

**Ending Autocracy,  
Enabling Democracy:  
The Tribulations of  
Southern Africa,  
1960–2000**

*ROBERT I. ROTBERG*

**WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION  
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS**

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Ending Autocracy,  
Enabling Democracy

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Southern Africa, 1960–2000*

ROBERT I. ROTBERG

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION  
*Cambridge, Massachusetts*

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—R. I. R.

*For*

Dylan Alexander

Quinton Yates

Jared Paul

Joanna Gabrielle

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


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# Southern Africa, 2000



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## *Engaging, Explaining, Entreating Southern Africa*

The storm clouds over sub-Saharan and southern Africa have long been dark with danger and despair. Although the skies were promising enough when the new nations of tropical Africa began so eagerly to rule themselves—the dawning sun at first burning brightly—the goals of representative democracy, good governance, and rising standards of living soon lost their luster. The squalls of danger moved from west to east in the 1960s, spawning occasional tornadoes and then great lines of convergence and confusion as the number of military coups and personality cults multiplied. Satisfying the broad basic needs of whole citizenries became submerged as a priority beneath the delivery of bursts of intense satisfaction to narrow ruling cliques, families, and individual leaders.

Societal participation in the process of governing was overtaken almost everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa and southern Africa by the rule of the few. There were bitter, often violent contests for primacy. The objectives of economic emancipation proved harder and harder to achieve as macroeconomic and monetary prudence was cast aside in favor of statist panaceas and adventurous attempts to create growth on the back of import substitution, grand industrial schemes, and deficit spending. Africans grew poorer on average, although in some favored places the reverse was true, and in a number of countries educational opportunities increased, medical care was much more available, and infrastructures greatly improved.

For the majority, however, the rains came. A growing darkness obscured all but a few parts of sub-Saharan Africa and southern Africa as the 1960s gave way to two very difficult decades. Yet, beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, much more promising and prosperous times beckoned. By the end of the century, much (although certainly not all) of sub-Saharan Africa—especially southern Africa—had glimpsed the sun again and, sobered by earlier

storms, was attempting to focus pragmatically on incremental improvements to the difficult problems of governance and growth.

Africa in the second half of the twentieth century is a tale of great hope and expectation, followed by disappointment (and many trials and tribulations), and then by disciplined review and cautious optimism. Southern Africa, particularly, has been a work in progress, sometimes blessed by the heavens and sometimes cursed by the horsemen of the apocalypse. Throughout, as forbidding as the days and nights often appeared, there were always those who could envisage a path to betterment. There were always a few, at least, who appreciated what was awry and how to set Africa, or their particular patch of southern Africa, back on track toward freedom from fear, from hunger, and from despotism.

Based on contemporary observation and commentary, this is a book that reflects the evolution of much of southern Africa from times of triumph—the winning of independence from white rule—to periods of partial or complete failure (the Congo), and on to an era of new successes in the face of sustained cross-national adversity and the determined perversity of leaders.

This is less a full history of forty years than an individualistic approach to many of the searing issues of southern Africa during those decades. The chapters that follow provide both contemporaneous and after-the-fact explanation and analysis of southern Africa's struggles: to oust settlers and colonists, to defeat the ruthless hegemony of apartheid, to cope with civil wars and ethnic and religious conflict, to overcome the many obstacles to political and economic development, to uplift itself in every imaginable way, and—in fits and starts—to end the rule of indigenous dictators and other authoritarian figures. Progress is never linear; in southern Africa it never was and it remains contentious and often frustrating.

Part 1 of this book is entitled “The New Africa” and is divided into six chapters on the years of southern Africa's early struggle for decolonization and autonomy, especially against lingering whites; the battle to end settler domination in Rhodesia; the process of growth and difficulty in Zambia; the troubled 1980s, when dictatorship and military coups trumped development; the battle to free southern Africa, especially Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia; the second surge toward democracy in the 1990s, especially in Malawi; and finally, the growth of greed and grandiosity in Zimbabwe. A postscript supplements the Zimbabwe story.

Part 2, “Freeing South Africa from the Yoke of Apartheid,” chronicles the battle against and the eventual denouement of apartheid; the vicissitudes of its architects, opponents, and critics; and the successes of the eventual African victors. This section includes chapters on the early forms of separate development; on the divestment and disinvestment controversies

before and after the Soweto disturbances of 1976; on the attempts to entrench white rule and bamboozle antagonists, following the rise of a new black consciousness; on the tripartite constitutional maneuverings and cataclysmic African reactions of the early 1980s; on the unraveling of apartheid later in that decade; on the coming of freedom; and, finally, on the positive leadership of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. In both this part and part 1, there are contemporaneous as well as current critiques of United States policy toward black Africa and South Africa under apartheid. (Many of the articles in part 1 are directly relevant to the discussion in part 2, and vice versa.)

Part 3 is about the future of southern Africa and the rest of Africa. It argues that improved economic and social living standards for the peoples of southern Africa (and Africa as a whole) can only be assured once good governance is widespread, policies conducive to sustainable and equitable per capita economic growth are the norm, and civil strife is eliminated. Part 3 discusses each of those three major aspirations at length, defines the issues involved, diagnoses the existing problems and sets of objectives, and suggests exactly how southern Africans can achieve their full potential in the decisive first decades of the twenty-first century.

Overall, in the post-imperial years from 1960, Africa and southern Africa experienced great wealth and abject poverty; frustrating modernization failures; cascades of interminable intrastate war; merciless and brutal genocides and other bitter massacres; state weakness and state collapse; many rejections of representative democracy and denials of fundamental human rights; the rise of despots and predators; the eventual triumph of justice over apartheid (and the transformation of a radiant convict into a shining international icon); the growth of healthy support for the realization of participatory democracy; and the crafting of radical new policies to approach the many critical inequities of the twenty-first century.

These subjects all required explanation and explication, then and now. This book embodies one observer's attempt to do so for southern Africa, omitting a broad range of contemporaneous opinion and reflection on the corresponding changes in the remainder of sub-Saharan Africa.

The American public, especially in the earlier years covered by this book, was woefully uninformed, or at best poorly advised, about such unfamiliar, complex, distant—even bizarre—issues as those affecting southern Africa. Press coverage was episodic, except when discontent tumbled into conflict, multiple lives were at risk, or other tragedies unfolded. Thus, there were obvious gulfs in public understanding and policy awareness which could be alleviated, however modestly or fortuitously, by those who were closer to the peoples, accomplishments, and concerns of southern Africa. Or so it

seemed to someone who was an early student of and an embryonic interpreter of southern Africa and all things African.

At the time, an obvious method of bridging the perceived gulfs of understanding was to inform the public through opinion pieces highlighting issues of immediate concern to Africans and to the development of southern Africa. Attempting to explain controversial issues of overseas development or using a column in a newspaper or news magazine to advocate counterintuitive policies regarding unfamiliar terrain was not the same as lecturing to a captive audience of university students. It was and is a very different kind of task, even if both are intended to serve the cause of education. Writing about complicated foreign policy questions in the press is certainly a form of teaching, but the result could never read like a lecture or a sermon. In order to heighten a reader's awareness of a distant country's problems, an analyst, like a compelling lecturer, should simplify without distortion and compress without sacrificing verisimilitude, all within a range of 600 to 900 words. Those are two (or three) tests of a news analysis column or an article on a newspaper's opinion page. Another is whether something new or enlightening has been offered. Has the article, or a collection of articles and opinions, advanced the cause of understanding? If possible, has a worthy new policy been championed? Has the combined effort of advocacy and explanation made a difference, at least potentially?

The pages that follow are intended to provide an extended, reflective, personal examination of southern Africa's political and economic development since 1960. The articles and analyses that are contemporary with events appeared primarily in the *New York Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and the *Boston Globe*, but also in the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Miami Herald*, *Newsday*, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, the *San Jose Mercury-News*, and other American newspapers. Some were written for African and South African publications like *Southern Africa Report*, the *Cape Times*, the *Star* (Johannesburg), and the *Sunday Express* (Durban). Others appeared in British and American weeklies or monthlies like the *New Republic*, *Africa Report*, or the *London Review of Books*.

Whatever the outlet, the writings were usually short, topical, and designed to explain or advocate, or both. They are presented in this book as sets of linked and continuing views on southern Africa. There is commentary especially on unfolding events and issues in Angola, the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and on the sub-region's concerns as a whole.

Rereading these occasional offerings as a whole (and also the ones on the rest of Africa that were omitted for reasons of space) provides a cumulative effect as later contributions build upon and deepen earlier ones. They con-

stitute more of a whole piece than they seemed to do at the time when they were written. That is, remembering that the writing of each was triggered by an event or a series of events that seemed worthy of comment—that seemed essential to the American public's understanding of occurrences overseas, including policy triumphs or missteps in Washington, London, Paris, or Pretoria—the fact that there is a visible continuity is welcome. Targets and approaches are unexpectedly consistent. Again and again the articles return to themes that remain important.

South Africa still debates why and how the National Party finally agreed to scrap apartheid; what motivated President P. W. Botha, and how he engineered attacks on his black opponents; the nature of, and contradictions within, separate development; the role of foreigners in bringing about Nelson Mandela's release from prison; and the abilities of President Thabo Mbeki.

The resilience of the African spirit is a further theme of contemporary significance. It helps analysts to explain how southern Africans endured so much and why the peoples and voters of the continent eventually were able to oust kleptocrats and autocrats. It links the resurgence of democracy in Malawi to the up-to-the-minute struggle against tyranny in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the fate of the Congo; the endless civil war in Angola; the justice of debt relief; the war against AIDS; uplifting the world's poor; and a host of other questions discussed herein are just as urgent now as when the commentaries first appeared.

The underlying concerns embodied throughout these writings are how to achieve justice, peace, and improving standards of living for the peoples of southern Africa.

Minority rule was and is unjust, not only because majorities were deprived of their rights of self-determination. Minorities also oppressed, denying majorities (and, in some places, other minorities) fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. Nominal democracies, ruled on behalf of representative coalitions, also degenerated into single-party or one-person rule. Many economic policies were disastrous. Despotism, in its various guises, had and has to be opposed. Americans had to be warned not to be gulled by artifice and rationalization, to avoid the misleading promises of constructive engagement and separate development, and to distinguish between false and true prophets and policies.

There was a pattern. The contemporary commentary gave no quarter to demagogues and dictators, whether in Rhodesia or Zimbabwe. It rang the tocsins of alarm when the West ignored the African famines of the 1970s and 1980s. It promoted debt relief in the 1980s. It urged support for the South African African National Congress (ANC) while Washington still termed it a Marxist organization. It opposed guns and funds for the Union



for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola. Going back to the late 1950s, it championed the nationalists who thereafter ended the despised Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But it also was quick to break with them when promising young African leaders turned against their own peoples, and became authoritarian and corrupt.

The press columns articulated deep worries about the state of affairs in southern Africa. But, reading them again, there is a touching sense of optimism—an abiding belief in perfectibility. Improvements were always possible, either by listening more openly to the voices of reason or by leaders coming to appreciate the despairing logic of their misplaced actions. Both, Prime Minister Ian Smith, President Robert G. Mugabe, Presidents Reagan and Bush, and so many others were urged to ameliorate their positions by coming to appreciate the long-term adverse consequences of flawed policies.

Written to highlight a particular concern or a trend in African affairs, these columns could not have covered every aspect of southern African affairs. But they should have articulated a view on many of the most timely and most difficult issues of the day. Even so, there are significant events, turning points, and policies that evaded comment. Either I failed to appreciate the importance of certain pivotal moments at the time or was unable to write about them, or my editors thought them unimportant. Whatever the cause, no collection of writings, even about South Africa or Zimbabwe over four decades, can be thought comprehensive or complete. What is included in this book—the new reflections and the original reports—focuses upon some of the most critical aspects of the unfolding scene in southern Africa.

These new essays and accompanying commentaries cannot be considered a full history of southern Africa, despite the broad sweep of reflection from 1960 to 2000. Because the articles emerged out of opinion pieces and analyses, they concentrate on political change and economic policy. Given what they were, and the audiences for whom they were written, they largely omit overt discussion of social matters. Even if they were informed by more than unfolding political crises, they are more about national questions than about the daily concerns of citizens. They are less about structure and culture than about individual and group failings and triumphs. They are necessarily about presidents and dictators more than parliaments and parties. They are about liberation and opposition movements (and their prime movers) and not about the experiences of Africans far from the mainstream of struggle or controversy. There is a broader range of African experiences that intrigued and captivated me but would not have seemed, or did not seem, urgent or appealing enough to editors in Boston or New York.

For analogous reasons, this is a book that inevitably focuses more on southern Africa's vicissitudes and struggles than upon its quiet successes. It

was hard to trumpet the democratic virtues of Botswana and Mauritius on editorial pages, or even to persuade editors to give me space to explain why those countries continued to perform well while their neighbors did not. It was equally problematic to write about weak or depressing places far from the concerns of American readers. And there is nothing on Swaziland and precious little about Lesotho, two fascinating and problematic countries.

Focusing on southern Africa followed naturally from my research interests in those parts of the post-colonial world and from a deep acquaintance with the leaders, policies, and issues of that part of the continent. As a doctoral student at the University of Oxford, I had first traveled to Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi to investigate the true nature of “partnership” in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Even more seriously flawed ideas in South Africa led me there, and then to Mozambique, Angola, and the Congo. Before returning to Oxford, I also sought out the rising generation of indigenous anti-colonial political leaders in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, and Ethiopia—Tom Mboya, Julius Nyerere, A. Milton Obote, and many others. Subsequently, as a jejune teacher at Harvard University, and later during many professional years at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, I became better acquainted with West Africa and the cities and countryside from Kampala to Cape Town. Amid frequent visits to the continent and several long stays, plus consultation and testimony in Washington and London, there were many controversies and misplaced initiatives meriting comment. Invariably, there was more to see and write about than the available time, research priorities, and other obligations permitted.

Much more recently, after joining the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and the World Peace Foundation, I continued to concern myself with the problems of Africa and southern Africa. In this most current period, as earlier, there has been a complementary quality between my academic and research pursuits and the subjects about which I wrote for the press. That had always been the pattern, for obvious reasons of proximity and knowledge. I rarely wrote about areas or subjects where my knowledge was secondhand. I was acquainted with South Africans on all sides, despite being banned as an enemy of the state there and in Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) by their white rulers for long stretches of time. Before I wrote about the controversies of place or a policy, I often visited, interviewed, and gained as full an appreciation as possible of the prevailing realities.

Opinion writings occasionally make policy. A good idea, in the public arena, starts a line of debate or encourages legislators and executive officials to create or alter thinking and problem-solving approaches. More frequently, opinion articles in the press strengthen arguments already in the policy-making domain. Equally often, they raise the consciousness of the American

public, and thus indirectly help to shape the contours of policy debate. Clearly, the most influential columns accomplish all of those goals, just as do the best of longer articles.

The reflections and articles that are the grist of this book emerge from a commitment to the betterment of the peoples of Africa and southern Africa. The articles criticized the follies of rulers and ruling classes, sought justice for individuals and groups denied basic rights, and suggested the kinds of policies that would benefit the mass of citizens, or particular groups or minorities. Overall, they and this book as a whole were written with the goal of informing Americans about the potential of a still poorly understood and much underappreciated part of our troubled world. As southern Africa becomes more completely enmeshed in the new globalized polity and economy, so its stability and progress becomes much more vital to those of Americans and Europeans, and to the rest of Africa.

## **Editorial Procedures**

All of the articles reprinted in this collection originally appeared as opinion pieces and news analyses in major American and overseas dailies, as well as two weeklies and two monthlies. They are reprinted as originally offered, but factual errors have been corrected insofar as possible. Some inconsistencies nevertheless remain, particularly regarding fluctuating national population estimates. There is some unavoidable repetition, too, primarily of the factual and context-setting kind. The articles were digitized for this book.

The articles include a proportion of my commentary on the political, economic, and social events of the developing world over four decades. Excluded from this book are pieces that are redundant or wholly repetitious, and travel articles. Also excluded is a large body of commentary on developments in eastern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and West Africa; a comparatively robust collection of articles on Haiti; a shorter corpus of analyses of the desperate situations in Burma, Fiji, and Sri Lanka; articles about the resolution of the stalemate in Cyprus; and articles that are not about the peoples or nations of the developing world. All articles are identified by publication and date and carry the original headlines. A full list of the articles is included at the end of the book; those articles omitted because of space considerations are marked with an asterisk.

The essays that precede each subject section provide fresh commentary and reflection. They also comment upon and situate each article in the context of the events of its period. The concluding chapter focuses on what still needs to be accomplished if southern Africa and Africa are to prosper, govern themselves well, and reduce the killing fields of civil conflict.

## *The New Africa: Euphoria, Kleptomania, and Charisma*

Seventeen African colonies shed their foreign masters in 1960 and became new countries. Ten more followed in the following five years, and two more in 1966.<sup>1</sup> Representative democracy was almost everywhere triumphant in Africa, and widely celebrated in much of the rest of the world. There was a heady euphoria; Africa would at last take its rightful place at the table of free nations. Together with freedom and a justifiable new sense of pride would come an end to poverty, new emphases on educational and medical services, and sustainable economic growth. Already at independence, some of the new entities boasted per capita gross domestic products higher than most of the developing countries in Asia. Reaching the point of economic takeoff was thus only a matter of time, of financial assistance from their former colonial masters and others, and (for most) the organizing of appropriate instruments of state control. Anything was possible now that Africans were arbiters of their own destinies. That was the heady aspiration of the 1960s.

There were some dark clouds, admittedly, over this rich parade of possibility. Throughout the 1960s, the hard vise of apartheid tightened on South

1. The rest of the African decolonization process was: Mauritius, Swaziland, and Equatorial Guinea became independent in 1968; Guinea-Bissau in 1974; Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Angola, and the Comoros in 1975; the Seychelles in 1976; Djibouti in 1977; Zimbabwe in 1980; Namibia in 1990; and Eritrea in 1993. South Africa shifted from white to African rule in 1994.

Africa's black majority. Nelson Mandela and others were imprisoned for life. The organization of a successful African National Congress (ANC) guerilla movement from outside was a decade or more away. White rule seemed altogether impregnable. It also seemed ascendant after 1965 in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), with a cadre of its African political leaders in jail and Western sanctions as ineffective as Western boycotts of South Africa. Namibia, experiencing its first indigenous political stirrings, was still held fast by South Africa's defiant embrace. Only in Zambia and Malawi, where African nationalism had destroyed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and farther north, in Kenya, was continued rule of Africans by white settlers being thwarted.

The 1960s in Africa framed a decade of promise and euphoria leavened by the notoriety of white intransigence. But, as the decade progressed, inherited representative democracy increasingly became an anachronistic and beleaguered pursuit. Some of the early post-colonial governments became authoritarian and corrupt, leaders hijacked their states, and economic potential based on cautious older methods almost everywhere was sacrificed to the grandiose panaceas of import substitution, heavy industry, tight regulation, and merciless intervention. Military coups became commonplace. Good governance became rare. So did the observance of basic human rights and the four freedoms. Africa began to squander its political and financial legacies and, partly in consequence, to solicit new sources of support from the West or the Soviet Union and China.

Optimism about prospects for Africa was not easily converted into skepticism and despair. That took another decade of leadership failure and spectacular economic misjudgment. Nevertheless, there was an ebbing away of confidence in African statesmanship and integrity. The process of nation-building that began with such excitement in Ghana in 1957, when Kwame Nkrumah gave his country an African name in place of its British designation and envisaged a United States of Africa, began to slow considerably only after his and his regime's excesses became too scandalous to be ignored. Ethnic antagonisms came to the surface in several African states. Adherence to participatory procedures ebbed. Even so, the West and critics in the West continued to support African leaders and states well after they had started suspending constitutions and converting their states into autocracies. Creating and holding Cold War allies was the higher goal. Gradually, however, the enthusiasm for and tolerance of black Africa receded.

Six compelling themes (and some minor ones) emerged in the 1960s and continued until the end of the century to vex southern Africans themselves and worry responsible outsiders:

—How best to strengthen Africa's pursuit of prosperity and human dignity.

—How best to maintain, fortify, and foster democratic tendencies in new, inexperienced states.

—How to curtail ethnic feuding and prevent the outbreak of intercommunal conflict, and then how to restore civil order when brutal intrastate wars ensued.

—How to dampen despotism and limit the likelihood of autocracy.

—How to maintain the momentum of decolonization, thus freeing majority Africans in the settler-influenced territories of East and Central Africa.

—How to dismantle apartheid in South Africa, the subject of part 2 of this book.

At first, these themes, especially the continuing struggle of decolonization and strengthening democracy, dominated most commentary, including my own. A series of early short and fuller-length reports in the *New Republic (NR)* and *Africa Report* drew readers' attention to missteps along the troubled road to freedom in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. Later I wrote about South Africa and the sub-region for *Newsday*, the *New York Times*, the *Boston Globe*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*, among others. Americans deserved to know what Africa's problems were, how Africans were coping with those concerns, and how the United States could help.

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## *Decolonization and the Debut of Democracy and Authoritarianism*

Achieving independence was long the aspiration of the inhabitants of southern Africa. The early accomplishments of African liberators elsewhere on the continent thus emboldened southern Africans from the 1950s and 1960s. What happened in West or East Africa was relevant to their own evolving situations. They could never be insulated.

The Kenyan struggle to be freed of settler rule, accomplished in 1962, and Tanganyika's smooth transition to independence in 1961, were particularly near at hand and salient for southern Africans. So was the turbulence in the Congo and distant but powerful Ghana's unraveling under Kwame Nkrumah, the first African president.

Nkrumah was a worry, and not only because his visionary ambitions threatened as many rival leaders as they excited others. His actions within Ghana were becoming more and more arbitrary. That the first liberationist of emergent Africa was betraying democratic practices might reflect badly upon and retard the decolonization of the still colonial territories, like the Rhodesias (Zimbabwe and Zambia), Angola, Mozambique, Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho), and others. Indeed, if outsiders looked closely they could detect economic malpractice, rampant corruption, labor and student unrest, and a rash of questionable practices in the five-year-old African vanguard state. Nkrumah's Soviet-style Convention People's Party (CPP) allocated employment opportunities only to party adherents. It indoctrinated young Ghanaians and attempted to inculcate the concept of Nkrumah's infallibility. Photographs of *Osageyfo* ("the redeemer") were everywhere. Opponents, including some of the country's older nationalists, were arrested. Criticism was forbidden. Nkrumah also promised to lock up



dissidents for twenty years. On the economic front, Nkrumah had dissipated the ample reserves that had been bequeathed to Ghana by the departing British rulers. Large Soviet-style construction projects had replaced the careful cultivation and marketing of cocoa, Ghana's main export. Nkrumah had besmirched the good name of Ghana, I wrote. It had become a full-blown "dictatorship." ("Ghana and 'The Redeemer,'" *New Republic*, 7 May 1962.)

As Ghana was abandoning representative democracy, Africans in the white-settler-dominated protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Africans in the white colony of Southern Rhodesia, were seeking, first, to remove the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, imposed upon them by Britain in 1953, and second, to become free. Britain had yoked the three territories together as a misplaced experiment in multiracial rule and economic uplift. Because Southern Rhodesia had been run by local whites since 1898, and the affairs of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been heavily influenced by settlers since the 1920s, the Federation was intended to be a buffer against the spread of apartheid from the south, create a larger local market, and benefit Africans by providing a period of benevolent white guidance. But this supposed "partnership" policy never amounted to more than piety. "Your government," said one of its only African cabinet officials in 1962, "has no intention of fully implementing the policy of partnership." From 1953 to 1962, only nine Africans ever received positions at any level in the federal civil service. "I feel . . . a piece of window dressing and completely frustrated," he concluded. ("Welensky's Last Stand: The Multi-Racial Experiment in Central Africa Is Finished," *New Republic*, 24 Sept. 1962.)

From its first intimation, in the late 1940s, Africans smelled a subterfuge and opposed the Federation. Within a few years of its establishment, indigenous inhabitants of the federal regions and dispassionate outsiders declared it a fake. Africans redoubled their opposition to the Federation from the later 1950s, when serious nationalist activity aroused all three sections of the Federation. I had written about the new activists as early as 1959 ("Gandhi's Tactics Pushed in Africa," *New York Times*, 24 Feb. 1959), before agitation and fears of rioting led the federal government to send troops into the northern territories, and their respective British governors to declare coordinated emergencies.

By 1962, it was fairly obvious that the white game was up in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The federal experiment was doomed. Britain had granted new constitutions to both dependencies and, a year before, Dr. Hastings Banda's Malawi Congress Party (MCP) had easily won a pre-independence parliamentary election. Banda, like Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of the

United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Northern Rhodesia, was authentic. I termed Kaunda “no fanatic.” He was “a sensible nationalist,” capable of leading his people peaceably to independence if, and only if, Britain ceased bowing to the threats and bluster of Sir Roy Welensky, locomotive driver and prime minister of the Federation.

Yet there were dire possibilities. If Britain continued to break promises to Kaunda, betrayal could lead to riots. Or Kaunda could be superseded by more militant colleagues. Either way, a “racial bloodbath” would then be likely, especially if Welensky and his military supporters tried forcibly to prevent black rule across the Zambezi River. Just as Britain had conceded self-government to the Africans of Nyasaland, it should do likewise in neighboring Northern Rhodesia. (“Northern Rhodesia,” *New Republic*, 1 Jan. 1962; “Central Africa: Test of Multi-Racial Rule,” *New Republic*, 9 April 1962.)

Britain, caught between rising, militant African nationalism and the defensive thrashings of white politicians, devised a clever liberal answer capable of promoting the kind of multiracialism that the Federation had been intended to instill. In late 1962, black and white voters were asked to elect members of a pre-independence legislative assembly. Instead of appealing for votes along party or color lines, candidates could win seats only if they attracted support from minimum percentages of voters of a color different than their own. Kaunda’s UNIP could win a majority only if it attracted sufficient white voters; likewise, Welensky’s United Federal Party could gain places only if blacks voted for its candidates.

Kaunda accepted this Hobson’s choice. Ever an optimist, he persuaded himself that whites would be reasonable and realistic. He campaigned to bring white and black together. Whites would be secure, and Zambia peaceful, he urged, only if the territory’s 72,000 whites voted for UNIP, the dominant African party. October’s balloting, however, was profoundly inconclusive. Africans voted massively for UNIP, whites for the Federal Party. But too many seats were left vacant when no candidate obtained sufficient crossover votes. A series of run-off elections were scheduled for December, and those, too, were frustrated by the failure to achieve any modicum of comity across the color line. Only after Britain abandoned its attempt to ease white fears and scheduled a straightforward majority election in 1964 could Kaunda and his party assemble the legislative majority with which to proceed to independence. UNIP won fifty-five of the seventy-five Legislative Assembly seats. (“Inconclusive Election in Northern Rhodesia,” *Africa Report*, Dec. 1962.)

About Banda's rule and the prospects for the future Malawi, I was strongly positive. "Racial tension is absent in Nyasaland," I wrote in late 1962, "and, if the next year is as happy as the last," Malawi should have little difficulty "inspiring the Western world with confidence in its ability to govern itself and overcome its economic handicaps." ("Onward to Independence: Dr. Banda Leads His People to the New Jerusalem," *New Republic*, 3 Nov. 1962.) After a constitutional conference late in 1962, Britain readily agreed to transform Nyasaland into a self-governing polity, with Banda becoming prime minister in law as well as in fact. The end of the Federation was also accepted.

Banda's "Western" attributes seemed to enhance his credentials and Malawi's likely success as a new nation. After a lifetime in the United States and Britain as a physician and Presbyterian Elder, Banda was a firm, old-fashioned Victorian moralist, a paternalist, and someone who strongly believed that black political control was more important than any Africanization of civil services or educational establishments. Promotion would be "on merit," Banda warned African civil servants. They should not "clamor greedily" for white jobs, he said. Whites would continue to manage tea estates, a matter of long-standing controversy. Banda was a teetotaler who closed down strip joints and refused to let his photograph hang in bars. He forbade trousers on women and long hair on men. He demanded hard work of his followers. He also compelled obedience and, copying Nkrumah, called himself *Ngwazi* ("the conqueror"). Banda also had established an effective propaganda machine, first through the weekly *Malawi News*, which he owned. ("Malawi 1963," *Africa Report*, Jan. 1963; "The Malawi News," *Africa Report*, Dec. 1963.)

I did not immediately realize that, again like Nkrumah and despite his training and experience in democracies, Banda would gradually evolve, after Malawi's independence in 1964, into a cruel, corrupt despot. Soon, for example, Banda declared himself "President-for-Life," and repressed a series of hapless revolts and invasions from Tanzania that were organized by his sometime comrades in arms. The Young Pioneers, his paramilitary youth league, were among the enforcers of this growing autocracy. Would-be heirs apparent were jailed or killed; Africans who refused to pledge loyalty to Banda or the MCP were attacked, including thousands of principled Jehovah's Witnesses. Banda also accepted massive aid and friendship from apartheid South Africa. He was, however, an anti-communist, and thus a firm friend of the Reagan and first Bush administrations.

Banda's repression continued for another ten years. But, like so many other omnipotent first rulers of Africa, Banda finally outlived his capacity to denounce criticism and deny human and civil rights. That was to come.

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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*Northern Rhodesia*

Kenneth Kaunda is a gentle vegetarian of Christian conviction who hopes to lead his people of Northern Rhodesia to independence along a Gandhian path. Sir Roy Welensky, once a champion prizefighter, is a charming block-buster of a man pledged to perpetuate white dominance in Central Africa. Along with Reginald Maudling, Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Kaunda and Welensky hold the key to the future of Africa south of the Congo, with its rich minerals, and its easy access to the South African Republic, Angola and Mozambique.

Explored by David Livingstone a century ago, Northern Rhodesia is populated by small islands of 74,000 whites and 10,000 Asians and coloreds in a sea of 2.6 million blacks. It is the second largest producer of copper in the world (after the U.S.) and has substantial private U.S. and British investments. Since 1924 it has been a British protectorate, administered by the Colonial Office with assistance from local white settlers. Federation was imposed from above in 1953 as an experiment in "partnership" between black and white. But Africans rejected the experiment then and have derided its hypocrisy since. In the contest for British favor, Sir Roy has led the settlers and Mr. Kaunda has championed the indigenes. The former has spoken about multi-racial comity ("partnership") as a bulwark against the spread of Communism in Southern Africa. He has patiently explained the dangers of black nationalism (he backs President Tshombe) and has sought to entrench his positions by public relations, constitutional manipulation, restrictive franchises, and a powerful military establishment. The British Government must now arbitrate between Sir Roy and Mr. Kaunda, who quietly asks whether Northern Rhodesia need lag behind Nyasaland and Kenya, where economic and political problems are greater.

So far Mr. Kaunda has been able to restrain his followers. He has assured them that the British Government means well and that patience will bring the New Jerusalem. In February he accepted a draft constitution that would have given a slim legislative majority to African nationalists. The British Government, under heavy pressure from Sir Roy and its own conservative wing, renege and in June promulgated an excessively complicated constitution which gives Sir Roy's United Federal Party an absolute white majority.

Mr. Kaunda heard the news in Accra and left for London, unable to believe the press. But it was all too true. During the summer he shuffled between Accra, London, Delhi, Dar-es-Salaam and Lusaka, his own capital. Some of his followers rebelled, rioted, and pillaged in Northern Rhodesia's Northern and Luapula Provinces. In September Britain finally said it would reconsider the June constitution if violence ceased. It stopped. If Mr. Maudling falters, Kaunda is almost certain to go and militant immoderates are bound to take his place. Blood could flow, repression follow, and an eventual black government would not need to be friendly towards the West (it has wealth) nor mindful of the just claims of whites in its midst. A small-scale Congo is even possible. In Kaunda the West has a sensible nationalist who can lead his people to self-government and independence with due regard to their desires and capabilities. Without him a fair and peaceful solution seems unlikely.

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### *Basutoland 1962*

Basutoland, Great Britain's enclave in South Africa, is ostensibly an ideal example of an emerging colonial territory. Both the African Progressives and their traditionalist rivals want independence. The colonial power and its local officials are fully ready to grant that independence. A sizeable corps of educated Basuto and a relatively large number of politicians and intelligentsia are available to govern the nation, to staff its schools, to run its legislative assembly, and to administer its social services. Four proto-ministers are being trained to assume cabinet-level positions. And there are no settlers—only 1,600 white administrators, missionaries, mechanics, and traders surrounded by 700,000 Basuto.

Both black and white in Basutoland wish that the political dynamics of the country were that simple. The Dominant Basutoland African Congress, a left-leaning, strictly modernist movement, is rigidly opposed by large groups which cling to the institution of chieftainship. In Basutoland that institution is monolithic; the sole paramount chief is a supreme ruler who theoretically reigns omnipotently over the colony with the advice of the British Resident Commissioner. In practice, effective power has remained in outside hands since 1868, when Moshoeshoe I prayed for Queen Victoria's protection and lost his sovereignty in the bargain. His successor, 23-year old Moshoeshoe II, now wants to reassert the glory of the fatherland and to rule as an unfettered monarch.

*Trained at Oxford*

The young paramount chief came down from Oxford University early last year, where he was reading politics, philosophy, and economics. He ousted the regent, his step-mother, and was acclaimed ruler of Basutoland at a tumultuous *pitso* in Matsieng, the tribal capital. Seventy thousand Basuto cheered their first sovereign in 20 years. Subsequently the tall, dignified, and gentle chief announced his program: if it were the wish of the people he would support “responsible government.” But he would be the head of such a state and the entire administration would be under him and carried out in his name. He would exercise a veto over legislation and any cabinet would be responsible to him, not to the legislative chamber.

As Prince Constantine Bereng Seeiso, the new paramount chief was educated by Roman Catholics in Basutoland and Britain as an heir apparent. He does not grasp for power. Yet he does have a feeling for his people’s lost heritage, and he means to reassert the role of monarchy within the tribal system. Were he possessed of pan-African ambitions or charisma he would probably compete on the hustings for electoral support. Instead he remains aloof, pursuing a lonely hand—and a hand strengthened by the mass reverence accorded the institution he represents and by the loyal support of older, reactionary chiefs who want no new order but who simply wish the preservation of their accustomed prerogatives.

*Progress Demanded*

The Basutoland Congress Party dismisses His Highness Moshoeshe II as “that young man” and recommends that he should be a nominal head of state. It wants self-government based on universal adult franchise, with a large, directly elected National Council, or legislative assembly, and an “enforceable” bill of rights. It wishes Britain to play a rapidly diminishing role. And most important, it desires a free black government to provide the catalyst for change in surrounding South Africa. (Congress is aligned with the South African Pan-Africanist Congress and is estranged from the South African National Congress, which it has accused of interference in Basutoland.)

Congress has been the strongest of the political parties since the 1960 elections, when it won an unexpected 73 of 162 directly elected district seats (it controls seven of nine district councils) and obtained 29 of 40 popular places in the National Council after the district councils had voted, in a second stage, as electoral colleges. Its opponents, the Marema Tlou (United Front), a conservative party backed by African business interests, won 16

district seats and five national positions, and the Basutoland National Party, supported by most of the chiefs, won 22 in the first instance and one at the final stage. Fifty-one independents were also elected to the district councils. Five were subsequently elevated to the National Council. Finally, 80 seats of the main legislative assembly were filled with four British officials, 14 nominees of the paramount chief, and the 22 principal chiefs, who sit by right.

The reconstituted National Council replaced a body of the same name that had functioned in an advisory capacity intermittently since 1903. It was given some power to effect economic, political, and social change, although the British Government reserved to itself control over internal security, currency, customs, posts and telegraph, telephones, external affairs, defense, and the civil service. Much of the debate has consisted of Congress' criticism about the pace of internal Africanization of administration and the tardy transformation of the colony into one popularly governed. In September the National Council, in a temporization which befits its composition and mirrors its politics, asked the colonial government to invite the paramount chief to appoint a commissioner to review the existing constitution and to formulate proposals "for an improved constitution."

Decisions of the National Council are now implemented by an Executive Council, controlled by British officials, of whom four (and the Resident Commissioner) sit with three chiefs and one former Congress leader. The main political party wants to transform the Executive Council into a parliamentary cabinet, directly responsible to the assembly. The paramount chief wants it to be his own executive arm.

### *British Role Defined*

The lines of future political conflict are therefore drawn and British officials now envisage themselves as a balancing counterweight. Congress is obviously the popular party. Its leaders, 43-year-old Ntsu Mokhehle and 35-year-old Godfrey Kolisang, are fervent pan-Africanists who speak the jargon of the left and keep in close touch with Accra and Cairo. Both are graduates of Fort Hare University College (Mr. Mokhehle with an M.Sc. in parasitology) and both have taught in South African and local schools. They are able administrators and forceful speakers and the party's overwhelming victory in the 1960 elections is a clear tribute to Mr. Mokhehle's skill in organizing party branches throughout the country and in channeling mass discontent.

Within Congress the extreme left wing is represented by two trade unionists, Shakhane Mokhehle (a younger brother) and Jack Mosiane. Outside Congress a local Communist Party was formed in early November. For about a year its leader, John Motloheloa, has tramped the dusty streets of



Maseru (the colony's capital) and the tortuous rural roads that connect trading posts and administrative centers. He has regularly peddled Soviet and Chinese Communist ephemera with some success. But his following will not be known precisely until a promised inaugural conference on March 14.

Until now Mr. Motloheloa has been more a figure of fun than a person taken seriously by British officials. They have not feared any Communist organization controlled by him, but they have worried, quite rightly, about the easy distribution of Communist literature. There are no legal impediments and his pamphlets have sold extremely well in a country where Western publications are expensive and difficult to obtain, and where, despite the government's urgent pleas, no American or British libraries have been established. Consequently, Mr. Motloheloa has had the field to himself. For a penny one could always buy reading for a day. And if cash were not at hand, the suave salesman would tell white and black alike—"Don't worry, pay me later."

### *Elements to the Right*

The leading figure on Congress' immediate political right is 47-year-old Bennet Makalo Khaketla, who helped the older Mr. Mokhehle revitalize Congress after 1955. A former teacher, he founded and edited *Mohlabhani* ("The Warrior"), a successful monthly, and constantly criticized British rule and Basutoland's color bar. During 1960 he grew increasingly critical of what he termed Mr. Mokhehle's dictatorial behavior and left-leaning posture as head of Congress. After resigning late last year he formed the Basutoland Freedom Party (and spent the summer at Harvard University), which he now represents in the National and Executive Councils. He is also the member for health and education in Basutoland's representative government.

The colony's political right is occupied by Marema Tlou and the National Party, led respectively by Chiefs Samuel Seephephe Matete and Macfarlane Lepolesa. Both owe fealty to the paramount chief and fear the progressive program of Congress. In the National Council they have followed the British lead and regularly fought measures which might in any way have brought about a diminution of the chiefly institution.

Despite frenzied internal political activity, and Mr. Mokhehle's frequent trips abroad, the future of Basutoland depends more on circumstances over which the colony has little control than on those which it can influence directly. Basutoland is a British island in a sea of apartheid, and as long as there is a white nationalist government in South Africa there can be no rampant black nationalism in Basutoland. Without Britain's protection—and even Congress admits it—an African-run Basutoland would rapidly be



swallowed up by Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd's army. Indeed, he has said as much himself (and Mr. Mokhehle has replied with a demand for lands ceded to the Orange Free State Boers in 1866). Recently South African President Charles Robert Swart came to Ladybrand, across the Caledon River from Maseru, and assured white farmers of the Free State that Basutoland would soon become another Bantustan. Like the Finns, Basuto are always in the shadow of their big neighbor.

In the economic sphere they are also directly beholden to South Africa. All imports and exports pass through the republic. Transportation and communication with the rest of the world depend on connections in South Africa. Main hopes for economic development rely in large measure on decisions taken by Mr. Verwoerd's government. In turn, the republic looks to Basutoland for skilled labor, but there are alternative sources.

The Basuto live on and above a dramatically beautiful 5,000-foot plateau about the size of Connecticut and Massachusetts combined. Innumerable streams drain off snows from 11,000-foot peaks and gush forward east into the Indian Ocean and west, as the Orange and Caledon Rivers, into the Atlantic. Where there is a striking contrast between rich brown earth and lush green pasture there is also erosion, which year after year carries irreplaceable topsoil into South Africa. Poorly paid administrators work to combat this erosion but water and animals regularly win. The major agricultural revenue comes from merino sheep and angora goats, who eat what grass cover is left after water takes its toll. Their high quality wool and mohair are then exported via the South African Wool Marketing Board, a simple demonstration of the colony's economic dependence.

Every Musuto owns some sheep and goats, a few horses, and grazing lands that typically are fragmented. Land reform is essential if the colony is to be developed, but such reform has regularly been opposed by traditional peasants and those chiefs who for long have had a remarkable measure of authority in the rural areas. Early this year the new department of local government embarked on a patient plan to consolidate individual holdings in the Mafeteng district into one large, mechanized aggregate. If local farmers continue to cooperate, and if the quiet revolution succeeds, the colony may once again be able to look to the land with some hope for the future. Nonetheless, Basutoland's most lucrative export is bound to remain labor. About 180,000 Basuto are regularly employed in South Africa, either on the farms of the Orange Free State or in the mines of Witwatersrand, where they are prized as expert shaft-sinkers.

The British colonial government is currently seeking ways in which to make Basutoland more viable economically. If funds can be obtained, the

existing network of sub-standard dirt roads will be upgraded and new roads will be built in order to connect the mountainous eastern and interior regions with the markets and government centers in the west. There are plans for a wool washing plant, and some small secondary industry based on wool weaving and pottery. Diamonds have been mined in the most inaccessible parts of the colony, but full-scale exploitation of minerals recently ceased when Colonel Jack Scott's concern plunged too deeply into the red.

The most ambitious project being considered would make Basutoland an important exporter of electricity and pure water to South Africa. If studies confirm its feasibility, a 200-foot-high dam will be built more than 9,000 feet above sea level in the center of a remote 170-square-mile catchment basin east of the administrative center of Butha Buthe. The dam would be situated at the confluence of the Malibamatso and Tsehlaneyane Rivers, near Moteng Pass in the Drakensberg mountains. A five-mile-long tunnel through solid basalt would provide sufficient flow for a power station in the Hololo Valley. Another tunnel eight miles long would lead to a still lower power station.

More than 387,000,000 kWh of electricity could be produced each year. About 10 percent would be devoted to internal development and the rest would be exported to Durban and Johannesburg via the existing grid that now runs north of Basutoland. Cheap power could encourage the establishment of secondary industry (only Maseru now has regular electricity) and it would be a good source of external earnings.

Water is even more important. Basutoland has abundant supplies of pure water, most of which regularly run off and are wasted. The Oxbow scheme, as it is called, could supply at least 40,000,000 gallons a day to water-short areas of South Africa, and at less than half of present delivered costs there. Basutoland envisages its water being used in the gold mines and cities of the Orange Free State and, eventually, in Johannesburg. One of the more attractive aspects of the proposal is that water could be sent 150–200 miles from its sources entirely by gravity. There would be no pumping costs and few maintenance worries. The colony's own consumption by 1999 is not expected to exceed eight percent of the present available volume, so any profits earned by the water would not divert a precious resource nor retard the colony's internal development. Total capital costs for the Oxbow major phases would be about £16,000,000 (\$44,800,000). Government had hoped to begin construction of the main dam by 1962, but hydrologists and financiers have both been behind schedule. And, as always, agreement must be reached with South Africa.

Before it can develop politically or economically, Basutoland must come to terms with itself and with South Africa. Britain wants to devolve its

responsibilities rapidly, but before London can succumb to the “wind of change” it must resolve two sets of contrary indigenous demands. It must reconcile a left-nationalism with a traditional monarchy and at the same time make the colony viable enough to withstand the pressures inherent in the South African situation. The immediate drift is toward self-government early in 1964 and independence as soon thereafter as the external factor permits. But this analysis presumes British military protection for an African-run Basutoland and a continuance of the status quo within South Africa.

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### *Central Africa: Test of Multi-Racial Rule*

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, established by Great Britain in 1953, was the first major attempt to accommodate white rule to the dynamics of black African nationalism. Africans would, in theory, be treated gradually as more equal partners. A unique multi-racial society would be forged on the anvil of white privilege and black subservience. Together, it was thought, the “Privileged and the People” epitomized by Disraeli’s “Two Nations” would link hands. The white colonial system, somewhat modified, would be secured. The Federation would thereby become a bulwark of the free world in its struggle with radical ideologies; its formation would also present an alternative to the overweening whiteness of South Africa and provide the investment-attracting advantages of size. Thus Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, two British protectorates, were joined to the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia despite vociferous African protest. And the resultant Federation was accorded what in practice amounted to independence, although the Protectorates also remained under Colonial Office control as far as local affairs were concerned.

As the British have recognized, the federal experiment was a total failure. Lip service was duly paid to the ideal of multi-racialism, but in fact federation only served to entrench white rule and white privilege in a Central Africa which now contains 300,000 whites and nine million Africans. Partnership continued to be the partnership of rider and horse. At the same time larger amounts of new capital were attracted to the Federation; copper boomed, the Kariba Dam was constructed athwart the Zambezi River, and Salisbury, the federal capital, came to resemble the sky-scrapered cities of America. New immigrants, white miners, shopkeepers, and bankers all grew more wealthy. Similarly Africans’ living standards probably increased, albeit more slowly than their own rising expectations. They saw very little

improvement in their lot, whether materially or spiritually, and they naturally continued to conspire against white rule. The African National Congresses of Nyasaland and the two Rhodesias agitated, boycotted, struck, and rioted against federation and for the ideal of African self-government. In 1959 emergencies were proclaimed in all three territories. During 1960 African nationalism gained ground, however, as Macmillan's "wind of change" blew south across the continent. Nyasaland, an impoverished sliver of mountain and lake, has since elected an African majority government. Northern Rhodesia should have the same by October. What then is the future of Central Africa?

Britain has now placed herself on the African side in the struggle for control in the Federation. After a year of vacillation, she has granted a new constitution to Northern Rhodesia which will permit a small African majority. Whites—of the dominant United Federal Party (UFP)—will have 15 seats; blacks—of the powerful United National Independence Party (UNIP) and its weaker rival, the African National Congress (ANC)—will have 15 more places; the final 15 "national" seats will probably go under a complicated formula to a UNIP coalition with the ANC and the small multi-racial Liberal Party. If the expected occurs, Northern Rhodesia's new black government will then be in a position to link arms with Nyasaland in an attempt to control the Federation. On the other hand, both protectorates could opt for secession, thereby destroying the Federation, leaving Southern Rhodesia (and her struggling African nationalist organizations) to go it alone.

### *Is a Black Federation Possible?*

Britain clearly wants the first alternative. African leaders of Northern and Southern Rhodesia would look with favor on an African-dominated federation. At the last moment Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, the leading Nyasaland nationalist, might also agree, although he has fulminated for years against the "stupid, so-called Federation" and has sworn secession. Nyasaland, unlike copper-rich Northern Rhodesia, would lose economically from secession, and Dr. Banda might ultimately prefer prosperity to independence if he can have prosperity without white supremacy.

The future of federation is, however, as much dependent upon white action as it is on black demands. Settlers have a huge stake in Central Africa and will not readily give it up. Understandably, they fear that the tide of black nationalism will engulf them and destroy their way of life while dissipating the achievements of 70 years. The promise of probable African legislative control over Northern Rhodesia (which has heretofore been ruled by white businessmen and settlers under a British governor) has therefore come

as a blow of immense portent. For that reason there is every reason to assume that white politicians will not react supinely to Britain's proposed devolution of authority in Northern Rhodesia. Africans, who have both rejected the new constitution as "inadequate" and signified their intention of participating in any election, will likewise oppose any moves to deprive them of their hard-won concessions. What this means is that another Algeria is possible.

A racial war over Northern Rhodesia depends, in the last analysis, on the opposing roles played by Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation, and Kenneth Kaunda, President of UNIP. Sir Roy, a massive blockbuster of a man, is the champion of white interest. In his younger days, before he turned from prizefighting to locomotive driving and politics, he was famed for an ability to punch his way out of tight corners. Now, as a parliamentarian and a statesman, he retains those gifts. He can charm the most fervidly opposed heart, whether black or white. And if the ruddy smile, the booming voice or the man-to-man talk over a gin-and-tonic fail, Sir Roy can bluster and threaten in the best mailed-fist tradition. His policies in this age of creeping nationalism have been simple: Label any nationalist upsurge "Communist-inspired and fanatic-oriented" at all costs; make agreements for the common defense of Central Africa with President Antonio Salazar of Portugal, who controls neighboring Angola and Mozambique, and with Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd of South Africa; encourage President Moise Tshombe of Katanga to resist the radicals of a unified Congo. Welcome Tshombe on various visits to Rhodesia, offer him refuge, and ship him supplies, whether butter or guns; defy the United Nations, and its anti-colonial Afro-Asian bloc, without fail. Most important, keep the Federation hated by all articulate Africans intact as a last redoubt of white rule in Africa. "And as for the break-up of the Federation, it will not happen while I am Prime Minister," he has said. "I have not been cast for that role." On the same day he announced the order of nine jet fighters from Britain.

Northern Rhodesia is the key to Sir Roy's federation. Now that it may obtain African majority government and, in time—which moves quickly by white clocks—full self-government, he is naturally aghast. When a similar pro-African constitution was introduced a year ago Sir Roy excoriated Whitehall, lobbied in Parliament, displayed his military strength and threatened war. Another constitution (technically but a final draft of the original) was therefore introduced in June, to his expressed pleasure. But African discontent and violence followed throughout Northern Rhodesia's winter. Whites were threatened, bridges were destroyed, and schools and churches were set afire. Eventually the Colonial Office promised to reconsider the June draft if peace were restored. It was, almost at once. A new constitution

has hence been proposed which promises to provide Northern Rhodesia with an African legislature and, implicitly, to assure a reorganization of the Federation. Sir Roy will do his best to sabotage the new settlement as he destroyed the old. Indeed, in London recently he promised to carry the fight to Rhodesia: "I believe in the Federation. I believe in what it is trying to do and I am prepared to go the whole hog to maintain it." That is, he said, "I would take every step necessary to carry out the policy I wish to carry out and use force if necessary."

Kaunda, by contrast, is the epitome of moderate, Western-oriented nationalism. His future, and the possibility of a racially relaxed Central Africa, depends upon the implementation of the new British proposals for Northern Rhodesia. Kaunda is Sir Roy's opposite in every way. He drinks not, smokes not, and forbids himself meat. Gandhi is his political mentor and nonviolence his unshakable creed. When Kaunda speaks, his eyes flash but his voice is mild; Sir Roy, for others a "vicious imperialist," is simply "misguided, unfair, and dishonest." Patient persuasion and a firm, perhaps foolish faith in Britain's good intentions has kept him ever hopeful that the quest for freedom in Northern Rhodesia would succeed. The son of a Presbyterian minister from Nyasaland, Kaunda has taught school and struggled for individual and collective self-respect since the beginnings of modern Northern Rhodesian nationalism in 1948. In 1959 he spent nine months in jail for preaching anti-colonialism. When he emerged in 1960 he found himself the unquestioned leader of Northern Rhodesia's nationalist movement. Whether any moderate can retain the leadership is an open question.

Last year he urged his supporters to accept the initial constitution as a decent stepping stone to independence. But in June, while visiting Accra, he learned, to his horror and shock, that London had doublecrossed him. For the rest of the summer he spent many of his days and nights lobbying in London, Delhi and Dar-es-Salaam or flying from capital to capital, always clutching a collection of old newspapers, his frayed trench coat, and a book by someone of Gandhian persuasion. He had a ready, warm smile for his friends and supporters, but there was a sad look behind the eyes. When fatigue and despair were at their worst—particularly during the disturbances which he had tried to prevent—he thought of returning permanently to his farm in the remote fastness of Bemba country. Had he done so, his younger, more militant colleagues would have gladly scrapped non-violence and proclaimed a racial war to the end.

*"One Man, One Vote"*

Such a war may still occur if Sir Roy, or his followers, try forcibly to prevent the emergence of indigenous rule in Northern Rhodesia. Where a

shared government in a multi-racial state was once possible, now only complete African rule in an “Africa for the Africans” is acceptable to those who are in the vanguard of the nationalist movement. If Kaunda stays—and his hand will be strengthened by a clear transfer of real power—“Africa for the Africans” will not mean segregation in reverse or discrimination against whites. It will, however, imply equal rights for all, providing Africans are recognized as sovereign. It will mean “one man, one vote”—that shibboleth of transplanted Jacksonian democracy—and a gradual transfer of control.

Kaunda is no fanatic and under him Northern Rhodesia would take its ordered time; he realizes that there is a shortage of trained African manpower (one lawyer, three doctors, perhaps five dozen university graduates) and that whites would have to be retained in government, particularly in the technical services, for a long time to come. Unlike others in his party, he talks little about nationalizing the mines and expropriating white-owned industry. He is a product of the best that the Church of Scotland could provide; he is Western in approach and inclination and firmly loyal to Britain and to the ideals she represents. All he really wants is the opportunity to implement them.

Only a Kaunda-Banda coalition can save the Federation. Even so, a viable federation would have to permit Joshua Nkomo, President of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, to lead Africans of Southern Rhodesia to self-government there. This may be a utopian vision, however, for the whites of Salisbury are probably incapable of countenancing equality and of trusting themselves to African rule. Yet there is really no other way. Southern Rhodesia could very likely hold out for another five or ten years; their jets could cow any African army. But in the long run jets will work no better on the banks of the Zambezi than they have in the hinterland of Algiers. A racial bloodbath would then be the Africans’ only answer to white settlement.

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### *Welensky’s Last Stand:*

### *The Multi-Racial Experiment in Central Africa Is Finished*

Zomba, Nyasaland—The white hand is losing its grip on British Central Africa. For nine years Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky and other leaders of the dominant United Federal Party (UFP) have, by occasional concessions, constant threats and military intervention, kept the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland intact. But Her Majesty’s Government, still the



ultimate authority, now insists upon a radical reconstitution of the Federation in accord with African demands. Arrangements for Nyasaland's independence outside the Federation will be made in November. In October Northern Rhodesia is expected to take its first step toward majority rule.

Welensky's party continues to claim that black nationalism is no substitute for a slow progression toward multi-racial rule in Central Africa, having due regard for the need to train a "backward" people to take their "place" in the modern world. Earlier this month, however, Welensky's only African official stunned Welensky's party by resigning his well-paid ministerial post and his membership. In cutting loose, Jaspas Savanhu, a thin, gentle man who had been Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Home Affairs since 1959, wrote Welensky: "I have finally reached the decision that your government, despite strong representation by the African party members and other quarters, has failed or has no intention of fully implementing the policy of partnership, and I feel it would serve no useful purpose for me to continue to be a member of your government." He explained that only nine Africans had ever been given clerical, administrative, or executive positions in the Federal Civil Service. "As matters stand today I feel that my presence among an all-white Civil Service is only tolerated and I feel lonely, a piece of window dressing and completely frustrated."

In 1953 Sir Winston Churchill's government agreed to tie the African protectorates of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to the self-governing white colony of Southern Rhodesia. It did so for economic reasons and in the belief that real "partnership" between black and white could be achieved honestly for the first time in Africa. British statesmen wanted to avoid both apartheid and the usurping of power by untrained black governments. But as the first Federal Prime Minister, Lord Malvern, candidly said, the partnership was one of "rider and horse." Now Savanhu has affirmed the denouement: the multi-racial experiment is "finished."

For Central Africa's 300,000 whites, most of whom live in Southern Rhodesia, the future is grim. The numerically unimportant tea planters of Nyasaland have already come to terms with Dr. Kamuzu Banda's ascendant Malawi Congress Party. The reforms which Dr. Banda promises will not prevent the peaceful development of a non-racial, African-directed society here. He wants white civil servants, managers, and capital to remain. And already, after only a year in office, the Malawi Party has impressed senior colonial officials and the people of Nyasaland with its capability and its careful planning for the future.

Northern Rhodesia's 70,000 whites are also resigning themselves to the prospects of African government. Although the UFP and other white parties



intend to contest the October election against Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party and Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress, their campaign has been listless. There has been no white rebellion, only a realization that it would be wise to accept local nationalism. Both Kaunda and Nkumbula will run a number of white candidates; both have assured white miners, civil servants and businessmen that they will be needed for a long time to come—but on African terms. Provided they choose to work loyally with and for Africans, there is no reason why whites in both protectorates should not retain their fairly comfortable economic and social positions for a decade or more.

Southern Rhodesia remains the white stronghold. Its leaders are prepared to remove some of the discriminatory pinpricks which have bulked so large in the past, they are prepared to accord a measure of parliamentary participation to Africans, but they are unwilling to grant the political equality to which men like Savanhu aspire. Since 1890, when the first pioneers came overland from South Africa, whites have claimed priority in Southern Rhodesia. They conquered the Ndebele and Shona peoples, achieved self-government in 1923 and built the impressively modern cities of Bulawayo and Salisbury. They carved out prosperous farms and built sprawling homes on the sub-tropical plateaus of Central Africa. Many know no other life; they have no homes in Britain and no interest in starting anew elsewhere. Their government is thus committed to repress any African attempts to subvert white authority, and it has a powerful army and air force with which to contain any open violence. Africans, equally determined, but far less well organized, look to Algeria and gird themselves for a showdown.

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*Onward to Independence:  
Dr. Banda Leads His People to the New Jerusalem*

When a plush new nightclub opened recently in Blantyre-Limbe, this country's commercial city, its highly touted strip-tease artists appeared on stage fully clothed, by the order of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). "Miss Eve Eden," said the official announcement, "was refused a license to strip on the grounds that her act would be repugnant to public morals." Simultaneously Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, Life President of the MCP, demanded that his photographs be removed from bars. He urged his many followers to drink not, and instead to labor faithfully in the service of the new Nyasaland.

Dr. Banda's government (his party controls the local Legislative Council and holds seven of ten seats in the Executive Council) is earnest, immense-

ly energetic, and undoubtedly Victorian. The banning of strippers and beer drinkers only symbolizes the tenor of a regime which intends to transform the British Protectorate of Nyasaland into what Dr. Banda, with some justice, calls "my Malawi." The *Ngwazi* ("conqueror"), as Dr. Banda is affectionately known, is determined to lead his people forward to the New Jerusalem. His message, and his appeal, is fiercely evangelical and, like the 19th century gospels, his vision is apocalyptic.

The Advent for which his people have prayed and fought is fortunately at hand. Dr. Banda, who returned to Nyasaland in 1958 after a long absence, led them in sometimes violent opposition to the hated federal government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and to the British local government.

Released from prison in 1960, Dr. Banda "turned Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod into a Christian gentleman" and then negotiated a new constitution favorable to African aspirations in Nyasaland. Last year he led the MCP to an overwhelming victory in the country's first direct elections (98 percent of those eligible voted). The opposition United Federal Party won a few European seats and candidates for another African party lost their deposits. The MCP immediately assumed control of Nyasaland's destiny under a transitional arrangement whereby it became the party "responsible" for the Protectorate's government while the Colonial Office, through its governor and his secretariat, retained substantive power. In the past year, as the MCP has proven its ability, the governor has progressively exercised less and less control over day to day affairs. The *Ngwazi*, having given his people a measure of freedom that they had long sought, personally made most of the important decisions of state.

Next year Dr. Banda will almost certainly lead his people out of Egypt into Israel. In November, after visiting Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa, he and his MCP colleagues will meet R. A. Butler, the Secretary of State for Central Africa, in London. They will demand immediate self-government, followed by independence outside the Federation. There is little doubt that these proposals will be greeted hospitably in Whitehall. Both sides will haggle over the economics of secession (the federal government, according to various estimates, injects 1.5 million pounds to 6 million pounds a year into the Nyasaland economy). Britain may well demand some political concessions as the price of its continued financial support. And the final agreement may delay the protectorate's day of independence—when "Nyasaland" becomes "Malawi"—until late next year. But the standard preparatory period of "self-government," on the Tanganyika and Uganda models, will probably begin in January. Dr. Banda will become chief minister and the present chief secretary will become a deputy governor. All the cabinet positions will be filled by MCP nominees. Then, perhaps in August,

the Central African Federation will lose its poorest member and Dr. Banda will have the heady satisfaction of having won independence.

Is Nyasaland ready for the responsibilities of sovereignty? During the past year the MCP has surprised British colonial officials and others concerned with the future of the Protectorate. Dr. Banda has gathered an energetic and dedicated team to assist him. Although not all of his colleagues prefer orange crush to beer and whisky, they are all accustomed to the 16-hour working day. While following the Ngwazi loyally, none is a sycophant, and all have been learning the intricate secrets of their ministries while seeking new ways in which to develop Nyasaland into a country capable of sustaining itself without permanent outside assistance.

John Msonthi, the Minister of Trade and Industry, taught at a Roman Catholic secondary school before and after his university days in Delhi. Willie Chokani, the Minister of Labor, taught in a Presbyterian secondary school before and after he, too, studied at Delhi on an Indian government scholarship. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Augustine W. Bwanausi, comes from a Yao family which has been in contact with Presbyterian missionaries for three generations. An outstanding mathematician and physicist who wanted to become a rocket scientist, Bwanausi won the top academic prizes at Makerere College, Uganda, and studied at the University of Bristol before returning home to teach secondary school. His brother, Dr. Harry Bwanausi, will probably be Nyasaland's first African medical director.

The actions of W. Kanyama Chiume, the Minister of Education and Social Welfare, have produced the most controversy, but he is also qualified and hard-working. Another Malawi supporter, the Scottish-trained lawyer Colin Cameron, is Minister of Works and Transport. Dr. Banda holds the portfolios of Land, Natural Resources, and Local Government. Orton Chirwa, at 43 the oldest of Dr. Banda's ministerial colleagues, has been Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Justice and is expected to become Minister of Justice in January. He was called to the bar in London, and practiced extensively in Nyasaland before entering politics. Unhappily, Dudunzu Chisiza, a brilliant theoretician who was being groomed as Minister of Finance, was killed in an automobile accident in September. His replacement is not yet announced.

If the top echelon is impressive, the second rank is even more exceptional. Few of the new nations of eastern Africa can boast such a wealth of persons capable of running a developing country. Wherever one travels in Nyasaland, one meets district councilors and party leaders who appear to be as keen and effective as those here in Zomba, the capital. The local officials—along the remote shores of Lake Nyasa as well as in the fertile cen-

tral granary—are busy mobilizing the rural masses for the “big push” that Dr. Banda has demanded. He, too, asked for sacrifice and plenty of hard work, and in the villages his supporters are rallying the people of Malawi. Taxes have been raised above previous limits. The traditional court system has been streamlined. Colonial administrative functions have been transferred from the British district commissioners to the African district councils. Yet, despite rapid Africanization Dr. Banda still needs European administrators and technical officers and desperately wants them to stay. Racial tension is absent in Nyasaland and, if the next year is as happy as the last, the Ngwazi’s Malawi should have little difficulty inspiring the Western world with confidence in its ability to govern itself and to overcome its economic handicaps.

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### *Inconclusive Election in Northern Rhodesia*

Lusaka, N.R.—The results of Northern Rhodesia’s October general election demonstrate the failure of a multi-racial approach to the political problems of the settler frontier.

Early last year, the British Colonial Office designed a complex constitution which granted “responsible” government to Northern Rhodesia, while at the same time purporting to ensure the emergence of a strong center bloc of white and black “moderates” between the aggressive extremes of white and black nationalism. Instead, the middle group—Sir John Moffat’s Liberal Party—was crushed between the opposing nationalist juggernauts.

Whites voted almost to the last man for Sir Roy Welensky’s United Federal Party (UFP). Africans, in turn, showed their preference for Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP). UNIP won 64,000 of 106,000 votes cast, including at least 80 percent of the African total.

Kaunda, ever an optimist, had persuaded himself that whites would be sufficiently realistic to vote in reasonable numbers with UNIP and for a government in which they could participate together with Africans. He loyally and energetically attempted to bring white and black together and thereby to make a difficult constitution work. During the weeks before the election, the UNIP president literally drove himself to exhaustion; he was on the road every day, giving speeches, exhorting his followers to work harder, preparing press releases, meeting visiting journalists, and then, in the small hours of the night, planning UNIP electoral strategy. In the process, he covered at

least 35,000 miles by car, primarily to address European audiences. He visited his own rural constituency only once.

Before such afternoon and evening gatherings, and on television and radio, he tried patiently to eliminate white fears and to explain candidly that he could only promise a peaceful and secure future to Northern Rhodesia's 72,000 whites if he received their support now. Despite the skepticism of some of his lieutenants, he wooed white voters assiduously. Although personally abstemious, Kaunda invited civil servants and mine workers to cocktail parties and answered their most anxious questions without embarrassment. UNIP's candidates were well chosen and included a number of prominent whites, including Lt. Col. Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, a veteran settler and former legislator; two Methodist ministers, Colin Morris and Mervyn Temple; and Eric Kreft, a Lusaka surgeon. But, in the end, whites, civil servants and farmers alike, voted overwhelmingly for the UFP.

Kaunda, intensely disillusioned by such racial solidarity, has since discarded his neat blue suit for a flamboyant mauve and black toga. He is worried, and for the moment unsure of the role which UNIP should seek to play in the immediate future. He faces a number of political realities from which he personally shrinks, but from which the party executive council, and his followers, may not.

### *The UNIP Campaign*

UNIP conducted an honest, somewhat poorly-organized, and at times naive campaign. Unlike the UFP and the wealthy African National Congress (which was supported financially by some large industrial concerns and the Katanga government), UNIP was and is desperately short of funds. It was further handicapped by a hostile press and by an electoral alliance between the UFP and the essentially tribal ANC, led by Harry Nkumbula.

In addition, the UFP waged an excessively dirty campaign, designed to frighten whites away from cooperation with African nationalism. Its posters were calculated: "Don't Burn, Build with UFP." It tarred UNIP with a slanderous brush and circulated libelous pamphlets, calling Kaunda's followers thugs and murderers.

Federal Prime Minister Welensky played on white fears in daily speeches before urban white audiences; he warned them that a vote for UNIP was a vote for Communism, for creeping pan-Africanism, for hooliganism, and, indeed, for everything "decent people" would think reprehensible. He promised that their futures would be safeguarded by the judicious deployment of the federal army and air force.

Northern Rhodesia's major newspaper, of which Welensky is part-owner, echoed these sentiments; during the last two weeks before the election, it headlined every act of African violence, however remote from politics, and gave Kaunda's speeches fractional coverage (those made by Welensky or UFP candidates received bold headlines and favorable comment). On election morning, *The Northern News*, the country's only daily, screamed: "KENYA COUPLE SLAIN BY MACHINE-GUN FIRE." The story was about a murder on Sardinia, but the headline may have influenced those who failed to read below. To frustrate UNIP further, the federal government, perhaps fortuitously, prevented posters printed for UNIP in Dar-es-Salaam from entering Northern Rhodesia.

The Liberal Party, caught in the middle, urged the electorate to "be sensible" and to "bridge the gap." Moffat spoke earnestly and reasonably. His party machine ground away efficiently and his hand-picked candidates canvassed diligently. Nevertheless, together they received only five percent of the votes cast. Nearly all their aspirants, including three ministers in the outgoing government (Moffat, Alfred Gondwe, and Harry Franklin), lost their deposits ignominiously. Later, after the dust of their defeats had settled, they liquidated the Liberal Party and, too late, urged their supporters to back UNIP.

### *Complex Voting Rules*

The electoral regulations were ingeniously constructed. Whites, Asians, and some Africans, depending upon their literacy and income qualifications, voted for 15 upper roll representatives in single-member constituencies. The others, if they earned at least £120 (\$336) a year and could complete the registration application unaided, chose 15 lower roll members, again in single-member constituencies. More than 34,000 persons were registered on the upper and 92,000 on the lower roll. (In 1959, for the last election, the respective figures were 23,000 and 6,000.) Both groups, voting together on the "national" roll, selected 14 more representatives in seven double-member constituencies. In four of these, they were required to vote for one African and one European. In addition, successful candidates were obliged to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes of each race and at least 20 percent of one. Asians voted separately for the fifteenth "national" member.

In the October 30 balloting, 87 percent of the eligible Africans and 90 percent of the eligible Europeans dipped their left thumbs in red ink, to prevent double voting, and then marked the appropriate papers. In the process, they spoiled or forfeited about 25,000 ballots by failing to follow the complicated

instructions. Otherwise, the election—on which the Northern Rhodesia Government has spent about £50,000—went smoothly.

### *Counting the Votes*

The UFP won all of the urban, and the two urban-rural, upper roll seats easily (one remains to be contested in December), with UNIP or UNIP-backed independents a distant second (by virtue of African votes) in nearly every case. In the two rural upper roll areas, UNIP did well, winning one and losing the other by 97 votes when Asian sympathizers defected.

On the lower roll, UNIP piled up impressive majorities, particularly on the Copperbelt and in the Northern Province, and won 12 seats. In the three most important urban lower roll contests, UNIP's strength was apparent: Sikota Wina, John Chisata, and Alexander Grey Zulu received a total of 31,000 votes, while their opponents together obtained only 2,900. The ANC was victorious in the three lower roll constituencies where Citonga, Nkumbula's vernacular and one of Northern Rhodesia's six major languages, is spoken.

On the national roll, the ANC was able to deliver 10 percent of the African vote to the UFP in two constituencies (covering roughly the same region as their lower roll successes) and the UFP returned the favor in those identical constituencies. As a result, each obtained two additional seats. The results in the other five national contests were inconclusive. UNIP candidates received impressive African majorities, but were unable to obtain more than four or five percent of the white vote. The UPP, in coalition with the ANC, received white support without being able to attract sufficient African votes. By-elections in these constituencies are scheduled for December 10, but the October results may well be repeated. If so, the seats stay vacant—thereby demonstrating the futility of legislating political multi-racialism in Central Africa.

### *Popular Vote Favors UNIP*

The UFP, which will probably win the remaining upper roll seat in December, emerged after the election with 15 places in Northern Rhodesia's new Legislative Council. UNIP, which won the special Asian seat in addition to those on the upper and lower rolls, had 14 members, and the ANC five. Yet UNIP, with its 64,000 votes, is clearly the majority party. The ANC obtained only 17,000 votes, mostly in the Citonga areas. On the lower roll, the UFP polled a total of 180 and the Liberal Party only 83. The Barotse National Party, supported by the UPP in the Barotseland East and West lower roll constituencies, and pledged to preserve the prerogatives of the



Lozi ruling class, received 134 votes as UNIP candidates piled up large majorities. On the upper roll, 21,500 persons favored the UFP, 4,500 backed UNIP, 1,500 supported the Liberals, and 1,000 voted for the ANC. A racial split was evident.

### *What Kind of Legislature?*

The new legislators comprise a cross-section of Rhodesian society. Of the UFP members, four work on the copper mines, three are university graduates (including two lawyers), three are farmers, two are businessmen, and one supervises an African township. Of the two UPP Africans, one was employed in the personnel department of a copper mine and the other is a medical assistant.

Nkumbula, the ANC president, received education diplomas from Makerere College and the London University Institute of Education. The ANC's Edward Mungoni Liso lists his profession as "politician," and Francis Chembe received a diploma in social work. Charles Cousins, the outgoing Minister of Labor and Mines, was another successful ANC candidate.

Among the UNIP representatives are five university graduates (four of whom hold advanced degrees), seven teachers, three businessmen, the president of the powerful African Mineworkers Union, a journalist, and a counselor of the Luvala Native Authority. If UNIP eventually forms a government, Kaunda can assemble an impressive cabinet from among his fellow legislators: Elijah Mudenda, a graduate of the University of Cambridge in agricultural science, is a prospective Minister of Agriculture. Mubiana Nalilungwe, who trained at Delhi and Bombay Universities, is the party's economic expert. John Mwanakatwe, Northern Rhodesia's first African university graduate and an experienced headmaster, would be a likely Minister of Education. Arthur Wina, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of California in Los Angeles, is, like his younger brother Sikota, slated for important responsibilities. Simon Kapwepwe, who also was educated in India, is Kaunda's life-long friend and will be placed in a position of trust. So, in time, will be Nalumino Mundia, the American- and Indian-educated director of elections. All, except for Kapwepwe, are under 40.

Governor Sir Evelyn Hone has refused to invite any of the parties to form a government (with nominated officials) until after the results of the December by-elections are known. Even then, it is unlikely that a stable coalition can be created. The role of the ANC is crucial.

UNIP has attempted to persuade an ailing Nkumbula, with whom Kaunda broke in 1958, to forget the animosities of the past and join together in a temporary parliamentary alliance to avoid the type of inter-party strife that



has been so ruinous in Kenya. The UFP, on the other hand, sees an arrangement with Nkumbula as the only way in which it can continue white minority rule and perpetuate the existence of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Welensky party has promised to help Nkumbula, now 46, to destroy UNIP's hold upon the African masses and to return him to the limelight which he enjoyed before 1959.

Kenneth Kaunda hopes to avoid the internecine bitterness a UFP-ANC alliance would entail. But if Nkumbula and his supporters refuse to join hands with UNIP, Kaunda—like Milton Obote last year in Uganda—will lead his followers into opposition and thereafter agitate constructively for self-government.

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### *Malawi 1963*

Shiwa Ngandu, N.R.—The achievement of self-government in Nyasaland marks both the end of 71 years of colonial rule and beginning of what could be a remarkable exercise in economic, political, and social development.

For more than a year—since the battle for home rule appeared to have been won—the monolithic Malawi Congress Party has turned its attentions to urgently needed rural and urban reconstruction. The enthusiasm of the architects has been infectious; even the remote, long-neglected villagers of the Northern Province have become actively involved in building a new Nyasaland. At the same time, now that whites no longer rule, the problems of racial conflict have been pushed aside.

Thus Nyasaland, in contrast to some of its neighbors, is currently placing first priority on instilling the vigor of self-respect into the minds of a people long accustomed to alien government and, if possible, transforming a country long-dependent upon outside assistance for recurrent expenditures into one capable of standing alone.

#### *Nationalism's Early Stages*

Although the Nyasaland African Congress was organized by James Sangala, a government clerk, in 1943, the modern phase of the struggle for independence began in 1955–56, when the youthful Dunduzu Chisiza, Masauko Chipembere, and Kanyama Chiume returned home respectively from Uganda and Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Tanganyika. Chiume and Chipembere were elected easily to the Legislative Council in 1956.

Meanwhile, the “Young Turks” of the party were able to persuade their colleagues to elect a Congress president more responsive to their own concepts of African nationalism. The campaign against the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which had been imposed in 1953, was intensified, and Congress tried its best to obtain the removal of Nyasaland’s representatives from the federal parliament. Throughout the length of their elongated country, the new leaders of Congress organized branches and overhauled the party’s administrative and financial system.

They also continued to keep in touch with Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, then practicing medicine in the Gold Coast. Dr. Banda had supported Congress financially, and had guided it from afar, since its earliest days. When he was at last persuaded to come home, the people of Nyasaland were hopeful that he could lead them across the colonial desert to the sweet waters of political freedom.

Dr. Banda’s triumphal return in July 1958, after an absence of about 43 years, gave fresh impetus to the campaign for self-government. With Chisiza, who had been recalled from his studies at Fircroft College, Birmingham, and Dunduzu’s elder brother, Yatuta, who had resigned a commission in the Tanganyika police, Dr. Banda revitalized Congress. Funds were raised, branch members were integrated more completely into the party apparatus, and plans were made for the various stages of political advance.

By the end of 1958, Congress commanded overwhelming African support. Political disturbances throughout the Protectorate resulted, on March 3, 1959, in the banning of the party and the arrest of its leaders. The police also detained a majority of those Africans who had been educated and who had attained professional positions of responsibility. They were sent to prison in Southern Rhodesia, together with many of the senior party officials.

In prison the school teachers fraternized with the politicians; they organized themselves and successfully protested against prison conditions. Those who were university graduates formed a “school” and tutored their less well-educated colleagues in English literature, mathematics, Latin, economics, and science. By 1960, when the teachers and their pupils emerged from detention, they were ready to govern their country.

### *Malawi Congress is Born*

Meanwhile, in late 1959, a small group in Blantyre helped Orton Chirwa, Nyasaland’s first African lawyer, and Aleke Banda, a school-boy journalist who had been deported to Nyasaland from Southern Rhodesia, to form the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) as the banned Congress’ successor. Young Banda, no relation to Dr. Banda, edited a party broadsheet and, with other

members of the MCP, reorganized branches during a period of heightened tension. This was the transitional stage.

As the leaders of the old Congress and their fellow prison graduates were slowly released, the campaign against British rule increased in intensity. Dr. Banda was allowed to leave Gwelo prison in April 1960 and thereafter the MCP gathered to itself the overwhelming support of the people of Nyasaland. Their backing was demonstrated in August 1961, when the MCP polled more than 90 percent of the votes and won all of the 20 lower roll seats and two of eight upper roll places.

### *“Responsible” Government*

An era of “responsible” government was ushered in, with the MCP obtaining five, and eventually seven, of the 10 available Executive Council positions. In official circles, it was generally expected that the MCP ministers would now sit back and enjoy the spoils of office—a large house on the side of Zomba mountain, a shining black limousine, an annual salary of £3,000—and would gladly permit the white permanent secretaries to run the various ministries in the traditional manner. Immediately, however, Dr. Banda and his colleagues made known their will to govern. They proceeded to reform the existing administrative machinery and to plan seriously for the future. Before the new ministers had been in office many months, their industry and ability to learn was legendary. They quickly impressed civil servants and outside observers; existing standards of efficiency were maintained and rural villagers began to experience directly the benefits which a local rule could confer.

By the beginning of 1962, Dr. Banda, the Minister of Land, Natural Resources, and Local Government, had emerged as the de facto prime minister. Sir Glyn Jones, Nyasaland’s Welsh governor, permitted the MCP leader to initiate and to execute any reasonable policies. Decisions of national importance were made by him; his junior ministers and parliamentary secretaries conferred with him daily. At the same time, each of the ministers placed an individual stamp upon the department for which he was responsible.

Chiume, Minister of Education and Social Development, ordered the rapid expansion of the long-neglected system of secondary education to provide for a ten-fold increase in enrollments. The gifted Dunduzu Chisiza, whose death in September was indescribably tragic, prepared an ambitious five-year development plan and organized a successful international economic symposium in July. He would have been the architect of Nyasaland’s

“operation bootstrap.” Chirwa, the parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Justice, reconstituted the Native Court system to provide for more progressive leadership. Augustine W. Bwanausi—a physicist, one of the prison schoolmasters, and later Minister of Internal Affairs—has given the expanded municipalities new powers and responsibilities. John Msonthi, educated at Delhi University and the Minister of Trade and Industry, has already interested European and Asian governments and commercial firms in Nyasaland’s potential for growth. He is also trying to create a tourist industry by opening up certain of the country’s more inaccessible regions of interest. Willie Chokani, the Minister of Labor and another Delhi graduate, has instituted new wages and hours legislation and has warned the local trade unions that they must not interfere unduly with attempts to develop Nyasaland rapidly.

Meanwhile, Dr. Banda has ended the somewhat feudal system of agricultural tenancy and has reformed the existing produce-marketing arrangements. As Minister of Local Government, he has deprived many chiefs of their traditional powers and has instead introduced popularly elected district councils with wide parochial authority. They have been very active recently, and their chairmen seem generally able and effective, as agents of the central government, in dealing with often-difficult rural problems.

### *Gearing for Self-Government*

At the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference held in London in November, it was agreed that Nyasaland should become fully self-governing in January and that Dr. Banda will then become Prime Minister in law as well as in fact. On December 19, the British Government announced acceptance “in principle” that Nyasaland will be allowed to secede from the Federation. During the period of self-government, the cabinet, with a year of executive experience, can be expected to continue to lead energetically from the top, and its directives will be translated into action at the various levels by a capable cadre of loyal officials. Independence is now only a matter of time—probably a rather short time.

Nyasaland, fortunately, has a range of talented personnel; others are now coming home from training abroad and the government has started a public administration training center on Nigerian lines. A special local course for prospective lawyers will prepare its most successful students for study of law in England. Three African doctors already practice in Nyasaland and several others are now completing their training outside the country. Chiume has found places abroad (in the United States, Great Britain, Ghana, and

East Africa) for numerous university students, including those withdrawn from the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Salisbury), which is boycotted by the MCP because of its federal affiliations. And, if Dr. Banda has his way, a University of Malawi will be built at Livingstonia, a remote mission station where the United Free Church of Scotland established the most significant of central Africa's early educational institutions.

### *Racism Discouraged*

Despite these various training schemes and Africanization of various key positions, the Government of Nyasaland expects to rely upon white administrative and technical expertise for some time to come—and sees the necessity of paying expatriate allowances to foreign civil servants to keep them there. Dr. Banda hopes that he will be able to retain the services of most of those now employed by his government, although he intends to dismantle the existing provincial and district administration and has made it clear that he does not want whites who will obstruct the future Malawi government. By the same token, Dr. Banda has warned African civil servants that promotion will be on merit, and that they must not clamor greedily for white jobs if they are incapable of performing the necessary tasks. In the agricultural field, Africans will be encouraged to grow tea on a cooperative basis on new land; however, the management of existing estates, most of which are owned by British firms, will probably remain unaffected since the bulk of the country's export earnings come from tea.

Thus, unless Dr. Banda's hold upon Malawi should weaken—which seems unlikely—those whites who choose to remain in Nyasaland should continue to enjoy life essentially in the manner to which they have become accustomed. Nyasas are surprisingly free from xenophobia.

### *The Economic Burden*

With independence will come Nyasaland's most serious problem: How is the MCP to transform what Lord Home once called an "imperial slum" into a prosperous member of the United Nations? Recurrent expenditures have always been met from outside sources—in the first instance from Her Majesty's exchequer, latterly from Northern Rhodesia's copper revenues channeled through the federal apparatus. The annual deficit is variously estimated at \$1,500,000 to \$26,000,000. Great Britain may reassume this responsibility on a temporary basis, taxes can be raised (as they have been), and certain expenditures, notably official salaries and overhead, could be reduced, but the long-term problem will still remain. Moreover, Nyasaland cannot afford to stand still.

Dunduzu Chisiza recognized the nature of these and other problems and had ambitious developmental plans for which he had devised novel ways of attracting financial support. Whoever replaces him and becomes Minister of Finance will find that he must be continually ingenious if he is to implement Mr. Chisiza's plans. West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States all expect to help, but the ultimate solution—unless economically extractable minerals are found—may be some new form of association with one or more of Nyasaland's neighbors.

In the meantime, the United States Government is sending Peace Corps teachers, constructing a \$1,000,000 technical institute, providing money for a higher education survey, and has expressed an interest in Nyasaland's transport problems. An Italian consortium is interested in motels, the Danish Government will assist with the development of cooperatives, and a UNESCO team is investigating tourism.

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### *The Malawi News*

"The Voice of Malawi," the weekly *Malawi News*, is one of the most successful and readable political periodicals in tropical Africa. It is the official organ of Nyasaland's all-powerful Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and is, as the masthead proclaims, "The Only Newspaper in East, Central and Southern Africa Owned, Printed and Published by Africans themselves at a Press that is Owned and Managed by Africans themselves."

In the dark, colonial days before the MCP began to govern Nyasaland in 1961, the *Malawi News*—then a modest, mimeographed news sheet—helped to enlist mass support and to ensure Dr. Banda's unquestioned seniority in the party. Now that Nyasaland is about to become independent, and the line of command is firmly established, the newspaper occupies an even more important role. Because its columns reflect changes in official thinking, it serves as a palatable, yet authoritative, guide to what is politically proper. Provincial and regional branch leaders read it avidly and are quick to adjust local policies and programs to its guidelines. Thus does the *Malawi News* assist Dr. Banda's attempt to mobilize his people for the task of transforming a deficit-ridden dependency into a viable nation. It is noteworthy that Dr. Banda personally owns the newspaper.

The format, news presentation, and editorial page of the *Malawi News* are all keyed to Dr. Banda's and the MCP's purposes. A recent banner headline on page one carefully underscored a speech by the Prime Minister on the

need to increase agricultural production: "I WANT MY PEOPLE TO HAVE ENOUGH FOOD AND BE HAPPY." In the same issue, a letter from him informing locally-based (mainly African) civil servants that "the primary criterion of promotion is merit" was displayed prominently. A third article, on the trip of two members of the cabinet to the United States, was headed: "Kamuzu Runs Four Ministries."

Every issue of the *Malawi News* has a photograph of Dr. Banda in the upper center part of its front page. Only very occasionally are pictures of other local leaders included, although Jomo Kenyatta, Haile Selassie I, and Kwame Nkrumah are welcome when they grace the front pages arm-in-arm with Dr. Banda. Until recently, every mention of Dr. Banda in the weekly was accompanied by a long, sycophantic introduction. A common formula was: "*Ngwazi* (The Conqueror) Dr. Kamuzu Banda, Prime Minister of Malawi, Life President of the mighty Malawi Congress Party and Founder of the Malawi Nation, said . . ." But, in Nyasaland's case, such devices serve political, not personal ends. The motive is not so much vanity as unity; Dr. Banda is convinced that the best means of forestalling factional fighting and ensuring dedication to immediate national ends is by buttressing his autocratic position within the MCP.

The editorial page of the *Malawi News* is often a testing ground for trial balloons. Its long, polemical "leaders," which often air views too radical for expression in the Legislative Council or in official speeches by members of the government, were until recently written by 24-year-old Aleke Banda, the founder-editor of the *News* (he is no relation to the Minister). Recently, under the headline "MIND YOUR OWN BUSINESS," an editorial writer made it clear that it was the patriotic duty of the people of Nyasaland to give way on the road whenever they saw the Prime Minister's car. This formula subsequently became official policy. In a similar vein, editorials criticizing the political views of a white school master and an African doctor have preceded official punitive action. Under the headline, "We Mean to be Rulers in Malawi," the paper reported: "There is one African doctor . . . who suffers from a stupid inferiority complex which makes her look down on our people there and say rude remarks against our leader and about our secession from Welensky's Federation. This woman . . . has no business to be here if she has the type of mentality she is showing in Lilongwe. . . . We will not brook nonsense from anyone in this country . . . she knows why we are telling her to go." With ground thus prepared, both the doctor and the headmaster were shortly removed.

The *Malawi News* also warns, exhorts, informs, and instructs the people of Nyasaland on day-to-day responsibilities. In its columns, citizens of

Malawi learn when they must turn out in large numbers for celebrations, elections, and civic functions of all kinds. An editorial, headed, "WE MUST REGISTER IN THOUSANDS," spoke about the struggle for self-government and then concluded as follows: "We must organize ourselves and consolidate our unity in order to win the elections and to have a good representation on the Municipal Council. Let us flock to the registration offices in thousands. . . . FORWARD TO THE TOWN COUNCILS NOW!" Another recent "leader" urged better methods of agriculture: "We must prove to the World and all settlers here . . . that Malawi is not a poor country, but only neglected, as our Leader [Dr. Banda] has always said. And now that we have got the Freedom that we wanted, we have to prepare ourselves for the task of developing our country. This can only be done by adoption of improved methods of agriculture."

Similarly, an editorial, headed "CIVIL SERVANTS MUST HAVE GOOD MANNERS," said just that, and ended with a recurrent refrain: "We want to have here a model state. People in other countries must envy what we are doing here and copy our way of doing things." African receptionists and clerks were warned to be more civil toward the public. Nurses were instructed to make the sick happy in addition to healing them: "Nurses are not there to boss the people."

Recent editorials, for reasons that are not explicit, have cautioned Africans to be wary of Europeans in their midst: "Our warning to the people of Malawi is that now that we are free and are going to be independent soon we must watch every white man because this is the time when the white men, if not watched, can be dangerous. Our advice is 'sup with the white man with a long spoon.'"

Europeans, particularly those who are active in the government, read the *Malawi News* as thoroughly as Africans. From no other source can they obtain detailed information about happenings in Nyasaland or a full appreciation of the policies of the new administration. Much of the advertising, despite the recent establishment of an official Department of Information vernacular newspaper, is also inserted by European-owned firms.

But the *Malawi News* is not all polemics. It justifies its circulation of 10,000 copies—very large for Central Africa, where the twice weekly, European-owned *Nyasaland Times* only sells about 2,000 copies—by comprehensive sports coverage and a reasonably full account of other non-political news in the villages of the country. Its price was recently reduced from 6d (7 cents) to 3d (2 1/2 cents) an issue. Four of the 12 pages (seven columns wide, 24 inches deep) include articles in Cinyanja, while the remainder of the paper is in English. One entire page is reserved for letters



from readers, and the advertising content, including almost a page of classifieds, is heavy.

Technically, the *Malawi News* is a somewhat haphazard affair; italic characters, for example, tend to appear inexplicably in a line of otherwise Roman typeface. The newspaper's two ancient linotype machines share a small building in Limbe with an obstinate flat-bed press and a bookshop, all of which are owned by the Malawi Press Ltd. Soon the paper will have its own photo-engraving machine, and thus will be able to process photographs that now must be sent by air to Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. Three African linotype operators, 14 compositors, and four reporters are the paper's professional staff.

Both substance and production have, until recently, been closely supervised by Editor Aleke Banda. Although his parents lived near Nkata Bay on the Nyasa, Aleke grew up in Southern Rhodesia. He was a 19-year-old student in a Southern Rhodesian secondary school operated by the London Missionary Society when the political situation in Central Africa came to a head in 1959. At that time, he had never been in Nyasaland. Arrested by the police for his active role in student politics, Aleke was sent to prison (without trial) for several months, during which time he met a number of jailed Nyasas.

Upon his release, the Southern Rhodesian authorities deported him in May 1959. He arrived in the homeland of his forebears at a time when the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) had been banned, relations between white and black had reached their nadir, and African political fortunes were decidedly unpromising. But the African Trade Union Congress (TUC) had been allowed to continue in existence, and Mr. Banda was soon active again in nationalist politics. Despite the absence of any journalistic experience, he single-handedly founded and edited a mimeographed TUC newspaper that helped to revitalize the sagging spirits of Nyasa nationalism. In September 1959, three months after launching the TUC newspaper, he joined forces with Orton Chirwa and a number of influential Africans to organize the MCP. He became secretary of the party at its founding and, in December 1959, published the first issue of the *Malawi News* with the specific objective of popularizing the new party's program throughout Nyasaland.

By the time the leaders of the banned Nyasaland African Congress were finally released from prison in 1960, the MCP was a going concern and both Aleke Banda and his *Malawi News* were potent political factors. Young Banda became one of Dr. Banda's trusted assistants and soon assumed numerous new formal and informal positions of responsibility.

Recently, he handed over the active editorship of the *Malawi News*—at least temporarily—to Crispin Chindongo, and left Nyasaland for an intensive study of radio broadcasting in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. When he returned to Nyasaland in November, he took over the directorship of the new Radio Malawi (see “‘Malawi Radio’ Inaugurated,” *Africa Report*, October 1963, p. 26). Meanwhile, he will continue to serve as secretary-general of the MCP, director of the Malawi Press Ltd., private secretary to Dr. Banda, and editor-in-chief of the *Malawi News*.

## *From Settler Rhodesia to African Zimbabwe*

With Britain's decision to grant Malawi independence after three years of "responsible" and then "self-"government in mid-1964, and, a few months later, to give the same future to Zambia, the Federation was effectively dissolved. But the demise of the Federation left whites in power in Rhodesia. Much more numerous in Rhodesia than in Zambia and Malawi, they had put down roots there beginning in the 1890s, tens of thousands as recently as the 1950s. They had forcibly occupied the country, pushed Africans off the best soils, introduced segregation, and then carved out prosperous farms and built sprawling homes on the sub-tropical plateaus of the country that they called home. Many knew no other lives. Their government, I wrote, was "committed to repress any African attempts to subvert white authority." It had a powerful army and air force. Africans were equally determined, but were far less organized. They had come late to the nationalism of modern Africa. They looked to Algeria, where French colonials were then under siege, and prepared for a showdown.

That showdown soon came. Partially because the African nationalist leadership of Joshua Nkomo was so ineffectual—I suggested that Robert Gabriel Mugabe, able, ascetic, and courageous, could succeed him ("From Moderate to Militant," *Africa Report*, March 1962). Mugabe and his militant colleagues were largely detained or jailed for a decade from 1964, making it easier for whites to withstand the tides of indigenous home rule that had crested in Zambia and Malawi. Indeed, Britain, the nominal colonial overlord, favored the sharing of power with blacks in Rhodesia. Fearing increased external pressure to thus accommodate black aspirations, in 1965 a new local administration under Prime Minister Ian Smith defied the mother country and unilaterally declared independence.

This was an alarming turn in the wheel of post-colonial fortune. Some critics wanted Britain forcibly to put down this revolt. Others believed incorrectly that blockades of fuel delivery at the Indian Ocean coast (Rhodesia was landlocked, but could count on South African and Portuguese colonial assistance) and refusals to purchase Rhodesian minerals and tobacco would quickly bring the settlers to their knees and their senses.

They never came to their senses. Nor did sanctions have any salutary effects other than punishment and the encouragement of an autarkic self-reliance. Africans abandoned peaceful protest inside the country and took to the bush to create two vigorous guerilla movements with Chinese and Soviet assistance. One was the Shona-dominated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the other the Ndebele-led Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). The former was Chinese backed, the latter Soviet supported.

As these insurgents were mobilizing with increasing potency during the early 1970s, Britain was also pursuing a series of multi-pronged diplomatic efforts to negotiate an end to the Rhodesian separation. Smith's 230,000 whites desired decades of autonomy and a gently graduated—almost interminable—forty-year period of minority rule that would eventually incorporate the majority. But for 5 million Africans, anything other than near-term African parity, leading to full black rule, was intolerable. When Britain and Rhodesia negotiated a proposed new constitution in 1971, its heavily graduated transition hewed closely to the white position. It would also have legitimized the usurpation of authority of 1965.

The arrangement seemed a sellout, but, to appease opponents in Britain, the proposed constitutional changes provided for an elaborate canvassing of the opinions of the territory's African population. It was evident from listening to those sessions in Rhodesia in late 1971 and early 1972 that Africans were wildly opposed to the new proposals, and that the British commissioners hearing protests could hardly ratify the new constitution. The result of the exercise would be twofold: a continuing stalemate in the battle between colony and mother country and, thanks to the opinion-soliciting exercise, the widespread politicization of the mass of Africans throughout the breadth of Rhodesia. ("Great Britain Hasn't Solved the Rhodesia Problem Just Yet," *Newsday*, 29 March 1972.)

The war between whites and guerillas warmed up, too, and soon threatened to embroil both banks of the Zambezi River and Mozambique. By early 1973, to the consternation of isolated white commercial families in the distant Centenary and Mt. Darwin districts, guerilla bands began killing and wounding whites. As during Kenya's Mau Mau episode, these early raids

testified to the vulnerability of widespread farms far from urban centers. The heartland of the colony—the white-dominated cities and towns—was “in no way threatened,” although it was soon to become tense and well fortified. What particularly worried white defenders was the fact that the several African guerilla groups had finally created a Joint Military Command, coordinated their attacks, and joined hands with the well-organized and experienced insurgent forces of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the army that was waging war against that Portuguese colony.

Smith’s followers could no longer grow crops or dig minerals in peace and think that the African problem had been solved, or at least deferred. The newly trained fighters belonging to ZANU and ZAPU were tougher and better armed than the whites had expected them to be. They had training camps in Zambia and farther afield. Indeed, because Zimbabwe had shut its borders to traffic from Zambia, and Zambia, newly embarked on a trajectory of single-party rule, had retaliated by closing its side of the divide, the danger of a widespread war throughout the region was hardly far-fetched. Indeed, FRELIMO soldiers had only recently consolidated their control over the countryside in the northern half of Mozambique and had established beachheads near important towns and cities throughout that elongated colony.

Portuguese rule was heavily compromised. So was the Rhodesian defense perimeter, and South Africa was put at risk. The U.S. had an interest in persuading Rhodesia and Portugal to reconcile with their opponents before it was too late, but concern over American bases in the Azores, and anxiety over giving comfort to Marxist insurgents, stayed any influence that the Nixon and Ford administrations may have been willing to exert. (“Southern Africa May Be the World’s Next Guerrilla War Zone,” *Newsday*, 8 Feb. 1973; “Portugal’s African Stalemate,” *Newsday*, 18 Feb. 1973.)

These were threatening times for whites north of South Africa. The dawn of indigenous hegemony was beginning to color the horizon. By 1975, those hues were brighter and much more apparent. “The struggle to maintain white supremacy in Rhodesia,” I wrote, was doomed. The era of real multi-racial rule was coming much closer, to be followed by the creation of Zimbabwe, a black-run country.

In 1974, a socialist military coup in Portugal effectively ended that nation’s colonial pretensions and gave Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau the self-determination for which their several liberation movements had long fought. Mozambique’s formal independence was to be inaugurated in mid-1975, but already (writing in February of that year) the impact on Rhodesia’s white redoubt was significant. The rails and fuel lines that ran from Indian Ocean ports onto the Rhodesian plateaus would now be

in enemy hands. ZANU and ZAPU guerillas (mostly ZANU, as it developed) would be able to attack Rhodesia from bordering Mozambique. Only South Africa, of the countries surrounding Rhodesia, would be able to assist the land-locked whites. And for how long, given Western pressure on South Africa?

I suggested that South Africa would opt for strategic peace in southern Africa, the better to protect itself and secure its own moated fortress. Rhodesia's whites were mostly not Afrikaners, their own vulnerability and isolation contributing to a potential weakness in South Africa. Assisting in the removal of Smith could benefit South African strategic interests with the West and with the newly emergent Front Line states like Mozambique. For South Africa, Rhodesia, like white-run Namibia, became a bargaining chip.

South African strategists had come to regard Rhodesia as "an anachronism." With backing from FRELIMO and Zambia, ZANU guerillas were poised to take their hitherto successful hit-and-run war to the Rhodesian cities. Then there would be a white exodus. Of the 230,000 whites, only about 50,000 were heads of families. It might not take too many battlefield reverses or much urban sabotage, I intimated, to deplete the army's white ranks and destroy commerce. "Whites simply [could not] sustain a defensive, unwinnable war for more than a few years against blacks with sanctuaries in neighboring Mozambique and access to Mozambican as well as Soviet and Chinese weapons, facilities, and training." Smith, who pledged never to condone majority rule—"not in 1,000 years"—could be pushed aside. However it happened, power would soon shift in Rhodesia. ("The Knell for White Rhodesia," *Newsday*, 9 Feb. 1975.)

That was a shade too optimistic, but Smith's days were indeed numbered. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger should attempt to accelerate the process, I advised, when he visited the region in 1976. "We need forcefully to urge South Africa to give no new aid to Smith." Kissinger could pledge financial support to Zambia and Mozambique, which had cut lucrative ties to Rhodesia. I also suggested that Kissinger could offer to help repatriate some or all of Rhodesia's whites to South Africa, Australia, Canada, or Britain. It did Washington "little good to continue to hide behind the legal fiction that Rhodesia [was] a British responsibility."

Kissinger should say, I wrote, that a negotiated settlement was in the interests of everyone, especially Rhodesian whites, and that a settlement more favorable to whites was more likely to be negotiated sooner rather than later. ZANU's guerillas would shortly achieve a string of military successes, so waiting and hoping was a less good option. Washington should speak effectively and without "seeming mealy-mouthed." Perhaps Kissinger could

preside over a bargaining session, I urged. ("U.S. Role in Rhodesia," *Boston Globe*, 13 April 1976.)

It would be no simple matter, however, to sit African dissidents around a conference table. Mugabe, at the head of ZANU, and Nkomo, at the head of ZAPU, were "violently antagonistic" despite their brief-lived joint command, and "unwilling under almost all conceivable circumstances to cooperate with their rivals." Power was at stake and near at hand. Both groups knew, I wrote cynically, that the victors in the contest for Zimbabwe would find ways to exclude the losers. That had been the pattern in Africa, with minorities being pushed aside after independence. A post-independence civil war was eminently possible.

ZANU and ZAPU were separated ideologically, with the former being more committed to Marxism. But the more profound differences between the two movements were ethnic and personal. The first was largely Shona-speaking, and 80 percent of Zimbabweans spoke that language. The second was led by Sindebele speakers, from Zimbabwe's southwest. But Mugabe had essentially divided Zimbabwe's nationalist endeavor by breaking with Nkomo, the historic leader of Rhodesian Africans, in 1963. Mugabe and others decried Nkomo's lack of courage and his moderation in the struggle. Indeed, for Mugabe and those who formed ZANU, Nkomo's legitimacy had been eroded by years of easy living, negotiating errors, and "a generally flabby" approach to hard questions of nationalist tactics. Mugabe was the more ruthless, the more revolutionary, and the more welcoming of violence. With the guerillas, most of whom spoke Shona, Mugabe had a distinct edge over Nkomo. But probably not until 1979 was it certain that Mugabe, and not one of the generals in the bush, would win the allegiance even of the ZANU freedom fighters. There were contending factions within ZANU and among the soldiers, but Mugabe either eliminated opponents or won them over by deploying Chinese, Ethiopian, or Libyan patronage to good effect. Rather than concerning himself with white rights, I urged Kissinger to abandon Smith's Rhodesia and to craft a mechanism capable of uniting the various Zimbabwean African factions and forestalling a "disastrous" post-transfer struggle for power. That was the surer path to sustainable peace. ("The Knot That Rhodesian Negotiators Must Untie," *New York Times*, 29 Oct. 1976.)

Kissinger took only some of this advice. As part of a series of complicated anti-Soviet maneuvers in southern Africa, he backed South Africa's proxy incursion into Angola (against the legitimate new government of President Eduardo dos Santos), which subsequently drew Cubans to that theatre of war, and began the laborious process of persuading Prime

Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster's South African administration to ease its support of Smith. Then, with President Carter's defeat of President Ford in the 1976 U.S. elections and the shift of effective responsibility for southern Africa to Ambassadors Andrew Young and Donald McHenry, the pressure on Smith, ever wily and determined, increased substantially.

So did guerilla threats. In addition to incursions into northeastern and eastern Rhodesia, the militants had begun attacking in the northwest and the west. There were attacks on the outskirts of Salisbury (Harare) in 1977. Smith's regular army was stretched. Further mobilization of white fighters would cripple the already weakened local economy. By the next year, 50 percent of white adult males were in the ranks of the military. White Rhodesia was under siege. Morale was questionable. Not surprisingly, 1,600 whites were leaving beleaguered Rhodesia each month; blacks were also exiting to join the insurgent struggle.

The status quo was untenable in 1977. Smith might try to "tough it out." But it also appeared that he would reluctantly be compelled by South Africa to consider an Anglo-American peace plan that Young and British Foreign Minister David Owen had delivered to Smith a month before. ("Final Choices in Rhodesia," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Oct. 1977.) Smith's riposte was to put together an internal settlement, with African leaders loyal to neither ZANU nor ZAPU in charge. Moreover, the actions of the proposed new multiracial parliament would be subject to a white veto. Such contrivance and subterfuge would only encourage an intensification of the war, I wrote. It was hardly worthy of international recognition. Nor could it command more than contempt from the guerillas.

Mugabe, indeed, to the annoyance of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, cast aspersions on any deals with tame Africans like Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Vance's staff, in turn, unfavorably likened Mugabe to segregationist Georgia Governor George Wallace. That was unwise, I wrote. So was Vance's notion that he could switch Western support to Nkomo and bring Nkomo into the internal settlement. That was an act of "misplaced desperation." Admittedly, Mugabe's intemperate attacks on Owen and his strident Marxist rhetoric made him seem unbalanced—a precursor of rhetoric and actions to come. But it was a mistake to belittle Mugabe's influence with Zimbabwe's guerillas, and with the great mass of Shona-speaking Africans. He had an ethnic base which was the envy of other potential Zimbabwean leaders. Having always shunned "the kinds of sybaritic trappings that [were] so common among exiled liberationists," Mugabe had managed by "force of example" since 1974 to give political coherence to the "unsophisticated posturings" of the ZANU military command. Stubborn he was, but he also



guarded the primary path to peace. (“The Rhodesian Predicament,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 Feb. 1978; “A Rhodesian ‘Wallace’? Tsk-tsk,” *New York Times*, 1 May 1978.)

With the insurgents bleeding white Rhodesia physically and psychologically, and with new administrations in Washington and London arrayed against Pretoria and Salisbury, it was only a matter of time until Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha, who had succeeded Vorster, compelled Smith to devolve nominal power to Muzorewa after an election in 1979. This was a transitional charade—an “essential irrelevance”—disavowed by the liberation leaders and the U.S. Muzorewa’s administration was controlled by Smith and whites. It could not satisfy African aspirations for freedom, nor stem the nationalist tide. (Some members of the U.S. Congress wanted to lift sanctions and recognize the Muzorewa government as a means of strengthening anti-communism in Africa. Doing so would lead to more, not less, warfare, I wrote, and, paradoxically, would encourage the spread of communist influence. Nor were the elections free, as Congressmen claimed. The liberation movements were still banned, so could not compete. It was all smokescreen, and Muzorewa was not a free agent.) (“The Queen Could Prevent Armageddon in Rhodesia,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 Jan. 1979; “Rhodesia’s Election: To Observe or Not to Observe?” *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 March 1979; “A Rope of Sand,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 May 1979.)

But Muzorewa’s election as prime minister did provide a face-saving way of moving, before the end of the year, to negotiations in London. Propelled forward by a meeting of the leaders of the British Commonwealth, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda of Zambia directed Nkomo and Mugabe—who were still calling talks a waste of time—toward the conference table. With British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington presiding deftly over three-month-long deliberations between Rhodesian whites, the two main nationalist movements, Muzorewa’s administration, and Britain, a new constitutional dispensation was at last developed for an independent Zimbabwe. Britain would resume its lapsed sovereignty for an interim period of months, pending full parliamentary elections. (“Winning the Peace in Zimbabwe,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 Dec. 1979.)

Mugabe and ZANU won that poll resoundingly, despite strong South African support for Nkomo and the widespread fear among Britons and others that Mugabe was a Marxist despot in embryo. (Mugabe had attempted to reassure whites that he had no intention of overturning the local version of a market economy.) Indeed, as I had suspected, South African, British, and Rhodesian predictions to the contrary, only the magnitude of ZANU’s

victory was ever in doubt. Given the ethnic complexion of the territory, and the preponderance of Shona voters, ZAPU's minority appeal could hardly prevail. ("If Mugabe Wins in Rhodesia," *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 Feb. 1980.)

Zimbabwe's history as an independent nation began in April, 1980, with Mugabe as prime minister (and later president). Those who predicted authoritarianism instead of democracy were eventually proved correct.

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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### *From Moderate to Militant*

Late last year the government of Southern Rhodesia banned the National Democratic Party (NDP), the colony's only effective African political organization, and drove many of its leaders underground. The party's president, Joshua Nkomo, came home hurriedly from Dar-es-Salaam, where he was happily celebrating Tanganyika's independence, and immediately formed the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) as a lineal descendant. In the ways of Rhodesia's multiracial politics, the banning was but a routine, if harsh, way of warning African politicians that they had carried protest too far. It served, perhaps intentionally, to strengthen Nkomo's leadership. At the same time, it almost certainly contributed to an exacerbation of conflict between the races. A bloody showdown has been made more certain.

#### *Late Awakening*

The NDP was banned as a consequence of its growing strength in Bulawayo and Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia's two key industrial centers. Government claimed that the party's widespread support was coerced, and that the NDP had embarked on a wholesale intimidation campaign to enlist added followers. Strikes had been organized in Bulawayo. Masses of shouting Africans had responded night after night to NDP speeches made in the Bulawayo and Salisbury suburbs. Africans were, in fact, becoming much more "cheeky" than they had ever dared to be. For the first time, a nationalist ideology seemed to have caught the fancy of the majority of Southern Rhodesia's 2,475,779 Africans.

No longer were the leaders fringe fellows operating from location huts or dim figures who cycled furtively from village to village. They had become

*Africa Report*, March 1962.

charismatic personalities at last: they held court in proper offices, drove large, gaily-painted Land Rovers, and flew frequently to commune with friends throughout independent Africa. In the eyes of the Southern Rhodesian Government, the men of the NDP had not played a gentlemanly game. They showed few signs of becoming "responsible" black Tories. Hence the ban, despite the lessons of Nyasaland, Kenya, Ghana, *ad nauseam*.

As recent African history has showed plainly, banning is an almost certain way of strengthening nationalist resolves. In this case, Nkomo's prompt return to Salisbury and his immediate announcement of ZAPU (in accord with a prearranged plan) have given him renewed importance in Rhodesia. He has become the unquestioned spokesman for those who would now seek only the most radical of solutions to the Southern Rhodesian conflict. An extreme future for Nkomo, as well as for the party, is therefore seemingly ordained.

### *An Unlikely Nationalist*

On the face of it, Joshua Nkomo is still the most unlikely of militant leaders. There are many within his own party, and a host of foreign critics, who think him unsuited for a role he has played with increasing sagacity since 1957. His detractors decry Nkomo's love of comfort and good living, his easy, affable way with whites, and his past history of moderate inaction in the nationalist cause. He can display none of Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda's skills with harangue. He fails to demonstrate Kenneth Kaunda's burning intensity of purpose. At 45, he appears to his younger, more impatient followers as too old, too schooled in the experience of white paternalism to lead them to the New Jerusalem. His joyful girth is no answer to those in Central Africa who now preach austerity with a fervor that would have pleased Mohandas Gandhi. On what foundation does Nkomo's leadership rest?

Joshua Mquabuko Nyongolo Nkomo, the son of Sindebele-speaking Kalanga, had a fairly orthodox tribal youth. He herded cattle, attended mission and government schools in the Matopos District near Bulawayo, and then went on to Adams College in Natal for his secondary education. The young Nkomo was no doubt influenced by the benevolent, staunchly Methodist paternalism that permeated Adams College during the principalship of Dr. Edgar Brookes. He was affected enough to become a Methodist lay preacher—although he is not now an ardent churchgoer—and to train for social work at the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Science in Johannesburg, then the only institution of its kind in eastern or southern Africa. He attended African National Congress meetings in Johannesburg and was conversant with many of its leaders, but his goal then was education, not politics. Even

after his return to Southern Rhodesia in late 1947, he continued studying for the BA, which he eventually obtained by correspondence from the University of South Africa (Pretoria).

### *First Job in 1951*

Nkomo's first task was to find a job. An unblemished record (in the eyes of the British South Africa Police Special Branch), his unique training, and his pleasing personality resulted in an appointment as Rhodesia Railways' first African welfare worker. African employees liked Nkomo well enough to select him in 1961 as the first full-time general secretary of the Rhodesia Railways African Employees' Association, then the best situated, if not the most powerful, of Central Africa's fledgling unions. He was not a particularly energetic or successful union organizer, but very soon Nkomo found himself, unexpectedly, a national political figure.

These were the hectic days when Africans in Rhodesia and Nyasaland were frantically seeking to stave off federation. An African National Congress had existed as a welfare society from 1921, and a successor had been formed in 1934, but not until 1948 did African political aspirations pose any threat to the dominant white oligarchy. A revived Congress, led by the Rev. Mr. Thompson Douglas Samkange, joined with a proletarian movement known as the African Voice Association (led by B. B. Burombo) to demonstrate urban African discontent. A general strike was broken by government, carrying its protest to the rural reserves.

### *Federation Protested*

When federation was initially mooted, Burombo was joined in protest by Samkange and Charles Mzingeli, president of the Industrial and Commercial Union. Nkomo instead went to London as one of Prime Minister Sir Godfrey Huggins' representatives to the Lancaster House talks of 1952. The name Nkomo was vilified at home and abroad. But ever willing to be carried by the tide of opinion, he spoke out strongly in London against the imposition of federation. Upon his return home he again amazed those who had labeled him "stooge" by referring to the day "when Africans take over." Nkomo promptly became general secretary of the All-African Convention which Mzingeli had formed to fight federation.

His horizons had been broadened. The former herd boy had been impressed by the spectacle of white men doing menial work in Great Britain; he had experienced the adulation of the Africa Bureau, the Fabian Society, and those of the Labor Party who were opposed to federation. He had come to know the joys of world travel and the mental and physical comforts of life

abroad. Upon his return, he therefore fought shoulder to shoulder with the militants in the Convention and became president of the temporarily resuscitated African National Congress.

### *Nkomo Tries New Approaches*

But both Congress and Convention withered in Nkomo's hands. He even joined the Federal Party (now the United Federal Party of Sir Edgar and Sir Roy Welensky) in order to contest the African seat of Matabeleland in the 1954 elections. A predominantly white electorate instead cast their votes for Michael Hove, the safer Federal Party candidate, and Nkomo's willingness to use the orthodox avenues of change came to naught.

Had there been any implementation, during the first years, of those persuasive policies of multiracial partnership on which the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was predicated, the early failures of Congress and Convention might have led to the permanent demise of African nationalism. Nkomo left the railway union and turned to business, first as an insurance and building society agent, later as an auctioneer. He was popular and knowledgeable, but his was not the Midas touch and the enterprises languished as his political ventures had. Yet his was the key African name in Bulawayo and Matabeleland; he retained a grip on what was left of Congress and kept up his overseas contacts. He bided his time.

In much the same way that Dr. Banda was enticed from Ghana in 1958 by W. Kanyama Chiume and Henry Chipembere, so Nkomo was summoned to Salisbury in 1957 to head the rejuvenated African National Congress. Two years earlier, George Nyandoro, Dunduzu Chisiza (then living in Southern Rhodesia), and Robert Chikerema had formed the City Youth League (subsequently the Southern Rhodesia African National Youth League) as an earnest of their disillusionment with federation. Their following was confined for the most part to Harari and Highlands, the large African suburbs of Salisbury. It constituted an urban movement of the younger intelligentsia; in order to broaden their appeal, they needed the support of what was left of the old Congress in Bulawayo. They also thought their movement needed a national figure at the head; if nothing else, the assignment of the presidency to an older outsider would avoid factional disputes within the Youth League itself.

The new Congress combined the ideas and vitality of the Youth League with the experience of the old Congress. The party affirmed repeatedly that it stood for "National Unity of all inhabitants of the country, in true partnership, regardless of race, color and creed . . . for a completely integrated society, equality of opportunity in every sphere, and the social, economic,

and political advancement of all.” It demanded “full participation of African people in government” and regularly attacked the color bar while explicitly recognizing the permanent rights of white and Asian citizens.

### *Congress Is Destroyed*

Congress spread rapidly to the rural areas, where it campaigned against the Native Land Husbandry Act (designed to consolidate holdings and to drive Africans to the cities), and it increased its hold on urban opinion. But even this Congress was hardly militant; most of its battles were fought in the courtroom rather than in the streets. In short, the party was a moderate movement with some rabid spokesmen (Nyandoro, Chikerema). Nkomo consorted with contacts in Ghana, and Nyandoro met with friends in Nyasaland, but there is little evidence that Congress constituted a threat to peace in February 1959, when disturbances in Nyasaland rocked the entire Federation. Nonetheless, 300 Congressmen were arrested in a pre-dawn raid, and the movement itself was proscribed two months later. Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead said at the time there was substantial proof that Congress had plotted collusively with Dr. Banda and that disorders were timed to coincide with the transfer of troops to combat the Nyasaland riots.

### *Congress Leaders Arrested*

In any case, Southern Rhodesia immured all Congressmen it could find and succeeded in destroying the organization. Nkomo, on his way from the All-Africa Peoples Conference in Accra, escaped capture and quickly became the unquestioned leader of Southern Rhodesia’s African nationalism. Some of the younger men, it is true, resented his unwillingness to suffer the privation of imprisonment but most saw the need for a continuation in exile. Approval by Kwame Nkrumah helped, and Nkomo’s essay into British and international pressure politics from an office in Golders Green (where he remained for nearly two years) was almost completely successful. He was more aroused than ever before. Clearly the peaceful, gradual approach only led to prison.

Open political nationalism returned to Southern Rhodesia early in 1960. The NDP was formed by Michael Mawema (who is now leader of the rival Zimbabwe National Party), Stanlake Samkange (son of the former Congress president), and Tarcisius M. Silundika at a time when Nkomo was still in London and other Congress leaders languished in preventive detention. The NDP expanded on the policies of Congress and quickly drew to its ranks African intellectuals and professionals who had previously held aloof from active nationalism. Herbert Chitepo, Southern Rhodesia’s first African

barrister, the Rev. Mr. Ndabaningi Sithole, Dr. E. M. Pawarayi, a prominent medical practitioner, Enoch Dumbutshena, a leading journalist, and Leopold Takawira of the moribund Capricorn Society all joined the NDP.

### *Becomes NDP President*

Nkomo returned home in October 1960 to assume the party presidency after the government said he would not be subject to arrest. Under his leadership, the NDP picked up strength slowly. He was more forthright and radical than before, but in many respects was not in complete control of the movement. Silundika, a former teacher and research assistant in anthropology at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Moton Malianga became the active policy planners. Nyandoro and Chikerema, by now only restricted to rural Gokwe, sent a constant stream of advice to party headquarters. Indeed, the Gokwe detainees wrote the original NDP constitution and smuggled it somehow to Salisbury. Nkomo was party president but events were often shaped as much by his younger lieutenants (official and unofficial) as they were by himself.

### *Decision in London*

On some occasions, Nkomo asserted himself only to find it necessary to recant. His greatest embarrassment came after he had agreed, at the constitutional conference held in London in February 1961, to a Southern Rhodesian constitution suggested by Sir Edgar. In exchange for NDP agreement to the devolution of the British Government's residual power to veto discriminatory legislation from London to a local Constitutional Council, Africans were to be given their first 15 seats in an expanded territorial legislature of 65. Former Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister R. S. Garfield Todd pointed out that this compromise shunted more than two million Africans on to a dead-end siding with 15 seats while the whites roared through on the main line with 50 seats.

Nkomo, believing that some advance was preferable to none at all, accepted the new constitutional proposals and prepared to contest the elections. However, upon subsequently discovering that influential elements in the party preferred not to ride the train at all, he repudiated the agreement: "I cannot disregard the wishes of my people and supporters."

At the October 1961 NDP congress, Nkomo demonstrated that a summer of increasingly more radical action and pronouncement (including a successful African boycott of the constitutional referendum) had put him more firmly in the driver's seat. Despite predictions that his party would split, the Congress overwhelmingly carried Nkomo's proposal that all forms of partic-



ipation in the next elections be eschewed. He came out for the first time strongly in favor of the political kingdom and nothing less. In a reference to segregation in swimming pools, he declared: "We don't want to swim with them in pools—we want to swim with them in parliament." Southern Rhodesia, he said, was to become an African country, not a non-racial or multi-racial country. Those whites and Asians who accepted black rule could stay.

A disaffected minority representing several Salisbury branches accused Nkomo, Silundika, and other leaders of being out of touch with the masses, of maladministering the party, of living too well, and of being too docile. Had the Congress been held three or four months previous, their resolutions might well have passed. But by October Nkomo had moved far enough to the left to carry the younger nationalists and many of the urban workers. As always, however, his strongest supporters were those representing rural branches. Nkomo has his roots in the reserves, where nationalists are more conservative and more inclined to associate age and experience with wisdom. And Matabeleland, as expected, went solidly for its man.

During November and December, the declaration of political war was followed by a progressive rejection of all things white. Africans, it was decreed, were to go without shoes on Sundays. Those who attended rallies—and they came in large numbers—were to remove shoes and socks. Since the British government had indicated a reluctance to interfere in Southern Rhodesia because of the size of British capital investment there, the NDP was to seek destruction of European commerce and industry. Strikes and boycotts toward this end followed.

### *A New Phase Opens*

The Zimbabwe African People's Union is a creature of a Nkomo now genuinely converted to the need for ceaseless strife with government. Although he has ridden tides of opinion in the past, his actions must no longer be interpreted as those of an opportunist. He is finally persuaded that little will be gained in Southern Rhodesia by negotiation or compromise; Nkomo and his followers, including a new party vice-president, Dr. Tichafa Samuel Parirenyatwa (35-year-old former house physician at Harari Hospital), and a new general secretary, Washington Malianga, have moved into a new phase of nationalism where it appears to them that only the most radical approach will succeed. Whereas the NDP had only seven on its National Executive, ZAPU has 14—with the explicit objective of training a "shadow cabinet."

Nyandoro, Chikerema (now members of the ZAPU executive board), and the other Gokwe detainees will continue to have some influence, but Nkomo



is once again Southern Rhodesia's leading nationalist. Silundika, the former NDP secretary-general, and Moton Malianga, former treasurer, will continue to counsel Nkomo, though they are not on the ZAPU Executive and are reportedly slated for "diplomatic posts" abroad. If he should falter in his new role, more radical nationalists such as Silundika and Robert Mugabe—an articulate ex-teacher who spent four years in Ghana before becoming NDP (and now ZAPU) publicity secretary—may well take ZAPU (or whatever it may be called) down more desperate paths.

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### *Great Britain Hasn't Solved the Rhodesia Problem Just Yet*

When the first shipment of Rhodesia chrome ore in six years arrived at the Louisiana port of Burnside last week, a small group of blacks met the ship to protest. These men were not only protesting the Nixon administration's violation of repeated United Nations' declarations against trading with the white minority regime in Rhodesia; they were also echoing an ongoing protest inside Rhodesia itself, a protest in which Rhodesian blacks have long been involved. Recently that protest has led to some rather unusual developments inside the country itself.

Late last year, after several previous abortive negotiations, the illegally independent colony of Rhodesia and Great Britain, its historic overlord, finally agreed on a formula by which Rhodesia could gain legitimacy as a nation. Britain, with troubles in Northern Ireland and concerns in Europe, wanted to rid itself of the Rhodesian problem. The Rhodesians, hampered by political and economic sanctions, were equally anxious for a reconciliation.

The result was a draft constitution, which included provisions for an increase in the Africans represented in the colony's proposed 100-member parliament. Under the [proposed] '69 constitution Africans would have 16 seats. As Africans achieve the educational, income or property levels qualifying them for parliament, they were promised additional parliamentary representatives. Every time the number of enfranchised Africans increased by six per cent of the white voting population, two more Africans would be added to parliament until 50 seats are held by Africans. After additional talks and votes this could lead to African majority rule.

But Ian Smith, Rhodesia's prime minister, has often said that Africans would never achieve majority rule in his son's lifetime. Given the low educational, income, and property levels of most black Rhodesians and the statistical likelihood of more Africans' achieving the franchise requirements, it

has been calculated that under the new Anglo-Rhodesian formula it will take at least 40 years before parliamentary parity is achieved.

The settlement called for a bill of rights, enforced through the white courts, and an anti-discriminatory commission, but its powers would be limited to future laws, not to eliminating segregationist legislation. Britain also offered loans and grants for African education and development. Finally, in order to mollify those British who thought this was a sellout of African interests, the two governments agreed to test the settlement within the colony. A referendum would have been simple, but because they wanted a “yes” vote both governments tested opinions by sending 18 white commissioners to tour Rhodesia and to hold meetings there.

This device has backfired. For the first time in the almost 10 years since right-wing governments regained control of Rhodesia and imprisoned all politically minded Africans, the indigenous population was being asked for its opinion. Would it accept a settlement that would legalize the original usurpation of independence in 1965, end sanctions and provide some increase in African political power and influence?

Members of the African elite who were out of prison welcomed the parliamentary power and the recognition, at long last, that 5,000,000 Africans deserved parity with 250,000 whites. They suspected, however, that the whites would find some way to fiddle the franchise requirements. They knew, too, that educated schoolteachers earn less than \$1,800 a year, the proposed lowest qualifying minimum. Few Africans earn more, and most are less well educated. Only 250 graduated last year from the few colony senior high schools. The settlement did not promise to abrogate the laws that prohibit Africans from mixing socially with whites, living or having offices in the centers of the main towns or farming in the best districts.

Most of all, the people of Rhodesia felt that they could not “in any circumstances accept a settlement whose result, directly or indirectly, is the legalization of this unilateral declaration of independence.” In its testimony to the British commission, the black African National Council explained that saying “no” was the “first and last chance for the African people to pass a verdict on white minority rule. Our rejection of these proposals is unanimous.”

Simply, eloquently and unequivocally, the council made these points to Lord Pearce, Lord Harlech and Sir Glyn Jones of the commission. The three listened impassively in late January as Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the chairman of the council, explained that no African could willingly vote to accept white rule. Eddison Zvobgo, the council’s assistant organizing secretary and a former student at Tufts University who recently was freed after seven years

in prison for political activities, asked whether Rhodesian blacks could be expected to be the only human beings requesting rule by a minority?

The council is the only legally organized black political group. It speaks for most Africans, and its leadership helped to solidify African opposition to the proposal. The commission shouldn't have any doubts about the feelings. Everywhere the commissioners have encountered a massive refusal to approve an illegal white minority regime.

In Rhodesia's remote eastern highlands, Chief Rekayi Tangwena wagged his finger at a startled commissioner and told him, "The children of the Queen are doing very much wrong here. Let them be put in jail." On the shores of Lake Kariba, touring commissioners received the same reaction from illiterates as well as the educated.

The commission, as it draws up a report in London on the proposal, can hardly ignore the negative reaction of Africans.

The commission can hardly say that Africans want the Anglo-Rhodesian accord. They could equivocate but, given Lord Pearce's reputation, certainly will not. They could return a negative verdict but qualify it in so many elegant ways that the British government could somehow rationalize settling on last year's terms. This is what both governments want, but the riots and the recent arrests of 133 Africans may already have aroused British public opinion.

The British government simply could wash its hands of Rhodesia, leaving the Africans to fight their battles alone. Effective sanctions could then lapse, and Rhodesia, although in limbo and outlawed, could gradually acquire a patina of economic respectability.

