic *intégrisme* or certain Sinhalese schools in Sri Lanka that disseminate hostility to Western ideas (Pfaffenberger, 1990: 243, 248).<sup>12</sup> Should the state control the content of ethnic education insofar as it touches upon basic issues of national integration, or should it permit the schools to “monitor” themselves?

A related question is whether there is a threshold beyond which the number of different ethnically specific schools in a given locality threatens to fragment the locality. If there are many ethnic minorities, how many of them, and which ones, should be entitled to have their separate educational options?<sup>13</sup> It may be necessary to establish a hierarchy of entitlement, which may be based on specific criteria, such as the following: the size of the community; the length of its presence; its degree of entrenchment or rootedness; the presence of a network of supporting institutions; the existence of “respectable” ethnic linguistic and literary traditions; and the depth of ethnic consciousness and cultural commitment. It is uncertain how inclusion in, or exclusion from, this entitlement affects the potential for ethnic political mobilization. Does ethnic consciousness expand or contract as a consequence of the *availability* of ethnocultural institutions or, on the contrary, as a consequence of the *lack* of such institutions?

*The Institutional Legitimation of Ethnic and Religious Groups.* The official acceptance of the religion of an ethnic community—giving it an “establishment” character or

otherwise putting it on a par with the dominant religion— may have perverse consequences. In order to secure the acceptance of Judaism as one of the national “cults” in Napoleonic France and in nineteenth-century Germany, the Jews had to commit themselves to a “deethnicization” process that resulted in a Westernized and progressively “denatured” Judaism. In order for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to be accepted as a bona fide “American” religion, the Mormons had to shed polygamy, one of the important elements of their communal cohesion. Conversely, while the official acceptance of the ethnic identity of Catalans and other minorities in post-Franco Spain caused them to develop a more positive attitude toward the Spanish republic, the relegitimation of the idea of a “plural society” has had the contagion effect of reviving a consciousness of the Arabic roots of some Spaniards, about 2 000 of whom have converted to Islam (Riding, 1993). It is interesting to speculate whether this consequence of pluralism will have the short-term effect of promoting the influence of the dominant strain of Arab political culture, which is hostile to institutional pluralism.

*Affirmative Action Policies.* Affirmative action in the United States to promote the recruitment of African-Americans and other selected minorities compensates for past discrimination, but it is based on an arbitrary list of “victim” groups defined in terms of rigid racial criteria; and it introduces discrimination (“negative action”) for members of the dominant majority and of “white ethnic” communities, thereby engendering sentiments of relative deprivation among them, raising their own ethnic consciousness, and sharpening interethnic conflict (Killian, 1981: 44ff.).<sup>14</sup> In addition, a pattern of affirmative action may harm the self-image of members of minority groups who are perfectly capable of “making it” on the basis of merit.

*Special Protection.* Special legal protection of Jews (as in Germany and Italy) is a sign of official acknowledgment of past persecution, but it tends to “museumize” them and therefore to denature their communities.<sup>15</sup>

*Anti-Hate Legislation.* The criminalization of the distribution of hate propaganda and of the dissemination of revisionist statements in France and Germany protects selected ethnic minorities and their collective memories (as in the case of Jews and the historicity of the Holocaust), but it may tend to undermine freedom of expression generally.

*Ethnic vs Socioeconomic Interests.* It is uncertain whether the official legitimation of ethnic communities amounts to a legitimation of “false consciousness” and hence interferes with the “real” and “objective” interests of members of ethnic minorities, that is, their class interests, as Marxists have insisted (Wallerstein, 1979: 181–185); or whether such legitimation, by satisfying the intangible identitive concerns of ethnic minorities, now permits them to proceed with the pursuit of their economic and other nonethnic interests.

*Ethnic Recruitment.* The recruitment of members of the ethnic cultural and political elite to prominent positions within the system because of their ethnic elite status certainly constitutes a form of official legitimation and public recognition; at the same time, however, such recruitment may amount to a form of cooptation that “subtracts” these elites from their masses and deprives the latter of crucial articulators of ethnic demands. Much depends on the way ethnic leaders are selected,



from what pool, and for what reason. Are they to be chosen by the public authorities as tokens, because of their ethnic “origins,” or because of their ethnic identification and activism; or are they to be selected by the ethnic community and subject to recall by it? Having been coopted into the foreign policy establishment, Henry Kissinger was inhibited from articulating the specific foreign policy concerns of American Jews (assuming that he was interested in doing so); once having been appointed to the US Supreme Court, Clarence Thomas may be inhibited from articulating the civil rights concerns of his African-American “constituency” (assuming, of course, that he was interested in doing so and that he was selected to his position as a representative of that constituency).

