PEASANT REFLECTIONS ON THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT LED INDUSTRIALIZATION (ADLI) PROGRAMME

Derese Getachew

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Addis Ababa University

I. Introduction

This paper is a synopsis informed by a series of interviews carried out in fifteen villages across Ethiopia from July to September 2003 in the Amhara, Oromiya, Tigray and the Southern Peoples regions. The study was conducted by the Wellbeing in Developing Countries research project, based in the University of Bath, which looks into issues of poverty, inequality and quality of life in four developing countries (Ethiopia, Peru, Thailand and Bangladesh). In an attempt to capture local realities of what wellbeing and development mean to people, the study has tried to shed some light on how people understand, appreciate and criticize state-sponsored interventions such as the Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation.

Instead of capitalizing on the agronomic aspects of the package or econometric computations on whether inputs (like fertilizers and certified seeds) have brought increased yield productivity or marginal utility returns at the household level, our interviews have set out to know how farmers feel they have benefited or are harmed by the introduction of the intervention. The paper begins with a brief overview of agricultural development policies in Ethiopia pre 1974 and afterwards up until 1991. Following is a brief introduction into the origin and ideals of ADLI as a nationwide development policy. The article then delves in detail into the peasant responses to the aforementioned questions. It also attempts to reflect on whether the respondents feel the ongoing implementation of ADLI related interventions in their villages has benefited a designated group of people within their respective communities. The responses would enable us to critically reflect on how the social dynamics in the villages (established kin, elite or ethnic networks with vested interests) relate to linear, planned and extensive 'packages' like the ADLI. Discussing on how peasants project on the prospects of ADLI interventions, the paper finally ends with concluding remarks.

II. Agricultural Development Policies in Ethiopia

The Imperial Regime

Ethiopia is one of the poorest economies in the world where 45 percent of its rural population and 37 percent of its urban population now resides below the absolute poverty line. (MOFED, 2002:38)The prevalence of such grinding poverty is structurally linked to the low growth and productivity of Ethiopia's subsistence agriculture, the mainstay of 85% of its population. (UNDP 2003:11)The farming practise is traditional (using ox drawn ploughshares), inefficient and vulnerable to the vagaries of nature as it is primarily rain-fed. Productivity therefore plummets once the rains shortfall and famine strikes. The problem of food insecurity has now become

chronic where an average of 4 million people need food assistance every year. Fostering sustainable agricultural development, with a view to attend domestic consumption demand and supply foreign exchange earning crops to export, has therefore been a policy imperative articulated in all hitherto drafted and endorsed development policies of the country. Following regime changes, however, one would notice outstanding differences both in the economic theory and political preoccupations (ideologies) underpinning these agricultural development policies.

A central and nationwide development plan meant to spearhead various sectoral development programs was first drafted in Imperial Ethiopia for a five years period spanning 1957-1961.A trailblazer document as it was, the First Five Year Plan was set to realize a monetized robust Ethiopian economy which is predominantly non-agricultural. While recognising that the greater part of the population is engaged in agriculture, around 17 million people out of a total population estimated at 19 million in 1957, the document referred to the subsistence agriculture and cattle breeding of the peasantry as "obsolete forms of economy" whose "degree of integration into the various branches of the economy has been relatively low". It then posits that the growth of Ethiopian agriculture should be geared in manner where the monetized contribution of the sector could be augmented through the establishment and consolidation of an urban and industrialized economy that "creates a higher monetary demand and a strong incentive to agricultural production." In short, industrialization became an overarching development agendum in the FFYP that was also thought to trigger, monetize and integrate agriculture. (FFYP, 1957:4)

Policy planners also outlined the strategies that could be employed to increase agricultural productivity two of which were: extending the surface land used for cultivation (extensification) and increasing labour productivity on the cultivated farm fields (intensification). The rationale for the former is the fact that a large portion of Ethiopia's arable land was not utilized yet and the government was leasing huge tracts of land for foreign and local investors in order to promote large scale commercial farms. A daunting task however was to transform the small holder subsistence agriculture where inefficient and traditional implements and farming techniques were used by farmers to fend mainly for household consumption. To intensify productivity on these holdings, the government endorsed the development of agricultural extension services that capitalized mainly on the provision of improved farming implements (iron-ploughs, harrows, rollers, improves sickles, scythes, wooden rakes, hay forks etc), the popularization and distribution of improved seeds and the instruction of modern farming techniques to peasants. Again small holder agriculture was deemed to increase yield of marketable crops and industrial raw materials. (FFYP, 1957:20)

Despite the FFYP's aspirations to monetize and integrate agriculture with an industrial economy, through the promotion of large-scale commercial farms, the country could not even meet the growing consumption demand of its people. The Second Five Year Plan (1963-67) began acknowledging that the country has then become "an importer of wheat (45000 tones in 1960) instead of being an exporter". The failure was partly said to be caused by the neglect or lack of attention given to the small holders' peasant agriculture. The remedy envisaged to increase production and fill the food deficit (in the SFYP) was again the agricultural extension service whose objectives were to introduce "advanced methods of farming and improved technical means in the peasant sector of the economy". The SFYP, to the planners' credit, has

also stated why the shift to promote and transform the peasantry was then viewed as indispensable. First, because the livelihood of the majority of the people is exclusively based on peasant agriculture, attention should be given to this subsection of the economy. Secondly, the national and political consciousness of the peasantry would have an important bearing not only on the development but also on the entire prospect of the country. The document was also a pioneer to formally recognize that the feudal land tenure system was one major obstacle against the development of agriculture. While airing these problems as challenges lying ahead of the Ethiopian economy and politics, it however reiterated that "large scale farming is the right way to develop Ethiopian agriculture." And to the latter end, more than 50% (estimated at 128 million Ethiopian Birr) of the total monetary investment in agriculture (estimated at 242 million Ethiopian Birr) was allocated, attesting that there was not any genuine political commitment on the part of the Imperial regime to address the challenges facing peasant agriculture.(SFYP, 1963: 45, 115)

Then came the Third Five Year Plan (1968-73) that reported about the remarkable increase in the per capita production of the non-agricultural sectors (at an average rate of 7.5 %). Agriculture, however, was mentioned to have lagged behind whose repercussions would threaten the progress in the other sectors as well. It is argued that an accelerated development of agriculture would have: an output contribution by supplying industrial raw materials to the emerging manufacturing sectors, a factor contribution releasing surplus and disguised labour to the other sectors, and a market contribution where peasants consume processed goods and services.

