Rethinking Africa's Security in the Age of Uncertain Globalisation: NEPAD and Human Security in the 21st Century[1]

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Over the past two decades, Africa has consistently evoked the image of a continent in distress; taunted as "deeply troubled" and on the path of self-destruction (Gberie, 2005: 337-342; Schwab, 2002). At a time other regions of the world are counting their achievements, Africa is counting more losses; backsliding steadily in virtually all human development indicators. It is assumed that its peoples are poorer now than in 1960; most of them living on income level below one dollar per day. At the same time, the continent's share of global trade is just around 2%, contributing even less (about 1%) to total global economic output.[3] Apart from the tiny fraction of the national elites in different African countries that have helped themselves to stupendous riches derived from national treasuries, the majority live in chronic poverty. There is now an odious nexus between poverty and conflict (Fayemi and Hendickson, 2002: 67). Africa is also the worst hit by an unprecedented number of intrastate conflicts and civil wars, with an estimated 20% of the total population of the continent, over 150 million people, according to the African Development Bank, living in conflict areas (Ilorah, 2004: 226).

Almost five decades down the road, the momentum of development that was affectionately pursued during the first decade of independence has been dissipated; now it is replaced by appalling socio-economic and political conditions. But then, at the same time that Africa's missed socio-economic opportunities are causing disturbing nightmares, modest advances have been recorded in the political sphere with the conduct of multiparty elections in about 42 countries across the continent. No matter the inherent limitations in Africa's political transition programs, and these are many, the sheer number of countries that have made the difficult transition from full-blown military/civilian authoritarian regimes to kinds of multiparty rule offer some hope that the continent could still redeem itself despite widespread belief that it lacks the capacity to do so. The complexities of Africa's recent experiences prompted an editorial opinion in *The Round Table*, asking whether the so-called giant strides in Africa are "merely straws in the wind" or "rearguard actions in a war the continent… is losing, a war against poverty, disease, misgovernment and consequent military carnage" (2004: 307; Field, 2004) [4]

In part, the continent's myriad problems have been blamed on the failures of post-colonial governance, and less indictment of external forces. One familiar diagnosis of Africa's consistent poor performance favoured by international organisations and multilateral institutions linked it close with "insufficient investment aggravated by poor management" (Ilorah, 2004: 226). On those few instances that the role of external actors is acknowledged, their dimensions and reach are only partially flagged. Writing on Africa's place in world politics, for instance, Taylor and Williams insisted that the discourse of the continent's marginality "is a nonsense" since "the continent has in fact been dialectically linked, both shaping and being shaped by international processes and structures" (2004: 1). These types of conclusions about

[3] See www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/africa1.htm
[4] 'Editorial: Africa- Making Democracy Work', The Round Table, 93, 375, July 2004: 307-310.

Africa promoted Paul Nugent to conclude that most of them are "unreflective and does not seek to place the material in any kind of historical context" (Cited in Gberie, 2005: 338). By brushing aside the historical footage to Africa's contemporary developmental failures, "the victims of current predicaments and conditions are blamed or represented as hapless and willing actors in the process of reproducing underdevelopment and dependence (Ihonvbere, 2000). It gives the dog a bad name just to hang it.

This paper takes its departure from the point that it would be far more catastrophic to give up on the persistent search for better and viable alternative paths for Africa development and security in the 21st Century. A major concern is to place endogenous and exogenous factors side-by-side in order to articulate alternative that are appropriate for interpreting and solving Africa's security and developmental predicaments. Quite correctly, Africa's failure to improve the welfare and living conditions of its peoples is not so much because efforts have not been made in the past. Since the decade of independence in the 1960s, several creative developmental blueprints have been experimented with (Diescho, 2002: 8-9; Ilorah, 2004: 235-238; Mbaku, 2004: 391-392). These blueprints have unfortunately not yielded qualitative results for different reasons, the most significant being the consistent manner in which they have been pursued on the basis of wrong development assumptions. The critical referent point is the New Partnerships for Africa's Development (NEPAD) which was launched in 2003 as another effort to promote security and development throughout the continent. Although a relatively young project, NEPAD has received a lot of attention, most especially outside Africa, but also in the academic and public policy sectors within the continent.

For a better understanding, NEPAD must be understood in the context of the demands and challenges of globalisation; itself a new force trumpeted as the most suitable environment for global development and improved welfare. On the other hand, globalisation has been shown to be undermining and destroying the capability of many developing countries especially to manage their affairs well. What is coming out boldly for Africa in particular, is that globalisation is also further deepening its security (and developmental) problems. This paper demonstrates, not just how globalization is expanding the divisions, frictions and fault lines among different ethnic, religious, political, class, demographic and social groups and causing unprecedented civil strife, political instability and state collapse, but also how NEPAD may turn out to be another hoax in Africa's search for an appropriate developmental paradigm. My contention is that given the character and fall-outs of globalisation, particularly what the phenomenon is doing to Africa, the way the NEPAD initiative is conceived and currently implemented may not serve Africa's security problems well now or into the future.

Another thrust of this paper is that given the significant changes caused by globalisation, it would no longer be satisfactory to retain the present narrative of 'security' which focuses principally on regime and territorial security, without cognisance to critical human security issues. Thus, there is no better period than now to appraise the capacity of, and resources available to African countries, individually and collectively, in confronting the multiple and complex security challenges triggered by globalisation. The paper raises several critical issues relating to the appropriateness and realism in the visions and mandates of NEPAD for managing

Africa's myriad conflict and security challenges? What are these security challenges facing the continent in this age of globalisation, and in what different ways is the NEPAD frameworks grappling with them, and in the process, reinventing itself better to serve the cause of development in the continent. What are the human security issues in Africa's security and developmental equation, and how are they distinct from or similar to the existing ones focusing on regime and/or territorial security? How is globalisation implicating, good or bad, Africa's capacity to implement the visions and priorities of NEPAD with regards to security and development? The rest of the paper is devoted to: (i) globalisation and its uncertainties: paradigms in African Security; (ii) the changing discourse on security: from state to human security; (iii) NEPAD and the fictionalisation of human security in Africa; and (iv) the conclusions.