Alternatively, the coopted (or self-selected) ethnic leaders may function as agents to pressure ethnic minorities to tone down their particularistic demands. Stalin was a Georgian who did his best to suppress Georgian nationalist sentiments and (with the outbreak of World War II) even promoted Great Russian nationalism. Tito was a Croat, but as the Yugoslav leader he inhibited the Croats’ ethnic demands rather than representing them. Anastas Mikoyan was a token Armenian who spoke for Bolshevik rather than specifically Armenian interests. Napoleon was a Corsican who promoted the idea of a homogeneous French nation-state. The various British prime ministers of Scottish background were not appointed to their positions because of their ethnic identification and were not expected to be spokesmen for the Scottish community. However, the desire to cling to power may transform a politician who is a member of an ethnic minority from an opponent to a proponent of ethnic cultural or political claims. A recent study points out that a number of communist politicians, having failed to stamp out ethnonationalism (a task for which they had been recruited originally), transformed themselves into ethnonational spokesmen when the “transethnic” communist system collapsed (Kreindler, 1993: 265, 270).

Listening to the leaders of ethnic minorities and catering to their political ambitions may be a way of legitimating the concerns of the rank-and-file members of these minorities; but although this may strengthen the ability of the leaders to retain the loyalty of their ethnic clientele, the retention of that clientele may become an end in itself.<sup>16</sup> However, the conferring of political elite status on an ethnic minority leader does not necessarily inculcate “mainstream” political behavior in that person; thus, certain Cuban-American leaders in Miami, Florida, may participate in American politics but use methods typically associated with Caribbean politics (Rohter, 1992).

*Ethnic Political Parties.* The existence of ethnicity-based political parties constitutes a form of political expression in a number of countries. These parties help to protect and promote the interests of ethnic minorities *within the political system* (as is the case in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Malaysia, Fiji, Israel, and a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa). Such parties tend to operate successfully under a certain number of conditions: (a) the ethnic party is able to achieve a rough parity with another ethnic party—which presupposes a more or less biethnic population (as in Malaysia and Fiji [Milne, 1988]); (b) there are several ethnic parties representing a multiplicity of ethnic communities and forming an ethnic alliance (as in Guyana) or a “rainbow coalition” (as has been attempted at various levels in the United States, with mixed success); (c) the ethnic party accepts the existing state boundaries and is not perceived to be separatist; (d) the ethnic party shares a sufficient number of nonethnic policy concerns with other parties, to enable it to

participate productively in policy making; and (e) the existence of such parties is compatible with the prevailing national ideology (as would be the case in Fiji but not in France, for example, with its Jacobin principles, or in Tanzania<sup>17</sup> and, to a lesser extent, in Ghana and Sudan<sup>18</sup>).

*Communalism.* In its “generic” sense, communalism refers to a form of social organization based on religious, ethnic, racial, linguistic, and other inherited criteria. It may be innocuous; it may be permitted or encouraged in the interest of promoting grass-roots participation in selected socioeconomic processes, and it may relieve the national government of organizing and socializing responsibilities; but it may also interfere with the unity-building and modernizing efforts of the national government. Communalism in India appears to be of the latter kind; it refers to social units that are exclusivist and that do not share their national values with others. There is a vicious circle: “Communalism,” as President S.D. Sharma said recently, “[curtails] our capacity as a nation in key tasks of building a self-reliant, competitive economy, creating gainful employment . . . and developing the aggregate wherewithal for a welfare state” (India News, 1992). But the survival or revival of communalism is in a large measure a response to the *failure* of the state to fulfill these tasks, that is, to carry its “expectation load.” Such a state is often identified with rule in behalf not of the nation, but of privileged communal segments of it (Nandy, 1972).<sup>19</sup>

*Multiculturalism.* The policies of “multiculturalism” (especially in the United States) clearly constitute a recognition of the sensitivities of ethnic or racial minorities. But multiculturalism must not be confused with *cultural pluralism* in the sense of Horace Kallen’s use of the term. According to Kallen, ethnic groups should be maintained as identifiable constituents of the American nation because of the unique contributions they make to the richness and variety of American culture. Preserved minority cultures thus constitute harmonious components of “a federation or commonwealth of national cultures” (Kallen, 1915 and 1956).