In a similar vein, the policy identified two major problems in Ethiopian agriculture which were the problem of production and the problem of the peasantry. The latter was referring to the prevailing landlord-tenant tenure system that had strangled the development of peasant agriculture as one structural impediment. The monarchy and feudal aristocracy then had either ownership ("rist" and "rist guilt" arrangements) or usufruct rights ("gult") over land and used to lease out land to tenants often on a sharecropping basis. The former predated "on the fruits of the farmer's labour" as the lion share (often more than two third) of what peasants or tenants produced was expropriated by the land lords. It is stated in the TFYP that the existing tenure system availed neither the means (owing to meagre tenant capital) nor the motives (owing to tenant insecurity) for increasing output. Stressing the urgency to execute land reform it stated,

> The immediate concern of land reform is to overcome the apathy, of the agricultural population caused by traditional inequitable land tenure patterns, concentration of land ownership in a small group, insecurity of tenure, and exorbitant rate share cropping arrangements. (TFYP, 1968:195)

Accordingly a draft proclamation was presented to the Parliament that discussed the problems related to the existing land tenure system and suggested motions on how to reform certain aspects of it i.e. matters related to tenant-landlord contracts, terms of lease, and tenure security. The draft document was rejected by the majority of the members of parliament who used to have huge tracts of land and felt threatened by these modest technical and less radical suggestions of the draft document. The monarchy and its old guard feudal entourage were unwilling to take practical

legislative as well as executive measures to deal with land tenure issue. The half heartedness of the ruling elite and the prolonged delay of the reform later made the regime pay dearly.

The TFYP also came up with a more explicit and well thought strategy to modernize peasant agriculture through the allocation of financial and human resources to areas that were defined as promising like Chilalo in Arssi province, Wolayita in Sidamo province and the Southern livestock regions. This strategy of concentrating development efforts in selected areas was called the Minimum Package Program I. The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in Arssi was the first project that the new package kicked off with followed by the Wolayita Agricultural Development Unit (WADU) and the Adda District Development Program (ADDP) launched in 1967, 1970, and 1972 respectively. The package program in Tewelde's words was "essentially in the Ethiopian version of the Green Revolution…the synergetic adoption of modern high yield varieties, chemical nutrients, pesticides and irrigation and extension services." (Tewelde, 1984:150)

The projects saw to it that they engage with smallholding tenants, mainly with holdings of 20 hectares or less so as to increase yield productivity, create employment opportunities and bridge the income disparities between peasants and the remaining section of the population. Tenassie (1985) wrote that promising as these initiatives were, they proved to be too costly in terms of manpower and financial resources. They also got entangled in a number of organizational as well as structural (political) problems. In CADU's case for instance, the integrated nature of the project brought a challenge on how to coordinate the various stakeholders (local administrative structures, the project office, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Agro Industrial Bank of Ethiopia, Highway Authority etc).Landlords deeply resented and were suspicious of the project's effort to address and communicate with their tenants. On the other hand, Tewelde (1984:162) mentions that the feudal lords were eager to "beat the system and capture the gains of the Minimum Package Program (MPP)" using their local social networks and bureaucratic machinations.

To conclude, it would be safe to assert that the monetization of the economy through rapid industrialization was an imperative commanding the heights of economic planning in Imperial Ethiopia. Agricultural development was relegated to a level where it is seen as a tributary sector feeding industrial raw materials and redundant labour to an urban industrialized metropolis. The sectoral policies therefore favoured the establishment and expansion of large scale commercial farms at the expense of small holder peasant agriculture that employed more than two thirds of the economically active labour force. The imperial regime used to draw foreign and domestic entrepreneurs to invest in commercial farms through a package that leases out land with symbolic rent expenditure, exempts investment equipments from custom duties, allows free remittance of profits, and the provision of credits under favourable conditions.(MoI, 1964:25) In contrast little attention was given to peasant agriculture up until the endorsement of the TFYP that elucidated the weight of agricultural development in the Ethiopian context, attempted to deal with structural problems like the land tenure issue, and led to the package program. Project initiatives like CADU however were not success stories as they were costly and not placed in an ideal situation. Problems faced by the Ethiopian green revolution ranged from technical and organizational hiccups to more structural problems pervasive and

inimical in the system i.e. serfdom and tenure insecurity. The consequences were a sharp decline in agricultural productivity, increased national dependence on food imports and the 1973/74 famine that took heavy tolls of lives in Wollo and Tigray provinces and ultimately led to the downfall of the Imperial regime.

The Derg Regime

Beginnings made to promote the development of peasant agriculture were further pronounced following the overthrow of the old feudal order and the ascendancy of a Military Marxist junta to power. The period of transition was epitomized by political upheavals, instability and terror unfolding in the struggle between rival political forces to control power and the state machinery. Nevertheless the Military cabal declared Ethiopian socialism on December 20 1974 as the ideology instituting a new social and economic order in Ethiopia. Ethiopian socialism acceded to the Marxist Leninist stance about the exploitation of mankind through the private ownership of the means of production, one of its primary goals being the "elimination of exploitation through ownership and control of the major means of production". (PMAC, 1975:4)

Faced with the pressing vagaries of the peasantry, pressured by the radical student movement and somewhat inspired by the tenets of socialism, the military government then endorsed the famous Rural Lands Proclamation on March 4 1975 abolishing the anachronistic tenure system by way of nationalizing all rural land and redistributing it to the tillers of the land, the peasants themselves. The proclamation prohibited any title to private tenure of land. The sale, exchange, mortgaging, leasing and bequeathing of land was also prohibited. The proclamation has also stipulated the formation of Peasant Associations within a minimum of 800 hectarage. Emerging as the lowest tier of local administration in rural Ethiopia, Peasant Associations were also envisaged to play a greater role in the transformation of peasant agriculture.

The government then endorsed a program of National Democratic Revolution (1976) that served as an overarching policy document considered to guide the subsequent development of sectoral plans. Accordingly a policy statement entitled as "Measures for Rural Transformation" was developed and disseminated by the then Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement in February 1978. The document enumerated basic objectives Ethiopian agriculture should be geared towards that inter alia were: to ensure sufficient production for the growing population, produce various exportable crops for foreign exchange, to guarantee the supply of primary goods for local industries, and provide employment opportunities. To this end, the introduction of better agricultural inputs, the politicization of Peasant Associations and the development of Producer and Service Cooperatives were thought as pivotal. Once again the importance of a nexus between existing agricultural research institutions and farmers plots for adequate provision of improved seeds, fertilizers, new tools and modern agricultural techniques was stressed.

Accordingly, CADU expanded to include two more awrajas in the Arssi provinces namely Ticho and Arbagugu and was renamed as the Arssi Rural Development Unit (ARDU) program. There was a slight difference between these two as the former used the "model farmer" approach to disseminate inputs and techniques into the

surrounding. Farmers living in an area roughly covering 800 hectares were asked to nominate five farmers one of which was selected by CADU to serve as a model farmer. The farmer's plot would also be used as a demonstration plot to others. Tennasie (1985:44) stated that this system was mainly criticized for "turning the model farmers into elite farmers alienated from the surrounding." ARDU however brought a change in the modus operandi developing a distinct structure parallel to the local administration tiers in the Arssi province. Arssi was first divided into 6 District Development Centres (DDCs) and 57 Rural Development Centres (RDCs).Technically the RDCs were below the wereda level and the extension agents resorted to using a parcel or two of the cooperative farms as demonstration plots instead of working with model farmers. (Arsema, 1998). Accordingly, the Minimum Package Program launched before the revolution (1971) and was originally planned to last for only two years was extended until succeeded by a new package in 1978-the Minimum Package Program II.

