# Race and Ethnicity in East Africa

Peter G. Forster, Michael Hitchcock and Francis F. Lyimo

Race and Ethnicity in East Africa

Also by Peter G. Forster

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Race and Ethnicity in East Africa

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Preface

This text arises out of teaching and research materials collected by the Department of Sociology of the University of Dar es Salaam. It is concerned with the examination of basic issues in the study of Race and Ethnicity, using examples drawn particularly but not exclusively from an East African context. The aim is both to make students and others aware of the basic sociological and anthropological ideas concerning race and ethnicity, and to examine the relevant issues in relation to Africa. The text is expected to be of general value in East Africa; also for those elsewhere who have East African interests, or who wish to study matters of race and ethnicity using East African examples. The subject-matter is also relevant to broader issues of the relationship between culture and development. An original synthesis of the relevant material has been attempted throughout. Excessive use of specialized terminology has been avoided, and such unfamiliar terms and nuances that have been retained have been explained in the glossary provided at the end of the text.

Chapter 1 is broad and interdisciplinary in scope, and examines the evolution of man with particular reference to the East African context. The political and ideological implications of African identity are also considered. Insights from archaeology and the biological sciences are used, as well as those from social science. Chapter 2 deals with some key issues in the study of race and ethnicity from the viewpoint of the social sciences. Once again, the political implications of such an exercise are considered, likewise that of whether problems of race and ethnicity can be reduced to other factors. Chapter 3 examines the spread of racism in Africa, and by the nature of the exercise attention is paid particularly to South Africa and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Chapter 4 develops the theme of European penetration into East Africa, and considers pre-colonial contact, and economic, political and cultural aspects of European colonialism and settlement; and the difference in styles of colonial rule receives special treatment. Chapter 5 examines the issue of Asian penetration, and looks at trading links with Southeast Asia, the Indian Sub-continent and the Arab world. Once again, economic, political and cultural factors are all considered. Chapter 6 deals mainly with the post-colonial situation in East Africa, in relation to problems arising from ethnic diversity amongst indigenous Africans, and includes discussion of the implications of multipartyism. A special section is also

devoted to the situation in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s. Chapter 7 is concerned with the phenomenon of religion, which is a further source of cultural differentiation in East Africa, and considers how it relates to ethnicity. Chapter 8 deals with tourism, which is coming increasingly to be recognized as a phenomenon of inter-ethnic relations, and which is of particular significance in the economies of East African states.

Peter G. Forster, University of Hull
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Acknowledgements

1 The Peopling of Africa

HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN

The issue of how to define a human being assumes considerable moral, political and religious importance. There is a widespread belief throughout all cultures in the world that human life is to be valued, and that it is not to be ended deliberately. Christian belief involves statements as to the sanctity of human life, and some secular philosophies are described as 'humanism'. Such beliefs generally do not go so far as to suggest that killing another human being is never justified. Exceptions are generally granted in the case of war, and also by way of revenge or punishment for certain offences, particularly homicide. Whether there should be any additional circumstances in which human life can legitimately be ended can often be a matter of heated debate, as in discussion about euthanasia. But certainly there is a sharp distinction drawn between human and animal life. In most societies in the world, animals are killed for food. Some also have totem animals which cannot be killed or eaten; and those who keep pets would feel revulsion about eating them, in the same way as they would about human beings (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 204–8; Leach 1964; Leach 1970: 36–75). But even here life is not seen as sacred in the same way. Euthanasia, for instance, is generally seen as morally justified where severely injured pet animals are concerned.

A distinction is also often drawn between members of one's own group and non-members. In warfare, killing the enemy is felt to be less morally objectionable because they are outsiders. Correspondingly, killing of a close kinsman is seen as more repulsive than killing a non-kinsman. Peristiany notes that towards the end of boys' initiations among the Kipsigis of Kenya, an admonition was given never to kill *another Kipsigis* under any circumstances (Peristiany 1939: 23). Evans-Pritchard has shown for the Nuer of the southern Sudan that when feuding within a village occurred, clubs were the weapons permitted; the use of spears, which are much more lethal, was reserved for attacks on outsiders (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 152–5). Commenting on his work among the LoDagaa of Ghana, Goody notes that applicability of social norms depends upon the social distance between the parties concerned, and that this relates to homicide as well as to other offences (1962: 116–17).

The commandment 'thou shalt not kill' is held to by most Christians in conjunction with a 'just war' theory.

The issue of human and non-human is also of importance to the study of race. If anyone is seen as non-human or sub-human then this can for some be seen as justification for treatment that would not be seen as appropriate if they really were full human beings. It will be shown in Chapters 2 and 3 that this issue assumed some relevance for Africa in relation to slavery. The Bible of course provides for the separate creation of man, but even among Christians few non-fundamentalists take such a view literally. There was much controversy on the subject in the nineteenth century, especially since evolution was seen as denial of design in nature. Most Christians would now accept evolution, though many would insist that divine intervention was needed for the creation of the human soul. Some Muslims would be more likely to object to the abuse of the theory of evolution by unbelieving scientists, than to evolutionary theory as such. Koranic verses exist which encourage discovery of the origin and evolution of beings (Golshani 1986: 87–9). Evolutionary biology is now generally seen as the key to the understanding of the origin of man. At one time, however, it was believed that the different races evolved separately in different environmental conditions (Coon 1993). However this view presents many difficulties, because there are problems as to how similar human beings of all races have turned out to be (Fox 1991: 71–2). There are some who still maintain that there has been gradual evolution along separate lines, but with some intermixing so that a network of genes flowed between those at parallel stages of evolution. Such is the view of Wolpoff, Wu and Thorne (1984), who referred to their theory as 'multiregional evolution' (Stringer and McKie 1996: 48). It is also the case that human beings everywhere can interbreed and produce viable offspring. It is now generally seen as evident that all the races of mankind have a common origin, although some maintain that the final stages of evolution might have taken place independently, in separate areas. Another point of interest is that evolution is not to be seen as 'dehumanizing'; on the contrary, racist theories are sometimes held in conjunction with anti-evolutionist standpoints. This has at times been found to be the case in both South Africa and in the southern parts of the United States.

Human beings are mammals who belong to the primate order, and within this they belong to a family known as hominids. The most closely related primates outside the hominid family are the apes. Hominds themselves developed into several different species, but all except one of

these species has died out. The survivor is *homo sapiens*. Other hominids that are now extinct but whose existence has been revealed by archaeological evidence are the genus *australopithecus* (within which species can be distinguished); and within the genus *homo*, the species *habilis* and *erectus*. There has been much debate as to what count as distinctively human characteristics. One factor commonly identified is the ability to make tools. This is not confined to hominids, since leaves, branches and sticks are sometimes used in such a way by animals; but only humans can use one tool to make another, or produce standard tools. This ability is not confined to *homo sapiens*; remains of tools have been excavated at the same sites as *australopithecus* and other species of *homo*. It is also evident that the complexity of human behaviour can be linked to the ability to interpret symbols, to abstract, and to communicate, especially to the young. Thus language is seen as a key human characteristic. Its exact origin is difficult to determine, especially since brain tissue does not fossilize; and it is recognized that all primates use body language and non-linguistic vocalizations. But language as we now know it involves a wide range of open symbols which can relay different messages and which also enables abstraction.

Also relevant is the level of development of social organization. Humans asserted their mastery of the world by use of their brains rather than by physical strength alone; and as a result they were able to dominate stronger predators. Cooperation was needed to secure this. The idea of culture is also relevant when considering the emergence of human beings. Man and culture can be seen as having evolved together. Culture was defined by Tylor as 'that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society' (Tylor [1871] 1958: 1). It identifies activities which are learnt rather than instinctive, and which are transmitted from one generation to the next. Artifacts such as tools and clothing are included: these are part of 'material culture'. Culture is cumulative, and as new techniques are learnt they can be passed on to the next generation. Man belongs to the primates, but is different from them by having overcome his primate nature; yet at the same time, culture is the product of a natural process. The anthropologist Lévi-Strauss has been particularly concerned with the ways in which man as a toolmaker succeeds in transforming nature. He maintains that customs, beliefs, and institutions are techniques like others (Lévi-Strauss 1963: 256–7). A very controversial issue is that about how far intelligence can dominate over biological urges.

AFRICA AND HUMAN ORIGINS

The question of human origins is especially interesting when posed in the African context, because the general consensus seems to be that it was in Africa that humans evolved. Archaeological research has shown the way here, and various pieces of evidence suggest that Africa was particularly important in the process of human evolution. Hominids first evolved in Africa, and the evolutionary process to *homo sapiens* continued over a period of three million years.

Some findings on human origins have been remarkably recent, and have involved techniques such as DNA testing, This has confirmed the belief that African human populations have a longer history than those found elsewhere in the world. But the first major breakthrough came in 1924, at Taung in Cape Province in South Africa. Human remains were discovered by Raymond Dart in that year, but they had much smaller brains than those of modern man. The name Australopithecine was given to this particular hominid type. This discovery led Robert Ardrey, in a popular work (1961), to maintain that it represented the precursor to modern man. He argued that human origins were bloody and that they depended upon the production of weapons. However, this thesis was not substantiated, not least because at Taung no conclusive evidence of tools was found, and indeed it seems that the australopithecines were themselves hunted (Stringer and McKie 1986: 20–1). There were, however, indications of adaptation to bipedal locomotion. The genus *australopithecus* is believed to have been existence as early as five million years ago. Specimens of members of the genus *homo* have mostly come from archaeological research in East Africa. A major breakthrough came in 1959, and this was in northern Tanzania. In that year some early Stone Age artifacts were found in Olduvai Gorge by Mary Leakey, together with hominid remains which were anatomically distinct from the australopithecines, displaying an increased cranial capacity, comparatively smaller teeth, and hands capable of finer manipulation.[1] Olduvai Gorge also proved to be a rich source of tools, though it could not be ascertained whether hominids of the kind found possessed language. The human remains are of the species *homo habilis* which was eventually dated as being 1.8 million years old. Evidence now points to the evolution of a large-brained form, by 1.6 million years ago, which is now known as *homo erectus*. Again this evolution seems to have first taken place in Africa, with specimens first being discovered in the 1930s. Those who subscribe to a theory of multiregional evolution do not dispute this, but maintain that *erectus* spread round the Old World,

with subsequent evolution in different places but always with genes flowing between different human populations (Stringer and McKie 1996: 48–52). 1.6 million years ago also saw the beginning of the pleistocene era in geological time. A cooler climate prevailed and glaciation occurred, while the fall in sea level led to the opening of land bridges, which were subsequently closed during interglacial periods. This *erectus* species seems to have continued in existence till 250,000 years ago. Earlier specimens seem to be of *habilis*, though some may be transitional forms. *Erectus* has a larger cranial capacity than *habilis*, though less than *sapiens* as known today. *Erectus* also shows a robust constitution, suggesting a physically demanding lifestyle. There is evidence of cave dwelling: and also an ability to make fire, enabling tolerance of colder environments. *Erectus* seems to have been a better hunter than *habilis*, and was able to make chopping tools. But the problem still remains as to how the boundaries between species are to be defined. Biologists normally use the criterion of ability to interbreed so as to produce fertile offspring, but information relevant to this issue cannot be obtained from fossils (Stringer and McKie 1996: 51–2).

Migration appears to have occurred from human origins in Africa to the rest of the world. The species *homo sapiens* could have existed in its archaic forms from about 400,000 years ago, but detailed information concerning his early life is scanty, and there is evidence of much diversity. Recent archaeological findings in Ethiopia suggest that the origin of *homo sapiens* lies firmly in Africa. Two archaic forms are identified, before *homo sapiens sapiens* (modern man) developed; the existence of the latter dates from about 40,000 to 80,000 years ago. Other subspecies found in Europe (Neanderthals and Cro-Magnon) are seen as quite close to modern man, and are associated with the development of aesthetic appreciation.

DNA testing has in recent times proved to be a useful addition to evidence derived from fossils. This has focused mostly upon mitochondrial DNA, which can only be passed on from mothers to their offspring and which accumulates only occasional mutations. DNA research has a wide range of uses in explaining differences between people, and can be applied with profit to the study of human origins. Such an approach was first developed by Cann, Stoneking and Wilson (1987); and there is now a widespread consensus that the DNA of different populations throughout the world is too uniform for there to have been gradual evolution in different parts of the globe. It is also apparent that Africans have experienced more mutations, thus lending support to the theory that modern human origins are to be found in Africa (Stringer and McKie 1966: ch. 6).

All human populations in existence today are of modern man, *homo sapiens*. In popular discourse race is sometimes held to have a high explanatory potential, but this is now proven to be unfounded. This will be developed in Chapter 2, where it will also be shown that the very idea of race is more of a social than a genetic category. It is however true that people are most likely to mate with those geographically near to themselves, and that accordingly there can be different gene frequencies in different populations. There are also local genetic adaptations such as response to heat and resistance to particular diseases, when people occupy the same habitat (Fox 1991: 67–82). Intelligence is definitely not related to race, though different skills can be developed in accordance with their utility in a particular environment.

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

Not only are tools a key factor in indicating human existence, but technological development is also an important factor in human progress. In the African context, the earliest techniques used involved the working of stone. It is uncertain whether such stone tools originated before *homo erectus* developed, but it is known that techniques improved as the move from *erectus* to *sapiens* took place. Then came the gradual development of iron-working skills, from around 500 BC. Those who had developed such skills were in a better position to expand to other territories. Initially subsistence will have been through hunting and gathering, with few possessions and a low population density. Some scattered groups, such as the Dorobo in Tanzania, could have a purely hunting economy. Others remained in harsher land but had trading relationships with non-hunters: the Hottentots (Khoikhoi) of South Africa and Namibia serve as an example of this. Such peoples were however displaced to the less fertile areas when settled agriculture developed. Plant and animal domestication was gradual, over a long historical period: and the development of pastoralism and agriculture did not always occur concurrently. The typical instrument for agriculture was and remains the hoe, and the system of slash and burn operated. Fishing could also be important, and was linked to concentration of population consequent upon the rise in water level. Hunting generally remained a subsidiary element in non-hunting economies. Where animal husbandry was practised, sometimes it could be of key importance and

at other times it was merely a secondary activity. Craft work also became developed; wood, metal and ivory were used and a certain amount of specialization occurred when a surplus could be accumulated.

In some cases a high degree of sophistication developed. The Nile Valley in Egypt is an obvious case in point. The fertile strip along the Nile facilitated communication and dense settlement. Trading links were established, and also various craft techniques were practised, in specialisms such as pottery. Political development followed with the unification of the state under a single king in around 3100 BC. Monumental brickwork was now possible, and writing had begun. Centralization continued further after 2700 BC. The pyramids now served as permanent royal tombs for the kings (Pharaohs). Buildings such as the Sphinx served as part of the cult complex which protected the Pharaoh's interests after his death. Some form of state structure continued though at times weakened, till the Roman conquest which occurred shortly before the birth of Christ. As will be shown, the sophistication of Egyptian civilization has been pointed to by some nationalists as a key component of the African heritage. Moreover in central Africa, the case of Zimbabwe ruins is of note. Such ruins are testimony to the existence of powerful kingships between the Zambezi and the Limpopo, at various periods between the fifth and the fifteenth century. Complex states also became developed on the west coast. Africa did not in any case exist in isolation; there were long-standing trading relationships with the outside world but these were largely confined to the coast.

The situation was far from static from a geographical as well as a historical point of view. The myths of origin of nearly all African peoples suggest that they came from 'elsewhere' (Maquet 1972: 23). In some cases there was movement but for short distances only, as among nomadic peoples like the Bushmen (San). In other cases such as the Maasai and the Nuer, transhumance occurred. More distant contacts were intermittent, but certain individuals and groups made much longer journeys. Early iron age culture was introduced to Bantu-speakers; linguistic evidence points to an origin for them in the Benue Valley, situated between Nigeria and Cameroon. Migrations occurred between 1200 and 1545, and herders were easily conquered and absorbed. Pastoralists also migrated southwards, and sometimes introduced new political structures. Often this was linked with superior military power. Conquests of this nature were the basis for aristocratic structures such as are found in Rwanda and Burundi.

LINGUISTIC DIVISIONS

Language is the other key characteristic by which 'human beings' can be identified. But while language is unifying in that all humans possess it, at the same time it is divisive because of the numerous ways in which it manifests itself. It bears no direct relationship to ethnicity as such, but it is generally a way by which ethnic categories are socially identified. In the African context it can be acknowledged that the situation is highly complex, with many not yet recorded. The classification of African languages has also proved to be a controversial issue, and much is based upon untested hypotheses rather than proofs of genetic relationship. But there is wide acceptance of the divisions proposed by Greenberg. In his earlier work (Greenberg 1955), he proposed sixteen families of language but he later revised this and reduced them to four, or five if Madagascar is to be included (Greenberg 1963). These are as follows:

1. *Niger-Congo*: These are the largest group, spoken in west, central and southern Africa, with some in the western Sudan. This is the largest class, with two-thirds of African languages belonging to it. The main branch is that of the Benue-Congo languages, spoken from the Benin–Nigeria border and southwards to cover the remainder of Africa apart from the south-western corner. Bantu languages are a sub-grouping of this branch.

2. *Afro-Asiatic*: These are spoken in north and east Africa. Those languages known as 'Cushitic' belong here, and are spoken in Somalia, and Ethiopia, though some including Iraqw are spoken in central Tanzania.

3. *Khoisan*: These are the 'click' languages found in southern Africa. There are also two Tanzanian languages (Sandawe and Hadzapi) which belong to this group.

4. *Nilo-Saharan*: These are found in the area of the Congo–Nile divide. They include the Nilotic group of languages, spoken in central Tanzania, then found northwards across Kenya, Uganda and the southern Sudan, spilling out into Ethiopia. Included in this group are Luo, Maasai, Teso, Datoga, and Kalenjin.

5. *Austronesian*: These include Malagasy, a language with various dialects, spoken in Madagascar. The significance of this will become apparent when relations with South-east Asia are considered in Chapter 5. This class is not represented on the African mainland.

It is therefore apparent that all four of the mainland divisions of languages are represented in East Africa. However, the Niger-Congo is dominant; it should be noted that this includes Swahili, a Bantu language which is in widespread use as a lingua franca over the area.

ETHNICITY: UNITY AND DIVERSITY

There are numerous ethnic divisions among Africans, though the issue of how these are to be distinguished is highly complex. However, conquerors and subjects often remain differentiated long after the event; also production techniques are important, and language is often regarded as a key indicator of difference. Physical classification is complex. (Ottenberg 1960: 18–20; Oliver and Crowder 1981: 70). Some make crude distinctions between the Caucasoid, found in North-east Africa, the Khoisanoid, i.e. Hottentot/Bushmen, the Negroid, found in most of Africa, and the Mongoloid, found only in Madagascar. Ottenberg is concerned to stress the diversity to be found in Africa in terms of culture as well as language. He points to major variations in terms of kinship, politics, beliefs and economics, and notes the constraints imposed by topography and climate (1960: 3–4). Maquet, however, maintains that there are also basic similarities which can be linked both to similar experience of the world and to dissemination of certain traits (1972: 16–34). He suggests that certain common cultural elements can be discerned. These include a close link between mother and child, with growth in the context of a broader family; overall authority of the lineage, deriving from the ancestors, and serving to provide for essential needs and to regulate marriage; a conception of the individual as part of a stream of life which transcends one's own self; a relationship with nature, which both hurts and protects; and an emphasis on the group rather than the individual.

In such a vision, adaptation rather than initiative may be stressed but it should not be assumed that the group can imposed its will unchallenged. Various safety-valves operate by which unpopular decisions can be circumvented. Maquet writes as an anthropologist. Numerous missionaries have also shown interest in 'Africanity'; Gutmann, Smith, Tempels, Westermann and Young serve as examples.[2]

RACE, CULTURE AND AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Writers on the distinguishing features of 'African culture' have been mentioned but so far all of these have been Europeans. The question arises as to how Africans and those of African ancestry have responded to such ideas: have they been built on or rejected as distortions, and what alternatives have been proposed? Two problem-areas are evident. The one relates directly to philosophies of liberation which have

a racial component, and which also have something to say which is of general importance concerning human nature in the African situation. The other relates to nationalism based upon a vision of African culture which is somewhat narrower in conception. The two will be considered in turn, but cannot be distinguished completely.

Where the racial component is examined, it is necessary to speak not only of Africans but of those of African descent, since some of the perspectives stem from thinkers born in the United States or the West Indies. Articulation of such common concerns was not without its problems, since American Blacks were mostly urbanized and shared much of a common culture with their White counterparts; whereas Africans were mainly rural-based and had a very different culture. But all were victims of oppression, and common interests were articulated through the philosophy of Pan-Africanism.

Edward Blyden (1832–1912) was a native of St Thomas in the then Danish West Indies. He was of quite recent African ancestry, descended from an eastern Nigerian family; and eventually he settled in Liberia and Sierra Leone. He was highly educated, especially in the Greek and Latin classics, and retained a deep respect for Greco-Roman culture. He had a high overall regard for early European culture but maintained that Europe had subsequently been degraded as a result of the slave trade. He was eager to preserve African culture and to reinterpret history. He showed a strong interest in the Pharaonic tradition of Egypt, and also promoted the study of oral history. He saw evidence of consanguinity between the 'races' of inner Africa and the ancient Egyptians and Ethiopians. He saw 'race' as the effective basis for nationalism (a view which was also general in Europe at the time). He saw Blacks as distinct but equal; he opposed racial mixture, and looked to the setting up of a Black republic as preferable to a society where Blacks were merely tolerated. He sought amalgamation of West African culture and later in life developed sympathies with Islam. He felt that this religion was not disruptive of African culture, and that it had helped to promote African consciousness and to organize communities (Mudimbe 1988: 98–134).

Marcus Garvey (1887–1940) was born in Jamaica, but was particularly active in the American context. He sought Negro unity and was sceptical of any hope of liberation from oppression in the United States. Rather he saw Africans and those of African descent as in a better position to live together in harmony. He worked on practical measures to this end, setting up the Black Star shipping line so as to enable contacts between African and American Blacks. In 1914 he formed the Universal Negro Improvement and Conservation Association and African Com-

munities League (UNIA). He sought cooperation with Liberia, though in the end this was not successful. He was suspicious of some historical claims that he saw as White distortions. He saw Egypt as a source of Black pride, and as prior to Greek culture which he considered to be derivative. He was a pioneer in promotion of African unity, and looked forward to a United States of Africa (Ajala 1973: 92–101). He was sceptical of the potential for Christianity as it stood, and sought to establish an African Orthodox Church, which later developed links with Greek Orthodoxy.

Both Blyden and Garvey tended to advocate a segregationist policy. This did not however go unchallenged. One opponent was *William Du Bois* (1868–1963). Du Bois was a Black American and was well qualified in the Greek and Latin Classics and the social sciences. Like Blyden and Garvey before him, he was impressed by the idea of a specifically Black Egyptian heritage. He saw White Americans as eventually capable of seeing reason about discrimination, and he was considered to be a moderate in contrast to Garvey. In 1910 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP) was formed, and Du Bois was made its director of publicity and research. This was an inter-racial body led by White liberals. Du Bois did sometimes vacillate upon the issue of cooperation between races. In 1917 he initiated the support of American Negroes for African freedom and he is particularly remembered as a pioneer of Pan-Africanism. He called the first Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919, and there were three further events of this nature during the inter-war period. In 1961 he became a citizen of independent Ghana (Ajala 1973: 101–4).

Another 'moderate' figure, probably even more so, was *James Aggrey* (1875–1927). Born in Ghana, he was quietist in his support for African nationalism, and even had some sympathy for colonialism. He disapproved of Garvey's standpoint though understood the circumstances which had led him to it. But he did support Black pride in the cultural sphere. He felt that Whites' sense of justice and altruism would ultimately reward patience and humility on the part of Blacks. He was influenced by the notion of 'consciousness of kind' as promulgated by the American sociologist Giddings (see Chapter 2). He was concerned that Whites felt in such a way in respect of their own group. He saw such a consciousness as capable of being extended to the whole of humanity with the help of Christianity. He sought cooperation on the basis of at least some degree of equality. He is particularly well known for his analogy with piano keys, in which he argued that though some sort of tune could be played with the black or the white keys alone, harmony could be

achieved only by playing on both white and black. He played a significant role in 1920 through his membership of the Phelps Stokes commission on education in East Africa, since he was its only African member (King 1971: 95–118; Smith 1929).

The next generation of key thinkers came from the francophone African countries. All had experienced the assimilation policy adopted by the French colonialists, in which those who had absorbed French education and culture to a high level could be regarded as equals. However, they never felt fully absorbed and had been forced to repudiate their indigenous African values. Three key thinkers considered here showed marked differences between themselves. Senghor and Diop emphasized the intellectual component in liberation, but whereas Senghor saw this in cultural terms, Diop saw in in terms of science. Fanon was impatient with intellectualism and sought mass support involving recourse to violence.

Léopold Sédar Senghor (born 1906) recognized that absence of racial prejudice against him in France was conditional upon his cultural assimilation. He espoused the cause of *négritude*, a philosophy originally articulated by Aimé Césaire in the early 1930s, but which acquired a more obvious political dimension in the late 1940s. Senghor was impressed by anti-rationalist elements in French thought, such as that of Bergson. He was also influenced by Western ethnographic work, such as Tempels (1959) and his notion of 'vital force'; and the work of Delafosse on the 'Negro soul' (1927) and Frobenius on 'African culture-history' (1936). He went on to suggest that Black and White had different conceptions of the world, though this was not to imply any suggestion of superiority or inferiority. He maintained that whereas Europeans based their thought on mind, Africans base theirs on instinct. Such views put him in strange company. Not only were French colonial officers likely to hold similar views, but they were also found in some racist philosophy. Gobineau (1854), seen as the father of modern racism and an influence on Hitler, saw emotion as Negro and reason as hellenic: and Senghor quoted him explicitly (Hyams 1971: 66). Senghor initially appears to have held to some racist beliefs, and also attached importance to the significance of Africa as the cradle of humanity.[3] Some militant supporters of négritude were able to suppress racist sentiment only with difficulty. Senghor was however to have an important ally on the Left, namely Jean-Paul Sartre. For Blacks, négritude could be seen as a way by which the oppressed class could take conscience of itself. It involved an acceptance of difference, an awareness of ancestry as important in a people's 'soul', and acknowledgement of the spiritual dimension in life. Sartre

saw négritude in terms of a dialectical progression, with white supremacy as the thesis, négritude as the antithesis, and human society without racism as the synthesis. Thus négritude could be recognised as a 'non-racist racism' which proclaimed its own destruction (Sartre 1948: xl).

Partly as a reaction against Nazism, Senghor eventually went on to advocate 'cultural cross-breeding'. He also urged revitalization of African languages but not to the exclusion of French. He stressed the continued importance of cultural issues, and saw them as liable to be forgotten if left to the last (Hyams 1971: 80–8).

Senghor has been criticized on a number of counts. The Nigerian poet Wole Soyinka saw négritude as narcissistic, and commented that a tiger does not proclaim its tigritude but just pounces (cf. Jahn 1966: 265–6). In reply, some observed that Whites did not need to proclaim their whiteness because the oppressors and oppressed had different needs. Other critics maintained that négritude was very remote from the African masses, for whom self-knowledge was not the top priority. Others objected on the grounds of mystification, saying that reason and emotion were to be found in all races, and that négritude was merely an escape. Négritude represented something very different from Pan-African ideals.

Cheikh Anta Diop (1923–1986) approached the issue of African liberation first and foremost in terms of correcting the scientific record. He studied initially in his native Senegal and later in Paris, where he had difficulty in getting recognition for his thesis by the examiners. His particular focus was upon ancient Egypt, whose culture he saw as standing in the same way towards the rest of African culture as Greco-Latin culture stood to Europe. His concern was to seek objective evidence for the important historical role of 'Blacks'. He used the techniques of natural science but his interests were developed as a response to cultural alienation. He did research on mummified remains from ancient Egypt and detected the presence of a melanin (black pigment) content. He also maintained that Egyptian culture had origins further south in Africa. His aims here were to correct biased impressions that Africa had not made any worthwhile contribution to civilization. Evidence does in fact suggest that pre-dynastic Egyptians were of Central or West African stock; the situation concerning the Pharaohs is less certain, but pre-dynastic culture would have to have been sufficiently advanced to respond to a stimulus for change. It does not however seem to be the case that the Greeks took their philosophy from Egypt, though some Egyptian records might distort the situation. Diop joined the opposition movement in Senegal in 1960, and was arrested and imprisoned.

His particular aim on return to Africa was to continue scientific activity concerning carbon dating. He looked towards African unity as the only hope for the future but saw cultural unity as having to come first. Such a task he saw as able to be advanced by anthropological research (*Présence Africaine* 1989; Van Sertima and Williams 1986).

A quite different contribution comes from *Frantz Fanon* (1925–61). Born in the French Antilles, Fanon studied medicine in France. He had a major impact on anti-imperialist thinking and was particularly active in the liberation of Algeria. He was hostile to Senghor's idea of giving primacy to cultural liberation; rather he followed the Marxist line in seeing culture as part of the superstructure. He moved away from a humanistic approach, towards a revolutionary philosophy in which he was to stress the importance of violent revolution, since violence was the only sure way of wakening the masses. He saw bloodshed as involving cultural regeneration, and leading to final and authentic decolonization. He felt some common cause with the White proletariat to be possible, but that this could be limited because no Whites had direct experience of racism. His tone was romantic and chiliastic, and his didactic style sometimes led to exaggeration.[4]

Finally, the issue of Pan-Africanism remains. Few Africans attended the earlier meetings but the Fifth Pan-African Congress, held in Manchester in 1945, was highly significant in that several who were destined to become heads of African independent states were present. The question arises as to what happened to Pan-Africanist sentiments after independence had been achieved. Kwame Nkrumah, who became first president of Ghana in 1957, was very keen to continue to promote this idea, and made it clear immediately. But as more countries attained their independence there developed an unwillingness to give up the sovereignty that been attained only after a long struggle. Territorial nationalism became more prominent and Pan-Africanism waned; and the original consensus on African unity was broken by factionalism and differences in respect of how close an association was thought desirable. In 1963 the Organization of African Unity was set up. This represented a compromise between conceptions of a loose and a federal structure. No government continued to promote the aim of a United States of Africa. But some common concerns remained, especially in respect of liberation for the parts of Africa still under White rule (Ajala 1973: 65–90; 106–112).

In view of such developments, it is not surprising that a narrower view of African culture has been more prevalent in modern Africa. It is of interest that, despite some suspicion, many African political thinkers

have built on the work of their Western predecessors. In Kenya for instance Jomo Kenyatta celebrated Kikuyu culture in his *Facing Mount Kenya*, but he was influenced in his work by the anthropologist Malinowski (1938: vii–xiv). In the earlier stages of Kenyan nationalism, however, political ideology built on this further and a broader vision of an affinity between African tradition and socialism was postulated. Kenyatta had mentioned cooperation, reciprocity, mutual help and solidarity, and collectivistic values of this kind were seen as relevant (Grillo 1993). In Tanzania the link with Western expositions of African culture is less obvious, though Nyerere did study social anthropology as part of his course at Edinburgh university, and he was certainly strongly influenced by Catholic missionaries. Nyerere was clearly concerned to defend the communitarian values of indigenous African culture against the more individualistic perspective found in Western capitalism.[5] In Central Africa, Banda in Malawi was clearly influenced by the work of the missionary Young, and the focus this time was upon ascription and hierarchy (Forster 1994). Another example, based on a broad conception of Christian teaching combined with a certain understanding of African culture, is that of *Humanism*. This philosophy is associated with Zambia during Kenneth Kaunda's presidency. It maintains that African society is always man-centred, and upholds the virtues of selflessness and service to people. He sees this as applicable regardless of race, and though seeing it as rooted in the Bible Kaunda maintained that Humanism conformed to the beliefs of every religion in the world. This philosophy built on values found elsewhere in Africa, but its articulation was confined to the Zambian situation.[6]

However, when African traditional values are invoked in a way which does not highlight any particular ethnic group, problems can arise as to the effective content of what is being advocated. One difficult area is that it can really be a matter of support for *Gemeinschaft* values, which involve association as an end in itself rather than as a means to achieve different goals (Forster 1994a: 494–5). These are seen as characteristic of the rural community, but also as under threat. In the African context they are seen as looked down upon by Europeans who denied that Africa could be said to have a real culture. Elements of common ownership, and brotherhood, are generally invoked, meaning that Christianity or socialism can also be seen as fully compatible with indigenous African ideals.

2 Theories of Race and Ethnicity

SCIENTIFIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS

The study of race inevitably tends to be a politically and emotionally charged issue. It is also one which brings to the fore the moral and political relevance of social science. Rex, for instance, has suggested that problems concerning race challenge the conscience of the sociologist just as the problem of nuclear weapons challenges the nuclear physicist. He notes that this is not the same thing as being in a position to dictate solutions; but rather that, in the case of the sociology of race relations, it should be possible to make clear the causes of the problem of the use of 'race' to discriminate against, exploit or even exterminate whole populations (Rex 1970: 1).

The specific problem with regard to race is that it is seen in much popular thinking as having a considerable explanatory power. There is frequent appeal to explanation of behaviour in terms of 'natural' or 'inherited' characteristics. This has remained so even though classification of indicators such as skin colour can be highly complex (Banton 1967: 4, 7–8; Firth 1938: 13–24; Rex 1970: 2–3). Not only has the notion been popular in folk belief, but it has been the basis of particularly brutal and repressive regimes, as can be seen by the cases of Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa. But there is a much longer history of racist and ethnocentric thought, and it is safe to assume that all societies are ethnocentric to some degree. Many theories of race have emerged in the European context, and their rise has tended to coincide with the rise of European dominance in the historical process (Banton 1967: 47–8). It was well into the twentieth century before there was a sustained critical attack on theories of this kind; this gained momentum in response to the rise of the Third Reich. It should not be supposed that behaviour in response to race derives from the relevant theories. Rather, the theories can be seen as symptoms of behaviour. For instance theoretical justifications of slavery arose only after slavery was already taking place (Banton 1967: 113).

Race has been seen as based upon phenotype. *The Oxford English Dictionary* defines a phenotype as 'an organism distinguishable from

others by observable features'; however race is defined as 'a group of people connected by common descent', and this does not suggest that differences are obviously visible. The same dictionary defines a genotype as 'the genetic constitution of an individual, especially as distinguished from phenotype'. The relationship between genotype and phenotype is highly complex since human groups are fluid and there is considerable diversity within them. Some very wide phenotypical varieties are commonly distinguished, on the basis of clusters of physical characteristics: hair type, skin colour, nasal shape, and lip form, and on that basis Mongoloids, Negroids and Caucasoids are identified. But the distinctions are very sweeping and do not accommodate cases such as the Bushmen in southern Africa and the Aboriginals of Australia (Richardson and Lambert 1985: 10).

The notion of race has in fact had different meanings in the course of history. It is useful to draw the distinction between race and ethnicity, though this is often blurred. For instance the OED defines 'ethnic' as 'pertaining to race' and 'originating from a specific racial or linguistic group'. More recently there has been the tendency to regard all minorities as 'ethnic'. It is perhaps more useful to think of racial differences as based on phenotype, and ethnic differences as based upon culture; though it will be shown shortly that the matter is much more complex that this.

It is true that phenotypical differences do exist, and that attempts can be made to provide a scientific classification of them. But this is very different from saying that these are determinants of behaviour; and theories of such a nature have been firmly rejected in modern scientific thinking. In view of the political dangers of biological reductionism, which had been particularly evident in very recent history, United Nations and particularly UNESCO sponsored investigation of such issues (Rex 1970: 2–4). This began in 1947 and a final statement was made in 1964. Scientists were able to demonstrate that physical variety was not linked to behavioural and psychological differences (Klineberg 1951; Dunn 1951); and many overlaps between different physical classifications were identified. The human species was shown to have a common origin and it was made clear that so-called 'races' were merely statistically distinguishable groups. Scientific support was therefore given to a 'universalist' view, one that involved treating everyone regardless of phenotypical difference in the same way.

This still raises the question of how the human species (*homo sapiens*) evolved. It has been shown in Chapter 1 that a small stock appears to have spread around the globe, changing and adapting in accordance

with ecology. Man has the unique ability of possessing *culture*. This is seen as a specifically human quality, and the anthropologist Lévi-Strauss has based most of his key ideas upon the distinction between 'nature' and 'culture'. In evolutionary terms it is important since man did not need to wait for genetic change in order to adapt. Rather, the presence of culture meant that nearly all environments could be exploited (Fox 1991: 71,78). The alternative theory, that *homo sapiens* developed separately in different places, seems unlikely to be true; its shortcomings have already been noted in Chapter 1.

The issue also arises as to how far natural selection led to particular physical traits prevailing in different parts of the world. But adaptations are very loose, and populations have shifted considerably. Thus any links between physical and environmental traits can only be very tentative. There are certain loose correlations between hair type and skin colour; also nose types have some adaptive qualities, but even here the shape of the nose is closely linked to the size and shape of the rest of the face. There are some differences in the distribution of blood groups (even for instance within different European populations). Type of blood relates to resistance to disease, and it is possible that adaptive potential is relevant here (Fox 1991: 73–8).