Globalization and its uncertainties: Paradigms in African Security

The various facets and impacts of globalisation on Africa cannot be contemplated in this short paper. It is important to bear in mind that globalisation did not cause Africa's contemporary predicaments; even though it, in many ways, exacerbated them. The logic driving Africa's developmental problems could be traced to a variety of external and internal factors, mostly relating to the manner and processes through which the continent was absorbed, forcefully, into the global capitalist order around the mid-1500. How this long colonial adventure continues to implicate Africa's current development has fascinated African scholarship. Some of the highlights of Africa's experiences during that historical moment have been identified by Ihonvbere (2003: 3-4) as including the experience of slavery; the termination of endogenously driven patterns of state and class formation; the imposition of colonial rule; the balkanization of the continent and imposition of alien values, tastes, and institutions; the creation of a repressive corrupt, unproductive, unstable, and illegitimate state; the creation of a highly fractionalised, factionalised, dependent, corrupt, and weak elite; the domination of the African economy by profit-and-hegemony-seeking transnational corporations dedicated to making profit at all cost; the total denigration of local cultures, values, and institutions, and the introduction and promotion of primordial differences and suspicions; and finally, the structured incorporation of the African economy into the periphery of the global division of labour and power as vulnerable, dependent, underdeveloped, weak, and largely raw material-producing region, to mention a few. That colonial rule retains its substances despite terminating formally many decades ago is evident in the behaviours and pathologies of its offspring, the post-colonial state, and the contradictory manner in which it relates to society (Fawole, 2004: 297-303).

Despite all of its complications, however, there is substantial intellectual interest in and fascination with the circumstances and conditions that continues to keep the post-colonial state in Africa alive, even if it is not entirely well. It is partly by investigating how and why the post-colonial state has survived that contemporary African security problems could best be understood. First is that the post-colonial state in Africa has survived largely because it has held on, very precariously still, to the 'authoritarian and social licenses' to govern by constantly changing and adapting itself but hardly altering or compromising the substance of its ruthless power (Ihonvbere, 2000). With the manner of its composition and behaviours, the political elites in charge of the different post-colonial African states mostly paid attention to their own survival and longevity than to the welfare and security of their people. Thus, apart from the first

decade after independence which coincided with steady growth in many African countries, the period after steadily plunged many countries into dangerous socio-economic and political problems. By the 1990s, insecurity became accentuated as a result of the decline in, or outright disappearance of domestic support and external patronages. This period provided the backdrop for many of the violent conflicts and civil wars that featured in many African countries; most of them rooted in a complex of interconnected social, leadership, resource, personality, class, ideological, colonial, post-colonial, ethnic, territorial, religious and Cold War divisions (Herbst and Mills, 2003: 7). The nature of these conflicts was such that only a thin line separated them from other forms of organised crime and large scale human rights violations (Mary Kaldor quoted in Bassey, 2003: 43).

How globalisation is affecting Africa has become the subject of robust debate in the social sciences, at least over the large decade (Cooper, 2002; Hughes, 2002; Juhasz, 2002; Meagher, 2003; Morton, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004). Only the extent to which globalisation is complicating Africa's security problems will be of interest here. As a preliminary note, it is possible to discern that different historical moments had its own different and unique 'globalisation'. However, what may be different about the current one can be explained in terms of its scope (global spread), *intrusivity* (the degree of penetration) and *intensiveness* (the resultant changing effects). For Africa, globalisation may have been delivered in different forms but the effects where essentially the same. As colonialism, it represented political and administrative domination mainly to facilitate extraction and accumulation. After independence in many countries, globalisation manifested as imperialism by helping to deepen accumulation even further, allowing the persistence of human indenture, magnifying the inequality of capitalist expansion and generally provoking violent disorders (Bracking and Harrison, 2003: 6-7). During the 1980s, globalisation was represented by the activities of the Breton Woods institutions and international donors under the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment program (SAP). Presently, it is vividly shown by the contraction in time and space, the ease of capital mobility and the radical transformations in the organisation of human affairs and social life (Bischoff, 2005: 7-11; Held, 1997: 252-253). For most weak and developing countries, each of these phases of globalisation simply reinforced the other thereby accelerating the decline or collapse of welfare and security safe nets.

Those who celebrate globalisation point to the phenomenal increase in the movement of peoples, coupled with unprecedented flows of goods, services and capital around the world (Ibi-Ajayi, 2004). Those critical of it insist that the agency of globalisation has become too destructive and consuming as it widens social disconnections, social dislocations and violent conflicts at every point that it strives to negotiate a presence (Held, 1997: 257-8). For Africa, then, globalisation provokes a "return to familiar conditions of subordination"- much like those which marked the insertion of the continent into the global capitalist system fully around 19th century by European colonialism (Clapham, 1996: 24). The Ugandan political analyst, Catherine Odora Hoppers described the current phase of globalisation and the neo-liberal ideology driving it as simply a "continuation of the war that began with colonialism and never ended" (Peace and Change, 25, 2, 2000: 149)

Obono (2004: 87-105) challenged the pro-globalisation thesis relating to the question of space and territoriality. His main point was that while it may be may be true that

the physicality of space no longer hinders interactions and movement of factors of production, globalisation has turned out to be another euphemism for westernisation in direct opposition to multiculturalism presented as the discourse of differences and diversity. What globalisation seem to be doing to developing societies, particular Africa, then is intensifying

> age-old group antagonisms: sublime racial politics, regional economic disparities, and worsening global poverty… It disguises the true nature of the North-South divide and generates the illusion that to transcend differences is to overcome it. Globalisation does not and cannot foster equity because its technology is driven by the same exploitative trade regimes which it supposedly called out of order (Obono, 2004: 90-91).

In '*Globalisation, Equity and Development: Some Reflections on the African Experience*' (Olukoshi, 2004: 32-42) observed that globalisation is celebrated even when it is uncertain "whether the global uniformity that is projected is desirable, beneficial or even possible in the final analysis". The outlines of globalisation, according to him, is revealing that

> some regions of the world…has been associated with the collapse of the middle class, side by side with the collapse of the middle ground in the national and regional politics, the widening of the social gulf between the rich, whose numbers are radically thinned out, and the poor whose numbers are swelling by the day, as well as sharp increases in armies of unemployed people, mostly young school leavers" (2004: 25-26).