It has been suggested that Kallen’s approach to cultural pluralism had a racialist dimension because he “blur[red] together” race, culture, and nationality, especially when he discussed temperamental differences (Gleason, 1982: 100–103). However, whereas to Kallen and other cultural pluralists these differences are determined *to some extent* by ethnic or racial heredity, the currently most widespread approach to multiculturalism is almost entirely ethnoracial.<sup>20</sup> While most proponents of cultural pluralism fully accept a “national” culture—usually that of the majority—as superordinate, that is, as one that serves a vehicle of interethnic communication, multiculturalism often tends to be culturally isolationist or “separatist.” Moreover, many proponents of multiculturalism believe that their minority ethnic culture is not only equal but superior to that of the majority. While cultural pluralism is conservative, multiculturalism is *radical* in that it rejects long-established cultural traditions that the dominant as well as minority elites have wished to conserve. Yet cultural pluralism may be a force for modernity because it accords a place to ethnic minority cultures that may in certain instances be more advanced than the culture of the majority,<sup>21</sup> whereas multiculturalism is *antimodern* to the extent that it stresses affirmative action and ascriptive (as opposed to merit-based) recruitment.

In any case, multicultural curricula, in teaching about the heroes, the holidays, and the achievements of the ethnic minority and its contributions to society in

general, appeal to ethnic pride (Bernstein, 1992). These policies may provide jobs for ethnic minority intellectuals and administrators; in order to justify their positions—and the maintenance of the new ethnic minority bureaucracy—they may seek to attract a large enough clientele by appealing to the lowest common denominator, for example, by offering courses on Chicano cuisine and dance (vestigial or nostalgic ethnicity) and socioeconomic problems in the *barrio* (“oppression studies”)<sup>22</sup> rather than the Spanish language and literature. In order to gain tactical allies, the purveyors of multiculturalism often make common cause with *nonethnic* multiculturalists by mixing courses on ethnic culture with those on gender-specific (for example, feminist) culture and the culture of alternative life styles. While these approaches seek to undermine the dominance of the majority culture, they are ultimately counterproductive for the ethnic minority because they may cancel each other out<sup>23</sup> and undermine the clarity and prestige of *its* culture.

*Reliance on the Market.* There are those (especially among libertarians or “neoliberals”) who have argued that the best policy regarding a plural society is to have no policy at all: to leave questions of language and culture to the interplay of market forces. Under this approach minority languages would be neglected—in advertising, product labeling, television programming, textbook publishing, and so on—owing to economies of scale (except for pockets of heavy ethnic minority group concentration, such as those of Latinos in Miami and the southwestern United States); however, a rough ethnic justice might be attained as the dominant majority culture and language tend themselves to be vulgarized. Nevertheless, in most countries the market remains a minor agent of language and culture promotion compared to governments, which administer public education. For that reason, a meaningful policy of ethnic-minority culture protection must necessarily imply deliberate government action.

*Redrawing Constituency Boundaries.* The redrawing of electoral district boundaries (“gerrymandering”) may take into account the ethnic or racial composition of the electorate, as it often does in the United States; but while in one case this may be done to maximize the electoral weight of an ethnic or racial minority and guarantee for it some representation, in another case it may minimize this weight by confining minority influence to a small number of concentrated areas. A related approach is the redrawing of internal political-administrative boundaries. This may be resorted to in order to favor the dominant ethnic majority—as was done in France (in 1941) when the city of Nantes was detached from Brittany (although given the lack of regional and local powers at the time, the action had only symbolic significance) and in Italy (in 1948) when Alto Adige was combined with Trentino; or in order to reduce the relative weight of the dominant ethnic group—as was done by Tito when he subdivided Serbia and created the semi-autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Voivodina, thereby moderating the centrifugal tendencies of Croatians and Slovenes (Duhacek, 1988: 22).

*Supranational Arrangements.* One solution that does not involve changing borders, transferring populations, or creating extraterritorial political enclaves is a supranational regional arrangement such as the European Community. Under such an arrangement, Alsatians, Basques, Catalans, Celts, Flemings, and members of other ethnocultural groups may move freely across political frontiers in order to meet

with their ethnic brethren. If the European Community is to serve as a model for Eastern Europe, Magyar and other irredentisms might become irrelevant because borders—such as between Hungary and Romania, Hungary and Slovakia, Poland and Lithuania, and Poland and Germany—would be open and common cultural zones would be permeable.<sup>24</sup> The existing political sovereignties would not infringe upon the particular cultural expressions of ethnic minorities; in turn, the “trans-political” cultural relationships of these minorities, while moderating their country’s tendencies toward cultural uniformity, would not threaten its political sovereignty.