These are depressing alternatives. If the Pearce commission issues a strong negative report denouncing the Smith regime, it might then exceed its present brief and offer new terms to meet most of the main African objections. This is a result Africans would welcome, but they are not romantics, and Muzorewa and supporters know that whatever the outcome, months if not years of struggle are ahead. Africans are once again politicized.

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### *Southern Africa May Be World's Next Guerrilla War Zone*

Serious economic and military battles have again broken out along the Zambezi River, the natural frontier between black Africa and the white-dominated South.

A lonely farm of white settlers in the Centenary District of Rhodesia, not far from the Zambian border, was attacked just before Christmas. Three

whites were wounded in the attack by guerrillas of the Joint Military Command of two of the region's three liberation groups, who call Rhodesia by the African name Zimbabwe. Elsewhere in the border area there have been ambushes, and one white soldier was killed and seven wounded when their vehicles detonated guerrillas' land mines. The totals so far are three whites killed and 23 wounded. The Rhodesians say they have found and disarmed other land mines and confiscated "offensive material of Communist origin." Rhodesian reserves have been mobilized, roadblocks established, and intensive patrolling begun in farming areas bordering Mozambique and Zambia.

"It is no longer idle talk of the possibility of a slowly escalating Vietnam-type situation in Southern Africa," says the *Cape Times*, one of South Africa's more influential dailies.

Guerrilla warfare has gone on for years against the Ian Smith regime in Salisbury, which declared its independence from Great Britain in 1965 as the ultimate act in resistance to pressure to allow the overwhelmingly African majority in the country a greater voice in its government. The Joint Military Command was formed by the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union. Their forces inside Rhodesia are still thought to be few, but for the first time since 1967 the Rhodesians fear that the liberationist groups have managed to infiltrate a rural area, obtain cooperation from local villagers, and cache arms and ammunition. White native commissioners are now permitted to levy collective fines on Rhodesian African villages suspected of helping or sheltering guerrillas.

The recent incursion constitutes the most serious threat to Rhodesian security in many years. The Centenary and neighboring Mt. Darwin Districts are remote, however, and steep wooded valleys and an escarpment falling sharply to the Zambezi River provide natural cover for infiltrators and for hit-and-run action.

The heartland of Rhodesia—the white-dominated cities and towns—is in no way threatened. But what has made the Rhodesians particularly nervous is the belief that the Joint Military Command has abandoned its piecemeal approach of previous years in favor of a coordinated, well-orchestrated series of encounters preceded by a local educational campaign and followed by ambushes and other attacks designed to damage white morale.

Moreover, the Joint Military Command is cooperating for the first time with the much better organized and equipped army of Frelimo, Mozambique's leading African liberation movement. Frelimo is an experienced, sophisticated, and successful guerrilla organization which claims to have made the main roads in the panhandle of central Mozambique—which separates the northern part of Rhodesia from Zambia—unsafe for the

Portuguese. Frelimo's operations have also made more difficult the completion of the Cabora Bassa Dam on the Zambezi and threatened the borders of Rhodesia.

Retaliating against the guerrillas, Rhodesia last month threatened to attack their training camps in Zambia and denounced Zambia for giving them shelter. Rhodesian troops, which jointly patrol the borders of Zambia with South African police, are accused of planting the land mines in Zambia which have recently killed six and maimed 13 Zambian soldiers and civilians. South Africans on a patrol boat cruising the Zambezi also recently exchanged shots with Zambians.

The preliminary escalation in the war of nerves came in mid-January, however. Rhodesia, through which Zambia traditionally exports about 50 percent of its vital copper ore and imports about 60 percent of its capital and consumer goods, closed its frontier to all traffic except Zambian copper. The move was intended to pressure Zambia into reconsidering its support for the guerrillas. But Zambia, refusing to comply or to be seen to be supine, said it would no longer ship copper via Rhodesia. Instead, copper would travel 800 miles via the narrow gauge railway to Angola on the Atlantic and via road to the head of the Chinese-constructed Tanzania-Zambia Railway, now about 600 miles from the Indian Ocean and 800 miles from the copper mines.

Rhodesia Railways, which is in parlous financial shape, has long relied for a large portion of its revenues on Zambian copper traffic. Both countries are thus suffering severe economic dislocation. An airlift is being mounted to fly essential goods—mining equipment, explosives, and a Japanese acid plant—from South Africa or from Beira in Mozambique, hitherto Zambia's main port-of-entry on the Indian Ocean. Interestingly enough, South Africa is furious about the boycott of Zambia by South Africa's ally Rhodesia. The boycott upsets South Africa's important commercial relationship with Zambia and increases the possibility of armed conflict along the Zambezi.

Zambian and Rhodesian rhetoric, as well as their newly exacerbated economic antagonism, has made a serious military confrontation more likely than at any time since Rhodesia's declaration of independence in 1965. Militarily, Zambia's 5,000-man army and 700-man air force (with its trainers and older transports) is probably less well-trained and not yet as well-equipped as the Rhodesian military forces. The Rhodesians have more and better bombers, fighters, and pilots. The Zambian radar and Rapier surface-to-air missiles are not yet fully operational. Moreover, in any conflict the Rhodesians could count on massive support from the Portuguese and from South Africa, one of the three strongest military powers on the African continent. Zambia might seek help from her nearest black-ruled neighbors, from

Nigeria, and perhaps from a combined British–United Nations force, but logistical and other problems (short of an unlikely U.S.-Soviet joint intervention) would minimize the value of short-term British-UN help. Facilities in Zambia are also inadequate to mount a major assault, whether offensive or defensive, against Rhodesia.

Open hostilities could occur if the Joint Military Command guerrillas continue their string of isolated successes, or if Frelimo makes Rhodesia's border less and less secure. Then the Rhodesians, for internal reasons, would feel it necessary to strike back. Rhodesia might bomb the training camps in Zambia, setting off serious warfare. Or, the Rhodesians might try cutting off hydroelectric power to Zambia from the joint Rhodesian-Zambian-owned Kariba Dam generating facilities on the south (Rhodesian) bank of the Zambezi River. (Zambia's own Kafue Dam generators will not be operating until 1975.) If the power stops, Zambia is bound to attempt some form of counterattack. It would have serious military consequences for both sides, and obviously embroil others.

Even if prudence prevails along the Zambezi and the dislocation of the Zambian economy is somehow held to a minimum, Zambia's consumers will once again exist on a "wartime" footing reminiscent of the dark days of 1966–67. (Gasoline was then rationed, but Zambia now has a pipeline from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's capital on the Indian Ocean.) Rhodesia may suffer even more acutely, since, in Zambia's present mood, there is little desire to revert to the transportation of copper through Rhodesia despite the very high costs involved in using the Angolan and Tanzanian routes.

Tension along the Zambezi may temporarily be reduced, but whatever the outcome, Rhodesia may suffer more permanent damage than Zambia. Unwittingly, the white government of Rhodesia has also strengthened the somewhat precarious hand of President Kenneth Kaunda's recently established one-party rule in Zambia. With Rhodesia becoming belligerent, Kaunda can remind his opponents that political division at home is no longer either appropriate or necessary.

Last weekend, Rhodesia relented, and opened its border. But Zambia, pleased with its neighbor's miscalculation, has declared the border closed irrevocably—even to tourists. On Tuesday, Zambia also ended dial telephone service between the two territories. The rupture seemed to be growing.

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### *Portugal's African Stalemate*

Despite the assassination last month of Amilcar Cabral, guerrilla warfare continues unabated in Portugal's three remaining territorial possessions on the African continent. In Guine, sandwiched between French-speaking independent Guinea and Senegal on the west coast of Africa; in Angola, between Zaire (the former Belgian Congo) and Southwest Africa [Namibia]; and in Mozambique, along the shores of the Indian Ocean, a number of African liberation movements are continuing a long and bitter struggle, and with varying successes, to oust their colonial overlords.

Since Eduardo Mondlane, the leader of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), was killed when a mailed package blew up in his face in 1969, Cabral had been the most articulate and successful of the anti-Portuguese militants. His Party for the Independence of Guine and Cape Verde (PAIGC) launched an armed struggle against the Portuguese in Guine in 1963 after two years of intensive clandestine "education" of its rural population. During the ensuing decade the PAIGC has survived all Portuguese efforts at repression.

Today the PAIGC makes a reasonably validated claim to control nearly two-thirds of the rural areas (much of which is forest and swamp), about a third of the villages, but none of the major towns. Cabral and the PAIGC also succeeded in creating a new political and social structure of self-rule in the regions in which the guerrillas have eliminated durable control by the Portuguese army. In January, PAIGC managed to hold local "elections."

Cabral was killed in Conakry, the capital of neighboring, independent Guinea. Sekou Toure, Guinea's president, has blamed the assassination on Inocentio Canida, the PAIGC's naval commander. President Toure says that Canida was in the pay of the Portuguese. The Portuguese deny any involvement, just as they denied any knowledge of the bomb that killed Mondlane.

President Toure says that the assassination of Cabral was "the opening shot in a Portuguese campaign to eliminate serious African liberation movements." This is a plausible, if unsubstantiated, hypothesis. Clearly, with 142,000 soldiers tied down in Africa, resultant expenses, and a foreign exchange drain caused by the war, the Portuguese have every incentive to try to end their mini-Vietnam—a struggle fought on three fronts which neither side seems capable of winning—by eliminating charismatic leaders.

Moreover, no matter how irrational the Portuguese claim on Guine, Angola and Mozambique are unquestionably valuable properties and contribute substantially to the economic health of the mother country. Angola



has oil, coffee, diamonds, iron ore, gold, and sisal. Mozambique, with a vast untapped mineral potential, markets cashew nuts and cotton. Along the Zambezi River, which flows to the sea through Mozambique, Portugal is also building the massive Cabora Bassa Dam in order to sell hydroelectric power to neighboring Rhodesia and distant South Africa. Mozambique's ports of Lourenco Marques, Beira, and Nacala serve land-locked Rhodesia and Malawi, the mines of South Africa, and, until recently, the mines of Zambia.

Both Angola and Mozambique have substantial numbers of settlers. Guine has none, and it is an essentially worthless property, but the Portuguese will not let it go voluntarily, for to do so would encourage would-be liberationists in Angola and Mozambique, and weaken Portugal's resolve to fight to the end. Also, Portugal would not want to compromise her grip on the mulatto-inhabited Cape Verde Islands, long a Portuguese possession in the Atlantic.

As the battle for Guine continues with no sign of imminent victory for either adversary, it is unclear whether Cabral's murder will do more than to remove a skilled strategist from the scene. Aristedes Pereira, his successor, was secretary general of PAIGC. His comparative lack of charisma may not immediately affect the prosecution of the struggle. The momentum already achieved under Cabral should prove sufficient to sustain the war at its recent level of intensity. Guinea and Senegal will continue to provide sanctuaries when needed, and easy conduits for the transmission of material and funds.

After Mondlane's death there was a period of despondency, followed by some jockeying for power within Frelimo, and then a renewed effort pre-saging a higher level of combat activity than ever before. Mondlane was eventually succeeded by Samora Machel, who has proven as tough a field leader as his predecessor, if less adept at international propaganda and cementing relations with allies overseas.

Under Machel's direction, Frelimo has opened up new fronts within Mozambique, making it more likely than before that within a few years the Portuguese could lose control of the northern half of their 1,000 miles long territory. Frelimo is determined to prevent the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam, but so far its attacks on and mining of the roads leading to the dam have hindered the work without halting it. The dam continues on schedule. If and when it is completed, however, the Portuguese will confront the very serious problem of protecting vulnerable pylons and electrical transmission lines from periodic destruction.

Most of the white population and industry of Mozambique is in the port cities. The backcountry—near Tanzania, Frelimo's main sanctuary—has few sizable towns and has been largely controlled by Frelimo for about six



years. Recently Frelimo, striking from Tanzania and occasionally from Zambia and Malawi, has gained a wide measure of local hegemony in the Zambezi River middle region of Mozambique. Its soldiers have also posed a threat to Rhodesia, and Frelimo recently assisted Rhodesian liberationist groups attacking whites inside that country.

Both South Africa and Rhodesia are worried about Portugal's faltering grip in eastern Africa. Although their military defenses are coordinated, South Africa would interfere massively in Mozambique or Angola only if Frelimo made dramatic military gains or its counterparts in Angola managed to achieve similar breakthroughs, which now seem unlikely.

Nearly eight years ago the Portuguese seemed to be losing all in Angola. From bases in Zaire, Holden Roberto's Union of the Peoples of Angola (now called the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile) had a few years before launched a major assault on the coffee-producing region of northwestern Angola. But their attack faltered. Rivals chafed under Roberto's leadership, the situation in Zaire became unstable, finances grew precarious, and the Portuguese counterattacked effectively by bombing and strafing the guerrillas, regrouping villages, and rousing men and equipment into the field.

Roberto also lost support in wider African circles because of his movement's generally conservative ideology. Dr. Agostinho Neto, with backing from the Organization of African Unity, leads the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which is now favored by Africans. A smaller third group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is led by Jonas Savimbi.

Roberto's movement is still active, but with diminished effectiveness. The MPLA is credited with the largest regional influence, principally in central Angola and along the colony's southeastern border, and UNITA operates along the northeaster frontiers with Zambia. But as the battle ebbs and flows across the savannah of upland Angola, none of these guerrilla groups seems to have the thrust and the financial, logistical, or martial capabilities to break Portugal's control of the productive resources of Angola. By the same token, there are areas of the colony, as there are in Mozambique and most of Guine, where Portuguese travelers are distinctly unsafe.

Portugal's rule in Africa has been oppressive, narrow-minded, and blatantly racial, Portuguese propaganda notwithstanding. Covert rural sympathies in the three colonies are therefore bound to run with the guerrillas. But moving villagers from sympathy to action is more difficult than it seems to overseas observers. Villagers have everything to lose until a liberation movement appears to be on the brink of victory.

Portugal has achieved a stalemate in her African colonial war. Yet, given continued Czech, Libyan, and Chinese support for Frelimo, a conceivable lessening of Portuguese resolve because of political and economic modernization at home, and the sheer cost of the war, the potential for large-scale warfare along the Zambezi, and in Angola, grows rather than diminishes with each new confrontation. The African guerrillas are unlikely to give up, and Portugal does not seem to have the power to crush them completely.

Although the U.S. will publicly continue to frown on Portugal's African war, it lacks the influence and values its bases in the Azores too highly to do much directly to bring about a settlement favorable to the guerrillas. However, to bring additional pressure on Portugal, the U.S. Department of Commerce could positively discourage American investment in the colonies, actively do more to prevent the leakage of NATO and other U.S.-supplied arms and ammunition from metropolitan Portugal to Africa, and find ways of hindering American tourism to Portugal. Whatever moral leadership in these directions might be given has thus far been muted, perhaps on White House orders.

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### *The Knell for White Rhodesia*

The struggle to maintain white supremacy in Rhodesia appears to be doomed. The white government that broke away from Britain nine years ago rather than give more rights to its black citizens will almost certainly yield to a multi-racial state in the near future. And there is little doubt that a black-dominated state will follow soon thereafter. Rhodesia then will become Zimbabwe, yet another black nation next door to the African redoubt of the white man, South Africa.

This startling change in the fortunes of the colony's 6,000,000 blacks and 250,000 whites is the result of a rapid shift in the southern African balance of power. The precipitating event was last April's dramatic coup in Portugal. The soldiers and socialists who came to power there were recommitted to ending Portugal's long battle to keep control of Mozambique and Angola, its colonies in southern Africa.

Mozambique was declared free last August, with formal independence under black direction scheduled for this coming June. (Angola won her liberation last month, after negotiations in Kenya and Portugal.) Because Mozambique abuts Rhodesia on the northeast and east (along a 1,000-mile border) and railways across Mozambique provide the shortest and most

accessible outlets to the sea for Rhodesia, the consequences of Mozambique's independence for continued white rule in Rhodesia are enormous.

Since Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in 1965, her chrome, copper, gold, asbestos, tobacco, and maize have—despite UN sanctions—been exported via Mozambique and South Africa to China, Japan, the Soviet bloc states, Holland, Switzerland and (in the case of chrome) the United States. Her imports, especially the gas and oil without which the colony would long ago have ground to a halt, also reach Rhodesia via Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, South Africa.

The new Mozambique is therefore in a position to strangle Rhodesia economically. Frelimo (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), which is the ruling black party in Mozambique, has for many years assisted the efforts of black guerrillas to invade Rhodesia. In particular, Frelimo has given aid, shelter, advice, and logistical support to the Zimbabwe African National Union, the most militarily successful of the anti-Rhodesian liberation movements. (Zimbabwe was the capital of the country's leading pre-colonial dynasty.) There is every expectation that Frelimo has the capacity to continue to do so now.

Since Rhodesia is now effectively surrounded by the African-run states of Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique, only its alliance with white-led South Africa can sustain the Rhodesia that was. However, South Africa will continue to act to end diluted white rule in its near neighbor to the north.

This is an unexpected development. Certainly the Rhodesian government of Prime Minister Ian Smith, and many South Africans, previously could not have conceived of a white government in South Africa acting in concert with blacks to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia.

The reasons for doing so are complicated and depend largely upon an appreciation of the shifting strategic and economic balances of power in southern Africa. With the demise of Portugal as a colonial power, Rhodesia must now depend exclusively for its needs upon South Africa. Already, with unusual rapidity, the Rhodesians have constructed an 85-mile rail spur to connect its existing rail line (to Mozambique) to the northernmost point of the South African system. Consequently, if Mozambique decides to strangle Rhodesia, it will still be possible to move goods in and out of the colony.

The white Rhodesians want all the South African support they can get. In the best of all possible worlds, they would continue to receive South African military assistance, financial backing and the logistical support without which Rhodesia would long ago have disappeared.

Many Rhodesian whites assume that South Africa will naturally wish to sustain their white outpost, if for nothing else as a buffer against the

encroachment of black freedom fighters. But South Africa has indicated that it is prepared to follow an opposite course.

South Africa wants majority rule in Rhodesia to ensure its own security and to improve its relations with Mozambique and Zambia. There are important economic reasons. For many years Mozambique will welcome the considerable foreign exchange earned by the 100,000 Mozambicans who work in the mines of South Africa; so equally does South Africa need their labor. Similarly, though the planned Caborra Bassa dam in central Mozambique was for long a target of Frelimo attack, now that the guerrillas are in power Frelimo intends to complete the dam in order to sell the power to South Africa, which has long counted upon such electricity. The port of Lourenco Marques, Mozambique's largest, serves as a major outlet for South Africa and thus earns substantial foreign exchange for Mozambique. Both countries want to maintain such helpful ties.

Yet if Rhodesia is still run by whites, Mozambique will feel called upon to rupture their ties, which are as profitable for both as are links to South Africa. Mozambique could close the ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques to the Rhodesians. Then they might be forced by the logic of their actions to sunder ties to South Africa. Electricity from Caborra Bassa, for example, could be cut off.

South Africa wants to protect any disruption of its own economic progress. Even more significantly, South Africa desires stability in southern Africa. It does not want to be drawn into a war in Rhodesia which could be won by the whites only if South Africa participated on a massive scale, thereby inviting retaliation from elsewhere in the Third World. It thus wants the end of its entanglements with Rhodesia.

South African strategists have also come to appreciate that the borders of their own country are much easier to defend than distant Rhodesian ones. Most of all, the South Africans believe that the now black nation of Zimbabwe will be fairly easy to control, either by the threat of pre-emptive strikes or through the promise of economic assistance.

Thus South Africans, who hold the trump cards, now regard the white regime in Rhodesia as an anachronism. With Frelimo and Zambian support, the Zimbabwe guerrillas can continue their fairly successful hit-and-run war of attrition in the northeast and east. Once these same forces threaten the urban areas, where most whites live, a white exodus would occur. Of the 250,000 whites, only about 50–60,000 are heads of families. Nearly all immigrated to Rhodesia after World War II, and therefore most have homes to which to return. It would not take too many battlefield reverses or much urban sabotage to deplete the white ranks in the army and make it impossible (without South African help) to sustain the war.

For all of these reasons, blacks can expect to accede to power in Rhodesia, probably (thanks to South Africa) by peaceful means within a year. Whether the local whites welcome them or not, there are bound to be negotiations, spurred on by relentless South African pressure on Smith.

Smith has said that he will never condone majority rule in Rhodesia. As a result, he may be pushed aside or forced to think again. He cannot continue to run against the local tides of history.

Smith's only hope of remaining in power is the existence of serious divisions among the black leaders. But both the South African and Zambian governments—strange cohorts indeed—will insist upon unity sufficient to embrace a formula which will begin with a short period of multi-racial shared power and end in black majority rule.

There is now, for the first time in a decade, the opportunity for a peaceful shift of power in Rhodesia. We are about to witness what not long ago was considered a miracle.

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### *U.S. Role in Rhodesia*

It is about time the United States enunciated a precise, unequivocal policy regarding the future of Rhodesia. Since Rhodesia's African majority is bound to oust its white minority and since (despite the infamous Byrd Amendment) the United States has never seriously backed Rhodesia's white regime, it makes no political or strategic sense to be muddy in thought or rhetoric now.

When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger goes to Central Africa next month, he would be wise to make our support for a swift transfer of power widely known. The longer the Smith government in Rhodesia stalls, the more certain large-scale bloodshed becomes. Stalling also damages the economies of neighboring Zambia and Mozambique and maximizes the likelihood of further Cuban and Soviet intervention in southern Africa.

No one—least of all the United States, Zambia, Mozambique and the black population of Rhodesia—needs prolonged instability in southern Africa. Instability nourishes fantasy, wild ambition and dreams of hegemony on the part of other outsiders. It brings closer the frightening possibility of an American involvement in southern Africa to limit chaos or to rescue whites trapped by their own foolishness.

The United States has but a few weeks to speak boldly. Since its leverage on the Smith government is marginal, we need forcefully to urge South

Africa to give no new aid to Smith. The Secretary of State should make such advice known widely. He can also pledge American financial support to Mozambique and Zambia, both of which now suffer economically because of the recent sundering of Rhodesia's direct links to the Indian Ocean.

Further, the United States can promise both technical assistance to Rhodesia's next black government and funds for the repatriation of some or all of the 250,000 whites who may wish to be relocated in South Africa, Australia, Canada or Great Britain after blacks assume power in Rhodesia. It does us little good to continue to hide behind the legal fiction that Rhodesia is a British responsibility.

The Secretary of State needs to say that a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian conflict is in the interest of everyone—including the beleaguered whites. (President Ford said as much in Wheaton, Ill., in mid-March, but his message was too muted and hedged to be heard in Africa.) Kissinger can add that whites will be able to ensure a more favorable settlement sooner rather than later, when the African guerrilla movement attacking Rhodesia will have achieved a string of successes and have received considerable outside assistance. Perhaps the Secretary of State will even want to offer to preside over accelerated negotiations.

Involving ourselves in this way is less dangerous to our interest in world and African peace than is standing by and muttering pious and well-meant but easily misunderstood phrases. We would be foolish, however, to take sides between the contending African liberation movements. The Soviet Union backs the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, and the Chinese support the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led now effectively by Robert Mugabe.

These foreign alignments may change, especially if the war against Rhodesia continues for more than a few months. At this stage choosing between one or another African nationalist faction, and thus between Nkomo and Mugabe, and their backers, is not necessary. What is important is a rapid agreement to end hostilities and transfer power.

The United States can again gain credibility in southern Africa. If it does, it may be able to influence a successful shift of governance in Namibia, the next zone of conflict after Rhodesia becomes Zimbabwe. But we must act now, and speak effectively and without seeming mealy-mouthed.

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### *The Knot That Rhodesian Negotiators Must Untie*

Cambridge, MA—The tragedy of Rhodesia is that the mere gathering of black nationalists around a conference table in Geneva may prove insufficient to produce a settlement satisfactory to all. The persuasive powers of a distinguished British chairman, the assurances of United States assistance, the support of now-pragmatic South Africans, and—should it be realized— even the public humbling of a hitherto intransigent Rhodesian white public may all be to no avail.

Black Rhodesians (the future Zimbabweans) are not yet united in ultimate purpose. All are grateful to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for his timely ability to persuade the Rhodesian regime of Ian D. Smith that whites could win a war against Chinese- and Soviet-backed guerrillas only if South Africa continued to provide overwhelming support, which it will not. Mr. Kissinger knew that South Africa was more than prepared to withdraw its backing in order to ensure a rapid transfer of power in Rhodesia to a stable black government.

Africans are pleased that Prime Minister Smith capitulated under pressure. That makes the ultimate struggle easier, for whites will no longer have the will to fight. The more-militant blacks can thus afford to see the Geneva conference fail, and to return to an accelerated military struggle. If this happens, the guerrillas will have the support of President Samora Machel of Mozambique, who still would prefer a revolutionary government to come to power in Zimbabwe through a protracted military victory.

What must be at stake for the African nationalists in Geneva is power. Whichever black group forms the new government will, the others fear, control Zimbabwe indefinitely.

Naturally, there are ideological differences between the groups. Equally, there are clashes of personality, a measure of ethnic or sectional discord and the remnants of historic animosity.

Until 1963, Joshua Nkomo, a social worker from the Bulawayo area of southwestern Rhodesia, led a nationalistic movement in what was then Southern Rhodesia, a British colony. Then the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, an American-educated Congregationalist from eastern Rhodesia, and Robert Mugabe, a teacher from northern Rhodesia who had spent several years in Ghana, formed a breakaway faction.

They claimed that Nkomo was too soft—that he compromised with whites and was uninterested in socialism. For them and their largely edu-

cated followers, Nkomo's legitimacy had been eroded by years of easy living, egregious negotiating errors, and a generally flabby approach to what they considered the hard questions of nationalistic tactics. They wanted someone more revolutionary, more ascetic, more violent.

Above all, Rhodesia is divided into two linguistic groups, Cishona and Sindebele. Sithole and Mugabe speak Cishona, and Nkomo and most of his lieutenants speak Sindebele.

Out of this ideological, personal and sectional/ethnic dispute, emerged Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

In 1971–72, when Nkomo, Sithole, Mugabe and many others were still in local jails (having languished there for seven or eight years), Bishop Abel Muzorewa, a Methodist, and several followers of both Nkomo and Sithole formed the African National Council as a temporary successor to both ZANU and ZAPU. In 1974, after the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, persuaded Smith to release Nkomo, Sithole and Mugabe, the old ZAPU and ZANU organizations were merged into the Council. But this expedient lasted only a matter of months.

Nkomo's ZAPU, Mugabe's ZANU, Sithole's ZANU, and Muzorewa's Council are at odds. Now, too, there is a fifth group with which only Mugabe, of the political leaders, has ties. It consists of the guerrillas themselves, with bases in Mozambique. They are led by Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo), assisted by a political committee whose chairman is Zinashe Machingwara. The guerrilla leadership and rank-and-file (as well as the black soldiers and policemen in Rhodesia) are predominantly Shona. Moreover, they are overwhelmingly of the Shona subethnic group called Karanga, from southern Mashonaland. (The Karanga number about 45 percent of the black population of Zimbabwe.) None of the older political leaders are ethnically close kin.

Within the black ranks, and even within the ranks of the Cishona speakers, there are serious cleavages. Only the guerrillas are now armed and trained, and only they, and the Karanga, can benefit from a breakdown in negotiations. If Prime Minister Smith remains intransigent this group will benefit. Smith's threat to conclude a settlement with "tame" blacks is not only unrealistic, it is foolish bravado.

The problem in Geneva is now to arrange a settlement that will bring about a true transitional regime without the overhanging threat of civil war. To do so may mean major concessions by whites, and even by some of the African groups, and the contriving of externally funded arrangements capable of minimizing or eliminating interethnic conflict.



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### *Final Choices in Rhodesia*

It is a time of decision for Rhodesia. Ahead of the whites are two choices: (1) a war with determined black guerrillas which, no matter how long it takes, can only result in the destruction of the comfortable life which whites now enjoy; or (2) a negotiated peace which may just possibly provide for the kind of stability under black rule which would permit whites to prosper, if not maintain power and exclusive privilege.

The first choice fits well with the head-in-the-sand posture that has guided Ian Smith's Rhodesian government since 1965. It flows from an assumption on the part of whites that a mere minority of 250,000 can indefinitely hold 6 million blacks in subjection. Simply put, choosing the first alternative accords well with a stubborn adherence to the status quo.

The second choice would reflect an awareness that life simply cannot go on for too long as it is. The war with the guerrillas has spread from the north-eastern and eastern to the western and northwestern frontiers of the country. The regular Army is stretched, and full-scale mobilization can provide additional manpower only by hobbling the country's economy. Military commanders are not overly confident about their ability to curtail guerrilla onslaughts during the next wet season, which begins in November and lasts through March. And there is a general awareness among whites that a siege economy is endurable only so long as better days lie ahead.

There are signs that confidence is ebbing. Not only do 1,600 whites leave each month (others go away on visits and never return). A former minister of defense left permanently in July. The Rhodesian Parliament opened its new session in September without the usual displays of pomp and circumstance. Austerity is everywhere the rule in government circles.

Moreover, although incidents in the cities are so far rare, this year there have been more than ever before, including a shoot-out with guerrillas in the center of the territory's third largest city. Blacks also are leaving the territory in surprising numbers, thousands having recently joined the Zimbabwe African People's Union guerrilla army in Zambia, and the Zimbabwe African National Union army in Mozambique.

Prudent men might be expected to reject the first alternative. The status quo is truly untenable. But for twelve years Smith, a wily, tenacious leader, has always managed to foster white supremacy in the face of normal rationality. He certainly cannot be expected to relinquish power simply because times are rougher and a bell has begun to toll with greater urgency.

Smith may still try to tough it out. His decision to invite British and UN representatives to talks in Rhodesia may be seen as another in a tradition of great and successful stalls. Like a slippery salmon, he has always taken the bait and then managed to plunge upstream, having discarded the hook.

Or, just perhaps, Smith may at last have done his sums sagaciously. He may know that this is the month—the last before the rains—when he can still bow to the inevitable and salvage peace with honor (and potential rights for whites). The Anglo-American peace plan (delivered to Smith in September by Ambassador Andrew Young and British Foreign Minister David Owen) contains clauses that Smith abhors: that he should hand power directly to a British commissioner, who would rule, supervise elections, and maintain the peace with a joint guerrilla and UN-sponsored military force.

Smith could avoid this outcome by simply transferring power to blacks now within Rhodesia, the most likely prospect at the moment being a coalition of ex-militants led by the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. But its following is small, he and his cohorts would be branded as stooges, and neither recognition nor the cessation of hostilities would automatically follow.

There may be a third possibility. If Smith is capable both of careful calculation and unexpected generosity of spirit he could combine the spirit of the Anglo-American initiative with some of the mechanisms of an internal settlement. He could call for elections on a one-man, one-vote franchise, promise to transfer power to the winning party or coalition (which would almost certainly be black), and go out of his way to beseech disarmed guerrillas and their leaders to return to Rhodesia to put their ideologies to the electoral test.

The crucial test of his sincerity would be the extent to which his troops permitted open campaigning by all and ran the poll (perhaps observed by the UN) with scrupulous objectivity. If Smith could bring himself thus to accomplish the main objectives of the Anglo-American plan without outside interference he could just conceivably hand over power to a black government of the people which would be almost certain to gain recognition in exact proportion to its perceived legitimacy.

Only by some such means can prolonged war be avoided and conditions capable of maximizing the chances of peace and prosperity for all Zimbabweans be provided.

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### *A Rhodesian Wallace? Tsk-tsk*

Cambridge, Mass.—Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, in attempting to solve the problems of Southern Africa, has unwisely made a villain of Robert Mugabe. Press accounts of his trip last month indicated that Mr. Vance wanted to edge Mugabe out of a new Rhodesian settlement. Earlier, a Vance aide wrongly likened Mr. Mugabe's electoral possibilities to those of George C. Wallace.

Mr. Mugabe leads one wing of the Patriotic Front in its struggle to end white rule in Rhodesia. The other wing's leader is Joshua Nkomo, whom Secretary Vance and others persist in trying to separate from Mr. Mugabe, and, somehow, to merge with the white-sponsored ongoing internal settlement that is propelling Rhodesia toward an internationally unrecognized form of black-and-white condominium.

Trying to split the Front and to graft one leader and not the other onto the corpus of the ongoing Rhodesian transition is an act of misplaced desperation. The West and the Rhodesians both have different reasons to be desperate: the West because the absence of an internationally valid solution to the Rhodesian crisis makes Great-Power conflict in Southern Africa (as in the Horn) that much more likely; the Rhodesians because their economy is crumbling (the war costs \$1 million a day), whites are fleeing, and only a quick end to the guerrilla war and the lifting of United Nations sanctions can make of the internal settlement an enduring arrangement for peace and prosperity.

Creative policy depends upon accurate assessments of local conditions and personalities. In Mr. Mugabe's case, his intemperate attacks on the British Foreign Minister, David Owen, and uncompromising stand against having anything to do with the internal settlement have clearly not endeared him to those who seek a compromise between the proponents of an internal settlement and the guerrillas. His Marxist rhetoric is strident, too, and unsettling.

But it is a very great mistake to belittle Mr. Mugabe's influence by comparing his political ambitions to Governor Wallace's Presidential ambitions. In the Rhodesian context, Mr. Mugabe has an ethnic base that cannot be dismissed. Of Rhodesia's 6.5 million Africans, about 2.5 million are Karanga—the largest single cohesive ethnic grouping in the country; Mr. Mugabe, although a Zezeru and not a Karanga, commands their political loyalty through his leadership of the Karanga-dominated wing of the Patriotic Front.

The Karanga guerrillas have since 1972 intensified pressure on white Rhodesia. From their bases in Mozambique, and with support from the Soviet Union, they are a potent (if not yet decisive) force. About 80 percent of Rhodesia's own black soldiers and policemen are also of Karanga origin. Arrangements that fail to provide for Karanga interest therefore promise little stability to the country, renamed Zimbabwe, that Rhodesia will soon become. And the dismissal of Byron R. Hove from the Justice and Law and Order Ministries will increase international and internal distrust of the interim government.

Mr. Mugabe has always shunned the kinds of sybaritic trappings that are so common among exiled liberationists. His asceticism and integrity are well known. He has managed by force of example since 1974 to give political coherence to the otherwise unsophisticated posturing of the Karanga military command. As stubborn as Mr. Mugabe sounds, only he is capable of selling an effective, fair settlement to the guerrillas.

Despite the Karanga plurality, many persist in arguing that, to succeed, all the internal settlement needs is Mr. Nkomo's accession. It is true that Mr. Nkomo, a Rhodesian nationalist leader since 1957, would bring a historic legitimacy to any internal settlement. He is an effective vote-getter; he might well be able to elicit support at the polls from numerous black Rhodesians, although his ethnic base is under 20 percent of the total.

In the future election in which he and his followers compete against the supporters of Bishop Abel Muzorewa (who could be the ethnic standard bearer of the two million Zezeru), and the supporters of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau (whose real ethnic bases and, hence, constituencies, are tiny), it is reasonable to guess that Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Muzorewa would together run a close race. (Mr. Muzorewa, Mr. Sithole, and Mr. Chirau participated in the internal settlement that is already showing signs of strain serious enough to destroy it.) But any such solution would still leave the Karanga unsatisfied, Mr. Mugabe's half of the Patriotic Front guerrillas still bearing arms, and African states and forces of the Soviet bloc anxious to force a military solution.

To isolate Mr. Mugabe and his men is a miscalculation. It would be better to pursue a policy that provides clear incentives to the interim internal government in Rhodesia, to the complete Patriotic Front, and to the frontline states of Africa. To despair and divide is to invite the kind of confrontation in southern Africa that the United States has been attempting to avoid.

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## *The Queen Could Prevent Armageddon in Rhodesia*

Must Rhodesia remain a synonym for despair?

The undeclared war between black guerrillas of the Patriotic Front and white colonists has spread with ferocity from the rural areas to the suburbs of the country's cities. Whites and blacks in their thousands are being killed, more in 1978 than in the previous four years of combat. Everywhere there is fear and pain and increasing hopelessness.

The white government of Ian Smith still prevails, but its time is fast running out. It can bomb guerrilla and civilian camps in neighboring Zambia and Mozambique, and within Rhodesia battle some guerrillas some of the time. But the guerrillas are everywhere, their recent success having forced Smith to put three-quarters of the country under martial law.

Whites no longer think that Smith's attempt to stall for time by promising elections in April, and a subsequent transfer of much of the government to friendly blacks, will succeed. Whites have already begun to vote negatively with their feet, more than 1,800 (of a total white population of 230,000; blacks number 6 million) having left for good in October. Nearly 15,000 left in 1978.

Locally and internationally the notion that April's transfer will stem the guerrilla tide is no longer believed. Recently announced constitutional changes also undercut the basis of the transfer: Even when blacks obtain a majority of the seats in the country's new Parliament, whites will retain a quarter of the Cabinet seats and control, through newly appointed commissions, crucial governmental departments like defense and foreign affairs. It is also possible—because of the arithmetic involved—that none of the cooperating black parties will be able to form a government in April without white backing.

Evolutionary changes sufficient to prevent today's bitter combat from escalating into all-out war now seem unlikely to be achieved. April's alteration will not do. The Anglo-American effort to bring Smith and Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, the leaders of the Patriotic Front, to the negotiating table seems, after many assiduous attempts in 1978, to have failed. Mugabe and Nkomo now preach a war to the end. They and their African, Soviet, and Cuban patrons see no real advantage in accepting terms less than unconditional victory.

Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, must understand this now. In May, contrary to declared United States poli-

cy, he apparently urged the Chinese to persuade Mugabe to join Smith's internal settlement. But Mugabe obviously knew that the internal settlement was only a means to perpetuate white control and could not begin to stem the tides of war.

Only Smith's departure promises a possible end, short of white collapse and black victory, to the war. On the experience of the last 13 years it is unlikely that he will realize the need to go and to give the reins to someone capable of negotiating meaningfully with the guerrillas. Only such negotiations will preserve a lasting stake for whites in the country that they have helped to develop.

Smith is letting the downward spiral of war destroy everything that has been created industrially and economically in Rhodesia. One of Africa's richest nations, and one of the few that is agriculturally self-sufficient, is being sacrificed for the chimera of continued minority rule.

If Smith will not go, and less stubborn whites will not oust him, only black triumphs on the battlefield can transform Rhodesia into Zimbabwe. Such military superiority will not come easily, however, and will not come without blacks and whites paying a ruinous price.

There is another, if unlikely, solution. Legally, Queen Elizabeth II still rules Rhodesia. It is a colony in rebellion against the Crown. Troops of the Queen, assisted logistically and financially by the United States, could resume control, sponsor and hold fair elections, and then transfer power to a majority government.

Obviously Britain's minority Labour government would be loath to take such action on the eve of national elections at home. Britain's troops are anyway pinned down in Northern Ireland. To use them and fly them would be costly. Such interference could come too late. The Patriotic Front and its African allies might oppose the takeover. So would the Soviet Union. Britain understandably would fear replacing Rhodesia as a target of guerrilla enmity.

All the objections are real; they militate against the adoption of such a simply conceived, straightforward resolution of the Rhodesian conflict. But it provides the only sure way of ending the war and ensuring peaceful conditions during the necessary period of transition. Any other option seems either incapable of ending the war or certain to ensure a massive bloodletting.

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### *Rhodesia's Election: To Observe or Not to Observe?*

When Rhodesia votes for its first black-dominated parliament on April 20, influential U.S. senators want officially sponsored Americans to observe the balloting. Only by seeing for ourselves, they say, can we be certain that the poll is conducted fairly.

But by so falling in with the desires of Ian Smith, the leader of Rhodesia's present white minority government, the senators betray naiveté about the realities of today's Rhodesia.

The question is not whether the elections will be run properly, but whether elections arranged by Smith will permit a full range of choice for black Rhodesians (or Zimbabweans, as they will soon be called). Without such choice the elections, however conducted, will be illegitimate and should have no bearing on any decision to lift sanctions.

Much more relevant is the strength and legitimacy of those who oppose white rule. The intellectual and long-established political leaders of the future Zimbabwe are nearly all out of the country, allied to one of the two branches of the Patriotic Front. The 20,000 guerrillas of the Front are increasingly besieging Rhodesia. In addition to their assaults on civil airliners and urban oil storage depots, they recently attacked the country's main airport with mortars. They are tying down about 40,000 defenders, have compelled the government to put 90 percent of the country under martial law, and harass travelers outside the two largest cities almost at will. Most traffic outside the towns moves in convoy; no one dares drive far at night.

The guerrillas are bleeding Rhodesia, and, as Smith himself has admitted, they cannot lose. Nor can whites win. A stalemate could persist for some months, with the \$1.6 million a day cost of the war escalating, Rhodesia's economy deteriorating, and whites exiting at a rate of about 3,000 a month, nearly treble a year ago. Some among the remaining 5,000 farmers (of a white population of about 230,000) only want to reap their crops this month or next and then get out. Some, in the war zone, have no crops standing, and little prospect of planting again unless and until peace returns to Rhodesia.

The elections in April cannot bring peace. Only negotiations with the guerrillas (or an ultimate surrender) will do that. Smith is once again whistling in the dark when he supposes that the installation of an internal black government could overcome the loyalty of the mass of black Zimbabweans.

Moreover, the fine print of the new, 151-page Rhodesian constitution almost ensures that, whichever of the internal black parties wins the election, it will be able to form a government only with white cooperation. Since whites will in any event control 28 of the 100 seats in the next parliament and blacks are bound to distribute about 25 percent of the Cabinet seats to whites, one of the black parties would need to take an unlikely high fraction of the total vote to avoid a coalition government with Smith's cohorts.

Smith has also arranged, via the new constitution, that whites will retain *de facto* control of the civil service, the military, the police, the judiciary, and foreign affairs through a complicated series of white-dominated, newly introduced commissions. Segregation was officially abolished last month, but it lingers everywhere, and whites, since the end of segregation, have been permitted to purchase the control of their formerly state-run schools to prevent African enrollment.

The guerrillas are powerful and strong. Each day the war continues they gain renewed legitimacy. They probably have the capacity to disrupt a large portion of the rural polling on April 20. More important, the election itself, since it can hardly lead to peace, stability, or renewed economic development in Rhodesia, is a cruel hoax. Nor will it introduce rule by all groups within the majority. To lend the dignity of the U.S. Senate, or American-sponsored observers, to Smith's latest legerdemain is therefore damaging to American self-interest.

The proprieties are not at issue. Except for scattered attempts to influence black voters, the polling itself will almost certainly be conducted chastely whether or not foreign observers are present. There is thus very little need—except for purposes of Rhodesian propaganda—to observe the form and process of the vote itself. True, the observers might notice that the turnout was low in the sections of the country under martial law. They may see rural polling places heavily protected by troops. They will see a Rhodesia traumatized, and people living on the very precipice of chaos.

But it is the essential irrelevance of the exercise that speaks to senatorial folly. The guerrillas hold the future of Zimbabwe at ransom. No electoral arrangement which ignores them makes sense. Why play an official role in an electoral charade which, whatever the detailed result, cannot alter the realities of power in Rhodesia? Why, in such dubious circumstances, give any aid and comfort to a regime which has been condemned by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and which is in the final tremors of its 13-year-long period of illegal, usurped, white rule?

Doing so would conform to no political wisdom and provide no certain international advantages. It would antagonize our closest African allies



(including a major oil supplier), and decisively put back the cause of peace in southern Africa.

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### *A Rope of Sand*

Those who would fight communism by removing sanctions against Rhodesia and recognizing a new government there would in fact accomplish the opposite. The surest recipe for disaster in southern Africa is premature support for the plan which encourages, rather than staves off, communist involvement.

The false assumption that is being made in some sections of the Congress is that American backing for a new Rhodesian government, however it is led, will make it viable and resistant to guerrilla onslaught. Unfortunately, Rhodesia's still fragile economy, its ultimate dependence upon South Africa, the fears of its shrinking white population, dissension within the ranks of the African leaders who have been cooperating with white politicians, the steady increase in recent months of guerrilla penetration of Rhodesia's cities, and the overriding fact that time is ultimately on the side of the guerrillas make this simple proposition untenable.

Taking a stand somewhere, someplace, sometime if that is what some senators want is a worthy emotional objective, but not when it ranges in the United States behind eventual losers (as in Iran), next to South Africa, and against the united opinion of black Africa. Moreover, one (but not the only) factor which heretofore has reduced the probability of stepped up Soviet support for the insurgents, and the possibility of Cuban combat involvement, has been the American alignment alongside the African frontline states. That mutuality of interest has restrained Soviet and Cuban activity. If the alliance with America is sundered, so will checks against Marxists be removed.

There is an ancillary issue, too. Last year's Case-Javits amendment directs President Carter to lift sanctions if he determines (in practice Congress could force his hand) that a Rhodesian black government has been installed by free elections, with participation by all political and population groups, and that the new government has shown its willingness to negotiate with the guerrillas.

Members of Congress are already arguing that the recent Rhodesian elections met those conditions. They say that the guerrillas could have participated, but refused. However, the truth—carefully blurred by Rhodesian reports—is that both parties belonging to the Patriotic Front guerrilla orga-

nization are banned in Rhodesia. Its members are prohibited from standing and testing their strength at the polls. As a representative of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia told a Congressional committee shortly before the elections, "The parties themselves are illegal. A fair number of their supporters were restricted once again. The names of the parties may not be mentioned, and the leaders of the parties may not be mentioned in public."

The fact that black Rhodesians went to the polls in great numbers is not disputed. However, the Rhodesian claims that 50 or 60 percent of all eligible blacks cast ballots is open to careful scrutiny. There was no prior registration. Thus the 50 or 60 percent is of an unknown figure, estimated before the election on extrapolations from census data which are themselves estimates. There have been no censuses of blacks in Rhodesia. Population figures are in dispute. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that more than 100 percent of the black voters were counted in two important districts, and 94 percent in another.

However the Rhodesians excuse this massive overcount, it is bound to cast doubt on the credibility of the overall percentage totals. In the only recent election held under comparable conditions in a nearby African territory, more than 80 percent of Namibians went to the polls. They had been registered beforehand, so the possibility of fiddled figures was limited.

Were the elections free? The Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, the leader of one of the three black groups vying for votes and an undoubted partisan, claims that there were serious irregularities. Unofficial observers sent by Freedom House, a New York private nonprofit body headed by former Senator Clifford Case (of the Case-Javits amendment) were generally impressed by the way in which the elections were conducted. American reporters glimpsed few questionable acts. But those who have filed stories in further depth wrote of workers encouraged to vote by their employers and of villagers sent to the polls by their chiefs. Few visitors could have learned of literal or subtle intimidation, if any. Such intimidation is hardly unknown in elections in Africa.

What about negotiations? Again there is a smokescreen. In the United States in October, Premier Ian Smith said that he would parley with the guerrillas. But this he has consistently refused to do. Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the most popular of the internal black leaders, and Sithole have both consistently refused to negotiate with the Patriotic Front. Only Chief Jeremiah Chirau, the least popular of the three black internal leaders, has demonstrated his willingness to talk to the guerrillas. He has, in fact, done so on several occasions.

In plain language, since the Rhodesian elections will bring to power a government dependent for its very existence upon white military and electoral support (the Cabinet will contain several whites and the government could be formed by a coalition of white and black groups), and since the installation of a new regime will widen, not diminish, the scope of the war, Americans should reserve their options. This is neither the place nor the time to make the stand against communism which should have been made elsewhere, at other times, and on firmer ground. Rhodesia is a rope of sand.

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### *Winning the Peace in Zimbabwe*

Winning the peace in Zimbabwe will prove as difficult as ending the war. Although a settlement of the 14-year-old Rhodesian dispute has at last been concluded, the agreement contains inevitable areas of ambiguity and conflicting interpretation. The events of the next few weeks will demonstrate whether the terms of the settlement can be implemented sufficiently to ensure fair elections, results which will be respected, and the formation of a strong, broadly based new government.

There are problems ahead. But they do not diminish the accomplishments of the three-month-long conference that produced the settlement. Lord Carrington, Britain's Foreign Minister, showed great skill and determination in overcoming the resistance of a well-armed and defended multiracial regime and a large, powerful force of guerrillas. Since 1965 Rhodesian whites had persisted in an illegal assertion of independence from Her Majesty's Government in London. Carrington's firm diplomacy has reestablished Britain's sovereignty. He has also made the multiracial regime led by Prime Minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front guerrillas, led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, realize that their options were limited. To settle under Carrington's guidance, he showed them, provided their mutual best chance of gaining power or a share of power in the new Zimbabwe.

Carrington's formula was sound. He first persuaded Muzorewa to break publicly with Ian Smith, the leader of Rhodesia's runaway government and its former premier. The break came when Muzorewa understood that the game of agreement was a severe diminution of white power in the new Zimbabwe. Instead of 28 of 100 parliamentary seats and a ten-year veto over constitutional amendments and changes in the composition of the judiciary, the civil service, and the military leadership, whites were limited to 20 seats and stripped of their vetoes. These 20 places in the new parliament may

prove crucial and permit a post-electoral alliance between white supporters of Smith and a black-led party that may have won less than a majority in the balloting, but at least the white stranglehold on black-led change has been removed.

Carrington then had to provide sound transitional arrangements. He persuaded Muzorewa to give up his prime ministerial role, passing power to a British governor. Lord Soames, the new Governor, has become the legislative, executive, and military ruler. He will rule by fiat, presumably installing British subordinates at the apex of each department of government. British policemen will assume control of local security. The Rhodesian Army will take its orders from Soames. Together a relatively small-sized British contingent will lay down the rules for and organize the conduct of the elections which will conclude the British exercise in temporary recolonization.

Carrington and Soames envisage a transition period lasting a mere two months between a cease-fire and elections. But the immediate and complicating problem is how to implement that cease-fire. The guerrillas rightfully fear being shot at or harassed by the official Rhodesian Army and by the South African troops which for the past few months have been assisting the Rhodesians inside and beyond the borders of the country. Carrington has promised to keep South African soldiers out of Zimbabwe and to ground the Rhodesian air force. But can he and Soames confine the Rhodesian Army to its barracks without giving an unfair advantage to the guerrillas?

Likewise, can Soames and company disarm the guerrillas effectively to limit the kind of military clashes which will inevitably bedevil the transition period? Soames will be assisted by a small Commonwealth monitoring force of 1,200 men. The guerrillas have at least 16,000 men inside Zimbabwe. They operate in about 90 percent of the countryside. Compelling compliance with the terms of the cease-fire will thus be difficult, especially since both the guerrillas and the loyalist defenders will be jittery, suspicious, and greatly fearful of losing the advantages that each thinks it now has.

The settlement does not specify how the people of Zimbabwe will vote. But the brief period allowed within which to organize an election certainly means that the poll will be conducted largely along the lines of last April's general election. Individuals will run in eight large multimember constituencies as members of party teams. This is essentially a modified Israeli system, with parties obtaining the number of parliamentary seats within the eight constituencies which directly reflect their proportion of the total national vote. This is a simple test of popularity. It permits the representation of minorities (in the case of Zimbabwe, of ethnic minorities), but it need not lead to a clear-cut victory for any of the contesting parties.

Immediately after the elections the British governor will summon the leader of the party with the largest number of seats. Then the British governor will turn over the reins of power to that leader, declare the country independent, and leave.

But the elections may not produce a clear-cut victor. Nkomo and Mugabe may maintain their alliance of war through the elections, and triumph. Or Muzorewa, Smith, and others may emerge with the most seats. Conceivably (Zimbabwe has seen strange combinations in the past) Muzorewa might even team up with Mugabe and isolate Nkomo. Or lesser lights like James Chikerema (who broke away with his supporters from Muzorewa this summer), and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole (who also broke with Smith and Muzorewa in the summer) might forge an alliance with Mugabe (and Nkomo?) in order to isolate Muzorewa and Smith. There are many possibilities, little time, and many expectations of continued instability.

To have shown how the war can be ended and to have demonstrated how a peace can be achieved is enormously to Carrington's credit. Now it is up to Soames, who will need the skill that he has previously demonstrated as a British parliamentarian and ambassador, to steer a deft course between the different Zimbabwean animosities toward the distant shore of majority rule and broadly accepted legitimacy.

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### *If Mugabe Wins in Rhodesia*

Rhodesia has enjoyed an unexpected succession of wonders. First, the settlement and successful cease-fire which ended a bloody civil war after seven years. Second, a period of transition which, thanks largely to African goodwill, big-power involvement elsewhere, and British almost even-handedness, has avoided an outright resumption of hostilities. The third, the holding of full elections, begins today. The fourth, despite the turmoil of recent weeks, is expected to be the installation about mid-March of an authentic, internationally recognized black government. It will probably be led by a well-educated, ascetic, Roman Catholic with Marxist sympathies.

The British election commission in charge of the poll has established an elaborate system to ensure that the balloting is fair and seen to be fair. Britons with previous experience as district commissioners in colonial Zambia and Kenya are overseeing the conduct of the elections in eight rambling multimember constituencies. Within each are polling stations manned by Rhodesians (a few of whom are black).

Because voters have never been registered, because the last national census was in 1969, and because time was short, the elections this week are between parties, not individuals. Indeed, unless the voters paid close attention when lists were published in the press, they will have no certain idea which persons are candidates in the constituencies.

Based upon a modified version of the Israeli method of proportional representation, the election will decide the most popular party or parties. Seats will be distributed accordingly within each constituency. However, supporters of the less popular parties may effectively be disenfranchised.

Within each constituency a party must obtain at least 10 percent of the vote to be eligible for a seat. This high threshold will help ensure stability in the new Parliament, but it distinctly favors the three most important parties.

Although nine parties are contesting the election, only three are serious contenders. They are the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), led by Robert Mugabe, the ascetic Catholic/Marxist; the Patriotic Front (formerly the Zimbabwe African People’s Union), led by Joshua Nkomo, a Methodist; and the United African National Congress, led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, also a Methodist.

These three parties are expected to divide at least 70 of the 80 seats that are being contested this week, with Mugabe and Nkomo possibly obtaining a solid majority between them. Another 20 seats, all reserved for whites, were won by former premier Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front party in a separate poll held on Feb. 14.

About 3 million Africans are expected today, tomorrow, and Friday to come to a polling station, put a cross next to the symbol of their favored party on the ballot paper, and stuff that paper into a ponderous box. Guarded by unarmed policemen, the actual polling is likely to be free and fair. Intimidation and bribery of voters will have already taken place, in some areas extensively so.

When the voting is completed in each area the weighty boxes will be carried to district counting stations. Eventually the elaborately certified count will be transferred to constituency and then to national headquarters. The actual ballots themselves, with a proper sense of the occasion, will be flown to London and preserved for a time in secure archives.

The national count is to be announced Monday or Tuesday, thus concluding an exercise in self-expression that few believed could be accomplished in so short a time (since January) and with so few outbreaks of violence. It would be wrong, however, to minimize the extent of interparty conflict on the hustings. Muzorewa has complained that his people were unable to campaign in areas dominated by Mugabe’s men. Mugabe has, in turn,

been attacked personally by men allegedly loyal to Muzorewa and to the Rhodesian security forces.

Even so, nearly everywhere there have been real campaigns and contests, especially in the crucial urban areas where at least a sixth of all Africans live. As a British official told me a few weeks ago, "We expect incidents of intimidation to cancel themselves out."

In recent days Mugabe has claimed that Lord Soames, the British governor, and his officials have openly favored Muzorewa and Nkomo. He and his followers say that the British desperately wish to forestall a Mugabe victory, if so, this is a new development, for until recently the British clearly wished to conduct a well-run poll, install a government, and depart with their last major colonial mission accomplished—whatever the subsequent chaos.

If the British have become partial, South Africa, long a critic of Mugabe, has apparently reconciled itself to his victory. Its analogy is with Marxist Mozambique, with which South Africa has had excellent and mutually beneficial relations since 1975.

Yet Mugabe, if he wins (and most observers think his party will emerge by far the largest), intends to develop Zimbabwe, the new name for Rhodesia, strikingly differently from Mozambique. Mugabe in recent weeks has attempted to reassure whites and South Africa, and has told his followers not to expect an immediate, radical overturning of the free enterprise system of what is one of the healthiest economies in Africa.

If Mugabe's party wins a stunning majority, this dampening of Marxist ardor may be easier to ensure than if he and Nkomo should be forced into an uneasy coalition. Worse, for the stability of the new country, would be an electoral result which linked Nkomo and Muzorewa, plus the whites. That would almost surely result in a resumption of the war.

By the Ides of March Lord Soames ought, unless the poll results compel new fighting, to be able to hand over power to a new president and prime minister. Doing so will mark the end of 90 years of foreign rule. But, depending upon the complexion and security of the new government, it could mean the beginning of new struggles for power, and the possibility of more bloodshed.

## *Zambia: Promise Forgone*

**K**aunda had given aid and comfort to the guerilla struggles of both ZAPU and ZANU (and the South African ANC), despite damaging Rhodesian and South African military raids and a campaign of economic dislocation. From the late 1960s, Zambia was compelled by Rhodesian blockades and the logic of its own sense of solidarity with the liberation struggle to find innovative (and expensive) methods of bringing petroleum products into its landlocked terrain and shipping refined copper, its primary export, to markets in Europe, the U.S., and Asia. But, as Zambia nobly entwined its national destiny with the fates of its compatriots to the south, so it simultaneously adopted misguided (or at least ill-considered) economic and political policies that helped to transform a promising new state into one of Africa's earliest disasters. Zambia is a tragic study of how poor decisions led to state immiseration and widespread poverty.

Nyerere, Kaunda's mentor, in 1965 abolished Tanzania's participatory parliamentarianism in favor of the all-knowing, single-party state. Nyerere rationalized this derogation of democracy in Tanzania by declaring that Africans had in pre-colonial times achieved consensus without the overt strife and competition that was fundamental to Western electoral politics. So a party leader and president (Nyerere) would decide, sometimes with the assent of a ruling oligarchy, and a subservient parliament would ratify. That was a way of rationalizing authoritarian tendencies, so common in Africa as the democratic fervor of the 1960s gave way to the heavily rationalized retention of power in the hands of an all-knowing, supposedly platonic, oligarchy.

Kaunda, still as gentle-seeming and considerate as ever, followed Nyerere down this common Cold War path of single-party, all-powerful, autocratic rule. Never an ideologue in the Mugabe manner, and less insistent on establishing a cult of personality than Kenyatta, Banda, Mugabe, or



Samora Machel in Mozambique, Kaunda nevertheless crippled his economically fragile and ethnically fractured country by adopting the popular supposed panaceas of the era. Unwittingly, and without the intentional motives of personal avarice that drove so many of his contemporaries and successors, Kaunda, his advisors, and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) hierarchy transformed Zambia from a promising to an impoverished African case, from the world's third largest producer of copper to an also-ran, and from a decently administered to a corrupt, crime-ridden, shadow of its post-colonial self. It did not have to turn out so sadly.

Zambia's gradual descent into disruptive decay began three years after independence in 1964 with presidential actions that seemed unfortunate, but hardly indicative of a devastating trend. Following a rather trivial, but racially highly charged incident involving a white butcher's misconstrued gift of a turkey to the vice-president's wife, UNIP Youth Brigade members rioted. Kaunda initially condemned the rioters. Then he interfered with the subsequent proceedings of the High Court, where the Youth Brigade ringleaders were being tried, and pardoned the chief culprit. The president, it was clear, had undermined faith in the sanctity of the rule of law (however unadapted to "local conditions" existing legislation, procedures, and expatriate judges may have seemed). The Zambian judiciary was never again independent, and Kaunda, for years to come, controlled its decisions.

Kaunda refused to rein in the Youth Brigade when it attacked the local daily newspaper and its white editor for supporting the judges and bemoaning the escalation of a white-black misunderstanding into a fracas. Nor did he act when the Brigade attacked the hapless butcher's white lawyer. Juridical niceties and freedom of expression were not, in Zambia, allowed to stand in the way of the state or its alter ego, the dominant political party. That was the message of an incident and its consequences which, possibly unwittingly, forced Kaunda's hand in directions that were unanticipated and whose long-run implications may have been too little understood.

Contemporaneous with the fall-out from the noisome turkey, Kaunda unveiled the "Doctrine of Humanism" with which he intended to guide the official and unofficial business of Zambia. Somewhat derivative of Nyerere's earlier Arusha Declaration, the new Doctrine called for a return to the (imaginary) "classless" society of pre-colonial Zambia, and the redistribution of wealth accordingly. For Kaunda, the principles of humanism transcended the "narrow" ideologies of both communism and capitalism and yet incorporated the best features of each. Economic development was important to the extent that it benefited "each individual," and not simply the collectivity. Abstract enemies were named—apathy and ill-discipline, and the

provincialism, racialism, and tribalism that had already become prevalent within UNIP. Politically, Kaunda's new "Red Book" was designed to provide moral legitimacy as representative democracy was slowly subsumed within an authoritarian framework. ("Tribalism and Politics in Zambia," *Africa Report*, Dec. 1967.)

One-party rule became a reality in 1972. In the same year, Zambia nationalized its copper mines, taking them away from the Anglo-American Company of South Africa and Roan Selection Trust of the U.S. Zambia was then producing 500,000 tons of copper a year, a level it never again achieved. Its GDP per capita in those years was about \$624 (in constant 1995 dollars); in 1999, using the same 1995 dollars, the comparable figure was \$369.

The nationalization of the mines began a process of turning virtually all private enterprises into state-owned endeavors, with disastrous results. In order to sustain development as productivity slumped and wage bills rose in the state-owned entities—"parastatals" as they came to be known—thanks to the patronage-filling opportunities within the new corporations, Zambia went on a spree of international borrowing based on anticipated high prices for copper and continued high levels of output, both of which assumptions were soon proved false. (Copper earnings fell from \$1.10 a pound in 1972 to \$.58 in 1978, but it still cost Zambia \$.65 to produce each pound.) Zambia also subsidized urban consumers and miners by imposing price controls; maize meal and cooking oil prices were kept low; farmers were paid less for their crops. The inevitable result was an exodus from rural Zambia, thus putting intensifying pressure on the services of the cities. Meanwhile, UNIP ran the country, dissent was repressed, and, even as foreign exchange and essential commodities became short and life became harder for Zambians (the war against Rhodesia also contributed), Kaunda never appreciated the extent to which his policies of personal and state control were at the root of all of the country's difficulties, and that they constituted a permanent, not a temporary, dilemma.

These misguided policies were unsustainable. By 1978, Zambia had run out of foreign exchange, payments for imports were a full year in arrears (the gap was to grow), and the country's debt had already reached billions of dollars—more than 100 percent of export earnings. No firms could import machinery to upgrade the mines or other industrial undertakings. Nor could they import consumer goods, since the state, which was broke, licensed everything. The state had killed its agriculture, too; Zambia had become the most urbanized country in Africa, with more than 50 percent of all citizens living in cities, too many employed by the mushrooming state bureaucracy.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed drastic reforms, not once but many times. Kaunda could never bring himself to implement those reforms, promise what he might. Zambia needed assistance, I wrote, but I should also have been sufficiently prescient to prescribe the tough love (from international lenders and others) that was then essential, but came many years—indeed decades—too late. (“Others Will Suffer if Zambia Is Not Saved,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 April 1978.)

Zambians had no way of voicing their own displeasure with personal privation and national mismanagement. Students at the state university periodically downed their pencils and marched in protest on State House; rural dwellers continued their silent infiltration of the cities; and there were murmurs of discontent, quickly silenced by executive action, within the party. In an election at the end of 1978, voters could not cast ballots against Kaunda’s presidential re-appointment; there was no opposition candidate. All they could do was refuse to go to the polls; to re-elect Kaunda, a 50 percent turnout was necessary. This was ensured by enticing and forcing citizens to the polls. The edifice that Kaunda had built to safeguard the all-knowing state interventionism that was then so much in vogue in Africa was thus sustained, but barely. (“A Crucial African Election,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 Dec. 1978.)

Even the arrival of Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 failed to alleviate Zambia’s parlous condition. Although shorter routes to the sea, for exports and imports, were now available, world copper prices were still far below the Zambian producer price. Cobalt, Zambia’s only other significant export, provided little help. By 1982, Zambia was one of the five most heavily indebted nations in the world. Paying overseas creditors usually took twenty-five months. Cash and barter had replaced the usual credit in international transactions. The country had ground to a halt, with most of the domestic sources of manufacturing employment dependent upon scarce raw material or machinery imports. Shortages of foreign exchange and a depreciated currency were closing those local industries, keeping goods off the supermarket shelves, and textbooks out of the university and school libraries. Zambia was dependent on imports for 50 percent of its food and on exports of copper and cobalt for 96 percent of its foreign exchange. Fertilizer was always short, for the same reasons, and crops could not be grown locally without such imports. Everything depended on permits, which depended on bureaucratic decisions, which in turn were influenced by opportunities for personal enrichment. Zambia had tumbled even further into a slough of its own making. The answer was obvious, but premature: new leadership, participatory democracy, and a return to the market econ-

omy. ("Zambia Struggles with the Plight of Have-Not Nations," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 Oct. 1982.)

During some of these same years, the rains failed for three successive annual cycles in southern Africa. South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, and Namibia all were without sufficient staple grains to feed their growing populations. ("African Economies Dangerously Mired," *Boston Globe*, 13 June 1983.)

In all of these crises, and in the midst of many other less cataclysmic ones, southern Africa tragically could not begin to cope. With so many more mouths than at the coming of independence, its countries could no longer feed the poorest of its peoples. Southern Africa had also become much more urban; famine usually was a rural phenomenon, and was a manifestation of shortages of cash as much as the true absence of local food supplies.

Periodic droughts directed attention to a set of underlying problems faced by so much of Africa during the 1980s. Although underpopulated in comparison to Asia, African and southern African population numbers had grown by 2.7 percent a year throughout the 1970s. Two countries, Kenya and Zimbabwe, claimed the highest rates of population growth in the world—about 4 percent each. Africa's population was expected to double by the end of the century; Zimbabwe would grow as rapidly. With those kinds of population growth rates, it was extremely difficult to create jobs or maintain living standards. Declining real returns to farmers had also driven many off the land.

Pressure on southern African governments for services (housing, roads, power, water, and sewerage) grew exponentially with city expansions. They also bred demands for the subsidizing of staples, as in Zambia. Exports were fetching less. Imports, especially petroleum, were expensive. Exchange rates rose appreciably and local currencies became overvalued, leading to the loss of market share, foreign exchange scarcities, import quotas, import substitution arrangements, and the devotion of scarce human resources to nonproductive regulation and interference with the regular wheels of commerce. Southern Africa could deal with these issues, I wrote, only by encouraging family planning, tightening the belts of its peoples, imposing new forms of austerity, and stimulating new forms of manufacturing. Southern Africans needed to reduce their "swollen" public sectors, "unmanageable" debts, and "vast reservoirs" of corruption.

By the end of the 1980s, Zambia's economic crisis seemed permanent. But the post-Cold War wind of reconsideration and change began blowing strongly in Zambia, as it had begun to loosen the bonds of despotism elsewhere in Africa. By 1990, Kaunda's legitimacy as the founding father of his

country had faded. Rioters in the capital demanded political changes, and food. There was a rising clamor for multiparty instead of single-party rule. The country's trade union, based on the now decrepit mining industry, wanted democracy. So did most Western-educated Zambians and university students.

Kaunda hardly knew what to do. But, less autocratic by personal inclination, and still with a touching belief in his popularity with the masses, Kaunda agreed to a referendum testing whether Zambians still wanted UNIP's dominance. Overwhelmingly, in late 1990, the people of Zambia demonstrated a preference for open democracy. In an election the following year, the new Movement for Multiparty Democracy, promising participatory governance and private enterprise, overwhelmingly defeated UNIP. Kaunda became one of the very few African autocrats to retire peacefully from office. He was succeeded by Frederick Chiluba, an articulate trade unionist. And a new cycle of difficulty began for the citizens of Zambia. Few, I wrote, expected Chiluba to govern "any more effectively" than Kaunda, whatever his rhetoric. Indeed, under Chiluba corruption became an accepted accompaniment of renewed despotism. The new regime, despite its campaign promises, "had no shame." ("Africa's Tottering Despots," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 July 1990; \*"African Winds of Democracy," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 May 1991.)

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

### *Tribalism and Politics in Zambia*

Are tribal loyalties an insuperable obstacle to the development of secure national political institutions in independent Africa? Is the weight of tribe, added to the other inherited burdens of independence, too heavy for the new states? Where stability seems to be jeopardized by conflict within the dominant political party, as in Zambia, is tribalism the cause or is it a symptom of more complex tensions within the society?

Because a direct causal diagnosis is always tempting—and also, I suspect, because the "primitive" quality of tribalism may fit unconscious Western stereotypes—analysis of contemporary African political difficulties is heavily infused with references to the "retreat to tribalism." Increasingly, evidence of cleavages along ethnic lines is employed as an all-embracing explanation for political developments that derive from much more compli-

cated factors and deserve more sophisticated study. In Zambia, for example, the results of the recent election for places in the Central Committee of the United National Independence Party (see *Africa Report*, October 1967, p. 35) have generally been ascribed to tribalism. I would argue that "class" is the more determining variable in Zambian politics today, and that the "tribal" split in the governing party is symptomatic rather than causal.

It is true that virtually all of the candidates from the Cinyanja-speaking Eastern Province and Lozi-speaking Barotseland were defeated by persons speaking Cibemba or Citonga in the UNIP election at Mulungushi in August 1967. Simon Kapwepwe, a Bemba who had been the treasurer of the party, defeated incumbent Reuben Kamanga, a Cinyanja-speaking Cewa, for the critical position of UNIP's deputy national president. Mainza Chona, a Tonga, held off challenges of Munukayumbwa Sipalo, a Lozi, and Aaron Milner, a Eurafrikan, to retain his post as national secretary. Justin Chimba, a Bemba, defeated Humphrey Mulemba, from a Lunda-speaking area, in the contest for deputy national secretary. Elijah Mudenda, from a Citonga-speaking area, won the position of national treasurer in a straight fight with Arthur Wina, a Lozi. Lewis Changufu, who speaks Cibemba, defeated Wesley Nyirenda, a Tumbuka from the Eastern Province, for the post of deputy national treasurer.

Solomon Kalulu, a Soli from a Citonga-speaking area, was unopposed as party chairman, and Grey Zulu, a Ngoni, won the post of deputy national chairman by defeating Peter Matoka, a Lunda from the Northwestern Province. (Matoka was later appointed a UNIP trustee by President Kenneth Kaunda.) Sikota Wina, a Lozi, was unopposed as party publicity director. Dingiswayo Banda, who is a Senga from the Eastern Province but is politically allied to the Bemba, retained his position as Director of the Youth Brigade without opposition. Mrs. Maria Nankolongo, a Bemba, ousted the incumbent, Mulena Mukwae (Princess) Nakatindi, a Lozi, as the leader of the women's brigade.

President Kenneth Kaunda, who had not been unaware of the dangers of holding completely free and "unrigged" party elections, had refrained from campaigning, even covertly, for any of the candidates, and had reinforced his nonpartisan stance by refusing to cast a ballot. He was visibly disturbed at the blatant call to ethnic loyalties at Mulungushi and made an angry speech condemning the vicious electioneering and logrolling which preceded the vote. Implicitly, he accepted that a Tonga/Bemba alliance had been forged to thwart the Lozi and their followers.

Yet President Kaunda coupled his denunciation of the flagrant tribal voting with an almost immediate accommodation to the resulting political

realities. He promptly shuffled his cabinet to take account of the new power structure in the party. Thus he moved the victorious Kapwepwe into the Vice-Presidency to replace Kamanga, who took over Kapwepwe's former position as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mudenda was shifted from the Ministry of Agriculture to Finance, while Arthur Wina was transferred from Finance to Education, where he may receive increased political exposure. Sipalo was moved from Labor (where his energy and decisiveness may have antagonized Cibemba-speaking trade unionists) to Agriculture; and Chona (rumored on his way out of the cabinet earlier in the year) was assigned to a new position as Minister without Portfolio, where it was understood that he would devote his full time to the affairs of the party. In sum, and despite numerous less "tribalistic" shifts at the sub-ministerial and parliamentary-secretary level, the rearrangement of the new cabinet announced in October suggested that tribalism (as popularly defined), with all of its associated infections, had triumphed in Zambia.

#### *No History of Tribal Conflict*

It would be easier to let this conclusion stand if there had been a history of tribal conflict in Zambia. In fact, there has been almost none, least of all between Bemba and Lozi. It is true that Bemba fought Ngoni and others during the nineteenth century, and that the Lozi at various times conquered the Ila and the Tonga, but there was virtually no contact between the Bemba and the Lozi. Indeed the historian, probing old antagonisms that might reemerge in modern political rivalries, would first look within the heterogeneous group of Cibemba-speaking peoples (the Bisa, eastern Lunda, Tabwa, and Ushi, all finally made subordinate to the Bemba and fully assimilated to their language during the nineteenth century) and their immediate neighbors. An analogous situation existed in Barotseland, where the Lozi came to dominate a number of subject peoples. In short, the present tribal-political cleavages do not follow pre-colonial patterns.

Zambia contains about 70 "tribes" speaking some 30 languages. Most of the languages fit within four main linguistic categories (Cibemba, Cinyanja, Silozi, and Citonga), although Southern Lunda and Luvale remain apart. During the colonial period, none of these linguistic groups obtained unusual advantages, although the Cibemba speakers were by far the most numerous. All of Northern Rhodesia (even Barotseland, the "protectorate within a protectorate") was administered with comparatively equal neglect. In some areas particular missionary societies (21 or more operated in the territory) made a special effort to promote the educational and medical advancement of their followers, but the deviation from any rough norm does not appear to have been statistically significant.



This does not mean that all of the peoples of Northern Rhodesia entered the modern economic and political sector at the same time. Nor were they equally subjected to the pressures of “Westernization.” But the colonial government showed no ethnic favoritism (as among Zambians) in employment. At first, Malawians who had been trained by the Livingstonia and Blantyre missions (both Presbyterian) filled lower-level positions in the Northern Rhodesian civil service. Later, members of most of the tribal groups of Zambia joined them, and there is little evidence of ethnic favoritism on the part of the colonial government. Economically as well, no African group gained ascendancy—since either whites or Asians controlled nearly all aspects of rural commerce. Unlike Nigeria, the animus that is directed nearly everywhere against petty traders could not be focused upon a Zambian tribe or linguistic complex. Moreover, no section of the country benefited from an excessively intricate or unusually sophisticated infrastructure. Admittedly some rural areas were relatively more isolated than others from the urban spine of Northern Rhodesia, but, once again, the resulting differences do not seem to have been significant or to have influenced the nature of contemporary political maneuvering.

Several of Zambia’s peoples seem to have entered the colonial period and emerged from it with a greater sense of pride, or, possibly, with their early esteem intact. But, within the colonial context, no particular group achieved an especially prominent level of success or domination. There was little evidence of prejudice between Africans, whether political, social, or economic: Zambians were probably too busy experiencing color discrimination by whites to manifest hostility, if it existed, against their fellows.

It was the development of copper mining, and the resulting urbanization of settlements along the line of rail that carried the ore to world markets, that brought Africans from diverse rural and cultural backgrounds into contact. In the late 1920s, after an American engineer had discovered an economically feasible way to exploit Zambia’s comparatively rich sulphide ores, the mining companies began to recruit labor from all sections of the territory. Malawians, many of whom man the mines of the Witwatersrand, and speakers of Cibemba, some of whom had already handled copper ore in the older mines of Katanga, formed the largest component of the labor force throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Although some Lozi were attracted to the copperbelt—as the urban complex in and around Nkana, Roan Antelope, and Mufulira came to be known—most of them continued to go south to Johannesburg for logistical as well as historical reasons. During the copperbelt strikes of 1935 and 1940, speakers of Cinyanja and Cibemba were prominent, and, from a linguistic point of view, Cinyanja seemed dominant on the copperbelt at that time. Only during the 1950s did Cibemba (the more



complicated language) come to be the lingua franca of the copperbelt and of Broken Hill, the midlands lead and zinc mining center.

This linguistic ascendancy paralleled the sheer increase in the number of Cibemba-speaking males resident on the copperbelt and the gradual growth in trade union and political party participation by speakers of Cibemba (not all of whom, one must remember, were tribally Bemba). The leaders of the Cinyanja-speaking group were, for the most part, from Malawi; this proved a handicap with the growth of local chauvinism, and no other tribal or linguistic group could challenge the urban Bemba in terms of size or leadership.

### *Pan-Tribal Roots of Nationalism*

In Zambia, neither the organization of trade unions nor the struggle for self-government followed tribal lines. When the Federation of African Societies became the Northern Rhodesian African Congress (NRAC) in 1948, a Lozi was elected president; his most prominent colleagues spoke Cibemba and Cinyanja, and they could count followers in all parts of the protectorate. In 1951, a militant, pan-tribal cadre gained control of the Congress (later called the African National Congress) and elected Harry Nkumbula, an Ila (of the Citonga language group) as president. Justin Chimba and Reuben Kamanga were among Nkumbula's staunch supporters and, in 1953, the a tribal Kenneth Kaunda (see below) became the secretary-general of the Congress after gaining political experience in the Bemba-dominated Northern Province.

Until 1958 the Congress showed no evidence of tribal cleavages. Its leaders were of diverse origin and seemed to present national rather than sectional sentiments. From about 1955, however, the younger elements grew increasingly impatient with Nkumbula's leadership. Several of the more able and aggressive of these militants, led by Simon Kapwepwe after his return from studies in India, were from the Northern Province, but Lozi (such as Sipalo, who had also been educated in India) and others from the Central and Northwestern regions gave this disaffection a pan-tribal cast. The composition of the NRAC itself also encouraged many neutral observers to predict that Zambia would proceed to self-government and independence without suffering the destructive pains of tribalism.

Even the open split within the Congress which led to the formation, in October 1958, of a rival Zambia African National Congress did not change this expectation. Kaunda led the breakaway Zambia Congress, while Kapwepwe and Chimba (both Bemba), Kamanga (Nyanja), and Sikota Wina and Sipato (both Lozi) were among his colleagues. The majority of the members of the new Zambia Congress were, it is true, from the Northern

Province, and the movement had its most immediate and satisfying success there; but the only area under-represented was the Citonga-speaking Southern Province. And Nkumbula's Congress remained a national organization, even after the banning of Kaunda's Zambia Congress in March 1959 and the emergence of numerous substitute political parties during the remainder of that year. He could even count upon some Bemba support, not least from the Cibemba-speaking leaders of the Mine Workers' Union.

In 1960, Kaunda emerged from prison and accepted the presidency of the new United National Independence Party. By the end of that year, UNIP clearly had surpassed Nkumbula's Congress in size and dynamism. The new party could claim branches and many followers everywhere except the Southern Province, Nkumbula's bastion, and, for legal reasons, in Barotseland. (See "What Future for Barotseland?" *Africa Report*, July 1963.) The old Congress had become an ethnic party; but the new organization was national in scope and endeavor.

#### *"Activists" and "Intelligentsia"*

From 1960, however, the ball of nationalism was carried forward primarily by activists residing on the copperbelt or in the Northern Province. For the most part, these activists spoke Cibemba and contained among their number a high proportion of the unemployed youth of the towns. UNIP's Youth Brigade became a predominantly Bemba affair, to some extent because Cibemba had by this time become the language of the dwellers of the towns. In 1961, too, rural Cibemba-speaking activists employed violence against property in the Northern Province to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the constitutional rearrangements then under discussion in London. The proposed constitution and the electoral provisions were soon altered in favor of Africans, and the activists had reason to believe that they had been instrumental in bringing about this volte-face.

But the spoils of success did not immediately accrue to the successful activists. Kaunda was clearly wary of bringing the more militant elements into the front ranks of the party at that critical time. In order to enhance the international image of Zambian nationalism, as well as to reinforce UNIP's appeal to white voters in the 1962 elections, Kaunda and the Central Committee chose their key candidates from among the previously non-political African intelligentsia, not from the ranks of the party faithful. Even after the election of 1964, the leadership of the party reflected its new image as much as its original complexion. In so consciously seeking to represent all sections of the country in the upper echelons of the party, Kaunda may unwittingly have focused attention on tribal origins.

By the time of independence in 1964, it was generally accepted that the cabinet was divided into two factions, popularly labeled Bemba and Lozi, with followers at the sub-ministerial level and within the ranks of the party. Officially, no such split existed: the press never wrote openly of dissension and, in fact, no particular political decisions could ever reliably be interpreted as factional victories. There were no public or semi-public displays of acrimony. Nor is there hard evidence that the existence of the split inhibited the decision-making ability of the cabinet.

The split was nonetheless very real, and superficially it did appear to flow along tribal lines and to reflect instinctive hostilities. But closer examination makes it evident that "tribalism" is an inadequate description for the Zambian malaise. In the Zambian case, among others in Africa, tribalism may merely be a European-coined euphemism for sectionalism. There the existence of "tribalism" reflects the manipulation of loyalties to tribe or language for personal political ends. This manipulation is encouraged by the concentration of power in a few hands, and, primarily, from the lack of any well-trying institutional means of limiting the continued exercise of such power.

The "split" in the cabinet is basically between the university graduates and the party stalwarts, and it both reflects and encourages the pronounced division within the party between the more recent recruits from the "intelligentsia" and the pre-independence party activists. In the eyes of the old hands, the intelligentsia has received an excessive share of the accoutrements of power; the activists who created the United National Independence Party and rightly claimed to have put it in power naturally want rewards commensurate with their expectations.

#### *Case of the Unwholesome Fowl*

The approach of the activists is exemplified in the curious case of the unwholesome fowl. In early February 1967, one of Vice-President Reuben Kamanga's servants purchased meat from a butcher shop in Lusaka owned and managed by Carlo Ottino, an alien with long residence in Zambia. Ottino, who failed to sell all of his Christmas turkeys, gave one of the fowls to the servant to take home as a gift to the Vice-President's wife. Unfortunately, the fowl may have passed its prime; Mrs. Kamanga complained that she had been insulted, and that Ottino had used abusive language when she accused him of sending a bloated bird to her table. The health committee of the Lusaka City Council immediately made an inspection and ordered the butchery closed on sanitary grounds. Ottino and his controversial lawyer, Colin Cunningham, countered by swiftly obtaining a High Court injunction preventing the Council from shutting the shop. After being closed on a Friday, the butchery opened for business the next morning.

Up until this point, the case had attracted only minor interest. Early on Sunday morning, however, more than 150 shouting members of the UNIP Youth Brigade drove to the shop in three trucks belonging to the City Council. In broad daylight they hurled bricks and stones at the windows of the butcher's shop, while Ottino fled from the howling mob. Eustace Mumba, secretary of the Youth Brigade for the Lusaka constituency, said that his followers wanted to demonstrate against Ottino because they could not "tolerate any white chap treating us like in the colonial days."

President Kaunda immediately condemned and deplored the attack on the butcher's shop. He told a press conference that peaceful demonstrations were proper but "to take the law into their own hands is something that this government and this party cannot allow." At the same time, however, he criticized an editorial in *The Times of Zambia* which had acidly denounced the "young fools" and "party thugs" who had disgraced their parent party and sullied the rule of law.

It was clear that none of the 150 party youths could be brought swiftly to justice. Witnesses were unavailable and the *Times* reporter who accompanied the mob probably feared the consequences of identifying the ringleaders. Instead, on behalf of the butcher, Cunningham pressed a charge of contempt of court against Mumba and Mayor Whitson Banda of Lusaka (who had supposedly told a reporter of the *Times* on the day before the attack that anyone trying to defy the Council would be responsible for "any consequences that may follow").

The hearings were prolonged, the argument revolving around the evidence of two reporters to whom Banda and Mumba had made their potentially hostile comments. Justice Ramsay, a British judge of the High Court whose conduct of the case elicited criticism in legal as well as political circles, concluded that Mumba's statement, and the actions which he may have incited, seriously undermined respect for the rule of law. The youth leader received an unusually severe sentence of 12 months in jail, and it is not clear whether he was advised that his contempt could be purged by a simple apology. Mayor Banda received a six-month sentence, which he appealed.

To everyone's surprise, Mumba's stay in jail was very brief. Seven days after the youth leader was detained, President Kaunda exercised the executive clemency clause in Zambia's constitution and remitted the sentence. Kaunda gave no reasons for his action, but a spokesman said that the prerogative of mercy had been exercised for reasons "quite divorced from the judiciary." After meeting with the President, Zambia's judges publicly accepted this explanation. To most observers, however, it appeared that political considerations, and more specifically the power of the Youth Brigade, had moved the President to use his constitutional prerogative. This

assessment was given greater credence when the President made no move to release Mayor Banda. (When Mayor Banda's appeal was heard a few weeks later, the three British members of the Appeal Court overturned Justice Ramsay's original decision and Banda, too, was free.)

The case opened up a new and politically charged argument on the rule of law in Zambia. Many in the ruling elite wanted local law to reflect indigenous conditions and mores. They contended that the country's expatriate judges, some of whom had served in Zambia during the colonial period, were responsive to a British conditioning which did not reflect African conditions. Would Mumba, they asked, have been convicted of contempt had he been tried by Zambian judges?

The favorable decision on Banda's appeal could have closed the case of the unwholesome fowl, but it did not. In the course of the contretemps, party officials and the Lusaka City Council had condemned *The Times of Zambia* for its outspoken support of the judiciary. Youth Brigade delegations had demonstrated outside the offices of the newspaper. One placard referred personally to Editor Richard Hall: "*Hall of Times of Lies is a mental home candidate for calling us stupid. Hall why can't you control your stupid journalists, some of them are spies.*" A police guard was provided for the offices of the newspaper and Hall's home. During the colonial era, Mr. Hall had been similarly vilified by whites for his ardently pro-African position.

Cunningham was awakened by the police one morning at 4:30; his office and home were searched and papers confiscated. Ottino was detained for a few days for refusing to answer inquiries posed by immigration officials. Both eventually fled to Rhodesia, and were promptly declared prohibited immigrants in Zambia. Cunningham's wife was deported.

In the popular view, it seemed that the activists had won a signal victory, that Western notions of the rule of law were incapable of being applied universally, and that juridical niceties were not to be allowed to stand in the way of the Zambian state or its alter ego, the dominant political party. Certainly the judiciary and the press seemed chastened. Yet a few months later Mumba (a Bemba) was quietly transferred away from Lusaka, and his immediate superior, Sefelino Mulenga (a Bemba), was placed in a sub-ministerial position in order to remove him from day-to-day party responsibilities.

### *The "Doctrine of Humanism"*

President Kaunda has meanwhile served notice on the party and the nation that he personally intends to oppose the growth of particular tribal or personal power blocs within the party or the nation. In his "Doctrine of Humanism," first set forth in April, the President articulated ideas which he had long cher-

ished and publicized, but this was the first time he had brought them together in a fully elaborated political, social, and economic program. There were some stylistic resemblances to Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere's earlier Arusha Declaration, as well as some use of the Arusha model in developing the economic passages, but the basic philosophy was Kaunda's.

"Zambian Humanism" calls for a return to the "classless" society of pre-colonial Zambia, and the redistribution of wealth accordingly. Man is designated as the focus of society and of all the activities of the party. President Kaunda sees it as a doctrine which transcends the narrow ideologies of capitalism and communism, crudely defined, and yet incorporates the best features of each. Economic development is important only to the extent that it benefits each individual of the nation, and not simply the collectivity.

Toward the end of his forthright exposition of Humanism, President Kaunda named the enemies of his doctrine: "Human nature being what it is, we have got to think of those who might be apathetic, those who want to deviate from the Party line, either because they do not like discipline or simply because of their own selfish reasons. There is, of course, tribalism, provincialism, racialism and bureaucracy. Of course, all these evils are dangers not only within the Party but perhaps even more so in Government."

At the party congress at Mulungushi in August, Kaunda pursued the Humanism theme. He told the party delegates that they should all be working to establish a man-centered society: "It is important to state that the most important single unit in our democracy is man himself, and let me emphasize that this man is not defined according to his color, tribe, religion, creed or political leanings. Indeed, not even his material contribution is considered. It is simply that he is man, the beginning and the end of everything on earth. With this as our understanding we are now engaged in the process of democratizing the whole structure of the people's Government. This is a very difficult job to do in that it is a continuing process."

Humanism did not appear to be in the forefront of the delegates' minds, however, when they cast their ballots on the last day of the Mulungushi conference. Although the results were close, they seemed to signify a critical reversal for the President's anti-tribal campaign. It is true that speakers of Cibemba were more numerous among the delegates than those of any other linguistic persuasion, and that the supporters of Kapwepwe had greater political experience than delegates of other backgrounds. The fact remains, however, that the "stop Kapwepwe" movement was carried forward and also defeated by logrolling and sectional campaigning. From the President's point of view, the party suffered a grievous blow from which it might take considerable time to recover.

The disaster seemed greater when it appeared that the ballot boxes had been stuffed (fortunately the votes had merely been poorly counted and the adjudicated recount provided a very similar result to that originally announced) and when Sipalo refused to be downgraded. He resigned from the party in protest, and thought about joining Nalumino Mundia (a Lozi who had been cast out of UNIP earlier in the year for vociferously opposing his own ministers) in opposition. If the Wina brothers had joined the other two, the Lozi political establishment would, in opposition, have posed a serious threat to the stability of the state. In the end, however, Sipalo acceded to Kaunda's wishes, Kamanga loyally accepted his demotion, Arthur Wina followed suit, and nothing was heard from Sikota Wina.

In October, President Kaunda lashed out at "small-minded people who went round to preach that Zambians were being dominated by the Bemba." In Lundazi in the Eastern Province, he asked party members whether they could "honestly believe that I in my position, believing as I do in God, believing as I do in Humanism, believing as I do in Christianity, believing as I do in common man, would let one tribe dominate other tribes in Zambia?"

### *Kaunda's Difficult Role*

The party elections did not change, but only gave new emphasis to, the peculiarly difficult political role which President Kaunda must play as he also copes with the practical problems arising from Zambia's landlocked geographical placement and the political and economic pressures generated by the success of UDI in Rhodesia. Kaunda's great strength is that he has never been identified with any tribal or other bloc. He was always the leader of all of the people, and none of his actions before or since independence has detracted from the image that he is "above tribe" and opposed to all forms of sectionalism. Indeed it is his a tribal origins that specifically provide one of the main keys to the President's present success and importance. Although he was born in the heart of Bembaland and grew up there on a Presbyterian mission station, his parents were both originally non-Zambian, and he is not considered "another Bemba."

In sum, Kaunda is the critical fulcrum on which the contending political forces in Zambia are balanced. Indeed, it could be said that the existence of such forces strengthens his own lone hand. He is both an intellectual and an acknowledged member of the "old guard"—the activist wing—of the party. He suffered imprisonment to lead Zambia to independence, and few in Zambia question his zeal, courage, and ability. He qualifies both as the "father of his people" and as the "builder of the new nation," and can pre-



side amicably over both wings of the party. The tension between the Kapwepwe/Banda faction and the Sipalo/Wina faction as they jockey for power has not materially affected Kaunda's relations with either group or his ability to work with both in the councils of party and government. His long friendship with Kapwepwe—which goes back to childhood—is especially important, for it may inhibit Kapwepwe's ambitious supporters from seeking the presidency of the party.

President Kaunda is indispensable, certainly in the short run. No other Zambian in politics has his ability to command the loyalties of all sectors of society. Without him and everything for which he stands, Zambia's vaunted stability might prove extremely evanescent. But to say this is not to say that his task is or will be one of keeping one tribe from attacking another. Rather, only the President's appeal to a national cause can override the call of contending politicians to tribal arms.

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### *Others Will Suffer if Zambia Is Not Saved*

John Mwanakatwe, Zambia's minister of finance, last month admitted what others had known for months: the world's third largest copper producer was on the verge of economic collapse. Foreign exchange reserves provided only a few days' cover, import bills were almost a year in arrears, the internal debt was of catastrophic proportions.

Yet Zambia is no third world "basket case." Its problems cannot be dismissed by the developed leaders of the West. For if Zambia really should collapse then it will drag much of Africa, which has similar problems, and American policy down with it.

Kenneth D. Kaunda, Zambia's mild-mannered President, espouses a gentle form of socialism which he calls humanism. By the standards of Africa his rule is more benevolent than arbitrary and more collegial than personalistic. The press is a contradiction: although government owned, it is encouraged to criticize, sometimes rather caustically. The judiciary is not fully controlled, and the one-party Parliament contains some outspoken opponents of official policies. Recently, too, prominent Africans hitherto publicly antagonistic to Kaunda and his government were welcomed back into the ruling United National Independence Party and promised legislative seats.

Zambians are accustomed to a higher standard of living than most other Africans. Of all Africans they are the most highly urbanized, about 50 percent



of them living in cities. Despite socialism they are bourgeois, consumer-oriented, and more entrepreneurial than many.

But Zambia's prosperity has been based almost exclusively on the mining of copper from aging mines. Two years ago, when the price of copper plummeted from \$1.10 to 70 cents a pound, Zambia began more and more to live beyond its means. With the world price of copper still around 58 cents a pound while Zambia's costs of production have risen to about 65 cents a pound, the Zambian state finds itself steadily draining its resources and its reserves.

Wholly dependent upon copper, Zambia has no other means of obtaining foreign exchange. It has to keep producing, even at a loss. For without foreign exchange, Zambia cannot buy the machinery needed to keep the mines working, import the consumer goods to which its citizens have become accustomed, or pay for the arms with which it defends itself from Rhodesian and South African attack.

Zambia has for long neglected agriculture. For one thing, the state-run organizations which are supposed to provide fertilizer, credit, and markets for farmers have proven inefficient. There are too few incentives to motivate residents of rural Zambia. And, because of the attraction of employment in the mines and in the urban-based, swollen bureaucracy, the open spaces of Zambia contain few able-bodied males. Zambia, about the size of France, Spain, and the Low Countries, has become citified too fast, and without balance. Kaunda and his colleagues are desperately trying to persuade Zambians to return to their rural homes, but their chances of success are limited.

Zambia has some major structural defects, too. It has lengthy and costly transportation routes along a Chinese-built railway to the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam or via a ferry crossing by road through Botswana to South Africa. The other railway route, through Angola, has been cut since 1975. If Rhodesia were under black rule Zambia could use a more efficient rail route to South Africa or to Mozambique. These real distortions increase the cost of both imports and exports.

State control of most of Zambia's industry, the vast number of civil servants needed to staff the industries, and the notorious lack of efficiency of the state-run concerns also inflate the cost of goods and are responsible for periodic scarcities and the kind of consumer dissatisfaction which no leader wants, especially prior to a national election.

The national election is scheduled for October, when Kaunda's mandate may be challenged. Economic catastrophe obviously imperils his rule. So does the proposed cure. If the International Monetary Fund, to which Zambia is appealing for a major loan to stave off bankruptcy, insists upon

closing a mine and throwing thousands of Zambians out of work, or on strict import restrictions, Kaunda's political fortunes will prove grim.

Kaunda alone, however, stands against further denials of human rights to Zambia's 6 million citizens. Only he can prevent sectional and ethnic conflict. He is also a bulwark against Soviet and Cuban involvement in any escalated war over Rhodesia.

For all these reasons Zambia needs American assistance. It should not be written off as another example of African collapse, even if many of Zambia's problems are of its own making. If Zambia should fail, American hopes for a stable transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia would be harmed, perhaps irreparably. Zambia deserves imaginative, not punitive, attention.

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### *A Crucial African Election*

When Zambians go to the polls on Dec. 12, they will be voting as much on issues connected with the liberation of southern Africa as on parochial issues of local concern only. Zambians, unlike most other black Africans, are intimately and directly affected by each and every twist in the fortunes of the struggle for Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa.

They will cast ballots for a president and a parliament of 110. President Kenneth Kaunda, who has dominated Zambian political life since independence in 1964, is the only candidate for that office. But to be elected he must obtain at least 50 percent of the valid vote.

Since Kaunda is unopposed, and has guided Zambia through difficult economic and political times since 1964, his own election should present few problems. However, Zambia is seething with discontent, and voters have no other mechanism for demonstrating their displeasure than by refusing to affirm Kaunda. True, in the individual constituencies voters have been permitted by the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) to decide between one or another of the candidates for each seat approved by the UNIP central committee. (There has already been a primary election, where the multiplicity of UNIP-approved candidates was reduced in each constituency from six or more to two or three.)

But ordinary Zambians know that the victors in these local elections will, when in parliament, have very little influence on national policy of significance, particularly policies relating to the liberation of southern Africa. The president and the party central committee (Zambia has been a one-party

state since 1972) will instruct members of parliament on their duties as representatives of the people. Moreover, UNIP itself hinted at the irrelevance of parliament in Zambia (as in many African nations) when Kaunda and its central committee in November prohibited several victors in October's primary election, including a prominent ex-cabinet minister who had served an urban constituency for many years, from contesting the final election. He was thought to be too critical of Kaunda.

Voting for and against Kaunda has therefore become a way—indeed the only legal way—for ordinary Zambians to criticize both the centralization of power in the hands of the President and UNIP and the arbitrary use of that power. Moreover, of overriding importance, many Zambians now object to the use of that power to yoke the life of Zambians to the Rhodesian, Namibian, and South African freedom struggles. Since at least 1965 they have felt their standard of living fall in order to help support the United Nations-sponsored boycott of Rhodesia. They have also played a crucial role in the liberation struggle by providing camps and transit facilities for guerrillas fighting against South African control of Namibia and white control of Rhodesia.

Within the last few months most Zambians have become painfully aware of the costs of such support. In late October and early November Rhodesian aircraft bombed guerrilla camps in Zambia, killing hundreds. The bombings and the ability of the Rhodesians to invade Zambian territory and airspace gave Zambians a real sense of insecurity. In Lusaka, the capital, Africans turned for a few days in frenzy on resident whites. This in turn made white farmers, the mainstay of Zambia's agricultural productivity, anxious. They complained of harassment by guerrillas from training camps near Lusaka. Most Zambians suddenly realized that their own police and army were numerically smaller than the guerrillas, and far less well-armed. Had Zambia become a hostage to guerrilla fortunes?

In order to prevent consumer discontent and to nurture the maize on which Zambia feeds itself, Kaunda had been forced in October to import American-provided fertilizer through both South Africa and Rhodesia. He had closed the railway from the south in 1973. Now he had to reopen it, a decision greeted as long overdue by most Zambians, and as politically astute by commentators. But whether Zambia's recurrent shortages of basic consumer goods like salt, flour, sugar, tea, and coffee will have been relieved sufficiently to affect the vote on Dec. 12 is not yet clear.

If for one of several reasons Kaunda receives less than 50 percent of the vote, or 50 percent but on a very low percentage poll, or the vote count is thought to be rigged, Zambia could be plunged into the kind of political

insecurity which could lead to bitter street fighting between Bemba-speaking opponents of Kaunda and other Zambians, the exodus of the foreigners, who now provide the technical expertise to help run the country's copper mines and other industries, and a military takeover.

Unless Kaunda receives a solid mandate from the voters, there is almost certain to be a moderation in Zambia's steadfast support for the liberation of southern Africa. In turn this may compel the guerrillas to strike more insistently at the Rhodesian white heartland, and, conceivably, to request direct assistance by Cubans and Russians.

Observers have in the past questioned Kaunda's political acumen. But even those who are aware of discontent, and therefore of potential instability, may again be fooled on Dec. 12 by Kaunda's ability to persuade his electorate that only he knows how to mix idealism and practicality in the correct proportions.

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### *Africa Needs to Clean House*

With the world in recession, the plight of the nations of the third world, particularly those of Africa, becomes increasingly acute. Dependent as so many are on the export of primary products for which world markets and prices have deteriorated, they suffer deeply. It is clearly in the interest of the West to help Africans reach the level of development which will help them take advantage of improvements in the world economy and permanently to avoid future recessions. But how?

The nations of Africa clamor for massive redirections of the flows of trade, and of stabilization schemes for commodities like cocoa and copper which would provide steady profits to indigenous growers and miners. But the administration of President Reagan is hostile to these and analogous suggestions, as it again demonstrated earlier this month at the United Nations conference on the environment in Kenya. Other Western governments are also opposed to most of the proposals of the developing countries regarding raw materials, seabed mining, or levels of guaranteed assistance.

Accelerating African development, or even arresting the decline in African growth, will not come about by any rapid restructurings of the international economic order. Indeed, before the West can help, Africa needs to address its own complex problems with energy, intelligence, and integrity. That is the sober message of a recent, controversial World Bank report

called "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action."

What the report concludes, many African economists only assert in private. In the 1960s and 1970s, the first two decades of black African independence, the new nations pursued strategies of economic growth which poorly used their own human and physical resources. They biased their own economies against agriculture, turning the terms of trade away from the common man and transforming themselves from food-sufficient countries into net food importers. They created economically draining, inefficient public sectors. They poorly utilized the foreign assistance and foreign investment which they attracted.

As a result of the deficiencies of the two initial decades of independence, only two or three African countries feed themselves. Some, like Zambia, are more dependent on the export of single commodities than they were at independence. Some, again with Zambia in the lead, are massively more urbanized than they were during the colonial period.

Fertility is a problem. Although underpopulated in comparison with Asia, Africa's population increases have outstripped its real rates of economic growth. At an average yearly increase of 2.7 percent in the 1970s, Africa had the highest rate of growth in the world. Zimbabwe and Kenya had increases of about 4 percent per year. By the year 2000 the population of Africa will double, to nearly 700 million, and Zimbabwe and Kenya will better than double their present populations of 7 and 16 million without the ability easily to create jobs or even maintain current, low standards of living per head.

Moreover, high net population increases and declining agricultural returns have driven Africans off the land. In 1960 three cities in Africa had populations greater than 500,000. Now there are 28. Pressure on the governments of Africa for urban services increases exponentially with the growth in cities. Moreover, cities breed demands for subsidized staples, which in turn lowers the real returns to the farmer and encourages a further cycle of migration to the towns.

Africa has seen its hopes for real growth dashed despite the grand plans of the 1960s and early 1970s. Not only have there been too many new mouths to feed, and too little demand for commodities like copper, sisal, cocoa, and cotton, but imports (especially petroleum) have become so much more costly that several countries now devote all of their export earnings to the purchase of fuel and food. Soon, as has happened to several, their balances of payment collapse and the International Monetary Fund enters the scene to order a mandatory housecleaning and a devaluation of currencies.

Increasingly during the 1970s African countries let their exchange rates rise appreciably, and their currencies become over-valued. This led to the loss of the market shares of commodity exports, to foreign exchange scarcities, to imposed import quotas (rather than devaluation), wasteful import-substitution and noncompetitive local industrialization, and the devotion of high proportions of scarce administrative talent to nonproductive regulation and restriction of the economies. The cycle of negative growth, near national bankruptcy, and lowered standards of living can be broken. To do so, however, the leaders of black Africa will have to tighten the belts of their people and lessen their sometimes overweening expectations of development.

They will have to listen to their own planners, most of whom have had their advice rejected on grounds of political expediency. They will want to find a means of encouraging birth control. They will have to rearrange their economies in ways which may cause political dissent, and many may be too weak to do so.

The West can help by targeting its aid to those who are conscious of the need to clean house. But since housecleaning will be labeled by some as capitalism, when it may simply be common sense, the road to economic reform in Africa may be long and rocky.

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### *Zambia Struggles with the Plight of Have-Not Nations*

Zambia, its economic promise largely stifled by the world's recession, high petroleum prices, and persistent low prices for base metals, has the national problems which are symptomatic of the third world. Inherent instabilities pose serious problems for the West as well as, in Zambia's case, for Zambians and Africans generally. As the world's third-ranking copper producer, Zambia prospered, particularly in the 1950s and after independence in 1964. But in real terms, a ton of copper fetches less in the 1980s than at any time since about 1958.

Meanwhile, the costs of producing a ton of copper in Zambia have risen in real terms. Each ton Zambia exports is sold at a loss. Yet the nation has no other significant source of foreign exchange and has thus continued to export refined copper year after loss-making year. Metal specialists expect no near-term return to high demand for copper or other base metals. Even Zambia's strategic supplies of cobalt fetch low prices.

Based on the good years of copper, Zambia expanded an already highly geared and comparatively modern economy in accord with healthy returns

from copper sales. It built roads and schools, necessary after colonial neglect; began spending large sums on military hardware; and created a number of state-owned industries, financial institutions, and service operations. The bureaucracy naturally grew.

Led by President Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia emerged from the 1960s as an important and respected middle-rank African power. During the white insurgency period in Rhodesia (1965–79), Zambia was on the front line between white and black in Africa and suffered economic and military blows as a result of its support for the guerrilla insurgencies against Rhodesia and South African control of Namibia.

When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980, Zambia's problems were expected to end. Instead, they intensified. Copper prices continued to fall. Foreign-exchange reserves steadily declined. Zambia borrowed. Today it is among the five most indebted third-world states, according to the International Monetary Fund. It also has an overvalued currency, and serious problems with the IMF.

The ordinary payments queue for Zambians to change money into dollars has been about 25 months long for several years. Manufacturers of commodities, like pharmaceuticals, often refuse to supply Zambia without cash payment. For that reason the mines lack essential plant and spare parts, the Ministry of Health cannot ensure steady supplies of vaccine, a soft-drinks monopoly cannot produce for want of caps, and local flour mills have flour but no sacks. In general, most of the industries developed in the 1960s and '70s to permit Zambia to become self-sufficient (auto assembly, tiremaking, and so on) largely depend upon imported parts and raw materials.

In early September, the minister of agriculture reported that he was "battling" with the Bank of Zambia to arrange a means of paying for about \$4 million worth of fertilizer which had been shipped from overseas but was held up at ports in South Africa. Likewise he was upset that the bank was withholding foreign exchange with which to pay for emergency supplies of seed maize. Zambia's farmers sow in November and depend upon seed maize and fertilizer.

Zambia is in many ways an extreme example of acute national distress in the third world. In addition to its long-term reliance on a single raw material, copper, for about 96 percent of foreign-exchange earnings, and its overwhelming dependence on expensive imported petroleum, it must also import about 50 percent of its staple food. In the colonial period and into the 1960s Zambia was largely self-sufficient in maize, meat, and milk. But with rising African incomes, neglect of the indigenous farming community, and hostility toward the few but productive white maize, tobacco, and beef farmers,

supplies of basic foodstuffs grew less and less sufficient. Most damagingly, Zambia made the mistake of most new third-world governments. Instead of providing realistic economic returns for farmers (black and white), the state subsidized consumer costs for urban dwellers.

Because staying at home on the farm made less and less economic sense, and because the state catered to townsmen, rural dwellers swelled the populations of the cities. By 1980 Zambia had become 60 percent urbanized, arguably the most intensely citified sizable country in the third world. This increase has put new and expensive pressure on the social services of the urban areas of the country.

During a long period of economic weakness Zambia has been unable to satisfy the aspirations of its urban and increasingly middle-class population. The impact of the world recession has intensified its already serious problem of widespread unemployment. Housing is short. Food scarcities recur, and the state-owned corporations frequently report an inability to supply first this and then that basic commodity.

In an atmosphere where mismanagement and inefficiency are taken as norms, and foreign-exchange permits or supplies of essential goods are crucial prerequisites of privilege, the temptation for officials to embezzle, steal, and be bribed is common. In September, for example, the minister of power, transport, and communications was officially accused of embezzling large sums from a disaster relief fund.

The West worries about whether countries like Zambia will simply lose the ability to satisfy their citizens, pay their debts, and avoid being perpetual charges on the world welfare system. The primary producers of the third world have asked for relief from the West in terms of guaranteed high prices for raw materials. The West wants a curb on corruption and politicized, ideological mismanagement.

At the moment there are few workable solutions which would be acceptable either to the free-enterprise nations of the West or the state-controlled economies of Africa. Without a solution, it is clear that authoritarianism and military rule, bankruptcy, and further downward economic spirals are certain to mortgage the growth and prosperity of the many countries in Zambia's precarious position.



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### *The Economic Crisis Spreads in Africa*

When the West tightens its economic belt, much of the Third World feels a desperate pinch. As this year's recession in the developed, largely northern world has worsened, so the economic problems of the developing and less developed countries, many of them in Africa, have become more acute.

Africa's relatively recent inability to feed itself, coupled with its twin dependence upon imports of critical foodstuffs and finished goods and exports of raw materials, had made the nations of the continent particularly vulnerable to the shifting terms of world trade. But the deterioration of the market for primary products has worsened an already serious plight. Zambia, for example, depends almost exclusively on copper for foreign exchange, as the Sudan depends upon cotton. But prices for these and other commodities have plunged to new lows while the costs of fuel and debt servicing have soared. Cotton no longer covers the Sudan's petroleum bill. Zambia, like Zaire, loses money on each ton of copper.

As a way to overcome the cycle of economic feast or famine, the nations of Africa have asked the West for massive redirections in the flow of trade and for stabilization schemes for commodities such as cocoa, cotton and copper that could provide steady, modest returns to growers and miners. The producers want to smooth out the peaks and valleys in the Northern-dominated economic trade cycles.

But America and most other sizable consuming nations of the West have been hostile to these and similar suggestions. They've rejected African pleas for guaranteed levels of both economic assistance and crop or mineral purchases, or any other interferences with the free flow of world trade. It is evident that arresting the decline in African growth—much less the continent's development—cannot depend upon a restructuring of the international economic order.

Even if such a reform were at hand, Africa would still need to overcome the obstacles to economic advance that are of its own making, and capable of being attacked (if not easily overcome) at the national level. Africans now bemoan their own massive population increases, catastrophic food deficits, swollen public sectors, dampening of entrepreneurial initiatives, unmanageable debts, overvalued currencies and vast reservoirs of corruption.

It is now clear that in the 1960s and '70s, when the nations of Africa were freshly independent, they pursued strategies of growth that poorly used their own human and physical resources. They decisively biased their own

economies against agriculture, turning the terms of trade away from the common man and transforming themselves from food-sufficient to food-deficient.

The nations of black Africa created uneconomic, inefficient public sectors. Large amounts of foreign aid were squandered. Foreign investment, which initially flowed in reasonable amounts, was rebuffed, attacked or harshly controlled.

As black Africa entered this decade, only two or three countries were capable of feeding themselves.

Many of the countries of Africa, like Zambia, are now much more dependent upon the export of single commodities than at independence. Some, again with Zambia in the lead, are massively more urbanized than during the colonial period. Urbanized populations demand costly modern services and low or stable prices on commodities such as cooking oil and flour, which often requires state subsidies. But every subsidy drains productive capital and, most critical, lowers the prices received by farmers, who eventually give up and stream to the cities.

Almost everywhere in Africa governments have both neglected rural producers and, by arbitrarily deflating their real rates of return, have made life on the farm intolerable. These perhaps well intentioned but misguided actions, when coupled with the attraction of the brightly lit and glamorous cities, has encouraged one after another cycle of migration off the land. In 1960, Africa had three cities with populations of more than 500,000. Now there are 28.

Fertility adds to these problems. Although under-populated in comparison with Asia, Africa's new numbers have outstripped its real rates of economic growth. At an average yearly increase of 2.7 percent in the '70s, Africa had the highest population increases in the world. Zimbabwe, Kenya and several of the homeland areas of South Africa are growing at about 4 percent a year.

If this pace continues to the year 2000, Africa will double its size, to nearly 700 million. Zimbabwe and Kenya will more than double their populations of 7 million and 16 million without the ability to create jobs or even maintain current low standards of living.

The International Monetary Fund, asked to intervene in country after African country to prevent fiscal collapse, has urged governments to curb their population increases, devalue long over-appreciated currencies and end urban subsidies, while paying prices sufficient to keep farmers producing. It has called for a halt to wasteful import substitution and for reductions in the size of bureaucracies and government-controlled banks and industries. It has asked, in sum, for a greater play of market forces.

Even if the leaders of Africa follow the IMF's recipe, the cycle of negative growth, near national bankruptcies and lowered standards of living may be hard to reverse. National belt-tightenings may also occasion popular protests and the overthrow of regimes. But economic conditions are so precarious that only extreme measures may prove timely.

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### *Africa's Tottering Despots*

Despotic, or merely authoritarian, regimes lose their legitimacy almost overnight. The pillage of Liberia and the rising voices of protest in Kenya and Zambia illustrate that lesson. Increasingly, especially in the wake of cataclysmic changes in Eastern Europe, Africans demand a say.

President Samuel K. Doe, an unlettered sergeant when he overthrew Americo-Liberian oligarchic rule in 1980, governed capriciously and without attention to the views of most of his country's 2.5 million people. His personal and family enrichment became glaringly obvious as ordinary Liberians began to experience shortages, the failure of government services, ethnic favoritism, and officially condoned brutality.

When Charles Taylor invaded northeastern Nimba province in February with 150 men, Doe's coterie hardly took the prospect of civil war seriously. But the people had long wanted their complaints and views to be heard.

The winning cry of Mr. Taylor and other rebels was "Why die for Doe?" And the army promptly melted away. There was some desultory fighting in Nimba, and nearer the coast, but undermotivated foot soldiers saw no compelling reason to go all out for a despot that had delivered little to them and, if they thought about it, for their country.

Mr. Taylor has triumphed with surprising ease. Neither Liberians, except for President Doe's ethnic compatriots, nor Western backers and donors, could see any point in trying to save the Doe government. The United States could have intervened, but wisely chose to abstain.

President Daniel arap Moi's regime in Kenya has provided much more materially for its people than could President Doe in Liberia. But ever since Mr. Moi acceded to the leadership of his country upon the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, he has grown steadily more authoritarian and corrupt.

The present crisis, leading possibly to an army-led coup, has been coming for some time. Moi has never tolerated the democratic strivings of his Western-oriented, well-educated, and highly urban country of 19 million people. Nor has he moderated the stranglehold on economic and political power of minority tribespeople from his own Kalenjii group. Kenya is

about 40 percent Kikuyu and 25 percent Luo; Mr. Kenyatta was the Kikuyu standard-bearer.

Now Kenyans in three-piece suits are being arrested for trying to hold protest meetings. Moi has promised to hunt down political pluralists "like rats."

President Moi refuses to permit discussion in parliament, in the press, or in the streets about the virtues of single-party versus multiparty rule in Kenya or Africa. The recent jailings of a dozen prominent opponents, and the pleadings of their wives that the men not be tortured or killed (as outspoken Kenyans have been in the past), plus the taking to the streets of university students, are but public indications that President Moi's national legitimacy is over. When the soldiers turn their backs on him, as they did on President Doe in Liberia, Kenyans and the West will search for a more open-minded successor.

President Kenneth D. Kaunda is personally much more open-minded. He has ruled Zambia, a country of 8 million, since independence in 1964. Originally a tolerant democrat, he copied Tanzania and turned Zambia into a crypto-Afro-socialist state in the 1970s. His pro-urban commodity pricing policies destroyed the country's agricultural productivity and swelled the sizes of his cities. Then the net returns on copper, Zambia's only important export, fell dramatically and the country became saddled with major and continuing debt obligations, now totaling about \$8 billion.

In the 1980s and this year, Zambia has asked for financial help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and many national donors. But the IMF has long demanded conditions, particularly the elimination of subsidies to urban consumers and the privatization of bloated state-run enterprises.

Recently, President Kaunda drastically reduced subsidies on maize meal and cooking oil, basic staples. Consumers naturally reacted with hostility, with serious rioting in the capital, and with renewed agitation for political change. There was an abortive coup, too.

But Zambia's crisis also mirrors that in Kenya. As President Kaunda's legitimacy as the founding father of his country has faded, the clamor for multiparty rather than single party rule has grown. The leading trade union wants more democracy. So do most Western-educated Zambians and university students. President Kaunda has hesitated to authorize a referendum in October on whether other parties will be permitted. His vacillations have further fueled discontent.

By letting the people decide whether or not the rule of one party is right for Zambia, President Kaunda may reign for a while longer. But if he continues to fear the kinds of democratic excesses that several parties might engender, and limits debate or curtails the referendum, a people ready for changes of all kinds might decide to oust its founder.

## *The Battle for Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Namibia*

**D**uring the decade of the 1980s, when so much of black Africa beat a retreat from democracy, became consumed by coups, and endured repeated shock waves of civil war, most of white-dominated southern Africa embraced its own catharsis of change. The South African redoubt was itself threatened seriously from within. (See part 2, “Freeing South Africa from the Yoke of Apartheid.”) On South Africa’s northwestern and northeastern flanks, a combined diplomatic and guerilla struggle throughout the decade sought to wrest Namibia away from South Africa and to end South African proxy wars deep within Angola and Mozambique.

For a long time, South African military planners believed that their country’s virtual Maginot line was best situated as far to the north in Africa as physically possible. Because the Soviet Union and China, and their liberation movement clients, were involved in a “total onslaught” against white South Africa, the “red threat” could best be contained by attacking black insurgents in their distant camps, by raiding capitals in the new nations that harbored rebels, by pursuing individual dissidents to Europe and the U.S., and by funding anti-Marxist rebels in Angola and Mozambique. In that manner, South Africa sought forcibly to safeguard white rule and apartheid.

Retaining Namibia, either directly or through a white home rule movement, was the centerpiece of this strategy. South African troops had liberated Southwest Africa, as Namibia was called, from Germany in 1915. In 1921, the League of Nations refused to give the ex-colony outright to South Africa, because of South Africa’s offensive segregationist policies. Instead, the League granted a Class C Mandate to South Africa, which in practice produced a congruent result. When the UN succeeded the League after

World War II, South Africa refused to recognize the authority of the UN Trusteeship Council in Southwest Africa. Despite internal protests and international criticism, it clung to the territory for its supposed mineral riches, because it bolstered the Afrikaner domination of South Africa, and because it could be used as a bargaining chip to protect apartheid from the “total onslaught.”

These complicated artifices and rationalizations led in the 1970s to a belated attempt to devolve authority for the territory’s internal governance to a multiracial but white-dominated assembly. Intended to blunt international criticism and slow outside support for SWAPO, the home-grown guerilla movement with bases in Zambia and Angola, the internal initiative had diversionary value so long as South Africa’s defense forces were holding their own along Namibia’s northern border and were aggressive well inside Angola.

Likewise, backing the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), a Rhodesian-created indigenous insurgency, against the Soviet-funded FRELIMO autocracy in Mozambique, made good defensive sense for South Africa’s protectors of apartheid so long as fighting and funding distant wars could plausibly stave off attacks on the heartland itself. Yet, once South Africa’s own cities became hotbeds of protest, it became harder and much more costly to fight on so many fronts simultaneously. Giving up the external bargaining chips also became more and more plausible as white South Africa’s ruling oligarchy came gradually to appreciate that the overall struggle was unwinnable, and some form of accommodation was wiser and more utilitarian, even for whites.

These lessons took more than a decade to learn. Even Smith’s debacle in Rhodesia did not provide an acceptable lesson for the defenders of the faith in South Africa. Yet, for a time during the Carter administration, when Ambassadors Andrew Young and Donald McHenry pressed South Africa relentlessly, there seemed a reasonable chance that Prime Ministers Vorster and Botha would cut a deal beneficial to themselves and to the 1 million indigenous inhabitants of Namibia.

In 1977, craving international legitimacy and a respite from criticism, Vorster finally agreed to scrap a long-nurtured plan—the Turnhalle Initiative—to impose a complicated, multi-tiered, ethnically defined government on Southwest Africa. South Africa had intended to divide the territory into eleven homelands, with the one for whites (only 90,000 in number, less than a tenth of the total population) having special, dominant status. Moreover, the Ovambo, more than half of the African population, would have but a tenth of the proposed legislative seats. Vorster also promised to

scrap the existing whites-only legislature, and to appoint an interim administrator, a kind of colonial governor, to move Southwest Africa along the road to some form of eventual home rule. Majority rule was not assured, I wrote, for SWAPO's role in any new dispensation was as yet unclear. There was much diplomatic work to be done—a massive understatement, as it transpired. (“Optimism on Namibia,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 July 1977.)

A year later, there was the slim chance that elections could be held to test SWAPO's support among Namibians, but South Africa was still not ready to give up local white control. So it seduced Western negotiators with promises, but each promise represented a complicated ruse that would buy time for apartheid and give little legitimacy to the freedom struggle. Each of these abortive agreements throughout 1978 and 1979 ultimately indicated South Africa's reluctance to trust its buffer territory to black rule, or to limit its military initiative in and on Angola's borders. Under Botha, there were tactical feints to and forays with the West, but only the barest incremental progress.

In late 1978, Botha—a brand new prime minister—indeed dismayed the West and hopeful conciliators in his own country when he reneged on an agreement, forged over eighteen months, to conclude a cease-fire, remove South African troops from Namibia, and hold UN-supervised elections. Botha's substitute offer was to mount an internal election arranged and monitored by South Africa, leading to a reprise of the discredited Turnhalle plan. Vorster's talks with the U.S. and the West had stayed international sanctions and had also limited the threat of Cuban adventurism southward from Angola (where there were 17,000 Cuban soldiers). Now Botha had revived the war for Namibia, and also for Angola. The hope for some kind of stability had again receded. (“Namibia—War or Peace?” *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 Oct. 1978.)

Because of the leverage that the West would gain, and also because Cuban and Soviet influence could thus be compromised, it made good sense for the U.S. to recognize and then to open diplomatic relations with Angola. I also advocated the removal of Congressional bans on economic assistance to that former Portuguese colony. After all, the Marxist nation was protecting the pumping of oil by large, capitalist American firms. Any complaints about the authoritarian nature of the Angolan regime also had to recognize that autocratic tendencies were authentically African, as well as Soviet-inspired. Cubans were no democratizing force in Angola. But they were in fact a source of stability as the official government of the country faced attacks both by South African troops and the South African-supplied forces of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The U.S.

would do well, I wrote, to bargain with, rather than shun, Angola's leadership. ("Needed: A New Deal for Angola," *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 July 1978.)

At the end of 1978, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a white-led, South African-affiliated political party of minorities (and few Ovambo), won 41 of the 50 seats in a new Namibian legislative assembly. SWAPO and its allies had refused to participate in such an exercise of apartheid "propaganda." Throughout the succeeding year, Botha toyed with envoys from the U.S. while giving more and more authority to the new white-run assembly. Finally, when it became clear in 1980 that Iran's taking of American hostages would help ensure the electoral victory of President Reagan, a friend of anti-communist South Africa, its negotiators slyly slid away from many of the tacit bargains that they had concluded with McHenry and his European colleagues. The South Africans congratulated themselves on having outlasted President Carter and his pro-African legions. They conveniently ignored the failure of the Muzorewa administration in Rhodesia to achieve legitimacy, and trusted that their Namibian DTA puppets could somehow become credible enough to hold back the coming tides of nationalist change. ("Suddenly Some Good News for Namibia," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 Jan. 1979; "Namibia: Dance of the Slow Snail," *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 Oct. 1980.)

SWAPO was too weak militarily to mortgage South Africa's hold on Namibia. Even with Cuban and Angolan backing, its cadres were no match for the training and firepower of the whites and their African allies. But the war for Namibia, largely confined to the territory's far northern border, cost South Africa at least \$500,000 a day, a punishing sum for a country of 4.6 million whites. Moreover, the fall of the Shah of Iran had deprived South Africa of assured supplies of petroleum at affordable prices. Thus, at a time of acute danger and hardship for apartheid, the Reagan administration's reluctance to continue the Carter policy of pressing Botha hard over Namibia reprieved South Africa.

President Reagan's officials preferred to engage South Africa "constructively." This meant offering South Africa carrots instead of sticks, behaving "reasonably" toward South Africa and its problems, and, in the Namibian case, recognizing the appropriateness of "minority rights," or continued privileges for a handful of whites. By pandering so determinedly, Washington also gave South Africa a distinct negotiating advantage and prolonged the many agonies and losses of life in southern Africa. ("Namibian Soap Opera: Is South Africa Ready to End It?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 June 1981.)



The British say that flies are more easily trapped with treacle—a sweet, sticky syrup—than with a swatter. The Reagan administration’s constructive engagement of South Africa was designed similarly to wrest Namibia from its overlord. From 1981, Washington’s emissaries, including then Vice President George H. W. Bush, had befriended South Africa. They had permitted South African military and intelligence operatives to move back and forth between Washington and Pretoria. The U.S. Department of Commerce had encouraged the sale of once-embargoed military and other items to South Africa. The U.S. government had backed an IMF loan. Washington also agreed (over strident objections from its African allies) to a constitution for a liberated Namibia that would have minimized the likelihood of an outright SWAPO electoral victory. The U.S. had even vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning a South African invasion of Angola. But, despite these efforts and many other entreaties, South Africa continued to balk at a definitive resolution of Namibia’s fate. First, it rejected the involvement of the UN in any election. When that objection was overcome, it refused to budge until Cuban troops vacated Angola. But its deeper-seated reason was the increasing likelihood of an overwhelming SWAPO victory in any free and fair Namibian election. Privately, but never publicly, South African strategists conceded that any internal settlement was a chimera. But the public posture was the official negotiating position, and the one with which the West had to contend. (“Southern Africa: A Crucial Test for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Boston Globe*, 17 May 1982; “Namibia and the Cuban Connection,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 Nov. 1982; “On Southern Africa,” *New York Times*, 10 Dec. 1982.)

Constructive engagement legitimized the presence of Soviet, Cuban, and East German military and intelligence involvement in southern Africa. That was the fallout of a misguided American strategy that, during much of the 1980s, dominated Western approaches to reducing South Africa’s destabilizing efforts in the region. I argued that the peace of southern Africa was threatened more by “the unchecked exercise of South African military might than by Soviet machinations” or Cuban troops. Yet, South Africa admittedly had limited SWAPO’s ability to strike into Namibia. South Africa controlled a 160-mile-deep salient of southern Angola, and, through UNITA, much of central and southeastern Angola. This buffer zone, analogous to Israel’s hold on south Lebanon, kept attacks on Namibia and South Africa at a helpful distance.