Olukoshi acknowledged the legitimate worry arising from globalisation that the world is seeing the worst and most extensive process of social exclusion ever know, occurring side-by-side with the "single-minded, ideologically-motivated retrenchment [and de-energising] of the state and the erosion of its capacity" (2004: 24, 27). The provocative reality about globalisation therefore is that at the same time that developed countries are putting in place robust policies to cushion the side effects and threats from globalisation, they are dissuading, even coercing, their weaker counterparts in the South from pursuing their own independent interests on the pretext that the state must roll back its presence and allow the market to mobilise and allocate social capital. Since "decay seems to outweigh renewal" therefore, Olukoshi warned that biggest challenge facing Africa consists of "renewing and retooling the State in order to enable it resume a meaningful role in the developmental process" (2004: 39). This is where the irony about globalisation and African security problematic most reveals itself: at the same time that globalisation is undermining the capacity of the state- and the state itself is reeking under the weight of its own internal contradictions- it is still expected to be the major force for stability and security in contemporary Africa.

Alongside the renewal and optimism that the new millennium ushered was a profound sense of apprehension that security and development could escape Africa totally if care is not taken (Chandler, 2004). There is even a suggestion that Africa is not yet on track to start pursuing the UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targeting the reduction of poverty by half, scaling-up access to safe drinking water and achieving universal basic schooling by 2015 (ARB, 2003: 15103; Mepham and Lorge, 2005). These concerns have placed Africa on the top of the agenda of the international community, especially the G-8 countries (Olukoshi, 2003). Either individually or as a

group, however, a consistent pattern of deception seems to pervade the policies and actions of these countries as they chase shows while refusing to discuss the substantive causes of Africa's underdevelopment. One example that readily comes to mind in this respect is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) currently pursued with glee by the United States. According to Carol Thompson (2004: 457, 468), AGOA is providing neither growth nor opportunity for African economies, not just because only 6 African countries have benefited from the initiative, but also that it offers much less in terms of "shared values" and "shared responsibilities". She demonstrated how western insincerity is leaving Africa in a doldrums while the rich countries spent $300 billion in 2003 alone on farm subsidies; almost six times more than on development aid (2004: 472). It is in the same manner that Mepham and Lorge (2005) asked the G-8 countries to put their houses in order by stopping harmful practices creating gaps in western rhetoric and actions towards Africa. The harmful practices, according to them, includes the nature of aid and conditionality, discriminatory international trade regimes, the fuelling and exacerbation of armed conflicts and the strengthening of repressive regime by supplying them with arms and military equipments, financing of corruption and conflicts, and their contribution to adverse climate change. In short, since the end of the Cold War, EU policies towards Africa has both been criticized for lacking clear-cut consistence and coherence, and also for gravitating towards two directions: one, that is widening the original goal of promoting economic and social development to include promoting stability, security and democracy; and the other causing continuous decline in aid transfers and financial support due to Africa's low priority (Olsen, 2004: 425-426).

These obviously have perilous consequences, even for the wealthiest nations, as the wider repercussions of Africa's developmental problems cannot be contained within the continent. The response by Western countries, according to Herbst and Mills, is distinguished by "a continual schizophrenia" (2003: 31) on whether policy towards Africa should be based on a set of 'goods' (increased investment, aid, etc) or on a set of 'bads' (HIV/AIDS, war, terrorism, crime and refugee flows, the spread of disease, trafficking of persons, arms and illicit drugs). The set of 'bads' seems to be gaining ascendancy (Mepham and Lorge, 2005: 9). In fact, the "stubborn connection" between poverty and conflict in Africa has been encouraged by convergence in the development and security policies of the international community (Willet, 2004: 101). Other dimensions of this securitization of Africa's development, especially after 9/11, is leading to a shift from development/humanitarianism to a category of risk/fear/threat; and shown by the gradual shift in policy initiatives from the foreign offices in the United States and Britain to their defense offices. Securitisation is also driving policies of containment, or policing, and promoting a strange version of trusteeship-style responsibility tied to different parts of the continent to "quarantine disorder". Another aspect of this securitisation is demonstrated by the ongoing war against terror led by the United States. The way it is pursued, the war on terror is fast becoming synonymous with the war on poverty; turning anti-terrorism and poverty alleviation into two sides of the same policy coin. Second, is that securitisation of Africa is becoming part of the political strategy to unify public and party support at home behind governments at a time of vociferous debate and opposition in major western countries. Third, is that securitisation is reproducing a sense of prioritisation and urgency (no necessarily to justify increase development assistance) but to bring important political and ethical considerations and implications to the fore

(Abrahamsen, 2004: 680-682; Heather, 2004).[5] Under the new unipolar order, for instance, there is concern that the United States is single-handedly driving the global war on terror as it spends far more on defense and security than the next 8 or 9 'powers' combined (Cawthra, 2004: 27-28).

In 2004, the IDRC observed that at the international level, "globalization has posed new challenges to global governance and the management of global public goods (such as health, education, human security, etc.), provoked the emergence of global networks around a variety of issues, and put increasing strain on nation states, societies, and communities everywhere to adapt. Adebayo Adekanye further highlighted those human and social aspects of globalisation that have been thrust unto the global security and research agenda, including

> … rising poverty and rising incidents of conflict, rising migration and refugee flows, increasing environmental stresses and strains, demographic pressures on resources, deterioration in human security provisions, the diffusion of military technological know-how, skills and expertise of sub-state actors, proliferation of illegal arms, drug trafficking, money laundering, ad international terrorism- all of which have combined to constitute the new security issues and concerns of contemporary times (2004: vi)

At the same time, new models of governance and security are emerging while new ones are reinventing themselves. This was a central discourse in *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa* where Claude Ake engaged the issue of how globalisation is affecting governance and security. For him, threats to democracy in Africa are the same ones accelerating the process of social decay and political instability, and undermining peace and security in the continent. The most deadly threat, he explained, comes from how the process of globalisation is changing "traditional assumption to the effect that the nation-state is the inevitable basic political organisation of humankind [and at the same time] "is undermining the nation-state and its relevance, leaving its future in doubt". As the "repository of sovereignty", "the nation-state is now forced to contest power with sub-state and super-state political formations that have neither a root nor legitimacy" (2000: 26). Coupled with the fact that decisions and activities affecting the lives of people and shaping policies are made in far-away places, Ake showed how globalisation is causing the "annulment of the social" by increasingly privileging the market over the state. The market is therefore no longer a simple metaphor by a living realty proving the desocialisation of life in market societies as well as in those embracing the market without a choice. In the final analysis, globalisation is creating a condition of "disempowerment" as political mobilization is abstracted and concentrated in the mass media, and framed as "a syndrome of isolation and desocialisation" (Ake, 2000: 27-28).