Above all, it is to be remembered that intelligence is not to be seen as an adaptation of this nature. Different skills do develop in different places, since the need for them depends upon the environment. But the same intelligence is needed to practice them. The human brain has uniformly the same structure throughout the species, and exchange of knowledge and ideas is possible between all races (Fox 1991: 79–80).

However, rejection of racial theories by biological scientists did not imply that human beings would not continue to react behaviourally as if they subscribed to them. Even when theories are discredited they can still influence behaviour. Hence the importance of approaches of sociologists, social anthropologists, and other social scientists. Indeed, the major task for the first generation of sociologists after the First World War was to show the inadequacy of biological explanations, especially where racial and ethnic relations were concerned (Banton 1983: 78). Anthropologists have stressed the importance of cultural as opposed to hereditary factors and have demonstrated that attempts to explain behaviour in terms of heredity can be futile. In the United States the Crow Indians have a culture known as the 'horse complex' but it adds little to say that this derives from an equestrian instinct. Likewise, it is not very illuminating to say that gypsies are nomadic because they have the wanderlust in their blood (Harris 1968: 81). The study of race relations is

concerned particularly with the way in which racial differences often act as markers for unequal apportionment of rights: in other words, to situations marked by racism (Rex 1986: 9). Banton suggests that 'racism' can be identified as a doctrine that a person's behaviour is determined by stable inherited characters deriving from separate racial stocks having distinctive attributes and usually considered to stand to one another in relations of superiority and inferiority. The practice of such a doctrine is 'racialism' which can also be loosely identified as activities which serve the interests of a particular racial group (Banton 1967: 8). Therefore racialism is distinct from racism though is generally accompanied by it. Racist theories can remain respectable in folk ideology; and even if universalism is theoretically found to be acceptable, it might be compromised in practice. This was found for instance in Britain in the 1970s, when the Labour Party felt it necessary to make certain concessions over issues concerning immigration as a consequence of popular feeling which could have had unfavourable implications for reelection (Hiro 1991: 211). There are various ways in which the institutions of a society can involve some latent discrimination, and even in language some aspects of a racist outlook can be embedded (such as the derogatory meanings of the word 'black' in English (Mazrui 1975: 13, 81, 84–5). There can also be negative images in popular culture that are used to ridicule a racial or ethnic group that holds a subordinate position. For example, the depiction of black people performing common service tasks, on salt and pepper shakers, jars and ashtrays in the nineteenth and early twentieth century reinforced stereotypes. The popular press may pander to what it perceives to be the taste of its consumers, which may include ethnocentrism. By emphasizing the exotic, postcards and the images used in tourism promotion may also increase bias, as may the depiction of peoples in tourist destinations in service positions. The other side of this coin can be the glorification of imperialism in countries with such a history. For much of the recent history of Britain, people were forever reminded of the importance of the Empire, and this could extend to visual imagery (Mackenzie 1984).

Racist theory can be reinforced by the dominant classes in a society, by scapegoating minorities when social problems occur, with a view to deflecting criticism away from themselves. Rex and Moore show how in Birmingham (UK) in the 1960s, the civic authorities took Pakistani landlords to court and blamed them for evil conditions in their properties, though they provided housing to those whom nobody else (including the city authorities) was prepared to accommodate (Rex and Moore 1967: 40–1). Scapegoating need not in theory be based on race or ethnicity.

But for a group to be used as a scapegoat they need to be accessible and visible, and to have some latent hostility towards them already in place. For such reasons, phenotypically different minorities can be in danger of being scapegoats (Berry 1965: 308–9).

Racist ideology and racial discrimination can thus be recognized as an important social force, even if challenged scientifically and politically by universalism. There are however other forms of discrimination, and it is necessary to indicate how one distinguishes the racial form from other kinds. It appears that some notion of determinism is relevant here. Supporters of racist ideology and the practice of racialism subscribe to the view not only that race is a determinant of behaviour, but also that it determines behaviour in a way that cannot be changed.

RACE AND ETHNICITY: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

The issue of the difference between the ideas of 'race' and of 'ethnic group' needs to be considered further. It has been suggested that these are often confused and sometimes overlap; but they are not identical. It remains legitimate to distinguish between situations where physical differences are articulated and those where it is a matter of cultural distinctiveness. The difference can still be blurred, since in the case of racial difference it is not so much physical characteristics as such, but rather people's behaviour towards and attitudes to such characteristics (Rex 1986a: 16): also, racial minorities can often also display cultural differences. Furthermore, biological and genetic determinants might still be invoked by folk ideology even in the case of cultural differences. Dominant groups who may not be identifiably different in racial terms to subordinate groups may none the less choose to express their view of themselves as superior in quasi-biological terms. Cultural rather than racial markers may be relevant here, though that might not be how the people involved perceive it. Race is however more likely to be seen as immutable than is ethnicity. Race and ethnicity both depend upon ascription in that they are felt to be determined by birth, and involve categories which are largely self-perpetuating: but the notion of 'race' involves a stronger suggestion of ascription, and postulates some form of 'objective' difference. Ethnicity is felt rather than seen, and can therefore be more malleable (Wallman 1978: 202–5). Ethnic differences are often partly reflected in material culture, and some of this such as clothing and house types is highly visible. But material culture is susceptible to change and borrowing. 'Traditional' and 'modern' housing

can exist side by side. 'Ethnic' clothing can be sold to and worn by tourists.

Ethnocentrism, as already noted, can safely be regarded as universal. All societies have mechanisms by which children are socialized into appropriate attitudes to other groups. Derogatory ethnonyms are found in all parts of the world. Thus 'eskimo' refers to 'foul eater of raw meat', 'dyak' to 'up-river non-Muslim', and 'welsh' to a foreigner. The word 'barbarian' in Greek originally meant a foreigner, especially someone who spoke an incomprehensible language. It gradually came to taken on the meaning of 'uncivilized person ', and this is now the only meaning of the word in everyday English usage (cf. Bauman 1973: 17–18). Some Tanzanian peoples also have derogative names which are used to refer to foreigners. For the Chagga they are 'kyasaka', for the Pare, 'mnyika', and for the Luguru, 'mtoka mbali'. There are important differences according to whether an ethnic group is a majority or a minority in the case of ethnically mixed societies, though a numerical minority can still have greater power and prestige, such as in a colonial situation. Racism can be seen as a stronger form of ethnocentrism.

PRIMORDIAL AND SITUATIONAL ETHNICITY

Another relevant debate is over the issue of whether or not ethnicity is to be seen as 'primordial', as something arising out of a set of 'givens'. Giddings, whose work was mentioned in Chapter 1, popularized the notion of 'consciousness of kind'. He saw this as a fellow-feeling between all human beings at a broad level, though at the same time he maintained that humans also made choices and differentiated, with the result that those of the same ethnic consciousness could feel closer to themselves than to outsiders. He did however see consciousness of kind as extending to those of the same non-ethnic groups, such as those engaged in the same occupation. His theories as applied to ethnicity were taken up by his pupil T. Jesse Jones, who became an educationist (Giddings 1896; King 1971: 21). Jones went on to develop policies concerning Black education which were to become highly influential in the African context through the 'Phelps Stokes' philosophy (see Chapter 4). The view that ethnicity is primordial is supported by Geertz (1963). He sees ethnic identity as derived from being born into a particular community, where an individual learns its religion and cultural values, customs, and language. There is a feeling of being bound to other members of the same ethnic group not through choice, tactics, or common or reciprocal interest, but

through some 'absolute import attributed to the very tie itself' (Geertz 1963: 109). The bonds in question are similar to those of kinship, and are felt to involve behavioural expectations that are somehow sacred. Solidarity with members of one's own ethnic group can be seen in this perspective as an extension of nepotism. Far from being dependent upon class or political criteria, ties of this kind usually cut across them.

There is an alternative view which sees ethnicity in instrumental terms. The phenomenon is seen situationally, with greater emphasis upon operating as a set of processes and social relations. In this view, ethnicity is invoked according to circumstances: and as such it can cross-cut economic and political divisions. Ethnicity is seen in this way as a resource (or liability) which can be invoked in relation to particular objectives: it is context-related. According to this perspective, there is a need to examine the processes by which cultural differences are communicated: such is the position taken by Barth (1969). This is not to divorce it totally from the primordial aspect, since it remains true that ethnic groups are largely self-perpetuating. It is most likely that ethnicity will be invoked in this way in relation to conflicts. Rex prefers to speak of 'quasi-groups' (1986: 10, 27–9), a notion suggested earlier by Ginsberg (1934: 40–1). Ethnicity is seen here as closely linked to the study of social stratification though is not to be subsumed by it.

POLYETHNICITY, BOUNDARIES AND CATEGORIES

Classic anthropological studies tended to look at the more remote parts of the world, which were in most cases ethnically homogeneous. But as the scope of their work became broader, they found it necessary to deal with the phenomenon of polyethnicity in its various forms. This again raises the question of how ethnic categories are to be identified. All societies have some form of us/them distinctions (Wallman 1986: 227) and the question arises as to what is special about those based on ethnicity. Barth suggests that ethnic categories provide organizational vessels with varied form and content (Barth 1969: 14). Another dimension is that of the quality of the differences; they can be relevant only in some situations, or for some actors in the situation: and perceptions of similarity and difference may vary (Wallman 1978: 201). Ethnic signifiers such as food, appearance and kinship patterns can be identified: but these are only 'ethnic' if used by those on one side of a boundary to enhance the sense of 'us' (Wallman 1978: 207). Particularly important is the fact that each ethnic category has some different values. If people

identify themselves as 'A's, they judge themselves and are judged by others as 'A's (Barth 1969: 15). Moreover, if an 'A' differs markedly in behaviour from that expected of their category, then they can be regarded as 'really a "B"' (Barth 1969: 27–9). But most of the time boundaries remain even though it is possible to cross them.

Barth (1979: 15–17) also notes that relations between categories in a polyethnic society can take various forms. There can be major constraints on interaction if there are marked differences in values. Various degrees of reciprocity, specialism, separation and competition are also possible. If one category controls the means of production, then stratification can be based upon ethnicity. Stratification not based upon ethnicity also involves cultural differences, but these can merge more readily. Another problem-area is that insiders might draw boundaries in different ways from outsiders. In particular, an outsider might class together people who would themselves recognize boundaries among themselves. In the East African context this will be shown to be particularly important in the case of the Indian minority.

COLONIALISM, PLURALISM, AND PLURAL SOCIETY

Discussion of the ways in which interactions occur at ethnic boundaries has not so far led to an examination of historical causation. Theories of 'plural society' help to do this, even if one accepts Barth's unease (1967: 17) about subsuming different phenomena. Moreover, in view of the experience of colonialism, theories of the plural society are of particular interest to the student of East Africa. However, it must be remembered that a plural society is a specific kind of a more general phenomenon, that of pluralism. This represents the practice of 'live and let live', in which different cultural identities are valued equally. It can sometimes have constitutional backing, such as in Switzerland where there is no single national culture or language. This has been maintained quite successfully with the three linguistic categories (French, German and Italian) having roughly the same economic standing. However, the situation can also involve some tension, such as is found in Belgium, where Dutch-speakers have found it necessary to fight for equal rights in relation to French-speakers, and where the issue of parity still seems to remain under review and to constitute a source of political instability. Here the position is complicated by a history of social and economic inequality. On the other hand some would say that pluralism can serve as an integrative force. If different sections of society perform, for instance,

different economic functions, this makes for interdependence which can be a source of integration. Normally a plural society is the product of colonialism and conquest. The dominant group will assert superiority in quasi-biological terms or by way of cultural markers. Discussion of the plural society is generally associated with the work of Furnivall (1939, 1948) and that of M.G. Smith. There is necessarily a close link with those theories of social stratification which emphasize conflict rather than normative consensus. Furnivall derives many of his ideas from his earlier career as a colonial administrator. Using examples from Burma and Java, he speaks of a 'medley' of peoples: European, Chinese, Indian and indigenous. He shows that these maintain their own religion, customs and culture, and perform different tasks in the economy. They live in the same political unit, and they link but do not combine (Furnivall 1948: 109). Drawing on Boeke's studies in Indonesia (1935), Furnivall acknowledges that capitalism in the colonial situation takes a particularly brutal form (a point also made by Weber (1962: 221–3)), but he continues to emphasize the economic order as the key factor. In a plural society of this nature, primordial ties of the kind that Geertz identifies exist only within the separate ethnic groups; but no such ties exist to unite the society in terms of shared values of the kind that the functionalist would expect to identify. People are linked only through the market-place, which is under the overall control of the dominant ethnic group.

A related perspective is that of M.G. Smith who acknowledges a debt to Furnivall but sees him as having downplayed the importance of political factors. He speaks of several different societies alongside one another, each with its own set of institutions. However, none of these 'societies' has political institutions: these are supplied by the colonial power, which is the dominant group that controls the state. This particular group, often a cultural minority, maintains the society by regulation of inter-sectional relations. It is an entity divorced from the values of the separate groups. The various ethnic groups are then seen to occupy the positions that they do as a direct result of colonial conquest (Smith 1965b).

One feature of the structure of plural societies is the tendency for cross-cutting ties to be discouraged. In many colonies, especially in Africa, residential segregation prevailed. In some territories, Africans and Europeans used the same shops; but in others there were different entrances and Europeans would be served first. This was part of a wider form of etiquette that operated when colonial masters did interact with their subjects. Since the colonialists normally employed some of their

subjects as servants, a degree of intimacy could even be possible: but only if the appropriate etiquette was maintained at all times. In spite of measures of this kind, some forms of cross-cutting ties could develop: even in apartheid South Africa, as Gluckman has shown. This is considered further in the next chapter.

South Africa also serves as an example of a situation of pluralism in the dominant racial group. This operated between the Afrikaners, who were dominant in politics, and the British who were dominant in the economic sphere (Kuper 1969a: 485; 1969c: 177–9).

In the aftermath of a 'plural society' situation, problems can arise when the imperial power leaves. The colonial state was an instrument of repression but it did regulate competition to a certain extent; and when it ceased to fill this role certain disintegrating forces could come into operation, which may have been overt or hidden during the nationalist struggle. A good example of this are the processes which led to the partition of India: this arose because Hindu and Muslim elites were not able to rule together (Rex 1986a: 53). Some such as Wallerstein (1979: 185–6) would go further and speak of world system theory rather than just colonialism, and would see some such processes as continuing. Capitalist exploitation not backed by a colonial power could continue to operate on the pre-colonial basis for the sake of stability, or it could prove to be more innovatory (cf. Rex 1986a: 54–5).

Assessment of the relative importance of political and economic factors does in any case also depend upon one's view of the relationship between these forces in general. There is a long tradition of theorizing from Lenin (1968) to Fanon (see ch.1) and Frank (1969) which shows the relationship between colonialism and capitalism. Some would see colonialism and capitalism as closely linked, while others would insist upon the key importance of political relations in respect of plural societies. The particular brutality of capitalist exploitation in colonies is again relevant here.

RACE, ETHNICITY AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Issues of this kind highlight the importance of the relationship between race or ethnicity and class. Some would go so far as to incorporate the whole subject into the study of class. In 1974 the periodical *Race,* published by the Institute of Race Relations in London, changed its name to *Race and Class.* This was in order to reflect a commitment to liberation struggles in the underdeveloped world, as well as to the study of the

oppression of Black people in Britain (Sivanandan 1975). Predictably this tendency is particularly strong in Marxist thinking, though not all Marxists would go so far. However, the operation of the market is highly relevant in race and ethnic relations. Attempts can be made to create a form of split labour market, in which racial minorities compete separately – for lower pay and poorer conditions of service, and suffering disadvantages such as lack of trade union protection. In some but not all cases their residential status may be uncertain: they might have entered illegally, like some Mexican workers in the United States; or legally but under conditions such as being expected to return to their homes (the situation of 'guest-workers' in some Western European and Far Eastern countries). In other cases they may have full legal and residential status; but they may have suffered discrimination from entry into better-paid jobs with only ambivalent support from trade unions, thus forming an 'underclass'. Such has been the position of many West Indians in Britain.

The various dimensions of stratification can be applied to racial and ethnic differences. Weber (1948) distinguished between class and status, the former being based on economic factors and the latter on 'social honour'. These can also be distinguished from the 'estate', which is based upon differential legal rights. It is evident that in the case of the first two, ethnic and racial differences can be highly relevant; even in the third case, differences in legal status have been in evidence in colonial situations and until recently in South Africa. Ethnic associations are sometimes set up to promote their members' own interests (Rex 1986a: 14).

When considering race, ethnicity and social stratification, the question arises as to how far there are cleavages between the position of different groups and how far there is some overlap. W. Lloyd Warner (1936) concentrated upon the issue of status in his studies of an American city. He noted that a status order existed in which lower, middle and upper groups were present: and that though there were some restrictions a certain amount of mobility was possible. However, there was a dominant cleavage between Black and White. Blacks also had a status system within which mobility was possible, but even those who reached the highest status among Blacks could not enter White society. There was also a strong taboo against interracial marriage. Since there was also no mobility possible between the Black and the White status systems, Warner saw this as a division of caste (1936: 234–7). Warner noted that there could be problematic situations for those, such as a Black doctor, who scored high in social status but low in terms of 'caste'.

This term in itself requires scrutiny. It is derived from Hindu culture, and it implies that no mobility is possible. However, the analogy is far from perfect. In India some sub-castes do succeed in improving their position as a whole; moreover the Indian system has religious backing and at least in theory is supposed to be based upon consent. Familial institutions are similar in the various castes, and there is some sharing of public institutions side by side with economic interdependence.[1] For reasons such as this, a caste system can be regarded as quite different from a plural society (Smith 1969: 45). Another criticism of Warner's approach has come from Cox (1959: 489–508), whose work owes much to the Marxist perspective. He analysed the situation in terms of class, seeing the relationship between Black and White not as a caste barrier, but rather as a relationship between exploiter and exploited (1959: 393). He further suggests that in many societies there are taboos against intermarriage between those of different social position or background and that there can sometimes be fluidity across the racial boundary. He goes on to maintain that race prejudice in general tended to accompany the expansion of capitalism to areas endowed with natural resources. He saw the rise in the status of Black workers as going together with the rise of the proletariat in general.

It can be acknowledged that Cox's criticisms of the use of the term 'caste' with respect to the American situation can be valid; but many difficulties remain in his approach. In particular, Cox minimized the problem of race prejudice in the White working class, and the presence of exploitation within the White and the Black community. Bonacich (1972) speaks of the 'split labour market', a notion that has already been referred to. In such a situation the White working class are likely to put up a strong defence against those from other ethnic or racial groups whose members bid for the same kind of work. In such cases there are liable to be attempts at exclusion, or at ensuring that the new job-seekers are confined to the lowest-paid work. She notes that this is particularly likely to happen where there is a strong White working class, as in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Empirical situations can also be different. The cleavage based upon race is not everywhere so complete. There can be a more fluid situation such as in Brazil, where in contrast to the United States racial mixture has been more widespread. Here although lighter skin carries prestige, this is only one of a number of factors (Banton 1967: 265). Also it has been suggested that in Britain although dark skin may reduce status, other factors such as wealth and education can increase it (Banton 1967: 381). In both cases this means that some non-Whites have higher

status than some Whites. Rex points to another possibility where there can be pyramids associated with social status. There can be a majority pyramid, but also some for ethnic minorities. The majority and minority pyramids may move closer to one another and become more integrated, or they may move further away (Rex 1986a: 75–7).

In general it can be suggested that there is a clear and sometimes very strong overlap between race and class, where a class is seen in terms of individuals standing in a common relationship to the labour market (Banton 1983: 98). However, access to the labour market can be differentiated by race according to non-economic criteria (Rex 1986b). Whether in the last analysis the historical events which shape such differential access are the outcome of class struggles depends upon one's view of history.

RACE, ETHNICITY AND CULTURE

A final aspect of racial and ethnic division is that of cultural distinctiveness. The issue arises as to whether the dominant culture will be emulated by those who are dominated by it, or whether there will be a strong resistance to it. Conquerors can impose their own values through force, though may not always choose to do so. But the culture of the conquerors will inevitably influence subjects in some way or other. There were extreme situations, such as in Tasmania where the indigenous population were simply exterminated; or in North America where they remained but were marginalized in reservations: and were also very small in demographic terms, by contrast with the large immigrant population (Rex 1986: 41). Another aspect of the immigrant population in the case of the United States was (in the case of Whites) the strong emphasis upon assimilation of new groups into the 'American Way of Life', with little support for the preservation of cultural distinctiveness except that broader divisions based on religion emerged which did not however have much relevance in the public domain (Herberg 1956: 18–58, 88–104). In the colonial situation the impact of Western culture has everywhere occurred, but the form that it has taken has varied considerably. Westerners themselves tended to view indigenous cultures differently according to whether or not they were literate. Thus there was a certain amount of respect for Asian culture by Western colonizers, but this was rarely the case for Africa. It was even asserted by some that Africa had no culture. Since culture is generally deemed to be one of the key characteristics of the distinction between humans and animals,

this was tantamount to saying that Africans were not humans. Such an ideology could be used to support slavery, which involved cultural destruction but physical survival. Despite some criticisms from African nationalists, anthropology can be said to have had an important part to play in the recognition of African cultural values (Forster 1994a; cf. Galtung 1967: 13).

There was also the question of how far the colonial powers wanted their subjects to absorb Western culture. In India there was support by British colonialists for creating a class of Indians steeped in Western education, which could play a broker's role: such was the policy advocated by Lord Macaulay (Worsley 1964: 52). The reaction by colonialists to Africans who absorbed Western culture was very different, and depended upon which European power was in control: this will be considered in Chapter 4. The response of the colonized to Western culture was also not uniform. Mayer (1971: 4, 20–41) in his study of the Xhosa people in South Africa draws a distinction between the 'red' and the 'school'. Those identified as 'red' saw little of value in what the Whites had brought. They were forced to go to town to seek employment and money but otherwise they despised Western culture. Those identified as 'school' took a very different view. Their complaints about the Whites did not concern the whole of their culture. They saw that much of what the Whites had brought with them was not bad in itself; what they objected to was that the Whites wanted to keep it to themselves and were unwilling to share it with Black Africans. It can in general be said that the higher social strata everywhere will be more Westernized, especially in the public domain.

Another interesting feature is the reaction to Christianity. This will be examined in detail in Chapter 7, but for the moment it can be noted that in nearly all cases this was brought to Africa by Western missionaries. After initial failures, the response to Christianity in Africa became very positive, with the effect that Africa may be taking over from Europe as the centre of the Christian world. It has been suggested by Horton that a key factor was the widening of geographical horizons, making a 'world' religion more meaningful than indigenous cults that were more localized (Horton 1971). Also, not all aspects of mission Christianity have been accepted uncritically, and there have been numerous attempts to accommodate the church more to African culture. In some cases this has led to the creation of new 'African independent churches'. With regard to response to Christianity there has been a major contrast between Africa and Asia. Asia has also been extensively missionized from Europe but the response has been much less favourable (for India

see Boel 1975). One relevant factor is that indigenous religion in Asia has been much broader in geographical scope.

'Assimilation' is a term that is often used in the context of race and ethnicity, and it also was the key to French colonial policy. It involves the merging of minority and majority groups into one, with a common culture and identity. However, this is not on terms of equality. Much power is wielded by the group which is either in the majority numerically, such as when an immigrant minority is present in a larger culture, or which is a minority in terms of number but which wields power backed by force if needed. The latter situation is typical of the colonial encounter. However, 'assimilation' is usually far from total. In particular, there can be a distinction between the public domain, where there is sharing of institutions which are generally accessible to all; and the private, concerned with spheres such as kinship, custom and religion. This reflects the distinction between the politico-jural and the domestic domain, as articulated by Fortes in the context of kinship studies. There can be assimilation in the first of these thought not in the second (Fortes 1959; cf. Smith 1969: 38–9). The distinction is not as easy to draw as might at first appear; for instance if all share the same schools there can be encroachment on to the 'private' domain: issues such as family and gender roles, religion, and sexuality may be treated in a way which clashes with the values of some ethnic groups (Rex 1986: 121–35). Some recent controversies in France have arisen over the question of whether certain items of Islamic dress are to be permitted in state schools, which are supposed to be secular in character. Moreover, there are cases where assimilation can be minimal. This partly depends on the attitude of the host community, but minority groups might also resist assimilation, though not always succeeding in this endeavour. In particular Chinese communities throughout the world seem concerned to preserve their distinctiveness, though some have accommodated to the majority culture more than others (Berry 1965: 242–71).

There has been much discussion of the question of 'multiculturalism' in Europe in recent times (Rex 1986: 124–5), while much earlier in the century there was debate as to the appropriateness or otherwise of syllabuses based upon White schools for the education of American Blacks (King 1971: 1–20, 252–9). In the American situation, there was support among both racists and anti-racists for differentiation of course content. The racists argued that Negroes should be prepared for life according to the opportunities available to them, and that the emphasis should be on training for skilled manual work. Anti-racists have in turn argued that political awareness is best fostered by education which

emphasized the Black person's role in history, and that it should not be a mirror image of White education. Such was the standpoint of Du Bois, mentioned in Chapter 1. Debates over such issues also had repercussions in the African context. Likewise, in more modern times, anti-racists have supported the idea of multicultural education, maintaining that the right to cultural difference should be preserved. At the same time, education in apartheid South Africa has stressed that Black culture is to be preserved. Here there are shades of the red/school distinction already mentioned. The issue is highly complex. On the one hand, few would now defend the French colonial policy of basing the content of syllabuses on the assumption that Africans were merely to be integrated into French culture, as 'obviously superior' to all others (Kitchen 1962: 406): which led to the use of history textbooks in Africa which began with the words 'Our ancestors, the Gauls'. On the other hand, few would wish education to concentrate on the vernacular language to the exclusion of languages of wider communication. The matter is made easier when it is insiders to the culture rather than outsiders who decide what is 'good' in indigenous culture and worthy of being preserved. There will in any case be variation in response. Much depends upon which pattern of culture offers most for particular individuals. Some will see a better future in conforming to traditional expectations, others in what the new culture has to offer. In nearly all cases there will be some balance struck between the two.

Amalgamation is a related but different concept. This occurs when groups are assimilated biologically as well as culturally, through sexual and marital relationships. This is not always disapproved of, especially when a small number of male pioneers in a territory previously unknown to them encounter an indigenous female population. Some Western powers, particularly the Portuguese, continued to accept biological assimilation; whereas by contrast in South Africa any sexual activity across racial lines was eventually made illegal. Such prohibitions typically occur in situations where the cleavage between the races is especially marked and is characterized by a particularly unequal power relationship. The other principal example of legal sanctions against cross-racial sexual activity would be the 'Deep South' of the United States, with its history of slavery. In most colonial situations there was strong disapproval of cross-racial sexual activity though it was not legally forbidden. Typically, casual liaisons could be condoned more readily than stable marriages. But it is also the case that miscegenation continues to occur even when there are strong sanctions against it (Berry 1965: 272–95).

Some societies accept racial mixture. Brazil is often quoted as an example here. It cannot be said that a feeling of complete racial equality has been achieved, since as already noted light skin carries higher status. But there are other sources of status as well, such as wealth and occupation, which can outweigh the racial factor. A similar situation seems to prevail in the Seychelles, where there is a population of both French and African origin, with much smaller Indian and Chinese elements. General racial harmony prevails, with much biological intermixing. However, light skin still carries slightly higher status though other factors can make up for this (Benedict 1966: 7, 54–5).

Neither assimilation nor amalgamation may be key factors in many cases. As previously noted, there are various forms of polyethnic situation, of which the plural society is just one form. In other cases there can be minorities which are sometimes protected or at other times subjugated. In still other cases, there can be a majority which has historically been the subject of conquerors (such as in South Africa, and in Burundi and Rwanda). There are cases of transfer of population, sometimes peacefully and at other times by force (such as the 'ethnic cleansing' characteristic of parts of Eastern Europe). In extreme cases, as in Tasmania, it has been noted that genocide was the policy adopted towards the indigenous population (Rex 1970: 124).

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this chapter Rex's observations on the moral and political implications of the question of race and ethnicity were noted. It was stressed that all the scientific evidence pointed to the fact that no significant psychological difference was to be correlated with race. This standpoint is generally accepted by virtually all nations of the world, and by the values that international organizations such as UNESCO promote. But it does not follow that race and ethnicity are not thought to have explanatory power in many people's consciousness. In some European countries, for instance, political parties with a racist message have gained in strength in recent years. The question therefore arises as to why doctrines which have to all intent and purpose been refuted in scientific terms continue to have some appeal.

The answer is not hard to find. Racism is not an appeal to reason, but to feeling. Some have tried to make it intellectually respectable by providing pseudo-scientific backing but have in recent times always remained peripheral to the mainstream scientific community. Racial

prejudice offers a cruder and simpler explanation of social problems, such as unemployment, than do social and economic theories (O'Neill 1982: 137). A further problem is that a multiplicity of factors can bring about racial prejudice (Solomos and Back 1996: 212; Berry 1965: 315).

Giddings spoke of 'consciousness of kind', suggesting that the familiar is seen as congenial while what is strange provokes hostility and fear. But this should not be taken to imply that prejudices are innate. The uneven and inconsistent pattern of race prejudice throughout the world should make this clear. Who are to be seen as 'us' or as 'them' is an attitude developed by socialization and is instilled at an early age. Other factors linked to the prevalence of race prejudice include economic competition, and the psychological dimension is also relevant. Such factors can lead to its becoming embedded in culture and transmitted by socialization. But some measure of difference in culture can exist side by side with many values held in common, or with a particular set of values seen as appropriate in inter-ethnic contacts. There are all sorts of ways apart from prejudice by which such differences can be managed.

Yet again, some see ethnic nationalism as a legitimate response to oppression by a majority culture. The boundaries between race and ethnicity have already been acknowledged to be blurred, and some would defend movements like the Black Panthers, who gained some prominence in the United States in the late 1960s, on the same basis. This movement for Black liberation gained support from many liberals; though it was unsuccessful and it eventually split over the question of advocacy of violent revolution. Race and ethnicity can however be used as a political resource by both dominant and subordinate groups in order to further their own interests (Solomos and Back 1996: 207). The boundaries of races are flexible, and this vagueness can be used to further political ends.

At the same time, there are strong countervailing forces against racism in many societies. Legislation against racial discrimination is widespread throughout the world: but it is much easier to legislate against racialism than against racism, since attitudes are much more difficult to change. Scientific evidence about race does permeate the wider society through education; but this is a gradual process, and the emotional side needs also to be tackled. International condemnation of racism makes it difficult for a serious political leader to stand on an openly racist platform, especially as long as the atrocities of Nazi Germany are still within living memory. On the other hand, indirect racism can manifest itself more easily, being disguised in certain forms of immigration restriction or prerequisites for citizenship. Also, a mild form of racism can play on

ethnocentric sentiments and can make it easier for a mainstream politician to be elected.

KEY ISSUES IN EAST AFRICA

The situation in East Africa is one in which racial and ethnic complexity has played a major part in recent history. Typically in the colonial period the key issues related to the position of Europeans, Asians and Africans. European hegemony was based on a mixture of racism and paternalism, but neither of these standpoints could be expected to survive against the greater numerical strength of Africans, once nationalism and democratic pressures became a significant force. Post-independence governments did however feel it appropriate to build new nations at least partly on the European legacy, once colonialism had become dislodged: and Whites have generally been told that they are welcome to stay provided that they show respect to the new governments and do not display race prejudice. The position of Asians has proved to be more problematic, as will be shown in Chapter 5, and though officially anti-racist sentiments are supposed to apply to them also this has not always happened in practice. However, the key area of conflict has remained that which relates to ethnic loyalties among indigenous Black Africans. Once again, the official line will be one of opposition to 'tribalism', but the practice may well be different and in many cases the operation of ethnic particularism can be somewhat difficult to prove.

Those states which have departed from the internationally dominant anti-racist values have done so at their peril, and international ostracism or isolation have been the consequences. In East Africa, Uganda under Idi Amin was condemned internationally to the extent that military action by a neighbouring state (Tanzania), in opposition to him, met with widespread approval despite arguments that could be advanced concerning breach of national sovereignty.[2] In Southern Africa, both Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and South Africa have been the objects of international economic sanctions, as long as White supremacy has prevailed. Rwanda and Burundi have experienced problems in their international relations over the issue of ethnically-based hegemony. International financial institutions are increasingly scrutinizing the question of corruption, and this is sometimes linked to ethnic particularism. The broader issue of ethnic factors in national integration is considered in Chapter 6.

3 Racism, Racialism and Segregation in the African Context

Before examining the situation in East Africa in detail, it is appropriate to look at issues of race in the broader African context. Certain historical developments, some very recent and many more within living memory, have continued to affect modern political consciousness. In this chapter the first phenomenon considered, that of the slave trade, belongs to an earlier historical epoch. But it will be examined in some detail, because no other institution depended quite so much upon a racist outlook – though as has already been noted, ideologies which tried to justify slavery appeared only after it had begun. Secondly the European response to slavery in the form of missionary activity and subsequent colonialism will be considered with particular reference to the implications for race and racism. Thirdly, the situation in South Africa will be examined, as a phenomenon in itself and in terms of how the persistence of apartheid had its impact upon international relations in the African context. Fourthly, the issue of first the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and subsequently illegal declaration of independence in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and its impact upon international politics, will be considered. Finally, an analysis of African societies (South Africa and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe) in which racial segregation was one of the key characteristics will be made from the viewpoint of sociology and anthropology. The relative significance of economic and political factors will be considered, and the extent to which analysis of such societies as wholes is justified will be assessed.

THE SLAVE TRADE

The slave trade was originally part of a more broadly-based system of trading relationships between Africa and Europe and Asia. Such relationships did not involve slaves in the first instance; the slave element slowly grew, but for a long time it remained relatively small. Initially in the case of West Africa, trading was based upon relationships between

equals. Africa and Europe shared the same feudal structure which did permit the selling of slaves, and the dealers traded on the basis of relative equality. Slaves were exchanged for European luxury goods which were in great demand at West African courts. However, the pace of change was much more rapid in Europe than in Africa. Moreover towards the end of the eighteenth century the West Indies came to the notice of Europeans, and this led to the development of an important and highly lucrative trading relationship in which slaves were a key element. Those who bought the slaves made them work on sugar production, which required considerable labour relative to land and capital. The 'Great Circle', as it was known, consisted in the first instance of the import of cheap manufactures to Africa; slaves would then be exported to the West Indies and the Americas; and raw materials and foodstuffs would then be exported to Europe. Three profits were made and fortunes were accumulated quickly. Some major British ports owed their prosperity to trading links of this kind. Commercial capitalism was thereby built up, which provided the basis for industrial capitalism. Industrial capitalism could not benefit from slavery, since the processes required were executed more effectively by free labourers, by those who felt they had at least some stake in the outcome in the form of wages. Hence by the nineteenth century there was pressure to abolish slavery. It was not as some maintained the result merely of an appeal to religious and ethical principles. Rather such principles were taken more seriously when slavery ceased to have any economic advantages. Hence the British abolished such trade by British ships at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the British navy prevented involvement in the slave trade by the vessels of other European nations. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the trade had largely ended (Davidson 1961; Banton 1967: 101–30).

The Great Circle was largely associated with West Africa, but on the coast of East Africa the slave trade also had a major role. It was part of a long history of trade between East Africa and Asia, though for a considerable period slaves were not involved or formed only a very minor element. However by the beginning of the nineteenth century there was a substantial slave trade between East Africa and Brazil and Mauritius. The Sultan of Oman, who by 1840 had transferred his capital to Zanzibar, was heavily involved in this (Coupland 1938). Abolitionist agitation in Britain tended to centre particularly on East Africa, since it was here that Arab rather than British traders were the ones directly involved. The slave trade was associated with the trade in ivory (Alpers 1969, 1975). Ivory was in heavy demand for new luxury items such as piano

keys and billiard balls; slaves carried the ivory with them to the coast, and they would be sold together with what they carried. The loss of population that this involved could be highly disruptive in Africa: the slaves were exchanged for small luxury items such as beads, which were no compensation for the loss of labour power. Hence the trade marked the growth of inequality between Africa and Europe. As already noted, racial stereotyping also resulted. It could be seen as justified to treat slaves in an inhuman manner if they were seen as not really human beings in the first place.

The slave trade was also of historical importance in a way which is relevant for issues of race, because it paved the way for first, missionary activity, and second, colonial annexation. The campaign of Dr David Livingstone (1813–73) for British intervention against the slave trade and the disruption caused by it is well known. His message was that it should be replaced by 'legitimate commerce and Christianity'. This struck a responsive note to many Christian businessmen, who were prepared to support such effort financially. The missionaries provided new standards of education and health care, but there was also the danger of popularising crude stereotypes of pagan African culture. These may have led benefactors to feel the greater need for the mission, but at the same time they led to prejudice against Africans as 'uncivilized'. In some respects the message was positive about the future; Africans had souls and could be converted to Christianity; and the more liberal missionaries saw the highest levels of education as available to Africans provided that they worked hard. But the message was also negative, since it implied that Africans were virtually devoid of any culture or at least any worthwhile culture, and rather than they were empty jars into which Western culture could be poured.