Closer to the apartheid heartland, South Africa had also used the threat of retribution, and frequent border raids, to terrorize and destabilize its weaker neighbors—Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.

(A particularly egregious midnight raid on the sleepy capital of peaceful Botswana killed sixteen in 1985, and finally outraged the Reagan administration. ["U.S. & South Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 June 1985].) South Africa successfully threatened Mozambique through its funding and arming of RENAMO, an embryonic UNITA. Thus, a prime "fallout" of constructive engagement was destabilization, which had also enhanced the usefulness of Namibia to South Africa as a bargaining element. ("Namibia Settlement Fading; S. Africa's in the Driver's Seat," *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 Feb. 1983; "Why the Russians Can Fish in Southern Africa's Troubled Waters," *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 March 1983; "The Key to South Africa's Fate?" *Boston Globe*, 20 March 1983.)

Paradoxically, as SWAPO's military capability had been diminished by South African direct assaults and the atmosphere of destabilization, so its political stock had appreciated. SWAPO's 6,000–7,000 trained guerillas were no match for the South African Defence Force. Inside the disputed territory the guerillas mined roads, bombed administrative buildings, and assassinated collaborators, but they had been unable by 1983 to penetrate deeply into the territory, or to make the border war costly for their opponents. They could not bleed Namibia as ZANU had done in Rhodesia. Yet, weakened as it was as a fighting force, and also as an underground political movement within Namibia, SWAPO remained the only political entity with unchallengeable legitimacy both outside and inside the territory. South African attacks had bolstered its appeal to indigenous electors throughout the country. SWAPO's only potentially serious opposition, the DTA, had been discredited along with all other suspiciously-supported internal organizations. ("Namibia's Independence: A Political and Diplomatic Impasse?" *CSIS Africa Notes*, 5 May 1983.)

Despite the potential benefits of constructive engagement to South Africa, and an increasingly hostile international climate, the once-promising negotiations over Namibia's future stalled interminably throughout most of the balance of the 1980s. Meanwhile, the relevance of forcibly trying to retain power over Namibia, and the intrinsic economic importance of Namibia, became more and more questionable to South Africa. The vast territory possessed diamonds, to be sure, but Botswana since the mid-1970s had shared its diamond wealth with the same South African conglomerate that vacuumed Namibia's diamonds off the ocean floor. Copper, tin, lead, and coal prospects were becoming less attractive as a growing world glut, and the limited extent of Namibia's reserves, diminished the value of those minerals. A mountain of uranium oxide was the territory's major unanticipated source of potential wealth, but dimming global desires for nuclear

power and bombs by 1988 considerably lessened the riches that could be expected from that export. Soviet trawlers had depleted Namibia's stocks of pilchards and sardines in the cold Atlantic Ocean, but that industry could be resuscitated, and tourism given a boost, more by a new government than by South Africa. Grazing cattle and sheep remained of modest export value. Nearly all agriculture, especially by the Ovambo in the north, was for subsistence.

The territory seemed less and less a prize worth contesting as its significance to South Africa's military and diplomatic strategists also declined. These realizations, cost considerations, and South Africa's own intensifying internal troubles finally persuaded South African troops in 1984 to withdraw partially from Angola (in exchange for an official Angolan promise to prevent SWAPO insurgents from crossing into Namibia) and to release from prison Hermann Toivo ja Toivo, one of SWAPO's most celebrated leaders. ("Namibia's Freedom Conceivable, But . . .," *Boston Globe*, 19 March 1984.)

In the same year, South Africa and Mozambique concluded a non-aggression pact. Mozambique, having been hit hard by South African raids and dissatisfied with the delivery of help from its Soviet patrons, promised to cease letting ANC guerrillas launch attacks toward Pretoria. In exchange, South Africa offered to withdraw its support of RENAMO. Yet, its intelligence operatives continued covertly to aid RENAMO until 1990, thus double-crossing Mozambique and defying the U.S. ("Mozambique Finds a New Patron," *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 March 1984.) The U.S. State Department took many months to appreciate how the South Africans had taken advantage of its gullibility.

These several accords, and the waning influence of Moscow, were indicative of a trend in the region. At first, however, they strengthened South Africa's hegemonic role and influence. But they did nothing for Namibia. Given the lack of serious pressure from the West, South Africa still displayed no inclination to shed its colony in a hurry. Indeed, a South African raid in 1985 on American-owned oil pumping installations in northern Angola demonstrated "with what currency" South Africa repaid the Reagan administration's friendship and generous cooperation. ("Botha's Namibian Offer: Another Artifice," *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 June 1984; "Constructive Engagement Isn't Working," *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 May 1985.)

UNITA was South Africa's proxy in Angola. Unlike RENAMO in Mozambique, it possessed a national authenticity in addition to its financial, training, logistical, and materiel support from the apartheid redoubt. Since 1978, UNITA had managed to control about 40 percent of Angola, fending

off MPLA cadres backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union. Elements within the Reagan and Bush administrations favored UNITA, too. Its posture as an anti-Soviet bulwark particularly excited right-wing U.S. senators and congressmen, many of whom also expressed anti-liberationist sentiments and believed that the ANC and SWAPO were mere communist fronts. In 1986, this policy convergence in Washington led the White House to try to supply UNITA (and rebels in Afghanistan and Nicaragua) with Stingers—portable, heat seeking anti-aircraft missiles. Democratic Party opposition was fierce. I argued that aiding UNITA aided South Africa, and aligned the U.S. squarely with apartheid. It also undermined our search for peace in southern Africa. Moreover, sending Stingers would start an arms race in southern Africa harmful to peacemaking. Fortunately, after bitter hearings and much adverse publicity, Congressional antagonism stayed the administration's hand in Angola, but not in Afghanistan (with ultimately disastrous results). ("Angolan Sting," *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 April 1986.)

Leading Republican Senators, including Jesse Helms and Robert Dole, even sought to support RENAMO against the government of Mozambique. Yet, Joaquim Chissano, that country's brand new president, in 1987 desired better relations with the U.S., Britain, and Portugal, having cut ties to the Soviet Union. He was a "new progressive," I wrote, who had learned the lessons of Mozambique's socialistic excesses. Chissano and Mozambique needed and deserved Western economic assistance if Mozambique were to survive South Africa's continued efforts at destabilization, RENAMO depredations, and devastating droughts. Whatever FRELIMO's early history, backing Chissano and his government, not RENAMO, would help to improve the stability of southern Africa. ("A Weak Mozambique Needs Outside Help," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Nov. 1986; "Why Mozambique's Rebels Merit No U.S. Support," *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 June 1987.)

It took a serious revamping of the calculus of national self-interest to end the decade-long standoff between the West and the UN and South Africa over Namibia. The train of devolution began warming up in 1988 when the cost of feeding and sheltering 55,000 Cuban soldiers became too expensive for both Angola and the decaying Soviet Union, and when South Africa—with its own deep balance-of-payments problems—likewise wished to cut its \$2 billion a year investment in a distant defensive perimeter. A Cuban-administered setback to South Africans on the battlefield also helped. Moscow earlier in the year signaled its lessening interest in Africa to Washington; *Perestroika* was inward looking, and reform at home focused all of Premier Mikhail Gorbachev's interest and energy. Thus, the Soviet

Union was ready to abandon Angola and Ethiopia, having earlier neglected and lost Mozambique.

Botha and Gorbachev were of the same mind. The time had come to look to the home front. Namibia had come to matter less—even to a hawkish Botha—than undergirding white rule in South Africa itself. As a result, I wrote in September 1988, Namibia “could be free” by the next year. Peace in Angola would also be possible, if only the U.S. stopped supporting UNITA. (“Glasnost and Moscow’s Loosening Grip on Africa,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 June 1988; “Is Namibia on the Peace Train?” *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 Sept. 1988; “It’s Time to Help End Angola’s Civil War,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 Jan. 1989; “Peace in Angola and Mozambique,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 Aug. 1990.)

Freedom came quickly. After an agreement hammered out in late 1988 by Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the U.S., and the UN, South Africa withdrew the last of its troops from southern Angola and scaled back its occupying force in Namibia. A small UN peacekeeping contingent (the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group—UNTAG) replaced the South Africans and, under a gifted, energetic Finnish administrator, was charged with supervising the transfer of power from white to black via a suitable political contest. But this was no easy task: SWAPO, allowed back into Namibia to organize and campaign, distrusted South African intentions. The South Africans subsidized anti-SWAPO local groups. All sides refused to play fair, especially the Southwest African Police force. The UN peacekeepers, from thirty nations, hence had a tough task overseeing, patrolling, and controlling a vast territory twice the size of California. (“Namibian Independence—Hard Work Ahead,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 Feb. 1989.)

There were many controversies in the months of 1989 between the assumption of power by UNTAG in April and the actual nationwide elections to a constituent assembly in November. The assembly’s task was to write a new constitution for the country, and the clauses in that document had to be approved by a two-thirds majority. So, even if South Africa ruefully accepted that SWAPO was set to win the largest share of the assembly’s places, it still campaigned hard (through its proxies) against the size of that expected victory. That the actual election occurred at all, and to widespread acclaim—given the inexperience of an untutored electorate, forty-five new parties, attempted chicanery on many sides, and the polyglot character of the peacekeepers—was a tribute to UNTAG, and especially to the even-handed team led by Marti Arhtisaari, much later to become president of Finland. (“Namibia’s Troubled, Bitter Transition,” *Boston Globe*, 7 Aug. 1989; “The UN Holds Key to Success in Namibia,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 Aug. 1989.)

SWAPO won 41, or 57 percent, of the 72 seats in the constituent assembly. The white-led DTA (21 seats) and five smaller parties comprised the opposition. The true test of victorious nationalism became how to write a constitution for the new nation that would create conditions of good government and satisfy a number of contrasting sets of expectations. President Sam Nujoma, with his Marxist reputation, extended the hand of recognition to the DTA and the smaller parties. He accepted the need for a bill of rights, thus implicitly safeguarding the individual rights of minorities. Then the drafting and horse-trading began. Ultimately, the delegates produced one of the most liberal constitutions ever written, sanctifying private property, encouraging foreign investment, enshrining an appropriate concatenation of human rights and civil liberties, mandating an independent judiciary, and providing for an auditor-general and an ombudsman. ("In Namibia, a True Test of Nationalism," *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 Dec. 1989.)

Namibia became Africa's fifty-second independent nation in March 1990. The guerilla-derived government, led by President Nujoma, a SWAPO prime minister, and a multi-racial, pan-ethnic SWAPO cabinet, emerged triumphant and committed to good governance more than ideology. There was a tilt, too, toward accepting the continued importance of the white-dominated sectors of the country's economy. Nujoma went out of his way to avoid alarming its major (foreign-owned) export earners and to welcome new foreign investors. The Soviet Union had recently collapsed, which may have made shedding SWAPO's Marxist affinities relatively easy, and shed them the new government quickly did. Despite Nujoma's lack of formal schooling and the rawness of a country that had been starved of educational opportunity by South Africa, Namibia entered upon its long-awaited independence with more than the usual expectations of sense and sensibility. With an annual average GDP per capita higher than in many countries, a tiny population of 1.6 million, and the UN and the West by its side, there was every hope that Namibia could prosper and avoid the governance problems and internal strife that had plagued so many other African nations. ("Namibia's Nationhood," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 March 1990; "Namibia's Experiment," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 Feb. 1991.)

Namibia worked. That was the verdict in 1992, but small cracks soon began to appear in the neat façade of the nation. There were more pluses than minuses, but the list of worrying negatives grew slowly as Namibia matured over the 1990s. Nujoma himself set a good tone by limiting pomp and motorcades, receiving delegations of protesting white farmers, and—for several years—living without ostentation. There was some consternation in 1992, however, when the president insisted on purchasing an expensive jet aircraft for personal use. Later, his decision to re-interpret the constitution

so that he could continue as president for a third term (after elections in 2000) upset many of his initial boosters.

Namibia continued to be a functioning democracy, at first with an active opposition. But there were complaints by the first finance minister, who resigned, about the patronage-burdened quality of the civil service, and the country's budgets. About 55 percent of national employment was in the government sector. Yet this heavy staffing did not mean that the bureaucracy remained efficient. As experienced technocrats departed for South Africa or were pushed aside by SWAPO, the opposite tendency developed. Justice remained even-handed for a while. Yet, graft and bribery gradually surfaced, with a number of prominent members of the government being implicated in public scandals as early as 1992. "There was a growing sense of corruption" in the next year. It was probably minor compared to the standards of Nigeria or white South Africa, but it was disturbing in "a comparatively chaste and impoverished country like Namibia." By 1994, the auditor-general had accused the government of "sweeping corruption under the carpet." There had been demonstrated fiddling in the sensitive area of ecotourism, with important franchises being transferred for consideration to patrons of the president. With the revival of the offshore fishing industry, concessions to consortia including cabinet ministers were questioned. The nation's ombudsman meanwhile discovered serious scams in the ministry of foreign affairs, where fleets of expensive motor cars were purchased through roundabout and questionable channels. Some ministers had fenced off large farms for themselves in the north at government expense. There was more, but Namibia's main problem was that neither the president nor parliament took note of the reports of the auditor-general or the ombudsman, nor of the many other reports of shady schemes which had begun to undermine the reputation of the republic. ("Namibia: An African Success Story—So Far," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 July 1992; "Namibia Eschews Intolerance," *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 Aug. 1993; "Growing Clouds of Corruption Threaten Namibia's Progress," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 Aug. 1994.)

Namibia nevertheless remained a better than average African democracy. Abuses of power there continued to be, and steady corruption, but black-white friction largely receded, being replaced by an inter-ethnic, even an intra-Ovambo, competition that was never ignored by politicians and civil servants. The development of the north, a priority of the first post-independence government, continued to proceed much too slowly throughout the decade. The absence of economic take-off was true in the 1990s for most sectors of the economy, although diamonds remained the largest contributor to national GDP and export revenues. Tourism was harmed by the continuing war in Angola between the MPLA and UNITA, and its fatal



spillover southwards across the Kunene River into Namibia. There was an insurrection in the eastern portion of the Caprivi Strip, too, but that was easily contained, and two controversies with Botswana, both over water.

The first, which wisely was sent to the Court of International Justice at the Hague, concerned the ownership of a water-logged island in the middle of the Chobe River. It was ultimately decided in Botswana's favor. The second, which could someday lead to hostilities, concerned Namibia's desperate search for potable water in its cities, and its intention to take for that purpose some of the contents of the upper reaches of the Kavango River before those waters flowed into tourist-friendly areas of northern Botswana. Namibia urgently needed drinking water for Windhoek, its capital city of 300,000, and other towns in its parched interior. In 1996, only four inches of rain, not the customary fifty inches, fell on Windhoek. Yet, 75 percent of Botswana's earnings from tourism, and 6 percent of its annual GNP, derived from the Okavango Swamp area. If Namibia took a contemplated 120 million cubic meters of river flow out of the Kavango it might not affect Botswana in the few wet years, but in the many dry years Botswana's tourist industry would be devastated. This was a second controversy ripe for adjudication, not warfare. ("Botswana's Race to Arm," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 Aug. 1996; "Currents of War in the Kalahari," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 Feb 1997.)

Nujoma largely kept Namibia out of other African wars until 1998, when he joined Angola, Chad, and Zimbabwe in rushing to the assistance of President Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and helping to prevent his overthrow by rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Namibian troops fought alongside Kabila's, and Nujoma later stood together with Mugabe in opposition to Mandela and many others who wanted to broker a sustainable cease-fire in the Congo.

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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### *Optimism on Namibia*

American policymakers, long gloomy over prospects for peace in southern Africa, now express optimism over political change in the arid mandate known as South-West Africa—the modern Namibia. This optimism has a good basis, although there are still many obstacles to the easy transfer of power from white to black.

*Christian Science Monitor*, 12 July 1977.



On the positive side, astute, forceful, and well-timed American diplomatic intervention has persuaded Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa to scrap his long-nurtured plan to impose a complicated multi-tier, ethnically defined government on Namibia. An ingenious scheme would have divided the country into 11 "tribal" segments, one a fairly large one which would have been controlled by representatives of the 90,000 whites (a tenth of the total population) who now reside in Namibia. The 10 groups of blacks who would have played a major role in ruling the territory would have had their real power divided. The Ovambo, the largest black group with about half of Namibia's total population, would not have been able to elect half of the legislature or exercise power equivalent to its population size. Moreover, the elaborate constitutional proposals devised by delegates from the 11 groups (meeting in the Turnhalle building in Windhoek, Namibia's capital) were so arranged as to minimize the potential influence of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the territory's only liberation movement.

All of this carefully contrived artifice has been scrapped. For the dedicated Namibians who labored so long and diligently to reconcile the claims of black and white, there is frustration and anxiety. But there is also relief, for the compromise had been a mule instead of a horse. It carried no international legitimacy and in no way made it possible for the forces of SWAPO to be reintegrated into Namibia, for valid elections to be held, or for a government to come to power which met the requirements of the United Nations.

It is too soon to know if South-West Africa can become Namibia without bloodshed. Mr. Vorster, however, has agreed to appoint an administrator for the territory who will exercise power during an interim period prior to independence late next year. The present white-dominated legislature in the territory will cease to function. The various ethnic groups who have participated in the Turnhalle deliberations will form one or more political parties. So will SWAPO. There will be elections and, most of all, it appears that Vorster has agreed to some form of United Nations supervision, both of the elections and of the campaigning beforehand. This concession conforms to the demands of the UN General Assembly and to American policy.

Not yet clear is how South African administration and UN supervision can possibly mesh, what conditions may be imposed upon the participation of SWAPO adherents now resident in guerrilla encampments in Angola and Zambia, and how peace and security will be maintained during the interim, pre-election period.

Who will maintain security after the elections? Will the South African Government agree to the withdrawal of its 20,000 troops who hamper SWAPO infiltration from the North?

Who will delimit the constituencies, and on what basis? Will Vorster demand a scheme of proportional representation? What happens, too, if SWAPO fares poorly (as it might in some areas) in the elections? And on what basis, and at what price, will continued South African economic involvement with Namibia be arranged?

Namibia today is completely integrated into the economy of South Africa. It will be no easy task to disentangle the two without curtailing the development of Namibia. There also is the disposition of Walvis Bay, Namibia's only good port. Technically (for curious historical reasons) South African territory, it has been administered since 1921 as a part of South-West Africa. Vorster now intends to use it as a massive bargaining chip.

The road to some form of majority rule is not yet completely clear. But, as a result of the new American pressure, and Vorster's ability to bow to the inevitable (the Turnhalle solution looked increasingly harder to implement successfully), it may just be possible to demonstrate that peaceful transitions in southern Africa are still achievable.

Making that possibility a reality will depend upon the ability of the Americans to persuade SWAPO and the Organization of African Unity that what has been achieved is viable for Africans even though it does not assure immediate SWAPO control. It is not yet clear that SWAPO, largely led by Ovambo, has the support of Herero, Damara, and other smaller black groups. It is not yet clear that SWAPO can even command the backing of all branches of the Ovambo, who are divided into seven distinct, often antagonistic tribes. For these reasons, as well as its many years as a guerrilla organization, it is not as obvious to SWAPO as it is to Western policymakers that a scrupulously supervised election will necessarily prove beneficial.

It is the task of the United States, abetted by Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique, to reconcile the political needs of both SWAPO and South Africa in a manner which safeguards the freedom of choice of the peoples of Namibia and provides a secure basis for the development of one of Africa's potentially richest nations.

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### *Namibia: War or Peace?*

Namibia is teetering between resumed warfare and resumed negotiations, between local solutions and a transformation under the aegis of the United Nations. Secretary of State Vance and the other Western foreign ministers are flying to Pretoria to persuade P. W. Botha, South Africa's new Prime Minister, that renegeing on previous promises over Namibian self-government can only

lead to enlarged economic sanctions. Any permanent breakdown of negotiations could also widen the guerrilla war to include Cuban combat troops.

Until late September the West was correctly congratulating itself over its unexpected ability to have persuaded both South Africa, which has administered Namibia (formerly South-West Africa) since the end of World War I, and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), South Africa's main indigenous antagonist, to settle their differences. According to a Western plan that emerged from tedious bargaining sessions between mid-1977 and mid-1978, South Africa would remove nearly all of its troops, hostilities (mostly on Namibia's northern border with Angola) would cease, a UN force would arrive to monitor the actions of both sides and prepare for elections, political detainees would be released, elections would be held under UN supervision, and an elected constituent assembly would decide how and when Namibia would become independent.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations was charged with deciding how many peacekeeping troops and how many civilian administrators were needed. His report, calling for 7,000 troops, 2,000 civilians, 360 police, and a campaign period of seven months before elections next spring, provided either a reason or a pretext for South Africa to end its fruitful months of cooperation with the West. In September, outgoing Prime Minister B. Johannes Vorster rejected the Secretary-General's proposal and said that South Africa would go it alone. He announced elections for late November, subsequently postponed until the week of December 4.

The proposed elections would be arranged by South Africa and monitored only by the press. Scheduling them at all, and, moreover, scheduling them after nearly 18 months of seemingly successful bargaining with the West and SWAPO, was immediately viewed as a studied insult to the West. Within South Africa the English-language press expressed its horror, opposition white members of Parliament called the decision "insane," and even members of Botha's ruling National Party predicted that unnecessarily unpleasant consequences would result from so deliberate and belated a retreat.

South Africa may have miscalculated, too, for the results of such an internally imposed and internally validated election would be a large-scale Transkei. No white or black Namibians, and probably few South Africans, want Namibia to construct some form of autonomy without international recognition and with the prospect of renewed warfare, this time possibly including Cubans, for months, if not years to come.

Furthermore, in Namibia only the white-led Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, a party of mixed following and South African inspiration and backing, has welcomed the internal solution. Aktur, a right-wing white

party, has also agreed to contest the election. But neither SWAPO, the Namibian National Front, nor the new SWAPO-Democrats will participate. They will promote a boycott, thus putting any electoral results into question.

SWAPO-Democrats is run by Andreas Shipanga and Solomon Mifima, two long-time nationalists who were ousted from SWAPO by President Sam Nujoma in 1976. Shipanga, who visited the United States this month, and Mifima attacked Nujoma's autocracy and corruption and his refusal to hold a party congress as scheduled. Nujoma accused them of being South African stooges. Assisted by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, where SWAPO has its headquarters, Nujoma arrested nearly 2,000 of his opponents within SWAPO and sent Shipanga, Mifima, and the other leaders to Tanzania. Shipanga spent two years in a maximum-security prison, being released in July. Opposed to SWAPO, he is also a long opponent of South Africa. He and his party have therefore refused to take part in any but internationally run elections.

Shipanga's party is loosely affiliated with the Namibian National Front, an amalgam of moderate and left-wing black and white parties opposed both to South Africa and SWAPO. Its boycott is also assured. So, obviously, is that of SWAPO. Its troops remain poised to attack Namibia from Angola and Zambia.

Although much less numerous than the South African defenders (perhaps 3,000 to 25,000), less skilled, and with poorer weapons, SWAPO does have the advantage of local support and the ability to infiltrate in small groups. They are supplied by the Soviets and trained and assisted by the 17,000 Cubans still helping fight Angola's own civil war.

The earlier negotiations had by and large removed the threat of big power involvement in the Namibian transition, as well as the threat of Cuban adventurism. Now South Africa may have plunged its Namibian ward back into the cauldron of discontent. Or perhaps South Africa's new, tough Prime Minister will find a statesmanlike means of withdrawing from the brink of war, with accompanying sanctions.

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### *Needed: A New Deal for Angola*

A new deal for Angola is long overdue. American support for the losers in the Angolan civil war of 1975, and massive Cuban military assistance for the victors, has thus far prevented official American ties to and influence in the resource-rich former Portuguese colony of 8 million people.

As U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young said more than a year ago, the Cubans are a force for stability in Angola. Absent Western help, the Angolans should be grateful for Cuban technical aid as well as for the presence of about 20,000 soldiers. They contribute to the local economy and prevent the South African- and Zairese-backed Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) from breaking out of its southern third of the country and embroiling the rest of the new nation in a second round of civil war. The Cubans also help President Neto maintain his primacy in the government, having on at least one occasion prevented his overthrow from within the Angolan army.

Certainly the Cubans are no democratizing force in Angola. They probably did sponsor the second as well as the first Katangese invasion of Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba Province. But America's argument with Cuba need not stand in the way of substantial improvements to its position in southern Africa, of which Angola is a crucial component.

Angolan cooperation would deter further attacks on Shaba, thus contributing to regional stability and that period of peace which is essential if Zaire is to be saved from its own economic and political mismanagement. The Cubans and Soviets may encourage further attacks on Shaba primarily to maintain the existing high level of tension. But it is profoundly not in Angola's own self-interest to do so.

What is good economically for Angola is good, too, for Zaire and Zambia. The latter two, both major copper exporters, for many years transported their copper concentrates westward to the Angolan port of Lobito along a 700-mile British-built railway where the wagons are pulled primarily by wood-burning locomotives. The rail line was cut in 1975 and is kept closed by UNITA raids. Reopening it would drastically lower Zairian and Zambian costs (Zaire now ships its copper to Europe via a tedious rail, land, and water route to the mouth of the Congo River and Zambia relies exclusively on the overburdened Chinese-built railway to the jammed port of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania).

The third factor is Namibia. As that South African-ruled territory gropes toward independence, it will want less and less to worry about an insecure northern border. Restraining guerrillas cannot be accomplished without Angolan assistance. Nor can the waters of the Kunene River (which divides the two countries) provide hydroelectricity to or irrigate portions of Namibia without Angolan approval.

A willing Angola can thus greatly contribute to peace, prosperity, and stability in a volatile region. Zambia and Zaire are both objects of Western economic concern and expensive aid. Namibia is a zone of potentially painful

transition. In turn Angola would welcome an end to outside support for UNITA (the Cubans will stay until UNITA lays down its arms) and the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), a Zaire-based, anti-Neto group; the cessation of South African raids; and, conceivably, the development of Western contacts and relationships which could ultimately mature into assistance and cooperation.

Angola is a Marxist regime, but previous Soviet-assisted governments in Africa have for the most part moved away from slavish conformity to Moscow's line. African authoritarianism seems authentically indigenous, not a foreign transplant. Moreover, the government of Angola, despite its closeness to the Soviets and its reliance upon the Cubans, has welcomed and protected the pumping of oil by the Gulf Corporation of Pittsburgh.

There is room for Western influence in Angola. Without it Neto will have no incentive to disengage from his Marxist mentors. Nor will he have any overwhelming reason to help the West help Zaire and Zambia.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's recent dispatch of Ambassador Donald McHenry to Angola was a first step. Recognition of and the opening of diplomatic relations with Angola will be a useful and long overdue second. The removal of clauses barring economic assistance to Angola will be a third. With the implementation of those steps, and succeeding ones, an improved political climate in southern Africa should follow. Who knows, perhaps they will collectively be useful, too, in removing Cuba from Africa?

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### *Suddenly Some Good News for Namibia*

Thanks to the fall of the Shah, patient pressure by Western diplomats, a scandal that convulsed white politics, and a careful calculation of the odds by Prime Minister P. W. Botha, South Africa has once again internationalized the prospective independence of Namibia.

In September South Africa rescinded its agreement to a painfully negotiated formula which had been expected to inaugurate a period of political competition among black and white Namibians leading to an election organized by the United Nations. The election was to be followed by the formation of a majority government and an independence that would merit international recognition.

Earnest entreaties by the West, leading to half-reassurances by South Africa, failed to revive the agreement. In December, defying the United

Nations and the West, South Africa even insisted upon holding elections for a constituent assembly.

The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a multiracial amalgam of conservative groups backed by South Africa, easily won 41 of the 50 seats. But it won without serious opposition, for all of the nationalist parties refused to participate in what they and the West regarded as an exercise in South African propaganda.

Whether or not Prime Minister Botha intended the December election to be but a face-saving prelude to another poll in which the nationalist groups would participate, late in December he effectively negated the first vote by reaffirming the negotiated formula which had originally been accepted in April and then condemned in September.

The Shah's loss of control was crucial, for South Africa has for years been buying 90 percent of its oil from Iran. The Shah's successors say that no Iranian oil will be sold to South Africa for political reasons. Although South Africa has stored oil in old mines and may not feel the full force of the Iranian holdup for months, no beleaguered government would want simultaneously to combat both the reality of oil shortages and potential hostility from the West. Because of scarce and expensive supplies of oil, the threat of Western economic sanctions may also have had more impact than originally expected.

Given the turmoil within the ranks of the ruling National Party in South Africa, this is also not the best moment to continue jousting with the West. The financial scandal surrounding the affairs of the government's Information Department has undoubtedly weakened Botha's hold on the loyalty of the white electorate. But that weakness does less to destroy his ability to rule arbitrarily than it does to limit his ability to take on the West at a time when his party's unity has been undermined at home. Since a large segment of his party has moved perceptibly to the right, his room to maneuver is less broad than before, and his need to be decisive, rather than ambiguous, is that much more imperative.

The new Namibia will benefit from this conjunction of fortunate circumstances. True, South Africa could again renege. It could balk, as before, on the precise composition and size of the United Nations' administrative and military force. It could disrupt the elections, now scheduled for sometime before September, by harassing the nationalists and openly intimidating prospective voters. It could (and probably will) give unfair advantage to the DTA, now forming a kind of interim local government. South Africa has been accused of doing all of this before, and observers in Namibia think it might do so again when and if the oil problem has been resolved and the West has been lulled into complacency.



There is another component. South Africa may be gambling that the nationalists will somehow overplay their hand. The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is the main force. Backed primarily by the Soviet Union, it has opposed South African rule of Namibia militarily since 1966. It has widespread support, particularly in the northern part of the country where half of the population lives. Opposed both to SWAPO and South Africa are the SWAPO-Democrats, a recently formed breakaway group with limited backing, and the Namibian National Front, a multiracial alliance linked to SWAPO-Democrats and antagonistic to SWAPO and South Africa. It has a following mostly in the central section of the country.

If SWAPO steps up guerrilla attacks from Angola, South Africa may have the excuse it wants to abort the upcoming contest between all parties. It may also hope that the DTA, by sponsoring the continued desegregation of Namibia, may win widespread support legitimately. Or South Africa may have come to see the SWAPO-Democrats and the Namibian Front as spoilers capable of limiting what most outsiders predict will be the likely result of a full and fair election—an overwhelming victory by SWAPO.

If Iran and the West maintain their threatening posture without succumbing to the temptation to resolve all the problems of southern Africa at once and by the same means (a temptation which would backfire), then it is possible to be optimistic about the peaceful transformation of Namibia from minority to majority rule. South Africa is using devolution in Namibia as a bargaining card; to refuse to recognize why and how South Africa is prepared to bargain, and for what stakes, is to hamper what could be a model form of transfer in a zone of intense white/black competition.

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### *Namibian Soap Opera: Is South Africa Ready to End It?*

Can an upright, determined American administration persuade a coy, worried, and wily South Africa to come to terms over the fate of Namibia? The four-year-old negotiations over the future of that arid, diamondiferous land on Africa's southwestern coast do have a distinct soap opera quality. In the past, constancy and inconstancy have been declared, promises made and not kept, suitors jilted, and well-meaning Western marriage brokers spurned.

Now, like a handsome newcomer, President Reagan's administration believes, nay intends, to apply common sense and what it calls constructive engagement to the international resolution of the Namibian problem. In May the administration discussed its plan in Washington, first with the South African foreign minister, who checked with his cabinet and signified his



general approval, and second with the "contact group" (West Germany, Britain, France, and Canada).

The details of the new American plan have not been made public. The fact that they have not surfaced in South Africa is a sign that South Africa may be intrigued by the American proposal. That the South Africans are intrigued in turn worries the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Ovambo-dominated guerrilla movement battling South Africa from bases in Angola.

Given these considerations, but particularly given the failure of the Carter administration to bring the drama to a favorable conclusion, the new administration intends to exert a new, distinct American leadership, still in concert with the contact group but without much attention to the hitherto established negotiating primacy of the United Nations. Security Council Resolution 435 has governed the negotiating strategy of the UN and the West. It called for national elections in Namibia under UN supervision, followed by the formation of a constituent assembly and the writing, by that assembly, of a new constitution.

Understandably, such a procedure would be less advantageous to South Africa and the 100,000 whites and 400,000 non-Ovambo who live in Namibia than its reverse. A year ago, immediately after Zimbabwe became independent with a previously agreed upon constitution that preserved white land, jobs, and voting rights for a period of years, and limited nationalization of property, South Africans began calling for a similar arrangement for Namibia.

The Reagan administration agrees that the preservation of minority rights is a good thing, particularly if a method guaranteeing those rights can be devised which induces South Africa peacefully to let go of Namibia after 65 years. At a minimum, the U.S. plan is that Resolution 435 should be side-stepped and a constitution drawn up before any election or agreement on an election.

In the first instance, the constitution may be produced on the drawing board of the contact group and South Africa. At this stage, there seems little likelihood of a grand, international conference similar to that which was a prelude to Zimbabwe's 1980 election. Secretary of State Haig also hopes to ensure regular elections rather than the once and for all plebiscite which has been common in Africa and which the South Africans fear will put too much power in the hands of SWAPO.

If a constitution can be devised with these features and if SWAPO can be persuaded to accept it, then an election can be held which will move Namibia toward the internationally valid independence that Secretary Haig and the UN, and most Namibians, want.

Elections would follow, but under non-UN international supervision. This new notion would blunt South African fears of UN partiality to SWAPO. (The South African-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance is white-led and the main potential electoral competitor of SWAPO.) A campaign and election supervisory force would then be drawn from countries with which South Africa has favorable relations.

Arguably, the Reagan administration has an approach to Namibia and a plan whose time has come. Sanctions will not move South Africa, and the new U.S. government, unlike that of President Carter, has no stomach for sanctions. Given SWAPO's lack of battlefield success, and the desire of Africa's most concerned states to focus upon their own individual problems of economic growth, Africans may be prepared to settle for far less than under the old plan.

But a large central issue remains: is South Africa really ready to give Namibia its independence? Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha said last month that he was prepared to transfer power to SWAPO providing that SWAPO's victory came about by constitutional means. Do his words connote a new realization that ending the soap opera may be to South Africa's benefit? Is he at last persuaded that SWAPO could behave in victory like Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's party in Zimbabwe? Or are the South Africans again stalling, and will the Reagan administration let itself be drawn dangerously into an interminable exercise in futility?

Only if these questions can be answered securely and without embarrassing concessions (especially in the nuclear or military fields) should the U.S. move forward. Unless we perceive firm assurances from South Africa, to so gamble may lose us African support and confidence as well as the chance to give the Namibian drama a praiseworthy ending.

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### *Southern Africa: A Crucial Test for U.S. Foreign Policy*

The Reagan Administration's main opportunity for a foreign-policy success focuses on southern Africa, where Washington has been earnestly endeavoring to make Namibia (Southwest Africa) independent and to initiate reforms in South Africa itself. But South Africa, which controls Namibia, has been little impressed by the material and psychological concessions, packaged as "constructive engagement" by the State Department.

Washington most of all wants South Africa to agree to a formula that would bring about a validated end to the long-running Namibian conflict.

The final product would be an election supervised by the United Nations in which the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), a Soviet-backed guerrilla group, would seek power against the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (a South African-supported multiethnic party) and several other small, inconsequential factions. After an election, Namibia's first in full freedom, the resulting constituent assembly would write a constitution. Independence would follow.

Since 1977, when former President Jimmy Carter's ambassadors pressured South Africa to negotiate over Namibia (a South African-administered League of Nations mandate that had not been transferred to the United Nations along with all the other trust territories), the State Department has energetically sought a method whereby South Africa could loosen its grip on Namibia. In 1978, an agreement was reached, but South Africa subsequently raised fresh objections; it did so again in 1979 and 1980.

The Reagan Administration, rejecting the arm-twisting tactics employed by its predecessor, has instead offered sugarcoated carrots. Whereas the Carter administration was outspokenly antagonistic to apartheid, the Reagan State Department has been gentle in its criticisms. The premise of "constructive engagement" is that flies can be controlled more easily with treacle than with a swatter.

Last year, breaking with the Carter proposals, the State Department devised new protocols. The most important was that Namibia's constitution could only be adopted by a two-thirds vote of the assembly, potentially limiting the impact of SWAPO's prospective electoral edge.

In a further effort to assuage South Africa's fears of a SWAPO landslide, the American team suggested a two-part election. Under this plan, the voters would elect 50 assembly members from local constituencies (still to be established) and 50 members by nationwide proportional representation.

SWAPO smelled a rat. Despite U.S. attempts to persuade SWAPO otherwise, SWAPO worries that the 50-50 method, or anything similar, has been designed to deprive the nationalist movement of a two-thirds majority. This month, Sam Nujoma, the elusive leader of SWAPO, flatly refused to accept the 50-50 plan.

Even if the Namibian negotiations are resumed, there will be much quarreling before an election is finally held and Namibia becomes independent. If constituencies are used, all the parties will rightly wrangle about their shape and about the voting lists that must be constructed. The number and functions of the United Nations peacekeeping force, the electoral monitoring operation, and the basing of South African and guerrilla troops will obviously occasion argument.

Namibia is not yet a success for the Reagan Administration, and the auguries look bleak. Yet, “constructive engagement” has focused on Namibia at the expense of almost all else, except the stability of Zimbabwe. There the State Department has been instrumental in persuading South Africa to cease harassing the new nation. South Africa might not have signed a new preferential trade treaty with Zimbabwe and improved the operational capabilities of its railroad without quiet American intervention.

Zimbabwe aside, and with Namibia in abeyance, South Africa has done little to provide a success for constructive engagement. Although Prime Minister Pieter Botha almost three years ago told his countrymen that they needed to “adapt or die,” the fundamental mold of apartheid has not been broken. At a time when the African National Congress (ANC), a Soviet-backed guerrilla movement, has begun regularly to penetrate the country’s defenses, Botha’s ruling National Party has introduced almost no political and few social and economic reforms—outside important gains in the labor field—that the country’s 22 million blacks (there are 4.6 million whites, 2.8 million Coloreds, and nearly a million Asians) consider meaningful.

Later this month Botha may move forward with newly proposed political advances for Coloreds (people of mixed parentage) and Asians, but he has pledged his government never to give the vote or otherwise share real power with blacks. There is a possibility that he may at long last abrogate the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts, which prevent relations across the color lines and offend Africans. But even if his government should do so, Africans will continue to focus their aspirations on the political kingdom.

South Africa refuses to be embraced fully by “constructive engagement.” And unless Washington has prepared new initiatives or white South Africa suddenly sees its security in a new light, constructive engagement will grind to a halt.

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### *On Southern Africa*

The English say that treacle traps flies more easily than a swatter. The Administration’s treacly foreign policy for Southern Africa—called “constructive engagement”—is designed first to encourage South Africa to yield control of Namibia and second to persuade South Africa to help the West ensure the region’s security. In fact, the policy has brought no answer to the Namibian question and has unintentionally allowed South Africa to intensify security measures at home.

*New York Times*, 10 December 1982.

The policy, as articulated by Vice President Bush during last month's swing through Africa, and by State Department officials in Washington and Southern Africa, is a means, not an end. But from the African viewpoint, the friendship and support for South Africa that is an explicit component of constructive engagement has produced few beneficial results.

Although all recent administrations have expressed abhorrence of apartheid, constructive engagement was designed to differentiate the Reagan Administration's tactical approach sharply from the Carter Administration's. Where representatives of Jimmy Carter's State Department threatened sanctions if South Africa failed to cooperate, and held the South Africans at arm's length, our policy since early 1981 has been cordial and, at times, expansive. South African military and intelligence officials have moved back and forth between Washington and Pretoria. The Commerce Department has encouraged the sale of formerly embargoed items to South Africa. America favored the recent International Monetary Fund loan of \$1.2 billion to South Africa, without conditions.

Treacle is a sweet, sticky syrup. Washington has been spreading it thickly across the diplomatic bargaining table. With what results? Namibia remains an unresolved issue. Although now, as before Ronald Reagan's election in 1980, South Africa claims it is willing to settle the dispute, a definitive resolution is as far away as ever. Two years ago, the South Africans said the United Nations could not be trusted to help oversee a crucial election with impartiality. When constructive engagement smoothed over that problem, new ones arose. Now the South Africans refuse to budge until 20,000 Cuban troops leave Angola.

The Americans who are constructively engaged assure the South Africans that the Cubans will go if the South Africans prepare for the United Nations-supervised election that has long been agreed upon. But the South Africans know that the South-West Africa People's Organization, a Soviet-backed guerrilla group, will come to power in any free election. So constructive engagement continues, in this sphere, to accomplish less than intended.

The Administration can, in extenuation, rightly claim that American influence has curtailed overt South African antagonism to Zimbabwe. But it has done little to limit South African support for an anti-Mozambican guerrilla movement or to curb South African raids into Angola.

In South Africa itself, it is difficult to discern exactly what has been accomplished. There have been more deaths in detention this year than in the last three years of the Carter Administration. But the Minister of Law and Order recently instructed underlings to be more humane when interro-

gating security prisoners. Black trade unions exist, but their more successful leaders have been questioned and jailed for long periods without trial. The Government has also used sections of the new Intimidation Act to detain otherwise legitimate strikers.

South Africa this year proposed reforms that would give some, if less than equal, parliamentary representation to the 2.7 million coloreds (peoples of mixed descent) and 0.8 million Indians who, along with 4.4 million whites, are South Africa's minorities. But the 22 million Africans would remain unrepresented, relegated politically into overcrowded, overgrazed, impoverished homelands.

Constructive engagement has hardly led to discernible amelioration of the living arrangements or political condition of South Africa's majority. Were it not for that country's severe recession, the new American-encouraged investment and lending climate might have contributed significantly to measurable increases in black standards of living and net per capita income, but such improvements are still distant.

Constructive engagement has sheltered South Africa and enabled it to impose tougher restrictions on internal opponents. It has provided no incentive to improve its international image, to begin talking with Africans about their future political representation, or even to establish the beginnings of a process that would lead to the peaceful, gradual transformation of what, consistent with the reform proposals, is designed to remain a minority-ruled country.

Black South Africans and Namibians rightly ask: "What has constructive engagement done for us lately?" Whites need not ask.

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### *Why the Russians Can Fish in Southern Africa's Troubled Waters*

The peace of southern Africa is today threatened more by the unchecked exercise of South African military might than by Soviet machinations or the presence there of Cuban troops. Given South Africa's anxiety about a Soviet-sponsored "total onslaught" directed against white rule, its own attempts to unsettle the region are as doubtful as they are dangerous.

From a tactical perspective, the South African armed forces have been most open and most successful in Angola. In order to limit the field ability of the guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), Namibia's prime liberation group, South Africa has systematically

destroyed SWAPO bases in southern Angola, eliminated their effective radar cover, and pushed their command structure well north of the Angolan-Namibian border. South Africa has demonstrably limited SWAPO's ability to strike into Namibia.

It has also underscored the weakness of the government of Angola, and of the Cuban soldiers and East German and Soviet advisers in Angola. South Africa now controls, on a daily basis, a crucial salient of south-central Angola. There the writ of the Angolan government cannot run. Nor does it run in southeast Angola, or in the rural areas of much of central Angola. The Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), an antigovernment insurgency force backed by South Africa, holds sway in those sections.

Although Namibia is controlled by South Africa, it is not South African soil. Yet the South African Defense Force has made the effective defense of Namibia, including cross-border raids and the dominance of southern Angola, an integral part of the protection of the South African realm. It would also welcome the replacement of the present Angolan government by UNITA, with the exodus of Cuban troops an obvious prerequisite. The understandable goal is, on the Israeli model, to provide a buffer zone around South Africa, thus cushioning its isolation and minimizing the threat of border conflicts. If South Africa achieves a cease-fire in negotiations this month with Angola, that will help, even if a halt in hostilities leads to no overall Namibian settlement.

On its other exposed flanks, South Africa is attempting to create a buffer zone based on fear of South African retribution. The overt aim is strategic: to diminish attacks on and in South Africa by Soviet-supplied African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas operating from nearby Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland. An assault last year on little Lesotho had that effect. So did an earlier raid on Mozambique. But raids on independent neighbors form only a part of the South African arsenal. By supporting the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM), an antigovernment guerrilla force now operating throughout the old Portuguese colony, South Africa creates a further insecurity, flexes its muscles by proxy, and undermines the credibility of a regime which is friendly with Moscow.

The South Africans may even hope to use the MRM to topple the present government of Mozambique. In a slightly different sphere, but presumably with some of the same objectives in mind, they have already encouraged the MRM to cut oil and gas supplies to landlocked Zimbabwe, where an anti-Soviet but also anti-South Africa government rules.

These repeated actions have hindered the economic prosperity of Zimbabwe and helped contribute to an atmosphere of instability in the new

nation. South Africa may also be helping to inflame the wave of banditry which has so demoralized southwestern Zimbabwe since mid-1982. South Africa's neighbors complain about a pattern of deliberate destabilization. Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha of South Africa has vehemently denied the charge, calling it "another stunt by Marxist forces." But, in the same interview, he also promised to aid fellow Africans "threatened by the evils of communism."

For Mr. Botha's government, the Soviet threat is palpable. His critics, however, suggest that by deliberately undermining the stability of the region, South Africa enhances the legitimacy of a Soviet (and Cuban) presence, redoubles the need for Soviet assistance, and intensifies desperate rather than deliberate tendencies in the neighboring states.

If the region were not so threatened, South Africa would have an alternate way of demonstrating and exercising influence. As the region's economic powerhouse, with crucial transportation links, modern industry, and an agricultural sector often in surplus, it now plays and could in future play a dominant role in the modernization of southern Africa. But only within a framework of peaceful coexistence.

Much of the region's new instability has developed under the umbrella of the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement (being unusually nice to South Africa in order to gain independence for Namibia). Indeed, the fallout of constructive engagement is destabilization. An updated and revised version of constructive engagement could bring American policy choices to bear on South Africa, restore stability to the region, and contribute to a diminution of the Soviet ability to fish in the region's turbulent waters.

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*Namibia's Independence:  
A Political and Diplomatic Impasse?*

Namibia, a land twice the size of California, is seven-eighths desert and semi-desert, with only its northern hinterland receiving crop-sustaining regular refreshments of rain. Nearly two-thirds of all Namibians, especially the dominant Ovambo and their Kavango and Caprivi neighbors, live in this northern sphere, traditionally growing sorghum, pulses, and—recently—maize amid the palm trees south of the Kunene and Kavango Rivers. The Ovambo number about 600,000, the Kavango 100,000, and the Caprivi 40,000. And in the west are 11,000 Kaokovelders. Many Ovambo have



become labor migrants, working either in the territory's mines, in its few cities and towns, or on farms owned by others.

Central Namibia contains Windhoek, the capital and the only main city (population 120,000), a number of small towns, and—on the Atlantic coast—both Swakopmund, a Hanseatic German—appearing and –sounding touristic center and, nearby, the South African enclave of Walvis Bay, Namibia's only real port. This central belt of the country is the home of about 93,000 Damara and 71,000 Herero, as well as 40,000 Coloureds (recent emigrants from South Africa) and nearly all of Namibia's 70,000 whites (10,000 English-speakers and 25,000 German-speakers, with the remainder using Afrikaans as a mother tongue). Of the whites, only 4,000 farm. Most are employed in the civil service or by the South African–run railways, airways, and other state bodies. About 9,000 Tswana and 35,000 San (Bushmen) live in the eastern sections of this central region.

Southern Namibia—from Rehoboth to the Orange River border with South Africa—is a dry grazing area inhabited by 45,000 brown-skinned Nama (nineteenth-century conquerors from South Africa), 25,000 similarly brown-colored Baster farmers who live in and around Rehoboth (the Basters also come from South Africa), and a few thousand whites.

In the far south, at the mouth of the Orange River, Namibia mines gem diamonds. Taxes on these exports of the Consolidated Diamond Mines, a wholly owned subsidiary of the De Beers Ltd. cartel of South Africa, contributed in recent good years about 46 percent of the annual revenues of Namibia (now \$900 million). Although diamonds may in the future play a somewhat less crucial role than they now do in the country's economy, Namibia will probably live largely on their glittering proceeds for at least the rest of this century.

There is coal, too, in Namibia's south, but it is not of high enough quality to be exploitable in today's market. Instead, second to diamonds, is the 5,000 tons or so of yellowcake—uranium oxide—which is dug each year out of a mountain east of Swakopmund by a company controlled by Rio Tinto Zinc of Britain, operating with Canadian, French, and South African partners. Although the world spot price of yellowcake is now too low to justify new mining of uranium in Namibia, the present operation has long-term contracts sufficient to make uranium a key contributor to Namibia's state revenues and to its GNP.

Copper, cadmium, lead, zinc, and arsenic, mined at Tsumeb and elsewhere in the country's central region, command such low world prices that they are now unimportant as national revenue producers or the basis of profit-making

enterprises. There are small tin mines, too. Only Tsumeb is a sizeable enterprise, but it has returned little to its American owners (Newmont Mining and AMAX, Ltd.), or their South African partners, since the middle 1970s.

Fish were formerly caught and canned in Namibia, but the large schools of sardines and pilchards which were once brought into Walvis Bay were overfished and may not reappear in this century. The market, largely West German, for the skins of karakul sheep has also receded due to recession and changes in fashion. Namibia has never slaughtered much of its cattle, and its abattoirs are small. Nor has there been much internal production of food staples for inter-regional sale.

For a country of small population and limited potential, Namibia is a highly geared economic entity with an outstanding infrastructure and a first-rate service system. The South African connection has clearly contributed to this modernity, giving Windhoek and the other towns a striking aspect in the midst of an arid and semi-arid grazing zone. But Namibia imports 70 percent of its food (predominantly from South Africa), and virtually all of its consumer durables. It adds little value to its major raw material exports, all of which are ultimately sold in the northern hemisphere.

If world markets for base metals should improve dramatically over the next two decades, Namibian resources could be exploited more than at present, but the cost of proving new deposits under 50 meters of Kalahari sand is high. Likewise, known hills of uranium could be exported if world prices doubled. Failing these improbabilities, and absent the return of sardines and pilchards, Namibia will remain no unusually rich prize. Its best hopes lie in the continued production and export of diamonds and uranium (the two largest areas of employment of local labor), an attempt to raise and slaughter more beef and sheep, and—if the terms of rural trade can be arranged satisfactorily—the devotion of major new attention to the production of maize and rice for local consumption.

In addition to these basic economic factors which put limits on Namibia's future growth, the country's most serious impediment is its shortage of trained indigenous manpower. Because of German (to 1915) and South African failures to provide educational opportunities for the people of the territory, there are today no more than 300 black Namibians who have graduated from a recognized university. There are less than a half dozen black lawyers and five black physicians, and a sprinkling of other indigenous trained professionals or technically qualified individuals. Indeed, in recent years fewer than 100 indigenous Namibians have matriculated (graduated) annually from secondary school. In 1982 the number fell to 20.

*The Internal Political Scene*

Politically, there are two Namibias. Since the mid-1960s, the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has been the only indigenous party of national and international salience. Founded as an Ovambo group in the late 1950s and as SWAPO in 1960, it was anti-South African and Western-backed until about 1971, when it turned for funds and arms to the Soviet Union. Since then, and especially in the late 1970s, SWAPO has attempted to oust South Africa from Namibia by force, raiding first across the Zambezi River into the Caprivi region of Namibia from Zambia and then, after South Africa attacked Zambia and Angola became independent, from bases in Angola between the upper reaches of the Kunene and Kavango Rivers. These guerrilla attacks have successfully disturbed northern Namibia as far south as Grootfontein and Tsumeb. Since the mid-1970s, South Africa has used 25,000 or more troops to defend its presence in Namibia and, in recent years, to push SWAPO well back into Angola as well.

In terms of battlefield strength, SWAPO probably can count about 6,000 to 7,000 trained guerrillas (down from 12,000 a year or two ago) and logistical support from the Angolan army, Cuban troops in Angola, and Soviet and East German advisors. Its arms are no match for those of the South African Defense Force. Nor can it interfere more than sporadically with South African control of the skies of southern Angola and northern Namibia. Yet, as pronounced as South African military might is in the area, SWAPO is a guerrilla movement and continues to infiltrate small groups into Namibia. There it mines roads, bombs administrative buildings, and assassinates collaborators. While SWAPO is weakened as an insurgent force in 1983, it is not defeated, and probably never can be. On the other hand, SWAPO is unlikely to win independence for Namibia by warfare because it cannot bleed Namibia in the way the Patriotic Front did Rhodesia.

Although SWAPO is militarily weaker in the 1980s than in the 1970s, it remains the only Namibian political entity with unchallengeable legitimacy both outside and inside the country. Its organization inside Namibia is admittedly much more flaccid than it once was; some of its leaders are discredited and others have been detained or have fled. But South Africa's aggressive military and political offensives against SWAPO as "the enemy" have bolstered its reservoirs of political strength among potential Ovambo, Kavango, Damara, and Nama electors. Even Herero, who traditionally have been anti-Ovambo, are well represented among the upper ranks of the SWAPO official hierarchy.

Serious political alternatives to SWAPO are not now apparent. Although the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) remains an entity of national pretension, its support among potential Ovambo electors is as weak as its appeal elsewhere continues questionable. As an amalgam of black and brown local groups led by an Afrikaner and supported from its inception in 1977 by South Africa, the DTA's real ability to counter SWAPO's inherent and historic appeal was always problematical. This became more and more apparent, especially to South Africa, in 1982, leading early in 1983 to a final public rupture between Pretoria and the DTA. Whether or not the DTA now maintains itself as a vigorous Namibian political party, South Africa no longer regards it as a prime vehicle for countering SWAPO in elections. Indeed, the policies of the DTA, which controlled the territory's Council of Ministers, were successfully opposed in 1981 and 1982 by two right-wing parties, especially the National Party of Namibia, and finally by South Africa itself.

How will South Africa deal with the new reality that no political grouping to which it gives birth and which it backs morally and financially can prove viable in Namibia in this decade? One alternative would be to construe the demise of the DTA as an unparalleled opportunity for the new administrator-general of the territory to take the position that a new political era has commenced, and to begin readying the territory for its eventual emergence as a black, doubtless SWAPO-ruled, state. Making such a transition meaningful would enhance the likelihood that Namibia and South Africa could develop a mutually agreeable relationship as weak and strong neighboring nations after independence. But domestic South African political considerations, South African military successes, the diminished costs of international obloquy, and the political disarray of Namibia itself combine to render it very unlikely that the administrator-general's instructions permit such a progressive approach to the territory's short- and long-term future.

South Africa instead may continue casting about for manufacturing alternatives to SWAPO. Given its disenchantment with the white-led model represented by the DTA, and given a widespread recognition, at last, that consortia of minority peoples are far less politically relevant than a body that draws its strength from the majority Ovambo, South Africa has but two choices in its search for a new way of undercutting SWAPO: (1) to step up its support of the National Democratic Party, a year-old Ovambo group led by Peter Kalangula, chairman of the Ovambo Executive Committee, or (2) to create or locate some new leader and new organization. Until a year ago, Kalangula was president of the DTA and his credibility among Ovambo

must inevitably be limited by his and its long-term association with South Africa. If Pretoria chooses the second option, one question is, whom? Or, we could ask, how? A third question is: Could such a stratagem work?

There are a plethora of other Namibian political parties, most of which are and have been opposed to South African control of Namibia. They each disapproved of the DTA, and cooperated as little as possible with rule by the council of ministers. Nearly all accept the salience of SWAPO while eschewing the use of violence as a means to the mutually desired end of independence. Few any longer reckon that alone or in combination they would emerge from a national election with a decisive bloc of votes.

From a historic point of view, the most important of these intermediate organizations is the South-West Africa National Union (SWANU), which had Chinese and radical chic support throughout the 1960s. Now, however, it is a local organization with a predominantly Herero membership. Aably led by Moses Katjuongua and Nora Chase, it has recently become much more realistic than before in its public view of SWAPO. Otilie Abrahams, Chase's sister, and Dr. Kenneth Abrahams, her husband, run the very small Namibian Independence Party. SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D), another small unit, is led by Andreas Shipanga, an Ovambo who rose to very high rank in SWAPO before breaking with the SWAPO hierarchy in 1976. John Kirkpatrick and Bryan O'Linn lead the tiny white Federal Party of Southwest Africa. Together, most of these groups, along with the Damara Council, once were linked loosely as the Namibia National Front (NNF). But the Council now runs the second-tier (regional) Damara government and has retreated from the national scene, and the NNF is, for most purposes, moribund. Additionally, each ethnic group or locality in Namibia is represented by one or more political vehicles of personal or group expression, but none is of national significance.

In sum, apart from SWAPO, there is a political vacuum in Namibia today. The vacuum is being filled for the moment, as in 1978, by the new administrator-general. But command of the political arena can be maintained only if Dr. Willie van Niekerk acts by proclamation as sweepingly as did a predecessor, Judge Marthinus Steyn. If Pretoria wants to modernize Namibia politically, and thereby vastly alter South Africa's likely future relations with an independent Namibia, then van Niekerk will have to move rapidly to weaken the influence of the local right-wing white parties, to extend the scope and hasten the pace of desegregation in the territory, and to fold the regional governments into a new, truly national, governmental framework. The existence of regional entities enhances ethnic identities and gives local whites a large measure of control over educational, medical, and other ser-

vices which would otherwise be subject to multiracial influence. Bold moves by the administrator-general could also include the acceleration of education and training for Africans and the development of economic uplift schemes, especially in the north.

These kinds of initiatives would make events in Namibia itself much more central than they are at present in the decision-making arena. Absent such new policy departures, the fate of Namibia will continue to be decided elsewhere—primarily in South Africa, in Angola, and at the international negotiating table.

### *The Cuban Troop Withdrawal Issue*

Despite much *sturm und drang*, the negotiations on Namibia's future have been stalled for almost a year. In terms of the modalities of an overall settlement, or even the details of each modality, little separates South Africa from SWAPO and the Western Contact Group. Agreement on many items had been reached before the Carter administration left office. Its successor, ultimately hewing to the guidelines of Security Council Resolution 435, worked out a compromise over constitutional principles and the form of an eventual "free and fair," internationally validated, national election for a Namibian constituent assembly. The deployment, the numbers, and the approximate composition of the United Nations truce administering force is known. So are the numbers and dispositions of the South African troops who would remain during the transition period. The time periods between agreement and the stages of implementation are fixed. True, fine points still need to be discussed, questions about the command and control of UN and South African forces require answers, the logistics of the exercise—never easy across such remote distances—need to be planned, and the required funds must be found.

But as close as the several principals may be on these and other issues, the negotiations in a real sense are in abeyance. They are in abeyance—as they often have been before—because South Africa is in no hurry to settle and, indeed, is precluded by domestic considerations from agreeing to any simple conclusion to the Namibian question. The presence of Cuban troops in nearby Angola was added in 1982 as a further impediment.

Cuban troops came to Angola in 1975 to assist the Soviet-backed *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) in its struggle for victory in Angola against two Western-supported armies: the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA) and the *Unido Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA). The Cubans also helped the MPLA counter a short-lived 1975 South African invasion of Angola. Today

the Cuban soldiers shield the MPLA government against UNITA, which has a secure base in southeastern Angola and is supplied and assisted by South Africa, and provide some logistical backing for SWAPO. They do not actively counter South African preemptive attacks into southern Angola, but their presence, together with that of the Angolan army, may to some extent deter South African raids on central and northern Angola.

In 1982, the United States and South Africa linked the exodus of Cuban troops from Angola with decisive progress on a settlement of the Namibian problem. The assertion that removal of the Cubans will enhance South Africa's sense of security in the southern African region can be argued plausibly, but the major advantage for the South Africans would be psychological. A Cuban exodus would support the South African government's domestic and regional image as a negotiator obdurate enough to preserve white South Africa against external danger. Once the Cubans went, Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha's government could end its control of Namibia with less concern about adverse domestic political fallout, or about accusations that it had handed the territory, and the whites there, over to Marxism. Its inability to devise an effective internal political counterweight to SWAPO would not seem so worrying.

According to another view, these various pleadings are more or less irrelevant. A Cuban withdrawal is linked, by South Africa anyway, to the effective settlement of the Namibian question largely because the likelihood of such a withdrawal is remote. Although the Angolans have time and again said that they want the Cubans to go—and although there are good economic and political reasons why their government should, in fact, want the Cubans to leave—the very existence of the present government of Angola would be at risk if the Cubans departed without a satisfactory prior elimination of, or accommodation to, the threat from UNITA.

Recent bilateral direct talks between Angola and South Africa in Cape Verde (and elsewhere?) need not be seen as indicative of significant movement toward a Namibia settlement. Construed as a separate initiative, leading to a possible cease-fire, such talks could produce specific benefits for both South Africa and Angola, isolate SWAPO, strengthen UNITA, and lead away from, not toward, a resolution of the larger Namibia issue. Given the extent to which South Africa has gained military mastery in recent months over southern Angola, it is in Luanda's interest to end hostilities. At present, Angola can exercise little effective hegemony over its southern reaches. With an end to the war, South African raids would presumably halt, and Luanda would (depending on the South Africa/UNITA factor) have some hope of gradually asserting itself to the farthest points of its own domain.



Likewise, with SWAPO leashed, South Africa could pull back to the Namibian border and compel Angola to undertake the policing of SWAPO.

A cease-fire would represent an acknowledgment of South Africa's current position of strategic superiority, diminish the stature of the Cubans, give the South African government's image a boost with its electorate, and deflect attention from the Namibian settlement negotiations themselves. Moreover, with the cessation of hostilities and the virtual end of the guerrilla threat to Namibia, South Africa's ability to pursue the possibility of some kind of internal settlement would be greatly enhanced. Whether or not these are South Africa's intentions, it is noteworthy that the current talks about a cease-fire lead along the second of the two tracks that have long been followed by South Africa's negotiators. A cease-fire also profoundly enhances South Africa's international bargaining position.

#### *Why Pretoria Is Ambivalent on Namibia*

South Africa, as a presumed rational actor in a rational world, should want to bring the long-running Namibian soap opera to an end. Large expenditures could be forgone; the war on the border is estimated to cost up to \$500 million a year. Additional costs include the time underutilized by conscripts whose efforts could be employed more productively at home; industrial capacity diverted to armaments and other supplies of war; and the diversion of logistical resources away from the civilian economy of the Republic and the region. The large budgeted sums saved could be devoted to under-financed national needs such as the expansion of black educational and training facilities, the raising of salaries in the black educational sector, or the development of the impoverished rural homelands.

Although South African losses in the war have been few (77 versus SWAPO's 1,268 dead in 1982), eliminating the likelihood of casualties would still have widespread appeal in the white community of the Republic. The border conflict cannot yet be considered unpopular, but only in a few quarters is it regarded as a fully "just war." From admittedly impressionistic evidence, it appears that white South Africans—the current electorate—are less worried about the potential dangers of a black-run Namibia than are their political leaders. Namibia still seems remote, separated by a vast, largely uninhabited desert from the main South African population centers in the Transvaal, and north a long way across equally harsh terrain from Cape Town.

The West wants a Namibian settlement. Thus, it has long been assumed, an agreement would embellish South Africa's image in Western eyes and result in tangible as well as psychological benefits for Pretoria. There would



also be domestic political advantages to be gained by removing Namibia from the list of international disputes. The proposition is also advanced that South Africa can cut its best deal—indeed, its only favorable deal—over Namibia only so long as the Reagan administration is in office. A less “constructively engaged” American adversary would give South Africa poorer terms when and if South Africa decides or is compelled to loosen its hold on Namibia. Within the Republic, too, politicians note that the Namibian issue becomes more and more controversial as an election approaches. The Botha government need not call an election for whites until 1986. Depending upon how one evaluates the right-wing strength of the Conservative and Herstigte Nasionale parties, a good case can be made for concluding a Namibia settlement in 1983.

These are reasonable arguments which should help concentrate South Africa’s official mind on a devolution of power in Namibia. There are, however, countervailing axioms, and these seem to have held South Africa to its churlish, curmudgeonly course despite the many explicit and the many more implicit carrots of constructive engagement. Anxiety persists in the National Party about potential domestic political disgruntlement if Namibia becomes or seems to be becoming a SWAPO-dominated state. The acknowledgment that SWAPO today probably would have a marked electoral edge only accentuates that anxiety. Reassurances by Western observers about the depth of SWAPO’s actual Marxist commitment and intelligence estimates of the extent to which a SWAPO government would work effectively with South Africa in the post-independence era have not dampened the official enthusiasm to categorize SWAPO as pernicious, its leaders as devils incarnate, and so on.

At least one influential group of South African decision makers is determined to permit an internationally validated election in Namibia only when a surrogate political party has taken shape and somehow developed sufficient popular appeal to counter the undeniable attraction of SWAPO. Despite the demise of the DTA and the weakness of the Kalangula alternative, the military and some of the politicians concerned with Namibia still wish to create such a client, even if to do so from scratch will obviously take several years.

Less is said now than in earlier years about the advantages of moving South Africa’s defense perimeter south from the Angolan border to the Republic’s Orange River frontier with Namibia. The military has demonstrated its ability to pursue an Israeli-model strategy of retaliation and preemption; politicians are comfortable for the most part with its unexpected success. For at least the next year or two, no unmanageable challenges to the

continued pursuit of such a regional policy are foreseen: the West's complaints are parried, the Soviets and their proxies are not spoiling for a fight, and both Angola and SWAPO have been sufficiently weakened to embolden the most ambitious of the architects of South Africa's forward policy. If a separate peace should be achieved with Angola, the hostilities would de-escalate, costs would be deferred or saved, the psychological advantages would be significant and far-reaching, and a wall of time would be created behind which to pursue the surrogate option.

South Africa has several other incentives for deferring a settlement as long as possible. The Reagan administration's tactics have given Pretoria more elbow room to pursue a policy of tactical realignment at home and destabilization abroad than was possible in the Carter years or may be possible in the future. By this logic, bringing the Namibian imbroglio to an early conclusion makes no sense; as soon as Namibia ceases to be an issue of international concern, the West will—a fortiori—focus its attention on South Africa itself. The argument that a subsequent U.S. administration, or even this one, sufficiently annoyed, will take a harder line with South Africa is a risk that—given the success of Pretoria's bargaining wiles since 1977—is thought to be worth running. The costs of remaining minimally engaged while sheltering behind the bogey of a Cuban presence in Angola are perceived to be less, probably far less, than the risks of giving up an advantage without clear gain. The fruits of Western gratitude cannot be sweet enough. Only the kinds of guarantees that no Western government could give to white South Africa would substitute for the broad power that Pretoria continues to derive from its control of Namibia.

### *South Africa's Priorities*

The first priority for white-ruled South Africa is ensuring its short- and long-term security. Western pressure for internal change, when combined with urban unrest and/or an upwardly escalating equilibrium of violence, poses the major threat to the perpetuation of this hegemony. (The Soviet threat is largely derivative, a function of apartheid and the failure to develop viable channels for black political participation.) This being so, it is profoundly in white South Africa's self-interest to keep the attention of the West focused on Namibia. In this light, Namibia's main value to South Africa is as a psychological buffer—an object of bargaining contention. Pretoria gives up the position of bargainer in the great game of Namibia only at its own peril, or only when Namibia has outlived its usefulness to South Africa. When Rhodesia was still an issue internationally, the question of Namibia seemed easier to resolve. And it was, because the West needed South

Africa's help in the Rhodesian arena. Today, only the existence of the Namibian problem keeps the West from South Africa's door. What, then, is the overriding South African incentive to settle?

Constructive engagement has reinforced South Africa's appreciation of its bargaining advantages. Instead of providing incentives, the linking of the Cubans to the process and the tempering of *démarches* about destabilization have given South Africa every reason to strengthen its borders, and to negotiate a separate peace rather than the comprehensive settlement that the West wants. Namibia's independence will not soon occur.

### *The Reagan Administration's Dilemma*

South Africa and the United States have interests in Namibia that diverge fundamentally. The West wants to eliminate a potential source of East-West conflict by taking Namibia to independence. It also wants to strengthen ties to the nations of black Africa by visibly fostering Namibia's transformation. Overall, it sees the achievement of Namibia's independence as the primary means of bringing stability to an otherwise volatile region. Stability is essential for economic development and political progress. Its spread also deprives the Soviet Union and its allies of new opportunities to fish in the turbulent waters of discontent. But the South Africans—erroneously from the American view—regard peace and prosperity on the South African periphery as weakening the case for continued white tutelage within South Africa itself. There is an unsubstantiated notion that greater economic and political stability and self-reliance in the neighboring states would “destabilize” South Africa's own black population.

The West wants to close the Namibian case. Constructive engagers have said that South Africa needs the United States and therefore must, especially during this administration, produce results. But the South Africans no longer fear an American retreat from the bargaining table. They reason that too much is at stake for the State Department to pull out. Too much has been invested. Moreover, South Africa never says “no.” It simply buries its reluctance behind the Cubans as it once cried a lack of UN impartiality. Moreover, since it is at least arguable that South Africa's fundamental interest is never to settle and incessantly to bargain—always to be wanted and never to concede—a process characterized by constant wooing can succeed only if there are major shifts in South Africa's assessment of its available options.

How to effect that reassessment, a Cuban exit or no, has become one of the Reagan administration's foreign policy dilemmas of 1983 and 1984. Constructive engagement is by now a posture composed of a series of omissions and commissions. The fine-tuning of constructive engagement that

would be required to get South African policy on Namibia back on the main track could involve a basic reevaluation of the importance of the Cape sea route, of the minerals of South Africa, of South Africa's value to the Free World—indeed, of the whole notion of South Africa's strategic significance to the West. If those issues are placed in a fresh perspective (an action which has not been the hallmark of this administration), and if South Africa's own true self-perception of its own self-interest becomes fully appreciated, then and only then can the impress of American needs be brought productively to bear on South Africa, and therefore on the question of Namibia. Implicit in this formulation is the setting of American goals in a regional and African context. In terms of our global goals, too, a cozy relationship with a pariah South Africa would hold few benefits for the United States. It is also arguable that such a cozy relationship retards South Africa's pursuit of those very goals of substantial reform which are in its own overriding self-interest.

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### *Mozambique Finds New Patron*

Mozambique and South Africa today signed a non-aggression pact which promises to transform the political and economic configuration of southern Africa. Until the signing, Mozambique's only other international treaty of friendship was with the Soviet Union. Until today, too, Mozambique sheltered anti-South African guerrillas, and South Africa sponsored armed attacks against the Marxist government of its neighbor. The pledges of non-aggression which have now been exchanged are meant to turn a zone of war into a region of peace.

Until negotiations between South Africa and Mozambique were successfully concluded earlier this year, Mozambique had steadfastly backed the campaign of aggression which the African National Congress (ANC) had been waging against white control of South Africa since 1977. (Founded in 1912 in South Africa, the ANC was driven underground and into exile in 1960.)

From bases in Mozambique, ANC guerrillas crossed into South Africa and sabotaged industrial or military installations. In the 1980s, successful penetrations and attacks by the ANC increased in number and severity about one-hundred-fold. So did the popular appeal of the ANC to South Africa's 25 million blacks. In retaliation, South Africa raided buildings in and near Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, which were alleged to have housed the ANC.

Several years ago South Africa also adopted a shadowy ex-Rhodesian and ex-Portuguese mercenary movement and gave it training, arms, and logistical support. Now called Renamo, or the Mozambique Resistance Movement, this force of about 6,000 men has successfully threatened the integrity of the government of President Samora Machel's Mozambique. Renamo has weakened his control of nine of the country's 10 provinces.

Mozambique's own Army has been unable to contain the spread of such powerful, externally supported force. Fragile and poor before, the war with Renamo has become a war for the very survival of President Machel's regime. Soviet help against South Africa and Renamo has been found wanting. So has Soviet economic assistance in the face of the Indian Ocean country's increasing impoverishment. Socialism has brought little growth, many shortages, and decay.

Furthermore, the drought which has paralyzed much of southern Africa for two years has compelled Mozambique to use scarce foreign exchange to import maize, the staple of most of its 14 million people. An unusual cyclone, or hurricane, in late January wreaked additional havoc in the southern part of the country, relieving the drought but destroying roads, bridges, railways, and harbor installations.

Mozambique sued for peace and asked for economic help. Spared guerrilla attack, power is already flowing from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric facility on the Zambezi River. South Africa has promised to help restore tourist facilities for whites and to send them in the numbers that Mozambique can absorb. It has also offered to help restore destroyed facilities. Most of all, it says that support for Renamo will end. Mozambique may have exchanged a Soviet for a South African patron. If so, South Africa may achieve the freedom from guerrilla attack that its white government desires. The absence of war, when realized, should be welcomed throughout the region, if not necessarily by the blacks within South Africa. They will have to defer dreams of liberation.

When coupled with the recently achieved cease-fire in Angola and the weakening there of Soviet and Cuban forces, this week's reconciliation between Mozambique and South Africa could, providing it is nurtured and sustained, lead to a more stable and prosperous southern Africa. But such a result need not hasten political reform in South Africa itself.

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### *Botha's Namibian Offer: Another Artifice*

South Africa is teasing the West again over Namibia. Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha's declared willingness to cede control over Namibia to France, West Germany, Britain, Canada, or the United States signifies no breakthrough in the long negotiations over the future of what was once called South-West Africa. His seeming concession is merely another artifice. Mr. Botha made the offer last week in Bonn during a seven-nation European tour. He may have intended this unexpected gesture to disarm his critics or provide an item of conversation during the Western summit conclave in London. Certainly it was but the most recent of South Africa's many attempts to shift the blame for the lack of progress toward Namibian independence.

Since 1977 South Africa, the West, and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), a guerrilla movement, have been attempting to negotiate an end to the low-level war between SWAPO and South Africa and a transfer of effective control in the sparsely settled territory from South Africa to the United Nations, and thence to a legislature chosen after a UN-supervised election. South Africa has managed over the years to stall one after another Western initiative.

For two years South Africa has refused to leave Namibia until the 25,000 Cuban soldiers, who support the Marxist government of neighboring Angola against a South African-backed insurgency group, depart. Last week Mr. Botha said he would hand over Namibia to any Western nation that wanted to defend and administer it, but only after the Cubans had gone home.

Although the U.S. has exerted steady diplomatic pressure in pursuit of this objective, the Cubans cannot easily leave Angola until its government and its opponents find a means of accommodating each other. That will not happen soon, not least because of the proximity of the U.S. presidential election. Mr. Botha's offer was disingenuous, and was quickly rejected by Canada. Official Washington reacted cautiously, publicly without enthusiasm, and privately with levity. Who did Mr. Botha think he was kidding?

But in South Africa the press accounts were serious, and even his critics there may have regarded his offer as a serious rather than a calculated, frivolous gesture. Mr. Botha told correspondents in Bonn that he wanted to call the West's bluff, and thus to gain a psychological advantage for South Africa. Nevertheless, Botha's initiative conveyed three serious messages:

First, South Africa is still searching for a way to circumvent the UN. Although the West, and all of Africa, are still committed to the procedures

for Namibian independence that are spelled out in Security Council Resolution 435, South Africa prefers a regional initiative which it could dominate.

Second, Namibia, no longer a source of wealth, is costing South Africa dearly. The war there, infrastructural requirements in a time of war, and aid during years of serious drought are costing South Africa as much as \$2 billion a year. South Africa's own annual governmental budget is about \$20 billion. South Africa could use the \$2 billion at home.

Third, South Africa is in no hurry to shed Namibia. So long as Namibia is a source of international concern, the attentions of the West and of the world will be focused there, and not on South Africa itself.

Transferring power in Namibia to indigenous parties will prove easy once South Africa genuinely either desires to get out or is pushed or pulled sufficiently tenaciously by the West, and not before.

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### *U.S. & South Africa*

South Africa finally went too far. Outraged by South Africa's audacious midnight raid into peaceful Botswana, the Reagan administration recently summoned Ambassador Herman Nickel home from Pretoria. Private pressure on President Pieter W. Botha's white-run government having failed, the State Department was compelled, after five years of using the carrots of constructive engagement, to blow its diplomatic stack.

Not only had South Africa, within weeks of a brazen assault on United States-owned oil installations in Angola, attacked a weak and friendly neighbor, but it had once again demonstrated the ineffectuality of constructive engagement. For the State Department, that demonstration of failure could not have come at a more damaging time. Influential senators have for months been pressing the department to replace Mr. Nickel and have been seeking the resignation of Dr. Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for Africa and the architect of constructive engagement.

Pushed by congressional antagonism to Dr. Crocker's policies and the passage through the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of unprecedented legislation which, if enacted, would impose sanctions on South Africa, the State Department had already begun hardening its attitude toward Mr. Botha's government. Now South Africa has pushed Dr. Crocker even more forcefully, probably ending forever the longstanding U.S. policy toward Pretoria of friendship, accommodation, and limited criticism.

South African soldiers attacked alleged African National Congress (ANC) guerrilla safe houses in sleepy Gaborone, Botswana's tiny capital, without warning. Although this was the first such raid into placid, unprotected Botswana, South African troops have similarly raided the capitals of Lesotho and Mozambique in attempts to prevent or preempt ANC raids into the heartland of their adjacent country.

South African forces shot 16, including a baby and a white Dutch national. Moreover, Botswana is one of Africa's few multiparty, capitalist democracies. After cautioning South Africa over and over again, the Reagan administration at last was provoked beyond constraint.

Pretoria's failure to respond in any significant ways to its own internal spasm of violence, now 10 months old, has further annoyed Washington. If constructive engagement is to show positive returns, it will have to encourage serious South African attention to the problem of power-sharing with the 22 million Africans who daily protest militantly and peacefully against apartheid, white South Africa's intense form of segregation.

Constructive engagement was also devised to secure the independence of Namibia (formerly South-West Africa) from South African control in accord with United Nations resolutions. Recently South Africa gave internal responsibility in Namibia to a group of unelected black and white politicians who had earlier come together as the Multiparty Conference (MPC). This transfer of supposed authority in the lapsed mandate from South Africa's administrator-general to the MPC is opposed and unrecognized in Washington. The fact that the shift occurred, however, and that the MPC will now attempt to govern, is another rebuff to constructive engagement.

Ambassador Nickel's recall therefore has more than one immediate cause. A welcome and long-overdue sign of structural realignment in the State Department, it presages a return to the posture and policies of the last half of the Carter administration. Following Congress's lead, the executive branch will now carry at least some sticks and speak very softly about the realities of reform in South Africa. In turn, that shift in bargaining tactics arguably will accelerate rather than retard the process of positive change in that troubled, tension-ridden country.



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### *Angolan Sting*

Delivering a covert big sting to Angola will escalate existing regional conflict and add unnecessarily to tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. But that is precisely what the Reagan administration mistakenly intends.

The Central Intelligence Agency, acting on instructions from the White House, plans to supply the rebels of Jonas Savimbi's antigovernment Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) with Stingers, the portable, heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles. The United States also wants to give some to insurgents in Afghanistan and the anti-Sandinista cadres in Nicaragua/Honduras.

Leaders of both the Senate and the House Select Committees on Intelligence are attempting to rush bills through Congress denying covert assistance to UNITA if the Stinger transfers are not reversed.

Since 1978 UNITA has successfully prevented Angola's Soviet-backed government from exercising control over about 40 percent of its territory. UNITA has often struck close to Luanda, the nation's capital; UNITA power has closed the central rail line and made Angola's southern half unsafe for government forces.

The official government of Angola is supported financially and militarily by the Soviet Union. Soviet and East German officers advise the regular Angolan Army. But the government's main defense against UNITA is the presence of 35,000 well-armed Cuban troops.

UNITA would be a less formidable fighting force if it were not assisted financially, militarily, and logistically by South Africa. Indeed, it is easy to argue that UNITA has packed a robust punch only because of the steady transfer of supplies from South Africa and because of the direct assistance of a South African-officered battalion, and the provision of South African air cover, radar surveillance, and shared intelligence.

Aiding UNITA aids South Africa. That is one serious strike against the U.S. administration's current effort to back UNITA. To do so aligns the U.S. squarely with that apartheid regime at a time when the administration seeks to demonstrate its abhorrence of apartheid and its preference for a peaceful, democratic-majority solution to the turmoil in South Africa.

The U.S. seeks regional peace. It has condemned South African attacks on Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, and Angola. But supplying Stingers would attempt to tip the regional balance toward South Africa, in accord with the hegemonic designs of South African foreign policy.

Equally serious, if not more so, is the impact that supplying Stingers can have on Soviet and Cuban interests in the southern African region. It enhances them at the very time the U.S. is trying desperately to deprive the Soviets and the Cubans of legitimacy in Angolan and African eyes. Sending Stingers plays into the hands of the Soviets. It gives the USSR, as Angola's best friend, glittering credibility when Soviet influence was otherwise waning. The Angolan government would prefer the Cubans to leave, but now must urge them to stay.

The war for Angola has for many years been comparatively low level. The Stingers, useful against troop-carrying helicopters and other low-flying gunships, escalate the potential for war. Soviet and Cuban leaders are unlikely to refrain from matching the Stingers with sophisticated weaponry of their own. Thus the introduction of Stingers is bound to increase rather than reduce the war in southern Africa as well as the competition within the region and globally between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The administration believes that covert aid to Mr. Savimbi will twist the tail of the Soviet bear so hard that it will relax its hold on Angola, Nicaragua, or Afghanistan. But the opposite result is at least equally likely. Assisting UNITA diminishes the credibility of the U.S. in Africa as well as with Africans in South Africa, bolsters the Soviet Union, links Washington squarely with Pretoria, and compounds the folly of "constructive engagement" by adding a policy of covert aid to Angola which is illogical and counterproductive.

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### *A Weak Mozambique Needs Outside Help*

The United States must not let Mozambique slide further into chaos. Despite the great weakness of its economy and government, and despite the Marxist leanings of its leaders, helping Mozambique preserve its endangered independence and shore up its faltering economy will serve U.S. interests well.

Rent by civil war, Mozambique hardly functions. The government, led by newly selected President Joaquim Chissano, cannot impose its will in large portions of this country with a coastline of 1,700 miles. It still controls the cities but has lost an official grip on the rural central and northern areas. There the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR), also called Renamo, has imposed a formidable presence since about 1983. Only one of Mozambique's 11 provinces is comparatively free of MNR insurgents.

Although the Mozambican Army of 30,000 is about double the size of the MNR insurgent forces, it has failed time and again to halt the spread of

MNR activity. At times the MNR threatens the outskirts of Maputo, Mozambique's capital. Britain has begun retraining the Mozambican Army, but its modest efforts cannot soon restore the morale or make up for the fundamental and logistical supply problems of the official Army.

The MNR, on the other hand, has for many years been backed financially and materially by South Africa. Although not exclusively a creature of South Africa, the MNR has become a successful agent of Pretoria's destabilization policies. Whether or not South Africa originally wanted to undermine Marxist Mozambique's ability to develop and govern itself, South Africa and the MNR are capable in the near future of overthrowing Mr. Chissano's regime and installing their own.

The military situation is desperate. So is the economy, for the civil war has proved immensely expensive for the government. Defense expenditures absorb 42 percent of the official operating budget. The dangers of the war have prevented farmers from selling cash crops. The national commodity distribution system has decayed. Most roads and the rail networks are targets. Of Mozambique's 14 million people, large numbers, perhaps a third, are estimated to suffer serious food shortages.

The war has interrupted Mozambique's sale of hydro-generated electric power to South Africa from the mighty Cahora Bassa project on the Zambezi River. It has sundered and weakened rail and road transport ties to Malawi and Zimbabwe, and thus deprived Mozambique of important transit and port revenues. Obviously, it has prevented foreign investment and slowed the transition within Mozambique from a state-run socialist to a more broadly privatized, incentive-based economy.

Rational observers might justifiably conclude that South Africa should want a stable, tranquil, growing black neighbor on its northeastern flank. South Africa helps run the port of Maputo and maintains export links by rail through that port. It employs 50,000 Mozambican miners in its deep gold deposits, 15,000 digging coal and 30,000 on farms, and in 1984 forged a peace treaty with Mozambique which resulted in the expulsion of anti-South African guerrillas from Mozambique.

Instead, South Africa has orchestrated an effective insurgency by proxy. Mozambique, already reeling from economic mismanagement, ill-advised agricultural and industrial policies, and a failure to increase or even to maintain traditional exports of shrimps and cashews, tourism, and its income from port revenues, has edged from frailty to collapse. Moreover, South Africa has threatened to repatriate Mozambican laborers. Their remittances of \$100 million a year constitute about 60 percent of Mozambique's foreign-exchange earnings.

Moreover, the civil war in Mozambique pits a government against an insurgency with shadowy and invisible leaders and with virtually no political or ideological content. Other than being pro-South African, and vaguely anticommunist, the MNR offers no coherent plan or program for Mozambique. It is a mercenary force, backed but no longer thoroughly controlled from outside, and bent on disruption on as broad a scale as possible.

The force has been successful at disturbance well beyond MNR's and South Africa's original hopes. The weakness of the government could lead to an MNR (and therefore a South African) assumption of state power within 12 months.

The U.S. can no longer restrain South Africa easily. But it can try. The new Congress, with or without executive leadership, could seek appropriate funding to shore up Mozambican defenses, bolster the economy, and assist Western Europe in its efforts to restore enduring transport links between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The U.S. can lean on Malawi, which aids the MNR.

Most of all, as Mozambique under President Chissano seeks to survive, it must receive help. The Soviets will not provide an answer; but if the U.S. continues to turn a mostly deaf ear, Chissano may have little choice.

Letting matters take their course, and visiting prolonged civil disturbance on the people of Mozambique, only plays into South African hands and undercuts our newly focused antagonism to apartheid. To assist an MNR victory by doing little or nothing serves neither our interests nor the interests of the people of Mozambique. It actually helps only white South Africa.

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### ***Why Mozambique's Rebels Merit No U.S. Support***

The United States has a welcome opportunity to wean a beleaguered, impoverished, and strategically valuable African state away from Marxism while simultaneously alleviating widespread hunger and encouraging the best kind of national reconstruction. Yet its doing so is being thwarted by conservative Republicans in the Senate.

Mozambique, a sweltering, underdeveloped country stretching 1,700 miles along the Indian Ocean between Tanzania and South Africa, is the state in question. Governed since 1975 by the leaders of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), it has moved dramatically within the last three years from close friendship with the Soviet Union to a more open and eclectic approach to world politics.

Joaquim Chissano, who succeeded the late Samora Machel as president last November, has made improvements in relations with the U.S., Britain, and Portugal, the former colonial power, among his priorities.

A pragmatic man, he desperately needs Western assistance if his government is to survive the destabilization efforts of South Africa, Mozambique's big, bullying neighbor to the south and west. South Africa has long backed the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) guerrillas in their war against Frelimo. Although South Africa promised to cease backing Renamo in a U.S.-brokered good-neighbor treaty with Mozambique in 1984, funds and arms continued covertly to flow to the local version of the *contras*.

In recent years, with widespread drought, official Mozambique's economic and managerial deficiencies, falling standards of living, a demoralized army, and attacks by Renamo, continued Frelimo rule has become very questionable.

Renamo, a South African proxy guerrilla militia with no indigenous ethnic or popular base and no political program, controls interior sections of Mozambique and has emerged as a significant threat to Frelimo. Leading Republican senators, led by Jesse Helms of North Carolina, and Robert Dole, the presidential contender from Kansas, now want the U.S. to abandon its support for the government of Mozambique and back the anti-communist forces of Renamo.

The U.S. State Department, and so far, the White House, is attempting to beat back this right-wing threat to what is a carefully conceived policy in southern Africa. The State Department is working with President Chissano to increase Western ties so that Moscow's declining influence will become increasingly irrelevant.

The State Department proposed development aid, but its request for supplemental funds was recently rejected by Congress on ideological and fiscal grounds. Humanitarian assistance is now being debated. Currently, too, Senators Helms and Dole, and other prominent Republicans, are holding up the confirmation of Secretary of State George Shultz's nominee as the next U.S. ambassador to Mozambique.

Melissa Wells is a career officer of impressive standing who recently served as ambassador to the Portuguese-speaking African nations of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. She has become the latest political football in Washington's ongoing struggle between a pro-South African lobby and State Department attempts to forge a sensible alliance in southern Africa with new progressives.

Chissano is a new progressive. He and his government have learned from their socialistic excesses. They have experienced the folly of relying on the

Soviet Union, which aids Africans only on its own narrow terms, after exacting onerous fees and hard-currency payments in return.

Since Mozambique has begun, however tentatively, to embrace the market incentive system and to encourage entrepreneurship, it is foolish and counterproductive for Senators Helms, Dole, and others to embrace a puffed-up, non-legitimate movement like Renamo. Given Renamo's close ties to South Africa, and Washington's post-constructive engagement policy of concerted antagonism to apartheid, support for Renamo would be distinctly destructive.

Britain, the European Economic Community, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi, and India all support Frelimo. Britain, in particular, has delivered aid and training assistance to the army. Scandinavian countries and Holland are helping to relieve famine and to return the ports of central and northern Mozambique to their pre-1975 levels of efficiency. Zimbabwe and Tanzania are fighting alongside Frelimo's army against Renamo.

To such questions of ideology and governmental survival are added the immediate realities of famine. Congressman Mickey Leland (D-Texas) and his Select Committee on Hunger assert that a third of Mozambique's 14 million people will need food assistance this year.

Senator Dole, using this same issue, claims that to alleviate hunger in the Mozambican interior, the U.S. should channel humanitarian help through Renamo. He and others are thus trying to cloud the main issue, which is whether the U.S., which has only recently moderated its cozy approach to white South Africa, should join that country in contributing to the destabilization of Mozambique.

President Chissano has begun turning his country around economically and diplomatically. He needs all the support he can muster. By backing his government, the U.S. will bolster both the short- and long-term stability of southern Africa.

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### *Glasnost and Moscow's Loosening Grip on Africa*

The summit was about the death of the evil empire, arms control, and the education of an aging leader. It was also about the consolidation of political power in the Soviet Union. At the edge of the stage, but still relevant, was the noticeable realignment of the Soviet establishment's attitude toward Africa.

Glasnost promises to lessen Soviet interest in and, hence, influence upon Africa. Perestroika is inward looking; there is so much to reform at home

that Mikhail Gorbachev must want to focus his energies where the gains would be greater—at home or in Europe and Asia.

Under Joseph Stalin and his successors, Africa was an area of opportunity. But permanent Soviet gains have been negligible, and comparatively costly. Moreover, in contrast to the heady 1960s and '70s, when an early generation of African leaders embraced Marxism and trekked to Moscow, in the late 1980s only Ethiopia and Angola are linked tightly to the Soviets. Mozambique slipped away as a result of Soviet neglect, and now must cling to South Africa. Many others, like Benin and the Seychelles, have found Soviet ties unprofitable or unrewarding. And how can African nations hew to outdated Marxist notions when the Soviets themselves seem to be rejecting them?

Now as a result of summit discussion and Soviet foreign policy trends, Mr. Gorbachev's men appear willing to abandon Angola, just as Afghanistan. Ethiopia may be next, and Mengistu Haile Mariam, its ruler, appears worried.

The USSR entered Angola as the Portuguese left, in 1975. With the Cubans as the martial arm, Soviet support installed the present government of Angola and prevented South Africa from overrunning the country on behalf of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), an anti-Marxist guerrilla group. Now 40,000 Cuban troops prevent UNITA and South Africa from marching on Luanda, Angola's capital. UNITA, however, controls about 40 percent of the country; South Africa occupies a salient of territory deep in the south.

In the Moscow negotiations with the United States, the USSR expressed a willingness to leave Angola, as is the preference of the Angolan government, and to take the Cubans with them. But neither the Angolan government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos nor the Cubans and Soviets can go unless the U.S. manages to neutralize UNITA, to which it has been supplying arms, and South Africa.

In the aftermath of glasnost, South Africa (not the Soviets) has become the major obstacle to peace in Angola. Conservative U.S. legislators, led by Sen. Jesse Helms (R) of North Carolina, also back UNITA and thus South Africa. But as the USSR retreats, so must anything more than an apology for Marxism in Angola.

South Africa is less fearful of Soviet Marxism than it is eager to sponsor a friendly, preferably UNITA-run government in Angola. Since UNITA has demonstrated more military prowess than the Angolan Army (minus Cubans), achieving a cease-fire in Angola could depend upon preparation of a formula by which South Africa pulls back from Angola and promises to

cease supplying UNITA as the Soviets and Cubans withdraw. Or President dos Santos's government could accept a coalition with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Then the U.S. or the United Nations would be compelled to police the region to prevent the reengagement of South Africa's Army and Air Force. If UNITA thus enters the government of Angola, the ultimate irony of glasnost could be to strengthen South Africa's hegemony over southern Africa.

The future of Soviet intentions in Ethiopia is less clear. But Colonel Mengistu's recent rapprochement with Somalia over the Ogaden and other tense issues, and his subtle but evident overtures to the West, imply an awareness that ties to Moscow have proved expensive and unrewarding.

The Soviets have not helped Mengistu feed his starving millions. Only the West has. They have refused to help him crush the 28-year-old rebellion by Eritreans (many of whom are Marxists) and are reluctant to help him end the revolt in Tigre Province. Mengistu may also understand that his vicious style of leadership holds little appeal for the new Soviet rulers. Nor, in a domestic-oriented USSR, do entanglements with unsavory African regimes continue to make much sense.

It is too soon to predict a total Soviet withdrawal from Africa. But if the new atmosphere of U.S.-USSR cooperation can be sustained into 1989, the tentacles of the no longer evil empire are certain to loosen their grip on and support for questionable overseas clients.

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### *Is Namibia on the Peace Train?*

Namibia could be free in 1989. That, at least, is one of the plausible messages of the summer's negotiations among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, with the United States pushing and brokering and the Soviet Union giving moderate counsel.

If the Cubans do leave Angola in accord with the two-year timetable, and if the recently implemented cease-fire keeps Cubans and South Africans from firing at each other in southern Angola, then the South Africans will have to think seriously about leaving Namibia.

If they really want the Cubans out, they must also stop supplying the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which has fought a tough guerrilla war against the Soviet-backed government of Angola since 1976. The Angolans want the U.S. to cease funneling arms to UNITA, too.



There is pressure on both sides. South Africa is beginning to encounter serious balance-of-payments problems, and the Angolan war and the occupation of Namibia are both substantial drains on South African finances. South Africa for a decade has funded a massive military buildup in Namibia, and also underwrites the regular and the special development budgets of Namibia. It supplies its rail and air services, water and electricity grids, and nearly all of its technical services.

The Angolans, on their side, can no longer afford to feed and shelter 55,000 Cuban soldiers. Nor do the Soviets wish to continue to help the Angolans provide for so many foreign mercenaries.

Angola wants U.S. diplomatic recognition and technical assistance. It wants to develop and modernize a country with riches currently untappable because of war. Moreover, the cease-fire alone will not end warfare in Angola. Quelling UNITA is critical, and only removing South Africa from neighboring Namibia, with its easy access to southern Angola and UNITA, could ensure (or nearly ensure) the cutoff of material for UNITA.

All sides want peace and progress in southwest Africa. The Angolans (and the Soviets) are desperate for it. The South Africans, however, want peace only if the Cubans leave completely. When that happens, white South Africa will be unchallenged in the southern African region by any military force comparable to its own.

South Africa has long wanted UNITA to run Angola. South Africa's financial perils may be serious enough to persuade it to abandon UNITA for freedom from Cubans and, at last, a way out of Namibia.

Certainly Namibia is no longer the source of wealth it was once thought to be. Hardly anyone wants its uranium anymore. Its diamonds are still valuable, and probably contribute about a quarter of all public tax revenues. But copper, tin, zinc, and other metals have lost their importance, and the karkul sheep market in West Germany is cyclical and less valuable than it was in the 1970s. Because of overfishing and other environmental problems, the great pilchard runs of the 1960s and '70s off Namibia's Atlantic coast are gone.

In any event, Walvis Bay, the territory's only significant port, is a South African enclave thanks to treaties negotiated more than a century ago.

Namibia's real gross national product per head has declined in recent years. Expenses for the territorial government, a set of regional governments, and various local governments have grown as tax revenues have stagnated. Much of the added costs have come from logistical growth as a result of the internal and Angolan wars, and from security needs. South African grants have made up the difference.

At least half of Namibia's 1.2 million people are Ovambo, who live in the comparatively well watered northern eighth of the country and are largely antagonistic to South African occupation. Whites number about 80,000, and Kavango from the north, Herero from the drier center, Damara, from the dry west center, and Nama, Coloreds, and Basters from the dry south all number fewer than 100,000 each and make up the bulk of the rest of the population.

South Africa rules Namibia by decree in defiance of the United Nations. In 1916, South Africa took German South-West Africa from the Germans and governed it as a League of Nations mandate from 1921 to 1946. After World War II the UN demanded Namibia back, but South Africa refused to recognize the transition from the league to the UN.

Only in 1978, after American threats, did South Africa agree to negotiate Namibia's future with the Western powers on behalf of the UN. The current talks are an outgrowth of negotiations that have spanned the decade.

South Africa has consistently bargained over Namibia in bad faith. It has tried to foist a home-grown territorial government dominated by local whites and their indigenous black and brown (Nama, Coloreds, and Basters) allies on the UN and the West. It has hardly wanted to recognize either the legitimacy or the inevitability of a Namibia ruled by the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), a Soviet-funded guerrilla group with bases in Angola.

Troubles at home, in South Africa, and a shortage of cash may at last have altered this calculus. That is the West's and the UN's hope. Or has South Africa finally realized that a SWAPO-ruled Namibia would pose no more of a threat to white South Africa than socialist-leaning Zimbabwe?

After all, Namibia will not suddenly become wealthy. Nor will the South African-dominated economic realities of the region be altered. A new Namibia will be tied in innumerable infrastructural ways to South Africa.

The rulers of South Africa probably also appreciate that the new USSR wants to leave the region, and arguably will not come to the new Namibia's permanent assistance. Thus, if the Cubans leave Angola, South Africa need not fear an independent Namibia, even under SWAPO and Ovambo sway.

Even more positively, if the white South Africans really see the end of the Cubans and help usher in a free Namibia, they will have a win-win situation. They will spend less on war and on subsidizing Namibia, they will generate at least some world goodwill, they could trade with Angola and Namibia, and they could still dominate southern Africa as the region's strongest economic as well as military force.

As peace breaks out around the Gulf and elsewhere in the world, rationality may even prevail along the southern Atlantic shores of Africa.

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### *It's Time to Help End Angola's Civil War*

Leaders of the southern African frontline states sensibly urge President Bush to end United States support for the anti-government rebels in Angola. Now that the Cubans have begun leaving Angola and South Africa has promised Namibia independence, the only obstacle to peace in the region is the 13-year-old civil war in Angola.

The Reagan administration aided the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels with Stinger missiles, other armaments, and advice. South Africa says it will soon stop supplying UNITA with petroleum, weapons, and cash. If and when it does, the U.S. will be the main overt backer of the movement that has long been led by Jonas Savimbi.

Logic and a genuine desire for peace ought to lead the Bush administration to support the Reagan administration's recent mediation efforts in the region and to extend diplomatic recognition to the government of Angola. But President Bush and the current assistant secretary of state for Africa, Chester A. Crocker, have both backed the continued supply of war materiel to UNITA.

Mr. Savimbi's guerrilla forces exert a paramount influence over about 40 percent of Angola, primarily in the southern and central parts of the country. Later this year, once Cuban numbers have been reduced substantially, a UNITA army as powerful and as threatening to government troops as it now is might be powerful enough to march on Luanda, the national capital.

Clearly, the Republican administration wants Savimbi and his troops to remain strong, and intends to help UNITA overcome the loss of South African logistical and financial help. Although Mr. Crocker, who entered the Reagan administration because of George Bush's strong backing, tenaciously achieved agreements regarding Cuban withdrawal and Namibia's future, he now wants Washington to keep UNITA's saber sharp.

Angola's government is Marxist in origin and was secured in power in 1976 by Soviet and Cuban support. In this decade, since South Africa began backing UNITA and invading and occupying Angola, government forces have been on the defensive. Their position has been secured only by 60,000 Cuban soldiers and airmen.

Despite the Cubans, and Soviet-supplied aircraft, radar, and arms, UNITA has consistently held the upper hand. It raided and shut down the vital Benguela Railway, which traverses Angola, and ranged as far afield as the coffee plantations of the country's northwest and the diamond mines of the

northeast. Savimbi gave exuberant press conferences to Western journalists and welcomed South African officials openly to his rebel headquarters.

There seemed to be no stopping UNITA. Last year, however, new Soviet aircraft and Cuban pilots gained control of the southern Angola skies from the South African air force. There were a series of major land battles between the Cubans and South Africa, and the Cubans won. South Africa, hitherto largely invincible, began suffering its first serious human casualties.

South Africa agreed to leave Angola primarily for other reasons, and also to give Namibia independence. But its comparatively weakened military position helped accelerate an initiative already forming inside the South African political and foreign affairs establishment.

Angola has agreed to the removal of the Cubans over 27 months on the understanding that South Africa will no longer assist UNITA. If South Africa keeps its word, and UNITA receives no significant new help from outside, how long can UNITA survive as a fighting force?

That is the key question. Crocker and Mr. Bush want UNITA to remain potent in order to compel the left-leaning (but increasingly more pro-Western) government of Angola to negotiate the kind of peace treaty which would give UNITA a share of power. (U.S. companies pump oil from Angola and provide most of the country's export earnings.)

The South Africans assume that UNITA has sufficient fuel and arms to fight on against the government (and the Cubans) for as long as it takes for the government to agree to some kind of a coalition arrangement.

The government, in turn, calculates that UNITA cannot maintain its punch for as long as 27 months. While UNITA is strong, the government believes, the Cubans will be there as protectors. As UNITA's strength wanes, the Cubans will be able to leave without jeopardizing the otherwise parlous position of the government.

U.S. assistance to UNITA prolongs the agony. Yet Washington seems reluctant, now that it has achieved détente in southern Africa with Soviet help, to take the next step forward to stability and peace.

It would be folly to stand shoulder to shoulder with UNITA, whatever its anti-Marxist (and pro-South African) credentials.

It is wiser if the new Bush administration breaks cleanly with its predecessor and pushes the peace process in Angola. It is time to end the unneeded war in Angola.

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### *Namibian Independence—Hard Work Ahead*

Peacekeeping in Namibia will not be easy. The South African dominated territory on the southwestern shores of the continent is vast, its peoples and languages diverse, and its communication system underdeveloped.

In accord with an agreement painfully negotiated last year by South Africa, Angola, Cuba, and the United States, South Africa has withdrawn its troops from southern Angola and promised to scale back its occupying force in Namibia. A United Nations Security Council plan, devised in 1978, stipulates that the South African army units will be replaced by 7,500 UN-sponsored, armed, keepers of the peace.

The UN force is needed to keep the peace internally and to prevent any outsiders (including South Africa) from influencing or interfering in Namibia's elections. The territory's 1.4 million people will vote in November for a constituent assembly. The assembly will write the future nation's constitution. All of its decisions will have to be taken by a two-thirds majority. South Africa hopes to prevent its popular black opponents from winning a two-thirds majority of the seats in the assembly.

The big powers in the UN Security Council want a force smaller than 7,500 in order to reduce its estimated \$650 million cost. The South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which has been fighting to oust South Africa from Namibia since 1966, naturally prefers as much military protection as possible.

SWAPO distrusts South Africa's intentions. So did the U.S. and the other Western big powers, who in 1978 framed Security Council Resolution 435 and specified the size of the peacekeeping force. They argued that 7,000 men were needed to ensure an honest election.

Those fears are still real. After all, South Africa has controlled Namibia since 1915, first as the conqueror of what was the German colony of Southwest Africa, then as an agent of what became a League of Nations mandate, and, finally, after 1946, in defiance of UN orders that it place Namibia under the control of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

Only in 1977, after President Carter threatened to impose unspecified sanctions, did South Africa end its near-incorporation of Namibia and begin to negotiate with the U.S. and other Western powers. Many false promises and stalling maneuvers later, South Africa finally appears to be surrendering control.

But Namibia is nearly twice the size of California, and seven-eighths desert and semi-desert. South Africa knows the people and the terrain. Even 7,500 UN troops may understand Namibia only slowly.

Nearly two-thirds of all Namibians, especially the dominant Ovambo (700,000) and their Kavango (90,000) and Caprivi (50,000) neighbors, live in the northern, well-watered eighth of the country along the Angolan border. This is SWAPO country and also the area of greatest South African military penetration. Consequently, most of the UN troops will have to be stationed (and provisioned) in a region that is at least 300 miles from Windhoek, Namibia's capital.

UN troops will also have to monitor activity in the central belt of the country, where 65,000 white farmers, civil servants, and businessmen are dominant. South Africa's presence in and around Windhoek will remain, for South African Airways and South African trains will continue to connect Namibia to the rest of the world. Walvis Bay, Namibia's only real port, is a South African-owned enclave; trains will continue to carry imports from that port to Windhoek and take exports of uranium oxide and copper there.

Central Namibia is also the home of 90,000 Damara, 85,000 Herero, 40,000 mixed-background Coloreds (recent immigrants from South Africa), 9,000 Tswana, and 35,000 San (Bushmen). South of Windhoek to the Orange River, a dry grazing area, live 45,000 brown-skinned Baster farmers and a few thousand whites. Windhoek, with 150,000 people, is the only sizeable city.

South Africa has been subsidizing Namibia and spending \$1 billion a year on its army. So it wants out. But for at least 10 years it has called SWAPO (supported by the Soviet Union) a terrorist menace.

Although South Africa has reconciled itself to the likelihood of a SWAPO electoral victory, it still seeks to prevent a two-thirds sweep. South Africa will back financially and in other ways a coalition of anti-SWAPO non-Ovambo parties.

The task of the UN peacekeeping force, and of the much smaller UN elections supervisory team, will be to watch out for and frustrate undue South African influence between April and November.

Modern electronic surveillance techniques will not be sufficient. A large and savvy contingent of blue berets will certainly be required. Even then, the peacekeepers and the supervisors will need to be wary, lest South Africa continues to influence the Namibians it has governed, coerced, and befriended for so long.

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### *In Namibia, a True Test of Nationalism*

The true test of victorious nationalism comes when it is time to govern, and transform slogans into action. In Namibia, where the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) won a national election earlier this month, the rhetoric of revolution is being tried severely.

SWAPO's 57.3 percent poll gave it a decisive but not overwhelming triumph in the contest for seats in a 72-member constituent assembly. SWAPO had predicted a 90 percent vote in its favor, and knowledgeable observers had forecast that it would get at least 70 percent of the votes.

A two-thirds majority in the assembly will be necessary for passage of articles in Namibia's constitution, which will be written by the newly elected delegates. SWAPO now must work with its main opposition, the white-led Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), and five smaller parties to obtain the legislative arrangements it prefers and to lead Namibia to independence.

The DTA and the smaller parties—the United Democratic Front (UDF), the right-wing white Action Christian National party, the Federal Convention, and the National Patriotic Front—all campaigned against SWAPO. They fear its long devotion to Marxism, and its threats to nationalize private property. Above all, the DTA and the others represent Namibia's many minorities.

SWAPO is the party of the majority Ovambo, the people of the densely populated, well-watered, northern fringe of Namibia. SWAPO took 95 percent of the votes in Ovamboland, and also polled very well among the neighboring Kavango. The Ovambo represent about 65 percent of Namibia's 1.4 million people, its main farmers, and its mine labor force. Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's longtime leader, is an Ovambo. While prominent members of the Herero, Damara, and Nama ethnic groups have long been associated with SWAPO's nationalism, SWAPO gained many fewer votes than expected among these groups.

SWAPO holds 41 of the 72 assembly seats, the DTA 21, the UDF 4, Action 3, and the other two 1 each. In order to achieve the kind of majority rule to which SWAPO aspires, Mr. Nujoma and his colleagues will have to seek successful compromise with Dirk Mudge, the Afrikaner farmer who leads the DTA, and with several ex-SWAPO politicians who run the smaller parties.

Those compromises will provide the basis for Namibia's first government, probably sometime after April, 1990. The DTA and the others in

opposition will, in turn, seek ways to entrench minority vetoes and other anti-Ovambo legislative devices.

Mr. Nujoma, who never finished high school and worked on the South African railways before leading SWAPO in exile, has promised not to impose SWAPO's will on others. His party probably prefers a one-party state, but Mr. Nujoma says that must be the "wish of the people." He has also extended the hand of reconciliation to whites. They number only 75,000, but the surprising success of the DTA and of the Action party, as well as their leading economic role, gives them renewed hope.

Most important of all, Mr. Nujoma accepted the need for a bill of rights. If SWAPO and the other groups in the assembly can agree on a strong set of provisions along the lines of the amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and give review powers to a strong judicial branch, then Namibia might move to and beyond independence with confidence.

SWAPO probably will want the new constitution to reflect its view that Namibia is potentially rich, and that the commanding heights of the economy should be controlled by the state. The other parties will not see it that way, and SWAPO's socialism may have to give way before a shrinking tax base, lowered mineral sales, and expenditures that outrun revenues.

South Africa has been subsidizing Namibia's budget, and SWAPO will find it uncomfortable to continue depending on its enemy and equally uncomfortable doing without. In an era when the Soviets are retreating from Africa, SWAPO may be compelled to make difficult choices. Doing so will be the test of Mr. Nujoma and his colleagues, and of the maturity of a nationalist force confronting the realities of constitution making and governing.

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### *Namibia's Nationhood*

Namibia becomes Africa's 52nd nation tomorrow after more than a century of white rule. As it leaves South African control, it becomes a possible model for cross-color cooperation in southern Africa.

As large as two Californias, Namibia is nine-tenths desert and semi-desert. Its comparatively small population of 1.4 million is overwhelmingly African or of mixed descent. But because of its location on South Africa's northwestern flank, because 75,000 of its people are white and predominantly of South African extraction, and because South Africa has effectively ruled Namibia from 1915 until today, whites and blacks in South Africa



will be closely watching how the new Namibia relates to its neighbor, how it treats whites, and how democratically and tolerantly it rules itself.

The government that assumes power tomorrow is, moreover, derived from a guerrilla movement that opposed South Africa's control of Namibia from 1966. SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organization) fought bitterly against South Africa, largely without effect, until an American-brokered cease-fire brought peace in 1989.

During its many years of exile SWAPO was backed by the Soviet Union and other East-bloc nations. It preached a heady revolutionary rhetoric, and promised to nationalize white-owned property and set up a one-party state once it attained power.

Now that power is at hand, every indication is that SWAPO will avoid alarming its major revenue producers and export earners, and will woo rather than attack foreign investors. Mining is the mainstay of its fragile economy. Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM), a subsidiary of De Beers of South Africa, is the largest private employer of labor and the largest contributor to national export earnings (30 percent) and taxes (13 percent of the total). A subsidiary of RTZ, a British firm, exports uranium oxide from one of the world's largest deposits. Its share of exports and taxes is only slightly less than CDM.

Copper, lead, zinc, and tin have all been key to Namibia's economy. So have pilchards and sardines, and the pelts of karakul lambs. But markets and prospects have changed, and Namibia has recently been supported as much by South African assistance and wartime expenditures as by its minerals and agriculture.

Namibia also imports much of its food and other staples from South Africa and exports its uranium and other metals through the South African-controlled enclave of Walvis Bay. Its currency and tariffs are also South African. That neighbor has long run the railways, airways, harbors, and power facilities, and dominated Namibia's infrastructure.

For these reasons, as well as the sheer economic and political power of South Africa, SWAPO's government needs to move deliberately. Yet SWAPO is dominated by the Ovambo, people from Namibia's north, who constitute about two-thirds of the population. There is demand for development in the north, and SWAPO will be pressured to make up for South African neglect.

Fortunately, the way in which Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's canny leader and Namibia's first president, has chosen to organize his government has been greeted with pleasant surprise.

He and his followers agreed to a new constitution that limits the powers of the president, guarantees human rights, mandates an independent judi-

ary, and enshrines private ownership. A mixed economy is prescribed and foreign investment is encouraged. As written and ratified, Namibia's is the most liberal constitution in Africa.

Furthermore, Mr. Nujoma has not reserved his top posts for Ovambo or for Africans. His prime minister is expected to be Hage Geingob and his foreign minister Theo-Ben Gurirab. Both are Damara. Two Ovambo, Peter Mueshange and Hidipo Hamutenya, will become minister of defense and minister of information, respectively.

Nujoma has given the critical responsibility for the economy to Dr. Otto Herrigel, a German-speaking businessman who is known for his realism. A white human-rights campaigner will be the attorney general.

If the new Namibia operates along the lines of Botswana, where democracy and economic growth have been the rule since 1966, South Africans of all colors will notice. They will also observe how whites take part in the modernization of the country, and contemplate the extent to which Namibia functions as a harmonious multiracial entity.

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### *Peace in Angola and Mozambique*

After 15 years of civil war, Angola stands to benefit from the global peace dividend. But arms transfers from the U.S. pose a major obstacle.

For much of the past decade the U.S. has supplied military hardware, including shoulder-fired missiles, to the army of Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Since Angolan independence from Portugal in 1975, UNITA has battled his country's government, now led by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

The conflict was born of the cold war. The Soviets and Cubans backed and fought with the Movement for Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against Mr. Savimbi's men and their South African allies. Together they established the Angolan government and supported it as UNITA. With South African help from 1978, they mounted a tough guerrilla campaign against the Marxist state.

After the Soviets entered Afghanistan, President Reagan's administration decided to link arms with South Africa behind UNITA. The U.S. thus successfully raised the costs to the Soviet Union of intervention in Africa and the third world, and may have influenced the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Yet a de-escalation of hostilities in southwestern Africa, which led in late 1988 to the Namibian-Angolan peace accord, was primarily determined by President Gorbachev's reassessment of Soviet priorities. He no longer wanted to expend scarce Soviet resources on overseas adventures. He and his military advisers were no longer prepared to prop up third-world regimes. President Castro of Cuba was similarly anxious to beat an honorable withdrawal from Angola.

These moves had to be based on a South African pullout from Namibia and a stop of massive arms and fuel shipments from South Africa to UNITA. When those arrangements were secured, by mid-1989, the U.S. became the major supplier for UNITA, and the major outside support of the Angola conflict.

UNITA is still a tough fighting force. It may be able to count on the support of 40 percent of Angola. But steady U.S. backing removes incentives for a cease-fire. Mr. Savimbi has agreed to several cease-fires, but neither he nor UNITA have laid down arms. Indeed, the balance of power in the country recently shifted away from the government and back to UNITA. New northern bases opened up. In July, UNITA attacked the outskirts of Luanda, the capital.

The role of the U.S. is pivotal. Fortunately, Angola's government no longer considers itself Marxist. Only 12,000 Cuban troops (down from 35,000) remain. Best, in July President dos Santos' Central Committee accepted the principle of multiparty democracy.

Mozambique, a similarly ex-Portuguese and ex-Marxist state, also declared itself in favor of multiparty democracy. Early this month it agreed to permit opposition parties, even the Renamo guerrilla movement, to campaign against the government in elections that were set for 1991. By so doing, the government hopes to end its own 13-year-long civil war, and to begin a painful process of reconstruction and reconciliation.

The two Angolan contenders are poised on another cease-fire. This time the ingredients are there: exhaustion, stalemate, and a desire on both sides to compete in elections rather than on the battlefield. An end to American arms transfers would accelerate the process.

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### *Namibia: An African Success Story—So Far*

Namibia works. After two years of independence, Namibia remains a functioning, multiracial democracy with an active opposition, vigorous free press, and a national spirit of reconciliation.

Not every African country can boast such success. None can claim as liberal a constitution. Although South Africa's long rule of Namibia ended in

1990, even those whites who bitterly opposed majority rule, and fought it, say they are pleasantly surprised at the cautious, progressive state that Namibia has become.

The country is the size of two Californias, but with a population of only 1.5 million. Within that population there are numerous languages, and whites and Africans slip easily, sometimes in a single sentence, into English, Afrikaans, German, Herero, or Ovambo. Nearly 65 percent of the total population are Ovambo, who live in a narrow belt of northern territory. Only 75,000 of the total population are whites.

Not all the trains run on time. Businessmen say the home affairs ministry is quite slow to issue work permits, residence permits, and passports. The foreign affairs ministry is branded inefficient.

The lower court system has been in shambles with the high court regularly overturning the judgments of new magistrates. But the government has retrained its staff and is working hard to bolster its judicial reputation.

The labor scene is also unsettling. Despite 50 percent unemployment, there are many strikes for better pay. Some industries have retaliated by dismissing their work forces, and there has been serious industrial strife and violence.

But rural roads are being constructed, telephones are being repaired, and Air Namibia has launched flights to Europe.

Namibians credit Sam Nujoma, the former Marxist guerrilla leader turned responsible president, for encouraging, even demanding, evenhanded justice, ethnic neutrality, and good government. He has been joined in such example-setting by Prime Minister Hage Geingob and by many of his Cabinet ministers.

President Nujoma has slowed down his motorcades which used to rush at high speed through Windhoek, the capital. He has largely eschewed pomp, unlike a few of his ministers, and he stays in Africa more than they do.

But Nujoma recently aroused the ire of foreign embassies and many citizens by insisting on the purchase of a \$25 million presidential jet from France. Less expensive alternatives were available. Demanding the jet seems out of character and observers hope it was the exceptional extravagance that proves a positive rule.

Buying the jet could not have come at a less auspicious time, symbolically and actually. Namibia's economy is weaker than ever. The worst drought in 30 years has destroyed the subsistence agriculture and the grazing of cattle and sheep on which most Namibians depend.

The fishing industry is reviving, but slowly, thanks to continued poaching by Spanish and other trawlers. Because of the doldrums of the atomic power industry, uranium oxide prices are at rock bottom. Namibia's large

mine production facility has cut its output in half. Copper, lead, and zinc prices are low and no longer contribute much to Namibia's tax revenues or balance of payments position.

Only diamonds sparkle. Consolidated Diamond Mines, owned by the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, is the largest private employer (6,000 employees) and the largest industrial contributor to the nation's tax base. Negotiations begin in August, however, between the company and the government about transferring part-ownership to Namibia.

Namibia's recently announced national budget relies to a large extent on foreign aid and borrowing. The resignation earlier this year of the country's first minister of finance was in part a reflection of his ministry's concern over too rapid growth in state expenditures. A major complaint is the bloated size of the civil service. About 55 percent of all Namibian employment is in the government sector.

Namibia is not without its continuing problems. There have been cases of corruption and rumors of more. Inflation is running at about 20 percent a year and crime is rife and escalating. But, overall, the report card shows good grades.

Considering the immense difficulty of creating a national *mélange* of peoples accustomed to South Africa's domestic colonialism, Namibia has done exceptionally well. Considering, too, that independence coincided with economic downturns and now a dearth of rainfall, Namibia should receive much praise.

The white leader of the political opposition is enjoying being in opposition and keeping the government on its toes. A strong and not beleaguered opposition, debate within Nujoma's government, and the successful exchange of oppression and apartheid for genuine freedom—all count well.

Prosperity for all Namibians may come later, and only with difficulty. For now, Namibia ranks among the African success stories.

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### *Namibia Eschews Intolerance*

Namibia prides itself on official reconciliation. Three years after independence, the one-time virtual colony of South Africa still provides lessons for its much more complex neighbor.

Overt friction between whites and blacks in Namibia is noticeably absent. Indeed, Afrikaners still staff the civil service, control substantial sectors of

commerce, and dominate commercial farming. Whites also serve in the cabinet of the government of Namibia.

Early last month hundreds of white farmers—their ire raised by proposed increased taxes on cattle—disrupted traffic in downtown Windhoek, Namibia's capital. Then they marched on State House.

President Sam Nujoma, once the “devil incarnate” of South African depiction, calmly received the farmers' petition and thanked them for their concern.

Few African countries would have tolerated such white-led protests. Few black presidents would have reacted with equanimity. There were no outcries from members of the cabinet or the ruling South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) party. The farmers' protest underlined the workings of Mr. Nujoma's policy of reconciliation.

Despite SWAPO's Marxist rhetoric before independence, its determination to redress the grievances of 65 years of South African misrule, and the remaining social and economic inequalities between Namibian blacks and whites, the government has operated pragmatically.

Nujoma and Prime Minister Hage Geingob appreciate Namibia's fragile economic position, dependent as it is on the production of a South African-controlled diamond mining operation, on fishing projects that will require outside investment, and on the maintenance of the white-dominated cattle and sheep industry.

The sanctity of private investment and civil service tenure are protected in Namibia's decidedly liberal constitution, and discrimination on the basis of color or creed is prohibited. Nujoma is clearly in command, but not all decisions are handed down by him. The cabinet debates policies vigorously, as does Namibia's parliament.

Namibia is not perfect. There is a growing sense of corruption, minor by the standards of Nigeria and white South Africa, but disturbing in a comparatively chaste and impoverished country like Namibia.

The auditor general recently reported that the government had paid the ruling party large sums for fictitious war materiel. The presidential guard over-invoiced for hotel rooms and meals. Nurses claimed pay for thousands of hours never worked. There are rumors of kickbacks to politicians.

Even so, alleged corruption, complaints about the government's failure to develop the populous north of the country rapidly, worries about lack of progress in the educational sphere, and a rise in crime rates are accusations that shade rather than dim Namibia's steady growth as an oasis of sensibly managed political and social adjustment in Africa.

It is too soon to decide whether Namibia, a land defined by fragile deserts and areas of striking national beauty, will restrain the pressures of people

and animals on its ecology. Much-needed reforestation is in its infancy, and the big battles over the environment are not yet won, if even openly joined.

Namibia is a nation of only 1.5 million people. Fewer than 100,000 are white or of mixed parentage. South Africa's 40 million include 8 million whites, Asians, and Coloreds.

About 65 percent of Namibia's people are Ovambo, whereas no African group in South Africa is as dominant. Thus, Namibia is a beacon of sane light on South Africa's western flank, showing what can be achieved in a pluralistic and once bitterly-divided society.

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### *Growing Clouds of Corruption Threaten Namibia's Progress*

After four years of independence, Namibia can no longer call itself blemish free.

Until relatively recently, Namibia seemed a strong, secure, upright, wisely focused model for the new Africa, particularly for neighboring South Africa. Now there are well-placed allegations of spreading corruption and mismanagement, especially in the sensitive realm of ecotourism, and too little concern about it at the upper levels of government.

The auditor-general, a Namibian who reports to parliament, recently accused the government of "sweeping corruption under the carpet."

Namibia's most significant exports are diamonds, uranium oxide, and copper. Fish, especially sardines, pilchards, and hake, are growing in importance. Likewise, high-quality ecotourism is another economic mainstay, as well as a hope for the future. It is in the field of ecotourism that Namibia's government may be attempting to secure short-term national and personal gains at the expense of the long-term national interest.

Early this year, and despite local court opinions, the Namibian government lifted a longtime ecotourism concession to the famed Skeleton Coast from its local white pioneer and gave the exclusive rights to tourism along that remote part of Namibia's beautiful Atlantic shores to a German promoter.

The German firm had no comparable experience in Namibia, had been criticized for its tourism schemes elsewhere, but was known to have friends in the Namibian government.

Another foreign firm is building an unusually large lodge for tourists at the entrance to Sossusvlei National Park, which contains the highest natural sand dunes in the world. Ecologists in Namibia question the ability of the

red-, rust-, orange-, blond-, and other subtle-colored dune areas to sustain a surge of visitors, even on foot. The unique, fragile area is at risk, but the Namibian government has opted for foreign investment over protection of the environment.

There are persistent allegations of a deal having been made for Namibia to receive toxic wastes from Europe, but the country's minister of the environment strenuously denies them.

In addition, allegations have surfaced about ministers receiving government fishing-concession grants and subsequently selling or sharing them for great personal gain. So far, neither the nation's ombudsman nor the auditor-general have revealed the extent of their investigations in this area.

They have, however, reported to parliament on other improprieties without parliament or the government having taken action. The Namibian Constitution is one of the most liberal and forthright in the world. It provides for an independent auditor-general and an independent ombudsman.

To the credit of the government, President Sam Nujoma appointed two independently minded Namibians to those posts, and he and his Cabinet ministers have not publicly interfered with the work of either. But neither have they embraced and acted on their findings, or even published the reports of a separate commission established to investigate corruption.

The ombudsman has completed at least one startling investigation. After newspaper allegations last year, the ombudsman uncovered an expensive scam in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead of buying large Mercedes cars for its many new embassies overseas from the factory in Stuttgart, Germany, or from the local distributor of Mercedes in Windhoek, Namibia's capital, the contract was given to a French-connected firm in Windhoek, and the Mercedes were ordered, at higher prices, through Paris. The wife of a senior employee in the ministry works for that local French-connected company.

The auditor-general revealed that a well-connected official had used government funds and employees to fence off large farms in the north and dig deep wells. The official was dismissed, but has not yet been prosecuted. Likewise, nothing has happened to the employees who over-invoiced for myriad government vehicle tires, or who claimed per diems for stays in a long-defunct hotel.

But when the auditor-general initiated in March the arrest of the finance director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, allegedly for defrauding the government of R200,000 (U.S. \$65,000), the auditor-general was publicly castigated by the minister of foreign affairs himself, who called the auditor-general "unprofessional and unprocedural." Namibians go the polls in



December to elect a president and members of the National Assembly. Everyone expects President Nujoma to be reelected easily and for the ruling party, the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to increase its 10-seat majority over others in the Assembly. The black-led opposition seems fragmented, and unwilling or unable to capitalize on the allegations of corruption and mismanagement that have begun to threaten Namibia's reputation as a clean African democracy.