The Minimum Package Program II was endorsed for the period 1978 to 1982. Its objectives were not any different from its predecessors. In short the package aimed to increase small holder production through the provision of farm inputs on credit, extension and other support services. This time however the wereda became the basic organizational unit to carry out the agricultural extension program. Tennasie (1985:57) reported that the staff at the wereda level then "included one to four Development Agents (DAs), a cooperative agent, a home economics agent, book keepers, guards and gardeners." The concentration of personnel and offices at the wereda level however created a gap between the agents and the farmers in the hinterland. Furthermore, transport facilities were not made available for the agents that loosened contact, and hampered the progress of planned green revolution ventures.

Subscribing to the socialist model of centralized economic planning, the Military government established a Central Planning Scheme Council in 1978 which was delegated to prepare annual development plans in line with the commitments of the National Democratic Revolution. Up until 1984 this body used to issue annual plans, "zemetchas" in local parlance, which focused on the spatial and economic reorganization of the peasantry into producer and service cooperatives. The idea of collective farms was however not popular in the eyes of the independent-minded peasants which were quite euphoric about the land redistribution. More often than not farmers were forced to join in the cooperatives. Hansson(1995)argued that the state also used to favour these cooperatives and discriminate against independent peasants in the allocation of inputs such as fertilizers and capital equipment, in the type(fertility) of land the latter received, and the prices the Agricultural Marketing Corporation(AMC) used to offer to their produce. Many concur that there were other ulterior economic and political motives supposed to have underpinned the government's drive to collective farming and villagization. Some argued that agricultural surplus extraction, through the infamous Agricultural Marketing Corporation, has become quite easy for the government once collectivization was realized. (Kidane 1990, Hansson1995). On the other hand Cooperatives and Peasant Associations were also used by the regime as instruments of regimentation and political control over the peasant mass. Tadesse (1995:113) for instance underlines the adverse roles these institutions played stating,

> Collectivization restricted the democratic rights of the peasantry, both in political and economic terms. Party agents were purposely planted among the collectivized peasantry and Peasant Associations , not to help them increase productivity and develop the economy, but to control them politically in the rigid principles of socialist ideology and to curb their freedom.

The government on the other hand was in favour of promoting mechanized state farms by way of increasing production both for consumption and marketing purposes. According to Kidane (1990:148) the state farms sector was favoured in resource allocation. A figure cited was that only in 1981/82 around 76.42 % of chemical fertilizers and 94.8 % of the improved seeds distributed in the country were channelled to the state farms sub sector. The farms however were entangled in serious financial and administrative problems that hamstrung their efficiency and productivity. Financially speaking, state farms were over dependent on bank loans for both working capital and investment. The management was highly centralized and suffered from the lack of appropriate training in technical and managerial skills.

While the government was on the run to enforce these radical and wide scale measures, the economy in general and food availability in particular was declining at an exorbitant rate. The Great Famine (1984) was the logical zenith of the Ethiopian agrarian crisis. The happening shockingly jarred the whole wide world as the silent voices of the dying millions in Wollo and Tigre provinces were televised. The Famine was a multi-dimensional crisis whose immediate cause was the recurrent drought that hit the Northern provinces of the country for three consecutive years. Other factors that further compounded the problem were the decline in soil fertility, excessive division of farm land and the unbridled increase of the rural population. Structurally speaking however the famine was a stark proof of policy failure on the part of the Marxist military government. The government's attempts to collectivize peasant agriculture and bolster mechanized farming were not success stories. Neither were its agricultural pricing and marketing policies. Moreover, the country was embroiled in the civil war the Derg was waging against the TPLF and the EPLF in the North. More than 50% of the country's expenditures went for the army while less than 5% of the country's budget was spent on Agriculture. (TM Vestal 1985: 128)

It was here that the Derg drafted and endorsed a Ten Year Perspective Plan (1984/5-1993/4). In cognizance of the overall decline in the growth rate of the Ethiopian economy, the plan attributed the performance of the economy to factors like, the disruption of normal economic activity by the internal and external enemies of the revolution, low level of domestic saving which in turn fostered low level investment, higher inflation, a negative trade balance with the decline of exports and the higher growth of government expenditure. The document emphasized industrialization as the motive power for achieving rapid economic development in the country and saw the role of agriculture as that of generating the financial surplus for the country's long term industrialization program. It also stipulated that small holder peasant agriculture is characterized by technological backwardness, scattered farmlands, massive deforestation and soil erosion. The transformation of this backward sector was again said to be contingent on a novel reorganization of the peasantry into village settlements and the establishment of producer and service cooperatives. Fragmented land holdings and settlement patterns were believed to have handicapped the

improvement of the rural sector and the plan emphasized the urgency of pursuing countrywide resettlement and villagization schemes alongside coopertivization. The promotion of state farms on the other hand was not given due priority as the governments experience with the management of the nationalized large scale commercial farms proved quite unpleasant. For many, the government's campaign to resettle people from drought stricken areas in the North was imposed on the peasants. Allegedly the resettlement was also a political stratagem meant to drain and dry out the political support base for secessionist and nationalist armed movements in the North.

Following the development of the Ten Years Perspective Plan, a new agricultural development program namely the Peasants Agricultural Development and Extension Program (PADEP) was introduced expected to run from May 1985 to 1990 but was delayed for other reasons. Again the same ideals of fostering green revolution preponderated in PADEP. Its administration however resembled that of CADU as the country was first divided to 8 PADEP zones organized along commonalities in agro ecological make up and farming practises. Around 250 high potential weredas were selected within the 8 zones in order to concentrate resource and extensions efforts. In order to mitigate the problem of detachment between the agents and peasants, PADEP organization resorted to locating extension staff at junctures where service cooperatives (constituted by 2-4 PAs) were established. Overall, available information on PADEP performances indicates that for various reasons the achievements recorded remained far below the targets initially set.

To conclude, industrialization and the transformation of agriculture along socialist lines to pump drive industrialization was an overarching ideal that preponderated in the national as well as sectoral development policies and strategies of the Derg. While the rural land reform that abolished feudal serfdom in Ethiopia and redistributed land to the tillers was highly commended by the peasantry, subsequent coercive drives to collectivize agriculture were met with scepticism and defiance. Those that resisted joining cooperatives were discriminated against in the allocation of rural land; in terms of access to agricultural inputs; and the prices they sell their grains to the government. The military junta that dressed itself in socialist garb pursued its efforts quite aggressively for other economic and political reasons as well. Cooperatives and Peasant Associations served as repositories for surplus extraction by the government. They functioned more as instruments of state control and regimentation than as the lowest tiers of local administration. Efforts to consolidate and expand mechanized state farms also faced a number of technical, financial and managerial difficulties. Famine and the insidious civil war also ravaged the country's economy. In Hansson's words (1995:36), "the Derg's economic policy had taken the country to a situation that can be characterised as even worse than the one at the outset of the new policy in 1974."

III. Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) policy: An overview

Whereas the former regimes in Ethiopia toyed with the idea of agricultural development, it is this present government that regarded it as a major policy objective towards which the financial, human and institutional resources of the nation should be mobilized. Soon after the downfall of the Derg, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia declared that a major part of the budget and manpower would be allocated to

rehabilitate and develop peasant agriculture. In a similar vein, efforts to revitalize the agriculture sector started out when the Sasakawa Global 2000 initiative took off in 1993.The project developed a modest extension package that began with the provision of agricultural inputs and technical assistance to a total of 160 model farmers in the country. Inputs like fertilizers and certified seeds were dispensed on a credit basis where farmers were obliged to pay 25-50 % of the total price as dawn payment and clear the balance after harvest. In addition, the farmers' own plots were used as sites to demonstrate the use of improved implements and new agricultural techniques. These are called Extension Management and Training Plots (EMTPs).