After the missions came the colonialists. There was for instance in Britain a feeling that citizens should not be present in a 'dangerous' continent without protection. The missionaries for their part welcomed the idea of colonialism and felt that it would make them more effective. The aim of such an exercise was expected to be mutual benefit; there was no notion of incompatibility of interest between the colonizer and the colonized. The impetus towards political annexation was strengthened by competition between colonial powers, and the Berlin West African Conference of 1884–5 was the most ambitious of a number of exercises designed to ensure that conflicts over African interests would not fan the flames of potential disputes between major European powers. However, the overall European impact raises important issues of its own and is considered in detail in the next chapter.

THE RACE QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

One aspect of the impact of European contact which requires special treatment is the situation of South Africa. As with the slave trade, South Africa under apartheid represents a form of racism which had a unique historical impact. It was not identical to slavery: Black South Africans could sell their labour, own property, enter contracts, and have legal marriages. But racism became far more entrenched in South Africa than in any other territory subjected to colonial rule, and the situation continued even when most colonial territories were achieving their independence. South Africa therefore became problematic for the whole of the continent, and beyond. It was the scene of prolonged inter-racial struggle for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Partly because of their geographical proximity and largely because of South Africa's economic and military predominance, the East African nations have been acutely aware of the social and political upheavals taking place within their southern neighbour's borders. South Africa exerts a powerful influence upon surrounding countries; and much of the debate on international relations in East Africa has been strongly influenced by what has been happening in South Africa: notably the rise and fall of apartheid. It is worthwhile considering therefore, how this system came into being, what sustained it, and what effect this experience had on other African nations.[1]

   European presence in southern Africa dates back to 1497 and da Gama's voyages to Asia. English ships arrived just under a century later, and in 1651 a Dutchman, Jan van Riebeeck, established a settlement on the Cape. The indigenous people were the Hottentots, or Khoikhoi, a people speaking a 'click' language. They were related to the Bushmen (San), who were later to be encountered, but unlike them the Hottentots were cattle-keepers. The Cape was vital to European interests in Asia, and from the outset slaves were imported from other parts of Africa, and from South-east Asia, to help development of the economy. Their significance increased towards the end of the seventeenth century, when private agriculture became established. Interestingly, racial boundaries were not initially as they were to become, and in 1656 the marriage of a Dutchman to an ex-slave is recorded. Husbands could buy their wives' freedom, and conversion to Christianity conferred not only legal but social status. Other Dutchmen followed suit; in 1664 the explorer Peter van Meerhof married Eva, a Hottentot woman; and their wedding was celebrated by a bridal feast at Government House. This stopped with the growth of a larger settler community, and in 1685

marriage of a Dutchman to a black slave was banned by law. Irregular liaisons continued however, and formed the basis of the Coloured community (of whom some are descended from slaves, others from Hottentot women) (Wilson and Thompson 1969; Worden 1994).

The original settlers were employed by the Dutch East India Company, and were of French Huguenot and German extraction as well as Dutch. The 'Afrikaners' (those born in the country) eventually outnumbered those from overseas. There was no need for a continued influx of European labourers because of the presence of slaves. The language spoken on the Cape developed into Afrikaans, a modified but still recognizable Dutch dialect, with some loan-words from English, French and German. There was also some Malay admixture, as a consequence of the presence of a number of slaves and immigrants from Dutch South-east Asia. Some elements were derived from Bantu and Hottentot/Bushman (Khoisan) languages, which were spoken locally. Afrikaans remained the common linguistic medium until the British arrived. Although initially there was some peaceful trade, relations with the neighbouring Hottentot people soon became hostile. This arose as the Afrikaans-speaking Boers (Dutch for 'farmers', but in South Africa having more the connotation of 'landowners'), began to expand away from the coast in search of grazing land. Competition with the Hottentots over land led to warfare. This began in 1657 and continued spasmodically for another twenty years; however, the Boers were assured of eventual victory by virtue of their superior firepower. The Dutch were in a position to dominate the indigenous population by force of arms, and were subsequently able to dictate how power relations and role and status allocation were to operate.

The frontier farmers and settlers became detached from Europe and the social and religious changes that were taking place there. They themselves were very concerned to stress their permanent roots on African soil. A group consciousness developed, which was based upon religion and skin colour. Those of mixed race, the so-called 'Coloured' people, were now excluded though previously they had been admitted to the dominant society provided that they were baptized. Skin colour was an obvious physical difference; but it was not a criterion that worked consistently, especially in view of the extent of intermarriage in the early days of the Cape colony.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century European agricultural expansion was taking place at the Cape, The outlook known as the 'frontier mentality' developed (Frankel 1960). This implies the presence of a relatively small settler community, detached from their country of

ancestry. Their perspective resembles that of a military campaign, with the local indigenous population seen as complete outsiders. Any association with the local population is seen to be only on a temporary, ad hoc basis, and there can be no suggestion of integrated development. This situation applied all the more so since the Boers were now encountering the Bushmen, who proved more resilient to European contact than the Hottentots. The 'frontier' perspective remained and decisively affected race attitudes in South Africa. The main concern was with survival, and little consideration could be given to other peoples in such circumstances. Self-identity, status and social distance were paramount. By the 1770s competition between Boers and indigenous Africans for water and grazing lands was occurring, and it became imperative from the Boer point of view to dominate their African neighbours and to accentuate their differences.

The Boers' Calvinist religion in which predestination was a central doctrine conveniently placed the 'heathen' African beyond salvation. By virtue of his religion the frontier farmer thus justified his right both to extend his own lands and to subjugate the heathens by whom he was surrounded. From such a viewpoint, Christians and non-Christians could not be seen as equal. Indeed the Boer farmers conceived of the difference between themselves and the Africans to be as great as that between themselves and their cattle. The Boers described the Africans as 'Zvarte Vee' (Black Cattle). Boers became cut off from European influence, including the Enlightenment and subsequently Darwinian evolutionary theory. They were only belatedly to experience the Industrial Revolution, and their community was very isolated and inward-looking. It was on these foundations that the precursor of apartheid, the master-servant social fabric of the nineteenth century Boer republic was built up. Thus in the constitution of the Republic of the Transvaal, it was specifically stated that there could be no equality of race in church or state. Upon such a foundation, the psycho-social and historical legacies of (racial) conflict and (racial) fear, Afrikaner nationalism was later to build its most powerful weapon in its pursuit of its total domination of South African society. This weapon was racist ideology.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RACIST IDEOLOGY

Three fundamental and interlocking factors led to the development of the ideology of race in South Africa, which was itself based on the historical, political, and psycho-sociological legacies outlined. In the first

place, there was the rise of Afrikaner nationalism in the nineteenth century, in opposition to British imperialism. In the second place came acceptance by British imperialism of the already existing racial master-servant fabric. In the third place, Black and White have competed for urban employment, as a consequence of industrialization in the twentieth century.

Afrikaner nationalism developed out of the Boers' need both to reestablish their identity and to create a group homogeneity through which they could ultimately rectify and overcome the humiliations and defeats which they had suffered. In 1806 the British gained control of the Cape, and though they left some Dutch institutions in place (such as the legal system) their imposition of certain policies was resented. In particular, the Boers reacted against some relatively liberal measures concerning racial issues. Their opposition eventually led to the Great Trek, which began in 1835.[2] The British, however, steadily expanded their control of territory until the mid-1850s when they encountered successful Boer resistance in Transvaal. Britain did however successfully prevent Boer access to the sea. One British measure of interest was the non-racial franchise that operated in the Cape. Here people of any race were able to vote as long as they reached a certain level of property or earnings. In practice this was far less liberal, since as more Africans qualified their rights would be whittled away. In any case White voting strength was far out of proportion to White numbers. In 1909, 23 per cent of the population were White but they accounted for 85 per cent of the votes. Eventually Britain saw annexation of the Transvaal as the only way to secure gold supplies and the profits of the Rand. Such aspirations led to the Boer War of 1899–1902, though since this was part of a general British plan to expand her empire, political factors also had a role to play. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was established. This dashed African hopes of regaining land, and white supremacy was entrenched in the constitution. The non-racial franchise in the Cape was however allowed to continue, though it remained circumscribed by substantial property qualifications. Another effect of the establishment of the Union was that the boundaries of South Africa were drawn in a way which has since remained unchanged (if one excludes the so-called 'independent homelands' which were never recognized by any other country). Between 1910 and 1948, the power struggle between Whites was primarily peaceful, and was fought through elections from which non-Whites were excluded. The continued non-racial franchise in the Cape was a major subject of attack. In 1936 Blacks were removed from the common roll, and could henceforth vote only for a limited number

of White representatives. Eventually, in 1956, similar measures were provided for Coloureds. The phenomenon of 'pluralism' among Whites has been noted in the previous chapter: Afrikaners became dominant in the political sphere and in government service and English-speakers in the economic.

The racist ideology promulgated by Afrikaner nationalists had a two-fold purpose. In the first place, it was used to maintain and expand Afrikaner solidarity. In the second place, it was a political weapon with which to attack and accuse the mining magnates and their political representatives (notably Smuts and his South African Party, later United Party). These were castigated by Afrikaner nationalists for their laissez-faire economic and social policy, which for Afrikaners was selling the white man down the river for a pot of gold. Consequently Afrikaner nationalism was virtually bound to utilize the highly inflammable race issue as an ideological and political weapon with which to obtain power. In turn the English mine owners who spearheaded the growth of the South African industrial economy readily accepted the preexisting pattern of race relations, based as it was upon what prevailed prior to the opening of the mines. The White working class did at an earlier stage (in 1922) strike against White employers. However they were bought off successfully on the basis of a White supremacist platform which guaranteed them all the skilled work; they could not then make common cause with the Black work force. The position of Black workers was in any case weak, since they were not well organized and there were always new workers of rural origin willing to do the unskilled jobs. The phenomenon of the 'split' labour market' was created, through the system of migrant labour. Blacks were forced back into the Reserves (the rural areas not appropriated by Whites), but were taken back again to work for Whites in town. White employers saw no responsibility to provide for the workforce when not in employment; even slaves fared better in this respect, since their owners had some responsibility for their upkeep.

Segregationist policies were not supported only by outright racists but even had some liberal adherents. These argued that ethnic identity was to be preserved, and that Africans should be protected from denationalization or 'detribalization'. However, not only had 'tribal' identity already been reshaped by new forces: but a policy of this kind could only serve to divide and rule. It also served the interests of capital because it worked against proletarianization and possible radicalization. However, the 'native' administration and some chiefs could support such an exercise.

RACIALISM AS PRACTISED IN SOUTH AFRICA

Racialism in South Africa was upheld through social and penal sanctions which intertwined to affect the socialization process whereby race differentiation was embedded in and defined the white man's social definition of reality, his 'common-sense' view of the world, his expectations of others, particularly non-Whites, and his future desires and hopes. Segregation was the key element of the policies, and as van den Berghe shows (1975c: 319–20), there were three possible kinds of this. The first was micro-segregation, which involved segregation of public amenities; the second kind was meso-segregation, where there would be racially homogeneous residential ghettos within racially heterogeneous urban areas; the third was macro-segregation, where racial groups were segregated into distinct territorial units. The history of segregation will be traced so as to show how these three kinds of measure operated at different periods of South African history.

Some discriminatory practices had a long history. 'Pass laws' existed from the earlier days of White penetration, though there was some variation between States. Blacks (initially males only) were expected to carry a wallet of documentation whenever they were outside the ward of issue. The aim was one of regulating the flow of Blacks into towns; legislation was enacted that required employers to sign the documents regularly. Another example was the Native Land Act, 1913. This was an extension of the policies already operating in the Republic of the Transvaal. It prohibited Blacks from purchasing or leasing land outside designated 'reserves', which were situated away from areas of commercial agriculture. Initially only seven per cent of the land was allocated to the Reserves though this was later increased to fourteen per cent. But the heightening of racial consciousness through the deliberate use of penal sanctions took place mostly after 1948, when the Nationalist Party came to power. This success had been a consequence of the party's racial ideology, which united English and Afrikaner elements on the basis of a programme which involved increased domination over the non-White population.

With the Nationalist Party victory, the institutional framework of apartheid was introduced through various legal enactments. In 1949 interracial marriages were made illegal, and in 1950 this provision was extended to all interracial sexual activity. Also in 1950 came the Group Areas Act, which introduced a comprehensive and compulsory scheme of separate residential areas; and the Population Registration Act, which made racial classification a legal requirement. By 1951, illegal

'squatting' in urban areas was outlawed. 1953 saw the extension of segregation of all public amenities and in schools; though universities were not segregated till 1959. The curriculum at Black schools stressed 'Bantu'[3] culture, and the aim was to prepare pupils for little more ambitious than manual labour (Jones 1970). In 1950 communists were banned, and almost all opponents of apartheid were liable to be so described. In 1953, strikes by Blacks were made illegal. A turning-point came in 1960, when at Sharpeville a peaceful march concerning the pass laws issue was fired on by police, resulting in 69 being killed and 180 being wounded. Even before Sharpeville, Harold Macmillan (later Earl Stockton) as British Prime Minister spoke of the 'wind of change' in Africa: making clear that even the British Conservatives were not to be seen as friends of apartheid. The growing isolation of South Africa led to eventual withdrawal from the British Commonwealth later in the same year. In due course South Africa had to confront the question of diplomatic relations with states which had non-White governments. This led to the creation of special 'diplomatic suburbs', where apartheid did not apply. The only Black African state to establish full diplomatic relations was Malawi. When in 1971 her President, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, made a state visit to South Africa he had to be classified as an 'honorary White' for the purpose (MacMaster 1974: 105).

South Africa could not ignore the international non-respectability of racist policies, and the response was to move towards a more 'racialist' structure. The key feature of this was the designation of Black 'homelands' (often unofficially described as 'Bantustans'). Eight of these were established in 1959, and were based on government-designated 'tribes'; subsequently two others were created. Of the 'homelands', only one (Transkei) bore resemblance to an area of African settlement, and most consisted of just various patches on the map. The aim of this exercise was to remove Africans entirely from the body politic. By the end of 1981 four such 'homelands' (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) had been granted 'independence', though none of them had any potential for economic viability. This placated very few external critics, but it could be seen by South African Whites themselves as an effort to liberalize the regime. In some cases, such as job reservation, segregation became more rigorous than previously. However among the Afrikaner elite there grew a division between the more 'enlightened' *verligtes*, and the hard-line *verkramptes.* In some cases the measures taken against urban Blacks became harsher. Influx control became more rigorous, and some urban Blacks were expected to regard as 'homelands' places that they had never seen. Major riots took place in Soweto in 1976, over

the insistence on Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in schools. The *verligtes* succeeded in pressing for some changes, though were always prevented from going further by the *verkramptes*. Some internal reforms were made, on issues such as job reservation and sex across the racial line. A last-ditch attempt was made to coopt Indians and Coloureds into the system, by giving them a place in a tricameral legislature which was still to exclude Blacks. This did not however receive substantial support from non-Whites. In South-west Africa, which South Africa held through a former League of Nations mandate, the struggle for independence was successful, and in 1990 she became independent as Namibia.

One problem that remained in the liberation struggle in South Africa was internal division. The largest nationalist movement was the African National Congress (ANC). This had historical origins dating back to 1912, but for many years it had been moderate in policy and elite-oriented. But it became more radical after the Second World War, and gained substantial support especially among the urban Black population. It became more militant after Sharpeville. Its position was however challenged by the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), founded in 1959, which was militant from the beginning and emphasized 'Africa for the Africans'. Both of these were banned after Sharpeville. A policy of sabotage and armed resistance followed, though could have limited impact because of the need to operate from outside the country. Yet another element developed in the 1960s was the Black Consciousness movement, which represented a philosophy rather than constituting a formal organization. By the 1970s this also was subject to harassment and banning. A rather different element was Inkhata. This was formed in the 1920s, initially as a Zulu ethnic movement. In 1975 it was revived by Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi. Buthelezi had initially belonged to ANC but saw a power base in KwaZulu, one of the 'homelands' which was intended for the Zulu people. He was concerned to preserve hierarchical and patriarchal values. He did not command the support of all or even most of the Zulu people, and outside KwaZulu/Natal his following was negligible. But where Inkhata was strong, Black-on-Black violence occurred in relation to the ANC/Inkhata differences. Buthelezi was opposed to apartheid and the homelands system but he sought a high level of regional autonomy. One problem-area was that his emphasis upon preservation of cultural distinctiveness could lead to an uneasy common ground with certain White supremacists.

The 1990s saw an end to apartheid. The year 1990 saw the release of the ANC leader Nelson Mandela, and by the close of that year most segregation of public amenities had come to an end, and a start had been

made with desegregation of the schools. In March 1992 a referendum among Whites showed two-thirds in favour of continuation of negotiation towards a democratic constitution. In 1993 the ANC together with the now officially multi-racial National Party formed an interim government. In April 1994 the first multi-racial elections were held. A Government of National Unity was formed, with representation of all parties that had obtained at least five per cent of the vote: a position achieved by the ANC, the Nationalist Party, and Inkhata. Some concessions towards a federal structure were made to please Buthelezi. Ethnic clashes have centred around relations between Inkhata and ANC supporters, in view of the narrow victory for the former in Kwazulu-Natal, and the weak support that Inkhata receives from elsewhere. A controversial issue for Whites has been the downgrading of Afrikaans as a national language.

The economic legacy of apartheid remains, especially since recession in the recent past has led to Black unemployment, though the growth of the informal sector has absorbed some of this. Only accelerated economic growth can alleviate the situation.

RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE: COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

The other country eventually ostracized from the international community was that known first as Southern Rhodesia, then as plain Rhodesia, and eventually as Zimbabwe when full lawful independence was achieved (Blake 1977; O'Meara 1975). There were some political issues related to race which were shared with South Africa. These included the problem of land alienation, still a controversial feature after lawful independence; also issues such as pass laws, job reservation, and segregation in public amenities. In Zimbabwe as elsewhere in Africa Blacks were seen as having their 'home' in the rural areas with the towns being the abode of Whites. In both South Africa and Zimbabwe a system of migrant labour operated and some of the workers came from outside the country. In both countries a relatively high level of development has occurred, with Whites as the main beneficiaries. At the same time, Whites could be found doing some skilled manual work which their counterparts in neighbouring territories had passed on to Africans long before independence. In both South Africa and Zimbabwe, urban growth has been considerable, with rail communications important.

There were also numerous differences. The key Afrikaner/English division between Whites was a crucial factor in South African politics

and economics, but in Zimbabwe though there were some Afrikaner immigrants they were never numerous enough to be more important in politics than as a significant pressure group. Also among the African population in Zimbabwe there are only two numerically large ethnicities, the Shona and the Ndebele: whereas in South Africa the situation is much more complex.

In theory, the racial policies in Zimbabwe were very different. The key issue was the question of the franchise. A limited franchise for Blacks formed part of the official policy of the White-controlled government in Zimbabwe, whereas this was not on the whole the case in South Africa. The South African exception was the Cape franchise. Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902) had encouraged the notion of 'equal rights for all civilized men' and to this end voting was to be allowed subject to meeting an educational and/or property qualification. Legislation to provide for this was enacted in 1913. This still meant of course that Black voters were in the minority, and the economic and educational system could be manipulated in such a way as to make that situation permanent, even if this was not said explicitly. Rhodes did not see a Black majority government as likely in the foreseeable future, though he was willing to accept the idea of an educated minority.

The practices which operated were very much opposed to the development of a situation where majority rule would occur, or even where Black Zimbabweans could reach higher positions. In 1930 the Land Apportionment Act was passed, which allocated nearly half the land to the minority of White farmers. 1933 saw victory in the elections for the United Party, which emphasized separate development of the races. Pass laws were enacted in 1934, and a system of job reservation was introduced. Such measures aimed not only to secure the interests of White industrial workers, but also those of White farmers who feared that their work force would drift to town if high wages were on offer. Education for Blacks was very restricted especially in comparison to Whites. Such provision that was made emphasized vocational skills; and skills such as craft work were encouraged, since there was no danger here of competing with Whites. Some academic content was acknowledged, but there was considerable reluctance to enable Blacks to go on to full secondary education. Even as late as 1970, the policy was still than of enabling half of the Black population to have two years' secondary schooling: though all Whites followed a full secondary school programme (Parker 1970). One relevant aspect was that education was one criterion for qualifying for the franchise.

Southern Rhodesia was incorporated in 1953 into the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. On paper its aims were very different from what prevailed in South Africa. In South Africa the Union constitution had guaranteed White supremacy, and this was reinforced by the Nationalist victory in 1948. However, the Federation claimed to support 'African advancement'. The British Labour Party had originally rejected Federation as a way of promoting that idea, but had subsequently come to terms with it for fear of the encroachment of the South African apartheid system upon the northern neighbours. The British Conservative Party had just come to power when Federation was instituted. It was imposed against known African opposition; in particular the nationalist leaders observed that 'African advancement' did not mean self-determination, but rather the granting of concessions to Africans when Europeans thought them to be appropriate. The scheme was described by its proponents as 'partnership' but it was one in which Africans were to be forever the junior partner. Viscount Malvern, the Federal Prime Minister from 1953 to 1956, was quite explicit about this when in 1950 he described the partnership as akin to that between a rider and a horse. Africans in the two territories which joined the Federation – Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) were especially alarmed about the danger of extension of some of the particularly distasteful features of settler rule (such as pass laws) into their own areas.

There were some cosmetic reforms in Zimbabwe. In the mid-1950s, for instance, there was some desegregation of public amenities, one factor being that the small number of Africans admitted to the legislature could not be expected to use segregated facilities. But the key issue was that of the qualified franchise. Schemes were proposed by which a White minority would maintain its power, but that there would be a gradual if restricted extension to some Africans. This would depend on property and educational qualifications, and there was some debate as to whether there would be a common or a separate roll. Even this kind of arrangement was too liberal for some Whites, who would have preferred a more restricted franchise. One feature was that a small number of poor Afrikaner farmers were excluded from the system, but on the whole the effect in practice was to secure White domination.

Some White liberals saw 'partnership' as embodying a greater ideal. One organization which reflected this was the Capricorn African Society (Hancock 1984: 38–58; Oldham 1955). This was founded towards the end of the 1940s, and consisted of people who were generally conservative in outlook and who feared communism; but who sought an

opportunity to assimilate Africans who met certain criteria of 'civilized standards'. There was no suggestion of promoting the idea of one man, one vote, but the analogy was drawn with the gradual extension of the British franchise. Different degrees of liberalism were represented, but few saw majority rule as attainable in the foreseeable future, if at all. The appeal to 'standards' led the proponents of the Capricorn philosophy too close for comfort to the white supremacist camp. Moreover, little was done to promote African advancement; the policy was more one of acknowledging it when it had taken place. On the other hand, their views were seen as highly subversive by most white settlers. Also active was the Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia, a less elitist body, which aimed at broadening the franchise within the framework of existing political parties. There was much internal division as to how swift this process was to be.

The Federation was welcomed by the Capricornists as embodying their ideals, though some soon saw this as being true in theory only, not in practice. African nationalists immediately recognized that a few individual Blacks might advance themselves through so-called 'partnership' but that nothing would be done to advance the Black population as a whole. The Federation was seen as even worse than British colonialism. In Malawi Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the nationalist leader, could sometimes be relatively benign in his comments on the British; but he expressed a determination to break 'this stupid Federation' (and it should be noted that 'stupid' is a strong word in Central Africa) (Short 1974: 104). The word 'Capricorn' even became a term of abuse, rather like the term 'stooge' (Epstein 1958: 174n). A supportive stand towards Europeans was seen as far less pardonable when expressed by Africans, who could be seen as traitors, than when expressed by Europeans, who might simply be ignorant (Gussman 1962: 160).

The analogy with extension of the British franchise was misleading. In Britain the issue of national liberation was never at stake. The struggle in Ireland would have been a more appropriate analogy, where the aim was national self-determination (Blake 1977: 257–8). However in practice even paternalism as embodied in the 'partnership' philosophy was seen as too liberal by many Whites in Zimbabwe. With the forthcoming secession of Nyasaland as independent Malawi, and Northern Rhodesia as independent Zambia, the Federation came to an end in 1963, leaving 'Rhodesia' as still under British control. The dominant White policy was of course to fight for independence under White supremacy. However, British governments – Conservative as well as Labour – had by the 1960s become more accommodating to African

nationalism and were not prepared to take such a step. In 1964 the more openly White supremacist Ian Smith came to power. His aim was indefinite White control of the legislature: the most Blacks were ever to aspire to was parity in numbers in that legislature, and progress even to such an end was expected to be slow. Legitimacy among Blacks was sought through attempts to coopt chiefs. In 1961, together with headmen, they were placed on the lower roll of the franchise ex-officio. Chiefs were seen by White supremacists as representing 'true' African opinion. They did not represent the minority of urban-based Africans but these were seen as suspect in any case. It is true that chiefs were conservative in outlook, and did not reach their positions till quite late in life. Their incumbencies were also subject to government approval, and they could be reluctant to cause offence. They also felt threatened by African nationalism. However, the views they expressed to the government tended to be in terms of what they felt their people ought to think rather than what they actually did think. Therefore this attempt to use paternalism as a way of quelling African nationalism and supporting White supremacy proved to be a complete failure. Eventually, at the end of 1964, Smith made his famous Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). There was no further pretence at partnership, and White minority rule was displaced only by protracted guerrilla warfare. Two banned nationalist movements were operating. These were Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo. These coalesced as the Patriotic Front until the 1980 elections. An attempted compromise settlement involving Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1979 aimed at slow progress towards majority rule. White privilege was entrenched in the legislature and White control of security remained. This proved a failure with Muzorewa and his supporters seen as stooges. Lawful independence was finally achieved in 1980 after peaceful elections. ZANU won 47 of the 80 common roll seats: ZAPU obtained 20 and Muzorewa only 3. There were some interim safeguards for Whites written into the new constitution. This also applied to land rights, an issue which has recently come up for review.

In the Zimbabwean case, a colour line was apparent from the beginning and this remained despite pretensions of 'advancement' and 'partnership'. Educated Africans could be an anomaly in such a situation, and there were strong White pressures against higher levels of Black schooling as a consequence. A more liberal influence was never totally excluded from politics, but the aim of White liberals was usually to coopt educated Africans into the system. This could only serve to put a brake

on African nationalism, whether such was the intention or not. A strategy of this kind could have no long-term future, as subsequent events showed.

RACE, CLASS AND CAPITALISM

Sociological attention to racism and racialism in South and Central Africa has often focused upon the issue of the relative significance of political and economic factors. Some theoretical aspects of this question have been considered in Chapter 2. In the Central and Southern African context, the particular issue for debate has been that of whether capitalism worked hand in hand with a racist system, or whether the logic of capitalist development would bring down such a system eventually. As Wolpe (1988) shows, however, there can be problems in distinguishing political and economic factors; while Rex (1970: 73) notes that Whites might defend their position in both the political and the economic sphere. Wolpe does however observe that nationalist and class struggles are not to be seen as identical. But racial considerations enter the structure of class relations and class relations influence the structure of social order. Political and economic processes can be differentiated, in the institutional and organizational structure specific to each sphere.

It can be seen that a racist political system can produce a supply of cheap labour. Owners of capital are likely to remain content with a regime which allows them to make a substantial profit and to keep it. On the other hand White labour is correspondingly more expensive than economic forces would seem to justify. There can also be problems arising from segregated housing since this can entail long journeys to work, which increases transport costs; and some potential investors boycotted South Africa on political grounds. Both in South Africa and Zimbabwe, leading industrialists have been among critics of the regime, and in practice when economic growth occurs this does lead to greater racial integration. In both cases the end to the system came through political pressure: armed resistance from within, and international pressure from without; together with political events in neighbouring countries, such as the fall of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique in 1974. The economy has remained relatively unchanged. Indeed, soon after lawful Independence in Zimbabwe, Prime Minister Mugabe was concerned to allay White fears by promising that only a 'moderate' form of socialism was being proposed. More recently comments have been made to the effect that although White domination has come to

an end in the political sphere, this has not been the case in economic life. Moreover, land reform remains an emotive issue for obvious historical reasons: In 1997 there were attempts by Mugabe to institute a policy of mass takeover of (mostly White-owned) commercial farms. However, a combination of decline in investor confidence and international pressure forced him to abandon such a policy, though a long-term strategy for land reform remains in place. Another problem-area has been the attempt to extend welfare facilities of a kind that were previously reserved for Whites to the whole population: an exercise for which costs have proved prohibitive. In South Africa, too, it is one thing to dismember apartheid politically, but the economic legacy is another matter. However, the gap between White and Black incomes has been narrowed, and financial reforms have been instituted to facilitate small enterprise development. Unemployment among Blacks still continues to be high (37 per cent, as opposed to 6 per cent for Whites), though some so registered are absorbed in the informal sector. The public sector had been a major source of White employment in the apartheid era, but there are now policies of affirmative action in order to advance Black participation. One effect has been that some Whites now suffer poverty of a kind which was previously experienced only by those of other races.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND 'PLURAL SOCIETY' PERSPECTIVES

Racially divided societies have proved a challenge to anthropologists and sociologists. This has been particularly true for those who have worked within the functionalist tradition, which has emphasized a framework of consensus and has characteristically studied societies with a high degree of homogeneity. It has already been suggested that colonialism is likely to lead to development of a plural society. Rule can be imposed by force and continued by virtue of superior technological development. South Africa and Zimbabwe can both be seen to have gone through such an experience. In the case of South Africa the complexity is increased because of initial Dutch settlement and subsequent British conquest. Those of British and Dutch ancestry subsequently came together to form a White supremacist government in which each group had its distinctive niche. The Union thus formed was itself ethnically highly diverse but there was at least no dispute concerning external boundaries. The Union as constituted displayed a clear lack of consensus, but could be held together by force. A *state* can exist merely

on the basis of political bonds, whereas a *nation* implies at least some degree of common traditions, institutions, history, and ethnic identity (Smith 1969: 33–4). However, as Gluckman suggests (1969: 373–409), coherence may be possible even in the absence of consensus. Coherence exists when goals and values are compatible with one another, whereas consensus refers to agreement concerning goals and values. Gluckman goes on to suggest that South Africa cannot be seen to be a highly integrated society: both coherence and consensus would be needed for that; but that none the less a particular social field can be maintained as a continuous pattern by a variety of factors. He notes that even under apartheid, Whites and Blacks cooperated on a day-to-day basis and were involved in the same social field (Gluckman 1940; (1942) 1958; 1956: 135–65; (1947) 1963a: 207–34). Some Whites could defend Black interests, and some Blacks would appeal for help from the forces of law and order. He does however observe that such equilibrium as existed could not survive in the long term, especially as a consequence of over-population in the Reserves making the land less satisfying, and consequent increased Black urbanization which in turn develops a new level of consciousness. In his writing on the traditional Zulu social system Gluckman noted that conflicts could be contained within the system and promote cohesion at a higher level (i.e. rebellion occurred, rather than revolution); but he also stressed that such processes operated only in certain kinds of society, where no information as to realistic alternatives was available (1956: 33–47; 1963c: 110–36). His analysis of apartheid South Africa recognizes that a situation of *contradiction* operates, in which no long-term resolution is possible.

There are other possible responses to the indigenous population that can be made by colonial powers. Rather than adopting a policy of aloofness and cultural distinctiveness, they can try to coopt limited number of their subjects into the ruling elite. This policy, one of assimilation, was typical of French colonial practice, and is considered in more detail in the appendix to Chapter 4. It downgraded non-French culture, and was watered down when it appeared that too many were going to qualify. However, it did encourage education up to a high level, depending on ability regardless of race. Such a system never operated in apartheid South Africa; though particularly towards the end of the regime some Whites realized that it was only through better secondary education for Blacks that the 'Bantustans' could be expected to be viable (cf. Jones 1970: 88).

In Zimbabwe, however, the situation was more complex. Some concession seemed to be made to the idea of assimilation, since 'advancement'

of Africans was supposed to be official policy. At least the more liberal Whites wanted to coopt 'advanced' Africans into some form of ruling consensus. But in practice little was done to improve Black education, and there was much uncertainty as to what positions would be available in which they could make good use of their education. Many practices such as segregation in public amenities and in residential areas were very similar to those that operated in South Africa, even though there was no official 'apartheid' policy. Measures were taken to exempt 'advanced' Africans from such restrictions but there was no conception of a time when the whole structure of White dominance would disappear. The very limited provision of post-primary education for Africans was entirely consistent with overall political goals.

RACIAL CONFLICT AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute was set up in Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) in 1938. Its concern was with research of a kind which would generally have some practical applications. The appointment of Gluckman as its director in 1939 led to the wide application of his framework of analysis within the Zambian context (Werbner 1984). The struggle between White and Black in respect of political and economic control was one key issue considered in the work of his colleagues Epstein and Mitchell, who did research on the Copperbelt (Mitchell 1956a, 1966; Epstein 1958). Again it was emphasized that despite the racial cleavage (particularly evident during the Federation period), Europeans and Africans (and the various ethnic groups among Africans) operated within the same social field. Their studies portray growing political and economic consciousness, through the formation of a nationalist movement and a trade union. The White leadership for their part tried to delay this development for as long as possible, by a policy of 'divide and rule' which emphasized ethnic identity. This still remained important though changed in form in the urban context, but in the domestic rather than the politico-jural sphere. Also significant was the influence of material culture of European origin, especially clothing. The issue of relation to European culture is considered further in Chapter 4, and that of ethnic division in Chapter 6.

However, one final point of interest is the response that local Whites had to the practice of participant observation, which was the research method generally used by anthropologists on the Copperbelt, as else-

where. This meant breaking the colour line, and such research was denounced as 'hooey' in the columns of the *Central African Post* (10 April 1953, reprinted in Mitchell 1977: 315–16, also in Banton 1967: 226–7). Fieldworkers were condemned because they, counting as 'better type Europeans' were prepared to 'drop to the African level of village life', with the apparent result that Africans get 'wrong ideas' and lose their deference and respect for all Europeans'. Such comments reveal clearly the way in which the threat was perceived; once the colour line was breached, the whole system of White supremacy was in danger of crumbling. Responses of this nature stand in marked contrast to the liberal concern for 'African advancement' which was supposed to be enshrined in the Federation. It is significant too that the greater the extent to which White supremacy was threatened by African nationalism, the more likely such sentiments were to be articulated. A good example of this process can be seen in the pages of the periodical *East Africa and Rhodesia.* This represented during the 1930s a wide range of views, although the editorial line tended always to be that a form of White-dominated paternalism was of benefit to all concerned. However in the 1950s and 1960s, when African nationalism was becoming more successful, the overwhelming view represented was that of the far Right.

THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR EAST AFRICA

The effects of the depredations caused by the slave trade have already been commented upon. Many other events elsewhere in Africa have affected the situation in the East. In particular, Kenya was very much a settler colony, whereas Uganda was a protectorate believed by its principal indigenous leader (the Kabaka of Buganda) to be based on friendship, to be repudiated at will. Tanganyika was held after 1918 by Britain through a League of Nations mandate in which African interests were to be paramount. Discussions concerning closer union had a long history though the British government view for many years was to oppose anything like a Federation. But there was strong support among White settlers in Kenya for an arrangement of that kind (Hughes 1963: 219–26); and the Capricorn African Society was also active in East Africa. In 1948 an East Africa High Commission was set up, but security, the legal system, basic political and administrative powers and many other activities remained under control of the territorial governments. In 1953, however, the British Colonial Secretary during whose incumbency the Central African Federation had been set up (Oliver Lyttelton, later

Lord Chandos) alluded to the possibility of an East African Federation on the Central African model (Hughes 1963: 167–8). This caused furious protest from Africans all over East Africa, and especially from Uganda. On this occasion, the British replied that they recognized African opinion and that such a Federation could not be contemplated. The strength of African nationalism and the failure of the Central African experiment soon meant that another Federation on a similar basis was ruled out as a viable option. Throughout most of the colonial period the three territories did however share some common services, such as the postal system; and federation on a different basis remained a live issue for a number of years after independence.

The other main issue was the question of sanctions against South Africa, as a consequence of continuation of the apartheid system. Tanzania was particularly active in that respect, and became one of the 'frontline states', prepared to take an active role in the overthrow of apartheid including support for the armed struggle. Many political refugees from South Africa and Zimbabwe were received, and organizations for liberation of remaining colonized territories functioned in Dar es Salaam (Yeager 1982: 93). Tanzania refused to trade with South Africa, to allow entry of South African passport holders , or to allow anyone who had evidence of a visit to South Africa to enter the country. The description 'racist South Africa' was increasingly used in official and public discourse.

While apartheid remained, there could be problems for neighbouring countries for whom South Africa could serve as a natural trading partner and source of expertise, were it not for the racist regime. In view of such difficulties, in 1979 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was founded (Lyimo 1990). All states bordering on South Africa were members, together with Angola, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. Its aim was to harmonize development plans and to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. This policy was not very successful, and subsequent plans to establish economic sanctions on South Africa also proved ineffective. With the end of apartheid SADCC became the Southern African Development Community (SADC), aiming at economic integration towards a full common market.

4 Europeans in East Africa

EUROPEAN COLONIAL EXPANSION

European political control of Africa was of very brief duration in terms
of the entire history of the continent, though it could easily span a
person's whole lifetime: and its impact was in any case very considerable.
In 1880 about ninety per cent of African territory was under indigenous
government; by 1914, only Liberia and Ethiopia had not been colonised
by European powers. But in 1957 the Gold Coast became independent
as Ghana; Tanganyika became independent in 1961; and in 1994 the
end of apartheid in South Africa brought to a close all White minority
rule throughout the whole continent. Table 4.1 shows the date of formal
annexation, and the date of lawful independence, for all the East
African territories.