An emerging trend is that globalisation is encouraging the market to play a much greater role than the state. By privileging the market over and above the state, and removing the conditions that "make the public possible", globalisation is whittling down the state in Africa as the most important organisation of power on the continent

[5] See also, D. Farah, 'Terror Thrives in the Rich Runs of Africa', Washington Post, January 6, 2002; J. Keenan, 'Terror in the Sahara: The Implications of US Imperialism for North and West Africa', ROAPE, 31, 101, 2004: 475-496; P.N. Lyman and J.S. Morrison (2004), 'The Terrorist Threat in Africa', Foreign Affairs, 83, 2004: 75-86

(Nnoli, 2003: 23-25). Against the background of the growing complexity of transnational relations engendered by globalisation, then, the scope, goal, type of actors and the ferocity of struggles involved in the conflict dynamics in Africa, have broadened significantly (Bassey, 2003: 43). Since, wherever one looks, it is becoming difficult to contemplate an alternative framework to the State, certainly not the imperfect and anonymous market, it is important to start searching earnestly for how best to make the state more relevant (Gounden, 2005). At the same time that this reinvention of the State is going on, however, there should be a complementary reinvigoration of the civil society to be positively assertive both in terms of demanding its rights, but also in fulfilling its obligations and duties towards the State. These tasks are two sides of the same coin but, more importantly, they open up the issue of how the state should treat the people and what concurrent obligations the people have towards the state. This is an issue that will be explored further in the context of an assessment of the viability of NEPAD to respond to human security challenges and problems in contemporary Africa

Globalisation is also provoking crisis of governance in the manner in which it deepens and exacerbates the crisis of production and accumulation facing many African countries. Clapham (1996: 26) has shown how declining primary commodity production is affecting small farmers in Africa. Apart from trapping the state between the rock and a hard place, globalisation is tearing more and more African societies apart by accelerating the dismantling of local industries, privatisation of economic assets, de-funding of the public sector, and increasing unemployment, poverty, migration, and social conflict (Federici and Caffentzis, 2004).

While globalisation takes its tool on peace and security in Africa, old ways of managing these have been slower and less innovative in changing (Bush and Keyman, 1997). This is revealed, for instance, by the absence of adequate response to identity-based conflicts to date. In the mainstream (read: realist) scholarship, identity is still regarded as "fixed, coherent and self-contained" rather than dynamic and evasive. As Bush and Keyman insisted, "a relational, historical, and dynamic understanding of identity is crucial not only for coming to terms with the connections between security and (ethnic) identity but also for constructing effective strategies for the management or resolution of conflicts" (1997: 311). This issue shall be returned to later in the context of the growing calls to abandon, or at the very least, expand the long existing notion of security beyond the present focus on state/regime/territorial security (Pettman, 2005: 137-150). But it is necessary to point of that globalisation, perhaps inadvertently, has opened wide epistemological and policy windows for rethinking and better understanding/ responding to Africa's security problems and priorities into the future.

The Changing Discourse on Security in Africa: From State to Human Security

Briefly, this paper has shown that the end of the Cold War, and the present international environment dominated by the forces of globalisation, has significantly altered the security landscape within which many states in developing countries, in particular, operate. There are several dimensions to this as discussed. At the epicentre of these far-reaching changes is that traditional boundaries between state and civil society, and among different states, are breaking down or transforming in

unpredictable ways. The state-centric conception of security can therefore not hold much longer too; not least for the task of capturing the growing complexities of new and multi-dimensional global relations. Instead, the expanding scope of security threats, many of them associated with factors such as population growth, environmental degradation, energy shortage, drug trafficking, transnational criminality, the destruction of indigenous cultures, could not but prompt critical reflections regarding the shape, form and content that security discourses and practices are going to take in Africa over the next decades (Vayrynen, 1995: 259-260).

For many reasons, then, the security problems facing contemporary Africa deserve more rigorous and comprehensive attention. First, Africa has become a major flashpoint in of bloody civil wars and several other low-intensity conflicts, particularly since the end of the Cold War when the safety valves that the may superpower made available to prevent conflicts were promptly removed. Although many of these conflicts and civil wars were occurring within states, their "primary locale…is to be found where there is a combination of entrenched poverty, an excessive dependence on natural resource exports, and poor economic governance and state weakness" (Clover, 2004: 8-9). It is very difficult to distinguish between different types of conflicts as they are usually matched by criminal impunity and large-scale violation of human rights, as well as by complex humanitarian emergencies: massive internal displacements and refugee flows, collapse of sources of livelihood and municipal facilities, the spread of communicable and life-threatening diseases, the proliferation and widespread use of small arms and light weapons, and so on. These new conflicts are driven by a variety of factors, not least a militaristic ideology that incubates a frightful regime of terror and insecurity (Boyd, 2005: 117; Abdullah, 2004). Second, the collateral in terms of human, social and infrastructural capital losses are enormous. One study indicated that "armed conflict is surely one reason why at least 250 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa- nearly half of the population- are living below the poverty lines since the mid-1990s (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer (1996: ix). A third point has to do with the fearsome but legitimate fear that identity and resource-induced conflicts could undermine and consume whatever modest progresses may have been achieved on the continent. Again, these complex security concerns are happening at a most inauspicious momement when national security infrastructures have themselves been weakened, when more renegade groups are spring up, gaining access to dangerous weapons and challenging state authority, when new African wars are assuming a vicious pattern of impunity, plunder and profiteering, and finally, against the backdrop of what Herbst and Mills called the growing "diseconomies of scale" feeding directly into security problems for larger countries who have greater trouble policing their territories (2003: 24-25).

With the diversity and magnitude of the security problems facing Africa, one cannot contemplate an initiative such as NEPAD not concerned with improving security conditions in Africa. But the initiative must have to contend with a variety of problems, some relating to its underlying raison d'etre and others, to the relating to operational (domestic and external) environments within which it is expected to carry out its mandates. Obviously, meeting its other priorities such as political, economic and corporate governance would depend very much on how NEPAD is able to engage with these new security problems. Unlike other priorities highlighted in the NEPAD blueprint, the security challenges facing Africa have changed far more profoundly;

influenced mainly by the radical transformations within the national, regional and global domains. In this era of uncertain globalisation, new security threats/ challenges have come to the fore in a manner that is deepening insecurity and instability in the continent. An acknowledgement of the security priorities and challenges NEPAD is meant to address is itself an affirmation that it is in the security sector that immediate and concrete institutional and policy frameworks are most needed.