Not all Eastern European countries would have the same perspective about such transpolitical relationships. Hungary might welcome them because they would relieve it of the pressure physically to reattach Transylvania and to be faced with the possible counter-irredentism of a large Romanian-speaking minority. Slovakia, however, might view such relationships more negatively; given its recently gained independence, its cultural sensitivities compared to the more advanced Czech Republic, and the fact that its Magyar minority accounts for nearly a sixth of its population, Slovakia might seek to insulate itself culturally against its neighbors. To be sure, questions would be raised in all these countries about the lines of demarcation between the cultural and political arenas and the consequences of overlap. But there is no reason to believe that a person’s transpolitical cultural, religious, or commercial identifications or network memberships would translate into political disloyalties—unless his country forbids or seriously impedes such memberships.

To many observers, the experience of the European Community suggests a regional-territorial approach to ethnic minority accommodation as an alternative to separatism. But even that approach has become increasingly inadequate in the face of mass immigration from less developed to more developed countries and internal migration of indigenous ethnic groups from village to city in Third World countries. Should the host society exploit the weakness of these uprooted communities and see it as an opportunity to assimilate them in the name of “progress”? Should it wait until the population density of the ethnic minority communities has become sufficient to enable them to create institutional networks? Or should it take an active part in the creation of such networks?

### **Ethnoplural Society, Institutional Pluralism, and Democracy: Problems, Conflicts, and Prospects**

The legitimation of a plurality of ethnic groups introduces a division into society that helps to prevent the domination of a single organic group that claims to represent the whole nation—that is, the ethnic or racial majority—in the same way that the legitimation of the rights of a plurality of interest groups prevents the domination of one socioeconomic sector that claims to represent society—for example, (for Hegel and his followers), the “state-carrying” (*staatstragenden*) civil-service and military sectors in nineteenth-century Prussia as the representative of the “rational” state, or, (for Lenin and many of his followers) the working class in the former Soviet Union as the representative of the “just society.” To elevate the dominant ethnic group on the grounds that it is more “evolved” and to refuse legitimation of ethnic minorities on the grounds that they are “primordial” is to use the same argument from power that was used by the old Bolsheviks when they delegitimated the bourgeoisie and the muzhiks on the grounds that they were reactionary.

It should be kept in mind that recognition and legitimation alone are not yet institutional accommodation, and that the latter is neither tantamount to the granting of political sovereignty nor a prelude to separatism. There are those who contend that one step leads to another; that the appetite grows with the eating; that an ethnic group that is officially recognized as such will soon demand an institutional expression of that recognition, which will eventually escalate to a demand for a separate state. But there is no proof for this contention; on the contrary, the satisfaction of cultural claims, or even of claims for symbolic recognition (as, for example, the affixing of bilingual street signs or public notices and the broadcasting of limited minority-language programs), may be enough to avert more substantive, more institutional, and especially more political demands. For example, the Bretons, Catalans, and Basques in France have for years demanded government recognition of the special cultural aspects of their communities and asked for official support of ethnic language teaching and culture dissemination (Safran, 1989: 116–122; Beer, 1980). However, when the Socialist governments granted those demands (between 1981 and 1986), there was no escalation toward more “political” demands; on the contrary, hardly any ethnic minority leaders opted for separation or even federalism, and few members of the ethnic minorities even availed themselves of the new cultural-linguistic opportunities. Another example of the importance of symbolic legitimation is that of the Magyars in Transylvania, most of whom know the Romanian language but prefer that Hungarian be recognized as equally official, although they do not regard that recognition as a weapon for separation from the Romanian state.<sup>25</sup>

For Shils and other integrationists the recognition of ethnic communities introduces tensions between “primordial” politics, which is presumed to be “irrational,” and “civil” politics, which is considered “rational,” and in so doing interferes with *nation-building* (or, more correctly, *state-building*) and modernization (Shils, 1966; Geertz, 1963; Brass, 1985: 21). This interference can be eliminated through an “integrative revolution” that eliminates irrational elements. Such a development was expected to occur in Third World countries; once they achieved independence, their societies would be departicularized and detribalized and reorganized on the basis of more objective criteria—such as economic activities—and the distribution of jobs, benefits, and political power would be on the basis of performance rather than ascription.