   Burundi, Rwanda and Tanganyika were initially colonized as German
East Africa. However, Germany lost her colonies after the First World
War, and the European powers which took over were doing so under a
'League of Nations Mandate'. The aim in such cases was to promote
indigenous African interests as 'paramount', though in practice govern-
ment was just like any other colony. Rwanda and Burundi were for
most purposes integrated with the Belgian Congo (subsequently Zaïre,
now the Congo Democratic Republic). Britain took the view that there
was no real difference between League of Nations policy and that
which she already operated in her colonies.

   The whole of East Africa saw the end of colonialism in the 1960s.
This did not of course mean the end of European (or Western) influ-
ence. Moreover, there was often some measure of European contact

Table 4.1   Duration and type of colonial government in East Africa

	Date of first annexation	*Colonial power*	*Date of full independence*
Burundi	1899	Germany, Belgium	1962
Kenya	1895	United Kingdom	1964
Rwanda	1899	Germany, Belgium	1962
Tanganyika	1885	Germany, United Kingdom	1961
Uganda	1896	United Kingdom	1963
Zanzibar	1890	United Kingdom	1963

before European government became formally established. Different colonial powers had their own distinctive kinds of impact; and this had its effects upon the culture which continued after colonialism had gone.

Trading links were the main form of pre-colonial European contact, and as this was based on sea transport the coastal regions of East Africa were the ones particularly affected. The Portuguese had by the end of the fifteenth century developed some coastal contacts, but by the late seventeenth century these had been eliminated by Arabs. Portuguese expansion began again in the mid-eighteenth century, but colonial interests were eventually consolidated only further south in Mozambique (Alpers 1975: 39–171). The slave trade based on Zanzibar grew in importance throughout the nineteenth century,[1] and was especially associated with Zanzibar and the Sultan of Oman, who moved his capital there. British policy, however, was to oppose traffic in slaves, and the Sultan had to end the trade in return for British protection (a process that was completed in 1890). Missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, began work in various parts of East Africa from the middle of the nineteenth century (Oliver 1952). Their work was initially concentrated on Zanzibar and the coast, because of the difficulty of penetrating the interior. Hence Uganda was not reached till the 1870s. In support of their claims, advocates of colonialism could now argue that European citizens in Africa were in need of political protection. The aim of abolishing the slave trade also gave Britain an apparently humanitarian justification for colonialist policies.

The situation became more complex in the 1880s, when all the major European powers,together with Belgium and Portugal, began to show interest in colonial activity. Such developments led to the 1884–5 Berlin Conference, which though particularly concerned with West Africa and the Congo, had implications for the division of European interest throughout Africa. The particular concern was to avoid the danger that conflicts over African interests might have repercussions in Europe. The Conference did not settle all the issues concerned, and further Anglo-German agreements concerning East Africa were signed in 1886 and 1890. But eventually Britain gained control of Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar, while Germany took charge of Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania), Rwanda (Ruanda) and Burundi (Urundi) – the whole being known as German East Africa. As already noted, this situation lasted until the First World War.

Outside East Africa, Britain became the colonial power in Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, also in the islands of Mauritius and

the Seychelles. Somalia was divided between Britain and Italy. Britain displaced France in Egypt in 1882, though formal independence came in 1922. After the First World War, Britain held part of the former German colonies of Cameroon and Togo under a League of Nations mandate. The complexities of British involvement in South Africa were explained in Chapter 3; and it is also relevant to note that Namibia (another former German colony) was administered by South Africa under the League of Nations. The overall spread of French and Portuguese colonial power is presented in a postscript to this chapter.

METHODS OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

Even under British rule, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were very different one from another. Uganda and Zanzibar were 'Protectorates', Kenya became a settler colony, and Tanganyika was run under a League of Nations mandate. Kenya was the particular focus of white settlement, though some settlers did arrive in other territories.[2]

In Tanganyika, the Germans had not particularly encouraged settlement, though some had occurred, and about two million acres (810,000 hectares) of land had been alienated. The war prevented Tanganyika from becoming a German equivalent to Kenya. After the First World War, the British deported Germans from the territory, though this policy was reversed in 1925. Land alienated by German colonialists was not returned to Africans, and there was even some further land acquired. A characteristic feature of settlement in Tanganyika was that it was never confined to the colonial power. In the German period some Greeks and Italians who had been brought in to build the railways decided to stay and farm. In the British period, the Mandate stipulated that discrimination between League of Nations nationals on the issue of settlement was not admissible (Low and Smith 1976: 446).

In Kenya, most settlers were British, though some came from South Africa; and the substantial Indian population also became a significant force in politics. The issue of land alienation became prominent, and settlers had particularly strong roots in the land: though the urban White population eventually became quite large. Settlement from Britain saw major expansion in the 1920s, and even in the 1950s the White population was still growing. An aristocratic connection was by no means unusual among the new settlers, and most new arrivals had aspirations towards social mobility. After the First World War, a settlement scheme particularly aimed at the 'officer classes' was in operation (Kennedy

1987: 42–6, 56–7). The official government line was that some form of White-dominated paternalism was of general benefit and that though independence was to come eventually, this was seen as too remote to contemplate. There could, according to this view, be premature demands for independence by both White settlers and African nationalists, and the colonial government's responsibility was to be seen as resistance to both. The limitations of this view could be highlighted by African nationalists: particularly relevant were restrictions on African land ownership and upon the growing by Africans of valuable export crops.

Uganda was never a significant destination for White settlement. A distinctive feature of the context of colonial penetration was, especially in the case of the Kingdom of Buganda, the long history of trading links with the outside. This meant that relations with the colonial power could be on relatively equal terms. From the start the colonial policy was to base development upon peasant production, and very little land was alienated. Some European planters were attracted, but the missionary element predominated (though some mission stations also developed farming interests). In Zanzibar, White settlement was negligible: in 1948 there were only 296 resident Europeans: most of these were traders or administrators.

Rwanda and Burundi were administered by Belgium under the terms of the League of Nations Mandate. There was an official presence; but in contradistinction to the neighbouring Congo, European settlement was never a major undertaking.

SETTLERS AND ADMINISTRATORS

Settler interests can be distinguished from those of colonial administrators in that a settler community tends gradually to lose contact with the territory of origin, especially as children are born who know no other country. As a result, settlers will be particularly concerned to retain and where possible to strengthen power for themselves. Colonial administrators and their European support staff form a rather different category. Many of them did spend a long time in the colony concerned, but they still saw Europe as 'home', and expected to return there on leave and retirement; and they were responsible to European interests (and to Labour as well as Conservative governments). Some conflicts could arise as a result. Settlers could see the declared aim of looking after African interests as 'soft', and could feel that since they were on the spot they 'knew much better'. Often they associated themselves with glori-

fication of action and military adventure. Cleavages of this kind frequently led to fierce debates in colonial legislatures. However, the distinction must not be exaggerated. Many administrators came from similar backgrounds to settlers, and went to the same public schools.[3] As a settled community developed, boarding schools in Kenya received pupils from all over East Africa, which administrators' children might also attend (Goldthorpe 1958: 142): and settlers and administrators could belong to the same clubs, which reinforced many of the same social norms. Some administrators decided not to go 'home' on retirement but became settlers instead (Kennedy 1987: 42–7). Factors of this kind could promote feelings of solidarity. In Kenya after the Second World War, many administrators began to be recruited locally, while some who came from Britain were attracted by the idea of Kenya as a 'White man's country' (Low and Smith 1976: 454–5). Whatever the colonial set-up there was some racial segregation in operation, and characteristically towns would be designed with that in mind. The 'White' areas would have no African residents apart from domestic servants; housing density would be low, and life would be car-oriented (Sofer and Sofer 1955: 110). In Kenya there were even 'pass laws' of the kind found in South Africa. The response to criticism of open segregation could sometimes be to water it down, by placing notices saying 'right of admission reserved'.

The British government felt that some mechanism should be in place for expressing the views of British nationals in the colonies. The colony was governed by a Legislative Council, which had representatives of 'officials' (i.e. colonial civil servants); and 'unofficials' (i.e. representatives of settler interests). This body was responsible to a smaller 'Executive Council', which was in turn responsible to the Governor, who represented the British Sovereign. The 'officials' were required to vote in accordance with government policy, and formed the majority on the Legislative Council. Even the unofficials were initially nominated, but election procedures were subsequently introduced. There was some debate as to whether Indians could serve on the Legislative Councils, but in East Africa (apart from the special case of Zanzibar) there were no Africans present till 1944. Kenya had the first African member in that year, with Uganda and Tanganyika following one year later. Till then the dominant British view was that Africans were not 'ready', and that official representatives, especially those with special responsibilities for 'native affairs', could be relied upon to look after African interests. The Belgian system was also based upon paternalism but this applied to local Europeans as well as to Africans.[4]

COLONIAL RULE AND INDIGENOUS POLITICAL AUTHORITIES

The chief aim of the colonial government was to keep the territory quiet, which in practice meant ensuring that colonial rule continued to be accepted. The British distinguished between a 'protectorate', where the responsibilities of the metropolitan power were relatively few and much was devolved to the local level (with the right to call on British assistance when needed); and a 'colony', where more direct responsibility was taken (Porter 1975: 114). In practice the distinction could become blurred. Kenya became a protectorate in 1905 and was not declared a colony till 1920; but had been a colony in all but name long before then. Zanzibar and Uganda retained their 'protectorate' status until independence, but both developed the usual pattern of Legislative and Executive councils. In order to deal with indigenous authorities, the British adopted a system of Indirect Rule. This was the brain-child of Lord Lugard, who developed it on the basis of his experience as an administrator in Nigeria. The aim of this approach was to work as far as possible through pre-existing officers such as chiefs, who would be grafted on to the lower levels of colonial administration. These would be provided with a salary and a small staff. There could be much conflict among Africans, especially chiefs, as to how far cooperation with the British was to be seen as appropriate: but the system could not have operated effectively unless some Africans were prepared to work for it. Chiefs who refused to accept the new system could be replaced by someone else, provided that he had some claim by descent. There were limitations on this approach, since a chief acknowledged to be a stooge would lose support from his people (the very last thing that the colonialists wanted) . A further difficulty would be that bureaucratic norms of impartiality which the colonialists expected to operate did not fit easily into indigenous culture (Fallers 1956). An ethos of paternalism prevailed. The 'native' in the village was seen as content under colonial rule; but educated Africans, seen as 'cheeky' and as having 'swelled heads', were feared as having the potential to 'confuse' villagers by preaching subversive ideas. As will be seen, within this context there was discouragement of education for Africans especially at secondary level or above.

The system of Indirect Rule operated in Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika. Zanzibar was distinctive in that it was a centralized political system already ruled by the Sultan. The Sultan's position was quite high even under British rule, since he presided over the Executive Council: though the British Resident presided over the Legislative Council. The

composition of the latter was also unusual for the time in that when constituted in 1926, it provided for representatives of the different races, including two Africans. In Kenya the situation was very different. Many of the peoples of Kenya lived in 'stateless' societies which did not have chiefs. Indirect Rule was also disliked by settlers, who were eager to appropriate land for their own purposes, and who as a consequence feared that acknowledgement of the position of chiefs would mean recognition of indigenous claims to land. In the end, chiefs were appointed, chosen from clerks, soldiers and interpreters who were seen as loyal to colonial interests (Mair 1967: 38).

The Belgian system of colonial government bore some similarities to Indirect Rule, but day-to-day supervision of indigenous authorities was much closer, with a much greater tendency than the British to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' chiefs. However, policies worked out initially in the Congolese context had to be modified in Rwanda and Burundi, since the kingships found there were very different from what had previously been encountered. Kings could be seen as legitimators, though the situation was different in Rwanda, where authority was more centralized, from that which prevailed in Burundi, where more local autonomy prevailed (Lemarchand 1970: 63–89). There was generally a greater tendency for the Belgians to intervene in day-to-day activities than was the case with the British (Tanner 1965).

THE ROLE OF MISSIONARIES

Missionaries were fewer in number that most other Europeans in Africa, but their influence upon African culture was considerable: especially in the field of education. Policies varied markedly from mission to mission. However, all missionaries felt it to be important to teach Africans to read in the vernacular, in order for them to have access to the Bible. This in turn meant that the European missionaries themselves had to learn the African language to a sufficient standard to translate the Bible and to prepare hymn-books and other religious literature. In some cases this led to a deeper appreciation of indigenous culture. Some missionaries, such as Bruno Gutmann in Tanganyika, came to see particular virtue in African notions of kinship solidarity, and felt them to be more in accordance with Christianity than Western individualism (Winter 1979). However, there were also missionaries who did lay themselves open to charges of cultural arrogance: they had a direct concern to *change* the culture, and to colonize the heart and mind

(Beidelman 1982: 6). Some looked down upon African culture, seeing it as the work of the devil at worst, or child-like at best. Missionaries were not however a homogeneous group; they varied in accordance with denomination, churchmanship, country of origin, class background, and educational level. There was after a major conference of Protestant missionaries in 1926 an influential tendency to adapt teachings to African culture. This reduced ethnocentrism but could still sometimes be paternalistic. Christianity did eventually become very widespread in Africa, especially as the earlier localized forms of religious expression became less meaningful with wider geographical horizons. Churches in Africa are now often full while those of the country which missionized the area are relatively empty. The broader issue of religion and its relationship to race and ethnicity is considered in more detail in Chapter 7.

Particularly significant was the way in which missionaries tended to have a more positive view of African potential than was the case with other Europeans. This was especially important in respect of their educational activities. Even the more conservative missionaries had the aim of Africanizing the church, though only as a long-term vision. This meant training an African ordained ministry, and to reach that standard some secondary schooling would be necessary. It was education at secondary level which was particularly suspect as far as most resident Europeans were concerned. Literate African clerks, educated to primary school level, could be very useful to colonial and settler interests. They could be paid at a low rate, while a European brought out for such tasks would command a high salary. But secondary education would mean that some Africans could achieve higher levels than some Europeans. They would through their studies become much more aware of the outside world and of historical evidence for rebellion against colonialism and exploitation. But the demand for secondary education and subsequently higher education could not be stemmed. A few East Africans succeeded in obtaining scholarships to colleges in the United States. This was viewed with even more alarm by European interests, and eventually Makerere College (now Makerere University) was set up in Uganda to ensure that the demand for tertiary education could be contained within Africa (King 1971: 72).

EUROPEAN EXPATRIATE LIFE-STYLES

The first Europeans who arrived in Africa suffered particular privations in respect of medical insecurity in an unfamiliar climate. Homesickness

could also be a problem, and sometimes exaggerated assertion of identity developed: for instance Sir Harry Johnston, the pioneer explorer and later administrator, insisted on dressing for dinner in the jungle. Pioneer settlers could face problems of coping with unfamiliar territory; and missionaries experienced particular difficulties since there was no obvious relationship between competence and success (Cairns 1965: 63–72) . But the European community grew in size, especially with a colonial power to protect it, and began to shape the environment in relation to their own interests. Europeans appropriated the better land for themselves, and as numbers increased they began to form their own subcommunities with their own distinctive institutions. Of particular importance was the Club, the centre of the Europeans' social life. The sub-culture in which Europeans found themselves would be one where sociability was expected. Sporting and other leisure facilities would be available, and a bar would be provided: drinking, sometimes quite heavily, was a feature of European expatriate life. Some degree of self-discipline was imposed by not drinking during daylight: hence the first drinks of the day would be known as 'sundowners'. The work environment was very much male-dominated. Initially this would be evident in the overwhelming numerical preponderance of males. Apart from a few teachers and nurses, and sometimes certain clerical staff, hardly any European women would have taken up residence in the tropics because of their occupation. The majority of women would be married, and would have come to accompany their husbands. In settler communities, obviously the sex ratio eventually became more balanced. But in all cases the traditional domestic role of women was normally taken over by servants. In urban centres some married women might secure employment, but this was unlikely in the smaller places. This would leave the women free to engage in leisure pursuits: when these had been exhausted the only thing left to do would be to resort to gossip. Gossip was in itself an important source of social control within the European community, though at the same time there would be much superficial conviviality. This community would be much more close-knit than what had been experienced in the home country. At the same time, there would be deep nostalgia for Britain, still seen as 'home'. For settler families this would diminish with time,[5] though this would not lead to greater identification with indigenous African culture.

Apart from the club, the other main European institution to be found was the school designed for the children of Europeans. This could function most effectively at primary level, where the number of children was large enough to justify such provision. Secondary schooling might prove

to be more problematic. It was quite common for this to take place in the home country, and for civil servants the allowances often included provision for payment of fees for boarding schools in England. Another possibility, as already noted, was for boarding schools, for East Africa typically in Kenya, to have a catchment area beyond national boundaries.

It must however be recognized that differentiation also occurred within the European community. The civil service could be the main employer, and preoccupation with rank could be important. In some cases, skilled manual workers were present, often brought in for specific projects. They were of lower status than other Europeans, and a study of Jinja in Uganda notes that they were described as 'unclubbable'; the 'clubbable' were those of higher levels of education. Eventually in Jinja a new club was formed for those who were refused admission to the original club or who felt uncomfortable there (Sofer and Ross 1951; Sofer and Sofer 1955: 110–11). In contrast to Zimbabwe and South Africa, this particular group never developed a settled existence: thus 'job reservation' in respect of skilled manual work never became an issue. If a job were deemed unworthy of a European but no African had been trained to do the work, the relevant skills could be found in the substantial Indian population. Europeans doing lower-status jobs could be looked on by higher-status Europeans with a good deal of suspicion, as lowering the white man's prestige. This was felt to be always under potential threat, and its maintenance was in itself a major preoccupation. Another fear was miscegenation, which also posed a threat to the racial boundaries that were seen as essential. Casual relations between European men and African women could sometimes be condoned, but one motive for encouraging White women to immigrate was to discourage these from occurring (Kennedy 1987: 174–9). It is of interest that there was sometimes a reckless streak in the behaviour of very wealthy Europeans, as depicted in the book by James Fox, *White Mischief* (1982), which was later popularized on film.

THE EUROPEAN IMPACT UPON AFRICAN CULTURE

The impact of Europeans upon African life was of course also considerable. Deliberate offence to Africans by Europeans, though not universal, did sometimes take place. The closest contact that Europeans usually had with Africans was in the servant role; and the attitude was widespread that Africans were there simply to serve Europeans. Everywhere the overwhelming standpoint during the colonial period was that

Africans should be 'kept in their place', and that any proto-nationalist stirrings should be quickly suppressed.

The impact of material possessions brought by Europeans was considerable, and quickly apparent. Goods of European origin gradually trickled down into African life. Initial contacts made by Europeans sometimes involved a conscious desire by Europeans to strengthen Africans' interest in new kinds of possessions. When missionaries wanted to encourage Africans to work for wages to help to build up the mission, they needed first to stimulate a demand for the goods that money could buy. European styles of clothing became particularly important, and before long became nearly universal. The luxuries of one generation soon became the necessities of the next. Such changes were part of the general development of a money economy, with wage labour becoming essential to sustain the new standard of living. Apart from clothing, items such as furniture, cooking equipment, bicycles, sewing machines, irons and eventually radios were among those in heavy demand by Africans.

The impact of European possessions did not lead to greater acceptance of European colonial rule. Indeed, the most 'Europeanized' were typically the pioneer nationalists. They were concerned to defend the dignity of African culture, but not to the exclusion of what Europe had to offer. When independence eventually came, those who had led the political struggle became the new elites. They would in many cases occupy the houses vacated by their colonial predecessors, and would generally expect a high standard of living in accordance with their new status. There could be a danger that they might replicate the culture of their colonial predecessors. This was acknowledged to be exploitative, and there could be a serious problem if a new exploitative system was destined to follow the older one (Dumont 1969). Problems could arise, for instance, if African owners acquired farming land previously occupied by settlers, and proceeded to run it in very much the same way. Some ostentation could be evident in the behaviour of the new elites, who were known in Swahili as the *Wabenzi* (those who drove a Mercedes-Benz). Such developments could be acknowledged as problematic, particularly in Tanzania where conscious attempts were made by Nyerere's government to discourage such a situation from occurring. The historical time-span is also relevant. In the initial stages of independence, there could be excitement at Africans occupying high-status positions and enjoying the same standards as their European predecessors. But now that a whole generation has grown up under independent rule, there can be resentment at the standards enjoyed by the 'fat cats' in the capital

city. The urban basis of the new elite life-styles is also problematic with respect to district administration, and the staffing of rural schools and dispensaries. Colonial district officers were quite willing to accept rural postings. They came from a culture where rural residence could carry status, and their spartan education at public schools had prepared them for deprivations that would be encountered. But their African successors could see rural existence in no other terms but hardship and failure, and the very word 'villager' could be a term of abuse. In Tanzania, some Nyamwezi pointed out to Abrahams (1981: 45–6) that, while they had no wish to see colonialism return, it had to be acknowledged that colonial administrators saw the open spaces of rural life as having a romantic appeal. This was obviously lacking for their Tanzanian successors, who had experienced the discomforts of village life with a certain immediacy which their European predecessors were fortunate to have missed.

EUROPEANS IN AFRICA TODAY

Europeans still remain in East Africa and elsewhere on the continent. Segregation and privileges based on race obviously disappeared very quickly as independence approached. But nowhere has there been an attempt to expel Europeans by force, though with the end of colonialism many decided to leave voluntarily. In some cases this was mainly for political reasons, though there were times, such as in Uganda under Idi Amin, when it could be genuinely dangerous to stay (though not only Europeans were in danger). Europeans were in a good position to leave if they wished, since they could claim residence rights in countries such as Britain by virtue of their ancestry. They were however likely to find that living conditions were less favourable in respect of items such as low-density housing: and in particular, domestic servants would almost certainly be unavailable.

European subcommunities remain; and many clubs continue to operate. As independence approached these will have gradually transformed themselves into elite clubs. Especially initially there is likely to have been some reluctance, but a few token African members will have been accepted. The aim will have been to stave off accusations of racism. especially since their members knew that an African government could close the club down if it wished. However, such institutions have gradually become transformed so as to be more multi-racial. Even so, Europeans with fewer local ties are often more likely to be active members, and some club activities remain European-oriented.

Not only do settler families remain, but expatriates with specific skills continue to come out on contracts, which may be renewed regularly; or they may go away for a contract in another country, where the same set of expatriate institutions will await them. Their presence can be resented by African elites, who may however also see them as a reference group and may wish to make use of expatriate-oriented services. The previously 'European' school is typically redesignated as 'international'. The curriculum will remain heavily dominated by European-type syllabuses, and the fees will be out of the reach of most Africans, even members of the elite. None the less, some African families will wish to send their children there, and will succeed in doing so.

There are however some changes in the composition and lifestyle of the European community. Political life and district administration, which were the key components of the colonial structure, will have been localized very quickly. It is also likely to be the case that expatriates will be recruited from a wider range of countries than was the case in the colonial period. In particular, there will be some newcomers from outside Europe, especially the United States, and sometimes from Israel, Japan, and China. Some Eastern European countries may have sent experts where they were politically acceptable; this was especially the case in Tanzania. There will be less security, since when an African has been trained to an appropriate level, the post concerned will be 'localized'.

Some settlers will remain. Their numbers will be diminished, and their role in politics will be marginal. However, their economic significance continues, and can even raise questions about the effective independence of the country. All their activities will however have to be in full cooperation with the African government. Some settlers, though not many, may take local passports. They may often continue to have an enclosed social life which operates in much the same way as in colonial times, though at elite level there can be at least some degree of social integration with high-status Africans. There may be a measure of controversy among Europeans as to the extent to which this is appropriate.

Postscript: French and Portuguese Colonial Rule

Although the French and Portuguese were not present as colonial powers in what is normally thought of as East Africa, it is useful to consider briefly their ways of operating in the colonial setting. This exercise is of interest from the point of view of comparison, and because the methods adopted help to illustrate the concept of assimilation (and in the case of the Portuguese even amalgamation), although in neither case was the process ever fully carried out. A further relevant factor is that Mozambique, the southern neighbour of Tanzania, was a major component of the Portuguese empire.

THE FRENCH SYSTEM

The French colonial presence was to be found almost entirely in North and West Africa. France was the colonial power in Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Tunisia. Cameroon and Togo, former German colonies, were divided by Britain and France under the League of Nations mandate, and Morocco came partly under French and partly under Spanish colonial rule. However Djibouti, bordering Ethiopia and Somalia, was a French territory until 1977, and some islands in the Indian Ocean were or are under French control. Madagascar is by far the largest of these, having become independent from France in 1960. Réunion remains part of 'overseas France'. The Comoros are divided with three islands having opted for independence, and one (Mayotte) choosing to remain French. In Mauritius and the Seychelles the French were displaced by the British as the colonial power early in the nineteenth century, but the cultural and linguistic imprint of France remains considerable. In Egypt, French political and cultural influence was considerable until displaced by the British in 1882.

The philosophy behind French colonial rule is of particular interest (Hodgkin 1956: 33–40; Mair 1974: 34–41). This reflected the post-revolutionary vision that there were universal rights of man, and that French culture was the vehicle of this and was of universal validity.

Such a perspective supported colonialism, though officially it was felt inappropriate to speak of colonies, and the designation adopted was that of 'overseas France'. A policy of assimilation was the logical consequence of this perspective, and this meant the spreading of French-style education. Unlike the British, the French encouraged the emergence of an educated elite. In order to count as 'assimilated', an African was expected to show proof of having adopted a European lifestyle, in terms of education, monogamy, and loyalty to French interests. Provision of education to enable assimilation to take place was rather sparse, but where education was provided it was up to French standards.

The policy was carried out consistently to the extent that as early as 1914 the Deputy for Senegal in the French parliament was an African: and the process of Africans representing themselves continued, with some reaching senior positions. However, if the assimilation policy had been carried out consistently, the French in France would have eventually been outnumbered by French from overseas. As this was clearly not going to be found acceptable, the policy of assimilation was eventually watered down to one of 'association', and gradually a restriction on the number of those who could be 'assimilated' developed. A further problem-area was that 'assimilation' proved too difficult in the face of widespread cultural diversity, and in particular Islamic culture proved resilient. Attempts were also made to provide elected assemblies in overseas territories, and in various ways Africans were involved in discussing public policy. However, except in Senegal there were separate rolls for Africans and Europeans; and in any case Paris remained the only seat of major legislation.

Even for those who did count as assimilated, some problems became apparent. The French education that they had experienced made no concession whatever to African languages and culture, and the new elites came to resent the downgrading of everything in the African heritage. As shown in Chapter 1, African francophone intellectuals were in the forefront in reasserting their indigenous identity through the philosophy of négritude.

Like the British, the French had to come to terms with indigenous political authorities, and their philosophy implied that their policies would be very different. In contradistinction to the British, the French could be expected to have no respect for kings, aristocrats, chiefs, and others whose position was sanctioned by birth. They would have preferred to make their own appointments, though in practice this stance could be modified. Villagers would be allowed to make suggestions as to whom to appoint, and were likely to propose those who had some

traditional claims. Moreover, colonial administrators, often army officers, were generally conservative rather than revolutionary in outlook, and could have more respect for traditional authority that the official policy might dictate. There was also a certain amount of accommodation to Islamic institutions, which were seen as more worthy of respect than Black African culture. However the overall policy did tend to downgrade chiefly authority, with the consequence that local loyalties were watered down and national unity was easier to achieve: providing long-term benefits in the post-colonial situation.

A major area of difficulty for France was that of decolonization. Togo and Cameroon were special cases, since they were acquired under a League of Nations mandate which committed France to prepare them for independence. But elsewhere, since the situation had not been designated as one of colonialism in the first place, nationalist movements aiming to oppose colonialism were to be seen as irrelevant. But Africans saw the situation differently, and such movements were formed and were eventually successful. Though France eventually did agree to leave, sometimes amenities that had been provided were also removed. However, ties with France have been retained through the persistence of the use of French as a common language.

THE PORTUGUESE SYSTEM

Though not a major power in Europe, Portugal has been important as a factor in colonialism in Africa and elsewhere.[1] The countries that remained under Portuguese control till Independence were Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé e Principe. In East Africa, the Portuguese displaced the Arabs along what is now the Kenyan coast, but the Arabs eventually succeeded in recapturing the territory and Portuguese interests were subsequently concentrated further south, in Mozambique.

The situation of Portugal is unusual in that she has been relatively undeveloped compared with most other countries in Western Europe, making input of capital into the colonies difficult. Moreover, the Portuguese language and culture do not have the same international prestige as those of France or Britain, though Portuguese is also spoken in Brazil. Portugal was active in the slave trade and abandoned it only with reluctance. For most of the twentieth century Portugal has been a dictatorship, making it difficult to promote political ideals abroad. There was however some sense of mission in respect of Western and Christian values,

though many of the Portuguese who settled colonial territories were convicts or illiterate peasants. But in one respect Portugal did maintain that her culture stood at a unique advantage with regard to African links. The ideal promoted was that of 'Lusotropicalism', a philosophy which was tolerant of miscegenation and could even encourage it (Bender 1978: ch. 1; Abshire 1969). Sexual and marital relations between Europeans and Africans were as a consequence seen as perfectly acceptable. This meant that not merely assimilation, but amalgamation could be in order, and as an example the situation of racial mixture in Brazil would be cited. Relationships of this nature would appear to have been much less likely to be tolerated in the framework of British and French colonialism, though an assimilated African might be seen in the same light as a White French person, and casual liaisons between European men and African women would often have been condoned.

The Portuguese promoted a system of assimilation which bore some resemblance to that of France. A distinction was drawn between the *assimilados* and the rest of the population which remained *indigena*, but those Africans who qualified for the former category were very few in number. There were also some disadvantages attendant upon assimilation, since this meant higher taxes, the duty of service in the Portuguese army, and the loss of some traditional rights. Such education as was provided for Africans was very sparse, and the overwhelming majority in Portuguese African territories remained illiterate. Towards the end of colonial rule, however, the distinction between the assimilated and the non-assimilated began to break down, and after 1961 Africans were able to choose whether to retain a 'traditional' life or whether to take on the rights and duties of Portuguese citizenship (Bailey 1969b, 165–7).

Policies concerning chiefs and other traditional political leaders represented a position midway between the official British and French systems. District governors appointed *regadores* who sometimes but not always had a traditional basis for their authority, and they did this in consultation with the local population (Bailey 1969a: 239–40) Relationships with the African population involved a heavy reliance on forced labour. Though this might occur *de facto* in some British territories, because of the tax system, British rule was seen a clearly preferable as is seen by immigration from Mozambique into Nyasaland (Malawi), especially towards the end of the the nineteenth century (Mitchell 1956: 28, 59), to escape from Portuguese practice. At the same time, there was no racial segregation through devices such as Whites-only signs.

Like the French, the Portuguese preferred to speak of 'overseas citizens'. But very few were assimilated and as has been seen, provision of

education for Africans was limited (Lisboa 1970; Samuels and Bailey 1969: 178–89); and Portuguese rule is remembered mostly for the heavy-handed methods adopted. The apparent support for miscegenation did not mitigate the impact of alien rule (Abshire and Bailey 1969: 202–4). Bender suggests (1978: 18–54) that the presence of people of mixed race is not as such an indicator of amicable race relations, as is seen by the existence of the large 'Coloured' population in South Africa. He also notes that most cases of miscegenation were the products of liaisons out of wedlock: and that these were by no means unusual in other colonial situations, especially in the early stages when the White population consisted overwhelmingly of single males. Though he recognizes that those of mixed race had quite high prestige, he shows that their importance declined as a large number of Portuguese came to settle in the colonies.

Another distinctive feature of Portuguese colonialism was the refusal to leave and the need for the nationalist movement to drive out the Portuguese colonialists by force of arms . Not only did the Portuguese see their rule as non-colonial, but democratic values were seen as irrelevant and the remaining source of international prestige for Portugal was the continued existence of her empire. The success of guerrilla movements influenced Portuguese politics to the extent that a military coup occurred in 1974, which in due course ushered in democracy in the metropolitan country. It is of interest that the linguistic heritage of Portugal remains. The postcolonial governments have through their educational policies done more to spread the Portuguese language than the Portuguese ever did themselves; and they have shown little enthusiasm for strengthening the position of African vernaculars.

COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

The French and Portuguese both had some sort of policy of assimilation and a belief that their activities did not really constitute colonialism at all. A key problem-area was that assimilation of a relatively small number of Africans did very little to improve the position of Africans as a whole. The French and British took diametrically opposed views of the educated African (and theoretically, the Portuguese would seem to be nearer to the French than the British here). For the French, assimilation through education could occur regardless of phenotypical differences, while an African peasant had no more prestige than a French peasant. For the British, the aim was to preserve quiet and contented

peasantry, and this was a vision which had no room for the educated African, who, it was feared, would set out to 'confuse' the situation. There was perhaps some similarity between the French assimilation policy and the notion of 'partnership' in Zimbabwe, since policies were in place which could lead to recognition of Africans as equals provided that they were Europeanized. There were however also many differences. In Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) little was done to promote Western-type education for Africans at higher levels and even what efforts were made were resisted as too liberal by White supremacist interests.

An interesting debate occurred between Deschamps (1963) and Crowder (1964) over the question of how far the French and British systems differed in practice. Deschamps argued that Lugard though promoting Indirect Rule recognized that flexibility and pragmatism had to be built into the system, meaning that in practice there could be greater similarities with French policies. Crowder argued, however, that there was a difference in kind as well as in degree over the issue of local administration. In particular, he noted that chiefs were totally subordinate to French political officers, and that they were not necessarily those who would have been chosen by customary procedures – hence the ease with which they evaporated after independence. British political officers, however, while retaining overall control, were prepared to adopt the role of adviser on many day-to-day matters.

5 Asians in East Africa

The term 'Asian' is often used, especially since partition, to denote those whose ancestry is from the Indian sub-continent. 'Arabs' are seen as forming a separate category, and the term 'Indian' is reserved for visitors whose normal country of residence is India. However, the term 'Indian' will be adopted here to include all whose ancestry is from India, Pakistan or Bangla Desh. The term 'Asian' will be used here to include both Indians and Arabs, and historical links with South-east Asia will also be shown to be relevant.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Asian presence in East Africa dates as far back as 2,000–3,000 years. Until the nineteenth century Asians were confined to the coastal areas as small scattered groups of merchants (Hollingsworth 1960). The demand for ivory in ancient Greece and Rome encouraged Arab traders to explore the East African coast, but following the demise of the Roman Empire the trade declined. The loss, however, was compensated for by trade with India and China, which remained important markets until the early nineteenth century (Sheriff 1987: 12). Trade between China and East Africa was largely conducted through Arab commercial networks, though the Chinese also crossed the Indian Ocean. Between 1405 and 1453, the Ming Empire funded several maritime expeditions that visited around thirty states in South-east Asia and along the Indian Ocean, venturing as far as Hormuz and Somalia (Tsai 1996: 153). The Ming expeditions, led by the Imperial eunuch, Zheng He, relied on many centuries of Chinese commercial contacts emanating from Nanjing, to Borneo and Zanzibar (Tsai 1996: 163).

South-east Asian sailors were also involved in exploring the coast of East Africa, and they established settlements on the island of Madagascar. They seem unlikely to have arrived in identifiable waves, and though opinions vary concerning the precise date of settlement, they seem to have been well-established in Madagascar before the end of the first millennium AD. The ancestors of the Malagasy seem to have reached Madagascar by sailing along the east coast of Africa, though it remains

unclear whether or not they founded enclaves on the continent. The relationship between Madagascar and maritime South-east Asia has attracted academic attention; but the link with East Africa is less well understood. Some researchers have suggested that seafarers from the Indonesian archipelago penetrated the African continent, and that 'Afro-Indonesians' played an important role in the history of Madagascar: but evidence is limited, and this hypothesis remains highly speculative.

Little documentation is available on the early history of the East African coastline. The starting-point for research is the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, which was written by an anonymous Greek in the first century AD. (Huntingford 1980: 6; Phillipson 1977: 88). The *Periplus* contains fantasy as well as facts. Pemba, for instance, is described as an island inhabited by giant people (Gray 1962: 10), though the presence of coastal traders is also noted (Phillipson 1977: 155). The next major source are sailors' tales recorded by the Arabs (Sutton 1960: 66). The Arabs surmised – presumably following Ptolemy – that the Indian Ocean was a lake, though one early tenth-century writer, Al-Mas'udi, did not concur with this position since he had spoken to a sailor who had claimed to have sailed to the far south (Sutton 1990: 66).

Both Arab and Chinese texts refer to the coast of East Africa as 'Zenj', and mention a large island (Madagascar) known as Komr (Heseltine 1971: 61). This latter name was later given to the Comoro Islands (Keller 1901: 160). The term 'Madagascar' seems to be of more recent derivation and may be a corruption of Mogadishu (Sutton 1990: 66). 'Zenj' was also the name given to the indigenous coastal dwellers of East Africa, whom al-Mas'udi describes as non-Muslims (Phillipson 1977: 157). The term reflects the Persian word *zangh*, meaning a Negro (Pearce 1920: 4). Such coastal dwellers are said to have grown millet and herded cattle, and to have subsisted on coconuts and bananas, especially in Pemba. Another people known as the Waqwaq are also mentioned in Arab sources in connection with an attack on Qanbalu (Pemba) in AD 945–46. Arab sailors seem to have divided the Waqwaq into the eastern group, dwelling in the Indonesian archipelago, and the western group, dwelling in Madagascar. It does not follow that they discerned a meaningful connection between the two peoples, since 'Waqwaq' could simply have meant anyone whom the Arabs did not understand. Nevertheless, Sutton has argued that the Arabs were aware of the existence of cross-oceanic connections during the period before Arab expansion (Sutton 1990: 66).