Despite what Ajulo (2004: 272-273) described as the "considerable ambiguity and confusion about just what kind of security system" is most appropriate for Africa, a more desirable type of security for Africa is the one that dwell more on human security, that is, the welfare of the individual, and by extension, the community, as against threats to regimes and the territoriality of nation states. Over one decade after attention was drawn to it by the UNDP in the Human Development Report (1994), the concept of human security is assuming global salience with its focus on the two core values of human freedom and human fulfilment. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has distinguished between "territorial sovereignty" and what he called individual sovereignty, defined in terms of the "fundamental freedom of each individual… enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights… not to protect those who abuse them" (Cited in Oberleitner, 2005: 194). According to the co-chairs of the Human Security Report, Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, human security means "protecting vital freedoms- fundamental to human existence and development. Human security means protecting people from severe and pervasive threats, both natural and societal, and empowering individuals and communities to develop the capabilities of making informed choices and acting on their own behalf"[6] (Cited in Oberleitner, 2005: 187). Human security is also the

> safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people's right, their safety or even their lives… It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on security of territory or government. Like other security concepts- national security, economic security, and food security- it is about protection. Human security entails preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk, and taking remedial action when prevention fails (Sabelo, 2003: 299 cf. David Hubert, 1999).

Boyd (2005:115) defined human security as "the ability to pursue those choices in safe environment broadly encompassing seven dimensions of security- economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political". Kanbur (2002: 93) conceptualised human security in terms of vulnerability and voicelessness associated with poverty in the face of unresponsive local and national institutions. Without real peace, including feelings of security and actual security as Boyd (2005: 116) pointed out, there are no prospects for development or equality. Real peace, quoting Ursula Franklin, is understood to mean

> … more than the absence of war. It is also the absence of fear; fear of the knock on the door in the middle of the night, fear of hunger and helplessness, fear of the absence of justice. Peace is, then, the presence of justice for all, peace means respect for all human needs as well as the condition that force, in

[6] See also, 'Outline of the Report of the Commission oh Human Security', http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/Outlines/outlines.pdf (accessed on November 16, 2005)

all its forms, is not an instrument of national or international policy (Boyd, 2005: 119).

Peace is generally understood in terms of ending widespread and continuing violence. This definition of peace is too limited as the notion of violence as portrayed is physical (involving bodily harm or the destruction of properties) but could also be structural violence, involving less visible constraints on human potential due to economic and political structures (Galtung, 1969: 167-191). Hardly do issues having to do with broad-based recovery (involving improvements in the incomes and human development indicators of the majority of people) featured in this notion of violence and insecurity. The implication of this security concern becomes short rather than long term, implemented in very shoddy and half-hearted manner that leaves too many issues unattended and unresolved. In post-war countries, such issues have the potential of complicating recovery processes by introducing other dimensions that could further the cause of insecurity in the long run (ARB, March 2004: 15668). In such countries were prolonged atrocities have been committed against civilian population, human security concerns are hardly sustained after the peace process has been secured and consummated, and a new government sworn in. In fact, international humanitarian efforts mobilised during the war are quickly scaled down leaving such countries in distressed and having to fend for itself with all the risks. It is this concern for the peculiar situation that post-war countries find themselves that informed the recent International Crisis Group (ICG, 2004) report on Liberia and Sierra Leone to propose a long-term period, between 15-25 years, of sustained international support for post-war countries if they are not to slide back into bloody civil wars (Manning, 2002). It is also in this context that Addison (2003: 3-5)[7] proposed that emphasis should go beyond rebuilding shattered or collapsed infrastructure to investing in "social capital, including the trust that creates informal safety nets" and by so doing, altering the behaviour of critical national actors. (Harris, 2004: 5-10).[8]

Howbeit, the quest to redirect security towards human centred concerns raises several problems. In the first instance, "human security" is still heavily contested in its definition, scope and utility. The concept is criticised for overstretching the traditional notion of security- much the same way that environmental security did over the last decade. Another criticism is that 'human security' is far too universalistic, containing "conceptual flaws" that raises false priorities and hopes regarding the securitization of human beings. The orthodox conception of security, either focusing on the internal or external dimensions to insecurity, tend to restrict the concept to the political survivability and effectiveness of states and regimes, and in doing so, excluded economic, environmental, cultural and other non-political threats. It puts the state (and politics) at the centre of the conceptualisation of security, suggesting that non-political threats "become integral components of our definition of security only if they become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, and regime survival" (Vayrynen, 1995: 260). Another limitation of the

[7] Tony Addison, 'Introduction', in Tony Addison ed., From Conflict to Recovery in Africa. Oxford: OUP, 2004

[8] Geoff Harris, 'The Case for Demilitarisation in Sub-Saharan Africa', in Geoff Harris ed., Achieving Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cost Effective Alternatives to the Military. Pretoria: ISS, 2004: 5-10

concept of human security is that it cannot be fully consummated for as long as the quest for peace and security remains tied to the authoritarian values and motivations of those in power, human security would continue to suffer breaches and abuses as regime/ state security further allows official violence to multiply (Sabelo, 2003: 306; Niukerk, 2004). Adele Jinadu (2000) offered further perspectives on how human security suffers in the attempts by custodians of the state to retain and extract compliance through the instrumentality of force and coercion. He explained that the problematic of peace and security is "intrinsically bound up with human nature, especially the dialectics of the social psychology of human interactions, under conditions of scarcity and choice". Accordingly, the problem of peace and security "cannot and should not be divorced from the dialectics of domination and subjection, in order words from considerations of superordinate/ subordinate relations at the community, national and global levels" (Jinadu, 2000: 1). The crucial question, as he pointed out is "[If] humankind cannot create a perfect society, given human nature and the reality of scarcity, as well as the difficult and contentious questions of choice which scarcity poses, what needs to be done to create a less imperfect society? Under what conditions can such a less imperfect society expected to emerge and thrive? He argued that the "modern state…continues to be the pre-eminently contested terrain of hegemonic groups in national and international society, serving predatory group interests, and itself becoming part of the problem, the core avenue of contention and conflict, a major impediment to structural reform and, therefore, a major obstacle to peace and security, which requires in many cases, reconstitution and reconstruction as a necessary condition for the enthronement and durability of peace and security" (Jinadu, 2000: 2-3). As shall be discussed in the next section, what the above implies, in part, is that NEPAD must first resolve the underpinning motivation of power and militarism; of superordinate and subordinate.