The reports from the project sites were encouraging as the average yield per hectare of the EMTPs significantly increased outstripping that of the national average. The results led to the expansion of the project both in terms of the number of EMTPs and the technical packages offered to the peasant. In three years time (1995) the number of EMTPs rose to 3500 and packages developed to increase sorghum and teff yield were added to the already existing ones (wheat and maize). A project report in 1995 (SG report 1995:15) attested that notwithstanding regional and other variations, the overall mean yield of maize EMTPs was for instance 5.7t/ha which was then 192 percent above the national average. The relative success of these initiatives coupled with the self professed conviction of the ruling party to first eradicate the plights of the rural mass then led to the endorsement of the ADLI strategy (1995). Accordingly the policy emphasizes modernizing smallholder agriculture and intensifying yield productivity through the supply of appropriate technology, certified seeds, fertilizers, rural credit facilities and technical assistance. Along this line, various sectoral policy reforms were carried out in the last eight years which include: the inauguration of a nation wide agricultural extension program, the promulgation of laws that liberalized the procurement and distribution of inputs (fertilizers and certified seeds), and efforts to increase and avail rural credit facilities for farmers.

Subsequent to the inaugural of ADLI as the overarching policy dictum of the regime, a National Extension Intervention Program (NEIP) was established, under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), delegated with the task of developing a nation wide agricultural extension program. To that end, an extension program namely Participatory Demonstration and Training and Extension System (PADETES) was devised which took off with 32047 farmers in year 1995.PADETES described by its architects, is a hybrid of "the strong extension management principles and Training and Visit system (T&V) merged with the most practicable technology diffusion experience of the SG2000 approach." (MoA 1998:12) Since then the program has expanded enrolling a large number of farmers all across the country (around 3,807,658 farmers in 1998/99) and diversifying its technical package. Packages meant to intensify the production of high value crops, upgrade livestock quality and production, ensure post harvest protection as well as soil and water conservation followed suit.

Though a national initiative, the implementation of PADETES is entirely within the jurisdiction of the national regional governments and their regional agricultural bureaux. The training of frontline extension agents, the assortment and development of locally specific technical packages, the supervision and coordination of input agencies and credit organizations, all fall in the mandate of the regional agricultural bureaux. In most cases the regional bureaux are in turn divided into desks that

coordinate extension efforts in crop production, animal and fish resources development, natural resources development and conservation technology promotion. The recruitment and training of Development Agents (DAs) often takes place at a wereda level which in turn oversees activities out carried at the kebele level-the lowest tier of local administration where actual work with peasants takes place. In the Amhara National Regional State for instance 3 DAs are assigned to reach out a maximum of 1000 farmers in one kebele association.(Aynalem, 2003) The Federal Ministry on the other hand is delegated with the task of formulating agricultural policies, designing packages, organizing and conducting training activities to upgrade the knowledge and skill of regional partners.

A number of articles and evaluative reports are written on the post 1991 performance of Ethiopian agriculture, many of which attempted to reflect on ADLI and its PADETES package. The protagonists stress that the reforms introduced by the government have rehabilitated and revitalized the sector. Agricultural output showed a remarkable increase in 1995/96 and 1996/97 but sharply declined following the drought in 1997/98. It has picked momentum within the last three Ethiopian years. However its volume has not reached a level recorded in those two bumper year harvests. (Befekadu and Birhanu, 2001:49-94) The import of fertilizers has been steadily increasing following the liberalization of fertilizer procurement and marketing. So did the amount of total fund channelled to the agricultural sector in the form of credit for the purchase of these inputs. From 1995/96 to 1998/99, the volume of agricultural credit given to farmers has increased from 318.6 million Birr to 677.8 million. The distribution of high yield varieties has also increased in relative terms especially when compared to the pre 1995 period.(Mengistu, 2000)

Despite the aforementioned efforts to intensify small holder agriculture for nearly a decade, critics emphasize that ADLI with its green revolution packages has not yet realized its basic objective i.e food self sufficiency. In fact the problem of food insecurity has now become chronic where an average of 4 million people needs food assistance every year. Increases in yield productivity were not consistent but followed by abrupt and sharp declines. The situation is further bedevilled by the exponential growth of the Ethiopian population at an annual rate of 2.9-3 percent.

The criticisms posed on ADLI in general and the packages in particular are mainly of two types. The first cluster of arguments dwells on the technical, managerial and marketing problems of the policy. The recruitment and training of frontline extension agents, known as the development agents, was put as inadequate. The agents are high school graduates that got a nine months training only. According to Mulat Demeke (2001:196-202) the agents are also under-funded and over-burdened with other unrelated activities like the management of credit facilities. They tend to spend much of their time instructing farmers instead of improving farmer skills and utilizing indigenous knowledge. The other main problem, faced by farmers enrolled in the package, was the decline in output prices especially during years of good harvest. This has been acknowledged both by the practitioners (Federal Ministry officials and regional bureau heads) and the academics. The decline has adversely affected farmers gain and in most cases they were not able to defray costs incurred for fertiliser procurement. A study conducted by Tadesse (2002:47-48) succinctly summarizes how grain prices have tumbled down in face of the meteoric rise in the market price of farm inputs like fertilizers. He states,

> The extent to which fertilizer prices have changed relative to output prices can be determined by looking at the ratio of DAP and Urea prices to prices of major cereals in some markets located in surplus producing areas. For instance, the ratio of DAP to teff price increased from 0.6 in 1991 to 1.84 in 2001. This means only 0.6 quintal of mixed teff was required to buy a quintal of DAP in 1991 compared to 1.84 quintal in 2001.The change represents a 306 % increase in the amount of teff required to buy a quintal of DAP.

The figures clearly depict how unfavourable price declines were accompanied by an abrupt surge in fertilizer prices making it more difficult for the farmers to access inputs and pay back their debt.

Others set out to criticize the ADLI practice as one that has not essentially helped in the reduction of absolute poverty both in the rural and urban areas. There is an excessive decline of farm sizes with population increase. (Mulat, 2001) These plots are argued to be economically unviable as they have no capacity to generate surplus. Tenure insecurity is also argued as one other structural impediment that discouraged peasants from long term investment on farm plots. While paying a discriminate emphasis on marshalling capital and technical know how to trigger agricultural development, the ADLI policy has not delved into matters of creating links between the rural and urban sections of the population. Mulat (2001:212) for instance argues that concomitant developments in the urban and industrials sectors should also be given due attention for they serve as epicentres to draw the labour force and produce from the rural peripheries. In this regard, he suggests that government should also encourage "the development of small rural town, the centres of most commercial and manufacturing activities."