Arab writings on East Africa coincide with the rise of Arab supremacy in the Indian Ocean during the tenth century. Sutton suggests that

the Waqwaq raid on Pemba may have occurred because of competition for trade. But the Arab defences held and thereafter Waqwaq power declined. The East African ports adopted Islam and the Arabs consolidated their control over local trade through alliance with 'Swahili' people. Arab settlers freely intermarried with the indigenous African population, leading to the establishment of this mixed Arab/African population. All were or became Muslims, and spoke Swahili. This is a Bantu language with important Arabic borrowings, and it was first written in the Arabic script. The region became oriented to the north of the Indian Ocean and, as the Waqwaq sailing exploits diminished, Madagascar began to develop independently from Indonesia. Al-Mas'udi, for example, tells us that by the tenth century ivory, which was collected by the Zenj, was already being shipped to Oman for export to China (Phillipson 1977: 157).

The ruling dynasty in Persia (the Sassanids) encouraged seafaring and Emperor Narseh (AD 293–302) had relations with Zand Afrik Shah (King of the Zang (= Zanj or Zenj)) of eastern Somalia and trade between the Persian Gulf and East Africa continued until early Muslim times (Hourani 1963: 36–8). The Arabs followed existing trade routes, passing down the African coast in search of slaves, ivory and ambergris. By the close of the seventh century there were sufficient 'Zanj' in Mesapotamia to cause a slave revolt (Hourani 1963: 79). The Portuguese who arrived in the fifteenth century encountered well-established trading networks along the East African coast. The Portuguese also followed existing trade routes where possible, and used Madagascar as a staging post for the East Indies (Heseltine 1971: 69). Despite the fact that the Portuguese were in contact with both Indonesia and Madagascar, they do not appear to have been aware of the link between them, though further research on Portuguese sources is needed here.

The connection between Madagascar and maritime South-east Asia was not firmly established by researchers until the twentieth century, Alfred Grandidier and his son Guillaume were the first to propound the view that the ancestors of the Malagasy came from southern Asia, though other scholars subsequently modified this perspective (Grandidier 1920: 202–9; Mutibwa 1974: 3). The Grandidiers paved the way for research on the material culture, social organization, linguistics, and ethnobotany of Madagascar and today few scholars would dispute the link. Otto Dahl, for example, went on to show that not only was the Malagasy language related to Malay and Indonesian languages, but that it was closest to Maanjan, an Austronesian language from Borneo (Dahl 1951; Kent 1970: 47). Indonesian influences on Malagasy and

East African outrigger canoes were also discussed by Hornell (1920, 1934). This theme was later taken up by Deschamps, who also speculated that the proto-Malagasy lived for several generations in East Africa before moving on to Madagascar (Deschamps 1961: 15; Mutibwa 1974: 3–5). The concept of an Afro-Indonesian element in Madagascar was developed by Kent, who argued that these outrigger peoples spread into the interior of Africa along waterways and lakes; but that pressure from Bantu-speaking peoples necessitated another move, this time to Madagascar (Kent 1970: 247). Mack (1986: 21) also suggests settlement of Madagascar by way of the East African coast as a 'likely scenario'.

Even if not all the claims made by Deschamps and Kent are to be accepted, it is clear that the links between Madagascar, East Africa and Indonesia would repay further study. It is of interest, for example, that although the Malagasy language is basically Austronesian it contains many words of African origin. There are some Bantu terms associated with animal husbandry (*omby*, ox; *akoho*, hen; *akanga*, guinea fowl). Such animals were presumably taken by boat from East Africa, and were not brought all the way from South-east Asia. The ethnobotanical, material-cultural and linguistic information from East Africa and Madagascar all suggests that speakers of Austronesian and Bantu (Niger-Congo) languages had considerable contact with one another (Kent 1970: 51–5; Pearce 1920: 30; Heseltine 1971: 66). It remains a moot point, however, whether these exchanges took place during the early Austronesian migrations or at a later date. The fact that the *Periplus* does not mention outriggers is suggestive but not decisive (Huntingford 1980: 159). The distribution of outrigger canoes around the Indian Ocean implies, but does not prove conclusively, that the proto-Malagasy reached Madagascar via East Africa. Alternatively the Austronesian seafarers could have crossed the Indian Ocean by means of the southern equatorial current which rises south of Java: but this would have involved an open sea voyage of 3,500 miles, as opposed to just 250 miles (interspersed with landfalls) if the route via East Africa had been taken. A recent expedition to test the former possibility using an outrigger canoe made the crossing in 49 days (Crook 1990; Mack 1986: 21).

The proto-Malagasy seem likely to have sailed down the coast of East Africa though it is uncertain whether they absorbed Bantu-speaking elements at this stage. After the settlement of Madagascar, Malagasy sailors no doubt visited the shores of East Africa and in due course Swahili-speaking traders became established on the island. Some knowledge of Swahili has been reported in parts of Madagascar, and there are enclaves of Arab traders who maintain contact with the towns

in the East African coast (Keller 1901: 60; Heseltine 1971: 62–3). Though some issues remain uncertain, it is clear that African and South-east Asian elements are detectable in the joint heritage of Madagascar; and that as far as human history is concerned, the Indian Ocean is a 'lake' at least in the metaphorical sense.

ZANZIBAR AND THE EAST COAST: DIVERSITY AND SETTLEMENT

The name Zanzibar derives from the Persian root *zangh*, already referred to, and *bar* (coast) thus meaning 'Negro coast' (Pearce 1920: 4–5). The settlement of Zanzibar should be seen in the wider context of Arab contact with the East Coast. By the tenth century AD several city-states had been set up along the East African coast, for the purpose of trade in gold, slaves and ivory with Persia and Arabia. Arab seafarers frequently married indigenous Africans, as already noted. Portuguese seafarers successfully displaced Arab rule; though a century later, with help from Oman, Portugal was driven out of all her East African possessions north of Mozambique. This led to nominal suzerainty of Oman over the coast further north: a system widely resented by some long-established Arab dynasties. By the second half of the eighteenth century, Zanzibar began to be settled by Arab merchants and by the middle of the following century these began to build mansions, mostly close to the shore to catch the sea breeze. Seyyid Said, the Sultan of Oman, had begun to show interest in Zanzibar by the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1829 and throughout the 1830s he paid regular visits, some quite long in duration; and by about 1840 he seems to have made firm decision to transfer his main residence to the island (Nicholls 1971: 246–7). Zanzibar now became the principal port of East Africa. The Sultan brought with him a retinue of Arab officials and Indian merchants and financiers. In 1856 the sultanates of Oman and Zanzibar became separate, after division between the sons of Seyyid Said. The Sultan's mainland territory consisted of the coastal strip 10 miles (16 kilometres) wide, together with the area round some major coastal towns. With the incursion of Britain and Germany his position was challenged. He was displaced in the Tanganyikan part of the territory by a combination of force and acceptance of compensation, while the Kenyan section was administered by the British East African Company in the name of the Sultan: but in any case the Sultan in 1890 accepted British protection (Middleton and Campbell 1963: 1–9; Lofchie 1965: 23–51).

The diversity of Arab and Persian elements in Zanzibar is of note. The Omanis who came to East Africa were from two confederations of lineages. They were not averse to marrying Muslims from outside their own ethnic group. Another important group were the Hadhramis who began their settlement of East Africa in the sixteenth century. Originating from the Yemen, they formed communities on the coast at Pate and Mafia, but were forced to move to Zanzibar because of civil war and invasions. In the mid-nineteenth century they were reinforced by a group of primarily religious scholars with strong links to Tarim in Yemen. A third group of Hadhrami migrants came from Shihr and worked in Zanzibar as water carriers, and as rope and mat makers. Settlers came from the Comoro Islands around the same period, staying close to the shore where they worked as fishermen: these were not Arabs, but members of a mixed Swahili maritime culture. The earliest Arab settlers felt themselves to be the ruling house and formed a landed aristocracy. They retained close links with the city-states on the coastal strip. The Omanis were looked down on by them as upstarts but none the less held control until immediately after independence. The typical source of wealth in Zanzibar was from Arab-owned plantations which were worked by slave labour for as long as this was legal. But not all Arabs on Zanzibar were rich. Some were more recent, poor, and often temporary immigrants from Arabia. Prior to the revolution of December, 1964, Arabs constituted about seventeen per cent of the population, but were soon to suffer heavy losses.

Arab hegemony in Zanzibar was accepted by the British, and only a light veneer of colonial rule was readily apparent once slavery had been abolished. Arab culture carried prestige, and the term *uarabu* was used to mean 'civilized'. Arabs were willing to marry with Africans, thereby forming the 'Swahili' culture. Moreover, some Africans claimed to have descended partly from settlers who arrived from Shiraz in Persia, with a civilization older than that of the Arabs. They described themselves as 'Shirazi' and sought to distinguish themselves from African immigrants from the mainland. The Arab elite was never totally exclusive, but money was needed to acquire and retain high status. Poorer Arabs lost such status, and some Indians were among the richest people in Zanzibar. Although favoured by the British, it was the Arabs who started Zanzibar nationalism in the 1950s. The aim of this exercise was to remove the British before Africans had become politically organized. The Africans themselves proved to be divided over the issue of Arab hegemony. The Arab nationalist leaders appealed to Muslim unity, and this was sometimes successful. On the neighbouring island of Pemba,

where rule by the Sultan of Oman was seen by many subjects as better than that of earlier Arab settlers, there was more acceptance of its legitimacy. But Arab-led nationalism was very short-lived. Independence was attained on such a basis in 1963, but the Arab leadership proved to be highly vulnerable without British backing. Revolution began the following year; the Sultan was deposed and at least 5,000 Arabs are believed to have been killed in the course of the revolution, with a similar number being forced to flee the country. Those who remained had their property destroyed or confiscated (Lofchie 1965: 257–81; 1969: 324–8). Outside Zanzibar the Arab presence remained significant. In Kenya Arabs were overwhelmingly coastal, and after a long period of stability increased their number considerably through immigration after 1948. In Tanganyika there were some settlements in the interior as a consequence of trading activity. Commerce was the typical Arab activity though some engaged in skilled or even unskilled manual work. The position of Arabs declined initially as a result of evident European military supremacy on the coast, and subsequently with the rise of African trading. The aristocratic element in particular would tend to be backward-looking (Middleton and Campbell 1963: 46–7, 65, 69). However, the growing prosperity of the Middle East in recent times has had favourable repercussions for the Arab population in East Africa.

Indians also played an important role in the economic expansion of Zanzibar. Again, their presence needs to be seen in the context of trade with the East Coast in general. Contacts dated from many centuries, and Indian financiers often provided the backing for Arab enterprise. Some flourishing Indian settlements developed: the one in Mombasa dates from the fifteenth century. In the case of Zanzibar, settlement by Indians was welcomed by Seyyid Said. Among the first to arrive were the Baluchis from the border area of what are now Iran and Pakistan. Some of these had initially moved to the Arab countries in search of work as soldiers or guards, and were subsequently invited to Zanzibar. Others who arrived were Surtis from Swat, and Shi'a Ithna'sharis of Indian, Persian and Bahraini origin. Originally Ismailis. these split off around 1877 to join the Shi'as. Another Shi'a group were the Bohras, followers of the mullah of Surat (Issa 1995: 72–5). Much diversity among Muslims was therefore in evidence, and the Sultan in fact belonged to the Ibadi sect, which is otherwise little known outside Oman.

Seyyid Said also encouraged Banyans (Hindu traders from Gujerat) to settle in Zanzibar: these were mostly money-lenders, brokers and merchants. They originated in Cutch and Kathiwar, and returned after trading, until offered security by the British consul in 1842. Other arrivals

were Parsees from Mumbai (Bombay), who were Zoroastrians. The most famous member of this community was the rock star Freddy Mercury (Farok Bulsara), who was born in Zanzibar on 5 September 1946 (*Sunday Times* (London), 17 Nov. 1996). The Ahmaddiyya were the last Indian community to settle in Zanzibar. Small communities of Srilankan and Goan origin are also present (Issa 1995: 75–7).

THE INDIAN MINORITY: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The historic Indian presence in East Africa was consolidated and strengthened during the period of European colonialism. This was true even where Germany was the colonial power. In German East Africa the government was quite favourably disposed to settlement by Indian traders, though this was eventually restricted in view of hostility from resident Whites (Iliffe 1969: 93–7, 203). In 1887 the Indian population of German East Africa stood at 1751; by 1913 it had risen to 9645 (Honey 1982: 122, 296, quoted in Campbell 1995: 4). However the situation was more straightforward in British East African territories. India had been a colony since the seventeenth century, and Britain was in a position to use Indian labour elsewhere in the Empire. The British encouraged and helped Indians to migrate to East Africa especially to work on the construction of railways: the first of these arrived in 1896. Most of these were Punjabi. Once the railway to Uganda was completed, about one-fifth of the workforce decided to stay. Some remained to work the railway, and were joined by others. But a much wider range of positions were taken up by Indians. The typical occupation was that of trader, but skilled manual and clerical work were also engaged in. Some Indians also assisted the British in commerce, construction, and administrative work (Delf 1963; Hollingsworth 1960; Sofer and Sofer 1955: 48–51). Africans were not generally allowed to run businesses, and were seen as destined to remain rural cultivators who would produce both for the market and for their own consumption. Some Africans also worked on plantations or mines. Indian trading was encouraged by the British but their settlement on the land was discouraged or even forbidden. In Kenya, large-scale farming was to be a White prerogative, while in Uganda (where White settlement was not an issue) African claims on land were seen as paramount. However, some Indians were allowed to buy land for sugar plantations. In Tanganyika after the First World War, the position of Indians became strengthened after Britain

was nominated to exercise the Mandate. There was even a move by spokesmen of the Indian minority to lobby the League of Nations with a view to making Tanganyika an 'Indian colony' (Campbell 1995: 5). Some Indians were allowed to purchase land formerly owned by German settlers. But everywhere in East Africa the Indian population was over-whelmingly urban and sometimes very substantial: in Kampala in Uganda the Indian presence was particularly noteworthy. After the initial influx from the Punjab, most new arrivals came from Gujerat, and paid their own fares.

Shops owned by Indian traders typically sold basic consumer items such as cloth or groceries.[1] Local produce would also be purchased and distributed. As the business became more successful the shop would remain the same size but the owner would start another one elsewhere, run by a kinsman. Kinship and business norms reinforced each other, and a breach in either would lead to ostracism with no escape route elsewhere (Marris and Somerset 1971: 144–5). In all cases the shops would cater for a stable market, with a large number of low-income cus-tomers, and would make a small profit on each item. Long hours of work would be needed. Some Indians would be wage-earners, generally skilled artisans working for an Indian employer. Gujerati culture encourages industry, thrift and deferred gratification. The system of patron/client relationships which already operated in relation to more traditional activities became adapted for business purposes. A client would work for pocket money for many years, but would be paid in a lump sum at the end of his period of service. This could then be used as capital for his own business (Campbell 1995: 8; Dotson and Dotson 1968: 198–209). Many succeeded in accumulating considerable capital, and some became owners of factories. By 1939 the Indian minority had a major stake in Tanganyika, owning ninety per cent of urban property and eighty per cent of the sisal and cotton industry. In agriculture, too, there was concern about perceived exploitation by Indian middlemen, and such fears stimulated the establishment of cooperatives (Moshi 1992: 66; Maghimbi 1991: 218). Other sources of capital came from within India, and in some cases large enterprises based there expanded their operations into East Africa. At lower levels of the civil service some Indians were employed, and there were also professionals such as doctors and lawyers. Very few women were in paid work except as teachers, or later as nurses, clerks and secretaries (Sofer and Sofer 1955: 48; Ghai 1965a: 95).

Apart from land ownership, the key issues in politics concerning Indians during the colonial period were those of immigration and political

representation. In Kenya, immigration was restricted to a greater extent than it was in Uganda, since in the former case there could be a perceived threat to White interests. However, greater recognition was given by the British to the culture and the political maturity of Indians than was the case with Africans. Another factor after the Second World War was that in any case India and Pakistan had achieved full independence within the Commonwealth. Shortly before independence in Kenya, elections to the Legislative Council were based on separate registers and constituencies for Europeans and Asians, and a somewhat limited franchise for Africans: with each community electing its representatives directly. In Tanganyika the constitution was based on the principle of racial parity on the Legislative Council. In Uganda, most of the elected members of the Legislative Council were Africans, with a smaller number of European and Asian representatives nominated by the Governor (Goldthorpe 1958: 261–2).

As soon as African nationalism became a significant force, the Indian minority had to consider how it was going to relate to that movement: though it was only just before independence that non-Africans were allowed to become official members of the nationalist parties. Few Indians were in a position to return to their country of ancestry without considerable hardship, and their concern was to maintain a secure foothold in view of contemporary political developments. Thus it could be the case that as long as British colonial government was the stable order with no immediate likelihood of change, Indian community leaders would at least tolerate it as 'the devil you know'. Correspondingly the colonial government would willingly tolerate a quiet Indian population. But apart from African nationalism, there were other factors making for change. Indian nationalism had eventually dislodged the British and at least some could recognize it as inconsistent to support Indian but not African nationalism. Racial discrimination found in East Africa in places such as high-class hotels could be resented even more when it did not apply in India or even in Britain; and Indians had naturally always opposed the 'White man's country' philosophy that was widespread in Kenya. As African nationalism gained momentum community spokesmen, especially the younger generation, could acknowledge that it would eventually be successful and that it could be counter-productive in the long run to oppose it. At the same time, the position of Indians in the economy was not one which was conducive to widespread radicalism.

There were many fears for a future under African majority rule. These could be expressed in a certain ambivalence in private, even if this was not openly stated. In contrast to some other British colonies,

such as Fiji and Guyana, Indians were nowhere numerous enough in East Africa to secure political control (Tandon 1965: 67). There were no guarantees of a better deal if the British were dislodged. Indians did not find that Africans respected or even showed much interest in their culture. Emergent African elites looked to Western culture as a source of status, and it was this culture that had to be mastered if the colonialists were confronted on their own terms. Moreover, Indians were not to find a place in the new reassertion of African values. Indians were mostly more accessible to Africans than were Europeans, and opportunities for friction were greater as a result. Indians were also often accused of unscrupulous business practices, and have more recently been considered to have a heavy involvement in illicit foreign currency transactions (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990: 122–3). Some accusations were contradictory, such as Idi Amin's comment that Indians overcharged, but at the same time undercut African entrepreneurs (Hiro 1991: 324 n. 25; Marris and Somerset 1971: 97). But one major area of conflict was over the issue of retail trading. In the earlier stages of their activity, Indian traders were at a clear advantage in Africa since they were already familiar with a money economy and with skills such as book-keeping that go with trading. But in due course many Africans learnt the relevant skills, and tensions between African and Indian business competitors could mount. Africans had often worked more closely with Indians than with Europeans but had found the more impersonal, bureaucratic style of European culture easier to relate to when it came to learning new skills. Africans had learnt some skills from Indians, but the more particularistic understandings inherent in the structure of the family business proved virtually impossible to penetrate (Marris and Somerset 1971: 95). There were also aspects of indigenous African culture which could work to the disadvantage of capital accumulation which was needed for expansion of the business. Though they might sometimes help the business by being willing to work for pocket money, there is also the danger that expectations of extended kin for financial assistance might emerge at an early stage of business success, compromising attempts at further growth. Kin could also assume that they would secure employment regardless of ability, and obtain credit even if loans might prove difficult to repay. Indian entrepreneurs also had the extended family, but all concerned were either themselves in the business or lived too far away to be able to make persistent demands.

The position of the Indian minority after independence has not always proved secure. Capitalist-oriented governments would see them as competing against African enterprise, while a socialist government

would be likely to condemn them as capitalists. In Tanzania there has been a policy of colour-blindness which has worked against the scapegoating of any racial minority: but this has been combined with an expectation that loyalty should be indicated by taking out Tanzanian citizenship. A further problem-area for business activity was the socialist policy under Nyerere, which promoted state enterprise and in various other ways curtailed the activity of the Indian business sector (and of African business, too). Anti-Asian sentiment could be seen to exist under the surface, disguised very thinly in socialist rhetoric (Hartmann 1990: 240). The policies of nationalization which were implemented between 1971 and 1973 had particularly severe consequences for Indians on the Tanzanian mainland, especially with respect to the acquisition of buildings rented for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, often at extremely short notice. A major exodus to join kin living overseas took place as a consequence. At an earlier stage, during the revolution in Zanzibar it had been Arabs who were the main targets of mob violence; but many Indians were also forced to flee to the mainland and had their property appropriated (Campbell 1995: 14–18). The new governments introduced policies of exchange control, and lack of a sense of security within East Africa could lead to a greater temptation to indulge in illegal currency trading. In Kenya in 1967 the government enacted legislation (the Trade Licensing Act) which provided that non-citizens could work in Kenya only on a temporary basis. But the most drastic treatment was in Uganda, where Amin expelled Asians in 1972. Initially this applied only to those who were not Ugandan citizens but eventually all were included. Although theoretically the latter proviso was eventually withdrawn, nearly all left out of fear: only a few thousand elected to stay.

Only Uganda under Amin had the kind of regime which could openly ignore internationally respectable values which were opposed to racism and racial discrimination. Tanzania under Nyerere held to high ideals of human fraternity, and Kenya though less forthright in her commitment to values of such a nature could only declare official opposition to any kind of racist measure. Discrimination on the basis of citizenship rather than race was felt to be more acceptable, since all countries regard this as legitimate to some extent (Y.P. Ghai 1965: 138). At the same time, factors could work against a policy which was totally blind to racial difference. 'Positive discrimination' on a temporary basis could be felt appropriate to enable Africans to catch up. Also, if one particular ethnic group who were not indigenous Africans was seen to be conspicuously in control of large sectors of the economy (even if they were local

citizens) this could have a psychological impact upon Black Africans who wanted to enjoy the fruits of independence. In Kenya in particular, there could in practice be a tendency for 'Kenyanization' to become more like 'Africanization' (Hazlewood 1979: 89–90, 188). Moreover openly anti-Asian sentiments could be expressed by Members of Parliament; Ministers might be reassuring but this could be much less true of back-benchers (Himbara 1997: 3). There was evidence in Kenya of acceptance on equal terms of Black African citizens from elsewhere in East Africa, but of undue delays in granting citizenship to Asians born in Kenya (van den Berghe 1975a: 291–2). Thus although the right to freedom from discrimination was acknowledged it could also be felt possible to suspend it at times of emergency (Mair 1967: 64). Even Nyerere defended an explicit policy of 'Africanization' in such terms, while seeing it as only a temporary measure (Nyerere 1973: 269–70). On the other hand, Kenyan Indians did enjoy some of the fruits of independence, since they were allowed to buy some farms that had previously been White-owned. There were also some indirect benefits to those who chose to be citizens, since they faced less competition after non-citizens had left (Ghai and Ghai 1971: 28).

The British government had at independence in East Africa told both White and Indian settlers that they could receive British passports if they wished, with the tacit understanding that if the situation proved uncomfortable they could emigrate to Britain. This did not apply universally. Some deportees from Zanzibar actually became stateless, since they were not allowed to have either Tanzanian or British citizenship (Ghai and Ghai 1971: 16–17). When the need for British passport-holders to emigrate arose the move proved electorally unpopular in Britain, though Indians could hardly have been excluded while Whites were admitted without an openly racist policy being acknowledged. In 1968 the government, although it was Labour, introduced a restriction on right of abode to those with substantial connections with Britain, thus curtailing rights implicit in a document which the British government itself had issued. Such a policy was further strengthened in 1971, when the notion of 'patriality' (i.e. own or a parent's birth in the UK) was invoked when right of abode was to be considered. The Ugandan Asians expelled in 1972 were treated somewhat more sympathetically by the British government, now Conservative. Relevant factors included the behaviour and pronouncements of Amin, who had among other things praised Hitler for killing Jews. To placate British right-wing sentiment the government also stressed the middle-class economic status of the immigrants (Hiro 1991: 212–15).

Particular difficulties arose throughout East Africa since attempts to reduce the power of the Indian business community were not accompanied by the development of an African entrepreneurial class. There were problems when Indians who possessed the necessary skills were replaced by indigenous African political appointees whose competence in matters of business was not proven (Himbara 1997).

In Kenya the size of the Indian population remained substantial though declined from the 185,000 at independence. In Uganda Amin was ousted in 1979 and eventually in 1991 Museveni's government encouraged Ugandan Asians to return. By so doing Uganda expected to earn international approval, and also to attract investment by Asians with substantial business interests. The impact of structural adjustment has also proved to be an important factor, and indeed in the case of Uganda the return of expropriated Indian businesses was made a condition for IMF/World Bank support. In the case of Tanzania since 'liberalization' of the economy meant turning away from the earlier socialist policies and a corresponding improvement in the position of private entrepreneurs. One controversy surrounding this development was that of the consequences for the relative position of the Indian and the African sections of the population. Some would defend public enterprise as a way of curbing the power of private capital, which was mostly held by Asians (Nindi 1992: 170–2, 184). On the other hand, Booth's research in Iringa in 1989–91 suggests that though Asian enterprise remained important, there had been considerable emigration, leaving scope for the growth of African business (Booth 1992: 252–3). One remaining problem-area is that of remittances abroad. This has always been a contentious issue, but whereas these were previously mostly illegal, they now operate on a perfectly legal basis. One further source of instability may prove to be the spread of multipartyism which, as shown in the next chapter, has been accompanied especially in Kenya by a rise in ethnic consciousness. This could lead to scapegoating of the highly conspicuous Indian minority at times of political and economic instability.

The theoretical problem indicated by these developments relates to the issue of whether race or class is being talked about. Shivji (1976: 40) has maintained that ethnic consciousness is something to be explained, rather than being made an independent but decisive variable. He notes that during the colonial period, Indians were deprived of certain economic options because of their race; but that at the same time they monopolized the means by which Africans could sell their economic surplus.

THE INDIAN MINORITY: CULTURAL FEATURES

The Indian minority remains highly distinctive in cultural terms.[2] Difficulties placed in the way of full integration have contributed to reassertion of culture, though it has always been carefully preserved. The majority of Indians in East Africa are Hindus: though not in Tanganyika, where the majority are Muslims. A distinctive feature of Hindu culture is that of caste; and especially in Gujerat the caste hierarchy is highly complex. The caste system in general was originally based on four ancient categories known as *varna* (colour). The categories are Brahmans (priests), Kshatriyas (nobles and warriors), Vaisyas (merchants and farmers) and Sudras (servants). Members of the first three of these are known as the 'twice-born' and have to go through an initiation in order to achieve this status. There are also the 'untouchables', who are left outside the caste system, and who in rural India are segregated in separate quarters or outside the village proper. Discrimination against them is now illegal in India, and Gandhi had introduced for 'untouchables' the new designation *Harijan* (creature of God). Apart from the Brahmans, most Hindus identify themselves with local caste groupings (sub-castes) known as *jati*. In every region of India there is a hierarchy of caste groupings based on occupation and heritage. A caste can be seen as a micro-community which forms a kind of extended kinship group whose members are related by various degrees of proximity of descent and marriage. Rules of behaviour within the micro-community are well-defined and sanctioned, and councils exist at various levels which enforce rules and are responsible for social planning. There is normally some occupational specialization and distinctiveness in certain matters of religion.

Sub-castes within a caste may share occupation or common ethnicity. Moreover gods, people, social groups, animals and objects are ranked according to degrees of purity and impurity. Members of categories possess attributes, especially the capacity to pollute through contact with other beings, objects or events. The Brahman priest must be 'pure' in order to communicate with the gods. Lower castes absorb pollution for Brahmans and other 'twice-born'. States of impurity are caused by contact with persons of lower caste, or with death, birth, menstruation, sexual intercourse, defecation, bodily dirt and eating. Purification can be obtained by bathing and wearing new clothes. Each segment tries to preserve its own degree of purity from contamination by lower castes, and each in turn is excluded as contaminating by castes above. The specific application of caste in rural Gujerat is discussed in Pocock (1957a).

The obvious question is that of how far has this system (which is now officially widely contested in modern India and compensated for by certain positive discrimination programmes (Kolenda 1978: 126–32)) has been transplanted to Africa. Some decline was evident by the beginning of the twentieth century; though on the other hand, caste distinctiveness could reassert itself once members of a particular caste had arrived in sufficient numbers. Caste hierarchy became attenuated even though caste distinctiveness remained. In particular, kinship and marriage relationships would be confined to within the caste. The link between caste and occupation would be severely reduced in its importance though was not always totally lost sight of. One aspect of Hindu culture which was relevant to accommodation to the ethnic pluralism found in the African situation was that the perception of a society as divided into exclusive communities was nothing unusual. Dotson and Dotson suggest that in the Central African situation there was a reluctance to discuss the subject of caste, and also a tendency to deny its current relevance. Their study found however that it remained a significant factor in marriage choice even though this was diminishing (1968: 125–53, 359). In any case they found that arranged marriage was the norm, and this would mean that it would be to someone of the same caste. Muslims would deny the relevance of caste but in practice the differences were recognized, being seen more in terms of sub-culture. Bharati (1965: 20) reports a similar situation in East Africa. Bharati also suggests (1965: 16, 45) that few East African Indians explicitly favour the caste system; but that the older generation arrange marriages and are inclined to do so on a caste basis, though sometimes making exceptions; while the young are in principle often in favour of inter-caste marriage. Pocock (1957b) notes that in urban settings even in India modifications occur to the caste system, and that most East African Indians are urban. He observes however that though young people are less caste-conscious, they tend to be more accommodating as they get older.

Most of the Muslims are Sunni. However, the Khoji Ismailis have a high profile because of their relatively pro-Western outlook; this has been facilitated because of the position of the Aga Khan as their recognized leader. The Aga Khan has not only set an example by his own acceptance of many aspects of Western culture, but has required his follows to do likewise (Morris 1958; Bocock 1971: 366–7). They stand in contrast to the Bohra branch, whose leadership is more conservative and who are as a consequence more traditionalistic in outlook (Amiji 1975). Another noteworthy minority are the Goans, who are Roman Catholic, and who were often enumerated separately by the colonial

government. The older generation of Indians tend to see the West as degenerate and Khoji Ismailis as suspect because of their Westernization (Bharati 1965: 59–61). The Sikhs constitute another significant minority. Hindu–Muslim divisions were strengthened by the partition of India, and a new source of division has been between those who have taken citizenship in East Africa and those who have not. Acknowledgement of the heterogeneity of the Indian population and the proportion of sectional interests raises the issue of whether they could be considered as a community at all. Much has depended in the question of whether Indian interests as a whole were being defended or not: The notion of the 'quasi-group', as mentioned in Chapter 2, is relevant here. Education is highly valued, and government provision had to be sought since the Christian missions took little interest. Skills required for the economic role of Indians had to be taught, but a traditional respect for education was also relevant. However, commerce is generally a preferred occupation to teaching (Rattansi and Abdulla 1965: 119).

Other aspects of indigenous culture have been retained. Food is highly distinctive, and in the case of women traditional dress is widely retained. Extended kinship is important but differs somewhat from the patriarchal extended family. This may still be seen as the ideal, but in practice a wider range of extended patterns are in evidence (Campbell 1995: 9). The traditional system was not easily transferred to the African situation because individuals rather than whole kin-groups pioneered settlement in Africa. The lack of a dense kinship structure beyond the first generation tended to weaken culture, and in order to compensate for this, education in India has been encouraged. The Indian sub-continent is in any case not too far away for visits, and cultural retention is needed for traditional patterns to be able to operate. There is considerable pride in the Indian cultural heritage. European culture is looked on with ambivalence and incorporated only selectively; though some important aspects need to be assimilated if a high level of economic success is to be achieved. As is the case with Europeans, many continue to accept as axiomatic their belief in their cultural superiority over Africans.

One final point of interest is the issue of willingness to integrate fully with African society. A major difference between Arabs and Indians is apparent here. Arabs frequently intermarried so as to produce the distinctive 'Swahili' culture. By contrast Indians, whether Hindu or Muslim, have married almost exclusively within their own community and have perpetuated the system of marriage rules which has traditionally operated. Colonial society was highly tolerant of pluralism, but the issue has

remained as to how far this situation can continue. The independent governments are also less tolerant of political passivity, and Indians are expected to show active support for national values like anyone else. The key issue has been one of continued pluralism versus assimilation. The Indian community overwhelmingly prefers the former, but there can be pressures by African governments for integration or even assimilation. There are some factors for integration, such as the widespread use of Swahili as a lingua franca. But how far this is capable of being extended is highly controversial. With achievement of African advancement it might be the case that pressure for integration might diminish. Kenya and (except under Amin) Uganda have been relatively tolerant of pluralism, but in Tanzania there have been stronger pressures for integration and political participation, including measures such as prohibition of Indian radio programmes (Y.P. Ghai 1965: 141–2). In Zanzibar in 1970 pressures towards assimilation went so far as proposals to encourage marriage between Indians and Africans (Ghai and Ghai 1971: 36).

6 Ethnic Factors in National Integration

THE LEGACY OF COLONIAL BOUNDARIES

It is commonly recognized throughout Africa that problems arise from the colonial legacy in respect of national boundaries. These did not always ignore ethnic factors, but some of them were straight lines. A map of Africa shows this to be particularly the case in the west, but the boundary between Tanzania and Kenya is also straight for most of the way, and cuts right across the traditional homeland of the Maasai. Yet only rarely has the attempt been made after independence to go back to the previous boundaries, since the difficulties involved in such an exercise would be insurmountable. A large number of small states would thereby have been created (over 100 in Tanzania alone). Even attempts to rectify the division of ethnic units by a colonial boundary could have presented severe problems, and might even have led to warfare. Furthermore, at least some degree of national consciousness had been developed before independence. Those within a given colonial boundary were united by opposition to a common enemy, and in such circumstances nationalism made perfect sense (Worsley 1964: 65–7). There was also a measure of mobility beyond tribal boundaries before independence, especially in search of work. There were, none the less, some changes in boundaries after independence in East Africa. Rwanda and Burundi had been administered together within a single national boundary during the Belgian colonial period (and under German rule had been incorporated, with Tanganyika, into German East Africa), but as independent states they became two separate kingdoms again. Also, in 1964, Tanganyika joined with the island of Zanzibar to form a new nation, Tanzania.

PERSISTENCE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

Though it may have been the case that use of the colonial boundaries could seem to be the least problematic course of action, it does not follow that no difficulties arose. 'Tribal' identity was in no way destroyed

during the colonial period, and in some respects it was strengthened (Gertzel 1970: 7–12; Iliffe 1979: ch. 10; Southall 1976). Where Indirect Rule was imposed, authorities such as chiefs, who were already operating upon a tribal basis, obtained support. Moreover, the colonial governments were particularly concerned to discourage the development of a nationalist movement. 'Divide and rule' was one way of doing this, and this meant support for tribal identity. Indirect Rule was not adopted in Kenya, but policies in respect of maintaining this identity were not otherwise different. There could also be suspicion of the growth of a permanent urban African population, since it was feared that this could lead to disrespect for traditional authority and to broader problems of social control. As noted in Chapter 2, Kenya even went so far as to impose pass laws. 'Detribalization' of some urban residents was feared by some administrators, especially from the point of view of implications for social control (Molohan 1959). Westernization and missionary education could often be seen as a step in that direction (Kennedy 1987: 161–3). The extent to which 'detribalization' occurred could easily be exaggerated; though it is true that tribal identity took on new functions in the urban setting, and 'tribe' came to be seen more as a category into which people could be placed. It was however also the case that some of the new urban institutions, such as trade unions and political parties, were indeed of a kind that threatened European interests: and that in such institutions tribal identity assumed much less importance. Developments of this nature have been studied extensively by anthropologists, though mostly in the Central African context (Epstein 1958; Gluckman 1961; Mitchell 1966). However, Parkin also noted for Kampala (Uganda) that migrant groups (such as the Luo, who came from Kenya), were concerned to preserve their ethnic identity. Ethnic ties were seen to provide a sense of security and, even for wealthier people, they were a source of social support. Cultural differences based on ethnic division were seen as mainly relevant to domestic situations, but they could also provide a framework of established relationships that could also be politically significant. Some migrant communities in Kampala were seen to have their own associations, aiming at mutual assistance and preservation of culture (Parkin 1969a, b).

The Belgians (and even more so their German predecessors) were more prepared than the British to intervene directly in indigenous political arrangements (cf. Tanner 1965: 204), but they encountered traditional kingships in Rwanda and Burundi which they had no concern to alter (apart from incorporation of them into a wider national unit). However, one distinctive characteristic of these two small states

was the presence of an apparent ethnic division between the Tutsi rulers and the Hutu subjects: together with the existence of a very small aboriginal minority known as the Twa. A system of patronage prevailed, and the presence of Belgian rule made the situation more complex. Rwanda and Burundi were particularly unusual in that the two major ethnic groups shared the same language and culture (Lemarchand 1970: 63–89).

Zanzibar was another unusual case. This was also a small territory, and one in which inequality between different ethnic groups was considerable, and had important political implications. The British did not change the situation, and the system survived but only while British rule was intact (Lofchie 1965: 18–20; 1969: 292–3).