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### *Botswana's Race to Arm*

A perplexing and wasteful arms race is under way in southern Africa. Instead of a much-vaunted, post-apartheid peace dividend, nations are buying rather than shedding weapons of war.

Surprisingly, Botswana, Africa's longest-enduring democracy, is leading the way with massive purchases. Neighboring South Africa and Namibia are considering retaliatory responses, and Zimbabwe and Zambia, also neighbors, are growing anxious.

For reasons that are difficult to understand, Botswana's Defense Force recently ordered 13 second-hand, American-made F5 fighter aircraft from Canada; 40 surplus German-manufactured Leopard battlefield tanks from the Netherlands; and 36 British Scorpion tanks. The three purchases, plus other military equipment, will cost about \$150 million. Botswana's annual military budget is about \$192 million, an increase of \$70 million in three years.

Botswana, thanks to gem diamonds, is one of Africa's wealthiest countries, with a total gross domestic product of about \$4 billion, and a per person annual GDP of about \$2,700. But Botswana is mostly desert, with a population of about 1.4 million; sheep, goats, and cattle outnumber people. But it also has large pockets of poor farmers. The Bank of Botswana claims that 45 percent of the country's population lives below the local poverty datum line.

Botswana's Defense Force has consisted of an Army numbering about 7,500. It is expected to grow to 10,000. The head of the Defense Force is Lt. Gen. Ian Khama, the son of Sir Seretse Khama, Botswana's first president. During the last decade he has managed to increase the size and fighting power of his tiny country's military might.

Although Botswana was hammered hard by white South Africa in the 1970s and '80s, it now has no known disputes or controversies with its large,

powerful surrounding neighbor. Nearly all of Botswana's food and fuel imports, and its beef exports, reach the settled parts of Botswana through South Africa. If there ever were renewed hostilities between the two countries, Botswana's 10,000-strong force would be no match for South Africa's 100,000 soldiers.

South Africa's Air Force has wanted to update its equipment, and Botswana has accelerated its efforts. They would be able to defend against sophisticated tanks. But of what use will tanks be along its borders, or in its towns? The Botswana Defense Force's only known combat is against animal poachers and illegal border-crossing immigrants.

Botswana does have an ongoing border dispute with Namibia, with whom it shares both a long sandy western border and a riverine northern border. It is at the very tip of the northern border, almost at the point on the map where Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia meet, that Botswana and Namibia have been contesting a tiny island, usually occupied by grazing hippopotamuses.

Botswana's military has a hut there. Namibians set foot there regularly. Both sides patrol by boat, but the Chobe River washes the island from all sides and, in the wet season, floods it. The island's only potential riches are from ecotourism, and only then episodically. Botswana's latest military purchases have aroused skepticism, particularly since the rest of southern Africa will now have an excuse to spend scarce funds on guns rather than butter.

Foreign Minister Theo Ben-Gurirab of Namibia has condemned the Botswana purchases as "provocation." President Sam Nujoma of Namibia flew to Germany to try to persuade the Germans to persuade the Dutch to cancel the tank sale. Washington is worried, too, and needs to speak strongly to its one-time ally and client.

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### *Currents of War in the Kalahari*

Water is a scarce resource, and threats to world peace over the supply and availability of water are common in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Now southern Africa can be added to that list. Just as India and Bangladesh; Israel, Palestine, and Jordan; and the nations along the Mekong River battle diplomatically and otherwise over water, so a major dispute over water is brewing in the heart of Africa's southern desert.

The Kavango or Okavango River rushes south out of the highlands of Angola, crosses the strange strip of Namibia that stretches eastward to the Zambezi River, and slowly spreads out before burying itself in the sands of northern Botswana.

The river goes nowhere, in good years flooding Botswana's vast Okavango delta toward the frontier town of Maun. A prosperous tourist industry has developed amid the islands and sand spits that stand above the eddying waters of the delta. Big game animals, unusual antelopes, and avi-fauna abound, attracting tourists each dry season as the waters slurp slowly south.

But Namibia now threatens this tourist attraction, which accounts for about 75 percent of Botswana's earnings from tourism, supplies 6 percent of the country's gross national product, and employs thousands. Water-short Namibia proposes to divert up to 120 million cubic meters of river flow a year by 2020, particularly during the dry season. During wet years, taking 120 million cubic meters of water would not endanger the delta's size, but in periods of drought, and especially during the dry season, such diversion could destroy the ecology of the delta.

Namibia urgently needs water for Windhoek, its capital of 300,000, and other cities set atop that country's desiccated interior. Central Namibia is into its fifth year of serious drought. In 1996, only 4 inches of rain, instead of the customary 50 inches, fell on Namibia's central plateau. As a result, Windhoek, one of the few capitals in the world to recycle and reuse 80 percent of its water, is expected to go dry sometime this year.

Namibia could tap the Kunene River, on its northern border with Angola, and then pipe the water south to Windhoek. The cost of doing so, however, is estimated to be three times greater (about \$200 million) than diverting water from the Kavango in the Caprivi Strip. Namibia naturally prefers the waters on which Botswana relies. Namibia and Botswana already are at loggerheads over a nondescript and often flooded island in the Chobe River, on the southern border of the Caprivi Strip and upstream from Victoria Falls. The Namibians have accused the Botswana Defense Force, which attempts to patrol the little island, of harassment, rape, and stock theft, as well as war maneuvers.

Both countries have agreed to submit this dispute to the World Court. But recriminations have continued, and the confrontation over water is hardly making relations between the two lightly populated desert neighbors comfortable. What worries southern Africans and Americans, however, is Botswana's increasingly bellicose resort to arms purchases.

The Kalahari Desert, which both Namibia and Botswana straddle, would be an unlikely and inhospitable theater of war. Water rights can seem as important, if not more important, than sovereignty, however, and Botswana will not easily tolerate the drying up of its lush inland delta.

South Africa, under President Nelson Mandela, has imposed conditions of peace on some of its less powerful neighbors. If the two desert neighbors cannot themselves divide the waters equitably, the Botswana-Namibia dispute could prove another arena of critical local intervention.

## *Making the Further Transition to Democracy*

Namibia's emergence as an independent nation in part reflected the Soviet Union's decay. Equally, the wave of regime realignments, state implosions, and democratic realizations that punctuated the early 1990s were associated with the withdrawal of Soviet subsidies, weapons, and influence from Africa. Cash from the "evil empire" had enabled some of the continent's least savory despots to keep and extend power from the 1960s. Likewise, competition between the Soviet Union (and China) and the West had permitted other autocrats to flourish with cash subventions from the U.S., France, or Britain. When the Soviet Union slid into oblivion, dictators on both sides were thus compromised, but the Marxist versions experienced tougher times more immediately. It was democracy's turn.

As the Soviet Union crumbled, so its distant satrapies, like Marxist Ethiopia, weakened. The cruel and capricious ten-year rule of Sergeant Samuel Doe in Liberia was soon to succumb to vicious attacks by a rebel army commanded by Charles Taylor; and the autocratic leaderships of Siad Barre in Somalia and Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser in Sierra Leone were shortly eliminated. There were more traditional coups in Lesotho and Mali. In Zaire, Mobutu Sese Soko was beset with protests by hitherto weak and quiescent democrats. He, like the long-time presidents of Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Malagasy, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and the Central African Republic, were all forced to recognize the multiparty, constituent assembly, or other forms of organized dissent. Likewise, the one-party states were challenged by democratic clamor in the streets: Cape Verde, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia. Elections were demanded, in some countries held. So, while realignment in some places meant peaceful, if tumultuous change, in others the rulers managed to outwit the protestors and defer societal alterations for a few years. In several, the very states themselves were destroyed

by cataclysmic civil warfare. ("Outlook Brighter for Democracy in Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 Oct. 1990; "African Winds of Democracy," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 May 1991.)

There was an upwelling of pressure for more popular forms of governance. "The people were clamoring for democracy." Trade unionists, market women, and students were leading a charge throughout black Africa, as young South Africans had recently acted against apartheid. These long repressed groups demanded new, elected assemblies to write liberal constitutions, sponsor ballot contests, and transform their narrowly ruled and poverty-stricken countries into nations where the people had more say, where the press was free, and where human rights were respected. There were the francophone versions of these assemblies—*les conférences*—first in Togo, where President Gnassingbe Eyadema had come to power in a coup in 1967; in the Central African Republic, ruled harshly by Gen. André Kolingba; in Cameroon, Paul Biya's fief; and in Mobutu's Zaire. The assemblies, reluctantly received by all four rulers, directly accomplished little. Mobutu outwitted the conference participants on several occasions. His ouster and death came later. But the calling of the autocrats to account indicated, as early as 1991, that the "participatory imperative" had embraced Africa. ("Stirrings in Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 July 1991.)

Zambia was an example of the effectiveness of local popular action when combined with disciplined donor pressure. Kaunda permitted a referendum in 1990 that returned his nation to multiparty democracy. In the next year, with Zambia in acute economic distress, the upstart Movement for Multiparty Democracy triumphed over UNIP, Kaunda's historic ruling vehicle.

Banda, president-for-life in Malawi since 1964, did not survive either. By 1992, when Africa and Zambia's shift toward multipartyism and democracy brushed the shores of Lake Malawi, Banda was in his nineties, and still dogmatic. His country was poor, with scores of political prisoners and a recent tradition of summary justice. Banda had also constructed thirteen palaces, amassed a corporate empire, and prevented peasants from growing cash crops. When a brave young proponent of multiparty rule in Malawi flew in from Zambia in 1992, he was hustled off to jail and torture. When eight of the country's Roman Catholic bishops called for greater political freedom and directly criticized Banda, the security forces went after them and the bishops fled. Banda said that dissidents would become "meat for crocodiles" if they opposed him.

Britain and other donors, including the United States, were appalled by Banda's continued obstinacy. But they were also emboldened by improving climates for democracy elsewhere in Africa. They therefore told Banda that

he must ask Malawians to choose between the status quo or new possibilities. In mid-1993, Malawians thus voted in a referendum on their country's fate. Banda believed that he still commanded their loyalty. In fact, despite vigorous efforts by his Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the voters of Malawi followed their brethren elsewhere in Africa and the world. By a large margin, the citizens of the oppressed sliver of a nation opened its doors to the democratic spirit that was advancing in so many other sections of the continent. The vote was 63 percent in favor of multiparty democracy and change. ("African Democracy's Twisting Path," *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 April 1992; "Malawians Have a Chance to Throw the Despot Out," *Philadephia Inquirer*, 14 June 1993.)

A national election, the first since 1964, was held in mid-1994. Banda's MCP still commanded Chewa-speaking followers in the Central Province, while the new United Democratic Front (UDF), led by trucking magnate Bakili Muluzi, was based in the Southern Province and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) was led by men from the less populous Northern Province. Ultimately, the UDF won the most seats, but joined hands with AFORD to create a decisive parliamentary coalition. Muluzi became president and Malawi, a 600-mile long land squashed between Lake Malawi and Zambia, began undoing the desperate destruction of thirty years. A generation had been lost, as well as innumerable opportunities to grow economically.

Muluzi inherited a country with an annual per capita income of \$200, one of the lowest in the world. Its 12 million people were multiplying by 3.2 percent a year, among the most rapid rates anywhere. Only 500,000 of its people were in wage employment, a fifth of them in the public service. Almost its sole export earner was tobacco, grown on plantations and small-holdings, but global demand for tobacco was shrinking. Malawi was landlocked, and its imports and exports endured tortuous and expensive routes to and from the outside world.

Set against these undoubted problems, and its recent history of regimented rule, was a wealth of talent in the new government, and a well-nuanced understanding of how poor economies could develop in the age of globalism: by opening up their markets and liberalizing with speed. Muluzi's government also accepted that the best instrument for effective family planning and development was the education of young women, which had been retarded by Banda. So Muluzi made primary education free in an effort to persuade families to send their girls to school (a technique that worked immediately). His government could do nothing, however, about the shortage of physicians—122 for the entire population—or the growing scourge of AIDS. Malawi urgently required foreign assistance, the more the better.

(“Malawi Struggles to Undo Years of Corruption,” *Boston Globe*, 11 Aug. 1994; “Malawi Can Get By—With a Little Help from Its Friends,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 Dec. 1994.)

Over the next six years, and before and after the re-election of Muluzi and his followers in 1999, Malawi continued to struggle to rid itself of Banda’s legacy. Banda and his henchmen were prosecuted for murder in 1995, and tried and re-tried in the years following, but acquitted. Banda died in 1997. (“Despotism on Trial in Malawi,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 May 1995.) Malawi slowly liberalized its economy, privatizing several state-owned corporations, but was reluctant to become thoroughly open. Doing so would have limited the state’s control, and particularly the possibilities of private gain by key figures in and near the government. Corruption became a problem, despite the modest and seemingly way in which the UDF attempted to govern Malawi. In 2000, a major corruption scandal caused the ouster of three cabinet members; even Muluzi was allegedly compromised. Yet the press remained free, though the government retained control of radio and television. Multipartyism and democracy flourished, with MCP and AFORD retaining their ethnic and regional support, no matter how hard the UDF campaigned. Malawi entered the twenty-first century still very poor, beleaguered by AIDS and dependent upon tobacco, but proudly democratic.

Zaire was another prominent problem. Mobutu had outlived the Cold War and outwitted, bullied, and paid off his rivals during the democratization wave of the very early 1990s. His army terrorized Kinshasa, the capital, but the remainder of the country was devoid of more than rudimentary official attention. Because it was “profoundly” in the U.S. national interest for Zaire once again to function as a state, it was important to remove Mobutu so that the UN and the U.S. could attempt to encourage the reconstruction and, “just possibly,” the democratization of the sprawling center of Africa. It was possible to bring pressure on Mobutu, in power since 1965, if Belgium, France, Switzerland, and the U.S. could find and block his overseas bank accounts, which held millions if not billions of dollars. The Western nations to which Mobutu repaired periodically to enjoy his wealth and purchase property could also deny him entrance, and thus they could visit on him the kinds of salutary personal discomforts which might induce him to preside over positive political changes at home. (“Preventing Conflict in Africa,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 March 1993.)

Because, technically and politically, gaining access to Mobutu’s wealth proved too difficult for the Clinton administration (and no country withdrew visas), Zaire remained a humanitarian, economic, and political disaster slipping steadily toward tragedy. Inflation was reaching 12,000 percent a year,



soldiers foraged for food in the capital, and, periodically, the army went on sprees of ethnic cleansing in distant Shaba, Kasai, and Kivu provinces. More than 100,000 persecuted Luba had fled for their lives in Shaba, pursued by Mobutu and local Lunda. In northern Kivu, 150,000 Tutsi and Hutu, citizens of Zaire, were forced out of their villages by local groups covetous of their land. Thousands were killed. So long as the paralysis of Zaire was permitted to continue and its economy to remain in shambles, ethnic conflict would prevail. Veneal leadership at the local levels, as well as in Kinshasa, would dominate.

Mobutu held on to his decaying empire. A long-running stalemate pitted Mobutu against an aroused opposition led by Etienne Tshisekedi, once a Mobutu acolyte and a Luba from Kasai. According to a plan concocted in the throes of continuing urban unrest, Mobutu and Tshisekedi were supposed to compose a government of national unity. Throughout 1993, this unity government in fact consisted of two factions loyal to each of its principals. There were two prime ministers, Tshisekedi deriving his authority from a national conclave as long ago as 1991, a rival directly from Mobutu's fiat. In early 1994, Mobutu dissolved both pretending operations and talked about multi-party national elections. But that was just talk. "Mobutu's ouster was essential." Only then, I suggested, could Zaire begin to reclaim its government and economy—a process that would demand the help and attention of the Western powers who had kept Mobutu in office for so long. ("Giant Zaire Threatens to Become Africa's Next Tragedy," *Boston Globe*, 22 May 1994.)

When the Rwandan Patriotic Front had won a war for Tutsi over Hutu in devastated Rwanda, and President Yoweri Museveni had fully consolidated his military victories in Uganda, they together turned on Mobutu. He and his tottering regime had given aid and comfort to Hutu refugees from Rwanda based in eastern Zaire, to revenge-seeking elements among them, and to dissidents antagonistic to Museveni. This was a powerful combination. Laurent Kabila's insurgent invasion of Zaire/Congo in 1996/1997 may not have been organized completely by Rwanda and Uganda, but it was certainly armed, funded, staffed, and encouraged by those smaller countries.

Kabila himself was an old-time Marxist who had fought for Patrice Lumumba's legacy in the 1960s and for Antoine Gizenga against the U.S.-backed takeover of Zaire in the 1970s. He was part of the mini-rebellion in Kisangani (then Stanleyville) that attracted U.S. military intervention in 1964. He later was involved with Ernesto (Che) Guevara's abortive attempt to establish a revolutionary Cuban beachhead on the western shores of Lake Tanzania. Subsequently, Kabila traded clothing in Dar es Salaam, and sold ivory and gold across the eastern frontiers of Zaire.

Whatever Kabila's shadowy beginnings, by early 1997 the rebellion that he was leading looked very promising. Despite the skepticism of many observers who felt sure that Mobutu could contain the rabble from the east, Kabila's forces looked poised to sweep much, if not all, of the fragile nation. I urged the West to avoid attempting to hinder what seemed to be an authentic upsurge of discontent, and, if it came to that, not to oppose dismembering what was left of Zaire. Mobutu should not be propped up, as the French preferred and the U.S. might have wished. ("Zaire, as We Know It, Should Not Be Saved," *Boston Globe*, 19 Feb. 1997.)

By April 1997, Kabila's rebel army was threatening the diamond-mining and copper-extraction centers of southern Zaire and setting fair for Kinshasa. He and his men were received as a popular force, so there was no stopping their decisive march westwards. The ill-paid, demoralized regular army was retreating everywhere despite its numerical superiority and better weapons. Kabila's aim appeared to be a version of a Museveni-inspired guided democracy, whereby power was very gradually ceded to the people but markets were opened up, state intervention ceased, and corruption was attacked. This turned out to be a naïve assumption on my part.

If Kabila proved able and willing to contain corruption, I mused, Mobutu's predatory state would be finished. Top-down kleptomania had ravished Zaire. Roads were few, civil servants had not been paid for months, hospitals had no supplies, schools no longer taught, and life for ordinary citizens of Africa's second largest physical land mass had become brutish and short. But there was always the possibility that Kabila, his true intentions largely unknown, could succumb to the same Mobutu-like temptations. Until he showed any tendencies in that autocratic direction, I wrote, the new Congo would need and deserve massive outside assistance. It would merit debt cancellation on a very large scale. Since the West created Mobutu, and allowed him to steal as much as \$10 billion, the claims of Kabila's Congo (which was in place by July 1997), were impossible to ignore. ("Zaire's Zero Hour—Will America Be Ready?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 April 1997; "Help Congo Now," *New York Times*, 29 May 1997.)

There were worrying signs rather soon. By August, Congo was showing neither democratic nor tolerant tendencies. Tshisekedi had been imprisoned by Kabila as he had so often been jailed by Mobutu. Protest demonstrations had been banned. In sum, the new regime of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, its formal name, had done little to inspire confidence. Yet the Congo was too big, with 47 million people, and too important, flanked by Angola and the other Congo, to be allowed to fail. ("Help the New Congo Help Itself," *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 Aug. 1997.)

By November 1997, Kabila had made no attempt to construct a broad-based government (and never did). Democratic institutions were not being rebuilt (and never were). Elections (in 1997) were “a vague hope on a distant horizon.” They never occurred, either. The Clinton administration in 1997 was nevertheless proposing to reprieve Kabila from Western scrutiny. Doing so, I wrote, “would reward recalcitrant behavior and send the wrong message to the democratizing movement in Africa.” There were endless crimes still to be investigated. Moreover, Kabila had begun to break his ties to Rwanda and Uganda and to renege on promises to his one-time patrons to harness the Hutu and other dissidents along his eastern frontier. Kabila seemed not all that much of an improvement over Mobutu. (“U.S. and UN Should Investigate Human Rights Abuses in Congo,” *Boston Globe*, 8 Nov. 1997.)

Within a year, a new revolt had begun, again from the east, and again promoted by Rwanda and Uganda. Although at first the faceless rebels moved rapidly westward from the border regions, meeting little resistance, and seemed poised to threaten Kinshasa, Kabila called for military assistance from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. The presidents of each of those countries had scores to settle with Uganda and Rwanda, or with South Africa, now indifferent to Kabila’s fate. The arrival of their legions, especially battle-hardened troops from Angola, soon halted the rebel advance half-way across the width of the beleaguered and battle-scarred country. A stalemate prevailed from then on, with periodic cease-fires arranged by presidents and diplomats from the countries of south and middle Africa, and just as frequently broken. Nor was Kabila prepared to deal straightforwardly with UN attempts to deploy peacekeepers. The great promise of the post-Mobutu Congo remained unrealized in 2001. (“Congo on the Brink,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Aug. 1998.)

There had to be a better way to deal with threats to regional order and the twenty or more civil wars that were convulsing Africa each year during the final decade of the twentieth century. The wars in Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan were only the best known of the intrastate hostilities that defied traditional kinds of UN peacemaking and demanded some form of all-Africa or African sub-regional intervention for peace. Absent any UN ready-response forces able to act decisively and with dispatch—a long deferred dream of peacemakers at the UN—it behooved Africa to create for southern Africa, East Africa, and West Africa the kinds of brigades that could intervene locally to prevent conflict or the spread of war. ECOMOG had done so in Liberia and Sierra Leone because Nigeria had taken charge. Tanzania had ousted dictator Idi Amin. South Africa interfered easily in Lesotho. But there was no structure for systematic preven-

tion, and only diplomacy backed by military muscle could separate contending parties within national borders. At the technical level, creating such a force was not impossible. More difficult was defining crises appropriate for intervention, agreeing who or what mechanism would decide when and where to send in the intervenors—the potential peace enforcers—and fashioning their mandates. Those were questions of political will that did not seem possible to resolve within Africa, or even southern Africa, without UN direction. But some such innovative enterprise would continue to be required if southern Africa were to save itself from episodes of chaos. (“Wanted: A Sound Peacekeeping Structure for Africa,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 Oct. 1997.)

In 2001, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo still split asunder by war, and Angola no nearer than before to a resolution of its internal conflict, the need for new approaches to peace building was no less important than ever.

#### OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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### *U.S. Should Push Kenya's Moi toward Genuine Reform*

Kenya and Zaire are unlikely twins, but both are deeply stained with corruption. Both boast despotic rulers determined, Canute-like, to stay the tides of democratic change. Both harbor regimes which have long been backed by the United States.

The peoples of both deserve better from the U.S., possibly such determined steps as sanctions and adverse travel advisories.

Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi for years has refused to respect human rights or permit expressions of dissent.

Late in November, his police busted up the most recent opposition rally, detaining a dozen advocates of multiparty democracy. Earlier, he ended what limited press freedom existed in Kenya, jailing the editor of a legal publication and banning magazines. Some protesters were released from prison after American and world complaints; others were locked up.

Even the public and private efforts of U.S. Ambassador Smith Hempstone Jr. have failed to halt the latest waves of repression here. Instead, Mr. Hempstone has been condemned by President Moi.

Two coup attempts against Moi's reign have failed during the past decade, and the U.S. and other governments have reduced, but not completely cut off,

aid. Indeed, during the Gulf war Washington was anxious not to anger Kenyan officials, since the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa had some stand-by utility.

Washington has been reluctant to move against one of the more prosperous and more loyal regimes of Africa. Just as it was slow to appreciate that President Mobutu Sese Soko's days were numbered in Zaire, so it has not wanted to turn against another ally. But the extent of President Mobutu's misrule and corruption is now well known, thanks to Zaire's descent into chaos this year. Kenya's equally venal kleptomania has also come into view.

Robert Ouko, Kenya's foreign minister and a Luo from the far western part of the country, was killed mysteriously in early 1990. At the time, close observers of Kenya surmised that the slaying had been arranged. Now, thanks to the investigations of a British detective, Moi's closest colleagues are prime suspects.

In mid-November, Moi dismissed Nicolas Biwott, his strong right-hand man, from the Kenyan cabinet. Earlier he had sacked Hezekiah Oyugi, the head of Kenya's notorious internal security operations. Mr. Biwott and Moi are both Kalenjin, one of the country's smaller ethnic groups.

It seems clear that Mr. Ouko knew that Moi and Biwott were corrupt. He seems to have resented the extent of their skimming of public funds, some of which were intended for industrial development and others for the alleviation of poverty.

Biwott was known as the president's chief aide and counsel. He was feared by Kenyans for his ruthlessness and his greed. He was a leading defender, too, of the one-party state and of the small tribes of Kenya against the larger Kikuyu and Luo.

In both Kenya and Zaire, the U.S. has the influence and the wherewithal to encourage more punctilious respect for human rights and multiparty democracy. Since Kenya relies upon the West for financial assistance and for a steady flow of tourists, approaching two-fifths of its foreign exchange earnings, Washington ought to be able to persuade a severely weakened Moi to permit public discussion of democracy.

Last week Western nations aiding Kenya said financial help would be continued only if Moi moved toward fuller political participation. This week he responded by ending Kenya's ban on political parties in addition to his own. But opponents were skeptical about whether free elections would, or could, be held with Moi still in power.

Washington rightly worries about instability in Zaire after Mobutu's departure. But Kenya after Moi is less problematical. Kenya, unlike Zaire, works better than nearly all the countries of the continent. Its infrastructure

and educational systems are intact, its treasury reasonably full, and its people much more united.

Moreover, there are many well-trained Kenyans who are thirsting for the kinds of unfettered political participation that are now becoming more common in other parts of Africa: in Zambia, in Botswana, in Namibia, in Senegal, in Togo, and soon in Nigeria and Angola.

The murder investigation will doubtless come close to the Kenyan presidency, and Moi, like Mobutu, may need to beat a retreat. Washington has always known how corrupt and unprincipled both rulers were; now is the time to help save Kenya, at least, from further disarray.

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### *African Democracy's Twisting Path*

Africa continues its democratizing pace, but there are important exceptions. As Zaire resumes its discussion of a new constitution, progress toward real political choice remains slow in Kenya and almost nonexistent in Malawi.

In Zaire, President Mobutu Sese Seko, the giant country's arbitrary ruler since 1965, this month again permitted the "conference" that was closed down in January to resume. The legal but harassed opposition parties that dominate the "conference" are demanding that President Mobutu resign before national elections and not attempt to manipulate them.

If Mobutu again refuses to negotiate, or closes down the "conference," renewed rioting in Kinshasa is likely. Although his legitimacy is much diminished, Mobutu still controls the national purse and has military support.

Western nations, including the United States, want Mobutu to leave Zaire for good. But they also worry that instability might follow an abrupt departure. An orderly transition, culminating in free elections, would be a welcome outcome of the resumed deliberations by conferees.

President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, another autocrat, has been in office since 1978. Thanks to Western pressure, including the withholding of significant sums in foreign aid, President Moi did an about-face last year and permitted the formation of opposition parties. Political prisoners have been released and allowed to travel, and some freedom of expression has been restored. Elections may be held next year.

But Moi's government continues to harass political opponents. Although the *Nairobi Law Monthly* is no longer banned, copies of two other upstart monthlies, *Finance* and *Society*, continue to be impounded. Also, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), and the Democratic Party, the

two leading opposition groups, are being hindered by a series of obscure technicalities from campaigning nationwide.

Kenya and Zaire both need independent electoral commissions capable of organizing elections without official interference or funding. When the votes are held, international observing teams (as in Haiti and Zambia) will be necessary, but it is during the year or so of campaigning that unimpeachable support for the process and for political freedom is essential. Kenya's last free election was in 1963; Zaire has never had a free national vote.

Kenyans and some Zairians look hopefully to Zambia, where an opposition party received the overwhelming support of voters in October and immediately assumed power. Former President Kenneth D. Kaunda stepped down without a fuss after ruling since 1964, and the local military refused to intervene. International observers ensured a fair poll; during the months preceding the election, they assisted a Zambian electoral commission in arranging for the balloting.

Malawi is a 520-mile-long sliver of a country east of Zambia. Since its independence from Britain in 1964, its sole and thoroughly arbitrary ruler has been Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Educated in the U.S., Dr. Banda practiced for decades in Britain and Ghana before returning to Malawi in 1958 after an absence of more than 50 years.

President Banda is over 90, but as dogmatic as ever. Democrats and other opponents have always been dealt with summarily, and there are political prisoners throughout the country. When a brave young challenger (the leader of the Zambian-based United Front for Multiparty Democracy) flew into Lilongwe, Malawi's capital, in early April, he was promptly hustled away (in front of the foreign press) to jail and, probably, torture.

Earlier, eight of the country's Roman Catholic bishops circulated a pastoral letter condemning the government's violations of fundamental human rights. They also called for greater political freedom and, to the amazement of Malawians, dared to criticize Dr. Banda directly. The security forces were sent to find the bishops, who promptly went into hiding.

Banda recently told dissidents that they would become "meat for crocodiles" if they opposed his rule.

Clearly, there is still fire and brimstone in President Banda's aging authority. But because of his age, and because all around Malawi Africans are continuing to opt for democratic rule, the end of his regime may be near. In May, aid donors will meet. If they, including the United States, follow Britain's lead in halving its assistance levels, Banda may be compelled to pay attention. If he doesn't, long stable but repressed Malawi could be Africa's next scene of bitter bloodshed.



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### *Malawians Have a Chance to Throw the Despot Out*

The long-suffering citizens of Malawi go to the polls today to declare themselves for or against autocracy.

In a rare opportunity to choose their country's fate, Malawians will vote on a referendum that could allow the country's first presidential elections. But unless voters can summon the courage to chance freedom's uncertainty, they may succeed only in tightening the stranglehold of a nonagenarian despot.

Since 1964, self-proclaimed President-for-Life Hastings Kamuzu Banda has ruled with a paternal iron hand. He had lived outside Malawi (colonial Nyasaland) for more than 30 years before being called home in 1958 by younger nationalists to lead what became the Malawi Congress Party (MCP).

By that time, Banda had worked in Zimbabwe and in South African coal mines, been befriended by a black American churchman and concluded an American educational odyssey. He completed his bachelor's degree at the University of Chicago in 1931. He obtained a medical degree at Meharry Medical College, in Nashville, Tenn.

During World War II, Banda practiced medicine in England. He also befriended black nationalists from all over Africa. In the 1950s he moved his medical practice to Ghana.

Banda seemed an appropriate figurehead for the ambitious "young Turks" of the nascent MCP. However, he soon showed an intolerance for dissent, a Presbyterian priggishness, and a British snobbery about the primitiveness of Africa.

After he guided Malawi to independence from Britain in 1964, the curtain came down on democracy. He ousted and exiled the "young Turks," surrounded himself with sycophants and ruled despotically. The MCP Youth League acted as his enforcer, much as the tonton macoutes became a dreaded extralegal brigade for François "Papa Doc" Duvalier in Haiti.

Banda decreed that men must wear trousers, not shorts, and that women had to wear skirts. He opposed long hair on men. More seriously, he persecuted Jehovah's Witnesses, at one point in the 1970s imprisoning thousands.

He even detained his former aide-de-camp on a flimsy pretext and tossed him into jail for more than a decade. Banda also abducted Orton Chirwa, the country's first attorney general, another opponent, from Zambia in 1981 and sent him and his wife to prison, where Banda's unfortunate sometime colleague died last year. Defying the condemnation of the British Commonwealth, Banda befriended apartheid-ridden South Africa during the 1970s



and 1980s. He also supported Renamo, the South African-backed anti-government rebel movement in neighboring Mozambique.

Banda claimed economic benefits for autocracy. And indeed, during the 1970s Malawi achieved modest successes as a developing nation. Yet it remained poor, with a per capita income under \$200 a year. Meanwhile Banda built a large personal industrial and agricultural empire, skimming benefits of outside aid and indigenous development. He also hindered the growth of competing indigenous firms, regulating commerce and agriculture in ways to benefit his family holdings.

Banda controlled the University of Malawi, decreeing what could be taught and who could teach. He built Kamuzu Academy, an elite secondary school staffed by white foreigners and ordered a severe classical curriculum based on a remembered model of British private schools.

Along the way, Banda drove opposition movements underground and crushed several desultory revolts. Finally, in 1992, in the wake of democratic stirrings elsewhere, a few brave Malawians voiced their differences with the Banda regime. They were promptly jailed.

Amnesty International reported in 1992 that hundreds of opponents had been tortured after mass arrests following anti-government riots. But only after Britain, Germany and the United States cut off foreign assistance did Banda propose the referendum to be voted on today.

Malawi in 1993 is a regimented, tightly controlled, personally run sliver of a developing nation. A freely run referendum could allow opposing parties to compete in open and fair elections. It's time for Banda to go.

Yet the paternalism of 30 years and persisting fears of retribution from the Youth Leaguers and the police may produce a result bizarre for modern Africa: endorsement of an aged despot by his frightened subjects.

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### *Giant Zaire Threatens to Become Africa's Next Tragedy*

Zaire is a humanitarian and political disaster. After Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Rwanda and Burundi, massive Zaire remains a continuing crisis slipping bitterly toward tragedy.

In Kinshasa, the capital, a long-running political stalemate pits Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire's avariciously corrupt ruler, and his current associates against an opposition led by Etienne Tshisekedi, who once was a Mobutu acolyte. Together they are supposed to compose a government of national unity. But unity, a sense of nationhood and agreement on a government are all lacking.

For 10 months last year there were two opposing governments, one led by Tshisekedi and one led by Faustin Birindwa, who reported to President Mobutu. Both held the title prime minister, the first deriving his title and his limited authority from a national political conclave in 1991 and from the nation's disgust with its longtime self-anointed autocratic military ruler. Mobutu dismissed Tshisekedi twice, without effect, and then appointed Birindwa.

Mobutu dissolved both prime ministerships in January and ostensibly brought their forces together to prepare for long-promised multi-party elections at the end of 1994. But despite pressure from his own people in the form of strikes, protest marches and army mutinies and despite complaints from Western donors, Mobutu shows little sign of preparing to give up his 29-year rule.

Instead, backed by elite troops paid from corruptly obtained coffers, Mobutu once again is hoping to sow dissension among his opponents in the Constitutional Assembly.

The farce continues. But it is a farce that leaves Zaire, Africa's second-largest country (about the size of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, California and Oregon combined) largely ungoverned and on the brink of anarchy. Soldiers periodically raid and loot Kinshasa. Hotels, restaurants and many commercial establishments are boarded up. Rubbish litters the capital. Annual inflation soars about 12,000 percent. Aid workers say that malnutrition, long a scourge of the wild countryside, has even entered the capital itself.

Beyond Kinshasa, where effective government long ago dwindled to almost nothing, episodes of ethnic cleansing continue to embroil Shaba and Kasai provinces in the south center and Kivu Province in the east.

More than 100,000 Luba have fled for their lives in Shaba, Zaire's copper-producing region, since 1992. Amnesty International blames local Lunda politicians, encouraged by Mobutu, for the ouster of villagers from Kasai, to Shaba's north. Luba have lived in Shaba for generations. Because of earlier access to mission-provided educational opportunities, they have filled managerial positions on the mines. Lunda from Shaba envied Luba success.

After Tshisekedi, a Luba from Kasai, became prime minister in 1992, his national political rivals, some of whom were from Shaba and aligned with Mobutu, aggravated existing economic tensions in Shaba and urged attacks on Luba.

Lunda battled Luba in the cities of Shaba from August 1992. By June 1993, 75,000 Luba had fled their homes and were crowded in a fetid displaced persons encampment around a single railway station, awaiting infrequent transportation to Kasai. Another 23,000 Lubans lived in a camp near

Kolwezi until Lunda burned the camp in July, forcing their onetime neighbors to flee into the bush.

In the northern part of Kivu, about 150,000 Tutsi and Hutu with Zairian citizenship, but related to their conflicted neighbors in Rwanda and Burundi, were forced out of their villages in early 1993. Long simmering avarice over land, and a breakdown of Zairian governmental control of a region as distant as Kivu, led local Hunde and Nyanga to attack Tutsi and Hutu. Thousands were killed. As in Shaba, the victors moved into the houses of their enemies, and those who were displaced during the waves of violence have ended up in squalid camps.

So long as Zaire's governmental paralysis continues and its economy remains in shambles, stronger ethnic groups will try to take advantage of weaker ones. Rural Zaire has lost its Belgian-implanted infrastructure to decay and venal leadership, and its productive sectors have been pillaged too many times for villagers, or even urban workers, to have much hope. Zaire has virtually imploded, and every ethnic group and every individual seeks to convert anarchy to advantage. Further and varied attempts at ethnic cleansing could plunge Zaire into a series of civil wars.

Mobutu's personal fortune is estimated at \$8 billion, about the level of the country's total debt. As he amassed such immense wealth, Zaire deteriorated. Opponents were jailed and tortured, and the West tolerated his rule because he was staunchly anti-Soviet.

With the end of the Cold War, Mobutu lost his pro-Western cloak and emerged as the predatory dictatorial tyrant his people had long known him to be. Western pressure pushed Mobutu to permit opposition parties and compelled him to promise elections, but governments of the West have failed to do more. Threats to annex his Swiss bank accounts have not been carried out, nor has Mobutu been denied visas to visit his homes in Europe.

Mobutu's ouster is essential. Then Zairians can begin to reclaim their government and economy, a process that will take time and assistance from the powers that helped keep Mobutu in office for so long.

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### *Malawi Struggles to Undo Years of Corruption*

How best can an impoverished African nation recover from 30 years of corrupt, dictatorial paternalism? That is the challenge facing President Bakili Muluzi and his new, freely elected government in Malawi.

Muluzi's predecessor, the quirky, U.S.-educated Hastings Kamuzu Banda (Indiana University, University of Chicago, Meharry Medical College in

Nashville, Tenn.), ruled Malawi as a self-declared “president for life” from 1964 to May 1994.

That year voters dumped Banda’s Malawi Congress Party and its tonton macoutes—like Young Pioneers in favor of Muluzi’s United Democratic Front.

Banda had banned opposition parties, terrorized and cowed his people by unleashing the Young Pioneers, assassinated prominent dissidents and used so-called family enterprises to acquire much of the wealth of his 520-mile-long, 100-mile-wide state in central Africa.

The biggest symbols of personal and regime opulence at the expense of the people were Banda’s 13 state residences or palaces, which were constructed at government expense. He rarely visited them and stayed for only a few nights in the largest and most outrageous of all.

Outside Lilongwe, Malawi’s capital city, Banda and Cecilia Kadzamira, his consort, spent 20 years building a palace of more than 150 rooms. The whole, unedifying edifice sits in the center of 1,500 acres, cost about \$120 million and employed 300 gardeners and 500 house servants and courtiers.

The residence consists of phalanx after phalanx of expensively appointed offices, waiting rooms, board rooms, smaller board rooms and more offices, plus a panoply of bedrooms and bathrooms, plus entertainment rooms, kitchens and so on, each room furnished differently.

A massive, three-story stairway with elaborately conceived but badly carved balusters unites the living quarters. Kadzamira had it rebuilt three times. Attached to both halves of the residence is a never-used state dining room, which is large enough to temporarily house Malawi’s new, 177-person Parliament in luxurious and generous style. Banda even charged his government rent for the use of his lakeside residence, which was constructed by the state. The new government is now trying to recover that loss, at least.

A national audit is promised. An investigation into the assassination of dissidents will shortly be opened. The new government is also considering a broad inquiry into all of the previous regime’s excesses, but any unfettered scrutiny of the past could create new instability, and the Muluzi government plans to be cautious.

What it cannot afford to do, however, is remain complacent about the economy. The Banda regime did little to develop Malawi. The nation’s average annual per capita gross national product is about \$200, one of the lowest in the world. This year the rains failed, and Malawians will shortly be facing an acute shortage of corn. Only 1.2 million tons of corn, the national staple, were grown; 2 million tons are needed.

Malawi’s main export crop is tobacco, and that is doing well this year. But demand for tobacco is shrinking, and landlocked Malawi has no important mineral deposits and an underdeveloped potential for ecotourism. It also

has to overcome its dependence on expensive transport routes through Tanzania and Mozambique and Banda's corruption and excesses.

Malawi has 12 million people and a population growth rate of 3.2 percent a year, among the highest in the world. The new government wants to reduce its rate of population growth by encouraging women to bear fewer children. It also wants to send men to work in the mines of South Africa, as they did before Banda's time. But the new government of South Africa has said no.

The Muluzi government knows that the best instrument for effective family planning and economic development generally is the education of young women. For that reason Malawi will shortly make primary education free in an effort to persuade families to let their girls go to school.

But the current primary school population may then double, so the minister of education is scrambling to find qualified teachers, construct or borrow (from churches) classrooms and print as many as 8 million new textbooks.

Growth with equity, the eradication of poverty and massive educational improvements are the new government's priorities. If it can, with Western assistance, make a start in these and other directions and if the new government can persuade Malawians that it represents real change and intends to remain democratic, Malawi can recover from the Banda years and become a model for the new Africa.

The ingredients are there. The president is a gentle, wise trucking tycoon. The vice president is a well-trained former civil servant and college soccer all-American. The minister of finance ran a number of state corporations before Banda jailed him for 12 years. The minister of education was a successful multinational businessman and the head of the country's Chamber of Commerce. His deputy minister worked for two decades in Los Angeles as a child welfare specialist. Most members of the Cabinet are well educated and experienced. They also know how badly Malawi was ruled, and what they and the new Malawi want to avoid.

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### *Malawi Can Get By—With a Little Help from Its Friends*

The economic problems of Malawi are acute and reflect the results of three decades of dictatorship as much as natural weaknesses of climate and geography. This southeast African country's new democratic government wants to alleviate poverty and jump-start the country's economy. Doing so will be exceedingly difficult, as it is in so much of Africa.

Malawi unfortunately begins its fourth decade of independence desperately poor. It ranks eighth from the bottom of world economies; its total annual gross domestic product is only the equivalent of \$1 billion.

Only 500,000 of Malawi's 10 million people are in wage employment, 100,000 in the public service. For foreign exchange and staple food, Malawians are heavily dependent upon two crops, tobacco and maize. Both crops need good rainfall, and Malawi has suffered seriously from drought in the 1990s. Its last maize harvest fell 60 percent short of the country's food requirements. Donors are attempting to supply urgent needs, but many Malawians may go hungry before this year's crop is harvested in March.

In addition to these woes, the economically and socially destructive policies of H. Kamuzu Banda's dictatorship are difficult to eradicate. Many peasants were prevented from growing profitable cash crops, and state pricing policies for maize and groundnuts (and fertilizer) made the growing of those crops, and cassava, for home consumption difficult and expensive. Banda also restricted access through fees to primary schools, underfinanced the educational and health systems, and built 13 expensive palaces for himself. His last and final 150-room extravaganza cost \$120 million and was never used. On top of it all, the new government inherited a currency that was rapidly depreciating. In dollars, Malawi's kwacha is worth half of what it was in July, making even critical imports such as fuel, wheat flour, immunizations, and bandages prohibitively expensive. Moreover, inflation is running at 40 percent a year.

The new government wants girls to go to school, so it has abolished primary school charges. As a result, the primary school population doubled, to 3.4 million. Malawi is scrambling to find teachers, school books, and school rooms, all of which are expensive. Only 122 physicians serve all of Malawi, giving it one of the lowest physician per capita ratios in the world. AIDS is rampant, Malawi having the highest HIV positive prevalence in the world. Moreover, infant mortality and maternal death rates are unusually high. Family-planning services are essential in a country where the total population is doubling every 20 years. Women also say they want to limit their families from a high 6.7 live births per mother. But without readily available funds, the new government can only rely on American and other donors. Malawi must also continue to depend on a crop that commands relatively high world prices but is increasingly despised.

Certainly in the short run, the growing of tobacco is Malawi's only hope. It provides 75 percent of the country's foreign-exchange earnings, benefits from the abundance of labor in Malawi, and could increase its share of the world market even if the total size of that market slowly shrinks.

Malawi cannot yet fall back on industry, on other crops, or on services. It is well-placed geographically and climatically for little else. Production of its famed coffee and tea cannot be expanded. Sugar and cotton cannot compete on the world market. There are no known exploitable minerals. Textiles and piecework industry may have some promise, but Malawi has the highest transportation costs in the world and local resource blockages. Tourism is as yet underdeveloped.

A recent report from consultants recommended that Malawi focus on bottom-up growth, on lifting the incomes of tobacco and maize smallholders, and on letting multiplier effects flow from that initiative into the populous rural areas. It also urged the new government to let entrepreneurs, local and foreign, make most industrial and agricultural investments. The proper role of the government, it says, is to reduce the size of the civil service (to reduce the budget deficit) and to help stabilize the fiscal climate.

Malawi needs rain, assistance from the United States and other donors, and a welcoming approach to investors and other entrepreneurs. It also needs the kind of good, liberal democratic government that Banda's regime never provided, which has been available for the past six months.

The political ingredients and the national will are there. But if Malawi is going to progress economically and socially, it will have to do it itself, with as much help from the American public and private agencies as possible.

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### *Despotism on Trial in Malawi*

Almost no African or Asian state risks calling its despots to account. That is why it is so unusual and so salutary that Malawi has put its recent "President for Life," the American-educated Hastings Kamuzu Banda, on trial for murder.

Dr. Banda, trained for a medical career at the University of Chicago and Indiana University, and at Meharry Medical College in Nashville, outmaneuvered British colonial authorities in the early 1960s, and led Malawi's nationalist movement to power in 1964. Malawi now has about 10 million people and an annual per capita income of less than \$250. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, with health and educational deficits to match. AIDS is rampant. Malawi's peasant farmers grow maize for subsistence and tobacco for cash. Tobacco provides 75 percent of the state's meager export earnings.

For 30 years Banda ruled autocratically. He forced the inhabitants of his beautiful sliver of a country astride Lake Malawi, one of the five great lakes

of Africa's Rift Valley, to bend abjectly to his personal rule. His official watchwords for the government and the country were "Unity, Loyalty, Obedience, and Discipline."

Banda once told visiting foreign businessmen that "nothing is not my business in this country. Everything is my business. Everything. The state of education, the state of our economy, the state of our agriculture, the state of our transport, everything is my business."

Banda maintained his grip on the country by imprisoning or otherwise removing opponents who challenged his reign.

A year ago, after Western donors had demanded an end to despotism and the introduction of multiparty democracy, Banda, then about 95, put the question to a national referendum.

To his amazement, voters overwhelmingly favored democracy. In a subsequent election in May, Banda's party was roundly ousted from office.

Power passed to two democratic regional groupings, nearly all the leaders of which had once served successive Banda regimes as cabinet ministers or other officials. Indeed, Malawi's current finance minister had been jailed for trumped-up offenses by Banda for 12 years.

Now Banda, John Tembo (for many years minister of finance and head of the central bank), and two former police officials are all charged with murder in the Malawi High Court. They are accused of arranging the suspicious deaths of three Cabinet ministers and a parliamentarian in 1983. The victims were allegedly bludgeoned to death by policemen on Tembo's orders and with Banda's knowledge.

At least 6,000 other Malawians are believed to have been killed in much the same official manner.

A commission of inquiry had been empaneled last year. After many months of study, and acting like an American grand jury, it reported its findings in January.

Tembo, a man of great wealth, was immediately jailed to await trial. Because of his age and frail health, Banda was confined to one of the 13 palaces that he had constructed during his long reign.

It is unusual in the annals of Africa that an autocrat of Banda's formidable ego and total control was persuaded to relax his grip and live to see power pass to persons he hitherto had contemptuously called "my boys."

The trial of Banda, Tembo, and others, whatever its outcome, will allow the new democratic forces in Malawi to set an example of open justice and transparent accountability for Africa. That will be a major accomplishment.



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### *Zaire, as We Know It, Should Not Be Saved*

Zaire has been strip-mined by politicians. That is why Zaire is falling uncontrollably into civil war, and that is why there is too little that the United States, the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity want to and can do about it.

Mobutu Sese Seko, dictator of Zaire since 1965 and a close American ally most of the time, clawed away at his country's wealth, stashed it in Switzerland, France, and the United States, and now there is nothing left. Zaire as a nation has been stripped naked. Mobutu's rapacity has left nothing behind but widely separated nodes of economic activity, particularly in Shaba in the country's deep south.

There is a national government, but it long ago lost its legitimacy. It commands little support among the people of Zaire. Its writ hardly runs beyond Kinshasa, the capital, as the successes of rebels all along Zaire's eastern flank demonstrate almost daily.

A government commands the loyalty of its citizens and its forces when it delivers political goods. But Mobutu's government long ago ceased paying its soldiers, paving or clearing its roads, delivering mail, or providing a currency that its own citizens would use.

The mercenaries that Mobutu has begun to employ to fight the rebels might turn the tide. Or a Western or UN peacekeeping intervention might permit Zaire to survive as a nation as well as a forlorn geographical expression.

But should Zaire be helped to survive? That is a question for policymakers everywhere. "Yes," is one answer, because the OAU has decreed the sanctity of the colonial-given borders of Africa and because rebels should not be allowed to topple existing governments in the developing world or anywhere else. "Yes," because of stability. "Yes," because Zaire's people will suffer severely during a continuing civil war.

Yet, unless the powers of the West and Africa are prepared to recommit Zaire to a modern version of the UN Trusteeship Council and refocus and train the leaders of Zaire to exercise good government and good economic management, there is no entity to save. Intervening to prop up Mobutu's rule makes little sense, and would do little for the future of Zaire.

Zaire could split along ethnic and resource fault lines. This would shock many African heads of state, but just as Ethiopia and Eritrea function better apart than together, and northern and southern Somalia also are better divided, so two, three, or four Zaires might make reasonable sense ethnically, culturally and politically, if not economically.

To be so cynical is heresy. Nevertheless, a southern and eastern Zaire might function well as a landlocked but resource-rich state. Atlantic-facing Zaire, with a riverine hinterland to the north and territory slipping toward Angola, could make another country easier to rule and run than the present Zaire.

This is not to imply that the current conglomeration of Zaire—a land a third the size of the United States—is ungovernable. It simply has not been governed so far. It has not been knitted together. Indeed, since the Belgian colonizers fled in 1960, the very knitting that King Leopold I and his successors provided has unraveled rapidly.

It is not Africa's necessary fate to have its big countries collapse. Greed, and the failure of a weak and young civil society to prevent excesses of personal enrichment, have caused Zaire's descent into chaos. Now is the time to accept the fact that some countries have in fact been ruined irredeemably by their rulers. We must start over, and either let the rebellion (which has a popular appeal across a large swath of the country) continue, or forcibly take Zaire back under the UN's mantle, possibly for several years.

The latter course would demand heavy expenditures, a major airlift, the dropping of paratroops, and the willingness on the part of Western and African nations to absorb some casualties.

Most of all, taking this unprecedented course (but one that should have been used for Somalia and might still be valuable for Burundi) would demand a rapidly forged consensus by the likes of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim, President Clinton, President Chirac, and President Mandela.

Unless policy makers, especially in Africa, have the stomach for what will smack of paternalism, even modern colonialism, there should be no intervention. In the absence of such a concerted willingness to tutor Zaire back to economic and political growth, let us resist all efforts to save a nation that is no more.

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### *Zaire's Zero Hour—Will America Be Ready?*

What goes around, comes around. Laurent-Desiré Kabila has been attempting to overturn Mobutu Sese Seko's dictatorial rule of Zaire for 30 years. Now that his troops have captured the diamond-mining and copper-extraction centers of Mbuji-Mayi and Lubumbashi, all of Zaire will soon be his. When it is, there will be an important, clear role for the United States and other concerned world powers.

So far Mr. Kabila's rebel army has moved surely from Goma and Bukavu in the east toward the north and west to capture Kisangani, and just as easily south and west to gain control of the rich provinces of Kasai and Shaba.

This week's negotiations in South Africa could lead to an outright Zairean capitulation. There seem few reasons to think that Kabila's men will not soon march on Kinshasa, the distant, Atlantic-facing capital, and control Africa's second-largest land mass, with all of its neglected problems.

### *Popular Liberators*

Kabila's men are a popular force, so there is no stopping them. In comparison to the retreating, unpaid Zairean Army, these liberators have behaved well. The Army is the rabble, and it rapes and loots as it falls back toward a final stand somewhere closer to the mouth of the River Zaire. Kabila's forces are, however, alleged to have killed some Rwandan Hutu refugees who have fled before rebel advances.

Kabila himself is an old-time Marxist who fought for Patrice Lumumba's legacy and with Antoine Gizenga against Mobutu's CIA-backed takeover of Zaire in the late 1960s. He was a part of the mini-rebellion at Kisangani (then Stanleyville) that attracted U.S. military intervention. He appears to have been involved with Che Guevara's abortive (and CIA-opposed) attempt to establish a revolutionary beachhead on the Zairean shores of Lake Tanzania. Later Kabila became a successful merchant, trading in diamonds and ivory. He is a Luba from Shaba, but his trading successes occurred throughout eastern Zaire and its neighbors, like Uganda.

Whatever Kabila's shadowy past, he and his commanders have gained approval in the conquered towns by insisting on democratic frameworks. Local management committees have been elected by open, popular vote in hastily convened conventions.

Order has been restored in conquered towns. Commerce has resumed. New local taxes have been collected and devoted to public goods. Mwana Mawampanga, Kabila's finance minister who was trained at the University of Kentucky, has implemented a conservative economic stabilization policy in rebel-held areas. He understands the need for a strict monetary policy. Many "freed" Zaireans wait for Kabila and associates to behave like the ousted Mobutuites, but so far there seem to have been few complaints.

It is widely suspected that Kabila's insurgency was initially backed, if not promoted, by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and his successful protégé, Vice President Paul Kagame of Rwanda. The introduction of local participation in eastern Zaire and the tight control over the conquering troops is reminiscent of the methods employed by both Museveni in gaining control in Uganda and Kagame in Rwanda.

Kabila's aim, presumably, is a guided democracy on the Museveni model. A centrally controlled and gradually conceded articulation of people's power would be (and so far is) accompanied by an opening-up to a market economy, the end of state intervention, and an attack on corruption.

If Kabila can contain corruption from above, Mobutu's predatory state will be finished. Top-down kleptomania has ravished Zaire and put it into its desperate state. Roads hardly exist, the indigenous currency is regarded as a joke, inflation has been stratospheric, civil servants and other functionaries have not been paid for months, hospitals have no supplies, schools do not teach, parliament meets and does nothing, and life for ordinary Zaireans has become catch-as-catch-can. They see their president jetting back and forth to France, Switzerland, and Monaco, living off bilked billions.

If Kabila, whose actions now seem positive, instead succumbs to the same temptations, Zaire would gain little. The limited role of the U.S., France, Belgium, and South Africa should thus be directed to providing incentives for the gradual introduction of national democratic processes across competing regional interests and ethnic groups.

#### *Massive Aid Needed*

The reconstruction of Zaire will require massive outside assistance from many quarters. The polity and economy have been destroyed, and generating fresh beginnings without a functioning civil society will be extremely difficult. There is little remaining physical infrastructure, so the demands on any new government will be vexing and continuous.

Zaire is in the bad graces of world lending institutions. Thus one of the tasks of the meetings in South Africa, and of policymakers in Washington and Paris, is to carefully craft a multilateral, constructive approach that takes account of Zaire's great needs and great problems. Kabila's prospective victory will make the reconstitution of Zaire more, rather than less, urgent.

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### *Help the New Congo Help Itself*

The guns of Kabila were firing again recently in Kinshasa. President Laurent Kabila has banned public demonstrations, but dissident democrats continued to protest, and the new army of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly known as Zaire), fired into a crowd, killing three or four. Despite high expectations, the new regime has done little to inspire confidence at home or abroad.

Mr. Kabila has conquered Congo, but his ouster of Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire's long-time corrupt dictator, has so far fostered more questions than answers. Observers are waiting and watching. They're looking for stability and demonstrable political, social, or economic progress, but instead they're seeing understandable inexperience and lack of direction.

On a recent visit to Congo, I found an air of tense expectancy among the new governing ministers and officials, diplomats, UN workers, and, most of all, the people of Kinshasa, Congo's battered capital city. The new Congo, by area Africa's second largest state, hasn't begun to find itself.

Congo's economic rebirth is critical. Mr. Mobutu robbed the country of billions of dollars (its debt to international lenders is about \$14 billion) and left an empty treasury to his successors. Congo owes about \$1.5 billion in interest to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. Its once-rich copper mines are barely producing. Only the diamond mines, as well as import and export taxes, are capable of providing immediate cash to keep the government in business.

A strong case can be made to forgive Congo much of its debt, especially its arrears, and to provide immediate international aid. One proposal, put forward by Harvard University economists, suggests \$900 million, or \$20 a head, over the first year. Another, favored by more cautious Congolese officials recruited from abroad, especially from the United States and international lending agencies, is for \$320 million, or \$8 a head. As Jesse Jackson recently declared in Harare, Zimbabwe, Africa needs a Marshall Plan. And Congo needs one more desperately than the rest of the continent.

Congo needs to rebuild itself, especially its destroyed road and bridge network, as well as its telecommunications and energy systems. Most of all, it needs to demobilize its old army and train a police force. It has to jumpstart the economy so that cash flows into the cities and the countryside. Without a Marshall Plan, even a mini-plan, Kabila could fail, his revolution dissolve into instability, and intra-state conflict resume. Congo easily could be plunged into chaos again.

The U.S. and South Africa recognize that Congo is needy and deserving. There's a willingness to help. But the shooting of demonstrators in Kinshasa, the brief jailing of opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, and substantiated allegations that Kabila's troops massacred Hutu refugees in northeastern Congo last spring, haven't helped Congo's cause.

Nor does the fact that Kabila has put not one or two Cabinet ministers in charge of the country's economic affairs, but five. The minister of finance might in most states be in charge of economic matters. But Congo also has a powerful minister of the economy, a minister of planning and develop-

ment, a minister of national reconstruction, a minister of international economic cooperation, and a minister of mining. Soon there will be a new governor of the central bank.

The cooperation minister is officially in charge of receiving international aid, but the reconstruction minister thinks that he is, and the finance minister is in constant contact with potential donors. The planning and finance ministers are rivals (along with the others) for the president's ear.

Indeed, at a recent meeting to plan requests to donors, representatives of the planning and finance ministries disagreed sharply about who was in charge and who was legitimate. After making threats, the representative of the planning ministry stalked out. A few days later the minister of finance was jailed on suspicion of corruption. His enemies had spread rumors.

A coherent strategy for stabilizing and rebuilding the economy isn't available. The danger of hyperinflation is real, as is the total collapse of governmental and social services, rioting and looting, and the spread of epidemic diseases. Everyone and no one may be in charge. This condition inspires little confidence.

Congo is not yet democratic or tolerant. Neither is it fully organized. It has hardly articulated a clear vision, leaving many wondering whether Kabila is really in charge or whether he takes directions at some level from Vice-President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, the force behind the revolution. Tutsis have not yet gone back home to Rwanda. Nor have the Angolan troops who assisted in the revolution left Congo completely.

Nevertheless, Kabila deserves assistance. Congo is too big and too important to be allowed to fail. Having ousted Mobutu, Kabila is the best choice to rejuvenate the vast and problematic country. South Africa wants to see this revolution work so southern Africa and Africa itself can succeed. So do the European Community and the United States.

Washington and Pretoria should lead the effort to help Congo help itself. Timely and sufficient assistance is essential.

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### ***Wanted: A Sound Peacekeeping Structure for Africa***

Twenty or more civil wars convulse Africa each year. The potential for massacres and genocide is always present, as in contemporary Burundi and in the new and the old Congo. Surely the nations of Africa and the UN can devise mechanisms to prevent such constant, horrific conflict in the world's least-developed continent?

Then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher told Africans how they might do just that. In 1994 he proposed an African Crisis Response Force composed of battalions from several African nations that would have been trained, funded, and supplied by the U.S. and perhaps by cooperative European nations. The force would have intervened to prevent crises from becoming conflicts and massacres. Excellent idea though it was, the response force was dead on arrival. Africans hadn't been consulted beforehand, and the initiative was viewed as "too American."

No African initiative has been developed on the grand scale envisaged by Mr. Christopher. Africans have, however, heavily involved themselves in peacekeeping (as distinct from peace enforcement) activities throughout the troubled zones of their continent. Troops from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana have been trying for more than a year to maintain the cease-fire in Angola, but they are giving up at the end of 1997. Troops from Malawi, Botswana, and other countries have served in Somalia, and soldiers from Mali have been reducing hostilities in the Central African Republic. Other African countries have assisted peacekeeping operations elsewhere in Africa and even in Haiti.

Peacekeeping follows a negotiated cease-fire. Peace enforcement, however, precedes a cease-fire and could bring it about. Active intervention of that kind was needed in Rwanda, to prevent genocide, and in Congo (formerly Zaire), to have forestalled carnage after the humanitarian operations had concluded.

### *Existing Mechanisms*

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), which now has been extended to include Congo, has an organ for coordinating defense forces that could, in theory, sponsor subregional or regional peace enforcement activities. Some of its members, however, are wary of South Africa's dominance. They also assert, justly, that they lack the funds and, especially, the logistical capability to move quickly. In West Africa, Nigerian-led joint forces have been active in Liberia and Sierra Leone, with mixed results. Those operations also suffered from confusing leadership and command and control. Logistical difficulties were many.

The U.S., the Scandinavian countries, Britain, and France all have offered to assist African initiatives. Indeed, there are American and European schemes to pre-position equipment for an African-led force. There are talks about funding such a force from the resources of the West. Moreover, the U.S. has an active training program in Africa that already has engaged in serious cooperative military exercises with host countries, like

Uganda, and has several more planned. The U.S. African Crisis Response Initiative received funds in fiscal year 1997 and is seeking similar funds from Congress for fiscal 1998.

All of this welcome activity has not yet led to anything that could approximate Christopher's common-sense dream. There is still no consensus on critical issues:

What defines a crisis before it becomes a massacre or a genocide? How do observers in Africa or elsewhere know what is very serious and threatens to spread, like Burundi, and what is troublesome but containable, like the battles in the Republic of Congo (next door to former Zaire)?

If criteria can be developed to distinguish between purely local incidents and cataclysmic threats to regional peace, who decides? Who orders the crisis response force to intervene? At present, the UN Security Council makes those decisions. But it is often too slow, and hampered by big-power political considerations. It dithered over Rwanda and saw up to 1 million lives lost as a result.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) could, in theory, decide to intervene. But it has performed poorly in crises because it is a consensual body, and one or more countries may always object. Indeed, an existing government in normal control may refuse to request help or welcome an intervention. Then what? The OAU also has no mechanism for military intervention. The OAU is decidedly underfinanced.

Any African-organized intervention initiative would need a trigger and someone or some group to decide when to pull it. Then the contributors to the force would have to agree on the mandate—no easy task.

Is the intervention force's job just to impose a cease-fire? Or is it to rebuild civil authority and civil society (what Somalia still lacks)? And who decides when the intervention is over and the troops should leave? In peace-keeping endeavors the Security Council decides, usually on the recommendation of the secretary-general. But the contemplated interventions in Africa's zones of trouble may proceed without official UN backing.

### *Tough Questions*

African governments and military officials agree that they, not the West or the UN, should prevent future intrastate crises from escalating into massive threats to local and regional peace.

No one has yet answered all of the tough questions—not even a conclave of government officials, diplomats, soldiers, and academics from North America, Europe, and Africa who debated these issues at Harvard earlier this month. Each potential solution begged a series of even harder questions.



Peace in Africa clearly will come only when Africans invent a series of diplomatic and military methods of keeping it. South African President Nelson Mandela's leadership may prove to be critical. So far, no one else of stature has assembled heads of state to overcome the many structural and practical obstacles. The role of Washington, London, Paris, and Oslo must be secondary, but supportive and responsive.

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*U.S. and UN Should Investigate  
Human Rights Abuses in Congo*

Letting President Laurent Kabila's Congo Democratic Republic off the hook, as Washington has contemplated, is poor African policy. It would reward recalcitrant behavior and send the wrong message to the democratizing movement in Africa.

Ambassador Bill Richardson suggested that befriending the newly emergent Congo, with its great potential mineral and agricultural riches, 47 million people, and strategic location in middle Africa, might be more important than human rights considerations and finding out who killed refugees in the eastern Congo in April. France and the European Union tend to agree.

For six months Kabila has prevented a UN expert team from investigating charges that soldiers from Congo or Rwanda massacred more than 10,000 Hutu refugees and other civilians during Kabila's triumphant march across Congo earlier this year. The refugees were captured near Kisangani and slaughtered. At least that was the conclusion in the spring of the damning reports of two private examinations of the evidence, one by Human Rights Watch/Africa and another by Physicians for Human Rights of Boston. At the time, journalists and relief workers, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, voiced and wrote about similar suspicions. In August, John Shattuck, U.S. assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor, called for a truth commission to address economic crimes and ethnic violence in Congo.

Until recent hesitations, the United States and United Nations had warned Kabila that no assistance would be forthcoming until the truth about the alleged massacres had been discovered. Moreover, Richardson himself was strident in warning the Congo to cooperate or forfeit all help. Now those barriers to helping the Congo appear to be falling.

The Congo is deserving. Its millions were ruled until May by the kleptocratic dictatorship of President Mobutu Sese Seko, originally installed with

U.S. backing and supported almost until the end of his reign by the West, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank. The record of the West's and Washington's continued assistance to Mobutu, even in his most openly venal days, is hardly edifying or pretty.

It is also true that a stable Congo would contribute greatly to peace and stability in middle Africa, with troubled Congo-Brazzaville, on one flank, having emerged from a stark civil war, and Angola, on another, still in the throes of a simmering conflict. To the east, catastrophic hostilities still threaten to engulf Burundi, and there are continuing military skirmishes in Rwanda.

Washington and Richardson are concerned about improving the climate for democracy in Congo itself. So far, Kabila has made no moves to construct a broad-based government. Nor are democratic institutions being rebuilt with any alacrity. Elections are a vague hope on a distant horizon.

It is sensible to argue that assistance from the West and befriending Congo should encourage the growth of democracy in that country and the region, diminish threats to peace, and help Africa's urgent efforts to erase poverty and grow itself economically. Those are all critical goals.

But even hinting that human rights considerations can be set aside would set Kabila and much of Africa back down the road to autocracy. During the Cold War, it seemed expedient for the West to turn a blind eye to political realities in Africa. Doing so gave rise to Mobutu and his clones. There is no excuse for such expediency now.

There is every reason instead to espouse a policy of tough love, as Richardson and Washington preached until recently. Congo (and other African nations in similar situations) need to face up to accusations of massacre, abuses of minorities, violations of human and civil rights, and other insults to the democratic process. If not, those many Africans who have been campaigning valiantly for decent governmental behavior and, ultimately, for democracy and respect for human rights, will be sacrificed.

The democracy movement in Africa is real, but fragile. If the United States sends the wrong message, Africans who care will lose heart and the kleptocrats, the bullies (like Nigeria), and the predatory warlords (like Charles Taylor in Liberia) will continue to immiserate their own nationals.

The United States and the United Nations should insist that Kabila keep to his promises. The alleged massacres should be investigated without delay or hindrance by the UN team that sat around Kinshasa forlornly for weeks. Those are minimal conditions for large-scale international financial and economic support, which Congo desperately requires. In addition, Washington should encourage Kabila to begin developing social and political institutions that permit at least some measure of citizen participation in the decision-making process.

Helping the Congo in this way to move forward politically, socially, and economically will do more for stability and prosperity in Africa than accepting Kabila's self-serving obstinacy.

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### *Congo on the Brink*

All the big powers want Africans to shoulder their own burdens of war, and they are. But hardly with one voice. South Africa has failed to mediate the Congo crisis while Angola and Zimbabwe have sent troops and airplanes to help save Kinshasa from rebel capture. The West, meanwhile, is standing on the sidelines, not particularly caring whether or not President Laurent Kabila remains in charge.

Mr. Kabila has hardly endeared himself to the West or to the Congolese. His human rights record is mostly negative, his economic growth accomplishments few, his relations with the big powers and most of his neighbors poor, his people's affection for him limited, and his credibility thin. South Africa's President Nelson Mandela and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki have both soured on the man they helped install in power more than a year ago.

Rwanda and Uganda have sponsored the rebellion which a week ago appeared ready to drive Kabila from power. They feel doublecrossed. Having helped him invade Congo and overthrow dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, they sought secure borders and the end of raids on their territory from Congo. But Kabila has not produced stable frontiers. Nor has he gained much control over the far-flung reaches of Africa's second largest country.

Kabila and his ramshackle administration have disappointed their original benefactors. Kabila also made a fatal mistake recently when he dismissed Rwandans in senior positions in his armed forces. The die of war was then cast.

President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Eduardo dos Santos of Angola have calculated that keeping the Kabila regime intact is better for them and for their influence in Africa.

Zimbabwe is working at cross purposes with South Africa because of their rivalry for leadership within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which includes the Congo. Mr. Mugabe constantly attempts to play an outsized role on the African and international scene. By rushing hundreds of troops to Kabila's assistance, Mugabe hopes to be kingmaker.

Angola's intervention is even more important. Its army is the largest in the region, and its geographical and strategic interests in a cooperative

Congo are clear. Moreover, Angola's own ongoing civil war against the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) can only be won by controlling western Congo.

Kabila has not been the democratic leader Congolese and outsiders had hoped would succeed Mobutu's predatory state. Instead, corruption continued, and Congo swung largely leaderless without making friends at home or abroad. The inhabitants of Kinshasa do not want to be ruled by Rwandans, so there has been a rallying in recent days by western Congolese to Kabila's side. He can also count on support from his home region, Katanga. The remainder of his vast country, however, seems indifferent. Congo could easily split into two or three new countries, the west dominated by Angola, the east by Rwanda and Uganda, and the south by the remnants of the Kabila regime backed by Zimbabwe and Zambia.

If Kabila is reprieved by the efforts of Angola and Zimbabwe, he needs to reach out to his own people, especially to proven democrats. The persons and groups that fought Mobutu for many years have been persecuted or shunned. They need to be brought back. Kabila also needs to open up his country economically, rather than keeping tight control of state enterprises so he and his cronies can profit.

With Washington, London, and Paris on the sidelines, Congo's last best hope is South Africa. If South Africa can influence both the Kabila regime and the rebels, and placate Rwanda and Uganda, then it could install a democrat like Etienne Tshisekedi alongside Kabila. Otherwise Congo will implode, and Washington will have to become involved, whether it wants to or not.

## *Grandiosity and Greed: Zimbabwe*

Transforming Zimbabwe from a newly independent, democratically promising nation of great economic and social potential into a corrupt tyranny—bankrupt financially and morally, with rampant AIDS—was a work of twenty years. The high hopes born of independence in 1980 were slowly eroded, the result of egregious leadership follies and failures, fundamental miscalculations, the absence of critical voices within and without—until too late—and the growth of unchecked greed. Zimbabwe after twenty years was not an example of African inability or weakness; the visible hands of particular men brought it to its knees. New men and women will have to restore its potential, revive its promise, and give birth again to a truly democratic, truly free, Zimbabwe.

The initial human and physical raw materials were there. At a midnight ceremony in April 1980, ninety years of British and settler rule faded with the playing of old and new anthems. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and his ZANU government took charge. But the end of white rule began, rather than finished, a struggle to convert the new nation's wealth into resources for all 7 million citizens, not just the 230,000 white Zimbabweans. For Africa, the received patrimony was rich: a thriving mining sector that produced ferrochrome, gold, nickel, copper, asbestos, and coal; an agricultural sector that was self-sufficient and capable of producing great surpluses of food crops as well as export quality tobacco, beef, cotton, and sugar. The country also added value to raw materials and manufactured a wide range of consumer goods. Its physical infrastructure was impressive: roads, rails, and telecommunications were all of high standard compared to the rest of black Africa. It possessed thermal and hydroelectric generating capacity. Tourism flourished. Managers, both black and white, were numerous and capable. Indeed,

at independence Zimbabwe boasted more indigenous university graduates per capita than any other place on the continent.

Given this fortunate legacy, Mugabe's prime task was to uplift the ordinary Africans who had suffered for years under white rule and had benefited comparatively little from the colony's prosperity. There would be pressures to redistribute land to Africans and to nationalize industries. Mugabe was a scientific socialist, I reported, but since soundly winning an election earlier in the year, he had spoken carefully and pragmatically. He had promised not to interfere with income-producing mining or manufacturing concerns, and had said that he understood how important it was to maintain the country's capacity for growth. Mugabe was not doctrinaire, I concluded, and he and his hopes would not be assisted by "draconian Marxist solutions." U.S. financial assistance would be strategically placed, and a wise investment. ("And Now—to Share Zimbabwe's Bounty," *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 April 1980; "Why to Aid Africa Now," *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 June 1980.)

Zimbabwe's initial developmental choices were "incentive-based" and non-Marxist. Conscious of its problems of income inequality and pent-up black demand, it chose a model of multi-racial growth which deserved sustained U.S. support over many years. Zimbabwe needed to reconstruct its war-ravaged rural areas and improve opportunities for landless peasant farmers. A year into freedom, it was proceeding cautiously and well to address these problems without returning to the Marxist rhetoric that had punctuated its ten-year liberation struggle. Zimbabwe could become a model for white-black relations in neighboring, still unfree, South Africa. By helping the new Zimbabwe realize its worthy goals, the U.S. could also stem Soviet influence in southern Africa. ("Stemming the Soviets in Southern Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 April 1981.)

This strategic support for Mugabe and his approach, and criticism of Sen. Jesse Helms and others in Congress for attempting to slash developmental aid just when Zimbabwe's future was "balancing precariously," was reinforced by the Zimbabwean government's decision not to collectivize or expropriate land, to raise returns to farmers, and to refuse to subsidize urban consumers (an issue in Zambia and elsewhere in Africa). Even so, there were signs of danger. The government had purchased a South African-owned press chain that controlled the country's only daily newspapers, exerted official authority over radio and television broadcasts, and threatened to nationalize all marketing of minerals. Moreover, Mugabe had started to talk about turning Zimbabwe into a one-party state. It was not yet

time to “give up on Zimbabwe,” I suggested. Western support might still turn it aside from excesses of authoritarianism. (“Zimbabwe Needs Aid,” *New York Times*, 8 Dec. 1981.)

Those excesses were apparent in 1982 and 1983, when Mugabe sent a North Korean-trained battalion into southwestern Zimbabwe (Matabeleland) to eliminate opposition among Sindebele-speaking citizens who backed Nkomo. This was ethnic cleansing at its worst. Ostensibly sent after “bandits,” Mugabe’s soldiers exterminated noncombatant villagers and visited atrocities on local inhabitants, presumably because of their linguistic and inferred ZAPU (not ZANU) affiliations. Mugabe extolled the “work” of the soldiers, even after the country’s Roman Catholic bishops formally condemned “wanton” brutalities. Mugabe characteristically called the bishops meddlers and traitors. Between 20,000 and 30,000 Zimbabweans were massacred in the country’s southwest, a toll carefully obscured by propaganda and denial, and criticized only weakly in the West. (“Signs of Trouble Lurk in Zimbabwe,” *Boston Globe*, 18 April 1983.)

In 1984, Zimbabwe took further decisive steps backward when its leaders exchanged Western-style, market-oriented, multiparty rule for a single-party socialist state controlled by Mugabe and a party politburo and central committee superior to parliament. The only saving grace was their decision to do so slowly, “in the fullness of time,” and in accord with provisions of the state’s 1979 constitution that prohibited major shifts in governance before 1987. But the party gave Mugabe the right to become an executive president, to choose the members of the politburo, and, in effect, to run the country from 1987 in an authoritarian manner. Zimbabwe, I wrote, had promised not to make the mistakes of its predecessors, but had “fallen into the same trap.” (“A Gradual—but Decisive—Step Backward in Zimbabwe,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 Aug. 1984.)

Despite these serious intimations of danger, Zimbabwe had not yet joined the hopeless cases of Africa. Or so I hoped. Mugabe was “a clear-thinking, decisive” leader who through 1984 was charting a stable course for his country. He was soft-spoken, sober, and serious. He was aware of the ways in which other African revolutionary regimes had failed economically and politically. He was a socialist and a believer, still, in Marxism. But he remained a pragmatist, aware of his nation’s vulnerability adjacent to South Africa (which attacked Zimbabwe periodically) and the suspicion of foreign investors. Only 30,000 African peasants had been resettled on formerly settler-owned land. The 4,000 or so white farmers who had remained in Zimbabwe after independence were prospering and were largely content. Mugabe had shown no propensity to kill the territory’s golden

goose. Yet there were two serious problems: First, Zimbabwe's population was doubling every eighteen years; its rate of increase was second only to Kenya's in the world. Economic growth prospects would be slim unless Mugabe, a Catholic, urged family planning on his nation. Second, despite the Marxist resurgence that he had promoted, if Mugabe could not keep Zimbabwe on a market-oriented path, decay would set in after 1990—a prescient assertion. (“Zimbabwe’s Rhetoric at Odds with Reality,” *Boston Globe*, 14 Oct. 1984; “Zimbabwe’s Economic Success,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 March 1985.)

Washington lost patience with Mugabe. His country had consistently voted with the Soviet Union, and against the U.S., in the UN. At an embassy Independence Day celebration attended by former President Carter, a junior Zimbabwean official brazenly gave a speech critical of the U.S. Zimbabwe refused to apologize, and then condemned a U.S. air attack on Libya. Washington could hardly turn the other cheek, but Zimbabwe in 1986 was still an economic success story. It had remained orthodox in its internal fiscal arrangements and was providing incentives for its all-important farming community. In 1987, Mugabe reconsidered a plan to impose sanctions on South Africa, realizing that Zimbabwe might well end up the loser. Yet, simultaneously, his revolutionary rhetoric was becoming more strident, and was driving away the foreign investors that Zimbabwe so desperately desired. By 1987, Mugabe seemed determined to impose conditions on his energetic countrymen that were antithetical to economic growth and political freedom. He was forfeiting the great promise of his country and undermining his own reputation as a wise leader. (“Beating Up on Zimbabwe,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 Sept. 1986; “Democracy in Zimbabwe,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 Sept. 1987.)

Elsewhere in black Africa, single-party dominance had been jettisoned, along with most aspects of Afro-socialism and other supposed rationalizations for the all-encompassing rule of big men. The continent had known its chiefs, but, beginning with Nkrumah, one after another post-independent “democrat” had initially espoused the concept that political oppositions were non-African, time-consuming, hindrances to development, and Western, therefore wrong. These propositions prevailed for a decade or so, until a new generation of politicians in both francophone and anglophone Africa derided the hypocrisy, mismanagement, corruption, and distortion of national priorities that had become prevalent in nations lacking legal oppositions, free presses, and basic human rights. The excesses of Bokassa (tried for murder in 1987 in the Central African Republic), Amin (since 1979 ensconced in Saudi Arabia), and Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea



(made President in 1972, overthrown and executed in 1979) also refocused Africans on the importance of democracy.

As he himself exclaimed many years later, Mugabe was no Idi Amin. Smart, capable, tough, the possessor of several earned university degrees and diplomas, Mugabe was a far cry in intellect and style from the ill-educated bullies and despots who had bedeviled so much of Africa from 1960 to 1988. Some of his personal characteristics were reminiscent of Sir Seretse Khama, who had led neighboring Botswana since its independence. But Khama was an unswerving democrat, a gifted, long-sighted leader who eschewed ostentation and guided and instructed his small country from poverty to wealth. Mugabe, it turned out, modeled himself on Nkrumah more than Khama. In 1988, having bided his time and having carefully considered his options, Mugabe, already unchallengeable within the ruling party (with his own covert methods of enforcing discipline), commenced the long march to national insolvency and moral decay.

Rather than facing forward and riding the tide of change that was soon to produce democratic departures in South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, a host of francophone countries, and, eventually, Ghana and Nigeria, Zimbabwe in 1988 became effectively (but not legally) a one-party socialist state. Nkomo's ZAPU, decisively humbled on the battlefield and in elections, was compelled to fold itself into the new ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), with Nkomo being given a ceremonial vice-presidency under Mugabe. The judiciary, largely independent until this time, began to feel threatened. As Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia began dismantling their money-losing, patronage-swamped, state-owned enterprises, so Zimbabwe set about turning private firms into government ones. As countries to the north finally began to understand the economically adverse consequences of overvalued currencies, import restrictions, and closed economies, Zimbabwe began assiduously returning to the past. It started spending heavily on its armed forces and, for the first time, running deep current account deficits. Civil service numbers grew as efficiency decreased. Zimbabwe could have done much better, but Mugabe decisively chose a retrogressive path. ("Zimbabwe and the Socialist Embrace," *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 Jan. 1988.)

Dissent was theoretically possible, but few within ZANU-PF spoke privately or publicly against Mugabe. As the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) grew in size and power within State House, so Mugabe came to use the instruments of intimidation and patronage to keep senior (and junior) party members in line. With the media tightly controlled (there were timid independent weekly publications available from the 1980s, but serious independent weeklies emerged only in the mid-1990s, and an independent daily

only in 1999), lucrative commercial opportunities in the president's gift, and the white farming and mining enterprises left alone, Mugabe's authoritarian crypto-Marxism was at first of no deep concern to productive Zimbabweans. In 1990 and 1995, ZANU-PF won overwhelming parliamentary victories against token opposition. The twenty seats reserved for whites from 1980 were removed in 1990, but with ZAPU folded into the large dominant party, little opposition surfaced in Matabeleland.

In 1995, ZANU-PF won 117 of 120 elected seats, Mugabe appointing another thirty. One independent, a former CIO operative who felt that Mugabe was abusing his power, was elected after the High Court accepted her contention that ZANU-PF had falsified the registration rolls and distorted the count in an urban constituency. From 1995 to 2000, Margaret Dongo was the only fearless voice of criticism within parliament.

There was a presidential election in 1996. Again, given Mugabe's high standing among the country's overwhelmingly Shona-speaking electorate and his party's dominance of the media and of electoral arrangements, this constituted no real contest. Nevertheless, the security forces held the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, another presidential contender, in jail for six months before the poll, claiming that he had tried to sponsor an assassination of the president. Even so, Sithole took 2 percent of the votes and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the third candidate, won 5 percent of the votes, despite the fact that both men had dropped out of the race weeks before, blaming harassment and unfair tactics by ZANU-PF. Only 31 percent of the electorate cast ballots, against 53 percent in the 1990 presidential race. It was widely conceded within the discerning community of observers in Zimbabwe that the elections in 1990, 1995, and 1996 all demonstrated that democracy "was an illusion." Mugabe was running an autocracy masquerading as a democracy. ("Democracy in Africa: The Ballot Doesn't Tell All," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 May 1996.)

Zimbabwe had immense unlocked economic potential in 1980. Prosperity continued until about 1990. From then on intensified interventionism on the part of the state, mismanagement, the drumbeat of anti-foreign rhetoric (which chilled new investment), a lengthy period of drought, the willful evasion of IMF conditions, and the accelerated growth of individual greed turned promise and accomplishment into personal gain and national disaster. These were the failures of leadership, not the unforeseen consequences of globalization or of climatic disturbances.

Mugabe was steadfast throughout the 1990s in refusing to liberalize the national economy. His cabinet officials wished to privatize state-owned entities and to take part in growth, but time and again "the boss," as he was

referred to by members of the central committee, remained determined to retain control of the state's key resources. Mugabe wanted to run a closed economy. Meanwhile, his neighbors were opening theirs, and growing dramatically. From 1995 to 2000, Zimbabwe's annual per capita GDP fell from \$600 to \$400. Government deficits ballooned. Medical and educational services collapsed. Unemployment levels shot up to 60 percent. Inflation grew from 8 percent to 80 percent. The local currency slumped against the U.S. dollar, from 8 to 1 to 60 to 1. By 2000, Zimbabwe effectively was bankrupt, with no foreign currency in its coffers and persistent shortages of petroleum, cooking oil, kerosene, and, occasionally, staple food commodities. There was no foreign currency to pay for imported electricity, so brownouts and blackouts became common.

Shortly after Mugabe's re-election in 1996, a personal sense of omnipotence, combined with greed, began to weigh heavily on progress in Zimbabwe. Perhaps his affair with Grace Marufu, a secretary forty years Mugabe's junior, was a contributing factor. Starting in about 1990, when Sally Mugabe, his first wife, still lived, Grace began consorting with the president. She bore him two children while Sally was still alive, and another one after Sally's death in 1992. The affair and a traditional marriage to Grace were denied by Mugabe, but a church betrothal and official acknowledgement of Grace took place in 1996. At that point, or earlier, a cabinet official later reported, Mugabe entered "an acquisitive phase." He and Grace commandeered Air Zimbabwe commercial aircraft and flew frequently to Europe, South America, and Asia, purchasing as they went. At home, more and more construction contracts found their way to consortia controlled by the president's nephew, and Zimbabwe's once tight reputation for probity vanished. An independent weekly newspaper column labeled "Muckraker" compared Mugabe to Robin Hood. "You formerly robbed from the rich to give to the poor," a colleague said to Robin Hood. "But now you seem to be robbing the rich to give to your wife." ("Mugabe Seen as Bar to Zimbabwe's Progress," *Southern African Report*, 21 Feb. 1997.)

There were riots in Harare, Zimbabwe's capital, early in 1998 to protest the severe mismanagement of the economy. The cost of living had spiraled out of control. The local currency had collapsed, and the prices of food staples—especially for maize meal—had reached unprecedented levels. An attempt by the government to make maize millers reduce prices arbitrarily simply reduced supply, and prices shot up again.

Zimbabwe was collapsing because Mugabe had decided to attack his nation's most productive export sectors. Forty percent of all earnings came from crops grown on farms owned and managed by whites. But Mugabe, a

few months before the shortages and riots, had announced the confiscation of 1,500 of the 4,000 white-owned farms. He had no funds with which to resettle the landless on these farms, and previous land transfers had resulted in 8.3 million acres that were officially reported as “grossly underutilized.” But Mugabe, sensing his regime’s increasing illegitimacy as the economy declined steeply, tried to play on racist sentiments to restore his own popularity and grandiosity. It was a tactic that had worked earlier, in less sophisticated times, but no longer. Workers and homemakers rioted. (“Asian Nations Aren’t Alone: Zimbabwe Needs Help, Too,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 Jan. 1998.)

Mugabe heard the message of the rioters and sent in troops to repress it. Simultaneously, as a symbolic answer to the protesting workers, Mugabe asked his rubber-stamp parliament to approve a Presidential Benefits and Retirement Amendment Bill, which in perpetuity ensured former leaders the luxurious lifestyles that they had enjoyed in office. The bill pointedly made generous provision for the wife and minor children (out-of-wedlock children included) of a former president, indefinitely. The children were entitled to one-third of a president’s pension upon his death, with spouses receiving two-thirds. They were also entitled to free air travel, medical benefits, security allowances, entertainment, and so on. “Long-lived leaders and governments sometimes do themselves in,” I wrote piously. They did so especially when they demonstrated contempt for their constituents. (“Zimbabwe’s Leader Takes Care of His Own,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 Feb 1998.)

In late 1998, Mugabe dispatched 6,000 (later 13,000) of Zimbabwe’s crack troops to keep Kabila from being overrun by rebels in the Congo. Parliament had no say in this decision. Nor did the cabinet. The finance minister could not explain (not being informed by State House) how a cash-short Zimbabwe intended to pay for this foreign excursion. Clearly, Zimbabweans could defend the diamond fields of Mbuji-Mayi and the cobalt mines of Shaba while Mugabe and his associates could profit personally. The costs of the mercenary force were borne by the state.

Invading the Congo was not popular. Zimbabwe’s workers, I explained, might have understood why the price of imported fuel rose 67 percent, along with bread and cooking oil, and bus fares increased 100 percent. But, given the Congo escapade, they had difficulty accepting the cost-of-living escalations when they knew that Mugabe was constructing several expensive mansions for his second wife, that the mayor of Harare was building a \$1.5 million extravagance for his personal use, and that the city of Harare simultaneously could not afford a \$685,000 water pump—so the city ran dry. “Greed on the part of politicians [was] taken for granted,” but not welcomed.

By early 1999, Zimbabwe had tumbled. The war in the Congo was costing about \$5 million a week. Zimbabwe's currency had depreciated against the U.S. dollar by 100 percent. Inflation was nearly 60 percent and growing. Investment, domestic or foreign, was nil. Annual GDP growth increase rates had fallen below 2 percent and were destined to fall further. Hospitals were without essential supplies. Mugabe had clearly outlived his legitimacy. It was time "he went."

Absolute power probably does corrupt absolutely. As patient Zimbabweans lined up early in 1999 for scarce supplies of their staple maize meal, an independent Sunday newspaper reported an attempted troop mutiny in the Congo and an alleged abortive military coup at home against Mugabe's government. The editor of the Sunday paper, and his reporter, were promptly whisked off to military intelligence headquarters, and tortured by electric shock, near drowning, and multiple beatings. Zimbabwe's High Court ordered their release, but without a response. The judges of the Supreme Court protested directly to Mugabe, requesting that he affirm the rule of law.

The president's answer consisted of a tirade of abuse. The journalists were full of lies and must have been foreign spies. If the editor and reporter had not been "dishonest," they would not have been tortured. They had "forfeited" the right to legal protection. The judges were being impertinent, and should resign. British agents were somehow responsible for all of Zimbabwe's troubles. "Respect for the rule of law and economic rationality," I wrote, was the real issue, but not one the president chose to contemplate. ("Mugabe's Dictatorship Erodes," *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 Dec. 1998; "Corruption and Torture in Mugabe's Zimbabwe," *Boston Globe*, 14 Feb. 1999.)

Dongo, the lone independent legislator in parliament, raised her voice throughout this period. Leaders of the national trade union movement had expressed displeasure and led public protests in late 1998, and then resumed their questioning of Mugabe's rule in late 1999, prior to a parliamentary election scheduled for 2000. Finally, when Mugabe attempted to revise the national constitution to enable him to take land from whites without compensation, and put several permissive amendments to the test of a national referendum, Morgan Tsvangirai, the head of the Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions, initiated a broad campaign to deny approval to the president's proposals.

Mugabe had never before lost an electoral contest. This time, in February 2000, he was defeated handily. The Movement for Democratic Change, which Tsvangirai had been nurturing for several months before the victorious February referendum, was quickly transformed into a national anti-

ZANU-PF electoral vehicle. In response, and in order to rally popular support (or so Mugabe reckoned) in defiance of his referendum defeat and outstanding judicial orders, Mugabe sent rent-a-thug, supposedly landless, war veterans onto white-owned farms. These farm occupations led to ugly scenes, the destruction of property and housing, and to several murders of white farmers. The killings took place, however, primarily during the two-month period before the parliamentary elections, when Mugabe was intent on intimidating his MDC opponents, and also coercing African voters into ignoring MDC candidates. The whites who died were MDC supporters. So were the Africans who lost their lives to government-sponsored attacks. "When the time of arbitrary rulers is almost up," I wrote, "they thrash about trying to save themselves."

European and other electoral observers denounced the atmosphere of violence in which opposition candidates campaigned as wildly unfair. Constituencies had been delimited late, hindering the MDC campaign, and the MDC had obtained voters' rolls only belatedly, and after court appeals. ZANU-PF still controlled and exclusively used radio and television, plus the official daily newspapers in Harare and Bulawayo, the country's second city. The ruling party had every financial and strategic advantage, and then some. It also stuffed ballots in several constituencies and manipulated the count in others.

Nevertheless, the results of the parliamentary election, before judicially ordered recounts and by-elections in several contested constituencies, gave MDC 57 of the 120 contested seats. ZANU-PF won 62, and Sithole's party 1. Five senior ZANU-PF cabinet ministers were defeated. The MDC won every urban constituency, almost all of the seats in Matabeleland, and places everywhere except in Mugabe's rock-ribbed Shona heartland. ("The West Must Help Bring Democracy Back to Zimbabwe," *Boston Globe*, 24 Jan. 2000; "Only Fair Vote Can Save Zimbabwe," *Boston Globe*, 20 April 2000; "Saving Zimbabwe from Mugabe," *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 May 2000; "The Challenge to Mugabe," *Boston Globe*, 3 July 2000; "Zimbabwe's Prospect," *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 July 2000.)

Although the MDC introduced motions of impeachment in Zimbabwe's new parliament and indicated its determination to harass Mugabe until he resigned, or until it somehow gained a parliamentary majority (Mugabe had appointed an additional thirty legislators, as the constitution permitted), the president himself carried on, regardless. He said he would bring the troops home from the Congo, but they stayed. He promised to recognize the meaning of the election, but did nothing to improve the economic prospects of the nation. Instead, he redoubled the land confiscations and occupations, even

after promising President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa that he would behave. Venal leadership was in its death throes, but no one knew for how long, or what it would take for ZANU-PF to jettison him, South Africa to ease him out, or the MDC to win sufficient seats in the courts to overturn ZANU-PF's majority. ("It's Time to Loosen Mugabe's Grip," *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 Oct. 2000.)

Instead of attempting to regain legitimacy and behaving in a statesman-like manner, Mugabe took no heed of the voices of nearly half his people. During the six months that followed the election, Mugabe accelerated the rent-a-thug invasions of white-owned farmland. He rebuffed entreaties from Britain, the United States, and South Africa. Indeed, near the end of the year he ignored the direct criticisms of President Mbeki and President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, delivered to Mugabe in public in Harare. He turned away an envoy from the secretary-general of the UN.

Mugabe tightened his vise-like grip on ZANU-PF, even ousting several stalwart Central Committee members who had become critics. Although the Supreme Court several times ruled his attacks on white farms illegal, Mugabe paid no heed. "Africa is for Africans," Mugabe declared. "Land is ours by birth, ours by right."

The court also said that it was illegal for the state to withhold Zimbabwean passports from citizens of British descent. It told Mugabe's government that it could not refuse to supply state funding to the MDC. His justice minister was vitriolic in his complaints against the court, as was Mugabe. He even threatened white farmers who dared challenge the occupations of their lands. The government, he boomed, would become "even more angry." By fiat the president also declared illegal the contesting of election results (on grounds of fraud, vote-rigging, and so on) following elections or by-elections. Mugabe also attacked the independent press, calling their editors and reporters liars.

The president's rhetoric became even more impassioned than before. He told the forty-fifth annual ZANU-PF party congress at the end of 2000 that black Zimbabweans could not "brook any court impediments to our land acquisition program . . ." Courts "belong to the people . . . [and] will not be allowed to go against our quest for full sovereignty," whatever white racists say. "We are right and we are just." The British government is the enemy; white farmers are the enemy. "There are dangerous attempts by white interests in our region to forge a broad front across boundaries against genuine reforms being championed by . . . liberation movements." So ZANU-PF must "safeguard the nation and prevent its subjection once again to racist rule, oppression, and suppression." "I am not preaching violence,"



Mugabe told his party “comrades,” “but the fight that they want, we will give them twice as much. They are people of violence and if they start it, you must give them more and make it harder.”

Just before Christmas 2000, there were long gasoline lines in Harare. Other shortages were predicted in 2001, given the fact that commercial farmers had not been able to obtain bank loans and many once lucrative growing lands remained unplowed. Industrial production had fallen 30 percent, GDP per capita for 2000 was forecast below -5 percent, inflation was about 70 percent, the Congo war was still draining the country’s resources, and no immediate solution seemed likely.

Mugabe, smart and ruthless, is not up for re-election as president until 2002. Unless South Africa engineers his retirement, or internal protests sweep him from office in Yugoslav fashion, Mugabe seems to be taking the country’s economy and society deeply down with him. At the beginning of 2001, Mugabe was a dinosaur, aged 77 but still capable of further destroying and destabilizing his country. Absolute power in this case had absolutely corrupted a leader, a ruling party, and a generation or two of Zimbabweans. See also the Postscript (p. 518).

#### OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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### *And Now—to Share Zimbabwe’s Bounty*

At midnight tonight, April 17, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s government officially ends British and white settler rule in the colony that, from tomorrow, will be called Zimbabwe. But the end of white rule begins, rather than ends, a broader struggle to make the new nation’s wealth work for all the seven million Zimbabweans. Until today the country’s mineral and agricultural riches had primarily benefited its 230,000 whites. Rural blacks’ subsistence incomes are only \$31 per year per capita.

Zimbabwe’s economy is the envy of its neighbors. It has a thriving and diversified mining sector which produces chrome, gold, nickel, copper, asbestos, and high-quality coal. Agriculturally, it is more self-sufficient than any other country in Africa. The bounty of the land produces significant surpluses, making it the world’s leading exporter of white maize, a major exporter of beef and Virginia tobacco, and a producer of cotton and sugar. For local consumption Zimbabwe produces tea, coffee, grapes, citrus fruit, and vegetables.

*Christian Science Monitor*, 17 April 1980.



Unlike so many other countries of Africa, Zimbabwe also processes what it grows, and has a substantial manufacturing sector. That sector flourished because of United Nations–mandated sanctions but will probably continue to supply coal needs as well as to sell textiles, small appliances, and other consumer durables to South Africa, to Zambia, to Zaire, and to other countries in the region.

Zimbabwe's physical inheritance is also impressive. It has more miles of modern rails and a more highly developed road system than most African nations. It has an efficient telecommunications system. Most of all, its hydroelectric and thermal generating plants give Zimbabwe a capacity for power which is the envy of most African countries.

Zimbabwe's impressive physical attributes are magnified by the managerial expertise demonstrated within the colony's economy since 1965. The government redirected the productive capacity of the outlawed nation. It exercised highly advanced fiscal management, developed a small but efficient money market, and, because of sanctions, became ingenious in ways which are bound to benefit the new Zimbabwe.

But the management of the country has been almost exclusively white. The government, industry, and even agriculture were and are thoroughly dominated by whites. Zimbabwe's unusually large group of 11,000 university graduates remained largely untapped. The task of Mr. Mugabe's government will be to meet the expectations of this black group without picking or displacing whites.

Although farms run by 500 white agribusiness managers produce about 60 percent of all exported crops by value (roughly \$350 million worth), the confidence of the 5,000 other whites who farm is important to maintain until such a time (which cannot be soon) when Africans will be producing as successfully. It will probably be easier to Africanize the civil service and promote Africans to senior positions in industry than it will be to transform the leadership of the important agricultural export sector. This has been the lesson of other African countries.

Yet now that Africans have attained the commanding heights of government in Zimbabwe, the pressure upon the Prime Minister to meet the desires of ordinary Africans will be great. Since the country's distribution of income has been so unequal, and since the rhetoric of the liberation struggle has aroused such potent expectations, he will be under extraordinary pressure to mandate wholesale land reform and to turn industries over to Africans and, as well, to the state.

Mr. Mugabe, moreover, is a self-professed scientific socialist and adherent of Marxism. At least that is what he was saying during the years of the

military struggle. Since winning a massive electoral victory in February his rhetoric has been infused with pragmatism. He has specifically eschewed the nationalization of multinational mining or manufacturing concerns. He has promised not to give white-owned land to blacks. He has made it abundantly clear that he understands that short-cut solutions to the problem of enhancing equity may not produce increased per capita incomes for the African majority.

He appreciates the importance of maintaining the productive capacity of Zimbabwe and of building upon the well-functioning structure that is part of his country's heritage. But whether he can resist the inevitable popular demands, pent up after decades of white rule, is still an open question.

Zimbabwe begins its new era with an economy capable of unusual growth. But that growth will be possible only if draconian Marxist solutions are deferred or avoided altogether. Prime Minister Mugabe is not doctrinaire. For how long, however, will he be able to resist appeasing the land-hungry masses and the urban poor? That is the question for 1980 and beyond.

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### *Why to Aid Africa Now*

There are dozens of ethical and strategic reasons for assisting the new nations of Africa with American economic grants and loans. Such aid, if intelligently directed, can make it possible for poorer countries to modernize, avoid the perils of predatory authoritarianism, and escape military control. Many advocates also promote American aid as a means of minimizing Soviet influence in countries struggling to maintain minimal growth rates.

Nevertheless, aid has become far less fashionable than before in congressional circles. Despite American help in the 1960s, African countries experimented with varieties of strong and despotic rule. They also flirted with or became Marxist almost irrespective of American and Western aid flows. The percentage of American economic assistance as a proportion of gross national product has fallen below 1 percent. Where the United States once gave more than other major countries, it and Japan rank toward the bottom on most scales of generosity.

In early June the defenders of aid to Africa in the House of Representatives mounted a major campaign to preserve modest grants to the new Zimbabwe and to Zambia and Mozambique. For all three countries the arguments, which must still be made, are clear.

In the case of Zimbabwe, as a recent visit there confirmed, the new leaders are determined to make their country a showcase of sensible development. Despite the legacy of a bitter war and a decade of Marxist sloganeering, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and his Cabinet colleagues have a clear sense of priorities. They have learned from the mistakes of other black African nations, and intend to avoid short-term solutions to complex, multifaceted problems.

As a result of a bitter war that lasted eight years and devastated rural areas of the country, Zimbabwe must rebuild schools, clinics, roads, and water systems. The list of basic rural needs totals at least \$200 million. If the long-neglected African farming areas are to be developed and agricultural productivity to be enhanced, then roads, water, and technical assistance must be provided on an urgent basis.

The settlement of war refugees and the provision of occupations for about 50,000 ex-soldiers is a critical need. Zimbabwe's leaders want desperately to avoid the destabilization which could come from letting loose unemployed ex-soldiers into the countryside.

The white-run civil service leadership is gradually to be replaced by Africans; those who assume top positions will need to be trained. So will diplomats. The pent-up demand for education is massive in the urban areas among long-disenfranchised Africans.

Each of these needs has a large price tag. The United States has promised \$50 million over three years, was able to make nearly \$5 million immediately available, and expects to send about \$17 million in the first year. West Germany will assist. Britain has promised more than \$100 million over five years, much of it immediately. There will be multinational aid flows, too.

But Zimbabweans put these amounts alongside the \$1 billion promised by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976. Admittedly, the circumstances of that gift were very different from those of the tangible aid today. His promise was made to persuade whites to agree to black rule, and was intended to a large extent to assist white resettlement. Moreover, Congress would surely have balked in 1976 or 1977 at the appropriation of such an amount. Nevertheless, the legacy is there, and leading Zimbabweans forcefully make a point of reminding visiting Americans about it. Some even deride \$50 million as mere "peanuts."

Zimbabwe's friends are Yugoslavia, Mozambique, Romania, China, Britain, and the U.S. The American Embassy opened on day one of independence. The Soviet Union has thus far been denied permission to open an embassy. So has East Germany.

Those in Congress who spoke recently against aid to Zambia and Mozambique complained about human rights violations and, in Zambia's case, of its purchase of MIG-21 aircraft from the Soviet Union. But Mozambique has recently begun moving back from a Marxist toward a mixed system of enterprise which will welcome private foreign participation. President Samora Machel even promoted the return of Portuguese small businessmen.

In Zambia, which is dependent economically on a severely fluctuating price of copper, there are desperate times ahead. President Kenneth Kaunda, like Machel, is leading a return toward a mixed economy and has restored the profit incentive to state-run corporations. Moreover, the MIGs have not yet arrived and perhaps never will.

If Zimbabwe fails to prosper, and if Mozambique and Zambia slide backwards into the economic abyss, Soviet initiatives in southern Africa will receive more local approval than they do now. If the three countries tend toward instability, then change in South Africa will be slowed. This is the precise moment to increase our flow of assistance to Africa, especially to the critical nations of central and southern Africa. If we do not or cannot, a splendid opportunity to influence the course of events in that part of the world, and to benefit needy and responsible peoples, will have been lost—possibly for the balance of the decade.

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### *Stemming the Soviets in Southern Africa*

This is an unusually sensitive and critical time in the affairs of southern Africa. For policymakers, the moment is delicate. Missteps and miscalculations are likely and ought to be avoided. If Americans have learned anything in Africa in recent years, it is that there are no shortcuts to success in the policy exercise, especially as regards the dangerous zone in southern Africa, from Zaire southward.

The U.S. State Department has apparently developed a new set of policy guidelines which take account of these general considerations. They differ in tone, at least, from President Reagan's expressed views. In a televised interview in March the President spoke warmly of South Africa. The State Department has now expressed itself with more caution. South African apartheid has been condemned, and the importance of seeking a peaceful settlement of the Namibian conflict has been acknowledged. But there are

contradictory signals, too. The most important is the determination of this administration to repeal the Clark amendment, which prohibits covert military assistance to insurgents in Angola.

What happens in Angola intimately affects the future of Namibia, South Africa, and all of southern Africa. Moreover, until there is an internationally validated conclusion to the conflict in Namibia, the presumed twin global objectives of the new U.S. administration cannot be achieved. Those aims are to lessen or eliminate Soviet influence in Africa; to send home the 20,000 Cubans in Angola.

Until a few months ago it was possible to be confident about the failure of the Soviet Union in southern Africa. After the independence of Zimbabwe, Soviet influence through the region was lessened by the decision of both Angola and Mozambique to strengthen their ties to the West and by the support of the West for a fair settlement of the Namibian question.

The only standing that the Soviet Union now retains in the cockpit of southern Africa results directly from the stalemate in Namibia and the lack of credible change in South Africa. Any American moves which deter a rapid settlement of the Namibian question, and anything that smacks of support for South Africa, are therefore certainly bound to be counterproductive. They give the Soviets credibility. They give a bear with a bedraggled reputation new claws and a new reason for flexing its muscles. Indeed, the seeming tilt of the new administration toward South Africa, and toward UNITA in Angola, has already needlessly propped up a Soviet threat which had tottered, if not fallen.

There is no advantage to be gained in terms of American foreign policy, or even in terms of Republican ideology (or conservative ideology), from a repeal of the Clark amendment. To do so would be a commitment to myths of the past rather than a real response to the needs of the present. We can best help southern Africans achieve the kind of peace and prosperity which we and they want for the region and its inhabitants, and simultaneously diminish Soviet influence by:

1. Helping Zimbabwe to meet its own developmental goals. If Zimbabwe is (and it can be) a model of multiracial growth in the heart of southern Africa, and if the lesson of Zimbabwe is to prove capable of guiding South Africans, then we will want to assist Zimbabwe's planned reconstruction of its war-ravaged rural areas and assist in its Operation Bootstrap for peasant farmers. Zimbabwe has chosen an incentive-based, non-Marxist answer to its problems of income inequality, pent-up black demand, and pre-independence rhetoric. If those answers are to serve the nation successfully,

they need sustained support over many years. It is profoundly in our own interest, as well as in the interest of Africa, that we should do so.

2. For the same reasons, but also because Angola and Mozambique are anxious to move away from their Marxist beginnings, it is crucial that we support them.

3. We should also help Zambia and the smaller nations of the region. This is the moment when Africa is swinging back profoundly from its flirtation with Soviet Marxism. Poland and Afghanistan have only deepened the cynicism of Africa. For us to push Africans back again in the opposite direction by statements and actions which are ill considered is both foolish and counterproductive.

4. The choice is just as clear with regard to South Africa, although American policy cannot act so directly and with consequence in that sphere. An embrace of the tendencies within South Africa which are less, rather than more, reformist emboldens the Soviets. It disheartens Africans and enhances their frustrations.

Most of all, it dampens the ardor of reform within Afrikanerdom itself. It isolates those with *verligte* or enlightened tendencies. It comforts those who argue that change is unnecessary. It increases the possibility of internal violence and undercuts the very forces which have for the past few years gathered strength for an evolution-led process of political realignment. Anything which implies that we are not as interested as before in concentrating the minds of South Africa on its own problems, and that we are not anxious to accelerate the forces of evolution, will act against the interest of the West in Africa and in the world.

Surely, the lessons of Zimbabwe are clear: that there is a time to negotiate and a time when it is too late to negotiate well; that internal settlements only accelerate the day of reckoning; that there is no substitute for legitimacy; that the responsibility of office supersedes the rhetoric of a revolution; and, for South Africa in particular, that time can never be bought. The clock ticks, and as it ticks, the available options become fewer and fewer.

It is the role of American foreign policy to help South Africans focus upon their own mutual self-interest, not to persuade them that their problems can be avoided or solutions evaded.

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### *Zimbabwe Needs Aid*

Senator Jesse Helms and other senators and Congressmen are attempting to slash \$75 million in development assistance to Zimbabwe from the fiscal 1982 foreign aid bill, precisely when that nation's future is still balancing precariously.

Two years ago, white and black Rhodesians were still fighting a bitter civil war. A year ago, whites and blacks, and many skeptical foreigners, were euphoric over the way that Zimbabwe, created in April 1980, had overcome the legacy of war and had begun to organize its affairs. Today's Zimbabwe is by no means without problems. But, because its future is so essential to regional security and prosperity, only a foolish United States Government would refuse to help Zimbabwe help itself.

Since independence, Zimbabwe's leaders have moderated revolutionary rhetoric and adapted it to the country's economic realities. Instead of collectivizing the land or expropriating the property of white farmers, who hold most of the good land, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's Government raised agricultural prices, refused to subsidize urban consumers, and thus gave both black and white farmers the opportunity to grow corn, tobacco, sugar, and other crops for profit. The 1981 crop yield was spectacular, making Zimbabwe one of the few African countries that feeds itself and exports the surplus to its hungry neighbors.

On the other hand, the Government has purchased a South African-owned newspaper chain and has exerted its control over the broadcasting and television system. It is threatening to take away the marketing of minerals (chrome, nickel, copper, asbestos) from the foreign-owned corporations that have long done so. As a result, already mineral production has fallen 10 percent below last year's.

Zimbabwe is settling ex-guerrillas onto empty, formerly white-owned farmland. The once segregated hospital and school systems have been integrated, and whites worry that standards are dropping. Mr. Mugabe has been talking about the need for a one-party state and has been antagonistic to some "still racist-minded" whites.

These changes worry the 190,000 whites who still live in Zimbabwe, many of whom would go to South Africa if they could take a reasonable proportion of their savings and property. An alleged fall in Government efficiency caused by the exodus of white civil servants, physicians, and technicians worries them also. But Zimbabwe is still more prosperous and toler-

ant, and better run than its neighbors. Black and white opposition parties exist and their leaders voice protests.

Mr. Mugabe recently dismissed two of the Government's most strident antagonists of whites and elevated to new positions of power colleagues who are most opposed to ideologically extreme socialism. Zimbabwe is friendly to China, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, the middle-way socialists, but still contemptuous of the Soviet Union and East Germany.

It is not Marxism but South Africa that is Zimbabwe's main source of instability and economic vulnerability. Outsiders might imagine that South Africa wants its neighbors to prosper so as to ensure peace in the region. But, possibly in order to demonstrate its own strength, South Africa has systematically contributed to Zimbabwe's economic uncertainty. At a time when Zimbabwe needed every available locomotive, and diesel fuel, to move its bumper crops of maize and to keep the economy growing, South Africa demanded the return of 25 diesel engines and slowed the supply of fuel. It ended preferential treatment for Zimbabwean exports.

Zimbabwe accuses South Africa of funding and arming the Mozambique Resistance Movement, an anti-government insurgency group in central Mozambique that has disrupted rail lines and roads from Mozambique ports that serve Zimbabwe. In October, insurgents cut the pipeline, railway, and road between Umtali, Zimbabwe, and Beira, Mozambique. Two South African explosives experts were identified as serving with the movement at the time. Nonetheless, relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa may be improving. South Africa recently agreed to loan Zimbabwe 26 locomotives and to ensure a smoother flow of fuel. If these are harbingers of substantial change, Zimbabwe's attempt to prove that a non-Soviet mixed economy can succeed within South Africa's orbit will be improved. So will the likelihood that Mr. Mugabe will be able to avoid catering to extremists in his party who favor "scientific socialism."

This is not the time to give up on Zimbabwe. If excesses of authoritarianism are to be avoided, its atmosphere of toleration maintained, and its sizable economic potential realized, it needs all the assistance it can get, especially from the West. However its rhetoric may escalate, Zimbabwe remains fundamentally aligned with democratic forces of the West.



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### *Signs of Trouble Lurking in Zimbabwe*

Southwestern Zimbabwe has for nine months been overrun by “bandits,” soldiers loyal to the loser in the country’s 1980 struggle for power. The bandits have killed white farmers and hundreds of blacks, and kidnapped foreigners. Recently, in an effort to bring order to the region, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe sent his North Korean-trained Fifth Battalion to the area. Failing to wipe out the bandits, it has instead exterminated noncombatant villagers and visited atrocities on the local inhabitants, presumably only because they speak the language of those who are Mugabe’s political rivals.

Rather than reining in the enthusiasm of the Fifth Battalion, Mugabe essentially extolled its work, even after the country’s Roman Catholic bishops formally condemned the “wanton atrocities and brutalities” perpetrated by the soldiers. In a statement read in Catholic churches on Easter, the bishops, several of whom are black, criticized the prime minister and the government-controlled press for covering up the atrocities.

Mugabe, a Catholic, refused to accept such accusations. Although the Conference of Catholic Bishops was equally forthright in condemning injustice during the years of white rule, when Mugabe’s men were guerrillas, the prime minister told the bishops not to meddle, called them traitors, and suggested that they included disloyal collaborators with the old white-run government.

Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe’s information minister, called the bishops’ statement (backed as it was by detailed reports from a collection of villages) “irresponsible, contrived and propagandistic.” He said that, contrary to the bishops, the Fifth Battalion was bringing “peace and relief” to the affected area.

Yet, as far as Zimbabwe goes, there are real national issues on which Mugabe was once focused and to which he needs to return. The primary one is how to maintain Zimbabwe’s prosperity while distributing its benefits widely. Linked to this question is the need to raise the incomes and now-wretched living standards of peasant farmers permanently, and without harming the country’s overall economy.

If the 300,000 black rural farmers flourish alongside the 5,000 white ones who help make Zimbabwe one of Africa’s few countries self-sufficient in food, and the major exporter of corn and beef, then Mugabe will have achieved the kind of success that only four or five African nations can claim. But to do so, he has to convince the smallholders that his government cares and can deliver roads, equipment, fertilizer, and—most of all—consistent

markets. His white growers want the same perquisites, plus security, freedom from harassment and strife, and a dampening of societal conflict.

In the industrial sector, Mugabe's government has largely achieved an accommodation with the major bankers (American, British and South African) and with the international and local manufacturers and distributors. But his public economic flirtation with an ill-defined socialism, the absence of firm guidelines on wage movements and capital repatriation, and the ongoing episode of banditry, has failed to excise the fears of potential foreign investors.

Politically, Mugabe started at independence in 1980 to demonstrate that he believed in the reconciliation of the competing indigenous ethnic groups of whites and blacks. He also emphasized the rule of law, due process, and the importance of tolerating dissent.

Mugabe says he wants to convert Zimbabwe into a one-party state. The implication is plain: Zimbabwe could join those other African states where a central committee of the dominant political party calls all the shots. Participation by the people in the governing process would be eliminated. The result might be a more efficient, economically stable state like authoritarian Malawi. Or it could be a muddled and inefficient, nearly-authoritarian state such as Zambia or Tanzania.

Then there is the South African dimension. Outsiders, the United States State Department included, want Zimbabwe to succeed in order to demonstrate to white South Africans that a multiracial society can prosper under black leadership. Furthermore, outsiders want a harmonious, stable Zimbabwe to become an obvious model for South Africans who want to see evolutionary changes at home.

Admittedly, the government and armed forces of South Africa are hostile to Zimbabwe. South Africa is suspected of financing and arming some of the bandits and white saboteurs, and of damaging the new nation's economy, primarily by rupturing access lines to petroleum. But it is the denial of reality that is an enemy of Zimbabwe as it has been of neighboring Zambia and other African states. Concerted obfuscation and heated attacks on critics may be natural responses, but they contribute little to the kind of careful diagnosis that makes a wounded society whole. Mugabe is too wise to plunge into the deep waters of disbelief, and Shamuyarira is no fantasist. So it is too soon to lump Zimbabwe with the Zambias and the Zaires of today's debt-ridden and democratically stunted Africa, but the signs of early trouble are present.

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### *A Gradual—but Decisive—Step Backward in Zimbabwe*

Zimbabwe took a decisive step backward last weekend when its leaders agreed to abandon their Western-style, market-oriented, multiparty form of government and economy. A congress of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) decided to turn the country into a single-party socialist state, albeit gradually. Yet even the decision to convert slowly will frighten investors, Western allies and other donors, and even many Zimbabweans themselves.

The 6,000 delegates to the party's first assembly since its founding in 1964 ignored many of the practical risks. They agreed to make the transition to official socialism based on Marxist-Leninist principles "in the fullness of time." As Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has long promised, the delegates favored discarding Zimbabwe's present form of government only in accord with the provisions of their country's British-given Constitution. That document, which was drafted in 1979 at the end of a civil war between local white colonial and African guerrillas, specified that no major shifts in the country's method of rule could take place before 1987 without unanimous parliamentary approval, and preferably not before 1990.

The Constitution guarantees that 20 whites shall hold seats in Parliament until 1990. Another 20 seats are now filled by members of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, which opposes Mr. Mugabe and one-party domination. His party holds 57 seats and another party, 3.

The fact that Marxist-Leninist methods and a single-party model were not demanded immediately indicates how successfully Mugabe has consolidated power in his own hands while deftly appeasing party radicals who demand these fundamental changes at once. Significantly, the congress also gave Mr. Mugabe the right to become an executive president, and permitted him almost alone to choose the members of a 15-member politburo that is destined to supersede the authority of Parliament.

Mr. Mugabe, a quiet-spoken Roman Catholic with ascetic attributes, who shuns smoking and drinking and lives modestly, received personal authority to impose a very stringent anticorruption code on all state officials. In tacit recognition of the failings of many of his colleagues, he will now have the power to purge those who misbehave as well as those who use their positions to amass ill-gotten wealth. Whether or not he will be able to wield this kind of broom, however, is questionable. In Tanzania and Zambia, where similar leadership codes were adopted years ago, very little has changed.

In the economic sphere, where Mugabe inherited a well-functioning modern capitalistic system run by whites, more than 150,000 of whom still inhabit the country, rapid change need not be expected, either. Much as he has talked about socialism, Mugabe has always behaved with striking pragmatism. He and his finance minister have followed an orthodox fiscal and economic program, and now adhere closely to the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund. Unlike other African socialists, Mr. Mugabe has raised producer prices to realistic levels and refused to subsidize consumers. In so doing, even in a time of drought, he has tried to keep Africans on their farms and out of the cities. He has welcomed American and other investors to the industrial sector, too. There are no signs that Mugabe wishes to alter Zimbabwe's present recipe for prosperity.

Other than Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe has the most powerful, sizable economy in black Africa. With a population of 8 million, and traditional export earnings from corn, tobacco, and a variety of other agricultural commodities, as well as gold, copper, and other minerals, Zimbabwe has been among the very few African countries able to feed itself. An unusual two-year drought now imperils its development, but if this year's rains are ample, Zimbabwe should revive.

Zimbabwe will not change soon, and it never alters anything fundamental except the number of its permitted parties. Already ZANU is dominant in everything. But confidence in the country's future, in the U.S., Europe, and South Africa, will suffer severely as a result of the language and headlines generated by the party congress. Zimbabwe, which promised not to make the mistakes of its predecessors, has now fallen into the same trap.

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### *Zimbabwe's Rhetoric at Odds with Reality*

Zimbabwe, one of the key countries of black Africa, seeks desperately to be both pragmatic and socialist. Rhetorically extravagant, its policies nevertheless remain measured and prudent. It has become a question of watching what the country does rather than listening to what it says.

A country of 8.4 million inhabitants, Zimbabwe shares a southern border and many economic entanglements with white-run South Africa. It also abuts Mozambique, a Marxist-Leninist state by official definition, socialist Zambia and market-oriented Botswana.

Zimbabwe, unlike its neighbors, is a young state, having achieved independence only in 1980, after 90 years of colonial and settler rule. It was also

created in the crucible of revolution, the elections of 1980 having been preceded by seven years of bitter bush war against the white-ruled regime of what was then called Rhodesia.

Throughout those years, the guerrilla army of the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) was supported mostly by China, Romania, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Mozambique and Tanzania. The Soviet Union backed another African group, Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Both fought soldiers loyal to a white-settler dominated government. Then the country was home to 250,000 whites; only 120,000 remain.

### *Ambitions vs. Practicality*

Zimbabwe's present political ambitions reflect the arduous nature of the black struggle against whites (who have South African support) and the ideologies and external relationships that were developed in order to achieve victory. The country's economic posture, however, largely mirrors Zimbabwe's colonial heritage.

The contradictions inherent in these strikingly different backgrounds were apparent in August when the ZANU-PF held its first congress since 1964. The 6,000 delegates to the ruling party's first broad and formal discussions since independence decided to turn Zimbabwe into a single-party socialist state, albeit gradually. They agreed to make the transition to official socialism based on Marxist-Leninist principles "in the fullness of time."

Zimbabwe is now governed by a British-given constitution guaranteeing the present form and composition of the legislature and the executive until 1990. It sets aside 20 places in a 100-seat parliament for whites and stipulates that no changes to the constitution may be made without unanimous consent. Of the 80 black-held seats, 57 were won by ZANU-PF under Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, 20 by ZAPU and three by other Africans.

Mugabe has long advocated a one-party state and socialism. But the delegates agreed with his other principle, that Zimbabwe's current government should be abandoned only in accord with the limiting provisions of the constitution. Although that document, which was drafted in 1979 at the end of the civil war, might be called illegitimate by Africans, Mugabe seems content to abide by its provisions. Specifically, the ZANU-PF congress called for no immediate shifts in the country's method of rule.

The fact that the congress did not demand Marxism-Leninism and one-party rule at once indicates how successfully Mugabe has managed to consolidate power in his own hands while deftly appeasing party radicals who want these fundamental changes overnight. Significantly, the congress gave

Mugabe the right to become an executive president, permitted him to choose the members of a 15-member politburo, which is destined to supersede the authority of parliament, and let him impose a code of conduct on corrupt officials and legislators.

The radical rhetoric of the Congress, however, did frighten many among the remaining whites, commercially minded Africans and investors of all kinds.

By his deeds, Mugabe has demonstrated he does not want to dismantle an economy that is rich and well-functioning, especially by African standards. His talk, however, has worried the very persons and countries that his pragmatic policies are designed to attract.

### *Nurturing an Inheritance*

Mugabe inherited a modern capitalistic system run by whites. In normal climatic years, Zimbabwe's 4,600 white and 30,000 black farmers grow maize, tobacco, cotton, sugar, soybeans and peanuts for export. Beef is also raised and milk produced. Until the rains stopped in 1982, Zimbabwe fed itself amply and obtained 70 percent of its export earnings from the bounty of its soil.

The government of Zimbabwe has shown no anxiety to alter this golden pattern, even though 80 percent of the nation's goods and 5 percent of all export earnings were derived from white-owned farms. Indeed, recognizing the errors of its African neighbors, Zimbabwe has consistently raised producer prices and provided real incentives for its white growers. There has been comparatively little compulsory taking of white-owned land in order to provide plots for the black rural poor and the vast numbers of landless Africans.

For the most part the government has attempted—by increasing real returns to black farmers and spending money on rural development—to persuade Africans to stay on their present farms, to work them intensively and to seek the better life there. The government strives to keep its people from flooding the cities, where social services are costly and political passions volatile.

In additions to its cash crops, Zimbabwe exports chrome, copper, asbestos, nickel, tin, zinc and gold. But prices for those commodities have recently been low, and the region's catastrophic drought is in its third year. The government's fond hopes for economic growth have thus been dashed. This year Zimbabwe will also be using scarce foreign exchange to import about half of its maize, the staple food of the country.

Other African countries might have reacted to such a crisis by practicing what Zimbabwe only preaches. Zimbabwe, however, has behaved with

striking pragmatism. Mugabe and his Western-trained finance minister have followed an orthodox fiscal and economic program, and their country now adheres to the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund. Unlike other African socialist states, Zimbabwe has refused to subsidize its consumers. There are no signs that Mugabe wants to alter Zimbabwe's present recipe for prosperity.

### *Learning from Past Mistakes*

Mugabe is a clear-thinking, decisive prime minister who has thus far charted a stable course for Zimbabwe. A Roman Catholic teacher of ascetic leanings who spent a decade in prison for his political protests and there earned six university degrees, Mugabe is soft-spoken, sober, serious and very aware of the ways in which other African revolutionary regimes have failed both economically and politically.

Mugabe has never been slow to preach the virtues of socialism and to look forward to the day when his state could call itself Marxist. Yet his country's inability to provide a psychological climate capable of attracting foreign investors, the continued dominance of Zimbabwe's economy by South Africa and the lamentable failure of the expected rains, have compelled Mugabe and his followers to remain practical.

Since independence, there has been a great rupture between ZANU and ZAPU, once allied. Although Joshua Nkomo was Mugabe's first minister of the interior, ZAPU must now be considered a persecuted minority with very little likelihood of survival as a political force. Mugabe suspected that forces loyal to Nkomo were preparing a revolt, although Nkomo always insisted the charges were false.

The government's suppression of the Ndebele minority in southwestern Zimbabwe, the tribal group upon which Nkomo's movement was based, caused great disturbances in the 1982-84 period including the murders of many of the region's white farmers. Although the disturbances are now largely over, the regional economy has deteriorated and many of the remaining white farmers have left.

One further problem also bedevils Zimbabwe. Its population is growing too quickly. With an annual rate of increase nearly four percent, Zimbabwe is just behind Kenya in the Third World race for the dubious distinction of being a demographic trend-setter. The World Bank does not expect Zimbabwe's numbers to stabilize themselves until 2130, by which time there will be 71 million people, all poorer than today on a per head and family basis.

With his leadership confirmed by the party congress, Mugabe may now have the ability to stem this tide of Zimbabweans. He may also be able to

curb the rhetoric and actions of some of his committed Marxist-Leninist followers, and—when and if it rains—direct Zimbabwe along a market-oriented path to resumed prosperity. If not, Zimbabwe could soon, or after 1990, begin to show the signs of decay that have afflicted so many other African nations.