In some cases, detribalization has been counterbalanced by the retention of certain traditional and irrational elements associated with the *majority*, which minorities have had to accept. For example, the Chinese in Malaysia, in return for being granted their demand for citizenship on the basis of *jus soli*, accepted Islam as the state religion and Malay as the sole official language (Mauzy, 1985: 154–155). But in many newly independent countries of Sub-Saharan Africa not even this degree of detribalization has been achieved; payoffs are still based on tribal membership (to the extent that no payoffs are granted to those outside the elite circle at all). And since the new state, in its transethnic manifestations, has little to offer to minority tribes (unless they happen to be those of the state leadership), these attempt to gain legitimacy as claimants of payoffs, and failing this, retreat into their customary pre-independence social units, with their familiar values and solidarities.

To be sure, these states are new and still insufficiently modern.<sup>26</sup> But even in Western countries the integrative revolution has proven to be incomplete after many generations of evolution toward modernity. In the United States, White

Anglo-Saxon Protestant [WASP] culture continued to dominate for many generations, although non-WASPs voluntarily adopted selective aspects of it<sup>27</sup> and made their own contributions to it; and only in recent years has that culture been challenged by forces favoring “multiculturalism.” More seriously, it took several waves of ethnoracial mobilization for non-WASPs—such as African-Americans, Chicanos, Native Americans, Asians, and “white ethnics”—to be accorded places in political, economic, and academic elite institutions. In France, it took non-Catholics several generations to be beneficiaries of the “integration revolution” on a more or less equal basis—Protestants intermittently from the Edict of Nantes at the end of the sixteenth century until the mid-nineteenth century, and Jews intermittently from the early nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, while Muslims and descendants of Black immigrants are only gradually being included in the integration process.

It may be argued that the legitimation of ethnic minority communities by way of formally associating them with the official institutional structure will lead to the development of pro-system attitudes of ethnic groups in much the same way that the incorporation of economic interest groups (in particular radical or revolutionary ones, such as left-wing trade unions) has transformed the latter into state-affirming and cooperating entities, and that emerging patterns of cooperation will lead to a “deprimordialization” of ethnic groups, just as patterns of cooperation of religious groups with one another, and with the public authorities, have contributed to the “domestication” of radical ideological camps and the gradual republicanization and secularization of adherents of religious denominations (as has happened as a consequence of the development of consociational patterns in the Netherlands and Austria). The more frequent the collaboration of religious sects with one another and with the official (secular) authorities, the more quickly the emphasis on the Kingdom of Heaven gives way to a concern with mundane affairs and concrete social issues. To be sure, this evolution presupposes the existence of two facilitating conditions: (a) the dominance of secular political culture, and (b) a tradition of religious pluralism. The causal relationship is also reversible: patterns of collaboration themselves *contribute* to the development of these facilitating conditions.

The effect of ethnic-group “corporatism”<sup>28</sup> on ethnic pluralism is much less clear. As in the case of interest groups, the incorporation of ethnic groups could have a variety of consequences, depending on the relative strength of the state and the organizational cohesion of the ethnic group:

(1) It would give ethnic groups a guaranteed presence in public authority structures and the right to be heard in policy deliberations, which might be conducive to maintaining or promoting policies of cultural pluralism.

(2) It could give ethnic communities a stake in government and reduce tendencies to alienation and separatism and moderate the *political* nature of ethnic demands.

(3) It could put a brake on demands of ethnic groups for the sake of social peace or the “public interest,” or for the sake of a balance between ethnic and socioeconomic claims.

(4) It could weaken the ethnic group by creating a distance between the coopted (and encapsulated) ethnic leaders and their rank and file.

(5) It could make the ethnic community such an effective and habitual beneficiary of political and economic payoffs that ethnic consciousness will be weakened, ethnic cultural literacy will diminish, and ethnic concerns will dissipate. These

payoffs thus function as the fuel for the slow fire heating the melting pot. However, if the payoffs should subsequently be withdrawn as a consequence of political or economic upheavals, there is the danger that ethnic consciousness will be revived but without cultural substance to inform it. (The weakening of consociational arrangements [*ontzuijing*] in the Netherlands, which began in the late 1970s in the wake of an increasingly stagnating economy, did not lead to a politicization of ethnic consciousness, since consociation in that country involved competing economic and [secondarily] religious groups rather than ethnolinguistic ones.)