IV. Findings from the WED research

Methodology

This study was carried out in fifteen villages (See Annex I) whose constitution offers interesting variance in terms of agro ecological make up, social organization, production systems, distance from and integration to markets. These villages have also served as study sites for the Ethiopian Rural Economies Project, a periodic survey of panel households, conducted by the Economics Department of the Addis Ababa University (AAU) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). A series of semi structured interviews were carried out with farmers in each of the villages from July to September 2003. Peasants were asked about when and how PADETES was initiated in their respective villages. Secondly they were asked if they think the interventions have personally benefited or harmed them. Inquiries were also made to see if farmers feel the interventions have benefited or harmed a particular group of people. And finally they were also asked to suggest how the package could benefit them in the future.

The selection of the village sites and respondents was carried out in a statistically non-representative and purely purposive manner. Two interviewers were sent to each of these villages to conduct interviews with a maximum of six farmers (three each). Our attempt to synthesize the interview data into a comprehensive whole is of course a

bold attempt to portray national trends and commonalities in peasant reflections. It is unique in the sense that a qualitative research technique often used for case study purposes is employed to understand and appreciate the workings of ADLI in various parts of the country. Such a 'thin ethnography' however is limited by the fact that the sources represent diverse, confined constituencies featured by a multiplicity of local voices. One could therefore question the reliability of our generalizations if viewed from the quantitative, survey type orthodoxy of what a reliable, rigorous and therefore scientific research ought to be like. Nevertheless, we believe that such an approach offers a rich, more humane, and context-informed sense of the variety of peasant reactions and interpretations of ADLI. Much of our input was therefore dedicated to write up these reflections in a logical array and to decipher emergent trends and developments from the labyrinth of data our study garnered.

4.1. Reflections on the genesis and nature of the package

There is a wide range of responses across the fifteen villages on when exactly agricultural extension programmes got started in the weredas and kebele associations. Many however recognize that these interventions were launched during the present regime some ten years ago (between 1994 and 1996). Respondents in Turufe Kecheme (Shashemene wereda) and Arssi however responded that the extension program began in their locality in 1993. Farmers from Arssi further specified that the package was introduced in their village by the Sasakawa Global 2000 project. The kebele chairmen are mentioned to be the ones who played a major role in the mobilization of the local peasantry to join in. According to the peasants, the training and deployment of young development agents, frontline workers supposed to assist in the input and technology transfer has followed suit. A farmer from Yetmen village (in Enemay wereda of the Amhara National Regional Government) characterizes the role of these Development Agents as follows: "The government officials (that is to say the DAs), teach the importance of terracing, the adoption of improved seeds and the use of fertilizers." Another farmer from the same village states that a Development Agent "gives technical advice on methods of farming, sowing and weeding so as to increase the level of productivity."

There are a number of activities that peasants believed the extension package has introduced in their respective villages. Two of them however stand out as common to all of the villages, i.e. the provision of improved seeds and fertilizers to farmers. It seems that the technical package developed to increase crop production is the one which is widespread across all the sites. The effort to increase the scale and quality of livestock production was mentioned only in one instance. Peasants from a village called Adado (Gedeo wereda of the SNNP regional government) reported about the provision of credits in order to buy and fatten bulls for the market at a more gainful price. And measures to conserve soil and protect the environment were reported only in two villages, namely Yetmen and Geblen. The villages for instance could generally be categorized in to four production systems namely grain producing, cash crop producing, enset cultivation and pastoralist areas. These responses do not confirm to us on whether the assortment and application of the package has been sensitive towards these differences. In lieu, the pattern implies a blanket introduction of chemical fertilizers and seeds across all the sites irrespective of standing variations in agro ecological make up and production systems.

More often than not fertilizers were dispensed on credit via the local agricultural development agent. A respondent from Adado village explains on how the purchase of fertilizers was done in his locality stating that "Farmers are supposed to pay 25 % of the price as a down payment, and the remaining 75% is paid after harvesting and marketing the yield." Peasants are also given vegetable seeds like carrots, onions, cabbages, red beet and potatoes mainly cultivated in the backyard gardens. They are also provided with improved cereal varieties (like wheat, corn, sorghum etc) that are said to be drought resistant and nutritious.

The recently introduced water harvesting activities were also reported as initiatives included within the ADLI framework. These water wells are mainly meant to harvest rain water and utilize it for farming purposes during the dry season. The digging of the water wells was explained as one positive contribution of the ADLI package especially in those villages where recurrent drought and food shortage are recorded. The latter are Geblen, Adele Keke, and Gara Godo.

4.2. Reflections on the benefits and harm of the package interventions

The responses regarding the utility of the agricultural extension package range from positive responses about established gains from the activities to an outright repudiation of any good that has come out of it. The responses in favour of the benefits drawn from the package emphasise the increase in the productivity (yield per hectare) of both cereal crops and pulses. A farmer from Garagodo village (in Wolayita area of the SNNP regional government) for instance states, "It (the package) has benefited me and helped me to get food for the household consumption and for market". Other farmers commend that improved seeds (of crops like teff, maize and sweet potato) distributed through the program are drought resistant and therefore survive harsh weather conditions. Secondly, peasants underscore the advantage of accessing fertilizers through the kebele administration on credit and at an affordable price subsidized by the government. Others mention that the water wells dug have enabled them grow and sell vegetables during the dry season. In Bako (Bako Tibe wereda of the Oromyia National Regional government) where there is a Rural Technology Centre, farmers state that they have had the opportunity to rent in a combine harvester. They were also trained on how to construct improved granaries and bought carts, at a fair price, to transport the yield from the fields.

We have carried out a minor statistical computation (from a total of 61 responses across the fifteen sites) to see if there is any significant variation between farmers' income categories and their attitude to the package. Farming households were categorized into rich, middle income and poor households. While 37% of both the rich and middle income peasants responded that they have benefited from the package, around 17% and 23 % of each status groups reported that they have been harmed by the interventions. Middle income peasants constitute the largest share (54.5%) of the total number of people who responded that they have been harmed by the interventions. The poor households, on the other hand, comprised 18% of the total number of farmers that responded that the interventions have harmed them. It is therefore difficult to establish whether there are direct or inverse relations between peoples' attitude towards the interventions and their social status. Location wise, peasants from villages that are surplus producing and better integrated to the market

(like Yetmen, Turufe Kecheme, Arssi, and Bako) have in general been more affirmative regarding the benefits of the ADLI driven extension package. On the other hand peasants from known food deficit areas (like Geblen, Haresaw, Aze Deboa and Tsamako) reported that they have not benefited or are harmed by the introduction of the package.

The fact that the government has began pulling out from a subsidized sale of fertilizers and the rising market price of these inputs has become a major setback peasants complain about. Accordingly, a farmer from Geblen (Subhsaesie wereda of the Tigray National Regional Government) states "The use of fertilizers has increased crop output. But I do not think I will get much profit because the fertilizer is very expensive and the farm needs more fertilizer per hectare than what the development agent told us to use." Many of the respondents also stated that crop prices have plummeted during seasons of bumper harvest to the extent that they were not able to defray the debts they incurred for fertilizer purchase. Others expressed their dissatisfaction about the quality of selected seeds distributed by the wereda agricultural offices. In Tsamako (Banna Tsemai wereda of the SNNP regional national government), where there is a testing site for seeds, farmers expressed their discontent about the quality of seeds distributed to them. A respondent for instance complained about this stating, "They distributed a kilo of best corn seed for each family. But it was rotten seed. It was not even fit for consumption let alone sowing." A handful of respondents mentioned that the interventions have not personally benefited or harmed them.