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### *Zimbabwe's Economic Success*

Zimbabwe is a tropical paradox. Its leaders talk stridently about a leftist future and at the same time run a wholly realistic, pragmatic economy.

Since August Zimbabwe has been officially directed down a path toward scientific socialism. A one-party state will also come, in time. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and his Western-trained colleagues boldly extol the virtues of Eastern, state-centered systems. There is no lack of praise for the theories and concepts popularized by Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin.

No one in Zimbabwe doubts the sincerity of these rhetorical flourishes. They frighten investors and worry the country's rapidly growing indigenous middle class. But, speeches aside, Zimbabwe is being run in a tightfisted, financially orthodox manner. It has conformed to many guidelines of the International Monetary Fund, has reduced most consumer subsidies, and is attempting to maintain the capitalist system that Zimbabwe inherited at independence in 1980 from white settlers.

Zimbabwe's striking success is in agriculture. Of the new nations of Africa, Zimbabwe has a thriving, well-rewarded farming sector. In the years without drought, and even during the past three years of dryness, Zimbabwe fed itself and produced surpluses for export.

More than 65 percent of Zimbabwe's export earnings in 1983–84 were products of the soil. About 4,400 white farmers (down from 5,000 at independence) grew the bulk of the crops involved, but African peasant farmers also began for the first time to respond to Zimbabwe's emphasis on incentive pricing, efficient services, and careful attention to the rural segment of the country.

Most African nations have focused, with disastrous results, on urban consumers. But Zimbabwe, intent upon maximizing its return from the soil, maintaining its food self-sufficiency, and encouraging its growing population to remain country rather than city residents, has to good effect managed to keep the confidence of farmers during three difficult years of drought.



The drought seems to have broken. The Zimbabwean maize upon which much of Africa depends should grow well. The crucial cash commodities—tobacco, cotton, sugar, and beef—should also thrive.

Last year, when the rains were limited, Zimbabwe still managed to export Z\$636 million. Tobacco was worth Z\$350 million; cotton, Z\$140 million; sugar, Z\$53 million; and beef, Z\$53 million. (The Zimbabwe dollar is at 80 U.S. cents.) Africans grew 40 percent of both cotton and beef, and 35 percent of locally consumed maize.

Although the white farmers are still the backbone of the export economy of Zimbabwe, more Africans are entering the cash sector and joining the Commercial Farmers Union (once a white organization) in small numbers.

For the rest of Africa, Zimbabwe's lesson is simple. If prices are attractive, whites and Africans will maximize their own returns by nurturing their cash crops. But monetary incentives (deficient in other parts of Africa) are not enough. The central marketing or produce boards must also provide bags and other means of obtaining and storing the grain, must provide easy methods and reliable ways of collecting crops, and must pay farmers promptly. Zimbabwe pays within two weeks. Even in agriculturally dependent Kenya, there are long delays.

The Zimbabwean farmer benefits from a strong physical and financial infrastructure. He has access to credit, to technical advice, to fertilizer, and to marketing assistance. Other countries in Africa are deficient in these respects, and their farmers either grow only enough for themselves or abandon the rural areas for the cities.

Prime Minister Mugabe has relentlessly pursued a Western-oriented rural policy. He works closely with the commercial farming lobby. Despite pre-independence rhetoric, he has resettled only 30,000 families on formerly white-owned land, and only after willing sales.

In the industrial sector Zimbabwe has been less than successful in attracting new Western investment. Because of tight fiscal controls and a shortage of foreign exchange, this part of the local economy is operating at less than full capacity. The multinational mining and manufacturing companies are hardly happy, particularly since mineral prices have been soft and the government less responsive to their needs than to those of agriculture.

Despite such complaints about a population that could be growing at 4 percent a year, and fear of continued strife between the dominant Shona and the minority Ndebele, Zimbabwe is undoubtedly approaching the problems of a young fragile nation with both realism and a heady, antirealistic rhetoric.

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*Democracy in Zimbabwe*

Zimbabwe eliminates the last vestiges of white political representation this month, 99 years after Cecil Rhodes established a local legislature controlled by a few thousand conquering settlers. Last month, its parliament overwhelmingly approved the change.

Although Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) has dominated parliament ever since, 20 seats of 100 have been reserved for whites who are elected exclusively by whites. Mr. Mugabe has long threatened he will next create an executive presidency and then a single-party state, probably in 1990.

Many of the leaders of black Africa have favored sole rule by winning political parties since the 1960s, when President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana proclaimed the un-African quality of parliamentary oppositions. He also declared that opposition parties took up too much time with their questions and that the process of national economic development was hindered by their carping complaints.

Mr. Nkrumah's propositions were popular for a decade or more, but a new generation of politicians in both Francophone and English-speaking countries began to deride the hypocrisy, corruption, mismanagement, and distortion of national priorities that became noticeable in many nations without legal opposition. The excesses of the dictatorships of Idi Amin in Uganda, Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Empire, and Francisco Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea also helped refocus a new generation of Africans on the legitimacy of the concept and validity of opposition.

Some countries, like Botswana, never lost their acceptance of the value of more than one party. Others, like Kenya and Zambia, have single-party parliaments in which there are internal, sometimes bitter, and (in Kenya) frequently repressed voices of dissent.

Zimbabwe, too, has a constitution which enshrines the Westminster notion of multiple political parties. The ending of reserved seats for whites does not change its formal approach at all. Fifteen of the seats in its parliament are still occupied by adherents of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the main black opposition party.

Despite Africa's gradual disillusionment with the promise of one-party rule, Mugabe still talks about transforming his nation's legislature into a body occupied only by members of ZANU. At the moment, it is largely

controlled by ZANU, but ZAPU, independents, and whites still occasionally speak and criticize.

Mugabe and a few members of his cabinet may be the only prominent Zimbabweans demanding one-party rule and, thus, the end of conventional democracy. Yet Mugabe is a practical man as well as an ideologue.

He recently backed away from a plan to impose sanctions on South Africa when he became persuaded that breaking trade ties with his neighbor to the south would harm Zimbabwe more than impose pressure on apartheid.

Likewise, the decision to create a new form of rule in Zimbabwe also hinges on an appreciation of reality. Zimbabwe, largely well-run and with the best balanced economy in Africa, nevertheless achieved zero economic growth in the 1986–87 fiscal year.

The rains were poor and Zimbabwe's crops produced little surplus for export. Industrial expansion slowed considerably, to a large extent as a result of an acute shortage of foreign exchange. The government was also spending more than it earned, largely due to the cost of a large army and a bloated bureaucracy.

Most of all, Zimbabwe has not yet curbed a population which is expanding at about 3.6 percent a year, the second fastest rate (after Kenya) in Africa and the world. Because of these burgeoning numbers and zero industrial and agricultural growth, Zimbabwe has as many people (slightly more than 1 million) unemployed as employed. Thus its social service needs are great, and expensive.

In order to grow, Zimbabwe needs good rains, lowered trade barriers in its region, foreign aid, and foreign investment. Mugabe's oft-expressed revolutionary rhetoric drives away even the most charitable potential foreign investors, and chills foreign aid, particularly from the United States.

To move ahead with the single-party antithesis of democracy is thus hardly timely. Mugabe's hand will be stayed, but probably not his pronouncements nor, forever, the course he seems determined to impose on his country.

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### ***Zimbabwe and the Socialist Embrace: Roaring Backward into One-Party Rule***

Zimbabwe, a bellwether state in southern Africa, promises to leap backward into the ill-fated 1970s. Abandoning its eight-year-old multiparty government, and its envied position as a well-run, productive, new state, Zimbabwe intends soon to turn itself into a one-party socialist nation.

The first big steps in that direction were taken at the beginning of this

month when Prime Minister Robert Mugabe became Zimbabwe's first executive President, with far-ranging powers. A few days before he had successfully forged an alliance between his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

Since independence in 1980, the two longtime rivals for power and prominence in Zimbabwe's nationalist struggle had been bitter opponents. ZANU, dominant largely because of its firm base among the Shona ethnic majority, had swamped ZAPU, based on the Ndebele minority, in two elections. Dissident Ndebele, some with old Soviet-supplied arms and some with newly obtained South African weapons, had taken to the bush. In southwestern Zimbabwe they had attacked outlying farms. In the most recent outrage, Nov. 26, 16 missionaries and their children were hacked to death near Bulawayo.

Mr. Mugabe had been eager to fold ZAPU into ZANU for several years. After November's massacre, Mr. Nkomo and ZAPU were compelled to capitulate. Nkomo has become a member of Mugabe's Cabinet, and a vice president. But ZANU and Mugabe are still firmly in charge of Zimbabwe's destiny.

Zimbabwe, although led decisively by ZANU since 1980, has so far been governed with few excesses, modest but real levels of participatory democracy, and comparatively limited abrogations of human rights. For a new state, the judiciary has maintained a healthy measure of independence.

Although the number of whites shrank dramatically after blacks gained power in 1980, many of those who left for South Africa have returned. Until late last year white farmers, the backbone of Zimbabwe's agriculturally based economy, were largely content. Unlike so many other African states, Zimbabwe and Mugabe had refused to subsidize urban consumers and instead raised prices for rural producers to or above world levels for major crops. Even amid drought Zimbabwe had produced bumper crops of its staple maize, and also prospered from tobacco.

Mugabe has preached revolutionary socialism since his guerrilla days and during his seven years as prime minister. His jawboning, more than the actual operations of a generally orthodox and tightly run national financial regimen, drove valued foreign investment away. Now Mugabe, with more concentrated and potentially autocratic power, intends to implement full-fledged state socialism.

Mugabe is violently anti-cyclical. The Afro-socialist model has failed dramatically in Africa. Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana, and many of the other large, socialist-inclined states are now energetically dismantling their state industries and farms and their overvalued currencies and import restrictions.

They, and smaller states, are providing new incentives for farmers and entrepreneurs and are bemoaning the lost years of the '70s and early '80s.

Zimbabwe is now spending heavily on its armed forces and running current-account deficits for the first time; it hardly needs the new economic disincentives of revolutionary socialism, plus a "leadership code" of the kind that proved unenforceable in Zambia and economically debilitating in Tanzania.

Moreover, Zimbabwe is no minor state. After South Africa, it is the potential economic powerhouse of middle Africa, easily rivaling the Ivory Coast and Kenya. Yet Mugabe seems bent on undercutting the prosperity and confidence of his own regime.

Politically, too, Mugabe is leading Zimbabwe backward. Not too many African states have followed Botswana's steadfast multiparty model. Still, several one-party states have accepted the value of public participation and the need for competitive elections within the party, or have begun to slide away from autocracy toward new forms of national voting.

Zimbabwe's is a special case, too. South Africa is its neighbor. Mugabe and his government loudly condemn apartheid and white minority rule while they are extinguishing choice for their own people.

On all counts, Zimbabwe can do better. It has the best-educated constituency in Africa, a modern and successful economy, and a proud heritage of revolutionary struggle and, since independence, thoughtful and moderate leadership. Neither Africa nor the West should encourage Zimbabwe to turn its back on itself.

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### *Democracy in Africa: The Ballot Doesn't Tell All*

Elections and democracy go hand in hand, but not always. In Africa, where one-party dictatorships and military juntas once prevailed, democracy is gaining ascendancy. But only some democracies are completely democratic, and not every election consolidates a democratic transition.

During the last few weeks, three African countries have gone to the polls. In Sierra Leone, despite a raging civil war, citizens successfully cast ballots for a president, who duly took office from the leader of a military coup (who had himself ousted another military dictator). Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a Muslim lawyer, defeated John Karefa-Smart, a well-known physician, in the final runoff.

In Benin, Nicephore Soglo, a democratic president, was voted out of office after five years in power. Those who went to the polls chose, instead,

to reinstate Gen. Mathieu Kerekou, the once-Marxist military leader who ruled Benin repressively from 1972 to 1990. General Kerekou is from the north and Mr. Soglo from the south, so ethnic considerations were important. Also, Soglo was alleged to have abused the national trust by appointing relatives to key governmental positions. Accusations of nepotism and aloofness probably cost him a second term despite his reputation as a democrat.

These were standard popular exercises of choice appropriate to a recovering democracy like Sierra Leone or a fledgling democracy like Benin. Sierra Leonians had not enjoyed a free election since 1967. Since then, one-party rule or military dictatorship had reigned in the former British colony continuously, and rapaciously. Since 1990 shifting warlords and their gangs have terrorized much of the country. Democratically elected or not, it is unclear that President Tejan Kabbah can actually govern his recovering nation.

Benin, which holds the African record for coups since independence in 1960, made the transition from military to civilian rule in 1991. Now, democratically, the people of Benin are taking a step backward, even if President Kerekou faithfully upholds the Constitution and no longer intends to govern autocratically.

The third example is Zimbabwe, a democracy continuously since 1980, when the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by President Robert Mugabe, won the first post-colonial election. Zimbabwe—much larger and more prosperous than Benin and Sierra Leone—has a \$5 billion gross domestic product and a sizeable number of white farmers.

Zimbabweans went to the polls in mid-March to reelect President Mugabe to another six-year term. He had two other septuagenarian opponents, both of whom were expected to win tiny percentages of the overall vote. But Mugabe and his government made it difficult for the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and the Rev. Abel Muzorewa to campaign, and the Constitution denied government campaign funds to any but Mugabe's party. Mugabe also used Air Force helicopters to tour the countryside and speak to potential voters.

The government controls the daily press, radio, and television. It recently pressured an independent weekly to discharge its editor, who had been critical of the president.

Mugabe's opponents obviously received less coverage. Moreover, Mr. Sithole had been under arrest for six months before the election. Last year, in a poll for parliament, the government ended up with 147 of the 150 seats. The full apparatus of the dominant party, and the weight of mainstream ethnic opinion, was behind Mugabe and the party in both elections.

In this year's presidential balloting, only 31 percent of the 4.9 million registered voters bothered to go to the polls. By election eve, both Sithole and Mr. Muzorewa had dropped out of the race. But the government went ahead with the contest anyway.

Muzorewa won almost 5 percent of the total votes. Sithole took 2 percent. Mugabe received the remainder. In the 1990 elections, 53 percent of the electorate voted, and Mugabe won 78 percent of the votes—against a challenger who was stronger than Sithole or Muzorewa.

Local political scientists at Zimbabwe's university said that this year's electoral exercise demonstrated that the country's democracy had no legitimacy. The head of the local Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace declared that democracy in Zimbabwe was an illusion. Mugabe, he and others declared, headed a one-party state masquerading as a democracy. The electoral farce revealed the shabbiness of the country's democratic pretensions.

Paradoxically, despite the quality of the recent election, and despite the absence of essentials like a free press, Zimbabwe most of the time appears to be more democratic than despotic. There is heavy-handed security, but most people never experience it. Indeed, the Zimbabwean government usually operates openly, even if its president brooks little opposition.

Leadership in developing countries makes an essential difference. After Mugabe, 71, leaves the presidency, Zimbabwe bids fair to become fully democratic in practice as well as in name. By then, Benin under President Kerekou should have consolidated its recently demonstrated democratic tendencies, and Sierra Leone, emerging from civil war, may have returned to its traditional democratic path under the leadership of President Tejan Kabbah.

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### *Mugabe Seen as Bar to Zimbabwe's Progress*

Heads of state can make or break a country's image. What the head of state says, or how he behaves, influences how seriously or otherwise a state is taken. That is Zimbabwe's growing problem, not least because President Robert Mugabe is a strong leader who has put his determined stamp on the nation.

Mugabe has been president since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 and was re-elected to a fourth term with only token and cowed opposition in 1996. Although Zimbabwe is one of Africa's democracies, Mugabe controls his country's decisions and charts its overall destiny.

Although Zimbabwe has largely abandoned its one-time adherence to socialism, Mugabe almost alone of his senior political officials still clings to policies and policy directions which are state centred. Neighbouring countries have recently sold off their state-controlled enterprises and begun championing market reforms. Zimbabwe has been slow to privatise and to encourage real competition, almost entirely because Mugabe is not persuaded that market reforms will work.

Mugabe is reluctant to accept wholesale privatisation and Zimbabwe's sales of state-owned corporations have been partial, with the state retaining control. Critical sectors, like communications, are yet to be privatised too.

Cabinet ministers place this reluctance to open up Zimbabwe's very slow-growing economy squarely at Mugabe's feet. If a secret ballot were permitted in cabinet meetings, they say, ministers would vote overwhelmingly for wholesale privatisation. But not while Mugabe counts the votes and decides the fates of his ministers. Like many African heads of state, Mugabe appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers with ease.

Beyond these important large-scale policy questions, the cabinet and the nation are grumbling about Mugabe's frequent forays abroad. The president is hardly ever at home, flying frequently in recent months to Cyprus, Italy, Britain, Brazil, Malaysia and other destinations, sometimes on state business and sometimes not. He has been abroad more than he has been at home, at least that is the popular perception.

These visits overseas ostensibly develop investment and other contacts for Zimbabwe. So, in some sense, Mugabe is being a trade salesman for his country. But little foreign direct investment has resulted from these visits, in part because Zimbabwe is less friendly to foreign investors than many of its neighbors.

These trips also destroy the timetables of Air Zimbabwe, the government-owned national airline, because every time Mugabe travels overseas he commandeers Air Zimbabwe's sole Boeing 767. The travelling public has become infuriated.

A cabinet minister referred to his president as having entered an acquisitive phase. The acquisitive tendencies are publicly attributed, in part, to Mugabe's marriage in August to his former secretary. They are building additional mansions in Zimbabwe and some of the overseas trips are popularly believed to be shopping expeditions. Whether or not these beliefs are in fact accurate, because the public believes it and some cartoonists and columnists satirize the acquisitive mode, Zimbabwe's image suffers.

In one recent weekly newspaper column, Mugabe was compared with Robin Hood. "You formerly robbed from the rich to give to the poor," a



colleague says to Robin Hood. "But now," the colleague says, "you seem to be robbing the rich to give to your wife."

A leader's legitimacy begins to fray under such circumstances, particularly when Zimbabwe is making little progress on the economic front, too few jobs are being created each year to match population growth and so many Zimbabweans know there is a better way. They seem to know that their leader is holding them back.

Zimbabwe is not about to endure mass popular uprisings, as in Bulgaria and Serbia. But, among the middle classes of Zimbabwe's cities, at least, Mugabe's star has fallen. How and when he will be succeeded, and by whom, are the questions now on many Zimbabwean lips.

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### *Asian Nations Aren't Alone: Zimbabwe Needs Help, Too*

Zimbabwe is facing an Asian-type meltdown, but for very different reasons. The consequences also will prove radically different, and possibly of longer duration.

Zimbabwe's currency collapsed in November, rapidly falling from 11 Zimbabwe dollars to one U.S. dollar to Z\$22 to \$1. Zimbabwe's minister of finance implemented extraordinary measures that strengthened currency to Z\$13 to \$1, before losing ground again and falling to its January rate of about Z\$17 to \$1.

Zimbabwe's stock market, one of the world's top performers (90 percent growth in 1996), plummeted 26 percent and hasn't recovered. The local business confidence index has suffered correspondingly, and, as a result, one of Africa's most vibrant economies has stagnated.

East Asian countries and banks had borrowed heavily in U.S. dollars and now must seek IMF and U.S. bailouts to pay off creditors. Yet, once this severe shock to their banking and credit systems is absorbed and the mistakes of recent years are rectified, they each can become some form of tiger again.

But Zimbabwe's ills are different. Its currency collapsed not because of over-borrowing in dollars, or loose banking arrangements, but because its government decided to attack its most productive export sectors. Forty percent of all export earnings come from agricultural goods grown on farms owned and managed by whites. Of Zimbabwe's 13 million people, 70 percent still till the land, and about 100,000 are white. More than 4,000 of those 100,000 farm and control half of the country's arable land.

In October, President Robert Mugabe announced that his government would confiscate land holdings from 1,500 of those farmers—about 12 million acres. Not surprisingly, the country's confidence and currency plummeted. According to the government's auditor-general, previous land transfers of about 8.3 million acres resulted in farms that were "grossly underutilized."

It is estimated that Zimbabwe's export earnings will fall proportionately with the number of farms confiscated, about 37 percent. President Mugabe wants to give the 1,500 farms to some 150,000 landless Zimbabwean peasants. That number roughly corresponds with the number of agricultural laboring jobs that will be lost if the farms are nationalized.

It will cost about \$1 billion to settle these peasants on the farms. Britain, which a decade ago gave Zimbabwe \$75 million to resettle landless Africans, has refused to consider any financial assistance, harshly criticizing the initiative.

But because there are no funds with which to transfer the lands to be taken, President Mugabe has hinted he might "lease" the lands for an interim period to wealthy Africans. That might include Cabinet members, the president's relatives, and others favored by the government.

### *As if That Weren't Enough*

Adding to the turmoil, there was a further fiscal crisis last month. The government's attempt to raise taxes by 5 percent to pay for special, suddenly granted pensions to angry veterans of Zimbabwe's guerrilla struggle against white Rhodesia was rescinded after Mugabe's ruling party, as well as labor unions, took to the streets of Harare in protest.

Finance Minister Herbert Murerwa persuaded the World Bank to release \$60 million of a Second Structural Adjustment Credit. Dr. Murerwa satisfied the bank that his government could meet its obligations to the war veterans and take reductions elsewhere in its annual budget. Those budgets are regularly in deep deficit. The IMF will soon decide whether to provide Zimbabwe with additional backing in the form of a standby credit. Balance-of-payments support may follow.

Zimbabwe has promised the IMF and the World Bank that it will, at last, privatize its state-owned telecommunications infrastructure. Like so many countries in Africa, Zimbabwe has refused to sell state-controlled industries and services. That failure has contributed to a lack of competition, high domestic borrowing, and low economic growth.

Selling off this part of the state's patrimony will help open the economy to foreign investment and competition. It also should improve the country's

poor telephone service. Most of all, it should generate significant amounts of capital.

Support from the international lending organizations, as well as the selling of the phone system, may help reverse the slide in consumer confidence. Unless it does, Zimbabwe may face months of political and economic uncertainty. The possibility of serious unrest and instability remains.

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### *Zimbabwe's Leader Takes Care of His Own*

After riots come special benefits for national leaders. Late last month Zimbabwe endured violent protests against the government's severe mismanagement of the country's economy. Army helicopters sprayed tear gas to quell the disturbances. But now, a bill put before parliament by the executive proposes to award generous retirement packages to President Robert Mugabe and Vice Presidents Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda.

Despite public dismay at the spiraling cost of living in Zimbabwe, and a widespread belief that the recent actions of President Mugabe and his government are responsible for last year's collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar and wildly escalating staple food prices, the proposed Presidential Benefits and Retirement Amendment Bill would enable retired leaders to continue indefinitely the luxurious lifestyle they now enjoy.

What's more, the bill includes minor children of deceased and former presidents and vice presidents in its provisions, even beyond the age of 18. Neither of the current vice presidents has minor children. But President Mugabe does. Indeed, since his marriage in 1996 to his young secretary, the first family has included three of their children, all minors, including two born before their marriage, and a stepson. Out-of-wedlock children are specifically provided for in the proposed legislation.

According to the legislative provisions, minor children are entitled to one-third of a president's or vice president's pension upon the office-holders' deaths. Spouses receive two-thirds of the late president's salary. President Mugabe earns about \$27,000 a year, an enormous sum by local standards. Presidents and vice presidents also enjoy generous housing, clothing, food, entertainment, transport, medical, and security allowances. All of the pensions to their kin are tax-free.

Moreover, after they leave office, presidents, vice presidents, and surviving spouses will receive domestic services, security services, free transport, free air travel, medical attention, office space, secretarial services, entertainment allowances, and on and on.

No other African country has ever proposed anything so lavish, or so transparently acquisitive. Local observers have for several years wondered about the influence of President Mugabe's new wife. His shopping trips to Europe in the last 12 months have been the stuff of legend. Rumors abound, including the tale that he has purchased a castle or manor house in Scotland.

Whether or not the rumors are verifiable, the timing of the proposed legislation is extraordinary. At a time when the government is attempting to recover from a near economic and political disaster, and when its popular legitimacy is low, such a bill shows a clear disregard for public opinion. The independent press in Zimbabwe has howled with outrage, as have university lecturers and the one active opposition member of parliament. Margaret Dongo has already called the government "corrupt" in parliament. Now she is further affronted.

Last fall, President Mugabe proposed what seemed like generous pensions for 39,000 veterans of Zimbabwe's freedom struggle. The International Monetary Fund reminded Zimbabwe that it hardly had such funds, but the finance ministry has promised to find them by borrowing and by cutting its own expenses. Whether or not it can is an open question.

Perhaps President Mugabe, who also fought against the white Rhodesian regime for independence and has governed Zimbabwe with an authoritative hand since 1980, views himself as an undercompensated veteran, and his young children as his underprivileged heirs. Or perhaps he understands that the Mugabe dynasty can't perpetuate itself, and just provision should be made.

Long-lived leaders and governments sometimes do themselves in. When they demonstrate contempt for their constituents, and the people more generally, the ends of their hegemonies may be predicted.

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### *Mugabe's Dictatorship Erodes*

You can take advantage of your people only so long. Eventually they rise up in protest. That is what is happening now in Zimbabwe, where the tide of discontent runs high.

The protesting Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions is saying "enough is enough." It sponsors successful stay-aways from work. Other urban dwellers have taken to the streets in militant protest. Squatters are occupying white-owned farms. A fledgling opposition party is forming. And mutiny is the much-feared talk of the Army.

President Robert Mugabe, in power for 18 years, must go. That's the mes-

sage of the streets in Zimbabwe, as well as of the diplomatic corridors. It's time Mr. Mugabe heeded the call, and spared his people more turmoil.

His strong-arm rule is the triggering complaint. He has governed Zimbabwe coercively since independence in 1980, running roughshod over intimidated opposition parties and his own Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Elected overwhelmingly and regularly, he first foisted state-dominated socialism on Zimbabwe. More recently, he has vacillated between opening up to market forces and maintaining the core of centralized control.

State domination, widespread corruption, the failure to sell off state controlled enterprises, and Mugabe's own oft-voiced disdain for the private sector, has resulted in GDP annual growth increases that lag behind population increases, steadily falling standards of living, inflation approaching 50 percent this year, and unemployment approaching 50 percent.

Zimbabwe's dollar has fallen a third against the United States dollar since November 1997.

Zimbabwe's workers might have understood why prices of imported fuel had to increase 67 percent along with the costs of bread, cooking oil, the staple maize meal, and bus fares—up 100 percent. But not when they learned that Mugabe was building expensive mansions for his young second wife, that the mayor of Harare, the country's capital, was constructing a \$1.5 million house when luxury houses in the city cost a mere \$130,000, that the city of Harare could not pay for a \$685,000 water pump and so the city suffered serious shortages of water, and that the president had sent the Zimbabwean Army to fight an expensive war in the distant Congo.

No one in Zimbabwe can understand why its troops have been sent to defend President Laurent Kabila's continued dictatorship in the Congo at a time when Zimbabwe is desperately short of cash, and the Congo has none to offer.

Leading Zimbabweans speculate that the president has cut a lucrative deal: troops for a personal slice of the Congo's mineral wealth. Given the constant talk in Harare about Mugabe's crony capitalism (his nephew Leo Mugabe has won a number of lucrative contracts), nothing the president does astonishes corporate leaders or their employees. This month he also took a 16-day trip to Libya and Europe despite the crises at home.

Greed on the part of politicians is taken for granted. That is in part why Zimbabwe's 8,000 professional soldiers, fighting a war deep in the inhospitable reaches of the eastern Congo, have threatened mutiny.

Greed, and the cynicism it engenders, has also eliminated the possibility of foreign investment, even in the potentially rich local mining sector. The government's attempt to appease discontented Zimbabweans by seizing 841

white-owned farms without immediate compensation, and on 30-day notice, has made economic matters worse. About 18 percent of Zimbabwe's GDP, and 30 percent of its export earnings, are the result of the tobacco, horticulture, and maize produced by commercial farmers. Those farmers are hardly willing to continue investing in Zimbabwe.

Mugabe isn't up for election again until 2002, and Parliament not until 2000. ZANU controls 157 of 160 seats in Parliament. So one path to change would follow a split in ZANU, defying the wrath of the president's secret police. Or Margaret Dongo, the only independent member of Parliament, could succeed in starting a new party capable of providing an alternative to the president's tight-fisted rule.

Otherwise, Mugabe could be driven from office by urban protests fueled by continued economic discontent, cascading Army mutinies, and the alarm of even the many intimidated members of his Cabinet. President Nelson Mandela of South Africa would not be sorry to see his neighbor ousted. Nor would Washington and London.

Whether Mugabe exits gracefully, or is hustled out of office by his opponents, it is time he went.

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### *Corruption and Torture in Mugabe's Zimbabwe*

President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe says it is permissible in his democracy to arrest and torture journalists, ban unions, and force critical jurists to resign. He also sends troops to Congo without parliamentary approval, thumbing his nose at brave critics at home and horrified African and world leaders. It is not clear what his opponents, Washington, London, or Pretoria can do to restore reason.

Meanwhile, Zimbabwe's debilitating economic crisis worsens by the day. Last week in Harare, the capital, and in other cities, Africans rioted for food. The maize meal that every Zimbabwean eats every day has been unobtainable since the first of the month. Inflation is galloping ahead at 60 percent a year; the country's currency has depreciated against the U.S. dollar by 100 percent in a year. Bus fares have increased 60 percent. Unemployment is over 50 percent, and economic growth was below 2 percent per year in 1998. The telephone system breaks down. There are electricity shortages. The medical system has collapsed, and hospitals are without essential supplies. Late last year, Harare could not afford a critical water pump and much of the sprawling municipality was without water.

The war in Congo has been costing near-bankrupt Zimbabwe about \$5 million a week since October. Mugabe and his government ministers are continually abroad, at conferences and workshops, or, in the president's case, purchasing houses and furniture. Last week he was in Jamaica for a conference, fiddling while Rome burns at home.

Allegations of corruption are commonplace. The president's nephew has obtained a number of major construction contracts. Relatives of Cabinet ministers also do well. A Zimbabwean is running several key mines in Congo, possibly in exchange for the troops that are assisting President Laurent Kabila's battle against Rwandan-backed rebels. The mayor of Harare is building a \$3 million official house for himself when there are opulent houses on the local market for a sixth of that sum.

Zimbabwe has a captive daily press owned by the government. Television and radio is also government owned. But there are four brave independent weekly newspapers in Harare. In January, the independent *Sunday Standard* reported that there had been an aborted military coup against Mugabe's government. This echoed reports of military mutinies by Zimbabwean troops in Congo in December.

The army grabbed Mark Chavunduka, the *Standard's* editor, and Ray Choto, a journalist, for interrogation. They were then brutally tortured by military intelligence, possibly with the assistance of Mugabe's much-feared Central Intelligence Organization. Zimbabwe's judges ordered the release of the two journalists, but to no avail. When they were finally dumped back in Harare after several days of electric shocks, near-drowning, and multiple beatings, they were in very poor shape (as attested by two African medical specialists). Minister of Defense Moven Mahachi said they could not have been tortured; they must have "scratched" themselves.

White and black Zimbabwean professionals marched on Parliament and were tear-gassed and threatened. Students have also marched and battled with police. The mood in Harare is ugly. Three judges of the Supreme Court, one white and two black, protested directly to Mugabe, requesting that he affirm the rule of law and speak out against torture of innocent persons.

Mugabe's answer, last week, was a tirade against the judges, journalists who "think they can tell lies," and foreign "spies" who must be behind Zimbabwe's problems. If the journalists had not acted "dishonestly," Mugabe told the nation in a broadcast, they would not have been tortured. He said that the journalists had "forfeited the right to legal protection." He told the judges who had complained that they were being impertinent and impudent and invited them to resign and enter the political arena. Mugabe further blamed his country's problems on "insidious attempts by British agents planted or recruited in Zimbabwe." Those agents were sowing discord.

Last week, after the president's tough speech, four more journalists were arrested, two for days. They included the editor and several writers for the *Mirror*. Their crime was reporting in October that the head only of a dead Zimbabwean soldier from Congo had been sent back to next-of-kin and that his body was still missing. The government later denied the story. But why the men were arrested this month is a mystery, except for the obvious continued intimidation of the press.

The International Monetary Fund is considering a support payment to Zimbabwe of \$53 million. Presumably that grant is in jeopardy, but the IMF also fears weak countries like Zimbabwe renege on their debts and plunging more deeply into financial hardship. Washington is urging the IMF to focus on Zimbabwe's human rights deficiencies. London, with Mugabe's allegations ringing in its ears, presumably wonders how to exert itself. Pretoria, disgusted by Mugabe's actions, wishes it could intervene directly.

Zimbabwe's next parliamentary election is in 2000, and there is a presidential election in 2002. University students do not want to wait that long. Other Zimbabweans may soon join them.

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### *The West Must Help Bring Democracy Back to Zimbabwe*

One man rule in Africa is on the wane. But not in Zimbabwe, where despotism still prevails, despite a democratic facade.

One result is increased poverty for most people and increased riches for the president and his men. Another likely result is a mass revolt, the seeds of which are rooted in economic and political crisis. Zimbabwe consequently presents stark choices for the international lending agencies, like the International Monetary Fund, and for policymakers in Washington, London, and the capitals of democratic Africa. The task for Washington and London is to make sure Zimbabwe's next elections are free and fair. International monitoring should only proceed on that basis.

American, British, Russian, and African leaders will be able to speak their mind about Zimbabwe when Robert Mugabe, its president and the bad man of Africa, comes to the United Nations to defend himself and his policies on Jan. 24.

Mugabe has been in power for 20 years, and now rules Zimbabwe with an iron and cruel hand. Although he has been twice elected president and his Zimbabwe African Union–Patriotic Front party has 147 of 150 seats in the country's parliament, Mugabe no longer abides by common democratic forms and procedures. His Cabinet members are ignored. So is public



opinion. He makes the rules. He personally decides what happens when and who is allowed to do this or that.

At issue last week when I visited Zimbabwe were the details of a proposed new constitution, a referendum on that document, the timing and character of elections for parliament, and an economic crisis of unprecedented dimensions.

A constitutional drafting commission has written a new basic law for the country, after detailed consultations with the country's people. But Mugabe has waved the views of the people aside and has chosen to prepare his own drafts of key clauses to put before the public in a referendum. He says that he knows best.

The vote to approve the new constitution, with its many flaws, will take place next month. How voters will register to vote is still being decided by Mugabe. A UN visiting commission recently reported with horror on the defects of the existing voting rolls (with their many dead, missing, and duplicated persons).

The details of voter registration and constituency boundary delimitation are even more important for the parliamentary elections since none of these actions has taken place, and Mugabe has just announced that the elections will nonetheless be held in March. He declared that date after his own minister of justice decided that the elections could not legally or practically be held before June. The international community has reacted with horror to Mugabe's fiat.

President Mugabe, like most authoritarian leaders who are compelled to call elections, presumably copied President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in forcing a quick vote before any kind of voting register or constituency delimitation could occur. Like Yeltsin, he wants to make it difficult for the inexperienced new opposition to campaign effectively.

There are a clutch of opposition parties, but the most formidable are the Movement for Democratic Change and the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats. The first is led by Morgan Tsvangirai, a trade union leader, the second by Margaret Dongo, the only independent member of parliament. Neither seems poised to merge the parties, thus crippling the parliamentary battle with Mugabe's party. Neither has access, as the ruling party does, to government money. They thus fight the election with limited funds for organization and campaigning, especially in the rural areas.

But they have one major advantage over Mugabe. Zimbabwe's economy is about to collapse. Automobile fuel is being rationed. Diesel fuel, for farm tractors and industrial uses, is nowhere to be found. The state-owned electricity monopoly may soon shut down, being unable to pay for power from South Africa, Mozambique, and the Congo.

Zimbabwe has run out of foreign exchange. Its fuel monopoly and its power grid are completely broke, with credit liens finished. Inflation is racing along at 60 percent a year or more. Despite recent pre-election pay raises to the civil service and the army of 100 percent, 76 percent of all Zimbabweans are officially in poverty (according to government statistics released this month).

Mugabe's government has presided over a profound reduction of local living standards. It is estimated that Zimbabwe is poorer per capita today than in 1980, at independence.

The money has mostly gone into the pockets of the president and his cronies. Corruption is rampant, from construction kickbacks to bank fraud. But the biggest drain on the exchequer, and the cause of this deep crisis, is Zimbabwe's Vietnam.

For purely personal reasons, both of grandeur and of gain (diamonds and gold, mostly, but also an illegal traffic in endangered species), Mugabe last year sent 11,000 Zimbabwean soldiers into Congo to fight for President Laurent Kabila. The Zimbabweans have sustained serious losses to the rebels, who are fighting against Kabila in eastern Congo; body bags return secretly at night to Zimbabwe.

The war in the Congo is unpopular in Zimbabwe. So is the government's economic mischief. But no non-official Zimbabwean is confident that the parliamentary elections, on whatever basis they will be held, will be fair.

What ordinary Zimbabweans want and desperately need is a UN-organized and -run balloting, with similar supervision of the composition of the voting rolls and the arrangement of constituencies. Without such guaranteed transparency, no poll which backs the current government will appear fair.

The task of the West is to help bring actual democratic practice back to Zimbabwe.

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### *Only Fair Vote Can Save Zimbabwe*

When the time of arbitrary rulers is almost up, they thrash about trying to save themselves. President Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's 20-year autocrat, is unusually beleaguered and desperate. Last month he banned all e-mails that discuss politics and economics. This month there were riots in Harare, the capital, and killings of opposition politicians and white farmers. Washington may well need to facilitate Mugabe's exit to prevent further violence.

King Canute famously tried to hold back the waves from washing over England. Mugabe similarly thought he could repeal the laws of economics

and run Zimbabwe without funds for petroleum, electric power, and consumer goods. He may have assumed that most Zimbabweans would not notice their tightened belts. Or perhaps he did not care. But with lengthening lines at gas stations, dead telephones, power outages, and galloping inflation, life has become harder for almost everyone. Having sucked Zimbabwe dry and with consumer goods hardly ever available, Mugabe lost a constitutional referendum in February. He has twice postponed parliamentary elections, has quarreled with Britain over diplomatic protocol and colonial compensation, has withstood entreaties from the United States and the International Monetary Fund, and has unleashed rent-a-crowd “landless war veterans” onto white-owned farmland.

A new law that forces Internet service providers to disclose all messages in or out of the country to the government shows Mugabe at his worst. It is a global first and takes censorship and official paranoia to a far extreme, even for Africa. Mugabe has made it clear that anyone who disparages his regime or criticizes the political, economic, or social organization of Zimbabwe will have his e-mail services terminated. Internet providers who fail to police their networks or shut down offenders will be fined heavily.

The hiring of so-called landless veterans to invade white farmland (white farmers produce about 30 percent of Zimbabwe’s exports) is another sign of desperation, especially after the voters resoundingly rejected Mugabe’s attempt by constitutional amendment to confiscate such property without compensation.

The African invaders of nearly 800 farms have been paid by Mugabe; a number of rent-a-crowd groups have given up their new farms when promised official wages failed to arrive. Others have been chased away by the regular African farm employees, who stand to lose their jobs. Two white farmers have been killed and farm houses set alight. Mugabe has refused to honor a High Court ruling to remove the land invaders.

Previously, when white farms were confiscated, compensation had to be paid. In about 250 instances over the past decade, however, farms have been transferred to Mugabe’s family or his cronies, not to truly landless peasants.

Mugabe refuses to do the one thing—pulling his troops out of Congo—that might save his increasingly despotic and capricious regime. In 1998, he sent 11,000 soldiers into the Democratic Republic of Congo to help save President Laurent Kabila’s authoritarian leadership from being overrun by rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Mugabe wanted to prove he is a powerful continental actor. He and his generals also sought spoils in Congo. Kabila apparently gave Mugabe and his colleagues personal control over diamond mines and cadmium dumps. So the soldiers remain, fighting a los-

ing war 1,000 miles from Zimbabwe. Body bags are shipped back in the dead of night to Harare.

What was good for Mugabe and cronies is expensive for Zimbabweans. Funds and foreign exchange pay for the soldiers, not for goods wanted by Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe is effectively bankrupt, with soaring deficits, 60 percent inflation, hardly any currency reserves, unemployment over 50 percent, and corruption so rampant that average urban Zimbabweans can take it no more. Mugabe, in the style of potentates, has lavished new mansions, rugs, and furniture on his young, reputedly avaricious second wife. Meanwhile, his finance minister displays empty pockets to everyone he meets.

Before February, Mugabe had never lost an election, rigged or unrigged. He and his ruling party colleagues believed they would win the referendum by promising to give white lands to Africans. The new constitution would also have given Mugabe an extended term in office. But the voters, led by Morgan Tsvangirai's new Movement for Democratic Change and the National Constitutional Association, saw through the autocratic smoke screen.

Now the Movement for Democratic Change thinks it can win the parliamentary elections. Mugabe had originally set the election for March, then moved it to April, and now to May. It will almost certainly be postponed again. An electoral commission has just been appointed, and the process of freshly delimiting constituencies and purging voters' rolls of the dead has only now begun. Moreover, Mugabe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front is not ready to defend its 157 of the 160 seats in Parliament. Nor is it prepared to be defeated by the opposition.

While Zimbabwe collapses and Pretoria and Washington wring their hands, Mugabe continues to live ostentatiously, fiddling while Zimbabwe seethes. His downfall will come either by escalating violence or at the ballot box. But the voters can succeed only if Washington ensures that the next election is free and fair and is independently monitored.

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### *Saving Zimbabwe from Mugabe*

The impending transfer of authority from Zimbabwe's increasingly discredited rulers to a newly empowered grassroots political movement is fueling savage intimidation—killings of black opponents, invasions of white-owned farms, and the assassination of white farmers.

What unites those killed, both black and white, is their support of the Movement for Democratic Change, Zimbabwe's new popular counter to the

20-year rule of the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).

Britain and the United States have condemned the violence, and directly criticized President Robert Mugabe's refusal to honor high court verdicts. South Africa has been attempting to broker a truce, and a return to normality.

But Washington, London, and Pretoria, South Africa, must now be much more forceful in demanding free and fair elections soon if they are to preserve Zimbabwe's economic potential and the human rights of its citizens. At stake, and the motivator of officially inspired violence, is Mr. Mugabe's future, and the future of the political and economic edifice he and his cronies have erected. In recent years, that edifice has become increasingly authoritarian and corrupt.

Mugabe has been building and buying mansions in Zimbabwe and abroad at an accelerating rate. He has supervised the letting of large-scale public works contracts to consortia led by his nephew. Without consulting Parliament, he also dispatched 12,000 soldiers to the Democratic Republic of Congo to battle rebels there. Zimbabwe has bankrolled those troops, but it is widely believed Mugabe and several key colleagues are benefiting personally from exploitation of the diamond and mineral riches of that troubled nation. The Zimbabwean Army's high casualty rate hasn't helped.

What has transformed both Mugabe and Zimbabwe? As a young African nationalist, he came to prominence in the early 1960s. Unlike Joshua Nkomo, Zimbabwe's then-nationalist standard-bearer, the Jesuit-trained Mugabe was ascetic, principled, and courageous. His quick intelligence and strategic acumen impressed many visitors, including me, on numerous occasions. Later, during Zimbabwe's guerrilla war of the 1970s, Mugabe gained control of ZANU as a political commissar and superb fund-raiser among Marxist and socialist allies.

As head of government since 1980, Mugabe was ruthless with presumed opponents, but pragmatic in terms of the economy and white farmers. It is only during the last decade, and after having children with a young secretary who became his second wife, that Mugabe began to demonstrate the avarice and lust for absolute power that has now become his and his people's undoing.

Now the traditionally forgiving citizens have had enough. They handed electoral defeat to Mugabe in February, voting overwhelmingly against constitutional changes. They refuse to tolerate inflation that has soared to 70 percent; acute shortages of foreign exchange that have frequently left Zimbabweans short of fuel for cars, trucks, and tractors; and the meltdown of the once-prosperous economy.

The farm invasions—nominally by aggrieved, landless, war veterans, but really by government rent-a-thugs—have caused consternation at a time of the annual tobacco auctions. Tobacco is the mainstay of Zimbabwe's profitable agricultural exports.

Zimbabwe isn't usually in such chaos. It has the best educated population in Africa per capita, a very balanced economy—with a variety of cash crops, minerals, and manufactured goods to export. Mugabe's greed, compounded by the dubious decision to help occupy Congo, plunged Zimbabwe over the economic edge in 1999, and precipitously further this year. Africa has its many natural disasters, but Zimbabwe's collapse is entirely man-made. The acute danger now is that Mugabe will persist in violently trying to forestall defeat.

Zimbabwe has descended into the abyss of decay. Only tough intervention by Washington, London, and Pretoria can prevent Zimbabwe from collapsing. The three powers now need to compel Mugabe to honor the law, harness his rent-a-thugs, and promise honest elections in June.

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### *The Challenge to Mugabe*

Africans prefer participatory democracy to autocracy and honest leadership to corrupt cronyism—those are two of the lessons that can be drawn from Zimbabwe's recent electoral rebuke to President Robert Mugabe's long-unchallenged and economically and politically disastrous rule.

Although Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front, or ZANU-PF, gained a narrow majority in last week's parliamentary voting, the brand-new Movement for Democratic Change, or MDC, surprised Mugabe by winning 57 of the 120 open seats in the 150-member Parliament. One of the open seats was won by a small party from the eastern corner of the country, and the other 62 were won, some very narrowly, by ZANU-PF. (Thirty more members are presidential appointees.)

The MDC gained every urban seat, including all of those in Harare, the capital, and Bulawayo, the second city. It also swept the southwestern, western, and many eastern rural seats. Seven current Cabinet ministers were defeated, some resoundingly.

The MDC's overall national vote total was higher than that of ZANU-PF, but Zimbabwe uses the old constituency method. And in contrast to ZANU-PF, the MDC's strength proved pan-ethnic or nontribal, with four of its white members winning black seats, and no ethnic group predominated.

Because the outgoing government used widespread intimidation against MDC candidates and supporters in many constituencies before the polls, the run-up to the elections was hardly free and fair. The European Union electoral monitoring team denounced Mugabe's electoral exercise this week. Other observing teams were also skeptical. The MDC expects to contest up to 20 of the seats denied them, in some of which the European monitoring team saw ballot box seals cut.

In the weeks before the election, government-sponsored thugs attacked hundreds of MDC supporters, abducted several hundred more, and killed more than 30 MDC adherents. Several days after the election, one of the MDC victors could not return to his own constituency, where his house had been fire bombed.

The election results left Mugabe and his government reeling, but it will not be clear for weeks whether the anger of the voters will be translated into positive government action. Mugabe himself is not up for reelection until 2002.

Zimbabwe's economy is in a free fall, with inflation approaching 80 percent (up from 20 percent two years ago), and severe food, gasoline, and cooking oil shortages are common.

The cause of Zimbabwe's economic collapse is gross mismanagement and blatant corruption, but the precipitating error was Mugabe's decision in 1998 to send 6,000—now 13,000—Zimbabwean soldiers to bolster President Laurent Kabila's faltering regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Zimbabwe has been bleeding its coffers to pay for this intervention while Mugabe and his associates have been accused of profiting from Congolese diamond concessions and cadmium mining. In addition, a number of big construction contracts have been funneled to consortiums led by Mugabe's nephew.

Zimbabweans finally rose up and protested against the Mugabe government in February, when they voted down constitutional amendments he sought. The MDC led that campaign.

Mugabe derided the results of the referendum and defied court orders by paying supposed veterans of Zimbabwe's war of independence to invade white-owned farms. He promised to take all of Zimbabwe's 4,000 farms away from whites and, for good measure, to nationalize the country's mines.

But the people did not want their economy and political harmony disrupted. Fully 40 percent of Zimbabwe's exports (about 20 percent of its gross domestic product) are supplied by the produce of white-owned farms. Those farms are also the source of 400,000 African jobs. The gold mines, one of which closed last week because of unrest, also depend on stable foreign exchange ratios and are the source of another 30,000 jobs.

Mugabe now has a chance to reform and to behave more democratically and less corruptly. Restoring the rule of law would be a first step, and bringing the troops home from the Congo would be a second. A third would be ending the farm invasions and thus beginning to bring peace back to Zimbabwe.

If Mugabe can understand the electoral message of his own people, then Zimbabwe can recover economically. It has had a thriving agricultural sector and excellent mining prospects. Tourism could be revived. Zimbabwe also has the best-educated African population.

Western policy makers need to watch Zimbabwe closely and be ready to help financially if Mugabe changes course.

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### *Zimbabwe's Prospects*

This prosperous-appearing capital city is a modern Potemkin village. Stores and hotels are empty, businesses are shutting their doors, and tourists are absent. Downtown Harare is a lifeless shell following President Robert Mugabe's willful destruction of his nation's economy.

Political leaders, whether the ebullient architects of June's stunning vote in parliamentary elections for the new Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), or the glum Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) followers of Mr. Mugabe, sit in their offices wondering whether the president will change his dictatorial ways.

Last month's elections produced a meaningful opposition for the first time. Of the 120 elected parliamentary seats, 57 went to the MDC, one to an allied party, and 62 to ZANU-PF. Because of widespread intimidation and the likelihood of ballot stuffing and vote rigging, the MDC is contesting 28 of the seats it lost. It won all the cities and all rural areas except those in the president's Shona-speaking heartland. Four of its winners were whites, elected overwhelmingly by blacks despite Mugabe's racist campaign.

Morgan Tsvangirai, president of the MDC, smiled in his office, remembering how voters severely rebuked Mugabe's economic and political follies. Mr. Tsvangirai knows how to begin to fix Zimbabwe's woes: Let the country's currency devalue (to help farmers and other exporters); restore law and order to the farming sector by ousting interlopers; bring the country's 13,000 troops home from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and end the leader-led corruption.



In contrast, Mugabe remains silent and invasions of the white-owned farms continue illegally. Mugabe is also reluctant to pull his Army out of the Congo, where diamonds and cobalt are enriching his own personal wealth. Senior members of ZANU-PF want their president to resign, but fear his wrath.

Zimbabwe's once rich economy has endured a precipitous meltdown since 1998. Inflation has raced upward from 20 to 80 percent. Government deficits are now as high as 20 percent of GDP, while yearly GDP itself has tumbled from \$600 to \$400 per capita. GDP growth rates have slumped from 5 percent a year to a predicted minus 10 percent this year. The local dollar has fallen in value from 8 per \$1US to 60.

Zimbabwe is bankrupt. Consequently, its state petroleum monopoly has difficulty importing fuel for cars and tractors, and people stand in long lines, desperate for kerosene and cooking oil. The state-owned electricity utility has no money to import power, and at any time the country may go dark. Because Zimbabwe has no foreign exchange, and farmers can make no money on their crops, food shortages are beginning to appear. They could become serious by September if winter wheat isn't sown now.

In better-managed times, Zimbabwe boasted one of the best-balanced and well-functioning economies in Africa. But this healthy growth has been undermined by direct government action since 1998. By hiring rent-a-thugs to invade white-owned farms—and in some cases kill white farmers who favored the MDC—the government quickly destroyed the equivalent of 20 percent of GDP. Even worse, Mugabe threatened to confiscate all white-owned farms without compensation. He also vowed to nationalize the mines. Foreign investors withdrew in fear and dismay.

Unless Mugabe alters course significantly, emergency assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, much less Western donors, will not be forthcoming. That help will only arrive when Zimbabwe begins to put its own house in order.

Local businessmen suspect that it is too late. If they are right, then this well-educated and once well-run country could become the next Sierra Leone or Congo. Recovery is possible, but only if Mugabe resigns before his term ends in 2002, or refrains from new acts of venality.

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### *It's Time to Loosen Mugabe's Grip*

President Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe with increasing intolerance since 1980.

But now, a strong word from President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, backed by Washington, could send Mr. Mugabe toppling.

Just as an attempt to resist the real electoral results in Yugoslavia proved the undoing of ex-President Slobodan Milosovic, so Mugabe's unceasing attacks on his new opposition movement, and his brutal attempt last week to keep a new private radio station from broadcasting, may herald his own fall from power.

In parliamentary elections in June that European Union and other monitors called unfree and not fair, Mugabe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party won a few more seats than the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), probably by rigging the results.

Since then, security forces loyal to Mugabe have attacked MDC officials, thrown bombs at MDC offices, and attempted to intimidate the opposition party just as they have continued to intimidate white farmers and rural farmworkers.

Earlier this month, after the Zimbabwe Supreme Court overturned a long-entrenched government ban on private broadcasting endeavors, the police raided the new Capitol Radio station and shut it down. In two early-morning raids they removed broadcast and transmission equipment.

The police sought to arrest all of the directors of the station and issued an arrest warrant for the private station's lead lawyer, charging him in the Orwellian manner with "obstructing justice." The minister of home affairs even said last week that the station would be permitted to go on the air again "over my dead body."

After the Supreme Court issued restraining orders against the government, Mugabe quickly retaliated by publishing new, crudely drafted ordinances controlling independent radio stations. Clearly, Milosovic-like, Mugabe was intent on protecting the government monopoly of information conveyed by radio—the medium most influential throughout rural Zimbabwe. The government has controlled all radio and television stations since 1980. It also owns the country's main daily newspapers, although since last year there is an independent daily as well.

Zimbabweans took to the streets against Mugabe in 1997 and 1998. In February, Mugabe lost a constitutional referendum—the regime's first-ever ballot box defeat. Then he and his party were humbled in the disputed June

elections, the MDC winning every urban parliamentary seat and nearly all rural seats except those in Mugabe's own ethnic constituencies.

Mugabe himself is not up for reelection as president until 2002, but MDC parliamentarians have been attempting to introduce motions of impeachment on grounds of massive corruption.

Pressure for Mugabe to leave office has been welling up within the nation since the June election and afterwards, but Mugabe has refused to recognize the meaning of that major critique of his leadership. He has not brought Zimbabwean troops home from the Congo, reduced escalating government deficits, attacked soaring inflation, or taken steps to curb corruption. Instead, he has behaved with an insouciant sense of invulnerability that has infuriated most Zimbabweans, forced as they have been to tighten their personal belts.

Significantly, senior members of Mugabe's own party, many in the inner circle, also want him to go.

They envision the demise of ZANU-PF and their own political mortality if Mugabe stays.

If South African President Mbeki, backed by Washington and London, criticized Mugabe's role publicly, those in ZANU-PF who anticipate the swift demise of Mugabe's regime will be emboldened, and might act bloodlessly to rid Zimbabwe of its wily despot. A signal from powerful South Africa might also encourage the people of Zimbabwe's cities to take to the streets, as Yugoslav citizens did in Belgrade.

Washington worries that any such move by President Mbeki would destabilize all of Southern Africa, and weaken South Africa itself. But the reverse argument is stronger: Tension in Zimbabwe has already weakened the South African currency and caused investors to shun South Africa and the region. The longer Mugabe remains in office, the more damage he can do to his own country and to South Africa.

Concerted action is the best remedy for the region and for the future of the people of Zimbabwe.

No massacres are in the offing, but Mugabe's security officials will continue to brutalize his opponents and undercut the country's already parlous economy (GDP per capita has plunged from \$600 in 1995 to \$400 this year and less is forecast for next year) until he is eased from office. Shortages of essential foodstuffs are predicted to become common this month or next in a Zimbabwe that has almost no foreign exchange reserves.

If Mugabe is not encouraged to depart, residents of the cities may themselves follow the Yugoslav example.

It would certainly be timely for Washington and London to encourage South Africa to begin to show its displeasure at what Mugabe has done to defy the democratic impulses of Zimbabwe's citizens.

## *Freeing South Africa from the Yoke of Apartheid*

**H**ow to prise majority South Africans from the oppressive hegemony of minority whites was among the more difficult global challenges, moral dilemmas, and vexing foreign policy concerns of the second half of the twentieth century. Now that Nelson Mandela has served supremely as president of South Africa, deservedly become a global icon, and been succeeded by the gifted Thabo Mbeki, the assumption of power by Africans in South Africa may seem obvious, inevitable, and enduring. But the struggle to transfer authority from an entrenched white minority to a deserving but seemingly weak and widely ignored majority was hard, lonely, and in serious doubt during the dark 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Those were days when Mandela was in prison on Robben Island, breaking rocks, and when whites contained black opposition by brutality, legalisms, and vigorous denials of basic human rights. Africans were segregated strictly, hindered from moving freely by pass laws, constrained from the expression of opinion (not only for blacks) by bannings and detentions, and denied social services and employment opportunities because those rights were rationed by color and class.

South Africa was a hard, unremitting place with a few brave, combative journalists, lawyers, and liberal politicians; an incipient white and black underground of freedom fighters and bomb throwers; and a few wealthy businessmen who deplored the prevailing system but who felt powerless to oppose it directly. There were both an in-country opposition and the externally based and financed guerilla soldiers of the African National Congress.

Within the country, letters were censored, telephones were tapped, and informers were everywhere, especially in black ghettos and white newsrooms. Outside, liberation fighters and their supporters were attacked overtly and covertly by South African military operations. Air strikes and commando incursions were mounted against guerilla bases and the weak neighboring countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) that harbored freedom fighters. (“What Pretoria Seeks from Its Neighbors,” *Boston Globe*, 27 Dec. 1982.) South Africa also backed a few friendly regimes financially, like Malawi, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Côte d’Ivoire, and traded clandestinely with African and other states that had theoretically joined the prevailing global boycott of South African goods and services. (South African wines were served on Kenyan Airways, but with the labels torn off, and oil shipments arrived from Nigeria in unmarked tankers.)

The evil of apartheid was obvious to most U.S.-based scholars and other students of Africa and human rights. But not to all, and never to every decisive majority or minority leader in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, nor to policymakers in the upper echelons of the Reagan and elder Bush administrations. Apartheid South Africa had its apologists in Washington and elsewhere in the United States.

Those who might read opinion articles on controversial topics like apartheid in South Africa had to be reasoned with, presented with solid fact-based arguments, and given ample opportunity to appreciate the absurdities, ultimate impossibilities, and massive inhumanity of the South African tragedy.

The task of a researcher and concerned observer, especially one who studied, visited, and regularly wrote articles about South Africa, was complex and multifaceted. Apartheid could not merely be condemned. Its workings had to be explained before they could properly be exposed. The system’s ideological bases had to be plumbed before the system’s corrosive impact on blacks (and whites) could be asserted. Exactly how and why South Africa was ruled and organized had to be analyzed. Its madcap division of the country into Bantustans and homelands had to be examined, for example, before “separate development” could be attacked for inefficiencies as well as cruelties.

The approach of a writer wanting to influence opinion and policymaking had to be strictly objective, clear, and incisive. That meant fairly exposing the fallacies and idiocies of white South African governance to a critical light and then focusing the attention of Americans on the realities, not the hyperbole, of apartheid’s methods and results. Congress and the American

people needed to appreciate the depths of South Africa's folly and the complicated and comparatively limited policy options open to those in Washington and the United Nations who wanted to bring justice to all South Africans.

The articles in the second part of this book were written with those general goals in mind, but inevitably there were additional situational and temporal objectives to which the articles responded. (Some were solicited by editors, others were contributed on the author's own initiative.)

Given the spotty coverage of South Africa and Africa in the American media, even during the 1980s, it often seemed important and necessary to use opinion pieces to bring particular issues or failures (like the steep slide in high school graduation rates for Africans) to the attention of the American public and its leaders. The depths of South African despair and the profound poverty of imagination among the architects of apartheid could thus be discussed and commented upon in such columns. That was one goal. Another was to critique policies advanced in Pretoria, Washington, London, or other relevant capitals and to suggest better alternatives.

Even as late as the 1980s, not all American opinion makers publicly and privately agreed that apartheid was evil (the present vice-president, Richard S. Cheney, and other Congressmen voted against Mandela's release from prison in 1989); its ideological premises and functional faults had to be examined and argued. Its fallacies had to be exposed. But better than sideline criticism, however well informed and carefully calibrated, was the sharing of insights about the heart of the regime. To write about South Africa knowledgeably meant gaining and demonstrating an appreciation of the inner workings of the South African government and state, especially its security operations. Without that close scrutiny of the white rulers, and an equally close acquaintance with the above-ground and below-ground opposition, it would have been difficult to evaluate the available American policy options, and to suggest alternative responses.

Constructive engagement, the official mantra of the 1980s, was opposed as a Republican policy formulation in my articles because its assumptions were flawed and, certainly, because it was bound to fail. Full sanctions, and the impossibility of imposing them, were also assessed. As a policy alternative, a number of other short- as well as medium-term strategies were proposed in a series of columns over two decades.

Eventually, when it became clear to this writer that South Africa's ruling white oligarchy was at last losing its ability and resolve to maintain apartheid to the bitter end and at all costs, and when I sensed that fundamental reassessments were occurring within the citadel of apartheid, I prepared a series of articles that were intended to ready the West for Mandela's

release and the dramatic transition that followed. The unexpected revelation that apartheid was crumbling and that Mandela would be released appeared first in the *New York Times* on March 14, 1989, “Has South Africa Found Its Nixon?”—an allusion to President Nixon’s visit to China. That article argued that Frederik W. de Klerk, by then the head of South Africa’s National Party and the as yet unanointed president of the country, understood (as few others did) that the indefinite subjugation of blacks was no longer possible. That op-ed predicted that de Klerk would dismantle apartheid—that he was capable of making the compromises with dogma and ideology that his Afrikaner predecessors (and many of his contemporaries) could not.

A year before, a series of op-ed articles in the *Boston Globe* and the *Christian Science Monitor* foreshadowed the coming collapse of Afrikaner nationalism, and thus apartheid. “Only Nelson Mandela’s release from prison offers a solution to the South African crisis,” began a column in the *Boston Globe* (“Mandela’s Prisoner,” 29 Aug. 1988). Another was headlined “The Collapse of South Africa’s White Politics” (*Christian Science Monitor*, 16 March 1988), and a third was called “South Africa and Reality Testing” (*Christian Science Monitor*, 8 Dec. 1988). The first of these three articles argued that only negotiations with Mandela could provide a peaceful end to white rule. No other leader had the legitimacy to bargain with whites. South Africa was stalemated so long as Mandela was not free. (By 1988, in fact, Mandela and persons close to President Pieter Willem Botha were talking secretly in an Oslo-like manner, but no breakthroughs were imminent. The talks had begun in a desultory manner in 1986, and continued in fits and starts thereafter.)

The crisis to which these and other 1988 articles alluded was brought about by the resurgence of the white extreme right in South Africa, and by the victory of those arch-segregationists in the municipal elections late in the year. In 1987 and early in 1988 the new Conservative Party, a white breakaway from the ruling National Party, easily won critical parliamentary seats, taking them from the ruling Nationalists. Botha, unlike de Klerk later, saw the rise of the white right as a signal to cease any planning for the end of apartheid. And so the process of reform, which he himself had begun with so much promise in 1978 and had half-heartedly and ineptly attempted to guide during the subsequent decade, faltered and was largely aborted as Botha himself became more arbitrary and more cantankerous during the final years of his reign. Personality was as important as structure: Botha knew what had to be done, but tried to reach that objective by zigs and zags. Ultimately, he could not break out of his and his people’s mold; de Klerk, in

contrast, knew that a decisive and abrupt shift in national direction was essential for economic reasons over the medium- and long-terms. Fortunately, he proved capable of the bold moves that finally gave South Africa an opportunity to lead a free Africa.

Several longer articles, especially “The Process of Decision-Making in Contemporary South Africa” (28 Dec. 1983) and “Seven Scenarios for South Africa” (29 Oct. 1985), sought to make American policymakers aware of how Botha actually ran the critical and least open parts of his government, and of how the higher echelons of that government were organized to maintain internal control and keep the guerillas at bay. Shorter columns complemented the longer articles and tried to enlighten a wider audience about the structure and real workings of the South African state.



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## *Separate Development and Other Apartheid Contortions*

In the early 1960s, after returning to the U.S. from southern Africa at a time when an appreciation of African, much less South African, political realities was primitive, I sought to help Americans become more fully aware of the problems and complexities of South Africa in Africa. At first, the primary medium was a series of signed and unsigned contributions to the *New Republic*. Then, after a long visit to South Africa in 1972, I began writing more frequently and at length for major newspapers. “Apartheid: Changes Are at the Surface” (*Washington Post*, 14 May 1972), explained that although there had been a few hopeful breaks in the apartheid armor—judges had acquitted prominent defendants accused of seeking the state’s overthrow, the state-owned railways had begun to open up employment opportunities for skilled blacks, and South Africa had welcomed a black president from Malawi with electrifying attention and honors—these were but glacial shifts that did not portend the abandoning of harshly imposed minority rule. “Brutality is an equal and continuing reality,” I had reported in *Newsday* (“American Businessmen Could Change South Africa,” 25 April 1972).

Both articles indicated that “separate development,” the local code name for giving some kinds of autonomy to puppet homeland administrations, meant very little despite the advantages that it gave to one or two black critics of the system. I quoted Alan Paton, the renowned author: Separate development seemed to break “the logjam.” But I explained how separate development was a charade—yet another way to pretend to give blacks privileges and gull the West (and conservatives in the U.S. Senate) while keeping firm the tight vise of apartheid. And the security police were continuing to raid the offices of beleaguered white liberal groups. My *Washington Post* article, published at some length in a Sunday section, urged the Nixon administration not to align itself with those on Capitol Hill who backed

South Africa as a misunderstood bastion of anti-communism. Yet the *Newsday* article indicated that American (and other) corporations that continued to do business in South Africa could now, without government interference, raise African wages and in many other ways improve conditions of employment.

These writings marked the beginning of a much more active articulation of my views on the South African problem. Because of the contribution to the *Washington Post*, however, and because I had consorted earlier in the year in South Africa with Robert M. Sobukwe (founder of the Pan-Africanist Congress and the originator of the Sharpeville protests) and other opponents of white rule, the apartheid state had officially named me a “prohibited immigrant.” The South African ambassador to Washington at the time also administered a personal verbal rebuke. I was systematically denied a visa from 1972 until late 1976.

But I kept writing. After Arthur Ashe, the black American tennis star, played against South African whites in a tennis tournament there in 1974, it seemed important and relevant to remind the U.S. public that apartheid was still preventing local blacks from using white facilities or moving about freely within their own country. Julian Bond (now chairman of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) and John Lewis, now a Democratic Congressman from Georgia, had both also been given visas. A mixed golf tournament had been held. Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, then the leader of the KwaZulu homeland and since the 1980s the head of South Africa’s Inkatha Freedom Party, had also been permitted to travel to hostile countries in Africa, and to Europe and the United States. But apartheid was not weakening. In fact, it was as strong and as vicious as ever. (“Apartheid—Strong as Ever,” *Newsday*, 3 Feb 1974.)

Ashe’s visit and Buthelezi’s travels demonstrated the power of the regime, not its weakness. My article suggested how Ashe and Buthelezi were being used for South African propaganda, how the apparatchiks of South Africa were still forbidding contact between local white and black soccer teams and cracking down on Steve Biko’s South African Students’ Organization (SASO) and other active opponents, and how the whites of South Africa remained determined, and sufficiently dominant internally, to continue to pursue the ethnic cleansing policies of apartheid.

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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*Apartheid: Changes Are at the Surface*

Apartheid South Africa is changing—at least on the surface. Within the last few weeks local judges have acquitted three prominent political defendants accused of seeking the violent overthrow of the state. Last month the minister of transport announced broadened employment opportunities on the state-run railways for skilled blacks. Earlier he had permitted Africans to shunt trains openly, a category of employment previously reserved for whites.

Reversing previous policies, in recent months the government has been willing to welcome such potentially disruptive figures as United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, Rep. Charles Diggs (for one visit, anyway), Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, Eartha Kitt, and other distinguished black Americans. In March, South African President J. J. Fouche went to Malawi to return last year's precedent-shattering visit to South Africa by Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, the president of Malawi.

The U.S.-educated Dr. Banda, who worked in South Africa as a boy, thinks independently and is the linchpin of South Africa's "outward" policy—her wooing of independent Africa. During his state visit last August, he lived with his retinue in the smartest Johannesburg hotel, gave mixed parties, danced with whites, received Fouche, and maneuvered Prime Minister B. John Vorster into a situation where he was photographed sitting between two black women. Dr. Banda also paid a politically significant visit to Soweto, the conglomerate of segregated townships outside of Johannesburg. There he talked with "my people" and brushed aside those whites who wanted to interfere with his speechmaking. Whites adjusted themselves to an African being treated as an equal, and blacks took hope.

Malawi's ambassador and his wife are black, and stand no indignity. Neighboring black leaders from Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland are treated with equal grace, and there may soon be state visits from officials of the Malagasy Republic and the Ivory Coast. (The U.S. Department of State plans to send a black diplomat there very soon.) Even the black leaders of the so-called Bantu homelands or Bantustans within South Africa are being accorded a civilized reception when they visit their people in the urban centers. South African officials greet them publicly, and with appropriate hospitality.

*Washington Post*, 14 May 1972.

### *Glacial Shifts*

Vorster presides over these and other glacial shifts in official racial policy. He is a pragmatist, aware of the need to alter South Africa's outlook. Most of all, he and his cabinet realize that their country's economy is growing too slowly, largely because it utilizes scarce labor resources inefficiently. Since white labor is in short supply, blacks can be upgraded without displacing whites. Then, too, Africans command lower rates of pay, and permit South Africa's consumer industries to remain competitive when they sell to black-ruled neighboring countries to the north.

These very real economic forces, an awareness that South Africa's image is everywhere tarnished, and the growing sophistication of many of the more youthful and urbanized white voters have brought about a willingness to compromise with racial exclusivity when those concessions can be dismissed as insignificant exceptions to some general rules or as deviations which, by contortions of logic, can be said to strengthen apartheid.

South African whites are avid rugby, soccer, golf, tennis and cricket fans. In this sphere, the government has thus begun to relax its previously rigid ban on black and white mixing by permitting what it chooses to call "multinational" events. (Because of the existence of Bantustans, and their expected development as states, Vorster has banished the term "multiracial" and substituted "multinational" to describe the involvement of whites and blacks.) A French rugby team thus came to South Africa with a black member, Africans can now enter major golf tournaments, and the minister of sport has permitted "multinational" tennis matches—but, so far, in private, without an audience.

### *Luthuli's Heir*

Politics provides the crucial tests of these tentative departures from past practice. Since indigenous national black independence movements have been crushed and driven far underground, separate development (the technical term for apartheid) provides an arena to test South Africa's real intentions. According to the canons of apartheid, 87 per cent of the land of South Africa is reserved for whites and 13 per cent, by no means the best, for the mass of Africans. This 13 per cent is fragmented and divided into a number of ethnic homelands, of which the Transkei, Zululand and Tswanaland are the largest. Theoretically, these homelands must someday absorb all of the country's enormous black population. They are unable to now, and will be even less able to do so in the future, but fictive logic helps maintain the government's integrity.

For many years most Africans condemned separate development, and many still do. In 1971, however, Vorster promised to grant full independence

to the Bantustans when they wanted it and were ready. Already the Transkei legislates in a limited way for itself, and Zululand will assume the same rights this month. The governments of these territories can tax, spend and educate within their own borders. Its leaders can and do speak out against the national government, and speak for their people, both rural and urban.

The process of separate development thus weakens the overall appearance of apartheid and enhances the dignity of at least one body of Africans. No one performs this uplifting function more astutely and courageously than Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the chief executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority. About 42 and a university graduate, Buthelezi is a magnetic, energetic figure who easily captivates audiences of Afrikaners, local sugar planters, and the 4.5 million Zulu who are "his people."

Buthelezi is one of the best political poker players in Africa. He knows how high the stakes are, and how dangerous his own role, wearing the symbolic mantle of the late Chief Albert Luthuli and blessed by the author Alan Paton, will be. He abhors separate development and knows the government cannot someday escape the need to deal with its urban industrial problems, but he has accepted the challenge to work within the only framework now open to black political leaders. "I made it clear," he said recently "that the role I am now playing is that of bringing a change within the framework of present government policy."

Buthelezi believes that "any change in the day-to-day life of the black man in this country is something essential." He presumes that obtaining independence for Zululand will help reach that goal, even if it means using the system to other ends. He believes that the walls of apartheid (not, at first, white political power) will be breached by the growing stature of the Bantustans, and that the white government may eventually have to sit in some special consultative committee with black leaders from the peripheral states. He intends to be one of them, to continue to criticize the government openly (in January he and his Authority refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the republic), and to hold his head high on behalf of his people.

"They promised us human dignity," Buthelezi has said, "but there is only one version of human dignity. If they don't want to share human dignity with us, and they want to give us human dignity separately, that is all right. But it must be full human dignity as understood anywhere else."

### *Steps Backward*

As Paton says, the development of Bantustans seems to break "the log-jam, something moves." But even as South Africa has seemed in the last year to be creeping stealthily toward a more humane future, so too, there is constant evidence of backsliding. Last month, Buthelezi was prevented from

attending a conference in Holland on nonviolent means of effecting change. The Anglican Bishop of Damaraland (in northern Namibia, or Southwest Africa), an outspoken critic of the ways in which South Africa has treated the peoples of his diocese, was deported along with several of his priests.

In Parliament the government promised a full investigation of four of the few remaining white liberal organizations: the National Union of South African Students, the Black Sash (an advice and assistance organization run by fearless white women), the Christian Institute (run by clergymen who have defected from the apartheid-oriented Dutch Reformed Church), and the South African Institute of Race Relations, a sober, careful investigative and publishing body partially funded by the Ford Foundation. The security police also continue to raid.

Despite the real signs of change, whites do not want nor are they yet able to contemplate a new structure for their society. Premised on the perpetual dominance of a minority of 4 million over a black majority of 15 million, it cannot openly concede anything but a subordinated role to the mass of people classed as nonwhites. (In addition to the Africans, this category includes 2 million Coloureds, of mixed descent, and 630,000 Asians.)

These nonwhites have been systematically deprived of political rights. Only last year the Coloureds lost their final political stake in the greater South Africa when they were taken off the municipal voting rolls. Earlier, they had lost the right to vote in national and provincial elections, a right enshrined in the act of union which created the modern republic in 1910.

Blacks and Asians have not had political rights for some years. Africans are also prohibited from withholding their labor. The Native Labor Act of 1953 defines employees to exclude all Africans, thus preventing registered trade unions from having African members, and specifically enjoins strikes by Africans or sympathy strikes by others. African unions are therefore at a considerable disadvantage when negotiating with employers or collecting dues. This is all part of the government's "civilized labor" policy.

### *Social Barriers*

South Africa still segregates, separates by putative group identity, and classifies according to rigid definitions of race. All but a few urban upper-class hotels and restaurants are barred to Africans, Coloureds and Asians. The last integrated beaches, in the Cape Province, were closed two years ago, and the Coloureds were allotted the parts of most of the better beaches near sewage outflows. City benches are for whites only, although Africans lie nearby on the available grass. Everywhere one still sees signs reading "For Europeans Only" or "Not for Non-Whites."

No aspect of the color bar remains more wrenching than the prohibitions on multiracial social mixing. In a first-class hotel or a private home, whites and blacks may drink together, but whites (even hosts) may not serve alcoholic beverages to their black guests except at official receptions. Blacks must bring their own bottles, and have signed receipts to prove ownership. At a more important level, the Immorality Act specifically condemns intercourse, between what are called races, even if the partners are legally married. These strictures obviously affect whites, blacks, Coloureds, and Indians, but what about Chinese and Japanese?

In January, a young Afrikaans-speaking girl was made to realize that she could not continue to love her Japanese karate teacher openly, although Japanese (but not Chinese, at least not yet) have the status of honorary whites. A senior official of the Department of the Interior explained: "Japanese are considered honorary whites with many privileges, but that does not extend to their marrying or going to bed with a white woman. This does not mean that they are considered inferior—just different."

### *Effort to Endure*

But these aspects of apartheid, which South Africans call "petty," are only the surface indicators of a deeper and more troubling structural malaise. Black South Africans are still treated like so many depersonalized labor units. Life in any urban conglomeration is probably dehumanizing, but for black South Africans living in the ghettos that surround most of the Republic's cities, existence is an endless effort to endure.

Many live in corrugated iron hovels down muddy lanes in horrible places like Pimville, a section of Soweto. Some have houses in the better sections of Soweto, but all are denied ownership and the usual human dignities of possession. Unless a son is already married (and to a woman who can legally reside in the urban area), he cannot inherit a house from his father. Stores are few and prohibited from expanding or holding large food stocks. Most purchases by Africans must consequently be made in the white metropolitan areas.

According to the fiction of apartheid, the urban areas are for whites only, and for those Africans who reside there temporarily to work for whites. Unemployed widows, for example, are forced out of their homes and sent to rural reserves or homelands when their husbands die.

Since the temporary residence of Africans is official policy, large numbers of Africans are housed singly, without their husbands or wives, in so-called hostels. In one of the better hostels which I visited in January, 16 men were crammed to a room, each with his straw mattress, filthy blanket, his



battered, small locker, and 8 square feet of shared privacy. There was a stove and a communal pot of porridge for each room. For the whole of this hostel, which housed 26,000 Africans on 6 acres, there was one central lavatory facility (none of the toilets had seats), cold showers (the heads were all missing), and a large hall where African beer was sold in quart containers.

Wages are still low. The average African gold miner receives about \$25 a month, plus food and a hostel bed. Some domestic servants receive \$50 a month, plus room and board. White wages, however, are of a different order entirely, and the gap between the privileged and the underprivileged is probably growing in real terms.

### *Absolute Control*

These aspects of apartheid continue to burden Africans, but the pass system, influx control, being “endorsed out” or ordered to leave urban areas, and the group areas acts are even more crushing. No African may legally remain in an urban area more than 72 hours unless he has resided there continuously since his birth, worked there continuously for one employer for 10 years, has resided there lawfully for 15 years, or is the unmarried daughter or son under 18 years of age of a permitted person, resides with him and has entered the area legally.

Since work is unavailable in the rural areas, thousands of Africans daily evade the police dragnet, enter the urban area without a reference book or pass and seek employment. But employers may now only hire Africans through the government labor bureau. Eventually work-seekers are arrested, charged with not having the right kind of stamp in their passbook (many have simply mislaid their passes), summarily tried, fined, imprisoned, and, ultimately, endorsed out of the urban area and thus sent back to a rural location. Often, too, Africans who have always lived in the urban area, and who have lost their jobs or who have defective papers, are sent to a rural homeland which they have never seen and where they lack any close relatives.

The government has given itself absolute control over the movement and residence of nonwhites. It can and does prevent the relatively few black doctors from practicing in the urban areas and confines black lawyers to the African townships. A memorandum from the secretary for Bantu (African) administration and development to all offices and magistrates of the department gives the rationale: “The Bantu in the European areas who are normally regarded as nonproductive and as such have to be resettled in the homelands are conveniently classified as follows: the aged, unfit, widows, women with dependent children; Bantu on European farms who become superfluous as a result of age; professional Bantu such as doctors, attorneys,

agents, traders, industrialists, etc. Such persons are not regarded as essential for the European labor market, and as such they must be settled in their homelands." The control of the relevant cabinet minister, and thus the police, over the daily lives of urban Africans is practically limitless.

Since about 1960, the security police have seized, searched, and tortured those blacks, browns and whites about whom they have had suspicions. The Suppression of Communism and Terrorism Acts permit almost anyone to be detained on the flimsiest of pretexts.

I have done research in only one other state where fear was so pervasive. That was Haiti, where conversations could only be held in fast-moving motor vehicles. People lowered their voices in restaurants, talked out of the corners of their mouths, and listened for telltale clicks on their telephones.

Unlike Haiti, South Africa is a large, modern, industrial state thoroughly involved in the affairs of the Western world. It cannot afford to remain an international pariah indefinitely and, despite the determination of whites to remain in control without moderating apartheid, at the margin there is some movement. Pragmatic leaders will have ample opportunities, if they don't lose heart, to accelerate the pace of this movement. But a loosening of the reins in some areas will probably cause a tightening in others and continued activity by the Gestapo-like security police. There will also be official reluctance to admit that white South Africans cannot do without the genuine economic, and therefore the political, cooperation of their black fellow countrymen.

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### *Apartheid—Strong as Ever*

Arthur Ashe, the black U.S. tennis star, recently played against whites in a South African tournament. A mixed golf tournament was also held. Black Africans, who have never before been allowed to organize themselves in trade unions, have been permitted to group themselves in ways which amount to the same thing. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the country's leading black political figure, visited Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zambia without having his passport revoked.

Do these and similar occurrences mark the crumbling of apartheid?

Hardly. The color of a person's skin still governs where he lives, walks, sits, eats, goes to school, has his appendix out, and nearly everything else in South Africa. The demarcations and designations of apartheid, and especially the machinery classifying racial groups, are complicated but thoroughly

understood by all except those hapless few, like Chinese and Japanese, whose skin coloration makes precise categorization ambiguous.

So the Ministry of Sports' agreement to multiracial sporting events, and the Interior Department's willingness to issue visas to prominent black Americans like Julian Bond and John Lewis, signify no easing of racial separation. No repeal of the laws which divide whites from Africans, "Coloureds," or Asians can be foreseen. No member of the government dares favor dismantling the cumbersome and expensive instruments of division.

Moreover, the relaxation of rules that has taken place has primarily symbolic value for ordinary local blacks. Even as he was welcoming Ashe, the minister of sport was forbidding local soccer matches in Natal between African and white teams. (A member of parliament had complained.) And the minister of the interior was systematically forbidding the entry into South Africa of white and black American academics who had the advantage of knowing the country after earlier visits. He also was deporting pesky white missionaries and putting articulate black clergymen like Chief Buthelezi's cousin, a prominent Lutheran, under a form of house arrest.

Within South Africa the attack on apartheid's opponents is still carried on relentlessly. A parliamentary commission headed by Alwyn Schlebusch has been inquiring for nearly a year into the activities of anti-apartheid bodies like the Christian Institute (headed by a breakaway Afrikaner minister), the research-oriented South African Institute of Race Relations, the vocal National Union of South African Students, and the black South African Students' Organization. Those, including several churchmen, who have refused to appear before the commission, have compared it to the U.S. House Committee on Un-American Activities in the early 1950s. For their refusals—which probably would be upheld in the U.S. courts—many are on trial, several have been placed under house arrest, and others have had their passports revoked.

The government has signaled no relaxation of apartheid. In other directions, however, there have been a number of reinterpretations of official dogma that will benefit Africans economically and politically. The most striking permit Africans to present grievances to industries in a collective form (but do not sanction black unions) and to be trained in urban areas as apprentices for jobs hitherto held exclusively by whites. Within their own sphere, these are revolutionary policy alterations, but their impact is not yet fully tested.

Equally dramatic has been the government's granting of additional powers to the eight African rural enclaves (called homelands) which are now run

in many major respects by elected Africans. Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu, Chief Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana, and Chief Kaiser Mantanzima of the Transkei lead the largest of these homelands and each has become more and more openly critical of apartheid and South African anti-black policies.

Recently they and the leaders of the other five homelands met in a "summit" conference, thus defying the government. Their post-summit pronouncements were comparatively militant, Buthelezi even declaring, "We are doing the same thing as the banned African liberation movements, but we are using different methods.

"Through this unity," he continued, "as sure as the moon is in the heavens, we shall liberate ourselves. With power and with God on our side we shall overcome."

The government, which could easily have retaliated, has so far held its public fire. To the surprise of many it also promised last month to hand over to the Transkei a town called Port St. Johns on the Indian Ocean coast. Although it is now inhabited by whites, Port St. Johns has long been claimed by Mantanzima. Without it the Transkei remains landlocked, and is prevented from trading freely. If the government soon agrees to give Richards Bay, another small white town on the Indian Ocean, to landlocked KwaZulu, observers will be dumbfounded.

Yet even as it makes such a major concession, the government refuses to bring unconsolidated parts of several homelands together to provide more administratively and economically viable units. It fails to increase the size of the homeland budgets to the point at which innovation is possible and growth likely. It diverts some foreign firms away from investments in the homelands, and limits their supposed autonomy in educational and other spheres.

These are the kinds of paradoxes which stud nearly all aspects of South African racial policies. If one wants to be hopeful, the concessions provide grounds for believing that the lot of some Africans is improving. But for most there remains the dreary official antagonism to African betterment and the sameness of continued racial intolerance.

The only way one can begin to reconcile the two faces of South Africa is to believe that underneath the blanket of apartheid there is a stirring, not of conscience, but of economic and political reality. This stirring means little now, though it merits some cautious hope. If it is not stifled, however, Africans could benefit incrementally.

But these benefits will neither do away with nor erode the racial separation that is the keystone of official South African policy. Whites will give away almost anything before they will cease segregating, denying equal

opportunity, and enforcing their racial laws by the effective deployment of a large security police.

The statesmen of independent Africa, and many Arabs and Americans, believe that the current oil sanctions against South Africa will so cripple its economy as to compel the country to concede freedom to blacks. Yet whites would tighten their belts and go virtually to the economic wall before they would transfer meaningful power to blacks. Of even more importance, South Africans already have a large stockpile of oil, manufacture some of their own from shale and coal, are prospecting seriously off the country's coasts, and anyway obtain some crude oil from Iran and probably Indonesia.

Furthermore, South Africa only obtains about 30 per cent of its energy needs from external sources of oil, much of its electricity being generated by water-driven and coal-fired turbines. A 50 mile per hour speed limit on the nation's highways and a ban on Sunday gasoline sales are helping to conserve fuel. So, even if the oil sanctions ultimately hurt South Africa (which is unlikely) apartheid will be the last policy to be altered as a result of this kind of outside pressure.

In some ways those who want to do away with apartheid are forced to hope for an internal revolution, which at present seems extremely unlikely. The forces of repression are still too strong, and outside assistance too remote, for revolution to have any chance of success. Apartheid, with all its injustices, may well remain basic to South African life for a long time to come.

## *Divestment and Disinvestment*

In 1977, a year after bitter riots in Soweto revived speculation that apartheid could be destroyed both from within and without, I inaugurated a series of monthly columns in the *Christian Science Monitor*. The very first congratulated Andrew Young, the controversial U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, for having visited and criticized South Africa. But his suggestion in Johannesburg that blacks should boycott whites and use various methods of passive resistance to cripple apartheid was naive. Unlike the experience of the American South, black South Africans could not then count on support from the rule of law or successful appeals to responsive public opinion. “What worked in somewhat different times and places, with the assistance of an enlightened judiciary, [would] not work [in South Africa] as easily or as precisely.” Uninformed policymaking was dangerous and misleading. It underestimated the complexities and overestimated the ability of racists to appreciate when to buckle. (“Andrew Young: After Candor What?” *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 June 1977.)

If passive resistance and boycotts were unrealistic, could the South African juggernaut be brought to its knees by widespread U.S. corporate divestment? The moral argument against South Africa and apartheid was obvious and clear. But to what extent did the existence in South Africa of American firms prop up the South African system? If they withdrew, would South Africa change? This was a central policy argument of the 1970s and 1980s, especially in university and church circles.

Of all foreign investment in South Africa, the American share was then 16 percent. Britain had a share double or triple that of the Americans, and so did the remainder of Europe combined. Trade flows between Europe and South Africa were more important than between the U.S. and South Africa. So there was a question of efficacy. Additionally, if U.S. companies withdrew, their operations would continue but would be controlled by South African employers less supportive of Africans, and paying lower wages—exactly what happened when divestment occurred. I suggested that threats

of withdrawal were more salient than withdrawal itself, and that the denial of new investments (rather than divestiture) was more influential still. Only when positive political and economic changes took place would new investments follow. That was the stronger message to be delivered by foreign investors.

If they remained in South Africa, however, U.S. corporate entities could not sit on their hands. They should attempt to have a positive impact on the welfare and livelihoods of their employees, thus undermining apartheid. They should pay workers more, I advocated. They ought to promote Africans and give them managerial responsibilities, “even over whites.” They could appoint black directors and recognize black unions—both startling acts in the South African context. There were few legal constraints, I advised. Unless the American firms set an example of corporate social responsibility, how could they “justify remaining?” (“Should U.S. Firms Do Business in South Africa?” *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 July 1978.)

South Africa’s attempt physically to make its cities completely white (an impossibility) and give 22 million Africans nominal “rights” and farmland in thirteen small, scattered, and discontinuous homelands—within a much larger country controlled by 4 million whites—was then in full swing. Two of the homelands had even become “independent,” although the overall white government still controlled them in every sense. Several prominent German politicians, and a few Americans, like a governor of New Hampshire and a few U.S. senators and representatives, visited and praised the homelands. (Young had visited, too, but he had sung an anthem of defiance with Buthelezi.) In early 1978, I urged policymakers to regard the Transkei homeland’s diplomatic break with (it had earlier accepted “independence” from) South Africa as comic posturing, rather than anything serious. (“Don’t Yawn at Transkei Threat,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 April 1978.) The Transkei, a creature of apartheid and recognized only by South Africa, had recently attacked its patron verbally, and had threatened to mobilize its tiny army against the massive military might of South Africa. The article suggested that the Transkei was but a Potemkin-like provincial façade. No African countries would embrace the Transkei’s supposed independence, and the West should not be fooled into believing that the Transkei could assume more than a pretense of meaningful separation.

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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*Andrew Young: After Candor What?*

Ambassador Andrew Young has been good for Africa. He has focused attention in the United States on a series of problems which will not readily go away. For Africans his candor and his lack of diplomatic finesse provide a refreshing change after Secretary of State Kissinger's enigmatic variations. Mr. Young has given Africans the feeling that someone close to the most powerful leader in the world cares about them and what they think.

Style, for a time, is more important than substance. But, for Africans, the substance has also been good. Mr. Young has used the epithet *racist* liberally, and to the delight of Africans. He has taken his cause, and theirs, into the heart of white South Africa and, from the African point of view, said what had to be said.

Perhaps Ambassador Young's most dramatic act for Africans was his singing a black anthem of defiance with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu (a black homeland in South Africa). He also went to South Africa when the government wanted him to stay away. And he went to the Maputo conference in Mozambique against the advice of more cautious diplomats.

Andrew Young is good, spontaneous theater and Africans welcome that. Africans chortle at the discomfort of their enemies. Furthermore, they trust Mr. Young, and his well-articulated, easily understood enunciation of American policy regarding the third world. Dr. Kissinger—for them serious, melancholy, and “deep”—was open to suspicion. He warmed few African hearts.

More than high camp, Mr. Young talks what Africans regard as, and what is, after all, good sense. He has uttered some home truths about the Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia. If stability is a goal, the Cubans in Ethiopia may indeed assist in tempering the edges of chaos. In Angola, where Cubans intervened massively, they have also contributed to the administrative and technical uplift of a country otherwise largely bereft of skills.

For the sake of the relations of the United States with black Africa, it is good that Mr. Young has said all of these things. For the sake of the need to raise the consciousness of the American public about the problems of Africa, it is well that he has spoken intemperately. For the sake of his continued credibility, and for the sake of American relations with Europe, however, it is probably better that he now speak less often about Africa, and with



far more deliberation. President Carter has apparently come to the same conclusion.

But even President Carter may not appreciate the greatest danger in Ambassador Young's approach to and analysis of the dilemmas of Africa. Mr. Young has systematically compared the problems of South Africa to those of the American South. The analogy, however, is less than perfect. In many ways it is highly misleading. The weapons used by American blacks in their own struggle can backfire in the harsher atmosphere of South Africa.

When Mr. Young in Johannesburg last month commended the utility of an economic boycott by blacks, he failed to appreciate the enormous income disparities between white and black. He spoke too glibly of boycotts in a country where many working Africans can barely subsist, and where many can find no work.

There is also the inescapable fact—which concentrates white minds in South Africa—that Africans outnumber whites by 5 to 1. In the American South the ratio was almost everywhere different, and whites could look to the greater Union for economic and political security and, if necessary, escape.

Passive resistance is no real option for blacks. Support from the rule of law and enlightened public opinion is not readily available. More than privilege is at stake, too, and both the whites who hold power and the Africans who want that power have the destiny of whole peoples and nations in their hands. There is the force of history, too; the juggernaut of human rights and equality seems to be pressing relentlessly against the South African hulk.

What worked in somewhat different times and places, with the assistance of an enlightened judiciary, will not work as easily or as precisely at the tip of a troubled continent. In the American South, too, the first changes were reformist. In South Africa, where the whites look over their shoulders at the Congo, Uganda, Biafra, and so on, change is seen by both sides not necessarily correctly as cataclysmic. Blacks, too, will no longer be content with reform.

The danger for the United States in a naive analysis is that policy can flow from it, and such a policy can well prove insufficient or dangerous or both. At best, it tends to be misleading. It underestimates the complexities and, curiously, probably overestimates the ability of "racists" to alter their assessment of when and how best to accept the inevitable.

When Mr. Young told South African students last month that their country in 15 years could well "be ahead of England in race relations," he exuded a profound faith that reason and enlightened self-interest would prevail. He may be right, but translating Mr. Young's aphorism into action will prove much more difficult than he professes to realize.

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### *Don't Yawn at Transkei Threat*

The American media have largely viewed Transkei's diplomatic break with South Africa as an occasion for mirth. To be sure, the specter of one of South Africa's own children biting the hand that feeds it has an opéra bouffe appeal. Created and recognized only by South Africa, is Transkei merely huffing and puffing in order to gain greater attention from its benefactor, or can an aroused Transkei play a creative role in the emergence of a changed southern Africa?

As long ago as 1963, when South Africa's policy of transforming rural reserves into crowded Bantustans for the bulk of its black population began to gather momentum, Transkei was the first to accept the kind of modified home rule which ripened into independence in 1976. One other homeland, Bophuthatswana, followed Transkei in 1977; the tiny Venda homeland has asked for similar status this year. If it becomes independent, seven homelands of varying sizes will remain, all but one self-governing but thus far unready to request independence.

South Africa wants to transform all of its black subjects into citizens of these peripheral homelands. There are about 22 million black South Africans, and only 4 million whites, 3 million Coloureds, and 1 million Asians. But the homelands (including Transkei and Bophuthatswana) collectively comprise less than 13 percent of South Africa's land mass and probably less than 5 percent of its resources base.

Transkei's break with South Africa, coupled as it was with a stinging verbal attack on apartheid and a threat to mobilize Transkei's tiny army against the massive military might of South Africa, could have several unforeseen consequences. Because Transkei has now demonstrated that South Africa's puppets can denigrate as well as supplicate, Transkei's bold declaration of manhood could make it easier rather than harder for South Africa to justify the legitimacy of the homeland concept. If the process of creating independent homelands continues to its ultimate conclusion, South Africa will successfully have deprived Africans (this is its present plan) of all rights to the white heartland. Africans will be welcome to work there, but not to reside permanently.

Observers have always anticipated that Prime Minister Kaiser Matanzima of Transkei would someday break with his former masters. He may have done so now in order merely to elicit more South African financial assistance, as a kind of blackmail. (South Africa's Prime Minister John Vorster

told Parliament that, shocking and ungrateful as Transkei's behavior might seem, South Africa would continue to provide it with funds equivalent to 70 percent of its yearly budget.) Or Mr. Matanzima may have attacked by arrangement, as a means of giving greater credibility to South Africa's homeland policies. It is possible, too, that he picked a quarrel with South Africa over a relatively unlikely chunk of land because he felt that the time had come to seek international recognition.

The West has no intention of legitimizing South Africa's separate development policies by applauding Transkei's modest pressure on South Africa. Nor, for the same reason, will any African nations rush to embrace Transkei. But Mr. Matanzima, a shrewd opportunist of skill, may have looked northward to Ethiopia and westward to Angola. He may have despaired of obtaining orthodox financing for the economic transformation of his country and its single silted-up port on the Indian Ocean. He may also wonder whether having Soviet, Cuban, or Chinese embassies in Umtata, his capital, might not enhance his country's finances and image.

It is too early to suggest that Transkei, once derided, might prove the newest outpost of Soviet adventurism and the new center of the struggle for southern Africa. But if Gilbert and Sullivan or Evelyn Waugh lived, they would know how to ring both the comic and the tragicomic changes on the unlikely situation that has developed.

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### ***Should U.S. Firms Do Business in South Africa?***

Should American banks and corporations continue to do business in South Africa? Should they divest themselves of their holdings and have nothing more to do with South Africa until a just society is achieved? Or should they remain and try to exert a socially responsible influence?

These are key questions in congressional, university, church-related, and trade union circles. They also exercise the more than 300 managements of American corporations and banks with interests in South Africa.

The questions themselves pose simple choices, but the issues behind the questions are complex, and answers depend upon different sets of assumptions. There is one rule, however. American corporations and banks should act only in ways which promise to maximize their influence on policy.

Those who advocate disinvestment employ a central moral and economic argument: that the existence of American corporations helps prop up the inimical South African system. To withdraw would make white-ruled South Africa suffer, change its policies, and reform.

Alas, it is unlikely that an American withdrawal, even if physically and legally practical, would have the impact on policy which its supporters suppose. South Africa has made asset-stripping difficult; American-owned establishments might be commandeered by the state or transferred to non-Americans. Americans do have the kinds of managerial and technological expertise which South Africa wants, but it is not irreplaceable.

Furthermore, of the total foreign investment in South Africa, the American share is only 16 percent. The British investment is more than twice as massive, and the countries of the European continent have together invested as heavily as Britain. In terms of trade, too, Europe is much more active than the United States, and much more dependent as well upon sales to South Africa. Persuading European and American companies and banks to disengage from South Africa will be a daunting task.

Those who suggest disinvestment may also be making the wrong argument. For South Africa needs infusions of new capital to grow. There is little new American corporate money going to South Africa now: the economic climate is unattractive and, politically, there is little reason for American firms to be sanguine about the country's potential stability. Banks, too, have decided for economic and political reasons to refrain from any term lending, at least to the government and to public corporations.

The impact of American corporate and banking thinking on South Africa is probably greater because of the shrinkage of new funds than because of threats of withdrawal. The message is clear: only when the political and economic climates improve will American bankers and corporate managers invest sizable sums of new money.

In addition, if they stay, American corporations cannot sit on their hands. They can have a positive impact on the welfare and livelihood of their 100,000 employees. They ought to pay them more; they ought to promote blacks and give them managerial responsibilities, even over whites. They can appoint black directors; they can recognize black unions. There are far fewer legal constraints on such actions than American corporations have realized.

Too few American corporations have thus far exerted themselves in these areas. What they now do may not transform South Africa, but unless they set an example of corporate social responsibility, how can they justify remaining?

## *Mailed Fist and Velvet Glove*

Botha was elected prime minister of South Africa in 1978, succeeding the “dour” Balthazar Johannes Vorster, a Nazi sympathizer who had run the country with an iron fist for twelve gloomy years. In the *Christian Science Monitor* (“The South African Succession,” 26 Sept. 1978) and the *Baltimore Sun* (“South Africa’s New, Old Guard Prime Minister,” 15 Oct. 1978), I predicted that Botha, for many years minister of defense, would be unequal to the severe challenges facing South Africa (two years after the sprawling ghetto of Soweto, near Johannesburg, erupted into violence on a scale hitherto unknown in the country). Like the Kent State shootings in the U.S. (1970), the South African police had fired on peaceful school-age marchers intent upon protesting a discriminatory educational issue. Soweto had erupted. It was the first occasion since Sharpeville in 1961 that Africans had been able to mobilize against the apartheid regime. This time, the rolling disturbances continued for several months, spreading from Soweto to other cities, and inaugurating South Africa’s version of the *intifada* and anticipating the more successful and much more determined cascade of outrage in the 1980s.

In the aftermath of Soweto, Botha’s South Africa faced rising black unemployment, increasingly militant and restless African youths, new waves of violence, a faltering economy that could no longer attract foreign investment, and the country’s increasing isolation (with the Carter administration in the United States leading a renewed anti-apartheid and anti-South African charge). On past performance, I wrote, Botha would try to tough it out. He was volatile, with an imperious manner and a fierce temper. His understanding, even more so his appreciation, of African problems, was limited. Yet, in earlier speeches and in some of his previous ministerial actions, Botha seemed much more aware of apartheid’s flaws than Vorster. “All people are the creation of God,” he had declared in 1974. I suggested that the responsibilities of his office, and a thoughtfulness beneath the hard-boiled exterior, might produce unexpected political direction.

A year later, in 1979, a string of op-ed articles in the *Christian Science Monitor* noted how repeated outbursts of Soweto-like violence throughout the country, together with a widespread boycott of schools by African children, had coincided with partial, episodic, and very tentative (but still thoroughly inconclusive) easings of the stranglehold of apartheid. One op-ed was entitled “South Africa: Can It Go Two Ways at Once?” (28 June 1979).

Botha had declared that South Africa must “adapt or die.” He admitted the fundamental error of two thirty-year old laws, the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act, both of which criminalized sexual relations across the color line. Botha told his ruling National Party that those laws, and others like them, were unnecessary. He opposed routine segregation, as well, criticizing separate lines in post offices and the national ban on interracial sport. Meanwhile, Botha’s government accepted two pathbreaking commission reports. One recommended a remarkable weakening of official controls that for long had severely restricted African residence and employment in “white” urban areas—the cities of the country—where nearly all substantial income-earning opportunities could be found. Another recommended that Africans be permitted to form trade unions, that job categories long reserved for whites be opened to Africans, and that Africans now be trained for skilled (rather than just manual) occupations.

Bishop (later Archbishop) Desmond Tutu, then secretary of the South African Council of Churches and a persistent critic of the government, was sufficiently mesmerized by Botha’s moves, several welcome maneuvers by Botha’s outward-looking minister of cooperation and development (black affairs), and perhaps the convening of a remarkable conference on human rights in Cape Town—the first ever on South African soil (“South Africa’s Remarkable Conference on Rights,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 March 1979) that he offered Botha a formula for bold and positive action: Tutu asked Botha to create a common citizenship within an undivided nation, to abolish the pass laws (which restricted black mobility), to cease removing Africans from cities to rural dumping grounds, and to upgrade educational performance by creating a unified educational system. (“To Lead South Africa Out of Despair,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 Oct. 1980.)

Apartheid was inherently destructive, but taking Africans from their own homes in and around Johannesburg (starting with the notorious Sophiatown exodus in 1958) and Cape Town (District Six, from 1966 to 1980), and eradicating “black spot” (an African area outside the designated reserves, later bantustans and homelands) after black spot across the rural vastness of the nation, raised apartheid to unprecedented heights of individual and group cruelty. About 3.5 million Africans, Coloureds, and Asians were eventually

compelled to vacate their homes and ancestral lands to make way for whites or to tidy the segregated maps of South Africa in fits of bureaucratic fervor. One tragic case was that of Saul Mkhize, whose grandfather (along with other Africans of the same generation) purchased plots of land from whites in 1912 in the southeastern Transvaal (now Gauteng province). These plots remained in Mkhize's family and the families of his grandfather's compatriots thereafter, despite the fact that the plots collectively constituted a black spot.

In 1983, Mkhize and 7,000 fellow black spot farmers were told by the South African department of cooperation and development to leave their properties for unsuitable, waterless, less arable substitute plots in a homeland. The black spot would be forcibly removed, Mkhize and his friends were warned. Yet they tried to protest peacefully. They reasoned with the officials. Mkhize wrote a letter to Botha. Mkhize could not ask effectively for a court injunction, nor appeal to sympathetic politicians. Finally, in a confrontation with the protesters, still unarmed and attempting to reason, a police shotgun killed Mkhize.

"Mkhize was not a politician. Nor was he much interested in the affairs of state," I wrote. "But he was black and, with a desperation that is common to farmers, he was trying to save his land, and the land of nearly 7,000 others." Mkhize's death should "compel Americans and concerned white South Africans," I wrote, to question the justness of removals, even within the harsh and immoral framework of apartheid. ("A South African Death," *New York Times*, 18 April 1983.)

Mkhize's death hardly stopped the removals. In 1984, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain personally urged Botha to leave the people of Kwa Ngema alone. Thatcher interested herself in the tiny black spot of Kwa Ngema (only 160 families) because King Edward VII in 1904 had given the land of Kwa Ngema to Zulu warriors for their loyal help in fighting Botha's forefathers during the Anglo-Boer War. The Kwa Ngema inhabitants had petitioned Queen Elizabeth II: "We believed this land was ours forever. . . . We loved this land of ours. . . . Our ancestors are buried here." They feared being removed to barren soils near the Swaziland border. But Thatcher's intervention fell on deaf South African ears. Police and trucks came. Kwa Ngema was razed, and new houses were built for white workers. That was apartheid South Africa's version of progress. ("South African Black Spots and Removals," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 July 1984.)

Botha never addressed Tutu's real concerns. He was too intent on strengthening his own hand within the National Party and on pursuing a pre-emptive policy of extirpation against ANC guerillas in neighboring states or overseas. His government concocted a "total strategy" against the red

threat—"the total onslaught"—that supposedly was pointed dagger-like toward the heart of South Africa. "The military mind [had] thus clearly [been] imposed on the workings of the South African government." Botha was the leader of the securocrats and his then new State Security Council developed into a merciless directorate of repression, often declaring that African protest leaders should be "removed" from society. ("The Process of Decision-Making in Contemporary South Africa," *CSIS Africa Notes*, 28 Dec. 1983.) And many were, as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995–1999) discovered and documented.

Most South African and Western analysts had long assumed that because it had a parliamentary governmental system, South Africa made strategic decisions the way other, non-apartheid, "democracies" did—with relative transparency. Instead, under Vorster and his predecessors, decision-making in South Africa was highly concentrated. A handful of powerful oligarchs influenced prime ministerial conclusions, a few cabinet ministers exercised authority, but in circumscribed spheres, and parliament was largely a debating chamber. Vorster was rigid and authoritarian, but his governing methods were more informal than methodical.

What Botha brought to South African governance from his many years as minister of defence was a heightened sense of command and control. That was Botha's strength, and his and South Africa's ultimate undoing. A central purpose of "The Process of Decision Making" was to expose policy makers in the U.S. and Europe to the realities of Botha's rule. Whereas the guiding force in Vorster's time was the Bureau of State Security—a menacing intelligence agency—Botha created and then relied on a State Security Council, run by military officers, military intelligence, and civilian securocrats. They were at the helm of South Africa (with cabinet ministers having relatively less influence than before) during the increasingly troubled and desperate 1980s. Thus, political, economic, and social thinking were subordinated, under Botha, to the concerns of security. Coping with a perceived communist "total onslaught" from outside motivated the Council (and Botha) more than eruptions in the townships. The military mind imposed itself on a South Africa that needed more supple and much more forward-looking leadership.

Botha thus remained wedded to separate development and homelands, two of which—Venda and Ciskei—were pushed into "independence" during these same defining years. One of my opinion pieces called the homeland policy a "dead end," deriding the official decision to call an impoverished enclave (Venda) "independent" when 90 percent of its earnings depended on remittances from distant South African cities and when it



was run by a cabal of local, corrupt thugs reporting to a white “ambassador.” (“South Africa’s Homelands Policy—A Dead End,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 Oct. 1979.)

The Ciskei followed Venda into “independence,” notwithstanding an international commission that recommended sharply against such a folly. As my article explained, the commission even recommended an ingenious alternative—a method of linking the African areas labeled “Ciskei” effectively with the surrounding white urban and farming areas. The commission envisioned a self-governing “condominium” freed from South Africa’s racial legislation but remaining a part of the Republic for foreign affairs, defense, and in order to use the broader infrastructure. (“South Africa’s Latest Homeland: A New Approach,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 Feb. 1980.) But neither Botha’s government, nor the satrapy of the corrupt Ciskei, could act so innovatively, and both denounced the commission’s efforts and then embraced “independence” for the tiny territory along South Africa’s southeastern coast. (“Casting Ciskei Out of South Africa,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 Dec. 1981.)

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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### *South Africa’s New, Old Guard Prime Minister*

Pieter Willem Botha’s election last month as South Africa’s new prime minister could not have come at a more inopportune time. That, at least, is the prevailing view among liberals in South Africa and critics of South Africa in the West.

Even white South Africans who could hardly be called liberals, many of them Afrikaners of the so-called enlightened wing of the ruling National party, share the fear that Mr. Botha will not be equal to the challenges facing his country.

Those challenges are several: Within the country black unemployment is rising to unprecedented levels, the black dwelling areas are restless; young blacks are, if in diminished numbers, still boycotting secondary schools, and violence seems an expected accompaniment of daily race relations. One challenge is how best to accommodate black aspirations and black desires for effective political representation to white fears of the loss of power and privilege.

*Christian Science Monitor*, 15 October 1978.

A second challenge is related to the first: Although high gold prices have helped cushion the impact of recession on South Africa, its economy is faltering. Reviving confidence in its future growth is linked to a resolution of problems connected with the first challenge. Without finding ways to restore faith in its stability, South Africa will be unable to attract the foreign investment which it needs to grow (in real terms).

A third is the challenge of isolation: John Vorster, Mr. Botha's predecessor, refused to battle the West on every front. In 1977, he agreed to negotiate a transfer of power in Namibia with five representatives of the West. The negotiations earlier this year resulted in the acceptance by South Africa and the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), the main liberation group opposed to South African control of the territory, of a Western formula meant to convey legitimacy to a new government after elections to be supervised by the United Nations. But, just when it appeared that peaceful change was assured, Mr. Vorster last month coupled his resignation with a decision to go it alone in Namibia.

Mr. Botha, who has always been reputed to oppose the Namibian negotiations, now must decide whether or not to battle the West on Namibia and thereby to invite the implementation of broad sanctions against South Africa's economy.

Many South Africans of the ruling National party favor a standfast approach. They see their own safety in self-reliant antagonism rather than cooperation. Mr. Vorster spoke that way but acted more pragmatically. He took the position that, within limits, cooperation with the West, and with black Africa, could help ease the painful transition of South Africa from a white-run to (over a term longer than Africans are probably prepared to contemplate) some unspecified kind of mixed society.

Mr. Botha—on past performance—may not share that pragmatism. He may even want to resume military assistance (stopped by Mr. Vorster two years ago) to the beleaguered white Rhodesians. He may want to oppose all foreign attempts to nudge South Africa into a political posture more acceptable to world opinion. He may assert that world opinion is irrelevant.

His critics fear that he will hang tough—that he is not the man for this season of discontent, or any season. Whatever their political persuasion, most South Africans acknowledge their new prime minister's extreme volatility. They point to his excitability in Parliament as majority leader, his abuse of opponents and his reputation as a "cowboy." His nickname is "Piet Skiet" or "Pete Shoot."

Mr. Botha has been a member of Parliament for 30 years and is now 62. Before he entered Parliament he studied law at the University of the Orange

Free State. From that time he was a National party organizer. After entering Parliament—five years before Mr. Vorster—he was an active backbencher, then a deputy minister of the interior, minister of Coloured affairs, minister of public works, and from 1966, minister of defense, a position he maintains. He is reputed to be an efficient, careful manager of this large department.

The new prime minister has also headed the Cape Province section of the National party for 12 years. He is a thorough politician of tenacity, taking over from a predecessor of his own age. He has limited overseas experience and contacts, however, having rarely ventured very far outside South Africa.

In many respects Mr. Botha fits the stereotype of an Afrikaner politician. But, unlike his predecessor, Mr. Botha comes into office with a reputation in certain areas of internal politics more liberal than Mr. Vorster. He has represented a constituency in the Cape Province, where most Coloureds (people of mixed race) reside, and has never favored extreme discriminatory measures against them. In 1974, he told a party conclave that whites should not take apartheid too far. Shortly afterward he told a meeting in Pretoria that the country would face a revolution if it insisted on the supremacy of white over brown and black people.

“All people,” he said at the time, “are the creation of God.” (Yet he favors homelands for blacks and presumably opposes the transfer even of limited power to them.)

There may be a few other reasons, too, why Mr. Botha’s critics may be judging their man with too much haste. The responsibility and stature of office may moderate his tough-guy approach. The realities of the premiership have so affected all of his predecessors. But even if his approach in many ways is even more uncompromising than Mr. Vorster’s, conceivably Mr. Botha’s impeccable credentials as an opponent of rapid change will paradoxically make leadership and shifts in South Africa’s political direction easier to sell to whites and implement.

After all, it was President Nixon’s reputation as an anti-Communist that permitted him to make the opening to China. Mr. Botha—and this is the hope—will recognize the desperation of today’s South African dilemma and act decisively in a manner that a weaker, less secure figure could not.

No one has called Mr. Botha a fool. Despite what his critics say and Westerners fear, the logic of South Africa’s position may well propel Mr. Botha to lead boldly rather than reflexively. His policies during the next three months, especially those relating to Namibia and Rhodesia, will show the temper of the man and provide a guide to troubled South Africa.

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### *South Africa: Can It Go Two Ways at Once?*

The government of South Africa periodically tries to ride two horses at once. In May, outsiders took heart when its white leadership at last (or once again) showed signs of dismantling apartheid and of coming to terms with the reality of black numbers and black aspirations. But no sooner had one horse begun cantering leftward than the other trotted off to the right.

South Africa is undergoing one of those almost yearly exercises in euphoria and deflation. It is as important to be aware of the ferment of positive change, and to acknowledge its potential, as it is to note how churlishly the most important innovations have been accepted and how strong are contrary official tendencies.

Dr. Piet Koornhof, Minister of Cooperation and Development (black affairs), and the most articulate and adventurous liberal in the National Party Cabinet, made Africans happy by promising not to destroy the 20,000-strong Crossroads squatter settlement near Cape Town (his predecessors had bulldozed two other such shantytowns) and to maintain Alexandra township near Johannesburg as a residential area for black families rather than convert it into a high-rise hostel area for single migrant workers.

Koornhof further appointed a large committee to recommend changes in the way the state regards urban-dwelling blacks, thus hinting that the government was prepared to reevaluate previous policies based on the premise that Africans could be regarded only as temporary sojourners (out of the homelands) in the urban areas. In announcing the committee, Koornhof also did the unexpected: as members he nominated several Africans widely respected by militant blacks despite (or because of, which is the more remarkable) the fact that they had been imprisoned as enemies of the state less than two years ago.

Koornhof pleaded with opposition whites and with urban, militant blacks to give him and his policies "a chance." If Africans would only be patient, and cooperative, then he would seek to improve their lives as South Africans.

In May, too, the government warmly received two commission reports which confirmed the direction in which Koornhof seemed to be leading the government. The report of the Commission of Inquiry into Labor Legislation (known as the Wiehan report after its chairman) recommended that Africans be permitted to unionize, that the reservation of certain categories

of jobs for whites be eliminated, that discrimination in industry be eliminated, and that Africans be allowed to train for and assume skilled positions.

The report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilization of Manpower (known as the Riekert report after its chairman) recommended remarkable relaxations of government controls upon the limitations to the residence and employment of Africans in urban areas.

Both reports were widely welcomed in South Africa and accepted in principle by the government. They did not directly deal with the overriding problem of South Africa—how best to give Africans a political stake in the future of the country—but together with Koornhof's actions they represented a major shift in official thinking. For the first time in more than twenty years, said a long-time opponent of the government, the ideology of separation had been scrapped.

Hard-line whites do not give up easily, however. The right-wing white mine workers' union bitterly opposed the Wiehan recommendations and the government at first seemed to ignore protests from that quarter. But in late May the Cabinet began backtracking: it introduced legislation effectively emasculating the recommendations of the report. Migrant laborers (from other jurisdictions) and "commuters" into white-run cities—80 percent of the total—were excluded from unions and other new reforms. Dr. Alex Boraine, for the opposition, called the government action "the height of cynicism."

Where there had been euphoria there was disillusionment, and fears that the Riekert proposals would also be watered down. The disillusionment was increased, too, when the government in late May introduced legislation (despite protests from legal organizations and both the English and Afrikaans press) which would effectively make it illegal to expose official corruption in public until an advocate-general appointed by the state president had investigated such allegations in secret and handed down a ruling (months or years could go by).

This was Prime Minister P. W. Botha's answer to the Muldergate scandal, which has undermined the National Party's reputation for probity and last year brought about the resignation of three powerful party figures and this month the resignation of B. Johannes Vorster, the State President. *The Star*, the country's largest newspaper, said that Botha was merely "manufacturing a carpet under which dirt can be hidden in the future."

If the advocate-general bill, and an earlier amendment to the Police Act which, when enacted, will prevent the press from reporting police matters without permission of the police, were not enough, Botha's government has bristled internationally. It has backed away from its earlier agreement to

work toward an international settlement of the Namibian question, is supporting the Muzorewa government in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, and is talking bitterly about "going it alone" and ending all cooperation defensively and diplomatically with the West.

Which is the window dressing? American policymakers are sufficiently disillusioned with South Africa to assume that the internationally recalcitrant South Africa is the real South Africa. Optimists prefer to think that Koornhof is not alone, and represents hope for the future. Both may be right, and how best to accentuate the impetus for positive, constructive change is the political dilemma for America.

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### *South Africa's Homelands Policy—A Dead End*

South Africa recently transformed a partially self-governing black enclave into the locally recognized independent homeland of Venda. Doing so represented the high-water mark of separate development, a policy the time for which has past.

Venda, with nearly 300,000 residents within an area twice the size of Rhode Island, and with another 150,000 living outside in the white-run areas of the country, will be regarded as independent by no other nation, will depend for nearly 90 percent of its annual income upon the coffers of South Africa, and will, it appears, be governed despotically by a group of politicians firmly rejected by the voters in last year's Venda election.

Venda is the third homeland, following Transkei in 1976 and Bophuthatswana in 1977, to have moved from quasi-autonomy within South Africa to a local status of independence. The seven remaining South African homelands are unlikely to take the same route, three because their leaders are bitterly opposed to so blessing separate development and political apartheid, the others for practical reasons as well as reasons of principle.

Moreover, even white architects of separate development are beginning to concede that the long-nurtured attempt to grant homelands independence, and thus to remove Africans from the South African political equation, cannot succeed. When Dr. Cornelius Mulder was in charge of African affairs in 1978 he enunciated an unambiguous proposition: All Africans would be assigned to homelands; all homelands would become independent; and, as a result, South Africa would shed all of its African citizens, turning them into politically impotent guest-workers.

Yet millions of Africans are South Africans and have resisted the homelands policy. The homelands are too small, too impoverished, and too developmentally unpromising to provide meaningful resources for 22 million Africans now and 37 million in 20 years. Africans see no logical reason why they should forfeit a future claim to the vast wealth of South Africa. They have contributed to its growth for at least 150 years.

The government of South Africa, through the actions and words of its Prime Minister and its Minister of Cooperation and Development, has begun to rethink the practical sense as well as the political utility of trying to turn all of its Africans into non-citizens. It has realized that there are twice as many Africans as whites in the urban areas of the country. In the year 2000 there will be four times as many Africans as whites. Even as guest workers their numbers would be formidable, especially with vast and unassuaged political grievances.

The key leaders of the homelands, like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu and Dr. Hudson Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu, will resist independence to the last. Africans in the urban areas are implacably opposed. Even rural Africans are by and large antagonistic. The world condemns it. No nation has recognized Transkei, Bophuthatswana, or Venda. What profit a policy, white leaders now ask, which has been unmasked as a cynical and unsuccessful attempt to perpetuate white rule in South Africa by fictive devices?

Already the government of South Africa has begun talking seriously about the granting of a form of autonomy to Soweto, with its 1.3 million inhabitants, and other large African dormitory townships around the major cities of the country. There are official hints that the pass laws and influx control, those legal mechanisms at the heart of apartheid, will be modified. The government also intends to enlarge the land areas of the homelands (now only a total of 13 percent of the entire country) and to transfer white towns and farming areas to them. Economic concessions are being discussed, too. Most of all, there is an awareness that new political arrangements must be sought.

Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha's government is prepared to devise some kind of loosely linked federal arrangement, but the conditions, and the ways in which powers might be divided, are as yet unspecified. Changes along those and similar lines may help improve the quality of African life. But Africans primarily seek a universally recognized way of expressing their own views, and of helping to plan for the future of the greater South Africa. This is usually termed a demand for political representation or power sharing; both claims are anathema to the white government of South Africa.

How Botha's government resolves this dilemma will determine the fate of an expensive, conflict-ridden land. What appears certain is that separate development is approaching a dead end. Something new, conceivably something equally contrived, and therefore of no long-term utility, may be put in its place. Or, and this is as yet an aspiration, the end of separate development could herald the beginning of new political arrangements arrived at in consultation with Africans.

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### *South Africa's Latest Homeland: A New Approach*

A controversial international commission has just advised South Africans not to proceed with the independence of its remaining black homelands. It also offers an imaginative blueprint for the creation of a multiracial, self-governing zone within South Africa.

Both recommendations are sure to excite black South Africans and dismay the government. The commission, composed of a former British ambassador to South Africa, two American academics, and four South Africans (including two prominent Afrikaners and an African lecturer), was appointed a year ago by the government of the Ciskei, a homeland of 700,000 Africans on the southeast coast of South Africa. Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda, three of the homelands carved out of the body of South Africa despite great African hostility, declared their independence in 1976, 1978, and 1979. None has been recognized internationally. Each has been shunned in turn by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the leading nations of the West. Before taking a similar step, the Ciskei asked for advice and appointed the commission.

After taking evidence in South Africa and sponsoring a detailed public opinion poll among Africans, the commission learned that urban Africans (especially Ciskeians) were overwhelmingly opposed to further grants of independence to places like the Ciskei. Even rural Africans (including those resident in the Ciskei) were opposed.

The commission was heavily influenced by the results of its poll and by its deliberate weighing of arguments in favor of and against independence for the Ciskei. Finally, in its report (released Monday, Feb. 11, in South Africa) it argued against independence because "in terms of size and economic viability" the Ciskei would be badly endowed; because an independent Ciskei would not be recognized; because of the attitude survey data; and



because independence would cut off a place like the Ciskei from the political and economic benefits which would in the future accrue to the people of South Africa. The last, an argument in equity, was especially persuasive.

The commission recognized that the black government of the Ciskei might nevertheless decide in favor of independence. It might also be prodded by South Africa. The commission's report warned the Ciskei to opt for independence only if the majority of its people voted in favor of such a separation (no homeland has yet polled its people); if blacks were not forced to give up their South African citizenship as a result of any independence; if the Ciskei, now too small and too impoverished, were given a handsome land settlement, including important white areas; if Ciskeians were still permitted to seek work in South Africa; and if South Africa gave the Ciskei equitable financial terms.

In other words, independence in the style of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda is an unattractive option for the Ciskei and the other six remaining dependent homelands of South Africa. The body of the commission's 130-page report, especially the central political and economic chapters, elaborates that point at considerable length.

It is only at the end of its report that the commission describes its vision of a possible alternative to independence. The commission proposes the joining of the Ciskei, a nearby white farming area of roughly equal size, and the adjacent white port city of East London (pop. 75,000) into a multiracial condominium, governed by blacks and whites, and supported economically by an industrial processing zone (like Singapore) and a free port. What is envisaged is a self-governing area about the size of Connecticut, freed from South Africa's restrictive racial legislation but remaining a part of the Republic for purposes of foreign affairs, defense, and the provision of national services like railways.

The commission calls this new entity a condominium, and provides only a sketchy blueprint for its implementation. But it clearly hopes that South Africans will want to create such a black-white run area as an experimental harbinger in microcosm of a future South Africa.

The members of the commission want the condominium proposal to be discussed. In today's changing and still tense South Africa it is a serious and unique contribution to the recently elevated debate over urgent political change.

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### *To Lead South Africa Out of Despair*

The politics of South Africa have assumed a new quality of not-so-quiet desperation. With unaccustomed unanimity, the country's internal critics are demanding bold initiatives and resolute acts. Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha seems to agree. So do many of his colleagues. Even the usually subservient white electorate is looking for positive leadership. But very little has changed politically in South Africa in the year since the same prime minister dramatically heralded the coming of a better deal for blacks and progress in resolving the fundamental problems of his country.

Those problems, for the last six months, have been emphasized by the almost daily protests by African and Coloured (mixed race) school children against their denial of equal educational opportunity. There have been frequent violent clashes between the police and the children, a number of fatalities, and an almost perpetual state of tension in the African and Coloured townships that surround South Africa's major cities.

On several occasions, older urban Africans and Coloureds have grieved militantly, stoning police vehicles and being fired at in return. Last month there was renewed fighting near Cape Town and an outburst of violence in the old diamond mining center of Kimberley. In September, the minister of education and training closed down schools for Africans and Coloureds in many of the disaffected townships.

The children and their elders want better schools, better teachers, and the expenditure of funds on them to be more equal to that spent on whites. The government of South Africa now spends about \$1,000 per white child, \$300 per Coloured, and \$100 for each African in school. The prime minister has acknowledged the disparity and promised a sympathetic hearing to those who wish improvements. Mr. Botha has also been ready to criticize the inequities of social and economic apartheid. Two years ago he said that South Africa must "adapt or die." He admitted the fundamental wrong of two 30-year-old laws, the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act, both of which make sexual relations across the color line criminal offenses.

Last month Mr. Botha startled a provincial congress of his ruling National Party by reiterating that those laws, and others like them, were unnecessary: "I don't believe my nation depends on these laws for its survival." In the face of hostility from many of the delegates to the congress, he went on to attack those who still believed in routine forms of segregation, such as separated lines in post offices or separate athletic teams and competitions. But as

powerful as is Botha's rhetoric in the context of South Africa's overwhelming contest between 22 million blacks and 4.3 million whites, his critics contend that he fiddles relentlessly while South Africa burns. This year's legislative session of the country's exclusively white Parliament was distinctive for its lack of any legislation fundamentally modifying apartheid.