### **Combining State-Building and “National Integration” with Ethnic Minority Accommodation: Requirements and Expectations**

The problems and uncertainties discussed above would seem to support the reactionary thesis that most, if not all, attempts to find nonterritorial solutions to ethnic diversities—much like many other attempts at reform—have perverse and often negative consequences in that they create more problems than they solve, introduce unforeseen difficulties for the political system and/or the ethnic minority, or are futile at best (Hirschman, 1991). But such a view tends to lead to inaction and prevents a search for combined measures of ethnopluralistic accommodation that are consonant with the institutions, patterns, and policies of modern liberal democracies. In order for such a combination to be effected, the following facilitating conditions should obtain to a greater or lesser extent:

(1) There should exist a transethnic elite; that is, the elites of the various ethnic communities must share “national” political values, such as a commitment to institutional pluralism, individual freedom, orderly changes of government, and the non-violent resolution of conflicts.

(2) There should exist institutions for interethnic elite collaboration on non-ethnic and supraethnic political issues as well as nonpolitical concerns.

(3) The ethnic community should be permeable and non-exclusivist—that is, it should be open to outsiders who may wish to join and, conversely, must permit members to opt out without fear of punishment. This permeability moderates interethnic conflict by facilitating the creation of cultural subgroups within ethnic communities: for example, “Anglicized” Hindus in India, “Gallicized” Maghrebis in France, “Americanized” Jews in the United States, and Westernized members of tribal elites in Africa. However, while their existence has the effect of making ethnic minority–majority intercourse easier, it also weakens the internal unity of the ethnic minority.

A note of caution is in order. It is clearly possible to “opt” or “convert” into majority ethnocultural communities (often called “nations”), including those whose foundation rests (or once rested) on organic principles or myths; this is shown by the fact that many “ethnic” Germans have Slavic names, and many “indigenous” French people have Germanic or Italian names. It is equally possible to opt, or convert, into minority cultures whose matrix is religious, as, for example, in the case of outsiders who become part of the Arab, Armenian, Jewish, or Amish ethnic family. To be sure, such a process is not automatic; it often involves in-marriage. Obviously, it is much more difficult, and in the short run impossible, to “opt” into, or out of, an *ethnoracial* family. Finally, whereas members of a minority ethnic group should have the *right* to join a majority group that has constituted itself as a nation (an *Etat-nation*) on an ideological or “contractual” basis (and which is therefore transethnic by definition) if they accept the ideology or adhere to the contract, the

reverse situation does not, and perhaps need not, obtain: a Christian does not have the “right” to become a Jew, or an American Anglo to become an American Indian (even if that were possible).

(4) The dominant or majority community should itself be tolerant and open: it must not be too closely identified with an exclusivist religion, language, or culture.

(5) Members of ethnoracial categoric groups should not be excluded from membership in the political community, and *jus sanguinis* should not be the only basis for acquiring such membership. Preferably, citizenship should be defined in political and political culture terms, not ethnoracial, and perhaps not even cultural-linguistic, ones.

(6) Membership in an ethnic community must not foreclose membership in nonethnic and ethnically cross-cutting social units, such as trade unions, professional associations, and political parties. Contrary to the assumptions of Marxists, neo-Marxists, and other economic determinists (Furnivall, 1939: 451; M.G. Smith, 1969: 438–439), ethnic communities, especially in modern societies, are seldom so mutually conflictual or so invasive and intense in their “primordial” preoccupations as to raise insurmountable barriers to membership in nonethnic associations<sup>29</sup>—for the simple reason that in all but the most primitive societies ethnic groups can no longer fulfill all the needs of their members. For instance, the fact that (owing to the prevailing “organicist” definition of citizenship) Turkish “guest workers” in Germany cannot realistically aspire to political citizenship by naturalization, and tend therefore to remain closely identified with their ethnic community, has not prevented them from becoming active trade union members and from sharing in the benefits of “economic citizenship,” such as minimum wages and family income supplements. Since such citizenship often acquires practical meaning on local levels, one may also speak of a “municipal citizenship,” which is reflected in some countries (as in the Netherlands and Denmark) in the right of foreigners to vote in local elections (Korte, 1985: 36–38; Rath, 1990: 126ff.).

(7) The granting of official legitimacy to ethnic minority groups should imply the allocation of economic, employment, and educational resources without an attendant sacrifice of the ethnic group’s culture in exchange—unless such a sacrifice is demanded of the dominant (majority) group as well.

(8) The existence of separate ethnic minority schools should not imply that members of ethnic minorities are obligated to attend these schools; it should be possible to opt for either a general (majority) education (for reasons of economic integration, professional advancement, and upward mobility) or an ethnic minority educational experience (for reasons of cultural variety and emotional satisfaction), to combine the two, and to transfer from one to the other.