4.3. A Social Deconstruction of Planned Intervention

A sociology of planned interventions, like the ADLI inspired extension program, becomes quite interesting when peasants themselves are asked to reflect on what social category or group they think has benefited from its introduction. Seen from such a vantage point, development interventions emerge as social processes unpacked and reconstituted at the village level through a dynamic interaction between the frontline state technocrats and the local dwellers. In these processes both the local elite and the peasants attempt to control, enrol and subvert project activities into their own personal 'projects' even though the leverage each of the parties exercise to that end might vary.

Again there are a range of responses conveyed from farmers as to whom they think has distinctly benefited from the introduction of the agricultural extension program. But certain patterns of arguments do surface from the labyrinth of data our study has garnered. A significant number of the respondents in Turufe Kecheme, Debre Birhan, Bako, Aze Deboa and Somodo stated that those rich farmers who can afford to buy fertilizers and seeds at the market price have had increased yield from their fields and therefore are beneficiaries. The attributes farmers bestow to such 'rich' farmers obviously vary from a village to another. Peasants from the environs of Debre Birhan posited that one who owns a pair of oxen, an essential productive asset, is rich enough and capable to settle his debt on time. Others from Adado and Aze Deboa argued that the rich are those who have a large size of arable land that have again benefited from the interventions. In villages like Haresaw where riverside irrigation agriculture is practised, those farmers whose farm land border the water course were defined as the rich benefactors of the extension program that have managed to produce twice a year.

Other farmers boldly state that the introduction and distribution of agricultural inputs through the kebele, the lowest tier of local administration in the regions, has only benefited the kebele leaders themselves and their relatives. A farmer from Aze Deboa (Kambata area in SNNP regional government) responded stating that "those who are rich and support the administration have got the inputs. Moreover, relatives of those who are in power are the beneficiaries." Whereas a farmer in Geblen responded in irony that the Development Agents themselves benefit the most since they "get more per diem when they supervise." Another respondent from Bako mentioned that the package has only benefited "some people that are rich and talkative." Despite the fact that peasant construction about the rich and the powerful are context bound and less sophisticated, these responses do inform us on how planned interventions are deconstructed and socially reconstituted at the village level.

These responses would also make us contemplate over the notion that the provision of high yielding seeds, cheap credit, chemical fertilizers and pesticides could be used as an instrument of control and patronage on the part of the state over the rural mass. This line of argument was strongly accentuated amongst academics that looked into the political capital governments expedite from launching and orchestrating massive scale green revolution ventures. Jos Mooij (2000:220) reflects on the Asian green revolution experiences stating "Governments were involved in the provision of inputs, the procurement of commodities, road construction, research and extension. All this represented and further facilitated a massive increase in the control of the village by the state". The post colonial African peasant agriculture is also characterized as one affected by personal and patronage ties where political links highly matter. Philip Raikes(2000:67) for instance posits,

> The benefits from development projects and other external interventions are usually captured by the wealthy and politically influential , even when they are advertised as "small farmer" or "poverty oriented". Thus economic and social differentiation has generally increased with growth and development.

These reflections would indeed invite one to delve into the political sociology of these interventions in Ethiopia too and research if the package have benefited a few- the rich peasants and the village level politicians.

On the other hand poor people who could not afford to buy fertilizers and high breed seeds are referred to as the ones that have not benefited from the program. These poor households often rent out their land or share crop with other farmers. The other group of people mentioned as harmed by the introduction of the ADLI package are those who took fertilisers and selected seeds on credit but were not able to pay back. Some have gone to the extent of selling their livestock and household assets in order to pay back their debt. The decline in the price of agricultural products, which followed an increase in yield and market supply, had a negative impact on the livelihood system of certain farming households. Following from that is impoverishment indirectly induced from an established policy imperative that did not take the exigencies of the market into account so as to cushion their adverse effects on the household economy. A response of a farmer from Garagodo village epitomizes this assertion, "The poor are getting poorer as they are unable to cover all the costs of improved seeds and

fertilizers for the costs have out weighed the benefits." The situation is dire for farmers who do not have livestock and therefore cannot use animal dung as a substitute for chemical fertilizers.

4.4. Peasant projections into the prospects of the ADLI program

Asked in what ways could this package benefit them in the future, farmers came up with lots of suggestions on how the implementation of the package could be improved. The lion's share of comments forwarded concentrate on their concerns about the supply, distribution and price of agricultural inputs. Farmers mention that the ongoing agricultural extension program would benefit them if the supply of agricultural inputs especially fertilizers and certified seeds increases. The rationale is not only that the use of the inputs brings about an increase in productivity but that their farm land has lost its natural fertility from years of cultivation. Farmers express their discontent and worry about the meteoric increase in the price of fertilizers partly due to the fact that government is pulling out from marketing these inputs at a subsidized and reasonable price**.** This has been recorded in nine (9) of the sites from the fifteen (15) villages from where the data was gathered. In some villages, peasants responded that the supply of these inputs is not in time. Surprisingly**,** these concerns were raised by peasants from Yetmen and the environs of Debre Birhan whose respective villages are quite close to the towns and very well integrated to the market. Similar concerns were also raised in Bako and Gara Godo. In Geblen farmers complained that the type of fertilizer dispensed does not go along with the respective soil type of the area. In a similar vein, some farmers aired their views that the implementation of agricultural extension program was not carried out by capable experts. Whereas others posit that there are only a few people who have benefited from the package and ways should be sought in order to cover a wide range of the population.

Owing to the significant decline in the price of primary goods, after an intensive use of agricultural inputs and a remarkable yield increase, peasants insist that some kind of price regulative measures should be taken by the government**.** In Turufe Kecheme, farmers argue that the government should stabilize the fertilizer market by subsiding it. Furthermore farmers from Imdibir suggested that the government should intervene in the market and buy their products when there is a sharp decline of crop prices. Others from the same village also suggested that the development of rural infrastructure, especially surface roads, should be pursued in order to enable farmers' access markets in remote areas. The issue of land redistribution was brought up only once in Turefe Kecheme (Shashemene wereda of the Ormoyia National Regional Government). A young peasant commented that the ADLI driven extension package would benefit the community if "the land is redistributed evenly and the majority of the landless gets it."

Despite the aforesaid prospects that peasants ideally think ADLI interventions (if tailored to meet local community demands and concerns) could improve their livelihood, they also express their worries about how the agricultural extension programs could impinge on the ecology and livestock of the peasantry. The potential harms associated with the package do vary from one area to another. While some complain that some of the selected seeds do not grow well, others state that the use of

these seeds and inputs would in the end displace indigenous seeds and farming systems. In most of the villages, however, farmers state that their land is losing its organic fertility due to the increased use chemical fertilizers and they fear that "in the long run it will never give products without fertilizers." Farmers from six village sites (namely Yetmen, Adado, Debre Birhan, Haresaw, Geblen and Gara Godo) raised this problem repeatedly. In their words, the land is now "addicted" to fertilizers. The cost implication of the plots' increased dependence on fertilizers is another harm farmers express the extension program has inflicted on household economy. This is felt strongly especially in light of the skyrocketing market price of farm inputs.