Against the background of the complex welfare and safety problems in Africa, improving human security as a condition of existence which has both quantitative and qualitative aspects, must have far-reaching policy implications for the state as presently contrived (Thomas and Wilkin (1999). Indeed, human security calls to question which type of state is more able to enhance human security, and whether in fact states themselves are a potential solution to human insecurity or a major part of the problem in Africa. In the present circumstance that the post-colonial state in Africa is itself struggling to meet even the most basic demands of its existence, there cannot be a guarantee that the vast majority of citizens can be satisfied. Oberleitner (2005) noted that "[The] driving factors of the human security debate, "the constraints of state sovereignty, the mobilisation of international civil society in defence of international norms, and the sharing of power between state and non-state actors in a globalising world… leave a clear message: the state is no longer able to monopolise the concept and practice of security". Where then should the state acceptably belong since it is impossible to exclude it in any way from the process of reconstructing the security landscape in the continent to accommodate human security? The answer to this is that no project of human security can be accomplished without the presence and active participation of the state. Since the state cannot be excluded, then, a human security approach means providing within the state an environment that allows for the well-being and safety of the population as an equally important goal. This is obvious from the several ways in which migrations pose a threat to national security and how national security in turn becomes an obstacle put in place by states to limit search for safety and opportunity (Graham and Poku, 2000).

The above necessarily leads to another important issue. Since human and regime security are themselves inseparable from the possibilities and prospects of democracy and development in Africa, the search for peace and security becomes an idealised or hypothetical image of what human society should be, has never been and might never be" (Jinadu, 2000: 4, 9). As a categorical imperative, peace and security provides a critical theoretical, moral, political and philosophical standard in its core assumptions of justice and equality, that can be used to measure and approximate how societies are moving or drifting further away from the ideal (Ake, 2000: 9). There is no doubt that the end of the Cold War has ushered in renewed interest in governance issues, especially those pertaining to democracy and governance reforms. These multifaceted multi-faceted governance issues are mostly donor-driven and therefore with limited local content and sense of ownership (Cawthra, 2004: 30-31). A shift in focus to human security would therefore require understanding sources of threat and the reformulation of strategies towards ameliorating them. This was the framework within which Willet (2004: 114) suggested viewing state-society relations differently, especially because the capacities required to enhance human security in Africa are quite different from those that focus almost exclusively on the security of the state, regime or military security. The second aspect has to do with accountability for security provisions especially as sustainable development indicators become a far more important barometer for gauging society's progress. Third, is that focus on human security would also mean transforming global processes that impact upon and adversely affect the human security of vulnerable communities. The overall challenge is to cultivate and "shape a security paradigm that captures the need to reach out in defence of people as well as the states" (Oberleitner, 2005: 190-191).

It is important to add that it is not only the state that will be transformed under a new regime of security that derives its core value and acceptance from human security. There is a sense in which human security is also on its way to changing the practice and institutions of global governance as its "value-based and people-centred approach to security" gradually contributes to normative changes in the international norm, law and practices. Already, a lot of international efforts have been directed towards the promotion of human security- the setting up of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security in 1999, Commission on Human Security in 2001, Advisory Board on Human Security in 2003; and the creation of a Human Security Branch in the UN Office of Drugs and Crime in Vienna. These are no doubt modest starters but they also suggest a visible shift in orientation at the international level (Oberleitner, 2005: 185). Perhaps, rightly, the concept is gradually and logically becoming the next step towards a better appreciation of security at the global level.

AU-NEPAD and the Fictionalisation of Human Security in Africa

How much African states under the framework of NEPAD are able to grapple with and respond to these pressing social issues touching on the welfare and survival of the vast majority of its population would define the quality of human, social and national security in the continent in the near future. The choice for countries of the South, according to President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, "is not whether to engage with globalisation or not but how to engage with it" (cited in Griggs, 2003: 76). It is partly

an attempt to answer the question of "how" that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was born in Lusaka in July 2001.

Since 1963 when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was created, several major issues have preoccupied African countries. These include the issues of how to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and promote international cooperation. With hindsight, it is a tribute to the OAU that by the time it was formally dissolved and replaced by the African Union, radical transformations have occurred within the African political landscape as evident from the total end of formal colonial rule on the continent. But then, many other problems persisted, and in some cases, multiplied (Packer and Rukare, 2002: 371ff). The enthusiasm for a new continental framework to replace the OAU was demonstrated by the speed with which the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU) was adopted, signed and entered into force all within two years (Packer and Rukare, 2002: 365). Unlike the OAU, the AU explicitly included issues relating to promoting and defending African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples, encouraging international cooperation, promote peace, security and stability, as well as democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance, promoting and protecting human and people's rights, establishing the necessary conditions which would enable the continent play its rightful role in the global economy, promoting cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples, and finally, to working with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent (see Levitt, 2003: 40-41, 55). While they both adopted the principle of sovereign equality and interdependence, respect of borders peaceful resolution of disputes, establishment of a common defense policy, non-interference, peaceful coexistence, self-reliance, among others, the CAAU went further to identify other key principles such as the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security; promotion of gender equality; respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance; promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development; respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; and finally, condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (Levitt, 2003: 41-42). These are very significant additions compared to that of the OAU, but they again raise several important questions regarding the capacity and resources and will at the new organisation's disposal to achieve these extra goals (Tieku, 2004; Forge, 2004: 29). There is also fear that some of the legal, procedural, environmental problems that hampered the OAU may be repeated under the AU.

Further details will not detain us. But it is important to bear in mind that security concerns have featured very much in the enabling framework of the AU. The African Union was conscious that its achievements would very much depend on how far it is able to improve conditions for continental peace and stability. At the time the Act establishing the Union was endorsed in 2000, the African continent was suffering from almost a dozen internal conflicts and civil wars (Field, 2004: 19). The notion of

collective security was particularly given a pride of place around the following tasks: promoting peace, security and stability in Africa; implementing peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, co-ordinating and harmonizing continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism; developing a common defence policy; and protecting human rights (highlighted on Shannon, 2004: 21). To give effect to these concerns, the Peace and Security Council (PSC)[9] of the AU became the first initiative to be established, in July 2000, with mandate to intervene in the affairs of states to preserve peace and the rule of law- a mandate which as noted above, is contextually different from the inhibitive sovereignty and non-interference clauses of the defunct OAU). Apart from the PSC, the AU agreed to the idea of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDA) proposed by Nigeria (Shannon, 2004: 21-22)[10]. The protocol establishing the PSC also made provided for a Panel of the Wise, a sub-regional early warning systems linked to a regional 'situation room' at the AU headquarters, the African Standby Force and a Peace Fund (Shannon, 2004: 49-50; African Union, 2005: 1).