(9) The basic social, cultural, or religious values embedded in the traditions of the ethnic minority community do not conflict with the transethnic political values in such a way as to interfere with civic obedience and cross-ethnic collaboration. If the accommodation of ethnic minorities follows the model of the “salad bowl” rather than the “melting pot”—that is, a system in which a variety of ethnocultural elements combine without losing their distinctive flavor—then the “dressing” that helps to unite the different ingredients must make the salad palatable: the political values must make the ethnic cultural elements compatible (Bikales and Imhoff, 1985: 8, 21).

(10) The ethnic community is not subject to the control or heavy influence of extraterritorial authorities, and there is no outside interference in the country’s approaches to ethnopluralistic accommodation—that is, no attempt is made by



foreign governments, international organizations, or other external authorities to mobilize the ethnic community politically.<sup>30</sup> Much of the resistance to any form of legitimation of Maghrebis in France is due not only to the monistic Jacobin ideology of the “nation-state,” but also to the perception that Islamic leaders from outside France meddle excessively in the affairs of Muslims in that country.

(11) Political mobilization of the ethnic community in an irredentist or separatist direction is impossible or highly improbable, because the “mother country” (a) is not contiguous; (b) does not constitute an attractive political, economic, or cultural model; or (c) does not exist.

(12) The state (whether federal, unitary, or hybrid) is not overweening; it accords considerable autonomy to “civil society,” leaving many matters in the hands of subnational and/or subpolitical communities; it does not seek to politicize everything, and it preserves for itself essentially those matters that cannot be properly addressed in an ethnically segmented fashion: foreign policy, defense, economic growth, the maintenance of adequate standards of education, social protection and welfare, the guarantee of individual liberties as well as public order, and the perpetuation of common political values and standards of constitutional behavior.

### Notes

1. To Herder, a people’s collective personality is formed primarily by its cultural and linguistic heritage; his nationalism was nonpolitical and his preferred state was a pluralistic and decentralized one. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Werke*, cited in A.D. Smith, 1983: *passim*).
2. Ernest Gellner, who emphasizes the modernization process and the role of elites in the development of nationalism and, subsequently, nation building (Gellner, 1964, chaps. 6–8; and Deutsch, 1966: *passim*). Deutsch stresses communication and other transactions that result in the formation of a nation.
3. Jacobins in France have insisted that Breton and Occitan identities in that country are only “folkloric” remnants: and some Romanian politicians have denied that the population of Transylvania was Hungarian.
4. Moving toward full federalism under constitutional change of 1993.
5. As language splits developed within *millets*, their numbers increased.
6. The Scottish case is ambiguous. The Scottish independence movement gained ground in the 1970s because of dissatisfaction over the distribution of oil revenues; however, the Scots have received more funds per capita from the British government than have the English; this fact, as well as various kinds of ethno-regional accommodation (for example, a separate established church, currency, nobility, and judiciary) have limited the demands of most Scots to increasing “devolution.”
7. Although under Tito’s rule Croats articulated economic grievances, these were far less important than religion and historic memories and hatreds—only temporarily muted by communist ideology and charismatic leadership. See Djilas (1991).
8. Note that the turn from parliamentary rule to an authoritarian regime in interwar Poland coincided with a growing noncompliance with the minorities treaties sponsored by the League of Nations and the infringement of ethnic minority rights; that the return of Italy and Spain to democratic rule brought with it the reconquest of ethno-regional autonomy in these countries; and that there is a high probability that independent Slovenia will retain the existing bilingual (Slovene and German) options in elementary schools but that, conversely, the use of the Hungarian language in schools in Slovakia will be restricted as the regime of that country becomes increasingly authoritarian.
9. It is not clear whether this platform is serious or whether it is a decorative one designed to propitiate the Western democracies.