The presence of European and Asian minorities has itself raised important issues for national integration, but these have already been dealt with in previous chapters. Concern here will mainly be with the indigenous African population. The very nature of ethnicity among Africans has proved to be a problem-area in itself, and there has been controversy as to what term to use. The word 'tribe' has commonly been employed in the African context, and some commentators on East Africa have defended such a usage. For instance Gulliver (1959: 61; 1969b: 24) has maintained that the notion of 'tribe' is useful in order to indicate a group of people whose members distinguish themselves, and are distinguished by others, on the basis of cultural and regional criteria. He recognizes that such an identity can be fluid, but he still maintains that the term can have some analytical value. On the other hand Mafeje (1971: 258) sees the term 'tribe' as useful, if at all, only in the case of relatively undifferentiated societies with primitive subsistence economies, and local autonomy.

Particularly important is the question of the use of the term 'tribe' in modern life, for instance as a way of distinguishing people of different ethnic origin in an urban setting. Even if aspects of custom can be eroded, ethnic loyalty and identity can remain important. The term 'tribalism' is also used, generally in a derogative sense. when ethnic particularism intervenes in situations where national loyalty or allegiance to norms of impartiality are felt to be appropriate. Mafeje (1971: 258–9, 261) warns that economic and power relations can be disguised as tribal loyalty (though he does acknowledge that regional particularism can exist). Gulliver (1969b: 31) recognizes that cultural factors can represent economic or political struggles, but at the same time insists that symbols have an autonomous existence.

There are also controversies as to what constitute ethnic boundaries. There have at times been uncertainties concerning the exact scope of

jurisdiction of chiefs. Some ethnic groups did not have chiefs; there could be different levels of cultural unity; some political units were conquest states; and the colonial experience could have imposed rigidity upon a situation which had previously been much more fluid. Language is often seen as a decisive factor, but even here it may not be so easy to distinguish between a language and a dialect.

Another problem-area has been the way in which different ethnicities have had different exposure to external contact. Coastal peoples have long had external trading links, as have those whose territory lay on routes which gradually penetrated the interior. Missionary penetration from the nineteenth century onward had a very uneven impact. This was particularly significant in respect of education. Those from an ethnic group in the vicinity of a mission station could have a head-start in education (cf. Oliver 1952). This impact could persist through the generations to the extent that a particular ethnic group became disproportionately represented among the new elite. A further difficulty would be diversity of views among missions and missionaries concerning Africans' aspirations to higher levels of education. Some saw their policies as best concerned with village-based education, while others expected anyone who worked hard to achieve high levels educationally (cf. Jones 1925, chs 5–8, 9, 13; King 1971: chs 3, 4, 6). There were later problems concerning contact with secular Europeans. The Kabaka of Buganda became used to these relatively early, and was able to have dealings on a fairly equal basis. But there were subsequent problems arising from this in respect of national integration in Uganda as a whole (Fallers 1974).

Religious diversity can be a facet of ethnic diversity and can also be important in its own right. Traditional African religion seems not on the whole to have been a means of differentiation independent of ethnicity, and in particular it had no missionary aspirations. But the situation was quite different in the case of 'religions of the book', which for Africa would include both Christianity and Islam. There could be divisions between those of similar ethnic origin in respect of Christian, Muslim, and followers of traditional religion. There could also be differences in the case of Christians between Catholic and Protestant and between different Protestant denominations; and yet again, between followers of mission churches and those who supported churches of African origin. Muslims are also divided between Shi'ites, Sunnis, Ibadis and Ismailis; and both Christians and Muslims are divided between the fundamentalists and those influenced by liberalism. All such factors can make for further difficulties in national integration.

There is finally the factor of language. As with traditional religion, the vernacular language was generally coterminous with ethnic identity. Some languages did however have a wider regional significance, and in East Africa this was particularly true of Swahili. Swahili spread first and foremost through trading links, and served as a lingua franca long before colonial intervention (Mazrui and Mazrui 1995; Whiteley 1969b). The colonial situation meant an additional language, that of the colonialists, was to be added to the linguistic diversity that already prevailed. The appropriate mix between the colonial language, local vernaculars, and the lingua franca has been a major problem for modern African states to contend with. One factor which is particularly problematic is that some vernaculars have a much larger number of native speakers than others.

Politicians in modern Africa have constantly had to come to terms with the difficulties so far outlined. Some early decisions of leading nationalists in different countries represent a remarkably uniform awareness of the potentially divisive effect of the ethnic factor. Particularly important were the tendency to the use of colonial boundaries, the use of the colonial language as national, and the prevalence of the one-party state. The problem faced was the opposite one to that which had confronted the colonialists. The colonialists were concerned to stifle the development of a national identity, and did so by strengthening ethnic and regional loyalties. Their successors were concerned with 'nation-building', and aimed to foster such a national identity and to play down the importance of all kinds of sectional interest. The aim of promoting a national consciousness was paramount, but was beset with difficulties. Tribalism remained a reality, but a sense of national identity could be very weak. The better-educated would normally be the leaders, but educational provision could have been uneven in terms of ethnic and religious divisions. A strong ethic remained of helping one's kin to succeed, and this could be extended into tribalism since it was difficult to think of a non-member of one's own tribe as even a distant kinsman. To declare oneself opposed to tribalism is to acknowledge rather than to oppose its existence. Where tribalist sentiments were strong but feelings of national loyalty were weak, a situation where positions of power were held by members of a different tribe could seem like government by foreigners. A policy of ethnic balance in educational opportunity and in selection to senior positions may therefore be indicated, but this can contradict another policy which emphasizes national identity. There can be calls for national integration but different visions as to what this might mean (cf. Mazrui 1969). Freedom from colonial rule

can encourage reassertion of African cultural values, but there is a danger that these will be based upon tribe rather than nation (Fallers 1974: ch. 2; Richards 1969: ch. 4). There can be a much broader vision in terms of *African* cultural values, expressed mainly as a contrast to those of Europeans. But these may be so broad in scope that they are not nationally distinctive; hence this does not solve the problem of national consciousness. It may in any case be easier to think of oneself as a member of a tribe, and as an African, than as a national of a new state.

There are various ways in which these issues can be addressed. Some form of repression can create a degree of unity, though this is passive and rather negative, and should not be confused with integration. But some measure of heightened nationalism is likely to be in evidence. A contentious issue is likely to be the degree of pluralism that is to be accepted: one possibility is compromise, which accepts pluralism, while another alternative is synthesis, which is anti-pluralistic (Mazrui 1969). Mazrui has also pointed to the crucial importance of 'cultural engineering' in relation to nation-building in Africa. This involves the deliberate manipulation of cultural factors to deflect human habits to new and perhaps constructive endeavours (Mazrui 1972: xv, 183). Cultural nationalism can then be identified as the aspect of social engineering which is concerned with creating and strengthening a national consciousness Appeal is likely here to some elements of 'traditional values'. This requires inventiveness and selectivity, and sectional interests must not be highlighted. It requires the ingenuity of a particular nationalist leader to produce the relevant synthesis.

THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE QUESTION

The issue of national language is another problem-area. There has been a remarkably widespread tendency to continue to use the former colonial language as the main national language. This presents some difficulties, but the linguistic gap is the same regardless of a person's tribal background. National liberation was also secured by those proficient in the colonial language, and there are many practical advantages in using a language of wider communication: especially important is the literature available (including school textbooks). But it is difficult for an African government to promote the former colonial language exclusively. Practical instruction and internal trade might be more effectively conducted in a lingua franca, and the values of cultural nationalism will be supportive of at least some recognition for local vernaculars. Such

a task is highly problematic. For historical and demographic reasons vernaculars will be unequal in strength, and recognition of one might imply derecognition of others. Use of vernacular languages therefore inevitably raises the spectre of tribalism.

Swahili, spoken throughout East Africa and even beyond, is an interesting exception to the general pattern. Its position as the national language of Tanzania has been well documented. It has since 1974 also had that status in Kenya, and in Uganda its use as a lingua franca has increased. Swahili has considerable importance also as a regional language and as a bridge with francophone countries such as the Congo Democratic Republic (formerly Zaïre) (Mazrui and Mazrui 1995: 85). It has a much richer literature than probably any other African language. Of particular interest is the fact that Swahili was spread through the exigencies of trade rather than the educational system. There was at times some suspicion directed at the language by the British colonialists, since it enabled the kind of communication across tribal lines which they were particularly concerned to discourage. It was also the language of the urban 'detribalized' who were felt to be a threat to stability. In other respects, however, the British found Swahili useful. It could be a way of communicating decisions downwards, and promotion in the colonial service in East Africa could depend upon proficiency in the language. Swahili also served in a regional role for the army; the King's African Rifles recruited on a regional basis and Swahili was the common language.

In Rwanda and Burundi Belgium introduced French as the language of administration. Although Dutch (Flemish) is also spoken in Belgium, for many years French had greater prestige, and was used almost exclusively in the colonial setting. It is noteworthy that in in both Rwanda and Burundi French remained as the language of government after independence, although greater use of the indigenous African language would not as such have been divisive. A modern development in Rwanda is that the government is now led by many who were brought up in exile in Uganda, using English as their language of wider communication. This has led to the use of English as co-official with French as a language of government.

THE SITUATION IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

Issues of ethnic identity and national integration can now be explored in relation to the territories of East Africa in turn. All of them exhibit

some degree of ethnic complexity; the largest groupings are detailed by Gulliver (1969b: 35–8). The general issue of national consciousness will be considered as well as the problem of language. Finally, the implications of the challenge of multipartyism will be assessed.

In *Kenya*, ethnic undercurrents have always been a significant force in politics both before and after independence (Gertzel 1970: 9–10, 42–4, 91–4, 112–24; Hyden 1979). Even the existence of Kenya as a political entity was threatened on the coast by the strength of Arab nationalism. The 'coastal strip' was nominally under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and as African nationalism gained strength an Arab-led movement pressed for local political autonomy. This proposal was however rejected by the British, who saw this development as opposed to the idea of majority rule. The British also saw that secession of part of a territory would set a dangerous precedent, and that it would be undesirable to separate the chief port, Mombasa, from the capital, Nairobi.

In Kenya overall, three ethnic groups – the Kikuyu, the Luo and the Luhya – number more than one million (as commonly distinguished); the first two of these have had particular importance in the modern political complexion. The British policy in Kenya had been one of strengthening the importance of the District and weakening contacts between different peoples. The Kikuyu were the most educated and westernized during the colonial period, and also had the most to complain about in respect of land alienation. Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of the nationalist movement and first president, was himself a Kikuyu. He had taken a particular interest in the culture of his people; as noted in Chapter 1 he worked with Malinowski at the London School of Economics and wrote a study of his people entitled *Facing Mount Kenya* (Kenyatta 1938). This adopted an anthropological perspective but also had strong nationalist overtones.

The Kenya African Union was founded in 1944, and Kenyatta became its president in 1947. This organization was non-ethnic in inspiration, but in practice dominated by Kikuyu. Attempts were made to attract a wider range of supporters by appointing non-Kikuyu to some official positions, but mass following was mainly in Kikuyu areas. In Nairobi, however, support was somewhat broader, and ethnic factors were less crucial. Divisions were such that in 1960 there was a split between the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which was apparently on tribal lines: KANU was dominated by Kikuyu and Luo and had some wider support, but KADU was supported by those who felt excluded. There was also an economic aspect, since supporters of KANU tended to be wealthier

(Gertzel 1970: 10–11). KADU amalgamated with KANU at Independence in 1964, but even within the framework of the one-party state that was established, ethnic undercurrents remained important. Demands for recognition of local needs could easily raise ethnic issues; and in particular, there was criticism of Kikuyu reluctance to allow the less developed parts of the country to catch up. Another contentious issue was that of redistribution of land which had been previously alienated by Europeans: there were allegations that a disproportionate share went to the Kikuyu. There were ongoing accusations of tribalism in the civil service; patronage was known to exist but details were always difficult to prove. In the private sector tribalism could be more open, and some associations were set up to defend ethnic interests. The Luo were sometimes rivals of the Kikuyu, but at other times their interests coalesced. The Luo also had a tradition of higher educational achievement and economic development. When Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978, he was succeeded by Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin (one of the smaller ethnic groups).

The language issue reflected other aspects of policy during the colonial period. Fear of inter-tribal contact had led the British to prefer the use of local vernaculars, with English as a common language for the territory. Larger ethnic groups supported such a policy but smaller ethnicities were more likely to support Swahili. In practice even the British found some advantages in the use of Swahili. Their attitude to the language was somewhat pragmatic, and such a standpoint continued after independence. After 1974 a more supportive policy was in evidence, and in 1985 Swahili was made a compulsory subject in all primary and secondary schools.

In *mainland Tanzania* (Tanganyika), the ethnic factor has had a remarkably low profile in politics. This situation has been facilitated by the considerable ethnic complexity of the territory. Usually around 120 ethnic names are listed (as opposed to 27 for Kenya and 31 for Uganda (Richards 1969:7), and another distinctive feature for Tanganyika is that most of such units are quite small; only the Sukuma number more than a million, and these live in a relatively remote part of the country. There have, moreover, traditionally been no marked differences in wealth based upon ethnicity, though some peoples (especially the Chagga, Haya, Nyakyusa and Sukuma) did enjoy educational advantages. The British emphasized tribal identity in Tanganyika as elsewhere, and were aware that action on a wider basis could pose a serious threat to colonial interests. As early as 1905–6, in the German colonial period, the Maji Maji uprising had articulated grievances on a multi-ethnic

basis, and could be quelled only by bringing in reinforcements from Europe. For subsequent nationalists it set an example for wider levels of cooperation. Julius Nyerere, the first nationalist leader, was very conscious from the beginning of the goal of national unity (Iliffe 1979: chs 6, 15, 16). He saw tribes as irrelevant to a new nation and when in power as first president went so far as to abolish chiefs. He was also concerned to provide a philosophical justification for the new state based upon key ideas found in 'traditional' culture. He saw solidarity of the kinship group as capable of extension on a national scale, and out of this perspective he developed the idea of *ujamaa* socialism. This became a prevailing state ideology which was articulated throughout Nyerere's presidency (1961–85); though afterwards it was toned down considerably and with structural adjustment it can now be considered to be defunct. Nyerere aimed at the development of *ujamaa* villages, which would engage in productive and marketing activities collectively, and would also be responsible for some local community services. This strategy aimed at massive resettlement of people, and in theory this could break down ethnic divisions. But in practice it was often the case that the new villages were not ethnically heterogeneous.

National unification has been pursued in a way which is 'blind' to ethnic divisions, except in the case of some temporary 'positive discrimination' in favour of Africans as against other races. Such a policy has not operated in respect of Tanzanian Africans from different ethnic backgrounds, and the areas that were historically advantaged from an educational point of view are disproportionately represented in senior positions. As noted below, this has led to problems in relations between Muslims and Christians.

Recent tendencies have had the unintended consequence of giving greater prominence to ethnic divisions. The decline in the availability of services provided by the state and the general pattern of economic difficulties have meant that traditional methods of social support have gained renewed significance. These are mostly based upon ethnically homogeneous units, and greater ethnic awareness has resulted (Booth 1992: 265; Hartmann 1991).

There are four distinctive features of the Tanzanian scene where national integration is concerned. The first, as already noted, has been a positive factor, namely the salience of a state ideology based upon what were perceived by Nyerere as common aspects of indigenous culture throughout the territory. The second, however, has been a potential threat to national integration. This has been the religious issue, since traditional beliefs, Islam, and Christianity all have a substantial following

in Tanzania. Traditional religion has not been given much state encouragement, and has been seen as an aspect of an older localized ethnic culture; but both Christianity and Islam have remained powerful forces with the potential for a divisive political impact. Nyerere's policy was always to welcome the work of religious organizations provided that they did not pose a threat to state ideology; hence both Christianity and Islam were to be presented as supportive of *ujamaa* socialism. Even with the subsequent decline in importance of *ujamaa* both presidents who followed Nyerere have reaffirmed the importance of the secular nature of the Tanzanian state. However, with the waning of ujamaa socialism, it has become easier for centrifugal forces to reassert themselves (Forster 1997). Some challenges have come from Islamic fundamentalism, but the Tanzanian state has always taken swift action against them. There has continued to be fierce debate as to whether greater Muslim participation in government is simply the redressing of a historical imbalance, or whether it hides a radical Islamic agenda (Hunwick 1996: 246–50).

The third factor, the use of Swahili as the national language, has always been and remains a positive factor in national integration. Its use as a lingua franca for the whole territory has a long history, and had its beginnings even under German colonial rule. The ethnic diversity of the territory made the case for a common linguistic medium particularly convincing to the British colonialists, and resistance came only from those areas where an ethnic language had been well developed with respect to modern needs as a result of missionary influence. Swahili has the outstanding advantage of being the national language of none of the ethnic units of the mainland. There are, it is true, some who call themselves 'Swahili'; these would have tended to be suspect in the colonial period as being 'detribalized'; but in modern Tanzania such a classification now has more positive connotations, and accordingly more are eager to describe themselves in such a way. English remains important in Tanzania especially for external contact and for certain specialized, commercial and technical spheres; but probably nowhere else in Africa is an indigenous language used for such a wide range of purposes (Whiteley 1969a, 1969b). The Tanzanian parliament used Swahili from the very beginning. The language has also been felt to be the most appropriate medium for the articulation of *ujamaa* socialism, all the more so since avoidance of the need for proficiency in a European language for political participation is a way of widening access (Abdulaziz 1971).

The fourth factor unique to Tanzania is the Union with the island of *Zanzibar* (the main island, Unguja, and its neighbour Pemba). Ever

since this was achieved, the extent of national integration felt to be desirable has remained problematic. But even within Zanzibar the ethnic issue is of historical importance in itself. Since the middle of the nineteenth century Zanzibar Island had been dominated by an Arab oligarchy, and there was a larger non-aristocratic Arab presence which displayed solidarity with its leadership. Arabs were around 17 per cent of the total population, while Africans constituted about 76 per cent (1948 census). Africans were however divided between the indigenous inhabitants (Shirazis), who also had some Iranian descent; and those who were immigrants from the African mainland. The situation in Pemba was rather different. There was a much longer history of domination by Arab settlers, and when the Sultan of Oman overthrew them his rule was seen as relatively benign. Far less land was alienated by the Sultan's followers in Pemba than was the case on the Mainland.

The Sultan received British support as a stable ruler, but the British were non-Muslims and their rule was resented by Zanzibar Arabs, who aimed at an independent state where their supremacy would continue. Opposed to them was an alliance of African and Shirazi elements in the Afro-Shirazi party; but it was a loose coalition, and the initial platform was one of delaying independence till non-Arabs could catch up economically and socially. Arab support went to the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, which stood on a multiracial Koranic basis. Some Shirazis were supportive, and a narrow victory for that party ensued at the last election before independence. Revolution occurred soon afterwards because the Afro-Shirazi party felt cheated of victory. There were heavy casualties, mainly among Arabs, and many other Arabs fled to the mainland. Arab domination had now come to an end.

The religious issue remains important, however. ninety-six per cent of the population of Zanzibar are Muslims, so in principle Islam could serve as a unifying factor. But since the formation of the Union with the mainland, there have been tensions over the policy on religion which has operated throughout Tanzania. Zanzibar has been in a favourable position to look towards the Middle East for assistance, and here the Islamic identity could be important. There have also been tensions concerning alleged Christian domination of the Mainland, and about the appropriateness of a decision by Zanzibar to join an international Islamic organization. The Union remains, but has been weakened by issues of this kind; and tensions seem likely to continue.

The issue of language is not apparently problematic in Zanzibar. Swahili is the national language but in contrast to the Mainland it is also the mother tongue of the overwhelming majority. English

remains important for external contact, and for certain commercial purposes.

In *Uganda,* problems of cultural management have been unique in the region (Southall 1976). The only ethnic group which numbers over a million is the Ganda (usually known as the Baganda). Not only are they the largest group, but from the beginnings of external contact they always saw themselves as highly privileged in their relations with the British. Any links forged they saw as having been on a voluntary basis, and they were rewarded for their cooperation by the transfer to them in 1900 of nearly 40 per cent of the territory of the Nyoro, who had shown considerable resistance to British penetration. The Baganda adopted Christianity and were responsive to other aspects of Western culture. The British used Ganda agents in other parts of Uganda, and their language (Luganda) became the language of African administration. Consternation arose among the Baganda when the British were not willing to leave when asked; and it was only in 1953 that the Kabaka realised that it was compulsory for him to take British 'advice'. Continuing problems arose since the boundaries of the British colony of Uganda incorporated other ethnic groups, and the Baganda constituted only about 16 per cent of the total population of the territory. The Baganda lived under a traditional despotism led by the Kabaka, and proved exceedingly reluctant to accept the notion of a wider Uganda nationalism. Not all Baganda subscribed to this view, however, and in 1954 the Ganda elite formed the Democratic Party, which aimed at being a nationalist movement based on Uganda as a whole. This organization incurred the hostility of the Kabaka, who feared that it would destroy the special position of Buganda. There could also be fear of Ganda domination in a wider unit on the part of other ethnic groups. Resentment was particularly strong among Nilotic and Nilo-hamitic speakers; Bantu-speakers were also suspicious but retained some admiration for the Ganda culture. The Nyoro and some other ethnic groups had some cultural similarities, particularly in view of the fact that they were centralized kingships.

Independence came for Uganda in 1963. The Baganda were hostile, and wanted their own state (Buganda) which would be independent to the extent that it would have its own army. The initial solution to the problem of the Baganda was to make the Kabaka the first president, with Milton Obote (a Lango) serving as the first Prime Minister. Moreover, a federal structure was provided for, in which the four regions (Buganda being one of them) had considerable autonomy. Obote was socialist in orientation, and had to deal with the difficult task of fitting

the ancient kingdoms into the new state. He became increasingly suspicious of hereditary rulers, and in 1964 came into direct conflict with the Kabaka as president over an ethnic issue. A referendum had been carried out among the Nyoro whose territory had been transferred by the British to Buganda, in order to see whether they would prefer to return to the previous situation. A clear majority voted in favour of such a change, but the Kabaka refused to endorse this. In 1966 Obote deposed the Kabaka as president and took over that office himself. He was now prepared to give only formal recognition to kings and to withdraw regional autonomy. Increasing hostility with the Baganda ensued, to the extent that later in 1966 the army was sent to take the Kabaka's palace. Obote's success increasingly depended upon the army, and he was eventually deposed by a military coup in 1971, when Idi Amin took control of the country. Amin's rule was notoriously bloody, and his brutal attacks were sometimes based on ethnicity, such as those waged against the Lango and the Acholi. Force was the main method of 'integration' used during this period. Amin was eventually ousted in 1979, with Tanzanian help.

After a long interval, Yoweri Museveni, who had become president in 1986, decided in 1993 to restore the traditional monarchies, including the Kabaka: with the proviso that their functions were purely ceremonial and cultural.

As elsewhere, the language issue has mirrored the broader ethnic struggle. Wherever possible the Baganda pressed for the use of Luganda throughout the territory: and their influence on the British was considerable. However, Swahili was the language of the police and the army, who were recruited on an East African basis and regularly served outside their own territory. After independence, Luganda had the obvious disadvantage of its ethnic bias where national integration was concerned (Criper and Ladefoged 1971). Swahili had spread from elsewhere in East Africa into Uganda up to a point; it could be argued that it was a foreign language but this was not necessarily a disadvantage. The continued role of the army in politics also gave it some support. Obote sometimes favoured English as the sole national language, often with some reluctance, but the importance of Swahili has subsequently grown (Mazrui and Mazrui 1995: 75–7, 115).

Finally, the two former Belgian mandated territories in the region are the ones where the 'ethnic' issue has assumed a particularly high profile in ongoing political events. This is despite the fact that each of them traditionally represented a cultural unity, and that there were no controversies over issue of which indigenous African language to use.

There were, and remain, important divisions within such cultural unity. There are a few aboriginal inhabitants known as the Twa, but they constitute only about one per cent of the population and are not a major force in politics. The bulk of the population are the Hutu, who compose about 85 per cent. The remaining 14 per cent are the Tutsi, who have been overlords to the Hutu. They appear to have arrived from the north, and to have originally been Nilotic-speakers, but they subsequently adopted the languages (Rwanda and Rundi) which were dominant in their area. Their appearance is distinctive because of their tall stature. Traditionally the Tutsi have been pastoralists, and the Hutu agriculturists. The Tutsi introduced a centralized kingship to the area; both the Rwanda and Burundi kings had the title *Mwami*. A relevant factor to modern politics is that historically the Tutsi have always been in exclusive control of armed force. In pre-colonial times a system of patron–client relations prevailed, with Hutu as clients of Tutsi. This system apparently received general acceptance, and one observer has spoken of a 'premise of inequality' that was accepted by all involved (Maquet 1961).

There is in fact some dispute as to how generally accepted the system was. Predictably, the Tutsi view of the situation was of one in which reciprocity and harmony prevailed, thereby justifying their own privileges; whereas the Hutu would be more likely to emphasize the exploitative character of the regime (Igwara 1995: 63). Mullen (1995: 31) notes for Rwanda that since the Tutsi had a monopoly of armed force they could have ruled on the basis of this, but that they chose a complex system of patronage. Pottier suggests (1995: 42–6) that it would be misleading to maintain as Davidson implies (1992: 249) that any exploitative features of the regime developed as a result of colonial distortion. He cites evidence that ethnic self-consciousness was clearly present among Tutsi and Hutu before the colonial incursion.

It is however true that the German and subsequent Belgian administrators accepted and supported this system because of its stability, though they did introduce some bureaucratic aspects and in some respects over-emphasized the rigidity of the system. In Rwanda, for instance, some individual Hutu rose to high office, and could marry Tutsi women, their descendants becoming fully absorbed into Tutsi status. In Burundi, too the situation was more complex because princes had more autonomy; and some Hutu had been nominated as chiefs and courtiers. The latter were however derecognized by the Belgians. There was also a tendency for menial tasks expected to be performed for the colonialists to be done by Hutu. On the other hand, missionary educa-

tion policies which was developed during Belgian colonial rule were in Burundi quite liberal in their support for Hutu advancement, whereas in Rwanda they were geared rather more to reinforcement of Tutsi domination (Lemarchand 1970: 75, 134–40). However, the territories were both acquired under a League of Nations mandate, and eventually the Belgians had to prepare for independence. One aspect of this development was a shift in support by Belgium from the Tutsi to the Hutu.

As was the case in Zanzibar, a system of entrenched ethnic inequality could survive under colonialism, but hardly in a situation where democratic values were to be a relevant consideration. A political system based purely upon majority rule would quickly dispose of Tutsi hegemony in politics; but entrenched political privilege was intrinsic to the Tutsi conception of aristocratic status. This conflict has been endemic in both Rwanda and Burundi but has been pursued in very different ways.

In *Rwanda*, a rebellion against the Tutsi took place in 1959, shortly before independence. Very large numbers of Tutsi were killed and even larger numbers fled, remaining as refugees in neighbouring countries. A further blow to Tutsi hegemony was a referendum on the monarchy in 1961, which successfully called for its abolition. Tutsi refugees have felt widespread dissatisfaction against their exclusion from political power, and there have been various invasions in response to this. These were successfully put down and in retaliation, many more Tutsi were killed or forced into exile. However in 1990 a major well-armed invasion occurred, initially in response to the refusal of the then Rwandan government to allow refugees to return. The invading forces were of the Tutsi-dominated *Front Patriotique Rwandais* (FPR), whose programme has however been presented as representing a wider ethnic base. The 1990 invasion was successfully quelled, but the FPR struck again in 1991, with remarkable success until a cease-fire was negotiated, though this was short-lived. Military action against the invaders was extended to Tutsi remaining in Rwanda and to any Hutu who were suspected of not supporting the government. Peace between the two sides was eventually brokered in Arusha in 1993, in an arrangement which made major concessions to the Tutsi and did not prove to be a lasting solution.

In *Burundi* the situation has been more complex. Tutsi rule had not been felt to be so repressive as in Rwanda. None the less, some Hutu who had benefited from educational facilities operating under colonial rule were inevitably set to challenge Tutsi privilege. The overthrow of Tutsi overlords in Rwanda had a deep impact upon both Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi. No parallel expulsion of the Tutsi had taken place in Burundi, but the Hutu were by their sheer number easily able to vote

the Tutsi out of political office. This is in fact what happened in 1965, when the results of a free election left Hutu in full control of the new National Assembly. However the Mwami, whose position had initially become strengthened as a source of national unity as independence approached, set aside the result of the election. Frustrations that developed eventually resulted in an attempted coup one year later, led by Hutu army officers. This failed (though the Mwami had to flee the country) and a Tutsi military junta seized power. In 1972 a purge of Hutu from the army and the civil service took place, and this was soon intensified in the form of genocidal attacks against any Hutu who had achieved wealth or education; those who escaped death were forced into exile in neighbouring countries. Between 1976 and 1987 there was a process of transfer to civilian rule. There were some attempts to incorporate Hutu interests, though not in proportion to their numbers. In 1987 a further coup took place, and the new government was committed to extend the process of accommodation.

From the point of view of ethnic relations, the situation in Burundi and Rwanda raises certain specific issues which are rather different from those found elsewhere in East Africa. The phenomenon of the conquest state is found in other territories: in Uganda, for instance, the Ankole serve as an example (Oberg 1940). But in the modern political scene, the Ankole formed part of a larger political unit. Rwanda and Burundi operate as independent states in which ethnic conflict has not had a major geographical dimension: distribution is uneven, but both Hutu and Tutsi are found in most areas. The system of paternalism which traditionally operated reflected a set of common values which could not however survive the impact of pressure for democratic government. The only fallback position for hardline defenders of the system was military supremacy. The situation is by no means static, and was complicated in 1994 by the apparently deliberate killing of the presidents of both countries in an air crash.

THE CASE OF THE MAASAI

The Maasai are often cited as an example of conservatism and resistance to development, in both Kenya and Tanzania. They have certainly proved resilient in respect of cultural retention in the face of European influence, and for that reason could be viewed favourably by colonialists as being in no danger of becoming 'detribalized' (Kennedy 1987: 160).

By contrast, independent governments committed to development are liable to take another view. On close examination, however, the issue is more complex. The Maasai have had specific problems concerning safeguarding of their own interests, after a long process of adaptation They have been resistant to changes of kind that would require them to take on an alien way of life (Hutton and Cohen 1975: 112–13; Gulliver 1969a). Pastoralism forms the basis of their culture, and cattle are valued not so much for utilitarian purposes but rather as central to their system of values. The Maasai have historically been despised by their neighbours and this reaction has also been general in development agencies. Further difficulties have been presented by nomadism and dispersal, especially in the case of Tanzania where the policy has been one of concentrating population. However, they have not been unresponsive to any kind of change, but only to that which threatens their cultural integrity (Swantz 1995).

THE IMPACT OF MULTIPARTYISM

A recent development which has had serious implications for national integration has been the growth of multipartyism. Pressures towards this have arisen largely from Western sources. Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increased tendency for aid to be conditional upon 'good' government, and this has generally been deemed to imply multipartyism. This system stands in sharp contrast to the practice of most African countries since independence, where the one-party state has been the norm. This partly reflected the unanimity of support for pre-independence nationalist parties, but a major factor in the subsequent retention of the one-party state has been the very real fear that different parties would have a different ethnic base: thus posing a threat to national integration. One-party states have however differed from one another over matters such as the degree of debate permitted within the framework of the single party.

In *Kenya*, the initial merger of KANU and KADU into a single party was voluntary. However, an opposition party, the Kenya People's Union, was formed in 1966 and was banned in 1969. It was associated with those ethnically Luo, and was left of centre. The decision to ban it lead to a *de facto* one-party state. When Kenyatta died, the choice of another Kikuyu to follow him would have led to considerable suspicion, but the choice of the Kalenjin Daniel arap Moi could be seen as less likely to provoke controversy over ethnic issues. A *de jure* one-party

state was declared in 1982, but there was still considerable rivalry between party candidates: and the ethnic factor was relevant to this. A tendency could be discerned to remove earlier Kikuyu domination in favour of minority ethnic groups, with particular reference to the Kalenjin. International pressure led to the calling of an election in December 1992, which was based on multiparty politics. Voting was overwhelmingly on ethnic lines (something Moi had predicted when warning against multipartyism). One noteworthy feature was the loss of Kikuyu support for KANU, which by now had come to represent to interests of smaller ethnic communities in relation to Kikuyu domination. Some ethnic clashes had become widespread even before the election. However KANU retained power, and had a broader base than any of the other parties (Muigai 1995). Ethnic clashes continued after the election, and KANU was accused of encouraging violence: especially against other ethnic groups in the Kalenjin-dominated Rift Valley. A second multiparty election took place in 1997, and ethnic issues assumed even greater significance before, during and after the election. There were further accusations that KANU instigated violence, especially against up-country residents at the coast and against Kikuyu in the Rift Valley: and also that security forces were inactive in enforcing the law. Moi was again reelected, since although there was much opposition to him his rivals were themselves divided, once again on ethnic grounds: indeed, some parties which had a multi-ethnic following initially went on to split over the ethnic issue. There have been ongoing disputes concerning the validity of the election, and Kalenjin–Kikuyu clashes have often ended in bloodshed. Disputes of this nature are still continuing (Otieno 1998). The future seems uncertain, but clearly the issue of ethnicity needs to be renegotiated in the context of multipartyism. There are some calls, even from within KANU, for the revival of the idea of 'majimboism', which would involve a looser federal structure. This was initially mooted at the time of independence, but was rejected in favour of a strong centralized system: but it could now be considered as a possible way forward (Ajulu 1998: 285).

In *Tanzania*, there had been a one-party state ever since the Interim Constitution in 1965. TANU represented the Mainland and the Afro-Shirazi Party Zanzibar (where before the revolution there had been more than one party). In 1977 these two bodies merged to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). By 1991 it had been agreed to adopt a multiparty system, despite the fact that there was little popular support for this. Religious undercurrents in this election have already been referred to. Ethnic particularism was also a factor, though electoral procedures had

been designed to contain this; for instance Augustine Mrema, a Chagga, did not obtain support in certain non-Chagga opposition party strongholds where success would otherwise have been expected (Kaiser 1996). However, the ethnic dimension seems to have been less problematic than elsewhere in Africa where multipartyism has been introduced (Glickman 1995b: 289).

In *Uganda*, a multiparty system had operated in the early stages of independence, and had persisted until a threat on Obote's life in 1969, after which opposition parties were banned. The key ethnic factor had been the desire of Ganda traditionalists to preserve their interests; they formed a party (Kabaka Yekki) to this end before independence had been realised. Needless to say there was no multiparty political expression during Amin's dictatorship; though an election on this basis was possible in 1980, after his downfall. However, armed forces continued to have a high profile in political life and some ethnic tensions occurred, especially between the Acholi and the Lango. President Museveni has ruled since a military coup in 1986. Political parties are allowed, but effective public expression for them is prohibited. Museveni's preference is for a 'no-party' system (Omara-Otunnu 1992).

In *Rwanda*, the FPR invasions have had some political impact even though swiftly resisted. In 1991 a multiparty constitution was officially recognized, but was of little consequence in view of the state of civil war that was emerging. The 1993 Arusha peace accord led to hopes that it would now become effective.

In *Burundi* the situation has once again proved to be highly complex. However, multiparty elections were held in 1992. The previous single party, *Union pour le Progrès National* (UPRONA) now stood in competition with others, the *Front Démocratique du Burundi* (FRODEBU) being the main opponent. Each of these parties took care to field some candidates from the ethnic group with which it had not been historically associated. FRODEBU, associated with the Hutu, was predictably the victor. Here, as in Rwanda, there was not a one-to-one relationship between ethnicity and party loyalty, but the overlap was considerable. In practice parties were widely seen as linked to one particular ethnic group, making it easy for violent confrontation to be rekindled.

CONCLUSION

It can be seen that difficulties of national integration remain formidable and that ethnic factors are everywhere present in the region. They can

be and often are a cover for other kinds of interest, and their persistence needs to be explained: and they are also highly malleable. Difficulties may be magnified if such differences are simply ignored. It might for instance be possible to have a more positive view of diversity within an overall consensus. But new problem-areas arise with many recent developments. Democratization is seen as linked with the flourishing of 'civil society' but many of the relevant institutions are ethnically based (Doornbos 1991: 60). Multipartyism is now generally expected to prevail; but ethnic voting is normal though not universal. It is difficult for it to be otherwise. Members of Parliament normally represent particular localities, and ethnic units still tend to be localized (Fox 1996: 597; Throup 1993: 391–3). Hence the temptation for politicians to play the 'ethnic' card must prove very hard to resist. The expectation of favouring kin can only reinforce this, since members of different ethnic groups are non-kin. Such factors coexist with calls for national unity. However, feelings of national unity can be weak while kinship and ethnic sentiments remain strong, and tensions arising from this situation shows no sign of disappearing.

Postscript: Developments in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s

Rwanda and Burundi have in the 1990s received extensive media publicity as a consequence of widespread carnage and genocidal attacks. There has also been major displacement of population, involving a mass exodus of refugees into neighbouring countries, particularly Zaïre (Congo Democratic Republic), Uganda, and Tanzania. Such developments have attracted the attention of the international community at various levels. Neighbouring countries have been concerned about regional stability, the salience of ethnic issues, and problems arising from acceptance of large numbers of refugees. The Organization of African Unity has shown concern to the point where it has threatened to intervene and the United Nations has been involved to the extent of actually sending peace-keeping forces. The devastation caused by the conflict has also led to involvement of medical and food aid agencies, and the human rights issues have been the subject of concern by Amnesty International. The ethnic issue has remained the key factor in politics. Events since 1994, in the aftermath of the death of the presidents of both countries, are of particular significance.