Instead, the government's overwhelming majority in Parliament agreed to abolish its upper house, or Senate, and to replace it with a vaguely defined nominated constitutional body called the president's council, thus giving the prime minister added power and, admittedly, a degree of new freedom from the inhibiting influence of the more "verkrampste," or closed-minded, members of his party. (Africans are excluded from the president's council. Because of that exclusion, South Africa's main white opposition party refused to allow its members to be nominated for places on the council. Of the 61 council members, 15 are Coloured, Asian, or Chinese.)

Since Parliament adjourned in June, the prime minister has strengthened his control of the party and bolstered its "verligte," or liberal, wing by dismissing or shunting aside the verkrampste members of his Cabinet. In their place, he has installed a distinguished classicist, who also happens to have been the leader of the Broederbond (the Band of Brothers, the secret and powerful Afrikaner cultural and political organization); a young theologian and former rugby star; and, as minister of defense, a percipient general, who is credited with understanding that white influence in South Africa can only survive if internal discontent is muted by a fundamental redress of the long-standing injustices of apartheid.

Many politically influential Africans have welcomed Mr. Botha's rhetoric and have praised the way in which he has strengthened the verligte wing of the ruling party. But, their desperation has grown as students have rioted, as Mr. Botha has refused to consider political concessions, as he has forged ahead with plans to strengthen the so-called independent homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda) and to welcome a fourth (Ciskei) to their ranks—and, essentially, as nothing progressive seems to happen. Black desperation has been echoed in many white quarters. Afrikaner theologians have urged action. But no group in recent months has been more outspokenly critical than the usually subdued industrial and business community.

Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of the vast Anglo-American Corporation, is usually muted in his views. In July, however, he called for an urgent and fundamental remodeling of the country's educational system to provide equal facilities for all. He asked for immediate commitments, not vague promises. Racial discrimination and free enterprise were basically incompatible, he declared. In particular, the mobility of black workers was

obstructed and denied, despite government intentions to the contrary. Time, he said, was running out.

A few weeks earlier, in late June, Bishop Desmond Tutu, secretary of the South African Council of Churches and a persistent, but measured, black critic of the government (his passport was taken away earlier in the year), spoke of the dangerous crisis in race relations. But, optimistically, he indicated that Mr. Botha only had to act in four ways to resolve the conflict and lead South Africa in an orderly and evolutionary way toward "political power sharing."

Bishop Tutu said that the government must 1) commit itself to a common citizenship for all South Africans in an undivided South Africa, irrespective of color; 2) abolish the pass laws (which restrict black mobility); 3) cease sending urban Africans involuntarily to barren, rural dumping grounds; and 4) establish a single educational system for all.

Despite these and similar constructive initiatives, the prime minister has remained reluctant to grasp the nettle of bold leadership. There are excuses, foremost of which is a possible decision on his part to continue to consolidate his personal hold on the ruling party before acting resolutely. Or he may think that a general election, and a big victory, is necessary before he can move decisively. No one knows to what extent South Africa's future is a hostage of time.

Therefore, to temporize when the prime minister can lead, and lead boldly, makes critics despair. At a minimum, Mr. Botha could begin to meet Bishop Tutu halfway. For example, he could go beyond rhetoric to promise legislation repealing the Immorality and Mixed Marriages acts. He could modify the pass laws. He could do more than talk about altering apartheid. Most of all he could, before black youth become irretrievably alienated, squarely face the issue of political participation. How is power ultimately to be shared? Will continual violence be necessary to resolve the issue? Mr. Botha knows, and has said, that both questions are intertwined.

Black leaders are still prepared to talk to Botha and his colleagues about meaningful political growth. But for how long? The main lesson of Zimbabwe's successful struggle for independence was one of timing. It is likely that Botha, the supreme tactician, wants to and can act. The fear, however, is that he will talk either to unrepresentative blacks or to none. Only by answering Bishop Tutu and the students on their own terms can he lead South Africa out of despair.

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### *Casting Ciskei Out of South Africa*

The South African government tomorrow (Dec. 4) defies international and internal criticism by granting local independence to Ciskei, a small black enclave in its southeast corner. Ciskei is the fourth homeland to be separated in this manner from the body of South Africa. None of its predecessors (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda) has received any measure of international recognition, although South Africa attempts formally to treat each as if it were in fact a sovereign entity. Chief Minister Lennox Sebe of Ciskei agreed to accept local independence despite the decidedly unfavorable response of a careful public opinion poll and the unanimous opposition of an Anglo-American–South African commission established by his own government. In rejecting independence, the commission said that “South Africa is changing: this is not the time to risk (Ciskei) cutting itself off from the prospect of gaining its rightful share of political and economic benefits within South Africa.”

When South Africa began giving local independence to its 10 homelands in 1976, it thought that it could persuade its own 22 million blacks (and the world) that a measure of autonomy in their own small states (which together comprise but 13 percent of the total land mass of the country) would provide a suitable substitute for the right to vote in South Africa itself. But only a handful of African politicians have agreed. The leaders of the six still dependent homelands, led by Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu, fear the loss of the official South African connection. They say that the pretense of home rule cannot compensate for the loss of a stake in the future of the larger, wealthy South Africa. Urban African leaders are even more vehement, deriding homelands as a way of fracturing the unity of black nationalism. Ciskei is tiny. It encompasses two fragments of land and several other smaller parcels extending inland from the environs of East London, a white-dominated city on South Africa’s Indian Ocean coast. Ciskei’s total land area is about 2,000 square miles, slightly more than the total size of Delaware. A further 1,000 square miles, to be excised from white-owned South Africa, has been promised.

The government of South Africa assigns people to homelands on the basis of language and culture even if they have never lived in the homelands or had any historical connection with them. In Ciskei’s case, only about 700,000 of its nominal total population of 2,100,000 actually reside in the homeland. At least a third of the 700,000 live in Mdantsane, Ciskei’s largest city, a dormitory for commuters to East London. Among the remainder are

recent deportees from South Africa, many having been forcibly removed from white-controlled cities, from squatter camps, or from white-owned farms. They now live in dusty resettlement towns along the borders of Ciskei.

The commission reported that the Ciskei lacked "all the attributes of a viable economy," adding: "It cannot grow sufficient food, not even the basic carbohydrates, to feed its population. It cannot provide employment for its resident population." Moreover, the Ciskei has no port and only modest potential for agricultural and industrial growth. It has no proven mineral resources. Like the other homelands, Ciskei also remains dependent on South African parliamentary approval for at least 80 percent of its total annual budget.

Local independence is not expected to make Ciskei less of an impoverished, overgrazed, densely populated rural backwater with a single urban conglomeration. Many urban Ciskeians worry that the coming of independence could accentuate the depths of rural poverty and extend the impact of existing levels of malnourishment. They fear being cut off from the medical and social services of South Africa and wonder, too, how their schools will fare. Ciskei has also been subject to single-minded local rule. Chief Sebe and his party dominate the political arena, having since 1977 overcome or ousted all internal opposition. In recent months his government has arrested trade union leaders and journalists, holding many for months without trial. After independence Ciskei will doubtless continue to be ruled arbitrarily and toughly.

Given the experience of its three predecessors on the path of local independence, it is doubtful that Ciskei will become any less dependent than before on South Africa. The bulk of its people will still have to be employed there. Capital for improvements and maintenance will have to be found there. Many black South Africans continue to wonder whether the artifice of local independence can compensate for a homeland's separation from the emerging and changing political and economic complexity of the greater South Africa.

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### *What Pretoria Seeks from Its Neighbors*

South Africa's recent raid on little Lesotho was not its first on a neighboring country, nor will it be the last. With a fierce dedication to the Israeli doctrine of pre-emption, South Africa's troops have struck repeatedly since the mid-1970s against anti-South African insurgents in Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia. Yet guerrilla attacks continue.

In Lesotho, South Africans say they were after guerrillas of the African National Congress who had been planning sabotage attacks in South Africa after Christmas. Of the 42 killed in predawn fighting, South Africa claims the majority were guerrillas; Lesotho says they were black refugees from South Africa. At least seven of the dead had no connection with the African National Congress or South Africa.

South Africa's attacks on Angola have been more systematic and sustained. The immediate object has been to destroy the capacity of the SWAPO, the South-West Africa People's Organization, to disrupt Namibia, which is also known as South-West Africa and which is currently controlled by South Africa. Both sides have been at war since 1966. Despite Soviet advisers and 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola, South Africa has met little resistance from SWAPO and its military allies.

More powerful in its own sphere of influence than Israel in the Mideast, South Africa has effectively used its unquestioned hegemony to dampen insurgencies, wherever based, and to discourage its neighbors from providing secure camps for the guerrillas.

Unlike the experience in Southeast Asia, or in Zimbabwe between 1972 and 1979, when the Zimbabwe African National Union was battling white Rhodesia from bases in nearby Mozambique, there are few places to which large groups of anti-South African guerrillas can flee.

In addition to its own pre-emptive strike capability, South Africa is reliably suspected of arming and coordinating with a major antigovernment movement in Mozambique, of supporting the antigovernment UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in that country, and of financing opponents of and otherwise seeking to undermine the government of Zimbabwe. For perplexing reasons, South Africa may even be backing the Lesotho Liberation Front against the conservative, authoritarian government of that landlocked country.

South Africa seeks to caution its neighbors, just as it seeks to diminish the strength of its immediate adversaries. It also appears to be bent on destabilizing officially Marxist Mozambique, possibly with the aim of overthrowing President Samora Machel. Instead of working cooperatively to enhance the growth and promise of Zimbabwe and others on its periphery, South Africa wants to demonstrate the incompetence of the region's black-ruled countries. In effect, South Africa has equated the survival of its own white rule with chaos and disarray in the black-run nations.

There have been few South African initiatives to enhance the overall economic and political security of the region. The status quo has been maintained and mutually beneficial trade links continued, but the South Africans

have been grudging where they have not been obstructionist. The raids and the policy of covert military destabilization, when added to the often unhelpful attitude of trade and diplomatic officials, has limited the growth and economic options of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and the other black-ruled states.

Although South Africa has largely succeeded in augmenting the internal tribulations of these countries, it has largely failed to stem guerrilla attacks on itself or Namibia. The African National Congress, hardly as strong, well-armed or entrenched as the Palestine Liberation Organization was in Lebanon, has still been able to mount regular raids on South African industrial and military installations. Its ability to infiltrate across the South African border and through rural areas to the cities has hardly been diminished, as last week's sabotage of the country's first atomic reactor made evident.

If the raid on Lesotho was based on accurate information, then the African National Congress is still powerful; if not, the raid has nevertheless bolstered the credibility of the congress as a guerrilla movement among the black masses of South Africa's teeming cities.

When Pretoria flexes its military muscle it intimidates its weaker neighbors and defies both Moscow and Washington. But each cross-border strike and each tacit avowal of the continued relevance of the African National Congress emboldens the already alienated black youth of its cities and, more and more, their skeptical elders.

There is further disadvantage for South Africa in its muscle-flexing. Just as an Israeli government can overreach and lose legitimacy with its main Western supporters, so the attack on Lesotho has compelled Washington to condemn South Africa in the United Nations.

American policymakers may now be able to remind South Africa that the best antidote to insurgency is political modernization at home, combined with economic vigor and significant social improvements both at home and within the entire southern Africa region.

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### *A South African Death*

If the death of Saul Mkhize, a black South African farmer, serves any purpose, it will be to focus the attention of white South Africans on the removal of Africans from their property to distant places. It should compel Americans and concerned white South Africans to question the need for, if not the justness of, such a policy.

*New York Times*, 18 April 1983.



The killing of Mr. Mkhize, who died on the first weekend in April, epitomizes the depths of the South African tragedy. Mr. Mkhize was not a politician. Nor was he much interested in the affairs of state. But he was black and, with a desperation that is common to farmers, he was trying to save his land and the land of nearly 10,000 others.

Saul Mkhize lived in the southeastern reaches of the Transvaal province of South Africa. Until this month, he grew corn on land that—unusual for a black South African—he owned. Indeed, men of his grandfather's generation purchased the 300 small plots of land in question from whites in 1912. A year later, the Natives Land Act made it nearly impossible for blacks to purchase farmland in South Africa.

In 1913, South Africa created Native Reserves, where Africans could occupy land under a form of communal tenure. Outside the reserves, Africans could not own land. The reserves, at the time, approximated only 7 per cent of South Africa's total land mass. In 1936, about half of all South Africans lived in the reserves. These lands were officially judged vastly overcrowded, eroded, and unsuitable for agricultural development.

In that year, a plan was promulgated to add about 6 per cent more of the country's land to the reserves, a process that is still continuing. Meanwhile, the reserves were renamed Bantustans and then Homelands, some nominally independent, some officially still an organic part of South Africa.

Many Africans outside the Homelands have lived since 1913 in so-called Black Spots. These enclaves of black-occupied farmland in white-dominated areas disfigure the neat official maps of South Africa's rural division. For at least 20 years, the government of South Africa has been transferring Africans from Black Spots to distant or nearby Homelands.

South Africa wants a tidy map and a country in which black and white are as separate as possible in the rural areas. After Africans are pushed out of the Black Spots and their huts razed, their land is given to whites.

When the Africans inspect the new land, they generally find that it is inferior. Usually it is waterless, hard to plow, sometimes too cold, without services or roads.

Mr. Mkhize led his people in peaceful protest. He tried to reason with the white officials. He tried to persuade the minister of the Department of Cooperation and Development. He wrote a letter to Prime Minister P. W. Botha. Then, in an argument with the police over whether or not he had obtained the required permit for a protest meeting of 800 landowners and their families, he was felled by shotgun blasts and later died from his wounds.

As Africans such as Mr. Mkhize are compelled to leave land that they have farmed continuously since the 19th century and owned by freehold title for 71 years, otherwise apathetic peasants become politically involved in South Africa. They cannot ask a court for an injunction. They cannot put such actions to any political test, for most white rural voters want Africans restricted to the Homelands, and blacks cannot vote.

How will Africans respond to Mr. Mkhize's death?

That is a major question, for the thousands who are dispossessed every year only add numbers to those in the Homelands who are underemployed, poor, and undernourished.

The United States State Department has never favored separate development and largely shuns the independent Homelands. But it has paid too little attention to Black Spots, removals, and the execution of apartheid in rural areas.

Saul Mkhize's death may lead to a welcome re-evaluation of at least that aspect of U.S. policy toward South Africa.

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### *The Process of Decision-Making in Contemporary South Africa*

Before 1980, especially during the 12-year prime ministership of Balthazar Johannes Vorster, the South African government's decision-making process was less than methodical. Although rigid in personality and an unquestioned, authoritarian leader, Vorster believed in a decentralized style of management. Cabinet ministers conformed to the overall policies that were set by Vorster and a small oligarchy. But within that conformity to an overall plan, the ministers were encouraged to run their departments with little interference from the prime minister. Such autonomy stimulated political competition among departments. Often ministries were kept ignorant of what others were doing or planning. Collective responsibility was difficult to impose. In practice, there were no instruments, other than personal appeals to the prime minister, to limit this competition or to coordinate the different, sometimes crosscutting, governmental activities.

Vorster, like Hendrik F. Verwoerd before him, may have welcomed such rivalries. But it is more likely that the absence of coordination and the untidy administrative style were carried over from earlier times, when the meshing

of the initiatives of one or more departments may have been less critical to the functioning of the state.

For Vorster and his predecessors, informal methods by and large produced sufficient results. Furthermore, a decentralized state mechanism accentuated the personal power of the prime minister, backed as he would have been by personal alliances, party prerogatives, and largely unchallenged control over the distribution of patronage and preferment. In a regimented society with common political goals, represented by an unadventurous party caucus and held together by the imposition of discipline from the Broederbond and an allied church, the government functioned naturally as an assemblage of personalized and well-demarcated satrapies.

In Vorster's day, some of the departments (not the cabinet as a collectivity) were given (or demanded) command of the grand overarching policy initiatives of the state. The Bantu Administration Department (which later became Plural Relations and Development, and then Cooperation and Development) was charged with devising and overseeing the transformation of the Bantustans into quasi-autonomous homelands. The Information Department had its various forms of outreach and propaganda peddling, some clandestine and some not, and was almost immune from interference by Foreign Affairs. Finance operated largely on its own. So did Sport and other ministries, except when fundamental decisions had to be reached. At that point, either Vorster alone or Vorster and several cabinet and/or non-governmental colleagues arrived at decisions on the basis of information provided (depending on the issue) by single or competing departments, or by the state's security apparatus.

General Hendrik van den Bergh was Vorster's closest confidant and a devoted adviser from the days of their internment at Koffiefontein in World War II. Van den Bergh, a security policeman, fashioned the secret Republican Intelligence group out of the Security Police, which he headed, when Vorster was minister of justice under Prime Minister Verwoerd in the early 1960s. Republican Intelligence was created at a time when the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress, and the Communist Party had all been driven underground and were challenging the state with violence. There was an external threat, too, for the outside world was becoming more and more hostile. Thus, van den Bergh organized the Republican Intelligence to gather information at home and abroad, to engage where necessary in espionage, and to strengthen the hand of those, like Vorster, who were determined to outwit local and foreign rivals.

In 1969, the still clandestine Republican Intelligence became the nucleus of the new Bureau of State Security (BOSS), a department of state. BOSS

attempted with some success to usurp the prime functions of the security police and military intelligence. As security adviser to Vorster, van den Bergh had great organizational strengths to add to those which derived from their long friendship. He made much of these advantages, but he won few friends among the police or the military (especially the latter, whose minister throughout this period was Pieter Willem Botha).

BOSS doubled in size during its first 10 years and van den Bergh exercised more informal power than most South Africans realized. Along with Cornelius (Connie) Mulder, who served at various times as minister of information, of interior, and of plural relations, he helped plan and implement a policy of reaching out to Africans, of trading with them, of bribing or compromising foreigners of all kinds, of working effectively with Israel, and (paradoxically) of reforming South Africa's overseas image while simultaneously countering dissent at home. Van den Bergh opposed the military on the efficacy of what would now be called destabilization, and particularly over the invasion of Angola in 1975.

Van den Bergh's decisive influence is now widely known. What is less fully appreciated, however, is the extent to which BOSS, under van den Bergh's direction, provided what limited machinery of coordination existed during the Vorster era. As rudimentary as was that structure, it was in many respects much more significant, even powerful, than the formal apparatus that now exists. Van den Bergh was the crisis manager. With Vorster's blessing, and presumably at his behest, he dealt with emergencies and coordinated responses. As those crises became more and more charged and frequent, van den Bergh and BOSS moved more and more toward the center of decision-making. How smoothly crises were managed is another question. Van den Bergh was an autocrat and the building of a consensus was neither his talent nor his immediate responsibility. But he did compel the diverse tentacles of the state to come to grips with problems that overwhelmed individual departments and, at times, threatened to overwhelm the government as a whole.

Informal techniques, unclear accounting, and administrative obscurantism have their uses, especially when a modern nation attempts to gain what its leaders regard as just ends by questionable means, or by means that the public would question if it only knew. In the case of South Africa under Vorster, the lack of a centralized, formal mechanism of decision-making facilitated the hodgepodge of covert activities that eventually brought Vorster (and van den Bergh and Mulder) into disrepute and ended their control of the government. The great affairs of state, it transpired, had been decided by cronies huddling together and writing directives on the backs of

envelopes. The Infogate, or Muldergate, scandal brought new people to power. It also mandated the search for a new system of decision-making that would, ideally, provide better and more comprehensive information to aid the making of rational choices, provide a means of organizing that information, and offer a framework for deciding which among the many questions should be given priority attention. If these various elements were effectively meshed, then the coordination of the implementation of the ultimate decisions would, it was thought, be made both more systematic and more logical than before.

### *Total Onslaught and Total Strategy*

An alternative apparatus already existed. Following a set of recommendations made by Justice Potgieter in 1972, the Security, Intelligence, and State Security Council Act was passed in the same year. But the State Security Council (SSC) provided for in the act remained only one of 20 cabinet committees until 1979. Vorster paid these committees little attention, their meetings were irregular and infrequent, their agendas were uncirculated, and no minutes were kept. Nor were minutes kept of cabinet meetings.

When P.W. Botha became prime minister in 1978, he needed (not least for political reasons) to assert control over BOSS, over what remained of Mulder's empire, and over what he correctly regarded as an upper- and middle-level bureaucracy that might well be loyal to Vorster. The military had scores to settle, too. Since the invasion of Angola in 1975, if not before, its analysis of how best to deal with South Africa's enemies had been at variance with cabinet policy. Its leaders, and Botha, had wanted to take the war to the enemy. Influenced by Israeli strategic doctrine, and smarting from their enforced humiliation in Angola, they were anxious to take charge. Moreover, Botha and his military advisers had since 1966 been running the defense ministry in an orderly manner. Given his sense of managerial pride, his instincts as a party technocrat, and a degree of militaristic scorn for the slough into which the country had stumbled, it was predictable that the new prime minister would undertake to centralize, streamline, and reorient the decision-making machinery of the state.

Botha was the first prime minister to recognize publicly that revolution was a real possibility in South Africa. In order to implement an effective counterrevolutionary strategy, the state needed to function as a disciplined unit (to use a consciously military metaphor). "Total onslaught" quickly became the code name used by Botha, General Magnus Malan, and others from the military establishment to characterize the behavior of the Soviets, antiapartheid activists, and anyone else willing to support the African

National Congress or other guerrilla movements perceived to be threatening to South Africa. Malan and the others described this assault on the nation as being not merely militaristic, but also political, diplomatic, religious, psychological, cultural, and social. Only a "total strategy" could meet the total onslaught, and coordination was a necessary component of the total response. Moreover, when a state is assaulted totally, everything with which the government might conceivably concern itself becomes a fit subject for concerted state study, analysis, and policy guidance.

There is a further consideration which may directly or indirectly have brought not only Botha but a range of other Afrikaner power-wielders to a recognition that some new method was necessary if apartheid were to continue to protect the volk in a changing and troubled world. Apartheid had begun to lose its internal legitimacy—what some have called its hegemonic character and appeal. If so, or if the rethinking of the validity (as well as the efficacy) of radical discrimination and separate development by some Afrikaners (*verligte* ones, if that concept is helpful) had focused the prime minister's ideas, that line of analysis had also entered the military mind. The new ethic was one of survival through modernization, but not by challenging the very foundations of Afrikaner power. What Botha and officers alike chose as a means of countering the apartheid state's loss of hegemony was an instrumental formalism—a rationalized pragmatism of which the chosen instrument, naturally, was a new administrative structure and an important shift in the locus of decision-making power from old-line bureaucrats to a cadre largely composed of militarily-trained technocrats.

### *The New Cabinet Structure*

Botha announced his sweeping administrative reforms in 1979. Although it has taken until 1983 for the full extent of these changes to be realized, South Africa's method of operation and its ability to accomplish its business have been transformed by the shift from 20 to 4 cabinet committees, the primacy given formally and informally to the refurbished SSC, the concomitant expansion of the Office of the Prime Minister and the creation of a cabinet secretariat, the distribution of agendas and the keeping of minutes, the punctiliousness with which the paper flow is regulated, and the role which the military now plays in the entire process.

The Westminster model presumes the sovereignty of parliament, with a cabinet and a prime minister responsible to and acting on behalf of parliament. Nominally, South Africa's new arrangements adhered to such democratic principles, but their practice deviates markedly from them. As it has developed, the system as reshaped under Botha bypasses the cabinet and

parliament to a degree which is new even for South Africa, Infogate included. The untidiness of the past has been replaced, certainly formally, by a new accountability and tightened organizational flows. But if this process serves South Africa well, it does so by elevating the goals of bureaucratic achievement and policy coordination above those of meaningful political participation and the development of a national consensus.

South Africa's cabinet now meets every Tuesday during the parliamentary session from mid-morning until well into the afternoon. There are agendas, and minutes are kept. Dr. J. P. Roux, who has the title of secretary-general of the newly renamed Office of the Prime Minister, organizes the cabinet's affairs and sees that its decisions are implemented. In this role, he is at the center of a carefully spun web which encompasses the committees that staff the cabinet committees, the permanent secretariat, and the interdepartmental committees (which also offer questions, and sometimes answers, to the cabinet committees). Roux is also charged with the task of prodding and coordinating the implementation of cabinet decisions by departments and parastatal bodies.

This analysis, and the time (longer than in Vorster's day) devoted to the deliberations of the cabinet, implies an accretion, not a diminution, of cabinet-level power. In one sense this is correct, for the prime minister has shifted certain kinds of decisions from his own (or from Vorster-like) shoulders to the collectivity of the cabinet. He spends time in cabinet meetings constructing a consensus, something which no previous South African prime minister since Jan Christiaan Smuts ever sought to do. In 1982 and 1983, the cabinet met at great length to thrash out the details of the new constitutional legislation. Because there were major cleavages within the cabinet, with opposing points of view being represented by the most powerful members of that body, the proposals of the cabinet committees and their principals were subject to the kinds of cabinet-level review which nowadays are reserved for controversies and events that are extraordinary.

The serious issues on which there is substantive discussion are nevertheless few, and the most important do not under the present system necessarily come before the cabinet at all. Furthermore, because of the new committee system, and the seniority and influence of the ministers who chair the various committees, decisions made by the committees are by and large merely ratified by the cabinet, simply noted, or never discussed. (The future of Namibia is an example of a subject that is rarely discussed.) The less senior ministers say little, and certainly do not speak on matters outside their own portfolios. The amount of time devoted to cabinet meetings is therefore largely a reflection of the increasing complexity of government



business, the emergence of far-reaching and time-consuming issues such as the new constitution, and (above all) a new emphasis on tactics, on the merchandising of policies, and on devising methods of handling the increasingly acrimonious and acid attacks on the government in parliament by parties of the right and left.

### *The Three Other Committees*

Although the State Security Council has functioned in its new manner since September 1979, the three other committees of the cabinet have only in the last year begun to be fully operational. Whereas the SSC has a secretariat of 45, not counting its subordinate working committees, these other cabinet committees have small (five-man) secretariats, including some part-time members whose other work is performed directly for the Office of the Prime Minister.

The three committees are Financial and Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, and Constitutional Affairs. Minister of Finance Owen Horwood presides over the first; Minister of Cooperation and Development Pieter Koornhof runs the second; and Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning J. Christiaan Heunis has been in charge of the third.

Financial and Economic Affairs has a remarkable degree of autonomy, its decisions being regarded (probably erroneously) as largely technical and nonpolitical. Its secretariat is staffed by and draws upon the most financially and economically sophisticated talent in the Office of the Prime Minister, in the Reserve Bank, and in the Department of Finance.

The Social Affairs Committee has limited legitimacy, largely because Koornhof is perceived as having lost initiative and influence within the cabinet and within the ruling circles of the party. Many, if not all, of the issues which would be presumed to be "social" (i.e., those having an impact upon or altering the circumstances and welfare of Africans, Coloureds, and Asians) are dealt with almost exclusively in the Constitutional Committee, over which Heunis presides with a firm hand. Koornhof sits on that committee, as does the prime minister, Minister of Defense Malan, Minister of Police Louis le Grange, and Minister of Justice H. J. (Kobie) Coetsee. Major decisions concerning the tricameral parliament to be established when the new constitution comes into force, the President's Council, legislation to change the status of black urban dwellers, and influx control—in general, the shape and pace of reform—have been made by this committee.

These committees meet fortnightly throughout the parliamentary session and sporadically (unlike the SSC) throughout the rest of the year. Their meeting dates are staggered so that ministers can regularly attend the meetings of



more than a single committee. None of these activities conflicts with the convening every Monday of the SSC, and some meet before the cabinet convenes on Tuesdays. Since agendas are circulated beforehand, ministers other than those who are the official members of each of the committees are theoretically free to attend those meetings which interest or involve their own departments. Sometimes they do, but for the most part less senior ministers attend only those committees to which they are specifically invited.

Senior ministers are members of two or three committees (and sometimes also have seats on the SSC). The result is obvious: decisions of the cabinet are made by a subset of the total cabinet, either individually or together in the various cabinet committees, often with a full discussion only in the committees, if there. One caveat is that the prime minister cannot and does not attend all of the committee meetings. Important decisions are obviously discussed with him before they reach the committee stage, and monitored by one or more officials from his office. Decisions in all nonsecurity areas are probably also discussed beforehand with Heunis.

In addition to staff support supplied to each by a small secretariat, each of the three lesser cabinet committees is served by a subordinate working group convened and managed by the head of the committee secretariat and composed of high-level civil servants from the ministries concerned and, usually, a representative or two from the SSC. Nearly all of the decisions of the committees are prefigured by the working groups. The working groups raise issues, provide answers, and order the writing of the option papers that form the staple of the committee decision-making process. Ministers do give directions through the secretariats to these groups, but a crucial level of analysis and debate takes place intensely in these groups.

This intermediate process doubtless limits the ultimate range of options presented to the ministerial committees. It is in the working groups that interdepartmental rivalries become apparent, and compromises are struck. Notable, too, is the presence on each of the working groups of representatives of the military and the police. In the formulation of legislation (the postponed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Persons Bill comes immediately to mind), security considerations (in the case of the aforementioned bill, the concern with combating urban terrorism) had an influence which was visible and pervasive. During the Vorster years, van den Bergh was personally regarded with suspicion by members of the cabinet, which limited his influence over legislation. But P. W. Botha has arranged his new decision-making machinery so that how individual items of legislation conform or do not conform to the concept of a "total strategy" becomes a regular refrain. Overall, the SSC and the other three committees are but a part of

what Botha and the military have conceived of as a National Security Management System, for the defense of the Republic.

### *The State Security Council*

At the heart of the management system, and central to all of P. W. Botha's plans for himself, his government, and his country, is the State Security Council. The prime minister chairs its meetings. He is joined by the statutory members: Malan, Coetsee, le Grange, and Roelof (Pik) Botha, minister of foreign affairs. In addition, Koornhof was invited to attend in 1979 and remains a member; so does Minister of Finance Owen Horwood. But the most influential minister after the prime minister is Heunis, who chairs the meetings if the prime minister is absent. Other regular members are the directors-general of Foreign Affairs and Justice, the head of the police, the chief of the Defense Force, the director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and Dr. Roux, a total of 14. From time to time other individuals are invited to address or meet with the SSC. The SSC takes its decisions by consensus, but the forming of a consensus usually follows the lead of the prime minister, Heunis, and Malan.

What is immediately apparent is the number of ministers who are not members of the SSC. Furthermore, the notion of cabinet responsibility and their own positions as ministers is devalued within the government by the presence in the innermost decision-making councils of the state of non-elected officials, three of whom are responsible for implementing "total strategy." The composition of the SSC, as much as the prime minister's command of it, narrows the government's legislative focus and also must preordain the kinds of subjects which are addressed, as well as the approach to each. Additionally, given its size, status, and direction, the concerns and the conclusions of the SSC must inevitably influence, inhibit, and overshadow the three other cabinet committees as well as the entire functioning of the Botha government.

Even if its subject matter and membership did not give the SSC a preeminent status in the government, it would still be able to achieve significant leverage by virtue of its size, organization, and bureaucratic resources. Lieutenant General Andries Jacobus van Deventer, the secretary of the SSC, commands the "working committee" (which corresponds to the "working groups" of the other cabinet committees) of the SSC, which itself is composed (as far as one can find out) primarily of officials from the military and police, Justice, and Foreign Affairs. But van Deventer also has a staff, which serves him, and which is nine times the size of the largest of the staffs servicing the other cabinet committees.

Van Deventer monitors everything that goes on at the cabinet and sub-cabinet level. He sits as a member of the working groups of the three other cabinet committees and shares with Brigadier John Huyser, a retired intelligence officer, the responsibility for vetting and channeling all policy papers destined for subcabinet or cabinet consideration. They perform this latter task as the directors of the permanent cabinet secretariat. Seventy percent of the membership of the secretariat is drawn from the military. Twenty percent comes from the NIS, and 10 percent from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Van Deventer's deputy is General G. J. F. van Rensburg.

Below the secretariat, and also subordinate to the working groups and the working committee, are 15 interdepartmental committees. Organizationally, they emanate from and report to the SSC, and are the originators of nearly all policy recommendations. The membership of the interdepartmental committees consists principally of heads of departments and of their senior deputies, legal advisers, and so on. A representative of the Defense Force sits on each committee and reports to van Deventer. Foreign Affairs is represented only on four of the interdepartmental committees; other ministries are represented on no more than and usually less than that number.

Van Deventer, now 53, was chief of staff of the finance division of the Defense Force before 1979. He worked closely with the prime minister when Botha was minister of defense under Vorster, and regards himself as the person chosen because of this long association to bring a military-style order to a hitherto uncoordinated government. Van Deventer thinks of himself as a careful planner, as a facilitator, as a good manager of paper flow on behalf of a prime minister who appreciates meticulous, precise management, good staffing, and appropriate follow-through. The prime minister insists on fully researched options before decisions can be contemplated. However, the extent to which "fully researched" means objective analysis cannot be ascertained. In any case, sloppy thinking is less often tolerated under the National Security Management System than it was before Botha came to power.

The military mind has thus clearly imposed itself on the workings of the South African government, but that mind appears to be primarily technocratic and functional and not (as yet) given to Latin American-type designs on the transformation or capture of the state. Those kinds of prescriptive possibilities have doubtless occurred to some officers now serving at the heart of the bureaucratic endeavor, particularly if they have viewed inefficiency and (perish the thought) chicanery in the ranks of civilian government. But the managerial revolution is still a servant of a more cautious, politically led reorientation of South Africa's style of governance.

The SSC effectively makes decisions and influences many which are not directly its own. As its name implies, all security (military and police) questions are brought to it, and it follows from the South African doctrine of total onslaught and total strategy that almost every aspect of modern government in South Africa can be construed to have security implications. Moreover, and much more basic to an understanding of who runs South Africa today, and how it may continue to be run, the SSC has become the court of virtually final resort for a broad range of national issues.

The future of Namibia, for example, is hardly a matter of solely parochial concern. It is linked to a bundle of domestic and external political issues, questions involving intricate negotiations with the West and with Angola, tactics for counterrevolutionary action within the territory and across its borders, economic and financial concerns, social matters, and so on. How South Africa resolves the problem of Namibia will have a direct impact on the entire future security, economic well being, and political survival of white South Africa itself. Yet, if the fate of Namibia were ever an issue discussed by the representatives of the (white) electorate of South Africa, that day is past. Strategy and tactics on Namibia are decided upon in the SSC whenever those decisions have not already been preempted by a military action of some kind. Did the military decide to undo Dirk Mudge, leader of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, before or after a decision was taken in the SSC? Was the decision to back Peter Kalanguka of the National Democratic Party made in Namibia by the military command, or by the SSC? The SSC probably has authorized the overall direction of preemptive strikes into Angola, leaving the chain of military command to work out the precise details. It regulates the flow of supplies to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. It has sanctioned the cease-fire talks with Angola. It decides how and when to respond to Western initiatives. Moreover, each decision of this kind began, whether implicitly or actually, as an option to be presented to the SSC. The positions on which the options were based started as military, or sometimes foreign affairs, initiatives.

The range of possibilities presented to the SSC need not emerge from the deliberations of the working committee in especially broad forms. The influence of "doves," including the foreign minister and his director-general, is limited by the preponderance of "hawks" at all levels of this new decision-making apparatus. Observers are certain, for example, that Pik Botha and his department have relatively little influence in today's decision-making arena; from a structural viewpoint, personalities aside, it is understandable why he and his department should feel so powerless beside the juggernaut of the technocratic, military machine.

If the Department of Foreign Affairs has relatively little clout within the SSC, obviously those departments which are not represented on the SSC, and are not consulted (even in the cabinet), can have less impact on decisions. Minister of National Education Gerrit Viljoen, who has previously served as the administrator-general of Namibia, presumably is a Namibian expert. But he is not on the SSC and formally seldom learns about or is asked to advise on the day-to-day running of the territory he once administered by fiat. Foreign Affairs no longer has a direct say about Namibia's internal governance either. The new administrator-general and his principal civilian deputy report to the Office of the Prime Minister, while the commanding general in Namibia has his military chain of command which eventually leads to the SSC.

Whether to raid Maseru, support the MNR in Mozambique, give aid to Zimbabwean dissidents, and try to purchase long-range reconnaissance aircraft are obviously decisions within the ultimate purview of the SSC. In the case of the December 1982 raid into the Lesotho capital of Maseru, for example, the Defense Force seems to have had prior approval in principle from the SSC, but the cabinet was not informed beforehand. Moreover, the Defense Force appears to have chosen the precise date and method in accord with general rather than specific instructions.

The SSC involves itself in a much broader range of decisions, too. It is interested in land transfers such as the 1982 attempt to cede the KaNgwane part of KwaZulu and part of Ingwavumaland to Swaziland. It has a say about the overall policy regarding trade unions, detentions without trial, the shape of the new Defense Force legislation (including the issue of conscientious objection), the character of social legislation (particularly that giving further prerogatives to Africans), and the broadening of educational opportunities. In the case of the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Persons bill, representatives of the military staff of the SSC joined forces with civil servants from Koornhof's own department to defeat his reform endeavors in the constitutional committee. The bill that emerged was not one that Koornhof wanted, but security considerations had prevailed. They may yet do so with regard to other aspects of Koornhof's urban reform program.

### *Who Governs?*

The formal mechanism of decision-making in South Africa gives the SSC a primary role and the three other cabinet committees important, but (except for the Finance and Economics Committee) lesser ones. Because the SSC and the other committees are subject to direct and indirect influence by well-

entrenched civil servants, and since so many of those civil servants are in fact seconded military officers, it is evident that the real levers of formal power in South Africa are no longer controlled exclusively, or as much as they were, or even as much as the South African public may think they are, by elected representatives of the (white) people. Indeed, the National Security Management System has superseded the cabinet, the party, and the electorate in many areas. A saving grace, if that is the word, is that the prime minister is in ultimate control, assisted by at least one other elected party member and the chain of military command. Furthermore, complete military dominance of the decision-making machinery is tempered by the non-military bureaucrats' awareness of their weakened position, a suspicion of military designs, and the natural infighting that occurs when one institution has been invaded by another.

Even as the authority of the cabinet has become increasingly titular, the National Party has also undergone a dramatic loss of power. There still are parliamentary study committees on virtually all subjects, but the power of their chairmen (backbench members of the National Party) to hold ministers to account has diminished. Where the caucus retains much of its power is not on particular decisions but on the very broad reach of national policy. The prime minister must still take heed of the risk of revolt among his backbenchers on issues such as the constitutional reform. But he can ignore them on Namibia, on "destabilization," on trade unions, and so on. And while neither Botha nor the military bureaucrats can ignore the backbenchers on issues of constituency concern, such as borehole drilling and perimeter defense, those are more matters of politics than decision-making.

Beyond the party caucus are the provincial congresses—historically the inner core and the strength of the National Party. The prime minister used the provincial machinery skillfully in 1982 when he sought the congresses' necessary consent for the updated version of his constitutional plan, but he does not seek their advice on security matters or Namibia. There also are provincial legislatures and officials, but their influence on national or party policy has been diminished under Botha.

The role in the decision-making process of commissions of inquiry, composed of experts, of presumed adjudicators (e.g., judges), or of a cross section of the power elite, has varied. Since the formation of commissions is used throughout the world to defer or permanently postpone decisions, it comes as no surprise that official South Africa has found it expedient from time to time to give intractable problems to supposedly impartial commissions in the hope that the very calling of a commission will make the problem go away or that the passage of time will make recommendations

electorally or internationally palatable. Some commissions have studied a problem and, from the government's view, exceeded their mandate by proposing solutions too radical for the prime minister, the party, the civil service, or all three. Other commissions, mostly those attempting to solve problems in areas where the government knows it must advance, but cannot think how, have, because of a sufficiently broad and influential membership, a decisive and well-connected chairman, or both, altered the perceptions of the government itself.

Some of the academically led commissions can be expected to develop their own sources of information and analysis. Normally, that function is performed by a seconded bureaucracy. Insofar as those seconded staffs will now be drawn, even partially, from the SSC and the military, an additional lever will be added to the influence of the Defense Force on South African decision-making.

Do the departments (ministries) themselves still matter? Clearly, no matter how well the SSC and the other committees coordinate, prod, and push, the machinery of implementation remains in the departments. The departments have admittedly lost a share of the available overall finances, which, in any institutional power struggle, go to the favored and the swift, especially if the favored and the swift are guiding the ship of state. The SSC, through its mostly military representatives, can learn what is happening and why, and can certainly poke and extol the departments through the interdepartmental committees—but the drafting of legislation is still done in departments. South African bureaucrats are especially adept at dragging their feet and working to rule; they know and make the regulations, too. Thus, the cooperation of the departments is necessary before decisions can be implemented.

What has been described thus far is the formal process used in South Africa to arrive at decisions. The process is intended to be methodical and systematic, and intolerant of shortcuts. Intentionally painstaking, it can only be implemented by an enlarged coordinating bureaucracy. And it takes time, especially if policy directives and actual legislation are to reflect new kinds and degrees of staff attention.

This is a system which could prepare for crises and emergencies, but could only rarely cope with them in an instantaneous fashion. It may be a system more efficient than the informal one employed in Vorster's day, but it is cumbersome. Therefore, a description and analysis of the formal decision-making capacity and machinery of the South African state can only partially answer the crucial question: Is the new machinery actually employed when those who rule South Africa make the decisions that count?



Vorster and van den Bergh made the important decisions in their time. Vorster also had golfing friends and corporate cronies. Representatives of some kinds of institutions used contacts to reach Vorster himself, to obtain either favorable decisions or other forms of help at one or more levels of government. From impressionistic evidence, it appears that Vorster gathered most of his ideas, information, and insights from his tight-knit circles of friends. Most of those friends were from the private sector, and Vorster was never loath to bypass official channels (the Muldergate scandal makes this point perfectly evident). Vorster's staff work was rudimentary and his colleagues and his party caucus rarely knew precisely how or why key decisions were made.

Today this process is supposed to be different. But is it? Botha has a new set of friends and is not known for his golf. But he is close to Malan and other military officers. He relies on the advice of Heunis and Vice-President Alwyn Schlebusch. He frequently talks to industrialists.

In crises, Malan and Heunis rush to Botha's side as van den Bergh went to Vorster's. Ad hoc decisions are still made on or recorded on the backs of envelopes. Someone in high places, for example, decided to back the 1981 attempt to overthrow the government of the Seychelles. The SSC, it is understood, did not know about it, although sections of the military and the NIS were aware of the preparations that were revealed in court. The now-aborted Swaziland land swap seems to have been initiated in the upper reaches of the Department of Foreign Affairs and never to have been subjected to full SSC or cabinet scrutiny. Responses to key American or Angolan diplomatic communications are probably required too urgently to be left to percolate through each of the levels of the SSC. If a swift response were needed in the wake of, say, the death of a neighboring monarch or the ouster of a neighboring head of state, it would be equally difficult to formulate policy through the SSC. Overall, South Africa still lacks what U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker once described as a capacity for sophisticated threat assessment and political analysis.

No modern executive is fully accountable. No matter how punctilious the procedures and ironclad the rules have become, it is hardly plausible that Botha acts only when he has proper briefing books and full analyses. A volatile person, he naturally responds to decisive moments, even if to do so may mean bending his own strictures about the need for "research." Moreover, decisions made by ad hoc methods by Botha, or by Malan, by the chief of the Defense Force (e.g., the Maseru raid), or even by Major-General Charles Lloyd in Namibia/Angola, are ones more important and more injurious than those that usually filter up through the SSC and the other committees.



In noting the distinction between formal and informal modes of decision-making and the different kinds of decisions that are made in both spheres, it should also be apparent that the membrane between formal and informal is permeable. The informal impinges upon and influences the formal. The formal validates and covers up for the informal. Prime ministers are known to come to cabinet (and now SSC) meetings with their own plans, or plans devised after talking to all manner of outsiders from different parts of the private sector.

Decisions that are unfortunate for South Africa, defined in this context merely as those which generate unfavorable publicity, need not have been made through the formal channels. If a preemptive strike on a neighboring nation infuriates the West, that is one kind of decision where an agreement in principle, made initially at high levels (if not through the stated channels), may become a counterproductive act if the scale, the timing, or the side effects of the strike conform insufficiently to the original policy directive. And the military leadership may have an agenda different (as it does in Namibia) from those of most, if not all, civilian politicians. The entire regional destabilization policy may fit under this rubric.

But where South Africa suffers most (even under the National Security Management System) is when middle-level officials react traditionally or exceed instructions. Or, possibly, they obey the letter of outdated or ill-conceived instructions from their superiors. The death of Saul Mkhize, defending his land in the southeastern Transvaal, is an example of a general decision (to continue removals), followed by a high-level decision (one presumes) to move against the particular Driefontein Black Spot and to ignore African protests, followed by the maladroit implementation of orders by low-ranking bureaucrats. It is unlikely that any management system, no matter how efficient, can rapidly alter the reflexes of rank-and-file officials. Moreover, given the structure of South Africa, it is probably unreasonable to expect the National Security Management System to think through the consequences at the implementational level of all varieties of decisions that flow from a policy framework (in this case apartheid) with so many givens, precedents, and shibboleths. Botha does not intend his new military-manned system to transform South Africa. He merely wants the tactical (not the strategic) posture of his administration to be coherent and coordinated.

Individuals influence decision-makers informally. So do institutions. Botha's government is much less influenced by or intertwined with the Broederbond than was Vorster's. The Dutch Reformed Church has declined in its immediate influence on the leaders of the present government, and also nationally. The Afrikaans-speaking business community has access to Botha

and his government. The police have a say. The Departments of Foreign Affairs and of Cooperation and Development have less influence than before. The old-line bureaucracy battles against change, and does manage to slow Botha's pursuit of reform. But, aside from the party and the cabinet, it is obviously the military which is the leading decision-making institution in today's South Africa, both because of Botha's belief in its abilities and its clear-sightedness and because he ascended to the top without a range of other powerful national connections.

Kenneth W. Grundy argues that the SSC is a check on the Defense Force. The SSC reinforces the principle of civilian supremacy over the military and of the paramountcy of politicians in decision-making. But Grundy's conclusion, given what we know of the expectations and close governmental involvement of the military, is wildly optimistic. Individuals from the Defense Force are at the core of the formal and informal dimensions of all South African policymaking. The influence of the military is increasing, even if South Africa is still a long way from becoming a jackboot state in the Latin American sense. There are important countervailing tendencies: the inertia of a bloated bureaucracy (including the parastatals) will tend to block the conversion of South Africa to Prussian-style government. Yet, Botha shares the military's vision of a fortress South Africa, tactically reformed, but strategically sound if not hegemonic. The soldiers are his chosen instruments and he is theirs.

### *The New Constitution*

The formal system, as described, is eminently adaptable to the strong executive presidency to be established under the new constitution approved by the white voters on November 2. What works in a nominal parliamentary democracy will work even more efficiently within the overall framework of the new constitution. Indeed, one supposes that the SSC would become even more central to the functioning of the new arrangement, serving (as in a sense it now does) as the secretariat of the presidential system. If so, the other three committees of the cabinet may become less important, even as the cabinet, the parliament (now to be tricameral), and the party caucus lose whatever residual powers each still retains. One can foresee a greater centralization of power under the new system. The military will run the SSC, involve itself more and more in affairs of state, and certainly not lessen its institutional influence on the future shape of South Africa.

## *The Townships Erupt*

Botha remained mired in the quicksands of apartheid. Botha, unlike de Klerk, could never rise above a need to control. He could not bring himself to think boldly outside of the box that he had inherited from Vorster and earlier architects of apartheid. The real future of South Africa was at risk, but Botha could only see a short distance forward. He could help the West oust Ian Smith's white government from Rhodesia, but he could not see the same ultimate futility for himself and his compatriots. Instead, he set about establishing a clever but deeply flawed constitutional rearrangement of South Africa. It was intended to give Coloureds and Asians a semblance of coordinate power with whites (against Africans) as a way, seemingly, to appease Western critics. Yet this artificial devolution of power soon backfired, and spawned massive internal violence during the 1980s.

In op-eds in the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Boston Globe*, and in a series of "news analysis" articles on the second page of the *Globe*, throughout 1980 to 1983, I charted the origins and unfolding of Botha's dangerous constitutional reforms. Pernicious because they purported to provide a modicum of autonomous self-government for the hitherto disenfranchised 2.3 million Coloured and 800,000 Asian South Africans while continuing to deny 22 million Africans participation in the national decision-making arena, these reforms were designed carefully to strengthen, not weaken, the power of whites. The Coloureds and Asians, in their separate houses of the new three-chamber parliament, would only be able to debate matters pertinent to their own "communities." National issues would be discussed jointly; because South Africa had 4.6 million whites, the white parliamentary chamber would have the representative numbers to outvote the combined Coloured and Asian parliaments on all matters of common concern. Whites would give up nothing, Botha reasoned (to the consternation of hard right Nationalists and members of splinter parties), and would co-opt the dark but not quite African minorities. The exclusion of blacks, the majority, from virtually all political life might hence seem less damaging to outsiders.

And some American officials and businessmen indeed were taken in by Botha's artifice. The changes were termed "better than nothing." Optimists even suggested that a chamber for Africans could ultimately be added to the new parliament, and that such an arrangement could enable South Africa gradually to give Africans a voice in their own governance.

This was a misreading of Botha's intentions. Africans would continue to be ruled by whites: Botha said repeatedly that Africans could expect neither political representation nor common treatment as citizens of South Africa. ("No Cheers for Botha's Proposed Token Reforms," *Boston Globe*, 24 April 1983). Moreover, the nation's separate development (homeland) policy remained one of the bedrocks of National Party policy; Africans continued to be removed from "white" areas. Botha even tried cannily to give Swazi-speaking South Africans to Swaziland by ceding large portions of the neighboring South African KaNgwane and KwaZulu homelands. ("South Africa's Swaziland Scheme," *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 June 1982; "The Reforming of South Africa," *Boston Globe*, 6 Sept. 1982.) Africans wanted a territorially unfragmented South Africa, a chance to vote on national policy, the end of segregation, and to be considered South Africans. But Botha would affirm none of those rights. ("South Africa: A Change, but Not Necessarily for the Better," *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 Nov. 1983.)

Despite the scrapping of a seventy-three-year-old Westminster constitution and its replacement by Botha's new troika arrangement, the bastions of apartheid were being buttressed, not purposely weakened. The construction and practice of apartheid was not intended to be tinkered or interfered with by the subordinate legislative assemblies for Coloureds and Asians. Moreover, under the new constitution Botha became executive president with enhanced powers while the new tricameral parliament, and even its white chamber, gave up some of the influence that it had exercised under the Westminster model from 1910.

Whites gained power. Coloureds and Asians gained a voice. Africans lost. "There is no cause for complacency," one article concluded, "and much for despondency, particularly since no one in power [in South Africa] is concerning himself with or articulating a vision for South Africa that addresses the common concerns of all." ("Face of Change in South Africa," *Boston Globe*, 15 Aug. 1983.)

The new changes, proposed in 1979 and debated from 1980 to 1982, were finally enacted (despite a clamor from local liberals) in 1983. In a referendum for whites only, they unexpectedly sanctioned the tricameral parliament by a massive margin. The U.S. Department of State welcomed the vote as a first step toward more sweeping reform. This was wrong-headed and

dangerous, I believed, as it indicated a lack of understanding of Botha's strategy. In a series of articles, I indicated why Washington should not have sanctioned Botha's so-called reforms of the constitution. Apartheid had merely been repackaged. Its rigid denial of the rights of the growing majority had finally gone beyond segregation to perpetual exclusion. Violence would flow from the empowering of Coloureds and Asians, which infuriated Africans. By attempting artificially to reconfigure apartheid without moderating its core, the white government of South Africa had unwittingly invited wholly unprecedented levels of indigenous asperity and retaliation. This conclusion became even more apposite in 1984, when South Africa held desultory elections to the two new chambers (the white parliament simply continued) with blacks watching angrily from the sidelines.

"Attempts at cooptation might have worked [to shore up apartheid] at the beginning of the 1970s," I speculated, "when these figures [of African majorities in all the country's cities] and African expectations were radically different." But, I warned, "they can no longer be expected to serve the very real needs of an increasingly tense society more and more antagonistically divided in the 1980s along legislated lines of color." ("South Africa's Winter of Reform," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 July 1982.)

Nevertheless, there were those in decisive circles in Washington who believed in co-optation, and believed that the U.S. could more effectively influence Botha for the better by muting rather than trumpeting official criticism. This was constructive engagement, as practiced by the Reagan and Bush administrations. I believed that such a policy was misguided, immensely damaging to American and South African black interests, and ultimately self-defeating. Constructive engagement meant "sweet-talking" South Africa. It also led to the lifting of a U.S. embargo on a range of strategic exports, including nuclear fuel, and relaxing visa and other restrictions. ("South Africa à la Eagleburger," *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 July 1983.)

After three years of constructive engagement, I wrote, South Africa had hindered the achievement of stability in southern Africa, driving Angola and Mozambique toward the Soviets. South Africa was backing Jonas Savimbi against the legal government in Angola. South Africa had not helped free Namibia, as anticipated (see part 1, "The New Africa," above). At home, in South Africa, there had been few significant improvements. Apartheid was largely unmodified. Constructive engagement, I concluded, was moribund. Before the 1984 election in the United States, I applauded the criticism of constructive engagement by the then leading set of Democratic contenders. When Walter Mondale became the official Democratic nominee, he advocated the tightening of embargoes against South Africa, and limiting official contact with Botha and his entourage until they took reform seriously. ("A

Moribund Policy toward S. Africa," *Boston Globe*, 3 Oct. 1983; "U.S. Falls Short in South Africa," *Boston Globe*, 9 July 1984; "Africa in the U.S. Presidential Race," *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 Oct. 1984.)

On the eve of the first trilateral elections, South Africa's townships erupted into unprecedented surges of protest, leading inevitably to brutal battles between repressive police forces (later reinforced with military contingents). ("South Africa on Edge," *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 Sept. 1984.) By the following March, more than 600 Africans had been killed and thousands wounded in escalating battles between emboldened, mostly youthful, Africans and Coloureds and the white regime's enforcement squads. Botha responded by jailing, without hope of rapid trial, the leaders of the new United Democratic Front (UDF), "the very moderate black leaders with whom a government bent on reform would want to negotiate." Botha called them communists. He rebuffed criticism from the U.S., especially from Secretary of State George Shultz.

"White South Africa can ill afford to do nothing," I commented. More repression was likely, but since a combination of internal violence and Western pressure had always resulted in reform, "new tactical retreats" from apartheid were to be anticipated. Yet Africans could not easily be appeased, I wrote. They desired the franchise, and nothing less. "Whites will think they are reforming and Africans, marginally consulted if at all, will dismiss concessions as cosmetic. Until white South Africa agrees to negotiate with blacks for the lasting future of the country, cycles of violence and repression are certain to continue." ("South Africa: Domestic Turmoil," *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 March 1985.)

Within three months, Botha's velvet glove removed several strands of offensive apartheid legislation while his mailed fist put the entire country under a stringent state of emergency. The white regime announced that it would repeal legislative prohibitions against cross-color sex and marriage. The long hated Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts would go. But Africans in the 1980s wanted political participation, not a legal chance to love whites physically. Like so much in any totalitarian state, change for the better was coming too late to be meaningful. "Had both prohibitions been scrapped two or three years ago, their demise would have been celebrated in South Africa and throughout the West." But after eight months of continuous unrest and five months of anti-South African protest in the U.S., the end of legislative bans on inter-color marriage and sex had little political significance.

Symbolic shifts could hardly substitute for citizenship, basic justice, the scrapping of the pass laws, the end of legislation that prevented economic mobility, and real participation in political decision-making. Black "South

Africa has moved on," I noted. The repeal of hated social legislation would have relevance only if "the government demonstrate[d] a determination to tackle the fundamental questions of political, not social, apartheid." ("Political Apartheid," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 April 1985.)

Declaring a state of emergency demonstrated the government's weakness. "Unwilling to negotiate with blacks . . . and unable to . . . sanction non-violent channels of protest, the government has been driven to a Draconian choice." The state of emergency also acknowledged how broad and deep was the chasm between white attempts to reform and black aspirations to be free. Botha was as yet unprepared to think strategically about his regime's realistic options. I warned that the very power of South Africa's military and police would prove no effective substitute for evolutionary change. Even when the government's forces had diminished violence in the townships (and I underestimated the staying power of young black protesters), it could buy neither time nor enduring peace with piecemeal concessions. ("South Africa: Legitimate Demands," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 July 1985.)

After nearly a year of turbulence in the townships, with about 700 Africans killed and many thousands wounded, Botha gave a much anticipated watershed speech—headlined "Crossing the Rubicon"—in which he promised more repression and the possibilities of limited legislative modifications of apartheid. The speech dismayed white liberals and black pragmatists, and hinted at the poverty of Afrikaner responses to a nation engulfed in protest. South Africa's ruling whites believed that they could offer sufficient social and economic reforms to appease blacks. But they failed to appreciate that, thanks to the inactions of Botha's government, "the toughs of the streets [had] largely taken political leadership away from the likes of [moderates] like Tutu. . . ." Moreover, in the international arena, South Africa had lost its friends. Its capital market and supply of investors was drying up. "Constructive engagement, writhing in the wake of South Africa's refusal to evolve . . . died in the wake of" Botha's Rubicon. Botha had driven South Africa deeper into tragedy. ("Satisfying South African Blacks," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 Aug. 1985.)

Or, damning with faint praise, I suggested in the *London Review of Books* (3 Oct. 1985) that Botha's incapacity to act could have reflected a genuine failure on the part of South Africa's ruling oligarchy to understand the depth and breadth of its country's crisis. For years, the government had believed that it could alter the political terrain from above, and shape or channel protest. Hence separate development. Hence propaganda overseas. Hence relaxations of petty apartheid in order to satisfy the economic aspirations of a small, but growing African bourgeoisie. Given its preponderant military strength and the comparative weakness of African protesters within and

ANC guerrillas outside the country, Botha and his colleagues still believed that they could orchestrate and control change, and could do so without disrupting the even tenor of a white-dominated economy and society. But the difference between this tactical maneuvering and a fundamental strategic repositioning was critical. Within the government, at least, I detected no awareness of how profoundly the political, economic, and security dynamics of South Africa had shifted. The inauguration of the tricameral parliament produced an effect directly opposite to that intended. So did social concessions and emergency actions.

Yet, it was not the slow speed of reform, nor solely the lack of a place for Africans in the new parliamentary structures, that sparked the spate of riots that continued and seemed likely to continue indefinitely. There were absolutely no indications, Africans said, that the Botha government had understood their message. Young Africans were profoundly alienated from the state in a manner that had been unthinkable a decade before. Although they possessed weapons no more powerful than sticks and stones and occasional petrol bombs, and although they faced machine-guns, tanks, and the strongest army in Africa, the predominantly young partisans of the townships were invigorated by their ultimate invincibility and a new spirit of derring-do.

At the international level, the failure of Botha's reform efforts signaled the demise of constructive engagement. President Reagan had finally proclaimed sanctions, albeit watered-down ones, against South Africa. He had earlier professed a misplaced faith in quiet diplomacy, and said that he preferred friendship and conciliation for South Africa. Then, in late 1984, he finally lashed out at South Africa, joining thirty-seven prominent Republican members of Congress (but not Senator Jesse Helms) who belatedly had got the message. Constructive engagement had been characterized throughout Reagan's first term almost exclusively by carrots, but never sticks, not even twigs. Now the president of the U.S. was at last brandishing a small branch. This was a positive development because American influence was more powerful in effecting change in South Africa when the forces of internal dissent were active, even violent. I urged the Reagan administration to stiffen its criticisms so that South Africa would become more isolated internationally and thus be compelled to focus on a set of what really were very limited local options. ("U.S. Shakes a Stick at South African Policies," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Dec. 1984; "U.S. & South Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 June 1985.)

Reagan's volte-face was important, but much more so were the positions taken by the bankers and businessmen of the United States. They had finally turned against South Africa, which in response had recently declared a debt



moratorium. It was the “almost unanimous anxiety of the financiers of the West (and that of white South African businessmen) which will compel South Africa’s rulers to concentrate their minds . . . and, conceivably . . . propel them in adventurous and positive directions.” This analysis was prescient, as it transpired, but the bold moves that were necessary took a few years to be realized. Secret negotiations with Mandela started in these desperate days (and Botha even offered in 1985 to end Mandela’s imprisonment if he renounced violence), but economic decay had to take a fuller toll before the ruling oligarchy could understand what Tutu, other Africans and white liberals, and some outsiders kept reiterating to the men around Botha. (Tutu’s views were laid out in an appreciative profile that I wrote for the *Los Angeles Times* [17 Oct. 1984], after he had won the Nobel Prize for Peace.) Outside “pressure works,” even if the South Africans denied it, was the lead of another article commenting on several compromising moves announced by Botha in early 1985. (“South Africa: The Case for Pressure,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 Feb. 1985.)

Africans would be satisfied with nothing less than the political kingdom. That was the predominant message of the 1980s in South Africa. The reality was not that the pace of reform had to be quickened but that shared power and majority rule were the most decisive issues for the energized inhabitants of the townships. “No longer [was] it possible for Africans who hoped to retain their legitimacy to bargain with the Government for anything less than [full] political participation.” Social and economic concessions no longer had any relevance. Militants had made ungovernable the large African ghettos (Soweto housed at least 1.5 million people) around South Africa’s nominally white cities. Africans could foresee the crumbling of the state. Armageddon, in their eyes, was around the corner. (“Get Much Tougher with South Africa,” *New York Times*, 12 Sept. 1985.)

It was at about this time that Washington asked me what would happen in South Africa. My response was embodied in “Seven Scenarios for South Africa” (*CSIS Africa Notes*, 29 Oct. 1985). I rejected the outliers—revolution at one end and retrenchment at the other. “No matter how virulent and enduring the unrest . . . South Africa is no longer a country where whites believe that apartheid . . . can ensure the continued dominance of whites. . . .” South Africa had changed profoundly since Vorster’s time, altered by the successful militancy in the townships. Africans no longer accepted subjugation, and African numbers were telling. Therefore, although Botha’s government would persist with “change but no change,” and then move toward “concessions,” neither option would provide a winning strategy. Only meaningful political participation and true power sharing were successful strate-

gies if white South Africans sought near- and medium-term peace and prosperity. Within five years, that was de Klerk's effective approach.

"The end of white rule [was] not at hand," I wrote. But "mighty and numerous as the white troops remain, the government [was] weaker than it admit[ted]." In South Africa itself, in the influential *Cape Times* (5 Feb. 1986), I also suggested that South Africa's defense force would never be overwhelmed, but it surely could be underwhelmed. The government's legitimacy was finished. Even Afrikaner businessmen and academics were preaching a new message of action, not rhetoric. The censoring of television and photojournalism reporting of township mayhem was an expression of desperation. So was the lifting of the passports of the students and clerics who tried to talk to the ANC in Zambia. South Africa was subject in 1985 to "the immutable law of diminishing options."

"The battle for South Africa [would] be won," I wrote, "by bold, brave, timely initiatives" capable of bridging the chasm between black aspiration and white fear. I urged Botha to chart a visionary, viable future for all South Africans. He needed to summon a constitutional congress (not the advisory council he proposed early in 1986) to negotiate an altered future for the entire country; establish black political participation at all levels; and repeal, not reform, all the discriminatory laws of apartheid. Africans pinned their new faith on individual rights, not the "group rights" so beloved of Botha and his advisors. The experience of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and other power realignments suggested that whites could gain more for themselves the sooner that they embraced change, and negotiated it with Africans. If they dilly-dallied, the proverbial Rome would burn, and ultimately they would find themselves with fewer options. "Every week that the white government forfeits, the black opposition gains additional credibility." Not knowing that tentative talks had recently been initiated with Mandela, I also urged Botha to bargain with him and others, directly. ("What Botha Should Do Now to Save South Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 Dec. 1985.)

Botha feared the rise of a "no concessions at all" flight of whites to even more conservative Afrikaner political parties, even though he was urged by many opinion page writers, including this one, to focus strictly on the problem of power sharing with Africans. That he briefly seemed to do in early 1986, when he told the tricameral parliament that apartheid was outdated and promised to provide equal education for all, restore citizenship to Africans, remove influx controls and the pass laws, and give Africans rights to own property in cities. But the president's speech presaged only business as usual. When Coloured and Asian parliamentarians (the supposed new elite) took Botha at his word and tried to sit down for lunch in the elegant

main dining room of parliament, they were denied service. When two white men in nondescript white towns near Cape Town married Coloured women, they were forced out of their houses and compelled to close their stores. When Botha's long-serving foreign minister suggested that South Africa could one day have a black man as president, the president promptly and publicly rebuked him. De Klerk, minister of education and soon to succeed Botha, assured parliament that Africans would never go to school with whites. In a staid exurb of Johannesburg, whites not for the first or last times shot without cause at Africans strolling a minor highway. The leader of the liberal Progressive Federal Party opposition in the white house of parliament waited for Botha to initiate the real changes that were needed; when they did not appear to be forthcoming, he resigned all of his political positions—expressing himself to be tired of the government's lies. A white opposition was useless, he declared, if the government intended "more of the same old white domination, dressed up in the rags of reform and gussied about with platitudes." A year later, two comparatively liberal members of Botha's own ruling party defected, for many of the same reasons. ("Botha's False Promises," *Boston Globe*, 10 March 1986; "Reasons for Hope in South Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 Feb. 1987.)

By the middle of 1986, nearly two years and 1,500 deaths into the tribulations of the townships, Botha had demonstrably lost the initiative. His feasible alternatives were reduced considerably, and were narrowing further with each passing week. I suggested that Botha was Mandela's prisoner. Only the legitimacy of such authentic leadership could rescue South Africa from its own imploding debacle. Secretary Shultz said so too, as did the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. But Botha continued detaining activists, 3,000 being under lock and key by mid-1986, and using other draconian methods of containment, like township curfews, police sweeps, and the like—all to no avail. In fact, his repressive methods truncated the government's ability to forestall the inevitable—not a revolution or a black takeover, but escalating black violence and heightened despair among white citizens. By 1986, some white businessmen and a politically influential organization of Afrikaners were advocating the introduction of a universal franchise. Apologists were suggesting confederal or consociational solutions to the South African crisis of expectations. But politically active Africans would now accept nothing less than a meaningful share of real power. Indeed, emergencies and repression effectively silenced the voices of older, seemingly peaceful, African opinion-shapers. Africans, even a homeland leader like Buthelezi, now refused to talk to the government without Mandela's release from jail. By 1986, Mandela had been incarcerated for

twenty-three years. African-initiated protests, and the resulting turmoil in the townships, had brought him out of languishing obscurity. His blessing had become indispensable if South Africa were ever to achieve peace.

The Democratic-controlled U.S. House of Representatives intended to accelerate the process by imposing severe sanctions on South Africa. It sought in 1986 to ban new U.S. investments there, prohibit bank lending, and prevent American construction firms from completing contracts that contributed to the maintenance of South African military might. Individual investments in gold mining and other South African stocks would be halted on U.S. stock exchanges. Imports of raw materials from South Africa—platinum, manganese, ferrochrome, and so on—would be embargoed. The South African national airline would be banned from landing in the U.S. But these proposals were flawed, I suggested, because they provided no calibrated incentives. I urged the staggering of different sanction actions over a series of months, thus giving South African businessmen an opportunity to persuade their notoriously shortsighted government incrementally to comply with the Congressional imperative. I also advocated different kinds of positive reinforcement: promises of financial support for educational reforms contingent upon moves toward real compromise. Such pressure from the U.S. was timely, but much more likely to be effective psychologically (if not necessarily economically) if Congress enabled South Africans to convert sticks into carrots. Later, for the leaders of Europe who were planning their own sanctions, I suggested that they could offer to double their imports of oranges and apples, and take more coal, etc., *if* South Africa “seriously began negotiating its democratic future with representative blacks.” (“Sanctions against South Africa,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 June 1986; “What Sanctions against South Africa Can and Cannot Do,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 Aug. 1986; “Going beyond Sanctions,” *The World and I*, July 1987.)

It was time for President Reagan to denounce South Africa. As a conservative who had been sympathetic to white South Africa, Reagan was superbly placed “to articulate the outrage of Americans.” He should say, “Enough is enough,” I wrote. He should help South Africans help themselves and urge Botha to negotiate with authentic representatives of the majority. Reagan should demand the release of Mandela, I advocated. He ought to invite Oliver Tambo, acting president of the ANC, to the White House, and find other symbolic and more direct ways of pressuring Botha and the other white politicians who were resisting the need to negotiate. (“What to Do about South Africa,” *New York Times*, 15 July 1986.) At the beginning of the next year, Secretary Shultz did meet with Tambo in Washington.

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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*The "Reforming" of South Africa*

The government of South Africa has proposed a thorough-going reconstruction of its constitution, giving representation to Coloureds (people of mixed descent) and Asians for the first time, but also subordinating its Parliament to the authority of an executive president. These far-reaching changes, if enacted early next year, could profoundly transform the way South Africa is ruled. But since they offer nothing new for Africans—the overwhelming majority of the population—no fundamental alteration of apartheid is anticipated.

Under the plan, Parliament would have three chambers, one for whites, Coloureds and Asians. If legislation were of common (not single community) concern, all three chambers would have to agree. An indirectly elected and appointed upper house, or President's Council, would arbitrate in cases of disagreement, but the executive president would have final authority to initiate, direct and focus legislation in unspecified ways.

The president would nominate a significant proportion of the members of the Council and the chairmen of the interchamber committees that would facilitate their functioning. The president would be selected by an electoral college drawn from the majority parties in the three chambers, with whites having more votes. As the system is now envisaged, not only would the president and the majority of the President's Council be white, but the president would also be the nominee of the National Party, which now dominates Parliament and has proposed the changes.

South African Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha, the likely first executive president, has urged the National Party to view the proposed reforms as timely and necessary modifications of white control. Since Africans number about 22 million, whites 4.6 million, Coloureds 2.7 million, and Asians nearly 1 million, he has urged the granting of political representation to the hitherto disenfranchised Coloureds and Asians as a means of countering the growth of African revolutionary potential. But many younger Coloureds and Asians now think of themselves as black.

The new proposals are an attempt to separate the aspirations of Coloureds from Africans. The proposals have not been presented, as in 1977, as only a first step toward the incorporation of Africans within the political system. Indeed, Botha has emphatically denied that there could be any place in South African politics for Africans.

The proposed reforms thus cater in no specific way to the aspirations of Africans. Despite official population projections that show African numbers doubling by the year 2000, and that 75 percent of all Africans will reside in urban centers (where nearly all whites live), the plan merely hints that Africans may obtain unspecified political benefits in metropolitan regions. The overall impact of the proposals is to slam the door shut on lingering African hopes for political representation at the national level.

African despair was deepened last summer by Pretoria's continuing attempt to cede an African homeland (KaNgwane) and the northern portion of another (KwaZulu) to Swaziland, despite the contrary desires of the Africans affected, court decisions and international antagonism. It was further deepened by new security legislation and the announcement of laws to tighten existing rules regulating African access to towns and urban-based employment. Taken together, the impact on South African politics must be an accentuation of confrontation.

The proposed reforms accelerate the clash of wills between white and black. While the existence of a functioning Parliament defuses some of that tension, the attempt to introduce authoritarian presidential rule gives new political ammunition to the African National Congress, South Africa's main guerrilla opposition. When South Africa, by the definition of its own government, can no longer be considered democratic, it actively assists the propaganda efforts of its antagonists.

The new reforms have other drawbacks, too. The fact that the proposed three-chamber parliament will perpetuate white rule means that many Coloured and Asian leaders will not accept it. Because the proposals also enshrine National Party dominance and give the executive president uncheckable power, both the main left- and right-wing white opposition parties have denounced them.

White voters may also find themselves wondering whether the new dispensation is not further flawed in two other ways: First, authoritarian systems are much easier to usurp, by coups or other means, than a Westminster-type parliament. Elsewhere in the Third World (and in the Second World) such structures have been subverted.

Second, successor governments, however they might come to power, will find the existence of authoritarianism ideal for their own purposes. A successor government some day could well use the arsenal of legal constraints inherent in the new proposals and existing legislation against those who are today their advocates. That, too, has been a common experience in the Third World.

Given such defects and the volatile climate in which the debate now takes place, the negative impact of the constitutional proposals can only be

relieved by democratizing the composition of the new Parliament and returning the balance of power to the legislature from the executive president.

At a more visionary level, the South African government could also resurrect the notion that an executive president would be authoritarian for the distinct purpose, to be clearly enunciated now, of granting a full franchise to Coloureds and Asians and subsequently, if in measured steps, to Africans. Such a statement of reformist purpose would transform a tactical maneuver into a potentially progressive stratagem.

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### *No Cheers for Botha's Proposed Token Reforms*

The white government of South Africa is attempting to modify the impact of apartheid on the 85 percent of the country's population that is not white without conceding power or much privilege. In doing so, however, it has drawn criticism both from the right and the left.

The right, vehemently represented by the far, far-right Herstigte (Reconstructed) National Party and the far-right Conservative Party, worries that any lessening of the rules and spirit of segregation will mean the end of white rule. South Africa's 4.6 million whites live among 25 million Africans, 2.7 million persons of mixed descent called Coloureds, and 800,000 persons of Asian descent. Those who vote and campaign for the right fear a future in which blacks might be recognized as equal citizens and might have a political voice at the local or regional, and some day at the national level.

These issues became more and more prominent last year, when Prime Minister Pieter Willem Botha and his ruling National Party proposed enlarging the South African parliament to include separate chambers for Coloureds and Asians (but not Africans) alongside whites. Although the three chambers would have roughly equal status, the non-white chambers would be unable to outvote the single white chamber on national issues, and would be unable to merge forces with the main opposition in that white chamber.

Botha and some of his cabinet colleagues from time to time say that they favor real reform. But their main efforts are now devoted to implementing the new constitutional proposals. They are also campaigning against the combined forces of the far right in a mini-poll scheduled for May 10. Three parliamentary seats in the northern part of the country are being contested,



with only whites voting. The outcome of these special elections may demonstrate either the weakness or the strength of far-right opposition to the policies of the National Party, especially the pace of reform.

Botha's party could well lose one or two of the seats. In one, his most liberal cabinet member is at risk. Whether the prime minister's current program is described as reform or as co-optation, a loss in one or more of the seats could seriously undermine his otherwise strong position.

As an acknowledgement of his possible peril, earlier this month Botha suddenly promised that whites would have an opportunity to vote on his constitutional proposals in a special referendum. To be held in September or October, the referendum was clearly announced now in order to lessen the significance at the May 10 vote. He thus buys time, but the holding of a referendum will also occasion acrimonious debate about the real utility of a tricameral parliament and an executive president.

Moreover, according to the proposed constitution, the real legislative authority is to reside in the office of an indirectly elected executive state president. He would further be able to nominate the members of an advisory council, which would be authorized to resolve conflicts between the three legislative chambers.

The right-wing parties and some of Botha's own supporters view the giving of parliamentary representation, no matter how diluted, to Coloureds and Asians as the thin end of a very dangerous wedge. The left, which includes white members of the parliamentary opposition and many influential Coloureds and Asians, views the changes as cosmetic. Controversy in the Coloured community rages over whether its leading politicians should take part in such a potentially co-optive arrangement, especially one that gives overwhelming power to the president. Most of all, the left sees the proposals as flawed because they make no provision for the political participation of the majority of the country's population. African leaders publicly and privately disdain to discuss or accept the relevance of the idea.

This last issue has a strategic component. Even some Afrikaners (the creators of modern apartheid) join other whites, blacks, Coloureds, and Asians in believing that time is running out for South Africa. If Botha's government cannot find a means to give blacks a real stake in South Africa, then guerrilla movements will capture African sympathies entirely.

Those who want South Africa to evolve peacefully see little being done politically, and too little being done economically and socially, to make recurring episodes of violence less likely. Too little, they complain, is being done to ensure the continued stability and prosperity of Africa's richest and best-organized nation.



Even the Reagan Administration has begun asking South Africa to produce meaningful progress. Herman Nickel, the American ambassador there, recently demanded visible results. The ability of the United States, he said, “to continue on our present course will surely depend on tangible evidence that we have been making progress toward our goal.”

### *New Problem for Botha*

Botha startled colleagues and opposition alike by calling the referendum, which the main opposition had earlier demanded and been denied. Yet he has a new problem. Coloureds and Asians are also clamoring for the opportunity to vote on the proposals. Their leaders might now refuse to participate in the proposed parliament if the referendum possibility is not extended to their communities. Then, if it is, whites of the far right will object to the participation of Coloureds and Asians in the process of national decision-making.

Coloureds and Asians, moreover, could well vote “no.” What if they do and whites vote “Yes”? Or if the results are close? Will Botha be able to realize his plan?

Botha has over and over said that blacks can expect neither political representation nor common treatment as citizens of South Africa. Nor can they (or Coloureds or Asians) expect a relaxation of housing segregation. The political rights of blacks, his party says, repose only in their 10 homelands or national states, the largely rural, mostly poverty-stricken segments of South Africa that comprise a total of only 13 percent of the land mass of the country.

It has for long been official dogma that blacks had no rightful place in urban, white-run South Africa. The National Party has long rejected the African insistence upon one South Africa as an integrated rather than a fragmented whole. Now it admits that since half of all blacks live there and 75 percent will live in the cities by the end of the century, something must be done.

A reform idea that should soon become real, as yet in an unspecified form, is the granting of a kind of municipal autonomy and local voting rights to blacks legally living in the segregated townships that surround the country’s major cities. But this advance will still deny Africans freehold tenure—the right to own their own houses and the land beneath them—and thus prevent the new African local authorities from raising revenues from a secure property base. The implementation regulations, not yet fully announced, also may not recognize the permanence of a black urban existence in other crucial ways. And there always is the problem, under South Africa’s apparatus of influx controls, of whether or not to recognize the

validity of the people who live and work in the cities without the necessary permits and identification papers.

There is a political problem, too, for the African leaders who oppose the government view these kinds of changes as half-hearted, co-optive, and ultimately designed to reinforce apartheid. Others, especially those who work within the system, see any gift of African voting rights as advances capable of leading to further progress. The first set of leaders also objects to decisions which are taken without consultation.

A committee the prime minister announced in February may thrash out some of these issues, and may talk openly and meaningfully with the most politically relevant Africans. But initial indications were that the committee would confine its consultations to those who were in some way or other already allied with the government.

The National Party wants a secure, stable, tension-free South Africa. But neither its top leadership nor its organization is yet ready to parley with Africans of stature. Neither the prime minister nor more than one or two of his colleagues is prepared to acknowledge the obvious: that white South Africa cannot begin to solve its central problem so long as it refuses to deal directly with the majority of the country's population. The evolution of South Africa is impossible without the active involvement of blacks and, at various levels, without meaningful black consent.

### *No Enthusiasm among Africans*

Instead of a focus on the underlying structural elements of overall reform, whites will be asked throughout the coming South African autumn and winter to debate the validity of a constitutional plan that omits virtually all consideration of the future of the African majority. Indeed, whites will vote on May 10 and again in the referendum without any notion of how the black-white schism in South Africa will be overcome.

Their government says that black aspirations can somehow be contained by municipal-level reforms and by opportunities, now largely imaginary, in the backward homelands. Their leaders imply that the government's might (its strong army and police) can control dissent and keep the country calm. Ambassador Nickel was asking for the unveiling of a coherent strategy for political evolution. But, if there is any such overall plan capable of eliciting the enthusiasm of Africans, it is well hidden.

Meanwhile, as whites vote, Africans see their shacks demolished on the outskirts of Cape Town, are dispossessed of rural land that they have owned (in one recent protest of this removal policy a rural leader was shot), are jailed for their political or trade-union affiliations in the homelands, and tell

poll takers that Nelson Mandela, the banned and long-jailed leader of the African National Congress, the country's main liberation movement, is the most popular folk hero.

Their feelings are not a part of the recipe for a successful evolution. Nor are the intermittent successes of the African National Congress, which has been attacking South African targets from bases in Mozambique. This winter, too, following a devastating drought that has cut South Africa's corn crop by two-thirds, and pushed rural blacks to the edge of starvation, hunger may drive Africans to protest. Additionally, there has been a heady ferment in the industrial areas since unions for blacks were legalized three years ago.

Until the South African government decides that it can afford to talk seriously with black leaders, or until a combination of internal troubles compels the government to reassess its long-term strategy, the path of evolution will remain empty. The tangible evidence of which Ambassador Nickel spoke is not near at hand.

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### *South Africa à la Eagleburger*

Although U.S. Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger late last month forthrightly linked the Reagan administration's southern African policy with that of the Carter era, he refused to make any fundamental tactical alteration to the current policy of the United States toward South Africa.

Mr. Eagleburger told the National Conference of Editorial Writers that South Africa's political system was "morally wrong." The U.S., he said, "must reject the legal and political premises and consequences of apartheid." It rejects any attempts to strip South African blacks of their citizenship. It is "repelled" by the forcible removal of stable black communities to barren sites in the so-called homelands. It could not "countenance repression of organizations and individuals by means of administrative measures like banning and detention without due process of law."

These are strong and welcome restatements of traditional American official views of the South African political process. Mr. Eagleburger also called for regional peace and stability which will, he said, encourage "essential change"—a "basic shift away from apartheid"—in South Africa. Overall, the tenor of the speech should be applauded by those in the U.S. and South Africa who hope for an intelligent modernization of the attitudes and actions of the country's ruling minority and rapid movement toward the essential, open, black-white dialogue that can alone propel South Africa down the road of evolutionary political development.

But Mr. Eagleburger did not demand mutual discussions between representatives of the majority and the several minorities that comprise South Africa. Instead, he said that “Western policy . . . must focus on how various black groups acquire the basis and influence necessary to participate in a genuine bargaining process that produces change acceptable to all.”

He went on to say that American interests were best served by encouraging the change that was now under way. Subsequently, he correctly applauded change in the sphere of labor relations and then praised the government of South Africa’s present intention to change its constitution to give some political representation to 2.6 million Coloureds (peoples of mixed descent) and .8 million Asians, without offering participatory crumbs to the country’s 22 million Africans.

Yet Africans have overwhelmingly condemned the new constitutional changes, as have two of the opposition parties in South Africa’s parliament. Prime Minister Pieter Botha has, in effect, slammed the final door on black political representation, denying often that the proposed changes are meant to be but a prelude to African advance. Mr. Eagleburger’s speech lamely excuses and condones this omission as a temporary tactic.

Most of all, despite Mr. Eagleburger’s critique of the system, his speech made no explicit or implicit modifications of the Reagan administration’s existing policy of “constructive engagement.” Indeed, Mr. Eagleburger refused to endorse, even as a tactic, the congressional efforts now under way to bar American bank loans to the government of South Africa, to halt the sale of South African gold coins in the U.S., and to compel American corporations to follow the voluntary code of good citizenship to which most already adhere.

Not even over Namibia, the fulcrum of constructive engagement, did Mr. Eagleburger promise that the Reagan administration would toughen its stance, or make new demands on South Africa. He talked weakly about the need for Angolan “reciprocity” when it is South African obstinacy which has frustrated the American initiative. Further, Mr. Eagleburger asked all parties to make a contribution; South Africa should withdraw its troops from southern Angola as well as Namibia, and Angola should send Cuban troops home.

But, South Africa is by far the most powerful military force in the region, and has demonstrated its power in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zambia, as well as Angola. Mr. Eagleburger did not promise to curb the exercise of South African power. Indeed, he promised more of the same constructive engagement which has so successfully encouraged South African forward military operations and the “destabilization” of the southern African region.

If the Reagan administration wants the kinds of profound internal changes that Mr. Eagleburger has enunciated so well, then constructive engagement will need to become an active as well as a passive policy. Mr. Eagleburger and his colleagues may therefore wish to find nonrhetorical ways to show the South Africans that they are serious about regional peace and internal change.

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### *A Moribund Policy toward S. Africa*

American policy toward southern Africa is in flux. In a marked departure from their previous stands, and even from the policy of President Carter's Administration, the six leading Democratic contenders for the 1984 presidential nomination last month declared their disdain for "constructive engagement." They endorsed a radical reassessment of the U.S. approach to South Africa.

Constructive engagement describes an approach to the problems of Namibia, South Africa and southern Africa (in that order) that led the Reagan Administration to adopt a tactical (not a strategic) posture to South Africa that was radically different from its predecessor's. It was and is tactical because, without liking apartheid more than Carter & Co., the Reaganites decided to try to sweet talk the South African state out of Namibia.

Nicer words and friendlier attitudes led to a number of tactical demonstrations of the "better" relationship: lifting the U.S. embargo on a range of strategic exports, making significant changes in the nuclear fuels embargo area, criticizing and condemning less in public and in private, relaxing visa and other visiting restrictions, improving the investment climate and so on.

These gestures were and are meaningful to South Africa. From the American side, they were meant to have a tactical impact and were intended initially to lead to the retrocession of South African control over Namibia. They were also designed, once the main object of the new policy was achieved, to encourage progressive change within South Africa and important improvements in South Africa's attitude toward its neighbors.

In the third year of constructive engagement, it is clear that only a few of the American policy objectives have been achieved. From an American perspective, South Africa has on the whole hindered the achievement of stability in southern Africa. Angola and Mozambique have been compelled to rely more than they wanted to on the Soviets and less on the West in part because

of South Africa's active antagonism. The record is somewhat more positive in the case of Zimbabwe, but South Africa has been only minimally helpful to the United States in assisting sensible development there.

From the American point of view, constructive engagement has had precious little impact on the modernization of politics, economics and social life in South Africa itself.

Namibia, moreover, looks no closer to an internationally validated independence than it did in 1981. Indeed, constructive engagement has backed itself into a corner. The State Department originally believed that it was politically wise to link a South African devolution of power in Namibia to the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola. The Angolans had indicated to the previous American administration that the Cubans could go once South Africa relaxed its grip on Namibia. Naturally, South Africa also wanted the Cubans to go in order to make any pullback from Namibia salable to its own white electorate.

But Jonas Savimbi and the insurgent forces of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) are held at bay only by the Cubans (and by Soviet, East German, Czech and other East European "advisers").

South Africa will hardly choose to weaken UNITA. In the short run, at least, it serves South Africa well. Only a stiffening of constructive engagement and a reversal of present American policy toward South Africa could raise the international political cost, at least, of South Africa's present adventurous policy in Angola and its clear lack of enthusiasm for a transfer of power in Namibia.

The opposition of the Democratic presidential aspirants mirrors that recently expressed by influential Republican senators and by many congressmen. Yet the Reagan Administration continues to cling to constructive engagement, hoping against hope that its now moribund policy will still somehow free Namibia and encourage a more equitable distribution of power in South Africa itself.

The problem for Democrats and Republicans alike will be how to make the new policies constructive in a way that impresses rather than caters to the South Africans.

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### *South Africa: A Change, but Not Necessarily for the Better*

South Africa changed its political system last week, but not necessarily for the better. Its white electorate strongly endorsed a radically new constitution which promises to alter the country's political focus profoundly.

The constitution transforms South Africa from a Westminster type of parliamentary system into a curious hybrid dominated by an all-powerful executive president. He will have broad appointive powers and control over most matters of national or cross-racial concerns. Three legislatures, one for whites, one for Coloureds (people of mixed descent), and one for Asians, will constitute a new tricameral parliament. Each will legislate only for its own peoples, thus perpetuating and institutionalizing apartheid (South Africa's special version of segregation).

Power will flow to the executive, and to a lesser extent to the white legislative chamber. The majority party in the white parliament, now the National Party, will be able to outvote any combination of the Coloured and Asian chambers, and also those two chambers and the opposition parties in the white chamber. These skewed votes will determine the election of the first state president, and all other issues that involve the opinion of the whole parliament. Moreover, the president will himself appoint a cabinet for the entire parliament, ministerial councils for each chamber, and an advisory council for disputes between chambers.

The new constitution gives no political role to the 23 million Africans who constitute South Africa's majority (whites number 4.6 million; Coloureds, 2.5 million; and Asians, 0.8 million). During the campaign that preceded last week's 66 percent majority for the new constitution, Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha over and over again promised that Africans would never be brought into South Africa's political system. They would never receive a chamber of their own or other rights and would have to continue to find some political solace in 10 small, rural, impoverished homelands on South Africa's periphery.

Africans of all backgrounds and political tendencies condemned the constitution. Their leaders pleaded with whites to vote no. So did the head of the liberal white Progressive Federal Party. By shutting Africans out and denying the majority a stake in the peaceful evolution of South Africa, they said that Mr. Botha was intensifying racial conflict in a country where Africans were already sympathetic to the African National Congress, an externally based guerrilla movement.

Asians and Coloureds are disaffected, too, although one set of Coloured politicians agreed early this year to accept positions in a chamber. Even though whites have now approved the constitution, Coloureds and Asians may not, if and when they are asked their opinion. They fear African reprisal. Moreover, Mr. Botha has refused to consider altering the segregationist policies, which injure Coloureds and Asians as much as Africans.

Many whites voted affirmatively last week because they thought the new constitution would enable Mr. Botha's government to reform their country's racial policies. Yet blacks want the chance to vote or at least influence the formulation of national policy. They want the elimination of segregation, especially legal limitations on their job and residential mobility. They want to be considered South Africans. They want a territorially unfragmented South Africa. But Mr. Botha's government is pledged to grant none of these rights. In the months ahead Mr. Botha may be influenced more by his defeat last week in one of the 15 voting areas where far right-wing whites thought his policies, vague as they are, too advanced.

South Africa after the referendum is much as South Africa was before last week's vote. Its vast majority is poor, alienated, and angry. Its Coloureds and Asians are wary and fearful, and its whites are no more secure than they were before. The new constitution and the new parliament that as a result will come into being next year address none of the fundamental problems of a still bitterly divided country. Also, the whites have traded a strong parliamentary government with a vigorous opposition for a potentially dictatorial one which has neither the vision nor the inspiration to deal directly with the all-consuming problem of a nation where evolutionary reform has now been made less rather than more likely.

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### *U.S. Falls Short in South Africa*

The Reagan Administration calls its policy toward Southern Africa constructive engagement, but the results have been more engaging than constructive. Contrary to the policy's intent, white South Africa has benefited and Africans everywhere in the region largely have not.

Washington now accepts the essential failure of constructive engagement. Thus, even the return of a Republican administration after November's presidential election should cause a reformulation of constructive engagement.

The cornerstone of constructive engagement has been the shifting of Namibia (once called South West Africa) from South African control to



independence in accord with a formula prescribed by Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. South Africa accepts the formula, but neither the strenuous efforts of the Reagan Administration nor the equally dedicated activity of the Carter Administration has been able to pry Namibia from South Africa's grasp.

Now the presence of 25,000 Cuban troops in Angola—and South Africa's expressed fears that those troops could unfairly dominate a black successor regime in an independent Namibia—is the prime excuse for South Africa's intransigence. The constructive engagers in Washington have accepted the argument, and are assiduously, but with little chance of success, attempting to persuade the government of Angola to send the Cubans home.

The Cubans will stay, at least until heavy South African support for the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) ends or the United States persuades Angola to trade Cuban for American help.

Constructive engagement differs from the policies of the Carter government by its stress on friendship and relaxed dealings with white South Africa. Despite the State Department's reiterated abhorrence of apartheid in South Africa, its relations with South Africa under this Administration have been much more amicable than any American administration since 1960. This closeness is intended to make Namibia free, which it has not.

Nor has constructive engagement brought about greater power sharing or a recognizable diminution of apartheid in South Africa itself.

South Africa is about to shift from a parliamentary to a presidential system, and Coloureds (people of mixed descent) and Asians will be voting next month for the first time to choose representatives for their separate national legislative assemblies. There will be a white legislature, too, and the three chambers will cooperate (but with whites retaining a veto) in making laws for their own groups and for the country. A white state president will oversee the process and have strong, unchecked powers of a broad kind. But in this process of political change, called reform in South Africa, there is no place for the 25 million Africans who are about 75 percent of the country's people.

Despite constructive engagement, white-ruled South Africa still says that blacks have political rights only in their group homelands, those 10 small chunks carved out of South Africa. Together the homelands encompass 13 percent of the total land area of the country.

Constructive engagement can claim to have protected Zimbabwe from South African economic attack. It can also credit itself with a critical role recently in persuading Angola to agree to a cease-fire with South Africa and Mozambique to sign a non-aggression pact with South Africa. But South

African troops had earlier occupied a portion of southern Angola and a South African-backed insurgency group had seriously menaced Mozambican control of its own countryside. This destabilization, as it is called, occurred since the Reagan Administration took office, so to claim credit for a de-escalation of hostilities, and a South African victory, may be a dubious honor.

November's election will encourage a long overdue fine-tuning of constructive engagement or, possibly, its total revamping.

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### *South Africa on Edge*

White South Africa is worried, and with reason. Last week's official ban on black protest meetings acknowledged the extent of the government's concern that this month's episode of violence by Africans could spread, gain momentum, and assume serious proportions.

Approximately 40 Africans, the most since 1976-77, have been killed since the beginning of September in a succession of violent protests directed at the newly installed white government of President Pieter W. Botha, at white-appointed black officials in the African townships or ghettos, against recent rent increases in the townships, and generally against the meaninglessness for Africans of the political reforms recently introduced for Coloureds (peoples of mixed descent) and Asians.

Nearly 4.6 million white South Africans rule 25 million Africans, 2.6 million Coloureds, and .8 million Asians. Last week Mr. Botha, previously prime minister, was installed as the country's first executive president; this week the new tricameral Parliament sits for the first time, 160 whites voting in one chamber, 80 Coloureds in another, and 40 Asians in a third.

Last month Coloured and Asian representatives were chosen in separate elections. Fewer than 30 percent of the registered voters, and fewer than 20 percent of the eligible voters, cast ballots. The white chamber carried over from the country's former legislature.

South Africa's police and Army have overwhelming firepower, and can thus contain and, if they wish to risk heavy casualties, end violent protest movements in individual townships. But taking that course would forfeit whatever positive results the government has achieved locally and worldwide following its devolution of some power to Coloureds and Asians. Massacre headlines would alarm the world, and also upset the United States

during the presidential election season. South Africa is very eager that President Reagan win a second term.

Banning meetings and public gatherings, even funerals for riot victims, stops just short of a declaration of public emergency. Black high schools, a focus of discontent and rage, have also been closed. Shortly the government may need to rescind the rent increases, which have added up to 25 percent to the already heavy burden poorly paid Africans bear in recessionary South Africa.

Thus far the riots have largely been confined to hardscrabble black townships near Vereeniging, south of Johannesburg, and several smaller ones east and west of Johannesburg. The 1.5 million people of Soweto, the largest black city in the country and the main labor reservoir for Johannesburg and adjacent gold mines, have not erupted into violence as they did in 1976.

But residents of Soweto dislike their local black officials—the clients of the white government, or “stooges,” as they are called—as much as the recent rioters of Sharpeville, Tembisa, and Sebokeng. They have also been upset by rent increases. And for a year schoolchildren in Tembisa and near Pretoria have been protesting third-rate facilities and poor teaching, boycotting classes for those and more political reasons.

South Africa is thus ripe for more widespread revolt. The precipitating factor was the heavy-handed final inauguration of the new Constitution and Parliament. It worsens the position of Africans, as conceivably it may ultimately benefit Coloureds and Asians, although only positive results will make that case. It also denigrates Africans, denying them any form of national political participation while giving Coloureds and Asians a little.

Even if the revolt spreads, it need not add up to a revolution. White South Africa is too strong, and it is determined to retain power and survive. But when Africans have protested militantly they have won concessions. They have obtained significant modifications of apartheid when their protest has been supported by Western diplomatic pressure. Thus, only if the Reagan administration now chooses to stiffen its attitude to white South Africa, and wishes to turn the events in South Africa to Washington's advantage, will this month's desperate attacks by Africans achieve much in the way of desirable social, economic, or political betterment.

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### *U.S. Shakes Stick at South African Policies*

A heightened American awareness of South African issues has resulted from the picket lines around and arrests of prominent politicians, labor leaders, and others near the diplomatic and consular missions of South Africa in this country. This new attention on black-white conflict in South Africa has raised the consciousness of Congress, and President Reagan. Whether it will have a lasting effect on South Africa, however, remains questionable.

President Reagan repeated his faith in quiet diplomacy as a way of dealing with South Africa on Dec. 7. He interpreted the four-year-old American policy of "constructive engagement" as mandating friendship and conciliation in our dealings with South Africa. Strong words, he implied, would be counterproductive.

Yet on Dec. 10, International Human Rights Day, the President lashed out at South Africa, criticizing apartheid, detention without trial, and forced removal of blacks from their communities, and he called for a more just society. Had the President suddenly become more aware of what Vice-President Walter Mondale and the Rev. Jesse Jackson had been saying throughout 1984, and earlier?

Had he taken the words of South African Bishop Desmond Tutu, this year's Nobel Peace Prize-winner, to heart? Advised by the State Department, had he also realized that four years of constructive engagement had accomplished little and that white South Africa was largely unreformed in terms of political participation? Had he realized that South Africa still controlled Namibia and that South Africa was stronger in its region than ever before? Or was the President responding to the public criticism of South Africa voiced by 37 prominent Republicans, including the new head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the head of its Africa subcommittee, and 35 representatives led by a leading conservative? Only the voice of Sen. Jesse Helms (R) of North Carolina was missing from this broad-based public response to the enhanced public focus on the reality of South Africa.

President Reagan may have been affected by all these considerations. Most of all, the President may well have been influenced by the overwhelming need for a policy realignment toward South Africa. What constructive engagement has long lacked is a sense that the United States would continue assisting South Africa only if political reform were being achieved and Namibia being abandoned. For four years American policy toward South Africa has been characterized by carrots, never sticks. Not even twigs. Now the President was brandishing a small stick.

He was asking for action, not more stalling.

The new president of South Africa claims that U.S. criticism is irrelevant and easily ignored. But that has never been true, and is less a reality today than at almost any time before. Even so, those who claim that the U.S. has the ability directly and powerfully to alter South Africa also overstate their case.

There are real limits to the ability of the United States directly or indirectly to effect rapid policy change in South Africa. We are not, however, without the kind of influence which, if it were to be employed systematically and carefully, would buttress those factors within the South African body politic which today encourage, even demand, greater real attention to African grievances and aspirations.

Historically, outside influence has been most relevant when the forces of internal dissent have been active and violent. Combined, they have produced a synergistic effect that has previously propelled South Africa forward.

President Reagan and his advisers may be as aware as the various American protest groups of the precarious position of today's South Africa. Poised between reform and repression, its leaders may privately welcome a newly raised American voice. By failing to heed it, they risk intensified U.S. threats of corporate divestment, more city and state legislative action against South Africa, localized boycotts, and—for the first time—credible congressional sanctions. Already the major American companies doing business in South Africa have voted to work strenuously for the ending of apartheid.

If Reagan and his principal aides continue to stiffen the thrust of constructive engagement, the government of South Africa will become more isolated internationally than ever before, and white South Africa will be compelled to focus on its tough and limited options.

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### *South Africa: The Case for Pressure*

Pressure works. That is the clear message of last week's critical shifts in South Africa, although its white government would vehemently deny being subject to outside influence.

It is the threat of disinvestment and sanctions, particularly the many legislative initiatives now being considered by Congress, that has encouraged the regime led by President Pieter W. Botha to concentrate its official thinking. He and his colleagues in the ruling National Party are trying to both accelerate their own process of political evolution and, with equal emphasis, to blunt growing American antagonism.

Salvo 1 in their counterattack against United States pressure was the electric, but very conditional, offer to release Nelson Mandela from life imprisonment. Mr. Mandela, the leader of the banned African National Congress (ANC) guerrilla movement, was offered his freedom if he renounced violence and promised to do nothing to occasion his rearrest.

Obtaining Mr. Mandela's release after 22 years in detention has long been the goal of opposition movements in South Africa and protesters in the United States. Mr. Mandela is the most popular and broadly acknowledged black politician in South Africa. The end of his incarceration would symbolize a new beginning for that troubled country of 25 million Africans, nearly 5 million whites, almost 3 million Coloureds (persons of mixed descent), and about 1 million Asians.

But if Mr. Botha's government envisages Mr. Mandela's release as a tactical maneuver to turn critics and gain time for the internal political restructuring that ruling whites favor, white and black opponents of apartheid want Mr. Mandela's freedom to accelerate and invigorate a process of dialogue between the rulers and ruled which could provide an alternative to fresh episodes of racial violence.

President Botha pointedly did not offer to legalize the ANC, banned since 1960. But if Mr. Mandela accepts the offer, which most observers doubt, he could then lead a black negotiating team into talks with whites about South Africa's future. This could be a master stroke on many accounts, although the white government is unready to bargain away its overwhelming power, and Mr. Mandela has his own image to worry about.

Leaders of the ANC in London and Lusaka, Zambia, have urged Mr. Mandela to dismiss the offer of conditional release until Mr. Botha's government itself renounces violence. African political leaders within South Africa have taken the same line, as has the wife of one of Mr. Mandela's long-imprisoned colleagues.

If Mr. Mandela heeds their views and refuses to risk legitimacy for the much more problematical possibility of negotiating change, he will do so knowing that whites are probably not yet able to share real power with blacks. Even so, Mr. Botha will have had a propaganda success.

The second salvo in South Africa's response to pressure was a decision, announced last Friday, to suspend the forced removal of Africans from long-held rural land in so-called white areas into the solidly black homelands. The United States, Britain, and numerous protest groups have decried this particularly inhumane policy.

Even though the Cabinet minister responsible hedged his suspension of removals with all manner of qualifications, it nevertheless represented a

significant break with a long line of government policy and a recognition of the danger to South Africa of American agitation.

In addition to these two recent, abrupt shifts in governmental approach, there is a new willingness in South Africa to consult with Africans instead of ordering them around. Furthermore, the government intends to give Africans freehold rights in the urban areas for the first time, to remove unnecessary forms of discrimination, and to restore some kind of citizenship rights to blacks. But whatever these new initiatives will mean in particular, the walls of apartheid will not soon come tumbling down.

Nevertheless, these new responses to crisis are all harbingers of a shift in tactics that has been accelerated by American protest—by pickets around and arrests at South African embassies and consulates, loudly expressed Republican and Democratic impatience with South Africa in the Senate and the House of Representatives, and by the consciousness raising of Sen. Edward Kennedy's visit there last month.

Yet American pressure would have been ineffective without the riots that engulfed South Africa's black townships last fall, the fateful decision to send troops to quell the black dissenters, and, arguably, the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa. Historically, pressure on South Africa has only been effective when internal violence has been coupled with the threat of economic attacks from outside.

The willingness of Mr. Botha's government to respond has widely been welcomed abroad far more than at home. Blacks inside are skeptical because of their memory of previous positive actions that brought little real change. Moreover, even if the intentions of the government are all that they appear to be, the major question still remains: Will the whites move fast enough?

Will official South Africa grapple with the fundamental question of political representation that is at the heart of the black-white divide? Africans, who lack the vote, say that the government is doing too little, too late.

If Mandela does emerge from behind bars to negotiate with the white government, black agitators inside and American protesters ought to claim some of the credit. Then a process of fascinating and exciting change will have a chance to begin, with white South Africa's instinct for survival squarely confronting black aspirations for shared power.

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### *South Africa: Domestic Turmoil*

South Africa's much trumpeted reform initiative rang harsh and hollow again this month. Shootings of black Africans throughout the Cape Province and parts of the Transvaal ended widespread hopes that United States pressure had persuaded South Africa's white rulers to conciliate and negotiate rather than kill.

The governmental policies which ensured those deaths were coincidentally, but strikingly, even lavishly exposed on U.S. television by President Pieter W. Botha of South Africa. President Botha's equivocations, rationalizations, and factual surprises provided a clear counterpoint both to black demonstrations and to widely published poignant photographs of Dr. Helen Suzman, a veteran opposition parliamentarian, sitting amid black protesters and taking note of their grievances.

President Botha did not explain the denial of the right to vote to South Africa's 25 million Africans.

Is there time? Black African protests against apartheid—against their political powerlessness, their economic deprivation, and segregation in all other aspects—were renewed in September when escalated rent increases were coupled with the establishment of a new tricameral Parliament that excluded blacks. Since September more than 600 Africans have lost their lives in or near the segregated townships, thousands have been wounded, and additional thousands of schoolchildren have boycotted classes to show their displeasure with the government form of education as well as the "system."

Last week's confrontation on the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre between a police detachment and 400 marching mourners in Uitenhage, in which 19 Africans were killed by police rifle fire, symbolized how distant white South Africa was from peaceful reform.

Nothing that the state president said that very day provided reassurance. He defended the jailing without hope of rapid trial on charges of treason of the leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the very moderate black leaders with whom a government bent on reform would want to negotiate. Instead, Mr. Botha called them communists. In counterpoint, American television viewers saw Dr. Allan Boesak, a Coloured (mixed race), Afrikaans-speaking minister of the Dutch Reformed Church and a founding leader of the UDF, display his enmity to godless, Soviet-inspired communists.

President Botha appeared as a defender of a beleaguered faith. He claimed that he and his government would not be bullied by U.S. antagonism.



He reacted with sharp hostility to Secretary of State George Shultz's exasperated condemnation of South Africa's continued, senseless violence against blacks.

It is clear, nevertheless, that Mr. Botha and his colleagues in the National Party who run South Africa are desperately worried that their inability to stanch black protests undercuts their own attempts to persuade the leaders of the West that South Africa is reforming, and that there still is abundant time to enact peaceful reform.

Certainly the killings at Uitenhage, the inability of the Coloured or Asian representatives in the new Parliament to mount an internal reform initiative, and the white government's refusal thus far to rescind the fundamental legal underpinnings of apartheid has added additional fuel to the rising divestment campaign in the U.S.

Despite what Mr. Botha implied on television, white South Africa can ill afford to do nothing. More repression is likely, for protracted disorder undermines white South Africa's image. But, since a combination of internal violence and Western pressure has hitherto always led to reform, new tactical retreats from all-out apartheid may also be anticipated. Once again, however, they will probably serve to appease the U.S. State Department more than Africans, who desire the franchise, and nothing much less. Thus whites will think they are reforming and Africans, marginally consulted if at all, will dismiss concessions as cosmetic. Until white South Africa agrees to negotiate with blacks for the lasting future of the country, cycles of violence and repression are certain to continue.

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### *Political Apartheid*

South Africa's announced willingness to repeal legislative prohibitions against cross-color sex and marriage is significant symbolically, for doing so could imply a gradual and ultimately powerful unraveling of the fabric of that country's social apartheid. But blacks are interested in political participation, not a legal chance to love whites physically. For them the repeal of the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts comes years too late to be meaningful, even as a gesture of reform.

The end of bans on cross-color relations has always affected whites and Coloureds (people of mixed descent) much more than Africans and Asians. From the 1950s to the early '70s, police snooped mercilessly and made life miserable for those few whites and Coloureds who were drawn to each

other. (Alan Paton's "Too Late the Phalarope" tells the story of such conflict unusually well.)

But in this decade arrests and prosecutions have been few; neither the state nor ruling Afrikaners have cared much about legislated morality. In any event, the existence of the acts served the political purpose of consolidating support behind the country's National Party in the 1950s, during the early days of its rule.

Had both prohibitions been scrapped two or three years ago, their demise would have been celebrated in South Africa and throughout the West. Observers would have seen the decision to chip away at the edifice of apartheid as early signals of major reform efforts. Now, after eight months of almost continuous unrest in the black townships of South Africa, and after five months of anti-South African protest in the United States, the end of legislative bans on inter-color marriage and sex is viewed as welcome, long overdue, but of extremely little significance politically.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Bishop Desmond Tutu agree that South Africa has long moved past the point in its white-black conflict when symbolic gestures, social concessions, or even economic moves can make an impact on the mass of aggrieved Africans. They are demanding citizenship, basic justice, the end of pass laws, the end of legislation that prevents economic mobility, and—ultimately, if not immediately—real participation in political decision-making at the highest level.

The South African government claims Africans may exercise political aspirations in the 10 homelands which make up 13 percent of the total land area of the country and are meant to be the homes for at least half the black population of 25 million. But that satisfies few blacks.

The government also says that blacks can vote and be a part of the town council system that runs their segregated living areas. But those councils have little power and are responsible to whites financially, and Africans have already boycotted several elections of town councilors throughout the country. Now, more dangerously, Africans are menacing those who have taken positions as councilors or mayors in the townships. Africans have made abundantly clear their distaste for collaborators of this kind. Black policemen have also been attacked, as informers always have been.

More interesting and positively, the abandonment of the facets of apartheid enshrined in the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts should logically mean that the state will need to remove provisions in other legislative enactments which now designate where persons of dark pigmentation may and may not reside, attend school, and so on. The Group Areas Act, which provides for housing segregation, will need to be amended to account

for those couples who are both white and black and who live together. Their offspring will be Coloured. Will they continue to be designated that way under the Population Registration Act (the administrative cornerstone of apartheid), or will there be a new accommodation of their existence? Must they go to Coloured schools?

In such senses there is more than symbolic significance in the expunging of the hated acts. South Africa has moved on, and those acts are a recognition of the sad contemporary past. Their repeal will have a much greater relevance if only the government demonstrates a determination to tackle the fundamental questions of political, not social, apartheid.

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### *South Africa: Legitimate Demands*

South Africa's newly declared state of emergency will not easily curb the continued violent expression of black anger there. Nor will it imply an early willingness on the part of the government of South Africa to deprive the riots of the fuel of political rejection that has sustained them for 10 months.

The declaration was a desperate act. The government already possessed virtually all the powers it established by promulgating an emergency. Most have been employed throughout the past year of intensifying violence. Now, to demonstrate its toughness, and possibly to avoid a few legal complications, the government has chosen martial law, has arrested several hundred black leaders, thrown rings of police and soldiers around particularly volatile black cities, and introduced curfews.

Instead of strength, the establishing of an emergency displays an underlying weakness of the state; unwilling to negotiate with blacks over the future of their country, and unable to provide or sanction nonviolent channels of protest, the government has been driven to a Draconian choice.

Most of all, a state of emergency acknowledges how broad and deep is the chasm between white attempts to reform and black aspirations. The government believes it can make concessions sufficient to appease militant blacks but insufficient to threaten existing white power and prerogatives. The government affirms tactical readjustments but is as yet unprepared to think strategically about its realistic options.

Yet South Africa is becoming blacker. Nearly 90 percent of the country's population is black, and even the white-controlled urban areas are nearly 70 percent black. About 25 million Africans, 4.6 million whites, 2.7 million Coloureds (persons of mixed descent), and 800,000 Asians reside in South

Africa. By the end of the century African numbers will have increased to between 36 million and 38 million, and whites to only 5 million. The cities will be 75 to 80 percent black.

The present South African government has been introducing reforms which have significance for whites but are irrelevant for blacks. The abolition of prohibitions against sex across the color line, multiracial dining, and increased employment opportunities for Africans are all positive attainments, but beside the point for blacks.

Africans now seek the political kingdom. They want to share power, to be citizens, to vote, and to help determine the future of a rich land in which they are much more numerous than their rulers. Even the concessions which will undoubtedly follow the emergency will be regarded by Africans as welcome but inconsequential.

The gulf between white and black thinking is growing wider and martial law will further separate the sides. Africans are not persuaded that whites want reform. They are becoming chary of consultation, for the government has regularly consulted with Africans who are widely regarded as collaborators and stooges. The houses of those unfortunate families have been fire-bombed in recent months in the segregated townships.

Africans want to negotiate with whites. Their model is a forum akin to the United States Constitutional Congress of the 1780s. No African leader expects such a process to be easy, quickly successful, or harmonious. But in a land where whites have preponderant military and economic power, and blacks have numbers and represent the future—no matter how distant—they believe that only genuine all-out negotiations can prevent repetitious cycles of escalating violence and an eventual civil war.

President Pieter W. Botha's National Party-dominated government of South Africa clearly thinks otherwise. Instead of releasing African leaders like Nelson Mandela from jail, or talking openly with aboveground men of influence like Bishop Desmond Tutu or Dr. Nthato Motlana, it has decided to repress, detain, incarcerate, and intimidate. It knows it must introduce serious changes, but it wants to do so from a position of unquestioned strength.

Without a strategic breakthrough, however—and none seems at hand—the very power of South Africa's military and police will prove no substitute for a program of evolution.

The government has no overall plan; after it succeeds by military might in diminishing the present state of violence, it may offer partial municipal autonomy to blacks, or it may make the administration of influx control regulations and pass laws less onerous. It may even try to introduce a black

advisory council or a black fourth chamber in its present white-dominated Parliament.

Blacks will today only accept increments of real political power. They are more impatient than ever before, and their riots are inflamed by palpable frustrations which are primarily political but also economic (South Africa is deep in recession and there is high and persistent unemployment among blacks).

Only a government prepared to accept the legitimate quality of current black demands, and to bargain about how those political goals are to be attained over time, can even hope to dampen conflict and stabilize a country now and for the foreseeable future convulsed by antagonism between the haves and the have-nots.

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### *Satisfying South African Blacks*

The government of South Africa still believes that whites can continue to rule without beginning to share power with blacks. That is the clear message of President Pieter W. Botha's much-heralded speech last week.

Despite a year of rolling rioting that has killed nearly 700, and a state of emergency that has exacerbated rather than calmed African townships and race relations, President Botha's regime remains reliant upon repression, to be followed, as he hinted, by moderations of several important constraints under which blacks habitually live out their years.

To have failed to have offered specifics, or even the outline of a program of evolution, instead of the usual clichés, only serves to enrage militant blacks. As the state of emergency polarized black and white, so President Botha's speech has widened the gulf further. His address was the despair of moderate Africans, both for its combative tone and for what he failed to say.

President Botha intended to define logic and reality: Whites, especially Afrikaners and the dominant National Party, are not yet prepared to share or even to divide power. Nor can they (or anyone sensible) contemplate partition. Yet whites are at last ready to erode privilege and to provide reasonably equal opportunity for many blacks in commercial and social spheres.

South Africa's ruling whites believe they can offer sufficient reform in these broad areas to stem the tide of revolt. Such changes, after all, are significant for whites accustomed to generations of unquestioned supremacy and unparalleled high standards of living in a blissful climate. Mr. Botha and colleagues also hope that the gradual enunciation of "reforms," such as a

modification of the past laws, an abridgment of influx control, and admission of some form of common citizenship, will appease the United States and the West.

But a year of rioting, the absence of any governmental appreciation of what the massive violent protests mean, and the words of the President have left politicized Africans (now the vocal majority) unwilling to be co-opted by well-meant and beneficial social and economic changes. Africans are now demanding to participate fully in the political restructuring of their country. They demand negotiations, and shun being merely consulted. Whether or not Africans would accept less than "one man, one vote," they do assume that only political influence now matters. That is the shift that the events of 1984–85 have wrought.

"If and when the Pretoria regime dismantles apartheid," a black Roman Catholic priest said last week, "we will be willing to sit down and discuss the future social order of this country." Another activist was quoted as summing up the change in black thinking even more simply: "We don't want to settle for half a loaf anymore. We want the whole thing."

President Botha is gambling that his immensely strong military machine, and his weaker, stretched, but still powerful police force, can soon cordon off the black townships and curtail the African anger that erupts from day to day in various parts of the country.

In the past, except for 1976–77, whites have managed to limit black violence. But today the alienation of Africans is much more widespread than ever before and psychologically much more entrenched. Africans are every day more numerous overall, and in the urban areas. There are almost 25 million Africans and fewer than 5 million whites, plus 2.7 million Coloureds (peoples of mixed descent) and 800,000 Asians.

The cities, where most whites live, are dominated numerically by Africans. Sixty-five percent of all Africans live in and around the white population centers. And the African population is increasing twice as fast as is the white. The economy is dependent on Africans' labor, as next week's announced strike by black miners of gold and coal may show. No part of South Africa is exclusively white, or able to function without integration of white and black skills, white and black capital, and white and black cooperation.

President Botha gave cold comfort to his black antagonists, to white businessmen who want reconciliation and a return to national prosperity, and to foreigners. Those in Washington (and Santa Barbara) who may have hoped that President Botha would announce drastic steps to end violence misjudged their target, as the Reagan administration policy of "constructive engagement" has systematically done since 1981. South Africa listens to the

United States, but more so when Congress threatens to impose sanctions, which will happen next month, than when the executive branch wrings its hands piously.

South Africa has crossed a Rubicon internally. Black patience, always stretched, has now worn out. Thanks to the inactions of Mr. Botha's government, the toughs of the streets have largely taken political leadership away from the likes of Bishop Desmond Tutu, Dr. Nthato Motlana, the Rev. Allan Boesak, and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.

Internationally, South Africa has lost its friends as well as their ambassadors. Its capital market and its supply of investors are slowly drying up. Constructive engagement, writhing in the wake of South Africa's refusal to evolve rapidly, died in the wake of Mr. Botha's address, leaving South Africa bereft of overseas psychological support.

It is hard to think that Mr. Botha could drive South Africa deeper into tragedy. But violence, more violence, and still further episodes of militant protest are clearly ahead for South Africa, until President Botha and his colleagues decide to take bold moves like prolonged negotiations over how best to take South Africa politically into the next century.

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### *Get Much Tougher with South Africa*

President Reagan's executive order imposing limited sanctions against the white regime in South Africa has been criticized as weak, tardy and probably ineffective. The sanctions fell short of what Congress wanted and failed to include a Congressional plea for automatic further sanctions in 12 months should South Africa fail to make significant reforms. But what the order also revealed was that the Administration's analysis of the depth and causes of the crisis in South Africa remains grievously flawed.

As the unrest has demonstrated, black antagonism to white minority rule is widespread and vicious. The Government intends to repress the violence, then make reformist concessions, but naturally from a secure position of strength.

The Reagan Administration's prevailing policy has been to support President P. W. Botha's approach. But it is an approach that lags well behind the reality of the South African crisis. It is too late for black "moderates" to prevail. It is too late for concessions. It is too late for constructive engagement—even President Reagan's renamed policy of "active constructive engagement."

The white rulers of South Africa have hitherto refused to negotiate in ways that would have boosted the credibility of nonviolent leaders of South Africa like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Bishop Desmond Tutu. By arresting nearly all of the significant leaders of the multiracial United Democratic Front, the Government has virtually insured further eruptions of militant anger.

The state of emergency, South Africa's new national liquidity crisis, its Government's intrinsic intransigence and the international notoriety of black protest have all shifted the argument between blacks and whites decisively to the left. No longer is it possible for Africans who hope to retain their legitimacy to bargain with the Government for anything less than political participation.

In short, we are beyond the point where social and economic concessions can bring about a reconciliation between black and white. Whites believe that changes in the fabric of apartheid would be important indications of serious evolutionary reform. And so they would be—but mostly for whites. For Africans, such well-meant gestures would be regarded as too late and too limited.

The differences between white and black aspirations are stark. Africans in 1985 are focusing on the adage popularized in the late 1940's by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall follow." A simple "one man, one vote," which whites naturally fear, is not yet the only rallying cry. Thus, there is still room to maneuver, but only within the arena of political power. Africans want representation at municipal, regional and national levels of authority, and they will no longer be put off by less.

Once the White House sees that the Rubicon of political aspiration has already been crossed in South Africa, and that there is no turning back, it will understand that its best hope of leverage on the policies of white South Africa is to shift publicly from constructive engagement to a tougher, more constructive policy that is less engaging.

This is not merely a play on words. Official South Africa is much more susceptible to influence from Washington in a crisis than the White House has been prepared to acknowledge. Moreover, the nature of the problem has altered dramatically, and South Africa has no other important friends or sources of psychological support. Accordingly, if the rulers of South Africa are to be encouraged to focus on real rather than spurious solutions to their crisis, American decisiveness will be crucial.

This is not to argue that stronger sanctions would have been decisive in and of themselves. But this was plainly the moment to show South Africa that there is no external recourse.



Attempts to sustain the myth of constructive engagement will not lead to full-faith bargaining between blacks and whites. And the longer President Botha's regime ignores the issues dividing his nation, the harder it will be to bring about compromise that minimizes bloodshed.

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### *Will There Be a Revolution in South Africa?*

"Our objective," said President Botha of South Africa on 9 September of the aims of his National Party-dominated government, "is peaceful reform. Reform can only be retarded by outside attempts to interfere." Both statements are false, and calculated to mislead. But they may well flow from a genuine failure on the part of South Africa's ruling oligarchy to understand the depth and breadth of that country's continuing crisis.

The Government has for several years believed that it could alter South Africa from above, moderating the impact of apartheid gradually, and thus forestalling black protest and Western worry. Among its aims has been to co-opt a black middle class through expanding economic opportunity and the gradual relaxation of petty apartheid: predominantly, it is bourgeois blacks who would be able to take advantage of such changes—significant from the white point of view—in the fabric of South Africa's segregated society. Given its preponderant military strength and the comparative weakness of the blacks, Pretoria believed (and may still believe) that it could orchestrate a pace of reform that would not disrupt the tenor of a white-dominated economy and society. President Botha's government sought and still seeks to succeed through tactical rearrangements. He and his colleagues do not contemplate any strategic revamping of South Africa.

The difference between tactical manoeuvring and strategic re-positioning is critical. As yet, there is no thought of diluting the white, indeed Afrikaner, monopoly of real power. Businessmen may consider sharing or dividing power, and the talk at cocktail parties and harried lunches may be of partition and other at present unrealistic solutions, but the Government itself intends to cling to hegemony, fearing that almost any significant sharing of power with blacks would be a step down the slippery slope leading to a loss of the untrammelled authority which Afrikaners fought so hard to attain from 1910 to 1948, and to keep ever since.

In 1984 President Botha and the National Party thought that they could satisfy the West, particularly the United States, by inaugurating a tricameral parliament for whites, Coloureds and Asians, and slowly improving the

social and economic circumstances of blacks. Abolishing prohibitions against mixed marriages and cross-colour sex, tinkering with economic restrictions, and providing more funds for African education, seemed helpful initiatives. Next, the Government hoped to consult with handpicked African leaders, and devolve upon them some limited political prerogatives. The overall plan, probably never fully thought out or blueprinted, comprised what President Botha genuinely thought of as a package of reform. But his reforms, and the reform notions of whites, carry less and less meaning for Africans.

It was not the slow speed of reform, nor solely the lack of a parliamentary chamber for Africans, which, together with rent rises in the black townships and a worsening economic climate, set off the riots of the past year. Instead, it was the fact that, from an African point of view, there were no significant initiatives, no indications that the Botha government was committed to the kind of programme which could and would transform South Africa. Blacks had grown impatient with tactical shifts, symbolic acts and rhetorical flutters. They wanted concrete proposals of strategic value. But these are far from being the preferred thoughts of their white rulers.

Africans, particularly those who are young and underemployed or unemployed, are alienated from the state, from their more moderate leaders, and from any institutional constraints on the immediate attaining of freedom. Although they may now only be climbing the Potemkin steps, after a year of confrontation they consider themselves the true vanguard of a people's war. That they have no more than sticks and stones and occasional petrol bombs, and face machine-guns, tanks and the strongest repressive assemblage in Africa only serves to quicken their pulse and to embolden their new, shadowy, mostly local leadership.

The armed might under white control is formidable, well trained, and prepared to act ruthlessly. Once suppression is accomplished, Botha's government will make concessions of a kind which could impress Western critics and alarm local whites, but the Government wishes to make concessions only from a position of strength. To do so under duress might lead to the strategic rather than tactical shifts which whites abhor. Those were among the strong messages of President Botha's hapless, mistimed "Rubicon" speech in August. Yet the days when social and economic concessions would be enough to bring about a reconciliation between black and white are past. Even an acknowledgement, otherwise welcome, that blacks are full citizens of the land of their birth now has only a limited impact on the aims of African protestors.

The differences between white and black aspirations are stark. Africans in 1985 are focusing on the old adage that was popularised in the late 1940s

by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall follow!" Political participation is now the Africans' key demand, even if a simple "One man, one vote" (the goal whites naturally fear most) is not the only rallying cry. There is still room to manoeuvre, but only within the arena of political power. Africans demand the franchise. They seek representation at municipal, regional and national levels of authority, and they will no longer be satisfied or put off by less. It follows that the era of reform from the top has ended. If there is to be evolutionary progression it will have to result from a partnership of black and white. Thus government attempts to consult with hand-picked "representatives" of the majority are outmoded. Even consultation is out as a vehicle of change. Africans intend to negotiate their own fate, their model remaining a national convention or some other large forum where the future of South Africa can be bargained out across a metaphorical large table.

Although Africans are more thoroughly alienated than ever before, and harbour more comprehensive and more robust demands than their predecessors in the riots of 1976 or the 1960 march on Cape Town, a resolution of colour conflict in South Africa isn't necessarily near at hand. Some English-speaking white businessmen are prepared to contemplate major alterations of the framework of South Africa, a sizable proportion of the white electorate is sufficiently insecure to listen intently to any new proposals, but their government, and its leaders, remain largely unmoved. They fear the negotiations that Africans request, and are unready to discuss, much less consider, the transfer to Africans of meaningful power at regional and local levels. African enfranchisement would signal the collapse of apartheid, the end of Afrikaner domination, and the demise of a South Africa based on minority pre-eminence. Clearly the extent to which the regime will be able to curb militant black protest must remain problematic. Despite African anger, the odds are favourable, for South Africa's Army and Police are strong and not yet strained. But it is far less likely that the townships will prove stable until Africans control them through at least a local franchise and some degree of fiscal autonomy.