10. In the landmark case of *Lau vs Nichols* [1974] (414 US 563), the US Supreme Court upheld the validity of Art. 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited the denial of access to education if such denial was based on race, color, religion, national origin and (by derivation) language. See Safran (1992: 552–553).
11. For example, the Yiddish folklore written in Yiddish but with a “transfusion” of Russian symbolism (Pinkhos Kahanovich [“Der Nister”]); literature clearly focusing on ethno-cultural themes of Bretons (Pierre Jakez-Hélias) or of Maghrebi immigrants (Tahar Ben-Jalloun) but written in French; or novels dealing with Abkhazian themes but written in Russian (Fazil Iskander).
12. An interesting experiment was the founding in 1991 in the French provinces of an Islamic seminary with a curriculum attuned to French values to train religious cadres.
13. In New York City alone, there were (as of 1993), nearly 135 000 students not proficient in English; among the 120 languages spoken, Spanish accounted for nearly 90 000 speakers, Chinese for 13 000, Russian for 5 300 and, much further down the list, Albanian for 600 and Farsi for 500. See Berger (1993).
14. This is not an exclusively American problem. In Israel, the preferential treatment of Sephardim and Ethiopian immigrants in regard to housing and school admission is generally accepted by *Sabra* elites but provokes resentment among immigrants from the former Soviet Union. The preferential treatment of *rapatriés* in France, however limited, has provoked resentment not only among “indigenous” French citizens but among descendants of North African Arab immigrants (*Beurs*) as well.
15. In Germany, the policy of making amends to Jews (*Wiedergutmachung*) has included the rebuilding of some old synagogues (as tourist attractions) and the establishment of institutes of Judaica (with few Jewish students)—all designed for the preservation of an “anthropological” remnant (*Denkmalschutz*) rather than the promotion of a living culture.
16. Ethnic leaders may function as “gatekeepers,” that is, as distributors of “divisible political rewards” (such as summer jobs for youth), as opposed to “indivisible rewards” that everyone is entitled to (for example, unemployment benefits). If, as seems to be the case with Polish-Americans and certain other “white ethnics,” the ethnicity of their clientele is “transitional,” the ethnic leaders will have a circumscribed role. See Borowiec (1975).
17. Even in France, from the Third Republic onward, there have existed differentiated institutional approaches to the management of areas with special—largely ethnic—characteristics: Alsace-Lorraine, Algeria, Corsica, and overseas territories (Michalon, 1982). In Nyerere’s Tanzania, forcible Swahilization was partly successful, but it was also accompanied by a form of affirmative action (or, as Donald Rothchild has called it, “corrective equity”) that was communal rather than regional (Rothchild, 1986: 91; and Neuberger, 1984: 241–248).
18. The “Jacobin” commitment of Nkrumah of Ghana was more verbal than real; and Sudan’s “Jacobinism” was accompanied by policies of Arabization and Islamization (Neuberger, 1984).
19. Nandy speaks of the aggrandizing tendencies of the secular Hindi modernizers and their lack of sensitivity to minority groups.
20. The two concepts are sometimes (con)fused, as in Fleras (1984), who stresses the notion of *cultural relativism*.
21. For example, Jews in Poland, Greeks in Anatolia, Germans in Romania, Chinese in Malaysia (Safran, 1991: 2).
22. The expression is taken from Dawidowicz (1992: 66).
23. As in the case of ethnic minority cultures in which discrimination against women or hostility to pluralism or to alternative sexual preferences are deeply embedded.
24. An example that might be followed is that of the Nordic Sami Council, which seeks to promote common cultural programs for the Sami (the “Lapps”) in Sweden, Norway, and Finland. See Eronn (1993: 8).

25. Separatist sentiment might, however, be generated by provocative nationalist behavior of majority politicians, such as that of Gheorghe Funar, the mayor of Cluj [Kolozsvár], who refuses to make the slightest concession to the Hungarian language. Alternatively, separatist sentiment might be generated if the political and economic reforms in Romania lag too far behind those of Hungary.
26. A "modern" society is assumed to include the following characteristics: a high degree of specialization of labor; the domination of a secular political culture; widespread use of science and technology; the use of inanimate sources of energy; increasingly impersonal and interdependent markets; functional social relations; management of political and economic affairs by centralized hierarchies recruited non-ascriptively; and increased levels of economic well-being. See Inkeles (1973).
27. For example, the so-called "Protestant ethic" of hard work and sobriety, one aspect of a WASP subculture, has increasingly been adopted by Jewish and Asian immigrants.
28. The much-abused term "corporatism" is used here not in its medieval ("guild") connotation nor in its fascist one, but rather in its "societal" variant made popular (and confusing) by Philippe Schmitter, Gerhard Lehbruch, and others.
29. There are exceptional circumstances, for example, the difficulty of Muslim, orthodox Jewish, and Christian fundamentalist women joining feminist movements; but this is slowly being overcome by the evolution of religious attitudes.
30. The attitudes and interferences of outside governments and elites vis-à-vis the pursuits of ethnic minorities have varied. Thus, Ibo separatism (leading to the founding of Biafra between 1967 and 1970) was viewed by many as "reactionary"; Palestinian Arab separatist efforts have been widely regarded as "progressive"; and Kurdish and Basque attempts at self-determination have been met with relative indifference.

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### *Biographical Note*

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