RWANDA

It had been hoped that ethnic strife would have been ended after a peace agreement signed in Arusha (Tanzania) in August 1993, with a United Nations peacekeeping force overseeing the transition. However, there was evidently some reluctance by the government to accept an arrangement which made major concessions to the Tutsi. Moreover Hutu extremists began attacks soon after the air crash in which the two presidents died; and they appeared to be already well mobilized to take action. They were successfully repelled by the FPR which expanded its power so as to control two-thirds of the country. Many Hutu feared reprisals and fled to Zaïre (Congo Democratic Republic). The international community debated the issue of sending a peace-keeping force and eventually, with UN support, French troops intervened to restore order, and

some patrolled zones within Rwanda which could be safely occupied by Hutu; but these joined the refugee exodus after the French had left. The FPR was Tutsi-led but had to attract the support of moderate Hutu in order to ensure any semblance of a democratic mandate. By November 1994 a system was in operation which provided for a measure of Hutu representation but did not reflect their status as a majority of the population. But in any case, the army rather than the National Assembly played the key role in politics. Continued Tutsi domination has led to considerable dissatisfaction among the Hutu and bloodshed has continued.

BURUNDI

The situation in Burundi became destablized in the autumn of 1993, when the first Hutu president (who had served only for four months) was killed in a coup allegedly conducted by high-ranking army officers. The coup eventually collapsed, but the 1994 crash led to fears that carnage would occur on the same scale as in Rwanda. Serious ethnic strife did occur but initially this was at a lower level, and involved conflicts between the Hutu militia and the army (which remained under Tutsi control). In September of 1994, as has been seen, an agreement was reached between UPRONA and FRODEBU whereby there would be power-sharing; this provided for a Hutu president and a Tutsi prime minister. However, the issue of the relative power of the president and the prime minister continued to be a contentious issue. Eventually in 1996 the military took political control. This led to sanctions being imposed by neighbouring states. Military intervention was contemplated but eventually rejected; however, a blockade was successful in extracting concessions, leading to an unusual situation where the constitution was suspended but parliament continued to operate, and political parties were before long able to function again. Ethnic strife has continued, with civilians being more likely to be targeted than protagonists of opposing ethnic interests. Negotiated settlement has again been hampered by extremists, both Hutu and Tutsi, who have taken up arms again in support of their aspirations.

COMMON PROBLEMS

Tutsi and Hutu both have their own visions of the past, which have been shown to be very different. The Tutsi see their role as that of benevolent

paternalists, while the Hutu see the Tutsi version as anachronistic and also as a cover for a history of repression. The issue is not entirely polarized on ethnic lines. Even the traditional system involved cross-cutting ties. Education has helped Hutu to improve their status. Political parties have frequently tried to present an appeal which is broader than that of the ethnic group with which they have been traditionally associated.

A 'rational' solution would involve power-sharing, and this is what at various times has been attempted in both countries. However, this involves compromise, and one difficulty can be that a compromise between the Tutsi and the Hutu view of the situation will lead to retention of at least some Tutsi privilege. Any system of power-sharing is open to continued review as to whether the settlement is really fair. Any feeling that it is unjust can make the situation deteriorate quickly into one where ethnic identity is paramount. Ethnic militias can obtain support from refugees outside the country, who in some cases were already in a state of military preparedness. Hutu may support the principle which has been reinforced by genocide and by instruction in Hutu refugee camps, that Tutsi are never to be trusted (cf. Igwara 1995: 12–13). Malkki (1995: 55–72, 224, 243) shows that in a Hutu refugee camp in Tanzania, 'authentic' Hutu ethnic identity was reinforced, and that a key element in socialization was the demonization of the Tutsi as oppressive interlopers. She notes that there was particular bitterness directed against the killing of educated Hutu, who had benefited from the relatively liberal education policies in Burundi and who were seen as a threat by the Tutsi (Malkki 1995: 74–6, 96–8, 135). Similar patterns are reported more recently, from camps in the Congo Democratic Republic (*The Guardian,* 9 March 1995).

Tutsi have the advantage of a strong martial tradition, and continued control of the army. They can also resort to ethnic violence though need some Hutu support if any concession to democracy is to be made. Thus the delicate balance which is needed in power-sharing can quickly deteriorate into a renewed cycle of ethnic violence, with unarmed civilians routinely drawn into the conflict and having their worst suspicions confirmed.

CONCLUSION

The inflexible, ethnically stratified system that characterizes relations in Rwanda and Burundi makes the situation particularly intractable. Attempts at reform tend to be followed by further polarization, and

ethnic violence continues. Personal experience of this by the survivors tends to reinforce the situation, and though cross-cutting ties have always existed, these tend to disappear as ethnic identity is reasserted.

There are differences between the Rwanda–Burundi situation and that of most other African countries. Some of these might appear to work to the advantage of national cohesion. There is a common language, there are no disputes about territorial boundaries, and some other cultural elements are shared. But an important element is missing. In most African countries there is usually at least some rhetoric at higher levels to the effect that tribalism is something to be discouraged (even though this is not always what happens in practice). But in Rwanda and Burundi attempts at compromise over matters concerning ethnic interests can easily be seen as betrayal. This has to be seen in the context of the fact that the nation-states of Rwanda and Burundi are based on indigenous, rather than colonial boundaries. It is interesting to speculate whether similar problems would have arisen in the case of other traditional African polities in which aristocratic incomers monopolized political power, leaving no outlet for educated 'commoners'. However benevolent their paternalism might have been, such leaders could not survive against the yardstick of 'democratic' values. It is significant that, after a long period of stable continuity in Ethiopia, feudalism collapsed in 1974; even though the aristocracy could not be described as interlopers and there had been no colonial presence to 'distort' the situation.[1] In this particular case the immediate sequel to feudalism was communist-oriented military rule; 'democratic' government did not appear until 1991.

In another way, however, Rwanda and Burundi do reflect a broader pattern. Igwara notes (1995: 4) that in most African states, 'political power is popularly conceived of as belonging to the ethnic group from which the leadership comes'. True and imagined 'tribalism' are major sources of instability in many African nation-states. The usual response is to try to play down the importance of 'tribe' and to encourage feelings of national identity instead. But an exercise of this kind, if attempted in Rwanda and Burundi, could easily mean the reaffirmation of a vision of national unity under Tutsi domination. The Hutu do have an alternative version which maintains that they (together with the Twa) are the autochthonous claimants to the territory, and that the Tutsi are foreign interlopers. But such a vision leaves no place for the Tutsi, who would be the objects of discrimination, expulsion, or even genocide.

The difficulty of seeking common ground in the face of such opposed perspectives is only too obvious. It is however worthy of recall that the

values of international organizations such as UN are opposed to denial of human rights, to racism, and certainly to genocide. International supervision, intervention, and pressure have been significant elements in the political situation in Rwanda and Burundi in the recent past. In the course of the reaffirmation by UN of commitment to opposition of racial discrimination, Rwanda and Burundi have been called to account. Though there has been some resistance (and not only in the two countries concerned) to possible threats to national sovereignty, this has not been the only reaction. It is significant that in 1994 the Burundian ambassador to UN appealed to the international community not just for aid but for help to restore democratic government (Banton, 1995, xvii–xxiv). The problems are clearly of such magnitude that only an outside arbiter seems able to point the way forward.

7 Religion, Race and Ethnicity in East Africa

RELIGION, RACE AND ETHNICITY: GENERAL ISSUES

A close link can be discerned between religion on the one hand, and racial and ethnic issues on the other. Adapting a proposal by Spiro, Worsley defines religion as a system of culturally patterned interaction with a culturally postulated superhuman realm (Worsley 1968: xxxiii–xxxiv; Spiro 1966: 96). The entities in question are not empirically observable but religious beliefs and practices have observable consequences, and some of these relate to race and ethnicity. Ethnic units are often associated with religion. Religion gives support to and sustains certain values, which form part of culture, which in turn is related to ethnic identity. Although conversion to different religions, and to different religious bodies, can and does occur, overwhelmingly people in most societies continue to give allegiance to the religious tradition into which they were socialized. Religion for most people is a cultural matter rather than an allegiance based upon assent to a set of dogmas, or even upon an act of faith. For reasons such as this, religion is often seen as almost a primordial bond (cf. Geertz 1963: 109), and can manifest itself as such in the political sphere. In homogeneous societies religious and cultural values can reinforce one another: Durkheim shows this in his classic study (1915). Problems can however arise in a heterogeneous society when ethnic and religious identities are linked. In such situations a form of polyethnic situation is liable to remain. However, amalgamation and/or assimilation can occur where conversion takes place; such can be seen to have happened in the formation of Swahili Muslim culture (Harries 1964). But in other situations very little amalgamation or assimilation takes place, such as with Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, and Indians and other races in East Africa or Britain. Although a religious tradition may promote a general norm of human solidarity, there is likely to be a particular emphasis upon fellowship between co-believers: and this can reinforce pluralistic tendencies in a society. There are also situations when a common religious belief can override ethnic differences.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN EAST AFRICA

Four principal religious orientations are present in East Africa. In the first place there is African traditional religion, itself incorporating many variations. This is the indigenous, localized religion which has had to come to terms with forces of external origin. In the second place there is Islam, a religion which came to East Africa through maritime trading links, though in the north of Africa it had spread overland from Arabia at an early stage in Islamic history. Most African Muslims are Sunni, but Shi'ites and Ismailis are also found, mainly among those of Indian ancestry. The small Ibadi sect is also noteworthy since the Arab aristocracy in Zanzibar belonged to it. In the third place there is Christianity. This came to East Africa primarily through European missionary effort which began in the nineteenth century. Again, however, in some parts of Africa Christianity has an ancient presence. Some early Christian thinkers such as Origen and Eusebius had links with Egypt, and today Ethiopia remains a Christian country. Christianity in Africa also shows diversity in terms of denominational difference, and in ethnic background of the Western missionaries who brought the church in question to Africa: and in addition there are now numerous churches of indigenous African origin. Finally there is Hinduism which is practised by many Indians but which has hardly penetrated at all to other ethnic groups.

The religious geography of East Africa is characterized by a highly uneven spread of the various creeds that are represented. In numerical terms, Islam is everywhere stronger in the coastal areas of Kenya, and (especially) Tanzania. The Roman Catholic church is the largest, and is especially strong in Burundi, Rwanda and (to a lesser extent) in Tanzania. Anglicanism is strongest in Uganda, though also has a significant following in Rwanda. The Evangelical Lutheran Church displays strength in Tanzania, while in Kenya the Presbyterians and an interdenominational Protestant body are well represented. Some smaller bodies have major geographical concentrations, such as the Adventists in Rwanda and the Society of Friends in Kenya. Round about four to six per cent of the population are reported as following traditional religion, though in Tanzania the figure is nearer to eleven per cent.

TRADITIONAL RELIGION, RACE AND ETHNICITY

One must be cautions about generalizing too much about African traditional religion. But it can safely be said that there are certain common

elements present among the various systems. There is monotheism: a belief in one God, and also belief in localized spirits, which can be related to a locality or to a group of kin (or to both). The spirits take an active interest in the behaviour of the living and can reward and punish; whereas God is very remote. God is the ultimate origin of the world, and is sometimes invoked in relation to major disasters such as famine, or epidemics such as AIDS. There is a certain amount of variation in that some traditional religions invoke God more readily than others but generally he is a remote figure. As the Lugbara of Uganda say, God even made the Europeans (Middleton 1960: 27). Civilizing ancestors may be postulated as justification for the presence of their modern descendants on the land, and traditional political leaders such as kings and chiefs typically have at least some measure of spiritual power. Spiritual entities are invoked in relation to everyday concerns such as disease and the fertility of the land.

Cosmologies of this kind relate to the preoccupations of one individual ethnic group and are bounded by its culture. There is recognition that other ethnic groups will have their own spiritual entities which are valid for the people concerned (Tanner 1967: 62). The whole idea of being a missionary or proselytizing in any way is meaningless from such a perspective. Nor would there be any question of conversion, except in the case of a stranger who became incorporated into a different ethnic group. However the geographical boundaries of religious systems of this nature cannot easily be extended: hence there has with growth of scale been a tendency for traditional African religion to be responsive to the process of conversion to belief systems of broader geographical scope (Horton 1971).

In Tanzania, spasmodic localized resistance based on indigenous religion had appeared as early as 1897, and some such movements also operated on a wider basis than that of a single ethnic unit (Iliffe 1979: 204–5). The best-known of these was an anti-colonial movement called Maji Maji, which began in 1905. This was mobilized in response to a general hatred of German colonial rule, and operated on a multi-tribal basis. It was founded on spiritual authority using the pre-existing religious tradition. The movement opposed witchcraft as well as external enemies. It caught the colonial government unprepared and was not finally defeated until 1908 (Iliffe 1979: 168–202).

There were other instances of anti-European sentiments being expressed through traditional religion but within a more ethnically bounded framework. In Kenya as early as 1905 the Mumbu Cult was active, mainly among the Gusii, preaching the message that soon Europeans

would depart and a new golden age would be ushered in (Wipper 1977, pt II). Not long afterwards, among the Luo in 1913, and among the Kamba in 1923, preachers were active who predicted the eventual expulsion of Europeans. In 1943 there followed a more broadly-based movement known as *Dini ya Msambwa* (Religion of the Spirits of the Ancestors), led by Elijah Masinde. This was initially opposed to certain agricultural regulations imposed by the colonial government, but eventually it stood for expulsion of all Europeans. After 1947 there were attacks by Masinde's followers on mission and government premises, and in the last of these some of his followers were killed. Masinde was eventually arrested, but his followers continued and engaged in sporadic armed resistance (Wipper 1977: pt III; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966: 325–30). The atavistic tendency continued in Mau Mau, which was the major threat to colonial rule in the 1950s. The religious element was not the dominant feature in this movement but it cannot be ignored. Mau Mau was Kikuyu-based and important elements of traditional religion were invoked. Followers were expected to show that they were the true children of Gikuyu and Mumbi (the founding ancestors of the Kikuyu) by taking a special oath. The oath had been used earlier in Kikuyu nationalism and had originally been based on the Bible, but with the growth of Mau Mau there was a move towards the use of elements of Kikuyu culture. Oathings involved praying to God (Ngai) while facing Mount Kenya, and an appeal to a Kikuyu golden age (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966: 259–60, 330–2) .

ISLAM, RACE AND ETHNICITY

Islam came to East Africa through trading links, rather than through direct missionary effort. It came from Asia, where a literate and monetarized culture already existed. Islam came therefore with literacy and accountancy skills, and also affected material culture such as dress, ornaments and house types. Of particular importance was the Arab presence, since this formed the basis of the mixed Arab-African 'Swahili' culture. Their influence was primarily in Zanzibar and the coast, though especially in the case of Tanzania some penetrated the interior. The Arabs who came to Africa lost more than they gave but they retained their religion. Those who identify as Swahili are overwhelmingly Muslim. The 'purer' form of the Swahili language is felt to be associated with the coast, and the language has incorporated numerous Arabic elements.

The religious associations of the Arabic language help to protect its prestige among the Swahili (Harries 1964: 229).

It is also to be remembered that the Sultan of Oman established his suzerainty in Zanzibar and the coast of Kenya. This meant that Islam became the *de facto* established religion. Unlike the situation in Christianity, in Islam there are detailed prescriptions concerning activity in this world. Anti-racist teachings are particularly prominent in Islam, and in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad they are made very explicit. Speaking towards the end of his life,. Muhammad expressed his explicit opposition to prejudice against those with dark skins and against non-Arabs in general. Also important is the notion of *Umma*, the community of all believers (Ahmed 1988: 20). Racial diversity is seen as having sacred status as a divine creation. Africans, Shirazis and Arabs have intermingled on the basis of a common religion. Though the Arab aristocracy belonged to the Ibadi sect, which is dominant in Oman but is not widely found elsewhere, this proved no barrier to co-operation with other Muslims. In Zanzibar the appeal of the earlier nationalist movement was to Islamic unity, which transcended race barriers. This was Arab-led but in any case the Arabic language and culture enjoy a special status in Islam; and initially such an appeal was successful (Lofchie 1965: 12–13). Muslims share the same rituals and the sense of community extends to the general Muslim world. Patterns of worship that were segregated by race or ethnicity would definitely be forbidden. However, in a religiously mixed society the operation of Muslim law can be a divisive influence, where strictly enforced. Problems also arise because of divisions within Islam. The opportunity for development of cross-racial ties between Indians and Africans who are Muslims has been limited by the fact that Indians are generally Shi'ite or Ismaili while Africans are mainly Sunni.

One characteristic of Islam is that it is felt to accommodate to African culture more easily than was later to be found with Christianity (Horton 1971: 105; Lewis 1980: 45–75). It was noted in Chapter 1 that Edward Blyden had found it attractive for such a reason. Teachings did not require such a radical break with tradition. Existing beliefs in lesser spirits, and in magic and witchcraft, were not dismissed totally, provided that the preeminence of God was recognized. The believer in Islam might be warned against invoking such powers but this was not the same as requiring denial of their existence. Christian missions tended to be very strict on the issue of polygamy, but this is permitted in Islam up to a maximum of four wives: and only a few chiefs would find this difficult. Divorce is allowed and is quite easy to obtain. In some cases,

too, the trappings of Islamic material culture became adopted before conversion actually occurred – making such conversion less of a cultural break when it eventually did take place. Colonialists were not necessarily hostile to Islam: indeed, the Germans in Tanzania encouraged it and preferred to work through Swahili agents. This policy was a response to the fact that, unlike the British, the Germans found it most effective to seek a power base through alliance with coastal Muslims (Iliffe 1979: 208). However, when Western-inspired change came to be seen as a serious threat, traditionalists and Muslims could also join forces against possible major disruption (Swantz 1986: 99–100). Arab culture carried prestige, and was linked to literacy and civilization (Lienhardt 1968:7); also high social status could be linked to high religious status (Caplan 1975: 4, 85–8).

With European penetration Islam benefited from better communications and could continue to expand. However, it became challenged by Christianity, which was linked with a more developed culture and was felt to be more forward-looking. The link with education was especially relevant. The Koranic schools provided for Muslims could pre-date the Christian missions, but concentrated upon rote-learning and did not teach 'modern' skills extensively. In Kenya it was noted in Mombasa that there was a conflict between upholders of an Arabic-Islamic education and those who favoured a more Western content. In particular, it was argued that education for girls should be limited, and should not contain Western elements (Strobel 1979: 102). Skills of a 'modern' kind were provided by Christian missionaries; Muslims could be reluctant to send their children to such schools because of the fear that they might convert to Christianity. This could lead to an educational lag whose effects could still be felt at the time of independence. Influential Muslim leaders in Tanzania even wanted to delay independence until Muslims had had the chance to catch up in educational terms. In Kenya, the growth of British power eroded that of the Muslim elite on the coast, and the mission-educated Africans were the ones who secured advancement. The British presence led to a decline in patriarchy and to the introduction of European models of behaviour. This included the introduction to Mombasa of institutions such as night-clubs, which were strongly disapproved of by Muslim elders. Women were seen as particularly susceptible to 'corruption' by the West (Strobel 1979: 94, 116–25). Another factor in what is now Kenya was the position of that area of the coast which was historically controlled by the Sultan of Zanzibar. In the 1950s there grew up a movement for coastal autonomy: there were fears of domination by up-country people who were not Muslims,

if this territory were to obtain independence as part of Kenya (Strobel 1979: 41–2). The fear of such a development could even lead some Muslims to become pro-British. Conflicts between Muslims and up-country non-Muslim immigrants to the coast continues to be an ongoing political issue, especially in the context of multiparty politics.

In recent times with growing prosperity of some Islamic countries in the Middle East the situation has changed again. Zanzibar has strengthened her links with the Arab world and the Sultan of Oman is again becoming influential. A problem for many modern African states is that the decentralized nature of Islam (especially Sunni) has made it difficult for governments to negotiate with Muslims as a body: hence attempts have been made to create officially recognized Muslim organizations (Constantin 1995). In Kenya the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUKEM) was set up; the Tanzanian equivalent was *Baraza kuu Waislamu wa Tanzania* (BAKWATA), and the Ugandan, the Uganda Muslims' Supreme Council (UMSC). Issues such as organization of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca tend to be be channelled through such bodies.

CHRISTIANITY, RACE AND ETHNICITY

The key factor which led missionaries to Africa was an anti-racist gesture, in the form of David Livingstone's campaign to replace the slave trade with 'legitimate commerce and Christianity'. It might also be expected that Christianity should hold to ideals of human solidarity which would exclude other forms of racialist practices. However, as Oldham notes, there is no explicit guidance in the New Testament on race and nationality, since these were not issues confronted by the early Christians (Oldham 1924: 21). Oldham was an influential figure, since he served as secretary of the International Missionary Council. In the same work he went on to suggest that differences in biological endowment between the races could not be ruled out, and he also found it possible to defend on pragmatic grounds practices such as 'separate development' and immigration regulations based upon race. On the other hand, he urged that preservation of racial identity was not to be confused with a policy to promote racial supremacy. He also praised Islam and, within Christianity, Roman Catholicism, for their opposition to racial exclusiveness. He saw Islam as exhibiting a real brotherhood which Christian missions could usefully emulate if they wanted to have more satisfactory results (Oldham 1924: 140–2, 171, 262–3). A more recent

statement by the World Council of Churches (Adler 1974) traces the history of anti-racist activity of that body. Particular attention has been focused in recent years upon opposition to explicitly racist regimes such as apartheid in South Africa.

A problematic situation is the obvious racial-ethnic link that Christianity possesses with Europeans and European culture. This was recognized from the beginning by European powers and conversion to Christianity could be encouraged as a way of obtaining legitimacy for colonial penetration. Sir Harry Johnston, whose career on behalf of British colonialism involved activity in Nyasaland (Malawi) and Uganda, was himself an agnostic: but he fully supported the work of the missions as a tool of colonialism. Even against a background of a stronger mainstream secularist tradition, Gambetta remarked that anti-clericalism was acceptable in France but was not an appropriate commodity for export (Oliver 1952: 46, 128, 189).

This does not mean to say that the Christian missionaries worked hand in glove with the colonialists. The alliance could at times be tenuous. The missionaries brought education which the colonialists could see as suspect at higher levels, since it could cause some to question the colonial system. Missionaries held many different views but on the whole were more optimistic about African potential than was the case with other Europeans present in Africa. Secondary education had to be provided even by the more conservative missions, since they had a policy of training an African ordained ministry. The new political elites who led their countries to independence almost invariably went through mission schools. It is of interest that when the names of streets called after Europeans have been changed since independence, there has been more reluctance to do this in the case of those named after missionaries.

Missionaries were in a better position to dissociate their interests from those of the colonial power if they were from a different European country. Beidelman shows that in the case of Anglican missionaries in Tanzania, they could be detached from the German colonialists but were in a different position with respect to the British successors under the League of Nations mandate. Also, Belgian Catholic missionaries were critical of some colonial governments but found it difficult to take such a stand in the Congo where their fellow-countrymen were the colonial power (Beidelman 1982: 10, 72–81, 211). National origins of missionaries could also affect other aspects of the way in which they operated. The Church Missionary Society by virtue of its English and Anglican heritage could sometimes be quite accommodating to aspects of indigenous culture, in view of its tradition of flexibility and

inclusiveness. This was the case in respect of female circumcision in Kenya, which will be shown to have been a contentious issue for some other missions (Strayer 1978: 140).

Whatever the colonial power may have been, missionaries also encountered other expatriate Europeans. Missionaries were much wealthier than Africans and their possessions often made the first initial impact: but they were not so rich by the standards of other expatriates. This meant that they had problems when it came to reciprocating lavish entertainment, and might have difficulty in affording club subscriptions (though free or discounted membership was sometimes offered in view of this). Their relative lack of resources did not pass without notice among Africans, and some would see them as failed Europeans. Some churches might also forbid drinking, dancing or gambling, which were important leisure activities for other expatriates (Beidelman 1982: 190, 206).

In order to preach, contact with Africans was needed: but there could be much debate as to how close this should be. Roman Catholic and other unmarried clergy were in a better position to mingle closely with Africans, and in some cases detailed and accurate ethnographic and linguistic material was collected as a consequence. But married staff on the mission were in a different position. Africa could be felt to be a risky posting for families and some segregation could develop for this reason. A further factor was that missionary families were seen as having an important role in setting an example of Christian family life.

The most difficult area of missionary activity was in relation to the response to indigenous African culture. Some missionary policies were to see it as so beyond the pale that the only way of ensuring authentic Christian conversion was to create completely new mission communities for Africans, where Christian standards would be enforced. Such communities could attract fugitives, whether from the slave trade or from disputes in the village (Oliver 1952: 50; Strayer 1978: 37). But outreach into the wider community was restricted and policies of this kind were not viable in the long run. Where involvement in the local community was to be closer, customs and beliefs which were contrary to Christian teaching would be encountered. The response varied considerably, depending upon the church in question and on factors such as the level of education of the missionaries concerned. The local language had to be learnt, in order to preach, and to translate the Bible. In some cases this led to greater appreciation of the workings of the culture, and as already noted, some missionaries became competent ethnographers and linguists. But this was only one possible outcome. Missionary service could also attract those Europeans who had a rigid idea of right and

wrong, and the culture-shock in encountering different beliefs and customs could simply lead to outright condemnation (Rotberg 1965: 38–9). Their writings would often reflect this and a further factor was that financial support for the mission was more likely to be forthcoming if Africans were depicted as 'benighted savages' – showing how badly needed the mission was. There were times when the mission had a certain amount of discretion to adapt to local conditions, but this was not the course of action followed by the local clergy (Tanner 1967: 143).

There were certain teachings of the churches which conflicted with indigenous African culture. All without exception condemned polygamy, whereas in other cases the prohibitions depended upon the church in question. Presbyterians were likely to prohibit beer. This could have implications not only for leisure activities but also for agriculture, since beer could be the customary reward for agricultural labour. But though Presbyterians discouraged divorce they did not absolutely forbid it. Roman Catholics, on the other hand, had no objections to beer but would take a strict line on divorce – a problematic policy especially among matrilineal peoples where there was a high level of marital instability. In the case of the Kwaya of Tanzania, Catholic missionaries even tried to strengthen marriage by encouraging a move in a patrilineal direction, and towards the payment of bridewealth (Huber 1973: 83–92, 94). Differences in the practice of Christian discipline could cause confusion when various missionary societies worked in the same area, each claiming Christ as their head and each using the Bible. In some cases, too, missionaries could prohibit activities whose incompatibility with Christianity was more debatable. These would include traditional medicine, dancing and dress. These could admittedly sometimes offend religious sentiments in the case of magic and divination in healing, or moral sentiments in the case of sexuality expressed in dancing, or the degree of exposure permitted by traditional dress: but ethnocentrism also played an important part. And finally, there were instances of condemnation by missionaries of practices that were not incompatible with Christianity at all. Certain forms of Western etiquette were seen by some missionaries as essential to Christian conversion, and there could sometimes be stipulations concerning house types. There could be a reluctance to graft African material culture on to Christianity: drums might be forbidden in church and a harmonium might be expensively imported from Europe instead. Furthermore, there could be a culture gap between expatriate missionaries and African people in relation to non-religious matters, such as attitudes to time, privacy and property rights (Tanner 1967: 155–7).

Indigenous beliefs were condemned as incompatible with Christianity. A misunderstanding of intention could occur between Africans who welcomed Christianity as additional religious truth which supplemented their own, and missionaries who were determined to stamp out paganism. As with custom, there were differences between missionaries as to the degree of tolerance they were prepared to allow in respect of such beliefs. Some saw them as having got part of the way to Christianity, and the analogy of an 'African Old Testament' was used. Witchcraft and magic were however nearly always the subject of condemnation.

The situation with respect to accommodation to African culture changed somewhat after the international conference of Protestant missionaries that took place in Le Zoute (Het Zoute) in Belgium, in 1926. The policy of 'adaptation' was affirmed virtually unanimously at this gathering, though it was agreed to remain strict on the issue of polygamy (Smith 1926). This conference was one of the factors leading to the establishment of the International African Institute and the journal *Africa.* It was strongly influenced by the Phelps Stokes philosophy with regard to education (King 1971: 91, 143). Some missionaries saw African culture as having retained valuable elements which had been lost in the West. Many aspects of Western culture could be seen as a threat to faith, and missionaries often shared with administrators the fear of 'detribalization' (Strayer 1978: 87–90). Particular interest was expressed in the notion of brotherhood or solidarity as opposed to individualism. In some cases such ideas could form the basis of a mission philosophy. This was the case with Bruno Gutmann, a German Lutheran missionary among the Chagga of Tanzania. He was influenced by the notion of *Gemeinschaft*, as presented by the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (Tönnies 1974; Winter 1979: 158–61; Fielder 1996: 32, 41). Tönnies emphasized and celebrated the solidarity of the rural community, and Gutmann saw this as also enshrined in Chagga values and as the basis upon which the church should operate. He regarded structures of moral guidance as deriving exclusively from primordial ties. This standpoint was not without its critics: another Lutheran missionary, Johannes Raum, argued that Gutmann wished to preserve what the Chagga themselves wished to drop (Winter 1979: 70).

Another problem-area arose from the attempt of some missionaries to try to impose a Christian standard that had long ceased to operate in the West, even among churchpeople. However, it is true that eventually churchgoing became much more popular in Africa than in Europe. Many missionaries expressed ethnocentric attitudes, though they did recognize common humanity with Africans and hoped for their salvation

(Beidelman 1982: 16–17). This standpoint could however lead to paternalism. There was a danger that Africans could be seen in the same way as children, as innocent but also subordinate. It was easy for some missionaries to find common cause with the idea, popular among colonial administrators, that a form of White-dominated paternalism was beneficial to everyone. Oldham seemed to be broadly in agreement with such a policy, since he praised the idea of 'trusteeship' by 'advanced' nations, though recognizing that 'wards' grow up one day (Oldham 1924: 100, 107). His support for the Capricorn African Society was a logical development of such a standpoint (Oldham 1955).

One consequence of the link between Christian and Western values was the growth of African independent churches. About one-fifth of Christians in Africa as a whole are believed to belong to these. They are of interest since they wish to remain Christian but refuse to have anything to do with the missions. In nearly all cases the were splits from Protestant bodies, though in 1963 in Kenya the *Legio Maria* split from the Roman Catholics (Welbourn and Ogot 1966: 147–8; Barrett 1968: 138–9). Divisions have occurred in relation to the operation of missionaries in the African setting. In some cases there were conflicts with indigenous African culture (including beer, polygamy and traditional beliefs) and in other cases there were disputes over matters such as delay in ordination of Africans. Barrett (1968: 264–78) suggests that there were initial promises sought in the mission churches, but that there followed a period of disillusionment and a recognition of discrepancy between missionary attitudes and behaviour and Christian ideals of love and brotherhood. Between 1928 and 1931 there was a major crisis in Kenya over the issue of female circumcision. The Presbyterian Church of Scotland, in particular, took a strong line against this practice: more so than the colonial government, who wanted the practice eliminated but through the technique of persuasion. One response to this was the beginning of the *arathi* (prophets), also known as *Watu wa Mngu* (children of God). These remained within the Christian fold but were syncretistic. They were impressed by the miracles of Jesus, but also practised communion with the ancestors. They were opposed to the money economy and to foreign imports. They were not a political body, but were soon suppressed by the government. They claimed wide-ranging supernatural powers, and opposed the missionaries, whom they saw as claiming to be looking after African interests but in practice being in league with other Europeans (Kenyatta 1938: 263–9; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966: 133, 327; Welbourn 1961: 140). At a later stage in Kenyan history, a major separatist movement was begun by Matthew Ajuoga in 1957.

Ajuoga saw the existing Anglican church as unnecessarily foreign, and as paternalistic and too close to the colonialists. He saw a lack of love and brotherhood, and felt that missionaries had substituted European values for Christian. After unsuccessful attempts to reform the existing Anglican church, he felt that in setting up the Church of Christ in Africa he was simply initiating a 'national church' in the same way as the English had theirs (Ogot 1966: 59–64; Barrett 1968: 254–63). Polygamy was not a central issue and in fact monogamy was preached; but this was only seen as an ideal, and many polygamists did in fact join. Kenya was the East African territory in which there was a major tendency for religious separatism to occur, and in 1967 as many as 600,000 Kenyans belonged to churches of such a nature. It was in Kenya, with its much larger White population, where the strains of colonial rule were particularly strongly felt, and independent churches were an immediate response to a situation which later gave rise to a more radical nationalist response (Welbourn 1961: 6–7). In Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda the separatist tendency was much less significant and the number of followers is very small (if in the case of Uganda the Orthodox Church is excluded) (Barrett 1968: 28–32, 254–63). Ranger (1971, 1972) suggests that independent churches did not flourish in Tanzania because they operated most effectively in an already Christianized environment: but in Tanzania, retrenchment of missions of German origin had occurred during and after the First World War. In some cases this enabled Islam to expand more effectively, and sectarianism sometimes developed within an Islamic framework. In Uganda, or at least in Buganda, Christian and European penetration occurred in cooperation with the indigenous authorities, and the strains associated with change were fewer. There was however an unusual example of independent church development in the form of the African Orthodox Church. This was an international body founded by Marcus Garvey, and offered emancipation and succession to high office which had been denied in White-dominated churches. This came to Uganda through South Africa, and eventually incorporated independent churches in Kenya which regarded themselves as Orthodox. A key concern was opposition to paternalism. It presented a problem for the Anglican church in Uganda after 1946, when an application for acceptance into Greek Orthodoxy was successful: since some degree of intercommunion between Anglicanism and Greek Orthodoxy existed. In all independent churches there was some message concerning resistance to European domination. Most of them but not all are very small, but there is a very large number of them: and schisms within independent churches are also common. In independent Africa

churches of this kind continue to flourish even though the colonialists have gone. The old enemy is no longer there but they are still able to maintain that they practice a more authentically African form of Christianity.

AFRICAN NATIONALISTS' RESPONSE TO CHRISTIAN MISSIONS

Although nationalist leaders widely acknowledged the contribution of missions to their success, especially in the educational sphere, its does not follow that they were uncritical. In some cases missionaries were seen as working directly to promote White interests, hence the Kikuyu saying, 'There is no difference between a missionary and a settler'. Some missionaries in Kenya did in fact support the use of forced labour, if only for public works (Welbourn 1961: 111, 124). But not all missionaries shared such a view, and nationalists widely recognized the fact. However, missionaries were more likely than other European interests to criticize aspects of indigenous African culture. Though it has been seen that missionaries could also defend African values, there were issues about which the missions could be less accommodating than the colonialists. The British policy of Indirect Rule was concerned to cause as little disruption as possible unless aspects of the indigenous culture were deemed to be 'repugnant'. For instance if part of a stable indigenous culture, polygamy could be perfectly acceptable. But many, if not all, missionaries were concerned to bring about a more thorough-going transformation of custom. The attack on the basis of indigenous culture could be seen as dehumanizing. Kenyatta was strongly opposed to the attitude of many missionaries who failed to understand African culture and belief, and was one of many Africans to note that a number of leading figures in the Bible were polygamous. He attacked the Church of Scotland which operated among the Kikuyu for a number of other criticisms of indigenous culture, especially the practice of female circumcision (Kenyatta 1938: 125–6, 152–3, 260–2; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966: 105–25). As a result of this prohibition, some Kikuyu established the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association. The institutions set up used English and emphasized a Western type of curriculum, but no objection was made to female circumcision (Welbourn 1961: 144–9). Another response to the same problem was found in the Karing'a Schools, which eventually developed links with the African Orthodox Church (Welbourn 1961: 144–9; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966: 125–31).

In Tanzania Nyerere attacked the European bias in education and though he targeted colonialists he will have recognized that the schools in question were normally operated by missionaries (Nyerere 1966b: 186). Those missionaries who wished to retain traditional culture were also not without their critics, as they were felt to have a static view of the situation which was out of touch with the thinking of the educated (Fielder 1996: 10–11, 109). Tanner (1967: 171, 174) noted that African clergy and even catechists could come to see 'adaptation' as regression. He also observed (Tanner 1967: 197) that Sukuma converts to Christianity wanted a different religion, not one which was as close to their existing beliefs and culture as possible.

RELIGION AND ETHNICITY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION

There has been a tendency for modern African states to downplay traditional religion as something 'unprogressive', as linked to the past in general and especially to ethnic particularism. But the spatial dimension of the activities of all religious bodies can be potentially problematic. Missions have generally had an uneven impact therefore denominational and ethnic allegiance can be linked. Islam is far more prevalent in coastal regions of East Africa than in the interior. Such imbalances can have repercussions in the current political scene. This is particularly so in the context of multipartyism, though attempts have been made to prevent the formation of parties on a religious as well as on an ethnic basis.

In Uganda the issue of Ganda domination had repercussions for the church. In 1966 there was considerable controversy when a non-Ganda was appointed to the position of Archbishop in the Anglican Church. There was also a tendency for ethnically homogeneous dioceses to develop. Church boundaries were in any case often modelled on those set up by the state, which in turn were closely linked to ethnic divisions (Ward 1995: 74–6, 94).