The blueprint creating NEPAD derives its strength essentially from the AU.[11] NEPAD acknowledges good governance as a basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development; African ownership and leadership, as well as broad and deep participation by all sectors of the society. It anchored the development of Africa on its own resources and resourcefulness of its people; in creating partnerships between and among African peoples; accelerating regional and continental integration, building the competitiveness of African countries and the continent; forging a new international partnership that changes the unequal relationship between Africa and the developed world; and finally, ensuring that all partnerships with NEPAD are linked to the Millennium Development Goals and other agreed development goals and targets. African leaders that signed on to NEPAD pledged to "eradicate poverty and to place our countries, individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic on equal footing".[12] They acknowledged that poverty can only be effectively tackled through the promotion of democracy, good governance, peace and security; the development of human and physical resources, gender equity; openness to international trade and investment; allocation of appropriate funds to social sector; and new partnerships between government and the private sector, and with the civil society (par. 20, p. 7-8). To achieve its twin objectives of poverty eradication and economic development, therefore (par. 5, p. 3), NEPAD identified four areas of core emphases: Democracy and Good Political Governance, Economic and Corporate Governance, Socio-Economic Development and the African Peer Review Mechanism (par. 6, p. 3). Member countries also expressed their determination to "increase…efforts in

[9] For details on the Protocol Relating to the Establishment o the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AUPSC), Durban, South Africa, July 9, 2002, see Levitt, 2003: 161-186

[10] For details of the Draft Kampala Document for the Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) Kampala, Uganda, May 23, 2001, see Levitt, 2003: 227-248

[11] AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1: 2

[12] AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1: 1

restoring stability, peace and security in the African continent, as these are essential conditions for sustainable development, along side democracy, good governance, human rights, social development, protection of environment and sound economic management". They pledged to direct efforts and initiatives to move quickly towards finding peaceful solutions to current conflicts and to build Africa's capacity to prevent, manage and resolve all conflicts on the continent" (par. 9, p. 4). They accepted "a binding obligation to ensure that women have every opportunity to contribute on terms of full equality to political and socio-economic development in all out countries" (par 11, p. 4), while undertaking to "do more to advance the cause of human rights… to end the moral shame exemplified by the plight of women, children, the disabled and ethnic minorities in conflict situations in Africa" (par. 10, p. 4).

NEPAD prioritized eight codes and standards that should be observed by member countries "within their capacity capabilities", i.e. "minimum requirements, given a country's capacity to do so" (par. 17, p. 6). These priorities- with the potential to promote market efficiency, to control wasteful spending, to consolidate democracy, and to encourage private financial flows- include: code of good practices on transparency in monetary and financial policies; code of good practices on fiscal transparency; best practices for budget transparency; guidelines for public debt management; principles of corporate governance; international accounting standards; international standards on auditing; and finally, core principles for effective banking supervision (par. 18, p. 6-7). Finally, NEPAD affirms the need "to build on the promising foundation, working with our development partners and the wider international community to: forge new forms of international co-operation in which the benefits of globalisation are more evenly shared; create a stable international economic environment in which African countries can achieve growth through greater market access for their exports; the removal of trade barriers, especially non-tariff barriers and other forms of protectionism; increased flows of foreign direct investment; and debt cancellation. In short, NEPAD is presented both as the most ambitious framework for "moving the African continent from crisis to renewal in the past forty years", and as "one last hope for Africa to reverse its slide into irrelevance" (Hope, 2002: 397-389, 402; Diescho, 2002).

Going by the letters and spirit of NEPAD, one can comfortably conclude that it covers most of the important aspirations of Africans (Mbaku, 2004: 393). It was particularly obvious the desire for peace and stability within the continent. The framework establishing NEPAD, in fact, acknowledges that peace, security, and democracy are important preconditions for economic development, including attracting foreign investment (Hope, 2002: 392). This peace and security initiative is, in turn, based on three related elements: promoting long-term conditions for development and security; building the capacity of African institutions for early warning, as well as enhancing their capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts; and finally, institutionalising commitment to the core values of the New Partnership for Africa's Development through the leadership. To build Africa's capacity to manage all aspects of conflict, NEPAD focused on strengthening existing regional and sub-regional institutions in four key areas: prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement; post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.

These principles, objectives and action plans are bold and beautiful, but these are mostly in print. As a relatively young initiative still attempting to cut its teeth, it may be appropriate to give NEPAD to mature before assessing it on the basis of stated objectives and achievements. There are however a several other yardsticks/ parameters by which it can still be evaluated. As Olukoshi (2003: 21-25) rightly pointed out, one major limitation of NEPAD is its over-reliance on myths to sell itself to the public; myths that essentially represents a misreading of African past and recent experiences, but are gaining the status of truth with deliberate repetition. These include: (1) the idea that 40 years of independence in Africa has been characterised by a universal and uniformly dismal socio-economic record which NEPAD is now designed to correct; (2) the claim that the initiative represents the first comprehensive program to emerge from within Africa for resolving the developmental problems of the continent; (3) the pretentious claim that it is the first truly African-owned framework for redressing the socio-economic and political difficulties of African countries; and (4) the idea that NEPAD is the first truly market-friendly initiative to have emanated from African leaders (see also, Herbst and Mills, 2003).