The problem of securing enough moisture for agricultural purposes using resources other than rainwater still pose a challenge for Ethiopia's agriculture. Farmers from food deficit areas (also known for drought recurrence) like Geblen, Haresaw, Gara Godo, and Tsamako posited that the package has not yet addressed this chronic problem. They speculate on the rains while attempting to intensify yield productivity per hectare on their plots. When the rains shortfall, drought occurs and seasons of severe food shortage and famine ravage the peasant household. Farmers insist that the package was supposed to address this problem as a respondent from Geblen stated "When there is good rain, fertilizers are bringing good harvest. But when rain is poor, which is the usual scenario; it (farming) will be a total loss."

V. Conclusion

The detour we made through national and sectoral development policies in Ethiopia leads us to draw certain facts and developments about the way peasant agriculture and its contributions to national economic development were viewed by policy planners. Policies endorsed both during Imperial Ethiopia and the Derg catapulted industrialization as the motive power of economic development. A discriminate emphasis was therefore given to promote large scale commercial farms in order to produce industrial materials and high value crops. The only difference lay in the way this transformation was envisaged to happen. While the Imperial government capitalized on encouraging privately owned commercial farms, the Derg nationalized these farms and resorted to radical socialist reforms aimed at collectivizing small holder peasant agriculture. The latter include the countrywide establishment of peasant associations, producer and service cooperatives, resettlement and villagization schemes. Furthermore green revolution packages envisaged to increase yield productivity were devised both during the Imperial and the Derg regimes. They were not successful however as the policy environment was not favourable and enabling. While programs like MPP I was tried out in a context where feudal serfdom and tenancy prevailed during Imperial regime, attempts to collectivize agriculture were imposed on the peasantry hurriedly and coercively by the Military Marxist government. More over, programs devised to implement policy objectives were also faced with technical and managerial problems.

The Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) policy therefore came in the wake of a series of trials to promote agricultural development by the former regimes. Its rationale and the technical packages developed are not significantly different from any of its predecessors. The policy is however unique in the sense that the incumbent regime reiterates the spearheading role agricultural development should play so as to trigger national economic development. Following the

commencement of a national agricultural extension program, productivity has increased remarkably along with the increased supply of fertilizers and certified seeds in many parts of the country. Following the drought in 1997/8 however yield productivity has sharply declined though it picked up some momentum within the last three years. Critics stress the fact that the package has not yet ensured food self sufficiency; increases in productivity were not consistent; grain price declines have adversely affected farmers and as a result many were unable to defray costs incurred for fertilizers procurement. Problems related to tenure insecurity, excessive division of farm land due to population pressure and the absence of appropriate rural-urban linkages are also mentioned as issues the policy has over looked.

Interestingly enough, the peasant reflections on ADLI in general and PADETES in particular seem to share a lot with the afore described meta narratives. Most of the peasants recollect that the package started out in 1995/96 and identify the provision of inputs, credit facilities and technical assistance as the hallmarks of the extension program. Almost all peasants acknowledged that the use of fertilizers and selected seeds did increase yield productivity per hectare. However they resented the fact that fertilizer prices have sky rocketed following government decisions to stop subsidizing the market. Their situation is further bedevilled by the unfavourable decline of grain prices in the markets. As a result the majority of the peasants have found it difficult to reimburse the money they borrowed for fertilizer procurement and most are in debt. Some have gone to the extent of selling their livestock and household assets in order to pay back their debt. Following from this is impoverishment indirectly induced from an established policy imperative that did not take the exigencies of the market into account so as to cushion their adverse effects on the household economy.

When asked if there are any particular groups of people that have disproportionately benefited from the package, farmers responded that the rich did. The criteria they attribute to the latter however vary from one place to another. For some the rich are those who own a pair of oxen and for others the rich are those that own a relatively bigger tract of land. In places where riverside agriculture is common practise, farmers tilling land adjacent to river basins were also referred to as the rich. The other group of people that farmers reported as beneficiaries were the “talkative”, those that are associated with the kebele association leadership, and their relatives. On the other hand, the peasants posit that the poor have not benefited from the package at all. Asked to characterize who the poor in their villages are, farmers refer to people who are landless, who do not have productive assets like a pair of oxen or others that could not afford to pay back their debts. Despite the fact that peasant construction about the rich and the powerful are context bound and less sophisticated, these responses do inform us on how planned interventions are deconstructed and socially reconstituted at the village level.

Peasants also suggested certain measures be taken on the part of the government in order to make the package benefit them better. These relate mainly to the increased supply and distribution of agricultural inputs. They also stress that the government should take price regulative measures so as to cushion the harm smallholding peasants suffer from unfavourable grain price declines. Others touched on the need to develop rural infrastructure, especially all weather surface roads that would make farmers access grain and livestock markets in towns located farther. Most importantly however farmers expressed their worries about rising fertilizer prices and reiterated

the importance of government intervention to stabilize the market. Another chronic problem this package has not yet addressed is the challenge to secure enough moisture for agricultural purposes using water resources other than rainwater. Regretfully, farmers speculate on the rains while investing on their plots. When there is shortfall in the rains, drought occurs and seasons of severe food shortage and famine ravage the peasant economy. Farmers insist that the package was supposed to address this problem as one respondent from Geblen stated "When there is good rain, fertilizers are bringing good harvest. But when rain is poor, which is the usual scenario; it (farming) will be a total loss."

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ANNEX I

EXTRACT FROM

Hunger, Poverty and 'Famine' in Ethiopia: Some Evidence from Twenty Rural Sites in Amhara, Tigray, Oromiya and SNNP Regions.

(Alula Pankhurst and Philippa Bevan)

WED-Ethiopia Working Paper no. 1 available on the web-site www.WED-Ethiopia.org

1. Brief descriptions of the sites

The 20 WIDE rural sites are located in the four main regions of Ethiopia, which together, represent the bulk of the country's population (86%): Amhara (26%), Oromia (35%), Southern Region (19%), and Tigray (6%). The distribution of the sites is as follows: 8 in Oromia, 6 in the Southern Region, 4 in Amhara and 2 in Tigray. Although the Southern Region therefore seems over-represented it contains the greatest diversity, particularly in linguistic and ethnic terms since about half the 80 or so ethnic groups in the country reside within the Southern Region.

The sites were selected mainly on the grounds of existing household survey panel data in 18 of the sites, and village studies undertaken in 1995 in 15 sites, which allows us to build up a picture over time. Six of the sites were selected in 1989 for household surveys by the International Food Policy Research Institute on the grounds that they were food deficit areas. The Economics Department of Addis Ababa University together with the Centre for the Study of African Economies added nine more sites in 1993 to cover the major livelihood systems to be found in Ethiopia. Three further sites were added by the economists who were revisiting in 1999 to include more cash-cropping areas. The 18 panel sites provide data going back over 15 years for the first selection, 10 years for the second selection and 5 years for the last selection. As the selected sites did not include pastoralist communities, which make up 10 percent of the population, two sites in which WED Ethiopia team members had done in-depth anthropological research were added in 2003.