Less probable still is the restoration of comparative tranquillity. Even if suppression succeeds in quenching the overt fires of protest, they will smoulder and soon burst into flame again. Episodes of violence will follow episodes of violence, and though their duration and amplitude may vary, the rioting of 1984-85 presages much more of at least the same intensity for months, possibly for years, even decades. But although it is easy to predict more and more violence, to do so is not to predict a linear acceleration leading inevitably to some apocalyptic end. Historical determinism could hardly

have foreseen when and how the tsars or the shahs would have been overthrown. Nor, despite the vast demographic disparities in South Africa, and the untold frustration of South Africa's majority, can analysts confidently assume that black will triumph over white, and soon. Few would assert the certain victory in modern times of reason over error or good over evil. Likewise, democratic values need not prevail over determined opposition, in this case over a ruling cadre of millions fearful of being subjected to a fate similar to much (but not all) of a black Africa which has been poorly managed and shown little respect for individual or communal rights.

To say this is not to say that the events of 1985 may not foreshadow a revolution, or at least an explosion sufficient to compel whites to share power with blacks: but merely that they need not, for South Africa, unlike Iran or earlier examples, fits no classic pre-revolutionary profile. The major missing ingredient is the existence of military other ranks drawn from a stratum or a class substantially more deprived than that of their rulers. The South African military machine is more than 90 per cent white, and will probably remain so. In every other revolution the army's lower orders refused at some decisive point to continue to coerce the people, with whom they had come to identify. In South Africa, the lines of conflict follow colour, not class or ethnic lines. It is inconceivable that the sanctions of the South African state will wither as they did in Iran. True, the police are 50 per cent black, but they are a largely decentralised force incapable of resisting the Army, Air Force and Navy, and their black officers and men would probably find it difficult to act in concert.

Those who would revolt lack access to arms, to funds, to sanctuaries, and—for reasons which reflect some of the bitter consequences of separate development as well as a widespread black poverty—lack a broadly acknowledged leadership. Nelson Mandela could prove an exception, but he still remains incarcerated in conditions which elevate his national credibility. Some outsiders assert that the African National Congress, because it is avowedly popular among Africans in South Africa, and is the only generally recognised black political entity, could provide that missing leadership from a distance, or even direct the struggle, until triumph comes.

Certainly ANC guerrillas worry white South Africa much more than they did in the 1970s. Their actions are more and more welcomed by all manner of Africans within the country. But, having lost easy access to South Africa in the wake of the Nkomati accord and South Africa's destabilising strikes against Lesotho, Botswana and Angola, and their threat of more of the same elsewhere in southern Africa, the ANC in 1985 is less rather than more of a threat to white South Africa. Their guerrillas have found it harder to strike

at industrial and personal targets—not that this means that such attacks will end. Moreover, the Army and Police have shown an ability to deflect guerrilla incursions more easily in recent months, despite the violence in the townships.

The battleground of the 1980s is urban South Africa. By the end of the century at least 75 per cent of all Africans—between 28 and 32 million—will live in what whites call their heartland. If a classical revolution is unlikely, and a voluntary white sharing or transfer of power not to be expected, one must assume that violence punctuated by concessions will be the likely short-term fate of a troubled and bitterly divided South Africa.

In the past whenever a spate of internal violence has been combined with Western impatience and pressure, white South Africa has modified its stance of unwavering intransigence with bouts of subtle, reluctant but nevertheless helpful compromise. In recent months, as the black cities continued to burn, outside concern reached new heights. Political considerations more than narrowly economic or fiscal anxieties turned the bankers of the West against South Africa and the country was compelled to announce a debt moratorium despite its economy's residual strength. It is the almost unanimous anxiety of the financiers of the West (and that of white South African businessmen) which will compel South Africa's rulers to concentrate their minds on new attempts at reform—and, conceivably, if they read the message of the riots correctly (and more intelligently than this essay suggests that they will), propel them in adventurous and positive directions.

The watered-down sanctions announced this month by President Reagan and the still more pallid measures enunciated by the European Economic Community (bar Britain) will matter little economically, for in effect they ratify decisions already taken by the private sector, and long ago envisaged by all South Africans. Thus it matters less that Britain follows its European and American allies (Canada months ago signalled its displeasure) in approving specific sanctions than it does that Britain adds diplomatically and rhetorically to the impact of Western disapproval upon the hearts and minds of white South Africans.

In the short term, the direct influence of narrow economic measures on the policies of Botha's government is bound to be limited. The psychological atmosphere counts for a great deal more. The *laager* is a hoary myth. In the past, when whites have felt themselves to be beleaguered and isolated, there was some tendency to respond—even in the dark days of Hendrik Verwoerd—with alterations in their posture of defiance. This is why the U.S. policy of constructive engagement was misguided from the start, and is a palpable failure today. Indeed, one of the positive by-products of the fail-

ure of Botha's reform schemes is the demise of constructive engagement. When the President of the United States proclaims sanctions against South Africa, a country he usually refers to as an ally, it is clear in Washington that constructive engagement has failed. The President succumbed to domestic political pressures, but their strength showed how far was the U.S. executive branch out of phase with the elected representatives of the people in their legislature.

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### *Seven Scenarios for South Africa*

South Africa has seven possible destinies. From left to right the seven rubrics are: (1) Revolution, (2) Substantial Regime Change, (3) Power Sharing, (4) Limited Power Sharing, (5) Concessions, (6) Change but No Change, and (7) Reaction and Retrenchment.

The least likely scenarios—those hardest to imagine being realized—are the two extreme ones at either end of the continuum. This is a testimony to the extent to which South Africa has evolved politically. No matter how virulent and enduring the unrest of 1985, the country's ruling cadre has clearly undergone a profound shift in outlook since the days of Prime Minister Vorster. South Africa is no longer a country where whites believe that apartheid as a political program can ensure the continued dominance of whites over blacks. Likewise, Africans no longer accept their subjugation or believe that whites can magically make the power of black numbers disappear. A process of evolution has begun and is accelerating. The violence and repression of 1984–85 have hastened the pace of change objectively and also in terms of both white and black thinking. Political participation has emerged as the only sure bridge across the abyss dividing black and white aspirations for this beautiful, rich, and potentially powerful country.

#### *Reaction and Retrenchment (7)*

For all of these reasons, Reaction and Retrenchment (Scenario 7) has the least analytical power of all of the scenarios. It presupposes the coming of the Conservative and Herstigte Nasionale parties to power (on the lines of the National Party takeover of 1948) following a major lurch to the right as a result of adverse white reaction to reform initiatives of the present government. Theoretically, the general election results of 1989 could produce such a reversal. Or events before 1989 could lead to a military coup or a massive defection of sitting members of the National Party away from their

government. But there are profound historical as well as psychological reasons for doubting whether such a shift would or could take place, particularly in the charged atmosphere that is the reality of South Africa now and for the near future.

But there is a second point. Scenario 7 presupposes a turning back of the clock, a withdrawal of present overtures to the world and to Africans, as insufficient and as unsatisfactory as those overtures may be. This is a laager scenario, but South Africa has never known political laagers. Its leaders, even in the darkest of days, have always known how to retreat. They have known how to reach the exits, how to reformulate their positions, and how to find the high ground of flexibility. Even a regime farther to the political right than the present one would, willy-nilly, find itself somewhere within Scenario 6, Change But No Change. The path of evolution is one which permits deviations, but no total turnabouts. To walk more slowly, or even to walk in place, is possible, but this would be a feature of Scenario 6, not 7.

### *Revolution (1)*

At the opposite end of the spectrum is Scenario 1, Revolution. Revolutions, in the classical sense, occur when the state loses legitimacy—when it can no longer impose its authority. When the state can no longer compel obedience, then the regime is overthrown, or it weakens, decays, and is pushed aside. The breakdown begins when the lower orders become disaffected, perceive the power of the state to be past, and follow new leaders and new ideologies.

Since the state relies on a military institution to assert itself, and since the noncommissioned ranks of armies and police forces are by definition composed of lower orders or at least representatives of the lower orders, the disaffection of that section of a state's citizenry automatically signals the collapse of the state. In Iran, for example, the Ayatollah Khomeini's message commanded the attention of more and more members of Iran's military rank and file. When those lower orders perceived the likely victory of the mullahs, dissatisfaction with the Shah was transformed into disaffiliation, and the revolution began.

It is immensely difficult to devise a theoretical framework for a South African revolution. The popular employment of that label is unhelpful, for a revolution is a total destruction of the prevailing order, not simply a shift in the composition of the ruling class (Scenario 2). In the case of South Africa, the potential revolutionaries may possess sufficient grievances, but they lack funds, arms, materiel, and the standard building blocks of a late-twentieth-century revolution.



It is arguable that those components might in future be more readily available than at present. Moreover, sanctuaries and outside supporters so crucial in the North Vietnamese and the Chinese successes may become more available despite the current hegemony of South Africa in its neighborhood. On the other hand, there are some analytical and practical reasons why sanctuaries are likely to remain unavailable and revolution as a total concept unrealizable.

The military forces of South Africa may be 6 to 10 percent nonwhite, and those percentages may increase. But the lower ranks of South Africa's standing and conscript armies, as well as the numerous reserves ("Commandos"), will in this century remain overwhelmingly white. If the struggle for South Africa is between white and black, and not between different classes or different ideological persuasions, then no revolution fueled by a shift in the allegiance of the army will occur so long as the state continues to recruit its soldiers from among the ranks of those whose very way of life is at stake. Unlike the case in Portugal in 1974, the soldiers (as well as officers) of the South African Defense Force have no obvious self-interest in refusing to shoulder arms in defense of the present state.

#### *Change but No Change (6)*

Scenario 6 describes South Africa in 1985. Africans protest violently in recurring cycles which have varying amplitudes but which ebb and flow across the geographical face of South Africa. The state may have difficulty restoring peace and tranquility, but its ultimate authority is mortgaged in no overwhelming sense. That is, ordinary police tactics of crowd control are barely sufficient to impose law and order, but the firepower of the army is held largely in reserve. Indeed, although it is analytically likely that the repressive force of the state fuels much of the rioting (goading participants to challenge police patrols and so on) and that many of the townships are today ungovernable, it does not necessarily follow that this year's violence begets greater violence, and then even more violence, and that the state crumbles. Recurrent and intensified violence is certain in South Africa, but neither its intensification nor its effects will necessarily be governed by linear rules of progression.

Within the framework of Scenario 6, the state combines repression with the granting of concessions. Furthermore, the concessions follow limited consultation between the state and representatives of the protesters. In order to contain the riots, to stabilize the townships, to appease the West, to buy time, and so on, the state is prepared to improve the conditions under which Africans live, work, and play. The state and the white political system thus



offer changes—smoothings of the evolutionary path—which whites and the state believe are significant. That is, they constitute major alterations in the ways in which whites were for so long led to believe that their relations with Africans should be arranged, as well as in the place of Africans within the overall structure of South African society. Yet whatever assertions the state makes about the significance of its concessions, Africans regard “concessions” as cosmetic or irrelevant or both, whatever their nature and objective validity.

The state, within the confines of Scenario 6, is prepared to continue or even to accelerate its program of reform while asserting the importance of a top-down orchestration of the reform process. Africans, however, no longer want to be on the receiving end of reform. They demand participation in the process itself in the negotiation of reforms that will be meaningful. Naturally the state—any state—finding itself in this scenario knows that to negotiate the nature of change means a derogation of the authority of the state, and a weakening of its sinews of war.

Likewise, it is fundamental to Scenario 6 that protesters and their leaders believe that they will lose the momentum of their protest if they accept concessions as improvements decided upon unilaterally. In addition to such tactical considerations, the disaffected majority in South Africa has decidedly moved beyond a willingness to receive proffered economic and social benefits to an awareness that their political weaknesses can only be rectified by an insistence upon political participation. Thus, although the state wants to reform meaningfully (but more slowly than Africans desire), the state is not yet willing to accept the basic elements of the prevailing black demand for political participation and for negotiating its translation into practical policies.

This scenario—an abbreviated, abstracted description of the present dilemma—is important for what follows in the scenario-building exercise. It describes state immobility masquerading as forward movement. The state offers what it considers to be meaningful change. Blacks reject that change. And since blacks reject it, the label of Change but No Change is apt. Yet the levels of rhetoric are high in this phase: the state attempts to persuade its own supporters, Africans, and foreigners that its intentions are good but that it needs time. It talks about threats from the right (which may not be false). It hints, it frets, and there is some lack of cohesion within the ruling party. But in this phase either leadership or resolution is lacking for the kinds of strategic repositioning, rather than tactical readjustments, that would move South Africa from this scenario to Scenario 5, and beyond.

This last point is conceptually valuable. What Africans want, what the West calls for, and what a peaceful (or at least non-cataclysmic) solution to

the South African problem demands is a major strategic shift of a kind that happens only very occasionally in the life of any modern state. What governments in crisis generally try to do, instead, is to evade strategic necessities by tactical rearrangements and repositionings. An outside judgment is that only when a party, a ruling oligarchy, or a government is prepared to take the conceptual leaps that a strategic reassessment logically demands will South Africa begin to address (and therefore presumably to resolve) the fundamental issues of a country where a decreasing minority denies effective political participation at the central (and other) levels to its majority.

### *Concessions (5)*

Scenario 5, Concessions, is not yet the scenario within which South Africa is operating. Since Scenario 5 is different more in degree than in kind from Scenario 6, however, South Africa could slide easily from the one to the other, but not back. Part of the regime's current dilemma is that a return to a Scenario 6 posture cannot be achieved once Scenario 5 has been entered. Thus, the transition from 6 to 5 worries the government. And 5 has an open-ended quality unsettling to any government bent more on cautious than wholesale reform, or, to put the proposition in a slightly different way, any government seeking to control the pace and direction of reform rather than to begin a process over which authority could be lost.

Under Scenario 5, which could prevail any day now, the levels of violence common during 1985, especially after the declaration of the state of emergency, would induce the government to grant concessions (meaningful to whites, as discussed above, but not to blacks), and then more concessions, and then further concessions without achieving fundamental stability. What differentiates 5 from 6 and others is that the entrance into this scenario would be hastened by a combination of continued or renewed violence and intensified pressure from the West. The introduction of stronger U.S. sanctions, the animosity of Europe (and Australia and Canada), would be but a part of the overall atmosphere of Western alienation.

A second distinction between this and lower-numbered scenarios is that the conferring of concessions would be preceded, in each case, by some form of consultation between the state and presumably "authentic" representatives of the protesting majority. Consultation had not occurred in any notable or easily legitimized degree by the time of President P. W. Botha's August 1985 speech to the Natal Congress of the National Party. Indeed, the government may already have lost its final opportunities to consult by that time, inasmuch as Africans had moved on to demands for negotiated settlements and it had become dangerous to be consulted by the government. Any

such consultation, by individuals or groups, risked a loss of credibility and the label “collaborator” or “stooge.”

Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible for a government intent on believing that concessions would mute an opposition, or quiet protesters, to find Africans with whom discussions can occur. A government might also believe that the very contours of its concessions might defuse or defer protest. Clearly the government of South Africa could gain credibility overseas with the enunciation of an end to pass laws and influx control, broad new plans for housing and education, the introduction of an African franchise at the local or regional level, the provision of common citizenship, and so on. Nelson Mandela could be released. But such attempts to buy peace and time are bound to be insufficient if from the majority point of view they are introduced unilaterally and are not part of an overall restructuring of South Africa, including the homelands. In a more profound sense than most Africans realize, the majority seeks official recognition that South Africa can no longer progress without considering black preferences and opinions. Africans seek to become an integral part of the bargaining process.

#### *Limited Power Sharing (4)*

The government of South Africa has long ago realized that Africans prefer Scenario 4 to 5. That is, Africans want power sharing, even if limited, rather than concessions. The government would very much prefer to provide the latter, and to guide (a euphemism for control) the process. The government wants to slow down, to be static and passive. Those reactions are all possible under 5, but not 4. Thus the conceptual leap between 5 and 4 is much greater than between 6 and 5. Yet the failure of 6, Change but No Change, signaled by violence without end and the inability to repress without embarrassing losses of life, could lead to a decision to move directly from 6 to 4 on the grounds that concessions would be refused or rebuffed, but that limited power sharing would have at least some chance of halting rioting and removing the sting of protest. This it might, but only if the shift to limited power sharing is negotiated with Africans. To decide to negotiate is the major step. To persuade Africans recognized as politically legitimate to negotiate is a second major move, and both are intertwined.

A result of open bargaining between whites with physical and economic power and blacks with numerical (and possibly historical) power could be the sharing of political control in the operational sense between white and black at local and regional levels. The black cities would become black-governed entities with full revenue raising and revenue

expanding powers. Blacks would receive the franchise at the municipal level. Municipalities would obtain statutory rights and also have influence at the regional level. Blacks would begin to experience autonomy—a measure of control over their destiny in the political sense. They would start to have a stake in their own country, and have real if limited power as against the central government.

It is within this scenario that the South African government could experiment with the devolution of regional authority or consociational arrangements. It could shift responsibility for black affairs, education, health, and so on, to a new provincial government composed of black and white representatives, as proposed in the Ciskei Commission and Buthelezi Commission reports.

It is not clear whether or not the government has begun to think broadly and innovatively about limited power sharing in the sense of Scenario 4. Again, it is a question of power devolved being essentially unrecoverable. Further, although whites might be persuaded to concede limited power sharing in the sense described, they would want power sharing to remain limited, and not be a transitional stage. Africans, on the other hand, may have reached the point where they can only be persuaded to accept limited power sharing if they believe it to be a prelude to Scenario 3. Alternatively, but only after a period of bitter repression, Africans might become more willing to accept such “half loaves” rather than the full loaf that their leaders urge them to demand.

Scenario 4 would clearly become an option for the white government only after levels of violence reached new heights, Western pressure became even more insistent, and the National Party underwent substantial alterations in the nature of its leadership. A fundamental move would elevate those who believed in the modernization of white attitudes over those who preferred to react rather than gamble. Leaders would arise who understood that the old ways—the ways of the higher-numbered scenarios—simply cannot give South Africa stability and prosperity.

### *Power Sharing (3)*

Scenario 4 is an alternative to 5, and not as likely a progression from 5 as it is from 6. Scenario 3, Power Sharing, obviously flows from 6, and could result directly (as could 2) from 6. If violence is high and sustained for long periods, if police and military repression proves insufficient to quell or shorten the cycles of violence, if Western pressure grows more compelling and isolating, if prosperity fades (for whites as well as blacks), and if—decisively—the costs to the white way of life as well as the country’s economy

become too great (or are so perceived by large numbers of whites), then Scenario 3 becomes an operational possibility.

A shift to 3 is less abrupt, by definition, than a shift directly to 2. But it would nevertheless occur with comparative rapidity once the decision-makers appreciated that the white will to resist or to continue fighting had snapped. That appreciation would occur subjectively, not objectively, but it would occasion a crisis of legitimacy.

There are two preconditions: (1) that Africans would, over the bargaining table, be constrained to accept less than "one man, one vote" by the existence of a still strong military machine in white hands, and (2) that leaders would assume power in the National Party and in the top echelons of the Defense Force who were prepared to settle for less than total victory and to demand more than total defeat. Leaders of that caliber would not necessarily arise in time, or become conscious early enough to play their role. Nor would a military leadership necessarily recognize that there is an alternative between victory and defeat. Nevertheless, if there were unremitting agitation by Africans at levels five times greater than in 1985, white persons of power would be compelled to devise a new solution and Scenario 3 could be the negotiated result.

### *Substantial Regime Change (2)*

Scenario 2, Substantial Regime Change, is less than a revolution, for the prevailing order changes, but the structure of society remains. It may sound farfetched in 1985, but South Africa could be transformed radically and rapidly without the classical revolution which, as we have reasoned, is highly unlikely. Substantial regime change means a shift from white to majority rule under conditions of uncommonly high stress, with limited time for adjustment, little preparation, and few safeguards for minorities.

Scenario 2 could prevail if, after a period of sustained violence at about, say, 10 times the 1985 intensity, with widespread loss of white as well as black life, the white government finds that the quenching of violence is possible only by open negotiations with Africans, from a posture of weakness rather than strength. Prior to this point a National Party regime would have given way to a transitional white group, the military would have acknowledged an inability to continue fighting in a sustained way against Africans, and partition would be the solution on the lips of many.

### *The Odds*

These are the logical alternatives for the future of South Africa. A simple conclusion is that there is every cause for anxiety, since none of the scenar-

ios is promising, and each of the possible states would be reached only by the compulsion of events, not imaginative leadership. On the other hand, the 1984–85 cycle of violence does not necessarily and ineluctably presage repetitive cycles immediately. Historical determinism is not at work, but numerical superiority, international hostility, and the passage of time may nevertheless produce the same results.

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### *What Botha Should Do Now to Save South Africa*

The battle for South Africa will be won by bold, brave, timely initiatives capable of bridging the chasm that now separates black aspiration and white fear. The hitherto successful alternation of apartheid's mailed fist and velvet glove no longer works. South Africa's return to stability and prosperity depends upon a new strategic approach to the deepening tragedy of color conflict.

Since it came to power in 1948 and, especially since the 1960s, the Afrikaner-dominated National Party that rules South Africa has used the reality of overwhelming force to end the boycotts, riots, and other militant protests by the country's disaffected majority. (South Africa's 4.6 million whites govern 25 million voteless Africans, 2.6 million Coloureds, and 0.8 million Asians.) In recent years, too, the government has slowly begun the dismantling of social and economic apartheid. Within the last few months it has promised important additional measures of reform, each of which is regarded as significant by whites and, today, ignored or derided by Africans.

The reality of today's South Africa is not that the pace of reform must be quickened, but that, to Africans, social and economic reforms come too late and appear too little. Africans, mobilized and emboldened by rolling riots that have made their townships ungovernable and weakened the white-run state, exert a semblance of power for the first time. They think the white state is crumbling, and they now demand shared power and majority rule.

The end of white rule in South Africa is not at hand. But mighty and numerous as the white troops remain, the government is weaker than it admits. Its legitimacy is eroded; the white business community, some establishment Afrikaners, and several local commentators call for and predict the early resignation of President Pieter W. Botha, a nevertheless defiant, obstinate, and temporarily secure leader. The Associated Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of Chambers of Industry, Afrikaner students,

some Afrikaner church leaders, and Afrikaner academics urge action instead of rhetoric.

Neither the President nor his government wishes to make concessions or to be seen to be responding to African violence except from a position of strength. The President judged the moment to enunciate new departures premature in August and September, when he made a number of major speeches.

Recently, too, the government has emphasized its mailed fist by censoring television and photo reporting of the townships and by lifting the passports of students and clerics who sought to talk to the outlawed African National Congress guerrilla leaders. Armored vehicles continue to patrol the townships, as well.

President Botha has thus far refused to rise to the escalating levels of South Africa's greatest crisis. Instead, he has attempted to appear unmoved, impermeable, and—on behalf of whites—still firmly in command. Yet his is a South Africa subject to the immutable law of diminishing options.

Time is deepening divisions rather than healing them.

To accelerate the potential for reconciliation, President Botha or his successor needs to suggest those bold departures from accepted practice which all but the hard-right 20 percent of whites will still accept and which Africans, alienated but as yet still less dominant than they may become, could consider.

President Botha should summon his Parliament into emergency session immediately, and he should lay before it a package of legislation that would have the dual purpose of charting a visionary, viable future for all South Africans. Clearly this package would have to contain three elements:

—A procedure akin to a constitutional congress for discussing and then negotiating an altered future for one South Africa.

—An advocacy of black political participation at all levels.

—A determination to repeal the discriminatory laws of apartheid.

The third point is well understood and today widely if not universally accepted in South Africa. The Associated Chambers of Commerce now says: "Reform must not be aimed at improving discriminatory laws—it must remove them." It has called for laws that make it illegal to discriminate on the basis of color or race. A white education leader recently called for immediate school integration, no matter whether the education of white children would suffer. Many industrialists advocate the end to residential segregation; a major bank has purchased a house in an exclusive white suburb for a senior black employee.

The first and second points are much more innovative. They would give Africans slices of power, if not the entire pie, soon, and an increasing share

over time in the running of the country. Whites now realize that this is a goal that may have to be granted if peace and prosperity are to be regained. The question is how much power, over what period of time, and in what context (in a unitary or federal state; with a property franchise, proportional representation, or "one man, one vote")?

These are questions for which answers can no longer be decided by whites and proffered to Africans. That time is past. They may only be negotiated. The law of diminishing options suggests strongly that what can be arranged now cannot be contrived so readily later.

Every week that the white government forfeits, the black opposition gains additional credibility. President Botha ought therefore to take the initiative, even if it surely means bargaining with Nelson Mandela and the other imprisoned leaders of the African National Congress. If whites wait, they may negotiate from positions of further weakness with men lacking Mr. Mandela's maturity and authority. After Mr. Mandela it may be the maquis.

To ask a white government of South Africa to think about its country's future rather than its own immediate survival is to ask more than we should expect. But to ask less is to acquiesce in the further deterioration of South Africa. Only a shift of far-reaching strategic significance can prevent the cleavage between white and black from deepening, and thus its international isolation from worsening, its liquidity crisis from becoming more serious, and its overall economy from continuing to stagnate.

The world, and all the citizens of South Africa, demand and deserve better.

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### ***Blacks Want to See More Than Half Measures***

President Botha said nothing about black political participation at the national level. That was the crucial omission in a speech from the throne which was otherwise remarkable for its restraint, thoughtfulness and dulcet tones. It also promised what white South Africans are bound to regard as fundamental reforms.

The world will surely welcome President Botha's acknowledgement that South Africa has outgrown paternalism and the "outdated concept of apartheid."

It furthermore will anticipate the restoration of citizenship to blacks residing within South Africa, the restoration of freehold rights to blacks, the replacement of passes with non-racial passes, changes to immigration selection laws and changes (as yet unspecified) to an influx control system which has become "obsolete."



Most of all, world opinion now expects the dawning of a new era of more harmonious black-white relations.

### *Minority Rights*

But the State President's speech also contained its partisan components.

When President Botha stressed his determination to preserve minority rights, and characterized South Africa as a nation of minorities, he specifically reaffirmed white South Africa's intention to maintain all of its power, irrespective of black claims, the continued violence in the townships, world pressures (which will hardly cease) and the thunder to come.

President Botha proposed a national statutory council, chaired by him, and including members of the government, leaders of the self-governing national states and leaders of other black communities and interest groups, to advise him on matters of common concern (including proposed legislation, implicitly of a constitutional kind).

The council has predictably been condemned by leading urban blacks, the UDF and Azapo because it offers consultative, not participatory status primarily to collaborating Africans chosen by whites, not blacks.

If its black membership were to be elected by Africans on a broad franchise, the council might prove credible, and thus its deliberations important to South Africa's process of transition.

White South Africa's official attitudes have changed dramatically. As a result of 17 months of continuing violence the official mind has been concentrated wonderfully. There has been movement. But as yet there appears no commitment to a major conceptual shift.

The government says it is still wedded (as the president's speech declares) to a top down, time buying, series of maneuvers by which whites will retain power and attempt to bring Africans into regional councils and the new statutory body. The British used the same tactics on the eve of independence in colonial Africa, but failed for the same reasons that will determine failure in South Africa.

Time is a variable. The law of diminishing options is powerful, and its writ runs ruthlessly against the hopes and designs of ruling groups. White South Africa ignores that law at its profound peril. What white South Africa might be able to achieve now, by beginning to talk and by negotiating political representation with and for blacks, it will not be able to obtain tomorrow, or the day after.

There is a second law of politics. Political change comes before the fundamental structural change which rulers always hope will prepare gradually for shifts in control. Unhappily, as the first law grinds forward, the second becomes more powerful. South Africa's defence force will never be over-

whelmed, but it could be underwhelmed, especially when businessmen throughout the country lose heart and ANC attacks shake local and international confidence.

As President Botha offers regional and advisory councils, plus a partial dismantling of social apartheid, blacks emboldened by the mood of reform and their own successes in the townships want a constituent assembly elected by “the people” to draft a blueprint for the new South Africa. White South Africa cannot afford to beguile itself by half measures when Africans—conscious that whites still seek to keep power by one or other means—press for a fully democratic, fully reformed nation.

### *Sharing of Power*

Africans pin their faith on the rockbed of individual rights, not group rights. The very reiteration in the State President’s speech of “communities” is perceived as the old order in the new guise. The “sharing of power between these communities” is not the sharing of power among one people by normally understood democratic means. Even the president’s acceptance of an undivided South Africa was qualified by its emphasis on regions and communities.

Since the state of emergency remains in force, important national leaders capable of entering statutory councils and other bodies languish in prison and there is still no commitment to full political participation over time, freely arranged with representatives of the majority (as a whole or in communities), it is hard to affirm that progress is being made, or that the bankers and the businessmen of the northern hemisphere will take heart. They will continue, as will many South Africans, to require a strategic reassessment rather than another in a series of tactical shifts of position.

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### *Botha’s False Promises*

President Botha opened South Africa’s new parliamentary session recently with a declaration that apartheid was outdated. He promised equal education, an end to the carrying of passes by Africans, the restoration of citizenship to blacks, an altering of influx controls, and new freehold rights for blacks in the cities.

Corporate leaders in the United States and South Africa welcomed the tenor of Botha’s speech and the climate of change it signaled. So did spokesmen for the U.S. State Department.

Botha's rhetoric evoked optimism among white South Africans, while black leaders of almost all but collaborationist persuasions denounced him for repeating stale aspirations. They demanded: Where's the real beef?

Botha's central premise—that apartheid was dead—has been tested in the weeks since parliament reconvened, and has been found wanting. In the supposed post-apartheid era, South Africans have endured business as usual.

Thirty Coloured and Asian parliamentary associates of Botha and his National Party took him at his word. They sat down for lunch in the elegant dining room of the main white legislative building. Were they served? Of course not; segregation still reigns even in the government's showpiece multicolor assembly.

In Villiersdorp and Kirkwood, two towns in the Cape Province, two white men last year married Coloured women (Section 16 of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act has been repealed). This year the couple in Villiersdorp was given three months to vacate their house in a white area. In Kirkwood, the couple's hitherto prosperous store was denied a trading license, and had to close.

Roelof F. Botha, South Africa's long-serving foreign minister, told overseas correspondents that, in theory, his country could some day have a black man as president. Foreign Minister Botha was promptly rebuked by President Botha (no relation). The top Botha told the lesser Botha to mind his own business and stop demoralizing whites.

In his speech, President Botha offered black representation on a national advisory council, which he would head. But, in the wake of the president's criticism of his foreign minister, even Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the KwaZulu homeland, joined Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu in opposing such attempts to co-opt African leaders without scrapping apartheid.

F. W. De Klerk, minister of national education, leader of the Transvaal branch of the National Party and a likely successor to President Botha, told parliament that blacks would never go to white schools. Whatever President Botha may have meant by equal education, his words were not to be interpreted as foreshadowing joint schools or integrated education.

In an undistinguished exurb of Johannesburg called Honeydew, whites in cars randomly shot blacks strolling or loitering along a minor highway. Four Africans were wounded.

Dr. Frederick van zyl Slabbert, an Afrikaner and leader of the liberal Progressive Federal Party opposition in the white parliament, resigned all his political positions. He was tired, he said, of hearing the government's lies.

For a week after Botha's speech he sought confirmation that the president meant what his rhetoric implied. When Slabbert learned that the government intended more of the same old white domination, dressed up in the rags of

reform and gussied about with platitudes, he delivered an angry speech and strode out of formal political life.

A white opposition had no important role if the government was determined to fight Africans all the way, and failed to recognize the need for strategic shifts rather than tactical maneuvers. Slabbert joined black critics in South Africa in calling Botha's speech a public relations exercise largely for Western consumption.

The speech said nothing about meaningful political participation. Nor did it announce the end of the country's state of emergency. Only now, weeks later, has Botha conceded that the state of emergency is serving little purpose. However, he has made no moves to lift the ban on the African National Congress or promise talks between leading blacks and ruling whites.

Even more telling were the words that President Botha repeated over and over again. He called his country a land of communities and regions—a nation of minorities. "South Africa," he said, "stands as a symbol of hope for all minority communities."

This repeated stress on minority rights gave the game away. White South Africa still intends no power sharing of the kind Africans want. It seeks to maintain white minority rule despite black demands, unremitting violence in the black townships, world pressure, and the thunder to come.

Time is a variable that President Botha seems to ignore. He forgets that the law of diminishing options is powerful and runs against the hopes of ruling groups. There is a second law of politics: Political change almost always comes before fundamental structural change. Unhappily, as the first law grinds forward, the second grows in power.

Because President Botha's speech skirted the fundamental issue of power which divides South Africa, neither his conciliatory approach nor his well intended promises will easily or soon bridge the gulf between majority aspirations and white minority determination. That is the message both of the speech, and of the days since.

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### *Sanctions against South Africa*

Thanks to last month's bullying and unproductive raids on its neighbors, South Africa has provided a perfect justification for renewed comprehensive sanctions by the United States. A broad coalition of congressmen, Republicans and Democrats, has wanted for months to intensify U.S. pressure on that apartheid-dominated country.

But will Congress pass legislation that could encourage South Africa to

seek real change rapidly; or as before, appropriately enraged, will it simply attempt to punish the white regime?

Last year's congressional attempt to legislate a range of sanctions against South Africa was overtaken at the last moment by a presidential executive order to put in effect a less complete set of prohibitions. In September, President Reagan reluctantly banned the sale in the U.S. of South African-produced gold coins, halted new bank lending, tightened restrictions on the sale of high-technology equipment, and established a prestigious commission (now meeting) to recommend a new policy toward South Africa. But the President refused to include a trigger that would be activated if conditions in South Africa worsened or the white government of South Africa continued to refuse to talk with representative Africans about their joint future.

The new congressional initiative wants to restore the trigger and demonstrate U.S. displeasure with the slow pace of change in South Africa by broadening and deepening the range of U.S. sanctions. The proposed new measures include a ban on new U.S. investment in private business there and a strengthened ban on bank lending. It would prohibit companies like Fluor and Bechtel from continuing to construct oil-from-coal plants, which give South Africa partial self-sufficiency in energy.

Individual investments in South African gold mines and other shares traded in U.S. stock exchanges would be halted. So would U.S. deposits in South African banks. Imports of coal, uranium, and steel from South Africa, all of which compete with U.S. supplies, would be denied, but not imports of critical minerals like manganese and chrome, which are vital in steel-making. In a move that could cause acute stress to South Africans, their national airline would be denied landing rights in the United States. Later such a ban could be extended to all airlines serving South Africa.

The trigger would consist of the mandatory withdrawal of U.S. computer companies—principally IBM—if, after 12 months, South Africa had still not dismantled apartheid. But like last year's congressional bill and the President's milder executive order, the proposals so far contain no substantial carrot for white South Africa. Other than the ability to avert the withdrawal of U.S. computer facilities (and Japanese companies like Hitachi are already actively expanding in South Africa), the congressional proposals provide no calibrated incentives.

If the series of sanctions were staggered over a year, with different actions set for successive months, white businessmen in South Africa might have some hope of persuading their notoriously shortsighted government to begin meeting the political demands of South Africa's black majority.

Positive reinforcements could also be added: Promises of financial support for black education, for example, could be contingent on moves toward real compromise.

Without substantial incentives, those realistic whites who have already weighed the consequences and begun to recognize the guerrillas of the African National Congress as a legitimate force will have more difficulty shifting a largely intransigent white political leadership into assuming anything other than a posture of bitter resistance. White businessmen have welcomed their government's conciliatory talks with a Commonwealth negotiating team, along with the possibility that those explorations would lead to official negotiations with the African National Congress.

South Africa's raids were intended to strengthen the white government's bargaining position and internal image at a time when 22 months of continuous protest by blacks, and the failure to quell violence by both the mailed fist of repression and the velvet glove of tepid reform, have substantially weakened its image locally. The talks with the Commonwealth team were hurting the government on its right wing, too.

Renewed pressure on South Africa from the U.S. is timely, and much more likely to be effective psychologically, if not necessarily economically, than anything that can be achieved solely by university divestment or corporate disinvestment. But to achieve the maximum impact for good on a South Africa that is tense and volatile, the congressional legislation needs to give white South Africa the possibility of converting sticks into carrots, but without the whites using the prevarications and obfuscations that will encourage the South African crisis to escalate indefinitely.

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### ***What to Do about South Africa: Reagan Must Speak Out***

President Reagan should speak out on South Africa. Sanctions, or at least the threat of sanctions, are necessary, but the seriousness of the South African problem also demands a determined American response enunciated by our head of state.

As a conservative Republican President who has often sympathized with the reformist efforts of the white minority Government of South Africa, President Reagan is superbly placed to articulate the outrage of Americans. Enough is enough, he should say. South Africa must decide its own fate, but only by negotiating openly with the authentic representatives of all South

Africans, black and white, can Pretoria avoid repetitive cycles of bloodshed and, eventually, the collapse of all white influence.

South Africa's white business community, even many Afrikaans-speaking moguls, is urging its Government to bargain with blacks without preconditions. President Reagan could surely associate himself and the United States with such demands. He should condemn the current state of emergency, censorship and accompanying violence.

White businessmen seek the release of Nelson Mandela, the African National Congress leader who has languished in jail for 23 years, and the unbanning of his political organization. So should our President.

So long as Mr. Mandela remains incarcerated, the Government of white South Africa can bargain effectively with no other blacks. President P. W. Botha is Mr. Mandela's prisoner. In order to propel President Botha down this road of common sense and salvation, President Reagan should invite Oliver Tambo, leader of the African National Congress in exile, to the White House. Mr. Tambo is no stranger to official corridors in this country, and such a symbolic step could do more even than sanctions to concentrate the South African Government's mind on its few positive options.

The clampdown on black dissent has succeeded in exacerbating rather than diminishing protest. So long as the emergency and censorship remain, there can be no meeting of black and white minds. Ultimately, whether now or in a few years, whites will have to bargain with blacks, if only to keep the fragile economy stable and to arrange a peaceful transition to majority rule. President Reagan needs to help white South Africans help themselves.

By inviting Mr. Tambo to the White House, Mr. Reagan might grasp the idea that the nationalist credentials and aims of the African National Congress are at least as strong as its Moscow connections. Indeed, talking to the ANC would give support to nationalist rather than Marxist tendencies among its leaders.

It may be too much to shift President Reagan away from his opposition to sanctions. He may be perceptive, too, when he suggests that sanctions alone will not compel white South Africa to bargain with blacks. There is abundant intuitive and historical support for such a position.

But the threat of sanctions is demonstrably effective. The fear in South Africa of what the United States (and Britain and the other Common Market countries) can and might do is palpable. Businessmen in South Africa shudder, and their anxieties affect Government thinking.

South Africans want to continue selling their coal, steel and uranium in the United States. They want to continue flying on South African Airways to New York. They want renewed investment in their country by American

firms. What President Reagan should say in the strongest terms is that he wants what they want but that he cannot advise Americans to continue to invest and reinvest in South Africa so long as political instability so clouds their country's economic future.

President Reagan needs to swing the verbal big stick and warn South Africans that the rage of the Americans is real. He would not want to punish South Africa unnecessarily, and may not like the thought of sanctions, but the mood of the United States is well expressed by the House vote last month in favor of comprehensive sanctions.

As President and as leader of the free world, Mr. Reagan must advise Pretoria to act before even a person so patient and understanding as himself becomes thoroughly exasperated. What he did in the Philippines and Haiti he should at least try to do in South Africa. It is long past time for him to speak forcefully about this most starkly invidious of injustices.

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### *What Sanctions against South Africa Can and Cannot Do*

The hints of reform offered in Durban this week by South African President Pieter W. Botha are unlikely to stop the international momentum to impose sanctions on his nation.

But effective sanctions must be sharply focused. Those adopted at a recent mini-Commonwealth meeting in London are apt to be tougher on those drafting them than on South Africa itself.

Spurred on by Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia, and Robert Mugabe, prime minister of Zimbabwe, key leaders of the Commonwealth decided to respond economically to South Africa's continued holding of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, leader of the banned African National Congress (ANC), and imposition of repressive emergency measures. The Commonwealth "cannot stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral" but must take "effective concerted action," they said, to pressure Pretoria to dismantle apartheid.

So the Commonwealth leaders voted to bar the import of South African agricultural products, uranium, coal, and iron and steel. The package bans new bank loans or investments, cuts consular contacts, refuses to permit promotion of tourism, and sunders all air ties.

The Commonwealth decided to employ its economic leverage to propel white-dominated South Africa down the road to democracy. But the Commonwealth has virtually no economic leverage. Only Britain, the linchpin of



the Commonwealth, has the kind of economic weight to influence the South African equation, and Britain has refused (except in the minor instance of tourism) to join the Commonwealth attack on South Africa. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher fears that the price of sanctions on Britain, which gets 10 percent of its overseas earnings from South Africa, would be too high. Just cutting air services between London and Johannesburg would reduce annual British Airways revenues by about \$75 million a year.

The rest of the Commonwealth trades insignificantly with South Africa. Zambia and Zimbabwe, however, depend significantly on South African transit facilities. Fully two-thirds of their trade reaches the world via South African ports. Zambia cannot export its copper without South African cooperation, and many of its ordinary consumer goods come from South Africa. Already South Africa has begun retaliating against Zambia and Zimbabwe. For those two African countries and the rest of the Commonwealth to have acted prematurely, and without Britain, was folly.

Prime Minister Thatcher questions whether the sanctions can cut precisely enough to sever white South Africa's strong sinews of self-preservation. The threat of sanctions has had and continues to have an important psychological effect on white attitudes toward African advancement and on governmental policy. Actual enactment of sanctions, however, turns threat into reality and impels measures of avoidance and retaliation.

If Europe, which buys 70 to 80 percent of South Africa's oranges, apples, wool, and wine, were to cease importing, white farmers and black workers would be hurt. So would state-owned monopolies, if they cannot export iron, steel, and uranium. But only a presently unmanageable international boycott of South Africa could, even theoretically, starve it into submission.

Without the cooperation of Britain, the United States, Japan, and West Germany, there are simply too many loopholes. Even with the carefully monitored, joint efforts of the leaders of the free world, South Africa might still find markets for its crops and minerals. Moreover, gold, gold products, and diamonds account for about 60 percent of South Africa's foreign-exchange earnings. Unless the West drives down the price of gold dramatically (which would hurt the U.S., Europe, Japan, India, and other countries), South Africa will continue to earn dollars in substantial amounts on the world market.

Positive reinforcement may prove just as effective in policymaking as punitive sanctions. If South Africa releases Mr. Mandela, the West could say that it would be willing to double its import of oranges and apples. If South Africa unbans the ANC, the West could buy more coal. If the government seriously began negotiating its democratic future with representative blacks,

then the West could increase its lending and investment. (Doing so would then make acceptable economic sense, anyway.)

Thus the combination of initiatives with the greatest potential influence on policy may prove to be those that are psychological, easily reversible, and designed to show the seriousness of the West, particularly if combined with promises tied to better behavior. The West could thus combine cutting air, telegraphic, and postal links, and barring coal imports, with promises of positive action when South Africa moved toward majority rule. If South Africa did not act within a certain time, additional sanctions could become mandatory.

The U.S. Congress will probably not pass comprehensive legislation against South Africa until after the summer recess. If Mrs. Thatcher relents or is outvoted, a similar British bill could be enacted about the same time. White South Africa thus has a few months to show that it is changing course. Thereafter, the West, driven by Pretoria's indifference and its own outrage, will doubtless pursue the course of punitive sanctions, even if they are a blunt, unproven instrument of change.

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### *Going Beyond Sanctions*

The results of South Africa's recent election place ruling whites on an unswerving collision course with the country's vast black majority. An unexpected but clear swing to the far right indefinitely postpones the prospect of a negotiated settlement to the increasingly bitter and bloody conflict that has convulsed South Africa since 1984. Just as white South African voters may have responded to fears of black African political and social gains, so the young black Africans who lead protests in the segregated townships and their exiled allies of the African National Congress (ANC) will react to the election by stepping up their attacks on those who now control South Africa.

The elections have brought little reassurance to South Africa's majority or to liberal whites, and their outcome has compelled Western governments to reexamine their approaches to change in South Africa. Are the limited sanctions now invoked sufficient? Should broader approaches be considered? Or will continued disinvestment suffice?

Slightly more than two million of South Africa's three million registered white voters cast ballots on May 6 and chose representatives in the House of Assembly, one of parliament's three houses. Coloureds (persons of mixed

descent) vote separately for representatives in a second chamber; Asians send delegates to a third house. But the chambers are unequal in power; the white assembly dominates the others. Black Africans have no vote and no fourth house. Yet there are 25 million black Africans, 2.6 million Coloureds, 0.8 million Asians, and only 4.7 million whites in South Africa.

Since 1953 the National Party, controlled by Afrikaners, has governed South Africa with large parliamentary majorities. In the country's recent election, however, its percentage of the vote dropped from 57 to 52 percent at the same time that it was increasing the number of its seats from 117 to 123 in a 166-seat assembly. (Another 12 seats are nominated by political parties, 10 by the Nationalists.)

The major gains were made on the far right. The Conservative Party (CP), composed of dissidents who broke away from the National Party earlier in the 1980s, gained five seats—from 17 to 22—and doubled its proportion of the popular vote from 13 to 26 percent. In a further 10 constituencies in which the CP failed to win, it nevertheless polled impressively. A member of the National Party cabinet and two deputy ministers were defeated by CP candidates. Challenged by the CP, even the leader of the NP in the Transvaal barely retained his own seat.

### *The New Opposition*

The Conservatives have become the official opposition in the white parliament, giving them endless opportunities to harass an already right-wing government from arch-segregationist positions. An even more extreme right-wing political party, the Herstigte (Reconstructed) National Party, lost its sole seat in parliament. But that loss hardly undermines the clear evidence that the rulers of South Africa will turn away from even mild reform and attempt to counter the upsurge of voter sentiment on the farthest right by becoming even more reactionary themselves. After all, the National Party came to power in 1948 after splitting away in the 1930s from an Afrikaner-run party that had become too "English," too "soft" on Africans, and generally too "international" in its approach to local problems.

The big loser in the election was the broad alliance of moderates and liberals to the left of the NP who denounced apartheid and decried the slow pace of reform. Its members range from the leaders of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), who espouse one man, one vote, to apostates from the Nationalists' ranks. Although the PFP wants majority rights more than majority rule and has proposed ingenious ways of sharing power without giving it away, their electoral allies in the New Republic Party (NRP) and

among independents simply sought “real” reform and significant modifications of apartheid.

The PFP lost its position as the official opposition by dropping from 26 to 19 elected seats. The NRP won a seat and a chief NP defector kept his seat as an independent. Moreover, a former NP stalwart and ambassador came within 39 votes of ousting the second most powerful person in the National Party. But his strong showing, supported as he was by a coterie of Afrikaner intellectuals in a university constituency in the Cape Province, meant almost nothing in the face of the rolling tide of right-wing sentiment that swept white South Africa.

Although Helen Suzman and Colin Eglin are still in parliament, their roles will be diminished. Suzman—single-handedly from 1961 to 1974 and with the help of Eglin and others since then—has attempted to keep the NP from committing too many excesses. They embarrassed the NP, reported atrocities, asked questions about the fate of blacks, and kept the flame of liberalism alight during South Africa’s darkest days.

Now, however, the main pull on the NP will be from the right—to re-erect whatever few barriers to black advancement have been dismantled since 1978. The government has already attempted to crush black protest. It will redouble those efforts, however slim its hope for eradicating black antagonism to apartheid, and will also turn its back decisively on accommodation and negotiation with blacks. The ANC will not soon be unbanned nor Nelson Mandela, its leader, be released from prison. Any hope that the NP, under President Pieter W. Botha, will abolish the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act, the two cornerstones of legislative apartheid, may now be discarded. (The Group Areas Act mandates residential segregation and the Population Registration Act defines a person’s color group from cradle to grave.)

Protests against the National Party’s rule in 1976 and 1977 left 600 black dead, 5,000 wounded, and a legacy of bitterness that was eroding by the beginning of the 1980s. Botha then indicated that whites must “adapt or die,” and he and his colleagues began making conciliatory noises. Those noises proved a prelude to little legislative reform, and blacks derided what the NP offered, even the abolition of passes in 1986, as “too little, too late.”

### *Violence and Repression*

The introduction of the tricameral parliament in 1984 proved the final goad. It led to waves of protest, repression, and violence that have left 1,600 blacks dead, 10,000 wounded, and about 30,000 detained (many of whom

have been released). South Africa has known hardly a single day without white-black violence since September 1984. Indeed, blacks have grown steadily more militant, and their decisiveness has survived two states of emergency, censorship, and intensified police and military surveillance and intervention.

In past decades, blacks sought equal educational opportunities, economic advancement, trade unionization, social acceptance, and the kinds of recognition that any segregated majority would want. The white rulers of South Africa have slowly, timidly, begun to dismantle social and economic apartheid. South Africa is much more integrated on many levels than it was in 1977, and a few elite blacks even live unobtrusively in exclusive white suburbs.

But blacks are no longer content to seek such concessions. The scrapping of the Westminster parliamentary system in 1984 and its replacement by a supposedly multiracial parliament that excluded blacks, who form the majority, posed an unexpectedly bitter challenge. Black Africans no longer want whites to change, they want political rights that would permit them to participate fully in and, indeed, to order that change. They want enfranchisement in order to share meaningful power.

For these obvious reasons, the tilting of the white electorate to the right and the way in which Botha accepted that electoral mandate will compel blacks to redouble their efforts internally. Likewise, the ANC, with bases in Angola and Zambia, promises a renewed and accelerated attack on the white redoubt. The ANC specializes in sabotage and assaults on property; it may now attack whites on their isolated farms and blacks everywhere who they believe are collaborating.

Yet even the fiercest likely combination of ANC guerrilla attacks from outside and militant activity by blacks within South Africa will not soon undermine white control. The South African Defense Force is 250,000 strong and overwhelmingly in white hands. Moreover, the army and the tiny navy and air force are able to draw upon locally manufactured weapons, including aircraft and helicopters. There is little likelihood that white South Africa can be bled as comparatively easily (although it took seven years) as was white Rhodesia, which is now black-ruled Zimbabwe.

No matter how much the Soviet Union chooses to support the ANC, Botha now has what he believes to be a mandate for—at best—tentative, state-controlled reform, renewed co-optation of blacks (a policy long doomed to failure), and staunch hostility to outside efforts to pressure white South Africa to come to terms with majority aspirations.

*Sanctions and Disinvestment*

Botha won the election, in part, by attacking the United States and other outside antagonists of apartheid. Although the sanctions initiative in the United States and fears of the sanctions weapon being employed in Western Europe certainly worried big (mostly English-speaking) businessmen in South Africa, it had nothing but a negative effect on voters. If divestment and disinvestment played any part in the election at all, those policies clearly produced defensive, negative responses from most whites.

Thus far the campaign to compel white South Africa to come to terms with blacks—to negotiate—by cutting off exports to the United States of coal, steel, agricultural products, Krugerrands, and so on, and by cutting off direct air links, has produced no amelioration of apartheid policies. White South Africa is as determined to deny blacks the vote as before.

*Divestment* is the selling of shares of stocks that are held by pension funds and universities in American-based multinational corporations in order to “compel” them to disinvest from South Africa. *Disinvestment* is the ceasing of *operations* in South Africa by American companies. Since 1985, more than 120 have sold or given their businesses, factories, and distribution networks to local managers and employees or to Japanese, European, or South African corporations.

More than half of the U.S. corporations that have disinvested have sold their assets and goodwill to South African firms. There is little dispute that thus far the primary result of disinvestment has been the transfer of American assets inexpensively to South Africa. One major U.S. company abandoned its \$5 million operation and has not been able to sell it at all. A few large American firms have sold themselves to consortia of local managers. Neither the South African companies nor the new managerial entities have pledged to maintain the affirmative action policies of the departing firms. Black employment levels have also fallen as a result of the transfers of ownership.

The divestment campaign on the nation’s campuses and in the states and pension fund world played hardly any role in concentrating the minds of U.S. corporate board members. American companies have pulled out of South Africa because they were either losing market share, losing money, or making far less than they once did in the straitened economic circumstances of today’s violence-prone South Africa. Moreover, most U.S. companies derive less than 1 percent of their total overseas profits from South Africa. The companies feared more bad news and strikes in South Africa; poor eco-

conomic conditions are expected to continue into the 1990s. They were also influenced by the attitude of American consumers. Few want to be boycotted in their primary markets, and many were tired of being harassed. The recent election returns should send additional companies, of the 200 remaining, scurrying home.

Given the mass exodus of powerful American companies from South Africa—including General Motors, IBM, Exxon, and Coca-Cola—have there been any policy changes? Has disinvestment worried the government? Almost certainly. But have those worries been translated into the kind of policy initiatives that would benefit blacks, lead to negotiation, or assist blacks in their quest for majority rule? So far, nothing positive can be traced directly to disinvestment. Since disinvestment has done no more than transfer American assets and knowledge cheaply to South Africans (as well as others), divestment can hardly be seen to have accomplished much politically or in terms of blacks' advancement. It is thus hard to justify renewed divestment initiatives.

That the divestment campaign has raised the consciousness of students about the evils of apartheid is wholly to the good. That it has compelled boards of trustees, pension fund directors, and state legislators to address the questions of ethical investing is also wholly commendable. But there is no plausible ground on which to base claims that the divestment campaign has mandated disinvestment or that divestment or disinvestment has influenced white South African policies or attitudes in any but negative ways.

### *The Coming Revolt*

It is often argued that the withdrawal of American industry and investments from South Africa will hasten the day when black South Africans will successfully revolt. The white economy will be so weakened by American disinvestment that the dominant economy will collapse and blacks will triumph. That is nonsense.

As Americans pull out, South Africans become richer and exercise greater control over their own economy. They begin manufacturing their own personal computers, just as they have long made their own guns in the face of a UN arms embargo. There is no evidence that oppressed peoples become stronger as they or their countries become poorer. Indeed, the evidence is exactly the reverse.

There is a strong moral argument that it is wrong to profit from evil regimes. On average, American stockholders in companies with operations in South Africa probably receive less than 1 percent of their earnings from South Africa, although holders of gold mining shares should feel far less

comfortable. It has been argued that colleges and universities should not finance scholarships and buildings from South Africa–derived earnings.

That argument has a simple appeal that cannot easily be gainsaid except to the extent to which one can separate profits from the sale of baby oil or pharmaceuticals, for example, from the propping up of the state or the support of any part of the apartheid system. U.S.-owned companies now control such a small part of the overall economy that the moral imperative is hard to sustain except in abstract terms. Similarly, since South African businessmen have had surprisingly little impact on the policies of their government, American firms are relatively insulated from the charge of complicity.

### *The Moral Argument*

The moral charge is hard to prove except in very broad terms. Indeed, in 1987, especially after the election, all aspects of disinvestment and divestment appear essentially irrelevant in the face of the far more potent weapons that are available to pressure South Africa. Even the deployment of sanctions by the most powerful nation in the world has done little except to tilt an election toward the right.

The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa earlier this year suggested that American sanctions were having too little effect because Western Europe and Japan were not also pressuring South Africa by sanctions. A broader boycott of South African goods would certainly have a greater impact on the South African economy than has American disinvestment. Thus it is to Washington, London, Bonn, and Tokyo that anti-South African activity ought to be addressed. The offices of American university presidents are too far removed from Pretoria, or even from corporate boardrooms. Students will have a more direct influence on policy through elected representatives and senators and possibly by raising funds to educate black South Africans.

Sanctions have thus far worked poorly because South Africa depends only very marginally on the kinds of exports that have been barred. The secret of South Africa is that it is driven by the engine of gold. Exports of that metal, in ingot form, supply 65 to 70 percent of all foreign exchange earnings. Diamonds are responsible for 5 percent; coal for 10 percent; other metals like manganese, chromium, and platinum another 10 combined; and all the agricultural and miscellaneous products one can imagine for the remainder.

Altering South African policy can be influenced best economically, if at all by economic means, through gold. Surer measures would be by invasion or blockade, but no one advocates such initiatives or believes them to be



probable. Barring gold shipments from South Africa would be less successful than finding a way to lower gold's value. If by selling gold steadily from central bank stocks the West could reduce South Africa's net return by half (or more), then it might have located a kind of leverage that makes more sense than all the divestment and disinvestment efforts imaginable. Gold provides the very lifeblood of South Africa.

Even so, a cautionary note must be sounded. The lessons of the election are that white South Africa will tighten its belt before it succumbs to pressure. Even a run on gold may not work.

Whites and blacks will slug it out in South Africa for years, if not decades, to come. Only a breakthrough of common sense and statesmanship among National Party whites can avert the turmoil and tension that lie ahead. Negotiations will come, but only following more violence and, after the 1988 elections, conceivably the decisive intervention of a new American president.

## *The Demise of Apartheid*

The ANC, long derided by the Reagan administration and suspect as a bunch of Soviet-backed bomb throwers, had begun to appear an increasingly viable negotiating partner. White South African opposition leaders (and even a few Afrikaners who fronted for the government) had begun to meet clandestinely with the ANC elsewhere in Africa and in Europe. By 1986, if not earlier, the ANC was a key part of the solution to South Africa's troubles, not a cause. I sought to put the ANC and its leadership into proper perspective. It was "a dangerous mistake," I reported, to characterize the ANC as stridently Leninist, terrorist, oppressive, and dictatorial. The ANC derived its popularity less from its "mildly socialistic, idealistic" Freedom Charter of 1955 than from its long and unswerving opposition to segregation and apartheid since 1912. Opinion polls showing Mandela to be the overwhelming favorite of black South Africans were accurate. Whatever the ANC's views might be upon assuming power, Africans had felt since at least 1980 that the organization embodied their full nationalist aspirations.

The rebellion in the townships was two years old. It was led locally not by the ANC but by younger radicals who were openly sympathetic to Mandela. But, I tried to make clear, the ANC, with its headquarters in distant Zambia, did not initiate and could not hope to control the rebellion. Indeed, although the ANC in the 1980s had sent guerillas into South Africa from camps in Zambia and Mozambique, blowing up offices and stores and mining roads, its actions were more unnerving to fortress South Africa than they were a "serious external threat."

The ANC derived much of its support from the Soviet Union, particularly financing for sabotage. Many, perhaps half, of the leaders of the ANC in Zambia and elsewhere were Marxists. "But the striking truth is," I wrote, "that its top leaders, in and out of South Africa, [were] thoroughly bourgeois." Mandela and Tambo, both lawyers, were included in that definition. Tambo, I reported, over and over claimed not to want to oust whites from

South Africa. Majority rule would not be Communist rule, thus it was important to negotiate earlier rather than later with Mandela and his aging prison mates. ("Pretoria Must Deal with Black Leaders," *New York Times*, 27 Oct. 1986.) Throughout 1987 and 1988, South Africa's progression toward a new and more just political dispensation seemed as slow and retarded as ever. Botha may have recognized the inevitable—the granting of full political rights to Africans—but he refused to be rushed or to consider declaring apartheid truly dead on any but his own terms. He and his ruling party were also troubled by a right-wing resurgence within Afrikanerdom. Thus, during many months when his presidential leadership should have been focused strategically upon a reconfiguring of the country, he instead tried to stem the drift of white voters toward hard edged rivals on his far right. In parliamentary elections in 1987, the National Party gained a few seats, but the more extreme Conservative Party doubled its percentage of the white vote and added a significant number of seats. It also replaced the Progressive Federal Party, on which American officials had placed their hopes for peaceful change, as the official opposition. It lost nearly a fourth of its seats.

So ended any hope that positive change could be accomplished via the white ballot box. ("Security in South Africa: More May Be Less," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 May 1987.) Botha became even more cautious than before. His government deferred major new repeals of apartheid, including scrapping legislation which mandated racial segregation and the separation of peoples by color. A year later, after three stunning parliamentary by-election losses to the Conservatives, as well as the subsequent loss of control in 60 percent of Transvaal's white-run cities in municipal polls, the National Party backtracked rapidly from its earlier endorsements of modifications to apartheid. Those in the party who had been pushing Botha to negotiate with African dissenters became still. The Conservatives were wedded to the reactionary return of undiluted apartheid, and could always accuse the National Party of being soft on security. They managed easily to outflank Botha on the right. "Tragically," I concluded, both electoral outcomes demonstrated that "tentative reform without a vision and without black backing" only served to exacerbate residual white fears. Botha was losing white support because he was irresolute, not necessarily because his instincts were deplored. ("The Collapse of South Africa's White Politics," *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 March 1988; "South African Elections Leave a Wobbling Status Quo," *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 Nov. 1988.)

Amid an atmosphere of white anxiety fueled by continued turmoil in the townships and the spread of violence to the rural fastness of Natal, later KwaZulu-Natal, because of Botha's refusal to take bold steps; a weakening

economy, inflation, a depreciating currency, and shortages of foreign exchange; and South Africa's increasing isolation internationally, South African white businessmen began to react. Some, like the charismatic chairman of a major packaged food conglomerate, simply left the country. Others closed down critical newspapers and discharged crusading white editors, self-censoring even absent official pressure. Meanwhile, the government itself cracked down on press freedom and detained African editors and acclaimed African educational moderates, holding them without charges or trials. The government decreed that newspapers that published "propaganda" could be closed. But "propaganda" was never defined. The regime also demanded that the nation's leading white universities curb student protests against apartheid or forfeit their subsidies from the state. By early 1988, Botha's regime was in full retreat from any previously contemplated accommodation of African political aspirations. Negotiations with Mandela (then happening behind closed doors) were publicly unthinkable. Fearful of further voter support for the far right, the ruling oligarchy back-pedaled into a posture of authoritarian restraint reminiscent of the 1970s. ("Freedom in South Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 Nov. 1987; "Despair in South Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 Feb. 1988.)

Apartheid had failed. By the end of 1988, harsh demographic and economic realities had overtaken dreams of white supremacy. South Africa's white population numbered fewer than 5 million; there were 26 million Africans, and the African population was expected to double every twenty years, whites only every forty years. The cities were more black than ever; as much as 75 percent of the population of the notionally white municipal landscape was in fact African. Such increases in African numbers had put enormous strains, which would grow exponentially, on the country's existing social and economic infrastructure. Job growth had fallen well behind population increases. Unemployment was about 50 percent for Africans, and almost nil for whites. With the loss of foreign investment, South Africa's long years of per capita GDP growth had ceased. Indeed, the country's foreign exchange reserves were exhausted and capital flight had become a daily event. Gold sales, once the panacea for a South Africa in trouble, were flat and expected to decrease. It had become evident to most thinking South Africans that the country's and their own economic health would return only after it resolved its black-white crisis. ("South Africa and Reality Testing," *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 Dec. 1988.)

That meant talking to Mandela, who had been transferred from the notorious Robben Island prison off Cape Town to the mainland, where the physical conditions of his confinement were greatly improved and where,

coincidentally, he was accessible to covert official emissaries. In an article in the *Boston Globe* headlined "Mandela's Prisoner" (29 Aug. 1988), I reiterated an earlier theme, but now with greater urgency and assurance. Botha and the fate of white South Africa were together "hostage to Mandela's fortune." Thus, the moment had come to open the doors of his jail cell. "His legitimacy," I tried to explain, "reinforced and sanctified by white venom and long years of incarceration," was unique. Only Mandela had the authority to bargain openly with whites.

South Africa was stalemated so long as Mandela was not free, I argued. White South Africa could not begin to forge a satisfactory future for itself or for the entire plural society of the nation without Mandela's help. His was the decisive voice. Effectively, he was "Botha's jailer."

For several years Botha privately had wanted to release Mandela, but on the white government's terms. Mandela had refused banishment to a homeland and refused to renounce violence. So Botha had been stymied, and so were those in the National Party who favored Mandela's release without preconditions but feared a consequential cataclysmic wave of violence too catastrophic for the security forces to contain. Mandela refrained from giving the assurances that the government repeatedly sought. He would not bargain for his own release.

Botha's government was caught in a standard prisoner's dilemma. But doing nothing would only postpone the day of reckoning for whites, and leave them in a less advantageous bargaining position. Botha's fears of the white right were undeniable and real. Nevertheless, "letting Mandela out now [was] South Africa's best choice." Botha would then regain the politically high ground among whites, and be enabled to transform himself and his party from "rear-guard survivalists into statesmen." Only by so doing would he have a chance of uplifting the future of his country for peoples of all colors. World leaders, I urged, should "redouble their efforts to persuade white South Africans to strike a blow for Mandela's freedom—and for the freedom of all of South Africa."

New leadership was necessary to break the mold of Afrikaner intransigence. Only when Botha, 73, suffered a stroke in early 1989 and de Klerk, 53, replaced him as head of the party (and subsequently as president) could whites grasp the nettle of meaningful transformation. Precisely because de Klerk, minister of national education and leader of the National Party in the Transvaal, possessed impeccable right-wing credentials, could he break the deadlock in white-black relations. "Just as President Nixon was able to go to China," I argued, so de Klerk could travel metaphorically to Soweto or Lusaka. De Klerk had a record of speaking out against reform. He had

opposed relaxing residential segregation and scrapping social apartheid. As minister of national education he had harassed multiracial universities. Yet de Klerk was of a newer Afrikaner generation than Botha.

“Has South Africa Found Its Nixon?” in the *New York Times* (14 March 1989) argued that de Klerk’s elevation to leadership signaled the “most important shift in white politics in years.” He and younger Afrikaners finally appreciated that whites could no longer expect to dominate blacks indefinitely, and certainly not without incurring enormous costs. Western sanctions, international opposition, downward spikes in prices for gold and other minerals, and a loss of business confidence at home had ended years of prosperity and growth. The country was experiencing severe balance-of-payments problems, high inflation, and little room to maneuver. Good times would only return when power was shared with the voteless African majority.

De Klerk was less bedeviled than Botha by the hobgoblin of Afrikaner solidarity. Unlike Botha, he was ready, I suggested, to make the necessary compromises with dogma and ideology that were required in a tense and economically weak South Africa. Indeed, de Klerk was backed, even guided to some extent, by the Afrikaner Broederbond, a once-secret, Masonic-like, brotherhood of South Africa’s dominant white tribe. I implied that de Klerk would make “the great leap forward” and negotiate South Africa’s future with Mandela.

By mid-1989, four months later, this process was well under way. Mandela had taken tea with Botha and visited de Klerk. Thabo Mbeki, ANC spokesman and ultimately Mandela’s successor as president of South Africa, told me confidentially in Lusaka that Mandela would be released from his prison sentence early in 1990. It was also known that emissaries of the government of South Africa were meeting at various levels, in and out of the country, with ANC counterparts, including Mbeki. Electric charges of change were in the air, even if de Klerk had not fully displayed his strategic vision or, at this point, even been confirmed as president. (That further consolidation took place in September.) Shortly after mid-year, although hedging a little, I could predict that the end of apartheid would soon be at hand. (“South Africa’s Tide Shifts,” *New York Times*, 3 August 1989.)

Although still too cautious in September, after de Klerk’s party had lost seats in a whites-only parliamentary election to the Democratic Party on its left and the Conservative Party on its right, I sensed that de Klerk was still (unlike Botha) ready to move forward and plan a transition with the ANC. He was presiding over a “slide toward normalcy.” ANC leader Walter Sisulu was released from Robben Island in October. Mandela’s release would

follow, "early next year," I wrote. ("Time to Negotiate in South Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 Sept. 1989; "The Broederbond and Progress," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Oct. 1989.)

A year before, I had speculated that apartheid would not last out the century. Now the tectonic plates of change were shifting much more swiftly than anyone could have prophesied a few years before. The once impregnable South African defense force was still strong, but the economic foundation of apartheid had crumbled. A new cohort of Afrikaners was more outward-looking and sophisticated than their forebears. It could appreciate that apartheid had failed, Canute-like, to repress the tides of history and the logic of majority rule. Only by uniting with Mandela and embracing the ANC could they conceivably preserve a modicum of hope for their grandchildren's generation. Just as Nixon knew that the opportunity to create seismic policy departures occurred only rarely, de Klerk appreciated that he would have to act early, decisively, and boldly if he were to have any hope of transforming South Africa for the better. Paradoxically, because Botha and his predecessors had effectively run the country autocratically, de Klerk could impose his will on a party and a country that desperately sought believable solutions to a decade-long era of anxiety and intensifying desperation.

"The well-being of all in this country," de Klerk told parliament and his nation in February 1990, was "linked inextricably to the ability of the leaders to come to terms with one another on a new dispensation. No one can escape this simple truth." He promised a "totally new and just constitutional dispensation in which every inhabitant will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavor." The season of violence was over. So was apartheid. Mandela was to be released, the ANC unbanned and its leaders amnestied, and a process of reconciliation and reconstruction commenced. Hallelujah!

But bold strokes do not successful transitions make. That was an important reminder; de Klerk and others still had to face down the resurgent white right, which favored partition or other implausible solutions. He and Mandela also had to clarify the precise results and contours of the society which would flow from the transition. The ANC wanted majority rule, plain and direct. It sought a unitary state, without homelands. It favored a rapid transition while whites preferred to string out the shift for as long as possible. The Broederbond and the National Party wanted a more guided plan, with whites giving up as little as possible of their predominant positions. De Klerk sought to protect "minorities" through the introduction of group legislative vetoes. Confederal answers were being mooted. The forces around de Klerk also wanted to bring homeland leaders, especially the now anti-

ANC personality of Chief Buthelezi—anathema to the ANC and the physical opponent of the UDF in the Transvaal and Natal—into the negotiations as a countervailing factor. Those large differences meant that the end of apartheid would not lead effortlessly to majority rule. (“New Era in South Africa?” *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 Feb. 1990; “Turning the Corner in Troubled South Africa,” *Boston Globe*, 11 Feb. 1990, “Black Reconciliation in South Africa,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 April 1990.)

Mandela’s charismatic inclusionism—“we’re all victors”—and de Klerk’s supple flexibility soon created an atmosphere conducive to serious bargaining. Calm discussions between equals over a common future were a first for South Africa, and accelerated a momentum for positive accommodation that could not be derailed, however the white right tried. “The tides of progress at last seem to be surging relentlessly toward a safe harbor,” I wrote in May. (“A Fresh Start in Cape Town,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 May 1990.)

There was substantial and continuing movement throughout 1990 and 1991. De Klerk’s government repealed the Group Areas Act (which segregated cities), the Population Registration Act (the classification of South Africans by gradations of color), and the Natives Land Act (dating from 1913), which prevented Africans from holding land or farming outside of the segregated homelands. Then the homelands themselves were abolished. The “fake mini-states” that South Africa had carved out of itself to justify denying Africans the vote were folded back into the country in 1991. South Africa had never given them the means to thrive, so they remained impoverished, hollow labor reservoirs for the larger national economy. The Transkei, which had itself rescinded its separation in 1990; Bophuthatswana; Venda; and the Ciskei all lost their so-called independence, as did the six other homelands that had always refused to secede from South Africa. The two Xhosa-speaking entities, the Transkei and the Ciskei, explicitly aligned themselves with the ANC. (“Homelands’ Demise,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 March 1991.)

Abolishing the legal framework of apartheid could hardly abolish the corrosive attitudes that had separated peoples from one another. Nor could abolition have been expected to reduce antagonisms, particularly since new relationships of authority were being shaped. As white rule receded, Africans would fill the vacuum of power, and tangible rewards would be available to the ambitious and swift. Among the homeland despots who had been created and supported by South Africa, several were ousted by internal coups in 1990 and 1991. Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana was eventually removed by ANC efforts. But the big battle, and one that continued for much of the decade of the 1990s, was between Buthelezi’s followers and the ANC. Xhosa-speaking (ANC) adherents had clashed with Zulu workers and



warriors in and around Johannesburg and throughout the rural areas of Natal since the middle 1980s. But as white rule wound down, Buthelezi sought militantly to retain control of what was to become KwaZulu-Natal. He feared being eclipsed totally by Mandela and marginalized by the ANC. His followers equally fought to retain their large share of the spoils of freedom. ("No Peace among South Africa's Blacks," *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 April 1991.) Between 1986 and 1995, when the internecine clashes largely ended, 36,000 Africans lost their lives in this African turf war.

As early as 1991, it was demonstrated that Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party had been assisted covertly in the 1980s by South African police and soldiers. The police had funded and supported Inkatha "hit squads." That scandal, which greatly threatened de Klerk's credibility with the ANC and in Washington, was dubbed "Gatshagate." A year later, Buthelezi, the leader of the largest ethnic entity in the country, had signaled a seemingly irreversible break with the ANC over primacy and control. He made cause with conservative whites and, in the ongoing constitutional debate, campaigned for the regional, confederal arrangements that were anathema to the ANC. He even declared Natal and KwaZulu autonomous, and defied national retaliation. I mistakenly thought that he had forfeited his role as a solver of South Africa's difficulties. He had become a central part of the problem. Knowing him well, I called him an "irascible, vengeful, and . . . ethnic autocrat." He had "overplayed his political hand." I explained how this once brave opponent of apartheid had for many years twisted the mad logic of apartheid to his own and black South Africa's advantage, but had since flirted with white power-mongers in order to keep his own claims to authority alive. At one point in 1993, Buthelezi even forged an alliance with one of the most virulent of all white right separatists. Later he attempted to disrupt the first national elections of 1994. ("Buthelezi Deals Himself out in S. Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Oct. 1992; "Two against the Tide in South Africa," *Boston Globe*, 13 Dec. 1993.)

What I failed to appreciate was how ruthlessly and successfully Buthelezi could play a relentless end game—the "Bosnian option." Buthelezi retained sole control of his KwaZulu-Natal province until the elections of 1999, and kept a senior membership in ANC-led cabinets throughout the period. One of Mandela's greatest acts of statesmanship was to contain Buthelezi and keep him within the ANC political tent while gradually gaining greater stature for the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. ("Buthelezi's Game," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 April 1994.) Mbeki inherited the alliance that Mandela had forged with Buthelezi and Inkatha, and kept it alive into the new century.

OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

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*Pretoria Must Deal with Black Leaders*

Although President Samora Machel of Mozambique, who died last week in an airplane crash, at first appeared to be a devilish Marxist, he later cooperated with the West as a sensible pragmatist. It is likewise a dangerous mistake to characterize the African National Congress of South Africa as stridently Leninist, terrorist, oppressive and dictatorial.

The African National Congress derives its popularity among South Africa's 26 million blacks more from its long and unswerving opposition to segregation (from 1912 to 1948) and apartheid (since 1948) than from its mildly socialistic, idealistic Freedom Charter of 1955. Pretoria has condemned the congress and has kept its top leaders, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, in prison since 1963.

Yet since 1980, opinion polls have consistently declared Mr. Mandela to be black South Africans' overwhelming favorite. They have also demonstrated the black population's solid allegiance to the congress. Whatever the organization's views might be if it ever came to power, Africans now feel that it embodies their nationalistic aspirations. Even Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi wisely refuses to bargain with Pretoria unless Mr. Mandela is free to join him.

Some 20 months ago, Africans began protesting Pretoria's obduracy and "reforms." The police and the army retaliated; there have been states of emergency, censorship and education restrictions. Yet vigorous protest continues in the townships. So do the deaths, woundings and detentions. The troubles demonstrate African antagonism to any reform short of shared power and majority rule—short of one man, one vote.

The protest in the townships is led locally not by the ANC but by younger, more radical people than would have been the case a few years ago. Most are openly sympathetic to the congress. But that organization, with its headquarters in distant Zambia, has not and cannot yet hope to control the rebellion.

The congress is a complex group filling a complex role. It is by definition a violent organization. From camps in Angola and Zambia, it infiltrates saboteurs more than 600 miles into South Africa, attempting in the last few years to blow up buildings, offices and stores. It mines roads near

the northern and eastern borders. Whites and Africans have been killed in the roughly 100 attributable incidents each year. Occasionally, there are shootouts between infiltrators and the police or military. The congress has thus damaged and unnerved South Africa. But it hasn't yet presented a serious external threat.

The congress is also a political and public relations organization. It issues manifestos from Lusaka, Zambia, where it receives visiting dignitaries, including white South African businessmen and church leaders. It has consulted with American and British officials, and it reminds the world of the evils of apartheid at the United Nations and elsewhere.

The congress also talks with the Soviet Union. It derives most of its financial support for sabotage from Moscow, and many—perhaps half—of its top leaders embrace Marxism. But the striking truth is that its top leaders, in and out of South Africa, are thoroughly bourgeois. Mr. Mandela and the president, Oliver Tambo, in exile since 1960, were lawyers together in the 1940s and 1950s. They became militant freedom fighters only when the congress was driven underground in 1960. Mr. Tambo and his spokesmen have said over and over again that they do not want to oust whites from South Africa.

Washington urges Pretoria to release Mr. Mandela, end the ban on the ANC and negotiate with Africans. Even white South African businessmen now advocate giving the vote to Africans. They see sharing power now as the only alternative to a severely destabilizing civil war, the only way to avoid exclusively black rule.

To equate the African National Congress with Communism—and thus to equate majority rule with Communist rule—is, in effect, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Certainly, such an outcome is more likely if Pretoria continues to keep Mr. Mandela and the elder generation of ANC leaders away from the bargaining table.

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### *Security in South Africa: More May Be Less*

Progressive change in South Africa will not come through the ballot box. That is the clear message of last week's whites-only election there.

With nearly two-thirds of all registered whites (about 2 of 3 million) voting, President Pieter W. Botha's ruling National Party surprised even seasoned observers by gaining six seats in the House of Assembly, the white senior chamber in the country's three-year-old tricameral parliament. The

party now holds 123 of the 166 elected seats there and will soon gain 10 more of the 178 total seats by nomination.

To President Botha's consternation and to the surprise of almost all analysts, the right-wing, apartheid-adhering Conservative Party increased its total seats from 17 to 22. It also gained a strident 26 percent of the total popular vote. In the last election it received only 13 percent. Conservative Party popularity was demonstrated beyond its rural northern Transvaal strongholds. An arch segregationist white union leader took an important blue-collar seat from the National Party. The hitherto impregnable National Party in the Transvaal barely kept its seat before a Conservative Party challenge.

On the even farther right of white politics, however, the Herstigte (Reconstructed) National Party lost its only parliamentary seat and its influence on the reactionary end of the white spectrum.

The much-vaunted U.S. hope that white voters would understand the peril of their current condition and vote decisively for South Africa's moderate-liberal alliance has been denied decisively. The Progressive Federal Party, which held 26 of the elected seats, lost seven. Although Helen Suzman, in Johannesburg, and Colin Eglin, the party leader in Cape Town, won easily, the Progressives took their first decisive setback since 1961.

The Progressives lose considerable influence in Parliament by being reduced from the official opposition to but the third party in the white assembly. More important, black Africans will lose whatever faith they may still have in the ballot box as an agent for real reform in South Africa. The tenor of national politics, and critical debates in Parliament, will move decisively rightward.

The moderate-liberal alliance can gain some comfort from the additional victory of a New Republic Party candidate in Natal and from the easy triumph of Wynand Malan, a prominent National Party apostate who ran as an independent. Also, former South African Ambassador Denis Worrall, another defector from the ruling party, came within 39 votes of 18,000 cast of defeating Chris Heunis, the Cabinet minister responsible for constitutional development and the President's right-hand man. Overall, the share of whites voting for the broad "left" fell to a low 16 percent.

President Botha said that he feared a right-wing upsurge, and analysts obviously dismissed his predictions too cavalierly. Or did the president's pandering to the "far right" in pre-election campaigning encourage the least progressive instincts of the largely Afrikaans-speaking electorate? Whichever is correct, even the lethargic pace of official "reform" in South Africa will now be slowed.

President Botha will be even more cautious than before. Though the

Conservative Party percentage of the total votes is still less than a third of the total, and the National Party's winning percentage dropped only from 57 to 52 percent, the weight of opinion is now on the right (where possibly a solid third of National Party members lean anyway). The Conservatives became the official opposition.

President Botha's plans to modify the Group Areas Act, which mandates residential segregation, and the Population Registration Act, defining color designation from cradle to grave, will now be postponed indefinitely. The two are the bedrock legislation of apartheid.

Before last week's election, militant blacks, who have been locked with whites in an almost three-year-long violent struggle for autonomy, could hope that whites would come to their progressive senses. Instead, whites have voted for retrenchment and confrontation by choosing the security of segregation. They have rejected the possible perils of discussion and bargaining with South Africa's majority. Implicitly, whites have voted for the party and the leadership that they have known since 1948.

Whether President Botha's talk of controlled reform, whatever that may mean, persuaded them to vote again for the National Party and also for the Conservatives can only be guessed. But it is clear that they are less ready than expected to bargain directly with blacks about a new South Africa.

The South African scene is now set for renewed black African protest, accelerated attacks from outside by the banned African National Congress, intensified repression, and a greater impact on governmental decisions of short-term considerations of security. The police and the military will exert an even greater influence on South Africa's future than before.

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### *Freedom in South Africa*

Freedom in South Africa is under renewed siege. Both press freedom and academic freedom are being more seriously threatened by actions of the white minority government than ever before.

New legislation permits the government to reduce national financial support to those universities that do not curb the vocal (and sometimes physical) protests of students. Since between 50 and 80 percent of the financial support of universities is derived from the national government, the threat to academic life is clear and sharp.

Primarily affected by the government's hardly hollow threat are the four international, intellectually vigorous English-speaking universities (Cape

Town, Witwatersrand, Rhodes, and Natal), and the University of the Western Cape, an institution established for Coloureds (peoples of mixed race) and now known for its intellectual fervor. The other four universities, once exclusively for whites, now have student bodies that are 20 percent black.

The five universities that teach in Afrikaans are largely unaffected by the new regulation and the threat of reduced support. So are the largely black, mostly segregated universities of the north and of Zululand, where troops and police have been preventing dissent for years.

The five universities most affected have threatened to defy the government. If they do, they may be starved of funds and gradually reduced in their ability to offer the kind of educational quality they have long afforded. Alternatively, they could conform, and physically prevent their students from voicing displeasure against apartheid and minority rule.

Beleaguered university leaders and academics in South Africa—not to mention students—will need all the moral, and, in some ways, financial, support of the United States to withstand their government. Washington and London could help by continuing to decry this great threat to academic freedom.

The West also needs to shine bright torches of freedom upon white South Africa's little known but potentially Draconian efforts to compel the press to censor itself. The government seeks to avoid possible political embarrassment.

Until September, a thick book of regulations and laws effectively contributed to self-censorship by the daily press. Information about police and military action, the petroleum and nuclear industries, and prison conditions can be released only by the government. Only police can confirm protests and incidences of violence, even if reporters witness them firsthand. People who are "banned" cannot be quoted. Overall, the press can be penalized for breaking rules after the fact—hence the rule book and its privately supplied interpretive guide. The police also have the right to demand to know the identity of sources, a way of drying up the press's ability to produce information.

In September, without too many non-South Africans noticing, the government went a step further. In an attempt to curb the criticisms of the "alternative" press, including church-sponsored weeklies and left-leaning newsheets, the government decreed that newspapers could be closed if they published "propaganda." The government will set the definition of "propaganda"; it will include increasing the "esteem" of a subversive organization.

What escaped broad notice is that the regulations can also be used against the regular press. Although the voice of the English press is still comparatively resonant, the new regulations allow the government to tighten a ready noose, indeed to strangle the daily press.

Outcries from the West, and continued attention to the loss of this and other freedoms, may help stay the government's hard hand. But no threat can afford to be ignored by those who want to keep the world civilized and South Africa as livable as possible.

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### *The Collapse of South Africa's White Politics*

South Africa's white politics have become increasingly nasty and inconclusive. The ruling National Party has been paralyzed by the recent upsurge of far-right public sentiment.

The pronounced rise of South Africa's white right has largely ended the search for meaningful, new alternatives to the country's internal struggle for power. In the face of pronounced conservative sentiment among whites, the ruling National Party has largely ended its search for ways to dismantle apartheid.

Although the leaders of the National Party never sought a real sharing of power with the country's disenfranchised blacks, until last year they sought arrangements that could help alleviate black discontent. They considered the release of Nelson Mandela from prison after 20 years, and contemplated negotiations with authentic black leaders, many of whom now crowd the country's jails.

The right-wing Conservative Party, a breakaway from the National Party, displayed unexpected popularity in last May's white general election. Earlier this month it easily won two by-elections despite energetic National Party efforts. On March 29, the National Party will almost certainly lose a third seat, in Randfontein, to the Conservatives.

The by-election defeats followed a massive crackdown in February against 17 major anti-apartheid organizations and the arrest and detention of the leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Soweto Action Committee, and other active urban groups.

The National Party also continued its attacks on the free press and now threatens to halt the activities of moderate white-led organizations like the Institute of Democratic Alternatives for South Africa (IDASA). Led by former Progressive Federal Party leader Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and the Rev. Dr. Alex Boraine, IDASA seeks to expose black and white South Africans to ideas about a shared future. It brings whites (especially Afrikaners) together with blacks (often from the UDF or the exiled African National Congress—ANC) in conferences outside or inside South Africa. The

National Party was outraged by last year's well-publicized meeting in Dakar, Senegal, between ANC leaders and a largely Afrikaner group from South Africa.

IDASA is a threat to the National Party because the battle for white political hegemony between the National Party and the Conservative Party is a battle for the conscience and soul of Afrikanerdom.

Although the National Party holds 133 seats (of 176) and the Conservatives only 22 in the white chamber of Parliament, the ruling group's massive defeats in by-elections have chilled its confidence. The by-election voting patterns of whites in 1987 and '88 also suggest the possibility of further Afrikaner defections from the National Party and a possible rout in the next general election. That poll could come as early as 1989. Outsiders may think that white South Africans should react more sharply to black dissent and Western consternation. Some do. But the Afrikaners, like President Pieter W. Botha, who control the National Party, now worry far more about intra-Afrikaner rivalry. They will be unlikely to chance dominance by dealing humanely with blacks. Neither Mr. Botha nor his party dares stand accused of being "soft" on Africans or on the "security" of the country.

The far right, wedded to a reactionary return to undiluted apartheid, or thoroughgoing segregation, is growing stronger every week. Even comparatively "enlightened" members of the National Party fear for their seats at the next election. Their voices, once in favor of positive change, are now stilled.

Even among the ranks of the Progressive Federal Party there is disarray and a movement toward the center. The PFP, the party of Helen Suzman, recently took the unprecedented step of backing a bill that would permit the government to halt the publication of information "helpful" to the world sanctions crusade.

The crackdown on blacks may shortly provoke a new crescendo of internal black protest, violent confrontations with the state, and further forms of repression. It also promises to attract a stepped-up series of guerrilla attacks by the ANC from outside the country. Neither these threats nor heightened United States and world sanctions are likely to spark a reasonable response.

From Botha's narrow viewpoint, the politically urgent will certainly crowd out important planning for South Africa's future. Above all, Botha does not want to lose the support of Afrikaners.



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### *Mandela's Prisoner*

Only Nelson Mandela's release from prison offers a solution to the South African crisis. Indeed, because President P. W. Botha and the fate of white South Africa are hostage to Mandela's fortune, now is the opportune moment to open the doors of his jail cell.

Mandela, 70, and a prisoner for 26 years after trying to overthrow the minority government of South Africa, recently was diagnosed as suffering from tuberculosis. Medical reports from Cape Town suggest that he will recover. But neither South Africa nor the nations of the West can afford to lose this opportunity to show compassion to an older prisoner and to initiate the kinds of negotiations that can lead to peace in troubled South Africa.

Representatives of the country's 26 million Africans, indigenous chiefs, prominent internal protesters and the leaders of the exiled African National Congress, which Mandela headed before his arrest in 1962, cannot talk seriously to Botha and his cabinet without Mandela. His legitimacy, reinforced and sanctified by white venom and long years of incarceration, is unique among South African blacks. Only he has the authority to bargain openly with whites.

No other African leader dares to be seen discussing South Africa's future with whites. Even Chief M. Gatscha Buthelezi, leader of the KwaZulu homeland and head of the large, Zulu-based Inkatha political movement, refuses to sit down with Botha without Mandela's sanction.

South Africa thus is stalemated so long as Mandela is not free. His death in prison would occasion riots, but the overriding reason (in addition to many humane ones) for releasing Mandela now is political. White South Africa, with fewer than 5 million people, cannot begin to forge a satisfactory future for itself or for the entire plural society of South Africa without Mandela's help. By both white and black definition, his is the deciding voice. He is Botha's jailer.

Botha has wanted for several years to release Mandela, but on the white government's terms. Mandela has refused to be banished to a homeland (to internal exile) or to promise to renounce violence. He has rejected all terms. Botha could still push him out of prison and then place him under house arrest, but even the supporters of the white government understand that Mandela is no ordinary prisoner. He has become a symbol for an entire people as well as a personality of great stature.

Elements within South Africa's ruling National Party and, indeed, within the country's cabinet, want to release Mandela. But Botha has wavered. If

he lets the ANC leader go, will a great black wave of protest and agitation sweep over and engulf white South Africa? Will his security forces be overwhelmed? Can he gamble on Mandela's demonstrated force of character and wisdom? After all, Mandela was a lawyer before he energized the protests of the ANC during the 1950s. He took to violence only after the ANC was banned in 1960.

Botha can gain no assurances from Mandela. If he lets his prisoner go now, eight weeks before a critical series of local elections throughout South Africa, will the right-wing Conservative Party undermine the hold of the Party on Afrikaner and all white loyalties? Will that event destroy all possibility of peaceful negotiations with Mandela or others for years?

Botha is in his early 70s. Despite real fears of the white right, and potent worries about what Africans will do, letting Mandela out now is South Africa's best choice. Botha will regain the politically high ground among whites. He will be able to transform himself and his party from rear-guard survivalists into statesmen. He would then stand a fair chance of uplifting the future of his country for peoples of all colors for many years.

Doing nothing, which is what so many of Botha's predecessors have done in similar circumstances, postpones the day of reckoning. For all sides, and in all aspects, that reckoning inevitably gets worse. Further, if Botha loses Mandela, he will have no one to whom to turn in a crisis.

These are unusually opportune days in South Africa. World leaders should redouble their efforts to persuade the white South Africans to strike a blow for Mandela's freedom and for the freedom of all of South Africa.

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### *South African Elections Leave a Wobbling Status Quo*

White South Africa last week took another painful step down the path of political paralysis. In the first-ever all-races municipal elections, blacks turned out in low numbers and bitter Conservatives gained control of nearly 60 percent of the white municipalities in the Transvaal, the most populous of South Africa's four provinces.

On the white side of the country's political ledger, every Conservative gain was achieved at the expense of the National Party of President Pieter Botha. The National Party has ruled the country since 1948, and controlled nearly all important cities and towns in the Transvaal until now. But as the National Party retreats hesitantly from all-out apartheid (or segregation), so the young Conservative Party capitalizes on the fears and prejudices of rural and blue-collar whites who oppose concessions to blacks.

The population increase among blacks is about double that of whites. Already there are more than 26 million Africans, 3 million Coloureds (people of mixed descent), 1 million Asians, and not quite 5 million whites.

During this decade, President Botha has led the National Party in a guarded retreat from apartheid. Mixed dining, drinking, and marriage are permitted, if not necessarily encouraged or welcomed. Asians and Coloureds have some representation in a national Parliament and elect their own legislators in separate elections.

Until last week's vote, Africans cast ballots only in the government-created rural homelands and in selected segregated municipalities. They do not have the vote nationally. Nor can they choose where to live. The Population Registration Act still compels babies to be listed by race classification.

About 500,000 blacks voted last week, at most a third of the low level of those registered to vote. Only half of the black seats on local councils were contested, and there were many towns where no candidates stood at all. In Alexandra, a dense, tense black slum within Johannesburg, blacks totally boycotted the process. In Soweto, 11 percent of the eligible Africans voted. In several black towns, mayors who had established good relations with Mr. Botha or the white central government were ousted.

As proof that the National Party's reforms had captured the hearts and minds of the country's black majority, the municipal election failed. On the other hand, the government held its narrow ground and, as a result of several polling innovations and widespread pre-electoral jailings, it fared no poorer in terms of black participation than in previous black-only local elections.

Until the government gives black local authorities real power, including the ability to tax and spend without central interference, or until white South Africa commits itself to the national enfranchisement of its majority, blacks will largely disdain attempts to co-opt them. White town and city councils, however, have long had substantial power to dispose and spend. Hence the glee with which the Conservatives greeted last week's results. Moreover, despite their failure to gain many seats in provinces other than the Transvaal, the tide of Conservative sentiment has not ebbed since that party won 22 seats in the 1987 general election.

If white South Africa is compelled to call a national election next year, last week's level of commitment could translate into 50 Conservative seats in a Parliament of 166 elected and 10 appointed members. The National Party would still hold a plurality of the seats, perhaps 85 or 90, but defections toward the left (and right), and new coalitions, would become possible for the first time since 1948.

The government claimed a victory last week on the strength of its ability to retain control of the larger cities, especially Pretoria, where it edged the Conservatives, and Bloemfontein. It managed to wrest Johannesburg decisively from the Progressive Federal Party. In Natal, it also won Pietermaritzburg from a Progressive coalition. The drift rightward was unmistakable, although the Progressives did take Randburg, in the Transvaal, from the National Party.

The Conservatives spoke of victory, too, since their control of key towns in the largely Afrikaner Transvaal will enable their representatives to thwart tendencies toward desegregation. The central government has said it would never allow resegregation to recur; some interesting battles between the right-wing National Party and its further-right opponents should ensue.

The final word probably belonged to Zach de Beer, the new leader of the liberal Progressives. He said that the local elections did little to alter the status quo, except in the direction of added white confusion and worry.

South Africa will continue to drift under Botha until he decides to accept demographic and economic realities and sits down with legitimate Africans to plan the future of his country. Releasing the imprisoned Nelson Mandela will be essential to this process of meaningful change.

The results of the municipal elections show that nothing less will win black support. Tragically, the electoral outcome also demonstrates that tentative reform without a vision and without black backing exacerbates white fears. Only strong leadership and a high and determined profile by Botha can regain the confidence of whites and blacks alike.

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### *South Africa and Reality Testing*

White South Africa is responding in new, positive ways and in some of the old, negative ways to the harsh realities of its current economic and political crises. Simultaneously it persists in ignoring the meaning of long-term demographic trends.

On the positive front, South Africa seems at last poised to give independence to Namibia. It has removed its troops from Angola and apparently withdrawn its support from an antigovernment insurgent movement in Mozambique. Its special forces have not staged preemptive raids against any of South Africa's neighbors for three months. Moreover, President Pieter Botha late last week commuted the sentences of six political activists who had been condemned to death. Nelson Mandela, the long-jailed African

National Congress (ANC) leader, was placed under house arrest (within a prison) instead of being returned to his prison cell after recuperating from tuberculosis. Also, activist editor Zwelakhe Sisulu was released from detention after two years, but he remains under a form of house arrest.

Within South Africa itself, except for Mr. Botha's reprieve for the Sharpeville 6 and his improved treatment of Mr. Mandela, apartheid continues as usual. The embattled opposition *Weekly Mail* newspaper was banned for a month and Botha and his senior associates tongue-lashed the country's main English language newspapers, as well as the foreign press. The government threatened to curb the country's best universities, where free speech still flourishes. Two more prominent black organizations were shut down and a dozen black leaders were detained. Last week police interrupted a funeral to remove ANC flags.

President Botha's regime recognizes that its foreign-exchange reserves are almost gone, that capital flight occurs every day, and that annual growth is well below increases in population at 1.5 to 2.5 percent a year. Inflation is running steadily above 14 percent; for five years South Africa's real interest rates have been markedly negative.

Each time before that South Africa faced political disaster, it was saved by increases in real returns from gold, which accounts for between 50 and 60 percent of its export revenues. But gold is unlikely to rebound toward \$500 an ounce from its present \$420 level. Anyway, the key to economic recovery is no longer technical, or driven by commodity prices. Political tension and continued low-level violence have demoralized South Africa's economy. It is now clear that South Africa's economic health will return only when it faces and resolves its black-white crisis.

Over Namibia, South Africa seems to be beating a retreat and cutting its losses. Once it begins withdrawing 50,000 soldiers from Namibia (in mid-1989) and thus reducing its military expenditures substantially, South Africa's finances should improve. So should its relations with Britain, West Germany, and the United States, and even with the Soviet Union.

In exchange for the coming of black rule in Namibia, South Africa will also eliminate ANC guerrilla training bases in Angola (they will be reestablished in distant Tanzania), bring about the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and ensure a potentially important role for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a South African client, in any future government of Angola.

President Botha also reckons that granting independence, and bringing in the United Nations to carry out Security Council Resolution 435 and supervise a free election in Namibia, will consume all of 1989. During that

period, U.S., British, and West German sanctioners will almost certainly stay their hands.

For the moment, the South African Cabinet has resumed debate on the details of an Angola-Namibia peace accord, having recalled its representatives from negotiations in Brazzaville, Congo.

Likewise, the government's approach to the Sharpeville 6 and Mandela shows a cautious willingness to work with the West. These initiatives also help South Africa to gain the cooperation of black African countries. Recently intensified regional dialogues between South Africa and African states are intended to neutralize South Africa's antagonists as well as to open up and build upon existing trade links. If all goes well, several of South Africa's new friends may also encourage an internal reconciliation in Angola, with UNITA joining its government.

All these gestures are no harbingers of major relaxations of white power within South Africa. Quite the contrary, they are canny maneuvers to maintain white hegemony in an increasingly anxious, economically parlous environment.

As responsive as white South Africa has recently become with regard to Namibia and Angola, it has not yet begun to appreciate the demographic facts. Whites now number fewer than 5 million and Africans, about 26 million. The number of Africans is doubling every 20 years; white numbers will double only every 40 years. (There are now about 1 million Asians and nearly 3 million Coloureds.)

Increases in African numbers place enormous strains on South Africa's existing social and economic infrastructure. Those strains will obviously grow. So will the state's inability to provide jobs for Africans who enter their working years in the 1990s. Already 30 to 50 percent of economically active Africans are unemployed. The education and medical gaps will grow, too.

Although there are as yet no signs, the reality testing that has led South Africa to accept the prospect of a black-run Namibia may yet compel President Botha and his associates to negotiate with rather than continue to detain Mandela and thousands of other black political leaders. If the likely economic costs can be borne by the white-dominated state for some time still, there are ultimate demographic truths which can be ignored only at South Africa's peril.

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### *Has South Africa Found Its Nixon?*

White South Africa may have found its Richard Nixon in F. W. de Klerk.

With the selection last month of Mr. de Klerk as head of the ruling National Party, white South Africa may at last be poised to break the deadlock in white-black relations. Just as President Nixon was able to go to China, so Mr. de Klerk could be the leader to go, metaphorically, to Soweto or Lusaka, the capital of Zambia.

Mr. de Klerk is not yet president of South Africa. President P. W. Botha, who suffered a stroke in January, has said repeatedly that he would not step down. But Mr. Botha is unlikely to remain in office long after a national election is held, probably sometime this year. And when he resigns, which nearly all of his parliamentary party favor, Mr. de Klerk is the designated heir according to the resolution adopted yesterday.

Mr. de Klerk has authentic right-wing credentials. As leader of the National Party in Transvaal Province, he has spoken out regularly against too much reform. He has not favored relaxing residential segregation laws, or the too rapid scrapping of social apartheid.

For the past four years, he has served as Minister of National Education in President Botha's Cabinet, where he has threatened the prestigious, multi-racial universities. For example, in 1987, he tried to make financial assistance to the Universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand, Natal and others dependent on restraining student unrest. He has also favored controls on the admission of blacks to what were once segregated but are now increasingly mixed universities.

Shortly after his contested election to the party leadership, Mr. de Klerk addressed the white Parliament in bold terms. Astonishingly, he railed against racism and talked of a country freed from discrimination based on color and the domination of a large majority by a tiny minority. He even detached himself from support for group rights, that white code phrase for the denial of individual rights for blacks. He said very plainly that five million whites could no longer expect to dominate 30 million blacks. Mr. de Klerk's elevation could signal the most important shift in white politics in years. At 53, he is a full 20 years younger than Mr. Botha. His generation of whites understands that it can no longer expect to dominate blacks indefinitely, and certainly cannot continue to dominate them without incurring enormous costs.

South Africa's economy is no longer robust. The bitter and widespread violence of 1984 to 1987, the official state of emergency of 1988 to 1989,

Western sanctions, international caution and shifts downward in the world price of gold have all ended long years of growth. Business people reluctantly accept the truth that good times will only return when power is shared with the now voteless majority. Mr. de Klerk understands this shift in short- and medium-term reality in a way that has escaped President Botha.

He is also less bedeviled than President Botha with the hobgoblin of an earlier Afrikaner generation: keeping the Afrikaner nation together. Mr. de Klerk can therefore make the necessary compromises with dogma and ideology that are necessary in today's tense and economically weak South Africa.

He will be well placed, too, to preside over the final dismantling of political apartheid. The quality and mettle of South Africa's white leadership becomes more crucial with each passing month. There is a new readiness in large sectors of the Afrikaner business, clerical, press and even political leadership to release Nelson Mandela and bargain meaningfully with blacks.

A white leader can decide to release Mr. Mandela, titular head of the African National Congress, from prison. A wise white leader can choose to make the great leap forward and negotiate South Africa's future with Mr. Mandela.

President Nixon long opposed negotiating with Red China. Only a leader with impeccable conservative credentials could have changed course and have been credited with statesmanship. So Mr. de Klerk may also possess authentic ingredients of such statesmanship in South Africa.

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### *South Africa's Tide Shifts*

Nelson Mandela holds the keys. He is South Africa's true jailer, and the country's white leaders, his prisoners.

That is the pronounced significance of Mr. Mandela's visit from prison to President Pieter W. Botha and the trek of Frederik W. de Klerk, Mr. Botha's heir-in-waiting, to the capitals of Europe. Soon Mr. de Klerk will visit Washington. A major U.S. initiative is possible.

Mr. Mandela's tea with President Botha need not mean his imminent release from detention after 26 years. Nor does his recent family birthday party in prison, his comparatively comfortable accommodations there and the attention being paid to him and his movements by all South Africans.

Nevertheless, the gradual shift of Mr. Mandela, 71, from antihero to hero, is intended by the white-minority Government to confer a new legitimacy on him and, according to a recent speech by Mr. de Klerk, also on the African National Congress, Mr. Mandela's exiled and banned guerrilla movement.



Mr. Botha, Mr. de Klerk and most other white political leaders now know that Mr. Mandela and the ANC are essential to any solution of South Africa's color crisis.

Mr. Botha wanted, in the last three months of his tenure as President, to measure the mettle of his foremost adversary. He and Mr. de Klerk at last appreciate that he must be released. But when? And how?

To free Mr. Mandela before the national election on Sept. 6 (from which black voters are excluded) would adversely affect the fortunes of Mr. de Klerk's ruling National Party.

Mr. Botha might release him during those few weeks after the election when he is still in power, before turning the presidency over to Mr. de Klerk. But a new government would be ill-equipped to deal with the tumultuous result.

Moreover, the National Party is also intensely interested in the results of the Constituent Assembly election in neighboring Namibia. The election there will be held Nov. 1, and the National Party hopes to obtain as many votes as possible for the white-led Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in its competition with the South-West Africa People's Organization.

Although there is a conference of Commonwealth heads in late October, and Mr. Mandela's release would prevent any renewed threat of sanctions and gain South Africa the backing of Britain, the impact of such a release on the Namibian election would prove more decisive for South Africa.

For these reasons, and because Mr. de Klerk will, understandably, want carefully to prepare South Africa for Mr. Mandela's release, the beginning of the end of apartheid is not yet at hand.

The fact that white South Africa courts Mr. Mandela, may even be negotiating at a low level with the ANC and hardly tries to prevent large delegations from making the trek to Lusaka, Zambia, to meet and be impressed by the ANC leaders, adds excitement and new hope to those who seek peace in South Africa.

Certainly the African National Congress, having largely shed its rampant Marxism in the post-Gorbachev era, is ready to help plan South Africa's future with whites. Both sides are studying constitutional options anew. Once Mr. Mandela is free, other political prisoners are released and the ANC unbanned, then the guerilla movement, internal African opponents of apartheid and the Government will be able to negotiate.

That scenario, once a fantasy, is now—according to the representatives of the Government and ANC—very much closer at hand than at any time since 1948. No one believes the National Party wants to give up all its power, but a weariness of combat and miserable economic forecasts impel change.

South Africa has severe balance of payments problems, high inflation, a falling index of business confidence and little room for maneuver. Only a political settlement can permit a return to positive rates of growth. Mr. de Klerk will come to power knowing that Mr. Mandela's freedom and negotiations with the ANC are the costs of prosperity.

When Mr. de Klerk visits Washington this month to see Secretary of State James Baker, many Congressmen and perhaps President Bush, he can be reminded how much the U.S. wants to see a negotiated settlement. More than that, Mr. Baker or Mr. Bush can offer to convene and preside over a Camp David session for South Africa.

It might even make sense for President Bush to offer to preside with Mikhail Gorbachev, who also wants a negotiated peace in South Africa. The African National Congress is ready to talk, and so might whites be also willing to talk realistically in a prestigious setting about their future in a united South Africa.

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### *Time to Negotiate in South Africa*

Last week, whites in South Africa endorsed liberal reform. Acting President Frederik W. de Klerk received the mandate he wanted. Now a skeptical world will watch how he acts.

Although President de Klerk's National Party lost almost 30 seats in an elected parliament of 166, the left-leaning Democratic Party won a surprising total of 33 seats. Together, nearly 75 percent of the white electorate voted for either moderate or rapid change.

The right-wing Conservative Party juggernaut gathered steam, but its 39 seats were fewer than it had forecast, and a long way behind the National Party's total. Admittedly, the Conservatives made substantial gains over their seats in the 1987 poll, and won for the first time outside the Transvaal, in the Orange Free State and the Cape Province.

Last week's election shows that white South Africa is once again divided. The Conservative Party has tightened its political lock on blue-collar constituencies, and on the farming vote outside the Cape. Twenty-five percent of the whites have demonstrated a fierce disdain for dialogue with blacks. They fear change and fear what a new de Klerk government might bargain away to blacks.

Yet the National Party is largely free of pressure from the right. Analysts in South Africa think the Conservatives have approached the apogee of their

appeal. Moreover, the National Party has shed itself of Afrikaners to the right and to the left. No longer can that party regard itself as the only or even the prime home of the *volk*. The supporters of the National Party are demonstrably English as well as Afrikaans-speaking.

The Democratic Party attracted discontented and impatient Afrikaners, old-line liberal Progressives, and solid support across a broad belt of the cosmopolitan cities. Although its trio of co-leaders combined ex-Nats with staunch Progressives, its appeal in a time of perceived crisis was broad and generous.

There can be no immediate hope of, nor need for, a coalition between Nationalists and Democrats. However, the National Party can only lean left, where it will receive sympathy and, if it genuinely moves to accelerate change, lavish backing.

The business community in South Africa desperately wants the kinds of improvements in the country's commercial climate that can only come from shifts in black-white relations, and reductions in societal tension and conflict. African protesters want the same kinds of improvements, but not at the cost of substantial political progress. Outside South Africa, the Soviet Union and the West want to see the end of racial violence and undiluted minority rule. Forward movement by de Klerk and his slimmed-down party will be supported by virtually all engaged in the struggle for South Africa's destiny.

Leaders of the National Party have for many years talked splendidly about reform and done little. De Klerk may be tempted to do the same, but neither South Africa's parlous economic straits nor the expectations of his followers and his potential well wishers in the West will permit dithering.

South Africa, gripped by black protest and the anxieties of businessmen, can hardly afford to lose whatever momentum the new electoral mandate can provide. Nor can that mandate be squandered, for the National Party will implode and its parliamentary members scatter if de Klerk loses the opportunity to lead.

De Klerk seems ready to grasp the nettle of negotiation and decisive settlement. Every indication exists that the African National Congress (ANC) and other black movements of opposition are ready to join whites in planning a successful transition. The African Front-Line States and nations of the West also want to help.

We shall soon see if de Klerk, his new slimmed-down party, and the Democrats behind him prepare South Africa for the release of black political prisoners, the unbanning of the ANC and other black groups, and the further dismantling of apartheid.

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*The Broederbond and Progress*

South Africa's slide toward normalcy seems promising, with President Frederik W. de Klerk matching soothing noises with positive actions. Even fierce critics of apartheid like Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu appear prepared to give Mr. de Klerk's regime the benefit of the doubt, for now.

Thousands of political prisoners remain jailed, but the release earlier this month of Walter Sisulu and other long-serving African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress detainees implied that black-white negotiations could begin sooner rather than later. De Klerk hinted he might lift South Africa's four-year-old state of emergency.

Nelson Mandela is still incarcerated, but his release looks likely early next year, after the minority government has tested African (and white) reactions to the freeing of Mr. Sisulu and others. Low-intensity, quiet negotiations continue between the government and Mr. Mandela, and with ANC leaders in Zambia.

For economic as well as political reasons, De Klerk and his close associates in the ruling National Party know that apartheid must be modified drastically, if not abandoned entirely.

The approach enunciated by Mr. de Klerk since early September, including the sanctioning of protest marches, public discussions with Archbishop Tutu and other black leaders, and curbing police excesses, has won him the strong backing of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain. And European bankers last week rescheduled about \$8 billion of South Africa's debt.

De Klerk knows that he must restructure his country if prosperity is to be restored. If whites are to remain at least influential indefinitely, the government must start accommodating the aspirations of Africans.

But no matter how optimistic current changes may make long-jaundiced observers of South Africa, De Klerk and his party have no plan for majority rule.

De Klerk's ascent earlier this year was assisted by the Afrikaner Broederbond, a once-secret brotherhood of South Africa's dominant white tribe. Originally an architect of hard-line apartheid, the Broederbond has during the last decade become increasingly liberal within the context of Afrikaner politics. Its leaders were often at odds with former President P. W. Botha.

De Klerk and the Broederbond share a similar version of the next moves in the intricate political maneuverings of South Africa. Mr. de Klerk

appointed Gerrit Viljoen, a recent head of the Broederbond, to the key cabinet position in charge of constitutional change and new arrangements with blacks.

The Broederbond, thoughtful as its key figures have been in private in recent years, is concerned primarily with the survival of Afrikanerdom. Reform follows, and so does the inclusion of blacks in government and a more even distribution of power.

But a private document obtained by journalists in South Africa indicates that the Broederbond intends to make these changes without ceding control to the vast African majority. Whites, Asians, and each African language group would gain autonomy over their own affairs. Languages, cultural and educational practices, and religions would be protected.

The state would function through consensus, a procedure akin to a minority veto. Whereas the ANC espouses a unitary state and "one man, one vote" procedures, the Broederbond plan implies group or regional separateness within a weak, federalized state. The National Party attempted a similar constitutional scheme in Namibia, but it likely won't last through next month's election there.

The Broederbond documents, as well as statements by De Klerk, make it clear that any new constitution would be designed to prevent a majority group from dominating. Preservation of the privileged status quo of whites is obviously intended.

The document explains that political development is "an evolutionary process" achieved by negotiation. It envisions the result of talks between blacks and whites as a written constitution protected against arbitrary amendment and enshrining such freedoms as speech, privacy, movement, mother-tongue education, and property.

The document also envisages the voluntary association of individuals within groups and explicit protection for Afrikaners and their associates. It mandates "Christian justice." With regard to voting, the document proposes "entrenched representation" at all levels "to ensure that the size of any single participating entity will not be decisive." It favors equality of groups within legislative bodies, the now discredited Namibian idea.

De Klerk's public statements since September echo the sense of the Broederbond manifesto. To the extent that he is wedded to its approach, negotiations between blacks and whites will falter. If so, the positive auguries of this month may be succeeded by frustration and disappointment. Maintaining momentum will be a significant test of governmental intentions and resolve. Success in South Africa is not yet assured.

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### *New Era in South Africa?*

“We are seeing real change in South Africa,” Archbishop Desmond Tutu said last week. His country is on the road to majority rule. Apartheid still exists, but its dismantling is almost certain.

By legalizing long-banned political movements, especially the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa gives blacks a legitimate, open voice for the first time since 1960.

Moreover, President Frederik de Klerk last week promised to lift emergency regulations and release Nelson Mandela, the ANC’s long-imprisoned leader.

Mr. De Klerk’s speech to parliament was a prelude to the beginning of a process of negotiation. It signified the conclusion of a long era of repression, but not yet its replacement by a new order in which the majority exercises its full franchise.

“With the steps the government has taken,” said De Klerk, “it has proven its good faith and the table is laid for sensible leaders to begin talking about a new dispensation, to reach an understanding by way of dialogue and discussion.”

The white minority government of South Africa has taken a giant leap toward negotiation. De Klerk’s speech built upon the liberal leanings of the white electorate in September’s poll, upon the release from prison of seven of Mr. Mandela’s closest confederates, and upon a number of peaceful black protest rallies permitted since then by the government.

But what whites and De Klerk want to negotiate, and what Africans, led by Mandela after his imminent release, prefer to negotiate, may prove divergent. Whites are not yet ready to concede one-man, one-vote to a black majority at least six times more numerous than themselves. But Africans have not suffered for generations for anything less.

Whites possess massive military power and have privilege and position to lose. Under De Klerk they have come a long way since September, and he has already begun to suffer attack from the white right wing.

Aroused Conservative Party leaders talk of partitioning the country along racial lines. The often-conservative white army and police could object and foment dissent. A right wing coup is unlikely, though possible.

Nevertheless, given the parlous state of the South African economy and a recognition that economic improvement will depend on a peaceful political

transition, most whites applaud De Klerk's opening to the left. They have few other options, and going back to rigid apartheid that worked only through repression is no longer attractive.

South Africa is too integrated industrially and in every other economic way for anything less than shared power to work. Partition has long since ceased to be an alternative. What De Klerk and Mandela have together done is to hold out the promise of a peaceful if uncertain transition toward a new South Africa.

How that new South Africa is to be achieved is clear to no one. Instead, the white government presumably expects that its new gesture of reasonableness will propel hitherto irreconcilable political dispositions into a prolonged and serious negotiation.

The ANC previously refused to sit down with other black opponents, but De Klerk seems to have been promised a new approach by Mandela and other ANC leaders. The ANC has ceased almost all guerrilla attacks, and the government has reduced defense expenditures.

Is there a conceivable common ground? The likelihood that there might be has motivated both sides. It led to President De Klerk's speech and the decision to open a widespread and far-ranging political debate centered on the recognition that common ground precludes more destruction, an awareness of prevailing strengths and weaknesses on both sides, and a mutual decision that the time is ripe for a negotiated settlement.

Changes in the attitude of the Soviet Union toward South Africa and the ANC and cataclysmic events in Eastern Europe have played a part in bringing South Africa to this point. So have sanctions and the economic stress of white South Africa. Mr. Mandela is growing no younger, too, and most whites want an end to tension.

The common ground thus consists of a desire to talk before it is too late and key figures cannot take part, a desire to talk rather than to continue fighting, an acceptance (crucial to both sides) that each is strong in some ways and weak in others, and a desire to forge a successful transition.

The government and its opponents have very different notions of what the transition should involve. It is precisely that large difference which means the end of apartheid will not immediately mean the beginning of majority rule.

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### *Turning the Corner in Troubled South Africa*

President F. W. de Klerk has set South Africa on a bold course for the future. Many of his fiercest critics, including leading anti-apartheid campaigners in South Africa, have called his recent speech to parliament courageous and epochal. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia sent congratulations for "a job well started." Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain announced the removal of her nation's already limited sanctions.

De Klerk has lifted 30-year-old bans on leading black nationalist organizations such as the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress and promised to release Nelson Mandela, the ANC's leader, from prison and end his country's five-year-old state of emergency. He will ask parliament to rescind the Separate Amenities Act, which since 1956 has prevented blacks and whites from sharing public facilities.

Apartheid is not yet dismantled. At its bedrock are the Population Registration Act, which classifies South Africans by descent and color, and the Group Areas Act, which prevents blacks and other groups from living where they like.

Even more fundamental is the denial of voting rights to black Africans, who constitute about 28 million of the country's nearly 40 million people. About 5 million of the total are white, 3 million Coloured (or mixed race) and 1 million Asian.

The ANC and most Africans demand one man, one vote in a unitary state, or full majority rule. Nearly all whites, including President de Klerk's ruling National Party, seek a more limited and, as yet, unspecified sharing of power. De Klerk has talked in recent months of group rather than individual rights and implied a controlled and circumscribed franchise for blacks. Whatever he may intend, blacks are justifiably wary.

Despite serious uncertainties about precisely how South Africans will resolve these fundamental differences, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, President Kaunda and many others are right to applaud the significant corner that was turned by the leader of the white minority. "The well-being of all in this country," de Klerk said, "is linked inextricably to the ability of the leaders to come to terms with one another on a new dispensation. No one can escape this simple truth."

De Klerk promised that the government would give the process of negotiation its highest priority. The aim of talks with Mandela and other black leaders was "a totally new and just constitutional dispensation in which



every inhabitant will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavor." The season of violence was over, he declared.

What was embodied in these fine words was new: The white minority government clearly intends to do something its predecessors have always refused to do—to sit down with blacks from militant anti-apartheid organizations, as well as others, and to devise a blueprint for the future of their country. Hitherto, whites have tried to talk to tame collaborators only and to consult about white-authored schemes.

At last an authentic Afrikaner leader has understood that the ANC and Mandela genuinely represent the aspirations of a large proportion of the majority and that nothing can be accomplished without Mandela's full cooperation and the participation of those of the ANC and other groups who are in exile or jail. De Klerk has removed restrictions on numerous Africans and will shortly have to declare a complete amnesty for ANC figures who want to come home.

### *Opposition from the Right*

The ruling National Party will have a major battle on its hands from right-wing whites, 31 percent of whom voted in September for the pro-apartheid Conservative Party. The Conservatives demand a new election (none is necessary until 1994), threaten a blue-collar national strike and will attempt to foment unrest in the army and police. A right-wing coup is always possible but, given the mind-set of today's army and police leadership, unlikely.

Most observers believe the right-wing backlash will ultimately prove feeble. De Klerk's initiatives have captured the imagination of whites as well as blacks. Given the parlous state of the economy of South Africa and a recognition that improvements to it will depend upon a peaceful political transition, most whites applaud de Klerk's opening to the left.

Whites fear renewed violence and the kind of confidence-shattering instability that has contorted South Africa for most of the last seven years. Moreover, most whites understand that their real options are limited. Going back to a rigid apartheid that worked only through costly repression is hardly attractive. De Klerk has given them a way to think about their long-term survival.

Since September's white election, which produced a major mandate for change, South Africa for the first time since the 1950s has enjoyed peaceful protest rallies by blacks in which the ANC was celebrated. The country has witnessed the release from long-term imprisonment of seven of Mandela's closest confederates, and wondered at the government giving these men and others passports to consult with exiled ANC leaders in Lusaka and Europe. A mere half-year ago, these men were openly "terror-

ists” and their names unmentionable. Now they have become “legitimate” in the eyes of the state.

The Conservative Party is now demanding partition, and the creation of an Afrikaner homeland within South Africa. But the nation is too integrated industrially and in every other economic way for anything less than shared power within a unitary framework to work. Territorial separation makes no sense, given the location of gold mines and other resource bases, and the fact that more than half the black and nearly all the white populations live in the cities.

### *Search for a Common Ground*

How the new South Africa will be constructed on the foundations of the old is the critical question. No one envisages an easy negotiation, but, for the first time, all parties want to talk.

But is there a common ground? Certainly the possibility that there was has motivated the decisions of the white government since September. Not least, the government has cut its defense budget and permitted its opponents to talk openly for the first time in decades. The ANC, in turn, has ceased guerrilla attacks on South Africa and adopted a much more positive rhetoric about de Klerk and his parliamentary associates.

The common ground consists in part of the acceptance, new by whites, of blacks as voters. There is every suspicion, however, that the leaders of the National Party hope to put Africans on a separate roll, hold special elections or grant them only group rights. They presumably also hope to cling to the existing 10 rural homelands, where blacks already enjoy a degree of home rule.

Blacks are weak militarily compared with whites, but their numbers are overwhelming and growing at three times the rate of whites. The economy depends on their willing commitment. So does new investment from outside and domestic peace. The ANC and many of the strident internal black political organizations want full power (possibly after a short period of transition) in a South Africa where black and white are completely equal, where there are no artificial territorial exclusions and where the government is strong and centralized.

Anything less will be looked upon with suspicion. Anything less over any period other than a brief one will equally be viewed with intense displeasure. There is too much pent-up demand, decades of grievance and no necessary acceptance of the good intentions of whites.

Mandela cannot have bargained his coming freedom for reasonableness. Yet, he has long been the key to success in bargaining precisely because he is the only South African whose legitimacy is unsullied and widely

accepted. The white government thus understands that he is the key to a successful negotiation; bargaining can take place essentially only on his terms.

Since its formation in 1912, the ANC has asked successive white governments to talk. Now, at last, the talks are about to begin, for that is the unequivocal message of recent changes in South Africa. Bargaining, even with Mandela, can lead to frustration and disappointment, and there may even be renewed episodes of violence.

Nevertheless, it is positively exciting that blacks and whites, led by de Klerk and Mandela, are about to sit around a bargaining table and plan the South Africa that is to be.

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### ***Black Reconciliation in South Africa***

South Africa, wracked by intercommunal violence, is nonetheless moving toward reconciliation. That is the paradox coiled within the remains of apartheid.

Thousands of black lives have been lost in South Africa's Natal province since 1984, when Zulu and Xhosa loyal to the United Democratic Front (UDF) began battling Zulu adherents of Inkatha, the large movement headed by Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. Both sides compete for local power as well as power in the emerging country.

Since control of the African side of South Africa's process of change has long been at stake, it is hardly unexpected that the UDF, originally the above-ground front for the then illegal African National Congress (ANC), should have seen Inkatha as the enemy. Likewise, Chief Buthelezi desires unquestioned primacy within his own province, where Zulu predominate. He also wants to continue to play a leading role in the politics of transition.

Within this larger picture, there are many local feuds and competitions. The shedding of blood in the environs of Pietermaritzburg and Durban/Umlazi has been ferocious, probably abetted until recently by the indifference of white-officered police. Nelson Mandela tried on two occasions since his release from prison to exhort both sides to lay down their spears and knives. He even planned to meet with Chief Buthelezi, but others in the ANC and the UDF vetoed the rendezvous because it might have legitimated the chief's position.

That reconciliation will come, for Mr. Mandela and the ANC ultimately will need widespread Zulu backing. Numbering about 8 million, the Zulu are South Africa's largest ethnic group. They work in the mines near

Johannesburg as well as in factories and on sugar and other plantations throughout Natal.

Despite his prickly personality and his compromising role within the apartheid system as a chief minister, Chief Buthelezi has always been against apartheid, and he spoke out for years in favor of Mr. Mandela's release. But he and the ANC/UDF are yet to be reconciled, for Chief Buthelezi still claims a seat at the negotiating table where apartheid is truly dismantled.

In one important sense, however, Chief Buthelezi's official power base is crumbling. He runs the country's largest homeland, but the brief era of ethnic homelands is rapidly drawing to a close. Pro-ANC coups have occurred in Transkei, Ciskei, and Venda, three of the "independent" homelands. The new military rulers of the three satrapies favor reincorporation of their entities into the common areas of South Africa.

When that occurs, later this year or next, the so-called separate development walls of apartheid will come tumbling down. The walls were erected by South Africa's white rulers in and after 1959, and the four homelands gained their nominal independence between 1976 and 1981. But none has really functioned independently, and they rely heavily on Pretoria for funding.

Already, there have been pro-reincorporation riots in the fourth independent homeland, Bophuthatswana, and the leaders of most of the six homelands have refused to engage in talks about negotiations with the white government until Mr. Mandela and the ANC authorize them to do so.

Chief Buthelezi has met with President Frederik de Klerk recently, however, and is still seeking to avoid being shut out of the national talks which are about to begin. After Mr. Mandela and other ANC leaders now in exile meet face to face with the white cabinet next month, and efforts at black-white reconciliation commence in earnest, there will be renewed pressure on all contending black parties to present a united front.

Mr. Mandela thus will want to incorporate Chief Buthelezi and his followers into an ANC-led movement of change and potential bargaining with whites. If he can, and if he can provide the necessary political incentives, then the momentous process of change in South Africa can roll forward with diminished violence and at least the possibility of a successful transition to a peaceful post-apartheid society. Whites for once probably even wish to help, rather than to continue to divide the black groups.

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### *A Fresh Start in Cape Town*

So far, so good. The African National Congress (ANC) and the white minority government of South Africa have met face to face in Cape Town, and both sides emerged smiling.

Apartheid is not yet dead. As Nelson Mandela, the leader of the ANC delegation, made clear, Africans are still denied the vote. Until 28 million Africans vote alongside 5 million whites, they will remain powerless in their own country.

The Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act, laws that mandate racial classification and residential segregation, are still very much in force. Police and soldiers led by white officers still patrol African townships.

Yet the talks in Cape Town symbolized the rapid erosion, if not quite the permanent decay, of white power. Until a few months ago, the white government refused to talk to the men and women it denounced as terrorists. Now those enemies of the state have been embraced in public.

Emerging from the final sessions in Cecil Rhodes's sun-drenched manor house near Cape Town, Mr. Mandela smiled and said that both the ANC and the government went into the discussions determined that there should be neither victors nor losers. At the conclusion of the talks, "not only are we closer to one another," he said, "but we are all victors." Moreover, South Africa was the victor, a sentiment echoed not only by President Frederik W. de Klerk, but also by other members of the Cabinet.

The symbolic togetherness may be more important and more decisive than the concrete results of the talks. Nevertheless, the two sides did commit themselves toward ending violence and intimidation, to negotiate peacefully, and to seek stability for South Africa. The ANC, which for at least 13 years has attempted to overthrow apartheid by guerrilla attacks from outside the country, promised to reconsider its military struggle.

The government promised to lift the state of emergency once the ANC ended its own campaign of violence, and to review existing security legislation to "bring it into line with the new dynamic situation developing in South Africa." In other words, to normalize political activities.