The above myths have been developed to market the neo-liberal tenets driving NEPAD especially since its existence and legitimacy very much depend on this. This "obsession with neo-liberalism and its willingness to integrate Africa into what is essentially an unjust global trade system" has been criticised in different fora including during the African Social Forum held in Bamako, Mali, in January 2002 (Mbaku, 2004: 394). More importantly, this pandering to the logic of neo-liberalism despite the fact all around that this ideology has been discredited for its woeful performances all over Africa. Based on the strength of its avowed commitments to neo-liberalism, it should not be expected that NEPAD would be able to muster any autonomous and assertive voice to challenge or seek a comprehensive reform of the existing order that are largely responsible for Africa's many predicaments. What seems to be happening is that the operators of NEPAD are contented with falling in line than any serious effort to assert Africa's right to fair trade, for instance. At a time when it is generally agreed that the global economy has not been favourable to Africa, NEPAD is calling for further integration of the continent into the system through the instrumentalities of trade liberalization and the formation of free markets in Africa. No matter how glossy it is presented, then, neo-liberalism can only accentuate the already deep-seated crisis facing societies in Africa as it draws more and more people into the loop of poverty rather than alleviate poverty as it promises (Mbaku, 2004: 394). By leaning so heavily on neo-liberalism and market forces, NEPAD will be stalling if not subverting the expansion of welfare opportunities for the ordinary African as it creates room for profiteering (Matthews, 2004: 503). It might also mean NEPAD sacrificing the human rights of African peoples to the "whims of a volatile and untrustworthy global capital" (Mbaku, 2004: 396). The worst case scenario coming out of NEPAD's neo-liberal agenda is that it seems to be offering the West an opportunity to continue the exploitation of Africa as Mbaku insisted (2004: 401). After all, the initiative offers no insight about how the unfair global trade regime would structurally redefine changes in a way that favours Africa and still gives the West its prized control and dominance.

There is a sinister ambiguity regarding the even nature of partnership envisaged, especially between NEPAD and the wealthier donor nations and institutions. As presented, NEPAD has claimed a development rhetoric which retains the political and

economic governance processes in the West as the model of what it means to be 'developed'. By pushing in this direction, the operators of NEPAD are not even thinking that there may well be other paths to development from the one that the West is working hard to foist on Africa. Contrary to Africa's claim to ownership, NEPAD is still manipulated behind the scenes by its development partners. By emphasizing this peculiar type of partnership, therefore, NEPAD is furthering the undermining of Africans to determine their own destiny and future (Matthews, 2004: 497-500). It is this kind of partnership that drives the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) implemented since 1999 by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund since 1999, after their admission that the SAPs of the 1980s turned into a colossal failure (Hope, 2002: 400). It was in this regard that Abrahamsen referred to NEPAD as a "western wolf in African sheepskin"- to underscore the continent's persistence subservience to western power and western values despite claiming African ownership (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1454).

Rita Abrahamsen (2004: 1254) drew attention to the deeper ramifications of the type of partnership that NEPAD is seeking to forge with the West. According to her, "partnerships are little more than conditionality by another name"; a form of advanced liberal rule that increasingly govern through the explicit commitment to self-government and agency of the recipient states". Using NEPAD and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as examples, she described partnership "as a form of advanced liberal power" working "not primarily as direct domination and imposition, but through promises of incorporation and inclusion". Recognising that their "over-prescriptive and interventionist development models" have not worked satisfactorily, the West is retreating to the position that "they are no longer in the business of telling poor countries what to do" (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1453-4)

To understand this type of subtle transformations in the framework of partnerships, Abrahamsen reinterpreted the logic of power relations differently from the way it is usually understood as the capacity of certain actors to control directly the actions of others. She framed this new interpretation along and beyond that proposed much earlier by Lukes: power employed by one actor over another; non-decision as a form of power which is characterised by the ability to shape political agendas and prevent issues from entering public debate; and the most insidious exercise of power, which involves shaping people's perceptions, cognitions and preferences in ways that may be contrary to their own interests but at the same time making people accept and work for the existing order of things, including their own domination. She however added a fourth dimension of power incorporating "governmentality as a form of power". By governmentality, Abrahamsen was alluding to the "the conduct of conduct", "a particular modern form of power that is characterized by an increasing reliance on pastoral care and techniques of normalisation and consensus, as opposed to more overtly coercive forms of power" (2004: 1458-1459). As political interventions designed to produce particular modern subjects, partnerships deriving from governmentality allows governments in weaker recipient countries the opportunity to learn to practice their freedom 'responsibly' in a way that capacity building is simultaneously empowering and disciplinary, in that both constitutes and regulates the identities, behaviour, and choices of their target countries" (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1462). This, according to her, is not simply a trick of deception, or a rhetorical devise, but has very real productive power which makes partnerships to function as "a form of advanced liberal governmentality that increasingly governs through the explicit

commitment to self-government and agency of African states" without necessarily losing the traditional notion of power as domination (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1463).

This illusion about partnerships manifest concurrently, then, by the fact that through contemporary donor practices, certain sections of the African elite and bureaucracy come to internalise the neo-liberal values of governance and even develop toolkits that will not be radically different from those that usually developed in the think tanks of the West. An immediate example is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which was approved in Cape Town in July 2003, as "mutually agreed" and "voluntary" instrument for self-monitoring is "to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance".[13]

(Abrahamsen, 2004: 1459). As Chabal (2002: 462) informed us, "NEPAD must… be understood as a commitment on the part of the current (and not so new) elites in Africa to the present 'democratic orthodoxy' in order to guarantee a transfer of resources to Africa: a continuation with, rather than a break from, the type of relations that has guided the continent's engagement with the international community since independence" (Chabal, 2002: 462).

The affection and obedience that NEPAD demonstrates towards the central tenets of neo-liberalism raises questions as to on the extent to which the initiative can serve as the foundation for a new optimism about Africa's future (Olukoshi, 2000: 20). The logic of NEPAD is that of African adherence to the pre-requisites for the successful implementation of this programme is expected to be rewarded with material support from the developed countries and IFI. On closer examination, Olukoshi acknowledged that "some of the high hopes generated by the NEPAD document would seem to be seriously undermined by the essentially neo-liberal pitch of its economic blueprint and the limited scope of its political agenda which is cast in the kinds of governance managerialism that has become the hallmark of neo-liberal economy" (Olukoshi, 2003: 21). As long as NEPAD does not give critical consideration to issues confronting Africa as deriving not so much from the marginalisation of Africa but from the "problematic manner in which the continent has been integrated into the contemporary world system", it is doomed for failure (Olukoshi, 2003: 27).

Conclusion

The conclusion that from this paper are as follows: (1) the discourse on African security has changed significantly in less than two decades; mostly coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the powerful contradictions from globalisation; (2) despite the increase in global attention to human security as new form of security narrative for managing Africa's security problems, it is still a long way before the concept can challenge established notions of security based on regimes, state and

[13] Ibid.

territoriality; (3) the underlying assumptions of globalisation and of NEPAD based as they are on neo-liberalism cannot serve the cause of human security, even as it also undermines regime security, state security and territorial security; finally (4) the search for new paradigms for security should intensity but must have as its focal point mechanisms for unleashing the resources, creativity and talent of peoples and communities all over Africa

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