In Kenya, the key problem-area under the Kenyatta government was Kikuyu domination. This was also found to be the situation in the Anglican, Roman Catholic and Presbyterian churches, which were noted to be reluctant to criticize the government as a consequence. There have been further problematic issues concerning churches which are dominant in particular parts of the country, making it difficult not to appear to have a special concern with specific ethnic units (Throup 1995: 146–7, 162).

In Tanzania there have been numerous problems arising from religious pluralism, and these have been more overt than ethnic issues. Especially in the context of the Union overall, religion has been a major factor for controversy, since the overwhelmingly Islamic character of Zanzibar has potentially threatened the future of links with the Mainland. Closer links with the Middle East and the rest of the Arab world have inevitably reinforced possible separatist tendencies (Forster 1997).

THE CASE OF HINDUISM

The position of Hinduism is very different because it is found almost exclusively among the Indian community. Anyone can enter a temple but most worship is domestically based. Conversion is almost impossible, and it is particularly difficult to accommodate to the caste system. There are some similarities with indigenous African religion on the matter of the identity between religious and ethnic allegiance. Pluralism is accepted as the norm within Hinduism and a polyethnic society is readily accommodated to.

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM

For the colonial period, the key relevance of religion to ethnicity lies in the relationship with opposition to alien rule. The strength of colonial rule and the level of political awareness of the colonized were such that a secular form of resistance was not initially feasible. However, superior spiritual power was a possible source of challenge to the authority of human beings. Sometimes this developed on the basis of indigenous religion, and sometimes on Christian independency (though by no means all Christian separatists were nationalists in a political sense). Christianity was also the official religion of the colonialists and when ideals of human solidarity preached by the church were not put into practice, this did not pass without notice by Africans. Religiously-based nationalism was eventually supplanted by secular political movements: a process also noticed for Melanesia, by Worsley (1968). Islam was in a different position. It was not the religion of the colonialists, so accusations of hypocrisy were irrelevant. There is also an uneasy relationship between Islam and nationalism, and the ideal of an Islamic state could not be realistically pursued except in Zanzibar. The lag in education

could even lead to pressures to delay independence: such views were heard both in Tanzania and on the Kenya coast.

For the post-colonial period, the relevance of religion lies in its uneven spread. Linked with ethnicity, religion can be a powerful source of local cohesion but also of conflict with outsiders, and this can pose a problem for national integration and homogenization. The ethnic politics of modern nation-states can also be reflected within religious groupings. A further problem-area is that religious boundaries do not correspond to national boundaries, and this can lead to conflicts of loyalties and to criticism that is unwelcome to the political leadership.

8 Ethnicity and Tourism

Tourism may be considered to be a variety of inter-ethnic relations because it brings into contact peoples who are not only strangers to one another, but may also be members of different cultures or sub-cultures (van den Berghe 1994: 8). Ethnicity permeates many aspects of tourism, not least because the tourism industry regards ethnicity as a resource. The marketing of ethnic tourism, according to Smith, involves the 'quaint customs of indigenous and often exotic peoples'. The activities that attract tourists, he continues, include 'visits to native homes and villages, observation of dances and ceremonies, shopping for primitive wares and curios' (1989a: 4). Such observations were first published in 1977, and, though her categorization of tourists may seem dated in the 1990s, her general account of what attracts tourists remains relevant, and is broadly applicable to East Africa. What is significant about the region, however, is the attention focused on the conflicting demands of tourism development, environmental conservation, and the territorial rights of indigenous minorities. Although these issues are by no means unique to the region, they are of central rather than peripheral significance.

Tourism makes a major contribution to the economies of East Africa and in the early days of its development it was thought to be a more efficient earner of foreign exchange than any import-substitute industry (Ouma 1970: 29). Tourism opens employment opportunities, generates income, and contributes to the Gross National Product of the East African countries. For example Kenya is the second most visited tourist destination in Sub-Saharan Africa, receiving over 700,000 visitors annually. Tourism is of vital importance to Kenya's economy: it is the largest single generator of foreign exchange and employs an estimated eight per cent of the labour force (EIU 1991: 79). The tourism industry also influences other sectors of the economy, stimulating growth elsewhere by what is known as the multiplier effect. Tanzania, for example, made substantial investments in tourism at the end of the 1960s, encouraged by its rapid growth at international level (Curry 1990: 133). The National Development Corporation was very active in the late 1960s and planned to invest fifty million Tanzanian shillings ($980,000) in hotels up to 1970, and an additional seventy million shillings ($1,372,000) the following year (Svendsen 1969: 308). Tourism became an important foreign exchange earner, bringing in roughly 120 million shillings ($2,352,000) per annum by the early 1970s (*Tanzania: a Country Study*, 1992: 129).

Initial optimism was dashed, however, with slower economic growth in the 1970s. Receipts dropped sharply between 1973 and 1974 because of the worldwide recession. Further problems arose because disputes within the putative East African Common Market led to the closure of the border between Tanzania and Kenya in 1977, cutting back the supply of tourists (Curry 1990: 133–4). One major factor in the Tanzanian decision to instigate the closure was the desire to curtail access by Kenya-based tourists to Tanzanian game parks, since this was liable to damaging her own tourism industry.

   One major problem with tourism as a source of revenue can also be that it might be subject to a sudden drop in response to reports of political instability or of situations adversely affecting the safety of tourists. Pre-election ethnic violence in 1997 led to a dramatic drop of tourists in the coastal region of Kenya; and the war in Rwanda will inevitably have discouraged all but the most dedicated from visiting the game parks there, despite their special interest. The upkeep of tourist facilities can also deteriorate at times of instability; and poaching, both commercial and subsistence, can be difficult to control at such times. During ethnic strife in Rwanda the rare mountain gorilla was at risk since local people were desperate for food (Malkki 1995: 295; *The Guardian*).

   Despite the undoubted economic benefits, the introduction of tourism has been problematic and both foreign and local researchers and activists have had cause to question some of the received wisdom associated with this industry (Monbiot 1994). According to Jommo (1987: 130), control of tourism in the Kenyan economy reflects the general pattern and is centred on elites drawn from the Kikuyu. Tourism was questioned as a development priority from the outset with some local scholars arguing that it would reinforce existing colonial and neo-colonial social and cultural relationships (Shivji 1973: 1). International tourism in the developing countries was minimal in the 1950s and the 1960s when the development model later known as 'modernization theory' became widely accepted. Tourism, however, could easily be accommodated within the prevailing 'modernization' perspective, which saw culture as a barrier to development and contact with the so-called modern world as a remedy. The reservations that were expressed by Tanzanian critics accord well with the attack launched on modernization theory by the dependency theorists and others in the late 1960s and 1970s (Wood 1993: 50–2). As the 'African socialism' debate on Tanzania clearly demonstrated, the critics are not invariably Western academics. Contributing to the debate, Malunga (1973) comments on how tourism contravenes the goals of self-reliance laid down in the Arusha declaration. Another

commentator, Nash (1989: 50) maintains that there is no inevitability in the tourism process and that it is premature to suggest that there is a universal evolutionary theme for tourism development.

Despite such reservations tourism continued to grow throughout East Africa. Kenya was of particular note as a tourist destination, but by the 1990s Tanzania and Uganda also began to feature prominently in wild-life watching programmes (Shackley 1996: 8). National parks in particular make a major contribution to the regional economy, but not without some attendant social problems, of which many are related to questions of ethnicity and identity. Kenya alone has 13 national parks and 24 national reserves: roughly 7.5 per cent of its total land area (Mieczkowski 1995: 121). Maasai Mara and Serengeti alone cover more than 10,000 square kilometres (3,860 square miles) (Shackley 1996: 67).

In addition to the wildlife reserves, tourism plays an important economic role in coastal and riverine areas. The development of sport fishing off the coast of East Africa has been facilitated by the series of sheltered bays and inlets which provide anchorages, and deep waters for safe fishing. Uganda has a network of waterways suitable for fresh water fishing; there are also the lakes, hemmed in by the extensive geological fault known as the Rift Valley. Lake Victoria, which is the world's second largest lake, is shared by Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.

The coast sites are rich in Islamic and other artifacts and structures. These are dotted on the islands and strung along the whole coast from Lamu in Kenya to Mtwara in Tanzania. Most of the coastal sites have stone works of mosques and graveyards dating from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century, for display to tourists. Fort Jesus in Mombasa, originally a Portuguese settlement but later occupied by the Arabs, and other sites of historical interest, also act as tourist attractions. Inland, archaeological and other antiquities and historical sites are more varied and they are scattered over a wide range of altitude, climate, and cultural environment.

The savannah grasslands of East Africa are among the world's most popular destinations (Shackley 1996: 8), though there are signs that visitors are starting to regard the national parks of Tanzania and Kenya as being too crowded and too commercialized (Shackley 1996: 50). In Tanzania, there is Mount Kilimanjaro, located in the north-east, in Moshi District. This is the highest mountain in Africa, and stands at 5895 metres (19,347 feet) three degrees south of the Equator. It is an extinct volcano, with two peaks (Kibo and Mawenzi) which are surrounded by dense forests which are full of a variety of flora and fauna. The area around the mountain is a national park. Other tourist attractions are

Mounts Kenya and Elgon in Kenya, and Mount Ruwenzori in Uganda.

Tanzania is distinctive in having allocated at least twenty-five per cent of its total area to wildlife, national parks, and game reserves. These include Serengeti, Lake Manyara and Ruaha National Parks, Selous Game Reserve, and Ngorongoro Crater. Ngorongoro Conservation Area has a crater stocked with wild life, while the rim and the adjacent land is inhabited by the Maasai, who have herds of cattle. The Selous Game Reserve, in southern Tanzania,. is the largest in Africa, with a land area of 55,000 square kilometres (21,230 square miles). It is second only to the Buffalo National Park of northern Canada. Selous Game Reserve has 650,000 large animals, with a density of 13 animals per square kilometre (31 per square mile).

Kenya and Uganda also have extensive national parks and game reserves. These include Tsavo National Park in Kenya, and Murchison National Park in Uganda. There are also offshore islands of which the largest are the clove-rich islands of Unguja and Pemba: these together form Zanzibar which is part of the United Republic of Tanzania. These islands have tourist attractions which range from historic buildings with unique architecture, to narrow winding streets and rich culture and traditions.

East Africa also has many historic ruins. In Tanzania there are ruins in Zanzibar, Bagamoyo, and Kilwa, also the stone age remains of Ismani in Iringa. The Olduvai Gorge, mentioned in Chapter 1, is the 'cradle of mankind' and lies between the Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro Crater. In Kenya there is Lamu, of interest to tourists for its architecture, narrow streets, and the preservation of Swahili culture.

The sea coast provides a further attraction to tourists, by use of the 'tropical paradise' image. There has been extensive development in Kenya at Malindi, where the Marine National Park is a specialized feature; other areas of tourist development are to be found around beaches north and south of Mombasa; Diani is probably the best-known of these. In Tanzania, south of Dar es Salaam there is Mafia Island, which is a diver's paradise and is famous worldwide for its deep-sea fishing.

Tourism in East Africa is popularly associated with primate watching and the work of primatologists such as Jane Goodall, who established the Gombe Stream Chimpanzee Research Station in 1960 (Shackley 1996: 72). Dian Fossey's best-selling book *Gorillas in the Mist* (1983), based on her research in Rwanda, also stimulated public interest, as did the subsequent film of the same name which dramatized her life (Shackley 1996: 65). In Zaïre (Congo Democratic Republic) and Rwanda, gorilla-

based tourism has become sufficiently lucrative for the park authorities to consider ways of encouraging more of these animals to become accustomed to human beings (Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1994: 439).

In East Africa, a tourist is a person who has a visitor's visa which is usually valid for a stay of up to three months. Travellers passing through to a destination outside the country of arrival are given an in-transit pass. Very few indigenous people can afford to take holidays in East Africa, and in common with other less developed regions, tourism is largely a north to south phenomenon. The 'tourist' is therefore usually a foreigner and domestic tourism remains very much in its infancy (Husbands 1989: 247). Receipts from tourism in Kenya in 1989 were £55.7 million ($91.3) (Sinclair, Alizadeh and Onunga 1992: 55), with 60 per cent of the tourists being drawn from Europe and another 12 per cent from North America (Harrison 1992a: 7).

Given the overwhelming preponderance of White tourists, it is not surprising that visitors are commonly referred to as *Mzungu*, a term used for Whites but which in Swahili also has come also to imply the idea of a startling person, an object of wonder. Tourists move rapidly from one destination to another and are likened to burning grass, to the fires that move swiftly across the savannah during the dry season. Economic inequality is not, however, necessarily a bar to communication. This seems to be the case in Swaziland, where Swazis increasingly interact with White visitors who are, by most standards, reasonably affluent (Harrison 1992c: 149). On the other hand, tourist development can attract thieves. The threat of violent robbery is something that tourists are warned against, especially in some coastal areas in East Africa. In the case of the road to Lamu the danger is seen as sufficiently severe for tourists to be advised to travel by air.

Tourism developed under colonial rule and evolved in broadly similar ways, especially in the former British territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania: it thus has a regional dimension. As noted in Chapter 3, a number of common services were established, and these were essential to the development of tourism on a regional basis. Attempts were made after independence to sustain and develop further cooperative ventures of this nature, but these proved unsuccessful. However, the regional approach adopted by the British colonial governments also bequeathed to East Africa a large measure of uniformity in respect of conservancy laws and national park management.

The relationship between sex and tourism has attracted academic attention in destinations such as South-east Asia (see for example Seabrook 1996 and Cohen 1993), but the issue has not been thoroughly

documented in East Africa. What has been written tends to focus on German tourists rather than tourists as a whole, and thus the complete picture remains unclear. Bachmann (1988: 262) notes for example that a major German operator markets Kenya with the slogan 'Nach Malindi der Liebe wegen' (To Malindi for love), implying that Malindi offers not only freedom but perhaps sexual liberation. While admitting that it is difficult to quantify the numbers of tourists involved in sexual contacts with local people, Schurian-Bremecker estimates that perhaps as many as twenty per cent of Germans so indulge (1987: 254). Popular sources, as well as academic ones, comment on the ubiquitous beach boys in Kenya, usually assuming that they are involved in providing sexual services. Schurian-Bremecker also estimates that sexual encounters between Germans and locals are ninety per cent heterosexual, with about sixty per cent being between German males and Kenyan females, and thirty per cent between German females and Kenyan males. The remaining ten per cent, he maintains, are homosexual (Schurian-Bremecker 1987: 256).

He also refers to stereotyping of East African women in postcards; one of his illustrations shows a reclining topless Turkana girl (Schurian-Bremecker 1987: 285). A Turkana girl wearing 'traditional beads and skirt' is also illustrated in a study of postcards by Edwards (1996: 207–8). This kind of postcard , which permits easy immediacy without direct experience, represents an aspect of touristic desire. Despite the images, however, it is the alleged sexual promiscuity of tourists that can be disliked by peoples living around one destination. In the case of Malindi, Bachmann draws upon research by Migot-Adholla, Mkangi and Mbindyo to show that 45 per cent of respondents disliked this aspect of tourism, whereas only 8 per cent complained about the arrogance of tourists (Bachmann 1988: 274).

GAME RESERVES, AND THE MAASAI

The creation of national parks and game reserves is a European legacy that arose out of the desire to protect East Africa's wildlife from the early excesses of sport hunting. Theodore Roosevelt and his son, for example, who regarded themselves as nature-lovers, organized an expedition which killed five thousand animals belonging to seventy species, including the already rare white rhino. The game was also of economic importance, and during the Second World War, large numbers of wild animals were killed to provide meat for British troops (Monbiot 1994:

80). The conservationists aimed to create space where the game would be seen only by paying visitors: a corollary of this was that human residents were to be excluded. Beginning in the 1940s, vast areas of land were rapidly designated as parks and reserves, and eventually the only people who would be admitted were tourists and wardens.

A German conservationist, Professor Bernhard Grzimek, argued that a game park should be a primordial wilderness where noone, not even 'natives' should live (Monbiot 1994: 81). But this was far from the case when game reserves were initially designated as such. They were areas providing a home to thousands of local people. The game was concentrated in areas where the best grazing was located, and which was consequently already used by pastoralists. The creation of exclusive zones deprived local herders of their dry season lands. Among the most affected were the Maasai, who were in fact allowed to remain in the parks, but only with restrictions imposed as to what they were permitted to do there. Otherwise, local people who entered the areas defined as parks came to be regarded as trespassers and poachers. And the Maasai, as shown in Chapter 6, have also been seen as problematic with respect to other kinds of development.

Attempts have been made to have a more 'people-centred' approach to wild life conservation, with some of the economic benefits of tourism being channelled into improvement of local facilities. Such a scheme operated for the Maasai of Amboseli in Kenya, where water supplies were improved and wildlife utilization fees were paid. In return the Maasai were expected to restrict their movements. But the benefits proved to be irregular and were not sustained. There was also uncertainty as to whether the majority of the Maasai supported cooperation, or whether this attitude was confined to a minority of opportunistic individuals (Lindsey 1987). The Maasai themselves did not initially engage in poaching, which previously had been organized by outsiders on a commercial basis. But they themselves became active in this respect when they faced declining living standards and came to resent conservation (Monbiot 1994: 83). In both Kenya and Tanzania, there was remarkably little research on the current practices of the Maasai; rather the stereotypes were such that attempts at expulsion or sedenterization became almost a foregone conclusion (Collett 1987; Lindsay 1987). In Arusha National Park, the authorities pushed for preserving the Ngurdoto crater from human incursion (Curry 1990: 139).

The poachers eventually posed such a threat to wildlife that the Kenyan government was forced to take action. This led in 1989 to the appointment of Dr Richard Leakey as Director of the new Kenya Wildlife

Service. The son of Mary Leakey, he has established a considerable personal reputation as a researcher on human origins: and he has a long association with the cause of wildlife conservation. Leakey's task was to safeguard the nation's most important industry by persuading ordinary Kenyan citizens that conservation was good for them, while simultaneously encouraging visitors from overseas to take advantage of these natural assets. The beneficiaries of poaching, however, included not only disgruntled local people and foreign businessmen, but also politicians inclined to turn a blind eye to the trade. Leakey was thus forced to curtail practices that had the support of some of the country's most powerful people, and he rapidly acquired enemies in high places. Leakey drew up plans to share some of the proceeds from tourism with local people, who would in turn become more closely involved with the work of the reserves. So closely was Leakey associated with the conservation effort and so directly was the link made between the wildlife and economic prosperity, that the animals in the reserves came to be known locally as 'Leakey's cattle'. The EIU study on Kenya refers to the scheme designed to provide financial compensation for residents of parks for the loss of revenue from agriculture and livestock rearing as 'innovative'. This study links tourism development to rural development and reports that the Kenya Wildlife Service's revenue sharing approach is designed to win moral and practical support for conservation, by people living near a protected area. It goes on to note, however, that the Kenya Wildlife Service reserves the right to determine entitlements from revenue sharing (EIU 1991: 83–4).

A complicating factor is the widespread use of images of the Maasai in the promotional literature associated with tourism. In addition to comprising part of the decor of the destination, the Maasai have become icons or 'cultural markers' of the host population (Dann 1996: 70). The Maasai are not just part of the scenery; they are one of the key symbols of the touristic experience of East Africa. Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1994: 435) have noted that tourism at the Mayers' ranch near Nairobi is paradoxical. The presentation of pastoralism as pristine and independent is an idealization that depends on Maasai adaptability and interdependence. The authors argue that the Maasai and the Mayers who present them to tourists are not simply 'powerless pawns' and do not have to perform for tourists. If they do so, however, then the authors conclude, pessimistically, that they must 'follow the script' (1994: 467). They also argue (1994: 436) that 'tourism gives tribalism and colonialism a second life by bringing them back as representatives of themselves and circulating them with an economy of performance'; and that tourism

not only provides an economic incentive for the revival of traditional practices, but creates a safe place for practices that are contested in other spheres (1994: 448).

It is possible that the Maasai will use their identity in an instrumental way to secure what they see as their just rights, by way of tourism. The Maasai pose for photographs for money and sell jewellery and other souvenirs to tourists, but are not yet involved in many commercial ventures with a high degree of value added. Moreover, carvings depicting Maasai people are popular with visitors but are not made by the Maasai themselves, who do not have a major woodcarving tradition. Instead these souvenirs are made by Makonde carvers, who originated near the Mozambique border from where they migrated to the main tourism centres.

In *No Man's Land,* Monbiot argues that the Kenyan government is 'obsessed' with the Maasai and he devotes a whole chapter to the question of 'Leakey's cattle' (1994: 79–111). Questions of tourism, conservation and custodianship of the land are doubtless important within this context, though other explanatory frameworks are also worth considering. Not only are the Maasai primarily pastoralists, but they also speak a Nilotic language, and have historically been looked down upon by their Bantu-speaking and horticulturist neighbours. The cleavages between the Maasai and their neighbours are therefore found to be greater than those between the various Bantu-speaking groups. Linguistic, economic and ethnic allegiances combine to set the Maasai apart.

Conservation policies and the institution of conservancy areas have undoubtedly helped to protect the fauna and flora of East Africa. Human rights are excluded in the national parks, but in the game reserves some might exist, such as the grazing rights of cattle-keepers. But in both national parks and game reserves no species of fauna may be killed or removed without legal authorization, for which the control is vested in the Chief Game Warden. Stringent laws also apply to all flora, rocks and other objects within a conservancy area.

The laws relating to national parks are very similar throughout East Africa. The National Parks Ordinance for Kenya exemplifies their aims and scope. The national park laws aim 'to provide for the establishment of National Parks and for the preservation of wild animal life, wild vegetation, and objects of aesthetic, geological, prehistoric, archaeological, historical and other scientific interest therein and for incidental matters relating thereto'.[1] Most game reserves are owned and operated by district councils but the national reserves are administered and controlled by the national government.

In order to spread employment opportunities and to look after the tourists and ensure that national park rules are adhered to, vehicles visiting reserves are expected to be accompanied by a guide. But as research in Botswana has shown, rules about tourists engaging guides are liable at first to be met with opposition (Almagor 1985: 35). Such reactions are not necessarily financially motivated and may be rooted in different perceptions of the natural environment. The guides, for example, often consider the park to be a 'tourist spot' unique to their country and often assume that tourists are after game. In contrast the tourists, though they are fully aware of which country they are in, may place the reserve in a global context, often ignoring specific local, ethnic and cultural associations. To complicate matters, tourists often seek elusive goals such as an 'encounter with nature', in which animals play a part but are not the ultimate aim (Almagor 1985: 43). Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1994: 438) refer to the image of the untouched landscape in Kenya as a 'trope'. Guides are reluctantly cast in the role of servant, and in South Africa they used to share food with tourists with great unease (van den Berghe 1986: 102).

TOURISM AND ZANZIBAR IDENTITY

Zanzibar is a notable exception to the general pattern of wildlife tourism that prevails in East Africa. The folklore associated with Zanzibar has become widely known internationally. The island is a repository of fabulous stories, such as those of Sinbad, while there are also fantasies relating to aromatic spices, ivory, slaves, harems and princes which are based on historical reality. European interest in Zanzibar was heightened by the writings of Sir Richard Burton, and the fact that the missionary David Livingstone set forth from the island to explore the mainland. The history of Zanzibar is closely associated with the other Swahili cities of the East African coast but it retains a vitality that sets it apart. Zanzibari identity is also closely linked to the Stone Town, which has been the centre of various restoration and development initiatives since the 1980s (Sheriff 1995: 6). In 1988 Zanzibar was designated a conservation area in the Zanzibar government gazette, though the precise legal position remained unclear (Meffert 1995: 109).

According to Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, tourism is unyielding in its demands and insists on 'recidivism, atavism and anachronism' (1994: 467). This is however a somewhat polarized position that overlooks the significance of other variables, especially with regard to local

politics. Thus tourism alone cannot account for the revitalization of Zanzibar, and the mobilization of local support was clearly a key factor. The emphasis placed by the government on the international significance of Zanzibar doubtless helped it to secure support from the UNDP for the conservation effort. The government was also successful in attracting financial support from the Aga Khan Trust for Culture on account of the distinguished Islamic heritage to be found on the island (Balcioglu 1995: 130). Thus backing for conservation of the Stone Town has been sought by drawing attention simultaneously to the international and Islamic inheritance of the island. According to Kadir H. Din, Muslims do not necessarily share the commercial goals of mass tourism, but rather see travel as a sacred act of submission to God (Kadir 1989).

Zanzibar has also reasserted its separate identity within the state of Tanzania by at times imposing exchange controls on overseas visitors. Tourists are obliged to pay for accommodation in foreign currency brought directly to the island, without changing it in advance on the mainland. The rapid growth of tourism in Zanzibar, combined with growing commercial independence and an enhanced international pro-file, is leading to demands for greater autonomy and flexibility within the union with the mainland. The islanders have recourse to a variety of ethnonyms, especially 'Swahili', 'Tanzanian' and 'Zanzibari': but the growth of a specifically Zanzibari self-consciousness is indicative of a situational response to modern commercial and political realities. What is significant is that a name bestowed by foreigners, Zanzibar, is used willingly by the islanders to pursue contemporary objectives. This is part of a broader phenomenon internationally, where 'states within states' (such as Bali in Indonesia and the Mayaworld in Mexico) emerge within the context of tourism.

TOURISM, ETHNICITY AND CULTURE CONTACT

Although travel is widely expected to be a kind of educational experience, it has also been noted that expatriate communities form their own distinctive sub-cultures which create barriers with the host society and can even exaggerate the home identity. Manifestations of such developments are even evident in the case of communities of short-stay visitors, especially when numbers become larger (Smith 1989a: 11–14). The extent and quality of contact between tourists and indigenous populations can turn out to be problematic. Bachmann argues that mass tourists are not interested in contacts with foreign peoples, though he does not test this

empirically. Based on his observations of mainly German tourists taking culturally oriented excursions from hotels and resorts, he concludes, however, that small numbers are interested in learning about East African peoples (Bachmann 1988: 263). Nevertheless, he notes that tourists in Malindi mainly meet professional hosts and that tourism is concentrated in what he calles 'ghettos', where contacts with local peoples are limited to a few hotel employees. Bachmann appears to blame enclave tourism of this nature for the lack of cultural awareness of visitors, and advocates a more integrated approach to facilitate more intensive contacts between hosts and guests – with the aim of reducing what he assumes are mutual prejudices (1988: 305). Another issue that he draws attention to is the fact that few East Africans have direct contact with tourists and that even among those who do, little is known about indigenous attitudes. Figures are not consistent in respect of contacts with foreigners on the part of those living near or working in tourist destinations. Following the study in Kenya by Migot-Adholla, Mkangi and Mbindyo (1982), Bachmann maintains that only a third of Malindi's population (roughly 23,000) had any interpersonal contact with tourists, as compared with 39 per cent in Watamu, 20 per cent in Msambweni, and 12 per cent in Diani. The respondents were generally positive about the economic benefits of tourism, with 49 per cent agreeing that it brought in foreign exchange, 32 per cent seeing it as creating more employment, and 14 per cent associating tourism with the more general aims of progress and development (Bachmann 1988: 271).

'Enclave' versus 'integrated' tourism is a well-known debate in the literature on tourist development, especially in relation to the religious factor. and Bachmann's recommendations need careful scrutiny. Richter (1993: 185) argues for example that some cultures, especially Islamic ones, are less suited to an integrated approach than others, The governments of the Maldives, Morocco or Indonesia have sometimes favoured attempts to isolate tourists from the mainstream of Islamic society. One journalist, Mark Ottaway, even maintains that in the case of Zanzibar the Italian tour operators do not like to inform their customers that their destination is a strict Islamic society, presumably because they feel that thus might discourage holidaymakers (*Sunday Times* (London), 22 June 1997).

Furnivall's theory of pluralism may be appropriate within the context of resorts like Malindi, where in the modern context of tourism different groups meet but they do not combine. Tour operators and marketing companies, such as those mentioned by Bachmann and Edwards, may pander to prevailing cultural norms and may perpetuate stereotypes.

Situational theories of ethnicity, however, provide a dynamic view of identity, where this is used by actors such as the Maasai in order to mobilize support and to achieve what they see as just treatment. The reassertion of Zanzibar's identity may also be understood situationally. Ethnicity therefore becomes a living process articulated between different groups, and not a process of homogenization or image creation imposed by remote industrial managers.

Ethnicity and 'environmental' tourism, as Smith acknowledges (1989b: 5), are closely linked, especially with regard to the idea that indigenous people like the Maasai are custodians of the land and are the possessors of traditional skills and knowledge. Even the hedonistic 'mass tourist' who is thought to have no interest in East African culture may at times interact with the residents of destinations or with tourists of different ethnicities, and engage in some inter-cultural exchange. New nations, such as those of East Africa, build and reinforce national cultures in self-conscious ways through the process of cultural engineering, and often create exemplary pasts and heroic ancestors. Tourism contributes to the process of invention of tradition and the formation of identity, and may also encourage a reevaluation of people such as pastoral herders who were previously considered backward. The interest shown in minorities by tourists may arouse positive views of identity, persuading majority populations that minority cultures are worthwhile, even desirable.

Notes

CHAPTER 1:   THE PEOPLING OF AFRICA

1. For a first-hand account of investigations in the area, including assessment of the work of the Leakey family, see Johanson and Shreeve (1991).
2. Key works include Gutmann (1925, 1926, cf. also 1966), Smith (1927), Tempels (1959), Westermann (1937, 1949), and Young (1937, 1940). Very little of Gutmann's work has been translated, but for an assessment in English see Winter (1979). For an assessment of Young see Forster (1989).
3. For overall assessments of Senghor see Hyams (1971) and Markovitz (1969).
4. Key works are Fanon (1967, 1964). For a brief overall assessment see Caute (1970).
5. Nyerere's own thoughts are to be found in Nyerere (1966a, esp. 1–22 and 162–71). For a recent assessment see Legum and Mmari (1995).
6. Kaunda (1976) presents his own exposition of humanism. For comments see Meebelo (1973) and Ranganathan (1986).

CHAPTER 2:   THEORIES OF RACE AND ETHNICITY

1. For more detail concerning the Hindu notion of caste, see Chapter 5.
2. Such is what happened in 1979, when Tanzania invaded Uganda. It is true that this was provoked by illegal annexation by the Ugandan army of a part of northern Tanzania: but Tanzanian troops did more than recapture the territory, and proceeded into Uganda to spearhead the overthrow of Amin.

CHAPTER 3:   RACISM, RACIALISM AND SEGREGATION IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

1. For discussion of the historical situation in South Africa see Wilson and Thompson (1969); and Worden (1994).
2. Continuities in Afrikaner history are discussed in Patterson (1957).
3. The term 'Bantu' was used in South Africa to refer to South African Blacks, but was disliked by them. The use of the term to describe a group of languages (to which most but not all of those spoken by Black South Africans belong) is legitimate.

CHAPTER 4: EUROPEANS IN EAST AFRICA

1. For detailed treatment see Coupland (1968) and Davidson (1970).
2. The pattern of settlement in East Africa is discussed in Brett (1973: 163–234); Bennet (1970); Crowder (1970); and Smith (1976).
3. In British usage, 'public' schools are in fact privately run elite institutions, generally operating on the boarding principle.
4. The pattern of administration in respect of both Europeans and African is discussed in Mair (1967: 28–34, for Britain, and 42–48 for Belgium).
5. Clubs in Tanganyika are discussed in Tanner (1966); for Uganda see Sofer and Ross (1951) and Sofer and Sofer (1955: 110–111). For a comparable situation in West Africa, see Proudfoot and Wilson (1961).

POSTSCRIPT: FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE COLONIAL RULE

1. For a full discussion of the development of the Portuguese empire see Boxer (1969).

CHAPTER 5: ASIANS IN EAST AFRICA

1. For an inventory of the contents of Indian-owned shops (in this case in Malawi) see Mitchell (1956: 215); and Dotson and Dotson (1968: 56–74).
2. For discussion of Indian culture in the African situation see Sofer and Sofer (1955: 92–8); Goldthorpe (1858: 117–28); Morris 1968; Dotson and Dotson (1968).

POSTSCRIPT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI IN THE 1990S

1. Tensions which foreshadowed the end of feudalism are discussed in Levine (1966).

CHAPTER 8: ETHNICITY AND TOURISM

1. Kenya Colony and Protectorate, Ordinances and Regulations, 1945, 26–33 quoted in Ouma (1970: 40).

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Glossary

The following definitions of terms are supplied with a view to clarifying the distinctive ways in which they are used by sociologists and anthropologists working in the field of race and ethnicity. Some expressions from general sociology and anthropology have also been included if they appear in the text. It will be observed that in most cases the terms are current in everyday English usage but have somewhat more specific connotations when employed by social scientists.

The source of the definition is indicated, where it has been taken wholly or substantially from elsewhere.

Amalgamation: The biological mixture of originally distinct races, sometimes leading to merging through interbreeding.

Assimilation: The process whereby a group through contact absorbs the culture of another group or groups, or the result of such absorption (Changes of this kind are usually gradual and are a matter of degree.) *Adapted from Gould and Kolb, 1964: 38*.

Caste: The form of social organization found in India based on religious beliefs which supports rigid ranking according to birth, and restrictions on occupation and marriage; or one of the hereditary groups within this system. *Adapted from Gould and Kolb 1964: 75*.

(*loosely*) The principle by which an individual's status, role and various other aspects of life are determined by birth and remain fixed. *Adapted from Berry 1965: 311.*

Communalism: The phenomenon of collision or tension between several communities coexisting in a single territory. This can be based on race, ethnicity, language, religion, or historical memory. *Hancock 1937: 430*.

Culture: The complex of human activities which are learned and not instinctive, and which are transmitted from generation to generation through various learning processes. *Beattie 1964: 20*.

Detribalization: (Chiefly in colonial ideology) Perceived loss of tribal identity with pathological consequences for social control.

Ethnic group: A social group which, within a larger cultural and social system, claims or is accorded a special status in terms of a complex of traits which it exhibits or is believed to exhibit. *Gould and Kolb 1964: 243*.

Ethnocentrism: The emotional attitude that one's own group is the centre of everything, and all others are to be scaled and rated with reference to it. *Sumner 1906: 13*.

Functionalism: The perspective in sociology and anthropology in which the various elements of society, or of a given society, are seen as fulfilling certain needs and as working together to maintain the continuity of the system.

***Gemeinschaft*:** (A usage in sociology suggested by Tönnies (1887).) A social system where association is seen as an end in itself, and is spontaneous and affective.

Genocide: The deliberate and systematic extermination of an ethnic or national group. *Oxford English Dictionary*.

Genotype: The genetic constitution of an individual. *Oxford English Dictionary*.

Miscegenation: Biological mixture of persons of different racial types. *Adapted form Oxford English Dictionary*.

Multiculturalism: The preservation of the right to cultural distinctiveness in the private sphere (e.g. religion, language, family and art) while sharing a common public culture (e.g. the law, politics and the market-place) on the basis of equal opportunity. *Adapted from Rex 1986a: 121, 124–5*.

Particularism: Treatment of individuals in terms of the category to which they belong.

Phenotype: A human (or other) organism distinguishable from others by observable featues. *Adapted from Oxford English Dictionary*.

Pluralism: The presence, within a social system, of a multiplicity of autonomous but interdependent groups. *Adapted from Gold and Kolb 1964: 507*.

Plural society: A society characterized by certain conditions of cultural diversity and social cleavage, in whatever way these conditions of social and cultural pluralism arise from the contact of different peoples and cultures within a single society. *Kuper 1969b: 7*.

Primordial: An adjective used to describe bonds taken as given, where there is a feeling of being bound to others of the same group through absolute importance attributed to the tie itself. *Adapted from Geertz 1963: 109*.

Quasi-group: A collectivity amid a network of social relationships of a communal kind, which is not of itself a group but which can give rise to group formation. *Adapted from Rex 1986a: 10*.

Race: A subdivision of a species, individual members of which display with some frequency a number of hereditary attributes which have become associated with one another in some measure through a considerable degree of in-breeding among the ancestors of the group during a sustained part of their recent evolution. *Adapted from Gould and Kolb 1964: 569*.

Racialism: The practice of racist activities, that serve the interests of a particular racial group. *Banton 1967: 8.*

Racism: The doctrine that a person's behaviour is determined by stable inherited characters deriving from separate racial stock having distinctive attributes and usually considered to stand to one another in relations of superiority and inferiority. *Banton 1967: 8.*

Scapegoat: A person or group forced to take the blame for others (generally visible, not too strong readily accessible, and already the object of some latent hostility). *Adapted from Berry 1965: 308–9.*

Segregation: The act, process or state of being separate or set apart – a form of isolation which places limits a restraints on contact, communication, and social relations. It usually involves unequal treatment and is commonly a condition forced upon one group by others. *Adapted from Berry 1965: 198.*

Tribalism: Loyalty to and identification with a particular tribe within a social system (e.g. a modern state) much wider than that of the tribe.

Tribe: A group of people possessing a common name, who recognize themselves as distinct from their neighbours in terms of their social system, culture and language. *Adapted from Gulliver 1959: 61.*

Universalism: Treatment of all in the same way, regardless or phenotypical, cultural or other differences.

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Names of ethnic groups in Africa are indicated with an asterisk.