The 15 sites from which data on ADLI was reported include *Harresaw, Geblen, Yetmen, Debre Berhan environs, Dinki, Turufe Kecheme, Adele Keke, Arsi Gonde – Odawata, Bako – Oda Haro, Somodo, Adado, Imdibir, Aze Deboa, Gara Godo and Tsamako-Luqa.* A brief descriptions of these sites is presented hereafter as a background.

Sites in Tigray Region

Harresaw

Located in the Eastern zone of Tigray Region in Atsbi *wereda* Harresaw is a highland site on the eastern escarpment. The main production is cereals notably barley. Livestock sales, migration and the salt trade are the major sources of additional income. The site used to produce a regular surplus but has become vulnerable to famine.

Geblen
Located in Tigray region, Geblen is a highland escarpment site producing cereals, notably barley. Cash is obtained by selling livestock and labour migration. The site is vulnerable to famine.

Sites in Amhara Region

Yetmen
Located in Amhara Region, East Gojjam Zone, Enemay *wereda* Yetmen is a mid-altitude site producing cereals, especially *tef* and wheat. Cereals, livestock and their products are the main sources of cash as well as some trade and migration. The site is fairly rich
Debre Berhan
The four sites near the town of Debre Berhan are in Amhara Region, in Basso and Worana and Debre Berhan Zuria *weredas*. The area is a highland cereal producing area that is generally self-supporting.

Dinki
Located in Amhara Region, North Shewa Zone, Tegulet Wereda, Dinki is a small lowland site producing mainly *tef*¸ maize and sorghum, with some fruit around the river. The site is vulnerable to famine.

Shumsheha
Located in Amhara Region, in the Lasta area, Shumsheha is a lowland site near the airport of Lalibela Town. The main crops are cereals and pulses, with limited irrigation. The area is vulnerable to famine and many people migrate out in search of work.

Sites in Oromiya Region

Sirbana Godeti
Located in Oromia Region in the fertile Ad'a plain Sirbana Godeti are two mid-altitude road-side villages producing cereals, notably *tef* and pulses. *Tef* is the major cash crop and livestock and their products are also traded. The area has been a surplus producing area linked to nearby markets and is fairly prosperous.

Turufe Kecheme
Located close to the town of Shashemene in Oromia Region, Eastern Shewa Zone, Turufe Kecheme is on the edge of the Rift Valley. The main products are cereals, pulses, oilseeds and vegetables. The site produces cereals and vegetables, notably potatoes which as sold as cash crops as are livestock. The site has become rich due to its linkages with Shashemene and involvement in the market economy.

Adele Keke
Located in the Oromia Region, Kersa Wereda, Adele Keke is a middle altitude site which produces a variety of cereals and vegetables and the cash crop chat. It is by the roadside near the town of Alemaya that provides a ready market and the site can be considered to be fairly rich with some very wealthy inhabitants. The site has regularly been affected by rain failure and in bad years is dependent on food aid.

Arsi Gonde -Odawata
The site of Odawata is located in Oromia Region, Tiyo Wereda of Arsi Zone. Cereals and pulses are produced as well as vegetables on irrigated land. The site is within a agricultural surplus producing area and is fairly well off.

Bako – Oda Haro
Located in Oromia region, West Shewa Zone, Bako Tibe Wereda the site of Oda Haro is mainly a maize producing area, as well as other cereals, pulses, oil seeds, and *chat* for cash crops. The area is relatively wealthy.

Somodo
Located in Oromia Region, Jimma Zone, Mana Woreda the village of Somodo is a mid altitude site producing cereals, pulses and *enset*. Coffee is the most important cash crop and some villagers are involved in trade, and the sale of livestock products. The area is fairly prosperous.

Kereyu
Located in Oromia Region among the pastoral Kereyu this site is a lowland area which has been affected by the introduction of irrigated farms and the establishment of a park. The Kereyu rely largely on their livestock although some sedentarisation and cultivation has been taking place. The Kereyu have found their livelihoods becoming more vulnerable in part owing to externally induced pressures.

Korodegaga
Located in Oromia Region, Arsi Zone, Dodota *wereda*, Korodegage is a lowland area by the Awash river. The main crops are maize and *tef*, as well as pulses. The main source of cash are livestock and firewood sales. The Oromo population is only partly settled, and the site is vulnerable to drought despite some irrigation, and malaria poses a major problem.

Sites in SNNP Region

Adado
Located in the Southern Region in Gedeo Zone, Adado is a middle altitude site within the *enset* growing area. Coffee is the major cash crop. Both hoe and ox-plough agriculture are practised to produce a wide variety of crops and livestock. The site is within the area of the Gedeo people and can be considered fairly rich, although it was hard hit by the drought of 2002.

Imdibir
Located in the Southern Region in the Chaha Gurage area near the town of Imdibir Haya Gasha is a mid-altitude site producing *enset*, maize, and vegetables. The main cash crop is eucalyptus trees. The site can be considered to be fairly well off.

Aze Deboa
Located in the Southern Region in the Kambata area, Aze Deboa is within the highly populated *enset* growing area. Cereals, pulses and vegetables are the main crops, and cash is obtained through sale of livestock and their products, as well as Eucalyptus, *chat* and coffee, as well as through trade and migration.

Do'oma
Located in the Southern Region, North Omo Zone within the Gamo area Do'oma is a lowland site set up initially as a resettlement project in 1985. The main production is cereals notably maize and the main sources of cash are cotton production and weaving and trade in livestock products. The site relies on irrigation but is vulnerable to drought.

Gara Godo
Located in the Southern Region, Wolayta Awraja, Bolosso Wereda, Gara Godo in a densely populated middle altitude site within the *ense*t growing area. The main other crops are maize, vegetables, and fruit. Trade and migration are the main sources of cash together with sale of coffee and livestock products. The site is vulnerable to famine.

Tsamako
Located in the Southern Region, South Omo Zone, the Tsamako site is an agro-pastoralist lowland site relying partly on traditional irrigation. The main crops are sorghum and maize and livestock are important sources of cash. The area has been vulnerable to drought.

ANNEX II

MODULE 4: PROTOCOL 6M –AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT LED INDUSTRY PROGRAMME

We want to explore the impact of ADLI on a range of men in the community.
Find out which elements of ADLI are operating in the community and the name by which it is known.
NAME: .....
Respondents:
Identify the men likely to have been affected positively and negatively. These would include
a) richer farmers
b) middle farmers
c) poorer farmers

Minimum interviews: 3

Respondent 1: ..... (write social position)
Q1. Describe the introduction of (ADLI-related programmes) into the community. What did which people do? How did what they did affect you? What did you do?
Q2. Describe the ways in which (ADLI-related programmes) have benefited or harmed you personally?
Q3. Describe the ways in which these programmes have benefited particular people in the community.
Q4. Describe the ways in which these programmes have harmed particular people in the community.
Q5. In the long run in what ways do you think these programmes will benefit the community as a whole?
Q6. In the long run in what ways do you think these cooperatives will harm the community as a whole?

Repeat for other respondents

Use this space to comment on the Protocol – does it work? any problems? suggestions for improvement

ANNEX III

A GEOGRAPHICAL MAP OF WED STUDY SITES