Before the next negotiating session, probably in mid-July, a working group of ANC and white officials will meet to discuss the timing of further improvements in the climate of opinion. First on the agenda is the release of political prisoners and the granting of immunity to ANC members who have lived in exile and long been branded enemies of the state.

The working group was specifically asked to take into account the experiences of Namibia. Presumably, the cooperative and constructive manner in which the former white rulers of that nation and their long-time black antagonists negotiated a liberal and forward-looking constitution that included an American-style bill of rights was foremost in the minds of the ANC and the government. So must have been clauses 78 and 79 of the Namibian constitution, which sanctify private property and welcome foreign investment.

Yet fine words and good intentions may not mask major underlying conflicts.

The ANC is committed to one man, one vote in a unitary state. Mr. de Klerk, however, says that his National Party is determined to ensure that in any new constitutional system minorities are "protected against domination and against suppression in any form."

Constitution makers have talked about a parliamentary arrangement within which all minorities (not just whites) could veto legislation and thus protect fundamental interests. Whether embedded in the structure of a bicameral legislature with a strong, non-democratic upper house, or in a geographically decentralized, diffuse confederal setup, such a plan would differ fundamentally from today's highly centralized state, and elevate group rights over individual rights.

The hard bargaining will come over just those questions. But at least the discussions will be conducted within the same room by men and women now united fervently on the benefits and desirability of peaceful change and a just solution to the color cleavages of their country.

Among the many positive outcomes of this first meeting between former enemies is the clear understanding that South Africa is their country together. No longer can whites claim sole authority; and blacks, at least the ANC, acknowledge the permanence of white involvement.

Yet there are important elements on both color flanks that will continue to oppose the new alliance that Mr. Mandela and Mr. de Klerk have begun to forge so well. The abandonment of the armed struggle will not be popular with the militant youths who have been the leading edge of the black struggle against apartheid. Nor will it please Stalinists of the ANC in exile. The smallish Pan-Africanist Congress accuses the ANC of knuckling under to whites.

Right-wing whites will gather strength, too. The Conservative Party walked out of Parliament to protest the Cape Town talks, and it wants a national referendum on change. Just conceivably, its supporters within the ranks of the army and police could, down the road, become sufficiently agitated to stage a coup.

Given the rapid shift from apartheid to accommodation within the ranks of the ruling white party, and an equally felicitous movement in the ANC, the tides of progress at last seem to be surging relentlessly toward a safe harbor. That there will be serious constitutional shoals along the way is as obvious as is the new will to navigate those and myriad other obstacles. "We're at last under way," Mr. de Klerk said last week.

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### *Homelands' Demise*

As South Africa's apartheid crumbles, its national Humpty Dumpty is getting put back together again. The fake mini-states that white South Africa carved out of itself to justify denying black Africans the vote are now being folded back into the parent country.

In 1976, South Africa declared the Transkei, a black homeland on its east coast, an independent country. In 1978, Bophuthatswana, a collection of arid black reserves stretching from the edge of white Pretoria to the borders of Botswana, and then across to the Orange Free State, also claimed independence. Venda, a pocket of land along the Limpopo River, and the Ciskei, a sliver stretching inland from East London, followed suit in 1979 and 1980.

These so-called independent homelands, and six other dependent homelands that refused to secede from South Africa, are the successors to reserves for blacks demarcated in 1913 and 1936. Although blacks then accounted for at least 80 percent of the population of South Africa, the total area of the reserves and homelands has never amounted to more than 13 percent of the nation's acreage.

That 13 percent was never sufficient for the populations or the cattle and sheep of the homelands. All are now badly overgrazed and overcrowded, bitter places of rural poverty, under-education, and very high population growth. Only Bophuthatswana has any capacity to generate wealth, from platinum and vanadium. All the homelands largely subsist on funds provided through annual appropriations by South Africa's parliament.

Last month the movement to end the homeland experiment accelerated. By permitting South Africa to appoint four cabinet ministers to help run the small state, the Ciskei gave up its local sovereignty. Brig. Gen. Oupa Gqozo, Ciskei's president, called his new arrangement with South Africa "the first step on the road to incorporation into a new, nonracial South Africa." He thus aligned himself and his mini-state with the African National Congress (ANC), which seeks to run a non-fragmented, unified country.

But what is equally important is that the same white government that created the homelands, yet failed to give them international credibility, is now prepared to help in their dismantling.

Doing so in Ciskei will almost certainly lead to the demise of a separate Transkei, where Gen. Bantu Holomisa, its leader, is close to the ANC. Venda is too small and isolated to hold out long. That leaves Bophuthatswana, where Lucas Mangope has ruled defiantly since 1978. His separate government will almost surely be the last to fall, but his is also the most beleaguered by the ANC and citizens who want to be linked again with South Africa.

South African troops have suppressed coups in Bophuthatswana. But coups brought Generals Holomisa and Gqozo to power, and there has been a coup in Venda. Both Holomisa and Gqozo ousted ruthless, corrupt civilians who had worked closely with South Africa. It is not clear that South Africa will act against the next anti-Mangope protest.

White South Africa understands that its "independent" homelands were never independent, and that they and most of the dependent homelands never had an opportunity to be viable economically or politically. The attempt to confine black political freedom to the homelands has failed. All attempts to decentralize South Africa economically have also failed. Now the homelands are largely labor reservoirs and sad domains of the unemployed and the unemployable.

In the post-apartheid world that is dawning, the homelands could become provinces or regions in an ANC-dominated country. But even the role of these old reserves as regions is questionable. Everything that was rotten about apartheid, and the Africans who collaborated with the system, is, for blacks, encapsulated in the homelands.

Now that the 1913 and 1936 land acts are being repealed, blacks will no longer be confined as farmers to the homelands. Thus blacks will attempt to move onto better land outside the homelands, and the bureaucracies and minor governments of the homelands will soon wither.

What to do with those whose livelihoods are connected with the homelands, and whose political efforts were engaged there, is another question. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland, will wonder what will happen to his political base as the homeland system decays. He, unlike the other homeland leaders, may have a sure enough ethnic base to remain a strong rival of Nelson Mandela of the ANC. But as the other homelands rapidly lose their purpose, so will the notion of a reunified South Africa become politically dominant.



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### *No Peace among South Africa's Blacks*

South Africa's killing fields are relentlessly bloody. Africans attack other Africans for political advantage in big urban centers and in distant villages, and this year's death toll mounts alarmingly. Even the country's once all-powerful white-led police appear unable to stanch the flow of blood.

The violence is between followers of the African National Congress (ANC) and Zulu-speaking adherents of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Whether in big-city ghettos like Soweto, or in more distant Transvaal industrial townships like Sebokeng, Zulus and ANC-believers have fought for primacy. In Natal, where Zulus are the majority, members of Inkatha and ANC rivals have killed each other for five years.

Each side accuses the other of fomenting and perpetuating the violence. In almost every case local feuds are involved and, like the Hatfields and McCoys, both sides have long memories. But at bottom, the brightening future for South Africa, the possibility of African rule in this decade, and maneuvering in anticipation of such changes are the underlying causes of malevolence on the killing fields.

Chief G. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland and head of the Inkatha party, would deny that he and other leading Zulus originally encouraged attacks on the ANC in Pietermaritzburg and other centers of Natal. He would claim that insofar as Zulus were involved, they were defending themselves from the ANC.

He is a committed Christian and deplors violence. Yet he insists that he and Inkatha deserve to be present at all bargaining tables, that his movement is as important as the ANC, and that Inkatha would "tear apart, piece by piece," any secret agreement reached between the ruling white National Party and the ANC.

After a long awaited and oft-postponed meeting in January between Chief Buthelezi and Nelson Mandela, deputy president of the ANC, the two leaders seemed reconciled. Mr. Mandela officially "recognized" Chief Buthelezi's importance and stature for the first time, and their personal and institutional concord immediately slowed the flow of African blood.

But the peace accord has not lasted. Between January and April, 200 Africans have been killed. Fifteen ANC student mourners were killed in Alexandra, a black slum in northern Johannesburg, and 13 ANC leaders were shot in Daveyton, both in late March. Fifteen more died in clashes in Soweto in mid-April.

Nowhere in Transvaal and Natal is black life sacred. Conflicts between the ANC and Inkatha are even spreading into once-white city centers. In late March Buthelezi said that “hopes that there will be peace between Inkatha and the ANC are becoming slimmer by the day.” Mandela canceled a visit overseas in order to try to find a way to end the violence, but his exhortations and his criticism of the white-led police have had little effect.

Leaders of the ANC and many independent white observers believe that white police, possibly only at the local level, are encouraging Inkatha. Their evidence is circumstantial but powerful. Police have not been preventing Africans from carrying traditional so-called ceremonial weapons—spears and pangas (machetes).

The police, and a now disbanded special-projects group within the military, are accused of aiding Inkatha directly, of intervening selectively, of transporting Zulu militants, and of providing intelligence to Inkatha attackers.

The white government has long wanted a credible African negotiating ally and a strong African counterpart to the ANC. After seven years of internecine violence, everyone, even the ANC, concedes that Inkatha cannot be ignored.

The ANC demanded the dismissal of the cabinet ministers for defense and police, and asked for army action to end the killing. President Frederik de Klerk has deplored violence too. But it may have escalated out of control.

Even Buthelezi may be powerless to call a halt. Indeed, if the turf wars ceased, his and Inkatha political prominence might fade.

Buthelezi wants to be received as a national leader despite his rural base. A presence, even a violence-achieved presence, nationally continues to serve him well. In that sense, the sooner whites and blacks negotiate around a bargaining table, the sooner armed conflict can—and it is a slim hope—be transformed into open electoral combat.

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### *Buthelezi Deals Himself Out in S. Africa.*

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party and the KwaZulu homeland, has become a part of the problem. No longer is he a part of South Africa’s solution.

Irascible, vengeful, and an ethnic autocrat, Chief Buthelezi has overplayed his political hand. Once a brave opponent of apartheid with a canny ability to twist the mad logic of white domination to his own and black

South Africa's advantage, Buthelezi has in recent years flirted with apartheid in order to keep his own claims to power alive.

Now that the ruling white government of President Frederik de Klerk is apologizing for inflicting apartheid on South Africa and attempting anew to forge a meaningful relationship with Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC), Buthelezi has lashed out at them both.

In the early 1970s, when apartheid entered what would be its final flush of naked repression, Buthelezi turned the government's cynical policy of separate development on its head. As a homeland leader who had been a member of the ANC and claimed to be a disciple of the imprisoned Mr. Mandela, Buthelezi refused to do the government's bidding. He also refused to declare KwaZulu independent, as whites wished.

In 1973 Buthelezi even caused consternation by shouting "we shall overcome" from a hotel balcony in Umtata, the Transkei, after a summit meeting of homeland leaders. Along with the black power leader Steve Biko, Buthelezi was the loudest and most effective opposition figure during this period.

The ANC was a weak exile organization at this time. Most of its leaders were in prison. After the 1976 Soweto rising, however, and the politicization of black South Africa that followed, the ANC grew in influence. Many young blacks fled South Africa to join its guerrilla ranks.

Buthelezi was seen increasingly as a government stooge by the young black community leaders who became prominent after the Soweto rising. The charge was unfair, but it was also true that Buthelezi intensely disliked sharing the opposition political stage with others. Nor would he countenance democratic initiatives of others within his own homeland.

In the 1980s the battle between Buthelezi and proxies for the ANC, which was still banned, became intense. Whether or not Buthelezi ordered, encouraged, or condoned attacks by his followers (the Inkatha movement, now a party, was re-established during this period) on cadres loyal to the ANC, turf battles that began in Pietermaritzburg spread by the end of the decade to all of the Zulu home province of Natal.

Deaths in what was called black-on-black violence amounted to 5,000 by early this year. Moreover, by 1990 ANC-Inkatha clashes had spread to Soweto and other African enclaves within the Transvaal. There were bitter assaults on Africans in villages and on hostel dwellers in townships. Guns replaced knives, spears, and other "ceremonial" weapons as the instruments of mayhem.

The Boipatong massacre last June, in which Zulu warriors killed 37 ANC adherents, was only the most recently publicized incident of its kind. The

government and right-wing whites have been accused of assisting Inkatha and possibly of providing funds and weapons.

Throughout, Buthelezi has sought parity with Mandela for himself and his regional political movement. He has refused to bring Inkatha and the Zulu into the ANC. He continues to insist on a post-apartheid constitution that would enshrine regional autonomy and give him and his people a major role in a federal government of South Africa.

In a world increasingly ethnicized and beset by regional nationalisms, Buthelezi's role is understandable if not laudable. So is his rage recently against De Klerk and Mandela for reopening negotiations. Increasingly, Buthelezi seems intent primarily on obstructing political progress, whatever the cost.

KwaZulu is supported financially by South Africa's white parliament. Many Zulu, particularly urban residents, back the ANC. Of the 7 million Zulu who live in South Africa, possibly half support Inkatha (which claims 1 million members) and Buthelezi. But no one can know for sure, and no homeland elections or referendums are scheduled.

It is premature to call Buthelezi a spent force. But if the government and the ANC cleave together and begin successfully to construct a post-apartheid South Africa, Buthelezi, Chief Lucas Mangope of the Bophuthatswana homeland, and the leaders of Ciskei and QwaQwa will become increasingly marginalized.

Regions will be important, but the homelands will disappear. The regions will be less ethnically homogenous than the homelands, and will of necessity have to work with an ANC-led national government.

Buthelezi's role as a spoiler will not benefit the Zulu and may even lose him primacy in Natal. If he continues to make common cause with conservative whites and the other forces of reaction, his influence in and over South Africa's future will diminish further.

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### *Avoid S. Africa Chaos—Restrain Buthelezi*

Violence threatens to spoil South Africa's hard won transition to democracy and delay next year's elections. Unambiguous actions by the government and the new multiracial, multiparty Transitional Executive Council (TEC), including the deployment of military force in the troubled black townships, are essential. The government and the TEC need to discipline troublemakers, especially Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

Some 9,000 South Africans, nearly all black, have been killed in the three years since Nelson Mandela's release from prison. Those killings, more than 100 a week, are due to vicious antagonism between the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress (ANC) in and around the cities of Natal and urban Johannesburg. Inkatha is led by Chief Buthelezi, whose personal and party rivalry with Mr. Mandela and the ANC is at the heart of South Africa's internal conflict. Buthelezi and the Zulus want either a major slice of the national political pie or autonomy in their home province of Natal.

Their proximity to the violence has made Buthelezi and Inkatha more critical to the negotiating process than might have been expected of a regional party. But they have been denied hegemony in Natal and, if Buthelezi can no longer hope to play a significant political role nationally, he at least wants to dominate his home area. Natal is the home base of Zulu-speakers, South Africa's largest ethnic group (9 million out of nearly 40 million). The Zulu also work as migrant laborers on and near the mines and industries surrounding Johannesburg. A year ago Buthelezi and President Frederik de Klerk were informally aligned. At one point Mr. De Klerk's government helped fund Inkatha, and some of its security forces may have supplied Inkatha with destructive arms. More recently, De Klerk realized that the enduring peace and prosperity of South Africa depended upon cutting a realistic deal with Mandela and the ANC. At a personal and tactical level Buthelezi has always been a spoiler. De Klerk's white National Party collaborated with Inkatha on that basis, and with the hope of slowing down the pace of change in South Africa.

Now, however, the ANC and the National Party are partners (along with 23 other minor white and black political groups) in the TEC, which has been created to manage South Africa's transition from apartheid to majority rule. Inkatha refuses to take part in the TEC, but that may soon change.

Sustaining the peace effectively is impossible without both securing the details of its implementation and establishing oversight bodies for election, fair play by the media, and security issues. But eliminating internecine Inkatha-ANC violence is even more important.

Rising death tolls will obviously inhibit organizing, mobilizing, and campaigning for the elections, now scheduled for April. Turmoil helps Inkatha as well as those groups of the white right who are opposed to majority rule. It also strengthens those who still hope to undercut the political predominance of the ANC.

The ANC has moved to defuse hardline whites by talking to paramilitary groups like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and the Afrikaner Volksfront.

But it and the government hardly know what to do with Buthelezi. Do they try to co-opt him—or declare him a chief disturber of the peace? To do the latter takes the side of the ANC. But that is precisely what the government (now allied with the ANC through the TEC) must do.

The alternative is chaos. The army, not just the police, must be sent into the townships in order to separate the ANC and Inkatha, and impose a peace. De Klerk needs to assure himself that elements among the local security forces do not once again, as has been suspected, work covertly with Inkatha.

Absent a containment of Inkatha, and a strong public reprimand of Buthelezi, South Africa's hard-won transition may easily be undermined and its carefully, painfully, constructed interim constitution and transitional arrangements be disrupted.

## *Freedom and Independence*

As Mandela, Mbeki, and the ANC prepared in the early 1990s for the government of national unity that replaced white rule, and for the period of unquestioned ANC dominance that culminated in 1999, they also began to discover the many problems—deficits that would take decades to overcome—produced by apartheid. The population was growing more rapidly than the economy. No net new jobs had been created since about 1970. Unemployment and underemployment were rife. Poverty and crime had grown, the latter exponentially. Decent housing was unavailable for Africans, most of whom were poor. Squalid squatter settlements surrounded all of the country's cities and had become breeding grounds for disease and crime. Among the many medical and health disasters was the (in the early 1990s) underappreciated and (by National Party officials) derided onslaught of AIDS. And forty years of official neglect, youthful boycotts of schools, troubles in the townships, and sheer mismanagement by the government had culminated in a massive educational deficit, which continued to mortgage South Africa's future under African rule.

As early as 1990, I reported that African high school graduation rates had fallen to 42 percent of those 200,000 taking the mandatory end-of-year examinations in 1989. By contrast, 97 percent of whites passed the same test. Without a matriculation certificate, students found it almost impossible to secure any but low-skill manual laboring jobs. In order to enter a university or a technical institution, even higher qualifications were needed. Among whites, 41 percent of the examinees obtained those levels; among Africans, the rate was 9 percent. Yet the new South Africa would require vast numbers of skilled and educated Africans. In 1990, in a nation of about 28 million Africans, there were fewer than 1,000 black lawyers and physicians and only a handful of engineers and chartered accountants.

In succeeding years the decline in scores continued. In 1993 (announced in 1994) only 38 percent of Africans received their matriculation (graduation) certificates. That is, of the 360,000 Africans aged 18–23 who sat for

the examination, only 118,000 passed. The others, lacking qualifications, would enter the ranks of the jobless, the informal parallel economy, or the ranks of crime. Only 15 percent received ratings high enough for university entrance. As late as 2000, the school system was failing, the government could contrive few successful answers, and the nation—thanks to apartheid—still lacked the human resource capabilities that it needed to blossom and prosper. (“Education Deficit in South Africa,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 Jan. 1990; “After the Elections, South Africa Must Focus on Education,” *Boston Globe*, 25 Feb. 1994.)

The revolutionary expectations in political development that de Klerk unleashed in 1990 took four more eventful and troubled years to be fulfilled. The government had to dismantle apartheid completely, a process which was effectively accomplished by early 1992, when the world brought South Africa in from the cold. De Klerk was feted in Nigeria; his nation’s airline began flying to a raft of new destinations in Africa; ambassadorial exchanges took place between many of the states of the Organization of African Unity and South Africa; Europe started shipping petroleum to South Africa after a seven-year boycott; and South African cricketers were welcomed back into World Cup competition. A year later, Mandela agreed that the world’s remaining sanctions, including those of the U.S., could be lifted. (“World Verdict: Apartheid Is Dead,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 May 1992.)

Internally, however, there were serious conceptual differences between Mandela and de Klerk that arose in 1991 and 1992 and persisted, off and on, until a final interim agreement was forged in 1993. In 1992, they called each other liars, and negotiations broke off. Mandela saw that de Klerk was being made uncomfortable by the success of right-wing Afrikaners, and feared a military putsch. The acknowledgment that the National Party had earlier backed a “third force” that had assassinated many UDF leaders, had bombed opponents in neighboring countries, and had even attempted to poison ANC leaders in the U.S., hardly promoted confidence. Yet, de Klerk’s decisive break with the Inkatha Freedom Party in late 1992, and his dismissal of military hard-liners in the same year, certainly helped. So did his decision in early 1993 to create a single race-blind department of education, thus scraping the separate departments for each race’s education as well as the homeland educational establishments. De Klerk’s master stroke, however, was the preemptive calling of a referendum in 1992. It prevented the white right from coalescing against his reformist agenda; by refusing to be hindered by those reactionary elements, and by winning such a massive victory early in his campaign for overwhelming change, de Klerk could negotiate with



Mandela with a free hand. (“De Klerk Will Win His Gamble,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 March 1992; “Why Hope Survives in South Africa,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 July 1992; “Back on Track in South Africa,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 Dec. 1992; “South Africa’s Bold Initiative for Nonracial Education,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 Feb. 1993.)

That success did not necessarily mean that de Klerk at first favored the direct democratic nostrums that were clearly in the minds of the ANC. Indeed, only when de Klerk ceased demanding the retention of a white veto of all parliamentary actions could the negotiations of interim arrangements and a new constitution move forward on a firm basis. This development took until mid-1993, and there were many moments of profound despair, much mutual recrimination, and frequent feelings that the joint Mandela–de Klerk gamble of trust would not be realized. When it finally all came together, there was widespread acceptance of several elements that whites or blacks demanded, and a willingness to leave the final details to a constituent assembly that worked throughout late 1993 and early 1994, and was itself not without considerable controversy.

Among the critical components on the road to a liberal, democratic constitution was the mutual acceptance (after months of discussion) of an entrenched justiciable bill of rights, with specific clauses protecting private property and safeguarding the freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly. The independence of the judiciary was agreed, and a constitutional court, embodying many of the features of U.S. judicial review, was to be established. Whites (and Buthelezi) ultimately obtained the federal rule and multiple provinces, or regions, for which they campaigned. De Klerk’s insistence on devolving control over primary and secondary education and health to the provinces also prevailed, as a way of assuaging white fears. Mandela, in turn, agreed that there should be a government of national unity after the 1994 elections, thus continuing the Mandela–de Klerk partnership into the brave new era. Buthelezi’s needs could also be encompassed by such a confidence-building embrace. Rejecting the blanket amnesty for crimes that whites wanted, Mandela also persuaded de Klerk to accept a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its grants of individual amnesty. Leaving precise details of all of these matters to their gifted delegates, the two architects of the new South Africa positively influenced each other’s vision of how the plural nation could best move forward. They could see the big picture, Mandela always more clearly than de Klerk. But he, too, had moved and, with unexpected deftness, led his people massively to confront and then to accept the reality of black power in a democratic environment. (“In S. Africa: Close, Yet Far,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 June 1992;

“South Africa’s Political Transformation.” *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 July 1993.)

South Africa completed its remarkable transformation from unfree to free with great panache and enormous ease in April 1994. In the nation’s first full and fair poll, the ANC proportional representational list won 62 percent of the vote and the National Party 20 percent. Inkatha captured 9 percent, the Democratic Party (of Helen Suzman’s successors) 6 percent, the Pan-Africanist Congress (heir to Sobukwe) 2 percent, and the Conservative and other right wing white parties only 3 percent. So much for last-ditch Afrikanerdom. The feared white backlash never occurred; the military and police stayed loyal and remained comparatively neutral. Voter turnout was also exceptionally high—75 percent of registered voters.

The ANC had demonstrated the accuracy of its historical legitimacy, and the popularity of policies that linked together the partisans of the UDF, its own exiles and Robben Island prisoners, the black trade union movement, the vigorous remnants of the South African Communist Party, and clutches of white liberals who had longed, like their African compatriots, for the liberation of South Africa. The ANC had also won less than two-thirds of the total parliamentary seats, so whites had no need to fear the easy passage of adverse constitutional amendments.

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

### *Education Deficit in South Africa*

The “new” South Africa will require vast numbers of skilled and educated Africans. Without a steadily increasing output of trained workers, neither South Africa’s impressive economy nor its future majority government can hope to function at an adequate level, much less the critically high levels that will be needed.

Last year’s examination results emphasized the extent of the problem and its urgency. Of the nearly 200,000 black students who wrote matriculation examinations in December, only 42 percent passed. Of the 37,000 whites who took the same test, 97 percent achieved passing grades. The matriculation examination is a national high-school graduation hurdle.

Without a matriculation certificate black students find it almost impossible to obtain anything other than jobs in manual labor. Even with the certificate, obtaining employment and further education is difficult.

*Christian Science Monitor*, 29 January 1990.

To enter a college or university in South Africa demands more than a basic pass on the examination. For whites the university entrance success rate was 41 percent. For blacks the same rate was a low 9 percent. Moreover, the black success levels were lower than a year earlier, indicating a downward trend. At the moment South Africa may be poised for some kind of shared power and responsibility, fewer and fewer Africans are being prepared to enter the economic and social upper stream.

For a nation of about 28 million blacks plus 5 million whites, 3 million Coloureds, and 1 million Asians, the lack of trained black professionals is dramatic. Fewer than 1,000 blacks are lawyers and physicians; only a handful of engineers and chartered accountants are blacks. And the dearth of skilled black artisans is even more startling.

The educational and training deficit is a direct result of more than 40 years of apartheid. The white minority government of South Africa since 1948, and even before, spent literally 10 times more on each white pupil than it did on each black pupil. Moreover, it spent far less to train black teachers, provided inferior facilities, and imposed narrow, rigid curricula on black schools. Africans were consciously educated for inferiority.

Throughout the 1980s, as young African revolutionaries boycotted schools in the cities and forcibly prevented blacks from taking examinations, pass rates for Africans fell. So did absolute numbers. Indeed, in the 1989 examinations the black pass rates were much higher in rural than in urban areas, and in the Cape and Orange Free State provinces than in Soweto, the country's largest and toughest black city.

African leaders say that among the several obvious answers to the crisis in black education is centralization. They demand one national department of education for whites and blacks. Now the education of whites is the responsibility of a Cabinet department different from that for Africans. Moreover, each of the 10 homelands for rural Africans that have been carved out of the body of South Africa has its own educational system and bureaucracy. So there is waste and inefficiency, and the overall result is growing illiteracy.

The new South Africa cannot afford an illiterate citizenry. Nor, as it enters the perilous arena of shared power, can it afford an uninformed mass of voters. If South Africa is to avoid the kinds of tribal battles that have bedeviled other African countries, and if it is to reduce its high rates of population increase, it needs a wealth of well-educated women and men.

South Africa has a peace dividend of its own, following the settlement of conflicts in Angola and Namibia. Freed-up monies could provide the financial muscle for major changes in black education, but as yet they haven't.

Even without substantial new funds, however, the government of South Africa can merge blacks into underutilized white facilities, train teachers together, combine bureaucracies, and modernize the curriculum.

There is a crucial role, too, for U.S. government and private foundation funds. This is the moment to challenge the white educational establishment in South Africa.

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### *De Klerk Will Win His Gamble*

The referendum in South Africa next week is a master stroke. It risks the hopes of a new post-apartheid South Africa against those who would resume rigid segregation, but President F. W. de Klerk should win his calculated gamble easily and then be able to help guide South Africa securely toward serious power sharing.

Although Mr. de Klerk's National Party has lost a succession of parliamentary by-elections in right-wing constituencies to the diehard Conservative Party, he seized the political high road by demanding a whites-only vote next week. The referendum question asks whites whether or not they want to continue reforming South Africa through negotiations with black Africans.

Could whites reject what still is an unproven and open-ended process? Could they follow their largely rural compatriots and insist upon a return to apartheid? Are they so upset with the rapid transition of South Africa away from apartheid since 1990 that they would halt progress?

The outcome of the referendum will provide answers to those questions. But as desperately pro-apartheid as many Afrikaners and other whites may feel, it is unlikely that they will vote "no" in more than modest numbers.

Going back to the old ways is unthinkable for most whites. There would be a resurgence of black-white violence. The eagerly sought return to national prosperity would be deferred for years, if not indefinitely. Foreign investment and borrowing possibilities would end. The opportunity to send a South African team to the summer Olympics would be aborted, and all renewed sporting ties with the rest of the world, as well as contacts in other spheres, would be cut off.

There are Afrikaans-speaking whites who seek the security of legislated apartheid more than they want to feel a welcome part of the modern world. Despite the recent Conservative victories, however, their numbers are comparatively few. Extrapolating from the party votes in the 1989 general

election, and factoring in the swing against the National Party in last month's by-election, gives De Klerk a margin that could be as high as 63 percent to 37 percent in the referendum.

In 1988, nearly 48 percent of the electorate voted for the National Party and 20 percent for the liberal Democratic Party led by Dr. Zach de Beer. The vote total for all conservative groups was 32 percent. There was an 11 percent swing at the Potchefstroom by-election in February away from the National Party.

In addition to such numbers, De Klerk's hand has been strengthened by the bold way in which he declared a referendum immediately after losing at Potchefstroom. Previous leaders of the National Party always backed down when threatened politically from the right.

In 1978 and 1979, Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha said that South Africa must "adapt or die." Reform was essential if a black revolution were to be contained. But when the right wing attacked his policies, he refused to risk the loss of conservative support.

De Klerk has chosen to maintain the pace of reform. Together with Dr. de Beer, once the arch antagonist of his party, De Klerk has taken to the campaign trail. Uncharacteristically for South Africa, he and his colleagues are barnstorming the country, American-style, asking for a "yes" vote. Businessmen are raising funds to advertise in favor of "yes" and to mobilize support among whites in the cities.

Once he wins the referendum, De Klerk will have achieved far more than an endorsement of his policies of reform. He will have achieved a mandate for change that can be parlayed into the end of white politics as South Africa has known it since 1910.

There will be no need to consult whites in another referendum after a proposed new constitution for the country is formulated by the ongoing Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). Indeed, there need never be another whites-only election, particularly one in which the Conservative Party could show strong support.

The threat from the right will have been neutralized, whereas continued by-election losses would have bolstered the Conservatives. The African National Congress (ANC) will know that De Klerk is negotiating from strength, with the backing of the Democratic Party. Foreign governments will have further reason to trust and work with him.

De Klerk has understood since 1989 that South Africa must change the fundamental basis of its politics or continue to risk the economic and moral decay that accelerated so rapidly under Mr. Botha. Whatever constitutional

compromises emerge from CODESA, and whatever whites and blacks give up to achieve a more perfect union, he and other leading whites believe that there can be no turning back.

For that fundamental principle De Klerk and the National Party have appropriately staked their futures. It will be for the principle, as well as in widespread recognition that there are in fact no other viable options, that whites will vote "yes" in sufficient numbers on March 17.

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### ***World's Verdict: Apartheid Is Dead***

South Africa is rapidly coming in from the cold. Ever since white voters in March overwhelmingly backed continued negotiations with the African National Congress (ANC), a once-hostile world has been falling all over itself to ease South Africa's outcast status.

Among the most symbolic of recent recognitions was the welcome of South African President Frederik de Klerk to Abuja, Nigeria's new capital. Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, president of Nigeria, is also the current chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

When President Babangida last month rolled out the red carpet for President De Klerk, he conveyed the approval not only of Africa's most populous nation, but, informally, also of the rest of Africa. South Africa intends to apply for membership in the OAU later this year.

Remarkably, Nigeria's invitation to De Klerk was decided in Nigeria without the consultation or concurrence of the ANC. Nelson Mandela, president of the ANC, protested strongly, but Nigerian Foreign Minister Ike Nwachukwu replied that Nigeria's policies would be decided upon only by the interests of Nigeria. As far as Nigeria was concerned, the process of change in South Africa was "irreversible."

Elsewhere in Africa, long hostile nations are seeking South Africa's favor. Tanzania, for decades the home of exiled ANC guerrillas in training, has given South Africa rights to fly over its air space.

Tanzanian businessmen have also persuaded their government to request South African Airways (SAA) to fly to and from Johannesburg and Dar es Salaam. SAA already flies to and from Kenya and the Ivory Coast, as well as to neighboring countries like Zambia and Botswana. Last month, for the first time in 20 years, SAA also resumed flying to Luanda, the capital of Angola.

Diplomatic relations, including the exchange of ambassadors, are about to be resumed with the Ivory Coast and Zambia. (For decades, South Africa's only ambassador in black Africa was based in authoritarian Malawi.)

The Seychelles, off the east coast of Africa, says that it will soon resume diplomatic and trading ties to South Africa. Tiny Djibouti has done the same. Mauritius is upgrading its trade mission to consular status.

An oil embargo was once expected to compel the end of apartheid.

The European Community's oil ban was scrapped last month after seven mostly futile years, although bans on the sale of arms or sensitive military goods still remain. So does a prohibition against nuclear cooperation, the United Nations' and United States' three-decade-old arms trade embargo, and the U.S. ban on the transfer of nuclear secrets or materials.

The lifting of prohibitions on the sale of Europe's oil to South Africa will make little practical difference, since South Africa has managed to purchase, often at a stiff premium, almost all the petroleum it has needed.

Internally, however, the end of oil embargoes and other bans will call into question South Africa's own enormously costly drive for petroleum self-sufficiency. At the cost of more than \$4 billion, South Africa has been attempting to find suitable sources of energy off its southwest shores. Untold billions of dollars have also been expended to produce oil from abundant coal. South Africa's coming multiracial government will presumably want and be able to spend such large sums on educational growth and other social improvements.

De Klerk's decision in early 1990 to release Mr. Mandela from prison and to begin negotiating the true end of apartheid has also reaped dividends beyond the purely economic and diplomatic realms.

South Africa, a sport-mad country, has been excited that its cricket team reached the World Cup semifinals and its runners recently competed in the West African games in Senegal. In August, New Zealand's famed rugby team will play five matches in South Africa.

Now that South Africans have been allowed back into world competition, Dutch and Canadian leaders have visited.

Despite Mandela's protest that it is premature to end sanctions or revive routine diplomatic and economic exchanges with South Africa, the world refuses to wait. The world's readiness to embrace South Africa reflects a widespread expectation that, although minority rule persists, apartheid is dead.

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### *Why Hope Survives in South Africa*

South Africa is still heading, unexpectedly, toward majority rule and elections. That optimistic assessment holds despite the bitter friction of the last seven weeks between the leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) and the ruling white National Party (NP).

In May, June, and July, each of the major players in the South African drama loudly blamed the other for upsetting their six-month-long negotiations in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). President Nelson Mandela of the ANC and President Frederik de Klerk of South Africa virtually called each other a liar. Each believed he had been misled.

The ANC, some of the younger and more militant members of which had long been wanting to flex their political muscles, decided to stage mock trials and mass demonstrations to show its disgust with minority rule and to put pressure on the state, the economy, and the white population.

The ANC's militant trade union ally, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) ordered a four-day national strike in August. That worried South Africa's largely white business community. Side bargaining took place in mid-July between representatives of big business and Cosatu. There was hope that South Africa would not be brought to its knees economically by a strike. Business leaders initially agreed to support a list of Cosatu's political and economic demands, and jointly to sponsor a single day's expression of anti-government solidarity on Aug. 3. But on July 22 the talks deadlocked, both sides claiming that unacceptable demands were being made.

Neither side can really afford a strike, and the country cannot afford further turmoil at a time when the worst drought in 30 years, a falling gold price, political uncertainty, and high population growth are resulting in negative economic growth rates. Moreover, inflation is running at about 15 percent a year and, for the first time in 60 years, there is white unemployment as well as massive black unemployment.

Blacks and whites know that there is no real alternative to continued negotiations. Both blacks and whites are trapped in the reality of today's South Africa. A return to apartheid is unthinkable, and unworkable for economic reasons. The indefinite stall, a possible white tactic, would be met by mass action, possible violence, and blows to investor and corporate confidence that would plunge South Africa more deeply into negative growth and disinvestment.



Both sides, encouraged by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visit as a United Nations envoy, appreciate that talks have to be resumed, and soon. Face will somehow be saved.

But it won't be easy. Even with the abrupt conclusion of the CODESA II sessions in May, the government may not fully be ready to concede the majority rule and transitional arrangements favored by the ANC.

Indeed, the government had hoped to drag out negotiations and concede as little as possible. Militants in the ANC thought its leaders had given away too much. Shuffling on both sides is inevitable. The NP side now seems to embrace the black Inkatha Freedom Party of KwaZulu and the homeland parties of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana.

Bringing the major sides closer together will be the task of Mr. Vance and persons of goodwill in South Africa. Here are the possible outlines of an eventual compromise:

1. South Africa would become a federation, including nine or ten regions in place of the existing four provinces. All sides appear to agree that limiting the power of the central government and giving regions authority over schools, hospitals, roads, and so on would ease white fears and prevent a runaway ANC-dominated national state. Residual powers ("states' rights") would be exercised by the regions.

2. The regions would also elect members of an upper house or senate. That upper house could have concurrent authority with the lower house of the new, popularly elected parliament. The NP appears to have dropped its insistence on a minority veto in the senate, and on an undemocratic method of electing representatives to it. But those ideas may still resurface during the course of talks.

3. There would be an entrenched bill of rights. The bill of rights would include specific clauses protecting private property against nationalization and safeguarding religion, speech, and judicial independence. The entrenched provisions would be designed to quell white (and Zulu) worries.

4. There would be some kind of elected constituent assembly, chosen on straight proportional representation, to write the new constitution. Proportional representation at this stage and in the eventual lower house of parliament would, it is thought, ensure the representation of a variety of ethnic groups.

There seems to be an agreement on an interim executive composed of the heads of all of the major (and some minor) parties. Whether this (or almost anything else) is workable has yet to be tested in any effective way.

Little consensus, however, is evident on how long the transitional period would be and how and when it would end, especially if the assembly has not

arrived at a final agreement. The ANC does not want the NP and its allies to procrastinate and thus defer majority rule for more than a year. Whites want at least a three-year interim period.

Precisely how the homelands are to be reintegrated, and how the military and the police will be led, and by whom, are critical unresolved issues. Taxing powers have been discussed little. Even the precise shape of the regions has been assumed without much discussion.

Loose governmental strands need to be gathered together and knitted into a comprehensive agreement. That is a cause for pessimism, given the growing antagonism between the NP and the ANC.

Then there is the atmosphere of violence that engulfs South Africa, and that may or may not involve provocative involvement by the police or military. Vance and United Nations monitors may be able to calm the roiled waters, or even pinpoint real blame.

Optimism comes from an appreciation of how much constitutional progress has already been made, the conceptual concessions and compromises that have occurred, and the mutual recognition that South Africa can only resume its march toward prosperity for all (now three years in abeyance) after a coming together of the ANC, the NP, and other groups across the country's political spectrum.

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### *Back on Track in South Africa*

After months of distrust and wrangling, the African National Congress (ANC) and the ruling National Party of South Africa are preparing to put their disturbed and violent country back on a hopeful course.

Although it is midsummer and holiday time in South Africa, when nearly all political activity ceases, the ANC and the National Party have pledged to continue meeting in a series of joint committees.

The work of the committees is meant to clear away the remaining conceptual and procedural obstacles to new constitutional arrangements satisfactory both to the ANC and to whites.

In late January, leaders of the ANC and the National Party will meet in secret, as they did in early December, and prepare the way, first, for further multiparty talks about how South Africa's future will be arranged, and second, for multiracial constituent assembly elections in 1993.

The government's main concession has been to consider moving those elections up from 1994. Furthermore, President Frederik de Klerk and his

Cabinet colleagues have promised ANC leader Nelson Mandela and others that the government will redouble its efforts to reduce the country's continuing cascade of random killings.

In an important move in late December, Mr. De Klerk dismissed a number of senior military officers who were suspected of undermining his detente with the ANC.

De Klerk has also assured the ANC that his party's alliance of convenience with KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party has ended. Both the ANC and the government now agree that Chief Buthelezi's recent unilateral declaration of autonomy for KwaZulu and the Province of Natal (which surrounds KwaZulu) was harmful to the democratic development of a unified South Africa.

De Klerk and his associates long have favored a federal arrangement for a future South Africa, but they regard Buthelezi's preemptive move as dangerously fissiparous.

De Klerk and other white officials now recognize how harmful to progress the violence between the ANC and Inkatha has been, even though elements of the government are accused of helping to foment that violence.

The economy of South Africa has suffered seriously because of violence and continued political uncertainty. The likelihood that South Africa faces another year or more of economic decline, not growth, has concentrated the minds of all responsible South Africans. After six years of minimal growth, the country's once robust economy can hardly endure more stagflation, capital flight, and instability.

In December, too, surprise attacks by the Azanian People's Liberation Army on whites and blacks in the eastern Cape Province (near King Williams Town and Queenstown) alarmed both the government and the ANC, as well as whites generally. The closing of the ranks of the ANC and the government was a natural next step, with both former antagonists wishing to move South Africa along to a constitutional future before the Azanian and Inkatha fringe groups disrupt the country (and economic growth) further.

The Azanian Army is a militant offshoot of the Pan-Africanist Congress, a black political grouping with a following very much smaller than that of the ANC. It has long opposed negotiations with the government. In the early 1960s, also in the Queenstown area near the Transkei, a movement allied with the Pan-Africanist Congress conducted a campaign of random violence until the government jailed its leaders.

Given these polarizing forces of violence, both the ANC and the government have decided that a marriage of convenience would assist the country's

peaceful transition to the multiracial rule that both want, if in different degrees. The ANC has at last accepted that a new transitional government of unity will never come about without a comparatively strong National Party partner. Likewise, the government now views the ANC as a responsible group untainted by the ideological and violent approaches of the Azanians or Inkatha.

Six months ago, such reasonableness on the parts of both negotiating partners was conspicuously absent. But the passage of time and clear threats to the aspirations of both those who hold on to power, precariously, and those who want it but worry that it may slip from their grasp, have renewed the promise of constitutional progress in South Africa.

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### *South Africa's Bold Initiative for Nonracial Education*

Thanks to apartheid, South Africa's black majority has long lacked educated professionals. Now a bold, new, controversial government-sponsored initiative promises to begin to remedy that cruel result of decades of white domination.

Given the almost certain likelihood of shared power this year, the dearth of black scientists, engineers, chartered accountants, high-level managers, physicians, and lawyers disturbs even those who are confident that the African National Congress (ANC) and other blacks can guide the complicated machinery of national and regional government.

There may now be 1,000 lawyers and 1,000 physicians in an African population of 28 million. But the number of qualified accountants, surgeons, medical specialists, pilots, assay chemists, water-quality engineers, and so on can be counted on the fingers of a few hands.

In the 1950s the white rulers of South Africa systematically prevented blacks from gaining high-quality secondary or higher education by barring them from church-run high schools and leading universities. They created inferior educational tracks for blacks and other people of color and spent one-tenth as much per head on blacks as on whites.

In recent years, that spending disparity has been reduced to a 4 to 1 ratio, but diminished numbers of white children still enjoy the kinds of learning advantages to which Africans must continue to aspire.

This year, as in the past few years, as few as 42 percent of Africans who took the school-leaving matriculation examination at the end of high school (roughly equivalent to an American 11th-grade comprehensive assessment,

if there were one) passed. Moreover, only 10 percent of Africans who took the test scored high enough to be considered for university admission.

Ninety-eight percent of whites passed the matriculation hurdle, and 42 percent scored above the university admission level. Only 17 of the 314,367 Africans who took the test achieved a distinction. Among whites, about 2,400 of the 66,141 test-takers obtained a distinction.

President Frederik de Klerk's government now proposes an Educational Renewal Strategy. It would dismantle the 14 ethnic-based education departments that now determine schooling priorities nationally (for people of different colors) and in the homelands.

The government would create a single race-blind department to supervise all education in South Africa. The strategy would require all students (only whites are now required to go to school) to complete nine years of school. It would establish equal spending per head across the racial categories, overturning 300 years of practice and law.

New curricula would exist at all levels. The Christian National Educational system of the Afrikaner-dominated governments since 1948 would be scrapped.

The new strategy also proposes, dangerously, to cap enrollment in South Africa's research universities (still more than half white) and its overwhelmingly black undergraduate colleges, mostly in the homelands. The government says it can no longer fund the universities at existing levels.

It suggests that the African thirst for higher education, and the country's need for rapid training of skilled personnel, could best be met not at existing universities, but at a to-be-created cadre of less costly community colleges.

The ANC welcomed most of these proposals when they were introduced. The white Conservative party was appalled. However the strategy is modified, and no matter how rapidly numerous existing laws are repealed, the overturning and uprooting of current practices will be hard, bitterly contested by whites, and difficult to make final.

The government's new proposal to create a nonracial educational system is long overdue. Yet, sadly, it is bound to take 10 to 20 years to correct the deep imbalances and deficits of the present system. Even then, depending on what happens politically in South Africa, the attempt at last to be fair may have come too late to nurture a tolerant society or to give new generations of the majority the skills with which to lead their country well in the 21st century.

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### *South Africa's Political Transformation*

South Africa is almost free. South Africans of all colors finally agreed, early this month, to a negotiated settlement and national elections. But the details still have to be elaborated before the precise shape and practicality of the transfer of power can be assessed.

Nelson Mandela, president of the African National Congress (ANC), will soon declare sanctions over, but until elections are held and power genuinely transferred, even the lifting of sanctions will not inaugurate a rush to invest in South Africa.

The agreement forged by representatives of 26 different political parties and interest groups set South Africa's first-ever full and free election for April 27. The poll will be supervised by a to-be-selected local electoral commission.

Balloting will occur simultaneously at the national and regional levels, probably over more than one day. The rules of proportional representation will prevail at both levels, and thus there will be neither constituencies nor persons elected on local or purely ethnic bases.

Of the 400 Constituent Assembly seats to be chosen nationally by this method, 200 will come as a result of regional results and 200 as a consequence of the overall national returns. There also may be separate campaigns for municipal seats.

During this month's difficult negotiations, the ANC reluctantly agreed to trade undiluted national rule for a federal solution. The new regions will have significant powers, although their precise enumeration and the powers of the central government still have to be decided and their borders drawn.

South Africa long has had four provinces. The ANC, the National Party (NP), and the parties of the white right wing have begun submitting their own blueprints for the regions. The ANC and the NP seem to agree roughly on the carving up of South Africa into seven, eight, or nine regions. But the white right wants an Afrikaner-dominated *volkstaat*, or region of its own.

Once the borders are set, there will be bitter arguments about whether the regions will control primary and secondary education (likely), and higher education (doubtful). Will police forces be regionalized? Who will govern the hospitals and health care? What about roads, industrial policy, broadcasting, or the courts? For each of these questions there are as many answers as there are contending parties. Still to be decided are the extent and nature

of the regional taxing powers. And what will happen when an ANC-led central government seeks to overrule decisions taken at the regional level?

No one really knows how these tough issues of social engineering will be resolved, but preparations for the elections and campaigning cannot go forward until these many questions are answered.

The ANC and the NP, the two dominant contenders, must satisfy themselves and their supporters, but the negotiators must also take into account the hopes and fears of at least two others among the 26 negotiating teams.

Only when the antagonisms of the white right and the anxieties and ambitions of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) have been blunted can South Africa conclude this month's debates over an interim constitution and establish a Transitional Executive Council (TEC).

The TEC is meant to advise the existing government until April's elections. It will represent the major groups at the negotiating table and will ensure effective elections. When it is functioning, a new interim constitution, down to the last regional and civic clause, will have been agreed upon by all parties.

The Constituent Assembly, and a possible upper house or senate, will, after April, draft a further, final constitution for South Africa. The ANC assumes that if it achieves a resounding national majority it will be able to write clauses more beneficial to Africans than anything to which it agrees this month or next. But that is a gamble. Overriding the intense debates and speculation of recent months is the reality of violence. Ten thousand Africans have been killed in clashes between the IFP and the ANC since Mr. Mandela's release from prison in 1990. Earlier this month hundreds were dying weekly in the black townships east of Johannesburg.

The police claim to be powerless and frightened. There are rumors that a sinister, shadowy "third force" of right-wing whites is perpetuating and directly stimulating Zulu attacks on Xhosa-speaking members of the ANC.

Nothing is that simple, but violence in the black townships is continuously destructive. Are the police and the army reliable? The police appear to be colluding with the militant Afrikaner Resistance Movement and other fringe, but dangerous, groups on the white right. In late June these groups used an armored vehicle to invade the building in which the constitutional negotiators were meeting. The event was televised worldwide. There was no police opposition at the time and few arrests have since been made. There is an atmosphere of vigilantism that bedevils peaceful progress toward the election. Moreover, the IFP has threatened not to accept the interim constitutional arrangements and to accelerate violence in Natal. Most black and white leaders of South Africa intend their country to be free and to be ruled

after April, for five years, by a coalition government. The jockeying at the negotiating table, and the killings in the townships, are all part of the calculated pursuit of power by groups of whites and blacks harboring different and dramatically opposed agendas.

There is no doubt that South Africa will hold elections in 1994 and install a government of national unity. But how stable and peaceful it will be depends on answers to tough questions of principle and on doing what now seems hardly possible—ending the cascading violence in the nation.

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### *After the Elections, South Africa Must Focus on Education*

Good government starts with an educated citizenry. But not necessarily in South Africa, and certainly not now. Washington needs to redouble its efforts to help upgrade and reform South Africa's apartheid-infused educational system.

For the fourth year in a row the pass rate for Africans on South Africa's annual matriculation examinations has fallen, now to 38 percent, 5 percent lower than last year. The white pass rate remained at 97 percent. Matriculation exams mark the end of high school for nearly all South Africans.

The numbers are stark. Of the 360,510 Africans who sat for the equivalent of national high school graduation exams before Christmas, only 117,363 passed. That means that more than 200,000 Africans lack qualifications for even some of the menial jobs in South Africa. These potentially jobless youths swell the ranks of the young unemployed, a category to which perhaps half of all black South Africans between ages 18 and 25 now belong.

Given the country's heavy structural unemployment and five straight years during which economic growth (and job creation) have stagnated, these lamentable schooling results can only add more crime and violence to South Africa.

Since these low pass rates, and even much lower university entrance scores (about 15 percent), reflect nearly two decades of chaos in South Africa's educational system, there can be no quick fixes. Militant young Africans have boycotted classes and examinations since the 1970s. They have torched schools, intimidated teachers and pupils, threatened parents and made graduating from high school almost impossible.



But the real culprit has been apartheid. Since the mid-1950s, the ruling National Party government eradicated the country's existing educational system and, on a per pupil basis, spent 10 times more to teach white children (more recently only four times more) than to teach black children. The government's educational bureaucracy also starved black teacher training institutions of funds, built few schools, provided few up-to-date facilities and textbooks and tried to use the black schooling system to indoctrinate beliefs of inferiority.

The African National Congress recently called for a reconstructed nonracial educational system dedicated to social justice and high quality. Even the outgoing white government wants such a system, decades too late. Until this year there have been 10 lamentable, underfunded homeland educational systems plus a poorly financed national system administered by whites.

Massive outside funds will be required to help South Africa even begin to provide the minimum number of modern textbooks to the several hundred thousand blacks who emerge from primary school and seek a secondary education. To build schools, provide computers and ensure safe environments will take millions of dollars.

The biggest obstacle is a shortage of trained teachers. After two decades of unrest and nearly a decade of a struggle that convulsed the black schools, especially in the urban areas, there has been an exodus into industry of qualified and dedicated teachers. How to upgrade existing teachers and train new ones will be one of South Africa's key challenges for at least a decade.

Soweto has nearly 200 high schools for its adolescent population of about 2 million. Knowledgeable Africans say that only one of those high schools truly works. Only one, led by an experienced and authoritarian principal, closes its gates promptly at 8 a.m. every morning, ensures that its pupils work hard, attend classes and do their homework assignments and is producing successful matriculants.

The South Africa that begins to be ruled by blacks after elections in April will require an increasingly better educated citizenry, work force and civil service. Given the size and economic potential of South Africa, the number of black lawyers, physicians, certified accountants, engineers and scientists is few. In a country of nearly 40 million, accredited physicians, lawyers and other professionals number in the low thousands.

American universities, the U.S. government and American foundations have for several years provided sizable grants and other forms of support to uplift and reconfigure the South African educational establishment. The white government has used substantial funds once budgeted for police and defense purposes to reconstruct its schools.

Far more money and creative rebuilding and rethinking are required. The answer will come in part, but only in part, from the further integration of existing white schools, massive attention to teacher training, a Marshall Plan for school rebuilding and an end to student disruptions.

The other part will depend on a restructuring of South Africa's budget to emphasize schooling as a national priority despite the recent constitutional decision to turn educational matters over to the country's nine new regions. The United States will want to encourage the postelection government of South Africa to focus on its schools and its students with more urgency than deliberate speed.

## *Mandela and Mbeki*

Mandela, above all, made the ANC victory possible and palatable. From 1990 to 1994, he had demonstrated a clarity of all-embracing vision, an absence of vindictiveness, and a modest but sure sense of stature. He had charmed Afrikaners, reassured businessmen, gently retreated from hoary socialist mantras, endured the excesses of his then wife, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, with great dignity, and appeared, even to skeptics, capable, if anyone was, of healing the deep-seated sores in South Africa's soul. As president after 1994, he reached out with genuine skill to presumed enemies, both black and white. He took tea with the widow of an architect of apartheid, donned the jersey of the country's white rugby heroes, walked hand in hand with black soccer victors, preached fairness, defended Afrikaans, set the kind of abstemious example that was new to the leaders of Africa, and grew swiftly to iconic dimensions. The old prize fighter and "Scarlet Pimpernel" of the 1950s became the much-loved and much-revered peace maker. The uncomfortable fact that Mandela could not single-handedly provide a peace dividend that magically raised the living standards of his poor brethren, jump-start the stagnant national economy, curtail the world's most explosive crime and murder rates, eliminate corruption from political and bureaucratic life, or provide a well-functioning and efficient government, hardly tarnished his personal stature or reduced the people's faith in ANC leadership.

In a review of Mandela's leadership after twenty months in power, I stressed the gift of his remarkable practical, tempered vision. "From his initial agreement to head a government of national unity with the very whites who had oppressed him and his people to [his] insistence on the rights of minorities," I wrote, Mandela had "practiced the politics of inclusion with a passion that borders on the evangelical," and made many converts. He had refused to be politically correct or to genuflect before the expected altars of a new, African-controlled South Africa. He had refused to bash minorities even when the white minority had once been the oppressor. Mandela, I

wrote, possessed courageous ideas for South Africa. "He wants to build a nation despite the brutal past." He demonstrated respect—unusual under the circumstances—for the sensitivities of those very persons and groups who never had respected Africans. That was leadership of a high and visionary order. ("The Politics of Language, Identity, and Race," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 Feb. 1996.)

Two years after its electoral triumph, the ANC-led government of national unity was performing less brilliantly than its leader was winning hearts and minds. Three gigantic, urgent challenges faced the ANC: 1) South Africa's 40 million citizens could not eat black rule and fancy promises. Mandela's government, I urged, must begin to deliver per capita growth, educational services, medical care, and new housing. 2) The killing fields of ANC-Inkatha warfare, with continuing deaths of civilians in their thousands, had to be stopped. Mandela had to reduce this violence. 3) The prevalence of urban crime, especially carjackings and robberies, was corroding the state and vitiating economic growth. The government had to attack this problem with greater vigor than ever.

The Reconstruction and Development Program that was supposed to drive the achievement of these goals, and uplift impoverished South Africans, was still stuck in low gear. In order to create employment opportunities greater than population surges, South Africa's GDP had to grow per capita about 6 percent a year. Instead, growth was stuck below 2 percent, largely because of the country's command economy, its trade union stranglehold, and the ANC's lingering distrust of market mechanisms. South Africa required a wave of privatization—the selling off of state-owned enterprises, and the creation of a manufacturing sector for export. Punitive tariffs could be reduced and regional free trade embraced with alacrity. Reducing subsidies for South African farmers and welcoming imports of textiles, say, from neighboring African countries would benefit all South Africans, especially the unemployed, more rapidly than other interventionist methods. Doing so would also impede the flow of illegal immigrants into South Africa from the region, and possibly reduce crime and the smuggling of small arms. ("South Africa Needs to Think Regionally," *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 Sept. 1995; "Mandela's Challenges: Stop Crime and Political Killings, Speed Growth," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Jan. 1996.)

Mandela was conscious that South Africa harbored a serious land problem. Whites had taken land with pastoral or arable potential from Africans in the nineteenth century, if not as early as the seventeenth century. The iniquitous Native Lands Act of 1913, to campaign against which the ANC had been established in 1912, had further pushed Africans off the better soils of

the country and forbidden indigenous ownership outside of reserves (later homelands), which in turn became immensely overcrowded and overgrazed. The Reconstruction and Development Program specified that 30 percent of all agricultural land should be returned to Africans by 1999. But that was an impossible goal, despite some voluntary redistribution of land in the Eastern Cape Province, and the purchase of and resettlement of Africans on other lands throughout the country. Ownership of former black spots reverted in some cases, too. But Mandela understood better than most that he could not oust white farmers in some wholesale manner without harming national food sufficiency goals and reducing export earnings. Yet, if land redistribution remained too slow, wholesale squatting and outbreaks of rural anarchy could become serious obstacles to growth. Managing the land question well would create a solid foundation for a “truly united country.” (“Ethnic Power Sharing: South Africa’s Model,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 Sept. 1994.)

Measurements cannot be precise, but some of Mandela’s ministers served him poorly. Schooling faltered. The health services were overwhelmed by patient demands. The catastrophe of AIDS brazenly overwhelmed an unsuspecting ministry. The provision of housing took much longer than expected. Demoralized police forces were very slow to rebuild and reorient themselves against new threats to public order. Corruption escalated to hitherto unimaginable levels. The foreign ministry made some mistakes. But the finance and trade ministries performed well, and the Reserve Bank reduced inflation and restored national credibility. (“Why Mandela Changed His Lineup,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 April 1996.)

Mandela, at first a manager as well as a visionary, increasingly delegated day-to-day authority to Deputy President Mbeki. Gradually, he gave him more and more control of the country, and openly named him heir apparent. By late 1996, three years before South Africa would elect a new president, Mbeki was largely in command. The difficult problems of the nation as it overcame the legacy of apartheid and tried to satisfy the expectations of its people were his to solve.

Could Mbeki fill Mandela’s shoes? “Won’t South Africa fall apart when Nelson goes?” was a frequent question. My take was strongly positive. Mbeki, then 54, had a “distinctive intellect and style” that complemented Mandela’s. He was prepared to tackle the tough questions facing his country: How to achieve growth with equity, how to manage the largely incompatible and hard-to-satisfy aspirations of trade unionists and jobless would-be workers, how to build a consensus for good government, how to reduce criminal violence, and how to create a strong, forward-looking nation.

Mbeki’s style, so unlike other African leaders of his generation, was to ponder issues, examine and explain their complexity, and only then to offer

carefully crafted analyses. That worked for elites and Westerners, I suggested, but Mbeki's ability to reach out to ordinary Africans was widely perceived to be a problem. He was no extrovert. Whereas Mandela demonstrated a genius for the inclusive political gesture, Mbeki was less an inclusionist than a command-and-control strategist—a consummate inside political operator. As one of the chief ANC thinkers in Lusaka, and before then as a graduate student in economics at the University of Sussex, Mbeki had never had to campaign for office or satisfy a broad base of constituents. He grew up as a son of the struggle (his father, Govan Mbeki, a Marxist, was one of Mandela's older colleagues), but without prison or guerilla credentials. A carefully tailored pipe-smoker, diligent planner and organizer, and thoughtful articulator (even as early as 1996) of both his and Mandela's visions, Mbeki was a fit successor to South Africa's first black president. No one needed to worry unduly about South Africa after Mandela, I concluded. ("Mandela's Heir Apparent Is Different in Style but Similar in Skill," *Boston Globe*, 20 Sept. 1996.)

After Mbeki almost seamlessly acceded to Mandela's party leadership in 1998, and then to the presidency after the ANC's popular victory in the 1999 elections, he quickly consolidated his control over the party's formidable political apparatus, moved with speed to lessen trade union influence upon the country's crucial economic decisions, and deftly sought to extend South Africa's authority beyond its borders, but without arousing opposition. Under Mbeki's direction, South Africa embraced the market economy more fully than before, but still not as forcefully as some advisors preferred. He began to demonstrate some potentially authoritarian tendencies, too; local observers noted the enormous growth in the numbers of advisors attached to his private office, the creation of an executive cabinet within the regular cabinet of ministers, and his habit of micromanaging the affairs of ministries and departments. Critics complained that Mbeki spoke out against corruption more than he cashiered high-level offenders; as late as 2001, provincial leaderships and some national departments are studded with large-scale graft. Petty theft was a problem, but venal levels of misappropriation and bribery were more threatening to the efficiency and morale of the new South Africa. Mbeki was doing too little about the crime problem, too, although he argued that there was only so much even an all-powerful president could do in a democracy.

But Mbeki's credibility suffered most severely over AIDS. Apparently concerned about the high cost of the medicines available to treat pregnant mothers with AIDS, Mbeki took advice off the Internet as well as from scientific dissidents who suggested that HIV was not necessarily the cause of AIDS. Mbeki followed them in saying that AIDS resulted from poverty, not

primarily from a retrovirus. In late 1999, I critiqued Mbeki's stand. ("Americans Baffled by Mbeki's Ban on AZT," *Southern Africa Report*, 26 Nov. 1999.) He attracted much more opprobrium in 2000, after giving a dismissive keynote address to an international AIDS forum held in South Africa. International and South African scientists at the meeting were dismayed, and said so. Even Mandela gently rebuked him.

This international consternation was followed in mid- and late 2000 by Mbeki's tactical refusal to condemn President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe's brutal attack on his own white farming community and the unleashing of thugs to intimidate opponents in Zimbabwe's June election and thereafter. Mbeki, who personally disliked Mugabe and his methods, nevertheless believed in constructive engagement. Pushing Mugabe into a corner, he presumably calculated, would do more harm than good. At stake for Mbeki were a confirmation of his and South Africa's power in southern Africa and help for the faltering South African economy. Troubles in Zimbabwe had driven foreign investment away from South Africa and reduced the value of its currency against the U.S. dollar. For South Africa's economy to grow faster than its population, Mbeki required a stable and prosperous regional environment. Mugabe was an obstacle to South Africa's prosperity. So were AIDS, the continuing educational crisis, crime, housing deficits, renewed fighting in KwaZulu-Natal, corruption, and a host of other ills. However, Mbeki in 2001, weakened as he undoubtedly was by five major political acts of commission, and many more of omission, was still the only South African leader who could conceivably engineer improvements in the critical areas that mattered to South Africa and successfully uplift his people from the depths of post-apartheid impoverishment.

## OPINION PIECES AND ARTICLES

### *Ethnic Power Sharing: South Africa's Model*

Land on which to grow crops and graze cattle and sheep is a critical resource over which peoples and nations still fight. In the new South Africa, control over land is central to President Nelson Mandela's plan of reconstruction and development, but there will be no easy victories without careful planning and monetary backing from Washington.

"Unless we settle the land question, we do not have a country," Cyril Ramaphosa said recently. He is the secretary-general of the African National

Congress (ANC) and a potential heir to Mr. Mandela. If we handle the land question badly, he argued, "we tear South Africa to pieces. If we manage it well, we create the foundations of a truly united country." Few could have expressed South Africa's land dilemma so exactly. Despite a great deal of talk and bluster since 1980, neighboring Zimbabwe is still fumbling its land issue; very little land has been transferred from white to black hands. The number of landless people has grown enormously and, much as Zimbabwe's government has promised to return unproductive white-owned land to blacks, the landless still wait.

Under apartheid about 3.5 million Africans were removed from their ancestral farm lands and forcibly shifted to less arable, poorly watered, more crowded sections of the so-called homelands. Earlier, in 1913, the Native Lands Act deprived Africans of existing freehold rights and moved millions into reserves (later homelands) out of the way of whites. Even after the passage of a second version of that act in 1936, the entire black population of South Africa was still to be limited to control over no more than 13 percent of the total landmass of the country.

By the time South Africa achieved majority rule in April 1994, about half its entire black population, roughly 16 million people, were attempting to scratch a living from overcrowded, overgrazed acreage in the homelands. Long before April, white farmers, possibly fewer than 100,000 including their families, controlled the bulk of what once were African commons. About 80 percent of all farmland in South Africa is in white ownership. One of the deep roots of black poverty in South Africa is the shortage of land, especially land that is well watered and fertile.

No African grievance is more entrenched. Yet the new South African bill of rights, a product of extensive negotiations between the outgoing white rulers and the incoming leaders of the ANC, enshrines private property. Expropriation of land by the state is explicitly permitted, but only after the payment of "fair and equitable" compensation.

As the government of Zimbabwe found, compensation payments could easily deplete the national treasury. Ousting white farmers could also deprive South Africa, still growing only slowly, of surplus food and foreign-exchange earnings. Moreover, efficient white farmers now employ African labor. There is official anxiety that blacks will have neither the expertise nor the capital to maintain the productivity of returned land. Yet the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Program, which the new Mandela government now endorses, specifies that 30 percent of all the country's agricultural land should be redistributed from whites to blacks within five years.

If progress is too slow, if Africans are not resettled with all deliberate speed, Mandela fears wholesale squatting, preemptive land occupations, and



other outbreaks of rural anarchy that would unsettle his government. Already, Mandela has had to set the post-apartheid police on striking urban laborers and black miners. There have been a few examples of peaceful land transfer. Along the south coast of the eastern Cape region of Ciskei, a group of prosperous white dairy farmers have returned their land to the Mfengu villagers who were forcibly removed from it two decades ago.

However, the Mfengu do not yet intend to farm the land. They lack the experience and capital. So they have leased their land back to the current white farmers. The white farmers are now tenants, paying a large percentage of their profits to the Mfengu.

Mandela's continuing dilemma is that even with United States and World Bank funds, South Africa may not be able to afford to compensate white farmers. And a destabilized farming sector could frighten foreign investors and undercut South Africa's reconstruction program.

U.S. and World Bank advice may need to be cautionary. More deals like those made by the Mfengu would be useful, even if they remain rare. Outside backing should be offered, too, to support those African groups who do manage to reclaim their ancestral or recent lands.

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### *South Africa Needs to Think Regionally*

Regional integration is South Africa's urgent next challenge. Now that South Africa is free, largely peaceful, and making strides, however tentative, toward greater prosperity for all its peoples, a critical issue for President Nelson Mandela and his government is how best to uplift the southern African neighborhood.

South Africa's gross domestic product is four times larger than the combined GDPs of the 10 other countries of southern Africa and more than 100 times larger than the GDP of Zimbabwe, its comparatively wealthy neighbor to the near north.

For the last two decades of apartheid, from about 1974 to 1994, most of the newly independent states of the region formed political and economic alliances against South Africa. The Front Line States and the Southern African Development Coordinating Council attempted to reduce their economic dependence on white-run South Africa.

But South Africa's economic domination of southern Africa—founded on the imperialistic overtures, railway extensions, and commercial forays of the

late 19th and early 20th centuries—continued despite the physical and economic war against apartheid.

Today, that economic domination can be employed for the benefit of both South Africa and southern Africa, but only if wise, statesmanlike leadership prevails.

South Africa remains protectionist. Its economy, after decades of defending itself against world sanctions, is largely closed. Its trade barriers keep out goods from its neighbors, particularly textiles and electrical manufactures from Zimbabwe. Its exchange control mechanisms prevent easy investment by South African firms in the region. South Africa's trade policies invite retaliation. At a recent trade and investment conference in Zimbabwe, speaker after speaker threatened to raise local tariffs in response.

Southern Africa cannot afford a trade war. Even South Africa, desperately attempting to raise the incomes of its own inhabitants, hardly wishes to contemplate a region with falling incomes and falling economic expectations. Already, paralleling the experiences along the southern borders of the United States, southern Africans from as far away as Zaire are scrambling to enter South Africa illegally.

Shifting South Africa from thinking of itself as an economy under siege to one capable of prospering from free trade and open markets will take internal rethinking, as well as encouragement from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United States. Mr. Mandela and his government have demonstrated their ability to react with maturity to internal and global events. Now they need to think constructively about how to help themselves by helping the region.

Already, South Africa provides the nucleus of a southern African common market—a proto-NAFTA. The Southern African Customs Union has existed since 1910. Because South Africa controls most of the ports and import and export trade, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have been content since their respective dates of independence to receive a slice of the annual South African customs and excise pie.

Even Botswana, next to South Africa the wealthiest regional country per capita, hardly wants to start up its own customs service. It has a separate currency, unlike the other members of the customs union, but after years of benefiting from open borders, becoming more protectionist is not a favored option.

Now the test will be how best to follow the century-old rails and the commercial instincts of South African supermarket and mining conglomerates into the wider neighborhood. If Mandela and his government can be persuaded by the logic of free trade that what is good for the region is good for

South Africa, then a southern African extension of the existing customs union will be a plausible goal. It will certainly be a goal worth arguing and working toward.

The weaker and poorer countries of the region—as far away as Zaire and Angola—need trade and investment more than aid. They need markets for their exports. They also need to be reassured that the benefits of South African corporate investment in their own countries will be beneficial locally, and not purely exploitative.

Everyone has to be persuaded that what is good for Europe and North America, and what has been positive for South Africa's customs union, will be good for southern Africa, possibly as a harbinger of greater economic cooperation for Africa as a whole. The alternative is rising levels of poverty, probably for all.

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***Mandela's Challenges:  
Stop Crime and Political Killings, Speed Growth***

Now that ample Southern Hemisphere rains have begun to make up for years of drought, and reconciliation between whites and blacks is a success, President Nelson Mandela's new South Africa must solve three urgent problems if democracy is to be sustained.

—South Africa's 40 million citizens can't eat black rule and fancy promises. Mr. Mandela must begin to deliver per capita growth and, simultaneously, education, housing, and other services.

—Mandela's government must eliminate political killing fields. Zulus are still being massacred as the result of long-running feuds between adherents of Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

—Urban crime, particularly in Johannesburg and on the industrial Witwatersrand, is reaching new highs, with carjackings and robbery attacks topping the list. Despite much talk, neither Mandela's government nor the nine provincial governments have managed to do much about crime.

After assuming power in April 1994, Mandela's government promised to open the post-apartheid sluice gates. Africans' thirst for improved schooling, effective medical care, decent shelter, jobs, pensions, and a social safety net were to be met. A dramatic Reconstruction and Development Program, with lofty goals, was enunciated.

Meeting those targets depended on improvements in the national economy and real growth. South Africa's economic performance since 1994 has

indeed been good. Inflation has fallen into the single digits, to about 7 percent, but now it's growing again. Balance-of-payments figures have been solid, in recent months showing comparatively large surpluses. The Johannesburg Stock Market and Rand-denominated long bonds have performed well, but there has been little growth.

With its population increasing annually by about 2.6 to 3 percent a year, South Africa must grow 5 to 6 percent a year (at a modest Asian-tiger rate) for national growth to be sustained and for the poorest South Africans to begin to notice per capita benefits. Yet it's barely growing. For about 10 years, to 1994, South Africa grew hardly at all and probably declined on a per capita basis.

How to start the engine of growth is controversial. South Africa's farming and industrial sectors have been protected and subsidized, with high tariff barriers and little free trade. Lowering these barriers and ending subsidies is helping. Still more drastic action is required.

What South Africans politely call the country's labor aristocracy is a significant problem. Because unionized labor was critical to winning the anti-apartheid struggle, trade unions have successfully sought high wages from the mines and government. Wages outside these formal sectors are correspondingly high—for the comparative few who have jobs. Productivity is regarded as low.

Fifty percent of all South Africans are unemployed. The real issue is not how to maintain high wages for the unionized, but how to provide more job opportunities for the unemployed. A new national wage policy must be part of a strategy to encourage new export-oriented industries.

Combating crime is critical. Foreign investors have opened distribution centers or offices in South Africa. But they won't sink real money until the crime wave abates. Crime also is impelling skilled South Africans to flee the country. It will be some time before South Africa's apartheid-determined shortage of indigenous physicians, engineers, accountants, etc., is met.

A larger, reinvigorated, better paid, and better equipped set of provincial and local police forces is necessary. Serious detective work has deteriorated. Corruption and payoffs are frequent. Determined leadership, from the top, is urgently needed.

The same determination, using the military, could calm the province of KwaZulu-Natal, where most of the internecine political massacres are occurring. Mandela and Chief Buthelezi have discussed ways to end the violence, but the underlying issue remains: Buthelezi wants to retain his party's power in Natal; the ANC wants to end it.

Buthelezi and the IFP have boycotted this month's constitutional assembly, which is replacing the country's interim constitution with a permanent

one. At issue is the extent to which provinces (particularly KwaZulu-Natal) will be autonomous. The ANC wants a centralized federation; IFP wants one that's largely decentralized.

The battle is fundamentally about turf and political power. The killings in Natal have given Buthelezi a strong seat at the national bargaining table—and hope of holding onto regional power. Mandela must be tougher in dealing with Buthelezi. With Buthelezi more effectively harnessed, and troops interceding in the province, there can be peace—and it won't hurt growth strategy, either.

Mandela and his government must move from the opening phase of reconciliation into a new phase of tough love. Under that mantle, a resolute president will be able to make the needed difficult decisions on growth, crime, and KwaZulu-Natal.

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### *The Politics of Language, Identity, and Race*

Astute leadership is critical to good governance, particularly in the developing world. It is among the many key variables that distinguish countries that succeed politically, socially, and economically from those that fail. Nowhere is this factor of individual leadership making more of a difference than in post-apartheid South Africa.

President Nelson Mandela is leading all of his peoples, black and white, with a remarkable practical vision. Having endured 27 years in prison, he might have sought revenge. He might have sought unhindered black power. He might have sought to shift white wealth rapidly into black hands.

Instead, President Mandela's first 20 months at South Africa's helm have demonstrated the virtues of a tempered vision. From his initial agreement to head a government of national unity with the very whites who had oppressed him and his people to this year's insistence on the rights of minorities, Mr. Mandela has practiced the politics of inclusion with a passion that borders on the evangelical.

In sports-mad South Africa, Mandela could do no wrong after he publicly embraced South Africa's victorious (white Afrikaner) rugby captain, feted the triumphant (white English-speaking) cricket team, and walked off the field hand in hand with the country's (black) African Nations' Cup soccer winners.

But those were easy, if charismatic, gestures. More recently, Mandela took a tougher stand in favor of Afrikaans, the language of his minority oppressors. In this case, as in so many others, Mandela could have ducked.

At the beginning of the year, the Parliament's Joint Standing Defense Committee, which is dominated by Mandela's African National Congress (ANC), declared that the South African National Defense Force (embracing army, air force, and navy) would henceforth use English (rather than Afrikaans, Zulu, or Xhosa) as the sole language of command and instruction.

### *The Demotion of Afrikaans*

Since the 1950s, when the Afrikaner-led National Party gained control of South Africa's government and ousted English-speakers from the upper ranks of the defense force, Afrikaans has increasingly been the main military language.

In today's black-infused defense force, Afrikaners still occupy many of the higher ranks, as well as those middle levels where commands are executed and training occurs. Without the army's middle-ranking Afrikaners, South Africa would have great difficulty absorbing and integrating former ANC and other African cadres.

When Parliament's Defense Committee produced its white paper, and, in effect, demoted the use of Afrikaans in the military, Afrikaners inside and outside the defense force howled. Simultaneously, the state's multichannel television corporation indicated that it was reducing Afrikaans from an equal medium with English to a "tribal" language having to take its place alongside Venda, Tswana, Sotho, Zulu, Xhosa, Shangaan, and other indigenous tongues. At the beginning of the year, too, the Speaker of Parliament removed all portraits of Afrikaners from the walls of the House of Assembly.

### *Mandela not Pleased*

Afrikaners waxed indignant as Africans cheered. As a language goes, so goes a nationality, the Afrikaners complained. Africans agreed, and were pleased.

Mandela was not. He rebuked the defense committee. He told the defense force to ignore the committee's order. To leaders of an Afrikaner women's organization whom he invited to his official residence in Pretoria, the president said he had informed defense committee members that "If you want this country to be reduced to ashes, you must tamper with the language of a group."

Mandela believes strongly in inclusion. He promised the women, and told the South African press, that reducing the use of Afrikaans by fiat was on neither his nor the ANC's agenda. Startling many of his closest followers, he denied that he wanted to see Afrikaans disappear as the medium of instruction in schools and universities.

Any other leader but Mandela might have bowed to the popular will. In almost any other country in the developing world, minority-bashing is politically promising, if not enjoyable. It is doubly "legitimate" when the minority is a former oppressor.

But Mandela has different and more courageous ideas for South Africa. He wants to build a nation despite the brutal past. Doing so, for him, means respecting the sensitivities of those very persons and groups who never respected Africans. That, in the context of the developing world, is leadership of a high and visionary order.

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### *Why Mandela Changed His Lineup*

President Nelson Mandela's recent sudden reshuffle of his Cabinet of national unity strengthens Deputy President Thabo Mbeki's position as heir apparent. Mr. Mbeki's forceful hand was behind the sacking of Dr. Pallo Jordan, a popular figure in the African National Congress (ANC) and minister of posts, telecommunications, and broadcasting, and the placing of key colleagues into other ministerial positions.

Mr. Jordan is an Mbeki rival and antagonist of long standing from the intellectual left. He is believed to have irked President Mandela by opposing his reconciliation policies toward Afrikaners, especially with regard to the continued use of Afrikaans on state-controlled television and in the schools and Army. He also spoke out against clauses in the new Constitution (still being debated in South Africa) that would sacrifice the civil liberties for which the ANC fought, substituting provisions that could help combat crime.

Jordan and Mbeki clashed most decisively in 1994 and 1995, when Mbeki sought a guaranteed slot on South African TV to put forward the views of the ANC and extol its accomplishments. Jordan opposed anything that smacked of government interference with a free press and media.

In the Cabinet reshuffle, Trevor Manuel, minister of trade and industry, becomes minister of finance. Mr. Manuel is a technocrat with limited political following. He replaces Chris Liebenberg, an independent white banker, who resigned when it was clear that the finance ministry was becoming politicized.

Manuel's approach to managing the South African economy should prove little different than that of Mr. Liebenberg. Both are market oriented. Both sought a more open trading regime, and Manuel promoted the lower-

ing of South Africa's high tariff barriers against its poorer neighbors, like Zimbabwe.

The South African corporate community nevertheless favored the promotion of Alec Erwin, former Communist trade unionist and deputy minister of finance, to Liebenberg's post. Instead, he was given Manuel's old trade and industry position, presumably to strengthen Mbeki's own control over the government and the key economy ministry.

Mr. Erwin had impressed business people and the international finance community with his keen awareness of South Africa's urgent need for job growth. (More than 40 percent of all South Africans are unemployed.) Despite his background, he favored market competition and an end to state intervention.

The sharpest words in Mandela's announcement of the reshuffle were reserved for the much trumpeted Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). He acknowledged the failure to date of that initiative, directed by Minister without Portfolio Jay Naidoo. Too few houses have been built (the target is 1 million in 10 years), too few schools constructed and equipped, and too few jobs created. (In fact, there appears to have been a net job loss in the past year.) Mandela moved Mr. Naidoo, nevertheless, into Jordan's post.

The RDP office and team, however, were retained, but under Mbeki. They will be linked more closely with Mbeki's own economic advisers. The deputy president, both through the RDP office and through his relationship with the new minister of finance, will have a commanding role in promoting economic change and delivering results popular with the public.

Mandela's reshuffle served Mbeki's political interests, and focused the succession race in a manner that Mandela has favored from the beginning of black rule. By sacking Jordan unceremoniously, and thus departing unexpectedly from his usual support of old colleagues, the president also showed that he can be tough and decisive. He put other members of the Cabinet on notice that too much outspoken disagreement with the head man was dangerous. Mbeki may want that precedent to survive into his own presidency.



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*Mandela's Heir Apparent Is Different  
in Style but Similar in Skill*

“Won’t South Africa fall apart when Nelson goes?” is a frequent, anxious question in Cape Town, Pretoria, Washington and other world capitals. President Nelson Mandela, 78, has deftly, even magically, bonded South Africans together since majority rule replaced apartheid in 1994. Can any successor lead Africa’s wealthiest and most important country with the same amazing grace?

After a visit to Boston last week by Mandela’s likely replacement, the signs seem positive. Thabo Mbeki, 54, his country’s executive deputy president, is already forging the domestic and foreign policies that Mandela’s government promotes. Additionally, Mbeki has many of the same political instincts as South Africa’s first black president.

But Mbeki is not a Mandela clone. He is his own person, with a distinctive intellect and style which complements Mandela’s, and he promises to continue to provide vigorous, enlightened leadership to South Africa and to the African continent.

During four sessions at Harvard University last week, and in private sessions as well, Mbeki impressed audiences with his willingness to tackle the tough questions facing South Africa and Africa: how to achieve growth with equity, how to manage the appropriate and hard to satisfy expectations of trade unionists and long-suffering jobless South Africans, how to build a participatory consensus for good government on the foundation of a bitter anti-apartheid struggle, how to reduce criminal violence, and how to harness the creative energies of South Africans fearful of the power of the ruling African National Congress.

With each answer, Mbeki displayed a thoughtfulness and a respect for complexity that is rare among national leaders in and out of Africa. His style is to expose several sides of an issue. Only after making sure that a questioner or an audience appreciates why an answer is easy or difficult does Mbeki conclude a careful analysis. There is no doubt of his clear-eyed intellect, his command of South African and African issues, his decisiveness, and his understanding of political, economic, and social dynamics in general. Mandela has chosen wisely and well.

Already, it is evident that Mbeki is South Africa’s CEO, as well as Mandela’s heir apparent. Mbeki is clearly in charge. He influenced the recent reshuffle of South Africa’s cabinet, and helped install colleagues con-

versant with his approach to governing in key ministries. Most of South Africa's leadership in economic and foreign policy matters is orchestrated from his office. So are many of the social policy questions decided there.

What is unknown is whether his analytical and diplomatic skills can compensate for his perceived lack of common touch. Mandela has demonstrated a genius for the inclusive political gesture—whether at a rugby match or among almost unreconciled white hardliners—that will be hard to equal. Indeed, if Mbeki has the same inclusive instincts, they have not been displayed.

Mbeki lived for many years in exile in Europe and Africa during the ANC's guerrilla struggle against apartheid. Unlike Mandela and his own father, Govan Mbeki, he endured no long incarceration in South Africa's prisons. During his years in exile he gained a master's degree in economics from a British university.

Stylistically, Mandela and Mbeki are different. Their personal histories are dissimilar. So are their private interests, their manner of dress and speech, and their public demeanor. They come from different generations.

Just as destiny chose Mandela to deliver South Africa from apartheid, so Mbeki appears to have the skills and the political prowess necessary to build on the secure national foundations laid down by Mandela.

There are rivals, but Cyril Ramaphosa, only 43 and the recent Secretary-General of the ANC, has recently opted for a lucrative position in the black-run private sector. Tokyo Sexwale, 42, the charismatic premier of Gauteng Province, is busy sorting out difficult problems in the industrial heartland of the country. Both Ramaphosa and Sexwale led the anti-apartheid struggle inside the country while Mbeki was outside.

Mbeki has critics within the ANC's populist wing, but they have been quiet since the recent ouster from the cabinet of Winnie Mandela, the president's former wife, and Bantu Homomisa, an outspoken former Transkeian leader.

Mandela will not seek a second presidential term in 1999, and may give effective control of the country to Mbeki even before then. Whatever the timing, Mbeki's performance as deputy president should end the worries of those who fear that Mandela's departure will undercut South Africa's successful beginning as a new nation.

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### *America Baffled by Mbeki's Ban on AZT*

President Thabo Mbeki's many friends and admirers in the United States are astonished that he has rejected the use of AZT for pregnant women with AIDS and their unborn children. Official American responses have been muted, but the press and private comment is scathing.

AIDS researchers find Mbeki's criticism is not only unfounded, but bizarre.

They are appalled that the only proven medical treatment for the scourge of AIDS is being denied South Africans by government edict. All of their research findings demonstrate AZT's efficacy, its safety and its proven special benefit to soon-to-be born children.

Newspapers in the United States regularly run stories about the wildfire spread of AIDS in Africa. Americans are informed that Malawi, Zimbabwe, and South Africa are three countries where HIV prevalence is higher in adult populations than any other countries in the world. Of the three, they know that only South Africa has the financial means to begin to curtail AIDS in its target population by providing medical care and medicines.

That is why Mbeki's rejection has so confounded the press and physicians in the United States. They view Mbeki's actions as an unwillingness to prevent babies from being born with AIDS. As Africa's most important and most intelligent leader, they cannot understand the basis of Mbeki's decision or his arguments.

Based on scientific findings published in all of the respected medical journals in the United States and Britain, AZT has no serious side effects. Moreover, it has been used successfully for five and more years in all the better hospitals and across the full spectrum of American AIDS cases.

For Health Minister Dr. Manto Tshabalala-Msimang to suggest that AZT could produce children with disabilities is just wrong.

Americans who want to help South Africa and Africa reduce AIDS death are baffled.

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PART THREE

*Conclusion*

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## *Establishing Democracy and Encouraging Prosperity in Southern Africa and Africa*

The future of modern Africa depends upon

- Ensuring good governance,
- Enabling sustainable and equitable per capita economic growth, and
- Ending civil strife.

Forty years on from independence, Africa, especially southern Africa, once again sees brighter skies. There is a palpable sense of renewal, and quiet optimism, despite seven or eight brutal, continuing internal wars, the lingering rule of a handful of old-fashioned despots, the persistence of poverty, and the alarming devastation caused by AIDS and other diseases. Renewal and optimism on the continent and in its sub-regions flow from the surge of participatory democratic governance in the two linchpin states of sub-Saharan Africa—South Africa and Nigeria; from full, free, and fair elections in Ghana, Senegal, and Tanzania; and from the widespread realization among so many Africans everywhere that well-run administrations and well-run economies are both possible and desirable. The democratic impulse is strong among Africans, not least southern Africans; so is the clamor for jobs, schools, medicines, hospitals, roads, and security.

There is a broad recognition that Africa's earlier leaders (and Mugabe still) erred by attempting to repeal the fundamental laws of economics, by arrogating advantage and wealth to themselves, and by pretending that their anti-democratic ideologies and methods were somehow culturally sanctioned—that Africans preferred the modern equivalent of paramount chiefs to the exercise of real democratic practice. Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore and the architect of that nation's outstanding political and developmental success, was scathing: "When misguided policies based

on half-digested theories of socialism and redistribution of wealth were compounded by less than competent government, societies formerly held together by colonial power splintered, with appalling consequences.”<sup>1</sup>

Africans themselves, leaders and non-leaders alike, are equally critical. The rise of determined opposition movements in single-ruler states like Zimbabwe and Kenya (and an opposition victory in Ghana) is a mark of new expectations for leaders and governments. So is the continued spread of democracy and the expectation of democracy northward from South Africa and Botswana and eastward from Senegal and Nigeria. Particularly, it is the democratization of the major hegemons—the strong states of South Africa and Nigeria—that provides so much promise for the remaining polities of sub-Saharan Africa.

Freed from apartheid, South Africa offers open economic and political models for the rest of Africa and a level of deliberative democratic debate to which other states can aspire. Its neighborhood, too, has kept pace. Mozambique, Malawi, and Namibia are following in Botswana’s estimable path of good governance. Mozambique is also growing strongly (as Botswana has long done), if from a low base. Tanzania, the northernmost member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is another staunchly democratic, albeit not yet prosperous, member of the new club.

The road ahead for Africa and southern Africa is littered with the debris of hubris and unfulfilled expectations. The colonists created too many small, isolated, irrelevant administrative entities without ever meaning that all of them should become states in the modern sense. Yet, the cascading logic of post-World War II decolonization led unwittingly to polities fit and unfit for the trials of independence. No post-colonial indigenous leaders (bar some Somalis) agreed to be deprived of their chances of glory and power. They recognized that those opportunities were readily available only within their inherited, arbitrarily bordered, putative nations. Thus no leader—not even Kwame Nkrumah—willingly rejected the circumscribed patrimonies that were inherited from the colonial powers. Most, indeed, demanded independence for the entities that they had already enthusiastically labeled embryonic nations. They rushed forward to embrace nationalism and self-determination and persuasively argued in favor of devolution as of right.

The logic of nationhood was neither tidy nor developmentally assured. But there was no escaping its merit in the abstract, nor its justice for long-oppressed Africans. Just as the Egyptians could themselves manage the

1. Lee Kuan Yew, *The Singapore Story* (London, 1998), 539.

Suez Canal, and Asians had successfully inaugurated post-colonial governments, so Africans could fashion a range of effective, if differently sized, situated, and endowed new sovereign territories. Most of the new nationalist leaders were able, many even experienced in dealing with the outgoing colonial powers. There were no shortages of talent, no shortages of representative democratic or bureaucratic/administrative models. There was plenty of goodwill, and reasonable sums from outside to finance the new polities.

Yet the bubble of heady, infective euphoria of those early days too soon burst. There were growing suspicions, and examples, of the abuse of power, especially among those who had spoken so eloquently of democratic values. Economic gambles were taken; whole peoples were held hostage to those flings of the few. As the 1960s slid unhappily into the 1970s, the Vietnam War ended and commodity prices fell from historic highs, borrowings for capital projects proved dependent on revenue flows that were not materializing (as in Zambia), and many of the powerful developed countries began to turn ever so gradually but decisively away from disappointments in Africa, so the early momentum of African freedom appeared forfeited. Or at least it seemed sorely tried. As the earlier momentum of progress ground to a halt in the 1970s and 1980s—the lost years—much of Africa and southern Africa became poorer rather than richer (as Asia was doing the reverse). Citizens of southern Africa became much less wealthy on average, much more prey to corrupt autocrats and soldiers, and much more cynical. The great hope of independence was effectively replaced by a collective desperation toward the end of the old century.

In this new century, southern Africa, as well as the rest of the sub-Saharan continent, start over again from a vastly different and more promising place than they did when the colonists withdrew. Fortunately, although many mistakes were made, their lessons have been learned and widely absorbed. Moreover, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola were still colonies in the 1960s. South Africa was still brutalized by apartheid. The Cold War supported despots and held many of their peoples in thrall to rigid ideologies and regressive methodologies. Now, much of the undergrowth has been cleared. There is tougher-minded thinking, better discipline, less fuzzy math, and clear-eyed leaders who are showing the way to a promised land. A better life for Africa's peoples is attainable, despite the devastating scourge of AIDS, and despite continuing political and economic apostasy. But the tasks of the early decades of the twenty-first century, challenging as they are, still remain. They are best categorized under the three headings with which this chapter began.



## Good Governance

Good governance is the effective provision of political goods to all of the citizens of a state within a framework respectful of the rule of law, fundamental human rights and civil liberties, and civic engagement. Political (or public) goods are what states are meant to supply. Or, to express the same thought in a complementary way, states exist because they are responsible for the provision of political goods.<sup>2</sup> (Note that the first sentence of this paragraph includes the word “all,” but carefully omits prescribing the ideal “equally to all.”)

The list of those political goods starts with security and public order. States are useless—not doing their job—if citizens are unsafe and prey to brigands, civil strife, and so on. Nor are citizens secure if it is the state itself that preys on its own people. An independent judicial apparatus, operating under a set of widely respected laws, enhances and is essential for the full realization of a secure environment.

After security, states are responsible for providing a platform for economic takeoff. That includes, but is not limited to, a macroeconomic and fiscal setting that is conducive to enterprise, investment, and trade. For most African countries, that platform includes a central bank and a set of policies that are beneficial to, or at least permissive of, growth.

Other political goods include a set of obvious ones that need to be accessible to the public through government action, not necessarily through government ownership, direction, or control. Those goods include an effective educational system; a medical program and staff that prevent and cure disease; an efficacious and well-maintained road, rail, and port network; energy supplies; a working communications infrastructure (radio, television, land telephones, mobile telephones, the Internet, and post offices); and correctional facilities and policies.

Good government further includes a delivery network capable of ensuring that citizens obtain the services to which they are entitled: schools and medical intervention, surely; access to courts, birth and death registries, licensing boards; a stable currency; telephones that work; lights that remain lit; potable water; sanitation; availability of food (and for subsistence farmers, the wherewithal to produce it); and so on.

African states—even the more prosperous states of southern Africa—as this book has indicated, have had immense difficulty delivering good gov-

2. The original specification of political goods as outcomes was in J. Roland Pennock, “Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods,” *World Politics*, XVIII (1966), 420–26, 433.

ernment in a consistent, sustainable fashion. Only Botswana and Mauritius have done so across multiple decades. Mozambique, Cape Verde, Namibia, South Africa, Senegal, Mali, the Seychelles, Malawi, Tanzania, and perhaps Gabon and Ghana have done so in recent times. The rest either have failed to sustain brief and intermittent episodes of good governance or have never paid more than lip service to the concept that states are more than siphons for powerful leaders and their cronies.

According to attitudinal surveys, Africans desire good government, as do citizens everywhere who battle bureaucratic obstacles and crave services and opportunities that are scarce or nonexistent. But it is only the fortunate few, who live in the stable, peaceable, better-run states, who can go about their daily business with expectations of order, fairness, consistency, and predictability. More fear predation and corruption. They anticipate that faucets will go dry, lights flicker and dim, stores run out of maize meal and cooking oil, gas pumps become empty, and government offices lack the permits or approval stamps that are necessary for everyday transactions. That is the rough and ready regrettable lot of Africans in many countries (run by dictators, military juntas, guided democrats, and corrupted democrats), where good governance remains an aspiration rather than a right or an expectation.

Effective leaders, themselves concerned about and anxious to ensure well-governed states, are the first predictors of good governance. Fortunately, the number of those leaders is slowly multiplying, especially in southern Africa. Only capable leaders determined to root out corruption and strengthen the rule of law and bureaucratic performance can transform aspiration into anticipation, and provide good governance for their citizens. Before Festus Mogae became the third president of Botswana, he was its long-serving minister of finance. In that capacity, he was particularly unbending in compelling politicians—even members of the country's cabinet—to pay personal debts owed to government agencies. Indeed, his ministry insisted on foreclosure actions against members of his own political party.<sup>3</sup> Mogae followed the precepts of Botswana's first presidents in demanding zero tolerance for politically prominent borrowers (and those who took bribes, embezzled, or traded influence for perquisites). His was the rare African example.

Neither democracy nor regular elections are necessary or successful predictors of effective and good government. Not all democrats and democracies deliver political and economic goods in a sustainable manner. Nor are

3. John Holm, "Curbing Corruption through Democratic Accountability: Lessons from Botswana," in Kempe Ronald Hope and Bornwell C. Chikulo (eds.), *Corruption and Development in Africa* (New York, 2000), 293.

free and fair elections more than indicators of the possibility of democracy and of good governance. Yet, the existence of both testifies to the capacity of a state to produce or enable the private sector to deliver the ameliorative policies and real goods that its citizens desire. Participatory, deliberative democracy is particularly conducive to good governance because leaders accordingly are responsive to voters and seek their backing during and between elections. Where elections are competitive, so the contest to craft better policies to deliver more cost-effective political goods for more and more citizens is likely to lead to better governance, and often to rising living standards and improved economic growth.

Absent determined, visionary leaders like Mogae, and absent a tradition of good governance, it often proves difficult for poor, challenged states to deliver political goods in an effective, timely, even-handed, and successful fashion. They might be able to offer order, but without the openness and tolerance which ensures most (if not all) citizens equal access to services, power, roads, communications, and the like.

Observers argue that Africa has “almost no ‘practical ethic of the public service.’”<sup>4</sup> Elites generally have failed in practice to demonstrate enthusiasm for such an ethic, and Africa lacks a tradition of respect and responsibility for the public domain. There is no culture of “general interest,” is another way of putting this proposition. At the very least, it is probably safe to assert that over four decades leaders (and therefore followers) have honored the notion of general interest more in the breach than in performance.

A corollary that flows from the post-1960s nullification of any norm of general interest and public responsibility is the widespread collapse of the civil services in so many African countries. This bureaucratic breakdown is a product of declining real incomes (as inflation has long soared out of control and currencies have devalued), the demise of national ethical standards, broadening corruption, and, in sum, the spread of cynicism leading to great collapses of morale. Africans and southern Africans are survivors, so bureaucrats long ago took on second and third jobs (if they could find them), tended their chickens or small farm plots, ran taxi services, and generally entered the informal sector of their countries’ economies. They spent as little time as possible at their desks, and shuffled papers without reaching decisions.

Accountability also became rarer and rarer throughout African societies. Broadcast and print media were controlled, the reports of inspectors-general were ignored, civil society was intimidated or marginalized, free speech was curtailed, and governments rode roughshod over domestic critics, the few

4. J. P. Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, XXXVII (1999), 29.

remaining energetic civil servants, and those on the outside who attempted to challenge governments.

Botswana and Mauritius were exceptions, as they were across so many dimensions of African performance. Then South Africa joined them after 1994, and here and there since the mid-1990s other countries have begun to emulate the levels of bureaucratic performance expected in Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa. Many have also begun to demonstrate the respect for public service that was central to the performance of Botswana and Mauritius over four decades. Elsewhere, that norm is now honored less in the breach than before, but it is at least a work in progress.

The challenge for all of southern Africa in the first decade of the new century is to create a widespread ethos of good governance which crowds out the self-interested preferences of venal leaders and replaces avarice with performance. Since this ethos has for long been present in Botswana, from the reign of one president to the next, and is now present in South Africa and several other critical countries in southern Africa, there is no structural or political reason why observance of such norms cannot spread throughout the continent. Demand for it exists everywhere on the part of citizens. Unless Africa can satisfy their demand, even minimally and incrementally, it will be difficult for the peoples of the continent, or for a sub-region like southern Africa, to achieve economic progress or avoid renewed civil conflict.

## Achieving Sustainable and Equitable Economic Growth

The countries in tropical, middle Africa confront enormously steep economic challenges. Even before the onslaught of AIDS (in 2001 there were 26 million Africans infected with the virus; 11 million young persons had been orphaned), the disease regime of the tropics—malaria, schistosomiasis (bilharzia), trachoma, onchocerciasis (river blindness), trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), leishmaniasis, and cholera—limited developmental possibilities. So does the landlocked nature of so many African countries, especially those across the middle of Africa. Too many of those fifteen non-seacoast African nations (including six in southern Africa) lack easy access to the transportation networks of the globe—to ports on navigable rivers, to efficient rail links, and in some cases even to frequent air services.<sup>5</sup> So much of Africa thus begins the developmental race with extra burdens that stem from irreversible decisions about original borders, included territory, and logistical barriers. Only Botswana and Zimbabwe have managed to overcome

5. John Gallup and Jeffrey Sachs, *Geography and Economic Development* (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 5, 19–27.

their landlocked status, in large part because both countries historically have been linked tightly to the modern South African transportation network. Also, neither is a tropical country. In recent times, Zimbabwe has stumbled, but its economic deterioration owes nothing to the country's geographical legacy.

Developing countries prosper—grow economically with greater rapidity—if they trade openly with the world and thus take advantage of the free movement of goods (without subsidies) and of the technological advances that accompany open trade in goods and services. Open economies are market-based economies, and the more open and the more market based, the more rapidly African countries (Botswana and Mauritius, and now Mozambique) and the tiger countries of Southeast Asia and East Asia (Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea) have grown on a long-term basis. Those African countries with the least state intervention in and interference with their economies have done better than those with government control of “strategic” industries and sectors, with many parastatal corporations, with subsidies of consumer goods, with complicated tariff barriers, and with smaller rather than larger purely commercial sectors.

Less government is prudent for growth in fragile and inexperienced economic settings. So are sensible (noninflationary) monetary and fiscal policies, preferably run by central bankers without too much political interference (Botswana and South Africa are now models). Ballooning budget deficits are inimical to growth. So is “protection,” for the most part. “Protection is not going to be part of our scheme of doing things,” asserted John Kufour immediately after his election as Ghana's president. “We would rather broaden the base of production and try to enlarge the market within which Ghana would earn hard currencies to give us insulation against external shocks.”<sup>6</sup>

Corruption obviously is distortionary and inefficient. Africa's least corrupt countries typically display higher GDP per capita, higher expenditures on health and education as a percentage of GDP, higher creditworthiness ratings, greater observance of the rule of law, higher rates of literacy, lower national debts as a percentage of GDP, more press freedom, and fewer state-owned enterprises.<sup>7</sup>

6. Quoted in William Wallis, “Ghana's New Leader Takes Tough Stance,” *Financial Times*, 2 January 2001.

7. “Corruption Index 2000,” Kennedy School, Harvard University. Research by Ulrik Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, Emmanuel Anyidoho, Heather Baldwin, Daniella Ballou, Amelie von Briesen, Iolanda Fortes, Jennifer Jacoby, Christopher Maier, Sandra Sarria, Carolyn Race, Necia Stanford, Erica Westenberg, and Nicholas Wilson.

It may be as unsurprising as it is significant that the countries in Africa which have produced substantial and sustainable economic growth are also those countries which are least corrupt, spend proportionally the most on educational and health services, have smaller government sectors as a percentage of total GDP, have rarely been involved in conflicts (except to send peacekeepers to UN or OAU missions), adhere to the rule of law and the sanctity of contracts, and are highly democratic in performance. Those countries that are beginning to produce gains in economic growth are those that have roughly the same profiles, or are gradually developing policies that would allow them to join the group of rapidly growing African states.

The degree of a government's total dominance of an economy—the extent to which large percentages of GDP and employment are attributable to government—largely indicates how open or closed the state is to trade, how much competition it encourages and fosters, and to what extent (natural resources booms held constant) the state is focused on and its policies are conducive to sustainable economic growth. The larger, the more competitive, and the more independent a state's private sector is of national control and influence, the more likely an African state may be expected to pursue prospects for real and continuing economic growth.

For forty years, Africa's largely "stunted and dependent capitalism" has shaped stunted and dependent class relations. Privileged groups of state-dependent businessmen, bureaucrats, and politicians have failed to "disperse power or facilitate accommodation."

The result of this growth-minimizing paradigm, forged as it has been in a crucible of political elite self-enrichment, has been the absence of a self-confident business class. Africa has lacked a "hegemonic bourgeoisie" capable of disciplining and holding to account the wielders of political power.<sup>8</sup>

Where wealth flows, or is believed to flow, primarily from political primacy and the acquisition and retention of political power, politics naturally—ineluctably—becomes a deadly zero-sum pursuit. That has been most of Africa's fateful situation for much of the period since the 1960s (and during the colonial era). Reducing government regulations and controls, privatizing state enterprises, and outsourcing many state services and requirements will foster the non-state sector of the economy. Whether that sector is indigenous and empowering is less important than its rapid and responsible maturation. If foreign firms, encouraged by new opportunities, enter the sector to compete with local firms, so much the better, because foreign direct

8. Richard Sandbrook, *The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery* (New York, 1993), 98.

investment (especially in manufacturing capacity) is a privileged route to growth.

In a continent where unemployment rates still stagger along at 30 to 60 percent, what matters most of all is the provision of net new jobs, for which a genuinely competitive environment is a prerequisite. The best route to improved rates of GDP growth per capita and ameliorated living standards is through private job creation (and private sector spending of its own risk capital) instead of government employment (and rising government deficits). Poverty alleviation is best accomplished by opening up economies and gaining sustainable jobs.

The nations in Africa that have lost economic ground since the 1960s, some at a rapidly immiserating clip, and those that have recently begun dramatically to reduce the wealth of their citizens—like Zimbabwe (backwards by 10 percent in 2001)—have failed to abide by nearly all of these straightforward nostrums. Generally, the losers have shared a number of debilitating characteristics. Their capital accounts have usually been sucked dry by predatory rulers; venal corruption is rampant and large scale, as in Cameroon, Nigeria, Gabon, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Many of these states are still interventionist by philosophy, for state control greatly permits plunder. By definition, they are closed or nearly closed trading regimes, with self-defeating tariff barriers. They provide hostile conditions for foreign direct investment; whatever such investment enters the state is of high risk, but monopolies are often obtained in exchange for major enrichments of central figures in a ruling elite.

One of the keys to opening these weak economies to market forces and improving their performance is privatization. This means the sale of state holdings in a range of economic and industrial areas, usually including the telecommunications and power corporations, mining operations, airways, railways, ports and harbors, dairying, meat slaughtering and sales, timber, banking, and on and on. Reducing government ownership and management of enterprises reduces government patronage and the availability of opportunities for rent-seeking. Non-democratic administrations never admit that losing state control vitiates the very meaning of the state for kleptocrats and for those lacking a sense of public interest.

Most of those who refuse to unbundle state assets understand the economic rationale for privatization. They appreciate why it makes sense for entrepreneurs to risk their own capital rather than for governments to risk taxpayers' money. They also appreciate that private management is often more efficient than management by civil servants or other state employees. They understand too well the failures of state-owned enterprises to deliver

service or performance, and they usually understand the virtues of the market. Privatizing also brings needed funds into national treasuries to help reduce soaring deficits.

But the downside for individuals in the ruling elite is also obvious. No autocratic ruler prefers freedom and openness. No authoritarian regime feels comfortable without being able to decree industrial employment levels, divert resources to personal projects, commandeer commercial aircraft or vehicles, or fiddle with monetary policy for political, electoral, or personal purposes. What is rational for reformers and businessmen is not necessarily rational for politicians in non-democratic states. For them, a shrinking state arguably reduces their abilities to serve their peoples, limits their personal power and sense of efficacy, and diminishes their opportunities for personal enrichment.<sup>9</sup>

Even in non-venal states, presidents and ministers of finance must satisfy several constituencies. Segments of their own ruling political parties often retain vested interests in state-controlled policies or monopolies—grain storage, sugar importing, telecommunications regulations, high tariffs, anti-competitive restrictions, etc.

Courageous is the democratically elected leader who can sweep all of his or her backers and friendly special interests aside in favor of rational outcomes that in theory will benefit all citizens, but could more quickly and directly inconvenience privileged elites and powerful supporters.

It is for such reasons that so many of the states of Africa are pursuing reform with deliberate rather than vigorous speed. The majority of the presidents and finance ministers know what they should do to enhance the possibility of prosperity. They know that privatization will reduce official indebtedness, lower budget deficits (and increase savings), almost always improve service delivery, potentially increase medium- and long-term employment opportunities (while losing some jobs immediately), alleviate poverty, improve the local business confidence index, and vastly encourage foreign investment. But even well-intentioned leaders fear the loss of command, short-sighted but loud opposition from trade unions, complaints from the political opposition, and the loss of opportunity for personal aggrandizement and official patronage.

There are innumerable real and imagined constraints. Yet, Africa as a whole is falling behind the rest of the world economically at an accelerated rate. Its people are poorer per capita than they were decades ago. They have

9. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Politics of Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa," *African Competitiveness Report* (Geneva, 1998), 73.



missed the growth spurts of Asia and Europe, and could so easily miss out on or be bypassed by the next wave of technologically driven growth. The causes of so much of this failure to thrive can be attributed to the visible hand of man, particularly the leadership cadre that has ruled so many of the African states for so long.

Yet all is not lost. It is still possible for the rest of Africa to learn from Botswana and Mauritius—the unquestioned success stories—and from the signal triumphs of several Asian countries. Those lessons (now largely absorbed by such new rapid growth regimes as Mozambique, which soared 15 percent in the first half of 2001) are

—Make trade freer and easier. Reduce barriers to imports, exports, and capital flows.

—Eliminate overt and covert subsidies incrementally.

—Strengthen the rule of law, against crime and corruption, and for the sanctity of contracts.

—Exercise monetary restraint. Reduce inflation. Stabilize the local currency.

—Minimize the governmental regulatory regime, thus reducing permits and bureaucratic impediments, and curbing the potential for corruption.

—Improve the logistical and communications infrastructure.

—Privatize and encourage competition within the energy, telephone, Internet, railway, ports and harbor, and other hitherto state-owned or state-controlled sectors of the national economy.

—Outsource a variety of government-provided or government-procured services, like building maintenance, statistical compilation, road construction and maintenance, and even education, medical care, and corrections.

—Enable the growth of a robust private corporate sector capable of providing such outsourced services and managing unbundled state enterprises.

—Reduce opportunities for corruption, root out corruption, and set examples among governing elites of non- and anti-corrupt behavior.

—Improve accountability. Encourage a free press; end government control of radio and television; pay close attention to and abide by the findings of the reports of ombudsmen and inspectors- and auditors-general.

—Govern well. Develop an ethos of good government. Sanction only integrity among leaders.

—Take tough economic decisions, but painstakingly explain them to skeptical citizens.

—Make citizens effective partners in leadership, government, and in bringing about economic change.

None of the above prescriptions is a bridge too far for the nations that now lag in economic growth performance so far behind Botswana,

Mauritius, and the other higher achieving reformers of Africa and Asia. Some cannot fully escape the geographical and medical burdens with which they entered the development race. AIDS will take an additional massive toll. But, with the deserved coming relief of accumulated debt from so many, a number of the hitherto impoverished states will have renewed opportunities, and new incentives, to grow.<sup>10</sup>

How to grow is no longer a mystery. The prescriptions above are all sober, commonsensical, and realizable. The missing ingredient is visionary, committed, honest leadership of the kind that Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius, Tanzania, Senegal, and a few other African countries now enjoy and the developmental failures—Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and others—entirely lack. The international lending institutions, the United States, Europe, and Japan can reward and thus strengthen positive and ameliorative leadership and develop disincentives for venal, irresponsible, destructive leadership. After debt relief and trading opportunities, the developed world ought to begin to transform economic assistance into grants rather than loans, and to offer them for long-term structural improvements with as few attached strings as possible. In other words, sustainable, real African growth can be enhanced primarily by indigenous action and transformation, but the developed world can and ought to assist those who—in the platitude—are genuinely helping themselves. Aid, after all, works only when the recipients already have created growth-welcoming and growth-enhancing policy environments.

## Reducing Conflict

The existence of civil conflict obviously is inimical to good governance and economic growth. During 2001, substantial armed conflicts were under way within Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Congo-B (Republic of Congo), Congo-K (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Uganda, and the Western Sahara. These conflicts were either capable of reshaping the very nature of the state, and were intractable

10. Thomas Callaghy reminds us that debt relief is not a magic bullet. It is “more like a shot from a small water-pistol”—important for some African countries but “very far from being a major step towards turning Africa . . . around.” Thomas M. Callaghy, “Networks and Governance in Africa: Innovation in the Debt Regime,” in Thomas M. Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham (eds.), *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa* (Cambridge, forthcoming, 2002).

and interminable (Angola, Congo-K, and the Sudan); largely anomic, non-ideological, and loot driven (Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Uganda); essentially disputes over personal and ethnic political control (Central African Republic, Congo-B, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Guinea-Bissau); or deeply ethnicized and chronic (Burundi). Morocco, having occupied Western Sahara two and a half decades ago, was continuing to withstand the political and militant demands of the indigenous Polisario Front, based mostly in neighboring Algeria. With the signing of a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea late in 2000, all of Africa's wars were thus internal, albeit Uganda and Rwanda were continuing to sponsor insurgency movements against Congo-K.

To prosper in this century, Africa will need to curtail its propensity to destroy itself by intrastate mayhem. In the last decade, about 6 million Africans, mostly civilians, have been killed by gunfire or the famine and disease that has been associated with the worst of the internal wars—Angola, Burundi, Congo-K, Liberia (1989–1997), Rwanda (1994–1995), Sierra Leone, and the Sudan. More than 6 million Africans were official refugees or were displaced from their homes in 1999. Innumerable thousands more were added to these rolls in 2000, many fleeing the Congolese hostilities in December 2000 alone. The atrocities of the Rwandan genocide demonstrate an African capacity to destroy their own in order to pursue ethnic, ideological, or greedy ends. The massacres in Burundi extend this illogic, but so do the battles for diamond-rich alluvial grounds in Angola, Congo-K, and Sierra Leone and for linguistic, religious, and ethnic objectives and petroleum riches in the Sudan. Reducing incidents of intrastate mayhem, and alleviating those chronic sources of instability, as in Casamance (Senegal), Burundi, and the Sudan, is a precondition for solid and sustainable political and economic development in Africa.

The majority of the world's contemporary warfare is in Africa. No other continent harbors so many separate jurisdictions, and so many countries at war with themselves for so long. Outside of Europe, Indonesia is now fracturing, Fiji is again divided, the Tajiks are fighting insurgents, the Sri Lankan civil war is eighteen years old, and the Afghan internal conflict is of nine years' duration, but those combats pale in number and accumulated ferocity beside those of Africa. Many involve only their own nationals, but the war in Congo-K embroils Rwanda and Uganda against the troops of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe; the Sudanese now battle or formerly engaged Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, with Libya supporting northern Sudan, and the others its southern opponents. The Sierra Leonean butcheries have embroiled Guinea and Liberia, as well as Burkina Faso.

Senegalese troops intervened in 1998 in Guinea-Bissau; South Africa entered Lesotho in the same year. The malevolent or beneficial involvement of African nations in the troubles of their neighbors has hardly come to an end.

The causes of these intrastate conflicts are many, and both *sui generis* and capable of generalization across time and territory: low or reduced GDP per capita; low or reduced rates of literacy; population growth that outstrips economic and job growth—the African condition; large pools of young people without jobs or the likelihood of more than hardscrabble futures; accentuated ethnic size differences; avarice by minorities in power; competition over and unfair sharing of resources (oil, diamonds) between central governments and regions, corruption (and restricting its rewards to a select few), cronyism (and the consequent denial of political and economic opportunities to less-favored citizens); oppression and repression of minorities by majorities or majorities by minorities; widespread denial of human rights to citizens; fear of being deprived of resources and opportunities for growth in any of the ways described above—leading to preemptive defensive action, and the absence of credible information—precipitating attacks by the weak as well as the strong factions within a state. It is correct, but insufficient, to ascribe the internal wars of the continent primarily to Africa's poor economic performance, both absolutely and relatively to other regions.<sup>11</sup>

Many of the contemporary conflicts are rationalized by real grievance but mobilized more by the potential for gain—diamond fields, cobalt mines, petroleum deposits, timber harvests, or the very well of government itself. Ideology in the old, strict sense is almost wholly lacking. The Angolan war, once an offshoot of East-West Cold War rivalries, and refractive of ethnic differentiation, has for many years been driven by the possibilities of plunder. Personal greed and avarice for power also fuel many of today's wars, as they did in Liberia and the two Congos.

In Olsonian terms, Africa has its stationary bandits—leaders like Mobutu and Mugabe who exercise long-term monopolies of territorial control so as to enrich themselves and their associates. But it also has too many brigands, or roving bandits, who steal all they can as rapidly as they can.<sup>12</sup> They thrive on instability and war, and precipitated many of the intrastate hostilities that have engulfed Africa in the last decade.

11. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa," 16 August 2000, [www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/incidence.html](http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/incidence.html).

12. Mancur Olson, *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships* (New York, 2000), 6–11.

In the long term, jobs (and overall wealth creation) will doubtless minimize conflict in Africa. So will better governance, and the delivery of more and more tangible political goods to more and more of a state's citizens. Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Botswana, and—especially—Mauritius are models in both respects.<sup>13</sup> But, in the immediate term, there will persist a continuing need to prevent conflict through diplomatic or other means, and to intervene to contain conflict at its earliest stages. When and if those means fail, serious efforts to build peace will be essential; that is, peace enforcement activities as contemplated in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Africa's successful conflict reduction examples have been few. South Africa arguably limited the extent of mayhem in Lesotho, but precipitated some of its own. Senegal may have prevented more bloodshed in Guinea-Bissau, and Tanzania undoubtedly ended the terroristic reign of Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979. Yet, no one intervened to forestall genocide in Rwanda or massacres in Burundi. In the Congo-K, a number of African countries have attempted to halt the war by diplomatic means, brokering a dozen ceasefires. But others of their brethren have intervened to prolong the fighting. In Sierra Leone, Liberia and Burkina Faso have supported the Revolutionary United Front against the country's government and the United Nations. Only active British intervention has made much difference in damping down the hostilities there. Algeria and the U.S. eventually brokered a ceasefire and a peace agreement to end the Ethiopian-Eritrean war. But no one has been able to assist in peace building or peace making activities in Angola or the Sudan. Julius Nyerere tried hard to broker a peaceful resolution of the Burundian conflict, and now Nelson Mandela may have succeeded, but the atrocities continue.

Western armies could intervene to create zones of peace potential, as France once did in its former colonies and the British in theirs. But, aside from the active recent British presence in Sierra Leone, there can be no expectation in this century that the West will use its military might systematically or sustainably to prevent war in Africa. With the election of President George W. Bush in the U.S., that possibility has indeed receded further. The new European reaction force, once established, will also be deployed primarily within Europe, not in Africa.

13. For Mauritius, see Barbara Wake Carroll and Terrance Carroll, "Accommodating Ethnic Diversity in a Modernizing State: Theory and Practice in the Case of Mauritius," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, XXIII (2000), 120–142.

In terms of a potential reliance on outside agencies, that leaves peace enforcement in Africa almost exclusively to the UN. (The Organization of African Unity has no capacity, no will, and no precedent for intervening militarily in the conflicts of the continent.) But the UN has always lacked a standby intervention capability of its own and, as the early stages of its peace enforcement exercise in Sierra Leone indicated, it is hobbled by discord and disagreement in the Security Council, by financial weakness, and by the determinedly ad hoc nature of so much of what passes as UN peace making and peacekeeping. If Secretary-General Kofi Annan had his way, and the means (mostly from the U.S. and Europe), he could upgrade the capacity of his Department of Peacekeeping Operations and mount credible peace enforcement campaigns to stanch African wars at an early stage. But that is still an aspiration for Annan and the UN. Africa will remain war-torn until the UN acquires the capacity for intervention.<sup>14</sup>

Africa could curb its own propensity to engage in intrastate conflict. It could develop a regional or sub-regional capacity to intervene to separate combatants, restore order within states, or remove egregious disturbers of the peace. Two or three of Africa's sub-regions—the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which stretches from Cape Town to Kinshasa on the west and to Zanzibar on the east; the nascent East African community; and states of West Africa combined as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—could each establish an effective sub-regional crisis response force.

The military leaders of each of those sub-regions assert that such crisis response forces could be organized relatively easily, especially within SADC. The East Africans already train together, and there have been a number of joint training exercises of various kinds in southern Africa and in West Africa. Once agreed on a command structure, each sub-regional army could contribute a battalion to the virtual force structure. There would be no standing brigade, but the deputed battalions would train together and, when mobilized, assume a pre-assigned place and role in a sub-regional force.<sup>15</sup>

Each sub-regional force would have to rely upon the U.S., Canada, and Europe physically to move the battalions into a combat zone; Africa lacks

14. See Robert I. Rotberg, "Peacekeeping and the Effective Prevention of War," in Rotberg et al., *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention* (Washington, D.C., 2000), 2–14.

15. Rotberg, "African Responses to African Crises: Creating a Military Response," in *ibid.*, 98–109.

airlift and most other long-distance moving capacity. Each force would also depend upon the developed world for intelligence, communications, and other specialized facilities. Western funding would also be required, throughout.

Given such Western support (which has long been promised), and given the willingness of the nations concerned to create such a force or forces, the military leaders of Africa claim that they are willing and almost ready to make peace by military interposition in a conflict. They have the person power, the determination, and most of the materiel that would be needed to curtail, if not to eliminate, the intrastate hostilities that now bedevil Africa.

Curtailment and elimination raise tough questions, however, to which answers are not easily forthcoming. Who will summon the crisis response forces into action? Who will define conflicts as susceptible to and appropriate for intervention and peace building? Who will order breaches of an African state's sovereignty wall, and according to whose pre-existing or ad hoc agenda? Who will delineate the parameters of a crisis force's mandate? Who will limit or extend the scope of peace building, and any insistence on disarmament and demobilization of combatants? Who will organize any required post-conflict reconstruction? Who will recall the peace makers when they have done enough, and according to what criteria?

The UN secretary general is the heir presumptive to these thorny questions, and the only position/individual with sufficient global legitimacy to presume—if anyone can—that intervention may be appropriate in certain troubled situations. Only such a legitimate leader could order the caissons to roll. But Africa will have to organize itself to create such an external mechanism, and to hand over the keys of intervention to such an institutional figure (and someone otherwise beholden to the Security Council and the General Assembly).

Those interventions that have hitherto successfully deterred broader conflict, contained a spreading war, or ended the tyranny of a militaristic despot have all been fashioned by a hegemon or a coalition of willing armies. ECOWAS (through the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group—ECOMOG) interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were coalitions of the willing, but they were basically hegemonic and Nigerian-run. Without the efforts of the Nigerian army, Liberia would not have been subdued sufficiently to permit the election of 1997 and the end of civil strife. Likewise, in Sierra Leone in 1998–1999, the Nigerian role was critical. Nyerere's army ended the cruelties of Amin. South Africa prevented a mutiny in Lesotho from spreading. But the Angolan and Congolese wars were and are too massive for South African soldiers alone, and the Kenyans, Ugandans, and Tanzanians together could not take on the

Sudanese (even with assistance from the southern Sudanese insurgents). Favoring sides in those large conflicts has been considered too dangerous.

Sub-regional forces would have a more legitimate mandate, and the presumption of greater neutrality than the battalions of any hegemon alone. Backed by Western air cover and bolstered by Western intelligence gathering, the sub-regional forces might have many peace making advantages. But readers should not expect these sub-regional forces to contain Africa's continuing intrastate conflicts any time soon. Rather, if Africa prevents or retards conflict, it will be the hegemons who do so when their own strategic self-interests are threatened, or when genocides loom.

Credible genocidal worries will also draw in UN peace enforcers, and some very selective Western assistance. But, as the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo indicates so well, the UN acts with utmost reluctance and least dispatch when a sovereign ruler opposes even mere monitors, much less peace builders. Likewise, when the permanent members of the Security Council are hesitant about supplying their own combat personnel, or financial support, the UN can hardly act in any kind of meaningful manner. Thus, as necessary as it may be to reduce the internal killing fields in Africa and southern Africa, persuading any institution, state, or group of states to be proactive—to establish the required preventive and controlling mechanisms beforehand—is a key challenge to would-be peace brokers in this decade. Africa must perforce endure much more strife before any definitive solutions will be realized.

Given such a realistic, gloomy prognosis—that Africa and southern Africa has not yet seen the end of ethnically construed internal hostilities—and the unlikelihood that developmental quantum leaps will reduce the propensity to civil war in the foreseeable future, the beleaguered peoples of a goodly portion of sub-Saharan Africa will continue to miss out on growth and good governance. But there is more hope for some of their neighbors. Insofar as other parts of Africa gradually learn the lessons and adopt the approaches of Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa, and perhaps the new Nigeria, then more and more Africans—especially the more favored southern Africans—will benefit from improved living standards and enjoy a government similar in predictability and efficiency to those in more fortunate parts of the world.

The peoples of Africa have survived four difficult and troubled decades. They are wiser now, have loftier expectations and a fuller appreciation of their potential in a globalized economy. They have better and more responsive leaders. The coming decades will be decisive for Africa. A bright day may finally follow the dark storms of the previous century.



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## *Postscript*

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, speaking in Johannesburg on May 25, 2001, about the evil rule of President Robert G. Mugabe of Zimbabwe, urged the dictator to “submit to the law and the will of the people.” Powell hoped that “we can put the right kind of political pressure on him so that he will yield to the desire of the people to have a free and fair election . . . and that he will bring war veterans under control so that they stop terrorizing the communities in Zimbabwe.” Powell urged Mugabe to deal with land and other issues democratically, and “not through totalitarian methods.”

In so forthrightly criticizing an egregious example of African despotism, Powell was stressing the salient themes of the first section of this book—that democracy should be enabled and supported, autocracy condemned, and autocrats shunned. Powell’s remarks also paralleled the analyses of Zimbabwe’s condition in 2000 that was contained in the last parts of the first section of this book and developed further in several opinion pieces that appeared in 2001 in the *Boston Globe*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and the *New York Times*—as this book was making its way through the press. Indeed, the last of those articles appeared on May 14 in the *New York Times*, under the headline “Zimbabwe’s Spreading Misery.” It called on Powell (and South Africa) to help isolate and reform Zimbabwe’s outrageous regime.

The article suggested that “the economic and political cancer of . . . Mugabe’s regime . . . promises to spread to South Africa—and so endanger the continent.” His example compromised American attempts to help Africa help itself. The article urged Washington, London, and Pretoria to act together to end Zimbabwe’s lawlessness before it undermined the entire region.

“Constructive engagement” could no longer curb Mugabe’s assaults on Zimbabweans or his “flouting of international norms.” Instead, I argued, Western donors should freeze aid, refuse visas to officials, and generally tighten the screws on Zimbabwe until Mugabe stopped oppressing his people and restored the rule of law.

Powell endorsed and extended that diagnosis. “We may have to do more as the situation deteriorates,” he said. In order to “avoid the kind of crisis that is slowly building,” the United States wanted Mugabe to act more responsibly, Powell told a questioner. “We are working at a political level and at an economic level,” he continued.

At a subsequent press conference with South Africa’s foreign minister, Powell said that South Africa and the United States viewed the Zimbabwean problem in the same way. The “actions” of Mugabe were causing a crisis in southern Africa that would “spill over the borders in due course and affect South Africa.” He concluded by indicating firmly that “action” had to be taken to stabilize the situation and to “persuade” Mugabe to resolve the problem in Zimbabwe in a democratic fashion.<sup>1</sup>

1. Transcripts of Colin Powell’s remarks at the University of Witwatersrand and the press conference in Johannesburg on May 25, 2001, are available at ([www.usinfo.state.gov](http://www.usinfo.state.gov)). In late June, 2001, Senator Russell Feingold’s Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Africa held a hearing on Zimbabwe. My written and oral testimony echoed the substance of the published opinion pieces, and supported the passage of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001.

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*Robert I. Rotberg*  
*1960–2000*

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